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Mansel. +</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + p {margin-top: 0.5em; text-align: justify; margin-bottom: 0.5em;} + body {margin-left: 11%; margin-right: 10%;} + a {text-decoration: none;} + @media screen { + hr.ppg-pb {margin:30px 0; width:100%; border:none;border-top:thin dashed silver;} + .pagenum {display: inline; font-size: x-small; text-align: right; position: absolute; right: 2%; padding: 1px 3px; font-style: normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration: none; background-color: inherit; border:1px solid #eee;} + .pncolor {color: silver;} + } + @media print { + hr.ppg-pb {border:none;page-break-after: always;} + .pagenum { display:none; } + } + .footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + .footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + .figcenter {margin: 2em auto 2em auto; text-align: center;} + .fnanchor {font-size: .8em; text-decoration: none;} + hr.major {width: 65%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em; border:none; border-bottom:1px solid black;clear:both;} + .poetry p {text-align:center;margin-top:.05em;margin-bottom:.05em} +</style> + +</head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +Project Gutenberg's The Philosophy of the Conditioned, by H. L. Mansel + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Philosophy of the Conditioned + +Author: H. L. Mansel + +Release Date: April 3, 2009 [EBook #28484] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED *** + + + + +Produced by David Clarke, Tim Krajcar and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive/Million Book Project) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p style='text-align: center; font-size: 2em'> +THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +Reprinted, with Additions, from “The Contemporary Review.” +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +<i>Comprising some Remarks on Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy</i> +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +<i>and on Mr. J.S. Mill’s Examination of that Philosophy</i> +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +</p> +<p style='text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em'> +BY H.L. MANSEL, B.D. +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +</p> +<p style='text-align: center; font-size: .7em'> +WAYNFLETE PROFESSOR OF MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY +</p> +<p style='text-align: center; font-size: .7em'> +IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +</p> +<div class='figcenter'> +<img src='images/printer.png' alt='' title='' /><br /> +</div> + +<p style='text-align: center'> +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +ALEXANDER STRAHAN, PUBLISHER +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +LONDON AND NEW YORK +</p> +<p style='text-align: center'> +1866 +</p> +<hr class='ppg-pb' /> +<p style='text-align: center'> +MUIR AND PATERSON, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH. +</p> +<hr class='ppg-pb' /> +<hr class='major' /> +<div style='margin: auto; text-align: center; padding-top: 2em; padding-bottom: 1em'> +<h2>PREFACE</h2> +</div> + +<p> +The circumstance that the following remarks +were originally published as an anonymous +article in a Review, will best explain the +style in which they are written. Absence +from England prevented me from becoming +acquainted with Mr. Mill’s <i>Examination of +Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy</i> till some +time after its publication; and when I was +requested to undertake the task of reviewing +it, I was still ignorant of its contents. On +proceeding to fulfil my engagement, I soon +discovered, not only that the character of +the book was very different from what the +author’s reputation had led me to expect, +but also that my task would be one, not +merely of criticism, but, in some degree, of +self-defence. The remarks on myself, coming +from a writer of Mr. Mill’s ability and reputation, +were such as I could not pass over +without notice; while, at the same time, I +felt that my principal duty in this instance +was the defence of one who was no longer +living to defend himself. Under these circumstances, +the best course appeared to be, +to devote the greater portion of my article +to an exposition and vindication of Sir W. +Hamilton’s teaching; and, in the additional +remarks which it was necessary to make on +the more personal part of the controversy, +to speak of myself in the third person, as +I should have spoken of any other writer. +The form thus adopted has been retained in +the present republication, though the article +now appears with the name of its author. +</p> +<p> +My original intention of writing a review +of the entire book was necessarily abandoned +as soon as I became acquainted with its +contents. To have done justice to the whole +subject, or to Mr. Mill’s treatment of it, +would have required a volume nearly as +large as his own. I therefore determined +to confine myself to the <i>Philosophy of the +Conditioned</i>, both as the most original and +important portion of Sir W. Hamilton’s +teaching, and as that which occupies the +first place in Mr. Mill’s <i>Examination</i>. +</p> +<hr class='ppg-pb' /> +<hr class='major' /> +<div style='margin: auto; text-align: center; padding-top: 2em; padding-bottom: 1em'> +<h2>THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED.</h2> +</div> + +<p> +The reader of Plato’s <i>Republic</i> will +readily recall to mind that wonderful +passage at the end of the sixth book, in +which the philosopher, under the image of +geometrical lines, exhibits the various relations +of the intelligible to the sensible +world; especially his lofty aspirations with +regard to “that second segment of the intelligible +world, which reason of itself grasps +by the power of dialectic, employing hypotheses, +not as principles, but as veritable +hypotheses, that is to say, as steps and +starting-points, in order that it may ascend +<i>as far as the unconditioned</i> (μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου), +to the first principle of the universe, +and having grasped this, may then lay hold +of the principles next adjacent to it, and +so go down to the end, using no sensible +aids whatever, but employing abstract forms +throughout, and terminating in forms.” +</p> +<p> +This quotation is important for our present +purpose in two ways. In the first place, it +may serve, at the outset of our remarks, to +propitiate those plain-spoken English critics +who look upon new terms in philosophy with +the same suspicion with which Jack Cade +regarded “a noun and a verb, and such +abominable words as no Christian ear can +endure to hear,” by showing that the head +and front of our offending, “the Unconditioned,” +is no modern invention of Teutonic +barbarism, but sanctioned even by the Attic +elegance of a Plato. And in the second +place, it contains almost a history in miniature +of the highest speculations of philosophy, +both in earlier and in later times, and +points out, with a clearness and precision +the more valuable because uninfluenced by +recent controversies, the exact field on which +the philosophies of the Conditioned and the +Unconditioned come into collision, and the +nature of the problem which they both approach +from opposite sides. +</p> +<p> +What is the meaning of this problem, the +solution of which Plato proposes as the +highest aim of philosophy—“to ascend to +the unconditioned, and thence to deduce the +universe of conditioned existence?” The +problem has assumed different forms at different +times: at present we must content +ourselves with stating it in that in which +it will most naturally suggest itself to a +student of modern philosophy, and in which +it has the most direct bearing on the subject +of the present article. +</p> +<p> +All consciousness must in the first instance +present itself as a relation between two constituent +parts, the person who is conscious, +and the thing, whatever it may be, of which +he is conscious. This contrast has been indicated, +directly or indirectly, by various +names—mind and matter; person and thing; +subject and object; or, lastly, in the distinction, +most convenient for philosophy, however +uncouth in sound, between self and not +self—the <i>ego</i> and the <i>non-ego</i>. In order to +be conscious at all, I must be conscious of +something: consciousness thus presents itself +as the product of two factors, <i>I</i> and <i>something</i>. +The problem of the unconditioned is, +briefly stated, to reduce these two factors +to one. +</p> +<p> +For it is manifest that, so long as they +remain two, we have no unconditioned, but +a pair of conditioned existences. If the <i>something</i> +of which I am conscious is a separate +reality, having qualities and modes of action +of its own, and thereby determining, or contributing +to determine, the form which my +consciousness of it shall take, my consciousness +is thereby conditioned, or partly dependent +on something beyond itself. It is +no matter, in this respect, whether the influence +is direct or indirect—whether, for +instance, I see a material tree, or only the +mental image of a tree. If the nature of +the thing in any degree determines the character +of the image—if the visible form of a +tree is different from that of a house because +the tree itself is different from the house, my +consciousness is, however remotely, influenced +by something different from itself, the <i>ego</i> by +the <i>non-ego</i>. And on the other hand, if I, +who am conscious, am a real being, distinct +from the things of which I am conscious—if +the conscious mind has a constitution and +laws of its own by which it acts, and if the +mode of its consciousness is in any degree +determined by those laws, the <i>non-ego</i> is so +far conditioned by the <i>ego</i>; the thing which +I see is not seen absolutely and <i>per se</i>, but +in a form partly dependent upon the laws of +my vision. +</p> +<p> +The first step towards the reduction of +these two factors to one may obviously be +made in three different ways. Either the +<i>ego</i> may be represented as a mode of the <i>non-ego</i>, +or the <i>non-ego</i> of the <i>ego</i>, or both of a +<i>tertium quid</i>, distinct from either. In other +words: it may be maintained, <i>first</i>, that +matter is the only real existence; mind and +all the phenomena of consciousness being +really the result solely of material laws; the +brain, for example, secreting thought as the +liver secretes bile; and the distinct personal +existence of which I am apparently conscious +being only the result of some such secretion. +This is <i>Materialism</i>, which has then to address +itself to the further problem, to reduce +the various phenomena of matter to some +one absolutely first principle on which everything +else depends. Or it may be maintained, +<i>secondly</i>, that mind is the only real +existence; the intercourse which we apparently +have with a material world being really +the result solely of the laws of our mental +constitution. This is <i>Idealism</i>, which again +has next to attempt to reduce the various +phenomena to some one immaterial principle. +Or it may be maintained, <i>thirdly</i>, that real +existence is to be sought neither in mind as +mind nor in matter as matter; that both +classes of phenomena are but qualities or +modes of operation of something distinct +from both, and on which both alike are +dependent. Hence arises a third form of +philosophy, which, for want of a better +name, we will call <i>Indifferentism</i>, as being +a system in which the characteristic differences +of mind and matter are supposed to +disappear, being merged in something higher +than both. +</p> +<p> +In using the two former of these terms, we +are not speaking of Materialism and Idealism +as they have always actually manifested +themselves, but only of the distinguishing +principle of these systems when pushed to +its extreme result. It is quite possible to +be a materialist or an idealist with respect to +the immediate phenomena of consciousness, +without attempting a philosophy of the Unconditioned +at all. But it is also possible, +and in itself natural, when such a philosophy +is attempted, to attempt it by means of the +same method which has approved itself in +relation to subordinate inquiries; to make +the relation between the human mind and +its objects the type and image of that between +the universe and its first principle. +And such attempts have actually been made, +both on the side of Materialism and on that +of Idealism; and probably would be made +oftener, did not counteracting causes frequently +hinder the logical development of +speculative principles. +</p> +<p> +In modern times, and under Christian influences, +these several systems are almost +necessarily identified with inquiries concerning +the existence and nature of God. The +influence of Christianity has been indirectly +felt, even in speculations prosecuted in apparent +independence of it; and the admission +of an absolute first principle of all things distinct +from God, or the acknowledgment of a +God separate from or derived from the first +principle of all things, is an absurdity which, +since the prevalence of Christianity, has become +almost impossible, even to antichristian +systems of thought. In earlier times, indeed, +this union of philosophy with theology was +by no means so imperative. A philosophy +like that of Greece, which inherited its speculations +from a poetical theogony, would see +no difficulty in attributing to the god or +gods of its religious belief a secondary and +derived existence, dependent on some higher +and more original principle, and in separating +that principle itself from all immediate connection +with religion. It was possible to +assume, with the Ionian, a material substance, +or, with the Eleatic, an indifferent +abstraction, as the first principle of things, +without holding that principle to be God, or, +as the only alternative, denying the existence +of a God; and thus, as Aristotle<a name="FNanchor_A" id="FNanchor_A"></a><a href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">[A]</a> has observed, +theologians endeavoured to evade the +consequences of their abstract principles, by +attributing to the chief good a later and +derived existence, as the poets supposed the +supreme God to be of younger birth than +night and chaos and sea and sky. But to +a Christian philosophy, or to a philosophy +in any way influenced by Christianity, this +method of evasion is no longer possible. If +all conditioned existence is dependent on +some one first and unconditioned principle, +either that principle must be identified with +God, or our philosophical speculations must +fall into open and avowed atheism. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_A' id='Footnote_A'></a><a href='#FNanchor_A'><span class='label'>[A]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Metaph.</i>, xiv. 4. +</p> +</div> +<p> +But at this point the philosophical inquiry +comes in contact with another line of thought, +suggested by a different class of the facts of +consciousness. As a religious and moral +being, man is conscious of a relation of a +personal character, distinct from any suggested +by the phenomena of the material +world,—a relation to a supreme Personal +Being, the object of his religious worship, +and the source and judge of his moral obligations +and conduct. To adopt the name of +God in an abstract speculation merely as a +conventional denomination for the highest +link in the chain of thought, and to believe +in Him for the practical purposes of worship +and obedience, are two very different things; +and for the latter, though not for the former, +the conception of God as a Person is indispensable. +Were man a being of pure intellect, +the problem of the Unconditioned +would be divested of its chief difficulty; but +he is also a being of religious and moral +faculties, and these also have a claim to be +satisfied by any valid solution of the problem. +Hence the question assumes another +and a more complex form. How is the +one absolute existence, to which philosophy +aspires, to be identified with the personal +God demanded by our religious feelings? +</p> +<p> +Shall we boldly assume that the problem +is already solved, and that the personal God +is the very Unconditioned of which we were +in search? This is to beg the question, not +to answer it. Our conception of a personal +being, derived as it is from the immediate +consciousness of our own personality, seems, +on examination, to involve conditions incompatible +with the desired assumption. Personal +agency, similar to our own, seems to +point to something very different from an +absolutely first link in a chain of phenomena. +Our actions, if not determined, are at least +influenced by motives; and the motive is a +prior link in the chain, and a condition of +the action. Our actions, moreover, take place +in time; and time, as we conceive it, cannot +be regarded as an absolute blank, but as a +condition in which phenomena take place as +past, present, and future. Every act taking +place in time implies something antecedent +to itself; and this something, be it what it +may, hinders us from regarding the subsequent +act as absolute and unconditioned. +Nay, even time itself, apart from the phenomena +which it implies, has the same character. +If an act cannot take place except +in time, time is the condition of its taking +place. To conceive the unconditioned, as +the first link in a chain of conditioned consequences, +it seems necessary that we should +conceive something out of time, yet followed +by time; standing at the beginning +of all duration and succession, having no +antecedent, but followed by a series of consequents. +</p> +<p> +Philosophical theologians have been conscious +of this difficulty, almost from the +earliest date at which philosophy and Christian +theology came in contact with each +other. From a number of testimonies of +similar import, we select one or two of the +most striking. Of the Divine Nature, Gregory +Nyssen says: “It is neither in place +nor in time, but before these and above these +in an unspeakable manner, contemplated itself +by itself, through faith alone; neither +measured by ages, nor moving along with +times.”<a name="FNanchor_B" id="FNanchor_B"></a><a href="#Footnote_B" class="fnanchor">[B]</a> “In the changes of things,” says +Augustine, “you will find a past and a +future; in God you will find a present where +past and future cannot be.”<a name="FNanchor_C" id="FNanchor_C"></a><a href="#Footnote_C" class="fnanchor">[C]</a> “Eternity,” +says Aquinas, “has no succession, but exists +all together.”<a name="FNanchor_D" id="FNanchor_D"></a><a href="#Footnote_D" class="fnanchor">[D]</a> Among divines of the +Church of England, we quote two names +only, but those of the highest:—“The duration +of eternity,” says Bishop Pearson, “is +completely indivisible and all at once; so +that it is ever present, and excludes the +other differences of time, past and future.”