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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, Social Rights and Duties, Volume I (of 2), by
+Sir Leslie Stephen
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Social Rights and Duties, Volume I (of 2)
+       Addresses to Ethical Societies
+
+
+Author: Sir Leslie Stephen
+
+
+
+Release Date: May 21, 2009  [eBook #28901]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES, VOLUME I
+(OF 2)***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Thierry Alberto, Henry Craig, and the Project Gutenberg
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net)
+
+
+
+The Ethical Library
+
+SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES
+
+Addresses to Ethical Societies
+
+by
+
+LESLIE STEPHEN
+
+In Two Volumes
+
+VOL. I.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+London
+Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited
+New York: MacMillan & Co.
+1896
+
+
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+
+The following chapters are chiefly a republication of addresses
+delivered to the Ethical Societies of London. Some have previously
+appeared in the _International Journal of Ethics_, the _National
+Review_, and the _Contemporary Review_. The author has to thank the
+proprietors of these periodicals for their consent to the republication.
+
+L. S.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+                                                     PAGE
+
+THE AIMS OF ETHICAL SOCIETIES,                          1
+
+SCIENCE AND POLITICS,                                  45
+
+THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,                       91
+
+THE MORALITY OF COMPETITION,                          133
+
+SOCIAL EQUALITY,                                      175
+
+ETHICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE,                221
+
+
+
+
+THE AIMS OF ETHICAL SOCIETIES.[1]
+
+
+I am about to say a few words upon the aims of this society: and I
+should be sorry either to exaggerate or to depreciate our legitimate
+pretensions. It would be altogether impossible to speak too strongly of
+the importance of the great questions in which our membership of the
+society shows us to be interested. It would, I fear, be easy enough to
+make an over-estimate of the part which we can expect to play in their
+solution. I hold indeed, or I should not be here, that we may be of
+some service at any rate to each other. I think that anything which
+stimulates an active interest in the vital problems of the day deserves
+the support of all thinking men; and I propose to consider briefly some
+of the principles by which we should be guided in doing whatever we can
+to promote such an interest.
+
+      [1] Address to West London Ethical Society, 4th December, 1892.
+
+We are told often enough that we are living in a period of important
+intellectual and social revolutions. In one way we are perhaps inclined
+even to state the fact a little too strongly. We suffer at times from
+the common illusion that the problems of to-day are entirely new: we
+fancy that nobody ever thought of them before, and that when we have
+solved them, nobody will ever need to look for another solution. To
+ardent reformers in all ages it seems as if the millennium must begin
+with their triumph, and that their triumph will be established by a
+single victory. And while some of us are thus sanguine, there are many
+who see in the struggles of to-day the approach of a deluge which is to
+sweep away all that once ennobled life. The believer in the old creeds,
+who fears that faith is decaying, and the supernatural life fading from
+the world, denounces the modern spirit as materialising and degrading.
+The conscience of mankind, he thinks, has become drugged and lethargic;
+our minds are fixed upon sensual pleasures, and our conduct regulated
+by a blind struggle for the maximum of luxurious enjoyment. The period
+in his eyes is a period of growing corruption; modern society suffers
+under a complication of mortal diseases, so widely spread and deeply
+seated that at present there is no hope of regeneration. The best hope
+is that its decay may provide the soil in which seed may be sown of a
+far-distant growth of happier augury. Such dismal forebodings are no
+novelty. Every age produces its prophecies of coming woes. Nothing
+would be easier than to make out a catena of testimonies from great men
+at every stage of the world's history, declaring each in turn that the
+cup of iniquity was now at last overflowing, and that corruption had
+reached so unprecedented a step that some great catastrophe must be
+approaching. A man of unusually lofty morality is, for that reason,
+more keenly sensitive to the lowness of the average standard, and too
+easily accepts the belief that the evils before his eyes must be in
+fact greater, and not, as may perhaps be the case, only more vividly
+perceived, than those of the bygone ages. A call to repentance easily
+takes the form of an assertion that the devil is getting the upper
+hand; and we may hope that the pessimist view is only a form of the
+discontent which is a necessary condition of improvement. Anyhow, the
+diametrical conflict of prophecies suggests one remark which often
+impresses me. We are bound to call each other by terribly hard names. A
+gentleman assures me in print that I am playing the devil's game;
+depriving my victims, if I have any, of all the beliefs that can make
+life noble or happy, and doing my best to destroy the very first
+principles of morality. Yet I meet my adversary in the flesh, and find
+that he treats me not only with courtesy, but with no inconsiderable
+amount of sympathy. He admits--by his actions and his argument--that
+I--the miserable sophist and seducer--have not only some good impulses,
+but have really something to say which deserves a careful and
+respectful answer. An infidel, a century or two ago, was supposed to
+have forfeited all claim to the ordinary decencies of life. Now I can
+say, and can say with real satisfaction, that I do not find any
+difference of creed, however vast in words, to be an obstacle to decent
+and even friendly treatment. I am at times tempted to ask whether my
+opponent can be quite logical in being so courteous; whether, if he is
+as sure as he says that I am in the devil's service, I ought not, as a
+matter of duty, to be encountered with the old dogmatism and arrogance.
+I shall, however, leave my friends of a different way of thinking to
+settle that point for themselves. I cannot doubt the sincerity of their
+courtesy, and I will hope that it is somehow consistent with their
+logic. Rather I will try to meet them in a corresponding spirit by a
+brief confession. I have often enough spoken too harshly and vehemently
+of my antagonists. I have tried to fix upon them too unreservedly what
+seemed to me the logical consequences of their dogmas. I have condemned
+their attempts at a milder interpretation of their creed as proofs of
+insincerity, when I ought to have done more justice to the legitimate
+and lofty motives which prompted them. And I at least am bound by my
+own views to admit that even the antagonist from whose utterances I
+differ most widely may be an unconscious ally, supplementing rather
+than contradicting my theories, and in great part moved by aspirations
+which I ought to recognise even when allied with what I take to be
+defective reasoning. We are all amenable to one great influence. The
+vast shuttle of modern life is weaving together all races and creeds
+and classes. We are no longer shut up in separate compartments, where
+the mental horizon is limited by the area visible from the parish
+steeple; each little section can no longer fancy, in the old childish
+fashion, that its own arbitrary prejudices and dogmas are parts of the
+eternal order of things; or infer that in the indefinite region beyond,
+there live nothing but monsters and anthropophagi, and men whose heads
+grow beneath their shoulders. The annihilation of space has made us
+fellows as by a kind of mechanical compulsion; and every advance of
+knowledge has increased the impossibility of taking our little
+church--little in comparison with mankind, be it even as great as the
+Catholic Church--for the one pattern of right belief. The first effect
+of bringing remote nations and classes into closer contact is often an
+explosion of antipathy; but in the long run it means a development of
+human sympathy. Wide, therefore, as is the opposition of opinions as to
+what is the true theory of the world--as to which is the divine and
+which the diabolical element--I fully believe that beneath the war of
+words and dogmas there is a growth of genuine toleration, and, we must
+hope, of ultimate conciliation.
+
+This is manifest in another direction. The churches are rapidly making
+at least one discovery. They are beginning to find out that their
+vitality depends not upon success in theological controversy, but upon
+their success in meeting certain social needs and aspirations common to
+all classes. It is simply impossible for any thinking man at the
+present day to take any living interest, for example, in the ancient
+controversies. The "drum ecclesiastic" of the seventeenth century would
+sound a mere lullaby to us. Here and there a priest or a belated
+dissenting minister may amuse himself by threshing out once more the
+old chaff of dead and buried dogmas. There are people who can argue
+gravely about baptismal regeneration or apostolical succession. Such
+doctrines were once alive, no doubt, because they represented the form
+in which certain still living problems had then to present themselves.
+They now require to be stated in a totally different shape, before we
+can even guess why they were once so exciting, or how men could have
+supposed their modes of attacking the question to be adequate. The Pope
+and General Booth still condemn each other's tenets; and in case of
+need would, I suppose, take down the old rusty weapons from the
+armoury. But each sees with equal clearness that the real stress of
+battle lies elsewhere. Each tries, after his own fashion, to give a
+better answer than the Socialists to the critical problems of to-day.
+We ought so far to congratulate both them and ourselves on the
+direction of their energies. Nay, can we not even co-operate, and put
+these hopeless controversies aside? Why not agree to differ about the
+questions which no one denies to be all but insoluble, and become
+allies in promoting morality? Enormous social forces find their natural
+channel through the churches; and if the beliefs inculcated by the
+church were not, as believers assert, the ultimate cause of progress,
+it is at least clear that they were not incompatible with progress. The
+church, we all now admit, whether by reason of or in spite of its
+dogmatic creed, was for ages one great organ of civilisation, and still
+exercises an incalculable influence. Why, then, should we, who cannot
+believe in the dogmas, yet fall into line with believers for practical
+purposes? Churches insist verbally upon the importance of their dogma:
+they are bound to do so by their logical position; but, in reality, for
+them, as for us, the dogma has become in many ways a mere
+excrescence--a survival of barren formulæ which do little harm to
+anybody. Carlyle, in his quaint phrase, talked about the exodus from
+Houndsditch, but doubted whether it were yet time to cast aside the
+Hebrew old clothes. They have become threadbare and antiquated. That
+gives a reason to the intelligent for abandoning them; but, also,
+perhaps a reason for not quarrelling with those who still care to
+masquerade in them. Orthodox people have made a demand that the Board
+Schools should teach certain ancient doctrines about the nature of
+Christ; and the demand strikes some of us as preposterous if not
+hypocritical. But putting aside the audacity of asking unbelievers to
+pay for such teaching, one might be tempted to ask, what harm could it
+really do? Do you fancy for a moment that you can really teach a child
+of ten the true meaning of the Incarnation? Can you give him more than
+a string of words as meaningless as magical formulæ? I was brought up
+at the most orthodox of Anglican seminaries. I learned the Catechism,
+and heard lectures upon the Thirty-nine Articles. I never found that
+the teaching had ever any particular effect upon my mind. As I grew up,
+the obsolete exuviæ of doctrine dropped off my mind like dead leaves
+from a tree. They could not get any vital hold in an atmosphere of
+tolerable enlightenment. Why should we fear the attempt to instil these
+fragments of decayed formulæ into the minds of children of tender age?
+Might we not be certain that they would vanish of themselves? They are
+superfluous, no doubt, but too futile to be of any lasting importance.
+I remember that, when the first Education Act was being discussed,
+mention was made of a certain Jew who not only sent his son to a
+Christian school, but insisted upon his attending all the lessons. He
+had paid his fees, he said, for education in the Gospels among other
+things, and he meant to have his money's worth. "But your son," it was
+urged, "will become a Christian." "I," he replied, "will take good care
+of that at home." Was not the Jew a man of sense? Can we suppose that
+the mechanical repetition of a few barren phrases will do either harm
+or good? As the child develops he will, we may hope, remember his
+multiplication table, and forget his fragments of the Athanasian Creed.
+Let the wheat and tares be planted together, and trust to the superior
+vitality of the more valuable plant. The sentiment might be expressed
+sentimentally as easily as cynically. We may urge, like many sceptics
+of the last century, that Christianity should be kept "for the use of
+the poor," and renounced in the esoteric creed of the educated. Or we
+may urge the literary and æsthetic beauty of the old training, and wish
+it to be preserved to discipline the imagination, though we may reject
+its value as a historical statement of fact.
+
+The audience which I am addressing has, I presume, made up its mind
+upon such views. They come too late. It might have been a good thing,
+had it been possible, to effect the transition from old to new without
+a violent convulsion: good, if Christian conceptions had been slowly
+developed into more simple forms; if the beautiful symbols had been
+retained till they could be impregnated with a new meaning; and if the
+new teaching of science and philosophy had gradually percolated into
+the ancient formulæ without causing a disruption. Possibly the
+Protestant Reformation was a misfortune, and Erasmus saw the truth more
+clearly than Luther. I cannot go into might-have-beens. We have to deal
+with facts. A conspiracy of silence is impossible about matters which
+have been vehemently discussed for centuries. We have to take sides;
+and we at least have agreed to take the side of the downright thinker,
+who will say nothing that he does not believe, and hide nothing that he
+does believe, and speak out his mind without reservation or economy and
+accommodation. Indeed, as things are, any other course seems to me to
+be impossible. I have spoken, for example, of General Booth. Many
+people heartily admire his schemes of social reform, and have been
+willing to subscribe for its support, without troubling themselves
+about his theology. I will make no objection; but I confess that I
+could not therefore treat that theology as either morally or
+intellectually respectable. It has happened to me once or twice to
+listen to expositions from orators of the Salvation Army. Some of them
+struck me as sincere though limited, and others as the victims of an
+overweening vanity. The oratory, so far as I could hear, consisted in
+stringing together an endless set of phrases about the blood of Christ,
+which, if they really meant anything, meant a doctrine as low in the
+intellectual scale as that of any of the objects of missionary
+enterprise. The conception of the transactions between God and man was
+apparently modelled upon the dealings of a petty tradesman. The "blood
+of Christ" was regarded like the panacea of a quack doctor, which will
+cure the sins of anybody who accepts the prescription. For anything I
+can say, such a creed may be elevating--relatively: elevating as
+slavery is said to have been elevating when it was a substitute for
+extermination. The hymns of the Army may be better than public-house
+melodies, and the excitement produced less mischievous than that due to
+gin. But the best that I can wish for its adherents is, that they
+should speedily reach a point at which they could perceive their
+doctrines to be debasing. I hope, indeed, that they do not realise
+their own meaning: but I could almost as soon join in some old pagan
+ceremonies, gash my body with knives, or swing myself from a hook, as
+indulge in this variety of spiritual intoxication.
+
+There are, it is true, plenty of more refined and intellectual
+preachers, whose sentiments deserve at least the respect due to tender
+and humane feeling. They have found a solution, satisfactory to
+themselves, of the great dilemma which presses on so many minds. A
+religion really to affect the vulgar must be a superstition; to satisfy
+the thoughtful, it must be a philosophy. Is it possible to contrive so
+to fuse the crude with the refined as to make at least a working
+compromise? To me personally, and to most of us living at the present
+day, the enterprise appears to be impracticable. My own experience is,
+I imagine, a very common one. When I ceased to accept the teaching of
+my youth, it was not so much a process of giving up beliefs, as of
+discovering that I had never really believed. The contrast between the
+genuine convictions which guide and govern our conduct, and the
+professions which we were taught to repeat in church, when once
+realised, was too glaring. One belonged to the world of realities, and
+the other to the world of dreams. The orthodox formulæ represent, no
+doubt, a sentiment, an attempt to symbolise emotions which might be
+beautiful, or to indicate vague impressions about the tendency of
+things in general; but to put them side by side with real beliefs about
+facts was to reveal their flimsiness. The "I believe" of the creed
+seemed to mean something quite different from the "I believe" of
+politics and history and science. Later experience has only deepened
+and strengthened that feeling. Kind and loving and noble-minded people
+have sought to press upon me the consolations of their religion. I
+thank them in all sincerity; and I feel,--why should I not admit
+it?--that it may be a genuine comfort to set your melancholy to the old
+strain in which so many generations have embodied their sorrows and
+their aspirations. And yet to me, its consolation is an invitation to
+reject plain facts; to seek for refuge in a shadowy world of dreams and
+conjectures, which dissolve as you try to grasp them. The doctrine
+offered for my acceptance cannot be stated without qualifications and
+reserves and modifications, which make it as useless as it is vague and
+conjectural. I may learn in time to submit to the inevitable; I cannot
+drug myself with phrases which evaporate as soon as they are exposed to
+a serious test. You profess to give me the only motives of conduct; and
+I know that at the first demand to define them honestly--to say
+precisely what you believe and why you believe it--you will be forced
+to withdraw, and explain and evade, and at last retire to the safe
+refuge of a mystery, which might as well be admitted at starting. As I
+have read and thought, I have been more and more impressed with the
+obvious explanation of these observations. How should the beliefs be
+otherwise than shadowy and illusory, when their very substance is made
+of doubts laboriously and ingeniously twisted into the semblance of
+convictions? In one way or other that is the characteristic mark of the
+theological systems of the present day. Proof is abandoned for
+persuasion. The orthodox believer professed once to prove the facts
+which he asserted and to show that his dogmas expressed the truth. He
+now only tries to show that the alleged facts don't matter, and that
+the dogmas are meaningless. Nearly two centuries ago, for example, a
+deist pointed out that the writer of the Book of Daniel, like other
+people, must have written after the events which he mentioned. All the
+learned, down to Dr. Pusey, denounced his theory, and declared his
+argument to be utterly destructive of the faith. Now an orthodox
+professor will admit that the deist was perfectly right, and only tries
+to persuade himself that arguments from facts are superfluous. The
+supposed foundation is gone: the superstructure is not to be affected.
+What the keenest disputant now seeks to show is, not that the truth of
+the records can be established beyond reasonable doubt; but that no
+absolute contradiction in terms is involved in supposing that they
+correspond more or less roughly to something which may possibly have
+happened. So long as a thing is not proved false by mathematical
+demonstration, I may still continue to take it for a divine revelation,
+and to listen respectfully when experienced statesmen and learned
+professors assure me with perfect gravity that they can believe in
+Noah's flood or in the swine of Gadara. They have an unquestionable
+right to believe if they please: and they expect me to accept the facts
+for the sake of the doctrine. There, unluckily, I have a similar
+difficulty. It is the orthodox who are the systematic sceptics. The
+most famous philosophers of my youth endeavoured to upset the deist by
+laying the foundation of Agnosticism, arbitrarily tagged to an orthodox
+conclusion. They told me to believe a doctrine because it was totally
+impossible that I should know whether it was true or not, or indeed
+attach any real meaning to it whatever. The highest altar, as Sir W.
+Hamilton said, was the altar to the unknown and unknowable God. Others,
+seeing the inevitable tendency of such methods, have done their best to
+find in that the Christian doctrine, rightly understood, the embodiment
+of the highest philosophy. It is the divine voice which speaks in our
+hearts, though it has caught some accretion of human passion and
+superstition. The popular versions are false and debased; the old
+versions of the Atonement, for example, monstrous; and the belief in
+the everlasting torture of sinners, a hideous and groundless
+caricature. With much that such men have said I could, of course, agree
+heartily; for, indeed, it expresses the strongest feelings which have
+caused religious revolt. But would it not be simpler to say, "the
+doctrine is not true," than to say, "it is true, but means just the
+reverse of what it was also taken to mean"? I prefer plain terms; and
+"without doubt he shall perish everlastingly" seems to be an awkward
+way of denying the endlessness of punishment. You cannot denounce the
+immorality of the old dogmas with the infidel, and then proclaim their
+infinite value with the believer. You defend the doctrine by showing
+that in its plain downright sense,--the sense in which it embodied
+popular imaginations,--it was false and shocking. The proposal to hold
+by the words evacuated of the old meaning is a concession of the whole
+case to the unbeliever, and a substitution of sentiment and aspiration
+for a genuine intellectual belief. Explaining away, however dexterously
+and delicately, is not defending, but at once confessing error, and
+encumbering yourself with all the trammels of misleading associations.
+The more popular method, therefore, at the present day is not to
+rationalise, but to try to outsceptic the sceptic. We are told that we
+have no solid ground from reason at all, and that even physical science
+is as full of contradictions as theology. Such enterprises, conducted
+with whatever ingenuity, are, as I believe, hopeless; but at least they
+are fundamentally and radically sceptical. That, under whatever
+disguises, is the true meaning of the Catholic argument, which is so
+persuasive to many. To prove the truth of Christianity by abstract
+reasoning may be hopeless; but nothing is easier than to persuade
+yourself to believe it, if once you will trust instinct in place of
+reason, and forget that instinct proves anything and everything. The
+success of such arguments with thoughtful men is simply a measure of
+the spread of scepticism. The conviction that truth is unattainable is
+the master argument for submitting to "authority". The "authority," in
+the scientific sense of any set of men who agree upon a doctrine,
+varies directly as their independence of each other. Their "authority"
+in the legal sense varies as the closeness of their mutual dependence.
+As the consent loses its value logically, it gains in power of
+coercion. And therefore it is easy to substitute drilling for arguing,
+and to take up a belief as you accept admission to a society, as a
+matter of taste and feeling, with which abstract logic has nothing to
+do. The common dilemma--you must be a Catholic or an atheist--means,
+that theology is only tenable if you drill people into belief by a vast
+organisation appealing to other than logical motives.
+
+I do not argue these points: I only indicate what I take to be your own
+conviction as well as mine. It seems to me, in fact, that the present
+state of mind--if we look to men's real thoughts and actions, not to
+their conventional phrases--is easily definable. It is simply a tacit
+recognition that the old orthodoxy cannot be maintained either by the
+evidence of facts or by philosophical argument. It has puzzled me
+sometimes to understand why the churches should insist upon nailing
+themselves down to the truth of their dogmas and their legendary
+history. Why cannot they say frankly, what they seem to be constantly
+on the verge of saying--Our dogmas and our history are not true, or not
+"true" in the historical or scientific sense of the word? To ask for
+such truth in the sphere of theology is as pedantic as to ask for it in
+the sphere of poetry. Poetical truth means, not that certain events
+actually happened, or that the poetical "machinery" is to be taken as
+an existing fact; but that the poem is, so to speak, the projection of
+truths upon the cloudland of imagination. It reflects and gives
+sensuous images of truth; but it is only the Philistine or the
+blockhead who can seriously ask, is it true? Some such position seems
+to be really conceivable as an ultimate compromise. Put aside the
+prosaic insistence upon literal matter-of-fact truth, and we may all
+agree to use the same symbolism, and interpret it as we please. This
+seems to me to be actually the view of many thoughtful people, though
+for obvious reasons it is not often explicitly stated. One reason is,
+of course, the consciousness that the great mass of mankind requires
+plain, tangible motives for governing its life; and if it once be
+admitted that so much of the orthodox doctrine is mere symbolism or
+adumbration of truths, the admission would involve the loss of the
+truths so indicated. Moral conduct, again, and moral beliefs are
+supposed to depend upon some affirmation of these truths; and excellent
+people are naturally shy of any open admission which may appear to
+throw doubt upon the ultimate grounds of morality.
+
+Indeed, if it could be really proved that men have to choose between
+renouncing moral truths and accepting unproved theories, it might be
+right--I will not argue the point--to commit intellectual suicide. If
+the truth is that we are mere animals or mere automata, shall we
+sacrifice the truth, or sacrifice what we have at least agreed to call
+our higher nature? For us the dilemma has no force: for we do not admit
+the discrepancy. We believe that morality depends upon something deeper
+and more permanent than any of the dogmas that have hitherto been
+current in the churches. It is a product of human nature, not of any of
+these transcendental speculations or faint survivals of traditional
+superstitions. Morality has grown up independently of, and often in
+spite of, theology. The creeds have been good so far as they have
+accepted or reflected the moral convictions; but it is an illusion to
+suppose that they have generated it. They represent the dialect and the
+imagery by which moral truths have been conveyed to minds at certain
+stages of thought; but it is a complete inversion of the truth to
+suppose that the morality sprang out of them. From this point of view
+we must of necessity treat the great ethical questions independently.
+We cannot form a real alliance with thinkers radically opposed to us.
+Divines tell us that we reject the one possible basis of morality. To
+us it appears that we are strengthening it, by severing it from a
+connection with doctrines arbitrary, incapable of proof, and incapable
+of retaining any consistent meaning. Theologians once believed that
+hell-fire was the ultimate sentence, and persecution the absolute duty
+of every Christian ruler. The churches which once burnt and
+exterminated are now only anxious to proclaim freedom of belief, and to
+cast the blame of persecution upon their rivals. Divines have
+discovered that the doctrine of hell-fire deserves all that infidels
+have said of it; and a member of Dante's church was arguing the other
+day that hell might on the whole be a rather pleasant place of
+residence. Doctrines which can thus be turned inside out are hardly
+desirable bases for morality. So the early Christians, again, were the
+Socialists of their age, and took a view of Dives and Lazarus which
+would commend itself to the Nihilists of to-day. The church is now
+often held up to us as the great barrier against Socialism, and the one
+refuge against subversive doctrines. In a well-known essay on "People
+whom one would have wished to have seen," Lamb and his friends are
+represented as agreeing that if Christ were to enter they would all
+fall down and worship Him. It may have been so; but if the man who best
+represents the ideas of early Christians were to enter a respectable
+society of to-day, would it not be more likely to send for the police?
+When we consider such changes, and mark in another direction how the
+dogmas which once set half the world to cut the throats of the other
+half, have sunk into mere combinations of hard words, can we seriously
+look to the maintenance of dogmas, even in the teeth of reason, as a
+guarantee for ethical convictions? What you call retaining the only
+base of morality, appears to us to be trying to associate morality with
+dogmas essentially arbitrary and unreasonable.
+
+From this point of view it is naturally our opinion that we should
+promote all thorough discussion of great ethical problems in a spirit
+and by methods which are independent of the orthodox dogmas. There are
+many such problems undoubtedly of the highest importance. The root of
+all the great social questions of which I have spoken lies in the
+region of Ethics; and upon that point, at least, we can go along with
+much that is said upon the orthodox side. We cannot, indeed, agree that
+Ethics can be adequately treated by men pledged to ancient traditions,
+employing antiquated methods, and always tempted to have an eye to the
+interest of their own creeds and churches. But we can fully agree that
+ethical principles underlie all the most important problems. Every
+great religious reform has been stimulated by the conviction that the
+one essential thing is a change of spirit, not a mere modification of
+the external law, which has ceased to correspond to genuine beliefs and
+powerful motives. The commonest criticism, indeed, of all projectors of
+new Utopias is that they propose a change of human nature. The
+criticism really suggests a sound criterion. Unless the change proposed
+be practicable, the Utopia will doubtless be impossible. And unless
+some practicable change be proposed, the Utopia, even were it embodied
+in practice, would be useless. If the sole result of raising wages were
+an increase in the consumption of gin, wages might as well stay at a
+minimum. But the tacit assumption that all changes of human nature are
+impracticable is simply a cynical and unproved assertion. All of us
+here hold, I imagine, that human nature has in a sense been changed. We
+hold that, with all its drawbacks, progress is not an illusion; that
+men have become at least more tolerant and more humane; that ancient
+brutalities have become impossible; and that the suffering of the
+weaker excites a keener sympathy. To say that, in that sense, human
+nature must be changed, is to say only that the one sound criterion of
+all schemes for social improvement lies in their ethical tendency. The
+standard of life cannot be permanently raised unless you can raise the
+standard of motive. Old-fashioned political theorists thought that a
+simple change of the constitutional machinery would of itself remedy
+all evils, and failed to recognise that behind the institutions lie all
+the instincts and capabilities of the men who are to work them. A
+similar fallacy is prevalent, I fancy, in regard to what we call social
+reforms. Some scheme for a new mode of distributing the products of
+industry would, it is often assumed, remedy all social evils. To my
+thinking, no such change would do more than touch the superficial
+evils, unless it had also some tendency to call out the higher and
+repress the lower impulses. Unless we can to some extent change "human
+nature," we shall be weaving ropes of sand, or devising schemes for
+perpetual motion, for driving our machinery more effectively without
+applying fresh energy. We shall be falling into the old blunders;
+approving Jack Cade's proposal--as recorded by Shakespeare--that the
+three-hooped pot should have seven hoops; or attempting to get rid of
+poverty by converting the whole nation into paupers. No one, perhaps,
+will deny this in terms; and to admit it frankly is to admit that every
+scheme must be judged by its tendency to "raise the manhood of the
+poor," and to make every man, rich and poor, feel that he is
+discharging a useful function in society. Old Robert Owen, when he
+began his reforms, rested his doctrine and his hopes of perfectibility
+upon the scientific application of a scheme for "the formation of
+character". His plans were crude enough, and fell short of success. But
+he had seen the real conditions of success; and when, in after years,
+he imagined that a new society might be made by simply collecting men
+of any character in a crowd, and inviting them to share alike, he fell
+into the inevitable failure. Modern Socialists might do well to
+remember his history.
+
+Now it is, as I understand, primarily the aim of an Ethical Society to
+promote the rational discussion of these underlying ethical principles.
+We wish to contribute to the clearest understanding we can of the right
+ends to which human energy should be devoted, and of the conditions
+under which such devotion is most likely to be rewarded with success.
+We desire to see the great controversy carried on in the nearest
+possible approach to a scientific spirit. That phrase implies, as I
+have said, that we must abandon much of the old guidance. The lights by
+which our ancestors professed to direct their course are not for us
+supernatural signs, shining in a transcendental region, but at most the
+beacons which they had themselves erected, and valuable as indications,
+though certainly not as infallible guides, to the right path. We must
+question everything, and be prepared to modify or abandon whatever is
+untenable. We must be scientific in spirit, in so far as we must trust
+nothing but a thorough and systematic investigation of facts, however
+the facts may be interpreted. Undoubtedly, the course marked out is
+long and arduous. It is perfectly true, moreover, as our antagonists
+will hasten to observe, that professedly scientific reasoners are
+hardly better agreed than their opponents. If they join upon some
+negative conclusions, and upon some general principles of method, they
+certainly do not reach the same results. They have at present no
+definite creed to lay down. I need only refer, for example, to one very
+obvious illustration. The men who were most conspicuous for their
+attempt to solve social problems by scientific methods, and most
+confident that they had succeeded, were, probably, those who founded
+the so-called "classical" political economy, and represented what is
+now called the individualist point of view. Government, they were apt
+to think, should do nothing but stand aside, see fair-play, and keep
+our knives from each other's throats and our hands out of each other's
+pockets. Much as their doctrines were denounced, this view is still
+represented by the most popular philosopher of the day. And undoubtedly
+we shall do well to take to heart the obvious moral. If we still
+believe in the old-fashioned doctrines, we must infer that to work out
+a scientific doctrine is by no means to secure its acceptance. If we
+reject them we must argue that the mere claim to be scientific may
+inspire men with a premature self-confidence, which tends only to make
+their errors more systematic. When, however, I look at the actual
+course of controversy, I am more impressed by another fact.
+"Individualism" is sometimes met by genuine argument. More frequently,
+I think, it is met by simple appeal to sentiment. This kind of thing,
+we are told, is exploded; it is not up to date; it is as obsolete as
+the plesiosaurus; and therefore, without bothering ourselves about your
+reasoning, we shall simply neglect it. Talk as much as you please, we
+can get a majority on the other side. We shall disregard your
+arguments, and, therefore--it is a common piece of logic at the present
+day--your arguments must be all wrong. I must be content here with
+simply indicating my own view. I think, in fact, that, in this as in
+other cases, the true answer to extreme theorists would be very
+different. I hold that we would begin by admitting the immense value of
+the lesson taught by the old individualists, if that be their right
+name. If they were precipitate in laying down "iron laws" and
+proclaiming inexorable necessity, they were perfectly right in pointing
+out that there are certain "laws of human nature," and conditions of
+social welfare, which will not be altered by simply declaring them to
+be unpleasant. They did an inestimable service in emphatically
+protesting against the system of forcibly suppressing, or trying to
+suppress, deep-seated evils, without an accurate preliminary diagnosis
+of the causes. And--not to go into remote questions--the
+"individualist" creed had this merit, which is related to our especial
+aims. The ethical doctrine which they preached may have had--I think
+that it had--many grave defects; but at least it involved a recognition
+of the truth which their opponents are too apt to shun or reject. They,
+at least, asserted strenuously the cardinal doctrine of the importance
+of individual responsibility. They might draw some erroneous
+inferences, but they could not put too emphatically the doctrine that
+men must not be taught to shift the blame of all their sufferings upon
+some mysterious entity called society, or expect improvement unless,
+among other virtues, they will cultivate the virtue of strenuous,
+unremitting, masculine self-help.
+
+If this be at all true, it may indicate what I take to be the aim of
+our society, or rather of us as members of an ethical society. We hold,
+that is, that the great problems of to-day have their root, so to
+speak, in an ethical soil. They will be decided one way or other by the
+view which we take of ethical questions. The questions, for example, of
+what is meant by social justice, what is the justification of private
+property, or the limits of personal liberty, all lead us ultimately to
+ethical foundations. The same is, of course, true of many other
+problems. The demand for political rights of women is discussed,
+rightly no doubt, upon grounds of justice, and takes us to some knotty
+points. Does justice imply the equality of the sexes; and, if so, in
+what sense of "equality"? And, beyond this, we come to the question,
+What would be the bearing of our principles upon the institution of
+marriage, and upon the family bond? No question can be more important,
+or more vitally connected with Ethics. We, at any rate, can no longer
+answer such problems by any traditional dogmatism. They--and many other
+questions which I need not specify--have been asked, and have yet to be
+answered. They will probably not be answered by a simple yes or no, nor
+by any isolated solution of a metaphysical puzzle. Undoubtedly, a vast
+mass of people will insist upon being consulted, and will adopt methods
+which cannot be regarded as philosophical. Therefore, it is a matter of
+pressing importance that all people who can think at all should use
+their own minds, and should do their best to widen and strengthen the
+influence of the ablest thinkers. The chaotic condition of the average
+mind is our reason for trying to strengthen the influence, always too
+feeble, of the genuine thinkers. Much that passes itself off for
+thought is simply old prejudice in a new dress. Tradition has always
+this, indeed, to say for itself: that it represents the product of much
+unconscious reasoning from experience, and that it is at least
+compatible with such progress as has been hitherto achieved. Progress
+has in future to take place in the daylight, and under the stress of
+keen discussion from every possible point of view. It would be rash
+indeed to assume that we can hope to see the substitution of purely
+rational and scientific methods for the old haphazard and tentative
+blundering into slightly better things. It is possible enough that the
+creed of the future may, after all, be a compromise, admitting some
+elements of higher truth, but attracting the popular mind by
+concessions to superstition and ignorance. We can hardly hope to get
+rid of the rooted errors which have so astonishing a vitality. But we
+should desire, and, so far as in us lies, endeavour to secure the
+presence of the largest possible element of genuine and reasoned
+conviction in the faith of our own and the rising generation.
+
+I have not sought to say anything new. I have only endeavoured to
+define the general position which we, as I imagine, have agreed to
+accept. We hold in common that the old dogmas are no longer tenable,
+though we are very far from being agreed as to what should replace
+them. We have each, I dare say, our own theory; we agree that our
+theories, whatever they may be, are in need of strict examination, of
+verification, it may be, but it may be also of modification or
+rejection. We hope that such societies as this may in the first place
+serve as centres for encouraging and popularising the full and free
+discussion of the great questions. We wish that people who have reached
+a certain stage of cultivation should be made aware of the course which
+is being taken by those who may rightly claim to be in the van. We
+often wish to know, as well as we can, what is the direction of the
+deeper currents of thought; what genuine results, for example, have
+been obtained by historical criticism, especially as applied to the
+religious history of the world; we want to know what are the real
+points now at issue in the world of science; the true bearing of the
+theories of evolution, and so forth, which are known by name far beyond
+the circle in which their logical reasoning is really appreciated; we
+want to know, again, what are the problems which really interest modern
+metaphysicians or psychologists; in what directions there seems to be a
+real promise of future achievement, and in what directions it seems to
+be proved by experience that any further expansion of intellectual
+energy is certain to result only in the discovery of mares' nests.
+
+Matthew Arnold would have expressed this by saying that we are required
+to be made accessible to the influence of the Zeitgeist. There is a
+difficulty, no doubt, in discovering by what signs we may recognise the
+utterances of the Zeitgeist; and distinguish between loyalty to the
+real intellectual leaders and a simple desire to be arrayed in the last
+new fashion in philosophy. There is no infallible sign; and, yet, a
+genuine desire to discover the true lines in which thought is
+developing, is not of the less importance. Arnold, like others, pointed
+the moral by a contrast between England and Germany. The best that has
+been done in England, it is said, has generally been done by amateurs
+and outsiders. They have, perhaps, certain advantages, as being less
+afraid to strike into original paths, and even the originality of
+ignorance is not always, though it may be in nine cases out of ten, a
+name for fresh blundering. But if sporadic English writers have now and
+then hit off valuable thoughts, there can be no doubt that we have had
+a heavy price to pay. The comparative absence of any class, devoted,
+like German professors, to a systematic and combined attempt to spread
+the borders of knowledge and speculation, has been an evil which is the
+more felt in proportion as specialisation of science and familiarity
+with previous achievements become more important. It would be very easy
+to give particular instances of our backwardness. How different would
+have been the course of English church history, said somebody, if
+Newman had only known German! He would have breathed a larger air, and
+might have desisted--I suppose that was the meaning--from the attempt
+to put life into certain dead bones. And with equal truth, it may be
+urged, how much better work might have been done by J. S. Mill if he
+had really read Kant! He might not have been converted, but he would
+have been saved from maintaining in their crude form, doctrines which
+undoubtedly require modification. Under his reign, English thought was
+constantly busied with false issues, simply from ignorance of the most
+effective criticism. It is needless to point out how much time is
+wasted in the defence of positions that have long been turned by the
+enemy from sheer want of acquaintance with the relevant evidence, or
+with the logic that has been revealed by the slow thrashing out of
+thorough controversy. It would be invidious perhaps to insist too much
+upon another obvious result: the ease with which a man endowed with a
+gift of popular rhetoric, and a facility for catching at the current
+phrases, can set up as a teacher, however palpable to the initiated may
+be his ignorance. Scientific thought has perhaps as much to fear from
+the false prophets who take its name as from the open enemies who try
+to stifle its voice. I would rather emphasise another point, perhaps
+less generally remarked. The study has its idols as well as its
+market-place. Certain weaknesses are developed in the academical
+atmosphere as well as in the arenas of public discussion. Freeman used
+to say that English historians had avoided certain errors into which
+German writers of far greater knowledge and more thorough scholarship
+had fallen, simply because points were missed by a professor in a
+German university which were plain to those who, like many Englishmen,
+had to take a part in actual political work. I think that this is not
+without a meaning for us. We have learnt, very properly, to respect
+German research and industry; and we are trying in various directions
+to imitate their example. Perhaps it would be as well to keep an eye
+upon some German weaknesses. A philosophy made for professors is apt to
+be a philosophy for pedants. A professor is bound to be omniscient; he
+has to have an answer to everything; he is tempted to construct systems
+which will pass muster in the lecture-room, and to despise the rest of
+their applicability to daily life. I confess myself to be old-fashioned
+enough to share some of the old English prejudices against those
+gigantic structures which have been thrown out by imposing
+philosophers, who evolved complete systems of metaphysics and logic and
+religion and politics and æsthetics out of their own consciousness. We
+have multiplied professors of late, and professors are bound to write
+books, and to magnify the value of their own studies. They must make a
+show of possessing an encyclopædic theory which will explain everything
+and take into account all previous theories. Sometimes, perhaps, they
+will lose themselves in endless subtleties and logomachies and
+construct cobwebs of the brain, predestined to the rubbish-heap of
+extinct philosophies. It is enough, however, to urge that a mere
+student may be the better for keeping in mind the necessity of keeping
+in mind real immediate human interests; as the sentimentalist has to be
+reminded of the importance of strictly logical considerations. And I
+think too that a very brief study of the most famous systems of old
+days will convince us that philosophers should be content with a more
+modest attitude than they have sometimes adopted; give up the
+pretensions to framing off-hand theories of things in general, and be
+content to puzzle out a few imperfect truths which may slowly work
+their way into the general structure of thought. I wish to speak humbly
+as befits one who cannot claim any particular authority for his
+opinion. But, in all humility, I suggest that if we can persuade men of
+reputation in the regions where subtle thought and accurate research
+are duly valued, we shall be doing good, not only to ourselves, but, if
+I may whisper it, to them. We value their attainments so highly that we
+desire their influence to spread beyond the narrow precinct of
+university lecture-rooms; and their thoughts be, at the same time,
+stimulated and vitalised by bringing them into closer contact with the
+problems which are daily forced upon us in the business of daily life.
+A divorce between the men of thought and the men of action is really
+bad for both. Whatever tends to break up the intellectual stupor of
+large classes, to rouse their minds, to increase their knowledge of the
+genuine work that is being done, to provide them even with more of such
+recreations as refine and invigorate, must have our sympathy, and will
+be useful both to those who confer and to those who receive
+instruction. So, after all, a philosopher can learn few things of more
+importance than the art of translating his doctrines into language
+intelligible and really instructive to the outside world. There was a
+period when real thinkers, as Locke and Berkeley and Butler and Hume,
+tried to express themselves as pithily and pointedly as possible. They
+were, say some of their critics, very shallow: they were over-anxious
+to suit the taste of wits and the town: and in too much fear of the
+charge of pedantry. Well, if some of our profounder thinkers would try
+for once to pack all that they really have to say as closely as they
+can, instead of trying to play every conceivable change upon every
+thought that occurs to them, I fancy that they would be surprised both
+at the narrowness of the space which they would occupy and the
+comparative greatness of the effect they would produce.
+
+An ethical society should aim at supplying a meeting-place between the
+expert and specialist on one side, and, on the other, with the men who
+have to apply ideas to the complex concretes of political and social
+activity. How far we can succeed in furthering that aim I need not
+attempt to say. But I will conclude by reverting to some thoughts at
+which I hinted at starting. You may think that I have hardly spoken in
+a very sanguine or optimistic tone. I have certainly admitted the
+existence of enormous difficulties and the probabilities of very
+imperfect success. I cannot think that the promised land of which we
+are taking a Pisgah sight is so near or the view so satisfactory as
+might be wished. A mirage like that which attended our predecessors may
+still be exercising illusions for us; and I anticipate less an
+immediate fruition, than a beginning of another long cycle of
+wanderings through a desert, let us hope rather more fertile than that
+which we have passed. If this be something of a confession you may
+easily explain it by personal considerations. In an old controversy
+which I was reading the other day, one of the disputants observed that
+his adversary held that the world was going from bad to worse. "I do
+not wonder at the opinion," he remarks; "for I am every day more
+tempted to embrace it myself, since every day I am leaving youth
+further behind." I am old enough to feel the force of that remark.
+Without admitting senility, I have lived long enough, that is, to know
+well that for me the brighter happiness is a thing of the past; that I
+have to look back even to realise what it means; and to feel that a
+sadder colouring is conferred upon the internal world by the eye "which
+hath kept watch o'er man's mortality." I have watched the brilliant
+promise of many contemporaries eclipsed by premature death; and have
+too often had to apply Newton's remark, "If that man had lived, we
+might have known something". Lights which once cheered me have gone
+out, and are going out all too rapidly; and, to say nothing of
+individuals, I have also lived long enough to watch the decay of once
+flourishing beliefs. I can remember, only too vividly, the confident
+hope with which many young men, whom I regarded as the destined leaders
+of progress, affirmed that the doctrines which they advocated were
+going forth conquering and to conquer; and though I may still think
+that those doctrines had a permanent value, and were far from deserving
+the reproaches now often levelled at them, I must admit that we greatly
+exaggerated our omniscience. I am often tempted, I confess, to draw the
+rather melancholy moral that some of my younger friends may be destined
+to disillusionment, and may be driven some thirty years hence to admit
+that their present confidence was a little in excess.
+
+I admit all this: but I do not admit that my view could sanction
+despondency. I can see perhaps ground for foreboding which I should
+once have rejected. I can realise more distinctly, not only the amount
+of misery in the world, but the amount of misdirected energy, the
+dulness of the average intellect, and the vast deadweight of
+superstition and dread of the light with which all improvement must
+have to reckon. And yet I also feel that, if a complacent optimism be
+impossible, the world was never so full of interest. When we complain
+of the stress and strain and over-excitement of modern society we
+indicate, I think, a real evil; but we also tacitly admit that no one
+has any excuse for being dull. In every direction there is abundant
+opportunity for brave and thoughtful men to find the fullest occupation
+for whatever energy they may possess. There is work to be found
+everywhere in this sense, and none but the most torpid can find an
+excuse for joining the spiritually unemployed. The fields, surely, are
+white for the harvest, though there are weeds enough to be extirpated,
+and hard enough furrows to be ploughed. We know what has been done in
+the field of physical science. It has made the world infinite. The days
+of the old pagan, "suckled in some creed outworn," are regretted in
+Wordsworth's sonnet; for the old pagan held to the poetical view that a
+star was the chariot of a deity. The poor deity, however, had, in fact,
+a duty as monotonous as that of a driver in the Underground Railway. To
+us a star is a signal of a new world; it suggests universe beyond
+universe; sinking into the infinite abysses of space; we see worlds
+forming or decaying and raising at every moment problems of a strange
+fascination. The prosaic truth is really more poetical than the old
+figment of the childish imagination. The first great discovery of the
+real nature of the stars did, in fact, logically or not, break up more
+effectually than perhaps any other cause, the old narrow and stifling
+conception of the universe represented by Dante's superlative power;
+and made incredible the systems based on the conception that man can be
+the centre of all things and the universe created for the sake of this
+place. It is enough to point to the similar change due to modern
+theories of evolution. The impassable barriers of thought are broken
+down. Instead of the verbal explanation, which made every plant and
+animal an ultimate and inexplicable fact, we now see in each a movement
+in an indefinite series of complex processes, stretching back further
+than the eye can reach into the indefinite past. If we are sometimes
+stunned by the sense of inconceivable vastness, we feel, at least, that
+no intellectual conqueror need ever be affected by the old fear. For
+him there will always be fresh regions to conquer. Every discovery
+suggests new problems; and though knowledge may be simplified and
+codified, it will always supply a base for fresh explanations of the
+indefinite regions beyond. Can that which is true of the physical
+sciences be applied in any degree to the so-called moral sciences? To
+Bentham, I believe, is ascribed the wish that he could fall asleep and
+be waked at the end of successive centuries, to take note of the
+victories achieved in the intervals by his utilitarianism. Tennyson, in
+one of his youthful poems, played with the same thought. It would be
+pleasant, as the story of the sleeping beauty suggested, to rise every
+hundred years to mark the progress made in science and politics; and to
+see the "Titanic forces" that would come to the birth in divers climes
+and seasons; for we, he says--
+
+    For we are Ancients of the earth,
+      And in the morning of the times.
+
+Tennyson, if this expressed his serious belief, seems to have lost his
+illusions; and it is probable enough that Bentham's would have had some
+unpleasant surprises could his wish have been granted. It is more than
+a century since his doctrine was first revealed, and yet the world has
+not become converted; and some people doubt whether it ever will be.
+If, indeed, Bentham's speculations had been adopted; if we had all
+become convinced that morality means aiming at the greatest happiness
+of the greatest number; if we were agreed as to what is happiness, and
+what is the best way of promoting it,--there would still have been a
+vast step to take, no less than to persuade people to desire to follow
+the lines of conduct which tend to minimise unhappiness. The mere
+intellectual conviction that this or that will be useful is quite a
+different thing from the desire. You no more teach men to be moral by
+giving them a sound ethical theory, than you teach them to be good
+shots by explaining the theory of projectiles. A religion implies a
+philosophy, but a philosophy is not by itself a religion. The demand
+that it should be is, I hold, founded upon a wrong view as to the
+relation between the abstract theory and the art of conduct. To convert
+the world you have not merely to prove your theories, but to stimulate
+the imagination, to discipline the passions, to provide modes of
+utterance for the emotions and symbols which may represent the
+fundamental beliefs--briefly, to do what is done by the founders of the
+great religions. To transmute speculation into action is a problem of
+tremendous difficulty, and I only glance in the briefest way at its
+nature. We, I take it, as members of Ethical Societies, have no claim
+to be, even in the humblest way, missionaries of a new religion: but
+are simply interested in doing what we can to discuss in a profitable
+way the truths which it ought to embody or reflect. But that is itself
+a work of no trifling importance; and we may imagine that a Bentham,
+refreshed by his century's slumber, and having dropped some of his
+little personal vanities, would on the whole be satisfied with what he
+saw. If Bacon could again come to life, he too would find that the
+methods which he contemplated and the doctrines which he preached were
+narrow and refutive; yet his prophecies of scientific growth have been
+more than realised by his successors, modifying, in some ways,
+rejecting his principles. And so Bentham might hold to-day that,
+although his sacred formula was not so exhaustive or precise as he
+fancied, yet the conscious and deliberate pursuit of the happiness of
+mankind had taken a much more important place in the aspirations of the
+time. He would see that the vast changes which have taken place in
+society, vast beyond all previous conception, were bringing up ever new
+problems, requiring more elaborate methods, and more systematic
+reasoning. He would observe that many of the abuses which he denounced
+have disappeared, and that though progress does not take place along
+the precise lines which he laid down, there is both a clearer
+recognition of the great ends of conduct, and a general advance in the
+direction which he desired. That this can be carried on by promoting a
+free and full discussion of first principles; that the great social
+evils which still exist can be diminished, and the creed of the future,
+however dim its outlines may be to our perception, may be purified as
+much as possible from ancient prejudice and superstition, is our faith;
+and however little we can do to help in carrying out that process, we
+desire to do that little.
+
+
+
+
+SCIENCE AND POLITICS.[2]
+
+
+It is with great pleasure that I address you as president of this
+Society. Your main purpose, as I understand, is to promote the serious
+study of political and social problems in a spirit purged from the
+prejudice and narrowness of mere party conflict. You desire, that is,
+to promote a scientific investigation of some of the most important
+topics to which the human mind can devote itself. There is no purpose
+of which I approve more cordially: yet the very statement suggests a
+doubt. To speak of science and politics together is almost to suggest
+irony. And if politics be taken in the ordinary sense; if we think of
+the discussions by which the immediate fate of measures and of
+ministries is decided, I should be inclined to think that they belong
+to a sphere of thought to which scientific thought is hardly
+applicable, and in which I should be personally an unwarrantable
+intruder. My friends have sometimes accused me, indeed, of indifference
+to politics. I confess that I have never been able to follow the
+details of party warfare with the interest which they excite in some
+minds: and reasons, needless to indicate, have caused me to stray
+further and further away from intercourse with the society in which
+such details excite a predominant--I do not mean to insinuate an
+excessive--interest. I feel that if I were to suggest any arguments
+bearing directly upon home rule or disestablishment, I should at once
+come under that damnatory epithet "academical," which so neatly cuts
+the ground from under the feet of the political amateur. Moreover, I
+recognise a good deal of justice in the implied criticism. An active
+politician who wishes to impress his doctrines upon his countrymen,
+should have a kind of knowledge to which I can make no pretension. I
+share the ordinary feelings of awful reverence with which the human
+bookworm looks up to the man of business. He has faculties which in me
+are rudimentary, but which I can appreciate by their contrast to my own
+feebleness. The "knowledge of the world" ascribed to lawyers, to
+politicians, financiers, and such persons, like the "knowledge of the
+human heart" so often ascribed to dramatists and novelists, represents,
+I take it, a very real kind of knowledge; but it is rather an instinct
+than a set of definite principles; a power of somehow estimating the
+tendencies and motives of their fellow-creatures in a mass by rule of
+thumb, rather than by any distinctly assignable logical process; only
+to be gained by long experience and shrewd observation of men and
+cities. Such a faculty, as it reaches sound results without employing
+explicit definitions and syllogisms and inductive processes, sometimes
+inclines its possessors to look down too contemptuously upon the closet
+student.
+
+      [2] Address to the Social and Political Education League, 29th
+      March, 1892.
+
+While, however, I frankly confess my hopeless incapacity for taking any
+part in the process by which party platforms are constructed, I should
+be ashamed to admit that I was not very keenly interested in political
+discussions which seem to me to touch vitally important matters. And
+fully recognising the vast superiority of the practical man in his own
+world, I also hold that he should not treat me and my like as if we,
+according to the famous comparison, were black beetles, and he at the
+opposite pole of the universe. There exists, in books at least, such a
+thing as political theory, apart from that claiming to underlie the
+immediate special applications. Your practical man is given to
+appealing to such theories now and then; though I confess that he too
+often leaves the impression of having taken them up on the spur of the
+moment to round a peroration and to give dignity to a popular cry; and
+that, in his lips, they are apt to sound so crude and artificial that
+one can only wonder at his condescending to notice them. He ridicules
+them as the poorest of platitudes whenever they are used by an
+antagonist, and one can only hope that his occasional homage implies
+that he too has a certain belief that there ought to be, and perhaps may
+somewhere be, a sound theory, though he has not paid it much attention.
+Well, we, I take it, differ from him simply in this respect, that we
+believe more decidedly that such theory has at least a potential
+existence; and that if hitherto it is a very uncertain and ambiguous
+guide, the mere attempt to work it out seriously may do something to
+strengthen and deepen our practical political convictions. A man of real
+ability, who is actively engaged in politics without being submerged by
+merely political intrigues, can hardly fail to wish at least to
+institute some kind of research into the principles which guide his
+practice. To such a desire we may attribute some very stimulating books,
+such, for example, as Bagehot's _Physics and Politics_ or Mr. Bryce's
+philosophical study of the United States. What I propose to do is to
+suggest a few considerations as to the real value and proper direction
+of these arguments, which lie, as it were, on the borderland between the
+immediate "platform" and the abstract theory.
+
+Philosophers have given us the name "Sociology"--a barbarous name, say
+some--for the science which deals with the subject matter of our
+inquiries. Is it more than a name for a science which may or may not
+some day come into existence? What is science? It is simply organised
+knowledge; that part of our knowledge which is definite, established
+beyond reasonable doubt, and which achieves its task by formulating
+what are called "scientific laws". Laws in this sense are general
+formulæ, which, when the necessary data are supplied, will enable us to
+extend our knowledge beyond the immediate facts of perception. Given a
+planet, moving at a given speed in a given direction, and controlled by
+given attractive forces, we can determine its place at a future moment.
+Or given a vegetable organism in a given environment, we can predict
+within certain limits the way in which it will grow, although the laws
+are too obscure and too vague to enable us to speak of it with any
+approach to the precision of astronomy. And we should have reached a
+similar stage in sociology if from a given social or political
+constitution adopted by a given population, we could prophesy what
+would be the results. I need not say that any approximation to such
+achievements is almost indefinitely distant. Personal claims to such
+powers of prediction rather tend to bring discredit upon the embryo
+science. Coleridge gives in the _Biographia Literaria_ a quaint
+statement of his own method. On every great occurrence, he says, he
+tried to discover in past history the event that most nearly resembled
+it. He examined the original authorities. "Then fairly subtracting the
+points of difference from the points of likeness," as the balance
+favoured the former or the latter, he conjectured that the result would
+be the same, or different. So, for example, he was able to prophesy the
+end of the Spanish rising against Napoleon from the event of the war
+between Philip II. and the Dutch provinces. That is, he cried, "Heads!"
+and on this occasion the coin did not come down tails. But I need
+hardly point out how impossible is the process of political arithmetic.
+What is meant by adding or subtracting in this connection? Such a rule
+of three would certainly puzzle me, and, I fancy, most other observers.
+We may say that the insurrection of a patriotic people, when they are
+helped from without, and their oppressors have to operate from a
+distant base and to fight all Europe at the same time, will often
+succeed; and we may often be right; but we should not give ourselves
+the airs of prophets on that account. There are many superficial
+analogies of the same character. My predecessor, Professor Dicey,
+pointed out some of them, to confirm his rather depressing theory that
+history is nothing but an old almanac. Let me take a common one, which,
+I think, may illustrate our problem. There is a certain analogy between
+the cases of Cæsar, Cromwell, and Napoleon. In each case we have a
+military dictatorship as the final outcome of a civil war. Some people
+imagined that this analogy would apply to the United States, and that
+Washington or Grant would be what was called the man on horseback. The
+reasoning really involved was, in fact, a very simple one. The
+destruction of an old system of government makes some form of
+dictatorship the only alternative to chaos. It therefore gives a chance
+to the one indisputable holder of power in its most unmistakable shape,
+namely, to the general of a disciplined army. A soldier accordingly
+assumed power in each of the three first cases, although the
+differences between the societies ruled by the Roman, the English and
+the French dictators are so vast that further comparison soon becomes
+idle. Neither Washington nor Grant had the least chance of making
+themselves dictators had they wished, because the civil wars had left
+governments perfectly uninjured and capable of discharging all their
+functions, and had not produced a regular army with interests of its
+own. In this and other cases, I should say that such an analogy may be
+to some extent instructive, but I should certainly deny that there was
+anything like a scientific induction. We, happily, can reason to some
+extent upon political matters by the help of simple common sense before
+it has undergone that process of organisation, of reduction to precise
+measurable statements, which entitles it to be called a scientific
+procedure. The resemblance of Washington to Cromwell was of the
+external and superficial order. It may be compared to those analogies
+which exist between members of different natural orders without
+implying any deeper resemblance. A whale, we know, is like a fish in so
+far as he swims about in the sea, and he has whatever fishlike
+qualities are implied in the ability to swim. He will die on land,
+though not from the same causes. But, physiologically, he belongs to a
+different race, and we should make blunders if we argued from the
+external likeness to a closer resemblance. Or, to drop what may be too
+fanciful a comparison, it may be observed that all assemblies of human
+beings may be contrasted in respect of being numerous or select, and
+have certain properties in consequence. We may therefore make some true
+and general propositions about the contrasts between the action of
+small and large consultative bodies which will apply to many widely
+different cases. A good many, and, I think, some really valuable
+observations of this kind have been made, and form the substance of
+many generalisations laid down as to the relative advantages of
+democracy and aristocracy. Now I should be disposed to say that such
+remarks belong rather to the morphology than the physiology of the
+social organism. They indicate external resemblances between bodies of
+which the intimate constitution and the whole mode of growth and
+conditions of vitality, may be entirely different. Such analogies,
+then, though not without their value, are far from being properly
+scientific.
+
+What remains? There is, shall we say, no science of sociology--merely a
+heap of vague, empirical observations, too flimsy to be useful in
+strict logical inference? I should, I confess, be apt to say so myself.
+Then, you may proceed, is it not idle to attempt to introduce a
+scientific method? And to that I should emphatically reply, No! it is
+of the highest importance. The question, then, will follow, how I can
+maintain these two positions at once. And to that I make, in the first
+place, this general answer: Sociology is still of necessity a very
+vague body of approximate truths. We have not the data necessary for
+obtaining anything like precise laws. A mathematician can tell you
+precisely what he means when he speaks of bodies moving under the
+influence of an attraction which varies inversely as the square of the
+distance. But what are the attractive forces which hold together the
+body politic? They are a number of human passions, which even the
+acutest psychologists are as yet quite unable to analyse or to
+classify: they act according to laws of which we have hardly the
+vaguest inkling; and, even if we possessed any definite laws, the facts
+to which they have to be applied are so amazingly complex as to defy
+any attempt at assigning results. There is, so far as I can see, no
+ground for supposing that there is or ever can be a body of precise
+truths at all capable of comparison with the exact sciences. But this
+obvious truth, though it implies very narrow limits to our hopes of
+scientific results, does not force us to renounce the application of
+scientific method. The difficulty applies in some degree even to
+physiology as compared with physics, as the vital phenomena are
+incomparably more complex than those with which we have to deal in the
+simpler sciences; and yet nobody doubts that a scientific physiology is
+a possibility, and, to some extent, a reality. Now, in sociology,
+however imperfect it may be, we may still apply the same methods which
+have been so fruitful in other departments of thought. We may undertake
+it in the scientific spirit which depends upon patient appeal to
+observation, and be guided by the constant recollection that we are
+dealing with an organism, the various relations of whose constituent
+parts are determined by certain laws to which we may, perhaps, make
+some approximation. We may do so, although their mutual actions and
+reactions are so complex and subtle that we can never hope to
+disentangle them with any approach to completeness. And one test of the
+legitimacy of our methods will be, that although we do not hope to
+reach any precise and definitely assignable law, we yet reach, or aim
+at reaching, results which, while wanting in precision, want precision
+alone to be capable of incorporation in an ideal science such as might
+actually exist for a supernatural observer of incomparably superior
+powers. A man who knows, though he knows nothing more, that the moon is
+kept in its orbit by forces similar to or identical with those which
+cause the fall of an apple, knows something which only requires more
+definite treatment to be made into a genuine theory of gravitation. If,
+on the contrary, he merely pays himself with words, with vague guesses
+about occult properties, or a supposed angel who directs the moon's
+course, he is still in the unscientific stage. His theory is not
+science still in the vague, but something which stops the way to
+science. Now, if we can never hope to get further than the step which
+in the problem of gravitation represents the first step towards
+science, yet that step may be a highly important one. It represents a
+diversion of the current of thought from such channels as end in mere
+shifting sands of speculation, into the channel which leads towards
+some definite conclusion, verifiable by experience, and leading to
+conclusions, not very precise, but yet often pointing to important
+practical results. It may, perhaps, be said that, as the change which I
+am supposing represents only a change of method and spirit, it can
+achieve no great results in actual assignable truth. Well! a change of
+method and spirit is, in my opinion, of considerable importance, and
+very vague results would still imply an improvement in the chaos of
+what now passes for political philosophy. I will try to indicate very
+briefly the kind of improvement of which we need not despair.
+
+First of all, I conceive that, as I have indicated, a really scientific
+habit of thought would dispel many hopeless logomachies. When Burke,
+incomparably the greatest of our philosophical politicians, was arguing
+against the American policy of the Government, he expressed his hatred
+of metaphysics--the "Serbonian bog," as he called it, in which whole
+armies had been lost. The point at which he aimed was the fruitless
+discussion of abstract rights, which prevented people from applying
+their minds to the actual facts, and from seeing that metaphysical
+entities of that kind were utterly worthless when they ceased to
+correspond to the wants and aspirations of the peoples concerned. He
+could not, as he said, draw up an indictment against a nation, because
+he could not see how such troubles as had arisen between England and
+the Colonies were to be decided by technical distinctions such as
+passed current at _nisi prius_. I am afraid that the mode of reasoning
+condemned by Burke has not yet gone out of fashion. I do not wish to
+draw down upon myself the wrath of metaphysicians. I am perfectly
+willing that they should go on amusing themselves by attempting to
+deduce the first principles of morality from abstract considerations of
+logical affirmation and denial. But I will say this, that, in any case,
+and whatever the ultimate meaning of right and wrong, all political and
+social questions must be discussed with a continual reference to
+experience, to the contents as well as to the form of their metaphysical
+concepts. It is, to my mind, quite as idle to attempt to determine the
+value, say, of a political theory by reasoning independent of the
+character and circumstances of the nation and its constituent members,
+as to solve a medical question by abstract formulæ, instead of by
+careful, prolonged, and searching investigation into the constitution of
+the human body. I think that this requires to be asserted so long as
+popular orators continue to declaim, for example, about the "rights of
+man," or the doctrines of political equality. I by no means deny, or
+rather I should on due occasion emphatically assert, that the demands
+covered by such formulæ are perfectly right, and that they rest upon a
+base of justice. But I am forced to think that, as they are generally
+stated, they can lead to nothing but logomachy. When a man lays down
+some such sweeping principle, his real object is to save himself the
+trouble of thinking. So long as the first principles from which he
+starts are equally applicable,--and it is of the very nature of these
+principles that they should be equally applicable to men in all times
+and ages, to Englishmen and Americans, Hindoos and Chinese, Negroes and
+Australians,--they are worthless for any particular case, although, of
+course, they may be accidentally true in particular cases. In short,
+leaving to the metaphysicians--that is, postponing till the Greek
+Kalends--any decision as to the ultimate principles, I say that every
+political theory should be prepared to justify itself by an accurate
+observation of the history and all the various characteristics of the
+social organisation to which it is to be applied.
+
+This points to the contrast to which I have referred: the contrast
+between the keen vigorous good sense upon immediate questions of the
+day, to which I often listen with the unfeigned admiration due to the
+shrewd man of business, and the paltry little outworn platitudes which
+he introduces when he wants to tag his arguments with sounding
+principles. I think, to take an example out of harm's way, that an
+excellent instance is found in the famous American treatise, the
+_Federalist_. It deserves all the credit it has won so long as the
+authors are discussing the right way to form a constitution which may
+satisfy the wants and appease the prejudices then actually existing. In
+spite of such miscalculations as beset all forecasts of the future,
+they show admirable good sense and clear appreciation. But when they
+think it necessary to appeal to Montesquieu, to tag their arguments
+from common sense with little ornamental formulæ learnt from
+philosophical writings, they show a very amiable simplicity; but they
+also seem to me to sink at once to the level of a clever prize essay in
+a university competition. The mischief may be slight when we are merely
+considering literary effect. But it points to a graver evil. In
+political discussions, the half-trained mind has strong convictions
+about some particular case, and then finds it easiest to justify its
+conviction by some sweeping general principle. It really starts,
+speaking in terms of logic, by assuming the truth of its minor and
+takes for granted that any major which will cover the minor is
+therefore established. Nothing saves so much trouble in thinking as the
+acceptance of a good sounding generality or a self-evident truth. Where
+your poor scientific worker plods along, testing the truth of his
+argument at every point, making qualifications and reservations, and
+admitting that every general principle may require to be modified in
+concrete cases, you can thus both jump to your conclusion and assume
+the airs of a philosopher. It is, I fancy, for this reason that people
+have such a tendency to lay down absolute rules about really difficult
+points. It is so much easier to say at once that all drinking ought to
+be suppressed, than to consider how, in actual circumstances, sobriety
+can be judiciously encouraged; and by assuming a good self-evident law
+and denouncing your opponents as immoral worshippers of expediency, you
+place yourself in an enviable position of moral dignity and
+inaccessibility. No argument can touch you. These abstract rules, too,
+have the convenience of being strangely ambiguous. I have been almost
+pathetically affected when I have observed how some thoroughly
+commonplace person plumes himself on preserving his consistency because
+he sticks resolutely to his party dogmas, even when their whole meaning
+has evaporated. Some English radicals boasted of consistency because
+they refused to be convinced by experience that republicans under a
+military dictator could become tyrannous and oppressive. At the present
+day, I see many worthy gentlemen, who from being thorough-going
+individualists, have come to swallow unconsciously the first principles
+of socialism without the least perception that they have changed,
+simply because a new meaning has been gradually insinuated into the
+sacred formulæ. Scientific habits of thought, I venture to suggest,
+would tend to free a man from the dominion of these abstract phrases,
+which sometimes make men push absolute dogmas to extravagant results,
+and sometimes blind them to the complete transformation which has taken
+place in their true meaning. The great test of statesmanship, it is
+said, is the knowledge how and when to make a compromise, and when to
+hold fast to a principle. The tendency of the thoughtless is to
+denounce all compromise as wicked, and to stick to a form of words
+without bothering about the real meaning. Belief in "fads"--I cannot
+avoid the bit of slang--and singular malleability of real convictions
+are sometimes generated just by want of serious thought; and, at any
+rate, both phenomena are very common at present.
+
+This suggests another aspect of reasoning in a scientific spirit,
+namely, the importance which it attaches to a right comprehension of
+the practicable. The scientific view is sometimes described as
+fatalistic. A genuine scientific theory implies a true estimate of the
+great forces which mould institutions, and therefore a true
+apprehension of the limits within which they can be modified by any
+proposed change. We all remember Sydney Smith's famous illustration, in
+regard to the opposition to the Reform Bill, of Mrs. Partington's
+attempt to stop the Atlantic with her mop. Such an appeal is sometimes
+described as immoral. Many politicians, no doubt, find in it an excuse
+for immoral conduct. They assume that such and such a measure is
+inevitable, and therefore they think themselves justified for
+advocating it, even though they hold it to be wrong. Indeed, I observe
+that many excellent journalists are apparently unable to perceive any
+distinction between the assertion that a measure will be passed, and
+that it ought to be passed. Undoubtedly, if I think a measure unjust, I
+ought to say that it is unjust, even if I am sure that it will
+nevertheless be carried, and, in some cases, even though I may be a
+martyr to my opposition. If it is inevitable, it can be carried without
+my help, and my protest may at least sow a seed for future reaction.