<a name="FNanchor_E" id="FNanchor_E"></a><a href="#Footnote_E" class="fnanchor">[E]</a> +And Barrow enumerates among natural +modes of being and operation far above our +reach, “God’s eternity without succession,” +coupling it with “His prescience without +necessitation of events.”<a name="FNanchor_F" id="FNanchor_F"></a><a href="#Footnote_F" class="fnanchor">[F]</a> But it is needless +to multiply authorities for a doctrine so familiar +to every student of theology. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_B' id='Footnote_B'></a><a href='#FNanchor_B'><span class='label'>[B]</span></a> +<p> +<i>C. Eunom.</i>, i., p. 98, Ed. Gretser. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_C' id='Footnote_C'></a><a href='#FNanchor_C'><span class='label'>[C]</span></a> +<p> +<i>In Joann. Evang.</i>, tract. xxxvii. 10. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_D' id='Footnote_D'></a><a href='#FNanchor_D'><span class='label'>[D]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Summa</i>, pars. i., qu. x., art. 1. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_E' id='Footnote_E'></a><a href='#FNanchor_E'><span class='label'>[E]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Minor Theol. Works</i>, vol. i., p. 105. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_F' id='Footnote_F'></a><a href='#FNanchor_F'><span class='label'>[F]</span></a> +<p> +Sermon on the Unsearchableness of God’s Judgments. +</p> +</div> +<p> +Thus, then, our two lines of thought have +led us to conclusions which, at first sight, +appear to be contradictory of each other. +To be conceived as unconditioned, God must +be conceived as exempt from action in time: +to be conceived as a person, if His personality +resembles ours, He must be conceived as +acting in time. Can these two conclusions +be reconciled with each other; and if not, +which of them is to be abandoned? The +true answer to this question is, we believe, +to be found in a distinction which some +recent critics regard with very little favour,—the +distinction between Reason and Faith; +between the power of <i>conceiving</i> and that of +<i>believing</i>. We cannot, in our present state +of knowledge, reconcile these two conclusions; +yet we are not required to abandon +either. We cannot conceive the manner in +which the unconditioned and the personal +are united in the Divine Nature; yet we +may believe that, in some manner unknown +to us, they are so united. To conceive the +union of two attributes in one object of +thought, I must be able to conceive them as +united in some particular manner: when this +cannot be done, I may nevertheless believe +<i>that</i> the union is possible, though I am unable +to conceive <i>how</i> it is possible. The +problem is thus represented as one of those +Divine mysteries, the character of which is +clearly and well described in the language +of Leibnitz:—“Il en est de même des +autres mystères, où les esprits modérés trouveront +toujours une explication suffisante +pour croire, et jamais autant qu’il en faut +pour comprendre. Il nous suffit d’un certain +<i>ce que c’est</i> (τί ἐστι) mais le <i>comment</i> +(πῶς) nous passe, et ne nous est point nécessaire.”<a name="FNanchor_G" id="FNanchor_G"></a><a href="#Footnote_G" class="fnanchor">[G]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_G' id='Footnote_G'></a><a href='#FNanchor_G'><span class='label'>[G]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Théodicée, Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, +§ 56.</i> Leibnitz, it will be observed, uses the expression <i>pour comprendre</i>, +for which, in the preceding remarks, we have substituted +<i>to conceive</i>. The change has been made intentionally, on account +of an ambiguity in the former word. Sometimes it is used, as +Leibnitz here uses it, to denote an apprehension of the manner in +which certain attributes can coexist in an object. But sometimes +(to say nothing of other senses) it is used to signify a complete +knowledge of an object in all its properties and their consequences, +such as it may be questioned whether we have of any object whatever. +This ambiguity, which has been the source of much confusion +and much captious criticism, is well pointed out by Norris +in his <i>Reason and Faith</i> (written in reply to Toland), p. 118, Ed. +1697: “When we say that <i>above reason</i> is when we do not comprehend +or perceive the truth of a thing, this must not be meant of +not comprehending the truth in its whole latitude and extent, so +that as many truths should be said to be above reason as we cannot +thus thoroughly comprehend and pursue throughout all their consequences +and relations to other truths (for then almost everything +would be above reason), but only of not comprehending the union +or connection of those immediate ideas of which the proposition +supposed to be above reason consists.” <i>Comprehension</i>, as thus +explained, answers exactly to the ordinary logical use of the term +<i>conception</i>, to denote the combination of two or more attributes in +an unity of representation. In the same sense, M. Peisse, in the +preface to his translation of Hamilton’s <i>Fragments</i>, p. 98, says,—“Comprendre, +c’est voir un terme en rapport avec un autre; c’est +voir comme un ce qui est donné comme multiple.” This is exactly +the sense in which Hamilton himself uses the word <i>conception</i>. +(See <i>Reid’s Works</i>, p. 377.) +</p> +</div> +<p> +But this distinction involves a further consequence. +If the mysteries of the Divine +Nature are not apprehended by reason as +existing in a particular manner (in which +case they would be mysteries no longer), but +are accepted by faith as existing in some +manner unknown to us, it follows that we +do not know God as He is in His absolute +nature, but only as He is imperfectly represented +by those qualities in His creatures +which are analogous to, but not identical +with, His own. If, for example, we had a +knowledge of the Divine Personality as it is +in itself, we should know it as existing in +a certain manner compatible with unconditioned +action; and this knowledge of the +manner would at once transform our conviction +from an act of faith to a conception of +reason. If, on the other hand, the only personality +of which we have a positive knowledge +is our own, and if our own personality +can only be conceived as conditioned in time, +it follows that the Divine Personality, in so +far as it is exempt from conditions, does not +resemble the only personality which we directly +know, and is not adequately represented +by it. This necessitates a confession, +which, like the distinction which gives rise +to it, has been vehemently condemned by +modern critics, but which has been concurred +in with singular unanimity by earlier divines +of various ages and countries,—the confession +that the knowledge which man in this life +can have of God is not a knowledge of the +Divine Nature as it is in itself, but only +of that nature as imperfectly represented +through analogous qualities in the creature. +Were it not that this doctrine has been frequently +denounced of late as an heretical +novelty, we should hardly have thought it +necessary to cite authorities in proof of its +antiquity and catholicity. As it is, we will +venture to produce a few only out of many, +selecting not always the most important, but +those which can be best exhibited <i>verbatim</i> +in a short extract. +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Chrysostom.</span>—<i>De Incompr. Dei Natura</i>, Hom. i. 3: +“<i>That</i> God is everywhere, I know; and <i>that</i> He is +wholly everywhere, I know; but the <i>how</i>, I know not: +<i>that</i> He is without beginning, ungenerated and eternal, +I know; but the <i>how</i>, I know not.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Basil.</span>—Ep. ccxxxiv.: “That God is, I know; but +what is His essence I hold to be above reason. How +then am I saved? By faith; and faith is competent to +know that God is, not what He is.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Gregory Nazianzen.</span>—Orat. xxxiv.: “A theologian +among the Greeks [Plato] has said in his philosophy, that +to conceive God is difficult, to express Him is impossible. +... But I say that it is impossible to express Him, and +more impossible to conceive Him.” [Compare Patrick, +<i>Works</i>, vol. iii., p. 39.] +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Cyril of Jerusalem.</span>—Catech. vi. 2: “We declare not +what God is, but candidly confess that we know not accurately +concerning Him. For in those things which concern +God, it is great knowledge to confess our ignorance.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Augustine.</span>—Enarr. in Psalm, lxxxv. 8: “God is +ineffable; we more easily say what He is not than what +He is.” Serm, cccxli.: “I call God just, because in +human words I find nothing better; for He is beyond +justice.... What then is worthily said of God? +Some one, perhaps, may reply and say, <i>that He is just.</i> +But another, with better understanding, may say that +even this word is surpassed by His excellence, and that +even this is said of Him unworthily, though it be said +fittingly according to human capacity.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Cyril of Alexandria.</span>—<i>In Joann. Evang</i>., 1. ii., c. 5: +“For those things which are spoken concerning it [the +Divine Nature] are not spoken as they are in very truth, +but as the tongue of man can interpret, and as man can +hear; for he who sees in an enigma also speaks in an +enigma.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Damascenus.</span>—<i>De Fide Orthod</i>., i. 4: “That God is, +is manifest; but what He is in His essence and nature is +utterly incomprehensible and unknown.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Aquinas.</span>—<i>Summa</i>, pars. i., qu. xiii., art. 1: “We +cannot so name God that the name which denotes Him +shall express the Divine Essence as it is, in the same way +as the name <i>man</i> expresses in its signification the essence +of man as it is.” <i>Ibid.</i>, art. 5: “When the name <i>wise</i> is +said of a man, it in a manner describes and comprehends +the thing signified: not so, however, when it is said of +God; but it leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended +and exceeding the signification of the name. Whence it +is evident that this name <i>wise</i> is not said in the same +manner of God and of man. The same is the case with +other names; whence no name can be predicated univocally +of God and of creatures; yet they are not predicated +merely equivocally.... We must say, then, that such +names are said of God and of creatures according to +analogy, that is, proportion.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Hooker.</span>—<i>Ecc. Pol.</i>, I., ii. 2.—“Dangerous it were for +the feeble brain of man to wade far into the doings of the +Most High; whom although to know be life, and joy to +make mention of His name, yet our soundest knowledge +is to know that we know Him not as indeed He is, +neither can know Him.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Usher.</span>—<i>Body of Divinity</i>, p. 45, Ed. 1645: “Neither +is it [the wisdom of God] communicated to any creature, +neither can be; for it is unconceivable, as the very essence +of God Himself is unconceivable, and unspeakable as +it is.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Leighton.</span>—Theol. Lect. XXI., <i>Works</i>, vol. iv., p. 327, +Ed. 1830: “Though in the schools they distinguish the +Divine attributes or excellences, and that by no means +improperly, into communicable and incommunicable; yet +we ought so to guard this distinction, as always to remember +that those which are called communicable, when +applied to God, are not only to be understood in a manner +incommunicable and quite peculiar to Himself, but also, +that in Him they are in reality infinitely different [in the +original, <i>aliud omnino</i>, <i>immensum aliud</i>] from those +virtues, or rather, in a matter where the disparity of the +subjects is so very great, those shadows of virtues that +go under the same name, either in men or angels.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Pearson.</span>—<i>Minor Theol. Works</i>, vol. i., p. 13: “God +in Himself is an absolute being, without any relation to +creatures, for He was from eternity without any creature, +and could, had He willed, be to eternity without creature. +But God cannot naturally be known by us otherwise +than by relation to creatures, as, for example, under +the aspect of dominion, or of cause, or in some other +relation.”<a name="FNanchor_H" id="FNanchor_H"></a><a href="#Footnote_H" class="fnanchor">[H]</a> +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Beveridge.</span>—<i>On the Thirty-nine Articles</i>, p. 16, Ed. +1846: “But seeing the properties of God do not so much +denote what God is, as what we apprehend Him to be in +Himself; when the properties of God are predicated one +of another, one thing in God is not predicated of another, +but our apprehensions of the same thing are predicated +one of another.” +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +<span style='font-variant: small-caps'>Leslie.</span>—<i>Method with the Deists</i>, p. 63, Ed. 1745: +“What we call <i>faculties</i> in the soul, we call <i>Persons</i> in +the Godhead; because there are personal actions attributed +to each of them.... And we have no other word +whereby to express it; we speak it after the manner of +men; nor could we understand if we heard any of those +unspeakable words which express the Divine Nature in its +proper essence; therefore we must make allowances, and +great ones, when we apply words of our nature to the +Infinite and Eternal Being.” <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 64: “By the +word <i>Person</i>, when applied to God (for want of a proper +word whereby to express it), we must mean something +infinitely different from personality among men.” +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_H' id='Footnote_H'></a><a href='#FNanchor_H'><span class='label'>[H]</span></a> +<p> +Bishop Pearson’s language is yet more explicit in another +passage of the same work, which we give in the original Latin:—“Non +dantur pro hoc statu nomina quæ Deum significant quidditative. +Patet; quia nomina sunt conceptuum. Non autem +dantur in hoc statu conceptus quidditativi de Deo.”—(P. 136.) +</p> +</div> +<p> +The system of theology represented by +these extracts may, as we think, be fairly +summed up as follows: We believe that God +in His own nature is absolute and unconditioned; +but we can only positively conceive +Him by means of relations and conditions suggested +by created things. We believe that His +own nature is simple and uniform, admitting +of no distinction between various attributes, +nor between any attribute and its subject; +but we can conceive Him only by means of +various attributes, distinct from the subject +and from each other.<a name="FNanchor_I" id="FNanchor_I"></a><a href="#Footnote_I" class="fnanchor">[I]</a> We believe that in +verum, aut bonum esse, aut omnino ipsum esse. +His own nature He is exempt from all relations +of time; but we can conceive Him +only by means of ideas and terms which +imply temporal relations, a past, a present, +and a future.<a name="FNanchor_J" id="FNanchor_J"></a><a href="#Footnote_J" class="fnanchor">[J]</a> Our thought, then, must +not be taken as the measure and limit of +our belief: we think by means of relations +and conditions derived from created things; +we believe in an Absolute Being, in whose +nature these conditions and relations, in some +manner unknown to us, disappear in a simple +and indivisible unity. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_I' id='Footnote_I'></a><a href='#FNanchor_I'><span class='label'>[I]</span></a> +<p> +This will be found most distinctly stated in the context +of the extract from Beveridge, and in the citations from St. +Augustine given in his notes; to which may be added the following +from <i>De Trinitate</i>, vi. 7:—“Deus vero multipliciter quidem +dicitur magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus, et quidquid aliud +non indigne dici videtur; sed eadem magnitudo ejus est quæ sapientia, +non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute; et eadem bonitas +quæ sapientia et magnitudo, et eadem veritas quæ illa omnia: et +non est ibi aliud beatum esse et aliud magnum, aut sapientem, aut +verum, aut bonum esse, aut omnino ipsum esse.” +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_J' id='Footnote_J'></a><a href='#FNanchor_J'><span class='label'>[J]</span></a> +<p> +Compare the remarkable words of Bishop Beveridge, <i>l.c.