+But this is no answer to the argument of Sydney Smith when taken in a
+reasonable sense. The opposition to the Reform Bill was a particular
+case of the opposition to the advance of democracy. The statement that
+democracy has advanced and will advance, is sometimes taken to be
+fatalistic. People who make the assertion may answer for themselves. I
+should answer, as I think we should all answer now, that the advance of
+democracy, desirable or undesirable, depended upon causes far too deep
+and general to be permanently affected by any Reform Bill. It was only
+one aspect of vast social changes which had been going on for
+centuries; and to propose to stop it by throwing out the Reform Bill
+was like proposing to stop a child's growth by forcing him to go on
+wearing his long clothes. Sydney Smith's answer might be immoral if it
+simply meant, don't fight because you will be beaten. It may often be a
+duty to take a beating. But it was, perhaps, rather a way of saying
+that if you want to stop the growth of democracy, you must begin by
+altering the course of the social, intellectual and moral changes which
+have been operating through many generations, and that unless you can
+do that, it is idle to oppose one particular corollary, and so to make
+a revolution inevitable, instead of a peaceful development. To say
+that any change is impossible in the absolute sense, may be fatalism;
+but it is simple good sense, and therefore good science, to say that to
+produce any change whatever you must bring to bear a force adequate to
+the change. When a man's leg is broken, you can't expect to heal it by
+a bit of sticking-plaster; a pill is not supposed, now, to be a cure
+for an earthquake; and to insist upon such facts is not to be
+fatalistic, but simply to say that a remedy must bear some proportion
+to an evil. It is a commonplace to observe upon the advantage which
+would have been gained if our grandfathers would have looked at the
+French Revolution scientifically. A terrible catastrophe had occurred
+abroad. The true moral, as we all see now, was that England should make
+such reforms as would obviate the danger of a similar catastrophe at
+home. The moral which too many people drew was too often, that all
+reforms should be stopped; with the result that the evils grew worse
+and social strata more profoundly alienated. It is a first principle of
+scientific reasoning, that a break-down of social order implies some
+antecedent defect, demanding an adequate remedy. It is a primary
+assumption of party argument, that the opposite party is wholly wrong,
+that its action is perfectly gratuitous, and either causeless or
+produced by the direct inspiration of the devil. The struggle, upon the
+scientific theory, represents two elements in an evolution which can be
+accomplished peacefully by such a reconstruction as will reconcile the
+conflicting aims and substitute harmony for discord. On the other
+doctrine, it is a conflict of hopelessly antagonistic principles, one
+of which is to be forcibly crushed.
+
+I hope that I am not too sanguine, but I cannot help believing that in
+this respect we have improved, and improved by imbibing some of the
+scientific doctrine. I think that in recent discussions of the most
+important topics, however bitter and however much distorted by the old
+party spirit, there is yet a clearer recognition than of old, that
+widely-spread discontent is not a reason for arbitrary suppression, but
+for seeking to understand and remove its causes. We should act in the
+spirit of Spinoza's great saying; and it should be our aim, as it was
+his care, "neither to mock, to bewail, nor to denounce men's actions,
+but to understand them". That is equally true of men's opinions. If
+they are violent, passionate, subversive of all order, our duty is not
+bare denunciations, but a clear comprehension of the causes, not of the
+ostensible reasons, of their opinions, and a resolution to remove those
+causes. I think this view has made some way: I am sure that it will
+make more way if we become more scientific in spirit; and it is one of
+the main reasons for encouraging such a spirit. The most obvious
+difficulty just now is one upon which I must touch, though with some
+fear and trembling. A terrible weapon has lately been coming into
+perfection, to which its inventors have given the elegant name of a
+"boom". The principle is--so far as I can understand--that the right
+frame of mind for dealing with the gravest problems is to generate a
+state of violent excitement, to adopt any remedy, real or supposed,
+which suggests itself at the moment, and to denounce everybody who
+suggests difficulties as a cynic or a cold-blooded egoist; and
+therefore to treat grave chronic and organic diseases of society by
+spasmodic impulses, to make stringent laws without condescending to ask
+whether they will work, and try the boldest experiments without
+considering whether they are likely to increase or diminish the evil.
+This, as some people think, is one of the inevitable consequences of
+democracy. I hope that it is not; but if it is, it is one of the
+inevitable consequences against which we, as cultivators of science,
+should most seriously protest, in the hope that we may some day find
+Philip sober enough to consider the consequences of his actions under
+the influence of spiritual intoxication. Professor Huxley, in one of
+those smart passages of arms which so forcibly illustrated his
+intellectual vigour, gave an apologue, which I wish that I could steal
+without acknowledgment. He spoke of an Irish carman who, on being told
+that he was not going in the right direction, replied that he was at
+any rate going at a great pace. The scientific doctrine is simply that
+we should look at the map before we set out for Utopia; and I think
+that a doctrine which requires to be enforced by every means in our
+power.
+
+This tendency, of course, comes out prominently in the important
+discussions of social and economic problems. That is a matter upon
+which I cannot now dwell, and which has been sufficiently emphasised by
+many eminent writers. If modern orators confined themselves to urging
+that the old economists exaggerated their claims to scientific
+accuracy, and were, in point of fact, guilty of many logical errors and
+hasty generalisations, I, at least, could fully agree with them. But
+the general impression seems to be, that because the old arguments were
+faulty, all argument is irrelevant: that because the alleged laws of
+nature were wrongly stated, there are no laws of nature at all; and
+that we may proceed to rearrange society, to fix the rate of wages or
+the rent of land or the incomes of capitalists without any reference at
+all to the conditions under which social arrangements have been worked
+out and actually carried on. This is, in short, to sanction the most
+obvious weakness of popular movements, and to assure the ignorant and
+thoughtless that they are above reason, and their crude guesses
+infallible guides to truth.
+
+One view which tries to give some plausibility to these assumptions is
+summed up in the now current phrase about the "masses" and the
+"classes". We all know the regular process of logical fence of the
+journalist, _i.e._, thrust and parry, which is repeated whenever such
+questions turn up. The Radical calls his opponent Tory and reactionary.
+The wicked Tory, it is said, thinks only of the class interest; believes
+that the nation exists for the sake of the House of Lords; lives in a
+little citadel provided with all the good things, which he is ready to
+defend against every attempt at a juster distribution; selfishness is
+his one motive; repression by brute force his only theory of government;
+and his views of life in general are those of the wicked cynics who gaze
+from their windows in Pall Mall. Then we have the roll of all the abuses
+which have been defended by this miscreant and his like since the days
+of George III.--slavery and capital punishment, and pensions and
+sinecures, and protection and the church establishment. The popular
+instinct, it is urged, has been in the right in so many cases that there
+is an enormous presumption in favour of the infallibility of all its
+instincts. The reply, of course, is equally obvious. Your boast, says
+the Conservative, that you please the masses, is in effect a confession
+that you truckle to the mob. You mean that your doctrines spread in
+proportion to the ignorance of your constituents. You prove the merits
+of your theories by showing that they disgust people the more they
+think. The Liberalism of a district, it has been argued, varies with the
+number of convictions for drunkenness. If it be easy to denounce our
+ancestors, it is also easy to show how they built up the great empire
+which now shelters us; and how, if they had truckled, as you would have
+us truckle, to popular whims, we should have been deprived of our
+commerce, our manufactures, and our position in the civilised world. And
+then it is easy to produce a list of all the base demagogues who have
+misled popular impatience and ignorance from the days of Cleon to those
+of the French Convention, or of the last disreputable "boss" bloated
+with corruption and the plunder of some great American city. This is the
+result, it is suggested, of pandering to the mob, and generally
+ostracising the intelligent citizen.
+
+I merely sketch the familiar arguments which any journalist has ready
+at hand, and, by a sufficient spice of references to actual affairs,
+can work up into any number of pointed leading articles. I will only
+observe that such arguments seem to me to illustrate that curious
+unreality of political theories of which I have spoken. It seems to be
+tacitly assumed on both sides, that votes are determined by a process
+of genuine reasoning. One side may be ignorant and the other
+prejudiced; but the arguments I have recapitulated seem to imply the
+assumption that the constituents really reflect upon the reasons for
+and against the measures proposed, and make up their minds accordingly.
+They are spoken of as though they were a body of experts, investigating
+a scientific doctrine, or at least a jury guided by the evidence laid
+before them. Upon that assumption, as it seems to me, the moral would
+be that the whole system is a palpable absurdity. The vast majority of
+voters scarcely think at all, and would be incapable of judging if they
+did. Hundreds of thousands care more for Dr. Grace's last score or the
+winner of the Derby than for any political question whatever. If they
+have opinions, they have neither the training nor the knowledge
+necessary to form any conclusion whatever. Consider the state of mind
+of the average voter--of nine men out of ten, say, whom you meet in the
+Strand. Ask yourselves honestly what value you would attach to his
+opinion upon any great question--say, of foreign politics or political
+economy. Has he ever really thought about them? Is he superficially
+acquainted with any of the relevant facts? Is he even capable of the
+imaginative effort necessary to set before him the vast interests often
+affected? And would the simple fact that he said "Yes" to a given
+question establish in your mind the smallest presumption against the
+probability that the right answer would be "No"? What are the chances
+that a majority of people, of whom not one in a hundred has any
+qualifications for judging, will give a right judgment? Yet that is the
+test suggested by most of the conventional arguments on both sides; for
+I do not say this as intending to accept the anti-democratic
+application. It is just as applicable, I believe, to the educated and
+the well-off. I need not labour the point, which is sufficiently
+obvious. I am quite convinced that, for example, the voters for a
+university will be guided by unreasonable prejudices as the voters for
+a metropolitan constituency. In some ways they will be worse. To find
+people who believe honestly in antiquated prejudices, you must go to
+the people who have been trained to believe them. An ecclesiastical
+seminary can manage to drill the pupils into professing absurdities
+from which average common sense would shrink, and only supply logical
+machinery for warring against reason. The reference to enlightened
+aristocracies is common enough; but I cannot discover that, "taken in a
+lump," any particular aristocracy cannot be as narrow-minded,
+short-sighted, and selfish, as the most rampant democracy. In point of
+fact, we all know that political action is determined by instinct
+rather than by reason. I do not mean that instinct is opposed to
+reason: it is simply a crude, undeveloped, inarticulate form of reason;
+it is blended with prejudices for which no reason is assigned, or even
+regarded as requisite. Such blind instincts, implying at most a kind of
+groping after error, necessarily govern the majority of men of all
+classes, in political as in other movements. The old apologists used to
+argue on the hypothesis that men must have accepted Christianity on the
+strength of a serious inquiry into the evidences. The fallacy of the
+doctrine is sufficiently plain: they accepted it because it suited them
+on the whole, and was fitted, no doubt, to their intellectual needs,
+but was also fitted to their emotional and moral needs as developed
+under certain social conditions. The inference from the general
+acceptance of any theory is not that it is true, but that it is true
+enough to satisfy the very feeble demand for logic--that it is not
+palpably absurd or self-contradictory; and that, for some reason or
+other, it satisfies also the imagination, the affections, and the
+aspirations of the believers. Not to go into other questions, this
+single remark indicates, I think, the attitude which the scientific
+observer would adopt in regard to this ancient controversy. He would
+study the causes as well as the alleged reasons assignable for any
+general instinct, and admit that its existence is one of the primary
+data which have to be taken into account. To denounce democracy or
+aristocracy is easy enough; and it saves trouble to assume that God is
+on one side and the devil on the other. The true method, I take it, is
+that which was indicated by Tocqueville's great book upon democracy in
+America; a book which, if I may trust my own impressions, though
+necessarily imperfect as regards America, is a perfectly admirable
+example of the fruitful method of studying such problems. Though an
+aristocrat by birth and breeding, Tocqueville had the wisdom to examine
+democratic beliefs and institutions in a thoroughly impartial spirit;
+and, instead of simply denouncing or admiring, to trace the genesis of
+the prevalent ideas and their close connection with the general state
+of social development. An inquiry conducted in that spirit would not
+lead to the absolute dogmatic conclusions in which the superficial
+controversialist delights. It would show, perhaps, that there was at
+least this much truth in the democratic contention, that the masses
+are, by their position, exempt from some of the prejudices which are
+ingrained in the members of a smaller caste; that they are therefore
+more accessible to certain moral considerations, and more anxious to
+promote the greatest happiness of the greater number. But it might also
+show how the weakness of the ignorant and untrained mind produces the
+characteristic evils of sentimentalism and impatience, of a belief in
+the omnipotence of legislation, and an excessive jealousy of all
+superiorities; and might possibly, too, exhibit certain merits which
+are impressed upon the aristocrat by his sense of the obligations of
+nobility. I do not in the least mean to express any opinion about such
+questions; I desire only to indicate the temper in which I conceive
+that they should be approached.
+
+I have lived long enough to be utterly unable to believe--though some
+older politicians than I seem still to believe, especially on the eve
+of a dissolution--that any of our party lines coincide with the lines
+between good and bad, wise and foolish. Every one, of course, will
+repudiate the abstract theory. Yet we may notice how constantly it is
+assumed; and can see to what fallacies it leads when we look for a
+moment at the historical questions which no longer unite party feeling.
+Few, indeed, even of our historians, can write without taking party
+views of such questions. Even the candid and impartial seem to deserve
+these epithets chiefly because they want imagination, and can cast
+blame or applaud alternately, because they do not enter into the real
+spirit of either party. Their views are sometimes a medley of
+inconsistent theories, rather than a deeper view which might reconcile
+apparent inconsistencies. I will only mention one point which often
+strikes me, and may lead to a relevant remark. Every royalist
+historian, we all know, labours to prove that Charles I. was a saint,
+and Cromwell a hypocrite. The view was natural at the time of the civil
+wars; but it now should suggest an obvious logical dilemma. If the
+monarchical theory which Charles represented was sound, and Charles was
+also a wise and good man, what caused the rebellion? A perfect man
+driving a perfect engine should surely not have run it off the rails.
+The royalist ought to seek to prove that Charles was a fool and a
+knave, to account for the collapse of royalty; and the case against
+royalty is all the stronger, if you could show that Charles, in spite
+of impeccable virtue, was forced by his position to end on the
+scaffold. Choose between him and the system which he applied. So
+Catholics and conservatives are never tired of denouncing Henry VIII.
+and the French revolutionists. So far as I can guess (I know very
+little about it), their case is a very strong one. I somehow believe,
+in spite of Froude, that Henry VIII. was a tyrant; and eulogies upon
+the reign of terror generally convince me that a greater set of
+scoundrels seldom came to the surface, than the perpetrators of those
+enormities. But then the real inference is, to my mind, very different.
+Henry VIII. was the product of the previous time; the ultimate outcome
+of that ideal state of things in which the church had its own way
+during the ages of truth. Must not the system have been wrong, when it
+had so lost all moral weight as to be at the mercy of a ruffianly
+plunderer? And so, as we all admit now, the strongest condemnation of
+the old French _régime_ is the fact that it had not only produced
+such a set of miscreants as those who have cast permanent odium even
+upon sound principles; but that its king and rulers went down before
+them without even an attempt at manly resistance. A revolution does
+not, perhaps, justify itself; it does not prove that its leaders judged
+rightly and acted virtuously: but, beyond a doubt, it condemns the
+previous order which brought it about. What a horrid thing is the
+explosion! Why, is the obvious answer, did you allow the explosive
+materials to accumulate, till the first match must fire the train? The
+greatest blot upon Burke, I need hardly say, is that his passions
+blinded him in his age, to this, as we now see, inevitable conclusion.
+
+The old-fashioned view, I fancy, is a relic of that view of history in
+which all the great events and changes were personified in some
+individual hero. The old "legislators," Lycurgus and Solon and the
+like, were supposed to have created the institutions which were really
+the products of a slow growth. When a favourable change due to
+economical causes took place in the position of the French peasantry,
+the peasants, says Michelet somewhere, called it "good king Henry".
+Carlyle's theory of hero worship is partly an application of the same
+mode of thought. You embody your principle in some concrete person;
+canonise him or damn him, as he represents truth or error; and take
+credit to yourself for insight and for a lofty morality. It becomes a
+kind of blasphemy to suggest that your great man, who thus stands for
+an inspired leader dropped straight out of heaven, was probably at best
+very imperfect, one-sided, and at least as much of a product as a
+producer. The crudity of the method is even regarded as a proof of its
+morality. Your common-place moralist likes to call everything black or
+white; he despises all qualifications as casuistical refinements, and
+plumes himself on the decisive verdict, saint or sinner, with which he
+labels the adherents and opponents of his party. And yet we know as a
+fact, how absurd are such judgments. We know how men are betrayed into
+bad causes from good motives, or put on the right side because it
+happens to harmonise with their lower interests. Saints--so we are
+told--have been the cruellest persecutors; and kings, acting from
+purely selfish ambition, have consolidated nations or crushed effete
+and mischievous institutions. If we can make up our minds as to which
+was, on the whole, the best cause,--and, generally speaking, both sides
+represented some sound principle,--it does not follow that it was also
+the cause of all the best men. Before we can judge of the individual,
+we must answer a hundred difficult questions: If he took the right
+side, did he take it from the right motives? Was it from personal
+ambition or pure patriotism? Did he see what was the real question at
+issue? Did he foresee the inevitable effect of the measures which he
+advocated? If he did not see, was it because he was human, and
+therefore short-sighted; or because he was brutal, and therefore
+wanting in sympathy; or because he had intellectual defects, which made
+it impossible for him to escape from the common illusions of the time?
+These, and any number of similar difficulties, arise when we try to
+judge of the great men who form landmarks in our history, from the time
+of Boadicea to that of Queen Victoria. They are always amusing, and
+sometimes important; but there is always a danger that they may warp
+our views of the vital facts. The beauty of Mary Queen of Scots still
+disqualifies many people from judging calmly the great issues of a most
+important historical epoch. I will leave it to you to apply this to our
+views of modern politics, and judge the value of the ordinary
+assumption which assumes that all good men must be on one side.
+
+Now we may say that the remedy for such illusions points to the
+importance of a doctrine which is by no means new, but which has, I
+think, bearings not always recognised. We have been told, again and
+again, since Plato wrote his _Republic_, that society is an organism. It
+is replied that this is at best an analogy upon which too great stress
+must not be laid; and we are warned against the fanciful comparisons
+which some writers have drawn between the body corporate and the actual
+physical body, with its cells, tissues, nervous system, and so forth.
+Now, whatever may be the danger of that mode of reasoning, I think that
+the statement, properly understood, corresponds to a simple logical
+canon too often neglected in historical and political reasonings. It
+means, I take it, in the first place, that every man is a product as
+well as a producer; that there is no such thing as the imaginary
+individual with fixed properties, whom theorists are apt to take for
+granted as the base of their reasoning; that no man or group of men is
+intelligible without taking into account the mass of instincts
+transmitted through their predecessors, and therefore without referring
+to their position in the general history of human development. And,
+secondly, it is essential to remember in speaking of any great man, or
+of any institution, their position as parts of a complicated system of
+actions and emotions. The word "if," I may say, changes its meaning.
+"If" Harold had won the battle of Hastings, what would have been the
+result? The answer would be comparatively simple, if we could, in the
+old fashion, attribute to William the Conqueror all the results in which
+he played a conspicuous part: if, therefore, we could make out a
+definite list of effects of which he was the cause, and, by simply
+"deducting" them, after Coleridge's fashion, from the effects which
+actually followed, determine what was the precise balance. But when we
+consider how many causes were actually in operation, how impossible it
+is to disentangle and separate them, and say this followed from that,
+and that other from something else, we have to admit that the might have
+been is simply indiscoverable. The great man may have hastened what was
+otherwise inevitable; he may simply have supplied the particular point,
+round which a crystallisation took place of forces which would have
+otherwise discovered some other centre; and the fact that he succeeded
+in establishing certain institutions or laws may be simply a proof that
+he saw a little more clearly than others the direction towards which
+more general causes were inevitably propelling the nation. Briefly, we
+cannot isolate the particular "cause" in this case, and have to remember
+at every moment that it was only one factor in a vast and complex series
+of changes, which would no doubt have taken a different turn without it,
+but of which it may be indefinitely difficult to say what was the
+precise deflection due to its action.
+
+In trying to indicate the importance, I have had to dwell upon the
+difficulty, of applying anything like scientific methods to political
+problems. I shall conclude by trying once more to indicate why, in
+spite of this, I hold that the attempt is desirable, and may be
+fruitful.
+
+People sometimes say that scientific methods are inapplicable because
+we cannot try experiments in social matters. I remember being long ago
+struck by a remark of Dr. Arnold, which has some bearing upon this
+assertion. He observed upon the great advantage possessed by Aristotle
+in the vast number of little republics in his time, each of which was
+virtually an experiment in politics. I always thought that this was
+fallacious somehow, and I fancy that it is not hard to indicate the
+general nature of the fallacy. Freeman, upon whose services to thorough
+and accurate study of history I am unworthy to pronounce an eulogy,
+fell into the same fallacy, I fancy, when he undertook to write a
+history of Federal Governments. He fancied that because the Achæan
+League and the Swiss Cantons and the United States of America all had
+this point in common, and that they represented the combinations of
+partially independent States, their history would be in a sense
+continuous. The obvious consideration that the federations differed in
+every possible way, in their religions and state of civilisation and
+whole social structure, might be neglected. Freeman's tendency to be
+indifferent to everything which was not in the narrowest sense
+political led him to this--as it seems to me--pedantic conception. If
+the prosperity of a nation depended exclusively upon the form of its
+government, Aristotle, as Arnold remarks, would have had before him a
+greater number of experiments than the modern observer. But the
+assumption is obviously wrong. Every one of these ancient States
+depended for its prosperity upon a vast number of conditions--its race,
+its geographical position, its stage of development, and so forth,
+quite impossible to tabulate or analyse; and the form of government
+which suited one would be entirely inapplicable to another. To
+extricate from all these conflicting elements the precise influence due
+to any institutions would be a task beyond the powers of any number of
+philosophers; and indeed the perplexity would probably be increased by
+the very number of experiments. To make an experiment fruitful, it is
+necessary to eliminate all the irrelevant elements which intrude into
+the concrete cases spontaneously offered by nature, and, for example,
+to obtain two cases differing only in one element, to which we may
+therefore plausibly attribute other contrasts. Now, the history of a
+hundred or a thousand small States would probably only present the
+introduction of new and perplexing elements for every new case. The
+influence, again, of individuals, or accident of war, or natural
+catastrophes, is greater in proportion as the State is smaller, and
+therefore makes it more difficult to observe the permanent and
+underlying influences. It seems to me, therefore, that the study, say
+of English history, where we have a continuous growth over many
+centuries, where the disturbing influences of individuals or chance are
+in a greater degree cancelled by the general tendencies working beneath
+them, we have really a far more instructive field for political
+observation. This may help us to see what are the kinds of results
+which may be anticipated from sociological study undertaken in a
+serious spirit. The growth, for example, of the industrial system of
+England is a profoundly interesting subject of inquiry, to which we are
+even now only beginning to do justice. Historians have admitted, even
+from the time of Hume, that the ideal history should give less of mere
+battles and intrigues, and more account of those deeper and more
+continuous processes which lie, so to speak, beneath the surface. They
+have hardly, I think, even yet realised the full bearing and importance
+of this observation. Yet, of late, much has been done, though much
+still remains to do, in the way of a truly scientific study of the
+development of institutions, political, ecclesiastical, industrial, and
+so forth, of this and other countries. As this tendency grows, we may
+hope gradually to have a genuine history of the English people; an
+account--not of the virtues and vices of Mary Queen of Scots, or
+arguments as to the propriety of cutting off Charles I.'s head--but a
+trustworthy account of the way in which the actual structure of modern
+society has been developed out of its simpler germs. The biographies of
+great kings and generals, and so forth, will always be interesting; but
+to the genuine historian of the future they will be interesting not so
+much as giving room for psychological analyses or for dramatic
+portraits, but as indications of the great social forces which produced
+them, and the direction of which at the moment may be illustrated by
+their cases. I have spoken of the history of our industrial system. To
+know what was the position of the English labourer at various times,
+how it was affected by the political changes or by the great mechanical
+discoveries, to observe what grievances arose, what remedies were
+applied or sought to be applied, and with what result,--to treat all
+this with due reference to the whole social and intellectual evolution
+of which it formed a part, may well call forth the powers of our
+acutest and most thoroughgoing inquirers, and will, when it is done,
+give essential data for some of the most vitally important problems of
+the day. This is what I understand by an application of the scientific
+spirit to social and political problems. We cannot try experiments, it
+is said, in historical questions. We cannot help always trying
+experiments, and experiments of vast importance. Every man has to try
+an experiment upon himself when he chooses his career; and the results
+are frequently very unpleasant, though very instructive. We have to be
+our own experiments. Every man who sets up in business tries an
+experiment, ending in fortune or in bankruptcy. Every strike is an
+experiment, and generally a costly one. Every attempt at starting a new
+charitable organisation, or a new system of socialism or co-operation,
+is an experiment. Every new law is an experiment, rash or otherwise.
+And from all these experiments we do at least collect a certain number
+of general observations, which, though generally consigned to
+copybooks, are not without value. What is true, however, is that we
+cannot try such experiments as a man of science can sometimes try in
+his laboratory, where he can select and isolate the necessary elements
+in any given process, and decide, by subjecting them to proper
+conditions, how a definite question is to be answered. Our first
+experiments are all in the rough, so to speak, tried at haphazard, and
+each involving an indefinite number of irrelevant conditions. But there
+is a partial compensation. We cannot tabulate the countless experiments
+which have been tried with all their distracting varieties. Yet in a
+certain sense the answer is given for us. For the social structure at
+any period is in fact the net product of all the experiments that have
+been made by the individuals of which it is and has been composed.
+Therefore, so far as we can obtain some general views of the successive
+changes in social order which have been gradually and steadily
+developing themselves throughout the more noisy and conspicuous but
+comparatively superficial political disturbances, we can detect the
+true meaning of some general phenomena in which the actors themselves
+were unconscious of the determining causes. We can see more or less
+what were the general causes which have led to various forms of
+associations, to the old guilds, or the modern factory system, to the
+trades unions or the co-operative societies; and correcting and
+verifying our general results by a careful examination of the
+particular instances, approximate, vaguely it may be and distantly, to
+some such conception of the laws of development of different social
+tissues as, if not properly scientific, may yet belong to the
+scientific order of thought. Thus, when distracted by this or that
+particular demand, by promises of the millennium to be inaugurated
+to-morrow by an Act of Parliament, or threats of some social cataclysm
+to overwhelm us if we concede an inch to wicked agitators, we may
+succeed in placing ourselves at a higher point of view, from which it
+is possible to look over wider horizons, to regard what is happening
+to-day in its relations to slow processes of elaboration, and to form
+judgments based upon wide and systematic inquiry, which, if they do not
+entitle us to predict particular events, as an astronomer predicts an
+eclipse, will at least be a guide to sane and sober minds, and suggest
+at once a humbler appreciation of what is within our power, and--I
+think also--a more really hopeful anticipation of genuine progress in
+the future.
+
+All scientific inquiry is an interrogation of nature. We have, in
+Bacon's grand sententious phrase, to command nature by obeying. We
+learn what are the laws of social growth by living them. The great
+difficulty of the interrogation is to know what questions we are to
+put. Under the guidance of metaphysicians, we have too often asked
+questions to which no answer is conceivable, like children, who in
+first trying to think, ask, why are we living in the nineteenth
+century, why is England an island, or why does pain hurt, or why do two
+and two make four? The only answer is by giving the same facts in a
+different set of words, and that is a kind of answer to which
+metaphysical dexterity sometimes gives an air of plausibility. More
+frequently our ingenuity takes the form of sanctioning preconceived
+prejudices, by wrapping up our conclusion in our premisses, and then
+bringing it out triumphantly with the air of a rigorous deduction. The
+progress of social science implies, in the first place, the abandonment
+of the weary system of hunting for fruitful truths in the region of
+chimeras, and trying to make empty logical concepts do the work of
+observation of facts. It involves, again, a clear perception of the
+kind of questions which can be profitably asked, and the limits within
+which an answer, not of the illusory kind, can really be expected. And
+then we may come to see that, without knowing it, we have really been
+trying a vast and continuous experiment, since the race first began to
+be human. We have, blindly and unconsciously, constructed a huge
+organism which does, somehow or other, provide a great many millions of
+people with a tolerable amount of food and comfort. We have
+accomplished this, I say, unconsciously; for each man, limited to his
+own little sphere, and limited to his own interests, and guided by his
+own prejudices and passions, has been as ignorant of more general
+tendencies as the coral insect of the reef which it has helped to
+build. To become distinctly conscious of what it is that we have all
+been doing all this time, is one step in advance. We have obeyed in
+ignorance; and as obedience becomes conscious, we may hope, within
+certain narrow limits, to command, or, at least, to direct. An enlarged
+perception of what have been the previous results may enable us to see
+what results are possible, and among them to select what may be worthy
+ends. It is not to be supposed that we shall ever get beyond the need
+of constant and careful experiment. But, in proportion as we can
+cultivate the right frame of mind, as each member of society requires
+wider sympathies and a larger horizon, it is permissible to hope that
+the experiments may become more intelligent; that we shall not, as has
+so often been done, increase poverty by the very remedies which are
+intended to remove it, or diverge from the path of steady progressive
+development, into the chase of some wild chimera, which requires for
+its achievement only the radical alteration of all the data of
+experience. "Annihilate space and time, and make two lovers happy," was
+the modest petition of an enthusiast; and he would probably have been
+ready to join in the prayer, "make all men angels, and then we shall
+have a model society". Although in saying this my immediate moral is to
+preach sobriety, I do not intend to denounce enthusiasm, but to urge a
+necessity of organising enthusiasm. I only recommend people not to
+venture upon flying machines before they have studied the laws of
+mechanics; but I earnestly hope that some day we may be able to call a
+balloon as we now call a cab. To point out the method, and to admit
+that it is not laborious, is not to discourage aspiration, but to look
+facts in the face: not to preach abandonment of enthusiasm, but to urge
+that enthusiasm should be systematic, should lead men to study the
+conditions of success, and to make a bridge before they leap the gulf.
+
+
+
+
+THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.
+
+
+There seem to be at present many conflicting views as to the nature of
+Political Economy. There is a popular impression that Political
+Economy, or, at any rate, the so-called "classical" doctrine, the
+doctrine which was made most definite by Ricardo, and accepted with
+modifications by J. S. Mill, is altogether exploded. Their main
+doctrines, it is suggested, were little better than mares' nests, and
+we may set aside their pretensions to have founded an exact science.
+What, then, is to come in its place? Are we simply to admit that there
+is no certainty about economical problems, and to fall back upon mere
+empiricism? Everything,--shall we say?--is to be regarded as an open
+question. That is, perhaps, a common impression in the popular mind.
+Yet, on the other hand, we may find some very able thinkers applying
+mathematical formulæ to economics; and that seems to suppose, that
+within a certain region they obtain results comparable in precision and
+accuracy to those of the great physical sciences. The topic is a very
+wide one; and it would be presumptuous in me to speak dogmatically. I
+wish, however, to suggest certain considerations which may, perhaps, be
+worth taking into account; and, as I must speak briefly, I must not
+attempt to supply all the necessary qualifications. I can only attempt
+to indicate what seems to me to be the correct point of view, and
+apologise if I appear to speak too dogmatically, simply because I
+cannot waste time by expressions of diffidence, by reference to
+probable criticisms, or even by a full statement of my own reasons.
+
+A full exposition would have to define the sphere of Political Economy
+by describing its data and its methods. What do we assume, and how do
+we reason? A complete answer to these questions would indicate the
+limits within which we can hope for valid conclusions. I will first
+refer, briefly, to a common statement of one theory advocated by the
+old-fashioned or classical school. Economic doctrine, they have said,
+supposes a certain process of abstraction. We have to do with what has
+been called the "economic man". He is not, happily, the real man. He is
+an imaginary being, whose sole principle of action is to buy in the
+cheapest and sell in the dearest market: a man, more briefly, who
+always prefers a guinea--even a dirty guinea--to a pound of the
+cleanest. Economists reply to the remonstrances of those who deny the
+existence of such a monster, by adding that they do not for a moment
+suppose that men in general, or even tradesmen or stockbrokers, are in
+reality such beings,--mere money-making machines, stripped bare of all
+generous or altruistic sentiment--but simply that, as a matter of fact,
+most people do, _ceteris paribus_, prefer a guinea to a pound; and
+that so large a part of our industrial activity is carried on from
+motives of this kind, that we may obtain a fair approximation to the
+actual course of affairs by considering them as the sole motives. We
+shall not go wrong, for example, in financial questions, by assuming
+that the sole motive of speculators in the Stock Exchange is the desire
+to make money. Now, it is possible, perhaps, to justify this way of
+putting the case, by certain qualifications. I think, however, that, if
+strictly interpreted, it is apt to cover a serious fallacy. The
+"economic man" theory, we may say, assumes too much in one direction,
+and too little in another. It assumes too much if it is understood as
+implying that the desire for wealth is a purely selfish desire. A man
+may desire to make money in order simply to gratify his own sensual
+appetites. But he may also desire to be independent; and that may
+include a desire to do his part in the work of society, and probably
+does include some desire to relieve others of a burden. The wish to be
+self-supporting is not necessarily or purely "selfish". And obviously,
+too, one great motive in all such occupations is the desire to support
+a family, and one main inducement to saving is the desire to support it
+after your own death. Remove such motives, and half the impulses to
+regular industrial energy of all kinds would be destroyed. We must,
+therefore, give our "economic man" credit for motives referring to many
+interests besides those which he buttons into his own waistcoat. And
+therefore, too, as I have said, the assumption is insufficient. The
+very conception of economic science supposes all that is supposed, in
+the growth of a settled order of society. The purest type of the
+"economic man," as he is sometimes described, would be realised in the
+lowest savage, as sometimes described, who is absolutely selfish, who
+knocks his child on the head because it cries, and eats his aged parent
+if he cannot find a supply of roots. But such a being could only form
+herds, not societies. Political Economy only becomes conceivable when
+we suppose certain institutions to have been developed. It assumes,
+obviously, and in the first place, the institution of property; it
+becomes applicable, with less qualification, in proportion to the
+growth of the corresponding sentiments; it takes for granted all that
+highly elaborate set of instincts which induce me, when I want
+something, to produce an equivalent in exchange for it, instead of
+going out to take it by force. The more thorough the respect for
+property, the more applicable are rules of economics; and that respect
+implies a long training in that sense of other people's rights, which,
+unfortunately, is by no means so perfect as might be desired.
+
+It follows, then, that the economist really assumes more--and rightly
+assumes more--than he sometimes claims. He assumes what Adam Smith
+assumed at the opening of his great treatise: that is, the division of
+labour. But the division of labour implies the organisation of society.
+It implies that one man is growing corn while another is digging gold,
+because each is confident that he will be able to exchange the products
+of his own labour for the products of the other man's labour. This, of
+course, implies settled order, respect for contracts, the preservation
+of peace, and the abolition of force throughout the area occupied by
+the society. And this, again, is only possible in so far as certain
+political and ecclesiastical and military institutions have been
+definitely constructed. The economic assumption is really an
+assumption--not of a certain psychological condition of the average
+man, but--of the existence of a certain social mechanism. A complete
+science would clear up fully a problem which must occur often to all of
+us: How do you account for London? How is it that four or five millions
+of people manage to subsist on an area of a few square miles, which
+itself produces nothing? that other millions all over the world are
+engaged in providing for their wants? that food and clothes and fuel,
+in sufficient quantities to preserve life, are being distributed with
+tolerable regularity to each unit in this vast and apparently chaotic
+crowd? and that, somehow or other, we struggle on, well or ill, by the
+help of a gigantic commissariat, performing functions incomparably more
+complex than were ever needed for military purposes? The answer
+supposes that there is, as a matter of fact, a great industrial
+organisation which discharges the various functions of producing,
+exchanging, distributing, and so forth; and that its mutual relations
+are just as capable of being investigated and stated as the relations
+between different parts of an army. The men and officers do not wear
+uniforms; they are not explicitly drilled or subject to a definite code
+of discipline; and their rates of pay are not settled by any central
+authority. But there are capitalists, "undertakers" and labourers,
+merchants and retail dealers and contractors, and so forth, just as
+certainly as there are generals and privates, horse, foot, and
+artillery; and their mutual relations are equally definable. The
+economist has to explain the working of this industrial mechanism; and
+the thought may sometimes occur to us, that it is strange that he
+should find the task so difficult. Since we ourselves have made, or at
+any rate constitute, the mechanism, why should it be so puzzling to
+find out what it is? We are cooperating in a systematic production and
+distribution of wealth, and we surely ought not to find any
+impenetrable mystery in discovering what it is that we are doing every
+day of our lives. Certain economists writing within this century have
+often been credited with the discovery of the true theory of rent, or,
+which is equally good for my purpose, of starting a false theory. Yet
+landowners and agents had been letting farms and houses for
+generations; and surely they ought to have known what it was that they
+were themselves doing. One explanation of the difficulty is, that
+whereas an army is constituted by certain regulations of a central
+authority, the industrial army has grown up unconsciously and
+spontaneously. Its multitudinous members have only looked each at his
+own little circle; the labourer only thinks of his wages, and the
+capitalist of his profits, without considering his relations to the
+whole system of which he forms a part. The peasant drives his plough
+for wages, and buys his tea as if the tea fell like manna from the
+skies, without thinking of the curious relation into which he is thus
+brought with the natives of another hemisphere. The order which results
+from all these independent activities appeared to the older economists
+as an illustration of the doctrine of Final Causes. Providence had so
+ordered things that each man, by pursuing his own interests, pursued
+the interests of all. To a later school it appears rather as an
+illustration of the doctrine by which organisms are constructed through
+the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. In either
+case, it seems as though the mechanism were made rather for us than by
+us; that it is the product of conditions which we cannot control,
+instead of being an arrangement put together by conscious volitions.
+And, therefore, when the economist shows us what in fact are the
+existing arrangements and their mutual relations, he appears to be
+making a discovery of a scientific fact as much as if he were
+describing the anatomy of some newly-discovered animal or plant.
+
+The real assumption of the economist therefore is, as I think, simply
+the existence of a certain industrial organisation, which has a real
+existence as much as an army or a church; and there is no reason why
+his description should not be as accurate as the complexity of the
+facts allows. He is giving us the anatomy of society considered as a
+huge mechanism for producing and distributing wealth, and he makes an
+abstraction only in the sense that he is considering one set of facts
+at a time. The military writer would describe the constitution of an
+army without going into the psychological or political conditions which
+are of course implied, and without considering the soldiers in any
+other relations than those implied in their military services. In the
+same way, the economist describes the army of industry, and classifies
+its constituent parts. In order to explain their mutual relations, he
+has to make certain further assumptions, of which it would be rash to
+attempt a precise summary. He assumes as a fact, what has of course
+always been known, that scarcity implies dearness and plenty cheapness;
+that commodities flow to the markets where they will fetch the highest
+prices; that there is a certain gravitation towards equalisation of
+profits among capitalists, and of wages among labourers; so that
+capital or labour will flow towards the employments in which they will
+secure the highest reward. He endeavours to give the greatest accuracy
+to such formulæ, of which nobody, so far as I know, denies a certain
+approximate truth. So long as they hold good, his inferences, if
+logically drawn, will also hold good. They take for granted certain
+psychological facts, such as are implied in all statements about human
+nature. But the economist, as an economist, is content to take them for
+granted without investigating the ultimate psychological laws upon
+which they depend. Those laws, or rather their results, are a part of
+his primary data, although he may go so far into psychological problems
+as to try to state them more accurately. The selfishness or
+unselfishness of the economic man has to be considered by the
+psychologist or by the moralist; but the economist has only to consider
+their conclusions so far as they affect the facts. So long as it is
+true, for example, that scarcity causes dearness, that profits attract
+capital, that demand and supply tend to equalise each other, and so
+forth, his reasonings are justified; and the further questions of the
+ethical and psychological implications of these facts must be treated
+by a different science. The question of the play of economic forces
+thus generally reduces itself to a problem which may be thus stated:
+What are the conditions of industrial equilibrium? How must prices,
+rates of wages, and profit be related in order that the various classes
+concerned may receive such proportions of produce as are compatible
+with the maintenance of the existing system of organisation? If any
+specified change occurs, if production becomes easier or more
+difficult, if a tax be imposed, or a regulation of any kind affects
+previous conditions, what changes will be necessary to restore the
+equilibrium? These are the main problems of Political Economy. To
+solve, or attempt to solve them, we have to describe accurately the
+existing mechanism, and to suppose that it will regulate itself on the
+assumption which I have indicated as to demand and supply, the flow of
+capital and labour, and so forth. To go beyond these assumptions, and
+to justify them by psychological and other considerations, may be and
+is a most interesting task, but it takes us beyond the sphere of
+Economics proper.
+
+I must here diverge for a little, to notice the view of the school of
+economists which seems to regard scientific accuracy as attainable by a
+different path. Jevons, its most distinguished leader in England, says
+roundly, that political science must be a "mathematical science,"
+because "it deals throughout with quantities"; and we have been since
+provided with a number of formulæ, corresponding to this doctrine. The
+obvious general reply would be, that Political Economy cannot be an
+exact science because it also deals throughout with human desires. The
+objection is not simply that our data are too vague. That objection, as
+Jevons says, would, perhaps, apply to meteorology, of which nobody
+doubts that it is capable of being made an exact science. But why does
+nobody doubt that meteorology might become an exact science? Because we
+are convinced that all the data which would be needed are expressible
+in precise terms of time and space; we have to do with volumes, and
+masses, and weights, and forces which can be exactly measured by lines;
+and, in short, with things which could be exactly measured and counted.
+The data are, at present, insufficiently known, and possibly the
+problems which would result might be too complex for our powers of
+calculation. Still, if we could once get the data, we could express all
+relevant considerations by precise figures and numbers.
+
+Now, is this true of economic science? Within certain limits, it is
+apparently true: Ricardo used mathematical formulæ, though he kept to
+arithmetic, instead of algebra. When Malthus spoke of arithmetical and
+geometrical ratios, the statement, true or false, was, of course,
+capable of precise numerical expression, so soon as the ratios were
+assigned. So there was the famous formula proving a relation between
+the number of quarters of corn produced by a given harvest, and the
+number of shillings that would be given for a quarter of corn. If,
+again, we took the number of marriages corresponding to a given price
+of corn, we should obtain a formula connecting the number of marriages
+with the number of quarters of corn produced. The utility of
+statistics, of course, depends upon the fact that we do empirically
+discover some tolerably constant and simple numerical formulæ. Such
+statistical statements are useful, indeed, not only in economical, but
+in other inquiries, which are clearly beyond the reach of mathematics.
+The proportion of criminals in a given population, the number of
+suicides, or of illegitimate births, may throw some light upon judicial
+and political, and even religious or ethical problems. Nor are such
+formulæ useless simply because empirical. The law of gravitation, for
+example, is empirical. Nobody knows the cause of the observed tendency
+of bodies to gravitate to each other, and therefore no one can say how
+far the law which represents the tendency must be universal. Still, the
+fact that, so far as we have observed, it is invariably verified, and
+that calculations founded upon it enable us to bring a vast variety of
+phenomena under a single rule, is quite enough to justify astronomical
+calculation.
+
+If, therefore, we could find a mathematical formula which was, as a
+matter of fact, verifiable in economical problems about prices, and so
+forth, we should rightly apply to mathematicians to help us with their
+methods. But, not only do we not find any such simple relations, but we
+can see conclusive reasons for being sure that we can never find them.
+Take, for example, the case of the number of marriages under given
+conditions. I need hardly say that it is impossible for the ablest
+mathematician to calculate whether the individual A will marry the
+individual B. But, by taking averages, and so eliminating individual
+eccentricities, he might discover that, in a given country and at a
+given time, a rise of prices will diminish marriages in certain
+proportion. Our knowledge of human nature is sufficient to make that
+highly probable. But our knowledge also shows that such a change will
+act differently in different cases: there will be one formula for
+France, and another for England; one for Lancashire, and another for
+Cornwall; one for the rich, and another for the poor; and both the
+total wealth of a country and its distribution will affect the rule.
+Differences of national temperament, of political and social
+constitution, of religion and ecclesiastical organisation, will all
+have an effect; and, therefore, a formula true here and now must, in
+all probability, fail altogether elsewhere. The formula is, in the
+mathematical phrase, a function of so many independent variables, that
+it must be complex beyond all conception, if it takes them all into
+account; while it must yet be necessarily inaccurate if it does not take
+them into account. But, besides this, the conditions upon which the law
+obviously depends are not themselves capable of being accurately
+defined, and still less of being numerically stated. Ingenious thinkers
+have, indeed, tried to apply mathematical formulæ to psychology; but
+they have not got very far; and it may, I think, be assumed, without
+further argument, that while you have to deal both with psychological
+and sociological elements, with human desires, and with those desires
+modified by social relations, it is impossible to find any data which
+can be mathematically stated. There is no arithmetical measure of the
+forces of love, or hunger, or avarice, by which (among others) the whole
+problem is worked out.
+
+It seems to me, therefore, that we must accept the alternative which is
+only mentioned to be repudiated by Jevons, namely, that Political
+Economy, if not a "mathematical science," must be part of sociology. I
+should say that it clearly is so; for if we wish to investigate the
+cause of any of the phenomena concerned, and not simply to tabulate from
+observations, we are at once concerned with the social structure and
+with the underlying psychology. The mathematical methods are quite in
+their place when dealing with statistics. The rise and fall of prices,
+and so forth, can be stated precisely in figures; and, whenever we can
+discover some approximation to a mathematical law (as in the cases I
+have noticed) we may work out the results. If, for example, the price of
+a commodity under certain conditions bears a certain relation to its
+scarcity, we can discover the one fact when the other fact is given,
+remembering only that our conclusions are not more certain than our
+premisses, and that the observed law depends upon unknown and most
+imperfectly knowable conditions. Such results, again, may be very useful
+in various ways, as illustrative of the way in which certain laws will
+work if they hold good; and, again, as testing many of our general
+theories. If you have argued that the price of gold or silver cannot be
+fixed, the fact that it has been fixed under certain conditions will of
+course lead to a revision of your arguments. But I cannot help thinking
+that it is an illusion to suppose that such methods can justify the
+assertion that the science as a whole is "mathematical". Nothing,
+indeed, is easier than to speak as if you had got a mathematical theory.
+Let _x_ mean the desire for marriage and _y_ the fear of want, then
+the number of marriages is a function of _x_ and _y_, and I can
+express this by symbols as well as by ordinary words. But there is no
+magic about the use of symbols. Mathematical inquiries are not fruitful
+because symbols are used, but because the symbols represent something
+absolutely precise and assignable. The highest mathematical inquiries
+are simply ingenious methods of counting; and till you have got
+something precise to count, they can take you no further. I cannot help
+thinking that this fallacy imposes upon some modern reasoners; that they
+assume that they have got the data because they have put together the
+formulæ which would be useful if they had the data; and, in short, that
+you can get more out of a mill than you put into it; or, in other words,
+that more conclusions than really follow can be got out of premisses,
+simply because you show what would follow if you had the required
+knowledge. When the attempt is made, as it seems to me to be made
+sometimes, to deduce economical laws from some law of human desire--as
+from the simple theorem that equal increments of a commodity imply
+diminishing amounts of utility--I should reply not only that the
+numerical data are vaguely defined and incapable of being accurately
+stated, but that the attempt must be illusory because the conclusions
+are not determinable from the premisses. The economic laws do not follow
+from any simple rule about human desires, because they vary according to
+the varying constitution of human society; and any conclusion which you
+could obtain would be necessarily confined to the abstract man of whom
+the law is supposed to hold good. Every such method, therefore, if it
+could be successful, could only lead to conclusions about human desire
+in general, and could throw no light upon the special problems of
+political economy, which essentially depend upon varying industrial
+organisation.
+
+I will not, however, go further. You must either, I hold, limit
+Political Economy to the field of statistical inquiry, or admit that,
+as a part of sociology, it deals with questions altogether beyond the
+reach of mathematics. Like physiology, it is concerned with results
+capable of numerical statement. The number of beats of the pulse, or
+the number of degrees of temperature of the body, are important data in
+physiological problems. They may be counted, and may give rise to
+mathematically expressible formulæ. But the fact does not excuse us
+from considering the physical conditions of the organs which are in
+some way correlated with these observed phenomena; and, in the case of
+Political Economy, we have to do with the social structure, which is
+dependent upon forces altogether incapable of precise numerical
+estimates. That, at least, is my view; and I shall apply it to
+illustrate one remark, which must, I think, have often occurred to us.
+Political Economy, that is, often appears to have a negative rather
+than a positive value. It is exceedingly potent--so, at least, I
+think--in dispersing certain popular fallacies; but it fails when we
+regard it as a science which can give us positive concrete "laws". The
+general reason is, I should say, that although its first principles may
+be true descriptions of facts, and any denial of them, or any
+inconsistent applications of them, may lead us into error, they are yet
+far from sufficient descriptions. They omit some considerations which
+are relevant in any concrete case; and the facts which they describe
+are so complex that, even when we look at them consistently and follow
+the right clue, we cannot solve the complicated problems which occur.
+It may be worth while to insist a little upon this, and to apply it to
+one or two peculiar problems.
+
+Let me start from the ordinary analogy. Economic inquiry, I have
+suggested, describes a certain existing mechanism, which exists as
+really as the physical structure described by an anatomist. The
+industrial organism has, of course, many properties of which the
+economist, as such, does not take account. The labourer has affections,
+and imaginations, and opinions outside of his occupation as labourer;
+he belongs to a state, a church, a family, and so forth, which affect
+his whole life, including his industrial life. Is it therefore
+impossible to consider the industrial organisation separately? Not more
+impossible, I should reply, than to apply the same method in regard to
+the individual body. Were I to regard my stomach simply as a bag into
+which I put my food, I should learn very little about the process of
+digestion. Still, it is such a bag, and it is important to know where
+it is, and what are its purely mechanical relations to other parts of
+the body. My arms and legs are levers, and I can calculate the pressure
+necessary to support a weight on the hand, as though my bones and
+muscles were made of iron and whipcord. I am a piece of mechanism,
+though I am more, and all the principles of simple mechanics apply to
+my actions, though they do not, by themselves, suffice to explain the
+actions. The discovery of the circulation of the blood explained, as I
+understand, my structure as a hydraulic apparatus; and it was of vast
+importance, even though it told us nothing directly of the other
+processes necessarily involved. In this case, therefore, we have an
+instance of the way in which a set of perfectly true propositions may,
+so to speak, be imbedded in a larger theory, and may be of the highest
+importance, though they are not by themselves sufficient to solve any
+concrete problem. We cannot, that is, deduce the physiological
+principles from the mechanical principles, although they are throughout
+implied. But those principles are not the less true and useful in the
+detection of fallacies. They may enable us to show that an argument
+supposes facts which do not exist; or, perhaps, that it is, at any
+rate, inconsistent because it assumes one structure in its premisses,
+and another in its conclusions.
+
+I state this by way of illustration: but the value of the remark may be
+best tested by applying it to some economical doctrines. Let us take,
+for example, the famous argument of Adam Smith against what he called
+the mercantile theory. That theory, according to him, supposed that the
+wealth of nations, like the wealth of an individual, was in proportion
+to the amount of money in their possession. He insisted upon the theory
+that money, as it is useful solely for exchange, cannot be, in itself,
+wealth; that its absolute amount is a matter of indifference, because
+if every coin in existence were halved or doubled, it would discharge
+precisely the same function; and he inferred that the doctrine which
+tested the advantages of foreign commerce by the balance of trade or
+the net return of money, was altogether illusory. His theory is
+expounded in every elementary treatise on the subject. It may be urged
+that it was a mere truism, and therefore useless; or, again, that it
+does not enable us to deduce a complete theory of the functions of
+money. In regard to the first statement, I should reply that, although
+Smith probably misrepresented some of his antagonists, the fallacy
+which he exposed was not only current at the time, but is still
+constantly cropping up in modern controversies. So long as arguments
+are put forward which implicitly involve an erroneous, because
+self-contradictory, conception of the true functions of money, it is
+essential to keep in mind these first principles, however obvious they
+may be in an abstract statement. Euclid's axioms are useful because
+they are self-evident; and so long as people make mistakes in geometry,
+it will be necessary to expose their blundering by bringing out the
+contradictions involved. As Hobbes observed, people would dispute even
+geometrical axioms if they had an interest in doing so; and, certainly,
+they are ready to dispute the plainest doctrines about money. The other
+remark, that we cannot deduce a complete theory from the axiom is, of
+course, true. Thus, for example, although the doctrine may be
+unimpeachable, there is a difficulty in applying it to the facts. As
+gold has other uses besides its use as money, its value is not
+regulated exclusively by the principle assigned; as other things,
+again, such as bank-notes and cheques, discharge some of the functions
+of money, we have all manner of difficult problems as to what money
+precisely is, and how the most elementary principles will apply to the
+concrete facts. A very shrewd economist once remarked, listening to a
+metaphysical argument, "If there had been any money to be made out of
+it, we should have solved that question in the city long ago". Yet,
+there is surely money to be made out of a correct theory of the
+currency; and people in the city do not seem to have arrived at a
+complete agreement. In fact, such controversies illustrate the extreme
+difficulty which arises out of the complexity of the phenomena, even
+where the economic assumption of the action of purely money-loving
+activity is most nearly verified. The moral is, I fancy, that while
+inaccurate conclusions are extremely difficult, we can only hope to
+approach them by a firm grasp of the first principles revealed in the
+simplest cases.
+
+Even in such a case, we have also to notice how we have to make
+allowance for the intrusion of other than purely economic cases. The
+doctrine just noticed is, of course, closely connected with the theory
+of free trade. The free trade argument is, I should mention, perfectly
+conclusive in a negative sense. It demonstrates, that is, the fallacy
+which lurks in the popular argument for protection. That argument
+belongs to the commonest class of economic fallacies, which consists in
+looking at one particular result without considering the necessary
+implications. The great advantage of any rational theory is, that it
+forces us to look upon the industrial mechanism as a whole, and to
+trace out the correlative changes involved in any particular operation.
+It disposes of the theories which virtually propose to improve our
+supply of water by pouring a cup out of one vessel into another; and
+such theories have had considerable success in economy. So far, in
+short, as a protectionist really maintains that the advantage consists
+in accumulating money, without asking what will be the effect upon the
+value of money, or that it consists in telling people to make for
+themselves what they could get on better terms by producing something
+to exchange for it, his arguments may be conclusively shown to be
+contradictory. Such arguments, at least, cannot be worth considering.
+But, to say nothing of cases which may be put by an ingenious disputant
+in which this may not quite apply, we have to consider reasons which
+may be extra-economical. When it is suggested, for example, that the
+economic disadvantage is a fair price for political independence; or,
+on the other hand, that the stimulus of competition is actually good
+for the trade affected; or, again, that protection tends naturally to
+corruption; we have arguments which, good or bad, are outside the
+sphere of economics proper. To answer them we have to enter the field
+of political or ethical inquiry, where we have to take leave of
+tangible facts and precise measures.
+
+This is a more prominent element as we approach the more human side (if
+I may so call it) of Political Economy. Consider, for example, the
+doctrine which made so profound an impression upon the old
+school--Malthus's theory of population. It was summed up in the
+famous--though admittedly inaccurate--phrase, that population had a
+tendency to increase in a geometrical ratio, while the means of
+subsistence increased only in an arithmetical ratio. The food available
+for each unit would therefore diminish as the population increased. The
+so-called law obviously states only a possibility. It describes a
+"tendency," or, in other words, only describes what would happen under
+certain, admittedly variable, conditions. It showed how, in a limited
+area and with the efficiency of industry remaining unaltered, the
+necessary limits upon the numbers of the population would come into
+play. If, then, the law were taken, or in so far as it was taken, to
+assert that, in point of fact, the population must always be increasing
+in civilised countries to the stage at which the lowest class would be
+at starvation level, it was certainly erroneous. There are cases in
+which statesmen are alarmed by the failure of population to show its
+old elasticity, and beginning to revert to the view that an increased
+rate is desirable. It cannot be said to be even necessarily true that
+in all cases an increased population implies, of necessity, increased
+difficulty of support. There are countries which are inadequately
+peopled, and where greater numbers would be able to support themselves
+more efficiently because they could adopt a more elaborate
+organisation. Nor can it be said with certainty that some pressure may
+not, within limits, be favourable to ultimate progress by stimulating
+the energies of the people. In a purely stationary state people might
+be too content with a certain stage of comfort to develop their
+resources and attain a permanently higher stage. Whatever the
+importance of such qualifications of the principle, there is a most
+important conclusion to be drawn. Malthus or his more rigid followers
+summed up their teaching by one practical moral. The essential
+condition of progress was, according to them, the discouragement of
+early marriages. If, they held, people could only be persuaded not to
+produce families until they had an adequate prospect of supporting
+their families, everything would go right. We shall not, I imagine, be
+inclined to dispute the proposition, that a certain degree of prudence
+and foresight is a quality of enormous value; and that such a quality
+will manifest itself by greater caution in taking the most important
+step in life. What such reasoners do not appear to have appreciated
+was, the immense complexity and difficulty of the demand which they
+were making. They seem to have fancied that it was possible simply to
+add another clause--the clause "Thou shalt not marry"--to the accepted
+code of morals; and that, as soon as the evil consequences of the
+condemned behaviour were understood,--properly expounded, for example,
+in little manuals for the use of school children,--obedience to the new
+regulation would spontaneously follow. What they did not see, or did
+not fully appreciate, was the enormous series of other things--religious,
+moral, and intellectual--which are necessarily implied in altering the
+relation of the strongest human passion to the general constitution, and
+the impossibility of bringing home such an alteration, either by an act
+of legislation or by pointing out the bearing of a particular set of
+prudential considerations. Political Economy might be a very good thing;
+but its expositors were certainly too apt to think that it could by
+itself at once become a new gospel for mankind. Should we then infer
+from such criticisms that the doctrine of Malthus was false, or was of
+no importance? Nothing would be further from my opinion. I hold, on the
+contrary, that it was of the highest importance, because it drew
+attention to a fact, the recognition of which was essential to all sound
+reasoning on social questions. The fact is, that population is not to be
+treated as a fixed quantity, but as capable of rapid expansion; and that
+this elasticity may at any moment require consideration, and does in
+fact give the explanation of many important phenomena. The main fact
+which gave importance to Malthus's writings was the rapid and enormous
+increase of pauperism during the first quarter of this century. The
+charitable and sentimental writers of the day were alarmed, but proposed
+to meet the evil by a reckless increase of charity, either of the
+official or the private variety. Pitt, we know, declared (though he
+qualified the statement) that to be the father of a large family should
+be a source of honour, not of obloquy; and the measures adopted under
+the influence of such notions did in fact tend to diminish all sense of
+responsibility, encouraged people to rely upon the parish for the
+support of their children, and brought about a state of things which
+alarmed all intelligent observers. The greatest check to the evil was
+given by the new Poor-law, adopted under the influence of the principles
+advocated by Malthus and his friends. His achievement, then, was not
+that he laid down any absolutely correct scientific truth, or even said
+anything which had not been more or less said by many judicious people
+before his time; but that he encouraged the application of a more
+systematic method of reasoning upon the great problem of the time.
+Instead of simply giving way to the first kindly impulse, abolishing a
+hardship here and distributing alms elsewhere, he substantially argued
+that society formed a complex organism, whose diseases should be
+considered physiologically, their causes explained, and the appropriate
+remedies considered in all their bearings. We must not ask simply
+whether we were giving a loaf to this or that starving man, or indulge
+in _à priori_ reasoning as to the right of every human being to be
+supported by others; but treat the question as a physician should treat
+a disease, and consider whether, on the whole, the new regulations would
+increase or diminish the causes of the existing evils. He did not,
+therefore, so much proclaim a new truth, as induce reformers to place
+themselves at a new and a more rational point of view. The so-called law
+of population which he announced might be in various ways inaccurate,
+but the announcement made it necessary for rational thinkers to take
+constantly into account considerations which are essential in any
+satisfactory treatment of the great problems. If it were right to
+consider pauperism as a gulf of fixed dimensions, we might hope to fill
+it by simply taking a sufficient quantity of wealth from the richer
+classes. If, as Malthus urged, this process had a tendency to enlarge
+the dimensions of the gulf itself, it was obvious that the whole problem
+required a more elaborate treatment. By impressing people with this
+truth, and by showing how, in a great variety of cases, the elasticity
+of the population was a most important factor in determining the
+condition of the people, Malthus did a great service, and introduced a
+more systematic and scientific method of discussing the immensely
+important questions involved.
+
+I will very briefly try to indicate one further application of economic
+principles. A critical point in the modern development of the study was
+marked by Mill's abandonment of the so-called "wage fund theory". That
+doctrine is now generally mentioned with contempt, as the most
+conspicuous instance of an entirely exploded theory. It is often said
+that it is either a falsity, or a barren truism. I am not about to
+argue the point, observing only that some very eminent Economists
+consider that it was rather inadequate than fallacious; and that to me
+it has always seemed that the theory which has really been confuted is
+not so much a theory which was ever actually held by Economists, as a
+formula into which they blundered when they tried to give a
+quasi-scientific definition of their meaning. It is common enough for
+people to argue sensibly, when the explicit statements of their
+argument may be altogether erroneous. At any rate, I think it has been
+a misfortune that a good phrase has been discredited; and that Mill's
+assailants, in exposing the errors of that particular theory of a "wage
+fund," seemed to imply that the whole conception of a "wage fund" was a
+mistake. For the result has been, that the popular mind seems to regard
+the amount spent in wages as an arbitrary quantity; as something which,
+as Malthus put it, might be fixed at pleasure by her Majesty's justices
+of the peace. Because the law was inaccurately stated, it is assumed
+that there is no law at all, and that the share of the labourers in the
+total product of industry might be fixed without reference to the
+effect of a change upon the general organisation. Now, if the wage fund
+means the share which, under existing circumstances, actually goes to
+the class dependent upon wages, it is of the highest importance to
+discover how that share is actually determined; and it does not even
+follow that a doctrine which is in some sense a truism may not be a
+highly important doctrine. One of the ablest of the old Economists,
+Nassan Senior, after laying down his version of the theory, observes
+that it is "so nearly self-evident" that if Political Economy were a
+new science, it might be taken for granted. But he proceeds to
+enumerate seven different opinions, some of them held by many people,
+and others by writers of authority, with which it is inconsistent. And,
+without following his arguments, this statement suggests what I take to
+be a really relevant defence of his reasons. At the time when the
+theory was first formulated, there were many current doctrines which
+were self-contradictory, and which could, therefore, best be met by the
+assertion of a truism. When the peace of 1815 brought distress instead
+of plenty, some people, such as Southey, thought it a sufficient
+explanation to say that the manufacturer had lost his best customer,
+because the Government wanted fewer guns and less powder. They chose to
+overlook the obvious fact that a customer who pays for his goods by
+taking money out of the pockets of the seller, is not an unmixed
+blessing. Then, there was the theory of general "gluts," and of what is
+still denounced as over-production. The best cure for commercial
+distress would be, as one disputant asserted, to burn all the goods in
+our warehouses. It was necessary to point out that this theory (when
+stated in superficial terms) regarded superabundance of wealth as the
+cause of universal poverty. Another common theory was the evil effect
+of manufacturers in displacing work. The excellent Robert Owen stated
+it as an appalling fact, that the cotton manufacture supplanted the
+labour of a hundred (perhaps it was two hundred) millions of men. He
+seems to assume that, if the machinery had not been there, there would
+still have been wages for the hundred millions. The curious confusion,
+indeed, which leads us to speak of men wanting work, when what we
+really mean is that they want wages, shows the tenacity of an old
+fallacy. Mandeville argued long ago that the fire of London was a
+blessing, because it set at work so many carpenters, plumbers, and
+glaziers. The Protestant Reformation had done less good than the
+invention of hooped petticoats, which had provided employment for so
+many milliners. I shall not insult you by exposing fallacies; and yet,
+so long as they survive, they have to be met by truisms. While people
+are proposing to lengthen their blankets by cutting off one end to sew
+upon the other, one has to point out that the total length remains
+constant. Now, I fancy that, in point of fact, these fallacies are
+often to be found in modern times. I read, the other day, in the
+papers, an argument, adduced by some advocate, on behalf of the Eight
+Hours Bill. He wished, he said, to make labour dear, and would
+therefore make it scarce. This apparently leads to the conclusion that
+the less people work the more they will get, which I take to be a
+fallacy. So, to mention nothing else, it is still apparently a common
+argument in favour of protection in America, that the native labourer
+requires to be supported against the pauperised labour of Europe.
+Americans in general are to be made richer by paying higher prices, and
+by being forced to produce commodities which they could get with less
+labour employed on the production of other things in exchange. I will
+not go further; for I think that no one who reads the common arguments
+can be in want of sufficient illustrations of popular fallacies. This,
+I say, is some justification for dwelling upon the contrary truisms. I
+admit, indeed, that even these fallacies may apply to particular cases
+in which they may represent partial truths; and I also agree that, as
+sometimes stated, the wage fund theory was not only a truism, but a
+fruitless truism. It was, however, as I believe, an attempt to
+generalise a very pertinent and important doctrine, as to the way in
+which the actual competition in which labourers and employers are
+involved, actually operates. If so, it requires rather modification
+than indiscriminate denunciation; and it is, I believe, so treated by
+the best modern Economists.
+
+I consider, then, that the Economists were virtually attempting to
+describe systematically the main relations of the industrial mechanism.
+They showed what were the main functions which it, in fact, discharges.
+Their theory was sufficient to expose many errors, especially those
+which arise from looking solely at one part of a complex process, and
+neglecting the implied reactions. It enabled them to point out the
+inconsistencies and actual contradictions involved in many popular
+arguments, which are still very far from being destroyed. Their main
+error--apart from any particular logical slips--was, namely, that when
+they had laid down certain principles which belong properly to the
+prolegomena of the science, and which are very useful when regarded as
+providing logical tests of valid reasoning, they imagined that they had
+done a great deal more, and that the desired science was actually
+constituted. They laid down three or four primary axioms, such as the
+doctrine that men desire wealth, and fancied that the whole theory
+could be deduced from them. This, if what I have said be true, was
+really to misunderstand what they were really doing. It was to suppose
+that you could obtain a description of social phenomena without
+examining the actual structure of society; and was as erroneous as to
+suppose that you could deduce physiological truths from a few general
+propositions about the mechanical relations of the skeleton. Such
+criticisms have been made by the historical school of Economists; and
+I, at least, can fully accept their general view. I quite agree that
+the old assumptions of the older school were frequently unjustifiable;
+nor can I deny that they laid them down with a tone of superlative
+dogmatism, which was apt to be very offensive, and which was not
+justified by their position. Moreover, I entirely agree that the
+progress of economic science, and of all other moral sciences, requires
+a historical basis; and that we should make a very great blunder if we
+thought that the creation of an economic man would justify us in
+dispensing with an investigation of concrete facts, both of the present
+day and of earlier stages of industrial evolution. But to this there is
+an obvious qualification. What do we mean by investigating facts? It
+seems to be a very simple rule, but it leads us at once to great
+difficulties. So, as Mill and later writers have very rightly asked,
+how are we to settle even the most obvious questions in inquiries
+where, for obvious reasons, we cannot make experiments, and where we
+have not such a set of facts as would spontaneously give us the truths
+which we might seek by experiment? Take, as Mill suggested, such a
+question as free trade. We cannot get two countries alike in all else,
+and differing only in respect to their adoption or rejection of a
+protective tariff. Anything like a thoroughgoing system of free trade
+has been tried in England alone; and the commercial prosperity of the
+country since its adoption has been affected by innumerable conditions,
+so that it is altogether impossible to isolate the results which are to
+be attributed to the negative condition of the absence of protection.
+Briefly, the result is that the phenomena with which we have to deal
+are so complex, and our power of arranging them so as to unravel the
+complexity is so limited, that the direct method of observation breaks
+down altogether. Mill confessed the necessity of applying a different
+method, which he described with great ability, and which substantially
+amounts to the method of the older Economists. If, with some writers of
+the historical school, we admit the objections which apply to this
+method, we seem to be reduced to a hopeless state of uncertainty. A
+treatise on Political Economy becomes nothing but a miscellaneous
+collection of facts, with no definite clue or uniform method of
+reasoning. I must beg, in conclusion, to indicate what, so far as I can
+guess, seems to be the view suggested in presence of this difficulty.
+
+If I am asked whether Political Economy, understood, for example, as
+Mill understood it, is to be regarded as a science, I should have to
+admit that I could not simply reply, Yes. To say nothing of any errors
+in his logic, I should say that I do not believe that it gives us
+sufficient guidance even in regard to economic phenomena. We could not,
+that is, deduce from the laws accepted by Economists the necessary
+working of any given measure--say, the effect of protection or free
+trade, or, still more, the making of a poor-law system. Such problems
+involve elements of which the Economist, purely as an Economist, is an
+incompetent judge; and the further we get from those questions in which
+purely economical considerations are dominant, towards those in which
+other factors become relevant,--from questions as to currency, for
+example, to questions as to the relations of capitalists and
+labourers,--the greater the inadequacy of our methods. But I also hold
+that Political Economists may rightly claim a certain scientific
+character for their speculations. If their ultimate aim is to frame a
+science of economics which shall be part of the science--not yet
+constituted--of sociology, then I should say that what they have really
+done--so far as they have reasoned accurately--has been to frame an
+essential part of the prolegomena to such a science. The "laws" which
+they have tried to formulate are not laws which, even if established,
+would enable us to predict the results of any given action; but they
+are laws which would have to be taken into account in attempting any
+such prediction. And this is so, I think, because the laws are
+descriptions--within limits accurate descriptions--of actually existing
+facts as to the social mechanism. They are not mere abstract
+hypotheses, in the sense sometimes attached to that phrase; but
+accounts of the plan upon which the industrial arrangements of
+civilised countries are, as a matter of fact, constructed. Such a
+classification and systematic account of facts is, as I should suggest,
+absolutely necessary for any sound historical method. Facts are not
+simply things lying about, which anybody can pick up and describe for
+the mere pains of collecting them. We cannot even see a fact without
+reflection and observation and judgment; and to arrange them in an
+order which shall be both systematic and fruitful, to look at them from
+that point of view in which we can detect the general underlying
+principles, is, in all cases, an essential process before we can begin
+to apply a truly historical method. Anything, it is said, may be proved
+by facts; and that is painfully true until we have the right method of
+what has been called "colligating" facts. The Catholic and the
+Protestant, the Conservative and the Radical, the Individualist and the
+Socialist, have equal facility in proving their own doctrines with
+arguments, which habitually begin, "All history shows". Printers should
+be instructed always to strike out that phrase as an erratum; and to
+substitute, "I choose to take for granted". In order to judge between
+them we have to come to some conclusion as to what is the right method
+of conceiving of history, and probably to try many methods before
+reaching that which arranges the shifting and complicated chaos of
+phenomena in something like an intelligible order. A first step and a
+necessary basis, as I believe, for all the more complex inquiries will
+have to be found by disentangling the various orders of laws (if I may
+so speak), and considering by themselves those laws of industrial
+growth which are nearest to the physical sciences in certain respects,
+and which, within certain limits, can be considered apart, inasmuch as
+they represent the working of forces which are comparatively
+independent of forces of a higher order. What I should say for
+Political Economists is that they have done a good deal in this
+direction; that they have explained, and, I suppose, with considerable
+accuracy, what is the actual nature of the industrial mechanism; that
+they have explained fairly its working in certain cases where the
+economic are practically also the sole or dominant motives; and that
+they have thus laid down certain truths which require attention even
+when we take into account the play of other more complex and, as we
+generally say, higher motives. We may indeed hope and believe that
+society will ultimately be constituted upon a different system; and
+that for the organisation which has spontaneously and unconsciously
+developed itself, another will be substituted which will correspond
+more closely to some principles of justice, and give freer scope for
+the full development of the human faculties. That is a very large
+question: I only say that, in any case, all genuine progress consists
+in a development of institutions already existing, and therefore that a
+full understanding of the working of the present system is essential to
+a rational consideration of possible improvements. The Socialist may
+look forward to a time--let us hope that it may come soon!--when nobody
+will have any grievances. But his schemes will be the better adapted
+for the realisation of his hopes in proportion as he has fully
+understood what is the part played by each factor of the existing
+system; what is its function, and how that function may be more
+efficiently discharged by any substitute. Only upon that condition can
+he avoid the common error of inventing some scheme which is in
+sociology what schemes for perpetual motion are in mechanics; plans for
+making everything go right by condemning some existing portion of the
+system without fully understanding how it has come into existence, and
+what is the part which it plays in the whole. I think myself that a
+study of the good old orthodox system of Political Economy is useful in
+this sense, even where it is wrong; because at least it does give a
+system, and therefore forces its opponents to present an alternative
+system, instead of simply cutting a hole in the shoe when it pinches,
+or striking out the driving wheel because it happens to creak
+unpleasantly. And I think so the more because I cannot but observe that
+whenever a real economic question presents itself, it has to be argued
+on pretty much the old principles, unless we take the heroic method of
+discarding argument altogether. I should be the last to deny that the
+old Political Economy requires careful revision and modification, and
+equally slow to deny that the limits of its applicability require to be
+carefully defined. But, with these qualifications, I say, with equal
+conviction, that it does lay down principles which require study and
+consideration, for the simple reason that they assert the existence of
+facts which are relevant and important in all the most vitally
+interesting problems of to-day.
+
+
+
+
+THE MORALITY OF COMPETITION.
+
+
+When it has occurred to me to say--as I have occasionally said--that,
+to my mind, the whole truth lies neither with the individualist nor
+with his antagonist, my friends have often assured me that I was
+illogical. Of two contradictory principles, they say, you must take
+one. There are cases, I admit, in which this remark applies. It is
+true, or it is not true, that two and two make four. We cannot, in
+arithmetic, adopt Sir Roger de Coverley's conciliatory view, that there
+is much to be said on both sides. But this logical rule supposes that,
+in point of fact, the two principles apply to the same case, and are
+mutually exclusive. I also think that the habit of taking for granted
+that social problems are reducible to such an alternative, is the
+source of innumerable fallacies. I hold that, as a rule, any absolute
+solution of such problems is impossible; and that a man who boasts of
+being logical, is generally announcing his deliberate intention to be
+one-sided. He is confusing the undeniable canon that of two
+contradictory propositions one must be true, with the assumption that
+two propositions are really contradictory. The apparent contradiction
+may be illusory. Society, says the individualist, is made up of all its
+members. Certainly: if all Englishmen died, there would be no English
+race. But it does not follow that every individual Englishman is not
+also the product of the race. Society, says the Socialist, is an
+organic whole. I quite admit the fact; but it does not follow that, as
+a whole, it has any qualities or aims independent of the qualities and
+aims of the constituent parts. Metaphysicians have amused themselves,
+in all ages, with the puzzle about the many and the one. Perhaps they
+may find contradictions in the statement that a human society is both
+one and many; a unit and yet complex; but I am content to assume that
+unless we admit the fact, we shall get a very little way in sociology.
+
+Society, we say, is an organism. That implies that every part of a
+society is dependent upon the other parts, and that although, for
+purposes of argument, we may find it convenient to assume that certain
+elements remain fixed while others vary, we must always remember that
+this is an assumption which, in the long run, never precisely
+corresponds to the facts. We may, for example, in economical questions,
+attend simply to the play of the ordinary industrial machinery, without
+taking into account the fact that the industrial machinery is
+conditioned by the political and ecclesiastical constitution, by the
+whole social order, and, therefore, by the acceptance of corresponding
+ethical, or philosophical or scientific creeds. The method is
+justifiable so long as we remember that we are using a logical
+artifice; but we blunder if we take our hypothesis for a full statement
+of the actual facts. We are then tempted, and it is, perhaps, the
+commonest of all sources of error in such inquiries, to assume that
+conditions are absolute which are really contingent; or, to attend only
+to the action, without noticing the inevitable reactions of the whole
+system of institutions. And I would suggest, that from this follows a
+very important lesson in such inquiries. To say that this or that part
+of a system is bad, is to say, by implication, that some better
+arrangement is possible consistently with our primary assumptions. In
+other words, we cannot rationally propose simply to cut out one part of
+a machine, dead or living, without considering the effect of the
+omission upon all the other dependent parts. The whole system is
+necessarily altered. What, we must therefore ask, is the tacit
+implication as well as what is the immediate purpose of a change? May
+not the bad effect be a necessary part of the system to which we also
+owe the good; or necessary under some conditions? It is always,
+therefore, a relevant question, what is the suggested alternative? We
+can then judge whether the removal of a particular evil is or is not to
+be produced at a greater cost than it is worth; whether it would be a
+process, say, of really curing a smoky chimney or of stopping the
+chimney altogether, and so abolishing not only the smoke but the fire.
+
+I propose to apply this to the question of "competition". Competition
+is frequently denounced as the source of social evils. The complaint is
+far from a new one. I might take for my text a passage from J. S.
+Mill's famous chapter on the probable future of the labouring classes.
+Mill, after saying that he agrees with the Socialists in their
+practical aims, declares his utter dissent from their declamations
+against competition. "They forget," he says, "that where competition is
+not, monopoly is; and that monopoly, in all its forms, is the taxation
+of the industrious for the support of indolence, if not of plunder."
+That suggests my question: If competition is bad, what is good? What is
+the alternative to competition? Is it, as Mill says, monopoly, or is
+any third choice possible? If it is monopoly, do you defend monopoly,
+or only monopoly in some special cases? I opened, not long ago, an old
+book of caricatures, in which the revolutionary leader is carrying a
+banner with the double inscription, "No monopoly! No competition!" The
+implied challenge--how can you abolish both?--seemed to me to require a
+plain answer. Directly afterwards I then took up the newspaper, and
+read the report of an address upon the prize-day of a school. The
+speaker dwelt in the usual terms upon the remorseless and crushing
+competition of the present day, which he mentioned as an incitement to
+every boy to get a good training for the struggle. The moral was
+excellent; but it seemed to me curious that the speaker should be
+denouncing competition in the very same breath with proofs of its
+influence in encouraging education. When I was a lad, a clever boy and
+a stupid boy had an equal chance of getting an appointment to a public
+office. The merit which won a place might be relationship to a public
+official, or perhaps to a gentleman who had an influence in the
+constituency of the official. The system was a partial survival of the
+good old days in which, according to Sam Weller, the young nobleman got
+a position because his mother's uncle's wife's grandfather had once
+lighted the King's pipe. The nobleman, I need hardly add, considered
+this as an illustration of the pleasant belief, "Whatever is, is
+right". As we had ceased to accept that opinion in politics, offices
+were soon afterwards thrown open to competition, with the general
+impression that we were doing justice and opening a career to merit.
+That the resulting system has grave defects is, I think, quite
+undeniable; but so far as it has succeeded in determining that the men
+should be selected for public duty, for their fitness, and for nothing
+else, it is surely a step in advance which no one would now propose to
+retrace. And yet it was simply a substitution of competition for
+monopoly. As it comes into wider operation, some of us begin to cry out
+against competition. The respectable citizen asks, What are we to do
+with our boys? The obvious reply is, that he really means, What are we
+to do with our fools? A clever lad can now get on by his cleverness;
+and of course those who are not clever are thrust aside. That is a
+misfortune, perhaps, for them; but we can hardly regard it as a
+misfortune for the country. And clearly, too, pressure of this kind is
+likely to increase. We have come to believe that it is a main duty of
+the nation to provide general education. When the excellent Miss Hannah
+More began to spread village schools, she protested warmly that she
+would not teach children anything which would tend to make the poor
+discontented with their station. They must learn to read the Bible, but
+she hoped that they would stop short of such knowledge as would enable
+them to read Tom Paine. Now, Hannah More deserves our gratitude for her
+share in setting the ball rolling; but it has rolled far beyond the
+limits she would have prescribed. We now desire not only that every
+child in the country should be able to acquire the elements of learning
+at least; but, further, we hope that ladders may be provided by which
+every promising child may be able to climb beyond the elements, and to
+acquire the fullest culture of which his faculties are capable. There
+is not only no credit at the present day in wishing so much, but it is
+discreditable not to do what lies in one's power to further its
+accomplishment. But, then, is not that to increase enormously the field
+of competition? I, for example, am a literary person, after a fashion;
+I have, that is, done something to earn a living by my pen. I had the
+advantage at starting of belonging to the small class which was well
+enough off to send its children to the best schools and universities.
+That is to say, I was one of the minority which had virtually a
+monopoly of education, and but for that circumstance I should in all
+probability have taken to some possibly more honest, but perhaps even
+worse paid, occupation. Every extension of the margin of education,
+everything which diffuses knowledge and intellectual training through a
+wider circle, must increase the competition among authors. If every man
+with brains, whether born in a palace or a cottage is to have a chance
+of making the best of them, the capacity for authorship, and therefore
+the number of competitors, will be enormously spread. It may also, we
+will hope, increase the demand for their work. The same remark applies
+to every profession for which intellectual culture is a qualification.
+Do we regret the fact? Would we sentence three-quarters of the nation
+to remain stupid, in order that the fools in the remaining quarter may
+have a better chance? That would be contrary to every democratic
+instinct, to the highest as well as the lowest. But if I say, every
+office and every profession shall be open to every man; success in it
+shall depend upon his abilities and merits; and, further, every child
+in the country shall have the opportunity of acquiring the necessary
+qualifications, what is that but to accept and to stimulate the spirit
+of competition? What, I ask, is the alternative? Should people be
+appointed by interest? Or is nobody to be anxious for official or
+professional or literary or commercial success, but only to develop his
+powers from a sense of duty, and wait till some infallible observer
+comes round and says, "Friend, take this position, which you deserve"?
+Somehow I do not think that last scheme practicable at present. But,
+even in that case, I do not see how the merits of any man are to be
+tested without enabling him to prove by experiment that he is the most
+meritorious person; and, if that be admitted, is not every step in
+promoting education, in equalising, therefore, the position from which
+men start for the race, a direct encouragement to competition?
+
+Carlyle was fond of saying that Napoleon's great message to mankind was
+the declaration that careers should be open to talent, or the tools
+given to him who could use them. Surely that was a sound principle; and
+one which, so far as I can see, cannot be applied without stimulating
+competition. The doctrine, indeed, is unpalatable to many Socialists.
+To me, it seems to be one to which only the cowardly and the indolent
+can object in principle. Will not a society be the better off, in which
+every man is set to work upon the tasks for which he is most fitted? If
+we allowed our teaching and our thinking to be done by blockheads; our
+hard labour to be done by men whose muscles were less developed than
+their brains; made our soldiers out of our cowards, and our sailors out
+of the sea-sick,--should we be better off? It seems, certainly, to me,
+that whatever may be the best constitution of society, one mark of it
+will be the tendency to distribute all social functions according to
+the fitness of the agents; to place trust where trust is justifiable,
+and to give the fullest scope for every proved ability, intellectual,
+moral, and physical. Of course, such approximation to this result, as
+we can observe in the present order of things, is very imperfect. Many
+of the most obvious evils in the particular system of competition now
+adopted, may be summed up in the statement, that the tests according to
+which success is awarded, are not so contrived as to secure the success
+of the best competitors. Some of them, for example, are calculated to
+give an advantage to the superficial and the showy. But that is to say
+that they are incompatible with the true principle which they were
+intended to embody; and that we should reform our method, not in the
+direction of limiting competition, but in the direction of so framing
+our system that it may be a genuine application of Carlyle's doctrine.
+In other words, in all the professions for which intellectual
+excellence is required, the conditions should be such as to give the
+best man the best chance, as far as human arrangements can secure that
+object. What other rule can be suggested? Competition, in this sense,
+means the preservation of the very atmosphere which is necessary to
+health; and to denounce it is either to confirm the most selfish and
+retrograde principles, or to denounce something which is only called
+competition by a confusion of ideas. How easy such a confusion may be,
+is obvious when we look at the ordinary language about industrial
+competition. We are told that wages are kept down by competition. To
+this Mill replied in the passage I have quoted, and, upon his own
+theory, at any rate, replied with perfect justice, that they were also
+kept up by competition. The common language upon the subject is merely
+one instance of the fallacies into which men fall when they personify
+an abstraction. Competition becomes a kind of malevolent and
+supernatural being, to whose powers no conceivable limits are assigned.
+It is supposed to account for any amount of degradation. Yet if, by
+multiplying their numbers, workmen increase supply, and so lower the
+price of labour, it follows, conversely, by the very same reasoning,
+that if they refused to multiply, they would diminish the supply and
+raise the price. The force, by its very nature, operates as certainly
+in one direction as in the other. If, again, there is competition among
+workmen, there is competition among capitalists. In every strike, of
+course, workmen apply the principle, and sometimes apply it very
+effectually, in the attempt to raise their wages. It was often argued,
+indeed, that in this struggle, the employer possessed advantages partly
+due to his power of forming tacit combinations. The farmers in a
+parish, or the manufacturers in a business, were pledged to each other
+not to raise the rate of wages. If that be so, you again complain, not
+of competition, but of the want of competition; and you agree that the
+labourer will benefit, as in fact, I take it, he has undoubtedly
+benefited, by freer competition among capitalists, or by the greater
+power of removing his own labour to better markets. In such cases, the
+very meaning of the complaint is not that there is competition, but
+that the competition is so arranged as to give an unfair advantage to
+one side. And a similar misunderstanding is obviously implied in other
+cases. The Australian or American workman fears that his wages will be
+lowered by the competition of the Chinese; and the Englishman protests
+against the competition of pauper aliens. Let us assume that he is
+right in believing that such competition will tend to lower his wages,
+whatever the moral to be drawn from the fact. Briefly, denunciations of
+"competition" in this sense are really complaints that we do not
+exclude the Chinese immigrant and therefore give a monopoly to the
+native labourer. That may be a good thing for him, and if it be not a
+good thing for the Chinaman who is excluded from the field, we perhaps
+do not care very much about the results to China. We are so much better
+than the heathen that we need not bother about their interests. But, of
+course, the English workman, when he complains of the intensity of
+competition, does not propose to adopt the analogous remedy of giving a
+monopoly to one section of our own population. The English pauper is
+here; we do not want to suppress him, but only to suppress his
+pauperism; and he certainly cannot be excluded from any share in the
+fund devoted to the support of labour. The evil, therefore, of which we
+complain is primarily the inadequacy of the support provided,
+not,--though that may also be complained of,--the undesirable method by
+which those funds are distributed. In other words, the complaint may so
+far be taken to mean that there are too many competitors, not that,
+given the competitors, their shares are determined by competition,
+instead of being determined by monopoly or by some other principle.
+
+We have therefore to inquire whether any principle can be suggested
+which will effect the desired end, and which will yet really exclude
+competition. The popular suggestion is that the remedy lies in
+suppressing competition by equalising the prizes. If no prizes are to
+be won, there will so far be less reason for competing. Enough may be
+provided for all by simply taking something from those who have too
+much. Now, I may probably assume that we all agree in approving the
+contemplated end--a greater equality of wealth, and especially an
+elevation of the lower classes to a higher position in the scale of
+comfort. Every social reformer, whatever his particular creed, would
+probably agree that some of us are too rich, and that a great many are
+too poor. But we still have to ask, in what sense it is conceivable
+that a real suppression of competition can contribute to the desired
+end. It is obvious that when we denounce competition we often mean not
+that it is to be abolished, but that it is to be regulated and limited
+in its application. So, for example, people sometimes speak as if
+competition were the antithesis to co-operation. But I need hardly say
+that individualists, as well as their opponents, may legitimately sing
+the praises of co-operation. Nobody was more forward than Mill, for
+example, and Mill's followers, in advocating the principles of the
+early co-operative societies. He and they rejoiced to believe that the
+co-operative societies had revealed unsuspected virtues and capacities
+in the class from which they sprang; that they had done much to raise
+the standard of life and to extend sympathy and human relations among
+previously disconnected units of society. But it is, of course, equally
+obvious that they have grown up in a society which supposes free
+competition in every part of its industrial system; that co-operative
+societies, so far as the outside world is concerned, have to buy in the
+cheapest and sell in the dearest market; that the rate of wages of
+their members is still fixed by competition; and that they encourage
+habits of saving and forethought which presuppose that each man is to
+have private ends of his own. In what sense, then, can co-operation
+ever be regarded as really opposed to competition? Competition may
+exist among groups of men just as much as among individuals: a state of
+war is not less a state of war if it is carried on by regiments and
+armies, instead of by mere chaotic struggles in which each man fights
+for his own hand. Competition does not mean that there should be no
+combination, but that there should be no monopoly. So long as a trade
+or a profession is open to every one who chooses to take it up, its
+conduct will be equally regulated by competition, whether it be
+competition as between societies or individuals, or whether its profits
+be divided upon one system or another between the various classes
+concerned. Co-operators, of course, may look forward to a day in which
+society at large will be members of a single co-operative society; or,
+again, to a time in which every industrial enterprise may be conducted
+by the State. Supposing any such aspiration to be realised, the
+question still remains, whether they would amount to the abolition or
+still only to the shifting of the incidence of competition. Socialists
+tell us that hitherto the labourer has not had his fair share of the
+produce of industry. The existing system has sanctioned a complicated
+chicanery, by which one class has been enabled to live as mere
+bloodsuckers and parasites upon the rest of society. Property is the
+result of theft, instead of being, as Economists used to assure us, the
+reward of thrift. It is hoped that these evils may be remedied by a
+reconstruction of society, in which the means of production shall all
+be public property, and every man's income be simply a salary in
+proportion to the quantity of his labour. If we, then, ask how far
+competition would be abolished, we may first make one remark. Such a
+system, like every other system, requires, for its successful working,
+that the instincts and moral impulses should correspond to the demands
+of the society. Absolute equality of property is just as compatible
+with universal misery as with universal prosperity. A population made
+up of thoroughly lazy, sensual, stupid individuals could, if it chose,
+work such a machinery so as to suppress all who were industrious,
+refined and intelligent. However great may be the revenue of a nation,
+it is a very simple problem of arithmetic to discover how many people
+could be supported just above the starvation level. The nation at large
+would, on the supposed system, have to decide how its numbers and wants
+are to be proportioned to its means. If individuals do not compete, the
+whole society has, presumably, to compete with other societies; and, in
+every case whatever, with the general forces of nature. An indolent and
+inefficient majority might decide, if it pleased, that the amount of
+work to be exacted should be that which would be just enough to provide
+the simplest material necessities. If, again, the indolent and
+inefficient are to exist at all,--and we can scarcely count upon their
+disappearance,--and if further, they are to share equally with the
+industrious and the efficient, we must, in some way, coerce them into
+the required activity. If every industrial organisation is to be worked
+by the State, the State, it would seem, must appeal to the only means
+at its disposal,--namely, the prison and the scourge. If, moreover, the
+idle and sensual choose to multiply, the State must force them to
+refrain, or the standard of existence will be lowered. And, therefore,
+as is often argued, Socialism logically carried out would, under such
+conditions, lead to slavery; to a state in which labour would be
+enforced, and the whole system of life absolutely regulated by the will
+of the majority; and, in the last resort, by physical force. That
+seems, I confess, to be a necessary result, unless you can assume a
+moral change, which is entirely different from the mere change of
+machinery, and not necessarily implied, nor even made probable, by the
+change. The intellectual leaders of Socialism, no doubt, assume that
+the removal of "injustice" will lead to the development of a public
+spirit which will cause the total efficiency to be as great as it is at
+present, or perhaps greater. But the mass who call themselves
+Socialists take, one suspects, a much simpler view. They are moved by
+the very natural, but not especially lofty, desire to have more wages
+and less work. They take for granted that if their share of the total
+product is increased, they will get a larger dividend; and do not stop
+to inquire whether the advantage may be not more than counterbalanced
+by the diminution of the whole product, when the present incitements to
+industry are removed. They argue,--that is, so far as they argue at
+all,--as though the quantity to be distributed were a fixed quantity,
+and regard capitalists as pernicious persons, somehow intercepting a
+lion's share of the stream of wealth which, it is assumed, would flow
+equally if they were abolished. That is, of course, to beg the whole
+question.
+
+I, however, shall venture to assume that the industrial machinery
+requires a corresponding moral force to work it; and I, therefore,
+proceed to ask how such a force can be supposed to act without some
+form of competition. Nothing, as a recent writer suggests,--ironically,
+perhaps,--could be easier than to secure an abolition of competition.
+You have only to do two things: to draw a "ring-fence" round your
+society, and then to proportion the members within the fence to the
+supplies. The remark suggests the difficulty. A ring-fence, for
+example, round London or Manchester would mean the starvation of
+millions in a month; or, if round England, the ruin of English
+commerce, the enormous rise in the cost of the poor man's food, and the
+abolition of all his little luxuries. But, if you include even a
+population as large as London, what you have next to do is to drill
+some millions of people--vast numbers of them poor, reckless, ignorant,
+sensual, and selfish--to regulate their whole mode of life by a given
+code, and refrain from all the pleasures which they most appreciate.
+The task is a big one, and not the less if you have also to undertake
+that everybody, whatever his personal qualities, shall have enough to
+lead a comfortable life. I do not suppose, however, that any rational
+Socialist would accept that programme of isolation. He would hold that,
+in his Utopia, we can do more efficiently all that is done under a
+system which he regards as wasteful and unjust. The existing machinery,
+whatever else may be said of it, does, in fact, tend to weld the whole
+world more and more into a single industrial organism. English workmen
+are labouring to satisfy the wants of other human beings in every
+quarter of the world; while Chinese, and Africans, and Europeans, and
+Americans are also labouring to satisfy theirs. This vast and almost
+inconceivably complex machinery has grown up in the main unconsciously,
+or, at least, with a very imperfect anticipation of the ultimate
+results, by the independent efforts of innumerable inventors, and
+speculators, and merchants, and manufacturers, each of them intent, as
+a rule, only upon his own immediate profits and the interests of the
+little circle with which he is in immediate contact. The theory is not,
+I suppose, that this gigantic system of mutual interdependence should
+be abolished or restricted, but that it should be carried on
+consciously, with definite and intelligible purpose, and in such a way
+as to promote the interests of every fraction of society. The whole
+organism should resemble one worked by a single brain, instead of
+representing the resultant of a multitude of distracted and conflicting
+forces. The difficulties are obvious enough, nor need I dwell upon them
+here. I will not inquire whether it does not suppose something like
+omniscience in the new industrial leaders; and whether the restless and
+multifarious energy now displayed in discovering new means of
+satisfying human wants could be supplied by a central body, or a number
+of central bodies, made up of human beings, and, moreover, official
+human beings, reluctant to try experiments and strike into new courses,
+and without the present motives for enterprise, "Individualists" have
+enlarged sufficiently upon such topics. What I have to note is that, in
+any case, the change supposes the necessity of a corresponding morality
+in the growth of the instincts, the public spirit, the hatred of
+indolence, the temperance and self-command which would be requisite to
+work it efficiently. The organisation into which we are born
+presupposes certain moral instincts, and, moreover, necessarily implies
+a vast system of moral discipline. Our hopes and aspirations, our
+judgments of our neighbours and of ourselves, are at every moment
+guided and moulded by the great structure of which we form a part.
+Whenever we ask how our lives are to be directed, what are to be the
+terms on which we form our most intimate ties, whom we are to support
+or suppress, how we are to win respect or incur contempt, we are
+profoundly affected by the social relations in which we are placed at
+our birth, and the corresponding beliefs or prejudices which we have
+unconsciously imbibed. Such influences, it may perhaps be said, are of
+incomparably greater importance than the direct exhortations to which
+we listen, or than the abstract doctrines which we accept in words, but
+which receive their whole colouring from the concrete facts to which
+they conform. Now, I ask how such discipline can be conceived without
+some kind of competition; or, rather, what would be the discipline
+which would remain if, in some sense, competition could be suppressed?
+If in the ideal society there are still prizes to be won, positions
+which may be the object of legitimate desire, and if those positions
+are to be open to every one, whatever his circumstances, we might still
+have the keenest competition, though carried on by different methods.
+If, on the other hand, no man's position were to be better than
+another's, we might suppress competition at the price of suppressing
+every motive for social as well as individual improvement. In any
+conceivable state of things, the welfare of every society, the total
+means of enjoyment at its disposal, must depend upon the energy,
+intelligence, and trustworthiness of its constituent members. Such
+qualities, I need hardly say, are qualities of individuals. Unless John
+and Peter and Thomas are steady, industrious, sober, and honest, the
+society as a whole will be neither honest nor sober nor prosperous. The
+problem, then, becomes, how can you ensure the existence of such
+qualities unless John and Peter and the rest have some advantage in
+virtue of possessing them? Somehow or other, a man must be the better
+off for doing his work well and treating his neighbour fairly. He ought
+surely to hold the positions in which such qualities are most required,
+and to have, if possible, the best chance of being a progenitor of the
+rising generation. A social condition in which it made no difference to
+a man, except so far as his own conscience was concerned, whether he
+were or were not honest, would imply a society favourable to people
+without a conscience, because giving full play to the forces which make
+for corruption and disintegration. If you remove the rewards accessible
+to the virtuous and peaceful, how are you to keep the penalties which
+restrain the vicious and improvident? A bare repeal of the law, "If a
+man will not work, neither shall he eat," would not of itself promote
+industry. You would at most remove the compulsion which arises from
+competition, to introduce the compulsion which uses physical force. You
+would get rid of what seems to some people the "natural" penalty of
+want following waste, and be forced to introduce the "artificial" or
+legislative penalty of compulsory labour. But, otherwise, you must
+construct your society so that, by the spontaneous play of society, the
+purer elements may rise to the surface, and the scum sink to the
+bottom. So long as human nature varies indefinitely, so long as we have
+knaves and honest men, sinners and saints, cowards and heroes, some
+process of energetic and active sifting is surely essential to the
+preservation of social health; and it is difficult to see how that is
+conceivable without some process of active and keen competition.
+
+The Socialist will, of course, say, and say with too much truth, that
+the present form of competition is favourable to anti-social qualities.
+If, indeed, a capitalist is not a person who increases the productive
+powers of industry, but a person who manages simply to intercept a
+share produced by the industry of others, there is, of course, much to
+be said for this view. I cannot now consider that point, for my subject
+to-day is the moral aspect of competition considered generally. And
+what I have just said suggests what is, I think, the more purely moral
+aspect of the question. A reasonable Socialist desires to maintain what
+is good in the existing system, while suppressing its abuses. The
+question, What is good? is partly economical; but it is partly also
+ethical: and it is with that part that I am at present concerned.
+
+Any system of competition, any system which supposes a reward for
+virtue other than virtue itself, may be accused of promoting
+selfishness and other ugly qualities. The doctrine that virtue is its
+own reward is very charming in the mouth of the virtuous man; but when
+his neighbours use it as an excuse for not rewarding him, it becomes
+rather less attractive. It saves a great deal of trouble, no doubt, and
+relieves us from an awkward responsibility. I must, however, point out,
+in the first place, that a fallacy is often introduced into these
+discussions which Mr. Herbert Spencer has done a great deal to expose.
+He has dwelt very forcibly, for example, on the fact that it is a duty
+to be happy and healthy; and that selfishness, if used in a bad sense,
+should not mean simply regard for ourselves, but only disregard for our
+neighbours. We ought not, in other words, to be unjust because we
+ourselves happen to be the objects of injustice. The parable of the
+good Samaritan is generally regarded as a perfect embodiment of a great
+moral truth. Translated from poetry into an abstract logical form, it
+amounts to saying that we should do good to the man who most needs our
+services, whatever be the accidents which alienate ordinary sympathies.
+Now, suppose that the good Samaritan had himself fallen among thieves,
+what would have been his duty? His first duty, I should say, would have
+been, if possible, to knock down the thief; his second, to tie up his
+own wounds; and his third, to call in the police. We should not,
+perhaps, call him virtuous for such conduct; but we should clearly
+think him wrong for omitting it. Not to resist a thief is cowardly; not
+to attend to your own health is to incapacitate yourself for duty; not
+to apply to the police is to be wanting in public spirit. Assuming
+robbery to be wrong, I am not the less bound to suppress it because I
+happen to be the person robbed; I am only bound not to be
+vindictive--that is, not to allow my personal feelings to make me act
+otherwise than I should act if I had no special interest in the
+particular case. Adam Smith's favourite rule of the "indifferent
+spectator" is the proper one in the case. I should be impartial, and
+incline no more to severity than to lenity, because I am forced by
+circumstances to act both as judge and as plaintiff. So, in questions
+of self-support, it is obviously a fallacy to assume that an action,
+directed in the first instance to a man's own benefit, is therefore to
+be stigmatised as selfish. On the good Samaritan's principle, a person
+should be supported, _ceteris paribus_, by the person who can do
+it most efficiently, and in nine cases out of ten that person is
+himself. If self-support is selfish in the sense that the service is
+directly rendered to self, it is not the less unselfish in so far as it
+is necessarily also a service to others. If I keep myself by my labour,
+I am preventing a burden from falling upon my fellows. And, of course,
+the case is stronger when I include my family. We were all impressed
+the other day by the story of the poor boy who got some wretchedly
+small pittance by his work, spent a small portion of it upon his own
+needs, and devoted the chief part of it to trying to save his mother
+and her other children from starvation. Was he selfish? Was he selfish
+even in taking something for himself, as the only prop of his family?
+What may be the immediate motive of a man when he is working for his
+own bread and the bread of his family may often be a difficult
+question; but as, in point of fact, he is helping not only himself and
+those who depend on him, but also in some degree relieving others from
+a burden, his conduct must clearly not be set down as selfish in any
+sense which involves moral disapproval.
+
+Let us apply this to the case of competition. The word is generally
+used to convey a suggestion of selfishness in a bad sense. We think of
+the hardship upon the man who is ousted, as much as of the benefit to
+the man who gets in; or perhaps we think of it more. It suggests to us
+that one man has been shut out for the benefit of his neighbour; and
+that, of course, suggests envy, malice, and all uncharitableness. We
+hold that such competition must generate ill-will. I used--when I was
+intimately connected with a competitive system at the university--to
+hear occasionally of the evil influences of competition, as tending to
+promote jealousy between competitors. I always replied that, so far as
+my experience went, the evil was altogether imaginary. So far from
+competition generating ill-will, the keenest competitors were, as a
+rule, the closest friends. There was no stronger bond than the bond of
+rivalry in our intellectual contests. One main reason was, of course,
+that we had absolute faith in the fairness of the competition. We felt
+that it would be unworthy to complain of being beaten by a better man;
+and we had no doubt that, in point of fact, the winners were the better
+men; or, at any rate, were honestly believed to be the better men by
+those who distributed honours. The case, though on a small scale, may
+suggest one principle. So far as the end of such competitions is good,
+the normal motives cannot be bad. The end of a fair competition is the
+discovery of the ablest men, with a view to placing them in the
+position where their talents may be turned to most account. It can only
+be achieved so far as each man does his best to train his own powers,
+and is prepared to test them fairly against the powers of others. To
+work for that end is, then, not only permissible, but a duty. The
+spirit in which the end is pursued may be bad, in so far as a man
+pursues it by unfair means; in so far as he tries to make sham
+performance pass off for genuine; or, again, in so far as he sets an
+undue value upon the reward, as apart from the qualities by which it is
+gained. But if he works simply with the desire of making the best of
+himself, and if the reward is simply such a position as may enable him
+to be most useful to society, the competition which results will be
+bracing and invigorating, and will appeal to no such motives as can be
+called, in the bad sense, selfish. He is discharging a function which
+is useful, it is true, to himself; but which is also intrinsically
+useful to the whole society. The same principle applies, again, to
+intellectual activity in general. All genuine thought is essentially
+useful to mankind. In the struggle to discover truth, even our
+antagonists are, necessarily, our co-operators. A philosopher, as a man
+of science, owes, at least, as much to those who differ from him, as to
+those who agree with him. The conflict of many minds, from many sides,
+is the essential condition of intellectual progress. Now, if a man
+plays his part manfully and honourably in such a struggle, he deserves
+our gratitude, even if he takes the wrong side. If he looks forward to
+the recognition by the best judges as one motive for his activity, I
+think that he is asking for a worthy reward. He deserves blame, only so
+far as his motives have a mixture of unworthy personal sentiment.
+Obviously, if he aims at cheap fame, at making a temporary sensation
+instead of a permanent impression, at flattering prejudices instead of
+spreading truth; or, if he shows greediness of notoriety, by trying to
+get unjust credit, as we sometimes see scientific people squabbling
+over claims to the first promulgation of some trifling discovery, he is
+showing paltriness of spirit. The men whom we revere are those who,
+like Faraday or Darwin, devoted themselves exclusively to the
+advancement of knowledge, and would have scorned a reputation won by
+anything but genuine work. The fact that there is a competition in such
+matters implies, no doubt, a temptation,--the temptation to set a
+higher value upon praise than upon praiseworthiness; but I think it not
+only possible that the competitors in such rivalries may keep to the
+honourable path, but probable that, as a matter of fact, they
+frequently,--I hope that I may say generally,--do so. If the fame at
+which a man aims be not that which "in broad rumour lies," but that
+which "lives and spreads aloft in those pure eyes and perfect witness
+of all-judging Jove," then I think that the desire for it is scarcely
+to be called a last infirmity--rather, it is an inseparable quality of
+noble minds. We wish to honour men who have been good soldiers in that
+warfare, and we can hardly wish them to be indifferent to our homage.
+
+We may add, then, that a competition need not be demoralising when the
+competitors have lofty aims and use only honourable means. When,
+passing from purely intellectual aims, we consider the case, say, of
+the race for wealth, we may safely make an analogous remark. If a man's
+aim in becoming rich is of the vulgar kind; if he wishes to make an
+ostentatious display of wealth, and to spend his money upon
+demoralising amusement; or if, again, he tries to succeed by quackery
+instead of by the production of honest work, he is, of course, so far
+mischievous and immoral. But a man whose aims are public-spirited, nay,
+even if they be such as simply tend to improve the general comfort; who
+develops, for example, the resources of the country, and introduces new
+industries or more effective modes of manufacture, is, undoubtedly, in
+fact conferring a benefit upon his fellows, and may, so far, be doing
+his duty in the most effectual way open to him. If he succeeds by being
+really a more efficient man of business than his neighbours, he is only
+doing what, in the interests of all, it is desirable that he should do.
+He is discharging an essential social function; and what is to be
+desired is, that he should feel the responsibility involved, that he
+should regard his work as on one side the discharge of a social
+function, and not simply as a means of personal aggrandisement. It is
+not the fact that he is competing that is against him; but the fact,
+when it is a fact, that there is something discreditable about the
+means which he adopts, or the reward that he contemplates.
+
+This, indeed, suggests another and a highly important question--the
+question, namely, whether, in our present social state, his reward may
+not be excessive, and won at too great a cost to his rivals. And,
+without going into other questions involved, I will try to say a
+little, in conclusion, upon this, which is certainly a pressing
+problem. Competition, I have suggested, is not immoral if it is a
+competition in doing honest work by honourable means, and if it is also
+a fair competition. But it must, of course, be added, that fairness
+includes more than the simple equality of chances. It supposes, also,
+that there should be some proportion between the rewards and the
+merits. If it is simply a question between two men, which shall be
+captain of a ship, and which shall be mate, then the best plan is to
+decide by their merits as sailors; and, if their merits be fairly
+tried, the loser need bear no grudge against the winner. But when we
+have such cases as sometimes occur, when, for example, the ship is cast
+away, and it becomes a question whether I shall eat you or you shall
+eat me, or, let us say, which of us is to have the last biscuit, we get
+one of those terrible cases of temptation in which the strongest social
+bonds sometimes give way under the strain. The competition, then,
+becomes, in the highest degree, demoralising, and the struggle for
+existence resolves itself into a mere unscrupulous scramble for life,
+at any sacrifice of others. That, it is sometimes said, is a parallel
+to our social state at present. If I gave an excessive prize to the
+first boy in a school and flogged the second, I should not be doing
+justice. If one man is rewarded for a moderate amount of forethought by
+becoming a millionaire, and his unsuccessful rivals punished by
+starvation or the workhouse, the lottery of life is not arranged on
+principles of justice. A man must be a very determined optimist if he
+denied the painful truth to be found in such statements. He must be
+blind to many evils if he does not perceive the danger of dulling his
+sympathies by indifference to the fate of the unsuccessful. The rich
+man in Clough's poem observes that, whether there be a God matters very
+little--
+
+    For I and mine, thank somebody,
+    Manage to get our victual.
+
+But, even if we are not very rich, we must often, I think, doubt
+whether we are not wrapping ourselves in a spirit of selfish
+complacency when we are returning to a comfortable home and passing
+outcasts of the street. We must sometimes reflect that our comfort is
+not simply a reward for virtue or intelligence, even if it be not
+sometimes the prize of actual dishonesty. To shut our eyes to the mass
+of wretchedness around us is to harden our hearts, although to open our
+hands is too often to do more harm than good. It is no wonder that we
+should be tempted to declaim against competition, when the competition
+means that so many unfortunates are to be crowded off their narrow
+standing-ground into the gulf of pauperism.
+
+This may suggest the moral which I have been endeavouring to bring out.
+Looking at society at large, we may surely say that it will be better
+in proportion as every man is strenuously endeavouring to play his
+part, and in which the parts are distributed to those best fitted to
+play them. We must admit, too, that for any period to which we can look
+forward, the great mass of mankind will find enough to occupy their
+energies in labouring primarily for their own support, and so bearing
+the burden of their own needs and the needs of their families. We may
+infer, too, that a society will be the better so far as it gives the
+most open careers to all talents, wherever displayed, and as it shows
+respect for the homely virtues of industry, integrity, and forethought,
+which are essential to the whole body as to its constituent members.
+And we may further say that the corresponding motives in the individual
+cannot be immoral. A desire of independence, the self-respect which
+makes a man shrink from accepting as a gift what he can win as a fair
+reward, the love of fairplay, which makes him use only honest means in
+the struggle, are qualities which can never lose their value, and which
+are not the less valuable because in the first instance they are most
+profitable to their possessors. Nothing which tends to weaken such
+motives can be good; but while they preserve their intensity, they
+necessarily imply the existence of competition in some form or other.
+
+It is equally clear that competition by itself is not a sufficient
+panacea. Whenever we take an abstract quality, personify it by the help
+of capital letters, and lay it down as the one principle of a complex
+system, we generally blunder. Competition is as far as possible from
+being the solitary condition of a healthy society. It must be not only
+a competition for worthy ends by honourable means, but should be a
+competition so regulated that the reward may bear some proportion to
+the merit. Monopoly is an evil in so far as it means an exclusive
+possession of some advantages or privileges, especially when they are
+given by the accidents of birth or position. It is something if they
+are given to the best and the ablest; but the evil still remains if
+even the best and ablest are rewarded by a position which cramps the
+energies and lowers the necessity of others. Competition is only
+desirable in so far as it is a process by which the useful qualities
+are encouraged by an adequate, and not more than an adequate, stimulus;
+and in which, therefore, there is not involved the degradation and the
+misery on the one side, the excessive reward on the other, of the
+unsuccessful and the successful in the struggle. Competition,
+therefore, we might say, could be unequivocally beneficial only in an
+ideal society; in a state in which we might unreservedly devote
+ourselves to making the best of our abilities and accepting the
+consequent results, without the painful sense in the background that
+others were being sacrificed and debased; crushed because they had less
+luck in the struggle, and were, perhaps, only less deserving in some
+degree than ourselves. So long as we are still far enough from having
+realised any such state; so long as we feel, and cannot but feel, that
+the distribution of rewards is so much at the mercy of chance, and so
+often goes to qualities which, in an ideal state, would deserve rather
+reprobation than applause, we can only aim at better things. We can do
+what in us lies to level some inequalities, to work, so far as our
+opportunities enable us, in the causes which are mostly beneficial for
+the race, to spread enlightenment and good feeling, and to help the
+unfortunate. But it is also incumbent upon us to remember carefully,
+what is so often overlooked in the denunciations of competition, that
+the end for which we must hope, and the approach to which we must
+further, is one in which the equivocal virtue of charity shall be
+suppressed; that is, in which no man shall be dependent upon his
+neighbour in such a sense as to be able to neglect his own duties; in
+which there may be normally a reciprocity of good services, and the
+reciprocity not be (as has been said) all on one side. There is a very
+explicable tendency at present to ask for such one-sided reciprocity.
+It is natural enough, for reasons too obvious to be mentioned, that
+reformers should dwell exclusively upon the right of every one to
+support, and neglect to point out the correlative duty of every one to
+do his best to support himself. The popular arguments about "old-age
+pensions" may illustrate the general state of mind. It is disgraceful,
+people say, that so large a proportion of the aged poor should come to
+depend upon the rates. Undoubtedly it is disgraceful. Then upon whom
+does the disgrace fall? It sounds harsh to say that it falls upon the
+sufferers. We shrink from saying to a pauper, "It serves you right".
+That sounds brutal, and is only in part true. Still, we should not
+shrink from stating whatever is true, painful though it may be. It
+sounds better to lay all the blame upon the oppressor than to lay it
+upon the oppressed; and yet, as a rule, the cowardice or folly of the
+oppressed has generally been one cause of their misfortunes, and cannot
+be overlooked in a true estimate of the case. That drunkenness,
+improvidence, love of gambling, and so forth, do in fact lead to
+pauperism is undeniable; and that they are bad, and so far disgraceful,
+is a necessary consequence. In such cases, then, pauperism is a proof
+of bad qualities; and the fact, like all other facts, must be
+recognised. The stress of argument, therefore, is laid upon the
+hardships suffered by the honest and industrious poor. The logical
+consequence should be, that the deserving poor should become
+pensioners, and the undeserving paupers. This at once opens the
+amazingly difficult question of moral merit, and the power of poor-law
+officials to solve problems which would certainly puzzle the keenest
+psychologists. Suppose, for example, that a man, without being
+definitely vicious, has counted upon the promised pension, and
+therefore neglected any attempts to save. If you give him a pension,
+you virtually tell everybody that saving is a folly; if you don't, you
+inflict upon him the stigma which is deserved by the drunkard and the
+thief. So difficult is it to arrange for this proposed valuation of a
+man's moral qualities that it has been proposed to get rid of all
+stigma by making it the right and duty of every one to take a pension.
+That might conceivably alter the praise, but it would surely not alter
+the praiseworthiness. It must be wrong in me to take money from my
+neighbours when I don't want it; and, if wrong, it surely ought to be
+disgraceful. And this seems to indicate the real point. We may aim at
+altering the facts, at making them more conducive to good qualities;
+but we cannot alter or attempt to decide by laws the degree of praise
+or blame to be attached to individuals. It would be very desirable to
+bring about a state of things in which no honest and provident man need
+ever fall into want; and, in that state, pauperism would be rightly
+discreditable as an indication of bad qualities. But to say that nobody
+shall be ashamed of taking support would be to ruin the essential
+economic virtues, and to pauperise the nation; and to try to lay down
+precise rules as to the distribution of honour and discredit, seems, to
+me, to be a problem beyond the power of a legislature. I express no
+opinion upon the question itself, because I am quite incompetent to do
+so. I only refer to it as illustrating the difficulties which beset us
+when we try to remove the evils of the present system, and yet to
+preserve the stimulus to industry, which is implied in competition. The
+shortest plan is to shut one's eyes to the difficulty, and roundly deny
+its existence. I hope that our legislators may hit upon some more
+promising methods. The ordinary mode of cutting the knot too often
+suggests that the actually contemplated ideal is the land in which the
+chickens run about ready roasted, and the curse of labour is finally
+removed from mankind. The true ideal, surely, is the state in which
+labour shall be generally a blessing; in which we shall recognise the
+fact--disagreeable or otherwise--that the race can only be elevated by
+the universal diffusion of public spirit, and a general conviction that
+it is every man's first duty to cultivate his own capacities, to turn
+them to the best possible account, and to work strenuously and heartily
+in whatever position he has been placed. It is because I cannot help
+thinking that when we attack competition in general terms, we are, too
+often, blinding ourselves to those homely and often-repeated, and, as I
+believe, indisputable truths, that I have ventured to speak to-day,
+namely, on the side of competition--so far, at least, on the side of
+competition as to suggest that our true ideal should be, not a state,
+if such a state be conceivable, in which there is no competition, but a
+state in which competition should be so regulated that it should be
+really equivalent to a process of bringing about the best possible
+distribution of the whole social forces; and should be held to be,
+because it would really be, not a struggle of each man to seize upon a
+larger share of insufficient means, but the honest effort of each man
+to do the very utmost he can to make himself a thoroughly efficient
+member of society.
+
+
+
+
+SOCIAL EQUALITY.
+
+
+The problem of which I propose to speak is the old dispute between
+Dives and Lazarus. Lazarus, presumably, was a better man than Dives.
+How could Dives justify himself for living in purple and fine linen,
+while Lazarus was lying at the gates, with the dogs licking his sores?
+The problem is one of all ages, and takes many forms. When the old
+Puritan saw a man going to the gallows, "There," he said, "but for the
+grace of God, goes John Bradford". When the rich man, entering his
+club, sees some wretched tatterdemalion, slouching on the pavement,
+there, he may say, goes Sir Gorgius Midas, but for--what? I am here and
+he there, he may say, because I was the son of a successful
+stock-jobber, and he the son of some deserted mother at the workhouse.
+That is the cause, but is it a reason? Suppose, as is likely enough,
+that Lazarus is as good a man as Midas, ought they not to change
+places, or to share their property equally? A question, certainly, to
+be asked, and, if possible, to be answered.
+
+It is often answered, and is most simply answered, by saying that all
+men ought to be equal. Dives should be cut up and distributed in equal
+shares between Lazarus and his brethren. The dogma which embodies this
+claim is one which is easily refuted in some of the senses which it may
+bear, though in spite of such refutations it has become an essential
+part of the most genuine creed of mankind. The man of science says,
+with perfect truth, that so far from men being born equal, some are
+born with the capacity of becoming Shakespeares and Newtons, and others
+with scarcely the power of rising above Sally the chimpanzee. The
+answer would be conclusive, if anybody demanded that we should all be
+just six feet high, with brains weighing sixty ounces, neither more nor
+less. It is also true, and, I conceive, more relevant, that, as the man
+of science will again say, all improvement has come through little
+groups of men superior to their neighbours, through races or through
+classes, which, by elevating themselves on the shoulders of others,
+have gained leisure and means for superior cultivation. But equality
+may be demanded as facilitating this process, by removing the
+artificial advantages of wealth. It may be taken as a demand for a fair
+start, not as a demand that the prizes shall be distributed
+irrespectively of individual worth. And, whether the demand is rightly
+or wrongly expressed, we must, I think, admit that the real force with
+which we have to reckon is the demand for justice and for equality as
+somehow implied by justice. It is easy to browbeat a poor man who wants
+bread and cheese for himself and his family, by calling his demands
+materialistic, and advising him to turn his mind to the future state,
+where he will have the best of Dives. It is equally easy to ascribe the
+demands to mere envy and selfishness, or to those evil-minded agitators
+who, for their own wicked purposes, induce men to prefer a guinea to a
+pound of wages. But, after all, there is something in the demand for
+fair play and for the means of leading decent lives, which requires a
+better answer. It is easy, again, to say that all Socialists are
+Utopian. Make every man equal to-day, and the old inequalities will
+reappear to-morrow. Pitch such a one over London Bridge, it was said,
+with nothing on but his breeches, and he will turn up at Woolwich with
+his pockets full of gold. It is as idle to try for a dead level, when
+you work with such heterogeneous materials, as to persuade a
+homogeneous fluid to stand at anything but a dead level. But surely it
+may be urged that this is as much a reason for declining to believe
+that equal conditions of life will produce mere monotony, as for
+insisting that equality in any state is impossible. The present system
+includes a plan for keeping the scum at the surface. One of the few
+lessons which I have learnt from life, and not found already in
+copy-books, is the enormous difficulty which a man of the respectable
+classes finds in completely ruining himself, even by vice,
+extravagance, and folly; whereas, there are plenty of honest people
+who, in spite of economy and prudence, can scarcely keep outside of the
+workhouse. Admitting the appeal to justice, it is, again, often urged
+that justice is opposed to the demand for equality. Property is sacred,
+it is said, because a man has (or ought to have) a right to what he has
+made either by labour or by a course of fair dealings with other men. I
+am not about to discuss the ultimate ground on which the claim to
+private property is justified, and, as I think, satisfactorily
+established. A man has a right, we say, to all that he has fairly
+earned. Has he, then, a right to inherit what his father has earned? A
+man has had the advantage of all that a rich father can do for him in
+education, and so forth. Why should he also have the father's fortune,
+without earning it? Are the merits of making money so great that they
+are transmissible to posterity? Should a man who has been so good as to
+become rich, be blessed even to the third and fourth generation? Why,
+as a matter of pure justice, should not all fortunes be applied to
+public uses, on the death of the man who made them? Such a law, however
+impolitic, would not be incompatible with the moral principle to which
+an appeal is made. There are, of course, innumerable other ways in
+which laws may favour an equality of property, without breaking any of
+the fundamental principles. What, for example, is the just method of
+distributing taxation? A rich man can not only pay more money than a
+poor man, in proportion to his income, but he can, with equal ease, pay
+a greater proportion. To double the income of a labourer may be to
+raise him from starvation to comfort. To double the income of a
+millionaire may simply be to encumber him with wealth by which he is
+unable to increase his own pleasure. There is a limit beyond which it
+is exceedingly difficult to find ways of spending money on one's own
+enjoyment--though I have never been able to fix it precisely. On this
+ground, such plans as a graduated income-tax are, it would seem,
+compatible with the plea of justice; and, within certain limits, we do,
+in fact, approve of various taxes, on the ground, real or supposed,
+that they tend to shift burdens from the poor to the rich, and, so far,
+to equalise wealth. In fact, this appeal to justice is a tacit
+concession of the principle. If we justify property on the ground that
+it is fair that a man should keep what he has earned by his own labour,
+it seems to follow that it is unjust that he should have anything not
+earned by his labour. In other words, the answer admits the ordinary
+first principle from which Socialism starts, and which, in some
+Socialist theories, it definitely tries to embody.
+
+All that I have tried to do, so far, is to show that the bare doctrine
+of equality, which is in some way connected with the demand for
+justice, is not, of necessity, either unjust or impracticable. It
+may be used to cover claims which are unjust, to sanction bare
+confiscation, to take away motives for industry, and, briefly, may be a
+demand of the drones to have an equal share of the honey. From the bare
+abstract principle of equality between men, we can, in my own opinion,
+deduce nothing; and, I do not think that the principle can itself be
+established. That is why it is made a first principle, or, in other
+words, one which is not to be discussed. The French revolutionists
+treated it in this way as _à priori_ and self-evident. No school was in
+more deadly opposition to such _à priori_ truths than the school of
+Bentham and the utilitarians. Yet, Bentham's famous doctrine, that in
+calculating happiness each man is to count for one, and nobody for more
+than one, seems to be simply the old principle in a new disguise. James
+Mill applied the doctrine to politics. J. S. Mill again applied it,
+with still more thoroughness, especially in his doctrine of
+representation and of the equality of the sexes. Accordingly, various
+moralists have urged that this was an inconsistency in utilitarian
+doctrine, implying that they, too, could make _à priori_ first
+principles when they wanted them. It has become a sort of orthodox
+dogma with radicals, who do not always trouble themselves about a
+philosophical basis, and is applied with undoubting confidence to many
+practical political problems. "One man, one vote" is not simply the
+formulation of a demand, but seems to intimate a logical ground for the
+demand. If, in politics, one man is rightfully entitled to one vote, is
+it not also true that, in economics, one man should have a right to one
+income, or, that money, like political power, should be distributed
+into precisely equal shares? Yet, why are we to take for granted the
+equality of men in the sense required for such deductions? Since men
+are not equally qualified for political power, it would seem better
+_primâ facie_ that each man should have the share of power and
+wealth which corresponds to his powers of using, or, perhaps, to his
+powers of enjoying. Why should we not say, "To each man according to
+his deserts"? One practical reason, of course, is the extreme
+difficulty of saying what are the deserts, and how they are to be
+ascertained. Undoubtedly, equality is the shortest and simplest way
+but, if we take it merely as the most convenient assumption, it loses
+its attractive appearance of abstract justice or _à priori_
+self-certainty. Do a common labourer and Mr. Gladstone deserve the same
+share of voting power? If not, how many votes should Mr. Gladstone
+possess to give him his just influence? To ask such questions is to
+show that answering is impossible, though political theorists have, now
+and then, tried to put together some ostensible pretext for an answer.
+
+What, let us ask, is the true relation between justice and equality? A
+judge, to take the typical case, is perfectly just when he ascertains
+the facts by logical inferences from the evidence, and then applies the
+law in the spirit of a scientific reasoner. Given the facts, what is
+the rule under which they come? To answer that question, generally
+speaking, is his whole duty. In other words, he has to exclude all
+irrelevant considerations, such as his own private interests or
+affections. The parties are to be to him merely A and B, and he has to
+work out the result as an arithmetician works out a sum. Among the
+irrelevant considerations are frequently some moral aspects of the
+case. A judge, for example, decides a will to be valid or invalid
+without asking whether the testator acted justly or unjustly in a moral
+sense, but simply whether his action was legal or illegal. He cannot go
+behind the law, even from motives of benevolence or general maxims of
+justice, without being an unjust judge. Cases may arise, indeed, as I
+must say in passing, in which this is hardly true. A law may be so
+flagrantly unjust that a virtuous judge would refuse to administer it.
+One striking case was that of the fugitive slave law in the United
+States, where a man had to choose between acting legally and outraging
+humanity. So we consider a parent unjust who does not leave his fortune
+equally among his children. Unless there should be some special reason
+to the contrary, we shall hold him to be unfair for making distinctions
+out of mere preference of one child to another. Yet in the case of
+primogeniture our opinion would have to be modified. Supposing, for
+example, a state of society in which primogeniture was generally
+recognised as desirable for public interests, we could hardly call a
+man unjust for leaving his estates to his eldest son. If, in such a
+state, a man breaks the general rule, our judgment of his conduct would
+be determined perhaps by considering whether he was before or behind
+his age, whether he was acting from a keener perception of the evils of
+inequality or actuated by spite or regardless of the public interests
+which he believed to be concerned. A parent treats his children equally
+in his will in regard to money; but he does not, unless he is a fool,
+give the same training or the same opening to all his children, whether
+they are stupid or clever, industrious or idle. But what I wish to
+insist upon is, that justice implies essentially indifference to
+irrelevant considerations, and therefore, in many cases, equality in
+the treatment of the persons concerned. A judge has to decide without
+reference to bribes, and not be biassed by the position of an accused
+person. In that sense he treats the men equally, but of course he does
+not give equal treatment to the criminal and innocent, to the rightful
+and wrongful claimant.
+
+The equality implied in justice is therefore to be understood as an
+exclusion of the irrelevant, and thus supposes an understanding as to
+what is irrelevant. It is not a mere abstract assertion of equality;
+but the assertion that, in a given concrete case, a certain rule is to
+be applied without considering anything outside of the rule. An ideally
+perfect rule would contain within itself a sufficient indication of
+what is to be relevant. All men of full age, sound mind, and so forth,
+are to be treated in such and such a way. Then all cases falling within
+the rule are to be decided on the same principles, and in that sense
+equally. But the problem remains, what considerations should be taken
+into account by the rule itself? Let us put the canon of equality in a
+different shape, namely, that there should always be a sufficient
+reason for any difference in the treatment of our fellows. This rule
+does not imply that I should act in all cases as though all men were
+equal in character or mind, but that my action should in all cases be
+justified by some appropriate consideration. It does not prove that
+every man should have a vote, but that if one man has a vote and
+another has not, there should be some adequate reason for the
+difference. It does not prove that every man should work eight hours a
+day and have a shilling an hour; but that differences of hours or of
+pay and, equally, uniformity of hours and pay, should have some
+sufficient justification. This is a deeper principle, which in some
+cases justifies and in others does not justify the rule of equality.
+The rule of equality follows from it under certain conditions, and has
+gained credit because, in point of fact, those conditions have often
+been satisfied.
+
+The revolutionary demand for equality was, historically speaking, a
+protest against arbitrary inequality. It was a protest against the
+existence of privileges accompanied by no duties. When the rich man
+could only answer the question, "What have you done to justify your
+position?" by the famous phrase of Beaumarchais, "I took the trouble to
+be born," he was obviously in a false position. The demand for a
+society founded upon reason, in this sense that a sufficient reason
+should be given for all differences, was, it seems to me, perfectly
+right; and, moreover, was enough to condemn the then established
+system. But when this demand has been so constructed as to twist a
+logical rule, applicable to all scientific reasoning, into a dogmatic
+assertion that certain concrete beings were in fact equal, and to infer
+that they should have equal rights, it ceased to be logical at all, and
+has been a fruitful parent of many fallacies. Reasonable beings require
+a sufficient reason for all differences of conduct, for the difference
+between their treatment of a man and a monkey or a white man and a
+black, as well as for differences between treatment of rich and poor or
+wise men and fools; and there must, as the same principle implies, be
+also a sufficient reason for treating all members of a given class
+equally. We have to consider whether, for any given purpose, the
+differences between human beings and animals, Englishmen and negroes,
+men and women, are or are not of importance for our purpose. When the
+differences are irrelevant we neglect them or admit the claim to
+equality of treatment. But the question as to relevance is not to be
+taken for granted either way. It would be a very convenient but a very
+unjustifiable assumption in many cases, as it might save an astronomer
+trouble if he assumed that every star was equal to every other star.
+
+The application of this is, I think, obvious. The _â priori_
+assumption of the equality of men is, in some sense, easily refuted.
+But the refutation does not entitle us to assume that arbitrary
+inequality, inequality for which no adequate ground can be assigned, is
+therefore justifiable. It merely shows that the problem is more complex
+than has been assumed at first sight. "All men ought to be equal." If
+you mean equal in natural capacity or character, it is enough to say
+that what is impossible cannot be. If you propose that the industrious
+and idle, the good and bad, the wise and foolish, should share equally
+in social advantages, the reply is equally obvious, that such a scheme,
+if possible, would be injurious to the qualities on which human welfare
+depends. If you say that men should be rewarded solely according to
+their intrinsic merits, we must ask, do you mean to abstract from the
+adventitious advantages of education, social surroundings, and so
+forth, or to take men as they actually are, whatever the circumstances
+to which their development is owing? To ask what a man would have been
+had he been in a different position from his youth, is to ask for an
+impossible solution, and one, moreover, of no practical bearing. I
+shall not employ a drunkard if I am in want of a butler, whether he has
+become a drunkard under overpowering temptation or become a drunkard
+from inherited dipsomania. But if, on the other hand, I take the man
+for what he is, without asking how he has come to be what he is, I
+leave the source at least of all the vast inequalities of which we
+complain. The difficulty, which I will not try to develop further,
+underlies, as I think, the really vital difference of method by which
+different schools attempt to answer the appeal for social justice.
+
+The school of so-called individualists finds, in fact, that equality in
+their sense is incompatible with the varied differences due to the
+complete growth of the social structure. They look upon men simply as
+so many independent units of varying qualities, no doubt, but still
+capable of being considered for political and social purposes as equal.
+They ask virtually what justice would demand if we had before us a
+crowd of independent applicants for the good things of the world, and
+the simplest answer is to distribute the good things equally. If it is
+replied that the idle and the industrious should not be upon the same
+footing, they are ready to agree, perhaps, that men should be rewarded
+according to their services to society, however difficult it may be to
+arrange the proportions. But it soon appears that the various classes
+into which society is actually divided imply differences not due to the
+individual and his intrinsic merits, but to the varying surroundings in
+which he is placed. To do justice, then, it becomes necessary to get
+rid of these differences. The extreme case is that of the family. Every
+one probably owes more to his mother and to his early domestic
+environment than to any other of the circumstances which have
+influenced his development. If you and I started as perfectly equal
+babies, and you have become a saint and I a sinner, the divergence
+probably began when our mothers watched our cradles, and was made
+inevitable before we had left their knees. Consequently, the more
+thorough-going designers of Utopia have proposed to abolish this
+awkward difference. Men must be different at their birth; but we might
+conceivably arrange public nurseries which should place them all under
+approximately equal conditions. Then any differences would result from
+a man's intrinsic qualities, and he might be said to be rewarded simply
+according to his own merits.
+
+The plan may be tempting, but has its disadvantages. There are
+injustices, if we call all inequality injustice, which we can only
+attribute to nature or to the unknown power which makes men and
+monkeys, Shakespeares and Stephens. And one result is that the
+character and conduct of human beings depend to a great extent upon
+circumstances, which are accidental in the sense that they are
+circumstances other than the original endowment of the individual. In
+this sense, maternal love, for example, is unjust. The mother loves her
+child because it is her own, not because it is better (though of course
+it is better) than other children. So, as Adam Smith, I think,
+observed, we are more moved by our neighbour's suffering from a corn on
+his great toe than by the starvation of millions in China. In other
+words, the affections, which are the great moving forces of society,
+are unjust in so far as they cause us to be infinitely more interested
+in our own little circle than in the remoter members of humanity known
+to us only by report. Without discussing the "justice" of this
+arrangement, we shall have, I think, to admit that it is inevitable.
+For I, at least, hold that the vague and vast organism of humanity
+depends for its cohesion upon the affinities and attractions, and not
+_vice versâ_. My interests are strongest where my power of action
+is greatest. The love of mothers for children is a force of essential
+value, and therefore to be cultivated rather than repressed, for no
+force known to us could replace it. And what is pre-eminently true in
+this case is, of course, true to a degree in others. Burke stated this
+with admirable force in his attack upon the revolutionists who
+expounded the opposite principle of abstract equality. "To be attached
+to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society,
+is the first principle," he says, "the germ, as it were, of public
+affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed
+towards a love to our country and mankind." The assertion that they
+desired to invert this order, to destroy every social link in so far as
+it tended to produce inequalities, was the pith of his great indictment
+against the French "metaphysical" revolutionists. They had perverted
+the general logical precept of the sufficient reason for all
+inequalities by converting it into an assuming of the equality of
+concrete units. They fell into the fallacy of which I have spoken; and
+many radicals, utilitarians, and others have followed them. They
+assumed that all the varieties of human character, or all those due to
+the influence of the social environment, through whose structure and
+inherited instincts every full-grown man has been moulded, might be
+safely disregarded for the purpose of political and social
+construction. They have spoken, in brief, as if men were the equal and
+homogeneous atoms of physical inquiry and social problems capable of
+solution by a simple rearrangement of the atoms in different orders,
+instead of remembering that they are dealing with a complex organism,
+in which not only the whole order but every constituent atom is also a
+complex structure of indefinitely varying qualities. In the recognition
+of this truth lies, as I believe, the true secret of any satisfactory
+method of treatment.