</i>, +“And therefore, though I cannot apprehend His mercy to Abel +in the beginning of the world, and His mercy to me now, but as +two distinct expressions of His mercy, yet as they are in God, they +are but one and the same act,—as they are in God, I say, who is +not measured by time, as our apprehensions of Him are, but is +Himself eternity; a centre without a circumference, eternity without +time.” +</p> +</div> +<p> +The most important feature of this philosophical +theology, and the one which exhibits +most clearly the practical difference between +reason and faith, is that, in dealing with +theoretical difficulties, it does not appeal to +our knowledge, but to our ignorance: it +does not profess to offer a definite solution; +it only tells us that we might find one if +we knew all. It does not profess, for example, +to solve the apparent contradiction +between God’s foreknowledge and man’s free +will; it does not say, “This is the way in +which God foreknows, and in this way His +foreknowledge is reconcileable with human +freedom;” it only says, “The contradiction +is apparent, but need not be real. Freedom +is incompatible with God’s foreknowledge, +only on the supposition that God’s foreknowledge +is like man’s: if we knew exactly +how the one differs from the other, we might +be able to see that what is incompatible with +the one is not so with the other. We cannot +solve the difficulty, but we can believe +that there is a solution.” +</p> +<p> +It is this open acknowledgment of our +ignorance of the highest things which makes +this system of philosophy distasteful to many +minds: it is the absence of any similar +acknowledgment which forms the attraction +and the seductiveness of Pantheism in one +way, and of Positivism in another. The +pantheist is not troubled with the difficulty +of reconciling the philosophy of the absolute +with belief in a personal God; for belief in a +personal God is no part of his creed. Like +the Christian, he may profess to acknowledge +a first principle, one, and simple, and indivisible, +and unconditioned; but he has no need +to give to this principle the name of God, or +to invest it with such attributes as are necessary +to satisfy man’s religious wants. His +God (so far as he acknowledges one at all) is +not the first principle and cause of all things, +but the aggregate of the whole—an universal +substance underlying the world of phenomena, +or an universal process, carried on in and by +the changes of things. Hence, as Aristotle +said of the Eleatics, that, by asserting all +things to be one, they annihilated causation, +which is the production of one thing from +another, so it may be said of the various +schools of Pantheism, that, by maintaining +all things to be God, they evade rather than +solve the great problem of philosophy, that +of the relation between God and His creatures. +The positivist, on the other hand, +escapes the difficulty by an opposite course. +He declines all inquiry into reality and causation, +and maintains that the only office of +philosophy is to observe and register the +invariable relations of succession and similitude +in phenomena. He does not necessarily +deny the existence of God; but his +personal belief, be it what it may, is a matter +of utter indifference to his system. Religion +and philosophy may perhaps go on side by +side; but their provinces are wholly distinct, +and therefore there is no need to attempt a +reconciliation between them. God, as a first +cause, lives like an Epicurean deity in undisturbed +ease, apart from the world of phenomena, +of which alone philosophy can take +cognisance: philosophy, as the science of +phenomena, contents itself with observing +the actual state of things, without troubling +itself to inquire how that state of things +came into existence. Hence, neither Pantheism +nor Positivism is troubled to explain +the relation of the One to the Many; for the +former acknowledges only the One, and the +latter acknowledges only the Many. +</p> +<p> +It is between these two systems, both +seductive from their apparent simplicity, and +both simple only by mutilation, that the +Philosophy of the Conditioned, of which Sir +William Hamilton is the representative, +endeavours to steer a middle course, at the +risk of sharing the fate of most mediators in +a quarrel,—being repudiated and denounced +by both combatants, because it declares them +to be both in the wrong. Against Pantheism, +which is the natural development of +the principle of Indifferentism, it enters a +solemn protest, by asserting that the Absolute +must be accepted in philosophy, not as +a problem to be solved by reason, but as a +reality to be believed in, though above reason; +and that the pseudo-absolute, which +Pantheism professes to exhibit in a positive +conception, is shown, by the very fact of its +being so conceived, not to be the true Absolute. +Against Positivism, which is virtually +Materialism, it protests no less strongly, +maintaining that the philosophy which professes +to explain the whole of nature by the +aid of material laws alone, proceeds upon an +assumption which does not merely dispense +with God as a scientific hypothesis, but logically +involves consequences which lead to a +denial of His very existence. Between both +extremes, it holds an intermediate position, +neither aspiring, with Pantheism, to solve +the problems of the Absolute, nor neglecting +them, with Positivism, as altogether remote +from the field of philosophical inquiry; but +maintaining that such problems must necessarily +arise, and must necessarily be taken +into account in every adequate survey of +human nature and human thought, and that +philosophy, if it cannot solve them, is bound +to show why they are insoluble. +</p> +<p> +Let us hear Hamilton’s own words in relation +to both the systems which he opposes. +Against Pantheism, and the Philosophy of +the Unconditioned in general, he says:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“The Conditioned is the mean between two extremes,—two +inconditionates, exclusive of each other, <i>neither of +which can be conceived as possible</i>,<a name="FNanchor_K" id="FNanchor_K"></a><a href="#Footnote_K" class="fnanchor">[K]</a> but of which, on the +principles of contradiction and excluded middle, <i>one must +be admitted as necessary</i>. On this opinion, therefore, our +faculties are shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The +mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions, +subversive of each other, as equally possible; but only as +unable to understand as possible either of the two extremes; +one of which, however, on the ground of their +mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognise as true. +We are thus taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity +of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of +existence; and are warned from recognising the domain +of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the +horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we +are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive +aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a +belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond +the sphere of all comprehensible reality.”—<i>Discussions</i>, p. 15. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_K' id='Footnote_K'></a><a href='#FNanchor_K'><span class='label'>[K]</span></a> +<p> +It must be remembered that, to conceive a thing as possible, +we must conceive the manner in which it is possible, but that we +may believe in the fact without being able to conceive the manner. +Had Hamilton distinctly expressed this, he might have avoided +some very groundless criticisms, with which he has been assailed +for maintaining a distinction between the provinces of conception +and belief. +</p> +</div> +<p> +Against Materialism, and virtually against +Positivism in general, he says:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“If in man, intelligence be a free power,—in so far as +its liberty extends, intelligence must be independent of +necessity and matter; and a power independent of matter +necessarily implies the existence of an immaterial subject—that +is, a spirit. If, then, the original independence of +intelligence on matter in the human constitution—in other +words, if the spirituality of mind in man be supposed a +datum of observation, in this datum is also given both the +condition and the proof of a God. For we have only to +infer, what analogy entitles us to do, that intelligence +holds the same relative supremacy in the universe which +it holds in us, and the first positive condition of a Deity +is established, in the establishment of the absolute priority +of a free creative intelligence. On the other hand, let us +suppose the result of our study of man to be, that intelligence +is only a product of matter, only a reflex of organization, +such a doctrine would not only not afford no basis +on which to rest any argument for a God, but, on the +contrary, would positively warrant the atheist in denying +His existence. For if, as the materialist maintains, the +only intelligence of which we have any experience be a +consequent of matter,—on this hypothesis, he not only +cannot assume this order to be reversed in the relations of +an intelligence beyond his observation, but, if he argue +logically, he must positively conclude that, as in man, so +in the universe, the phenomena of intelligence or design +are only in their last analysis the products of a brute +necessity. Psychological Materialism, if carried out fully +and fairly to its conclusions, thus inevitably results in +theological Atheism; as it has been well expressed by Dr. +Henry More, <i>Nullus in microcosmo spiritus, nullus in +macrocosmo Deus</i>. I do not, of course, mean to assert +that all materialists deny or actually disbelieve a God. +For, in very many cases, this would be at once an unmerited +compliment to their reasoning, and an unmerited +reproach to their faith.”—<i>Lectures</i>, vol. i, p. 31.<a name="FNanchor_L" id="FNanchor_L"></a><a href="#Footnote_L" class="fnanchor">[L]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_L' id='Footnote_L'></a><a href='#FNanchor_L'><span class='label'>[L]</span></a> +<p> +This part of Hamilton’s teaching is altogether repudiated by +a recent writer, who, strangely enough, professes to be his disciple, +while rejecting all that is really characteristic of his philosophy. +Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his work on <i>First Principles</i>, endeavours +to press Sir W. Hamilton into the service of Pantheism and Positivism +together, by adopting the negative portion only of his +philosophy—in which, in common with many other writers, he +declares the absolute to be inconceivable by the mere intellect,—and +rejecting the positive portions, in which he most emphatically +maintains that the belief in a personal God is imperatively demanded +by the facts of our moral and emotional consciousness. +Mr. Spencer regards religion as nothing more than a consciousness +of natural facts as being in their ultimate genesis unaccountable—a +theory which is simply a combination of the positivist doctrine, +that we know only the relations of phenomena, with the pantheist +assumption of the name of God to denote the substance or power +which lies beyond phenomena. No theory can be more opposed to +the philosophy of the conditioned than this. Sir W. Hamilton’s +fundamental principle is, that consciousness must be accepted +entire, and that the moral and religious feelings, which are the +primary source of our belief in a personal God, are in no way +invalidated by the merely negative inferences which have deluded +men into the assumption of an impersonal absolute; the latter not +being legitimate deductions from consciousness rightly interpreted. +Mr. Spencer, on the other hand, takes these negative inferences as +the only basis of religion, and abandons Hamilton’s great principle +of the distinction between knowledge and belief, by quietly dropping +out of his system the facts of consciousness which make such +a distinction necessary. His whole system is, in fact, a pertinent +illustration of Hamilton’s remark, that “the phenomena of matter” +[and of mind, he might add, treated by materialistic methods], +“taken by themselves (you will observe the qualification, taken +by themselves), so far from warranting any inference to the existence +of a God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument +to his negation.” Mr. Spencer, like Mr. Mill, denies the freedom +of the will; and this, according to Hamilton, leads by logical consequence +to Atheism. +</p> +</div> +<p> +In the few places in which Hamilton +speaks directly as a theologian, his language +is in agreement with the general voice of +Catholic theology down to the end of the +seventeenth century, some specimens of +which have been given on a previous page. +Thus he says (<i>Discussions</i>, p. 15): “True, +therefore, are the declarations of a pious +philosophy,—‘A God understood would be +no God at all;’ ‘To think that God is, as +we can think Him to be, is blasphemy.’ The +Divinity, in a certain sense, is revealed; in +a certain sense is concealed: He is at once +known and unknown. But the last and +highest consecration of all true religion must +be an altar ’Αγνώστῳ Θεῷ—‘<i>To the unknown +and unknowable God.</i>’” A little later (p. +20) he says: “We should not recoil to the +opposite extreme; and though man be not +identical with the Deity, still is he ‘created +in the image of God.’ It is, indeed, only +through an analogy of the human with the +Divine nature, that we are percipient and +recipient of Divinity.” In the first of these +passages we have an echo of the language +of Basil, the two Cyrils, and John Damascene, +and of our own Hooker and Usher; +while in the second we find the counter +truth, intimated by Augustine and other +Fathers,<a name="FNanchor_M" id="FNanchor_M"></a><a href="#Footnote_M" class="fnanchor">[M]</a> and clearly stated by Aquinas, +and which in the last century was elaborately +expounded in the <i>Divine Analogy</i> +of Bishop Browne,—namely, that though +we know not God in His own nature, yet +are we not wholly ignorant of Him, but +may attain to an imperfect knowledge of +Him through the analogy between human +things and Divine. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_M' id='Footnote_M'></a><a href='#FNanchor_M'><span class='label'>[M]</span></a> +<p> +As <i>e.g.</i>, by Tertullian (<i>Adv. Marc.</i>, l. ii., c. 16): “Et hæc +ergo imago censenda est Dei in homine, quod eosdem motos et +sensus habeat humanus animus quos et Deus, licet non tales quales +Deus: pro substantia enim, et status eorum et exitus distant.” +And by Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. xxxvii.: “Ὠνομάσαμεν γὰρ ὡς ἡμῖν ἐφικτὸν ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ” +And by Hilary, <i>De Trin.</i>, +i. 19: “Comparatio enim terrenorum ad Deum nulla est; sed +infirmitas nostræ intelligentiæ cogit species quasdam ex inferioribus, +tanquam superiorum indices quærere; ut rerum familiarium +consuetudine admovente, ex sensus nostri conscientia ad insoliti +sensus opinionem educeremur.” +</p> +</div> +<p> +As regards theological results, therefore, +there is nothing novel or peculiar in Hamilton’s +teaching; nor was he one who would +have regarded novelty in theology as a recommendation. +The peculiarity of his system, +by which his reputation as a philosopher +must ultimately stand or fall, is the manner +in which he endeavoured to connect these +theological conclusions with psychological +principles; and thus to vindicate on philosophical +grounds the position which Catholic +divines had been compelled to take in the +interests of dogmatic truth. That the absolute +nature of God, as a supertemporal and +yet personal Being, must be believed in as +a fact, though inaccessible to reason as regards +the manner of its possibility, is a +position admitted, almost without exception, +by divines who acknowledge the mystery +of a personal Absolute—still more by those +who acknowledge the yet deeper mystery +of a Trinity in Unity. “We believe and +know,” says Bishop Sanderson of the mysteries +of the Christian faith, “and that with +fulness of assurance, that all these things +are so as they are revealed in the Holy +Scriptures, because the mouth of God, who +is Truth itself, and cannot lie, hath spoken +them; and our own reason upon this ground +teacheth us to submit ourselves and it to +<i>the obedience of faith</i>, for the τὸ ὅτι, that so +it is. But then, for the τὸ πῶς, Nicodemus +his question, <i>How can these things be?</i> it is +no more possible for our weak understandings +to comprehend that, than it is for the +eyes of bats or owls to look steadfastly upon +the body of the sun, when he shineth forth +in his greatest strength.”<a name="FNanchor_N" id="FNanchor_N"></a><a href="#Footnote_N" class="fnanchor">[N]</a> This distinction +Hamilton endeavoured to extend from the +domain of Christian theology to that of philosophical +speculation in general; to show that +the unconditioned, as it is suggested in philosophy, +no less than as it connects itself with +revealed religion, is an object of belief, not +of positive conception; and, consequently, +that men cannot escape from mystery by +rejecting revelation. “Above all,” he says, +“I am confirmed in my belief by the harmony +between the doctrines of this philosophy, +and those of revealed truth.... +For this philosophy is professedly a scientific +demonstration of the impossibility of that +’wisdom in high matters’ which the Apostle +prohibits us even to attempt; and it proposes, +from the limitation of the human +powers, from our impotence to comprehend +what, however, we must admit, to show +articulately why the ‘secret things of God,’ +cannot but be to man ‘past finding out.’”<a name="FNanchor_O" id="FNanchor_O"></a><a href="#Footnote_O" class="fnanchor">[O]</a> +Faith in the inconceivable must thus become +the ultimate refuge, even of the pantheist +and the atheist, no less than of the Christian; +the difference being, that while the +last takes his stand on a faith which is in +agreement alike with the authority of Scripture +and the needs of human nature, the +two former are driven to one which is equally +opposed to both, as well as to the pretensions +of their own philosophy. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_N' id='Footnote_N'></a><a href='#FNanchor_N'><span class='label'>[N]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Works</i>, vol. i., p, 233. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_O' id='Footnote_O'></a><a href='#FNanchor_O'><span class='label'>[O]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Discussions</i>, p. 625. +</p> +</div> +<p> +Deny the Trinity; deny the Personality +of God: there yet remains that which no +man can deny as the law of his own consciousness—<i>Time</i>. +Conditioned existence is +existence in time: to attain to a philosophy +of the unconditioned, we must rise to the +conception of existence out of time. The +attempt may be made in two ways, and in +two only. Either we may endeavour to +conceive an absolutely first moment of time, +beyond which is an existence having no duration +and no succession; or we may endeavour +to conceive time as an unlimited duration, +containing an infinite series of successive +antecedents and consequents, each conditioned +in itself, but forming altogether an +unconditioned whole. In other words, we +may endeavour, with the Eleatics, to conceive +pure existence apart and distinct from +all phenomenal change; or we may endeavour, +with Heraclitus, to conceive the universe +as a system of incessant changes, immutable +only in the law of its own mutability; +for these two systems may be regarded as +the type of all subsequent attempts. Both, +however, alike aim at an object which is +beyond positive conception, and which can +be accepted only as something to be believed +in spite of its inconceivability. To conceive +an existence beyond the first moment of +time, and to connect that existence as cause +with the subsequent temporal succession of +effects, we must conceive time itself as non-existent +and then commencing to exist. But +when we make the effort to conceive time +as non-existent, we find it impossible to do +so. Time, as the universal condition of +human consciousness, clings round the very +conception which strives to destroy it, clings +round the language in which we speak of an +existence <i>before</i> time. Nor are we more +successful when we attempt to conceive an +infinite regress of time, and an infinite series +of dependent existences in time. To say +nothing of the direct contradiction involved +in the notion of an unconditioned <i>whole</i>,—a +something completed,—composed of infinite +parts—of parts never completed,—even if we +abandon the Whole, and with it the Unconditioned, +and attempt merely to conceive an +infinite succession of conditioned existences—conditioned, +absurdly enough, by nothing +beyond themselves,—we find, that in order +to do so, we must add moment to moment +for ever—a process which would require an +eternity for its accomplishment.