+
+Does this fact justify inequality in general? Or does not the principle
+of equality still remain as essentially implied in the Utopia which we
+all desire to construct? We have to take it for granted that to each
+man the first and primary moving instinct is and must be the love of
+the little "platoon" of which he is a member; that the problem is, not
+to destroy all these minor attractions, to obliterate the structure and
+replace society by a vast multitude of independent atoms, each supposed
+to aim directly at the good of the whole, but so to harmonise and
+develop or restrain the smaller interests of families, of groups and
+associations, that they may spontaneously co-operate towards the
+general welfare. It is a long and difficult task to which we have to
+apply ourselves; a task not to be effected by the demonstration or
+application of a single abstract dogma, but to be worked out gradually
+by the co-operation of many classes and of many generations. If it is
+fairly solved in the course of a thousand years or so, I for one shall
+be very fairly satisfied. But distant as the realisation may be, we may
+or rather ought to consider seriously the end to which we should be
+working. The conception implies a distinction of primary importance
+towards any clear treatment of the problem. We have, that is, two
+different, though not altogether distinct, provinces of what I may,
+perhaps, call organic and functional morality. We may take the existing
+order for granted, and ask what is then our duty; or we may ask how far
+the structure itself requires modification, and, if so, what kind of
+modification. A man who assumes the existence of the present structure
+may act justly or unjustly within the limits so prescribed. He must
+generally be guided in a number of cases by some principle of equality.
+The judge should endeavour to give the same law to rich and poor; the
+parent should not make arbitrary distinctions between his children; the
+statesman should try to distribute his burdens without favouring one
+particular class, and so forth. A man who, in such a sense, acts justly
+may be described as up to the level of his age and its accepted
+established moral ideas, and is, therefore, entitled at least to the
+negative praise of not being corrupt or dishonest. He fulfils
+accurately the functions imposed upon him, and is not governed by what
+Bentham called the sinister interests which would prevent them from
+being effectually discharged for the welfare of the community. But the
+problem which we have to consider is the deeper and more difficult one
+of organic justice; and our question is what justice means in this
+case, or what are the irrelevant considerations to be excluded from our
+motives of conduct.
+
+Between these two classes of justice there are distinctions which it is
+necessary to state briefly. Justice, as we generally use the word,
+implies that the unjust man deserves to be hanged, or, at least, is
+responsible for his actions. What "responsibility" precisely implies
+is, of course, a debatable question. I only need assume that, in any
+case, it implies that somebody is guilty of wrong-doing, for which he
+should receive an appropriate penalty. But in organic questions it is
+not the individual, but the race which is responsible; and we require a
+reform, not a penalty. An impatient temper leads us to generalise too
+hastily from the case of the individual to that of the country. We
+bestow the blame for all the wrongs of an oppressed nation, for
+example, upon the nation which oppresses. But in simple point of fact,
+the oppressed nation generally deserves (if the word can be fairly
+used) to share the blame. The trodden worm would not have been trodden
+upon if it had been a bit of a viper. Whatever the duty of turning the
+second cheek, it is clearly not a national duty. If we admire a Tell or
+Robert Bruce for resisting oppressors, we implicitly condemn those who
+submitted to oppressors. If a nation is divided or wanting in courage,
+public spirit, and independence, it will be trampled down; and though
+we may most rightfully blame the tramplers, it is idle to exonerate the
+trampled. It is easy, in the same way, to make the rich solely
+responsible for all the misery of the poor. The man who has got the
+booty is naturally regarded as the robber. But, speaking
+scientifically, that is, with the desire to state the plain facts, we
+must admit that if the poor are those who have gone to the wall in the
+struggle for wealth; then, whatever unjust weapons have been used in
+that struggle, the improvidence and vice and idleness have certainly
+been among the main causes of defeat. Here, as before, the question is
+not, who is to be punished? We can only settle that when dealing with
+individual cases. It is the question, what is the cause of certain
+evils? and here we must resist the temptation of supposing that the
+class which in some sense appears to profit by them, or, at least, to
+be exempt from them, has, therefore, any more to do with bringing them
+about than the class which suffers from them.
+
+The reflection may put us in mind of what seems to be a general law.
+The ultimate cause of the adoption of institutions and rules of conduct
+is often the fact of their utility to the race; but it is only at a
+later period that their utility becomes the conscious or avowed reason
+for maintaining them. The political fabric has been clearly built up,
+in great part, by purely selfish ambition. Nations have been formed by
+energetic rulers, who had no eye for anything beyond the gratification
+of their own ambition, although they were clear-headed enough to see
+that their own ambition could best secure its objects by taking the
+side of the stronger social forces, and by giving substantial benefit
+to others. The same holds good pre-eminently of industrial relations.
+We all know how Adam Smith, sharing the philosophical optimism of his
+time, showed how the pursuit of his own welfare by each man tended, by
+a kind of pre-ordained harmony, to contribute to the welfare of all.
+Since his time we have ceased to be so optimistic, and have recognised
+the fact that the building up of modern industrial systems has involved
+much injury to large classes. And yet we may, I think, in great measure
+adopt his view. The fact that each man was rogue enough to think first
+of himself and of his own wife and family is not a proof or a
+presumption that he did not flourish because, in point of fact, he was
+contributing (quite unintentionally perhaps) to the comforts of mankind
+in general. What we have to reflect is that, while the bare existence
+of certain institutions gives a strong presumption of their utility,
+there is also a probability that when the utility becomes a conscious
+aim or a consciously adopted criterion of their advantage, they will
+require a corresponding modification intended to secure the advantages
+at a minimum cost of evil.
+
+Premising these remarks as to the meaning of organic justice, we can
+now come to the question of equality. Justice in its ordinary sense may
+be regarded from one point of view as the first condition of the
+efficiency of the social organ. In saying that a judge is just, we
+imply that he is so far efficiently discharging his part in
+society--the due application of the law--without reference to
+irrelevant considerations. He is a machine which rightly parts the
+sheep and goats--taking the legal definition of goats and
+sheep--instead of putting some goats into the sheepfold, and _vice
+versâ_. That is, he secures the accurate application of the purely
+legal rule. Organic justice involves an application of the same
+principle because it equally depends upon the exclusion of irrelevant
+considerations. It implies such a distribution of functions and of
+maintenance as may secure the greatest possible efficiency of society
+towards some end in itself good. Society of course may be organised
+with great efficiency for bad or doubtful ends. A purely military
+organisation, however admirable for its purpose, may imply a sacrifice
+of the highest welfare of the nation. Assuming, however, the goodness
+of the end, the greatest efficiency is of course desirable. We may, for
+our purposes, assume that the efficiency of a nation regarded as a
+society for the production of wealth is a desirable end. There are, of
+course, many other purposes which must not be sacrificed to the
+production of wealth. But power of producing wealth, meaning roughly
+whatever contributes to the physical support and comfort of the nation,
+is undoubtedly a necessary condition of all other happiness. If we all
+starve we can have neither art nor science nor morality. What I mean,
+therefore, is that a nation is so far better as it is able to raise all
+necessary supplies with the least expenditure of labour, leaving aside
+the question how far the superfluous forces should be devoted to
+raising comparative luxuries or to some purely religious or moral or
+intellectual purposes. The perfect industrial organisation is, I shall
+assume, compatible with or rather a condition of a perfect organisation
+of other kinds. In the most general terms we have to consider what are
+the principles of social organisation, which of course implies a
+certain balance between the various organs and a thorough nutrition of
+all, while yet we may for a moment confine our attention to the purely
+industrial or economic part of the question. How, if at all, does the
+principle of equality or of social justice enter the problem?
+
+We may assume, in the first place, from this point of view, that one
+most obvious condition is the absence of all purely useless structures,
+whether of the kind which we call "survivals" or such as may be called
+parasitic growths. The organ which has ceased to discharge
+corresponding functions is simply a drag upon the vital forces. When a
+class, such as the old French aristocracy, ceases to perform duties
+while retaining privileges, it will be removed,--too probably, as in
+that case, it will be removed by violent and mischievous methods,--if
+the society is to grow in vigour. The individuals, as I have said, may
+or may not deserve punishment, for they are not personally responsible
+for the general order of things; but they are not unlikely to incur
+severe penalties, and what we should really hope is that they may be in
+some way absorbed by judicious medical treatment, instead of extirpated
+by the knife. At the other end of the scale, we have the parasitic
+class of the beggars or thieves. They, too, are not personally
+responsible for the conditions into which they are born. But they are
+not only to be pitied individually, but to be regarded, in the mass, as
+involving social disease and danger. More words upon that topic are
+quite superfluous, but I may just recall the truth that the two evils
+are directly connected. We hear it often said, and often denied, that
+the rich are growing richer and the poor poorer. So far, however, as it
+is true, it is one version of the very obvious fact that where there
+are many careless rich people, there will be the best chance for the
+beggars. The thoughtless expenditure of the rich without due
+responsibilities, provides the steady stream of so-called charity,--the
+charity which, as Shakespeare (or somebody else) observes, is twice
+cursed, which curses him that gives and him that receives; which is to
+the rich man as a mere drug to still his conscience and offer a
+spurious receipt in full for his neglect of social duties, and to the
+poor man an encouragement to live without self-respect, without
+providence, a mere hanger-on and dead-weight upon society, and a
+standing injury and source of temptation to his honest neighbours.
+
+Briefly, a wholesome social condition implies that every social organ
+discharges a useful function; it renders some service to the community
+which is equivalent to the support which it derives; brain and stomach
+each get their due share of supply; and there is a thorough reciprocity
+between all the different members of the body. But what kind of
+equality should be desired in order to secure this desirable organic
+balance? We have to do, I may remark, with the case of a homogeneous
+race. By this I mean not only that there is no reason to suppose that
+there is any difference between the innate qualities of rich and poor,
+but that there is the strongest reason for believing in an equality;
+that is to say, more definitely, that if you took a thousand poor
+babies and a thousand rich babies, and subjected them to the same
+conditions, they would show great individual differences, but no
+difference traceable to the mere difference of class origin. I
+therefore may leave aside such problems as might arise in the Southern
+States of America, or even in British India, where two different races
+are in presence; or, again, the case of the sexes, where we cannot
+assume as self-evident, that the organic differences are irrelevant to
+political or social ends. So far as we are concerned, we may take it
+for granted that the differences which emerge are not due to any causes
+antecedent to and overriding the differences due to different social
+positions. If we can say justly (as has been said) that a poor man is
+generally more charitable in proportion to his means, or, again, that
+he is, as a rule, a greater liar or a greater drunkard than the rich
+man, the difference is not due to a difference of breed, but to the
+education (in the widest sense) which each has received. So long as
+that difference remains, we must take account of it for purposes of
+obtaining the maximum efficiency. We must not make the poor man a
+professor of mathematics, or even manager of a railway, because he has
+talents which, if trained, would have qualified him for the post; but
+we may and must assume that an equal training would do as much for the
+poor man as for the rich; and the question is, how far it is desirable
+or possible to secure such equality.
+
+Now, from the point of view of securing a maximum efficiency, it seems
+to be a clearly desirable end that the only qualities which should
+indisputably help to determine a man's position in life, should also be
+those which determine his fitness for working in it efficiently. In
+Utopia, it should be the rule that each man shall do what he can do
+best. If one man is a gamekeeper and another a prime minister, it
+should be because one has the gifts of a gamekeeper and the other the
+gifts of a prime minister: whereas, in the actual state, as we all
+know, the gamekeeper often becomes the prime minister, while the
+potential prime minister is limited to looking after poachers. But I
+also urge that we must take into account the actual and not the
+potential qualities at any given moment. The inequality may be obviated
+by raising the grade of culture in all classes; but we must not assume
+that there is an actual equality where, in fact, there is the widest
+possible difference. In short, I assert that it is our duty to try to
+make men equal; though I deny that we are clearly justified in assuming
+an equality. By making them equal, I do not, of course, mean that we
+should try to make them all alike. I recognise, with Mill and every
+sensible writer on the subject, that such a consummation represents
+rather a danger than an advantage. I wish to see individuality
+strengthened, not crushed, to encourage men to develop the widest
+possible diversity of tastes, talents, and pursuits, and to attain
+unity of opinion, not by a calm assumption that this or that creed is
+true, but by encouraging the sharpest and freest collision of opinions.
+The equality of which I speak is that which would result, if the
+distinction into organs were not of such a nature as to make one class
+more favourable than another to the full development of whatever
+character and talents a man may possess. In other words, the
+distribution into classes would correspond purely and simply to the
+telling off of each man to the duties which he is best fitted to
+discharge. The position into which he is born, the class surroundings
+which determine his development, must not carry with them any
+disqualification for his acquiring the necessary aptitude for any other
+position. It was, I think, Fourier who argued that a man ought to be
+paid more highly for being a chimney-sweep than for being a prime
+minister, because the duties of a sweep are the more disagreeable,--a
+position which some prime ministers may, perhaps, see reason to doubt.
+My suggestion is, that in Utopia every human being would be so placed
+as to be capable of preparing himself for any other position, and
+should then go to the work for which he is best fitted. The equality as
+thus defined would, I submit, leave no room for a sense of injustice,
+because the qualities which determine a man's position would be the
+qualities for which he deserves the position, desert in this sense
+being measurable by fitness. Discontent with class distinctions must
+arise so long as a man feels that his position in a class limits and
+cramps his capacities below the level of happier fortunes. Discontent
+is not altogether a bad thing, for it is often an _alias_ for
+hope; remove all discontent and you remove all guarantee for
+improvement. But discontent is of the malignant variety when it is
+allied with a sense of injustice; that is, of restrictions imposed upon
+one class for no assignable reason. The only sufficient reason for
+classes is the efficient discharge of social functions. The differences
+between the positions of men in social strata, supply some of the most
+effective motives for the struggle of life; and the effort of men to
+rise into the wealthy or the powerful class is not likely to cease so
+long as men are men; but they take an unworthy form so long as the
+ambition is simply to attain privileges unconnected with or
+disproportioned to the duties involved, and which therefore generate
+hatred to the social structure. If a class could be simply an organ for
+the discharge of certain functions, and each man in the whole body
+politic able to fit himself for that class, the injustice, and
+therefore the malignant variety of discontent, would disappear. Of
+course, I am speaking only of justice. I do not attempt to define the
+proper ends of society, or regard justice in itself as a sufficient
+guarantee for all desirable results. Such justice may exist even in a
+savage tribe or a low social type. There may be a just distribution of
+food among a shipwrecked crew, but the attainment of such justice would
+not satisfy all their wants. The abolition of misery, the elevation of
+a degraded class to a higher stage is a good thing in itself, unless it
+can be shown to involve some counterbalancing evil. I only argue that
+the ideal society would have this, among other attributes, and,
+therefore, that to secure such equality is a legitimate object of
+aspiration.
+
+I am speaking of "Utopia". The time is indefinitely distant when a man
+will choose to be a sweep or a prime minister according to his
+aptitudes, and be equally able to learn his trade whether he is the son
+of a prime minister or a sweep. I only try to indicate the goal to
+which our efforts should be directed. But the goal thus defined implies
+methods different from that of some advocates of equality. They propose
+at once to assume the non-existence of a disagreeable difficulty, and
+to take men as equal in a sense in which they are not, in fact, equal.
+To me the problem appears to be, not the instant introduction of a new
+system, but a necessarily long and very gradual process of education
+directed towards the distant goal of making men equal in the desirable
+sense; and that problem, I add, is in the main a moral problem. It is
+idle to make institutions without making the qualities by which they
+must be worked. I do not say--far from it--that we are not to propose
+what may roughly be called external changes: new regulations and new
+forms of association, and so forth. On the contrary, I believe, as I
+have intimated, that this method corresponds to the normal order of
+development. The new institution protects and stimulates the germs of
+the moral instincts by which it must be worked. But I also hold that no
+mere rearrangement does any permanent good unless it calls forth a
+corresponding moral change, and, moreover, that the moral change,
+however slow and imperceptible, does incomparably more than any
+external change.
+
+If we assume our present institutions to be permanent, a slight
+improvement in moral qualities, a growth of sobriety, of chastity, of
+prudence and intellectual culture, would make an almost indefinite
+improvement in the condition of the masses. If, for example, Englishmen
+ceased to drink, every English home might be made reasonably
+comfortable. The two kinds of change imply each other; but it is the
+most characteristic error of the designers of Utopias to suppose a mere
+change of regulations without sufficiently attending to the moral
+implication. To attain equality, as I have tried to define the word,
+would imply vast moral changes, and therefore a long and difficult
+elaboration. We have not simply to make men happy, as they now count
+happiness, but to alter their views of happiness. The good old
+copy-books tell us that happiness is as common in poor men's huts as in
+rich men's palaces. We are apt to reply that the statement is a mockery
+and a lie. But it points to the consummation which in some simple
+social states has been partly realised, and which in some distant
+future may come to be an expression of facts. It is conceivable surely
+that rich men may some day find that there are modes of occupation
+which are more interesting as well as more useful than accumulation of
+luxuries or the keeping of horses for the turf; that, in place of
+propitiating fate by supporting the institution of beggary, there is an
+indefinite field for public-spirited energy in the way not of throwing
+crumbs to Lazarus, but of promoting national culture of mind, of
+spirit, and of body; that benevolence does not mean simple
+self-sacrifice, except to the selfish, but the pursuit of a noble and
+most interesting career; that men's duty to their children is not to
+enable them to lead idle lives, but to fit them for playing a manly
+part in the great game of life; and that their relation to those whom
+they employ is not that of persons exploiting the energies of inferior
+animals, but of leaders of industry with a common interest in the
+prosperity of their occupation. People, no doubt, will hardly pursue
+business from motives of pure benevolence to others, and I do not think
+it desirable that they should. But the recognition that the pursuit of
+an honourable business is useful to others may, nevertheless, guide
+their energies, make the mere scramble for wealth disreputable, and
+induce them to labour for solid and permanent advantages. Such moral
+changes are, I conceive, necessary conditions of the equality of which
+I have spoken; they must be brought about to some extent if the
+industrial organism is to free itself from the injustice necessarily
+implied in a mere blind struggle for personal comfort.
+
+Moreover, however distant the final consummation may be, there are, I
+think, many indications of an approximation. Nothing is more
+characteristic of modern society than the enormous development of the
+power of association for particular purposes. In former days a society
+had to form an independent organ, a corporation, a college, and so
+forth, to discharge any particular function, and the resulting organ
+was so distinct as to absorb the whole life of its members. The work of
+the fellow was absorbed in the corporate life of his corporation, and
+he had no distinct personal interests. Now we are all members of
+societies by the dozen, and society is constantly acquiring the art of
+forming associations for any purpose, temporary or permanent, which
+imply no deep structural division, and unite people of all classes and
+positions. As the profounder lines are obliterated, the tendency to
+form separate castes, defended by personal privileges, and holding
+themselves apart from other classes, rapidly diminishes; and the
+corresponding prejudices are in process of diminution. But I can only
+hint at this principle.
+
+A correlative moral change in the poor is, of course, equally
+essential. America is described by Mr. Lowell in the noblest panegyric
+ever made upon his own country, as "She that lifts up the manhood of
+the poor". She has taken some rather queer methods of securing that
+object lately; yet, however imperfect the result, every American
+traveller will, I believe, sympathise with what Mr. Bryce has recently
+said in his great book. America is still the land of hope--the land
+where the poor man's horizon is not bounded by a vista of inevitable
+dependence on charity; where--in spite of some superficially grotesque
+results--every man can speak to every other without the oppressive
+sense of condescension; where a civil word from a poor man is not
+always a covert request for a gratuity and a tacit confession of
+dependence. "Alas," says Wordsworth, in one of his pregnant phrases,
+"the gratitude of men has oftener left me mourning" than their
+cold-heartedness; because, I presume, it is a painful proof of the
+rarity of kindness. When one man can only receive a gift and another
+can only bestow it as a payment on account of a long accumulation of
+the arrears of class injustice, the relations hardly admit of genuine
+gratitude on either side. What grates most painfully upon me, and, I
+suppose, upon most of us, is the "servility" of man; the acceptance of
+a beggar's code of morals as natural and proper for any one in a shabby
+coat. The more prominent evil just now, according to conservatives and
+pessimists, is the correlative one of the beggar on horseback; of the
+man who has found out that he can squeeze more out of his masters, and
+uses his power even without considering whether it is wise to drain
+your milch cow too exhaustively.
+
+A hope of better things is encouraged by schemes for arbitration and
+conciliation between employers and employed. But we require a moral
+change if arbitration is to imply something more than a truce between
+natural enemies, and conciliation to be something different from that
+employed by Hood's butcher when, after hauling a sheep by main force
+into the slaughter-house, he exclaimed, "There, I've conciliated
+_him_!" The only principle on which arbitration can proceed is
+that the profits should be divided in such a way as to be a sufficient
+inducement to all persons concerned to give their money or their
+labour, mental or physical, to promote the prosperity of the business
+at large. But the reconciliation can only be complete when the
+capitalist is capable of employing his riches with enough public spirit
+and generosity to disarm mere envy by his obvious utility, and the poor
+man justifies his increased wages by his desire to secure permanent
+benefits and a better standard of life. In Utopia, the question will
+still be, what plan shall be a sufficient inducement to the men who
+co-operate as employers or labourers, but the inducement will appeal to
+better motives, and the positions be so far equalised that each will be
+most tolerable to the man best fitted for it.
+
+Here a vast series of problems opens about which I can only suggest the
+briefest hint. The principle I now urge is the old one, namely, that
+the usual mark of a quack remedy is the neglect of the moral aspect of
+a question. We want a state of opinion in which the poor are not
+objects to be slobbered over, but men to help in a manly struggle for
+moral as well as material elevation. A great deal is said, for example,
+about the evils of competition. It is remarkable indeed that few
+proposals for improvement even, so far as I can discover, tend to get
+rid of competition. Co-operation, as tradesmen will tell us, is not an
+abolition of competition, but a competition of groups instead of units.
+"Profit-sharing" is simply a plan by which workmen may take a direct
+share in the competition carried on by their masters. I do not mention
+this as any objection to such schemes, for I do not think that
+competition is an evil. I do not doubt the vast utility of schemes
+which tend to increase the intelligence and prudence of workmen, and
+give them an insight into the conditions of successful business.
+Competition is no doubt bad so far as it means cheating or gambling.
+But competition is, it seems to me, inevitable so long as we are forced
+to apply the experimental method in practical life, and I fail to see
+what other method is available. Competition means that thousands of
+people all over the world are trying to find out how they can supply
+more economically and efficiently the wants of other people, and that
+is a state of things to which I do not altogether object. Equality in
+my sense implies that every one should be allowed to compete for every
+place that he can fill. The cry is merely, as it seems to me, an
+evasion of the fundamental difficulty. That difficulty is not that
+people compete, but that there are too many competitors; not that a
+man's seat at the table has to be decided by fair trial of his
+abilities, but that there is not room enough to seat everybody. Malthus
+brought to the front the great stumbling-block in the way of Utopian
+optimism. His theory was stated too absolutely, and his view of the
+remedy was undoubtedly crude. But he hit the real difficulty; and every
+sensible observer of social evils admits that the great obstacle to
+social improvement is that social residuum, the parasitic class, which
+multiplies so as to keep down the standard of living, and turns to bad
+purposes the increased power of man over nature. We have abolished
+pestilence and famine in their grimmest shape; if we have not abolished
+war, it no longer involves usurpation or slavery or the permanent
+desolation of the conquered; but one result is just this, that great
+masses can be regularly kept alive at the lowest stage of existence
+without being periodically swept away by a "black death" or a horde of
+brutal invaders. If we choose to turn our advantages to account in this
+way, no nostrums will put an end to poverty; and the evil can only be
+met--as I venture to assume--by an elevation of the moral level,
+involving all that is implied in spreading civilisation downward.
+
+The difficulty shows itself in discussions of the proper sphere of
+government. Upon that vast and most puzzling topic I will only permit
+myself one remark. In former times the great aim of reformers was the
+limitation of the powers of government. They came to regard it as a
+kind of bogy or extra-natural force, which acted to oppress the poor in
+order to maintain certain personal privileges. Some, like Godwin of the
+"Political Justice," held that the millennium implied the abolition of
+government and the institution of anarchy. The early utilitarians held
+that government might be reformed by placing power in the hands of the
+subjects, who would use it only for their own interests, but still
+retained the prejudices engendered in their long struggle against
+authority, and held that its functions should still be gradually
+restricted on pain of developing a worse tyranny than the old. The
+government has been handed over to the people as they desired, but with
+the natural result that the new authorities not only use it to support
+their interests, but retain the conviction of its extra-natural, or
+perhaps supernatural, efficacy. It is regarded as an omnipotent body
+which can not only say (as it can) that whatever it pleases shall be
+legal, but that whatever is made a law in the juridical sense shall at
+once become a law of nature. Even their individualist opponents, who
+profess to follow Mr. Herbert Spencer, seem often to regard the power
+of government, not as one result of evolution, but as something
+external which can constrain and limit evolution. It corresponds to a
+kind of outside pressure which interferes arbitrarily with the
+so-called natural course of development, and should therefore be
+abolished. To me, on the contrary, it seems that government is simply
+one of the social organs, with powers strictly limited by its relation
+to others and by the nature of the sentiment upon which it rests. There
+are obvious reasons, in the centralisation of vast industrial
+interests, the "integration," as Mr. Spencer calls it, which is the
+correlative of differentiation, in the growing solidarity of different
+classes and countries, in the consequent growth of natural monopolies,
+which give a solid reason for believing that the functions of the
+central government may require expansion. To decide by any _à
+priori_ principle what should be the limits of this expansion is, to
+my mind, hopeless. The problem is one to be worked out by
+experiment,--that is, by many generations and by repeated blundering. A
+fool, said Erasmus Darwin, is a man who never makes an experiment; an
+experiment is a new mode of action which fails in its object
+ninety-nine times out of a hundred; therefore, wise men make more
+blunders, though they also make more discoveries than fools. Now,
+experiments in government and social organisation are as necessary to
+improvement as any other kind of experiment, and probably still more
+liable to failure. One thing, however, is again obvious. The simple
+remedy of throwing everything upon government, of allowing it to settle
+the rate of wages, the hours of labour, the prices of commodities, and
+so forth, requires for success a moral and intellectual change which it
+is impossible to over-estimate. I will not repeat the familiar
+arguments which, to my mind, justify this statement. It is enough to
+say that there is no ground in the bare proposal for putting all manner
+of industrial regulations into the hands of government, for supposing
+that it would not drag down every one into pauperism instead of raising
+everybody to comfort. I often read essays of which the weakness seems
+to be that while they purpose to establish equality, they give no real
+reason for holding that it would not be an equality of beggary. If
+every one is to be supported, idle or not, the natural conclusion is
+universal pauperism. If people are to be forced to work by government,
+or their numbers to be somehow restricted by government, you throw a
+stress upon the powers of government which, I will not say, it is
+impossible that it should bear, but which, to speak in the most
+moderate terms, implies a complete reconstruction of the intelligence,
+morality, and conceptions of happiness of human beings. Your government
+would have to be omniscient and purely benevolent as well as
+omnipotent, and I confess that I cannot see in the experience of those
+countries where the people have the most direct influence upon the
+government, any promise that this state of things will be realised just
+yet.
+
+Thus, I return to my conclusion,--to my platitude, if you will.
+Professor Fawcett used to say that he could lay down no rules for the
+sphere of government influence, except this rule, that no interference
+would do good unless it helped people to help themselves. I think that
+the doctrine was characteristic of his good sense, and I fully
+subscribe to it. I heartily agree that equality in the sense I have
+given, is a most desirable ideal; I agree that we should do all that in
+us lies to promote it; I only say that our aims should be always in
+consistence with the principle that such equality is only possible and
+desirable in so far as the lowest classes are lifted to a higher
+standard, morally as well as physically. Of course, that implies
+approval of every variety of new institutions and laws, of
+co-operation, of profit sharing, of boards of conciliation, of
+educational and other bodies for carrying light into darkness and
+elevating popular standards of life: but always with the express
+condition that no such institution is really useful except as it tends
+to foster a genuine spirit of independence, and to supply the moral
+improvement without which no outward change is worth a button. This is
+a truism, you may say. Yet, when I read the proposals to get rid of
+poverty by summarily ordering people to be equal, or to extirpate
+pauperism by spending a million upon certain institutions for out-door
+relief, I cannot help thinking that it is a truism which requires to be
+enforced. The old Political Economy, you say, is obsolete; meaning,
+perhaps, that you do not mean to be bothered with its assertions; but
+the old Economists had their merits. They were among the first who
+realised the vast importance of deeper social questions; they were the
+first who tried to treat them scientifically; they were not (I hope)
+the last who dared to speak unpleasant truths, simply because they
+believed them and believed in their importance. Perhaps, indeed, they
+rather enjoyed the practice a little too much, and indulged in it a
+little too ostentatiously. Yet, I am sure that, on the whole, it was a
+very useful practice, and one which is now scarcely as common as it
+should be. People are more anxious to pick holes in their statement of
+economic laws than to insist upon the essential fact that, after all,
+there are laws, not "laws" made by Parliament, but laws of nature,
+which do, and will, determine the production and distribution of
+wealth, and the recognition of which is as important to human welfare
+as the recognition of physiological laws to the bodily health. Holding
+this faith, the old Economists were never tired of asserting what is
+the fundamental truth of so-called "individualism," that, after all we
+may say about the social development, the essential condition of all
+social improvement is not that we should have this or that system of
+regulations, but that the individual should be manly, self-respecting,
+doing his duty as well as getting his pay, and deeply convinced that
+nothing will do any permanent good which does not imply the elevation
+of the individual in his standards of honesty, independence, and good
+conduct. We can only say to Lazarus: "You are probably past praying
+for, and all we can do is to save you from starving, by any means which
+do not encourage other people to fall into your weaknesses; but we
+recognise the right of your class for any and every possible help that
+can be given towards making men of them, and putting them on their legs
+by teaching them to stand upright".
+
+
+
+
+ETHICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE.
+
+
+In his deeply-interesting Romanes lecture, Professor Huxley has stated
+the opinion that the ethical progress of society depends upon our
+combating the "cosmic process" which we call the struggle for
+existence. Since, as he adds, we inherit the "cosmic nature" which is
+the outcome of millions of years of severe training, it follows that
+the "ethical nature" may count upon having to reckon with a tenacious
+and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts. This is not a cheerful
+prospect. It is, as he admits, an audacious proposal to pit the
+microcosm against the macrocosm. We cannot help fearing that the
+microcosm may get the worst of it. Professor Huxley has not fully
+expanded his meaning, and says much to which I could cordially
+subscribe. But I think that the facts upon which he relies admit or
+require an interpretation which avoids the awkward conclusion.
+
+Pain and suffering, as Professor Huxley tells us, are always with us,
+and even increase in quantity and intensity as evolution advances. The
+fact had been recognised in remote ages long before theories of
+evolution had taken their modern form. Pessimism, from the time of the
+ancient Hindoo philosophers to the time of their disciple,
+Schopenhauer, has been in no want of evidence to support its melancholy
+conclusions. It would be idle to waste rhetoric in the attempt to
+recapitulate so familiar a position. Though I am not a pessimist, I
+cannot doubt that there is more plausibility in the doctrine than I
+could wish. Moreover, it may be granted that any attempt to explain or
+to justify the existence of evil is undeniably futile. It is not so
+much that the problem cannot be answered, as that it cannot even be
+asked in any intelligible sense. To "explain" a fact is to assign its
+causes--that is, to give the preceding set of facts out of which it
+arose. However far we might go backwards, we should get no nearer to
+perceiving any reason for the original fact. If we explain the fall of
+man by Adam's eating the apple, we are quite unable to say why the
+apple should have been created. If we could discover a general theory
+of pain, showing, say, that it implied certain physiological
+conditions, we shall be no nearer to knowing why those physiological
+conditions should have been what they are. The existence of pain, in
+short, is one of the primary data of our problem, not one of the
+accidents, for which we can hope in any intelligible sense to account.
+To give any "justification" is equally impossible. The book of Job
+really suggests an impossible, one may almost say a meaningless,
+problem. We can give an intelligible meaning to a demand for justice
+when we can suppose that a man has certain antecedent rights, which
+another man may respect or neglect. But this has no meaning as between
+the abstraction "nature" and the concrete facts which are themselves
+nature. It is unjust to meet equal claims differently. But it is not
+"unjust" in any intelligible sense that one being should be a monkey
+and another a man, any more than that part of me should be a hand and
+another head. The question would only arise if we supposed that the man
+and the monkey had existed before they were created, and had then
+possessed claims to equal treatment. The most logical theologians,
+indeed, admit that as between creature and creator there can be
+properly no question of justice. The pot and the potter cannot complain
+of each other. If the writer of Job had been able to show that the
+virtuous were rewarded and the vicious punished, he would only have
+transferred the problem to another issue. The judge might be justified,
+but the creator would be condemned. How can it be just to place a being
+where he is certain to sin, and then to damn him for sinning? That is
+the problem to which no answer can be given; and which already implies
+a confusion of ideas. We apply the conception of justice in a sphere
+where it is not applicable, and naturally fail to get any intelligible
+answer.
+
+It is impossible to combine the conceptions of God as the creator and
+God as the judge; and the logical straits into which the attempt leads
+are represented by the endless free-will controversy. I will not now
+enter that field of controversy: and I will only indicate what seems to
+me to be the position which we must accept in any scientific discussion
+of our problem. Hume, as I think, laid down the true principle when he
+said that there could be no _à priori_ proof of a matter of fact.
+An _à priori_ truth is a truth which cannot be denied without
+self-contradiction, but there can never be a logical consideration in
+supposing the non-existence of any fact whatever. The ordinary appeal
+to the truths of pure mathematics is, therefore, beside the question.
+All such truths are statements of the precise equivalence of two
+propositions. To say that there are four things is also to say that
+there are two pairs of things: to say that there is a plane triangle is
+also to say that there is a plane trilateral. One statement involves
+the other, because the difference is not in the thing described, but in
+our mode of contemplating it. We, therefore, cannot make one assertion
+and deny the other without implicit contradiction. From such results,
+again, is evolved (in the logical sense of evolution) the whole vast
+system of mathematical truths. The complexity of that system gives the
+erroneous idea that we can, somehow, attain a knowledge of facts,
+independently of experience. We fail to observe that even the most
+complex mathematical formula is simply a statement of an exact
+equivalence of two assertions; and that, till we know by experience the
+truth of one statement, we can never infer the truth, in fact, of the
+other. However elaborate may be the evolutions of mathematical truth,
+they can never get beyond the germs out of which they are evolved. They
+are valid precisely because the most complex statement is always the
+exact equivalent of the simpler, out of which it is constructed. They
+remain to the end truths of number or truths of geometry. They cannot,
+by themselves, tell us that things exist which can be counted or which
+can be measured. The whole claim, however elaborate, still requires its
+point of suspension. We may put their claims to absolute or necessary
+truth as high as we please; but they cannot give us by themselves a
+single fact. I can show, for example, that a circle has an infinite
+number of properties, all of which are virtually implied in the very
+existence of a circle. But that the circle or that space itself exists,
+is not a necessary truth, but a datum of experience. It is quite true
+that such truths are not, in one sense, empirical; they can be
+discovered without any change of experience; for, by their very nature,
+they refer to the constant element of experience, and are true on the
+supposition of the absolute changelessness of the objects contemplated.
+But it is a fallacy to suppose that, because independent of particular
+experiences, they are, therefore, independent of experience in general.
+
+Now, if we agree, as Huxley would have agreed, that Hume's doctrine is
+true, if we cannot know a single fact except from experience, we are
+limited in moral questions, as in all others, to elaborating and
+analysing our experience, and can never properly transcend it. A
+scientific treatment of an ethical question, at any rate, must take for
+granted all the facts of human nature. It can show what morality
+actually is; what are, in fact, the motives which make men moral, and
+what are the consequences of moral conduct. But it cannot get outside
+of the universe and lay down moral principles independent of all
+influences. I am well aware that in speaking of ethical questions upon
+this ground, I am exposed to many expressions of metaphysical contempt.
+I may hope to throw light upon the usual working of morality; but my
+theory of the facts cannot make men moral of itself. I cannot hope, for
+example, to show that immorality involves a contradiction, for I know
+that immorality exists. I cannot even hope to show that it is
+necessarily productive of misery to the individual, for I know that
+some people take pleasure in vicious conduct. I cannot deduce facts
+from morals, for I must consistently regard morals as part of the
+observed consequences of human nature under given conditions.
+Metaphysicians may, if they can, show me a more excellent method. I
+admit that their language sometimes enables them to take what, in words
+at least, is a sublimer position than mine. Kant's famous phrase, "Thou
+must, therefore thou canst," is impressive. And yet, it seems to me to
+involve an obvious piece of logical juggling. It is quite true that
+whenever it is my duty to act in a certain way, it must be a
+possibility; but that is only because an impossibility cannot be a
+duty. It is not my duty to fly, because I have not wings; and
+conversely, no doubt, it would follow that _if_ it were my duty I
+must possess the organs required. Thus understood, however, the phrase
+loses its sublimity, and yet, it is only because we have so to
+understand it, that it has any plausibility. Admitting, however, that
+people who differ from me can use grander language, and confessing my
+readiness to admit error whenever they can point to a single fact
+attainable by the pure reason, I must keep to the humbler path. I speak
+of the moral instincts as of others, simply from the point of view of
+experience: I cannot myself discover a single truth from the abstract
+principle of non-contradiction; and am content to take for granted that
+the world exists as we know it to exist, without seeking to deduce its
+peculiarities by any high _à priori_ road.
+
+Upon this assumption, the question really resolves itself into a
+different one. We can neither explain nor justify the existence of
+pain; but, of course, we can ask whether, as a matter of fact, pain
+predominates over pleasure; and we can ask whether, as a matter of
+fact, the "cosmic processes" tend to promote or discourage virtuous
+conduct. Does the theory of the "struggle for existence" throw any new
+light upon the general problem? I am quite unable to see, for my own
+part, that it really makes any difference: evil exists; and the
+question whether evil predominates over good, can only, I should say,
+be decided by an appeal to experience. One source of evil is the
+conflict of interests. Every beast preys upon others; and man,
+according to the old saying, is a wolf to man. All that the Darwinian
+or any other theory can do is, to enable us to trace the consequences
+of this fact in certain directions; but it neither creates the fact nor
+makes it more or less an essential part of the process. It "explains"
+certain phenomena, in the sense of showing their connection with
+previous phenomena, but does not show why the phenomena should present
+themselves at all. If we indulge our minds in purely fanciful
+constructions, we may regard the actual system as good or bad, just as
+we choose to imagine for its alternative a better or a worse system. If
+everybody had been put into a world where there was no pain, or where
+each man could get all he wanted without interfering with his
+neighbours, we may fancy that things would have been pleasanter. If the
+struggle, which we all know to exist, had no effect in preventing the
+"survival of the fittest," things--so, at least, some of us may
+think--would have been worse. But such fancies have nothing to do with
+scientific inquiries. We have to take things as they are and make the
+best of them.
+
+The common feeling, no doubt, is different. The incessant struggle
+between different races suggests a painful view of the universe, as
+Hobbes' natural state of war suggested painful theories as to human
+nature. War is evidently immoral, we think; and a doctrine which makes
+the whole process of evolution a process of war must be radically
+immoral too. The struggle, it is said, demands "ruthless
+self-assertion" and the hunting down of all competitors; and such
+phrases certainly have an unpleasant sound. But in the first place, the
+use of the epithets implies an anthropomorphism to which we have no
+right so long as we are dealing with the inferior species. We are then
+in a region to which such ideas have no direct application, and where
+the moral sentiments exist only in germ, if they can properly be said
+to exist at all. Is it fair to call a wolf ruthless because he eats a
+sheep and fails to consider the transaction from the sheep's point of
+view? We must surely admit that if the wolf is without mercy he is also
+without malice. We call an animal ferocious because a man who acted in
+the same way would be ferocious. But the man is really ferocious
+because he is really aware of the pain which he inflicts. The wolf, I
+suppose, has no more recognition of the sheep's feelings than a man has
+of feelings in the oyster or the potato. For him, they are simply
+non-existent; and it is just as inappropriate to think of the wolf as
+cruel, as it would be to call the sheep cruel for eating grass. Are we
+to say that "nature" is cruel because the arrangement increases the sum
+of undeserved suffering? That is a problem which I do not feel able to
+examine; but it is, at least, obvious that it cannot be answered
+off-hand in the affirmative. To the individual sheep it matters nothing
+whether he is eaten by the wolf or dies of disease or starvation. He
+has to die any way, and the particular way is unimportant. The wolf is
+simply one of the limiting forces upon sheep, and if he were removed
+others would come into play. The sheep, left to himself, would still
+give a practical illustration of the doctrine of Malthus. If, as
+evolutionists tell us, the hostility of the wolf tends to improve the
+breed of sheep, to encourage him to think more and to sharpen his wits,
+the sheep may be, on the whole, the better for the wolf, in this sense
+at least: that the sheep of a wolfless region might lead a more
+wretched existence, and be less capable animals and more subject to
+disease and starvation than the sheep in a wolf-haunted region. The
+wolf may, so far, be a blessing in disguise.
+
+This suggests another obvious remark. When we speak of the struggle for
+existence, the popular view seems to construe this into the theory that
+the world is a mere cockpit, in which one race carries on an
+interminable struggle with the other. If the wolves are turned in with
+the sheep, the first result will be that all the sheep will become
+mutton, and the last that there will be one big wolf with all the
+others inside him. But this is contrary to the essence of the doctrine.
+Every race depends, we all hold, upon its environment, and the
+environment includes all the other races. If some, therefore, are in
+conflict, others are mutually necessary. If the wolf ate all the sheep,
+and the sheep ate all the grass, the result would be the extirpation of
+all the sheep and all the wolves, as well as all the grass. The
+struggle necessarily implies reciprocal dependence in a countless
+variety of ways. There is not only a conflict, but a system of tacit
+alliances. One species is necessary to the existence of others, though
+the multiplication of some implies also the dying out of particular
+rivals. The conflict implies no cruelty, as I have said, and the
+alliance no goodwill. The wolf neither loves the sheep (except as
+mutton) nor hates him; but he depends upon him as absolutely as if he
+were aware of the fact. The sheep is one of the wolf's necessaries of
+life. When we speak of the struggle for existence we mean, of course,
+that there is at any given period a certain equilibrium between all the
+existing species; it changes, though it changes so slowly that the
+process is imperceptible and difficult to realise even to the
+scientific imagination. The survival of any species involves the
+disappearance of rivals no more than the preservation of allies. The
+struggle, therefore, is so far from internecine that it necessarily
+involves co-operation. It cannot even be said that it necessarily
+implies suffering. People, indeed, speak as though the extinction of a
+race involved suffering in the same way as the slaughter of an
+individual. It is plain that this is not a necessary, though it may
+sometimes be the actual result. A corporation may be suppressed without
+injury to its members. Every individual will die before long, struggle
+or no struggle. If the rate of reproduction fails to keep up with the
+rate of extinction, the species must diminish. But this might happen
+without any increase of suffering. If the boys in a district discovered
+how to take birds' eggs, they might soon extirpate a species; but it
+does not follow that the birds would individually suffer. Perhaps they
+would feel themselves relieved from a disagreeable responsibility. The
+process by which a species is improved, the dying out of the least fit,
+implies no more suffering than we know to exist independently of any
+doctrine as to a struggle. When we use anthropomorphic language, we may
+speak of "self-assertion". But "self-assertion," minus the
+anthropomorphism, means self-preservation; and that is merely a way of
+describing the fact that an animal or plant which is well adapted to
+its conditions of life is more likely to live than an animal which is
+ill-adapted. I have some difficulty in imagining how any other
+arrangement can even be supposed possible. It seems to be almost an
+identical proposition that the healthiest and strongest will generally
+live longest; and the conception of a "struggle for existence" only
+enables us to understand how this results in certain progressive
+modifications of the species. If we could ever for a moment have
+fancied that there was no pain and disease, and that some beings were
+not more liable than others to those evils, I might admit that the new
+doctrine has made the world darker. As it is, it seems to me that it
+leaves the data just what they were before, and only shows us that they
+have certain previously unsuspected bearings upon the history of the
+world.
+
+One other point must be mentioned. Not only are species interdependent
+as well as partly in competition, but there is an absolute dependence
+in all the higher species between its different members which may be
+said to imply a _de facto_ altruism, as the dependence upon other
+species implies a _de facto_ co-operation. Every animal, to say
+nothing else, is absolutely dependent for a considerable part of its
+existence upon its parents. The young bird or beast could not grow up
+unless its mother took care of it for a certain period. There is,
+therefore, no struggle as between mother and progeny; but, on the
+contrary, the closest possible alliance. Otherwise, life would be
+impossible. The young being defenceless, their parents could
+exterminate them if they pleased, and by so doing would exterminate the
+race. The parental relation, of course, constantly involves a partial
+sacrifice of the mother to her young. She has to go through a whole
+series of operations, which strain her own strength and endanger her
+own existence, but which are absolutely essential to the continuance of
+the race. It may be anthropomorphic to attribute any maternal emotions
+of the human kind to the animal. The bird, perhaps, sits upon her eggs
+because they give her an agreeable sensation, or, if you please, from a
+blind instinct which somehow determines her to the practice. She does
+not look forward, we may suppose, to bringing up a family, or speculate
+upon the delights of domestic affection. I only say that as a fact she
+behaves in a way which is at once injurious to her own chances of
+individual survival, and absolutely necessary to the survival of the
+species. The abnormal bird who deserts her nest escapes many dangers;
+but if all birds were devoid of the instinct, the birds would not
+survive a generation.
+
+Now, I ask, what is the difference which takes place when the monkey
+gradually loses his tail and sets up a superior brain? Is it properly
+to be described as a development or improvement of the "cosmic
+process," or as the beginning of a prolonged contest against it?
+
+In the first place, so far as man becomes a reasonable being, capable
+of foresight and of the adoption of means to ends, he recognises the
+nature of these tacit alliances. He believes it to be his interest not
+to exterminate everything, but to exterminate those species alone whose
+existence is incompatible with his own. The wolf eats every sheep that
+he comes across as long as his appetite lasts. If there are too many
+wolves, the process is checked by the starvation of the supernumerary
+eaters. Man can maintain just as many sheep as he wants, and may also
+proportion the numbers of his own species to the possibilities of
+future supply. Many of the lower species thus become subordinate parts
+of the social organism--that is to say, of the new equilibrium which
+has been established. There is so far a reciprocal advantage. The sheep
+that is preserved with a view to mutton gets the advantage, though he
+is not kept with a view to his own advantage. Of all arguments for
+vegetarianism, none is so weak as the argument from humanity. The pig
+has a stronger interest than any one in the demand for bacon. If all
+the world were Jewish, there would be no pigs at all. He has to pay for
+his privileges by an early death; but he makes a good bargain of it. He
+dies young, and, though we can hardly infer the "love of the gods," we
+must admit that he gets a superior race of beings to attend to his
+comforts, moved by the strongest possible interest in his health and
+vigour, and induced by its own needs, perhaps, to make him a little too
+fat for comfort, but certainly also to see that he has a good sty, and
+plenty to eat every day of his life. Other races, again, are extirpated
+as "ruthlessly" as in the merely instinctive struggle for existence. We
+get rid of wolves and snakes as well as we can, and more systematically
+than can be done by their animal competitors. The process does not
+necessarily involve cruelty, and certainly does not involve a
+diminution of the total of happiness. The struggle for existence means
+the substitution of a new system of equilibrium, in which one of the
+old discords has been removed, and the survivors live in greater
+harmony. If the wolf is extirpated as an internecine enemy, it is that
+there may be more sheep when sheep have become our allies and the
+objects of our earthly providence. The result may be, perhaps I might
+say must be, a state in which, on the whole, there is a greater amount
+of life supported on the planet; and therefore, as those will think who
+are not pessimists, a decided gain on the balance. At any rate, the
+difference so far is that the condition which was in all cases
+necessary, is now consciously recognised as necessary; and that we
+deliberately aim at a result which always had to be achieved on penalty
+of destruction. So far, again, as morality can be established on purely
+prudential grounds, the same holds good of relations between human
+beings themselves. Men begin to perceive that, even from a purely
+personal point of view, peace is preferable to war. If war is unhappily
+still prevalent, it is at least not war in which every clan is fighting
+with its neighbours, and where conquest means slavery or extirpation.
+Millions of men are at peace within the limits of a modern State, and
+can go about their business without cutting each other's throats. When
+they fight with other nations they do not enslave nor massacre their
+prisoners. Starting from the purely selfish ground Hobbes could prove
+conclusively that everybody benefited by the social compact which
+substituted peace and order for the original state of war. Is this,
+then, a reversal of the old state of things--a combating of a "cosmic
+process"? I should rather say that it is a development of the tacit
+alliances, and a modification so far of the direct or internecine
+conflict. Both were equally implied in the older conditions, and both
+still exist. Some races form alliances, while others are crowded out of
+existence. Of course, I cease to do some things which I should have
+done before. I don't attack the first man I meet in the street and take
+his scalp. One reason is that I don't expect he will take mine; for, if
+I did, I fear that, even as a civilised being, I should try to
+anticipate his intentions. This merely means that we have both come to
+see that we have a common interest in keeping the peace. And this,
+again, merely means that the tacit alliance which was always an
+absolutely necessary condition of the survival of the species has now
+been extended through a wider area. The species could not have got on
+at all if there had not been so much alliance as is necessary for its
+reproduction and for the preservation of its young for some years of
+helplessness. The change is simply that the small circle which included
+only the primitive family or class has extended, so that we can meet
+members of the same nation, or, it may be, of the same race, on terms
+which were previously confined to the minor group. We have still to
+exterminate and still to preserve. The mode of employing our energies
+has changed, but not the essential nature. Morality proper, however,
+has so far not emerged. It begins when sympathy begins; when we really
+desire the happiness of others; or, as Kant says, when we treat other
+men as an end and not simply as a means. Undoubtedly this involves a
+new principle, no less than the essential principle of all true
+morality. Still, I have to ask whether it implies a combating or a
+continuation of a cosmic process. Now, as I have observed, even the
+animal mother shows what I have called a _de facto_ altruism. She
+has instincts which, though dangerous to the individual, are essential
+for the race. The human mother sacrifices herself with a consciousness
+of the results to herself, and her personal fears are overcome by the
+strength of her affections. She intentionally endures a painful death
+to save them from suffering. The animal sacrifices herself, but without
+foresight of the result, and therefore without moral worth. This is
+merely the most striking exemplification of the general process of the
+development of morality. Conduct is first regarded purely with a view
+to the effects upon the agent, and is therefore enforced by extrinsic
+penalties, by consequences, that is, supposed to be attached to us by
+the will of some ruler, natural or supernatural. The instinct which
+comes to regard such conduct as bad in itself, which implies a dislike
+of giving pain to others, and not merely a dislike to the gallows,
+grows up under such probation until the really moralised being acquires
+feelings which make the external penalty superfluous. This,
+indubitably, is the greatest of all changes, the critical fact which
+decides whether we are to regard conduct simply as useful, or also to
+regard it as moral in the strictest sense. But I should still call it a
+development and not a reversal of the previous process. The conduct
+which we call virtuous is the same conduct externally which we before
+regarded as useful. The difference is that the simple fact of its
+utility, that is, of its utility to others and to the race in general,
+has now become also the sufficient motive for the action as well as the
+implicit cause of the action. In the earlier stages, when no true
+sympathy existed, men and animals were still forced to act in a certain
+way because it was beneficial to others. They now act in that way
+because they are conscious that it is beneficial to others. The whole
+history of moral evolution seems to imply this. We may go back to a
+period at which the moral law is identified with the general customs of
+the race; at which there is no perception of any clear distinction
+between that which is moral and that which is simply customary; between
+that which is imposed by a law in the strict sense and that which is
+dictated by general moral principles. In such a state of things, the
+motives for obedience partake of the nature of "blind instincts". No
+definite reason for them is present to the mind of the agent, and it
+does not occur to him even to demand a reason. "Our fathers did so and
+we do so" is the sole and sufficient explanation of their conduct. Thus
+instinct again may be traced back by evolutionists to the earliest
+period at which the instincts implied in the relations between the
+sexes or between parents and offspring, existed. They were the germ
+from which has sprung all morality such as we now recognise.
+
+Morality, then, implies the development of certain instincts which are
+essential to the race, but which may, in an indefinite number of cases,
+be injurious to the individual. The particular mother is killed because
+she obeys her natural instincts; but, if it were not for mothers and
+their instincts, the race would come to an end. Professor Huxley speaks
+of the "fanatical individualism" of our time as failing to construct
+morality from the analogy of the cosmic process. An individualism which
+regards the cosmic process as equivalent simply to an internecine
+struggle of each against all, must certainly fail to construct a
+satisfactory morality upon such terms, and I will add that any
+individualism which fails to recognise fully the social character,
+which regards society as an aggregate instead of an organism, will, in
+my opinion, find itself in difficulties. But I also submit that the
+development of the instincts which directly correspond to the needs of
+the race, is merely another case in which we aim consciously at an end
+which was before an unintentional result of our actions. Every race,
+above the lowest, has instincts which are only intelligible by the
+requirements of the race; and has both to compete with some and to form
+alliances with others of its fellow occupants of the planet. Both in
+the unmoralised condition and in that in which morality has become most
+developed, these instincts have common characteristics, and may be
+regarded as conditions of the power of the race to which they belong to
+maintain its position in the world, and, speaking roughly, to preserve
+or increase its own vitality.
+
+I will not pause to insist upon this so far as regards many qualities
+which are certainly moral, though they may be said to refer primarily
+to the individual. That chastity and temperance, truthfulness and
+energy, are, on the whole, advantages both to the individual and to the
+race, does not, I fancy, require elaborate proof; nor need I argue at
+length that the races in which they are common will therefore have
+inevitable advantages in the struggle for existence. Of all qualities
+which enable a race to hold its own, none is more important than the
+power of organising individually, politically, and socially, and that
+power implies the existence of justice and the instinct of mutual
+confidence-in short, all the social virtues. The difficulty seems to be
+felt in regard to those purely altruistic impulses, which, at first
+glance at any rate, make it apparently our duty to preserve those who
+would otherwise be unfit to live. Virtue, says Professor Huxley, is
+directed "not so much to the survival of the fittest," as to the
+"fitting of as many as possible to survive". I do not dispute the
+statement, I think it true in a sense; but I have a difficulty as to
+its application.
+
+Morality, it is obvious, must be limited by the conditions in which we
+are placed. What is impossible is not a duty. One condition plainly is
+that the planet is limited. There is only room for a certain number of
+living beings; and though we may determine what shall be the number, we
+cannot arbitrarily say that it shall be indefinitely great. It is one
+consequence that we do, in fact, go on suppressing the unfit, and
+cannot help going on suppressing them. Is it desirable that it should
+be otherwise? Should we wish, for example, that America could still be
+a hunting-ground for savages? Is it better that it should contain a
+million red men or sixty millions of civilised whites? Undoubtedly the
+moralist will say with absolute truth that the methods of extirpation
+adopted by Spaniards and Englishmen were detestable. I need not say
+that I agree with him, and hope that such methods may be abolished
+wherever any remnant of them exists. But I say so partly because I
+believe in the struggle for existence. This process underlies morality,
+and operates whether we are moral or not. The most civilised race, that
+which has the greatest knowledge, skill, power of organisation, will, I
+hold, have an inevitable advantage in the struggle, even if it does not
+use the brutal means which are superfluous as well as cruel. All the
+natives who lived in America a hundred years ago would be dead now in
+any case, even if they had invariably been treated with the greatest
+humanity, fairness, and consideration. Had they been unable to suit
+themselves to new conditions of life, they would have suffered an
+euthanasia instead of a partial extirpation; and had they suited
+themselves they would either have been absorbed or become a useful part
+of the population. To abolish the old brutal method is not to abolish
+the struggle for existence, but to make the result depend upon a higher
+order of qualities than those of the mere piratical viking.
+
+Mr. Pearson has been telling us in his most interesting book, that the
+negro may not improbably hold his own in Africa. I cannot say I regard
+this as an unmixed evil. Why should there not be parts of the world in
+which races of inferior intelligence or energy should hold their own? I
+am not so anxious to see the whole earth covered by an indefinite
+multiplication of the cockney type. But I only quote the suggestion for
+another reason. Till recent years the struggle for existence was
+carried on as between Europeans and negroes by simple violence and
+brutality. The slave trade and its consequences have condemned the
+whole continent to barbarism. That, undoubtedly, was part of the
+struggle for existence. But, if Mr. Pearson's guess should be verified,
+the results have been so far futile as well as disastrous. The negro
+has been degraded, and yet, after all our brutality, we cannot take his
+place. Therefore, besides the enormous evils to slave-trading countries
+themselves, the lowering of their moral tone, the substitution of
+piracy for legitimate commerce, and the degradation of the countries
+which bought the slaves, the superior race has not even been able to
+suppress the inferior. But the abolition of this monstrous evil does
+not involve the abolition but the humanisation of the struggle. The
+white man, however merciful he becomes, may gradually extend over such
+parts of the country as are suitable to him; and the black man will
+hold the rest and acquire such arts and civilisation as he is capable
+of appropriating. The absence of cruelty would not alter the fact that
+the fittest race would extend; but it may ensure that whatever is good
+in the negro may have a chance of development in his own sphere, and
+that success in the struggle will be decided by more valuable
+qualities.
+
+Without venturing further into a rather speculative region, I need only
+indicate the bearing of such considerations upon problems nearer home.
+It is often complained that the tendency of modern civilisation is to
+preserve the weakly, and therefore to lower the vitality of the race.
+This seems to involve inadmissible assumptions. In the first place, the
+process by which the weaker are preserved consists in suppressing
+various conditions unfavourable to human life in general. Sanitary
+legislation, for example, aims at destroying the causes of many of the
+diseases from which our forefathers suffered. If we can suppress the
+smallpox, we of course save many weakly children, who would have died
+had they been attacked. But we also remove one of the causes which
+weakened the constitutions of many of the survivors. I do not know by
+what right we can say that such legislation, or again, the legislation
+which prevents the excessive labour of children, does more harm by
+preserving the weak than it does good by preventing the weakening of
+the strong. One thing is at any rate clear: to preserve life is to
+increase the population, and therefore to increase the competition; or,
+in other words, to intensify the struggle for existence. The process is
+as broad as it is long. If we could be sure that every child born
+should grow up to maturity, the result would be to double the severity
+of the competition for support, What we should have to show, therefore,
+in order to justify the inference of a deterioration due to this
+process, would be, not that it simply increased the number of the
+candidates for living, but that it gave to the feebler candidates a
+differential advantage; that they are now more fitted than they were
+before for ousting their superior neighbours from the chances of
+support. But I can see no reason for supposing such a consequence to be
+probable or even possible. The struggle for existence, as I have
+suggested, rests upon the unalterable facts that the world is limited
+and population elastic. Under all conceivable circumstances we shall
+still have in some way or other to proportion our numbers to our
+supplies; and under all circumstances those who are fittest by reason
+of intellectual or moral or physical qualities will have the best
+chance of occupying good places, and leaving descendants to supply the
+next generation. It is surely not less true that in the civilised as
+much as in the most barbarous race, the healthiest are the most likely
+to live, and the most likely to be ancestors. If so, the struggle will
+still be carried on upon the same principles, though certainly in a
+different shape.
+
+It is true that this suggests one of the most difficult questions of
+the time. It is suggested, for example, that in some respects the
+"highest" specimens of the race are not the healthiest or the fittest.
+Genius, according to some people, is a variety of disease, and
+intellectual power is won by a diminution of reproductive power. A
+lower race, again, if we measure "high" and "low" by intellectual
+capacity, may oust a higher race, because it can support itself more
+cheaply, or, in other words, because it is more efficient for
+industrial purposes. Without presuming to pronounce upon such
+questions, I will simply ask whether this does not interpret Professor
+Huxley's remark about that "cosmic nature" which is still so strong,
+and which is likely to be strong so long as men require stomachs. We
+have not, I think, to suppress it, but to adapt it to new
+circumstances. We are engaged in working out a gigantic problem: What
+is the best, in the sense of the most efficient, type of human being?
+What is the best combination of brains and stomach? We turn out saints,
+who are "too good to live," and philosophers, who have run too rapidly
+to brains. They do not answer in practice, because they are instruments
+too delicate for the rough work of daily life. They may give us a
+foretaste of qualities which will be some day possible for the average
+man; of intellectual and moral qualities, which, though now
+exceptional, may become commonplace. But the best stock for the race
+are those in whom we have been lucky enough to strike out the happy
+combination, in which greater intellectual power is produced without
+the loss of physical vigour. Such men, it is probable, will not deviate
+so widely from the average type. The reconciliation of the two
+conditions can only be effected by a very gradual process of slowly
+edging onwards in the right direction. Meanwhile the theory of a
+struggle for existence justifies us, instead of condemning us, for
+preserving the delicate child, who may turn out to be a Newton or a
+Keats, because he will leave to us the advantage of his discoveries or
+his poems, while his physical feebleness assures us that he will not
+propagate his race.
+
+This may lead to a final question. Does the morality of a race
+strengthen or weaken it; fit it to hold its own in the general
+equilibrium, or make its extirpation by low moral races more probable?
+I do not suppose that anybody would deny what I have already suggested,
+that the more moral the race, the more harmonious and the better
+organised, the better it is fitted for holding its own. But if this be
+admitted, we must also admit that the change is not that it has ceased
+to struggle, but that it struggles by different means. It holds its
+own, not merely by brute force, but by justice, humanity, and
+intelligence, while, it may be added, the possession of such qualities
+does not weaken the brute force, where such a quality is still
+required. The most civilised races are, of course, also the most
+formidable in war. But, if we take the opposite alternative, I must ask
+how any quality which really weakens the vitality of the race can
+properly be called moral. I should entirely repudiate any rule of
+conduct which could be shown to have such a tendency. This, indeed,
+indicates what seems to me to be the moral difficulty with most people.
+Charity, you say, is a virtue; charity increases beggary, and so far
+tends to produce a feebler population; therefore, a moral quality tends
+doubly to diminish the vigour of a nation. The answer is, of course,
+obvious, and I am confident that Professor Huxley would have so far
+agreed with me. It is that all charity which fosters a degraded class
+is therefore immoral. The "fanatical individualism" of to-day has its
+weaknesses; but in this matter it seems to me that we see the weakness
+of the not less fanatical "collectivism".
+
+The question, in fact, how far any of the socialistic or ethical
+schemes of to-day are right or wrong, depends upon our answer to the
+question how far they tend to produce a vigorous or an enervated
+population. If I am asked to subscribe to General Booth's scheme, I
+inquire first whether the scheme is likely to increase or diminish the
+number of helpless hangers-on upon the efficient part of society. Will
+the whole nation consist in larger proportions of active and
+responsible workers, or of people who are simply burdens upon the real
+workers? The answer decides not only the question whether it is
+expedient, but also the question whether it is right or wrong, to
+support the proposed scheme. Every charitable action is so far a good
+action that it implies sympathy for suffering; but if it is so much in
+want of prudence that it increases the evil which it means to remedy,
+it becomes for that reason a bad action. To develop sympathy without
+developing foresight is just one of the one-sided developments which
+fail to constitute a real advance in morality, though I will not deny
+that it may incidentally lead to an advance.
+
+I hold, then, that the "struggle for existence" belongs to an
+underlying order of facts to which moral epithets cannot be properly
+applied. It denotes a condition of which the moralist has to take
+account, and to which morality has to be adapted; but which, just
+because it is a "cosmic process," cannot be altered, however much we
+may alter the conduct which it dictates. Under all conceivable
+circumstances, the race has to adapt itself to the environment, and
+that necessarily implies a conflict as well as an alliance. The
+preservation of the fittest, which is surely a good thing, is merely
+another aspect of the dying out of the unfit, which is hardly a bad
+thing. The feast which Nature spreads before us, according to Malthus's
+metaphor, is only sufficient for a limited number of guests, and the
+one question is how to select them. The tendency of morality is to
+humanise the struggle, to minimise the suffering of those who lose the
+game; and to offer the prizes to the qualities which are advantageous
+to all, rather than to those which increase and intensify the
+bitterness of the conflict. This implies the growth of foresight, which
+is an extension of the earlier instinct, and enables men to adapt
+themselves to the future and to learn from the past, as well as to act
+up to immediate impulse of present events. It implies still more the
+development of the sympathy which makes every man feel for the hurts of
+all, and which, as social organisation is closer, and the dependence of
+each constituent atom upon the whole organisation is more vividly
+realised, extends the range of a man's interests beyond his own private
+needs. In that sense, again, it must stimulate "collectivism" at the
+expense of a crude individualism, and condemns the doctrine which, as
+Professor Huxley puts it, would forbid us to restrain the member of a
+community from doing his best to destroy it. To restrain such conduct
+is surely to carry on the conflict against all anti-social agents or
+tendencies. For I should certainly hold any form of collectivism to be
+immoral which denied the essential doctrine of the abused
+individualist, the necessity, that is, for individual responsibility.
+We have surely to suppress the murderer, as our ancestors suppressed
+the wolf. We have to suppress both the external enemies, the noxious
+animals whose existence is incompatible with our own, and the internal
+enemies which are injurious elements in the society itself. That is, we
+have to work for the same end of eliminating the least fit. Our methods
+are changed; we desire to suppress poverty, not to extirpate the poor
+man. We give inferior races a chance of taking whatever place they are
+fit for, and try to supplant them with the least possible severity if
+they are unfit for any place. But the suppression of poverty supposes
+not the confiscation of wealth, which would hardly suppress poverty in
+the long run, nor even the adoption of a system of living which would
+enable the idle and the good-for-nothing to survive. The progress of
+civilisation depends, I should say, on the extension of the sense of
+duty which each man owes to society at large. That involves such a
+constitution of society that, although we abandon the old methods of
+hanging and flogging and shooting down--methods which corrupted the
+inflicters of punishment by diminishing their own sense of
+responsibility--may give an advantage to the prudent and industrious,
+and make it more probable that they will be the ancestors of the next
+generation. A system which should equalise the advantages of the
+energetic and the helpless would begin by demoralising, and would very
+soon lead to an unprecedented intensification of the struggle for
+existence. The probable result of a ruthless socialism would be the
+adoption of very severe means for suppressing those who did not
+contribute their share of work. But, in any case, as it seems, we never
+get away or break away from the inevitable fact. If individual ends
+could be suppressed, if every man worked for the good of society as
+energetically as for his own, we should still feel the absolute
+necessity of proportioning the whole body to the whole supplies
+obtainable from the planet, and to preserve the equilibrium of mankind
+relatively to the rest of nature. That day is probably distant; but
+even upon that hypothesis the struggle for existence would still be
+with us, and there would be the same necessity for preserving the
+fittest and killing out, as gently as might be, those who were unfit.
+
+
+
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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, Social Rights and Duties, Volume I (of 2), by
+Sir Leslie Stephen
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Social Rights and Duties, Volume I (of 2)
+       Addresses to Ethical Societies
+
+
+Author: Sir Leslie Stephen
+
+
+
+Release Date: May 21, 2009  [eBook #28901]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES, VOLUME I
+(OF 2)***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Thierry Alberto, Henry Craig, and the Project Gutenberg
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net)
+
+
+
+The Ethical Library
+
+SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES
+
+Addresses to Ethical Societies
+
+by
+
+LESLIE STEPHEN
+
+In Two Volumes
+
+VOL. I.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+London
+Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited
+New York: MacMillan & Co.
+1896
+
+
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+
+The following chapters are chiefly a republication of addresses
+delivered to the Ethical Societies of London. Some have previously
+appeared in the _International Journal of Ethics_, the _National
+Review_, and the _Contemporary Review_. The author has to thank the
+proprietors of these periodicals for their consent to the republication.
+
+L. S.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+                                                     PAGE
+
+THE AIMS OF ETHICAL SOCIETIES,                          1
+
+SCIENCE AND POLITICS,                                  45
+
+THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,                       91
+
+THE MORALITY OF COMPETITION,                          133
+
+SOCIAL EQUALITY,                                      175
+
+ETHICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE,                221
+
+
+
+
+THE AIMS OF ETHICAL SOCIETIES.[1]
+
+
+I am about to say a few words upon the aims of this society: and I
+should be sorry either to exaggerate or to depreciate our legitimate
+pretensions. It would be altogether impossible to speak too strongly of
+the importance of the great questions in which our membership of the
+society shows us to be interested. It would, I fear, be easy enough to
+make an over-estimate of the part which we can expect to play in their
+solution. I hold indeed, or I should not be here, that we may be of
+some service at any rate to each other. I think that anything which
+stimulates an active interest in the vital problems of the day deserves
+the support of all thinking men; and I propose to consider briefly some
+of the principles by which we should be guided in doing whatever we can
+to promote such an interest.
+
+      [1] Address to West London Ethical Society, 4th December, 1892.
+
+We are told often enough that we are living in a period of important
+intellectual and social revolutions. In one way we are perhaps inclined
+even to state the fact a little too strongly. We suffer at times from
+the common illusion that the problems of to-day are entirely new: we
+fancy that nobody ever thought of them before, and that when we have
+solved them, nobody will ever need to look for another solution. To
+ardent reformers in all ages it seems as if the millennium must begin
+with their triumph, and that their triumph will be established by a
+single victory. And while some of us are thus sanguine, there are many
+who see in the struggles of to-day the approach of a deluge which is to
+sweep away all that once ennobled life. The believer in the old creeds,
+who fears that faith is decaying, and the supernatural life fading from
+the world, denounces the modern spirit as materialising and degrading.
+The conscience of mankind, he thinks, has become drugged and lethargic;
+our minds are fixed upon sensual pleasures, and our conduct regulated
+by a blind struggle for the maximum of luxurious enjoyment. The period
+in his eyes is a period of growing corruption; modern society suffers
+under a complication of mortal diseases, so widely spread and deeply
+seated that at present there is no hope of regeneration. The best hope
+is that its decay may provide the soil in which seed may be sown of a
+far-distant growth of happier augury. Such dismal forebodings are no
+novelty. Every age produces its prophecies of coming woes. Nothing
+would be easier than to make out a catena of testimonies from great men
+at every stage of the world's history, declaring each in turn that the
+cup of iniquity was now at last overflowing, and that corruption had
+reached so unprecedented a step that some great catastrophe must be
+approaching. A man of unusually lofty morality is, for that reason,
+more keenly sensitive to the lowness of the average standard, and too
+easily accepts the belief that the evils before his eyes must be in
+fact greater, and not, as may perhaps be the case, only more vividly
+perceived, than those of the bygone ages. A call to repentance easily
+takes the form of an assertion that the devil is getting the upper
+hand; and we may hope that the pessimist view is only a form of the
+discontent which is a necessary condition of improvement. Anyhow, the
+diametrical conflict of prophecies suggests one remark which often
+impresses me. We are bound to call each other by terribly hard names. A
+gentleman assures me in print that I am playing the devil's game;
+depriving my victims, if I have any, of all the beliefs that can make
+life noble or happy, and doing my best to destroy the very first
+principles of morality. Yet I meet my adversary in the flesh, and find
+that he treats me not only with courtesy, but with no inconsiderable
+amount of sympathy. He admits--by his actions and his argument--that
+I--the miserable sophist and seducer--have not only some good impulses,
+but have really something to say which deserves a careful and
+respectful answer. An infidel, a century or two ago, was supposed to
+have forfeited all claim to the ordinary decencies of life. Now I can
+say, and can say with real satisfaction, that I do not find any
+difference of creed, however vast in words, to be an obstacle to decent
+and even friendly treatment. I am at times tempted to ask whether my
+opponent can be quite logical in being so courteous; whether, if he is
+as sure as he says that I am in the devil's service, I ought not, as a
+matter of duty, to be encountered with the old dogmatism and arrogance.
+I shall, however, leave my friends of a different way of thinking to
+settle that point for themselves. I cannot doubt the sincerity of their
+courtesy, and I will hope that it is somehow consistent with their
+logic. Rather I will try to meet them in a corresponding spirit by a
+brief confession. I have often enough spoken too harshly and vehemently
+of my antagonists. I have tried to fix upon them too unreservedly what
+seemed to me the logical consequences of their dogmas. I have condemned
+their attempts at a milder interpretation of their creed as proofs of
+insincerity, when I ought to have done more justice to the legitimate
+and lofty motives which prompted them. And I at least am bound by my
+own views to admit that even the antagonist from whose utterances I
+differ most widely may be an unconscious ally, supplementing rather
+than contradicting my theories, and in great part moved by aspirations
+which I ought to recognise even when allied with what I take to be
+defective reasoning. We are all amenable to one great influence. The
+vast shuttle of modern life is weaving together all races and creeds
+and classes. We are no longer shut up in separate compartments, where
+the mental horizon is limited by the area visible from the parish
+steeple; each little section can no longer fancy, in the old childish
+fashion, that its own arbitrary prejudices and dogmas are parts of the
+eternal order of things; or infer that in the indefinite region beyond,
+there live nothing but monsters and anthropophagi, and men whose heads
+grow beneath their shoulders. The annihilation of space has made us
+fellows as by a kind of mechanical compulsion; and every advance of
+knowledge has increased the impossibility of taking our little
+church--little in comparison with mankind, be it even as great as the
+Catholic Church--for the one pattern of right belief. The first effect
+of bringing remote nations and classes into closer contact is often an
+explosion of antipathy; but in the long run it means a development of
+human sympathy. Wide, therefore, as is the opposition of opinions as to
+what is the true theory of the world--as to which is the divine and
+which the diabolical element--I fully believe that beneath the war of
+words and dogmas there is a growth of genuine toleration, and, we must
+hope, of ultimate conciliation.
+
+This is manifest in another direction. The churches are rapidly making
+at least one discovery. They are beginning to find out that their
+vitality depends not upon success in theological controversy, but upon
+their success in meeting certain social needs and aspirations common to
+all classes. It is simply impossible for any thinking man at the
+present day to take any living interest, for example, in the ancient
+controversies. The "drum ecclesiastic" of the seventeenth century would
+sound a mere lullaby to us. Here and there a priest or a belated
+dissenting minister may amuse himself by threshing out once more the
+old chaff of dead and buried dogmas. There are people who can argue
+gravely about baptismal regeneration or apostolical succession. Such
+doctrines were once alive, no doubt, because they represented the form
+in which certain still living problems had then to present themselves.
+They now require to be stated in a totally different shape, before we
+can even guess why they were once so exciting, or how men could have
+supposed their modes of attacking the question to be adequate. The Pope
+and General Booth still condemn each other's tenets; and in case of
+need would, I suppose, take down the old rusty weapons from the
+armoury. But each sees with equal clearness that the real stress of
+battle lies elsewhere. Each tries, after his own fashion, to give a
+better answer than the Socialists to the critical problems of to-day.
+We ought so far to congratulate both them and ourselves on the
+direction of their energies. Nay, can we not even co-operate, and put
+these hopeless controversies aside? Why not agree to differ about the
+questions which no one denies to be all but insoluble, and become
+allies in promoting morality? Enormous social forces find their natural
+channel through the churches; and if the beliefs inculcated by the
+church were not, as believers assert, the ultimate cause of progress,
+it is at least clear that they were not incompatible with progress. The
+church, we all now admit, whether by reason of or in spite of its
+dogmatic creed, was for ages one great organ of civilisation, and still
+exercises an incalculable influence. Why, then, should we, who cannot
+believe in the dogmas, yet fall into line with believers for practical
+purposes? Churches insist verbally upon the importance of their dogma:
+they are bound to do so by their logical position; but, in reality, for
+them, as for us, the dogma has become in many ways a mere
+excrescence--a survival of barren formulae which do little harm to
+anybody. Carlyle, in his quaint phrase, talked about the exodus from
+Houndsditch, but doubted whether it were yet time to cast aside the
+Hebrew old clothes. They have become threadbare and antiquated. That
+gives a reason to the intelligent for abandoning them; but, also,
+perhaps a reason for not quarrelling with those who still care to
+masquerade in them. Orthodox people have made a demand that the Board
+Schools should teach certain ancient doctrines about the nature of
+Christ; and the demand strikes some of us as preposterous if not
+hypocritical. But putting aside the audacity of asking unbelievers to
+pay for such teaching, one might be tempted to ask, what harm could it
+really do? Do you fancy for a moment that you can really teach a child
+of ten the true meaning of the Incarnation? Can you give him more than
+a string of words as meaningless as magical formulae? I was brought up
+at the most orthodox of Anglican seminaries. I learned the Catechism,
+and heard lectures upon the Thirty-nine Articles. I never found that
+the teaching had ever any particular effect upon my mind. As I grew up,
+the obsolete exuviae of doctrine dropped off my mind like dead leaves
+from a tree. They could not get any vital hold in an atmosphere of
+tolerable enlightenment. Why should we fear the attempt to instil these
+fragments of decayed formulae into the minds of children of tender age?
+Might we not be certain that they would vanish of themselves? They are
+superfluous, no doubt, but too futile to be of any lasting importance.
+I remember that, when the first Education Act was being discussed,
+mention was made of a certain Jew who not only sent his son to a
+Christian school, but insisted upon his attending all the lessons. He
+had paid his fees, he said, for education in the Gospels among other
+things, and he meant to have his money's worth. "But your son," it was
+urged, "will become a Christian." "I," he replied, "will take good care
+of that at home." Was not the Jew a man of sense? Can we suppose that
+the mechanical repetition of a few barren phrases will do either harm
+or good? As the child develops he will, we may hope, remember his
+multiplication table, and forget his fragments of the Athanasian Creed.
+Let the wheat and tares be planted together, and trust to the superior
+vitality of the more valuable plant. The sentiment might be expressed
+sentimentally as easily as cynically. We may urge, like many sceptics
+of the last century, that Christianity should be kept "for the use of
+the poor," and renounced in the esoteric creed of the educated. Or we
+may urge the literary and aesthetic beauty of the old training, and wish
+it to be preserved to discipline the imagination, though we may reject
+its value as a historical statement of fact.
+
+The audience which I am addressing has, I presume, made up its mind
+upon such views. They come too late. It might have been a good thing,
+had it been possible, to effect the transition from old to new without
+a violent convulsion: good, if Christian conceptions had been slowly
+developed into more simple forms; if the beautiful symbols had been
+retained till they could be impregnated with a new meaning; and if the
+new teaching of science and philosophy had gradually percolated into
+the ancient formulae without causing a disruption. Possibly the
+Protestant Reformation was a misfortune, and Erasmus saw the truth more
+clearly than Luther. I cannot go into might-have-beens. We have to deal
+with facts. A conspiracy of silence is impossible about matters which
+have been vehemently discussed for centuries. We have to take sides;
+and we at least have agreed to take the side of the downright thinker,
+who will say nothing that he does not believe, and hide nothing that he
+does believe, and speak out his mind without reservation or economy and
+accommodation. Indeed, as things are, any other course seems to me to
+be impossible. I have spoken, for example, of General Booth. Many
+people heartily admire his schemes of social reform, and have been
+willing to subscribe for its support, without troubling themselves
+about his theology. I will make no objection; but I confess that I
+could not therefore treat that theology as either morally or
+intellectually respectable. It has happened to me once or twice to
+listen to expositions from orators of the Salvation Army. Some of them
+struck me as sincere though limited, and others as the victims of an
+overweening vanity. The oratory, so far as I could hear, consisted in
+stringing together an endless set of phrases about the blood of Christ,
+which, if they really meant anything, meant a doctrine as low in the
+intellectual scale as that of any of the objects of missionary
+enterprise. The conception of the transactions between God and man was
+apparently modelled upon the dealings of a petty tradesman. The "blood
+of Christ" was regarded like the panacea of a quack doctor, which will
+cure the sins of anybody who accepts the prescription. For anything I
+can say, such a creed may be elevating--relatively: elevating as
+slavery is said to have been elevating when it was a substitute for
+extermination. The hymns of the Army may be better than public-house
+melodies, and the excitement produced less mischievous than that due to
+gin. But the best that I can wish for its adherents is, that they
+should speedily reach a point at which they could perceive their
+doctrines to be debasing. I hope, indeed, that they do not realise
+their own meaning: but I could almost as soon join in some old pagan
+ceremonies, gash my body with knives, or swing myself from a hook, as
+indulge in this variety of spiritual intoxication.
+
+There are, it is true, plenty of more refined and intellectual
+preachers, whose sentiments deserve at least the respect due to tender
+and humane feeling. They have found a solution, satisfactory to
+themselves, of the great dilemma which presses on so many minds. A
+religion really to affect the vulgar must be a superstition; to satisfy
+the thoughtful, it must be a philosophy. Is it possible to contrive so
+to fuse the crude with the refined as to make at least a working
+compromise? To me personally, and to most of us living at the present
+day, the enterprise appears to be impracticable. My own experience is,
+I imagine, a very common one. When I ceased to accept the teaching of
+my youth, it was not so much a process of giving up beliefs, as of
+discovering that I had never really believed. The contrast between the
+genuine convictions which guide and govern our conduct, and the
+professions which we were taught to repeat in church, when once
+realised, was too glaring. One belonged to the world of realities, and
+the other to the world of dreams. The orthodox formulae represent, no
+doubt, a sentiment, an attempt to symbolise emotions which might be
+beautiful, or to indicate vague impressions about the tendency of
+things in general; but to put them side by side with real beliefs about
+facts was to reveal their flimsiness. The "I believe" of the creed
+seemed to mean something quite different from the "I believe" of
+politics and history and science. Later experience has only deepened
+and strengthened that feeling. Kind and loving and noble-minded people
+have sought to press upon me the consolations of their religion. I
+thank them in all sincerity; and I feel,--why should I not admit
+it?--that it may be a genuine comfort to set your melancholy to the old
+strain in which so many generations have embodied their sorrows and
+their aspirations. And yet to me, its consolation is an invitation to
+reject plain facts; to seek for refuge in a shadowy world of dreams and
+conjectures, which dissolve as you try to grasp them. The doctrine
+offered for my acceptance cannot be stated without qualifications and
+reserves and modifications, which make it as useless as it is vague and
+conjectural. I may learn in time to submit to the inevitable; I cannot
+drug myself with phrases which evaporate as soon as they are exposed to
+a serious test. You profess to give me the only motives of conduct; and
+I know that at the first demand to define them honestly--to say
+precisely what you believe and why you believe it--you will be forced
+to withdraw, and explain and evade, and at last retire to the safe
+refuge of a mystery, which might as well be admitted at starting. As I
+have read and thought, I have been more and more impressed with the
+obvious explanation of these observations. How should the beliefs be
+otherwise than shadowy and illusory, when their very substance is made
+of doubts laboriously and ingeniously twisted into the semblance of
+convictions? In one way or other that is the characteristic mark of the
+theological systems of the present day. Proof is abandoned for
+persuasion. The orthodox believer professed once to prove the facts
+which he asserted and to show that his dogmas expressed the truth. He
+now only tries to show that the alleged facts don't matter, and that
+the dogmas are meaningless. Nearly two centuries ago, for example, a
+deist pointed out that the writer of the Book of Daniel, like other
+people, must have written after the events which he mentioned. All the
+learned, down to Dr. Pusey, denounced his theory, and declared his
+argument to be utterly destructive of the faith. Now an orthodox
+professor will admit that the deist was perfectly right, and only tries
+to persuade himself that arguments from facts are superfluous. The
+supposed foundation is gone: the superstructure is not to be affected.
+What the keenest disputant now seeks to show is, not that the truth of
+the records can be established beyond reasonable doubt; but that no
+absolute contradiction in terms is involved in supposing that they
+correspond more or less roughly to something which may possibly have
+happened. So long as a thing is not proved false by mathematical
+demonstration, I may still continue to take it for a divine revelation,
+and to listen respectfully when experienced statesmen and learned
+professors assure me with perfect gravity that they can believe in
+Noah's flood or in the swine of Gadara. They have an unquestionable
+right to believe if they please: and they expect me to accept the facts
+for the sake of the doctrine. There, unluckily, I have a similar
+difficulty. It is the orthodox who are the systematic sceptics. The
+most famous philosophers of my youth endeavoured to upset the deist by
+laying the foundation of Agnosticism, arbitrarily tagged to an orthodox
+conclusion. They told me to believe a doctrine because it was totally
+impossible that I should know whether it was true or not, or indeed
+attach any real meaning to it whatever. The highest altar, as Sir W.
+Hamilton said, was the altar to the unknown and unknowable God. Others,
+seeing the inevitable tendency of such methods, have done their best to
+find in that the Christian doctrine, rightly understood, the embodiment
+of the highest philosophy. It is the divine voice which speaks in our
+hearts, though it has caught some accretion of human passion and
+superstition. The popular versions are false and debased; the old
+versions of the Atonement, for example, monstrous; and the belief in
+the everlasting torture of sinners, a hideous and groundless
+caricature. With much that such men have said I could, of course, agree
+heartily; for, indeed, it expresses the strongest feelings which have
+caused religious revolt. But would it not be simpler to say, "the
+doctrine is not true," than to say, "it is true, but means just the
+reverse of what it was also taken to mean"? I prefer plain terms; and
+"without doubt he shall perish everlastingly" seems to be an awkward
+way of denying the endlessness of punishment. You cannot denounce the
+immorality of the old dogmas with the infidel, and then proclaim their
+infinite value with the believer. You defend the doctrine by showing
+that in its plain downright sense,--the sense in which it embodied
+popular imaginations,--it was false and shocking. The proposal to hold
+by the words evacuated of the old meaning is a concession of the whole
+case to the unbeliever, and a substitution of sentiment and aspiration
+for a genuine intellectual belief. Explaining away, however dexterously
+and delicately, is not defending, but at once confessing error, and
+encumbering yourself with all the trammels of misleading associations.
+The more popular method, therefore, at the present day is not to
+rationalise, but to try to outsceptic the sceptic. We are told that we
+have no solid ground from reason at all, and that even physical science
+is as full of contradictions as theology. Such enterprises, conducted
+with whatever ingenuity, are, as I believe, hopeless; but at least they
+are fundamentally and radically sceptical. That, under whatever
+disguises, is the true meaning of the Catholic argument, which is so
+persuasive to many. To prove the truth of Christianity by abstract
+reasoning may be hopeless; but nothing is easier than to persuade
+yourself to believe it, if once you will trust instinct in place of
+reason, and forget that instinct proves anything and everything. The
+success of such arguments with thoughtful men is simply a measure of
+the spread of scepticism. The conviction that truth is unattainable is
+the master argument for submitting to "authority". The "authority," in
+the scientific sense of any set of men who agree upon a doctrine,
+varies directly as their independence of each other. Their "authority"
+in the legal sense varies as the closeness of their mutual dependence.
+As the consent loses its value logically, it gains in power of
+coercion. And therefore it is easy to substitute drilling for arguing,
+and to take up a belief as you accept admission to a society, as a
+matter of taste and feeling, with which abstract logic has nothing to
+do. The common dilemma--you must be a Catholic or an atheist--means,
+that theology is only tenable if you drill people into belief by a vast
+organisation appealing to other than logical motives.
+
+I do not argue these points: I only indicate what I take to be your own
+conviction as well as mine. It seems to me, in fact, that the present
+state of mind--if we look to men's real thoughts and actions, not to
+their conventional phrases--is easily definable. It is simply a tacit
+recognition that the old orthodoxy cannot be maintained either by the
+evidence of facts or by philosophical argument. It has puzzled me
+sometimes to understand why the churches should insist upon nailing
+themselves down to the truth of their dogmas and their legendary
+history. Why cannot they say frankly, what they seem to be constantly
+on the verge of saying--Our dogmas and our history are not true, or not
+"true" in the historical or scientific sense of the word? To ask for
+such truth in the sphere of theology is as pedantic as to ask for it in
+the sphere of poetry. Poetical truth means, not that certain events
+actually happened, or that the poetical "machinery" is to be taken as
+an existing fact; but that the poem is, so to speak, the projection of
+truths upon the cloudland of imagination. It reflects and gives
+sensuous images of truth; but it is only the Philistine or the
+blockhead who can seriously ask, is it true? Some such position seems
+to be really conceivable as an ultimate compromise. Put aside the
+prosaic insistence upon literal matter-of-fact truth, and we may all
+agree to use the same symbolism, and interpret it as we please. This
+seems to me to be actually the view of many thoughtful people, though
+for obvious reasons it is not often explicitly stated. One reason is,
+of course, the consciousness that the great mass of mankind requires
+plain, tangible motives for governing its life; and if it once be
+admitted that so much of the orthodox doctrine is mere symbolism or
+adumbration of truths, the admission would involve the loss of the
+truths so indicated. Moral conduct, again, and moral beliefs are
+supposed to depend upon some affirmation of these truths; and excellent
+people are naturally shy of any open admission which may appear to
+throw doubt upon the ultimate grounds of morality.
+
+Indeed, if it could be really proved that men have to choose between
+renouncing moral truths and accepting unproved theories, it might be
+right--I will not argue the point--to commit intellectual suicide. If
+the truth is that we are mere animals or mere automata, shall we
+sacrifice the truth, or sacrifice what we have at least agreed to call
+our higher nature? For us the dilemma has no force: for we do not admit
+the discrepancy. We believe that morality depends upon something deeper
+and more permanent than any of the dogmas that have hitherto been
+current in the churches. It is a product of human nature, not of any of
+these transcendental speculations or faint survivals of traditional
+superstitions. Morality has grown up independently of, and often in
+spite of, theology. The creeds have been good so far as they have
+accepted or reflected the moral convictions; but it is an illusion to
+suppose that they have generated it. They represent the dialect and the
+imagery by which moral truths have been conveyed to minds at certain
+stages of thought; but it is a complete inversion of the truth to
+suppose that the morality sprang out of them. From this point of view
+we must of necessity treat the great ethical questions independently.
+We cannot form a real alliance with thinkers radically opposed to us.
+Divines tell us that we reject the one possible basis of morality. To
+us it appears that we are strengthening it, by severing it from a
+connection with doctrines arbitrary, incapable of proof, and incapable
+of retaining any consistent meaning. Theologians once believed that
+hell-fire was the ultimate sentence, and persecution the absolute duty
+of every Christian ruler. The churches which once burnt and
+exterminated are now only anxious to proclaim freedom of belief, and to
+cast the blame of persecution upon their rivals. Divines have
+discovered that the doctrine of hell-fire deserves all that infidels
+have said of it; and a member of Dante's church was arguing the other
+day that hell might on the whole be a rather pleasant place of
+residence. Doctrines which can thus be turned inside out are hardly
+desirable bases for morality. So the early Christians, again, were the
+Socialists of their age, and took a view of Dives and Lazarus which
+would commend itself to the Nihilists of to-day. The church is now
+often held up to us as the great barrier against Socialism, and the one
+refuge against subversive doctrines. In a well-known essay on "People
+whom one would have wished to have seen," Lamb and his friends are
+represented as agreeing that if Christ were to enter they would all
+fall down and worship Him. It may have been so; but if the man who best
+represents the ideas of early Christians were to enter a respectable
+society of to-day, would it not be more likely to send for the police?
+When we consider such changes, and mark in another direction how the
+dogmas which once set half the world to cut the throats of the other
+half, have sunk into mere combinations of hard words, can we seriously
+look to the maintenance of dogmas, even in the teeth of reason, as a
+guarantee for ethical convictions? What you call retaining the only
+base of morality, appears to us to be trying to associate morality with
+dogmas essentially arbitrary and unreasonable.
+
+From this point of view it is naturally our opinion that we should
+promote all thorough discussion of great ethical problems in a spirit
+and by methods which are independent of the orthodox dogmas. There are
+many such problems undoubtedly of the highest importance. The root of
+all the great social questions of which I have spoken lies in the
+region of Ethics; and upon that point, at least, we can go along with
+much that is said upon the orthodox side. We cannot, indeed, agree that
+Ethics can be adequately treated by men pledged to ancient traditions,
+employing antiquated methods, and always tempted to have an eye to the
+interest of their own creeds and churches. But we can fully agree that
+ethical principles underlie all the most important problems. Every
+great religious reform has been stimulated by the conviction that the
+one essential thing is a change of spirit, not a mere modification of
+the external law, which has ceased to correspond to genuine beliefs and
+powerful motives. The commonest criticism, indeed, of all projectors of
+new Utopias is that they propose a change of human nature. The
+criticism really suggests a sound criterion. Unless the change proposed
+be practicable, the Utopia will doubtless be impossible. And unless
+some practicable change be proposed, the Utopia, even were it embodied
+in practice, would be useless. If the sole result of raising wages were
+an increase in the consumption of gin, wages might as well stay at a
+minimum. But the tacit assumption that all changes of human nature are
+impracticable is simply a cynical and unproved assertion. All of us
+here hold, I imagine, that human nature has in a sense been changed. We
+hold that, with all its drawbacks, progress is not an illusion; that
+men have become at least more tolerant and more humane; that ancient
+brutalities have become impossible; and that the suffering of the
+weaker excites a keener sympathy. To say that, in that sense, human
+nature must be changed, is to say only that the one sound criterion of
+all schemes for social improvement lies in their ethical tendency. The
+standard of life cannot be permanently raised unless you can raise the
+standard of motive. Old-fashioned political theorists thought that a
+simple change of the constitutional machinery would of itself remedy
+all evils, and failed to recognise that behind the institutions lie all
+the instincts and capabilities of the men who are to work them. A
+similar fallacy is prevalent, I fancy, in regard to what we call social
+reforms. Some scheme for a new mode of distributing the products of
+industry would, it is often assumed, remedy all social evils. To my
+thinking, no such change would do more than touch the superficial
+evils, unless it had also some tendency to call out the higher and
+repress the lower impulses. Unless we can to some extent change "human
+nature," we shall be weaving ropes of sand, or devising schemes for
+perpetual motion, for driving our machinery more effectively without
+applying fresh energy. We shall be falling into the old blunders;
+approving Jack Cade's proposal--as recorded by Shakespeare--that the
+three-hooped pot should have seven hoops; or attempting to get rid of
+poverty by converting the whole nation into paupers. No one, perhaps,
+will deny this in terms; and to admit it frankly is to admit that every
+scheme must be judged by its tendency to "raise the manhood of the
+poor," and to make every man, rich and poor, feel that he is
+discharging a useful function in society. Old Robert Owen, when he
+began his reforms, rested his doctrine and his hopes of perfectibility
+upon the scientific application of a scheme for "the formation of
+character". His plans were crude enough, and fell short of success. But
+he had seen the real conditions of success; and when, in after years,
+he imagined that a new society might be made by simply collecting men
+of any character in a crowd, and inviting them to share alike, he fell
+into the inevitable failure. Modern Socialists might do well to
+remember his history.
+
+Now it is, as I understand, primarily the aim of an Ethical Society to
+promote the rational discussion of these underlying ethical principles.
+We wish to contribute to the clearest understanding we can of the right
+ends to which human energy should be devoted, and of the conditions
+under which such devotion is most likely to be rewarded with success.
+We desire to see the great controversy carried on in the nearest
+possible approach to a scientific spirit. That phrase implies, as I
+have said, that we must abandon much of the old guidance. The lights by
+which our ancestors professed to direct their course are not for us
+supernatural signs, shining in a transcendental region, but at most the
+beacons which they had themselves erected, and valuable as indications,
+though certainly not as infallible guides, to the right path. We must
+question everything, and be prepared to modify or abandon whatever is
+untenable. We must be scientific in spirit, in so far as we must trust
+nothing but a thorough and systematic investigation of facts, however
+the facts may be interpreted. Undoubtedly, the course marked out is
+long and arduous. It is perfectly true, moreover, as our antagonists
+will hasten to observe, that professedly scientific reasoners are
+hardly better agreed than their opponents. If they join upon some
+negative conclusions, and upon some general principles of method, they
+certainly do not reach the same results. They have at present no
+definite creed to lay down. I need only refer, for example, to one very
+obvious illustration. The men who were most conspicuous for their
+attempt to solve social problems by scientific methods, and most
+confident that they had succeeded, were, probably, those who founded
+the so-called "classical" political economy, and represented what is
+now called the individualist point of view. Government, they were apt
+to think, should do nothing but stand aside, see fair-play, and keep
+our knives from each other's throats and our hands out of each other's
+pockets. Much as their doctrines were denounced, this view is still
+represented by the most popular philosopher of the day. And undoubtedly
+we shall do well to take to heart the obvious moral. If we still
+believe in the old-fashioned doctrines, we must infer that to work out
+a scientific doctrine is by no means to secure its acceptance. If we
+reject them we must argue that the mere claim to be scientific may
+inspire men with a premature self-confidence, which tends only to make
+their errors more systematic. When, however, I look at the actual
+course of controversy, I am more impressed by another fact.
+"Individualism" is sometimes met by genuine argument. More frequently,
+I think, it is met by simple appeal to sentiment. This kind of thing,
+we are told, is exploded; it is not up to date; it is as obsolete as
+the plesiosaurus; and therefore, without bothering ourselves about your
+reasoning, we shall simply neglect it. Talk as much as you please, we
+can get a majority on the other side. We shall disregard your
+arguments, and, therefore--it is a common piece of logic at the present
+day--your arguments must be all wrong. I must be content here with
+simply indicating my own view. I think, in fact, that, in this as in
+other cases, the true answer to extreme theorists would be very
+different. I hold that we would begin by admitting the immense value of
+the lesson taught by the old individualists, if that be their right
+name. If they were precipitate in laying down "iron laws" and
+proclaiming inexorable necessity, they were perfectly right in pointing
+out that there are certain "laws of human nature," and conditions of
+social welfare, which will not be altered by simply declaring them to
+be unpleasant. They did an inestimable service in emphatically
+protesting against the system of forcibly suppressing, or trying to
+suppress, deep-seated evils, without an accurate preliminary diagnosis
+of the causes. And--not to go into remote questions--the
+"individualist" creed had this merit, which is related to our especial
+aims. The ethical doctrine which they preached may have had--I think
+that it had--many grave defects; but at least it involved a recognition
+of the truth which their opponents are too apt to shun or reject. They,
+at least, asserted strenuously the cardinal doctrine of the importance
+of individual responsibility. They might draw some erroneous
+inferences, but they could not put too emphatically the doctrine that
+men must not be taught to shift the blame of all their sufferings upon
+some mysterious entity called society, or expect improvement unless,
+among other virtues, they will cultivate the virtue of strenuous,
+unremitting, masculine self-help.
+
+If this be at all true, it may indicate what I take to be the aim of
+our society, or rather of us as members of an ethical society. We hold,
+that is, that the great problems of to-day have their root, so to
+speak, in an ethical soil. They will be decided one way or other by the
+view which we take of ethical questions. The questions, for example, of
+what is meant by social justice, what is the justification of private
+property, or the limits of personal liberty, all lead us ultimately to
+ethical foundations. The same is, of course, true of many other
+problems. The demand for political rights of women is discussed,
+rightly no doubt, upon grounds of justice, and takes us to some knotty
+points. Does justice imply the equality of the sexes; and, if so, in
+what sense of "equality"? And, beyond this, we come to the question,
+What would be the bearing of our principles upon the institution of
+marriage, and upon the family bond? No question can be more important,
+or more vitally connected with Ethics. We, at any rate, can no longer
+answer such problems by any traditional dogmatism. They--and many other
+questions which I need not specify--have been asked, and have yet to be
+answered. They will probably not be answered by a simple yes or no, nor
+by any isolated solution of a metaphysical puzzle. Undoubtedly, a vast
+mass of people will insist upon being consulted, and will adopt methods
+which cannot be regarded as philosophical. Therefore, it is a matter of
+pressing importance that all people who can think at all should use
+their own minds, and should do their best to widen and strengthen the
+influence of the ablest thinkers. The chaotic condition of the average
+mind is our reason for trying to strengthen the influence, always too
+feeble, of the genuine thinkers. Much that passes itself off for
+thought is simply old prejudice in a new dress. Tradition has always
+this, indeed, to say for itself: that it represents the product of much
+unconscious reasoning from experience, and that it is at least
+compatible with such progress as has been hitherto achieved. Progress
+has in future to take place in the daylight, and under the stress of
+keen discussion from every possible point of view. It would be rash
+indeed to assume that we can hope to see the substitution of purely
+rational and scientific methods for the old haphazard and tentative
+blundering into slightly better things. It is possible enough that the
+creed of the future may, after all, be a compromise, admitting some
+elements of higher truth, but attracting the popular mind by
+concessions to superstition and ignorance. We can hardly hope to get
+rid of the rooted errors which have so astonishing a vitality. But we
+should desire, and, so far as in us lies, endeavour to secure the
+presence of the largest possible element of genuine and reasoned
+conviction in the faith of our own and the rising generation.
+
+I have not sought to say anything new. I have only endeavoured to
+define the general position which we, as I imagine, have agreed to
+accept. We hold in common that the old dogmas are no longer tenable,
+though we are very far from being agreed as to what should replace
+them. We have each, I dare say, our own theory; we agree that our
+theories, whatever they may be, are in need of strict examination, of
+verification, it may be, but it may be also of modification or
+rejection. We hope that such societies as this may in the first place
+serve as centres for encouraging and popularising the full and free
+discussion of the great questions. We wish that people who have reached
+a certain stage of cultivation should be made aware of the course which
+is being taken by those who may rightly claim to be in the van. We
+often wish to know, as well as we can, what is the direction of the
+deeper currents of thought; what genuine results, for example, have
+been obtained by historical criticism, especially as applied to the
+religious history of the world; we want to know what are the real
+points now at issue in the world of science; the true bearing of the
+theories of evolution, and so forth, which are known by name far beyond
+the circle in which their logical reasoning is really appreciated; we
+want to know, again, what are the problems which really interest modern
+metaphysicians or psychologists; in what directions there seems to be a
+real promise of future achievement, and in what directions it seems to
+be proved by experience that any further expansion of intellectual
+energy is certain to result only in the discovery of mares' nests.
+
+Matthew Arnold would have expressed this by saying that we are required
+to be made accessible to the influence of the Zeitgeist. There is a
+difficulty, no doubt, in discovering by what signs we may recognise the
+utterances of the Zeitgeist; and distinguish between loyalty to the
+real intellectual leaders and a simple desire to be arrayed in the last
+new fashion in philosophy. There is no infallible sign; and, yet, a
+genuine desire to discover the true lines in which thought is
+developing, is not of the less importance. Arnold, like others, pointed
+the moral by a contrast between England and Germany. The best that has
+been done in England, it is said, has generally been done by amateurs
+and outsiders. They have, perhaps, certain advantages, as being less
+afraid to strike into original paths, and even the originality of
+ignorance is not always, though it may be in nine cases out of ten, a
+name for fresh blundering. But if sporadic English writers have now and
+then hit off valuable thoughts, there can be no doubt that we have had
+a heavy price to pay. The comparative absence of any class, devoted,
+like German professors, to a systematic and combined attempt to spread
+the borders of knowledge and speculation, has been an evil which is the
+more felt in proportion as specialisation of science and familiarity
+with previous achievements become more important. It would be very easy
+to give particular instances of our backwardness. How different would
+have been the course of English church history, said somebody, if
+Newman had only known German! He would have breathed a larger air, and
+might have desisted--I suppose that was the meaning--from the attempt
+to put life into certain dead bones. And with equal truth, it may be
+urged, how much better work might have been done by J. S. Mill if he
+had really read Kant! He might not have been converted, but he would
+have been saved from maintaining in their crude form, doctrines which
+undoubtedly require modification. Under his reign, English thought was
+constantly busied with false issues, simply from ignorance of the most
+effective criticism. It is needless to point out how much time is
+wasted in the defence of positions that have long been turned by the
+enemy from sheer want of acquaintance with the relevant evidence, or
+with the logic that has been revealed by the slow thrashing out of
+thorough controversy. It would be invidious perhaps to insist too much
+upon another obvious result: the ease with which a man endowed with a
+gift of popular rhetoric, and a facility for catching at the current
+phrases, can set up as a teacher, however palpable to the initiated may
+be his ignorance. Scientific thought has perhaps as much to fear from
+the false prophets who take its name as from the open enemies who try
+to stifle its voice. I would rather emphasise another point, perhaps
+less generally remarked. The study has its idols as well as its
+market-place. Certain weaknesses are developed in the academical
+atmosphere as well as in the arenas of public discussion. Freeman used
+to say that English historians had avoided certain errors into which
+German writers of far greater knowledge and more thorough scholarship
+had fallen, simply because points were missed by a professor in a
+German university which were plain to those who, like many Englishmen,
+had to take a part in actual political work. I think that this is not
+without a meaning for us. We have learnt, very properly, to respect
+German research and industry; and we are trying in various directions
+to imitate their example. Perhaps it would be as well to keep an eye
+upon some German weaknesses. A philosophy made for professors is apt to
+be a philosophy for pedants. A professor is bound to be omniscient; he
+has to have an answer to everything; he is tempted to construct systems
+which will pass muster in the lecture-room, and to despise the rest of
+their applicability to daily life. I confess myself to be old-fashioned
+enough to share some of the old English prejudices against those
+gigantic structures which have been thrown out by imposing
+philosophers, who evolved complete systems of metaphysics and logic and
+religion and politics and aesthetics out of their own consciousness. We
+have multiplied professors of late, and professors are bound to write
+books, and to magnify the value of their own studies. They must make a
+show of possessing an encyclopaedic theory which will explain everything
+and take into account all previous theories. Sometimes, perhaps, they
+will lose themselves in endless subtleties and logomachies and
+construct cobwebs of the brain, predestined to the rubbish-heap of
+extinct philosophies. It is enough, however, to urge that a mere
+student may be the better for keeping in mind the necessity of keeping
+in mind real immediate human interests; as the sentimentalist has to be
+reminded of the importance of strictly logical considerations. And I
+think too that a very brief study of the most famous systems of old
+days will convince us that philosophers should be content with a more
+modest attitude than they have sometimes adopted; give up the
+pretensions to framing off-hand theories of things in general, and be
+content to puzzle out a few imperfect truths which may slowly work
+their way into the general structure of thought. I wish to speak humbly
+as befits one who cannot claim any particular authority for his
+opinion. But, in all humility, I suggest that if we can persuade men of
+reputation in the regions where subtle thought and accurate research
+are duly valued, we shall be doing good, not only to ourselves, but, if
+I may whisper it, to them. We value their attainments so highly that we
+desire their influence to spread beyond the narrow precinct of
+university lecture-rooms; and their thoughts be, at the same time,
+stimulated and vitalised by bringing them into closer contact with the
+problems which are daily forced upon us in the business of daily life.
+A divorce between the men of thought and the men of action is really
+bad for both. Whatever tends to break up the intellectual stupor of
+large classes, to rouse their minds, to increase their knowledge of the
+genuine work that is being done, to provide them even with more of such
+recreations as refine and invigorate, must have our sympathy, and will
+be useful both to those who confer and to those who receive
+instruction. So, after all, a philosopher can learn few things of more
+importance than the art of translating his doctrines into language
+intelligible and really instructive to the outside world. There was a
+period when real thinkers, as Locke and Berkeley and Butler and Hume,
+tried to express themselves as pithily and pointedly as possible. They
+were, say some of their critics, very shallow: they were over-anxious
+to suit the taste of wits and the town: and in too much fear of the
+charge of pedantry. Well, if some of our profounder thinkers would try
+for once to pack all that they really have to say as closely as they
+can, instead of trying to play every conceivable change upon every
+thought that occurs to them, I fancy that they would be surprised both
+at the narrowness of the space which they would occupy and the
+comparative greatness of the effect they would produce.
+
+An ethical society should aim at supplying a meeting-place between the
+expert and specialist on one side, and, on the other, with the men who
+have to apply ideas to the complex concretes of political and social
+activity. How far we can succeed in furthering that aim I need not
+attempt to say. But I will conclude by reverting to some thoughts at
+which I hinted at starting. You may think that I have hardly spoken in
+a very sanguine or optimistic tone. I have certainly admitted the
+existence of enormous difficulties and the probabilities of very
+imperfect success. I cannot think that the promised land of which we
+are taking a Pisgah sight is so near or the view so satisfactory as
+might be wished. A mirage like that which attended our predecessors may
+still be exercising illusions for us; and I anticipate less an
+immediate fruition, than a beginning of another long cycle of
+wanderings through a desert, let us hope rather more fertile than that
+which we have passed. If this be something of a confession you may
+easily explain it by personal considerations. In an old controversy
+which I was reading the other day, one of the disputants observed that
+his adversary held that the world was going from bad to worse. "I do
+not wonder at the opinion," he remarks; "for I am every day more
+tempted to embrace it myself, since every day I am leaving youth
+further behind." I am old enough to feel the force of that remark.
+Without admitting senility, I have lived long enough, that is, to know
+well that for me the brighter happiness is a thing of the past; that I
+have to look back even to realise what it means; and to feel that a
+sadder colouring is conferred upon the internal world by the eye "which
+hath kept watch o'er man's mortality." I have watched the brilliant
+promise of many contemporaries eclipsed by premature death; and have
+too often had to apply Newton's remark, "If that man had lived, we
+might have known something". Lights which once cheered me have gone
+out, and are going out all too rapidly; and, to say nothing of
+individuals, I have also lived long enough to watch the decay of once
+flourishing beliefs. I can remember, only too vividly, the confident
+hope with which many young men, whom I regarded as the destined leaders
+of progress, affirmed that the doctrines which they advocated were
+going forth conquering and to conquer; and though I may still think
+that those doctrines had a permanent value, and were far from deserving
+the reproaches now often levelled at them, I must admit that we greatly
+exaggerated our omniscience. I am often tempted, I confess, to draw the
+rather melancholy moral that some of my younger friends may be destined
+to disillusionment, and may be driven some thirty years hence to admit
+that their present confidence was a little in excess.
+
+I admit all this: but I do not admit that my view could sanction
+despondency. I can see perhaps ground for foreboding which I should
+once have rejected. I can realise more distinctly, not only the amount
+of misery in the world, but the amount of misdirected energy, the
+dulness of the average intellect, and the vast deadweight of
+superstition and dread of the light with which all improvement must
+have to reckon. And yet I also feel that, if a complacent optimism be
+impossible, the world was never so full of interest. When we complain
+of the stress and strain and over-excitement of modern society we
+indicate, I think, a real evil; but we also tacitly admit that no one
+has any excuse for being dull. In every direction there is abundant
+opportunity for brave and thoughtful men to find the fullest occupation
+for whatever energy they may possess. There is work to be found
+everywhere in this sense, and none but the most torpid can find an
+excuse for joining the spiritually unemployed. The fields, surely, are
+white for the harvest, though there are weeds enough to be extirpated,
+and hard enough furrows to be ploughed. We know what has been done in
+the field of physical science. It has made the world infinite. The days
+of the old pagan, "suckled in some creed outworn," are regretted in
+Wordsworth's sonnet; for the old pagan held to the poetical view that a
+star was the chariot of a deity. The poor deity, however, had, in fact,
+a duty as monotonous as that of a driver in the Underground Railway. To
+us a star is a signal of a new world; it suggests universe beyond
+universe; sinking into the infinite abysses of space; we see worlds
+forming or decaying and raising at every moment problems of a strange
+fascination. The prosaic truth is really more poetical than the old
+figment of the childish imagination. The first great discovery of the
+real nature of the stars did, in fact, logically or not, break up more
+effectually than perhaps any other cause, the old narrow and stifling
+conception of the universe represented by Dante's superlative power;
+and made incredible the systems based on the conception that man can be
+the centre of all things and the universe created for the sake of this
+place. It is enough to point to the similar change due to modern
+theories of evolution. The impassable barriers of thought are broken
+down. Instead of the verbal explanation, which made every plant and
+animal an ultimate and inexplicable fact, we now see in each a movement
+in an indefinite series of complex processes, stretching back further
+than the eye can reach into the indefinite past. If we are sometimes
+stunned by the sense of inconceivable vastness, we feel, at least, that
+no intellectual conqueror need ever be affected by the old fear. For
+him there will always be fresh regions to conquer. Every discovery
+suggests new problems; and though knowledge may be simplified and
+codified, it will always supply a base for fresh explanations of the
+indefinite regions beyond. Can that which is true of the physical
+sciences be applied in any degree to the so-called moral sciences? To
+Bentham, I believe, is ascribed the wish that he could fall asleep and
+be waked at the end of successive centuries, to take note of the
+victories achieved in the intervals by his utilitarianism. Tennyson, in
+one of his youthful poems, played with the same thought. It would be
+pleasant, as the story of the sleeping beauty suggested, to rise every
+hundred years to mark the progress made in science and politics; and to
+see the "Titanic forces" that would come to the birth in divers climes
+and seasons; for we, he says--
+
+    For we are Ancients of the earth,
+      And in the morning of the times.
+
+Tennyson, if this expressed his serious belief, seems to have lost his
+illusions; and it is probable enough that Bentham's would have had some
+unpleasant surprises could his wish have been granted. It is more than
+a century since his doctrine was first revealed, and yet the world has
+not become converted; and some people doubt whether it ever will be.
+If, indeed, Bentham's speculations had been adopted; if we had all
+become convinced that morality means aiming at the greatest happiness
+of the greatest number; if we were agreed as to what is happiness, and
+what is the best way of promoting it,--there would still have been a
+vast step to take, no less than to persuade people to desire to follow
+the lines of conduct which tend to minimise unhappiness. The mere
+intellectual conviction that this or that will be useful is quite a
+different thing from the desire. You no more teach men to be moral by
+giving them a sound ethical theory, than you teach them to be good
+shots by explaining the theory of projectiles. A religion implies a
+philosophy, but a philosophy is not by itself a religion. The demand
+that it should be is, I hold, founded upon a wrong view as to the
+relation between the abstract theory and the art of conduct. To convert
+the world you have not merely to prove your theories, but to stimulate
+the imagination, to discipline the passions, to provide modes of
+utterance for the emotions and symbols which may represent the
+fundamental beliefs--briefly, to do what is done by the founders of the
+great religions. To transmute speculation into action is a problem of
+tremendous difficulty, and I only glance in the briefest way at its
+nature. We, I take it, as members of Ethical Societies, have no claim
+to be, even in the humblest way, missionaries of a new religion: but
+are simply interested in doing what we can to discuss in a profitable
+way the truths which it ought to embody or reflect. But that is itself
+a work of no trifling importance; and we may imagine that a Bentham,
+refreshed by his century's slumber, and having dropped some of his
+little personal vanities, would on the whole be satisfied with what he
+saw. If Bacon could again come to life, he too would find that the
+methods which he contemplated and the doctrines which he preached were
+narrow and refutive; yet his prophecies of scientific growth have been
+more than realised by his successors, modifying, in some ways,
+rejecting his principles. And so Bentham might hold to-day that,
+although his sacred formula was not so exhaustive or precise as he
+fancied, yet the conscious and deliberate pursuit of the happiness of
+mankind had taken a much more important place in the aspirations of the
+time. He would see that the vast changes which have taken place in
+society, vast beyond all previous conception, were bringing up ever new
+problems, requiring more elaborate methods, and more systematic
+reasoning. He would observe that many of the abuses which he denounced
+have disappeared, and that though progress does not take place along
+the precise lines which he laid down, there is both a clearer
+recognition of the great ends of conduct, and a general advance in the
+direction which he desired. That this can be carried on by promoting a
+free and full discussion of first principles; that the great social
+evils which still exist can be diminished, and the creed of the future,
+however dim its outlines may be to our perception, may be purified as
+much as possible from ancient prejudice and superstition, is our faith;
+and however little we can do to help in carrying out that process, we
+desire to do that little.
+
+
+
+
+SCIENCE AND POLITICS.[2]
+
+
+It is with great pleasure that I address you as president of this
+Society. Your main purpose, as I understand, is to promote the serious
+study of political and social problems in a spirit purged from the
+prejudice and narrowness of mere party conflict. You desire, that is,
+to promote a scientific investigation of some of the most important
+topics to which the human mind can devote itself. There is no purpose
+of which I approve more cordially: yet the very statement suggests a
+doubt. To speak of science and politics together is almost to suggest
+irony. And if politics be taken in the ordinary sense; if we think of
+the discussions by which the immediate fate of measures and of
+ministries is decided, I should be inclined to think that they belong
+to a sphere of thought to which scientific thought is hardly
+applicable, and in which I should be personally an unwarrantable
+intruder. My friends have sometimes accused me, indeed, of indifference
+to politics. I confess that I have never been able to follow the
+details of party warfare with the interest which they excite in some
+minds: and reasons, needless to indicate, have caused me to stray
+further and further away from intercourse with the society in which
+such details excite a predominant--I do not mean to insinuate an
+excessive--interest. I feel that if I were to suggest any arguments
+bearing directly upon home rule or disestablishment, I should at once
+come under that damnatory epithet "academical," which so neatly cuts
+the ground from under the feet of the political amateur. Moreover, I
+recognise a good deal of justice in the implied criticism. An active
+politician who wishes to impress his doctrines upon his countrymen,
+should have a kind of knowledge to which I can make no pretension. I
+share the ordinary feelings of awful reverence with which the human
+bookworm looks up to the man of business. He has faculties which in me
+are rudimentary, but which I can appreciate by their contrast to my own
+feebleness. The "knowledge of the world" ascribed to lawyers, to
+politicians, financiers, and such persons, like the "knowledge of the
+human heart" so often ascribed to dramatists and novelists, represents,
+I take it, a very real kind of knowledge; but it is rather an instinct
+than a set of definite principles; a power of somehow estimating the
+tendencies and motives of their fellow-creatures in a mass by rule of
+thumb, rather than by any distinctly assignable logical process; only
+to be gained by long experience and shrewd observation of men and
+cities. Such a faculty, as it reaches sound results without employing
+explicit definitions and syllogisms and inductive processes, sometimes
+inclines its possessors to look down too contemptuously upon the closet
+student.
+
+      [2] Address to the Social and Political Education League, 29th
+      March, 1892.
+
+While, however, I frankly confess my hopeless incapacity for taking any
+part in the process by which party platforms are constructed, I should
+be ashamed to admit that I was not very keenly interested in political
+discussions which seem to me to touch vitally important matters. And
+fully recognising the vast superiority of the practical man in his own
+world, I also hold that he should not treat me and my like as if we,
+according to the famous comparison, were black beetles, and he at the
+opposite pole of the universe. There exists, in books at least, such a
+thing as political theory, apart from that claiming to underlie the
+immediate special applications. Your practical man is given to
+appealing to such theories now and then; though I confess that he too
+often leaves the impression of having taken them up on the spur of the
+moment to round a peroration and to give dignity to a popular cry; and
+that, in his lips, they are apt to sound so crude and artificial that
+one can only wonder at his condescending to notice them. He ridicules
+them as the poorest of platitudes whenever they are used by an
+antagonist, and one can only hope that his occasional homage implies
+that he too has a certain belief that there ought to be, and perhaps may
+somewhere be, a sound theory, though he has not paid it much attention.
+Well, we, I take it, differ from him simply in this respect, that we
+believe more decidedly that such theory has at least a potential
+existence; and that if hitherto it is a very uncertain and ambiguous
+guide, the mere attempt to work it out seriously may do something to
+strengthen and deepen our practical political convictions. A man of real
+ability, who is actively engaged in politics without being submerged by
+merely political intrigues, can hardly fail to wish at least to
+institute some kind of research into the principles which guide his
+practice. To such a desire we may attribute some very stimulating books,
+such, for example, as Bagehot's _Physics and Politics_ or Mr. Bryce's
+philosophical study of the United States. What I propose to do is to
+suggest a few considerations as to the real value and proper direction
+of these arguments, which lie, as it were, on the borderland between the
+immediate "platform" and the abstract theory.
+
+Philosophers have given us the name "Sociology"--a barbarous name, say
+some--for the science which deals with the subject matter of our
+inquiries. Is it more than a name for a science which may or may not
+some day come into existence? What is science? It is simply organised
+knowledge; that part of our knowledge which is definite, established
+beyond reasonable doubt, and which achieves its task by formulating
+what are called "scientific laws". Laws in this sense are general
+formulae, which, when the necessary data are supplied, will enable us to
+extend our knowledge beyond the immediate facts of perception. Given a
+planet, moving at a given speed in a given direction, and controlled by
+given attractive forces, we can determine its place at a future moment.
+Or given a vegetable organism in a given environment, we can predict
+within certain limits the way in which it will grow, although the laws
+are too obscure and too vague to enable us to speak of it with any
+approach to the precision of astronomy. And we should have reached a
+similar stage in sociology if from a given social or political
+constitution adopted by a given population, we could prophesy what
+would be the results. I need not say that any approximation to such
+achievements is almost indefinitely distant. Personal claims to such
+powers of prediction rather tend to bring discredit upon the embryo
+science. Coleridge gives in the _Biographia Literaria_ a quaint
+statement of his own method. On every great occurrence, he says, he
+tried to discover in past history the event that most nearly resembled
+it. He examined the original authorities. "Then fairly subtracting the
+points of difference from the points of likeness," as the balance
+favoured the former or the latter, he conjectured that the result would
+be the same, or different. So, for example, he was able to prophesy the
+end of the Spanish rising against Napoleon from the event of the war
+between Philip II. and the Dutch provinces. That is, he cried, "Heads!"
+and on this occasion the coin did not come down tails. But I need
+hardly point out how impossible is the process of political arithmetic.
+What is meant by adding or subtracting in this connection? Such a rule
+of three would certainly puzzle me, and, I fancy, most other observers.
+We may say that the insurrection of a patriotic people, when they are
+helped from without, and their oppressors have to operate from a
+distant base and to fight all Europe at the same time, will often
+succeed; and we may often be right; but we should not give ourselves
+the airs of prophets on that account. There are many superficial
+analogies of the same character. My predecessor, Professor Dicey,
+pointed out some of them, to confirm his rather depressing theory that
+history is nothing but an old almanac. Let me take a common one, which,
+I think, may illustrate our problem. There is a certain analogy between
+the cases of Caesar, Cromwell, and Napoleon. In each case we have a
+military dictatorship as the final outcome of a civil war. Some people
+imagined that this analogy would apply to the United States, and that
+Washington or Grant would be what was called the man on horseback. The
+reasoning really involved was, in fact, a very simple one. The
+destruction of an old system of government makes some form of
+dictatorship the only alternative to chaos. It therefore gives a chance
+to the one indisputable holder of power in its most unmistakable shape,
+namely, to the general of a disciplined army. A soldier accordingly
+assumed power in each of the three first cases, although the
+differences between the societies ruled by the Roman, the English and
+the French dictators are so vast that further comparison soon becomes
+idle. Neither Washington nor Grant had the least chance of making
+themselves dictators had they wished, because the civil wars had left
+governments perfectly uninjured and capable of discharging all their
+functions, and had not produced a regular army with interests of its
+own. In this and other cases, I should say that such an analogy may be
+to some extent instructive, but I should certainly deny that there was
+anything like a scientific induction. We, happily, can reason to some
+extent upon political matters by the help of simple common sense before
+it has undergone that process of organisation, of reduction to precise
+measurable statements, which entitles it to be called a scientific
+procedure. The resemblance of Washington to Cromwell was of the
+external and superficial order. It may be compared to those analogies
+which exist between members of different natural orders without
+implying any deeper resemblance. A whale, we know, is like a fish in so
+far as he swims about in the sea, and he has whatever fishlike
+qualities are implied in the ability to swim. He will die on land,
+though not from the same causes. But, physiologically, he belongs to a
+different race, and we should make blunders if we argued from the
+external likeness to a closer resemblance. Or, to drop what may be too
+fanciful a comparison, it may be observed that all assemblies of human
+beings may be contrasted in respect of being numerous or select, and
+have certain properties in consequence. We may therefore make some true
+and general propositions about the contrasts between the action of
+small and large consultative bodies which will apply to many widely
+different cases. A good many, and, I think, some really valuable
+observations of this kind have been made, and form the substance of
+many generalisations laid down as to the relative advantages of
+democracy and aristocracy. Now I should be disposed to say that such
+remarks belong rather to the morphology than the physiology of the
+social organism. They indicate external resemblances between bodies of
+which the intimate constitution and the whole mode of growth and
+conditions of vitality, may be entirely different. Such analogies,
+then, though not without their value, are far from being properly
+scientific.
+
+What remains? There is, shall we say, no science of sociology--merely a
+heap of vague, empirical observations, too flimsy to be useful in
+strict logical inference? I should, I confess, be apt to say so myself.
+Then, you may proceed, is it not idle to attempt to introduce a
+scientific method? And to that I should emphatically reply, No! it is
+of the highest importance. The question, then, will follow, how I can
+maintain these two positions at once. And to that I make, in the first
+place, this general answer: Sociology is still of necessity a very
+vague body of approximate truths. We have not the data necessary for
+obtaining anything like precise laws. A mathematician can tell you
+precisely what he means when he speaks of bodies moving under the
+influence of an attraction which varies inversely as the square of the
+distance. But what are the attractive forces which hold together the
+body politic? They are a number of human passions, which even the
+acutest psychologists are as yet quite unable to analyse or to
+classify: they act according to laws of which we have hardly the
+vaguest inkling; and, even if we possessed any definite laws, the facts
+to which they have to be applied are so amazingly complex as to defy
+any attempt at assigning results. There is, so far as I can see, no
+ground for supposing that there is or ever can be a body of precise
+truths at all capable of comparison with the exact sciences. But this
+obvious truth, though it implies very narrow limits to our hopes of
+scientific results, does not force us to renounce the application of
+scientific method. The difficulty applies in some degree even to
+physiology as compared with physics, as the vital phenomena are
+incomparably more complex than those with which we have to deal in the
+simpler sciences; and yet nobody doubts that a scientific physiology is
+a possibility, and, to some extent, a reality. Now, in sociology,
+however imperfect it may be, we may still apply the same methods which
+have been so fruitful in other departments of thought. We may undertake
+it in the scientific spirit which depends upon patient appeal to
+observation, and be guided by the constant recollection that we are
+dealing with an organism, the various relations of whose constituent
+parts are determined by certain laws to which we may, perhaps, make
+some approximation. We may do so, although their mutual actions and
+reactions are so complex and subtle that we can never hope to
+disentangle them with any approach to completeness. And one test of the
+legitimacy of our methods will be, that although we do not hope to
+reach any precise and definitely assignable law, we yet reach, or aim
+at reaching, results which, while wanting in precision, want precision
+alone to be capable of incorporation in an ideal science such as might
+actually exist for a supernatural observer of incomparably superior
+powers. A man who knows, though he knows nothing more, that the moon is
+kept in its orbit by forces similar to or identical with those which
+cause the fall of an apple, knows something which only requires more
+definite treatment to be made into a genuine theory of gravitation. If,
+on the contrary, he merely pays himself with words, with vague guesses
+about occult properties, or a supposed angel who directs the moon's
+course, he is still in the unscientific stage. His theory is not
+science still in the vague, but something which stops the way to
+science. Now, if we can never hope to get further than the step which
+in the problem of gravitation represents the first step towards
+science, yet that step may be a highly important one. It represents a
+diversion of the current of thought from such channels as end in mere
+shifting sands of speculation, into the channel which leads towards
+some definite conclusion, verifiable by experience, and leading to
+conclusions, not very precise, but yet often pointing to important
+practical results. It may, perhaps, be said that, as the change which I
+am supposing represents only a change of method and spirit, it can
+achieve no great results in actual assignable truth. Well! a change of
+method and spirit is, in my opinion, of considerable importance, and
+very vague results would still imply an improvement in the chaos of
+what now passes for political philosophy. I will try to indicate very
+briefly the kind of improvement of which we need not despair.
+
+First of all, I conceive that, as I have indicated, a really scientific
+habit of thought would dispel many hopeless logomachies. When Burke,
+incomparably the greatest of our philosophical politicians, was arguing
+against the American policy of the Government, he expressed his hatred
+of metaphysics--the "Serbonian bog," as he called it, in which whole
+armies had been lost. The point at which he aimed was the fruitless
+discussion of abstract rights, which prevented people from applying
+their minds to the actual facts, and from seeing that metaphysical
+entities of that kind were utterly worthless when they ceased to
+correspond to the wants and aspirations of the peoples concerned. He
+could not, as he said, draw up an indictment against a nation, because
+he could not see how such troubles as had arisen between England and
+the Colonies were to be decided by technical distinctions such as
+passed current at _nisi prius_. I am afraid that the mode of reasoning
+condemned by Burke has not yet gone out of fashion. I do not wish to
+draw down upon myself the wrath of metaphysicians. I am perfectly
+willing that they should go on amusing themselves by attempting to
+deduce the first principles of morality from abstract considerations of
+logical affirmation and denial. But I will say this, that, in any case,
+and whatever the ultimate meaning of right and wrong, all political and
+social questions must be discussed with a continual reference to
+experience, to the contents as well as to the form of their metaphysical
+concepts. It is, to my mind, quite as idle to attempt to determine the
+value, say, of a political theory by reasoning independent of the
+character and circumstances of the nation and its constituent members,
+as to solve a medical question by abstract formulae, instead of by
+careful, prolonged, and searching investigation into the constitution of
+the human body. I think that this requires to be asserted so long as
+popular orators continue to declaim, for example, about the "rights of
+man," or the doctrines of political equality. I by no means deny, or
+rather I should on due occasion emphatically assert, that the demands
+covered by such formulae are perfectly right, and that they rest upon a
+base of justice. But I am forced to think that, as they are generally
+stated, they can lead to nothing but logomachy. When a man lays down
+some such sweeping principle, his real object is to save himself the
+trouble of thinking. So long as the first principles from which he
+starts are equally applicable,--and it is of the very nature of these
+principles that they should be equally applicable to men in all times
+and ages, to Englishmen and Americans, Hindoos and Chinese, Negroes and
+Australians,--they are worthless for any particular case, although, of
+course, they may be accidentally true in particular cases. In short,
+leaving to the metaphysicians--that is, postponing till the Greek
+Kalends--any decision as to the ultimate principles, I say that every
+political theory should be prepared to justify itself by an accurate
+observation of the history and all the various characteristics of the
+social organisation to which it is to be applied.
+
+This points to the contrast to which I have referred: the contrast
+between the keen vigorous good sense upon immediate questions of the
+day, to which I often listen with the unfeigned admiration due to the
+shrewd man of business, and the paltry little outworn platitudes which
+he introduces when he wants to tag his arguments with sounding
+principles. I think, to take an example out of harm's way, that an
+excellent instance is found in the famous American treatise, the
+_Federalist_. It deserves all the credit it has won so long as the
+authors are discussing the right way to form a constitution which may
+satisfy the wants and appease the prejudices then actually existing. In
+spite of such miscalculations as beset all forecasts of the future,
+they show admirable good sense and clear appreciation. But when they
+think it necessary to appeal to Montesquieu, to tag their arguments
+from common sense with little ornamental formulae learnt from
+philosophical writings, they show a very amiable simplicity; but they
+also seem to me to sink at once to the level of a clever prize essay in
+a university competition. The mischief may be slight when we are merely
+considering literary effect. But it points to a graver evil. In
+political discussions, the half-trained mind has strong convictions
+about some particular case, and then finds it easiest to justify its
+conviction by some sweeping general principle. It really starts,
+speaking in terms of logic, by assuming the truth of its minor and
+takes for granted that any major which will cover the minor is
+therefore established. Nothing saves so much trouble in thinking as the
+acceptance of a good sounding generality or a self-evident truth. Where
+your poor scientific worker plods along, testing the truth of his
+argument at every point, making qualifications and reservations, and
+admitting that every general principle may require to be modified in
+concrete cases, you can thus both jump to your conclusion and assume
+the airs of a philosopher. It is, I fancy, for this reason that people
+have such a tendency to lay down absolute rules about really difficult
+points. It is so much easier to say at once that all drinking ought to
+be suppressed, than to consider how, in actual circumstances, sobriety
+can be judiciously encouraged; and by assuming a good self-evident law
+and denouncing your opponents as immoral worshippers of expediency, you
+place yourself in an enviable position of moral dignity and
+inaccessibility. No argument can touch you. These abstract rules, too,
+have the convenience of being strangely ambiguous. I have been almost
+pathetically affected when I have observed how some thoroughly
+commonplace person plumes himself on preserving his consistency because
+he sticks resolutely to his party dogmas, even when their whole meaning
+has evaporated. Some English radicals boasted of consistency because
+they refused to be convinced by experience that republicans under a
+military dictator could become tyrannous and oppressive. At the present
+day, I see many worthy gentlemen, who from being thorough-going
+individualists, have come to swallow unconsciously the first principles
+of socialism without the least perception that they have changed,
+simply because a new meaning has been gradually insinuated into the
+sacred formulae. Scientific habits of thought, I venture to suggest,
+would tend to free a man from the dominion of these abstract phrases,
+which sometimes make men push absolute dogmas to extravagant results,
+and sometimes blind them to the complete transformation which has taken
+place in their true meaning. The great test of statesmanship, it is
+said, is the knowledge how and when to make a compromise, and when to
+hold fast to a principle. The tendency of the thoughtless is to
+denounce all compromise as wicked, and to stick to a form of words
+without bothering about the real meaning. Belief in "fads"--I cannot
+avoid the bit of slang--and singular malleability of real convictions
+are sometimes generated just by want of serious thought; and, at any
+rate, both phenomena are very common at present.
+
+This suggests another aspect of reasoning in a scientific spirit,
+namely, the importance which it attaches to a right comprehension of
+the practicable. The scientific view is sometimes described as
+fatalistic. A genuine scientific theory implies a true estimate of the
+great forces which mould institutions, and therefore a true
+apprehension of the limits within which they can be modified by any
+proposed change. We all remember Sydney Smith's famous illustration, in
+regard to the opposition to the Reform Bill, of Mrs. Partington's
+attempt to stop the Atlantic with her mop. Such an appeal is sometimes
+described as immoral. Many politicians, no doubt, find in it an excuse
+for immoral conduct. They assume that such and such a measure is
+inevitable, and therefore they think themselves justified for
+advocating it, even though they hold it to be wrong. Indeed, I observe
+that many excellent journalists are apparently unable to perceive any
+distinction between the assertion that a measure will be passed, and
+that it ought to be passed. Undoubtedly, if I think a measure unjust, I
+ought to say that it is unjust, even if I am sure that it will
+nevertheless be carried, and, in some cases, even though I may be a
+martyr to my opposition. If it is inevitable, it can be carried without
+my help, and my protest may at least sow a seed for future reaction.