<a name="FNanchor_P" id="FNanchor_P"></a><a href="#Footnote_P" class="fnanchor">[P]</a> Moreover, +the chain of dependent existences in this +infinite succession is not, like a mathematical +series, composed of abstract and homogeneous +units; it is made up of divers phenomena, +of a regressive line of causes, each distinct +from the other. Wherever, therefore, I stop +in my addition, I do not positively conceive +the terms which lie beyond. I apprehend +them only as a series of unknown <i>somethings</i>, +of which I may believe <i>that</i> they are, but am +unable to say <i>what</i> they are. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_P' id='Footnote_P'></a><a href='#FNanchor_P'><span class='label'>[P]</span></a> +<p> +See <i>Discussions</i>, p. 29. Of course by this is not meant that +no duration can be conceived except in a duration equally long—that +a thousand years, <i>e.g.</i>, can only be conceived in a thousand +years. A thousand years may be conceived as one unit: infinity +cannot; for an unit is something complete, and therefore limited. +What is meant is, that any period of time, however long, is conceived +as capable of further increase, and therefore as not infinite. +An infinite duration can have no time before or after it; and thus +cannot resemble any portion of finite time, however great. When +we dream of conceiving an infinite regress of time, says Sir W. +Hamilton, “we only deceive ourselves by substituting the <i>indefinite</i> +for the infinite, than which no two notions can be more +opposed.” This caution has not been attended to by some later +critics. Thus, Dr. Whewell (<i>Philosophy of Discovery</i>, p. 324) says: +“The definition of an infinite number is not that it contains all +possible unities; but this—that the progress of numeration, being +begun according to a certain law, goes on without limit.” This is +precisely Descartes’ definition, not of the <i>infinite</i>, but of the <i>indefinite</i>. +<i>Principia</i>, i. 26: “Nos autem illa omnia, in quibus sub +aliqua consideratione nullum finem poterimus invenire, non quidem +affirmabimus esse infinita, sed ut indefinita spectabimus.” An +indefinite time is that which is capable of perpetual addition: an +infinite time is one so great as to admit of no addition. Surely +“no two notions can be more opposed.” +</p> +</div> +<p> +The cardinal point, then, of Sir W. Hamilton’s +philosophy, expressly announced as such +by himself, is the absolute necessity, under +any system of philosophy whatever, of acknowledging +the existence of a sphere of +belief beyond the limits of the sphere of +thought. “The main scope of my speculation,”<a name="FNanchor_Q" id="FNanchor_Q"></a><a href="#Footnote_Q" class="fnanchor">[Q]</a> +he says, “is to show articulately that +we <i>must believe</i>, as actual, much that we are +unable (positively) <i>to conceive</i> as even possible.” +It is, of course, beyond the range +of such a speculation, by itself, to enter on +an examination of the positive evidences in +support of one form of belief rather than +another. So far as it aims only at exhibiting +an universal law of the human mind, it is of +course compatible with all special forms of +belief which do not contradict that law; and +none, whatever their pretensions, can really +contradict it. Hence the service which such +a philosophy can render to the Christian religion +must necessarily, from the nature of the +case, be of an indirect and negative character. +It prepares the way for a fair examination +of the proper evidences of Christianity, by +showing that there is no ground for any <i>à +priori</i> prejudice against revelation, as appealing, +for the acceptance of its highest truths, +to faith rather than to reason; for that this +appeal is common to all religions and to all +philosophies, and cannot therefore be urged +against one more than another. So far as +certain difficulties are inherent in the constitution +of the human mind itself, they must +necessarily occupy the same position with +respect to all religions alike. To exhibit the +nature of these difficulties is a service to true +religion; but it is the service of the pioneer, +not of the builder; it does not prove the +religion to be true; it only clears the ground +for the production of the special evidences. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_Q' id='Footnote_Q'></a><a href='#FNanchor_Q'><span class='label'>[Q]</span></a> +<p> +Letter to Mr. Calderwood. See <i>Lectures</i>, vol. ii, p. 534. +</p> +</div> +<p> +Where those evidences are to be found, +Sir W. Hamilton has not failed to tell us. +If mere intellectual speculations on the +nature and origin of the material universe +form a common ground in which the theist, +the pantheist, and even the atheist, may +alike expatiate, the moral and religious feelings +of man—those facts of consciousness +which have their direct source in the sense of +personality and free will—plead with overwhelming +evidence in behalf of a personal +God, and of man’s relation to Him, as a +person to a person. We have seen, in a previous +quotation, Hamilton’s emphatic declaration +that “psychological materialism, if +carried out fully and fairly to its conclusions, +inevitably results in theological atheism.” +In the same spirit he tells us that “it is only +as man is a free intelligence, a moral power, +that he is created after the image of God;”<a name="FNanchor_R" id="FNanchor_R"></a><a href="#Footnote_R" class="fnanchor">[R]</a> +that “with the proof of the moral nature of +man, stands or falls the proof of the existence +of a Deity;” that “the possibility of morality +depends on the possibility of liberty;” that +“if man be not a free agent, he is not the +author of his actions, and has therefore no +responsibility, no moral personality at all;”<a name="FNanchor_S" id="FNanchor_S"></a><a href="#Footnote_S" class="fnanchor">[S]</a> +and, finally, “that he who disbelieves the +moral agency of man, must, in consistency +with that opinion, disbelieve Christianity.”<a name="FNanchor_T" id="FNanchor_T"></a><a href="#Footnote_T" class="fnanchor">[T]</a> +We have thus, in the positive and negative +sides of this philosophy, both a reasonable +ground of belief and a warning against presumption. +By our immediate consciousness +of a moral and personal nature, we are led to +the belief in a moral and personal God: by +our ignorance of the unconditioned, we are +led to the further belief, that behind that +moral and personal manifestation of God +there lies concealed a mystery—the mystery +of the Absolute and the Infinite; that our +intellectual and moral qualities, though indicating +the nearest approach to the Divine +Perfections which we are capable of conceiving, +yet indicate them as analogous, not as +identical; that we may naturally expect to +find points where this analogy will fail us, +where the function of the Infinite Moral +Governor will be distinct from that of the +finite moral servant; and where, consequently, +we shall be liable to error in judging +by human rules of the ways of God, whether +manifested in nature or in revelation. Such +is the true lesson to be learnt from a philosophy +which tells us of a God who is “in a +certain sense revealed, in a certain sense concealed—at +once known and unknown.” +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_R' id='Footnote_R'></a><a href='#FNanchor_R'><span class='label'>[R]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Lectures</i>, vol. i., p. 30. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_S' id='Footnote_S'></a><a href='#FNanchor_S'><span class='label'>[S]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Lectures</i>, vol. i, p. 33. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_T' id='Footnote_T'></a><a href='#FNanchor_T'><span class='label'>[T]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 42. +</p> +</div> +<p> +It is not surprising that this philosophy, +when compared with that of a critic like Mr. +Mill, should stand out in clear and sharp +antagonism. Mr. Mill is one of the most +distinguished representatives of that school +of Materialism which Sir W. Hamilton denounces +as virtual Atheism. We do not +mean that he consciously adopts the grosser +tenets of the materialists. We are not aware +that he has ever positively denied the existence +of a soul distinct from the body, or +maintained that the brain secretes thought +as the liver secretes bile. But he is the +advocate of a philosophical method which +makes the belief in the existence of an immaterial +principle superfluous and incongruous; +he not only acknowledges no such distinction +between the phenomena of mind and those of +matter as to require the hypothesis of a free +intelligence to account for it; he not only +regards the ascertained laws of coexistence +and succession in material phenomena as the +type and rule according to which all phenomena +whatever—those of internal consciousness +no less than of external observation—are +to be tested; but he even expressly denies +the existence of that free will which Sir W. +Hamilton regards as the indispensable condition +of all morality and all religion.<a name="FNanchor_U" id="FNanchor_U"></a><a href="#Footnote_U" class="fnanchor">[U]</a> Thus, +instead of recognising in the facts of intelligence +“an order of existence diametrically +in contrast to that displayed to us in the +facts of the material universe,”<a name="FNanchor_V" id="FNanchor_V"></a><a href="#Footnote_V" class="fnanchor">[V]</a> he regards +both classes of facts as of the same kind, and +explicable by the same laws; he abolishes +the primary contrast of consciousness between +the <i>ego</i> and the <i>non-ego</i>—the person and the +thing; he reduces man to a thing, instead of +a person,—to one among the many phenomena +of the universe, determined by the +same laws of invariable antecedence and consequence, +included under the same formulæ +of empirical generalization. He thus makes +man the slave, and not the master of nature; +passively carried along in the current of +successive phenomena; unable, by any act +of free will, to arrest a single wave in its +course, or to divert it from its ordained +direction. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_U' id='Footnote_U'></a><a href='#FNanchor_U'><span class='label'>[U]</span></a> +<p> +That this is the real battle-ground between the two philosophers +is virtually admitted by Mr. Mill himself at the end of his +criticism. He says:—“The whole philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton +seems to have had its character determined by the requirements of +the doctrine of Free-will; and to that doctrine he clung, because +he had persuaded himself that it afforded the only premises from +which human reason could deduce the doctrines of natural religion. +I believe that in this persuasion he was thoroughly his own dupe, +and that his speculations have weakened the philosophical foundation +of religion fully as much as they have confirmed it.”—P. 549. +Mr. Mill’s whole philosophy, on the other hand, is determined by +the requirements of the doctrine of Necessity; and to that doctrine +he intrepidly adheres, in utter defiance of consciousness, and sometimes +of his own consistency. Which of the two philosophers is +really “his own dupe,” Mr. Mill in believing that morality and +religion can exist without free will—that a necessary agent can be +responsible for his acts—or Sir W. Hamilton in maintaining the +contrary, is a question which the former has by no means satisfactorily +settled in his own favour. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_V' id='Footnote_V'></a><a href='#FNanchor_V'><span class='label'>[V]</span></a> +<p> +Hamilton, <i>Lectures</i>, vol. i, p. 29. +</p> +</div> +<p> +This diametrical antagonism between the +two philosophers is not limited to their first +principles, but extends, as might naturally be +expected, to every subordinate science of +which the immediate object is mental, and +not material. Logic, instead of being, as +Sir W. Hamilton regards it, an <i>à priori</i> +science of the necessary laws of thought, is +with Mr. Mill a science of observation, +investigating those operations of the understanding +which are subservient to the +estimation of evidence.<a name="FNanchor_W" id="FNanchor_W"></a><a href="#Footnote_W" class="fnanchor">[W]</a> The axioms of +Mathematics, which the former philosopher +regards, with Kant, as necessary thoughts, +based on the <i>à priori</i> intuitions of space and +time, the latter<a name="FNanchor_X" id="FNanchor_X"></a><a href="#Footnote_X" class="fnanchor">[X]</a> declares to be “experimental +truths; generalizations from observation.” +Psychology, which with Hamilton is especially +the philosophy of man as a free and +personal agent, is with Mill the science of +“the uniformities of succession; the laws, +whether ultimate or derivative, according to +which one mental state succeeds another.”<a name="FNanchor_Y" id="FNanchor_Y"></a><a href="#Footnote_Y" class="fnanchor">[Y]</a> +And finally, in the place of Ethics, as the +science of the <i>à priori</i> laws of man’s moral +obligations, we are presented, in Mr. Mill’s +system, with Ethology, the “science which +determines the kind of character produced, +in conformity to the general laws of mind, +by any set of circumstances, physical and +moral.”<a name="FNanchor_Z" id="FNanchor_Z"></a><a href="#Footnote_Z" class="fnanchor">[Z]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_W' id='Footnote_W'></a><a href='#FNanchor_W'><span class='label'>[W]</span></a> +<p> +Mill’s <i>Logic</i>. Introduction, § 7. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_X' id='Footnote_X'></a><a href='#FNanchor_X'><span class='label'>[X]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Ibid.</i>, book ii. 5, § 4. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_Y' id='Footnote_Y'></a><a href='#FNanchor_Y'><span class='label'>[Y]</span></a> +<p> +Mill’s <i>Logic</i>, book vi. 4, § 3. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_Z' id='Footnote_Z'></a><a href='#FNanchor_Z'><span class='label'>[Z]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Ibid.</i>, book vi. 5, § 4. +</p> +</div> +<p> +The contrast between the two philosophers +being thus thoroughgoing, it was natural to +expect beforehand that an <i>Examination of +Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy</i>, by Mr. +Mill, would contain a sharp and vigorous +assault on the principal doctrines of that +philosophy. And this expectation has been +amply fulfilled. But there was also reason +to expect, from the ability and critical power +displayed in Mr. Mill’s previous writings, +that his assault, whether successful or not in +overthrowing his enemy, would at least be +guided by a clear knowledge of that enemy’s +position and purposes; that his dissent would +be accompanied by an intelligent apprehension, +and an accurate statement, of the doctrines +dissented from. In this expectation, +we regret to say, we have been disappointed. +Not only is Mr. Mill’s attack on Hamilton’s +philosophy, with the exception of some minor +details, unsuccessful; but we are compelled +to add, that with regard to the three fundamental +doctrines of that philosophy—the +Relativity of Knowledge, the Incognisability +of the Absolute and Infinite, and the distinction +between Reason and Faith—Mr. +Mill has, throughout his criticism, altogether +missed the meaning of the theories he is +attempting to assail. +</p> +<p> +This is a serious charge to bring against a +writer of such eminence as Mr. Mill, and one +which should not be advanced without ample +proof. First, then, of the Relativity of +Knowledge. +</p> +<p> +The assertion that all our knowledge is +relative,—in other words, that we know +things only under such conditions as the +laws of our cognitive faculties impose upon +us,—is a statement which looks at first sight +like a truism, but which really contains an +answer to a very important question,—Have +we reason to believe that the laws of our +cognitive faculties impose any conditions at +all?—that the mind in any way reacts on +the objects affecting it, so as to produce a +result different from that which would be +produced were it merely a passive recipient? +“The mind of man,” says Bacon, “is far +from the nature of a clear and equal glass, +wherein the beams of things shall reflect +according to their true incidence; nay, it is +rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition +and imposture, if it be not delivered +and reduced.” Can what Bacon says of the +fallacies of the mind be also said of its proper +cognitions? Does the mind, by its own +action, in any way distort the appearance of +the things presented to it; and if so, how far +does the distortion extend, and in what manner +is it to be rectified? To trace the course +of this inquiry, from the day when Plato +compared the objects perceived by the senses +to the shadows thrown by fire on the wall of +a cave, to the day when Kant declared that +we know only phenomena, not things in +themselves, would be to write the history of +philosophy. We can only at present call +attention to one movement in that history, +which, was, in effect, a revolution in philosophy. +The older philosophers in general +distinguished between the senses and the +intellect, regarding the former as deceptive +and concerned with phenomena alone, the +latter as trustworthy and conversant with +the realities of things. Hence arose the +distinction between the sensible and the +intelligible world—between things as perceived +by sense and things as apprehended +by intellect—between Phenomenology and +Ontology. Kant rejected this distinction, +holding that the intellect, as well as the +sense, imposes its own forms on the things +presented to it, and is therefore cognisant only +of phenomena, not of things in themselves. +The logical result of this position would +be the abolition of ontology as a science +of things in themselves, and, <i>à fortiori</i>, of +that highest branch of ontology which aims +at a knowledge of the Absolute<a name="FNanchor_AA" id="FNanchor_AA"></a><a href="#Footnote_AA" class="fnanchor">[AA]</a> κατ’ ἐξοχήν, +of the unconditioned first principle of all +things. If the mind, in every act of thought, +imposes its own forms on its objects, to think +is to condition, and the unconditioned is the +unthinkable. Such was the logical result of +Kant’s principles, but not the actual result. +For Kant, by distinguishing between the +Understanding and the Reason, and giving +to the latter an indirect yet positive cognition +of the Unconditioned as a regulative principle +of thought, prepared the way for the +systems of Schelling and Hegel, in which +this indirect cognition is converted into a +direct one, by investing the reason, thus +distinguished as the special faculty of the +unconditioned, with a power of intuition +emancipated from the conditions of space and +time, and even of subject and object, or a +power of thought emancipated from the laws +of identity and contradiction. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AA' id='Footnote_AA'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AA'><span class='label'>[AA]</span></a> +<p> +The term <i>absolute</i>, in the sense of <i>free from relation</i>, may be +used in two applications;—1st, To denote the nature of a thing +as it is in itself, as distinguished from its appearance to us. Here +it is used only in a subordinate sense, as meaning out of relation to +human knowledge. 2ndly, To denote the nature of a thing as +independent of all other things, as having no relation to any other +thing as the condition of its existence. Here it is used in its +highest sense, as meaning out of relation to anything else. +</p> +</div> +<p> +The theory of Hamilton is a modification +of that of Kant, intended to obviate these +consequences, and to relieve the Kantian +doctrine itself from the inconsistency which +gave rise to them. So long as the reason is +regarded as a separate faculty from the +understanding, and things in themselves as +ideas of the reason, so long the apparent +contradictions, which encumber the attempt +to conceive the unconditioned, must be regarded +as inherent in the constitution of the +reason itself, and as the result of its legitimate +exercise on its proper objects. This +sceptical conclusion Hamilton endeavoured +to avoid by rejecting the distinction between +the understanding and the reason as separate +faculties, regarding the one as the legitimate +and positive, the other as the illegitimate +and negative, exercise of one and the same +faculty. He thus announces, in opposition +to Kant, the fundamental doctrine of the +Conditioned, as “the distinction between +intelligence <i>within</i> its legitimate sphere of +operation, impeccable, and intelligence <i>beyond</i> +that sphere, affording (by abuse) the occasions +of error.”<a name="FNanchor_AB" id="FNanchor_AB"></a><a href="#Footnote_AB" class="fnanchor">[AB]</a> Hamilton, like Kant, maintained +that all our cognitions are compounded of +two elements, one contributed by the object +known, and the other by the mind knowing. +But the very conception of a relation implies +the existence of things to be related; and +the knowledge of an object, as in relation to +our mind, necessarily implies its existence +out of that relation. But as so existing, it +is unknown: we believe <i>that</i> it is; we know +not <i>what</i> it is. How far it resembles, or how +far it does not resemble, the object apprehended +by us, we cannot say, for we have +no means of comparing the two together. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AB' id='Footnote_AB'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AB'><span class='label'>[AB]</span></a> +<p> + <i>Discussions</i>, p. 633. +</p> +</div> +<p> +Instead; therefore, of saying with Kant, that +reason is subject to an inevitable delusion, by +which, it mistakes the regulative principles of +its own thoughts for the representations of +real things, Hamilton would say that the +reason, while compelled to believe in the existence +of these real things, is not legitimately +entitled to make any positive representation +of them as of such or such a nature; and +that the contradictions into which it falls +when attempting to do so are due to an +illegitimate attempt to transcend the proper +boundaries of positive thought. +</p> +<p> +This theory does not, in itself, contain any +statement of the mode in which we perceive +the material world, whether directly by presentation, +or indirectly by representative +images; and perhaps it might, without any +great violence, be adapted to more than one +of the current hypotheses on this point. But +that to which it most easily adjusts itself is +that maintained by Hamilton himself under +the name of <i>Natural Realism</i>. To speak of +perception as a <i>relation</i> between mind and +matter, naturally implies the presence of +both correlatives; though each may be modified +by its contact with the other. The acid +may act on the alkali, and the alkali on the +acid, in forming the neutral salt; but each +of the ingredients is as truly present as the +other, though each enters into the compound +in a modified form. And this is equally the +case in perception, even if we suppose various +media to intervene between the ultimate +object and the perceiving mind,—such, <i>e.g.</i>, +as the rays of light and the sensitive organism +in vision,—so long as these media +are material, like the ultimate object itself. +Whether the object, properly so called, in +vision, be the rays of light in contact with +the organ, or the body emitting or reflecting +those rays, is indifferent to the present question, +so long as a material object of some +kind or other is supposed to be perceived, +and not merely an inmaterial representation +of such an object. To speak of our perceptions +as mere modifications of mind produced +by an unknown cause, would be like maintaining +that the acid is modified by the +influence of the alkali without entering into +combination with it. Such a view might +perhaps be tolerated, in connection with the +theory of relativity, by an indulgent interpretation +of language, but it is certainly not +that which the language of the theory most +naturally suggests. +</p> +<p> +All this Mr. Mill entirely misapprehends. +He quotes a passage from Hamilton’s Lectures, +in which the above theory of Relativity +is clearly stated as the mean between the +extremes of Idealism and Materialism, and +then proceeds to comment as follows:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“The proposition, that our cognitions of objects are +only in part dependent on the objects themselves, and in +part on elements superadded by our organs or our minds, +is not identical, nor <i>prima facie</i> absurd. It cannot, however, +warrant the assertion that all our knowledge, but +only that the part so added, is relative. If our author +had gone as far as Kant, and had said that all which +constitutes knowledge is put in by the mind itself, he +would have really held, in one of its forms, the doctrine +of the relativity of our knowledge. But what he does +say, far from implying that the whole of our knowledge is +relative, distinctly imports that all of it which, is real and +authentic is the reverse. If any part of what we fancy +that we perceive in the objects themselves, originates in +the perceiving organs or in the cognising mind, thus much +is purely relative; but since, by supposition, it does not +all so originate, the part that does not is as much absolute +as if it were not liable to be mixed up with, these delusive +subjective impressions.”—(P. 30.) +</p> +<p> +Mr. Mill, therefore, supposes that <i>wholly +relative</i> must mean <i>wholly mental</i>; in other +words, that to say that a thing is wholly due +to a relation between mind and matter is +equivalent to saying that it is wholly due to +mind alone. On the contrary, we maintain +that Sir W. Hamilton’s language is far more +accurate than Mr. Mill’s, and that the above +theory can with perfect correctness be described +as one of <i>total relativity</i>; and this +from two points of view. First, as opposed +to the theory of partial relativity generally +held by the pre-Kantian philosophers, according +to which our sensitive cognitions +are relative, our intellectual ones absolute. +Secondly, as asserting that the object of +perception, though composed of elements +partly material, partly mental, yet exhibits +both alike in a form modified by their relation +to each other. The composition is not a +mere mechanical juxtaposition, in which each +part, though acting on the other, retains its +own characteristics unchanged. It may be +rather likened to a chemical fusion, in which +both elements are present, but each of them +is affected by the composition. The material +part, therefore, is not “as much absolute as +if it were not liable to be mixed up with +subjective impressions.” +</p> +<p> +But we must hear the continuation of Mr. +Mill’s criticism:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“The admixture of the relative element not only does +not take away the absolute character of the remainder, but +does not even (if our author is right) prevent us from +recognising it. The confusion, according to him, is not +inextricable. It is for us to ‘analyse and distinguish +what elements’ in an ‘act of knowledge’ are contributed +by the object, and what by our organs, or by the mind. +We may neglect to do this, and as far as the mind’s share +is concerned, we can only do it by the help of philosophy; +but it is a task to which, in his opinion, philosophy is +equal. By thus stripping off such of the elements in our +apparent cognitions of things as are but cognitions of +something in us, and consequently relative, we may +succeed in uncovering the pure nucleus, the direct intuitions +of things in themselves; as we correct the observed +positions of the heavenly bodies by allowing for the error +due to the refracting influence of the atmospheric medium, +an influence which does not alter the facts, but only our +perception of them.” +</p> +<p> +Surely Mr. Mill here demands much more +of philosophy than Sir W. Hamilton deems +it capable of accomplishing. Why may not +Hamilton, like Kant, distinguish between the +permanent and necessary, and the variable +and contingent—in other words, between the +subjective and the objective elements of +consciousness, without therefore obtaining a +“direct intuition of things in themselves?” +Why may he not distinguish between space +and time as the forms of our sensitive cognitions, +and the things perceived in space and +time, which constitute the matter of the +same cognitions, without thereby having an +intuition, on the one hand, of pure space and +time with nothing in them, or on the other, +of things in themselves out of space and time? +If certain elements are always present in +perception, while certain others change with +every act, I may surely infer that the one is +due to the permanent subject, the other to +the variable object, without thereby knowing +what each would be if it could be discerned +apart from the other. “A direct intuition +of things in themselves,” according to Kant +and Hamilton, is an intuition of things out +of space and time. Does Mr. Mill suppose +that any natural Realist professes to have +such an intuition? +</p> +<p> +The same error of supposing that a doctrine +of relativity is necessarily a doctrine of +Idealism, that “matter known only in relation +to us” can mean nothing more than “matter +known only through the mental impressions +of which it is the unknown cause,”<a name="FNanchor_AC" id="FNanchor_AC"></a><a href="#Footnote_AC" class="fnanchor">[AC]</a> runs +through the whole of Mr. Mill’s argument +against this portion of Sir W. Hamilton’s +teaching. That argument, though repeated +in various forms, may be briefly summed up +in one thesis; namely, that the doctrine +that our knowledge of matter is wholly +relative is incompatible with the distinction, +which Hamilton expressly makes, between +the primary and secondary qualities of +body. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AC' id='Footnote_AC'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AC'><span class='label'>[AC]</span></a> +<p> +The assumption that these two expressions are or ought to be +synonymous is tacitly made by Mr. Mill at the opening of this +chapter. He opens it with a passage from the <i>Discussions</i>, in +which Hamilton says that the existence of <i>things in themselves</i> is +only indirectly revealed to us “through certain qualities <i>related to +our faculties of knowledge</i>;” and then proceeds to show that the +author did not hold the doctrine which these phrases “seem to +convey in the only substantial meaning capable of being attached +to them;” namely, “that we know nothing of <i>objects</i> except their +existence, and the impressions produced by them upon the human +mind.” Having thus quietly assumed that “things in themselves” +are identical with “objects,” and “relations” with “impressions +on the human mind,” Mr. Mill bases his whole criticism on this +tacit <i>petitio principii</i>. He is not aware that though Reid sometimes +uses the term <i>relative</i> in this inaccurate sense, Hamilton expressly +points out the inaccuracy and explains the proper sense.—(See +<i>Reid’s Works</i>, pp. 313, 322.) +</p> +</div> +<p> +The most curious circumstance about this +criticism is, that, if not directly borrowed +from, it has at least been carefully anticipated +by, Hamilton himself. Of the distinction +between primary and secondary qualities, +as acknowledged by Descartes and Locke, +whose theory of external perception is identical +with that which Mr. Mill would force on +Hamilton himself, Hamilton says: “On the +general doctrine, however, of these philosophers, +both classes of qualities, as known, are +confessedly only states of our own minds; +and while we have no right from a subjective +affection to infer the existence, far less the +corresponding character of the existence, of +any objective reality, it is evident that their +doctrine, if fairly evolved, would result in a +dogmatic or in a sceptical negation of the +primary no less than of the secondary qualities +of body, as more than appearances in and +for us.”<a name="FNanchor_AD" id="FNanchor_AD"></a><a href="#Footnote_AD" class="fnanchor">[AD]</a> It is astonishing that Mr. Mill, +who pounces eagerly on every imaginable +instance of Hamilton’s inconsistency, should +have neglected to notice this, which, if his +criticism be true, is the most glaring inconsistency +of all. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AD' id='Footnote_AD'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AD'><span class='label'>[AD]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Reid’s Works</i>, p. 840. +</p> +</div> +<p> +But Hamilton continues: “It is therefore +manifest that the fundamental position of a +consistent theory of dualistic realism is—that +our cognitions of Extension and its modes +are not wholly ideal—that although Space be +a native, necessary, <i>à priori</i> form of imagination, +and so far, therefore, a mere subjective +state, that there is, at the same time, competent +to us, in an <i>immediate</i> perception +of external things, the <i>consciousness</i> of a +really existent, of a really objective, <i>extended</i> +world.” Here we have enunciated in one +breath, first the subjectivity of space, which +is the logical basis of the relative theory of +perception; and secondly, the objectivity of +the extended world, which is the logical +basis of the distinction between primary and +secondary qualities. It is manifest, therefore, +that Hamilton had not, as Mr. Mill +supposes, ceased to hold the one theory when +he adopted the other.<a name="FNanchor_AE" id="FNanchor_AE"></a><a href="#Footnote_AE" class="fnanchor">[AE]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AE' id='Footnote_AE'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AE'><span class='label'>[AE]</span></a> +<p> +See <i>Examination</i>, p. 28. +</p> +</div> +<p> +The key to all this is not difficult to find. +It is simply that <i>objective existence</i> does not +mean existence <i>per se</i>; and that a <i>phenomenon</i> +does not mean a mere mode of mind. +Objective existence is existence <i>as an object</i>, +in perception, and therefore in relation; and +a phenomenon may be material, as well as +mental. The thing <i>per se</i> may be only the +unknown cause of what we directly know; +but what we directly know is something +more than our own sensations. In other +words, the phenomenal effect is material as +well as the cause, and is, indeed, that from +which our primary conceptions of matter are +derived. Matter does not cease to be matter +when modified by its contact with mind, as +iron does not cease to be iron when smelted +and forged. A horseshoe is something very +different from a piece of iron ore; and a man +may be acquainted with the former without +ever having seen the latter, or knowing what +it is like. But would Mr. Mill therefore say +that the horseshoe is merely a subjective +affection of the skill of the smith—that it is +not iron modified by the workman, but the +workman or his art impressed by iron? +</p> +<p> +If, indeed, Hamilton had said with Locke, +that the primary qualities are in the bodies +themselves, whether we perceive them or +no,<a name="FNanchor_AF" id="FNanchor_AF"></a><a href="#Footnote_AF" class="fnanchor">[AF]</a> he would have laid himself open to Mr. +Mill’s criticism. But he expressly rejects +this statement, and contrasts it with the +more cautions language of Descartes, “ut +sunt, vel saltem esse possunt.”<a name="FNanchor_AG" id="FNanchor_AG"></a><a href="#Footnote_AG" class="fnanchor">[AG]</a> The secondary +qualities are mere affections of consciousness, +which, cannot be conceived as existing +except in a conscious subject. The primary +qualities are qualities of body, as perceived +in relation to the percipient mind, <i>i.e.</i>, of +the phenomenal body perceived as in space. +How far they exist in the real body out of +relation to us, Hamilton does not attempt +to decide.<a name="FNanchor_AH" id="FNanchor_AH"></a><a href="#Footnote_AH" class="fnanchor">[AH]</a> They are inseparable from our +conception of body, which, is derived exclusively +from the phenomenon; they may or +may not be separable from the thing as it is +in itself. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AF' id='Footnote_AF'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AF'><span class='label'>[AF]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Essay</i>, ii 8, § 23. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AG' id='Footnote_AG'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AG'><span class='label'>[AG]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Reid’s Works</i>, p. 839. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AH' id='Footnote_AH'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AH'><span class='label'>[AH]</span></a> +<p> +We have been content to argue this question, as Mr. Mill +himself argues it, on the supposition that Sir W. Hamilton held +that we are directly percipient of primary qualities in external +bodies. Strictly speaking, however, Hamilton held that the primary +qualities are immediately perceived only in our organism as +extended, and inferred to exist in extra-organic bodies. The external +world is immediately apprehended only in its secundo-primary +character, as resisting our locomotive energy. But as the +organism, in this theory, is a material <i>non-ego</i> equally with the rest +of matter, and as to press this distinction would only affect the +verbal accuracy, not the substantial justice, of Mr. Mill’s criticisms, +we have preferred to meet him on the ground he has himself +chosen. The same error, of supposing that “presentationism” +is identical with “noumenalism,” and “phenomenalism” with “representationism,” +runs through the whole of Mr. Stirling’s recent +criticism of Hamilton’s theory of perception. It is curious, however, +that the very passage (<i>Lectures</i>, i., p. 146) which Mr. Mill +cites as proving that Hamilton, in spite of his professed phenomenalism, +was an unconscious noumenalist, is employed by Mr. +Stirling to prove that, in spite of his professed presentationism, he +was an unconscious representationist. The two critics tilt at +Hamilton from opposite quarters: he has only to stand aside and +let them run against each other. +</p> +</div> +<p> +Under this explanation, it is manifest that +the doctrine, that matter as a subject or +substratum of attributes is unknown and +unknowable, is totally different from that of +cosmothetic idealism, with which Mr Mill +confounds it;<a name="FNanchor_AI" id="FNanchor_AI"></a><a href="#Footnote_AI" class="fnanchor">[AI]</a> and that a philosopher may +without inconsistency accept the former and +reject the latter. The former, while it holds +the material substance to be unknown, does +not deny that some of the attributes of +matter are perceived immediately as material, +though, it may be, modified by contact with +mind. The latter maintains that the attributes, +as well as the substance, are not +perceived immediately as material, but mediately +through the intervention of immaterial +representatives. It is also manifest that, +in answer to Mr. Mill’s question, which of +Hamilton’s two “cardinal doctrines,” Relativity +or Natural Realism, “is to be taken in +a non-natural sense,”<a name="FNanchor_AJ" id="FNanchor_AJ"></a><a href="#Footnote_AJ" class="fnanchor">[AJ]</a> we must say, neither. +The two doctrines are quite compatible with +each other, and neither requires a non-natural +interpretation to reconcile it to its companion. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AI' id='Footnote_AI'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AI'><span class='label'>[AI]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Examination</i>, p. 23. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AJ' id='Footnote_AJ'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AJ'><span class='label'>[AJ]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Examination</i>, p. 20. +</p> +</div> +<p> +The doctrine of relativity derives its chief +practical value from its connection with the +next great doctrine of Hamilton’s philosophy, +the incognisability of the Absolute and the +Infinite. For this doctrine brings Ontology +into contact with Theology; and it is only in +relation to theology that ontology acquires a +practical importance. With respect to the +other two “ideas of the pure reason,” as +Kant calls them, the human soul and the +world, the question, whether we know them +as realities or as phenomena, may assist us in +dealing with certain metaphysical difficulties, +but need not affect our practical conduct. +For we have an immediate intuition of the +attributes of mind and matter, at least as +phenomenal objects, and by these intuitions +may be tested the accuracy of the conceptions +derived from them, sufficiently for all practical +purposes. A man will equally avoid +walking over a precipice, and is logically as +consistent in avoiding it, whether he regard +the precipice as a real thing, or as a mere +phenomenon. But in the province of theology +this is not the case. We have no immediate +intuition of the Divine attributes, +even as phenomena; we only infer their +existence and nature from certain similar +attributes of which we are immediately conscious +in ourselves. And hence arises the +question, How far does the similarity extend, +and to what extent is the accuracy of our +conceptions guaranteed by the intuition, not +of the object to be conceived, but of something +more or less nearly resembling it? But +this is not all. Our knowledge of God, originally +derived from personal consciousness, +receives accession from two other sources—from +the external world, as His work; and +from revelation, as His word; and the +conclusions derived from each have to be +compared together. Should any discrepancy +arise between them, are we at once warranted +in rejecting one class of conclusions in favour +of the other two, or two in favour of the +third? or are we at liberty to say that our +knowledge in respect of all alike is of such +an imperfect and indirect character that we +are warranted in believing that some reconciliation +may exist, though our ignorance +prevents us from discovering what it is? +Here at least is a practical question of the +very highest importance. In the early part +of our previous remarks, we have endeavoured +to show how this question has been +answered by orthodox theologians of various +ages, and how Sir W. Hamilton’s philosophy +supports that answer. We have now to consider +Mr Mill’s chapter of criticisms. +</p> +<p> +It is always unfortunate to make a stumble +on the threshold; and Mr. Mill’s opening +paragraph makes two. “The name of God,” +he says, “is veiled under two extremely +abstract phrases, ’the Infinite and the Absolute.’... +But it is one of the most +unquestionable of all logical maxims, that +the meaning of the abstract must be sought +in the concrete, and not conversely.”<a name="FNanchor_AK" id="FNanchor_AK"></a><a href="#Footnote_AK" class="fnanchor">[AK]</a>—Now, +in the first place, “the Infinite” and “the +Absolute,” even in the sense in which they +are both predicable of God, are no more +names of God than “the creature” and “the +finite” are names of man. They are the +names of certain attributes, which further +inquiry may, perhaps, show to belong to God +and to no other being, but which do not in +their signification express this, and do not +constitute our primary idea of God, which is +that of a Person. Men may believe in an +absolute and infinite, without in any proper +sense believing in God; and thousands upon +thousands of pious men have prayed to a +personal God, who have never heard of the +absolute and the infinite, and who would not +understand the expressions if they heard +them. But, in the second place, “the absolute” +and “the infinite,” in Sir W. Hamilton’s +sense of the terms, cannot both be names of +God, for the simple reason that they are contradictory +of each other, and are proposed as +alternatives which cannot both be accepted as +predicates of the same subject. For Hamilton, +whatever Mr. Mill may do, did not fall +into the absurdity of maintaining that God +in some of His attributes is absolute without +being infinite, and in others is infinite without +being absolute.<a name="FNanchor_AL" id="FNanchor_AL"></a><a href="#Footnote_AL" class="fnanchor">[AL]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AK' id='Footnote_AK'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AK'><span class='label'>[AK]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Examination</i>, p. 32. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AL' id='Footnote_AL'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AL'><span class='label'>[AL]</span></a> +<p> +See <i>Examination</i>, p. 35. +</p> +</div> +<p> +But we have not yet done with this single +paragraph. After thus making two errors in +his exposition of his opponent’s doctrine, Mr. +Mill immediately proceeds to a third, in his +criticism of it. By following his “most +unquestionable of all logical maxims,” and +substituting the name of God in the place of +“the Infinite” and “the Absolute,” he exactly +reverses Sir W. Hamilton’s argument, +and makes his own attempted refutation of it +a glaring <i>ignoratio elenchi</i>. +</p> +<p> +One of the purposes of Hamilton’s argument +is to show that we have no positive +conception of an Infinite Being; that when +we attempt to form such a conception, we do +but produce a distorted representation of the +finite; and hence, that our so-called conception +of the infinite is not the true infinite. +Hence it is not to be wondered at—nay, it is +a natural consequence of this doctrine,—that +our positive conception of God as a Person +cannot be included under this pseudo-concept +of the Infinite. Whereas Mr. Mill, by laying +down the maxim that the meaning of the +abstract must be sought in the concrete, +quietly assumes that this pseudo-infinite is +a proper predicate of God, to be tested by its +applicability to the subject, and that what +Hamilton says of <i>this</i> infinite cannot be true +unless it is also true of God. Of this refutation, +Hamilton, were he living, might truly +say, as he said of a former criticism on +another part of his writings,—“This elaborate +parade of argument is literally answered +in two words—<i>Quis dubitavit?</i>” +</p> +<p> +But if the substitution of God for the +Infinite be thus a perversion of Hamilton’s +argument, what shall we say to a similar +substitution in the case of the Absolute? +Hamilton distinctly tells us that there is one +sense of the term <i>absolute</i> in which it is +contradictory of the infinite, and therefore is +not predicable of God at all. Mr. Mill +admits that Hamilton, throughout the greater +part of his arguments, employs the term in +this sense; and he then actually proceeds to +“test” these arguments “by substituting the +concrete, God, for the abstract, Absolute;” +<i>i.e.</i>, by substituting God for something which +Hamilton defines as contradictory to the +nature of God. Can the force of confusion +go further? Is it possible for perverse criticism +more utterly, we do not say to misrepresent, +but literally to invert an author’s +meaning? +</p> +<p> +The source of all these errors, and of a +great many more, is simply this. Mr. Mill +is aware, from Hamilton’s express assertion, +that the word <i>absolute</i> may be used in two +distinct and even contradictory senses; but he +is wholly unable to see what those senses are, +or when Hamilton is using the term in the +one sense, and when in the other. Let us endeavour +to clear up some of this confusion. +</p> +<p> +Hamilton’s article on the Philosophy of +the Unconditioned is a criticism, partly of +Schelling, partly of Cousin; and Schelling +and Cousin only attempted in a new form, +under the influence of the Kantian philosophy, +to solve the problem with which +philosophy in all ages has attempted to +grapple,—the problem of the Unconditioned. +</p> +<p> +“The unconditioned” is a term which, +while retaining the same general meaning, +admits of various applications, particular or +universal. It may be the unconditioned as +regards some special relation, or the unconditioned +as regards all relations whatever. +Thus there may be the unconditioned in +Psychology—the human soul considered as a +substance; the unconditioned in Cosmology—the +world considered as a single whole; the +unconditioned in Theology—God in His own +nature, as distinguished from His manifestations +to us; or, finally, the unconditioned +<i>par excellence</i>—the unconditioned in Ontology—the +being on which all other being +depends. It is of course possible to identify +any one of the three first with the last. It +is possible to adopt a system of Egoism, and +to maintain that all phenomena are modes of +my mind, and that the substance of my mind +is the only real existence. It is possible to +adopt a system of Materialism, and to maintain +that all phenomena are modes of matter, +and that the material substance of the world +is the only real existence. Or it is possible +to adopt a system of Pantheism, and to +maintain that all phenomena are modes of +the Divine existence, and that God is the +only reality. But the several notions are in +themselves distinct, though one may ultimately +be predicated of another. +</p> +<p> +The general notion of the Unconditioned is +the same in all these cases, and all must +finally culminate in the last, the Unconditioned +<i>par excellence</i>. The general notion is +that of the One as distinguished from the +Many, the substance from its accidents, the +permanent reality from its variable modifications. +Thought, will, sensation, are modes of +my existence. What is the <i>I</i> that is one and +the same in all? Extension, figure, resistance, +are attributes of matter. What is +the one substance to which these attributes +belong? But the generalisation cannot stop +here. If matter differs from mind, the <i>non-ego</i> +from the <i>ego</i>, as one thing from another, +there must be some special point of difference, +which, is the condition of the existence +of each in this or that particular manner. +Unconditioned existence, therefore, in the +highest sense of the term, cannot be the +existence of <i>this</i> as distinguished from <i>that</i>; +it must be existence <i>per se</i>, the ground and +principle of all conditioned or special existence. +This is the Unconditioned, properly +so called: the unconditioned in Schelling’s +sense, as the indifference of subject and +object: and it is against this that Hamilton’s +arguments are directed. +</p> +<p> +The question is this. Is this Unconditioned +a mere abstraction, the product of our +own minds; or can it be conceived as having +a real existence <i>per se</i>, and, as such, can it +be identified with God as the source of all +existence? Hamilton maintains that it is a +mere abstraction, and cannot be so identified; +that, far from being “a name of God,” it is a +name of nothing at all. “By abstraction,” +he says, “we annihilate the object, and by +abstraction we annihilate the subject of consciousness. +But what remains? <i>Nothing.</i>” +When we attempt to conceive it as a reality, +we “hypostatise the zero.”<a name="FNanchor_AM" id="FNanchor_AM"></a><a href="#Footnote_AM" class="fnanchor">[AM]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AM' id='Footnote_AM'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AM'><span class='label'>[AM]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Discussions</i>, p. 21. +</p> +</div> +<p> +In order to conceive the Unconditioned +existing as a thing, we must conceive it as +existing out of relation to everything else. +For if nothing beyond itself is necessary as a +condition of its existence, it can exist separate +from everything else; and its pure existence +as the unconditioned is so separate. It must +therefore be conceivable as the sole existence, +having no plurality beyond itself; and as +simple, having no plurality within itself. +For if we cannot conceive it as existing apart +from other things, we cannot conceive it as +independent of them; and if we conceive it +as a compound of parts, we have further to +ask as before, what is the principle of unity +which binds these parts into one whole? If +there is such a principle, this is the true +unconditioned; if there is no such principle, +there is no unconditioned; for that which +cannot exist except as a compound is dependent +for its existence on that of its several +constituents. The unconditioned must therefore +be conceived as one, as simple, and as +universal. +</p> +<p> +Is such a conception possible, whether in +ordinary consciousness, as Cousin says, or in +an extraordinary intuition, as Schelling says? +Let us try the former. Consciousness is +subject to the law of Time. A phenomenon +is presented to us in time, as dependent on +some previous phenomenon or thing. I wish +to pursue the chain in thought till I arrive at +something independent. If I could reach in +thought a beginning of time, and discover +some first fact with nothing preceding it, I +should conceive time as absolute—as completed,—and +the unconditioned as the first +thing in time, and therefore as completed +also, for it may be considered by itself, apart +from what depends upon it. Or if time be +considered as having no beginning, thought +would still be able to represent to itself that +infinity, could it follow out the series of +antecedents for ever. But is either of these +alternatives possible to thought? If not, we +must confess that the unconditioned is inconceivable +by ordinary consciousness; and we +must found philosophy, with Schelling, on +the annihilation of consciousness. +</p> +<p> +But though Hamilton himself distinguishes +between the <i>unconditioned</i> and the <i>absolute</i>, +using the former term generally, for that +which is out of all relation, and the latter +specially, for that which is out of all relation +as complete and finished, his opponent Cousin +uses the latter term in a wider sense, as +synonymous with the former, and the <i>infinite</i> +as coextensive with both. This, however, +does not affect the validity of Hamilton’s +argument. For if it can be shown that the +absolute and the infinite (in Hamilton’s sense) +are both inconceivable, the unconditioned (or +absolute in Cousin’s sense), which must be +conceived as one or the other, is inconceivable +also. Or, conversely, if it can be shown that +the unconditioned, the unrelated in general, +is inconceivable, it follows that the absolute +and the infinite, as both involving the unrelated, +are inconceivable also. +</p> +<p> +We may now proceed with Mr. Mill’s +criticism. He says:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“Absolute, in the sense in which, it stands related to +Infinite, means (conformably to its etymology) that which +is finished or completed. There are some things of which +the utmost ideal amount is a limited quantity, though a +quantity never actually reached.... We may speak +of absolutely, but not of infinitely, pure water. The +purity of water is not a fact of which, whatever degree we +suppose attained, there remains a greater beyond. It has +an absolute limit: it is capable of being finished or complete, +in thought, if not in reality.”—(P. 34.) +</p> +<p> +This criticism is either incorrect or <i>nihil ad +rem</i>. If meant as a statement of Hamilton’s +use of the term, it is incorrect: <i>absolute</i>, in +Hamilton’s philosophy, does not mean simply +“completed,” but “out of relation as completed;” +<i>i.e.</i>, self-existent in its completeness, +and not implying the existence of anything +else. If meant in any other sense than +Hamilton’s, it is irrelevant. Can Mr. Mill +really have believed that Schelling thought +it necessary to invent an intellectual intuition +out of time and out of consciousness, in order +to contemplate “an ideal limited quantity,” +such as the complete purity of water? +</p> +<p> +Mr. Mill continues:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“Though the idea of Absolute is thus contrasted with +that of Infinite, the one is equally fitted with the other to +be predicated of God; but not in respect of the same +attributes. There is no incorrectness of speech in the +phrase Infinite Power: because the notion it expresses is +that of a Being who has the power of doing all things +which we know or can conceive, and more. But in speaking +of knowledge, Absolute is the proper word, and not +Infinite. The highest degree of knowledge that can be +spoken of with a meaning, only amounts to knowing all +that there is to be known: when that point is reached, +knowledge has attained its utmost limit. So of goodness +or justice: they cannot be more than perfect. There are +not infinite degrees of right. The will is either entirely +right, or wrong in different degrees.”