+But this is no answer to the argument of Sydney Smith when taken in a
+reasonable sense. The opposition to the Reform Bill was a particular
+case of the opposition to the advance of democracy. The statement that
+democracy has advanced and will advance, is sometimes taken to be
+fatalistic. People who make the assertion may answer for themselves. I
+should answer, as I think we should all answer now, that the advance of
+democracy, desirable or undesirable, depended upon causes far too deep
+and general to be permanently affected by any Reform Bill. It was only
+one aspect of vast social changes which had been going on for
+centuries; and to propose to stop it by throwing out the Reform Bill
+was like proposing to stop a child's growth by forcing him to go on
+wearing his long clothes. Sydney Smith's answer might be immoral if it
+simply meant, don't fight because you will be beaten. It may often be a
+duty to take a beating. But it was, perhaps, rather a way of saying
+that if you want to stop the growth of democracy, you must begin by
+altering the course of the social, intellectual and moral changes which
+have been operating through many generations, and that unless you can
+do that, it is idle to oppose one particular corollary, and so to make
+a revolution inevitable, instead of a peaceful development. To say
+that any change is impossible in the absolute sense, may be fatalism;
+but it is simple good sense, and therefore good science, to say that to
+produce any change whatever you must bring to bear a force adequate to
+the change. When a man's leg is broken, you can't expect to heal it by
+a bit of sticking-plaster; a pill is not supposed, now, to be a cure
+for an earthquake; and to insist upon such facts is not to be
+fatalistic, but simply to say that a remedy must bear some proportion
+to an evil. It is a commonplace to observe upon the advantage which
+would have been gained if our grandfathers would have looked at the
+French Revolution scientifically. A terrible catastrophe had occurred
+abroad. The true moral, as we all see now, was that England should make
+such reforms as would obviate the danger of a similar catastrophe at
+home. The moral which too many people drew was too often, that all
+reforms should be stopped; with the result that the evils grew worse
+and social strata more profoundly alienated. It is a first principle of
+scientific reasoning, that a break-down of social order implies some
+antecedent defect, demanding an adequate remedy. It is a primary
+assumption of party argument, that the opposite party is wholly wrong,
+that its action is perfectly gratuitous, and either causeless or
+produced by the direct inspiration of the devil. The struggle, upon the
+scientific theory, represents two elements in an evolution which can be
+accomplished peacefully by such a reconstruction as will reconcile the
+conflicting aims and substitute harmony for discord. On the other
+doctrine, it is a conflict of hopelessly antagonistic principles, one
+of which is to be forcibly crushed.
+
+I hope that I am not too sanguine, but I cannot help believing that in
+this respect we have improved, and improved by imbibing some of the
+scientific doctrine. I think that in recent discussions of the most
+important topics, however bitter and however much distorted by the old
+party spirit, there is yet a clearer recognition than of old, that
+widely-spread discontent is not a reason for arbitrary suppression, but
+for seeking to understand and remove its causes. We should act in the
+spirit of Spinoza's great saying; and it should be our aim, as it was
+his care, "neither to mock, to bewail, nor to denounce men's actions,
+but to understand them". That is equally true of men's opinions. If
+they are violent, passionate, subversive of all order, our duty is not
+bare denunciations, but a clear comprehension of the causes, not of the
+ostensible reasons, of their opinions, and a resolution to remove those
+causes. I think this view has made some way: I am sure that it will
+make more way if we become more scientific in spirit; and it is one of
+the main reasons for encouraging such a spirit. The most obvious
+difficulty just now is one upon which I must touch, though with some
+fear and trembling. A terrible weapon has lately been coming into
+perfection, to which its inventors have given the elegant name of a
+"boom". The principle is--so far as I can understand--that the right
+frame of mind for dealing with the gravest problems is to generate a
+state of violent excitement, to adopt any remedy, real or supposed,
+which suggests itself at the moment, and to denounce everybody who
+suggests difficulties as a cynic or a cold-blooded egoist; and
+therefore to treat grave chronic and organic diseases of society by
+spasmodic impulses, to make stringent laws without condescending to ask
+whether they will work, and try the boldest experiments without
+considering whether they are likely to increase or diminish the evil.
+This, as some people think, is one of the inevitable consequences of
+democracy. I hope that it is not; but if it is, it is one of the
+inevitable consequences against which we, as cultivators of science,
+should most seriously protest, in the hope that we may some day find
+Philip sober enough to consider the consequences of his actions under
+the influence of spiritual intoxication. Professor Huxley, in one of
+those smart passages of arms which so forcibly illustrated his
+intellectual vigour, gave an apologue, which I wish that I could steal
+without acknowledgment. He spoke of an Irish carman who, on being told
+that he was not going in the right direction, replied that he was at
+any rate going at a great pace. The scientific doctrine is simply that
+we should look at the map before we set out for Utopia; and I think
+that a doctrine which requires to be enforced by every means in our
+power.
+
+This tendency, of course, comes out prominently in the important
+discussions of social and economic problems. That is a matter upon
+which I cannot now dwell, and which has been sufficiently emphasised by
+many eminent writers. If modern orators confined themselves to urging
+that the old economists exaggerated their claims to scientific
+accuracy, and were, in point of fact, guilty of many logical errors and
+hasty generalisations, I, at least, could fully agree with them. But
+the general impression seems to be, that because the old arguments were
+faulty, all argument is irrelevant: that because the alleged laws of
+nature were wrongly stated, there are no laws of nature at all; and
+that we may proceed to rearrange society, to fix the rate of wages or
+the rent of land or the incomes of capitalists without any reference at
+all to the conditions under which social arrangements have been worked
+out and actually carried on. This is, in short, to sanction the most
+obvious weakness of popular movements, and to assure the ignorant and
+thoughtless that they are above reason, and their crude guesses
+infallible guides to truth.
+
+One view which tries to give some plausibility to these assumptions is
+summed up in the now current phrase about the "masses" and the
+"classes". We all know the regular process of logical fence of the
+journalist, _i.e._, thrust and parry, which is repeated whenever such
+questions turn up. The Radical calls his opponent Tory and reactionary.
+The wicked Tory, it is said, thinks only of the class interest; believes
+that the nation exists for the sake of the House of Lords; lives in a
+little citadel provided with all the good things, which he is ready to
+defend against every attempt at a juster distribution; selfishness is
+his one motive; repression by brute force his only theory of government;
+and his views of life in general are those of the wicked cynics who gaze
+from their windows in Pall Mall. Then we have the roll of all the abuses
+which have been defended by this miscreant and his like since the days
+of George III.--slavery and capital punishment, and pensions and
+sinecures, and protection and the church establishment. The popular
+instinct, it is urged, has been in the right in so many cases that there
+is an enormous presumption in favour of the infallibility of all its
+instincts. The reply, of course, is equally obvious. Your boast, says
+the Conservative, that you please the masses, is in effect a confession
+that you truckle to the mob. You mean that your doctrines spread in
+proportion to the ignorance of your constituents. You prove the merits
+of your theories by showing that they disgust people the more they
+think. The Liberalism of a district, it has been argued, varies with the
+number of convictions for drunkenness. If it be easy to denounce our
+ancestors, it is also easy to show how they built up the great empire
+which now shelters us; and how, if they had truckled, as you would have
+us truckle, to popular whims, we should have been deprived of our
+commerce, our manufactures, and our position in the civilised world. And
+then it is easy to produce a list of all the base demagogues who have
+misled popular impatience and ignorance from the days of Cleon to those
+of the French Convention, or of the last disreputable "boss" bloated
+with corruption and the plunder of some great American city. This is the
+result, it is suggested, of pandering to the mob, and generally
+ostracising the intelligent citizen.
+
+I merely sketch the familiar arguments which any journalist has ready
+at hand, and, by a sufficient spice of references to actual affairs,
+can work up into any number of pointed leading articles. I will only
+observe that such arguments seem to me to illustrate that curious
+unreality of political theories of which I have spoken. It seems to be
+tacitly assumed on both sides, that votes are determined by a process
+of genuine reasoning. One side may be ignorant and the other
+prejudiced; but the arguments I have recapitulated seem to imply the
+assumption that the constituents really reflect upon the reasons for
+and against the measures proposed, and make up their minds accordingly.
+They are spoken of as though they were a body of experts, investigating
+a scientific doctrine, or at least a jury guided by the evidence laid
+before them. Upon that assumption, as it seems to me, the moral would
+be that the whole system is a palpable absurdity. The vast majority of
+voters scarcely think at all, and would be incapable of judging if they
+did. Hundreds of thousands care more for Dr. Grace's last score or the
+winner of the Derby than for any political question whatever. If they
+have opinions, they have neither the training nor the knowledge
+necessary to form any conclusion whatever. Consider the state of mind
+of the average voter--of nine men out of ten, say, whom you meet in the
+Strand. Ask yourselves honestly what value you would attach to his
+opinion upon any great question--say, of foreign politics or political
+economy. Has he ever really thought about them? Is he superficially
+acquainted with any of the relevant facts? Is he even capable of the
+imaginative effort necessary to set before him the vast interests often
+affected? And would the simple fact that he said "Yes" to a given
+question establish in your mind the smallest presumption against the
+probability that the right answer would be "No"? What are the chances
+that a majority of people, of whom not one in a hundred has any
+qualifications for judging, will give a right judgment? Yet that is the
+test suggested by most of the conventional arguments on both sides; for
+I do not say this as intending to accept the anti-democratic
+application. It is just as applicable, I believe, to the educated and
+the well-off. I need not labour the point, which is sufficiently
+obvious. I am quite convinced that, for example, the voters for a
+university will be guided by unreasonable prejudices as the voters for
+a metropolitan constituency. In some ways they will be worse. To find
+people who believe honestly in antiquated prejudices, you must go to
+the people who have been trained to believe them. An ecclesiastical
+seminary can manage to drill the pupils into professing absurdities
+from which average common sense would shrink, and only supply logical
+machinery for warring against reason. The reference to enlightened
+aristocracies is common enough; but I cannot discover that, "taken in a
+lump," any particular aristocracy cannot be as narrow-minded,
+short-sighted, and selfish, as the most rampant democracy. In point of
+fact, we all know that political action is determined by instinct
+rather than by reason. I do not mean that instinct is opposed to
+reason: it is simply a crude, undeveloped, inarticulate form of reason;
+it is blended with prejudices for which no reason is assigned, or even
+regarded as requisite. Such blind instincts, implying at most a kind of
+groping after error, necessarily govern the majority of men of all
+classes, in political as in other movements. The old apologists used to
+argue on the hypothesis that men must have accepted Christianity on the
+strength of a serious inquiry into the evidences. The fallacy of the
+doctrine is sufficiently plain: they accepted it because it suited them
+on the whole, and was fitted, no doubt, to their intellectual needs,
+but was also fitted to their emotional and moral needs as developed
+under certain social conditions. The inference from the general
+acceptance of any theory is not that it is true, but that it is true
+enough to satisfy the very feeble demand for logic--that it is not
+palpably absurd or self-contradictory; and that, for some reason or
+other, it satisfies also the imagination, the affections, and the
+aspirations of the believers. Not to go into other questions, this
+single remark indicates, I think, the attitude which the scientific
+observer would adopt in regard to this ancient controversy. He would
+study the causes as well as the alleged reasons assignable for any
+general instinct, and admit that its existence is one of the primary
+data which have to be taken into account. To denounce democracy or
+aristocracy is easy enough; and it saves trouble to assume that God is
+on one side and the devil on the other. The true method, I take it, is
+that which was indicated by Tocqueville's great book upon democracy in
+America; a book which, if I may trust my own impressions, though
+necessarily imperfect as regards America, is a perfectly admirable
+example of the fruitful method of studying such problems. Though an
+aristocrat by birth and breeding, Tocqueville had the wisdom to examine
+democratic beliefs and institutions in a thoroughly impartial spirit;
+and, instead of simply denouncing or admiring, to trace the genesis of
+the prevalent ideas and their close connection with the general state
+of social development. An inquiry conducted in that spirit would not
+lead to the absolute dogmatic conclusions in which the superficial
+controversialist delights. It would show, perhaps, that there was at
+least this much truth in the democratic contention, that the masses
+are, by their position, exempt from some of the prejudices which are
+ingrained in the members of a smaller caste; that they are therefore
+more accessible to certain moral considerations, and more anxious to
+promote the greatest happiness of the greater number. But it might also
+show how the weakness of the ignorant and untrained mind produces the
+characteristic evils of sentimentalism and impatience, of a belief in
+the omnipotence of legislation, and an excessive jealousy of all
+superiorities; and might possibly, too, exhibit certain merits which
+are impressed upon the aristocrat by his sense of the obligations of
+nobility. I do not in the least mean to express any opinion about such
+questions; I desire only to indicate the temper in which I conceive
+that they should be approached.
+
+I have lived long enough to be utterly unable to believe--though some
+older politicians than I seem still to believe, especially on the eve
+of a dissolution--that any of our party lines coincide with the lines
+between good and bad, wise and foolish. Every one, of course, will
+repudiate the abstract theory. Yet we may notice how constantly it is
+assumed; and can see to what fallacies it leads when we look for a
+moment at the historical questions which no longer unite party feeling.
+Few, indeed, even of our historians, can write without taking party
+views of such questions. Even the candid and impartial seem to deserve
+these epithets chiefly because they want imagination, and can cast
+blame or applaud alternately, because they do not enter into the real
+spirit of either party. Their views are sometimes a medley of
+inconsistent theories, rather than a deeper view which might reconcile
+apparent inconsistencies. I will only mention one point which often
+strikes me, and may lead to a relevant remark. Every royalist
+historian, we all know, labours to prove that Charles I. was a saint,
+and Cromwell a hypocrite. The view was natural at the time of the civil
+wars; but it now should suggest an obvious logical dilemma. If the
+monarchical theory which Charles represented was sound, and Charles was
+also a wise and good man, what caused the rebellion? A perfect man
+driving a perfect engine should surely not have run it off the rails.
+The royalist ought to seek to prove that Charles was a fool and a
+knave, to account for the collapse of royalty; and the case against
+royalty is all the stronger, if you could show that Charles, in spite
+of impeccable virtue, was forced by his position to end on the
+scaffold. Choose between him and the system which he applied. So
+Catholics and conservatives are never tired of denouncing Henry VIII.
+and the French revolutionists. So far as I can guess (I know very
+little about it), their case is a very strong one. I somehow believe,
+in spite of Froude, that Henry VIII. was a tyrant; and eulogies upon
+the reign of terror generally convince me that a greater set of
+scoundrels seldom came to the surface, than the perpetrators of those
+enormities. But then the real inference is, to my mind, very different.
+Henry VIII. was the product of the previous time; the ultimate outcome
+of that ideal state of things in which the church had its own way
+during the ages of truth. Must not the system have been wrong, when it
+had so lost all moral weight as to be at the mercy of a ruffianly
+plunderer? And so, as we all admit now, the strongest condemnation of
+the old French _regime_ is the fact that it had not only produced
+such a set of miscreants as those who have cast permanent odium even
+upon sound principles; but that its king and rulers went down before
+them without even an attempt at manly resistance. A revolution does
+not, perhaps, justify itself; it does not prove that its leaders judged
+rightly and acted virtuously: but, beyond a doubt, it condemns the
+previous order which brought it about. What a horrid thing is the
+explosion! Why, is the obvious answer, did you allow the explosive
+materials to accumulate, till the first match must fire the train? The
+greatest blot upon Burke, I need hardly say, is that his passions
+blinded him in his age, to this, as we now see, inevitable conclusion.
+
+The old-fashioned view, I fancy, is a relic of that view of history in
+which all the great events and changes were personified in some
+individual hero. The old "legislators," Lycurgus and Solon and the
+like, were supposed to have created the institutions which were really
+the products of a slow growth. When a favourable change due to
+economical causes took place in the position of the French peasantry,
+the peasants, says Michelet somewhere, called it "good king Henry".
+Carlyle's theory of hero worship is partly an application of the same
+mode of thought. You embody your principle in some concrete person;
+canonise him or damn him, as he represents truth or error; and take
+credit to yourself for insight and for a lofty morality. It becomes a
+kind of blasphemy to suggest that your great man, who thus stands for
+an inspired leader dropped straight out of heaven, was probably at best
+very imperfect, one-sided, and at least as much of a product as a
+producer. The crudity of the method is even regarded as a proof of its
+morality. Your common-place moralist likes to call everything black or
+white; he despises all qualifications as casuistical refinements, and
+plumes himself on the decisive verdict, saint or sinner, with which he
+labels the adherents and opponents of his party. And yet we know as a
+fact, how absurd are such judgments. We know how men are betrayed into
+bad causes from good motives, or put on the right side because it
+happens to harmonise with their lower interests. Saints--so we are
+told--have been the cruellest persecutors; and kings, acting from
+purely selfish ambition, have consolidated nations or crushed effete
+and mischievous institutions. If we can make up our minds as to which
+was, on the whole, the best cause,--and, generally speaking, both sides
+represented some sound principle,--it does not follow that it was also
+the cause of all the best men. Before we can judge of the individual,
+we must answer a hundred difficult questions: If he took the right
+side, did he take it from the right motives? Was it from personal
+ambition or pure patriotism? Did he see what was the real question at
+issue? Did he foresee the inevitable effect of the measures which he
+advocated? If he did not see, was it because he was human, and
+therefore short-sighted; or because he was brutal, and therefore
+wanting in sympathy; or because he had intellectual defects, which made
+it impossible for him to escape from the common illusions of the time?
+These, and any number of similar difficulties, arise when we try to
+judge of the great men who form landmarks in our history, from the time
+of Boadicea to that of Queen Victoria. They are always amusing, and
+sometimes important; but there is always a danger that they may warp
+our views of the vital facts. The beauty of Mary Queen of Scots still
+disqualifies many people from judging calmly the great issues of a most
+important historical epoch. I will leave it to you to apply this to our
+views of modern politics, and judge the value of the ordinary
+assumption which assumes that all good men must be on one side.
+
+Now we may say that the remedy for such illusions points to the
+importance of a doctrine which is by no means new, but which has, I
+think, bearings not always recognised. We have been told, again and
+again, since Plato wrote his _Republic_, that society is an organism. It
+is replied that this is at best an analogy upon which too great stress
+must not be laid; and we are warned against the fanciful comparisons
+which some writers have drawn between the body corporate and the actual
+physical body, with its cells, tissues, nervous system, and so forth.
+Now, whatever may be the danger of that mode of reasoning, I think that
+the statement, properly understood, corresponds to a simple logical
+canon too often neglected in historical and political reasonings. It
+means, I take it, in the first place, that every man is a product as
+well as a producer; that there is no such thing as the imaginary
+individual with fixed properties, whom theorists are apt to take for
+granted as the base of their reasoning; that no man or group of men is
+intelligible without taking into account the mass of instincts
+transmitted through their predecessors, and therefore without referring
+to their position in the general history of human development. And,
+secondly, it is essential to remember in speaking of any great man, or
+of any institution, their position as parts of a complicated system of
+actions and emotions. The word "if," I may say, changes its meaning.
+"If" Harold had won the battle of Hastings, what would have been the
+result? The answer would be comparatively simple, if we could, in the
+old fashion, attribute to William the Conqueror all the results in which
+he played a conspicuous part: if, therefore, we could make out a
+definite list of effects of which he was the cause, and, by simply
+"deducting" them, after Coleridge's fashion, from the effects which
+actually followed, determine what was the precise balance. But when we
+consider how many causes were actually in operation, how impossible it
+is to disentangle and separate them, and say this followed from that,
+and that other from something else, we have to admit that the might have
+been is simply indiscoverable. The great man may have hastened what was
+otherwise inevitable; he may simply have supplied the particular point,
+round which a crystallisation took place of forces which would have
+otherwise discovered some other centre; and the fact that he succeeded
+in establishing certain institutions or laws may be simply a proof that
+he saw a little more clearly than others the direction towards which
+more general causes were inevitably propelling the nation. Briefly, we
+cannot isolate the particular "cause" in this case, and have to remember
+at every moment that it was only one factor in a vast and complex series
+of changes, which would no doubt have taken a different turn without it,
+but of which it may be indefinitely difficult to say what was the
+precise deflection due to its action.
+
+In trying to indicate the importance, I have had to dwell upon the
+difficulty, of applying anything like scientific methods to political
+problems. I shall conclude by trying once more to indicate why, in
+spite of this, I hold that the attempt is desirable, and may be
+fruitful.
+
+People sometimes say that scientific methods are inapplicable because
+we cannot try experiments in social matters. I remember being long ago
+struck by a remark of Dr. Arnold, which has some bearing upon this
+assertion. He observed upon the great advantage possessed by Aristotle
+in the vast number of little republics in his time, each of which was
+virtually an experiment in politics. I always thought that this was
+fallacious somehow, and I fancy that it is not hard to indicate the
+general nature of the fallacy. Freeman, upon whose services to thorough
+and accurate study of history I am unworthy to pronounce an eulogy,
+fell into the same fallacy, I fancy, when he undertook to write a
+history of Federal Governments. He fancied that because the Achaean
+League and the Swiss Cantons and the United States of America all had
+this point in common, and that they represented the combinations of
+partially independent States, their history would be in a sense
+continuous. The obvious consideration that the federations differed in
+every possible way, in their religions and state of civilisation and
+whole social structure, might be neglected. Freeman's tendency to be
+indifferent to everything which was not in the narrowest sense
+political led him to this--as it seems to me--pedantic conception. If
+the prosperity of a nation depended exclusively upon the form of its
+government, Aristotle, as Arnold remarks, would have had before him a
+greater number of experiments than the modern observer. But the
+assumption is obviously wrong. Every one of these ancient States
+depended for its prosperity upon a vast number of conditions--its race,
+its geographical position, its stage of development, and so forth,
+quite impossible to tabulate or analyse; and the form of government
+which suited one would be entirely inapplicable to another. To
+extricate from all these conflicting elements the precise influence due
+to any institutions would be a task beyond the powers of any number of
+philosophers; and indeed the perplexity would probably be increased by
+the very number of experiments. To make an experiment fruitful, it is
+necessary to eliminate all the irrelevant elements which intrude into
+the concrete cases spontaneously offered by nature, and, for example,
+to obtain two cases differing only in one element, to which we may
+therefore plausibly attribute other contrasts. Now, the history of a
+hundred or a thousand small States would probably only present the
+introduction of new and perplexing elements for every new case. The
+influence, again, of individuals, or accident of war, or natural
+catastrophes, is greater in proportion as the State is smaller, and
+therefore makes it more difficult to observe the permanent and
+underlying influences. It seems to me, therefore, that the study, say
+of English history, where we have a continuous growth over many
+centuries, where the disturbing influences of individuals or chance are
+in a greater degree cancelled by the general tendencies working beneath
+them, we have really a far more instructive field for political
+observation. This may help us to see what are the kinds of results
+which may be anticipated from sociological study undertaken in a
+serious spirit. The growth, for example, of the industrial system of
+England is a profoundly interesting subject of inquiry, to which we are
+even now only beginning to do justice. Historians have admitted, even
+from the time of Hume, that the ideal history should give less of mere
+battles and intrigues, and more account of those deeper and more
+continuous processes which lie, so to speak, beneath the surface. They
+have hardly, I think, even yet realised the full bearing and importance
+of this observation. Yet, of late, much has been done, though much
+still remains to do, in the way of a truly scientific study of the
+development of institutions, political, ecclesiastical, industrial, and
+so forth, of this and other countries. As this tendency grows, we may
+hope gradually to have a genuine history of the English people; an
+account--not of the virtues and vices of Mary Queen of Scots, or
+arguments as to the propriety of cutting off Charles I.'s head--but a
+trustworthy account of the way in which the actual structure of modern
+society has been developed out of its simpler germs. The biographies of
+great kings and generals, and so forth, will always be interesting; but
+to the genuine historian of the future they will be interesting not so
+much as giving room for psychological analyses or for dramatic
+portraits, but as indications of the great social forces which produced
+them, and the direction of which at the moment may be illustrated by
+their cases. I have spoken of the history of our industrial system. To
+know what was the position of the English labourer at various times,
+how it was affected by the political changes or by the great mechanical
+discoveries, to observe what grievances arose, what remedies were
+applied or sought to be applied, and with what result,--to treat all
+this with due reference to the whole social and intellectual evolution
+of which it formed a part, may well call forth the powers of our
+acutest and most thoroughgoing inquirers, and will, when it is done,
+give essential data for some of the most vitally important problems of
+the day. This is what I understand by an application of the scientific
+spirit to social and political problems. We cannot try experiments, it
+is said, in historical questions. We cannot help always trying
+experiments, and experiments of vast importance. Every man has to try
+an experiment upon himself when he chooses his career; and the results
+are frequently very unpleasant, though very instructive. We have to be
+our own experiments. Every man who sets up in business tries an
+experiment, ending in fortune or in bankruptcy. Every strike is an
+experiment, and generally a costly one. Every attempt at starting a new
+charitable organisation, or a new system of socialism or co-operation,
+is an experiment. Every new law is an experiment, rash or otherwise.
+And from all these experiments we do at least collect a certain number
+of general observations, which, though generally consigned to
+copybooks, are not without value. What is true, however, is that we
+cannot try such experiments as a man of science can sometimes try in
+his laboratory, where he can select and isolate the necessary elements
+in any given process, and decide, by subjecting them to proper
+conditions, how a definite question is to be answered. Our first
+experiments are all in the rough, so to speak, tried at haphazard, and
+each involving an indefinite number of irrelevant conditions. But there
+is a partial compensation. We cannot tabulate the countless experiments
+which have been tried with all their distracting varieties. Yet in a
+certain sense the answer is given for us. For the social structure at
+any period is in fact the net product of all the experiments that have
+been made by the individuals of which it is and has been composed.
+Therefore, so far as we can obtain some general views of the successive
+changes in social order which have been gradually and steadily
+developing themselves throughout the more noisy and conspicuous but
+comparatively superficial political disturbances, we can detect the
+true meaning of some general phenomena in which the actors themselves
+were unconscious of the determining causes. We can see more or less
+what were the general causes which have led to various forms of
+associations, to the old guilds, or the modern factory system, to the
+trades unions or the co-operative societies; and correcting and
+verifying our general results by a careful examination of the
+particular instances, approximate, vaguely it may be and distantly, to
+some such conception of the laws of development of different social
+tissues as, if not properly scientific, may yet belong to the
+scientific order of thought. Thus, when distracted by this or that
+particular demand, by promises of the millennium to be inaugurated
+to-morrow by an Act of Parliament, or threats of some social cataclysm
+to overwhelm us if we concede an inch to wicked agitators, we may
+succeed in placing ourselves at a higher point of view, from which it
+is possible to look over wider horizons, to regard what is happening
+to-day in its relations to slow processes of elaboration, and to form
+judgments based upon wide and systematic inquiry, which, if they do not
+entitle us to predict particular events, as an astronomer predicts an
+eclipse, will at least be a guide to sane and sober minds, and suggest
+at once a humbler appreciation of what is within our power, and--I
+think also--a more really hopeful anticipation of genuine progress in
+the future.
+
+All scientific inquiry is an interrogation of nature. We have, in
+Bacon's grand sententious phrase, to command nature by obeying. We
+learn what are the laws of social growth by living them. The great
+difficulty of the interrogation is to know what questions we are to
+put. Under the guidance of metaphysicians, we have too often asked
+questions to which no answer is conceivable, like children, who in
+first trying to think, ask, why are we living in the nineteenth
+century, why is England an island, or why does pain hurt, or why do two
+and two make four? The only answer is by giving the same facts in a
+different set of words, and that is a kind of answer to which
+metaphysical dexterity sometimes gives an air of plausibility. More
+frequently our ingenuity takes the form of sanctioning preconceived
+prejudices, by wrapping up our conclusion in our premisses, and then
+bringing it out triumphantly with the air of a rigorous deduction. The
+progress of social science implies, in the first place, the abandonment
+of the weary system of hunting for fruitful truths in the region of
+chimeras, and trying to make empty logical concepts do the work of
+observation of facts. It involves, again, a clear perception of the
+kind of questions which can be profitably asked, and the limits within
+which an answer, not of the illusory kind, can really be expected. And
+then we may come to see that, without knowing it, we have really been
+trying a vast and continuous experiment, since the race first began to
+be human. We have, blindly and unconsciously, constructed a huge
+organism which does, somehow or other, provide a great many millions of
+people with a tolerable amount of food and comfort. We have
+accomplished this, I say, unconsciously; for each man, limited to his
+own little sphere, and limited to his own interests, and guided by his
+own prejudices and passions, has been as ignorant of more general
+tendencies as the coral insect of the reef which it has helped to
+build. To become distinctly conscious of what it is that we have all
+been doing all this time, is one step in advance. We have obeyed in
+ignorance; and as obedience becomes conscious, we may hope, within
+certain narrow limits, to command, or, at least, to direct. An enlarged
+perception of what have been the previous results may enable us to see
+what results are possible, and among them to select what may be worthy
+ends. It is not to be supposed that we shall ever get beyond the need
+of constant and careful experiment. But, in proportion as we can
+cultivate the right frame of mind, as each member of society requires
+wider sympathies and a larger horizon, it is permissible to hope that
+the experiments may become more intelligent; that we shall not, as has
+so often been done, increase poverty by the very remedies which are
+intended to remove it, or diverge from the path of steady progressive
+development, into the chase of some wild chimera, which requires for
+its achievement only the radical alteration of all the data of
+experience. "Annihilate space and time, and make two lovers happy," was
+the modest petition of an enthusiast; and he would probably have been
+ready to join in the prayer, "make all men angels, and then we shall
+have a model society". Although in saying this my immediate moral is to
+preach sobriety, I do not intend to denounce enthusiasm, but to urge a
+necessity of organising enthusiasm. I only recommend people not to
+venture upon flying machines before they have studied the laws of
+mechanics; but I earnestly hope that some day we may be able to call a
+balloon as we now call a cab. To point out the method, and to admit
+that it is not laborious, is not to discourage aspiration, but to look
+facts in the face: not to preach abandonment of enthusiasm, but to urge
+that enthusiasm should be systematic, should lead men to study the
+conditions of success, and to make a bridge before they leap the gulf.
+
+
+
+
+THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.
+
+
+There seem to be at present many conflicting views as to the nature of
+Political Economy. There is a popular impression that Political
+Economy, or, at any rate, the so-called "classical" doctrine, the
+doctrine which was made most definite by Ricardo, and accepted with
+modifications by J. S. Mill, is altogether exploded. Their main
+doctrines, it is suggested, were little better than mares' nests, and
+we may set aside their pretensions to have founded an exact science.
+What, then, is to come in its place? Are we simply to admit that there
+is no certainty about economical problems, and to fall back upon mere
+empiricism? Everything,--shall we say?--is to be regarded as an open
+question. That is, perhaps, a common impression in the popular mind.
+Yet, on the other hand, we may find some very able thinkers applying
+mathematical formulae to economics; and that seems to suppose, that
+within a certain region they obtain results comparable in precision and
+accuracy to those of the great physical sciences. The topic is a very
+wide one; and it would be presumptuous in me to speak dogmatically. I
+wish, however, to suggest certain considerations which may, perhaps, be
+worth taking into account; and, as I must speak briefly, I must not
+attempt to supply all the necessary qualifications. I can only attempt
+to indicate what seems to me to be the correct point of view, and
+apologise if I appear to speak too dogmatically, simply because I
+cannot waste time by expressions of diffidence, by reference to
+probable criticisms, or even by a full statement of my own reasons.
+
+A full exposition would have to define the sphere of Political Economy
+by describing its data and its methods. What do we assume, and how do
+we reason? A complete answer to these questions would indicate the
+limits within which we can hope for valid conclusions. I will first
+refer, briefly, to a common statement of one theory advocated by the
+old-fashioned or classical school. Economic doctrine, they have said,
+supposes a certain process of abstraction. We have to do with what has
+been called the "economic man". He is not, happily, the real man. He is
+an imaginary being, whose sole principle of action is to buy in the
+cheapest and sell in the dearest market: a man, more briefly, who
+always prefers a guinea--even a dirty guinea--to a pound of the
+cleanest. Economists reply to the remonstrances of those who deny the
+existence of such a monster, by adding that they do not for a moment
+suppose that men in general, or even tradesmen or stockbrokers, are in
+reality such beings,--mere money-making machines, stripped bare of all
+generous or altruistic sentiment--but simply that, as a matter of fact,
+most people do, _ceteris paribus_, prefer a guinea to a pound; and
+that so large a part of our industrial activity is carried on from
+motives of this kind, that we may obtain a fair approximation to the
+actual course of affairs by considering them as the sole motives. We
+shall not go wrong, for example, in financial questions, by assuming
+that the sole motive of speculators in the Stock Exchange is the desire
+to make money. Now, it is possible, perhaps, to justify this way of
+putting the case, by certain qualifications. I think, however, that, if
+strictly interpreted, it is apt to cover a serious fallacy. The
+"economic man" theory, we may say, assumes too much in one direction,
+and too little in another. It assumes too much if it is understood as
+implying that the desire for wealth is a purely selfish desire. A man
+may desire to make money in order simply to gratify his own sensual
+appetites. But he may also desire to be independent; and that may
+include a desire to do his part in the work of society, and probably
+does include some desire to relieve others of a burden. The wish to be
+self-supporting is not necessarily or purely "selfish". And obviously,
+too, one great motive in all such occupations is the desire to support
+a family, and one main inducement to saving is the desire to support it
+after your own death. Remove such motives, and half the impulses to
+regular industrial energy of all kinds would be destroyed. We must,
+therefore, give our "economic man" credit for motives referring to many
+interests besides those which he buttons into his own waistcoat. And
+therefore, too, as I have said, the assumption is insufficient. The
+very conception of economic science supposes all that is supposed, in
+the growth of a settled order of society. The purest type of the
+"economic man," as he is sometimes described, would be realised in the
+lowest savage, as sometimes described, who is absolutely selfish, who
+knocks his child on the head because it cries, and eats his aged parent
+if he cannot find a supply of roots. But such a being could only form
+herds, not societies. Political Economy only becomes conceivable when
+we suppose certain institutions to have been developed. It assumes,
+obviously, and in the first place, the institution of property; it
+becomes applicable, with less qualification, in proportion to the
+growth of the corresponding sentiments; it takes for granted all that
+highly elaborate set of instincts which induce me, when I want
+something, to produce an equivalent in exchange for it, instead of
+going out to take it by force. The more thorough the respect for
+property, the more applicable are rules of economics; and that respect
+implies a long training in that sense of other people's rights, which,
+unfortunately, is by no means so perfect as might be desired.
+
+It follows, then, that the economist really assumes more--and rightly
+assumes more--than he sometimes claims. He assumes what Adam Smith
+assumed at the opening of his great treatise: that is, the division of
+labour. But the division of labour implies the organisation of society.
+It implies that one man is growing corn while another is digging gold,
+because each is confident that he will be able to exchange the products
+of his own labour for the products of the other man's labour. This, of
+course, implies settled order, respect for contracts, the preservation
+of peace, and the abolition of force throughout the area occupied by
+the society. And this, again, is only possible in so far as certain
+political and ecclesiastical and military institutions have been
+definitely constructed. The economic assumption is really an
+assumption--not of a certain psychological condition of the average
+man, but--of the existence of a certain social mechanism. A complete
+science would clear up fully a problem which must occur often to all of
+us: How do you account for London? How is it that four or five millions
+of people manage to subsist on an area of a few square miles, which
+itself produces nothing? that other millions all over the world are
+engaged in providing for their wants? that food and clothes and fuel,
+in sufficient quantities to preserve life, are being distributed with
+tolerable regularity to each unit in this vast and apparently chaotic
+crowd? and that, somehow or other, we struggle on, well or ill, by the
+help of a gigantic commissariat, performing functions incomparably more
+complex than were ever needed for military purposes? The answer
+supposes that there is, as a matter of fact, a great industrial
+organisation which discharges the various functions of producing,
+exchanging, distributing, and so forth; and that its mutual relations
+are just as capable of being investigated and stated as the relations
+between different parts of an army. The men and officers do not wear
+uniforms; they are not explicitly drilled or subject to a definite code
+of discipline; and their rates of pay are not settled by any central
+authority. But there are capitalists, "undertakers" and labourers,
+merchants and retail dealers and contractors, and so forth, just as
+certainly as there are generals and privates, horse, foot, and
+artillery; and their mutual relations are equally definable. The
+economist has to explain the working of this industrial mechanism; and
+the thought may sometimes occur to us, that it is strange that he
+should find the task so difficult. Since we ourselves have made, or at
+any rate constitute, the mechanism, why should it be so puzzling to
+find out what it is? We are cooperating in a systematic production and
+distribution of wealth, and we surely ought not to find any
+impenetrable mystery in discovering what it is that we are doing every
+day of our lives. Certain economists writing within this century have
+often been credited with the discovery of the true theory of rent, or,
+which is equally good for my purpose, of starting a false theory. Yet
+landowners and agents had been letting farms and houses for
+generations; and surely they ought to have known what it was that they
+were themselves doing. One explanation of the difficulty is, that
+whereas an army is constituted by certain regulations of a central
+authority, the industrial army has grown up unconsciously and
+spontaneously. Its multitudinous members have only looked each at his
+own little circle; the labourer only thinks of his wages, and the
+capitalist of his profits, without considering his relations to the
+whole system of which he forms a part. The peasant drives his plough
+for wages, and buys his tea as if the tea fell like manna from the
+skies, without thinking of the curious relation into which he is thus
+brought with the natives of another hemisphere. The order which results
+from all these independent activities appeared to the older economists
+as an illustration of the doctrine of Final Causes. Providence had so
+ordered things that each man, by pursuing his own interests, pursued
+the interests of all. To a later school it appears rather as an
+illustration of the doctrine by which organisms are constructed through
+the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. In either
+case, it seems as though the mechanism were made rather for us than by
+us; that it is the product of conditions which we cannot control,
+instead of being an arrangement put together by conscious volitions.
+And, therefore, when the economist shows us what in fact are the
+existing arrangements and their mutual relations, he appears to be
+making a discovery of a scientific fact as much as if he were
+describing the anatomy of some newly-discovered animal or plant.
+
+The real assumption of the economist therefore is, as I think, simply
+the existence of a certain industrial organisation, which has a real
+existence as much as an army or a church; and there is no reason why
+his description should not be as accurate as the complexity of the
+facts allows. He is giving us the anatomy of society considered as a
+huge mechanism for producing and distributing wealth, and he makes an
+abstraction only in the sense that he is considering one set of facts
+at a time. The military writer would describe the constitution of an
+army without going into the psychological or political conditions which
+are of course implied, and without considering the soldiers in any
+other relations than those implied in their military services. In the
+same way, the economist describes the army of industry, and classifies
+its constituent parts. In order to explain their mutual relations, he
+has to make certain further assumptions, of which it would be rash to
+attempt a precise summary. He assumes as a fact, what has of course
+always been known, that scarcity implies dearness and plenty cheapness;
+that commodities flow to the markets where they will fetch the highest
+prices; that there is a certain gravitation towards equalisation of
+profits among capitalists, and of wages among labourers; so that
+capital or labour will flow towards the employments in which they will
+secure the highest reward. He endeavours to give the greatest accuracy
+to such formulae, of which nobody, so far as I know, denies a certain
+approximate truth. So long as they hold good, his inferences, if
+logically drawn, will also hold good. They take for granted certain
+psychological facts, such as are implied in all statements about human
+nature. But the economist, as an economist, is content to take them for
+granted without investigating the ultimate psychological laws upon
+which they depend. Those laws, or rather their results, are a part of
+his primary data, although he may go so far into psychological problems
+as to try to state them more accurately. The selfishness or
+unselfishness of the economic man has to be considered by the
+psychologist or by the moralist; but the economist has only to consider
+their conclusions so far as they affect the facts. So long as it is
+true, for example, that scarcity causes dearness, that profits attract
+capital, that demand and supply tend to equalise each other, and so
+forth, his reasonings are justified; and the further questions of the
+ethical and psychological implications of these facts must be treated
+by a different science. The question of the play of economic forces
+thus generally reduces itself to a problem which may be thus stated:
+What are the conditions of industrial equilibrium? How must prices,
+rates of wages, and profit be related in order that the various classes
+concerned may receive such proportions of produce as are compatible
+with the maintenance of the existing system of organisation? If any
+specified change occurs, if production becomes easier or more
+difficult, if a tax be imposed, or a regulation of any kind affects
+previous conditions, what changes will be necessary to restore the
+equilibrium? These are the main problems of Political Economy. To
+solve, or attempt to solve them, we have to describe accurately the
+existing mechanism, and to suppose that it will regulate itself on the
+assumption which I have indicated as to demand and supply, the flow of
+capital and labour, and so forth. To go beyond these assumptions, and
+to justify them by psychological and other considerations, may be and
+is a most interesting task, but it takes us beyond the sphere of
+Economics proper.
+
+I must here diverge for a little, to notice the view of the school of
+economists which seems to regard scientific accuracy as attainable by a
+different path. Jevons, its most distinguished leader in England, says
+roundly, that political science must be a "mathematical science,"
+because "it deals throughout with quantities"; and we have been since
+provided with a number of formulae, corresponding to this doctrine. The
+obvious general reply would be, that Political Economy cannot be an
+exact science because it also deals throughout with human desires. The
+objection is not simply that our data are too vague. That objection, as
+Jevons says, would, perhaps, apply to meteorology, of which nobody
+doubts that it is capable of being made an exact science. But why does
+nobody doubt that meteorology might become an exact science? Because we
+are convinced that all the data which would be needed are expressible
+in precise terms of time and space; we have to do with volumes, and
+masses, and weights, and forces which can be exactly measured by lines;
+and, in short, with things which could be exactly measured and counted.
+The data are, at present, insufficiently known, and possibly the
+problems which would result might be too complex for our powers of
+calculation. Still, if we could once get the data, we could express all
+relevant considerations by precise figures and numbers.
+
+Now, is this true of economic science? Within certain limits, it is
+apparently true: Ricardo used mathematical formulae, though he kept to
+arithmetic, instead of algebra. When Malthus spoke of arithmetical and
+geometrical ratios, the statement, true or false, was, of course,
+capable of precise numerical expression, so soon as the ratios were
+assigned. So there was the famous formula proving a relation between
+the number of quarters of corn produced by a given harvest, and the
+number of shillings that would be given for a quarter of corn. If,
+again, we took the number of marriages corresponding to a given price
+of corn, we should obtain a formula connecting the number of marriages
+with the number of quarters of corn produced. The utility of
+statistics, of course, depends upon the fact that we do empirically
+discover some tolerably constant and simple numerical formulae. Such
+statistical statements are useful, indeed, not only in economical, but
+in other inquiries, which are clearly beyond the reach of mathematics.
+The proportion of criminals in a given population, the number of
+suicides, or of illegitimate births, may throw some light upon judicial
+and political, and even religious or ethical problems. Nor are such
+formulae useless simply because empirical. The law of gravitation, for
+example, is empirical. Nobody knows the cause of the observed tendency
+of bodies to gravitate to each other, and therefore no one can say how
+far the law which represents the tendency must be universal. Still, the
+fact that, so far as we have observed, it is invariably verified, and
+that calculations founded upon it enable us to bring a vast variety of
+phenomena under a single rule, is quite enough to justify astronomical
+calculation.
+
+If, therefore, we could find a mathematical formula which was, as a
+matter of fact, verifiable in economical problems about prices, and so
+forth, we should rightly apply to mathematicians to help us with their
+methods. But, not only do we not find any such simple relations, but we
+can see conclusive reasons for being sure that we can never find them.
+Take, for example, the case of the number of marriages under given
+conditions. I need hardly say that it is impossible for the ablest
+mathematician to calculate whether the individual A will marry the
+individual B. But, by taking averages, and so eliminating individual
+eccentricities, he might discover that, in a given country and at a
+given time, a rise of prices will diminish marriages in certain
+proportion. Our knowledge of human nature is sufficient to make that
+highly probable. But our knowledge also shows that such a change will
+act differently in different cases: there will be one formula for
+France, and another for England; one for Lancashire, and another for
+Cornwall; one for the rich, and another for the poor; and both the
+total wealth of a country and its distribution will affect the rule.
+Differences of national temperament, of political and social
+constitution, of religion and ecclesiastical organisation, will all
+have an effect; and, therefore, a formula true here and now must, in
+all probability, fail altogether elsewhere. The formula is, in the
+mathematical phrase, a function of so many independent variables, that
+it must be complex beyond all conception, if it takes them all into
+account; while it must yet be necessarily inaccurate if it does not take
+them into account. But, besides this, the conditions upon which the law
+obviously depends are not themselves capable of being accurately
+defined, and still less of being numerically stated. Ingenious thinkers
+have, indeed, tried to apply mathematical formulae to psychology; but
+they have not got very far; and it may, I think, be assumed, without
+further argument, that while you have to deal both with psychological
+and sociological elements, with human desires, and with those desires
+modified by social relations, it is impossible to find any data which
+can be mathematically stated. There is no arithmetical measure of the
+forces of love, or hunger, or avarice, by which (among others) the whole
+problem is worked out.
+
+It seems to me, therefore, that we must accept the alternative which is
+only mentioned to be repudiated by Jevons, namely, that Political
+Economy, if not a "mathematical science," must be part of sociology. I
+should say that it clearly is so; for if we wish to investigate the
+cause of any of the phenomena concerned, and not simply to tabulate from
+observations, we are at once concerned with the social structure and
+with the underlying psychology. The mathematical methods are quite in
+their place when dealing with statistics. The rise and fall of prices,
+and so forth, can be stated precisely in figures; and, whenever we can
+discover some approximation to a mathematical law (as in the cases I
+have noticed) we may work out the results. If, for example, the price of
+a commodity under certain conditions bears a certain relation to its
+scarcity, we can discover the one fact when the other fact is given,
+remembering only that our conclusions are not more certain than our
+premisses, and that the observed law depends upon unknown and most
+imperfectly knowable conditions. Such results, again, may be very useful
+in various ways, as illustrative of the way in which certain laws will
+work if they hold good; and, again, as testing many of our general
+theories. If you have argued that the price of gold or silver cannot be
+fixed, the fact that it has been fixed under certain conditions will of
+course lead to a revision of your arguments. But I cannot help thinking
+that it is an illusion to suppose that such methods can justify the
+assertion that the science as a whole is "mathematical". Nothing,
+indeed, is easier than to speak as if you had got a mathematical theory.
+Let _x_ mean the desire for marriage and _y_ the fear of want, then
+the number of marriages is a function of _x_ and _y_, and I can
+express this by symbols as well as by ordinary words. But there is no
+magic about the use of symbols. Mathematical inquiries are not fruitful
+because symbols are used, but because the symbols represent something
+absolutely precise and assignable. The highest mathematical inquiries
+are simply ingenious methods of counting; and till you have got
+something precise to count, they can take you no further. I cannot help
+thinking that this fallacy imposes upon some modern reasoners; that they
+assume that they have got the data because they have put together the
+formulae which would be useful if they had the data; and, in short, that
+you can get more out of a mill than you put into it; or, in other words,
+that more conclusions than really follow can be got out of premisses,
+simply because you show what would follow if you had the required
+knowledge. When the attempt is made, as it seems to me to be made
+sometimes, to deduce economical laws from some law of human desire--as
+from the simple theorem that equal increments of a commodity imply
+diminishing amounts of utility--I should reply not only that the
+numerical data are vaguely defined and incapable of being accurately
+stated, but that the attempt must be illusory because the conclusions
+are not determinable from the premisses. The economic laws do not follow
+from any simple rule about human desires, because they vary according to
+the varying constitution of human society; and any conclusion which you
+could obtain would be necessarily confined to the abstract man of whom
+the law is supposed to hold good. Every such method, therefore, if it
+could be successful, could only lead to conclusions about human desire
+in general, and could throw no light upon the special problems of
+political economy, which essentially depend upon varying industrial
+organisation.
+
+I will not, however, go further. You must either, I hold, limit
+Political Economy to the field of statistical inquiry, or admit that,
+as a part of sociology, it deals with questions altogether beyond the
+reach of mathematics. Like physiology, it is concerned with results
+capable of numerical statement. The number of beats of the pulse, or
+the number of degrees of temperature of the body, are important data in
+physiological problems. They may be counted, and may give rise to
+mathematically expressible formulae. But the fact does not excuse us
+from considering the physical conditions of the organs which are in
+some way correlated with these observed phenomena; and, in the case of
+Political Economy, we have to do with the social structure, which is
+dependent upon forces altogether incapable of precise numerical
+estimates. That, at least, is my view; and I shall apply it to
+illustrate one remark, which must, I think, have often occurred to us.
+Political Economy, that is, often appears to have a negative rather
+than a positive value. It is exceedingly potent--so, at least, I
+think--in dispersing certain popular fallacies; but it fails when we
+regard it as a science which can give us positive concrete "laws". The
+general reason is, I should say, that although its first principles may
+be true descriptions of facts, and any denial of them, or any
+inconsistent applications of them, may lead us into error, they are yet
+far from sufficient descriptions. They omit some considerations which
+are relevant in any concrete case; and the facts which they describe
+are so complex that, even when we look at them consistently and follow
+the right clue, we cannot solve the complicated problems which occur.
+It may be worth while to insist a little upon this, and to apply it to
+one or two peculiar problems.
+
+Let me start from the ordinary analogy. Economic inquiry, I have
+suggested, describes a certain existing mechanism, which exists as
+really as the physical structure described by an anatomist. The
+industrial organism has, of course, many properties of which the
+economist, as such, does not take account. The labourer has affections,
+and imaginations, and opinions outside of his occupation as labourer;
+he belongs to a state, a church, a family, and so forth, which affect
+his whole life, including his industrial life. Is it therefore
+impossible to consider the industrial organisation separately? Not more
+impossible, I should reply, than to apply the same method in regard to
+the individual body. Were I to regard my stomach simply as a bag into
+which I put my food, I should learn very little about the process of
+digestion. Still, it is such a bag, and it is important to know where
+it is, and what are its purely mechanical relations to other parts of
+the body. My arms and legs are levers, and I can calculate the pressure
+necessary to support a weight on the hand, as though my bones and
+muscles were made of iron and whipcord. I am a piece of mechanism,
+though I am more, and all the principles of simple mechanics apply to
+my actions, though they do not, by themselves, suffice to explain the
+actions. The discovery of the circulation of the blood explained, as I
+understand, my structure as a hydraulic apparatus; and it was of vast
+importance, even though it told us nothing directly of the other
+processes necessarily involved. In this case, therefore, we have an
+instance of the way in which a set of perfectly true propositions may,
+so to speak, be imbedded in a larger theory, and may be of the highest
+importance, though they are not by themselves sufficient to solve any
+concrete problem. We cannot, that is, deduce the physiological
+principles from the mechanical principles, although they are throughout
+implied. But those principles are not the less true and useful in the
+detection of fallacies. They may enable us to show that an argument
+supposes facts which do not exist; or, perhaps, that it is, at any
+rate, inconsistent because it assumes one structure in its premisses,
+and another in its conclusions.
+
+I state this by way of illustration: but the value of the remark may be
+best tested by applying it to some economical doctrines. Let us take,
+for example, the famous argument of Adam Smith against what he called
+the mercantile theory. That theory, according to him, supposed that the
+wealth of nations, like the wealth of an individual, was in proportion
+to the amount of money in their possession. He insisted upon the theory
+that money, as it is useful solely for exchange, cannot be, in itself,
+wealth; that its absolute amount is a matter of indifference, because
+if every coin in existence were halved or doubled, it would discharge
+precisely the same function; and he inferred that the doctrine which
+tested the advantages of foreign commerce by the balance of trade or
+the net return of money, was altogether illusory. His theory is
+expounded in every elementary treatise on the subject. It may be urged
+that it was a mere truism, and therefore useless; or, again, that it
+does not enable us to deduce a complete theory of the functions of
+money. In regard to the first statement, I should reply that, although
+Smith probably misrepresented some of his antagonists, the fallacy
+which he exposed was not only current at the time, but is still
+constantly cropping up in modern controversies. So long as arguments
+are put forward which implicitly involve an erroneous, because
+self-contradictory, conception of the true functions of money, it is
+essential to keep in mind these first principles, however obvious they
+may be in an abstract statement. Euclid's axioms are useful because
+they are self-evident; and so long as people make mistakes in geometry,
+it will be necessary to expose their blundering by bringing out the
+contradictions involved. As Hobbes observed, people would dispute even
+geometrical axioms if they had an interest in doing so; and, certainly,
+they are ready to dispute the plainest doctrines about money. The other
+remark, that we cannot deduce a complete theory from the axiom is, of
+course, true. Thus, for example, although the doctrine may be
+unimpeachable, there is a difficulty in applying it to the facts. As
+gold has other uses besides its use as money, its value is not
+regulated exclusively by the principle assigned; as other things,
+again, such as bank-notes and cheques, discharge some of the functions
+of money, we have all manner of difficult problems as to what money
+precisely is, and how the most elementary principles will apply to the
+concrete facts. A very shrewd economist once remarked, listening to a
+metaphysical argument, "If there had been any money to be made out of
+it, we should have solved that question in the city long ago". Yet,
+there is surely money to be made out of a correct theory of the
+currency; and people in the city do not seem to have arrived at a
+complete agreement. In fact, such controversies illustrate the extreme
+difficulty which arises out of the complexity of the phenomena, even
+where the economic assumption of the action of purely money-loving
+activity is most nearly verified. The moral is, I fancy, that while
+inaccurate conclusions are extremely difficult, we can only hope to
+approach them by a firm grasp of the first principles revealed in the
+simplest cases.
+
+Even in such a case, we have also to notice how we have to make
+allowance for the intrusion of other than purely economic cases. The
+doctrine just noticed is, of course, closely connected with the theory
+of free trade. The free trade argument is, I should mention, perfectly
+conclusive in a negative sense. It demonstrates, that is, the fallacy
+which lurks in the popular argument for protection. That argument
+belongs to the commonest class of economic fallacies, which consists in
+looking at one particular result without considering the necessary
+implications. The great advantage of any rational theory is, that it
+forces us to look upon the industrial mechanism as a whole, and to
+trace out the correlative changes involved in any particular operation.
+It disposes of the theories which virtually propose to improve our
+supply of water by pouring a cup out of one vessel into another; and
+such theories have had considerable success in economy. So far, in
+short, as a protectionist really maintains that the advantage consists
+in accumulating money, without asking what will be the effect upon the
+value of money, or that it consists in telling people to make for
+themselves what they could get on better terms by producing something
+to exchange for it, his arguments may be conclusively shown to be
+contradictory. Such arguments, at least, cannot be worth considering.
+But, to say nothing of cases which may be put by an ingenious disputant
+in which this may not quite apply, we have to consider reasons which
+may be extra-economical. When it is suggested, for example, that the
+economic disadvantage is a fair price for political independence; or,
+on the other hand, that the stimulus of competition is actually good
+for the trade affected; or, again, that protection tends naturally to
+corruption; we have arguments which, good or bad, are outside the
+sphere of economics proper. To answer them we have to enter the field
+of political or ethical inquiry, where we have to take leave of
+tangible facts and precise measures.
+
+This is a more prominent element as we approach the more human side (if
+I may so call it) of Political Economy. Consider, for example, the
+doctrine which made so profound an impression upon the old
+school--Malthus's theory of population. It was summed up in the
+famous--though admittedly inaccurate--phrase, that population had a
+tendency to increase in a geometrical ratio, while the means of
+subsistence increased only in an arithmetical ratio. The food available
+for each unit would therefore diminish as the population increased. The
+so-called law obviously states only a possibility. It describes a
+"tendency," or, in other words, only describes what would happen under
+certain, admittedly variable, conditions. It showed how, in a limited
+area and with the efficiency of industry remaining unaltered, the
+necessary limits upon the numbers of the population would come into
+play. If, then, the law were taken, or in so far as it was taken, to
+assert that, in point of fact, the population must always be increasing
+in civilised countries to the stage at which the lowest class would be
+at starvation level, it was certainly erroneous. There are cases in
+which statesmen are alarmed by the failure of population to show its
+old elasticity, and beginning to revert to the view that an increased
+rate is desirable. It cannot be said to be even necessarily true that
+in all cases an increased population implies, of necessity, increased
+difficulty of support. There are countries which are inadequately
+peopled, and where greater numbers would be able to support themselves
+more efficiently because they could adopt a more elaborate
+organisation. Nor can it be said with certainty that some pressure may
+not, within limits, be favourable to ultimate progress by stimulating
+the energies of the people. In a purely stationary state people might
+be too content with a certain stage of comfort to develop their
+resources and attain a permanently higher stage. Whatever the
+importance of such qualifications of the principle, there is a most
+important conclusion to be drawn. Malthus or his more rigid followers
+summed up their teaching by one practical moral. The essential
+condition of progress was, according to them, the discouragement of
+early marriages. If, they held, people could only be persuaded not to
+produce families until they had an adequate prospect of supporting
+their families, everything would go right. We shall not, I imagine, be
+inclined to dispute the proposition, that a certain degree of prudence
+and foresight is a quality of enormous value; and that such a quality
+will manifest itself by greater caution in taking the most important
+step in life. What such reasoners do not appear to have appreciated
+was, the immense complexity and difficulty of the demand which they
+were making. They seem to have fancied that it was possible simply to
+add another clause--the clause "Thou shalt not marry"--to the accepted
+code of morals; and that, as soon as the evil consequences of the
+condemned behaviour were understood,--properly expounded, for example,
+in little manuals for the use of school children,--obedience to the new
+regulation would spontaneously follow. What they did not see, or did
+not fully appreciate, was the enormous series of other things--religious,
+moral, and intellectual--which are necessarily implied in altering the
+relation of the strongest human passion to the general constitution, and
+the impossibility of bringing home such an alteration, either by an act
+of legislation or by pointing out the bearing of a particular set of
+prudential considerations. Political Economy might be a very good thing;
+but its expositors were certainly too apt to think that it could by
+itself at once become a new gospel for mankind. Should we then infer
+from such criticisms that the doctrine of Malthus was false, or was of
+no importance? Nothing would be further from my opinion. I hold, on the
+contrary, that it was of the highest importance, because it drew
+attention to a fact, the recognition of which was essential to all sound
+reasoning on social questions. The fact is, that population is not to be
+treated as a fixed quantity, but as capable of rapid expansion; and that
+this elasticity may at any moment require consideration, and does in
+fact give the explanation of many important phenomena. The main fact
+which gave importance to Malthus's writings was the rapid and enormous
+increase of pauperism during the first quarter of this century. The
+charitable and sentimental writers of the day were alarmed, but proposed
+to meet the evil by a reckless increase of charity, either of the
+official or the private variety. Pitt, we know, declared (though he
+qualified the statement) that to be the father of a large family should
+be a source of honour, not of obloquy; and the measures adopted under
+the influence of such notions did in fact tend to diminish all sense of
+responsibility, encouraged people to rely upon the parish for the
+support of their children, and brought about a state of things which
+alarmed all intelligent observers. The greatest check to the evil was
+given by the new Poor-law, adopted under the influence of the principles
+advocated by Malthus and his friends. His achievement, then, was not
+that he laid down any absolutely correct scientific truth, or even said
+anything which had not been more or less said by many judicious people
+before his time; but that he encouraged the application of a more
+systematic method of reasoning upon the great problem of the time.
+Instead of simply giving way to the first kindly impulse, abolishing a
+hardship here and distributing alms elsewhere, he substantially argued
+that society formed a complex organism, whose diseases should be
+considered physiologically, their causes explained, and the appropriate
+remedies considered in all their bearings. We must not ask simply
+whether we were giving a loaf to this or that starving man, or indulge
+in _a priori_ reasoning as to the right of every human being to be
+supported by others; but treat the question as a physician should treat
+a disease, and consider whether, on the whole, the new regulations would
+increase or diminish the causes of the existing evils. He did not,
+therefore, so much proclaim a new truth, as induce reformers to place
+themselves at a new and a more rational point of view. The so-called law
+of population which he announced might be in various ways inaccurate,
+but the announcement made it necessary for rational thinkers to take
+constantly into account considerations which are essential in any
+satisfactory treatment of the great problems. If it were right to
+consider pauperism as a gulf of fixed dimensions, we might hope to fill
+it by simply taking a sufficient quantity of wealth from the richer
+classes. If, as Malthus urged, this process had a tendency to enlarge
+the dimensions of the gulf itself, it was obvious that the whole problem
+required a more elaborate treatment. By impressing people with this
+truth, and by showing how, in a great variety of cases, the elasticity
+of the population was a most important factor in determining the
+condition of the people, Malthus did a great service, and introduced a
+more systematic and scientific method of discussing the immensely
+important questions involved.
+
+I will very briefly try to indicate one further application of economic
+principles. A critical point in the modern development of the study was
+marked by Mill's abandonment of the so-called "wage fund theory". That
+doctrine is now generally mentioned with contempt, as the most
+conspicuous instance of an entirely exploded theory. It is often said
+that it is either a falsity, or a barren truism. I am not about to
+argue the point, observing only that some very eminent Economists
+consider that it was rather inadequate than fallacious; and that to me
+it has always seemed that the theory which has really been confuted is
+not so much a theory which was ever actually held by Economists, as a
+formula into which they blundered when they tried to give a
+quasi-scientific definition of their meaning. It is common enough for
+people to argue sensibly, when the explicit statements of their
+argument may be altogether erroneous. At any rate, I think it has been
+a misfortune that a good phrase has been discredited; and that Mill's
+assailants, in exposing the errors of that particular theory of a "wage
+fund," seemed to imply that the whole conception of a "wage fund" was a
+mistake. For the result has been, that the popular mind seems to regard
+the amount spent in wages as an arbitrary quantity; as something which,
+as Malthus put it, might be fixed at pleasure by her Majesty's justices
+of the peace. Because the law was inaccurately stated, it is assumed
+that there is no law at all, and that the share of the labourers in the
+total product of industry might be fixed without reference to the
+effect of a change upon the general organisation. Now, if the wage fund
+means the share which, under existing circumstances, actually goes to
+the class dependent upon wages, it is of the highest importance to
+discover how that share is actually determined; and it does not even
+follow that a doctrine which is in some sense a truism may not be a
+highly important doctrine. One of the ablest of the old Economists,
+Nassan Senior, after laying down his version of the theory, observes
+that it is "so nearly self-evident" that if Political Economy were a
+new science, it might be taken for granted. But he proceeds to
+enumerate seven different opinions, some of them held by many people,
+and others by writers of authority, with which it is inconsistent. And,
+without following his arguments, this statement suggests what I take to
+be a really relevant defence of his reasons. At the time when the
+theory was first formulated, there were many current doctrines which
+were self-contradictory, and which could, therefore, best be met by the
+assertion of a truism. When the peace of 1815 brought distress instead
+of plenty, some people, such as Southey, thought it a sufficient
+explanation to say that the manufacturer had lost his best customer,
+because the Government wanted fewer guns and less powder. They chose to
+overlook the obvious fact that a customer who pays for his goods by
+taking money out of the pockets of the seller, is not an unmixed
+blessing. Then, there was the theory of general "gluts," and of what is
+still denounced as over-production. The best cure for commercial
+distress would be, as one disputant asserted, to burn all the goods in
+our warehouses. It was necessary to point out that this theory (when
+stated in superficial terms) regarded superabundance of wealth as the
+cause of universal poverty. Another common theory was the evil effect
+of manufacturers in displacing work. The excellent Robert Owen stated
+it as an appalling fact, that the cotton manufacture supplanted the
+labour of a hundred (perhaps it was two hundred) millions of men. He
+seems to assume that, if the machinery had not been there, there would
+still have been wages for the hundred millions. The curious confusion,
+indeed, which leads us to speak of men wanting work, when what we
+really mean is that they want wages, shows the tenacity of an old
+fallacy. Mandeville argued long ago that the fire of London was a
+blessing, because it set at work so many carpenters, plumbers, and
+glaziers. The Protestant Reformation had done less good than the
+invention of hooped petticoats, which had provided employment for so
+many milliners. I shall not insult you by exposing fallacies; and yet,
+so long as they survive, they have to be met by truisms. While people
+are proposing to lengthen their blankets by cutting off one end to sew
+upon the other, one has to point out that the total length remains
+constant. Now, I fancy that, in point of fact, these fallacies are
+often to be found in modern times. I read, the other day, in the
+papers, an argument, adduced by some advocate, on behalf of the Eight
+Hours Bill. He wished, he said, to make labour dear, and would
+therefore make it scarce. This apparently leads to the conclusion that
+the less people work the more they will get, which I take to be a
+fallacy. So, to mention nothing else, it is still apparently a common
+argument in favour of protection in America, that the native labourer
+requires to be supported against the pauperised labour of Europe.
+Americans in general are to be made richer by paying higher prices, and
+by being forced to produce commodities which they could get with less
+labour employed on the production of other things in exchange. I will
+not go further; for I think that no one who reads the common arguments
+can be in want of sufficient illustrations of popular fallacies. This,
+I say, is some justification for dwelling upon the contrary truisms. I
+admit, indeed, that even these fallacies may apply to particular cases
+in which they may represent partial truths; and I also agree that, as
+sometimes stated, the wage fund theory was not only a truism, but a
+fruitless truism. It was, however, as I believe, an attempt to
+generalise a very pertinent and important doctrine, as to the way in
+which the actual competition in which labourers and employers are
+involved, actually operates. If so, it requires rather modification
+than indiscriminate denunciation; and it is, I believe, so treated by
+the best modern Economists.
+
+I consider, then, that the Economists were virtually attempting to
+describe systematically the main relations of the industrial mechanism.
+They showed what were the main functions which it, in fact, discharges.
+Their theory was sufficient to expose many errors, especially those
+which arise from looking solely at one part of a complex process, and
+neglecting the implied reactions. It enabled them to point out the
+inconsistencies and actual contradictions involved in many popular
+arguments, which are still very far from being destroyed. Their main
+error--apart from any particular logical slips--was, namely, that when
+they had laid down certain principles which belong properly to the
+prolegomena of the science, and which are very useful when regarded as
+providing logical tests of valid reasoning, they imagined that they had
+done a great deal more, and that the desired science was actually
+constituted. They laid down three or four primary axioms, such as the
+doctrine that men desire wealth, and fancied that the whole theory
+could be deduced from them. This, if what I have said be true, was
+really to misunderstand what they were really doing. It was to suppose
+that you could obtain a description of social phenomena without
+examining the actual structure of society; and was as erroneous as to
+suppose that you could deduce physiological truths from a few general
+propositions about the mechanical relations of the skeleton. Such
+criticisms have been made by the historical school of Economists; and
+I, at least, can fully accept their general view. I quite agree that
+the old assumptions of the older school were frequently unjustifiable;
+nor can I deny that they laid them down with a tone of superlative
+dogmatism, which was apt to be very offensive, and which was not
+justified by their position. Moreover, I entirely agree that the
+progress of economic science, and of all other moral sciences, requires
+a historical basis; and that we should make a very great blunder if we
+thought that the creation of an economic man would justify us in
+dispensing with an investigation of concrete facts, both of the present
+day and of earlier stages of industrial evolution. But to this there is
+an obvious qualification. What do we mean by investigating facts? It
+seems to be a very simple rule, but it leads us at once to great
+difficulties. So, as Mill and later writers have very rightly asked,
+how are we to settle even the most obvious questions in inquiries
+where, for obvious reasons, we cannot make experiments, and where we
+have not such a set of facts as would spontaneously give us the truths
+which we might seek by experiment? Take, as Mill suggested, such a
+question as free trade. We cannot get two countries alike in all else,
+and differing only in respect to their adoption or rejection of a
+protective tariff. Anything like a thoroughgoing system of free trade
+has been tried in England alone; and the commercial prosperity of the
+country since its adoption has been affected by innumerable conditions,
+so that it is altogether impossible to isolate the results which are to
+be attributed to the negative condition of the absence of protection.
+Briefly, the result is that the phenomena with which we have to deal
+are so complex, and our power of arranging them so as to unravel the
+complexity is so limited, that the direct method of observation breaks
+down altogether. Mill confessed the necessity of applying a different
+method, which he described with great ability, and which substantially
+amounts to the method of the older Economists. If, with some writers of
+the historical school, we admit the objections which apply to this
+method, we seem to be reduced to a hopeless state of uncertainty. A
+treatise on Political Economy becomes nothing but a miscellaneous
+collection of facts, with no definite clue or uniform method of
+reasoning. I must beg, in conclusion, to indicate what, so far as I can
+guess, seems to be the view suggested in presence of this difficulty.
+
+If I am asked whether Political Economy, understood, for example, as
+Mill understood it, is to be regarded as a science, I should have to
+admit that I could not simply reply, Yes. To say nothing of any errors
+in his logic, I should say that I do not believe that it gives us
+sufficient guidance even in regard to economic phenomena. We could not,
+that is, deduce from the laws accepted by Economists the necessary
+working of any given measure--say, the effect of protection or free
+trade, or, still more, the making of a poor-law system. Such problems
+involve elements of which the Economist, purely as an Economist, is an
+incompetent judge; and the further we get from those questions in which
+purely economical considerations are dominant, towards those in which
+other factors become relevant,--from questions as to currency, for
+example, to questions as to the relations of capitalists and
+labourers,--the greater the inadequacy of our methods. But I also hold
+that Political Economists may rightly claim a certain scientific
+character for their speculations. If their ultimate aim is to frame a
+science of economics which shall be part of the science--not yet
+constituted--of sociology, then I should say that what they have really
+done--so far as they have reasoned accurately--has been to frame an
+essential part of the prolegomena to such a science. The "laws" which
+they have tried to formulate are not laws which, even if established,
+would enable us to predict the results of any given action; but they
+are laws which would have to be taken into account in attempting any
+such prediction. And this is so, I think, because the laws are
+descriptions--within limits accurate descriptions--of actually existing
+facts as to the social mechanism. They are not mere abstract
+hypotheses, in the sense sometimes attached to that phrase; but
+accounts of the plan upon which the industrial arrangements of
+civilised countries are, as a matter of fact, constructed. Such a
+classification and systematic account of facts is, as I should suggest,
+absolutely necessary for any sound historical method. Facts are not
+simply things lying about, which anybody can pick up and describe for
+the mere pains of collecting them. We cannot even see a fact without
+reflection and observation and judgment; and to arrange them in an
+order which shall be both systematic and fruitful, to look at them from
+that point of view in which we can detect the general underlying
+principles, is, in all cases, an essential process before we can begin
+to apply a truly historical method. Anything, it is said, may be proved
+by facts; and that is painfully true until we have the right method of
+what has been called "colligating" facts. The Catholic and the
+Protestant, the Conservative and the Radical, the Individualist and the
+Socialist, have equal facility in proving their own doctrines with
+arguments, which habitually begin, "All history shows". Printers should
+be instructed always to strike out that phrase as an erratum; and to
+substitute, "I choose to take for granted". In order to judge between
+them we have to come to some conclusion as to what is the right method
+of conceiving of history, and probably to try many methods before
+reaching that which arranges the shifting and complicated chaos of
+phenomena in something like an intelligible order. A first step and a
+necessary basis, as I believe, for all the more complex inquiries will
+have to be found by disentangling the various orders of laws (if I may
+so speak), and considering by themselves those laws of industrial
+growth which are nearest to the physical sciences in certain respects,
+and which, within certain limits, can be considered apart, inasmuch as
+they represent the working of forces which are comparatively
+independent of forces of a higher order. What I should say for
+Political Economists is that they have done a good deal in this
+direction; that they have explained, and, I suppose, with considerable
+accuracy, what is the actual nature of the industrial mechanism; that
+they have explained fairly its working in certain cases where the
+economic are practically also the sole or dominant motives; and that
+they have thus laid down certain truths which require attention even
+when we take into account the play of other more complex and, as we
+generally say, higher motives. We may indeed hope and believe that
+society will ultimately be constituted upon a different system; and
+that for the organisation which has spontaneously and unconsciously
+developed itself, another will be substituted which will correspond
+more closely to some principles of justice, and give freer scope for
+the full development of the human faculties. That is a very large
+question: I only say that, in any case, all genuine progress consists
+in a development of institutions already existing, and therefore that a
+full understanding of the working of the present system is essential to
+a rational consideration of possible improvements. The Socialist may
+look forward to a time--let us hope that it may come soon!--when nobody
+will have any grievances. But his schemes will be the better adapted
+for the realisation of his hopes in proportion as he has fully
+understood what is the part played by each factor of the existing
+system; what is its function, and how that function may be more
+efficiently discharged by any substitute. Only upon that condition can
+he avoid the common error of inventing some scheme which is in
+sociology what schemes for perpetual motion are in mechanics; plans for
+making everything go right by condemning some existing portion of the
+system without fully understanding how it has come into existence, and
+what is the part which it plays in the whole. I think myself that a
+study of the good old orthodox system of Political Economy is useful in
+this sense, even where it is wrong; because at least it does give a
+system, and therefore forces its opponents to present an alternative
+system, instead of simply cutting a hole in the shoe when it pinches,
+or striking out the driving wheel because it happens to creak
+unpleasantly. And I think so the more because I cannot but observe that
+whenever a real economic question presents itself, it has to be argued
+on pretty much the old principles, unless we take the heroic method of
+discarding argument altogether. I should be the last to deny that the
+old Political Economy requires careful revision and modification, and
+equally slow to deny that the limits of its applicability require to be
+carefully defined. But, with these qualifications, I say, with equal
+conviction, that it does lay down principles which require study and
+consideration, for the simple reason that they assert the existence of
+facts which are relevant and important in all the most vitally
+interesting problems of to-day.
+
+
+
+
+THE MORALITY OF COMPETITION.
+
+
+When it has occurred to me to say--as I have occasionally said--that,
+to my mind, the whole truth lies neither with the individualist nor
+with his antagonist, my friends have often assured me that I was
+illogical. Of two contradictory principles, they say, you must take
+one. There are cases, I admit, in which this remark applies. It is
+true, or it is not true, that two and two make four. We cannot, in
+arithmetic, adopt Sir Roger de Coverley's conciliatory view, that there
+is much to be said on both sides. But this logical rule supposes that,
+in point of fact, the two principles apply to the same case, and are
+mutually exclusive. I also think that the habit of taking for granted
+that social problems are reducible to such an alternative, is the
+source of innumerable fallacies. I hold that, as a rule, any absolute
+solution of such problems is impossible; and that a man who boasts of
+being logical, is generally announcing his deliberate intention to be
+one-sided. He is confusing the undeniable canon that of two
+contradictory propositions one must be true, with the assumption that
+two propositions are really contradictory. The apparent contradiction
+may be illusory. Society, says the individualist, is made up of all its
+members. Certainly: if all Englishmen died, there would be no English
+race. But it does not follow that every individual Englishman is not
+also the product of the race. Society, says the Socialist, is an
+organic whole. I quite admit the fact; but it does not follow that, as
+a whole, it has any qualities or aims independent of the qualities and
+aims of the constituent parts. Metaphysicians have amused themselves,
+in all ages, with the puzzle about the many and the one. Perhaps they
+may find contradictions in the statement that a human society is both
+one and many; a unit and yet complex; but I am content to assume that
+unless we admit the fact, we shall get a very little way in sociology.
+
+Society, we say, is an organism. That implies that every part of a
+society is dependent upon the other parts, and that although, for
+purposes of argument, we may find it convenient to assume that certain
+elements remain fixed while others vary, we must always remember that
+this is an assumption which, in the long run, never precisely
+corresponds to the facts. We may, for example, in economical questions,
+attend simply to the play of the ordinary industrial machinery, without
+taking into account the fact that the industrial machinery is
+conditioned by the political and ecclesiastical constitution, by the
+whole social order, and, therefore, by the acceptance of corresponding
+ethical, or philosophical or scientific creeds. The method is
+justifiable so long as we remember that we are using a logical
+artifice; but we blunder if we take our hypothesis for a full statement
+of the actual facts. We are then tempted, and it is, perhaps, the
+commonest of all sources of error in such inquiries, to assume that
+conditions are absolute which are really contingent; or, to attend only
+to the action, without noticing the inevitable reactions of the whole
+system of institutions. And I would suggest, that from this follows a
+very important lesson in such inquiries. To say that this or that part
+of a system is bad, is to say, by implication, that some better
+arrangement is possible consistently with our primary assumptions. In
+other words, we cannot rationally propose simply to cut out one part of
+a machine, dead or living, without considering the effect of the
+omission upon all the other dependent parts. The whole system is
+necessarily altered. What, we must therefore ask, is the tacit
+implication as well as what is the immediate purpose of a change? May
+not the bad effect be a necessary part of the system to which we also
+owe the good; or necessary under some conditions? It is always,
+therefore, a relevant question, what is the suggested alternative? We
+can then judge whether the removal of a particular evil is or is not to
+be produced at a greater cost than it is worth; whether it would be a
+process, say, of really curing a smoky chimney or of stopping the
+chimney altogether, and so abolishing not only the smoke but the fire.
+
+I propose to apply this to the question of "competition". Competition
+is frequently denounced as the source of social evils. The complaint is
+far from a new one. I might take for my text a passage from J. S.
+Mill's famous chapter on the probable future of the labouring classes.
+Mill, after saying that he agrees with the Socialists in their
+practical aims, declares his utter dissent from their declamations
+against competition. "They forget," he says, "that where competition is
+not, monopoly is; and that monopoly, in all its forms, is the taxation
+of the industrious for the support of indolence, if not of plunder."
+That suggests my question: If competition is bad, what is good? What is
+the alternative to competition? Is it, as Mill says, monopoly, or is
+any third choice possible? If it is monopoly, do you defend monopoly,
+or only monopoly in some special cases? I opened, not long ago, an old
+book of caricatures, in which the revolutionary leader is carrying a
+banner with the double inscription, "No monopoly! No competition!" The
+implied challenge--how can you abolish both?--seemed to me to require a
+plain answer. Directly afterwards I then took up the newspaper, and
+read the report of an address upon the prize-day of a school. The
+speaker dwelt in the usual terms upon the remorseless and crushing
+competition of the present day, which he mentioned as an incitement to
+every boy to get a good training for the struggle. The moral was
+excellent; but it seemed to me curious that the speaker should be
+denouncing competition in the very same breath with proofs of its
+influence in encouraging education. When I was a lad, a clever boy and
+a stupid boy had an equal chance of getting an appointment to a public
+office. The merit which won a place might be relationship to a public
+official, or perhaps to a gentleman who had an influence in the
+constituency of the official. The system was a partial survival of the
+good old days in which, according to Sam Weller, the young nobleman got
+a position because his mother's uncle's wife's grandfather had once
+lighted the King's pipe. The nobleman, I need hardly add, considered
+this as an illustration of the pleasant belief, "Whatever is, is
+right". As we had ceased to accept that opinion in politics, offices
+were soon afterwards thrown open to competition, with the general
+impression that we were doing justice and opening a career to merit.
+That the resulting system has grave defects is, I think, quite
+undeniable; but so far as it has succeeded in determining that the men
+should be selected for public duty, for their fitness, and for nothing
+else, it is surely a step in advance which no one would now propose to
+retrace. And yet it was simply a substitution of competition for
+monopoly. As it comes into wider operation, some of us begin to cry out
+against competition. The respectable citizen asks, What are we to do
+with our boys? The obvious reply is, that he really means, What are we
+to do with our fools? A clever lad can now get on by his cleverness;
+and of course those who are not clever are thrust aside. That is a
+misfortune, perhaps, for them; but we can hardly regard it as a
+misfortune for the country. And clearly, too, pressure of this kind is
+likely to increase. We have come to believe that it is a main duty of
+the nation to provide general education. When the excellent Miss Hannah
+More began to spread village schools, she protested warmly that she
+would not teach children anything which would tend to make the poor
+discontented with their station. They must learn to read the Bible, but
+she hoped that they would stop short of such knowledge as would enable
+them to read Tom Paine. Now, Hannah More deserves our gratitude for her
+share in setting the ball rolling; but it has rolled far beyond the
+limits she would have prescribed. We now desire not only that every
+child in the country should be able to acquire the elements of learning
+at least; but, further, we hope that ladders may be provided by which
+every promising child may be able to climb beyond the elements, and to
+acquire the fullest culture of which his faculties are capable. There
+is not only no credit at the present day in wishing so much, but it is
+discreditable not to do what lies in one's power to further its
+accomplishment. But, then, is not that to increase enormously the field
+of competition? I, for example, am a literary person, after a fashion;
+I have, that is, done something to earn a living by my pen. I had the
+advantage at starting of belonging to the small class which was well
+enough off to send its children to the best schools and universities.
+That is to say, I was one of the minority which had virtually a
+monopoly of education, and but for that circumstance I should in all
+probability have taken to some possibly more honest, but perhaps even
+worse paid, occupation. Every extension of the margin of education,
+everything which diffuses knowledge and intellectual training through a
+wider circle, must increase the competition among authors. If every man
+with brains, whether born in a palace or a cottage is to have a chance
+of making the best of them, the capacity for authorship, and therefore
+the number of competitors, will be enormously spread. It may also, we
+will hope, increase the demand for their work. The same remark applies
+to every profession for which intellectual culture is a qualification.
+Do we regret the fact? Would we sentence three-quarters of the nation
+to remain stupid, in order that the fools in the remaining quarter may
+have a better chance? That would be contrary to every democratic
+instinct, to the highest as well as the lowest. But if I say, every
+office and every profession shall be open to every man; success in it
+shall depend upon his abilities and merits; and, further, every child
+in the country shall have the opportunity of acquiring the necessary
+qualifications, what is that but to accept and to stimulate the spirit
+of competition? What, I ask, is the alternative? Should people be
+appointed by interest? Or is nobody to be anxious for official or
+professional or literary or commercial success, but only to develop his
+powers from a sense of duty, and wait till some infallible observer
+comes round and says, "Friend, take this position, which you deserve"?
+Somehow I do not think that last scheme practicable at present. But,
+even in that case, I do not see how the merits of any man are to be
+tested without enabling him to prove by experiment that he is the most
+meritorious person; and, if that be admitted, is not every step in
+promoting education, in equalising, therefore, the position from which
+men start for the race, a direct encouragement to competition?
+
+Carlyle was fond of saying that Napoleon's great message to mankind was
+the declaration that careers should be open to talent, or the tools
+given to him who could use them. Surely that was a sound principle; and
+one which, so far as I can see, cannot be applied without stimulating
+competition. The doctrine, indeed, is unpalatable to many Socialists.
+To me, it seems to be one to which only the cowardly and the indolent
+can object in principle. Will not a society be the better off, in which
+every man is set to work upon the tasks for which he is most fitted? If
+we allowed our teaching and our thinking to be done by blockheads; our
+hard labour to be done by men whose muscles were less developed than
+their brains; made our soldiers out of our cowards, and our sailors out
+of the sea-sick,--should we be better off? It seems, certainly, to me,
+that whatever may be the best constitution of society, one mark of it
+will be the tendency to distribute all social functions according to
+the fitness of the agents; to place trust where trust is justifiable,
+and to give the fullest scope for every proved ability, intellectual,
+moral, and physical. Of course, such approximation to this result, as
+we can observe in the present order of things, is very imperfect. Many
+of the most obvious evils in the particular system of competition now
+adopted, may be summed up in the statement, that the tests according to
+which success is awarded, are not so contrived as to secure the success
+of the best competitors. Some of them, for example, are calculated to
+give an advantage to the superficial and the showy. But that is to say
+that they are incompatible with the true principle which they were
+intended to embody; and that we should reform our method, not in the
+direction of limiting competition, but in the direction of so framing
+our system that it may be a genuine application of Carlyle's doctrine.
+In other words, in all the professions for which intellectual
+excellence is required, the conditions should be such as to give the
+best man the best chance, as far as human arrangements can secure that
+object. What other rule can be suggested? Competition, in this sense,
+means the preservation of the very atmosphere which is necessary to
+health; and to denounce it is either to confirm the most selfish and
+retrograde principles, or to denounce something which is only called
+competition by a confusion of ideas. How easy such a confusion may be,
+is obvious when we look at the ordinary language about industrial
+competition. We are told that wages are kept down by competition. To
+this Mill replied in the passage I have quoted, and, upon his own
+theory, at any rate, replied with perfect justice, that they were also
+kept up by competition. The common language upon the subject is merely
+one instance of the fallacies into which men fall when they personify
+an abstraction. Competition becomes a kind of malevolent and
+supernatural being, to whose powers no conceivable limits are assigned.
+It is supposed to account for any amount of degradation. Yet if, by
+multiplying their numbers, workmen increase supply, and so lower the
+price of labour, it follows, conversely, by the very same reasoning,
+that if they refused to multiply, they would diminish the supply and
+raise the price. The force, by its very nature, operates as certainly
+in one direction as in the other. If, again, there is competition among
+workmen, there is competition among capitalists. In every strike, of
+course, workmen apply the principle, and sometimes apply it very
+effectually, in the attempt to raise their wages. It was often argued,
+indeed, that in this struggle, the employer possessed advantages partly
+due to his power of forming tacit combinations. The farmers in a
+parish, or the manufacturers in a business, were pledged to each other
+not to raise the rate of wages. If that be so, you again complain, not
+of competition, but of the want of competition; and you agree that the
+labourer will benefit, as in fact, I take it, he has undoubtedly
+benefited, by freer competition among capitalists, or by the greater
+power of removing his own labour to better markets. In such cases, the
+very meaning of the complaint is not that there is competition, but
+that the competition is so arranged as to give an unfair advantage to
+one side. And a similar misunderstanding is obviously implied in other
+cases. The Australian or American workman fears that his wages will be
+lowered by the competition of the Chinese; and the Englishman protests
+against the competition of pauper aliens. Let us assume that he is
+right in believing that such competition will tend to lower his wages,
+whatever the moral to be drawn from the fact. Briefly, denunciations of
+"competition" in this sense are really complaints that we do not
+exclude the Chinese immigrant and therefore give a monopoly to the
+native labourer. That may be a good thing for him, and if it be not a
+good thing for the Chinaman who is excluded from the field, we perhaps
+do not care very much about the results to China. We are so much better
+than the heathen that we need not bother about their interests. But, of
+course, the English workman, when he complains of the intensity of
+competition, does not propose to adopt the analogous remedy of giving a
+monopoly to one section of our own population. The English pauper is
+here; we do not want to suppress him, but only to suppress his
+pauperism; and he certainly cannot be excluded from any share in the
+fund devoted to the support of labour. The evil, therefore, of which we
+complain is primarily the inadequacy of the support provided,
+not,--though that may also be complained of,--the undesirable method by
+which those funds are distributed. In other words, the complaint may so
+far be taken to mean that there are too many competitors, not that,
+given the competitors, their shares are determined by competition,
+instead of being determined by monopoly or by some other principle.
+
+We have therefore to inquire whether any principle can be suggested
+which will effect the desired end, and which will yet really exclude
+competition. The popular suggestion is that the remedy lies in
+suppressing competition by equalising the prizes. If no prizes are to
+be won, there will so far be less reason for competing. Enough may be
+provided for all by simply taking something from those who have too
+much. Now, I may probably assume that we all agree in approving the
+contemplated end--a greater equality of wealth, and especially an
+elevation of the lower classes to a higher position in the scale of
+comfort. Every social reformer, whatever his particular creed, would
+probably agree that some of us are too rich, and that a great many are
+too poor. But we still have to ask, in what sense it is conceivable
+that a real suppression of competition can contribute to the desired
+end. It is obvious that when we denounce competition we often mean not
+that it is to be abolished, but that it is to be regulated and limited
+in its application. So, for example, people sometimes speak as if
+competition were the antithesis to co-operation. But I need hardly say
+that individualists, as well as their opponents, may legitimately sing
+the praises of co-operation. Nobody was more forward than Mill, for
+example, and Mill's followers, in advocating the principles of the
+early co-operative societies. He and they rejoiced to believe that the
+co-operative societies had revealed unsuspected virtues and capacities
+in the class from which they sprang; that they had done much to raise
+the standard of life and to extend sympathy and human relations among
+previously disconnected units of society. But it is, of course, equally
+obvious that they have grown up in a society which supposes free
+competition in every part of its industrial system; that co-operative
+societies, so far as the outside world is concerned, have to buy in the
+cheapest and sell in the dearest market; that the rate of wages of
+their members is still fixed by competition; and that they encourage
+habits of saving and forethought which presuppose that each man is to
+have private ends of his own. In what sense, then, can co-operation
+ever be regarded as really opposed to competition? Competition may
+exist among groups of men just as much as among individuals: a state of
+war is not less a state of war if it is carried on by regiments and
+armies, instead of by mere chaotic struggles in which each man fights
+for his own hand. Competition does not mean that there should be no
+combination, but that there should be no monopoly. So long as a trade
+or a profession is open to every one who chooses to take it up, its
+conduct will be equally regulated by competition, whether it be
+competition as between societies or individuals, or whether its profits
+be divided upon one system or another between the various classes
+concerned. Co-operators, of course, may look forward to a day in which
+society at large will be members of a single co-operative society; or,
+again, to a time in which every industrial enterprise may be conducted
+by the State. Supposing any such aspiration to be realised, the
+question still remains, whether they would amount to the abolition or
+still only to the shifting of the incidence of competition. Socialists
+tell us that hitherto the labourer has not had his fair share of the
+produce of industry. The existing system has sanctioned a complicated
+chicanery, by which one class has been enabled to live as mere
+bloodsuckers and parasites upon the rest of society. Property is the
+result of theft, instead of being, as Economists used to assure us, the
+reward of thrift. It is hoped that these evils may be remedied by a
+reconstruction of society, in which the means of production shall all
+be public property, and every man's income be simply a salary in
+proportion to the quantity of his labour. If we, then, ask how far
+competition would be abolished, we may first make one remark. Such a
+system, like every other system, requires, for its successful working,
+that the instincts and moral impulses should correspond to the demands
+of the society. Absolute equality of property is just as compatible
+with universal misery as with universal prosperity. A population made
+up of thoroughly lazy, sensual, stupid individuals could, if it chose,
+work such a machinery so as to suppress all who were industrious,
+refined and intelligent. However great may be the revenue of a nation,
+it is a very simple problem of arithmetic to discover how many people
+could be supported just above the starvation level. The nation at large
+would, on the supposed system, have to decide how its numbers and wants
+are to be proportioned to its means. If individuals do not compete, the
+whole society has, presumably, to compete with other societies; and, in
+every case whatever, with the general forces of nature. An indolent and
+inefficient majority might decide, if it pleased, that the amount of
+work to be exacted should be that which would be just enough to provide
+the simplest material necessities. If, again, the indolent and
+inefficient are to exist at all,--and we can scarcely count upon their
+disappearance,--and if further, they are to share equally with the
+industrious and the efficient, we must, in some way, coerce them into
+the required activity. If every industrial organisation is to be worked
+by the State, the State, it would seem, must appeal to the only means
+at its disposal,--namely, the prison and the scourge. If, moreover, the
+idle and sensual choose to multiply, the State must force them to
+refrain, or the standard of existence will be lowered. And, therefore,
+as is often argued, Socialism logically carried out would, under such
+conditions, lead to slavery; to a state in which labour would be
+enforced, and the whole system of life absolutely regulated by the will
+of the majority; and, in the last resort, by physical force. That
+seems, I confess, to be a necessary result, unless you can assume a
+moral change, which is entirely different from the mere change of
+machinery, and not necessarily implied, nor even made probable, by the
+change. The intellectual leaders of Socialism, no doubt, assume that
+the removal of "injustice" will lead to the development of a public
+spirit which will cause the total efficiency to be as great as it is at
+present, or perhaps greater. But the mass who call themselves
+Socialists take, one suspects, a much simpler view. They are moved by
+the very natural, but not especially lofty, desire to have more wages
+and less work. They take for granted that if their share of the total
+product is increased, they will get a larger dividend; and do not stop
+to inquire whether the advantage may be not more than counterbalanced
+by the diminution of the whole product, when the present incitements to
+industry are removed. They argue,--that is, so far as they argue at
+all,--as though the quantity to be distributed were a fixed quantity,
+and regard capitalists as pernicious persons, somehow intercepting a
+lion's share of the stream of wealth which, it is assumed, would flow
+equally if they were abolished. That is, of course, to beg the whole
+question.
+
+I, however, shall venture to assume that the industrial machinery
+requires a corresponding moral force to work it; and I, therefore,
+proceed to ask how such a force can be supposed to act without some
+form of competition. Nothing, as a recent writer suggests,--ironically,
+perhaps,--could be easier than to secure an abolition of competition.
+You have only to do two things: to draw a "ring-fence" round your
+society, and then to proportion the members within the fence to the
+supplies. The remark suggests the difficulty. A ring-fence, for
+example, round London or Manchester would mean the starvation of
+millions in a month; or, if round England, the ruin of English
+commerce, the enormous rise in the cost of the poor man's food, and the
+abolition of all his little luxuries. But, if you include even a
+population as large as London, what you have next to do is to drill
+some millions of people--vast numbers of them poor, reckless, ignorant,
+sensual, and selfish--to regulate their whole mode of life by a given
+code, and refrain from all the pleasures which they most appreciate.
+The task is a big one, and not the less if you have also to undertake
+that everybody, whatever his personal qualities, shall have enough to
+lead a comfortable life. I do not suppose, however, that any rational
+Socialist would accept that programme of isolation. He would hold that,
+in his Utopia, we can do more efficiently all that is done under a
+system which he regards as wasteful and unjust. The existing machinery,
+whatever else may be said of it, does, in fact, tend to weld the whole
+world more and more into a single industrial organism. English workmen
+are labouring to satisfy the wants of other human beings in every
+quarter of the world; while Chinese, and Africans, and Europeans, and
+Americans are also labouring to satisfy theirs. This vast and almost
+inconceivably complex machinery has grown up in the main unconsciously,
+or, at least, with a very imperfect anticipation of the ultimate
+results, by the independent efforts of innumerable inventors, and
+speculators, and merchants, and manufacturers, each of them intent, as
+a rule, only upon his own immediate profits and the interests of the
+little circle with which he is in immediate contact. The theory is not,
+I suppose, that this gigantic system of mutual interdependence should
+be abolished or restricted, but that it should be carried on
+consciously, with definite and intelligible purpose, and in such a way
+as to promote the interests of every fraction of society. The whole
+organism should resemble one worked by a single brain, instead of
+representing the resultant of a multitude of distracted and conflicting
+forces. The difficulties are obvious enough, nor need I dwell upon them
+here. I will not inquire whether it does not suppose something like
+omniscience in the new industrial leaders; and whether the restless and
+multifarious energy now displayed in discovering new means of
+satisfying human wants could be supplied by a central body, or a number
+of central bodies, made up of human beings, and, moreover, official
+human beings, reluctant to try experiments and strike into new courses,
+and without the present motives for enterprise, "Individualists" have
+enlarged sufficiently upon such topics. What I have to note is that, in
+any case, the change supposes the necessity of a corresponding morality
+in the growth of the instincts, the public spirit, the hatred of
+indolence, the temperance and self-command which would be requisite to
+work it efficiently. The organisation into which we are born
+presupposes certain moral instincts, and, moreover, necessarily implies
+a vast system of moral discipline. Our hopes and aspirations, our
+judgments of our neighbours and of ourselves, are at every moment
+guided and moulded by the great structure of which we form a part.
+Whenever we ask how our lives are to be directed, what are to be the
+terms on which we form our most intimate ties, whom we are to support
+or suppress, how we are to win respect or incur contempt, we are
+profoundly affected by the social relations in which we are placed at
+our birth, and the corresponding beliefs or prejudices which we have
+unconsciously imbibed. Such influences, it may perhaps be said, are of
+incomparably greater importance than the direct exhortations to which
+we listen, or than the abstract doctrines which we accept in words, but
+which receive their whole colouring from the concrete facts to which
+they conform. Now, I ask how such discipline can be conceived without
+some kind of competition; or, rather, what would be the discipline
+which would remain if, in some sense, competition could be suppressed?
+If in the ideal society there are still prizes to be won, positions
+which may be the object of legitimate desire, and if those positions
+are to be open to every one, whatever his circumstances, we might still
+have the keenest competition, though carried on by different methods.
+If, on the other hand, no man's position were to be better than
+another's, we might suppress competition at the price of suppressing
+every motive for social as well as individual improvement. In any
+conceivable state of things, the welfare of every society, the total
+means of enjoyment at its disposal, must depend upon the energy,
+intelligence, and trustworthiness of its constituent members. Such
+qualities, I need hardly say, are qualities of individuals. Unless John
+and Peter and Thomas are steady, industrious, sober, and honest, the
+society as a whole will be neither honest nor sober nor prosperous. The
+problem, then, becomes, how can you ensure the existence of such
+qualities unless John and Peter and the rest have some advantage in
+virtue of possessing them? Somehow or other, a man must be the better
+off for doing his work well and treating his neighbour fairly. He ought
+surely to hold the positions in which such qualities are most required,
+and to have, if possible, the best chance of being a progenitor of the
+rising generation. A social condition in which it made no difference to
+a man, except so far as his own conscience was concerned, whether he
+were or were not honest, would imply a society favourable to people
+without a conscience, because giving full play to the forces which make
+for corruption and disintegration. If you remove the rewards accessible
+to the virtuous and peaceful, how are you to keep the penalties which
+restrain the vicious and improvident? A bare repeal of the law, "If a
+man will not work, neither shall he eat," would not of itself promote
+industry. You would at most remove the compulsion which arises from
+competition, to introduce the compulsion which uses physical force. You
+would get rid of what seems to some people the "natural" penalty of
+want following waste, and be forced to introduce the "artificial" or
+legislative penalty of compulsory labour. But, otherwise, you must
+construct your society so that, by the spontaneous play of society, the
+purer elements may rise to the surface, and the scum sink to the
+bottom. So long as human nature varies indefinitely, so long as we have
+knaves and honest men, sinners and saints, cowards and heroes, some
+process of energetic and active sifting is surely essential to the
+preservation of social health; and it is difficult to see how that is
+conceivable without some process of active and keen competition.
+
+The Socialist will, of course, say, and say with too much truth, that
+the present form of competition is favourable to anti-social qualities.
+If, indeed, a capitalist is not a person who increases the productive
+powers of industry, but a person who manages simply to intercept a
+share produced by the industry of others, there is, of course, much to
+be said for this view. I cannot now consider that point, for my subject
+to-day is the moral aspect of competition considered generally. And
+what I have just said suggests what is, I think, the more purely moral
+aspect of the question. A reasonable Socialist desires to maintain what
+is good in the existing system, while suppressing its abuses. The
+question, What is good? is partly economical; but it is partly also
+ethical: and it is with that part that I am at present concerned.
+
+Any system of competition, any system which supposes a reward for
+virtue other than virtue itself, may be accused of promoting
+selfishness and other ugly qualities. The doctrine that virtue is its
+own reward is very charming in the mouth of the virtuous man; but when
+his neighbours use it as an excuse for not rewarding him, it becomes
+rather less attractive. It saves a great deal of trouble, no doubt, and
+relieves us from an awkward responsibility. I must, however, point out,
+in the first place, that a fallacy is often introduced into these
+discussions which Mr. Herbert Spencer has done a great deal to expose.
+He has dwelt very forcibly, for example, on the fact that it is a duty
+to be happy and healthy; and that selfishness, if used in a bad sense,
+should not mean simply regard for ourselves, but only disregard for our
+neighbours. We ought not, in other words, to be unjust because we
+ourselves happen to be the objects of injustice. The parable of the
+good Samaritan is generally regarded as a perfect embodiment of a great
+moral truth. Translated from poetry into an abstract logical form, it
+amounts to saying that we should do good to the man who most needs our
+services, whatever be the accidents which alienate ordinary sympathies.
+Now, suppose that the good Samaritan had himself fallen among thieves,
+what would have been his duty? His first duty, I should say, would have
+been, if possible, to knock down the thief; his second, to tie up his
+own wounds; and his third, to call in the police. We should not,
+perhaps, call him virtuous for such conduct; but we should clearly
+think him wrong for omitting it. Not to resist a thief is cowardly; not
+to attend to your own health is to incapacitate yourself for duty; not
+to apply to the police is to be wanting in public spirit. Assuming
+robbery to be wrong, I am not the less bound to suppress it because I
+happen to be the person robbed; I am only bound not to be
+vindictive--that is, not to allow my personal feelings to make me act
+otherwise than I should act if I had no special interest in the
+particular case. Adam Smith's favourite rule of the "indifferent
+spectator" is the proper one in the case. I should be impartial, and
+incline no more to severity than to lenity, because I am forced by
+circumstances to act both as judge and as plaintiff. So, in questions
+of self-support, it is obviously a fallacy to assume that an action,
+directed in the first instance to a man's own benefit, is therefore to
+be stigmatised as selfish. On the good Samaritan's principle, a person
+should be supported, _ceteris paribus_, by the person who can do
+it most efficiently, and in nine cases out of ten that person is
+himself. If self-support is selfish in the sense that the service is
+directly rendered to self, it is not the less unselfish in so far as it
+is necessarily also a service to others. If I keep myself by my labour,
+I am preventing a burden from falling upon my fellows. And, of course,
+the case is stronger when I include my family. We were all impressed
+the other day by the story of the poor boy who got some wretchedly
+small pittance by his work, spent a small portion of it upon his own
+needs, and devoted the chief part of it to trying to save his mother
+and her other children from starvation. Was he selfish? Was he selfish
+even in taking something for himself, as the only prop of his family?
+What may be the immediate motive of a man when he is working for his
+own bread and the bread of his family may often be a difficult
+question; but as, in point of fact, he is helping not only himself and
+those who depend on him, but also in some degree relieving others from
+a burden, his conduct must clearly not be set down as selfish in any
+sense which involves moral disapproval.
+
+Let us apply this to the case of competition. The word is generally
+used to convey a suggestion of selfishness in a bad sense. We think of
+the hardship upon the man who is ousted, as much as of the benefit to
+the man who gets in; or perhaps we think of it more. It suggests to us
+that one man has been shut out for the benefit of his neighbour; and
+that, of course, suggests envy, malice, and all uncharitableness. We
+hold that such competition must generate ill-will. I used--when I was
+intimately connected with a competitive system at the university--to
+hear occasionally of the evil influences of competition, as tending to
+promote jealousy between competitors. I always replied that, so far as
+my experience went, the evil was altogether imaginary. So far from
+competition generating ill-will, the keenest competitors were, as a
+rule, the closest friends. There was no stronger bond than the bond of
+rivalry in our intellectual contests. One main reason was, of course,
+that we had absolute faith in the fairness of the competition. We felt
+that it would be unworthy to complain of being beaten by a better man;
+and we had no doubt that, in point of fact, the winners were the better
+men; or, at any rate, were honestly believed to be the better men by
+those who distributed honours. The case, though on a small scale, may
+suggest one principle. So far as the end of such competitions is good,
+the normal motives cannot be bad. The end of a fair competition is the
+discovery of the ablest men, with a view to placing them in the
+position where their talents may be turned to most account. It can only
+be achieved so far as each man does his best to train his own powers,
+and is prepared to test them fairly against the powers of others. To
+work for that end is, then, not only permissible, but a duty. The
+spirit in which the end is pursued may be bad, in so far as a man
+pursues it by unfair means; in so far as he tries to make sham
+performance pass off for genuine; or, again, in so far as he sets an
+undue value upon the reward, as apart from the qualities by which it is
+gained. But if he works simply with the desire of making the best of
+himself, and if the reward is simply such a position as may enable him
+to be most useful to society, the competition which results will be
+bracing and invigorating, and will appeal to no such motives as can be
+called, in the bad sense, selfish. He is discharging a function which
+is useful, it is true, to himself; but which is also intrinsically
+useful to the whole society. The same principle applies, again, to
+intellectual activity in general. All genuine thought is essentially
+useful to mankind. In the struggle to discover truth, even our
+antagonists are, necessarily, our co-operators. A philosopher, as a man
+of science, owes, at least, as much to those who differ from him, as to
+those who agree with him. The conflict of many minds, from many sides,
+is the essential condition of intellectual progress. Now, if a man
+plays his part manfully and honourably in such a struggle, he deserves
+our gratitude, even if he takes the wrong side. If he looks forward to
+the recognition by the best judges as one motive for his activity, I
+think that he is asking for a worthy reward. He deserves blame, only so
+far as his motives have a mixture of unworthy personal sentiment.
+Obviously, if he aims at cheap fame, at making a temporary sensation
+instead of a permanent impression, at flattering prejudices instead of
+spreading truth; or, if he shows greediness of notoriety, by trying to
+get unjust credit, as we sometimes see scientific people squabbling
+over claims to the first promulgation of some trifling discovery, he is
+showing paltriness of spirit. The men whom we revere are those who,
+like Faraday or Darwin, devoted themselves exclusively to the
+advancement of knowledge, and would have scorned a reputation won by
+anything but genuine work. The fact that there is a competition in such
+matters implies, no doubt, a temptation,--the temptation to set a
+higher value upon praise than upon praiseworthiness; but I think it not
+only possible that the competitors in such rivalries may keep to the
+honourable path, but probable that, as a matter of fact, they
+frequently,--I hope that I may say generally,--do so. If the fame at
+which a man aims be not that which "in broad rumour lies," but that
+which "lives and spreads aloft in those pure eyes and perfect witness
+of all-judging Jove," then I think that the desire for it is scarcely
+to be called a last infirmity--rather, it is an inseparable quality of
+noble minds. We wish to honour men who have been good soldiers in that
+warfare, and we can hardly wish them to be indifferent to our homage.
+
+We may add, then, that a competition need not be demoralising when the
+competitors have lofty aims and use only honourable means. When,
+passing from purely intellectual aims, we consider the case, say, of
+the race for wealth, we may safely make an analogous remark. If a man's
+aim in becoming rich is of the vulgar kind; if he wishes to make an
+ostentatious display of wealth, and to spend his money upon
+demoralising amusement; or if, again, he tries to succeed by quackery
+instead of by the production of honest work, he is, of course, so far
+mischievous and immoral. But a man whose aims are public-spirited, nay,
+even if they be such as simply tend to improve the general comfort; who
+develops, for example, the resources of the country, and introduces new
+industries or more effective modes of manufacture, is, undoubtedly, in
+fact conferring a benefit upon his fellows, and may, so far, be doing
+his duty in the most effectual way open to him. If he succeeds by being
+really a more efficient man of business than his neighbours, he is only
+doing what, in the interests of all, it is desirable that he should do.
+He is discharging an essential social function; and what is to be
+desired is, that he should feel the responsibility involved, that he
+should regard his work as on one side the discharge of a social
+function, and not simply as a means of personal aggrandisement. It is
+not the fact that he is competing that is against him; but the fact,
+when it is a fact, that there is something discreditable about the
+means which he adopts, or the reward that he contemplates.
+
+This, indeed, suggests another and a highly important question--the
+question, namely, whether, in our present social state, his reward may
+not be excessive, and won at too great a cost to his rivals. And,
+without going into other questions involved, I will try to say a
+little, in conclusion, upon this, which is certainly a pressing
+problem. Competition, I have suggested, is not immoral if it is a
+competition in doing honest work by honourable means, and if it is also
+a fair competition. But it must, of course, be added, that fairness
+includes more than the simple equality of chances. It supposes, also,
+that there should be some proportion between the rewards and the
+merits. If it is simply a question between two men, which shall be
+captain of a ship, and which shall be mate, then the best plan is to
+decide by their merits as sailors; and, if their merits be fairly
+tried, the loser need bear no grudge against the winner. But when we
+have such cases as sometimes occur, when, for example, the ship is cast
+away, and it becomes a question whether I shall eat you or you shall
+eat me, or, let us say, which of us is to have the last biscuit, we get
+one of those terrible cases of temptation in which the strongest social
+bonds sometimes give way under the strain. The competition, then,
+becomes, in the highest degree, demoralising, and the struggle for
+existence resolves itself into a mere unscrupulous scramble for life,
+at any sacrifice of others. That, it is sometimes said, is a parallel
+to our social state at present. If I gave an excessive prize to the
+first boy in a school and flogged the second, I should not be doing
+justice. If one man is rewarded for a moderate amount of forethought by
+becoming a millionaire, and his unsuccessful rivals punished by
+starvation or the workhouse, the lottery of life is not arranged on
+principles of justice. A man must be a very determined optimist if he
+denied the painful truth to be found in such statements. He must be
+blind to many evils if he does not perceive the danger of dulling his
+sympathies by indifference to the fate of the unsuccessful. The rich
+man in Clough's poem observes that, whether there be a God matters very
+little--
+
+    For I and mine, thank somebody,
+    Manage to get our victual.
+
+But, even if we are not very rich, we must often, I think, doubt
+whether we are not wrapping ourselves in a spirit of selfish
+complacency when we are returning to a comfortable home and passing
+outcasts of the street. We must sometimes reflect that our comfort is
+not simply a reward for virtue or intelligence, even if it be not
+sometimes the prize of actual dishonesty. To shut our eyes to the mass
+of wretchedness around us is to harden our hearts, although to open our
+hands is too often to do more harm than good. It is no wonder that we
+should be tempted to declaim against competition, when the competition
+means that so many unfortunates are to be crowded off their narrow
+standing-ground into the gulf of pauperism.
+
+This may suggest the moral which I have been endeavouring to bring out.
+Looking at society at large, we may surely say that it will be better
+in proportion as every man is strenuously endeavouring to play his
+part, and in which the parts are distributed to those best fitted to
+play them. We must admit, too, that for any period to which we can look
+forward, the great mass of mankind will find enough to occupy their
+energies in labouring primarily for their own support, and so bearing
+the burden of their own needs and the needs of their families. We may
+infer, too, that a society will be the better so far as it gives the
+most open careers to all talents, wherever displayed, and as it shows
+respect for the homely virtues of industry, integrity, and forethought,
+which are essential to the whole body as to its constituent members.
+And we may further say that the corresponding motives in the individual
+cannot be immoral. A desire of independence, the self-respect which
+makes a man shrink from accepting as a gift what he can win as a fair
+reward, the love of fairplay, which makes him use only honest means in
+the struggle, are qualities which can never lose their value, and which
+are not the less valuable because in the first instance they are most
+profitable to their possessors. Nothing which tends to weaken such
+motives can be good; but while they preserve their intensity, they
+necessarily imply the existence of competition in some form or other.
+
+It is equally clear that competition by itself is not a sufficient
+panacea. Whenever we take an abstract quality, personify it by the help
+of capital letters, and lay it down as the one principle of a complex
+system, we generally blunder. Competition is as far as possible from
+being the solitary condition of a healthy society. It must be not only
+a competition for worthy ends by honourable means, but should be a
+competition so regulated that the reward may bear some proportion to
+the merit. Monopoly is an evil in so far as it means an exclusive
+possession of some advantages or privileges, especially when they are
+given by the accidents of birth or position. It is something if they
+are given to the best and the ablest; but the evil still remains if
+even the best and ablest are rewarded by a position which cramps the
+energies and lowers the necessity of others. Competition is only
+desirable in so far as it is a process by which the useful qualities
+are encouraged by an adequate, and not more than an adequate, stimulus;
+and in which, therefore, there is not involved the degradation and the
+misery on the one side, the excessive reward on the other, of the
+unsuccessful and the successful in the struggle. Competition,
+therefore, we might say, could be unequivocally beneficial only in an
+ideal society; in a state in which we might unreservedly devote
+ourselves to making the best of our abilities and accepting the
+consequent results, without the painful sense in the background that
+others were being sacrificed and debased; crushed because they had less
+luck in the struggle, and were, perhaps, only less deserving in some
+degree than ourselves. So long as we are still far enough from having
+realised any such state; so long as we feel, and cannot but feel, that
+the distribution of rewards is so much at the mercy of chance, and so
+often goes to qualities which, in an ideal state, would deserve rather
+reprobation than applause, we can only aim at better things. We can do
+what in us lies to level some inequalities, to work, so far as our
+opportunities enable us, in the causes which are mostly beneficial for
+the race, to spread enlightenment and good feeling, and to help the
+unfortunate. But it is also incumbent upon us to remember carefully,
+what is so often overlooked in the denunciations of competition, that
+the end for which we must hope, and the approach to which we must
+further, is one in which the equivocal virtue of charity shall be
+suppressed; that is, in which no man shall be dependent upon his
+neighbour in such a sense as to be able to neglect his own duties; in
+which there may be normally a reciprocity of good services, and the
+reciprocity not be (as has been said) all on one side. There is a very
+explicable tendency at present to ask for such one-sided reciprocity.
+It is natural enough, for reasons too obvious to be mentioned, that
+reformers should dwell exclusively upon the right of every one to
+support, and neglect to point out the correlative duty of every one to
+do his best to support himself. The popular arguments about "old-age
+pensions" may illustrate the general state of mind. It is disgraceful,
+people say, that so large a proportion of the aged poor should come to
+depend upon the rates. Undoubtedly it is disgraceful. Then upon whom
+does the disgrace fall? It sounds harsh to say that it falls upon the
+sufferers. We shrink from saying to a pauper, "It serves you right".
+That sounds brutal, and is only in part true. Still, we should not
+shrink from stating whatever is true, painful though it may be. It
+sounds better to lay all the blame upon the oppressor than to lay it
+upon the oppressed; and yet, as a rule, the cowardice or folly of the
+oppressed has generally been one cause of their misfortunes, and cannot
+be overlooked in a true estimate of the case. That drunkenness,
+improvidence, love of gambling, and so forth, do in fact lead to
+pauperism is undeniable; and that they are bad, and so far disgraceful,
+is a necessary consequence. In such cases, then, pauperism is a proof
+of bad qualities; and the fact, like all other facts, must be
+recognised. The stress of argument, therefore, is laid upon the
+hardships suffered by the honest and industrious poor. The logical
+consequence should be, that the deserving poor should become
+pensioners, and the undeserving paupers. This at once opens the
+amazingly difficult question of moral merit, and the power of poor-law
+officials to solve problems which would certainly puzzle the keenest
+psychologists. Suppose, for example, that a man, without being
+definitely vicious, has counted upon the promised pension, and
+therefore neglected any attempts to save. If you give him a pension,
+you virtually tell everybody that saving is a folly; if you don't, you
+inflict upon him the stigma which is deserved by the drunkard and the
+thief. So difficult is it to arrange for this proposed valuation of a
+man's moral qualities that it has been proposed to get rid of all
+stigma by making it the right and duty of every one to take a pension.
+That might conceivably alter the praise, but it would surely not alter
+the praiseworthiness. It must be wrong in me to take money from my
+neighbours when I don't want it; and, if wrong, it surely ought to be
+disgraceful. And this seems to indicate the real point. We may aim at
+altering the facts, at making them more conducive to good qualities;
+but we cannot alter or attempt to decide by laws the degree of praise
+or blame to be attached to individuals. It would be very desirable to
+bring about a state of things in which no honest and provident man need
+ever fall into want; and, in that state, pauperism would be rightly
+discreditable as an indication of bad qualities. But to say that nobody
+shall be ashamed of taking support would be to ruin the essential
+economic virtues, and to pauperise the nation; and to try to lay down
+precise rules as to the distribution of honour and discredit, seems, to
+me, to be a problem beyond the power of a legislature. I express no
+opinion upon the question itself, because I am quite incompetent to do
+so. I only refer to it as illustrating the difficulties which beset us
+when we try to remove the evils of the present system, and yet to
+preserve the stimulus to industry, which is implied in competition. The
+shortest plan is to shut one's eyes to the difficulty, and roundly deny
+its existence. I hope that our legislators may hit upon some more
+promising methods. The ordinary mode of cutting the knot too often
+suggests that the actually contemplated ideal is the land in which the
+chickens run about ready roasted, and the curse of labour is finally
+removed from mankind. The true ideal, surely, is the state in which
+labour shall be generally a blessing; in which we shall recognise the
+fact--disagreeable or otherwise--that the race can only be elevated by
+the universal diffusion of public spirit, and a general conviction that
+it is every man's first duty to cultivate his own capacities, to turn
+them to the best possible account, and to work strenuously and heartily
+in whatever position he has been placed. It is because I cannot help
+thinking that when we attack competition in general terms, we are, too
+often, blinding ourselves to those homely and often-repeated, and, as I
+believe, indisputable truths, that I have ventured to speak to-day,
+namely, on the side of competition--so far, at least, on the side of
+competition as to suggest that our true ideal should be, not a state,
+if such a state be conceivable, in which there is no competition, but a
+state in which competition should be so regulated that it should be
+really equivalent to a process of bringing about the best possible
+distribution of the whole social forces; and should be held to be,
+because it would really be, not a struggle of each man to seize upon a
+larger share of insufficient means, but the honest effort of each man
+to do the very utmost he can to make himself a thoroughly efficient
+member of society.
+
+
+
+
+SOCIAL EQUALITY.
+
+
+The problem of which I propose to speak is the old dispute between
+Dives and Lazarus. Lazarus, presumably, was a better man than Dives.
+How could Dives justify himself for living in purple and fine linen,
+while Lazarus was lying at the gates, with the dogs licking his sores?
+The problem is one of all ages, and takes many forms. When the old
+Puritan saw a man going to the gallows, "There," he said, "but for the
+grace of God, goes John Bradford". When the rich man, entering his
+club, sees some wretched tatterdemalion, slouching on the pavement,
+there, he may say, goes Sir Gorgius Midas, but for--what? I am here and
+he there, he may say, because I was the son of a successful
+stock-jobber, and he the son of some deserted mother at the workhouse.
+That is the cause, but is it a reason? Suppose, as is likely enough,
+that Lazarus is as good a man as Midas, ought they not to change
+places, or to share their property equally? A question, certainly, to
+be asked, and, if possible, to be answered.
+
+It is often answered, and is most simply answered, by saying that all
+men ought to be equal. Dives should be cut up and distributed in equal
+shares between Lazarus and his brethren. The dogma which embodies this
+claim is one which is easily refuted in some of the senses which it may
+bear, though in spite of such refutations it has become an essential
+part of the most genuine creed of mankind. The man of science says,
+with perfect truth, that so far from men being born equal, some are
+born with the capacity of becoming Shakespeares and Newtons, and others
+with scarcely the power of rising above Sally the chimpanzee. The
+answer would be conclusive, if anybody demanded that we should all be
+just six feet high, with brains weighing sixty ounces, neither more nor
+less. It is also true, and, I conceive, more relevant, that, as the man
+of science will again say, all improvement has come through little
+groups of men superior to their neighbours, through races or through
+classes, which, by elevating themselves on the shoulders of others,
+have gained leisure and means for superior cultivation. But equality
+may be demanded as facilitating this process, by removing the
+artificial advantages of wealth. It may be taken as a demand for a fair
+start, not as a demand that the prizes shall be distributed
+irrespectively of individual worth. And, whether the demand is rightly
+or wrongly expressed, we must, I think, admit that the real force with
+which we have to reckon is the demand for justice and for equality as
+somehow implied by justice. It is easy to browbeat a poor man who wants
+bread and cheese for himself and his family, by calling his demands
+materialistic, and advising him to turn his mind to the future state,
+where he will have the best of Dives. It is equally easy to ascribe the
+demands to mere envy and selfishness, or to those evil-minded agitators
+who, for their own wicked purposes, induce men to prefer a guinea to a
+pound of wages. But, after all, there is something in the demand for
+fair play and for the means of leading decent lives, which requires a
+better answer. It is easy, again, to say that all Socialists are
+Utopian. Make every man equal to-day, and the old inequalities will
+reappear to-morrow. Pitch such a one over London Bridge, it was said,
+with nothing on but his breeches, and he will turn up at Woolwich with
+his pockets full of gold. It is as idle to try for a dead level, when
+you work with such heterogeneous materials, as to persuade a
+homogeneous fluid to stand at anything but a dead level. But surely it
+may be urged that this is as much a reason for declining to believe
+that equal conditions of life will produce mere monotony, as for
+insisting that equality in any state is impossible. The present system
+includes a plan for keeping the scum at the surface. One of the few
+lessons which I have learnt from life, and not found already in
+copy-books, is the enormous difficulty which a man of the respectable
+classes finds in completely ruining himself, even by vice,
+extravagance, and folly; whereas, there are plenty of honest people
+who, in spite of economy and prudence, can scarcely keep outside of the
+workhouse. Admitting the appeal to justice, it is, again, often urged
+that justice is opposed to the demand for equality. Property is sacred,
+it is said, because a man has (or ought to have) a right to what he has
+made either by labour or by a course of fair dealings with other men. I
+am not about to discuss the ultimate ground on which the claim to
+private property is justified, and, as I think, satisfactorily
+established. A man has a right, we say, to all that he has fairly
+earned. Has he, then, a right to inherit what his father has earned? A
+man has had the advantage of all that a rich father can do for him in
+education, and so forth. Why should he also have the father's fortune,
+without earning it? Are the merits of making money so great that they
+are transmissible to posterity? Should a man who has been so good as to
+become rich, be blessed even to the third and fourth generation? Why,
+as a matter of pure justice, should not all fortunes be applied to
+public uses, on the death of the man who made them? Such a law, however
+impolitic, would not be incompatible with the moral principle to which
+an appeal is made. There are, of course, innumerable other ways in
+which laws may favour an equality of property, without breaking any of
+the fundamental principles. What, for example, is the just method of
+distributing taxation? A rich man can not only pay more money than a
+poor man, in proportion to his income, but he can, with equal ease, pay
+a greater proportion. To double the income of a labourer may be to
+raise him from starvation to comfort. To double the income of a
+millionaire may simply be to encumber him with wealth by which he is
+unable to increase his own pleasure. There is a limit beyond which it
+is exceedingly difficult to find ways of spending money on one's own
+enjoyment--though I have never been able to fix it precisely. On this
+ground, such plans as a graduated income-tax are, it would seem,
+compatible with the plea of justice; and, within certain limits, we do,
+in fact, approve of various taxes, on the ground, real or supposed,
+that they tend to shift burdens from the poor to the rich, and, so far,
+to equalise wealth. In fact, this appeal to justice is a tacit
+concession of the principle. If we justify property on the ground that
+it is fair that a man should keep what he has earned by his own labour,
+it seems to follow that it is unjust that he should have anything not
+earned by his labour. In other words, the answer admits the ordinary
+first principle from which Socialism starts, and which, in some
+Socialist theories, it definitely tries to embody.
+
+All that I have tried to do, so far, is to show that the bare doctrine
+of equality, which is in some way connected with the demand for
+justice, is not, of necessity, either unjust or impracticable. It
+may be used to cover claims which are unjust, to sanction bare
+confiscation, to take away motives for industry, and, briefly, may be a
+demand of the drones to have an equal share of the honey. From the bare
+abstract principle of equality between men, we can, in my own opinion,
+deduce nothing; and, I do not think that the principle can itself be
+established. That is why it is made a first principle, or, in other
+words, one which is not to be discussed. The French revolutionists
+treated it in this way as _a priori_ and self-evident. No school was in
+more deadly opposition to such _a priori_ truths than the school of
+Bentham and the utilitarians. Yet, Bentham's famous doctrine, that in
+calculating happiness each man is to count for one, and nobody for more
+than one, seems to be simply the old principle in a new disguise. James
+Mill applied the doctrine to politics. J. S. Mill again applied it,
+with still more thoroughness, especially in his doctrine of
+representation and of the equality of the sexes. Accordingly, various
+moralists have urged that this was an inconsistency in utilitarian
+doctrine, implying that they, too, could make _a priori_ first
+principles when they wanted them. It has become a sort of orthodox
+dogma with radicals, who do not always trouble themselves about a
+philosophical basis, and is applied with undoubting confidence to many
+practical political problems. "One man, one vote" is not simply the
+formulation of a demand, but seems to intimate a logical ground for the
+demand. If, in politics, one man is rightfully entitled to one vote, is
+it not also true that, in economics, one man should have a right to one
+income, or, that money, like political power, should be distributed
+into precisely equal shares? Yet, why are we to take for granted the
+equality of men in the sense required for such deductions? Since men
+are not equally qualified for political power, it would seem better
+_prima facie_ that each man should have the share of power and
+wealth which corresponds to his powers of using, or, perhaps, to his
+powers of enjoying. Why should we not say, "To each man according to
+his deserts"? One practical reason, of course, is the extreme
+difficulty of saying what are the deserts, and how they are to be
+ascertained. Undoubtedly, equality is the shortest and simplest way
+but, if we take it merely as the most convenient assumption, it loses
+its attractive appearance of abstract justice or _a priori_
+self-certainty. Do a common labourer and Mr. Gladstone deserve the same
+share of voting power? If not, how many votes should Mr. Gladstone
+possess to give him his just influence? To ask such questions is to
+show that answering is impossible, though political theorists have, now
+and then, tried to put together some ostensible pretext for an answer.
+
+What, let us ask, is the true relation between justice and equality? A
+judge, to take the typical case, is perfectly just when he ascertains
+the facts by logical inferences from the evidence, and then applies the
+law in the spirit of a scientific reasoner. Given the facts, what is
+the rule under which they come? To answer that question, generally
+speaking, is his whole duty. In other words, he has to exclude all
+irrelevant considerations, such as his own private interests or
+affections. The parties are to be to him merely A and B, and he has to
+work out the result as an arithmetician works out a sum. Among the
+irrelevant considerations are frequently some moral aspects of the
+case. A judge, for example, decides a will to be valid or invalid
+without asking whether the testator acted justly or unjustly in a moral
+sense, but simply whether his action was legal or illegal. He cannot go
+behind the law, even from motives of benevolence or general maxims of
+justice, without being an unjust judge. Cases may arise, indeed, as I
+must say in passing, in which this is hardly true. A law may be so
+flagrantly unjust that a virtuous judge would refuse to administer it.
+One striking case was that of the fugitive slave law in the United
+States, where a man had to choose between acting legally and outraging
+humanity. So we consider a parent unjust who does not leave his fortune
+equally among his children. Unless there should be some special reason
+to the contrary, we shall hold him to be unfair for making distinctions
+out of mere preference of one child to another. Yet in the case of
+primogeniture our opinion would have to be modified. Supposing, for
+example, a state of society in which primogeniture was generally
+recognised as desirable for public interests, we could hardly call a
+man unjust for leaving his estates to his eldest son. If, in such a
+state, a man breaks the general rule, our judgment of his conduct would
+be determined perhaps by considering whether he was before or behind
+his age, whether he was acting from a keener perception of the evils of
+inequality or actuated by spite or regardless of the public interests
+which he believed to be concerned. A parent treats his children equally
+in his will in regard to money; but he does not, unless he is a fool,
+give the same training or the same opening to all his children, whether
+they are stupid or clever, industrious or idle. But what I wish to
+insist upon is, that justice implies essentially indifference to
+irrelevant considerations, and therefore, in many cases, equality in
+the treatment of the persons concerned. A judge has to decide without
+reference to bribes, and not be biassed by the position of an accused
+person. In that sense he treats the men equally, but of course he does
+not give equal treatment to the criminal and innocent, to the rightful
+and wrongful claimant.
+
+The equality implied in justice is therefore to be understood as an
+exclusion of the irrelevant, and thus supposes an understanding as to
+what is irrelevant. It is not a mere abstract assertion of equality;
+but the assertion that, in a given concrete case, a certain rule is to
+be applied without considering anything outside of the rule. An ideally
+perfect rule would contain within itself a sufficient indication of
+what is to be relevant. All men of full age, sound mind, and so forth,
+are to be treated in such and such a way. Then all cases falling within
+the rule are to be decided on the same principles, and in that sense
+equally. But the problem remains, what considerations should be taken
+into account by the rule itself? Let us put the canon of equality in a
+different shape, namely, that there should always be a sufficient
+reason for any difference in the treatment of our fellows. This rule
+does not imply that I should act in all cases as though all men were
+equal in character or mind, but that my action should in all cases be
+justified by some appropriate consideration. It does not prove that
+every man should have a vote, but that if one man has a vote and
+another has not, there should be some adequate reason for the
+difference. It does not prove that every man should work eight hours a
+day and have a shilling an hour; but that differences of hours or of
+pay and, equally, uniformity of hours and pay, should have some
+sufficient justification. This is a deeper principle, which in some
+cases justifies and in others does not justify the rule of equality.
+The rule of equality follows from it under certain conditions, and has
+gained credit because, in point of fact, those conditions have often
+been satisfied.
+
+The revolutionary demand for equality was, historically speaking, a
+protest against arbitrary inequality. It was a protest against the
+existence of privileges accompanied by no duties. When the rich man
+could only answer the question, "What have you done to justify your
+position?" by the famous phrase of Beaumarchais, "I took the trouble to
+be born," he was obviously in a false position. The demand for a
+society founded upon reason, in this sense that a sufficient reason
+should be given for all differences, was, it seems to me, perfectly
+right; and, moreover, was enough to condemn the then established
+system. But when this demand has been so constructed as to twist a
+logical rule, applicable to all scientific reasoning, into a dogmatic
+assertion that certain concrete beings were in fact equal, and to infer
+that they should have equal rights, it ceased to be logical at all, and
+has been a fruitful parent of many fallacies. Reasonable beings require
+a sufficient reason for all differences of conduct, for the difference
+between their treatment of a man and a monkey or a white man and a
+black, as well as for differences between treatment of rich and poor or
+wise men and fools; and there must, as the same principle implies, be
+also a sufficient reason for treating all members of a given class
+equally. We have to consider whether, for any given purpose, the
+differences between human beings and animals, Englishmen and negroes,
+men and women, are or are not of importance for our purpose. When the
+differences are irrelevant we neglect them or admit the claim to
+equality of treatment. But the question as to relevance is not to be
+taken for granted either way. It would be a very convenient but a very
+unjustifiable assumption in many cases, as it might save an astronomer
+trouble if he assumed that every star was equal to every other star.
+
+The application of this is, I think, obvious. The _a priori_
+assumption of the equality of men is, in some sense, easily refuted.
+But the refutation does not entitle us to assume that arbitrary
+inequality, inequality for which no adequate ground can be assigned, is
+therefore justifiable. It merely shows that the problem is more complex
+than has been assumed at first sight. "All men ought to be equal." If
+you mean equal in natural capacity or character, it is enough to say
+that what is impossible cannot be. If you propose that the industrious
+and idle, the good and bad, the wise and foolish, should share equally
+in social advantages, the reply is equally obvious, that such a scheme,
+if possible, would be injurious to the qualities on which human welfare
+depends. If you say that men should be rewarded solely according to
+their intrinsic merits, we must ask, do you mean to abstract from the
+adventitious advantages of education, social surroundings, and so
+forth, or to take men as they actually are, whatever the circumstances
+to which their development is owing? To ask what a man would have been
+had he been in a different position from his youth, is to ask for an
+impossible solution, and one, moreover, of no practical bearing. I
+shall not employ a drunkard if I am in want of a butler, whether he has
+become a drunkard under overpowering temptation or become a drunkard
+from inherited dipsomania. But if, on the other hand, I take the man
+for what he is, without asking how he has come to be what he is, I
+leave the source at least of all the vast inequalities of which we
+complain. The difficulty, which I will not try to develop further,
+underlies, as I think, the really vital difference of method by which
+different schools attempt to answer the appeal for social justice.
+
+The school of so-called individualists finds, in fact, that equality in
+their sense is incompatible with the varied differences due to the
+complete growth of the social structure. They look upon men simply as
+so many independent units of varying qualities, no doubt, but still
+capable of being considered for political and social purposes as equal.
+They ask virtually what justice would demand if we had before us a
+crowd of independent applicants for the good things of the world, and
+the simplest answer is to distribute the good things equally. If it is
+replied that the idle and the industrious should not be upon the same
+footing, they are ready to agree, perhaps, that men should be rewarded
+according to their services to society, however difficult it may be to
+arrange the proportions. But it soon appears that the various classes
+into which society is actually divided imply differences not due to the
+individual and his intrinsic merits, but to the varying surroundings in
+which he is placed. To do justice, then, it becomes necessary to get
+rid of these differences. The extreme case is that of the family. Every
+one probably owes more to his mother and to his early domestic
+environment than to any other of the circumstances which have
+influenced his development. If you and I started as perfectly equal
+babies, and you have become a saint and I a sinner, the divergence
+probably began when our mothers watched our cradles, and was made
+inevitable before we had left their knees. Consequently, the more
+thorough-going designers of Utopia have proposed to abolish this
+awkward difference. Men must be different at their birth; but we might
+conceivably arrange public nurseries which should place them all under
+approximately equal conditions. Then any differences would result from
+a man's intrinsic qualities, and he might be said to be rewarded simply
+according to his own merits.
+
+The plan may be tempting, but has its disadvantages. There are
+injustices, if we call all inequality injustice, which we can only
+attribute to nature or to the unknown power which makes men and
+monkeys, Shakespeares and Stephens. And one result is that the
+character and conduct of human beings depend to a great extent upon
+circumstances, which are accidental in the sense that they are
+circumstances other than the original endowment of the individual. In
+this sense, maternal love, for example, is unjust. The mother loves her
+child because it is her own, not because it is better (though of course
+it is better) than other children. So, as Adam Smith, I think,
+observed, we are more moved by our neighbour's suffering from a corn on
+his great toe than by the starvation of millions in China. In other
+words, the affections, which are the great moving forces of society,
+are unjust in so far as they cause us to be infinitely more interested
+in our own little circle than in the remoter members of humanity known
+to us only by report. Without discussing the "justice" of this
+arrangement, we shall have, I think, to admit that it is inevitable.
+For I, at least, hold that the vague and vast organism of humanity
+depends for its cohesion upon the affinities and attractions, and not
+_vice versa_. My interests are strongest where my power of action
+is greatest. The love of mothers for children is a force of essential
+value, and therefore to be cultivated rather than repressed, for no
+force known to us could replace it. And what is pre-eminently true in
+this case is, of course, true to a degree in others. Burke stated this
+with admirable force in his attack upon the revolutionists who
+expounded the opposite principle of abstract equality. "To be attached
+to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society,
+is the first principle," he says, "the germ, as it were, of public
+affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed
+towards a love to our country and mankind." The assertion that they
+desired to invert this order, to destroy every social link in so far as
+it tended to produce inequalities, was the pith of his great indictment
+against the French "metaphysical" revolutionists. They had perverted
+the general logical precept of the sufficient reason for all
+inequalities by converting it into an assuming of the equality of
+concrete units. They fell into the fallacy of which I have spoken; and
+many radicals, utilitarians, and others have followed them. They
+assumed that all the varieties of human character, or all those due to
+the influence of the social environment, through whose structure and
+inherited instincts every full-grown man has been moulded, might be
+safely disregarded for the purpose of political and social
+construction. They have spoken, in brief, as if men were the equal and
+homogeneous atoms of physical inquiry and social problems capable of
+solution by a simple rearrangement of the atoms in different orders,
+instead of remembering that they are dealing with a complex organism,
+in which not only the whole order but every constituent atom is also a
+complex structure of indefinitely varying qualities. In the recognition
+of this truth lies, as I believe, the true secret of any satisfactory
+method of treatment.