—(P. 35.) +</p> +<p> +Surely, whatever Divine power can do, +Divine knowledge can know as possible to be +done. The one, therefore, must be as infinite +as the other. And what of Divine goodness? +An angel or a glorified saint is absolutely +good in Mr. Mill’s sense of the term. His +“will is entirely right.” Does Mr. Mill +mean to say that there is no difference, even +in degree, between the goodness of God and +that of one of His creatures? But, even +supposing his statement to be true, how is +it relevant to the matter under discussion? +Can Mr. Mill possibly be ignorant that all +these attributes are relations; that the Absolute +in Hamilton’s sense, “the unconditionally +limited,” is not predicable of God at all; and +that when divines and philosophers speak of +the absolute nature of God, they mean a +nature in which there is no distinction of +attributes at all? +</p> +<p> +Mr. Mill then proceeds to give a summary +of Hamilton’s arguments against Cousin, +preparatory to refuting them. In the course +of this summary he says:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“Let me ask, <i>en passant</i>, where is the necessity for +supposing that, if the Absolute, or, to speak plainly, if +God, is only known to us in the character of a cause, he +must therefore ‘exist merely as a cause,’ and be merely ‘a +mean towards an end?’ It is surely possible to maintain +that the Deity is known to us only as he who feeds the +ravens, without supposing that the Divine Intelligence exists +solely in order that the ravens may be fed.”<a name="FNanchor_AN" id="FNanchor_AN"></a><a href="#Footnote_AN" class="fnanchor">[AN]</a>—(P. 42.) +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AN' id='Footnote_AN'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AN'><span class='label'>[AN]</span></a> +<p> +In a note to this passage, Mr. Mill makes some sarcastic comments +on an argument of Hamilton’s against Cousin’s theory that +God is necessarily determined to create. “On this hypothesis,” +says Hamilton, “God, as necessarily determined to pass from absolute +essence to relative manifestation, is determined to pass either +from the better to the worse, or from the worse to the better.” Mr. +Mill calls this argument “a curiosity of dialectics,” and answers, +“Perfect wisdom would have begun to will the new state at the +precise moment when it began to be better than the old.” Hamilton +is not speaking of states of things, but of states of the Divine +nature, as creative or not creative; and Mr. Mill’s argument, to +refute Hamilton, must suppose a time when the new nature of God +begins to be better than the old! Mr. Mill would perhaps have +spoken of Hamilton’s argument with more respect had he known +that it is taken from Plato. +</p> +</div> +<p> +On this we would remark, <i>en passant</i>, that +this is precisely Hamilton’s own doctrine, +that the sphere of our belief is more extensive +than that of our knowledge. The +purport of Hamilton’s argument is to show +that the Absolute, as conceived by Cousin, +is not a true Absolute (<i>Infinito-Absolute</i>), +and therefore does not represent the real +nature of God. His argument is this: +“Cousin’s Absolute exists merely as a cause: +God does not exist merely as a cause: therefore +Cousin’s Absolute is not God.” Mr. +Mill actually mistakes the position which +Hamilton is opposing for that which he is +maintaining. Such an error does not lead +us to expect much from his subsequent refutation. +</p> +<p> +His first criticism is a curious specimen of +his reading in philosophy. He says:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“When the True or the Beautiful are spoken of, the +phrase is meant to include all things whatever that are +true, or all things whatever that are beautiful. If this +rule is good for other abstractions, it is good for the Absolute. +The word is devoid of meaning unless in reference +to predicates of some sort.... If we are told, therefore, +that there is some Being who is, or which is, the +Absolute,—not something absolute, but the Absolute +itself,—the proposition can be understood in no other +sense than that the supposed Being possesses in absolute +completeness <i>all</i> predicates; is absolutely good and absolutely +bad; absolutely wise and absolutely stupid; and so +forth.”<a name="FNanchor_AO" id="FNanchor_AO"></a><a href="#Footnote_AO" class="fnanchor">[AO]</a>—(P. 43.) +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AO' id='Footnote_AO'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AO'><span class='label'>[AO]</span></a> +<p> +In support of this position, Mr. Mill cites Hegel—“What +kind of an absolute Being is that which does not contain in itself +all that is actual, even evil included?” We are not concerned to +defend Hegel’s position; but he was not quite so absurd as to mean +what Mr. Mill supposes him to have meant. Does not Mr. Mill +know that it was one of Hegel’s fundamental positions, that the +Divine nature cannot be expressed by a plurality of predicates? +</p> +</div> +<p> +Plato expressly distinguishes between “the +beautiful” and “things that are beautiful,” +as the One in contrast to the Many—the +Real in contrast to the Apparent.<a name="FNanchor_AP" id="FNanchor_AP"></a><a href="#Footnote_AP" class="fnanchor">[AP]</a> It is, of +course, quite possible that Plato may be +wrong, and Mr. Mill right; but the mere +fact of their antagonism is sufficient to show +that the meaning of “the phrase” need not +be what Mr. Mill supposes it must be. In +fact, “the Absolute” in philosophy always +has meant the One as distinguished from the +Many, not the One as including the Many. +But, as applied to Sir W. Hamilton, Mr. +Mill’s remarks on “the Absolute,” and his +subsequent remarks on “the Infinite,” not +only misrepresent Hamilton’s position, but +exactly reverse it. Hamilton maintains that +the terms “absolute” and “infinite” are perfectly +intelligible as abstractions, as much so +as “relative” and “finite;” for “correlatives +suggest each other,” and the “knowledge +of contradictories is one;” but he denies +that a concrete thing or object can be positively +conceived as absolute or infinite. Mr. +Mill represents him as only proving that the +“unmeaning abstractions are unknowable,”—abstractions +which Hamilton does not assert +to be unmeaning; and which he regards as +knowable in the only sense in which such +abstractions can be known, viz., by understanding +the meaning of their names.<a name="FNanchor_AQ" id="FNanchor_AQ"></a><a href="#Footnote_AQ" class="fnanchor">[AQ]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AP' id='Footnote_AP'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AP'><span class='label'>[AP]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Republic</i>, book v., p. 479. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AQ' id='Footnote_AQ'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AQ'><span class='label'>[AQ]</span></a> +<p> +This confusion between conceiving a concrete thing and +knowing the meaning of abstract terms is as old as Toland’s +<i>Christianity not Mysterious</i>, and, indeed, has its germ, though not +its development, in the teaching of his assumed master, Locke. +Locke taught that all our knowledge is founded on simple ideas, +and that a complex idea is merely an accumulation of simple ones. +Hence Toland maintained that no object could be mysterious or +inconceivable if the terms in which its several attributes are expressed +have ideas corresponding to them. But, in point of fact, +no simple idea can be conceived as an object by itself, though the +word by which it is signified has a perfectly intelligible meaning. +I cannot, <i>e.g.</i>, conceive whiteness by itself, though I can conceive +a white wall, <i>i.e.</i>, whiteness in combination with other attributes +in a concrete object. To conceive attributes as coexisting, however, +we must conceive them as coexisting in a certain manner; for +an object of conception is not a mere heap of ideas, but an organized +whole, whose constituent ideas exist in a particular combination +with and relation to each other. To conceive, therefore, we must +not only be able to apprehend each idea separately in the abstract, +but also the manner in which they may possibly exist in combination +with each other. +</p> +</div> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“Something infinite,” says Mr. Mill, “is a conception +which, like most of our complex ideas, contains a negative +element, but which contains positive elements also. Infinite +space, for instance; is there nothing positive in +that? The negative part of this conception is the absence +of bounds. The positive are, the idea of space, and of +space greater than any finite space.”—(P. 45.) +</p> +<p> +This definition of <i>infinite space</i> is exactly +that which Descartes gives us of <i>indefinite +extension</i>,—“Ita quia non possumus imaginari +extensionem tam magnam, quin intelligamus +adhuc majorem esse posse, dicemus +magnitudinem rerum possibilium esse indefinitam.”<a name="FNanchor_AR" id="FNanchor_AR"></a><a href="#Footnote_AR" class="fnanchor">[AR]</a> +So too, Cudworth,—“There +appeareth no sufficient ground for this positive +infinity of space; we being certain of no +more than this, that be the world or any +figurative body never so great, it is not +impossible but that it might be still greater +and greater without end. Which <i>indefinite +increasableness</i> of body and space seems to be +mistaken for a <i>positive infinity</i> thereof.”<a name="FNanchor_AS" id="FNanchor_AS"></a><a href="#Footnote_AS" class="fnanchor">[AS]</a> +And Locke, a philosopher for whom Mr. +Mill will probably have more respect than +for Descartes or Cudworth, writes more +plainly: “To have actually in the mind the +idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the +mind already passed over, and actually to +have a view of all those repeated ideas of +space, which an endless repetition can never +totally represent to it,—which carries in it +a plain contradiction.”<a name="FNanchor_AT" id="FNanchor_AT"></a><a href="#Footnote_AT" class="fnanchor">[AT]</a> Mr. Mill thus unwittingly +illustrates, in his own person, the +truth of Hamilton’s remark, “If we dream +of effecting this [conceiving the infinite in +time or space], we only deceive ourselves by +substituting the <i>indefinite</i> for the infinite, +than which no two notions can be more +opposed.” In fact, Mr. Mill does not seem +to be aware that what the mathematician +calls <i>infinite</i>, the metaphysician calls <i>indefinite</i>, +and that arguments drawn from the +mathematical use of the term <i>infinite</i> are +wholly irrelevant to the metaphysical. How, +indeed, could it be otherwise? Can any man +suppose that, when the Divine attributes are +spoken of as infinite, it is meant that they +are indefinitely increasable?<a name="FNanchor_AU" id="FNanchor_AU"></a><a href="#Footnote_AU" class="fnanchor">[AU]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AR' id='Footnote_AR'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AR'><span class='label'>[AR]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Principia</i>, i., 26. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AS' id='Footnote_AS'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AS'><span class='label'>[AS]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Intellectual System</i>, ed. Harrison, vol. iii., p. 131. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AT' id='Footnote_AT'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AT'><span class='label'>[AT]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Essay</i>, ii., 17, 7. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AU' id='Footnote_AU'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AU'><span class='label'>[AU]</span></a> +<p> +One of the ablest mathematicians, and the most persevering +Hamiltono-mastix of the day, maintains the applicability of the +metaphysical notion of infinity to mathematical magnitudes; but +with an assumption which unintentionally vindicates Hamilton’s +position more fully than could have been done by a professed disciple. +“I shall assume,” says Professor De Morgan, in a paper +recently printed among the <i>Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical +Society</i>, “the notion of infinity and of its reciprocal infinitesimal: +that a line can be conceived infinite, and therefore +having points at an infinite distance. Image apart, which we cannot +have, it seems to me clear that a line of infinite length, without +points at an infinite distance, is a contradiction.” Now it is +easy to show, by mere reasoning, without any image, that this +assumption is equally a contradiction. For if space is finite, every +line in space must be finite also; and if space is infinite, every +point in space must have infinite space beyond it in every direction, +and therefore cannot be at the greatest possible distance from another +point. Or thus: Any two points in space are the extremities of +the line connecting them; but an infinite line has no extremities; +therefore no two points in space can be connected together by an +infinite line. +</p> +</div> +<p> +In fact, it is the “concrete reality,” the +“something infinite,” and not the mere +abstraction of infinity, which is only conceivable +as a negation. Every “something” +that has ever been intuitively present to my +consciousness is a something finite. When, +therefore, I speak of a “something infinite,” +I mean a something existing in a different +manner from all the “somethings” of which +I have had experience in intuition. Thus it +is apprehended, not positively, but negatively—not +directly by what it is, but indirectly +by what it is not. A negative idea is not +negative because it is expressed by a negative +term, but because it has never been +realised in intuition. If infinity, as applied +to space, means the same thing as being +greater than any finite space, both conceptions +are equally positive or equally negative. +If it does not mean the same thing, then, in +conceiving a space greater than any finite +space, we do not conceive an infinite space. +</p> +<p> +Mr. Mill’s next string of criticisms may +be very briefly dismissed. First, Hamilton +does <i>not</i>, as Mr. Mill asserts, say that “the +Unconditioned is inconceivable, because it +includes both the Infinite and the Absolute, +and these are contradictory of one another.” +His argument is a common disjunctive syllogism. +The unconditioned, if conceivable at +all, must be conceived <i>either</i> as the absolute +<i>or</i> as the infinite; neither of these is possible; +therefore the unconditioned is not +conceivable at all. Nor, secondly, is Sir W. +Hamilton guilty of the “strange confusion +of ideas” which Mr. Mill ascribes to him, +when he says that the Absolute, as being +absolutely One, cannot be known under the +conditions of plurality and difference. The +absolute, as such, must be out of all relation, +and consequently cannot be conceived in the +relation of plurality. “The plurality required,” +says Mr. Mill, “is not within the +thing itself, but is made up between itself +and other things.” It is, in fact, both; +but even granting Mr. Mill’s assumption, +what is a “plurality between a thing and +other things” but a relation between them? +There is undoubtedly a “strange confusion +of ideas” in this paragraph; but the confusion +is not on the part of Sir W. Hamilton. +“Again,” continues Mr. Mill, “even if we +concede that a thing cannot be known at all +unless known as plural, does it follow that it +cannot be known as plural because it is also +One? Since when have the One and the +Many been incompatible things, instead of +different aspects of the same thing?... +If there is any meaning in the words, must +not Absolute Unity be Absolute Plurality +likewise?” Mr. Mill’s “since when?” may +be answered in the words of Plato:—“Οὐδὲν ἔμoιγε ἄτoπoν δoκεῖ εἶναι εἰ ἓν ἅπαντα ἀπoφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τoῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πoλλὰ τῷ πλήθoυς αὖ μετέχειν· ἀλλ’ εἰ ὃ ἔστιν ἕν, αὐτὸ τoῦτo πoλλὰ ἀπoδείξει, καὶ αὖ τὰ πoλλὰ δὴ ἕν, τoῦτo ἤδη θαυμάσoμαι.”<a name="FNanchor_AV" id="FNanchor_AV"></a><a href="#Footnote_AV" class="fnanchor">[AV]</a> +Here we are expressly +told that “absolute unity” cannot be +“absolute plurality.” Mr. Mill may say that +Plato is wrong; but he will hardly go so far +as to say that there is no meaning in his +words. In point of fact, however, it is Mr. +Mill who is in error, and not Plato. In +different relations, no doubt, the same concrete +object may be regarded as one or as +many. The same measure is one foot or +twelve inches; the same sum is one shilling +or twelve pence; but it no more follows that +“absolute unity must be absolute plurality +likewise,” than it follows from the above +instances that one is equal to twelve. And, +thirdly, when Mr. Mill accuses Sir W. +Hamilton of departing from his own meaning +of the term <i>absolute</i>, in maintaining that +the Absolute cannot be a Cause, he only +shows that he does not himself know what +Hamilton’s meaning is. “If Absolute,” he +says, “means finished, perfected, completed, +may there not be a finished, perfected, and +completed Cause?” Hamilton’s Absolute is +that which is “<i>out of relation</i>, as finished, +perfect, complete;” and a Cause, as such, is +both in relation and incomplete. It is in +relation to its effect; and it is incomplete +without its effect. Finally, when Mr. Mill +charges Sir W. Hamilton with maintaining +“that extension and figure are of the essence +of matter, and perceived as such by intuition,” +we must briefly reply that Hamilton +does no such thing. He is not speaking +of the essence of matter <i>per se</i>, but only +of matter as apprehended in relation to +us. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AV' id='Footnote_AV'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AV'><span class='label'>[AV]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Parmenides</i>, p. 129. +</p> +</div> +<p> +Mr. Mill concludes this chapter with an +attempt to discover the meaning of Hamilton’s +assertion, “to think is to condition.” +We have already explained what Hamilton +meant by this expression; and we recur to +the subject now, only to show the easy +manner in which Mr. Mill manages to miss +the point of an argument with the clue +lying straight before him. “Did any,” he +says (of those who say that the Absolute is +thinkable), “profess to think it in any other +manner than by distinguishing it from other +things?” Now this is the very thing which, +according to Hamilton, Schelling actually +did. Mr. Mill does not attempt to show +that Hamilton is wrong in his interpretation +of Schelling, nor, if he is right, what were +the reasons which led Schelling to so paradoxical +a position: he simply assumes that +no man could hold Schelling’s view, and +there is an end of it.