+
+Does this fact justify inequality in general? Or does not the principle
+of equality still remain as essentially implied in the Utopia which we
+all desire to construct? We have to take it for granted that to each
+man the first and primary moving instinct is and must be the love of
+the little "platoon" of which he is a member; that the problem is, not
+to destroy all these minor attractions, to obliterate the structure and
+replace society by a vast multitude of independent atoms, each supposed
+to aim directly at the good of the whole, but so to harmonise and
+develop or restrain the smaller interests of families, of groups and
+associations, that they may spontaneously co-operate towards the
+general welfare. It is a long and difficult task to which we have to
+apply ourselves; a task not to be effected by the demonstration or
+application of a single abstract dogma, but to be worked out gradually
+by the co-operation of many classes and of many generations. If it is
+fairly solved in the course of a thousand years or so, I for one shall
+be very fairly satisfied. But distant as the realisation may be, we may
+or rather ought to consider seriously the end to which we should be
+working. The conception implies a distinction of primary importance
+towards any clear treatment of the problem. We have, that is, two
+different, though not altogether distinct, provinces of what I may,
+perhaps, call organic and functional morality. We may take the existing
+order for granted, and ask what is then our duty; or we may ask how far
+the structure itself requires modification, and, if so, what kind of
+modification. A man who assumes the existence of the present structure
+may act justly or unjustly within the limits so prescribed. He must
+generally be guided in a number of cases by some principle of equality.
+The judge should endeavour to give the same law to rich and poor; the
+parent should not make arbitrary distinctions between his children; the
+statesman should try to distribute his burdens without favouring one
+particular class, and so forth. A man who, in such a sense, acts justly
+may be described as up to the level of his age and its accepted
+established moral ideas, and is, therefore, entitled at least to the
+negative praise of not being corrupt or dishonest. He fulfils
+accurately the functions imposed upon him, and is not governed by what
+Bentham called the sinister interests which would prevent them from
+being effectually discharged for the welfare of the community. But the
+problem which we have to consider is the deeper and more difficult one
+of organic justice; and our question is what justice means in this
+case, or what are the irrelevant considerations to be excluded from our
+motives of conduct.
+
+Between these two classes of justice there are distinctions which it is
+necessary to state briefly. Justice, as we generally use the word,
+implies that the unjust man deserves to be hanged, or, at least, is
+responsible for his actions. What "responsibility" precisely implies
+is, of course, a debatable question. I only need assume that, in any
+case, it implies that somebody is guilty of wrong-doing, for which he
+should receive an appropriate penalty. But in organic questions it is
+not the individual, but the race which is responsible; and we require a
+reform, not a penalty. An impatient temper leads us to generalise too
+hastily from the case of the individual to that of the country. We
+bestow the blame for all the wrongs of an oppressed nation, for
+example, upon the nation which oppresses. But in simple point of fact,
+the oppressed nation generally deserves (if the word can be fairly
+used) to share the blame. The trodden worm would not have been trodden
+upon if it had been a bit of a viper. Whatever the duty of turning the
+second cheek, it is clearly not a national duty. If we admire a Tell or
+Robert Bruce for resisting oppressors, we implicitly condemn those who
+submitted to oppressors. If a nation is divided or wanting in courage,
+public spirit, and independence, it will be trampled down; and though
+we may most rightfully blame the tramplers, it is idle to exonerate the
+trampled. It is easy, in the same way, to make the rich solely
+responsible for all the misery of the poor. The man who has got the
+booty is naturally regarded as the robber. But, speaking
+scientifically, that is, with the desire to state the plain facts, we
+must admit that if the poor are those who have gone to the wall in the
+struggle for wealth; then, whatever unjust weapons have been used in
+that struggle, the improvidence and vice and idleness have certainly
+been among the main causes of defeat. Here, as before, the question is
+not, who is to be punished? We can only settle that when dealing with
+individual cases. It is the question, what is the cause of certain
+evils? and here we must resist the temptation of supposing that the
+class which in some sense appears to profit by them, or, at least, to
+be exempt from them, has, therefore, any more to do with bringing them
+about than the class which suffers from them.
+
+The reflection may put us in mind of what seems to be a general law.
+The ultimate cause of the adoption of institutions and rules of conduct
+is often the fact of their utility to the race; but it is only at a
+later period that their utility becomes the conscious or avowed reason
+for maintaining them. The political fabric has been clearly built up,
+in great part, by purely selfish ambition. Nations have been formed by
+energetic rulers, who had no eye for anything beyond the gratification
+of their own ambition, although they were clear-headed enough to see
+that their own ambition could best secure its objects by taking the
+side of the stronger social forces, and by giving substantial benefit
+to others. The same holds good pre-eminently of industrial relations.
+We all know how Adam Smith, sharing the philosophical optimism of his
+time, showed how the pursuit of his own welfare by each man tended, by
+a kind of pre-ordained harmony, to contribute to the welfare of all.
+Since his time we have ceased to be so optimistic, and have recognised
+the fact that the building up of modern industrial systems has involved
+much injury to large classes. And yet we may, I think, in great measure
+adopt his view. The fact that each man was rogue enough to think first
+of himself and of his own wife and family is not a proof or a
+presumption that he did not flourish because, in point of fact, he was
+contributing (quite unintentionally perhaps) to the comforts of mankind
+in general. What we have to reflect is that, while the bare existence
+of certain institutions gives a strong presumption of their utility,
+there is also a probability that when the utility becomes a conscious
+aim or a consciously adopted criterion of their advantage, they will
+require a corresponding modification intended to secure the advantages
+at a minimum cost of evil.
+
+Premising these remarks as to the meaning of organic justice, we can
+now come to the question of equality. Justice in its ordinary sense may
+be regarded from one point of view as the first condition of the
+efficiency of the social organ. In saying that a judge is just, we
+imply that he is so far efficiently discharging his part in
+society--the due application of the law--without reference to
+irrelevant considerations. He is a machine which rightly parts the
+sheep and goats--taking the legal definition of goats and
+sheep--instead of putting some goats into the sheepfold, and _vice
+versa_. That is, he secures the accurate application of the purely
+legal rule. Organic justice involves an application of the same
+principle because it equally depends upon the exclusion of irrelevant
+considerations. It implies such a distribution of functions and of
+maintenance as may secure the greatest possible efficiency of society
+towards some end in itself good. Society of course may be organised
+with great efficiency for bad or doubtful ends. A purely military
+organisation, however admirable for its purpose, may imply a sacrifice
+of the highest welfare of the nation. Assuming, however, the goodness
+of the end, the greatest efficiency is of course desirable. We may, for
+our purposes, assume that the efficiency of a nation regarded as a
+society for the production of wealth is a desirable end. There are, of
+course, many other purposes which must not be sacrificed to the
+production of wealth. But power of producing wealth, meaning roughly
+whatever contributes to the physical support and comfort of the nation,
+is undoubtedly a necessary condition of all other happiness. If we all
+starve we can have neither art nor science nor morality. What I mean,
+therefore, is that a nation is so far better as it is able to raise all
+necessary supplies with the least expenditure of labour, leaving aside
+the question how far the superfluous forces should be devoted to
+raising comparative luxuries or to some purely religious or moral or
+intellectual purposes. The perfect industrial organisation is, I shall
+assume, compatible with or rather a condition of a perfect organisation
+of other kinds. In the most general terms we have to consider what are
+the principles of social organisation, which of course implies a
+certain balance between the various organs and a thorough nutrition of
+all, while yet we may for a moment confine our attention to the purely
+industrial or economic part of the question. How, if at all, does the
+principle of equality or of social justice enter the problem?
+
+We may assume, in the first place, from this point of view, that one
+most obvious condition is the absence of all purely useless structures,
+whether of the kind which we call "survivals" or such as may be called
+parasitic growths. The organ which has ceased to discharge
+corresponding functions is simply a drag upon the vital forces. When a
+class, such as the old French aristocracy, ceases to perform duties
+while retaining privileges, it will be removed,--too probably, as in
+that case, it will be removed by violent and mischievous methods,--if
+the society is to grow in vigour. The individuals, as I have said, may
+or may not deserve punishment, for they are not personally responsible
+for the general order of things; but they are not unlikely to incur
+severe penalties, and what we should really hope is that they may be in
+some way absorbed by judicious medical treatment, instead of extirpated
+by the knife. At the other end of the scale, we have the parasitic
+class of the beggars or thieves. They, too, are not personally
+responsible for the conditions into which they are born. But they are
+not only to be pitied individually, but to be regarded, in the mass, as
+involving social disease and danger. More words upon that topic are
+quite superfluous, but I may just recall the truth that the two evils
+are directly connected. We hear it often said, and often denied, that
+the rich are growing richer and the poor poorer. So far, however, as it
+is true, it is one version of the very obvious fact that where there
+are many careless rich people, there will be the best chance for the
+beggars. The thoughtless expenditure of the rich without due
+responsibilities, provides the steady stream of so-called charity,--the
+charity which, as Shakespeare (or somebody else) observes, is twice
+cursed, which curses him that gives and him that receives; which is to
+the rich man as a mere drug to still his conscience and offer a
+spurious receipt in full for his neglect of social duties, and to the
+poor man an encouragement to live without self-respect, without
+providence, a mere hanger-on and dead-weight upon society, and a
+standing injury and source of temptation to his honest neighbours.
+
+Briefly, a wholesome social condition implies that every social organ
+discharges a useful function; it renders some service to the community
+which is equivalent to the support which it derives; brain and stomach
+each get their due share of supply; and there is a thorough reciprocity
+between all the different members of the body. But what kind of
+equality should be desired in order to secure this desirable organic
+balance? We have to do, I may remark, with the case of a homogeneous
+race. By this I mean not only that there is no reason to suppose that
+there is any difference between the innate qualities of rich and poor,
+but that there is the strongest reason for believing in an equality;
+that is to say, more definitely, that if you took a thousand poor
+babies and a thousand rich babies, and subjected them to the same
+conditions, they would show great individual differences, but no
+difference traceable to the mere difference of class origin. I
+therefore may leave aside such problems as might arise in the Southern
+States of America, or even in British India, where two different races
+are in presence; or, again, the case of the sexes, where we cannot
+assume as self-evident, that the organic differences are irrelevant to
+political or social ends. So far as we are concerned, we may take it
+for granted that the differences which emerge are not due to any causes
+antecedent to and overriding the differences due to different social
+positions. If we can say justly (as has been said) that a poor man is
+generally more charitable in proportion to his means, or, again, that
+he is, as a rule, a greater liar or a greater drunkard than the rich
+man, the difference is not due to a difference of breed, but to the
+education (in the widest sense) which each has received. So long as
+that difference remains, we must take account of it for purposes of
+obtaining the maximum efficiency. We must not make the poor man a
+professor of mathematics, or even manager of a railway, because he has
+talents which, if trained, would have qualified him for the post; but
+we may and must assume that an equal training would do as much for the
+poor man as for the rich; and the question is, how far it is desirable
+or possible to secure such equality.
+
+Now, from the point of view of securing a maximum efficiency, it seems
+to be a clearly desirable end that the only qualities which should
+indisputably help to determine a man's position in life, should also be
+those which determine his fitness for working in it efficiently. In
+Utopia, it should be the rule that each man shall do what he can do
+best. If one man is a gamekeeper and another a prime minister, it
+should be because one has the gifts of a gamekeeper and the other the
+gifts of a prime minister: whereas, in the actual state, as we all
+know, the gamekeeper often becomes the prime minister, while the
+potential prime minister is limited to looking after poachers. But I
+also urge that we must take into account the actual and not the
+potential qualities at any given moment. The inequality may be obviated
+by raising the grade of culture in all classes; but we must not assume
+that there is an actual equality where, in fact, there is the widest
+possible difference. In short, I assert that it is our duty to try to
+make men equal; though I deny that we are clearly justified in assuming
+an equality. By making them equal, I do not, of course, mean that we
+should try to make them all alike. I recognise, with Mill and every
+sensible writer on the subject, that such a consummation represents
+rather a danger than an advantage. I wish to see individuality
+strengthened, not crushed, to encourage men to develop the widest
+possible diversity of tastes, talents, and pursuits, and to attain
+unity of opinion, not by a calm assumption that this or that creed is
+true, but by encouraging the sharpest and freest collision of opinions.
+The equality of which I speak is that which would result, if the
+distinction into organs were not of such a nature as to make one class
+more favourable than another to the full development of whatever
+character and talents a man may possess. In other words, the
+distribution into classes would correspond purely and simply to the
+telling off of each man to the duties which he is best fitted to
+discharge. The position into which he is born, the class surroundings
+which determine his development, must not carry with them any
+disqualification for his acquiring the necessary aptitude for any other
+position. It was, I think, Fourier who argued that a man ought to be
+paid more highly for being a chimney-sweep than for being a prime
+minister, because the duties of a sweep are the more disagreeable,--a
+position which some prime ministers may, perhaps, see reason to doubt.
+My suggestion is, that in Utopia every human being would be so placed
+as to be capable of preparing himself for any other position, and
+should then go to the work for which he is best fitted. The equality as
+thus defined would, I submit, leave no room for a sense of injustice,
+because the qualities which determine a man's position would be the
+qualities for which he deserves the position, desert in this sense
+being measurable by fitness. Discontent with class distinctions must
+arise so long as a man feels that his position in a class limits and
+cramps his capacities below the level of happier fortunes. Discontent
+is not altogether a bad thing, for it is often an _alias_ for
+hope; remove all discontent and you remove all guarantee for
+improvement. But discontent is of the malignant variety when it is
+allied with a sense of injustice; that is, of restrictions imposed upon
+one class for no assignable reason. The only sufficient reason for
+classes is the efficient discharge of social functions. The differences
+between the positions of men in social strata, supply some of the most
+effective motives for the struggle of life; and the effort of men to
+rise into the wealthy or the powerful class is not likely to cease so
+long as men are men; but they take an unworthy form so long as the
+ambition is simply to attain privileges unconnected with or
+disproportioned to the duties involved, and which therefore generate
+hatred to the social structure. If a class could be simply an organ for
+the discharge of certain functions, and each man in the whole body
+politic able to fit himself for that class, the injustice, and
+therefore the malignant variety of discontent, would disappear. Of
+course, I am speaking only of justice. I do not attempt to define the
+proper ends of society, or regard justice in itself as a sufficient
+guarantee for all desirable results. Such justice may exist even in a
+savage tribe or a low social type. There may be a just distribution of
+food among a shipwrecked crew, but the attainment of such justice would
+not satisfy all their wants. The abolition of misery, the elevation of
+a degraded class to a higher stage is a good thing in itself, unless it
+can be shown to involve some counterbalancing evil. I only argue that
+the ideal society would have this, among other attributes, and,
+therefore, that to secure such equality is a legitimate object of
+aspiration.
+
+I am speaking of "Utopia". The time is indefinitely distant when a man
+will choose to be a sweep or a prime minister according to his
+aptitudes, and be equally able to learn his trade whether he is the son
+of a prime minister or a sweep. I only try to indicate the goal to
+which our efforts should be directed. But the goal thus defined implies
+methods different from that of some advocates of equality. They propose
+at once to assume the non-existence of a disagreeable difficulty, and
+to take men as equal in a sense in which they are not, in fact, equal.
+To me the problem appears to be, not the instant introduction of a new
+system, but a necessarily long and very gradual process of education
+directed towards the distant goal of making men equal in the desirable
+sense; and that problem, I add, is in the main a moral problem. It is
+idle to make institutions without making the qualities by which they
+must be worked. I do not say--far from it--that we are not to propose
+what may roughly be called external changes: new regulations and new
+forms of association, and so forth. On the contrary, I believe, as I
+have intimated, that this method corresponds to the normal order of
+development. The new institution protects and stimulates the germs of
+the moral instincts by which it must be worked. But I also hold that no
+mere rearrangement does any permanent good unless it calls forth a
+corresponding moral change, and, moreover, that the moral change,
+however slow and imperceptible, does incomparably more than any
+external change.
+
+If we assume our present institutions to be permanent, a slight
+improvement in moral qualities, a growth of sobriety, of chastity, of
+prudence and intellectual culture, would make an almost indefinite
+improvement in the condition of the masses. If, for example, Englishmen
+ceased to drink, every English home might be made reasonably
+comfortable. The two kinds of change imply each other; but it is the
+most characteristic error of the designers of Utopias to suppose a mere
+change of regulations without sufficiently attending to the moral
+implication. To attain equality, as I have tried to define the word,
+would imply vast moral changes, and therefore a long and difficult
+elaboration. We have not simply to make men happy, as they now count
+happiness, but to alter their views of happiness. The good old
+copy-books tell us that happiness is as common in poor men's huts as in
+rich men's palaces. We are apt to reply that the statement is a mockery
+and a lie. But it points to the consummation which in some simple
+social states has been partly realised, and which in some distant
+future may come to be an expression of facts. It is conceivable surely
+that rich men may some day find that there are modes of occupation
+which are more interesting as well as more useful than accumulation of
+luxuries or the keeping of horses for the turf; that, in place of
+propitiating fate by supporting the institution of beggary, there is an
+indefinite field for public-spirited energy in the way not of throwing
+crumbs to Lazarus, but of promoting national culture of mind, of
+spirit, and of body; that benevolence does not mean simple
+self-sacrifice, except to the selfish, but the pursuit of a noble and
+most interesting career; that men's duty to their children is not to
+enable them to lead idle lives, but to fit them for playing a manly
+part in the great game of life; and that their relation to those whom
+they employ is not that of persons exploiting the energies of inferior
+animals, but of leaders of industry with a common interest in the
+prosperity of their occupation. People, no doubt, will hardly pursue
+business from motives of pure benevolence to others, and I do not think
+it desirable that they should. But the recognition that the pursuit of
+an honourable business is useful to others may, nevertheless, guide
+their energies, make the mere scramble for wealth disreputable, and
+induce them to labour for solid and permanent advantages. Such moral
+changes are, I conceive, necessary conditions of the equality of which
+I have spoken; they must be brought about to some extent if the
+industrial organism is to free itself from the injustice necessarily
+implied in a mere blind struggle for personal comfort.
+
+Moreover, however distant the final consummation may be, there are, I
+think, many indications of an approximation. Nothing is more
+characteristic of modern society than the enormous development of the
+power of association for particular purposes. In former days a society
+had to form an independent organ, a corporation, a college, and so
+forth, to discharge any particular function, and the resulting organ
+was so distinct as to absorb the whole life of its members. The work of
+the fellow was absorbed in the corporate life of his corporation, and
+he had no distinct personal interests. Now we are all members of
+societies by the dozen, and society is constantly acquiring the art of
+forming associations for any purpose, temporary or permanent, which
+imply no deep structural division, and unite people of all classes and
+positions. As the profounder lines are obliterated, the tendency to
+form separate castes, defended by personal privileges, and holding
+themselves apart from other classes, rapidly diminishes; and the
+corresponding prejudices are in process of diminution. But I can only
+hint at this principle.
+
+A correlative moral change in the poor is, of course, equally
+essential. America is described by Mr. Lowell in the noblest panegyric
+ever made upon his own country, as "She that lifts up the manhood of
+the poor". She has taken some rather queer methods of securing that
+object lately; yet, however imperfect the result, every American
+traveller will, I believe, sympathise with what Mr. Bryce has recently
+said in his great book. America is still the land of hope--the land
+where the poor man's horizon is not bounded by a vista of inevitable
+dependence on charity; where--in spite of some superficially grotesque
+results--every man can speak to every other without the oppressive
+sense of condescension; where a civil word from a poor man is not
+always a covert request for a gratuity and a tacit confession of
+dependence. "Alas," says Wordsworth, in one of his pregnant phrases,
+"the gratitude of men has oftener left me mourning" than their
+cold-heartedness; because, I presume, it is a painful proof of the
+rarity of kindness. When one man can only receive a gift and another
+can only bestow it as a payment on account of a long accumulation of
+the arrears of class injustice, the relations hardly admit of genuine
+gratitude on either side. What grates most painfully upon me, and, I
+suppose, upon most of us, is the "servility" of man; the acceptance of
+a beggar's code of morals as natural and proper for any one in a shabby
+coat. The more prominent evil just now, according to conservatives and
+pessimists, is the correlative one of the beggar on horseback; of the
+man who has found out that he can squeeze more out of his masters, and
+uses his power even without considering whether it is wise to drain
+your milch cow too exhaustively.
+
+A hope of better things is encouraged by schemes for arbitration and
+conciliation between employers and employed. But we require a moral
+change if arbitration is to imply something more than a truce between
+natural enemies, and conciliation to be something different from that
+employed by Hood's butcher when, after hauling a sheep by main force
+into the slaughter-house, he exclaimed, "There, I've conciliated
+_him_!" The only principle on which arbitration can proceed is
+that the profits should be divided in such a way as to be a sufficient
+inducement to all persons concerned to give their money or their
+labour, mental or physical, to promote the prosperity of the business
+at large. But the reconciliation can only be complete when the
+capitalist is capable of employing his riches with enough public spirit
+and generosity to disarm mere envy by his obvious utility, and the poor
+man justifies his increased wages by his desire to secure permanent
+benefits and a better standard of life. In Utopia, the question will
+still be, what plan shall be a sufficient inducement to the men who
+co-operate as employers or labourers, but the inducement will appeal to
+better motives, and the positions be so far equalised that each will be
+most tolerable to the man best fitted for it.
+
+Here a vast series of problems opens about which I can only suggest the
+briefest hint. The principle I now urge is the old one, namely, that
+the usual mark of a quack remedy is the neglect of the moral aspect of
+a question. We want a state of opinion in which the poor are not
+objects to be slobbered over, but men to help in a manly struggle for
+moral as well as material elevation. A great deal is said, for example,
+about the evils of competition. It is remarkable indeed that few
+proposals for improvement even, so far as I can discover, tend to get
+rid of competition. Co-operation, as tradesmen will tell us, is not an
+abolition of competition, but a competition of groups instead of units.
+"Profit-sharing" is simply a plan by which workmen may take a direct
+share in the competition carried on by their masters. I do not mention
+this as any objection to such schemes, for I do not think that
+competition is an evil. I do not doubt the vast utility of schemes
+which tend to increase the intelligence and prudence of workmen, and
+give them an insight into the conditions of successful business.
+Competition is no doubt bad so far as it means cheating or gambling.
+But competition is, it seems to me, inevitable so long as we are forced
+to apply the experimental method in practical life, and I fail to see
+what other method is available. Competition means that thousands of
+people all over the world are trying to find out how they can supply
+more economically and efficiently the wants of other people, and that
+is a state of things to which I do not altogether object. Equality in
+my sense implies that every one should be allowed to compete for every
+place that he can fill. The cry is merely, as it seems to me, an
+evasion of the fundamental difficulty. That difficulty is not that
+people compete, but that there are too many competitors; not that a
+man's seat at the table has to be decided by fair trial of his
+abilities, but that there is not room enough to seat everybody. Malthus
+brought to the front the great stumbling-block in the way of Utopian
+optimism. His theory was stated too absolutely, and his view of the
+remedy was undoubtedly crude. But he hit the real difficulty; and every
+sensible observer of social evils admits that the great obstacle to
+social improvement is that social residuum, the parasitic class, which
+multiplies so as to keep down the standard of living, and turns to bad
+purposes the increased power of man over nature. We have abolished
+pestilence and famine in their grimmest shape; if we have not abolished
+war, it no longer involves usurpation or slavery or the permanent
+desolation of the conquered; but one result is just this, that great
+masses can be regularly kept alive at the lowest stage of existence
+without being periodically swept away by a "black death" or a horde of
+brutal invaders. If we choose to turn our advantages to account in this
+way, no nostrums will put an end to poverty; and the evil can only be
+met--as I venture to assume--by an elevation of the moral level,
+involving all that is implied in spreading civilisation downward.
+
+The difficulty shows itself in discussions of the proper sphere of
+government. Upon that vast and most puzzling topic I will only permit
+myself one remark. In former times the great aim of reformers was the
+limitation of the powers of government. They came to regard it as a
+kind of bogy or extra-natural force, which acted to oppress the poor in
+order to maintain certain personal privileges. Some, like Godwin of the
+"Political Justice," held that the millennium implied the abolition of
+government and the institution of anarchy. The early utilitarians held
+that government might be reformed by placing power in the hands of the
+subjects, who would use it only for their own interests, but still
+retained the prejudices engendered in their long struggle against
+authority, and held that its functions should still be gradually
+restricted on pain of developing a worse tyranny than the old. The
+government has been handed over to the people as they desired, but with
+the natural result that the new authorities not only use it to support
+their interests, but retain the conviction of its extra-natural, or
+perhaps supernatural, efficacy. It is regarded as an omnipotent body
+which can not only say (as it can) that whatever it pleases shall be
+legal, but that whatever is made a law in the juridical sense shall at
+once become a law of nature. Even their individualist opponents, who
+profess to follow Mr. Herbert Spencer, seem often to regard the power
+of government, not as one result of evolution, but as something
+external which can constrain and limit evolution. It corresponds to a
+kind of outside pressure which interferes arbitrarily with the
+so-called natural course of development, and should therefore be
+abolished. To me, on the contrary, it seems that government is simply
+one of the social organs, with powers strictly limited by its relation
+to others and by the nature of the sentiment upon which it rests. There
+are obvious reasons, in the centralisation of vast industrial
+interests, the "integration," as Mr. Spencer calls it, which is the
+correlative of differentiation, in the growing solidarity of different
+classes and countries, in the consequent growth of natural monopolies,
+which give a solid reason for believing that the functions of the
+central government may require expansion. To decide by any _a
+priori_ principle what should be the limits of this expansion is, to
+my mind, hopeless. The problem is one to be worked out by
+experiment,--that is, by many generations and by repeated blundering. A
+fool, said Erasmus Darwin, is a man who never makes an experiment; an
+experiment is a new mode of action which fails in its object
+ninety-nine times out of a hundred; therefore, wise men make more
+blunders, though they also make more discoveries than fools. Now,
+experiments in government and social organisation are as necessary to
+improvement as any other kind of experiment, and probably still more
+liable to failure. One thing, however, is again obvious. The simple
+remedy of throwing everything upon government, of allowing it to settle
+the rate of wages, the hours of labour, the prices of commodities, and
+so forth, requires for success a moral and intellectual change which it
+is impossible to over-estimate. I will not repeat the familiar
+arguments which, to my mind, justify this statement. It is enough to
+say that there is no ground in the bare proposal for putting all manner
+of industrial regulations into the hands of government, for supposing
+that it would not drag down every one into pauperism instead of raising
+everybody to comfort. I often read essays of which the weakness seems
+to be that while they purpose to establish equality, they give no real
+reason for holding that it would not be an equality of beggary. If
+every one is to be supported, idle or not, the natural conclusion is
+universal pauperism. If people are to be forced to work by government,
+or their numbers to be somehow restricted by government, you throw a
+stress upon the powers of government which, I will not say, it is
+impossible that it should bear, but which, to speak in the most
+moderate terms, implies a complete reconstruction of the intelligence,
+morality, and conceptions of happiness of human beings. Your government
+would have to be omniscient and purely benevolent as well as
+omnipotent, and I confess that I cannot see in the experience of those
+countries where the people have the most direct influence upon the
+government, any promise that this state of things will be realised just
+yet.
+
+Thus, I return to my conclusion,--to my platitude, if you will.
+Professor Fawcett used to say that he could lay down no rules for the
+sphere of government influence, except this rule, that no interference
+would do good unless it helped people to help themselves. I think that
+the doctrine was characteristic of his good sense, and I fully
+subscribe to it. I heartily agree that equality in the sense I have
+given, is a most desirable ideal; I agree that we should do all that in
+us lies to promote it; I only say that our aims should be always in
+consistence with the principle that such equality is only possible and
+desirable in so far as the lowest classes are lifted to a higher
+standard, morally as well as physically. Of course, that implies
+approval of every variety of new institutions and laws, of
+co-operation, of profit sharing, of boards of conciliation, of
+educational and other bodies for carrying light into darkness and
+elevating popular standards of life: but always with the express
+condition that no such institution is really useful except as it tends
+to foster a genuine spirit of independence, and to supply the moral
+improvement without which no outward change is worth a button. This is
+a truism, you may say. Yet, when I read the proposals to get rid of
+poverty by summarily ordering people to be equal, or to extirpate
+pauperism by spending a million upon certain institutions for out-door
+relief, I cannot help thinking that it is a truism which requires to be
+enforced. The old Political Economy, you say, is obsolete; meaning,
+perhaps, that you do not mean to be bothered with its assertions; but
+the old Economists had their merits. They were among the first who
+realised the vast importance of deeper social questions; they were the
+first who tried to treat them scientifically; they were not (I hope)
+the last who dared to speak unpleasant truths, simply because they
+believed them and believed in their importance. Perhaps, indeed, they
+rather enjoyed the practice a little too much, and indulged in it a
+little too ostentatiously. Yet, I am sure that, on the whole, it was a
+very useful practice, and one which is now scarcely as common as it
+should be. People are more anxious to pick holes in their statement of
+economic laws than to insist upon the essential fact that, after all,
+there are laws, not "laws" made by Parliament, but laws of nature,
+which do, and will, determine the production and distribution of
+wealth, and the recognition of which is as important to human welfare
+as the recognition of physiological laws to the bodily health. Holding
+this faith, the old Economists were never tired of asserting what is
+the fundamental truth of so-called "individualism," that, after all we
+may say about the social development, the essential condition of all
+social improvement is not that we should have this or that system of
+regulations, but that the individual should be manly, self-respecting,
+doing his duty as well as getting his pay, and deeply convinced that
+nothing will do any permanent good which does not imply the elevation
+of the individual in his standards of honesty, independence, and good
+conduct. We can only say to Lazarus: "You are probably past praying
+for, and all we can do is to save you from starving, by any means which
+do not encourage other people to fall into your weaknesses; but we
+recognise the right of your class for any and every possible help that
+can be given towards making men of them, and putting them on their legs
+by teaching them to stand upright".
+
+
+
+
+ETHICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE.
+
+
+In his deeply-interesting Romanes lecture, Professor Huxley has stated
+the opinion that the ethical progress of society depends upon our
+combating the "cosmic process" which we call the struggle for
+existence. Since, as he adds, we inherit the "cosmic nature" which is
+the outcome of millions of years of severe training, it follows that
+the "ethical nature" may count upon having to reckon with a tenacious
+and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts. This is not a cheerful
+prospect. It is, as he admits, an audacious proposal to pit the
+microcosm against the macrocosm. We cannot help fearing that the
+microcosm may get the worst of it. Professor Huxley has not fully
+expanded his meaning, and says much to which I could cordially
+subscribe. But I think that the facts upon which he relies admit or
+require an interpretation which avoids the awkward conclusion.
+
+Pain and suffering, as Professor Huxley tells us, are always with us,
+and even increase in quantity and intensity as evolution advances. The
+fact had been recognised in remote ages long before theories of
+evolution had taken their modern form. Pessimism, from the time of the
+ancient Hindoo philosophers to the time of their disciple,
+Schopenhauer, has been in no want of evidence to support its melancholy
+conclusions. It would be idle to waste rhetoric in the attempt to
+recapitulate so familiar a position. Though I am not a pessimist, I
+cannot doubt that there is more plausibility in the doctrine than I
+could wish. Moreover, it may be granted that any attempt to explain or
+to justify the existence of evil is undeniably futile. It is not so
+much that the problem cannot be answered, as that it cannot even be
+asked in any intelligible sense. To "explain" a fact is to assign its
+causes--that is, to give the preceding set of facts out of which it
+arose. However far we might go backwards, we should get no nearer to
+perceiving any reason for the original fact. If we explain the fall of
+man by Adam's eating the apple, we are quite unable to say why the
+apple should have been created. If we could discover a general theory
+of pain, showing, say, that it implied certain physiological
+conditions, we shall be no nearer to knowing why those physiological
+conditions should have been what they are. The existence of pain, in
+short, is one of the primary data of our problem, not one of the
+accidents, for which we can hope in any intelligible sense to account.
+To give any "justification" is equally impossible. The book of Job
+really suggests an impossible, one may almost say a meaningless,
+problem. We can give an intelligible meaning to a demand for justice
+when we can suppose that a man has certain antecedent rights, which
+another man may respect or neglect. But this has no meaning as between
+the abstraction "nature" and the concrete facts which are themselves
+nature. It is unjust to meet equal claims differently. But it is not
+"unjust" in any intelligible sense that one being should be a monkey
+and another a man, any more than that part of me should be a hand and
+another head. The question would only arise if we supposed that the man
+and the monkey had existed before they were created, and had then
+possessed claims to equal treatment. The most logical theologians,
+indeed, admit that as between creature and creator there can be
+properly no question of justice. The pot and the potter cannot complain
+of each other. If the writer of Job had been able to show that the
+virtuous were rewarded and the vicious punished, he would only have
+transferred the problem to another issue. The judge might be justified,
+but the creator would be condemned. How can it be just to place a being
+where he is certain to sin, and then to damn him for sinning? That is
+the problem to which no answer can be given; and which already implies
+a confusion of ideas. We apply the conception of justice in a sphere
+where it is not applicable, and naturally fail to get any intelligible
+answer.
+
+It is impossible to combine the conceptions of God as the creator and
+God as the judge; and the logical straits into which the attempt leads
+are represented by the endless free-will controversy. I will not now
+enter that field of controversy: and I will only indicate what seems to
+me to be the position which we must accept in any scientific discussion
+of our problem. Hume, as I think, laid down the true principle when he
+said that there could be no _a priori_ proof of a matter of fact.
+An _a priori_ truth is a truth which cannot be denied without
+self-contradiction, but there can never be a logical consideration in
+supposing the non-existence of any fact whatever. The ordinary appeal
+to the truths of pure mathematics is, therefore, beside the question.
+All such truths are statements of the precise equivalence of two
+propositions. To say that there are four things is also to say that
+there are two pairs of things: to say that there is a plane triangle is
+also to say that there is a plane trilateral. One statement involves
+the other, because the difference is not in the thing described, but in
+our mode of contemplating it. We, therefore, cannot make one assertion
+and deny the other without implicit contradiction. From such results,
+again, is evolved (in the logical sense of evolution) the whole vast
+system of mathematical truths. The complexity of that system gives the
+erroneous idea that we can, somehow, attain a knowledge of facts,
+independently of experience. We fail to observe that even the most
+complex mathematical formula is simply a statement of an exact
+equivalence of two assertions; and that, till we know by experience the
+truth of one statement, we can never infer the truth, in fact, of the
+other. However elaborate may be the evolutions of mathematical truth,
+they can never get beyond the germs out of which they are evolved. They
+are valid precisely because the most complex statement is always the
+exact equivalent of the simpler, out of which it is constructed. They
+remain to the end truths of number or truths of geometry. They cannot,
+by themselves, tell us that things exist which can be counted or which
+can be measured. The whole claim, however elaborate, still requires its
+point of suspension. We may put their claims to absolute or necessary
+truth as high as we please; but they cannot give us by themselves a
+single fact. I can show, for example, that a circle has an infinite
+number of properties, all of which are virtually implied in the very
+existence of a circle. But that the circle or that space itself exists,
+is not a necessary truth, but a datum of experience. It is quite true
+that such truths are not, in one sense, empirical; they can be
+discovered without any change of experience; for, by their very nature,
+they refer to the constant element of experience, and are true on the
+supposition of the absolute changelessness of the objects contemplated.
+But it is a fallacy to suppose that, because independent of particular
+experiences, they are, therefore, independent of experience in general.
+
+Now, if we agree, as Huxley would have agreed, that Hume's doctrine is
+true, if we cannot know a single fact except from experience, we are
+limited in moral questions, as in all others, to elaborating and
+analysing our experience, and can never properly transcend it. A
+scientific treatment of an ethical question, at any rate, must take for
+granted all the facts of human nature. It can show what morality
+actually is; what are, in fact, the motives which make men moral, and
+what are the consequences of moral conduct. But it cannot get outside
+of the universe and lay down moral principles independent of all
+influences. I am well aware that in speaking of ethical questions upon
+this ground, I am exposed to many expressions of metaphysical contempt.
+I may hope to throw light upon the usual working of morality; but my
+theory of the facts cannot make men moral of itself. I cannot hope, for
+example, to show that immorality involves a contradiction, for I know
+that immorality exists. I cannot even hope to show that it is
+necessarily productive of misery to the individual, for I know that
+some people take pleasure in vicious conduct. I cannot deduce facts
+from morals, for I must consistently regard morals as part of the
+observed consequences of human nature under given conditions.
+Metaphysicians may, if they can, show me a more excellent method. I
+admit that their language sometimes enables them to take what, in words
+at least, is a sublimer position than mine. Kant's famous phrase, "Thou
+must, therefore thou canst," is impressive. And yet, it seems to me to
+involve an obvious piece of logical juggling. It is quite true that
+whenever it is my duty to act in a certain way, it must be a
+possibility; but that is only because an impossibility cannot be a
+duty. It is not my duty to fly, because I have not wings; and
+conversely, no doubt, it would follow that _if_ it were my duty I
+must possess the organs required. Thus understood, however, the phrase
+loses its sublimity, and yet, it is only because we have so to
+understand it, that it has any plausibility. Admitting, however, that
+people who differ from me can use grander language, and confessing my
+readiness to admit error whenever they can point to a single fact
+attainable by the pure reason, I must keep to the humbler path. I speak
+of the moral instincts as of others, simply from the point of view of
+experience: I cannot myself discover a single truth from the abstract
+principle of non-contradiction; and am content to take for granted that
+the world exists as we know it to exist, without seeking to deduce its
+peculiarities by any high _a priori_ road.
+
+Upon this assumption, the question really resolves itself into a
+different one. We can neither explain nor justify the existence of
+pain; but, of course, we can ask whether, as a matter of fact, pain
+predominates over pleasure; and we can ask whether, as a matter of
+fact, the "cosmic processes" tend to promote or discourage virtuous
+conduct. Does the theory of the "struggle for existence" throw any new
+light upon the general problem? I am quite unable to see, for my own
+part, that it really makes any difference: evil exists; and the
+question whether evil predominates over good, can only, I should say,
+be decided by an appeal to experience. One source of evil is the
+conflict of interests. Every beast preys upon others; and man,
+according to the old saying, is a wolf to man. All that the Darwinian
+or any other theory can do is, to enable us to trace the consequences
+of this fact in certain directions; but it neither creates the fact nor
+makes it more or less an essential part of the process. It "explains"
+certain phenomena, in the sense of showing their connection with
+previous phenomena, but does not show why the phenomena should present
+themselves at all. If we indulge our minds in purely fanciful
+constructions, we may regard the actual system as good or bad, just as
+we choose to imagine for its alternative a better or a worse system. If
+everybody had been put into a world where there was no pain, or where
+each man could get all he wanted without interfering with his
+neighbours, we may fancy that things would have been pleasanter. If the
+struggle, which we all know to exist, had no effect in preventing the
+"survival of the fittest," things--so, at least, some of us may
+think--would have been worse. But such fancies have nothing to do with
+scientific inquiries. We have to take things as they are and make the
+best of them.
+
+The common feeling, no doubt, is different. The incessant struggle
+between different races suggests a painful view of the universe, as
+Hobbes' natural state of war suggested painful theories as to human
+nature. War is evidently immoral, we think; and a doctrine which makes
+the whole process of evolution a process of war must be radically
+immoral too. The struggle, it is said, demands "ruthless
+self-assertion" and the hunting down of all competitors; and such
+phrases certainly have an unpleasant sound. But in the first place, the
+use of the epithets implies an anthropomorphism to which we have no
+right so long as we are dealing with the inferior species. We are then
+in a region to which such ideas have no direct application, and where
+the moral sentiments exist only in germ, if they can properly be said
+to exist at all. Is it fair to call a wolf ruthless because he eats a
+sheep and fails to consider the transaction from the sheep's point of
+view? We must surely admit that if the wolf is without mercy he is also
+without malice. We call an animal ferocious because a man who acted in
+the same way would be ferocious. But the man is really ferocious
+because he is really aware of the pain which he inflicts. The wolf, I
+suppose, has no more recognition of the sheep's feelings than a man has
+of feelings in the oyster or the potato. For him, they are simply
+non-existent; and it is just as inappropriate to think of the wolf as
+cruel, as it would be to call the sheep cruel for eating grass. Are we
+to say that "nature" is cruel because the arrangement increases the sum
+of undeserved suffering? That is a problem which I do not feel able to
+examine; but it is, at least, obvious that it cannot be answered
+off-hand in the affirmative. To the individual sheep it matters nothing
+whether he is eaten by the wolf or dies of disease or starvation. He
+has to die any way, and the particular way is unimportant. The wolf is
+simply one of the limiting forces upon sheep, and if he were removed
+others would come into play. The sheep, left to himself, would still
+give a practical illustration of the doctrine of Malthus. If, as
+evolutionists tell us, the hostility of the wolf tends to improve the
+breed of sheep, to encourage him to think more and to sharpen his wits,
+the sheep may be, on the whole, the better for the wolf, in this sense
+at least: that the sheep of a wolfless region might lead a more
+wretched existence, and be less capable animals and more subject to
+disease and starvation than the sheep in a wolf-haunted region. The
+wolf may, so far, be a blessing in disguise.
+
+This suggests another obvious remark. When we speak of the struggle for
+existence, the popular view seems to construe this into the theory that
+the world is a mere cockpit, in which one race carries on an
+interminable struggle with the other. If the wolves are turned in with
+the sheep, the first result will be that all the sheep will become
+mutton, and the last that there will be one big wolf with all the
+others inside him. But this is contrary to the essence of the doctrine.
+Every race depends, we all hold, upon its environment, and the
+environment includes all the other races. If some, therefore, are in
+conflict, others are mutually necessary. If the wolf ate all the sheep,
+and the sheep ate all the grass, the result would be the extirpation of
+all the sheep and all the wolves, as well as all the grass. The
+struggle necessarily implies reciprocal dependence in a countless
+variety of ways. There is not only a conflict, but a system of tacit
+alliances. One species is necessary to the existence of others, though
+the multiplication of some implies also the dying out of particular
+rivals. The conflict implies no cruelty, as I have said, and the
+alliance no goodwill. The wolf neither loves the sheep (except as
+mutton) nor hates him; but he depends upon him as absolutely as if he
+were aware of the fact. The sheep is one of the wolf's necessaries of
+life. When we speak of the struggle for existence we mean, of course,
+that there is at any given period a certain equilibrium between all the
+existing species; it changes, though it changes so slowly that the
+process is imperceptible and difficult to realise even to the
+scientific imagination. The survival of any species involves the
+disappearance of rivals no more than the preservation of allies. The
+struggle, therefore, is so far from internecine that it necessarily
+involves co-operation. It cannot even be said that it necessarily
+implies suffering. People, indeed, speak as though the extinction of a
+race involved suffering in the same way as the slaughter of an
+individual. It is plain that this is not a necessary, though it may
+sometimes be the actual result. A corporation may be suppressed without
+injury to its members. Every individual will die before long, struggle
+or no struggle. If the rate of reproduction fails to keep up with the
+rate of extinction, the species must diminish. But this might happen
+without any increase of suffering. If the boys in a district discovered
+how to take birds' eggs, they might soon extirpate a species; but it
+does not follow that the birds would individually suffer. Perhaps they
+would feel themselves relieved from a disagreeable responsibility. The
+process by which a species is improved, the dying out of the least fit,
+implies no more suffering than we know to exist independently of any
+doctrine as to a struggle. When we use anthropomorphic language, we may
+speak of "self-assertion". But "self-assertion," minus the
+anthropomorphism, means self-preservation; and that is merely a way of
+describing the fact that an animal or plant which is well adapted to
+its conditions of life is more likely to live than an animal which is
+ill-adapted. I have some difficulty in imagining how any other
+arrangement can even be supposed possible. It seems to be almost an
+identical proposition that the healthiest and strongest will generally
+live longest; and the conception of a "struggle for existence" only
+enables us to understand how this results in certain progressive
+modifications of the species. If we could ever for a moment have
+fancied that there was no pain and disease, and that some beings were
+not more liable than others to those evils, I might admit that the new
+doctrine has made the world darker. As it is, it seems to me that it
+leaves the data just what they were before, and only shows us that they
+have certain previously unsuspected bearings upon the history of the
+world.
+
+One other point must be mentioned. Not only are species interdependent
+as well as partly in competition, but there is an absolute dependence
+in all the higher species between its different members which may be
+said to imply a _de facto_ altruism, as the dependence upon other
+species implies a _de facto_ co-operation. Every animal, to say
+nothing else, is absolutely dependent for a considerable part of its
+existence upon its parents. The young bird or beast could not grow up
+unless its mother took care of it for a certain period. There is,
+therefore, no struggle as between mother and progeny; but, on the
+contrary, the closest possible alliance. Otherwise, life would be
+impossible. The young being defenceless, their parents could
+exterminate them if they pleased, and by so doing would exterminate the
+race. The parental relation, of course, constantly involves a partial
+sacrifice of the mother to her young. She has to go through a whole
+series of operations, which strain her own strength and endanger her
+own existence, but which are absolutely essential to the continuance of
+the race. It may be anthropomorphic to attribute any maternal emotions
+of the human kind to the animal. The bird, perhaps, sits upon her eggs
+because they give her an agreeable sensation, or, if you please, from a
+blind instinct which somehow determines her to the practice. She does
+not look forward, we may suppose, to bringing up a family, or speculate
+upon the delights of domestic affection. I only say that as a fact she
+behaves in a way which is at once injurious to her own chances of
+individual survival, and absolutely necessary to the survival of the
+species. The abnormal bird who deserts her nest escapes many dangers;
+but if all birds were devoid of the instinct, the birds would not
+survive a generation.
+
+Now, I ask, what is the difference which takes place when the monkey
+gradually loses his tail and sets up a superior brain? Is it properly
+to be described as a development or improvement of the "cosmic
+process," or as the beginning of a prolonged contest against it?
+
+In the first place, so far as man becomes a reasonable being, capable
+of foresight and of the adoption of means to ends, he recognises the
+nature of these tacit alliances. He believes it to be his interest not
+to exterminate everything, but to exterminate those species alone whose
+existence is incompatible with his own. The wolf eats every sheep that
+he comes across as long as his appetite lasts. If there are too many
+wolves, the process is checked by the starvation of the supernumerary
+eaters. Man can maintain just as many sheep as he wants, and may also
+proportion the numbers of his own species to the possibilities of
+future supply. Many of the lower species thus become subordinate parts
+of the social organism--that is to say, of the new equilibrium which
+has been established. There is so far a reciprocal advantage. The sheep
+that is preserved with a view to mutton gets the advantage, though he
+is not kept with a view to his own advantage. Of all arguments for
+vegetarianism, none is so weak as the argument from humanity. The pig
+has a stronger interest than any one in the demand for bacon. If all
+the world were Jewish, there would be no pigs at all. He has to pay for
+his privileges by an early death; but he makes a good bargain of it. He
+dies young, and, though we can hardly infer the "love of the gods," we
+must admit that he gets a superior race of beings to attend to his
+comforts, moved by the strongest possible interest in his health and
+vigour, and induced by its own needs, perhaps, to make him a little too
+fat for comfort, but certainly also to see that he has a good sty, and
+plenty to eat every day of his life. Other races, again, are extirpated
+as "ruthlessly" as in the merely instinctive struggle for existence. We
+get rid of wolves and snakes as well as we can, and more systematically
+than can be done by their animal competitors. The process does not
+necessarily involve cruelty, and certainly does not involve a
+diminution of the total of happiness. The struggle for existence means
+the substitution of a new system of equilibrium, in which one of the
+old discords has been removed, and the survivors live in greater
+harmony. If the wolf is extirpated as an internecine enemy, it is that
+there may be more sheep when sheep have become our allies and the
+objects of our earthly providence. The result may be, perhaps I might
+say must be, a state in which, on the whole, there is a greater amount
+of life supported on the planet; and therefore, as those will think who
+are not pessimists, a decided gain on the balance. At any rate, the
+difference so far is that the condition which was in all cases
+necessary, is now consciously recognised as necessary; and that we
+deliberately aim at a result which always had to be achieved on penalty
+of destruction. So far, again, as morality can be established on purely
+prudential grounds, the same holds good of relations between human
+beings themselves. Men begin to perceive that, even from a purely
+personal point of view, peace is preferable to war. If war is unhappily
+still prevalent, it is at least not war in which every clan is fighting
+with its neighbours, and where conquest means slavery or extirpation.
+Millions of men are at peace within the limits of a modern State, and
+can go about their business without cutting each other's throats. When
+they fight with other nations they do not enslave nor massacre their
+prisoners. Starting from the purely selfish ground Hobbes could prove
+conclusively that everybody benefited by the social compact which
+substituted peace and order for the original state of war. Is this,
+then, a reversal of the old state of things--a combating of a "cosmic
+process"? I should rather say that it is a development of the tacit
+alliances, and a modification so far of the direct or internecine
+conflict. Both were equally implied in the older conditions, and both
+still exist. Some races form alliances, while others are crowded out of
+existence. Of course, I cease to do some things which I should have
+done before. I don't attack the first man I meet in the street and take
+his scalp. One reason is that I don't expect he will take mine; for, if
+I did, I fear that, even as a civilised being, I should try to
+anticipate his intentions. This merely means that we have both come to
+see that we have a common interest in keeping the peace. And this,
+again, merely means that the tacit alliance which was always an
+absolutely necessary condition of the survival of the species has now
+been extended through a wider area. The species could not have got on
+at all if there had not been so much alliance as is necessary for its
+reproduction and for the preservation of its young for some years of
+helplessness. The change is simply that the small circle which included
+only the primitive family or class has extended, so that we can meet
+members of the same nation, or, it may be, of the same race, on terms
+which were previously confined to the minor group. We have still to
+exterminate and still to preserve. The mode of employing our energies
+has changed, but not the essential nature. Morality proper, however,
+has so far not emerged. It begins when sympathy begins; when we really
+desire the happiness of others; or, as Kant says, when we treat other
+men as an end and not simply as a means. Undoubtedly this involves a
+new principle, no less than the essential principle of all true
+morality. Still, I have to ask whether it implies a combating or a
+continuation of a cosmic process. Now, as I have observed, even the
+animal mother shows what I have called a _de facto_ altruism. She
+has instincts which, though dangerous to the individual, are essential
+for the race. The human mother sacrifices herself with a consciousness
+of the results to herself, and her personal fears are overcome by the
+strength of her affections. She intentionally endures a painful death
+to save them from suffering. The animal sacrifices herself, but without
+foresight of the result, and therefore without moral worth. This is
+merely the most striking exemplification of the general process of the
+development of morality. Conduct is first regarded purely with a view
+to the effects upon the agent, and is therefore enforced by extrinsic
+penalties, by consequences, that is, supposed to be attached to us by
+the will of some ruler, natural or supernatural. The instinct which
+comes to regard such conduct as bad in itself, which implies a dislike
+of giving pain to others, and not merely a dislike to the gallows,
+grows up under such probation until the really moralised being acquires
+feelings which make the external penalty superfluous. This,
+indubitably, is the greatest of all changes, the critical fact which
+decides whether we are to regard conduct simply as useful, or also to
+regard it as moral in the strictest sense. But I should still call it a
+development and not a reversal of the previous process. The conduct
+which we call virtuous is the same conduct externally which we before
+regarded as useful. The difference is that the simple fact of its
+utility, that is, of its utility to others and to the race in general,
+has now become also the sufficient motive for the action as well as the
+implicit cause of the action. In the earlier stages, when no true
+sympathy existed, men and animals were still forced to act in a certain
+way because it was beneficial to others. They now act in that way
+because they are conscious that it is beneficial to others. The whole
+history of moral evolution seems to imply this. We may go back to a
+period at which the moral law is identified with the general customs of
+the race; at which there is no perception of any clear distinction
+between that which is moral and that which is simply customary; between
+that which is imposed by a law in the strict sense and that which is
+dictated by general moral principles. In such a state of things, the
+motives for obedience partake of the nature of "blind instincts". No
+definite reason for them is present to the mind of the agent, and it
+does not occur to him even to demand a reason. "Our fathers did so and
+we do so" is the sole and sufficient explanation of their conduct. Thus
+instinct again may be traced back by evolutionists to the earliest
+period at which the instincts implied in the relations between the
+sexes or between parents and offspring, existed. They were the germ
+from which has sprung all morality such as we now recognise.
+
+Morality, then, implies the development of certain instincts which are
+essential to the race, but which may, in an indefinite number of cases,
+be injurious to the individual. The particular mother is killed because
+she obeys her natural instincts; but, if it were not for mothers and
+their instincts, the race would come to an end. Professor Huxley speaks
+of the "fanatical individualism" of our time as failing to construct
+morality from the analogy of the cosmic process. An individualism which
+regards the cosmic process as equivalent simply to an internecine
+struggle of each against all, must certainly fail to construct a
+satisfactory morality upon such terms, and I will add that any
+individualism which fails to recognise fully the social character,
+which regards society as an aggregate instead of an organism, will, in
+my opinion, find itself in difficulties. But I also submit that the
+development of the instincts which directly correspond to the needs of
+the race, is merely another case in which we aim consciously at an end
+which was before an unintentional result of our actions. Every race,
+above the lowest, has instincts which are only intelligible by the
+requirements of the race; and has both to compete with some and to form
+alliances with others of its fellow occupants of the planet. Both in
+the unmoralised condition and in that in which morality has become most
+developed, these instincts have common characteristics, and may be
+regarded as conditions of the power of the race to which they belong to
+maintain its position in the world, and, speaking roughly, to preserve
+or increase its own vitality.
+
+I will not pause to insist upon this so far as regards many qualities
+which are certainly moral, though they may be said to refer primarily
+to the individual. That chastity and temperance, truthfulness and
+energy, are, on the whole, advantages both to the individual and to the
+race, does not, I fancy, require elaborate proof; nor need I argue at
+length that the races in which they are common will therefore have
+inevitable advantages in the struggle for existence. Of all qualities
+which enable a race to hold its own, none is more important than the
+power of organising individually, politically, and socially, and that
+power implies the existence of justice and the instinct of mutual
+confidence-in short, all the social virtues. The difficulty seems to be
+felt in regard to those purely altruistic impulses, which, at first
+glance at any rate, make it apparently our duty to preserve those who
+would otherwise be unfit to live. Virtue, says Professor Huxley, is
+directed "not so much to the survival of the fittest," as to the
+"fitting of as many as possible to survive". I do not dispute the
+statement, I think it true in a sense; but I have a difficulty as to
+its application.
+
+Morality, it is obvious, must be limited by the conditions in which we
+are placed. What is impossible is not a duty. One condition plainly is
+that the planet is limited. There is only room for a certain number of
+living beings; and though we may determine what shall be the number, we
+cannot arbitrarily say that it shall be indefinitely great. It is one
+consequence that we do, in fact, go on suppressing the unfit, and
+cannot help going on suppressing them. Is it desirable that it should
+be otherwise? Should we wish, for example, that America could still be
+a hunting-ground for savages? Is it better that it should contain a
+million red men or sixty millions of civilised whites? Undoubtedly the
+moralist will say with absolute truth that the methods of extirpation
+adopted by Spaniards and Englishmen were detestable. I need not say
+that I agree with him, and hope that such methods may be abolished
+wherever any remnant of them exists. But I say so partly because I
+believe in the struggle for existence. This process underlies morality,
+and operates whether we are moral or not. The most civilised race, that
+which has the greatest knowledge, skill, power of organisation, will, I
+hold, have an inevitable advantage in the struggle, even if it does not
+use the brutal means which are superfluous as well as cruel. All the
+natives who lived in America a hundred years ago would be dead now in
+any case, even if they had invariably been treated with the greatest
+humanity, fairness, and consideration. Had they been unable to suit
+themselves to new conditions of life, they would have suffered an
+euthanasia instead of a partial extirpation; and had they suited
+themselves they would either have been absorbed or become a useful part
+of the population. To abolish the old brutal method is not to abolish
+the struggle for existence, but to make the result depend upon a higher
+order of qualities than those of the mere piratical viking.
+
+Mr. Pearson has been telling us in his most interesting book, that the
+negro may not improbably hold his own in Africa. I cannot say I regard
+this as an unmixed evil. Why should there not be parts of the world in
+which races of inferior intelligence or energy should hold their own? I
+am not so anxious to see the whole earth covered by an indefinite
+multiplication of the cockney type. But I only quote the suggestion for
+another reason. Till recent years the struggle for existence was
+carried on as between Europeans and negroes by simple violence and
+brutality. The slave trade and its consequences have condemned the
+whole continent to barbarism. That, undoubtedly, was part of the
+struggle for existence. But, if Mr. Pearson's guess should be verified,
+the results have been so far futile as well as disastrous. The negro
+has been degraded, and yet, after all our brutality, we cannot take his
+place. Therefore, besides the enormous evils to slave-trading countries
+themselves, the lowering of their moral tone, the substitution of
+piracy for legitimate commerce, and the degradation of the countries
+which bought the slaves, the superior race has not even been able to
+suppress the inferior. But the abolition of this monstrous evil does
+not involve the abolition but the humanisation of the struggle. The
+white man, however merciful he becomes, may gradually extend over such
+parts of the country as are suitable to him; and the black man will
+hold the rest and acquire such arts and civilisation as he is capable
+of appropriating. The absence of cruelty would not alter the fact that
+the fittest race would extend; but it may ensure that whatever is good
+in the negro may have a chance of development in his own sphere, and
+that success in the struggle will be decided by more valuable
+qualities.
+
+Without venturing further into a rather speculative region, I need only
+indicate the bearing of such considerations upon problems nearer home.
+It is often complained that the tendency of modern civilisation is to
+preserve the weakly, and therefore to lower the vitality of the race.
+This seems to involve inadmissible assumptions. In the first place, the
+process by which the weaker are preserved consists in suppressing
+various conditions unfavourable to human life in general. Sanitary
+legislation, for example, aims at destroying the causes of many of the
+diseases from which our forefathers suffered. If we can suppress the
+smallpox, we of course save many weakly children, who would have died
+had they been attacked. But we also remove one of the causes which
+weakened the constitutions of many of the survivors. I do not know by
+what right we can say that such legislation, or again, the legislation
+which prevents the excessive labour of children, does more harm by
+preserving the weak than it does good by preventing the weakening of
+the strong. One thing is at any rate clear: to preserve life is to
+increase the population, and therefore to increase the competition; or,
+in other words, to intensify the struggle for existence. The process is
+as broad as it is long. If we could be sure that every child born
+should grow up to maturity, the result would be to double the severity
+of the competition for support, What we should have to show, therefore,
+in order to justify the inference of a deterioration due to this
+process, would be, not that it simply increased the number of the
+candidates for living, but that it gave to the feebler candidates a
+differential advantage; that they are now more fitted than they were
+before for ousting their superior neighbours from the chances of
+support. But I can see no reason for supposing such a consequence to be
+probable or even possible. The struggle for existence, as I have
+suggested, rests upon the unalterable facts that the world is limited
+and population elastic. Under all conceivable circumstances we shall
+still have in some way or other to proportion our numbers to our
+supplies; and under all circumstances those who are fittest by reason
+of intellectual or moral or physical qualities will have the best
+chance of occupying good places, and leaving descendants to supply the
+next generation. It is surely not less true that in the civilised as
+much as in the most barbarous race, the healthiest are the most likely
+to live, and the most likely to be ancestors. If so, the struggle will
+still be carried on upon the same principles, though certainly in a
+different shape.
+
+It is true that this suggests one of the most difficult questions of
+the time. It is suggested, for example, that in some respects the
+"highest" specimens of the race are not the healthiest or the fittest.
+Genius, according to some people, is a variety of disease, and
+intellectual power is won by a diminution of reproductive power. A
+lower race, again, if we measure "high" and "low" by intellectual
+capacity, may oust a higher race, because it can support itself more
+cheaply, or, in other words, because it is more efficient for
+industrial purposes. Without presuming to pronounce upon such
+questions, I will simply ask whether this does not interpret Professor
+Huxley's remark about that "cosmic nature" which is still so strong,
+and which is likely to be strong so long as men require stomachs. We
+have not, I think, to suppress it, but to adapt it to new
+circumstances. We are engaged in working out a gigantic problem: What
+is the best, in the sense of the most efficient, type of human being?
+What is the best combination of brains and stomach? We turn out saints,
+who are "too good to live," and philosophers, who have run too rapidly
+to brains. They do not answer in practice, because they are instruments
+too delicate for the rough work of daily life. They may give us a
+foretaste of qualities which will be some day possible for the average
+man; of intellectual and moral qualities, which, though now
+exceptional, may become commonplace. But the best stock for the race
+are those in whom we have been lucky enough to strike out the happy
+combination, in which greater intellectual power is produced without
+the loss of physical vigour. Such men, it is probable, will not deviate
+so widely from the average type. The reconciliation of the two
+conditions can only be effected by a very gradual process of slowly
+edging onwards in the right direction. Meanwhile the theory of a
+struggle for existence justifies us, instead of condemning us, for
+preserving the delicate child, who may turn out to be a Newton or a
+Keats, because he will leave to us the advantage of his discoveries or
+his poems, while his physical feebleness assures us that he will not
+propagate his race.
+
+This may lead to a final question. Does the morality of a race
+strengthen or weaken it; fit it to hold its own in the general
+equilibrium, or make its extirpation by low moral races more probable?
+I do not suppose that anybody would deny what I have already suggested,
+that the more moral the race, the more harmonious and the better
+organised, the better it is fitted for holding its own. But if this be
+admitted, we must also admit that the change is not that it has ceased
+to struggle, but that it struggles by different means. It holds its
+own, not merely by brute force, but by justice, humanity, and
+intelligence, while, it may be added, the possession of such qualities
+does not weaken the brute force, where such a quality is still
+required. The most civilised races are, of course, also the most
+formidable in war. But, if we take the opposite alternative, I must ask
+how any quality which really weakens the vitality of the race can
+properly be called moral. I should entirely repudiate any rule of
+conduct which could be shown to have such a tendency. This, indeed,
+indicates what seems to me to be the moral difficulty with most people.
+Charity, you say, is a virtue; charity increases beggary, and so far
+tends to produce a feebler population; therefore, a moral quality tends
+doubly to diminish the vigour of a nation. The answer is, of course,
+obvious, and I am confident that Professor Huxley would have so far
+agreed with me. It is that all charity which fosters a degraded class
+is therefore immoral. The "fanatical individualism" of to-day has its
+weaknesses; but in this matter it seems to me that we see the weakness
+of the not less fanatical "collectivism".
+
+The question, in fact, how far any of the socialistic or ethical
+schemes of to-day are right or wrong, depends upon our answer to the
+question how far they tend to produce a vigorous or an enervated
+population. If I am asked to subscribe to General Booth's scheme, I
+inquire first whether the scheme is likely to increase or diminish the
+number of helpless hangers-on upon the efficient part of society. Will
+the whole nation consist in larger proportions of active and
+responsible workers, or of people who are simply burdens upon the real
+workers? The answer decides not only the question whether it is
+expedient, but also the question whether it is right or wrong, to
+support the proposed scheme. Every charitable action is so far a good
+action that it implies sympathy for suffering; but if it is so much in
+want of prudence that it increases the evil which it means to remedy,
+it becomes for that reason a bad action. To develop sympathy without
+developing foresight is just one of the one-sided developments which
+fail to constitute a real advance in morality, though I will not deny
+that it may incidentally lead to an advance.
+
+I hold, then, that the "struggle for existence" belongs to an
+underlying order of facts to which moral epithets cannot be properly
+applied. It denotes a condition of which the moralist has to take
+account, and to which morality has to be adapted; but which, just
+because it is a "cosmic process," cannot be altered, however much we
+may alter the conduct which it dictates. Under all conceivable
+circumstances, the race has to adapt itself to the environment, and
+that necessarily implies a conflict as well as an alliance. The
+preservation of the fittest, which is surely a good thing, is merely
+another aspect of the dying out of the unfit, which is hardly a bad
+thing. The feast which Nature spreads before us, according to Malthus's
+metaphor, is only sufficient for a limited number of guests, and the
+one question is how to select them. The tendency of morality is to
+humanise the struggle, to minimise the suffering of those who lose the
+game; and to offer the prizes to the qualities which are advantageous
+to all, rather than to those which increase and intensify the
+bitterness of the conflict. This implies the growth of foresight, which
+is an extension of the earlier instinct, and enables men to adapt
+themselves to the future and to learn from the past, as well as to act
+up to immediate impulse of present events. It implies still more the
+development of the sympathy which makes every man feel for the hurts of
+all, and which, as social organisation is closer, and the dependence of
+each constituent atom upon the whole organisation is more vividly
+realised, extends the range of a man's interests beyond his own private
+needs. In that sense, again, it must stimulate "collectivism" at the
+expense of a crude individualism, and condemns the doctrine which, as
+Professor Huxley puts it, would forbid us to restrain the member of a
+community from doing his best to destroy it. To restrain such conduct
+is surely to carry on the conflict against all anti-social agents or
+tendencies. For I should certainly hold any form of collectivism to be
+immoral which denied the essential doctrine of the abused
+individualist, the necessity, that is, for individual responsibility.
+We have surely to suppress the murderer, as our ancestors suppressed
+the wolf. We have to suppress both the external enemies, the noxious
+animals whose existence is incompatible with our own, and the internal
+enemies which are injurious elements in the society itself. That is, we
+have to work for the same end of eliminating the least fit. Our methods
+are changed; we desire to suppress poverty, not to extirpate the poor
+man. We give inferior races a chance of taking whatever place they are
+fit for, and try to supplant them with the least possible severity if
+they are unfit for any place. But the suppression of poverty supposes
+not the confiscation of wealth, which would hardly suppress poverty in
+the long run, nor even the adoption of a system of living which would
+enable the idle and the good-for-nothing to survive. The progress of
+civilisation depends, I should say, on the extension of the sense of
+duty which each man owes to society at large. That involves such a
+constitution of society that, although we abandon the old methods of
+hanging and flogging and shooting down--methods which corrupted the
+inflicters of punishment by diminishing their own sense of
+responsibility--may give an advantage to the prudent and industrious,
+and make it more probable that they will be the ancestors of the next
+generation. A system which should equalise the advantages of the
+energetic and the helpless would begin by demoralising, and would very
+soon lead to an unprecedented intensification of the struggle for
+existence. The probable result of a ruthless socialism would be the
+adoption of very severe means for suppressing those who did not
+contribute their share of work. But, in any case, as it seems, we never
+get away or break away from the inevitable fact. If individual ends
+could be suppressed, if every man worked for the good of society as
+energetically as for his own, we should still feel the absolute
+necessity of proportioning the whole body to the whole supplies
+obtainable from the planet, and to preserve the equilibrium of mankind
+relatively to the rest of nature. That day is probably distant; but
+even upon that hypothesis the struggle for existence would still be
+with us, and there would be the same necessity for preserving the
+fittest and killing out, as gently as might be, those who were unfit.
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES, VOLUME I
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