<a name="FNanchor_AW" id="FNanchor_AW"></a><a href="#Footnote_AW" class="fnanchor">[AW]</a> Hamilton’s purpose +is to reassert in substance the doctrine +which Kant maintained, and which Schelling +denied; and the natural way to ascertain his +meaning would be by reference to these two +philosophers. But this is not the method of +Mr. Mill, here or elsewhere. He generally +endeavours to ascertain Hamilton’s meaning +by ranging the wide field of possibilities. +He tells us what a phrase means in certain +authors of whom Hamilton is not thinking, +or in reference to certain matters which +Hamilton is not discussing; but he hardly +ever attempts to trace the history of Hamilton’s +own view, or the train of thought by +which it suggested itself to his mind. And +the result of this is, that Mr. Mill’s interpretations +are generally in the potential +mood. He wastes a good deal of conjecture +in discovering what Hamilton might have +meant, when a little attention in the right +quarter would have shown what he did +mean. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AW' id='Footnote_AW'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AW'><span class='label'>[AW]</span></a> +<p> +Mr. Mill does not expressly name Schelling in this sentence: +but he does so shortly afterwards; and his remark is of the same +character with the previous one. “Even Schelling,” he says, +“was not so gratuitously absurd as to deny that the Absolute +must be known according to the capacities of that which knows +it—though he was forced to invent a special capacity for the purpose.” +But if this capacity is an “invention” of Schelling’s, and +if he was “forced” to invent it, Hamilton’s point is proved. To +think, according to all the real operations of thought which consciousness +makes known to us, is to condition. And the faculty +of the unconditioned is an invention of Schelling’s, not known to +consciousness. In other words: all our real faculties bear witness +to the truth of Hamilton’s statement; and the only way of controverting +it is to invent an imaginary faculty for the purpose. +</p> +</div> +<p> +The third feature of Hamilton’s philosophy +which we charged Mr. Mill with misunderstanding, +is the distinction between Knowledge +and Belief. In the early part of this +article, we endeavoured to explain the true +nature of this distinction; we have now only +a very limited space to notice Mr. Mill’s +criticisms on it. Hamilton, he says, admitted +“a second source of intellectual conviction +called Belief.” Now Belief is not a +“source” of any conviction, but the conviction +itself. No man would say that he is +convinced of the truth of a proposition +<i>because</i> he believes it; his belief in its truth +is the same thing as his conviction of its +truth. Belief, then, is not a source of conviction, +but a conviction having sources of its +own. The question is, have we legitimate +sources of conviction, distinct from those +which constitute Knowledge properly so +called? Now here it should be remembered +that the distinction is not one invented by +Hamilton to meet the exigencies of his own +system. He enumerates as many as twenty-two +authors, of the most various schools +of philosophy, who all acknowledged it +before him. Such a concurrence is no slight +argument in favour of the reality of the +distinction. We do not say that these +writers, or Hamilton himself, have always +expressed this distinction in the best language, +or applied it in the best manner; but +we say that it is a true distinction, and that +it is valid for the principal purpose to which +Hamilton applied it. +</p> +<p> +We do not agree with all the details of +Hamilton’s application. We do not agree +with him, though he is supported by very +eminent authorities, in classifying our conviction +of axiomatic principles as <i>belief</i>, and +not as <i>knowledge</i>.<a name="FNanchor_AX" id="FNanchor_AX"></a><a href="#Footnote_AX" class="fnanchor">[AX]</a> But this question does +not directly bear on Mr. Mill’s criticism. +The point of that criticism is, that Hamilton, +by admitting a <i>belief</i> in the infinite and +unrelated, nullifies his own doctrine, that all +<i>knowledge</i> is of the finite and relative. Let +us see. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AX' id='Footnote_AX'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AX'><span class='label'>[AX]</span></a> +<p> +Hamilton’s distinction is in principle the same as that which +we have given in our previous remarks (pp. 18, 19). He says, “A +conviction is incomprehensible when there is merely given to us in +consciousness—<i>That its object is</i> (ὅτι ἔστι), and when we are unable +to comprehend through a higher notion or belief <i>Why or How it +is</i> (διότι ἔστι).”—(Reid’s Works, p. 754.) We would distinguish +between <i>why</i> and <i>how</i>, between διότι, and +πῶς. We can give no +reason <i>why</i> two straight lines cannot enclose a space; but we can +comprehend <i>how</i> they cannot. We have only to form the corresponding +image, to see the manner in which the two attributes +coexist in one object. But when I say that I believe in the existence +of a spiritual being who sees without eyes, I cannot conceive +the <i>manner</i> in which seeing coexists with the absence of the bodily +organ of sight. We believe that the true distinction between +knowledge and belief may ultimately be referred to the presence +or absence of the corresponding intuition; but to show this in the +various instances would require a longer dissertation than our +present limits will allow. +</p> +</div> +<p> +We may believe <i>that</i> a thing is, without +being able to conceive <i>how</i> it is. I believe +<i>that</i> God is a person, and also <i>that</i> He is +infinite; though I cannot conceive <i>how</i> the +attributes of personality and infinity exist +together. All my knowledge of personality +is derived from my consciousness of my own +finite personality. I therefore believe in the +coexistence of attributes in God, in some +manner different from that in which they +coexist in me as limiting each other: and +thus I believe in the fact, though I am +unable to conceive the manner. So, again, +Kant brings certain counter arguments, to +prove, on the one side, that the world has a +beginning in time, and, on the other side, +that it has not a beginning. Now suppose +I am unable to refute either of these courses +of argument, am I therefore compelled to +have no belief at all? May I not say, I +believe, in spite of Kant, <i>that</i> the world has +a beginning in time, though I am unable to +conceive <i>how</i> it can have so begun? What +is this, again, but a belief in an absolute +reality beyond the sphere of my relative +knowledge? +</p> +<p> +“I am not now considering,” says Mr. +Mill, “what it is that, in our author’s +opinion, we are bound to believe concerning +the unknowable.” Why, this was the very +thing he ought to have considered, before +pronouncing the position to be untenable, or +to be irreconcilable with something else. +Meanwhile, it is instructive to observe that +Mr. Mill himself believes, or requires his +readers to believe, something concerning the +unknown. He does not know, or at any rate +he does not tell his readers, what Hamilton +requires them to believe concerning the +unknowable; but he himself believes, and +requires them to believe, that this unknown +something is incompatible with the doctrine +that knowledge is relative. We cannot regard +this as a very satisfactory mode of +refuting Hamilton’s thesis.<a name="FNanchor_AY" id="FNanchor_AY"></a><a href="#Footnote_AY" class="fnanchor">[AY]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AY' id='Footnote_AY'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AY'><span class='label'>[AY]</span></a> +<p> +In a subsequent chapter (p. 120), Mr. Mill endeavours to +overthrow this distinction between Knowledge and Belief, by means +of Hamilton’s own theory of Consciousness. Hamilton maintains +that we cannot be conscious of a mental operation without being +conscious of its object. On this Mr. Mill retorts that if, as +Hamilton admits, we are conscious of a belief in the Infinite and +the Absolute, we must be conscious of the Infinite and the Absolute +themselves; and such consciousness is Knowledge. The fallacy +of this retort is transparent. The immediate object of Belief is a +<i>proposition</i> which I hold to be true, not a <i>thing</i> apprehended in an +act of conception. I believe in an infinite God; <i>i.e.</i>, I believe +<i>that</i> God is infinite: I believe that the attributes which I ascribe to +God exist in Him in an infinite degree. Now, to believe this proposition, +I must, of course, be conscious of its meaning; but I am +not therefore conscious of the Infinite God as an object of conception; +for this would require further an apprehension of the manner +in which these infinite attributes coexist so as to form one object. +The whole argument of this eighth chapter is confused, owing to +Mr. Mill not having distinguished between those passages in which +Sir W. Hamilton is merely using an <i>argumentum ad hominem</i> in +relation to Reid, and those in which he is reasoning from general +principles. +</p> +</div> +<p> +But if Mr. Mill is unjust towards the +distinction between Knowledge and Belief, +as held by Sir W. Hamilton, he makes +ample amends to the injured theory in the +next chapter, by enlarging the province of +credibility far beyond any extent which +Hamilton would have dreamed of claiming +for it. Conceivability or inconceivability, he +tells us, are usually dependent on association; +and it is quite possible that, under other +associations, we might be able to conceive, +and therefore to believe, anything short of +the direct contradiction that the same thing +is and is not. It is not in itself incredible, +that a square may at the same time be +round, that two straight lines may enclose a +space, or even that two and two may make +five.<a name="FNanchor_AZ" id="FNanchor_AZ"></a><a href="#Footnote_AZ" class="fnanchor">[AZ]</a> But whatever concessions Mr. Mill +may make on this point, he is at least fully +determined that Sir W. Hamilton shall +derive no benefit from them; for he forthwith +proceeds to charge Sir William with +confusing three distinct senses of the term +<i>conception</i>—a confusion which exists solely +in his own imagination,<a name="FNanchor_BA" id="FNanchor_BA"></a><a href="#Footnote_BA" class="fnanchor">[BA]</a>—and to assert that +the Philosophy of the Conditioned is entirely +founded on a mistake, inasmuch as infinite +space on the one hand, and, on the other, +both an absolute minimum and an infinite divisibility +of space, are perfectly conceivable. +With regard to the former of these two +assertions, Mr. Mill’s whole argument is +vitiated, as we have already shown, by his +confusion between <i>infinite</i> and <i>indefinite</i>; +but it is worth while to quote one of his +special instances in this chapter, as a specimen +of the kind of reasoning which an +eminent writer on logic can sometimes employ. +In reference to Sir W. Hamilton’s +assertion, that infinite space would require +infinite time to conceive it, he says, “Let us +try the doctrine upon a complex whole, short +of infinite, such as the number 695,788. Sir +W. Hamilton would not, I suppose, have +maintained that this number is inconceivable. +How long did he think it would take to go +over every separate unit of this whole, so as +to obtain a perfect knowledge of the exact +sum, as different from all other sums, either +greater or less?” +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_AZ' id='Footnote_AZ'></a><a href='#FNanchor_AZ'><span class='label'>[AZ]</span></a> +<p> +In reference to this last paradox, Mr. Mill quotes from <i>Essays +by a Barrister</i>: “There is a world in which, whenever two pairs +of things are either placed in proximity or are contemplated together, +a fifth thing is immediately created and brought within the contemplation +of the mind engaged in putting two and two together.... +In such a world surely two and two would make five. That +is, the result to the mind of contemplating two twos would be to +count five.” The answer to this reasoning has been already given +by Archdeacon Lee in his Essay on Miracles. The “five” in this +case is not the sum of two and two, but of two and two <i>plus</i> the new +creature, <i>i.e.</i>, of two and two <i>plus</i> one. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_BA' id='Footnote_BA'></a><a href='#FNanchor_BA'><span class='label'>[BA]</span></a> +<p> +The sense in which Sir W. Hamilton himself uses the word +<i>conception</i> is explained in a note to <i>Reid’s Works</i>, p. 377—namely, +the combination of two or more attributes in a <i>unity of representation</i>. +The second sense which Mr. Mill imagines is simply a mistake +of his own. When Hamilton speaks of being “unable to +conceive as possible,” he does not mean, as Mr. Mill supposes, +physically possible under the law of gravitation or some other law +of matter, but mentally possible as a representation or image; and +thus the supposed second sense is identical with the first. The +third sense may also be reduced to the first; for to conceive two +attributes as combined in one representation is to form a notion +subordinate to those of each attribute separately. We do not say +that Sir W. Hamilton has been uniformly accurate in his application +of the test of conceivability; but we say that his inaccuracies, such +as they are, do not affect the theory of the conditioned, and that in +all the long extracts which Mr. Mill quotes, with footnotes, indicating +“first sense,” “second sense,” “third sense,” the author’s +meaning may be more accurately explained in the first sense only. +</p> +</div> +<p> +It is marvellous that it should not have +occurred to Mr. Mill, while he was writing +this passage, “How comes this large number +to be a ’whole’ at all; and how comes it that +’this whole,’ with all its units, can be written +down by means of six digits?” Simply +because of a conventional arrangement, by +which a single digit, according to its position, +can express, by one mark, tens, hundreds, +thousands, &c., of units; and thus can exhaust +the sum by dealing with its items in +large masses. But how can such a process +exhaust the infinite? We should like to +know how long Mr. Mill thinks it would +take to work out the following problem:—“If +two figures can represent ten, three a +hundred, four a thousand, five ten thousand, +&c., find the number of figures required to +represent infinity.”<a name="FNanchor_BB" id="FNanchor_BB"></a><a href="#Footnote_BB" class="fnanchor">[BB]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_BB' id='Footnote_BB'></a><a href='#FNanchor_BB'><span class='label'>[BB]</span></a> +<p> +Precisely the same misconception of Hamilton’s position occurs +in Professor De Morgan’s paper in the <i>Cambridge Transactions</i>, +to which we have previously referred. He speaks (p. 13) of the +“notion, which runs through many writers, from Descartes to +Hamilton, that the mind must be big enough to <i>hold</i> all it can conceive.” +This notion is certainly not maintained by Hamilton, nor +yet by Descartes in the paragraph quoted by Mr. De Morgan; nor, +as far as we are aware, in any other part of his works. +</p> +</div> +<p> +Infinite divisibility stands or falls with +infinite extension. In both cases Mr. Mill +confounds infinity with indefiniteness. But +with regard to an absolute minimum of space, +Mr. Mill’s argument requires a separate +notice. +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“It is not denied,” he says, “that there is a portion of +extension which to the naked eye appears an indivisible +point; it has been called by philosophers the <i>minimum +visibile</i>. This minimum we can indefinitely magnify by +means of optical instruments, making visible the still +smaller parts which compose it. In each successive experiment +there is still a <i>minimum visibile</i>, anything less +than which cannot be discovered with that instrument, +but can with one of a higher power. Suppose, now, that +as we increase the magnifying power of our instruments, +and before we have reached the limit of possible increase, +we arrive at a stage at which that which seemed the +smallest visible space under a given microscope, does not +appear larger under one which, by its mechanical construction, +is adapted to magnify more, but still remains apparently +indivisible. I say, that if this happened, we should +believe in a minimum of extension; or if some <i>à priori</i> +metaphysical prejudice prevented us from believing it, we +should at least be enabled to conceive it.”—(P. 84.) +</p> +<p> +The natural conclusion of most men under +such circumstances would be, that there was +some fault in the microscope. But even if +this conclusion were rejected, we presume +Mr. Mill would allow that, under the supposed +circumstances, the exact magnitude of the +minimum of extension would be calculable. +We have only to measure the <i>minimum +visibile</i>, and know what is the magnifying +power of our microscope, to determine the +exact dimensions. Suppose, then, that we +assign to it some definite magnitude—say +the ten billionth part of an inch,—should we +then conclude that it is impossible to conceive +the twenty billionth part of an inch?—in +other words, that we have arrived at a +definite magnitude which has no conceivable +half? Surely this is a somewhat rash concession +to be made by a writer who has just +told us that numbers may be conceived up to +infinity; and therefore, of course, down to +infinitesimality. +</p> +<p> +Mr. Mill concludes this chapter with an +assertion which, even by itself, is sufficient to +show how very little he has attended to or +understood the philosophy which he is attempting +to criticise. “The law of Excluded +Middle,” he says, “as well as that of Contradiction, +is common to all phenomena. +But it is a doctrine of our author that these +laws are true, and cannot but be known to +be true, of Noumena likewise. It is not +merely Space as cognisable by our senses, +but Space as it is in itself, which he affirms +must be either of unlimited or of limited +extent” (p. 86). At this sentence we fairly +stand aghast. “Space as it is in itself!” +the Noumenon Space! Has Mr. Mill been +all this while “examining” Sir William +Hamilton’s philosophy, in utter ignorance +that the object of that philosophy is the +“Conditioned in Time and <i>Space</i>;” that he +accepts Kant’s analysis of time and space as +formal necessities of thought, but pronounces +no opinion whatever as to whether time and +space can exist as Noumena or not? It is +the phenomenal space, “space as cognisable +by our senses,” which Sir W. Hamilton says +must be either limited or unlimited: concerning +the Noumenon Space, he does not +hazard an opinion whether such a thing +exists or not. He says, indeed (and this is +probably what has misled Mr. Mill), that the +laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded +Middle, are laws of things as well as +laws of thought;<a name="FNanchor_BC" id="FNanchor_BC"></a><a href="#Footnote_BC" class="fnanchor">[BC]</a> but he says nothing about +these laws as predicating infinite or finite +extension. On the contrary, he expressly +classifies Space under the law of Relativity, +the violation of which indicates what may +exist, but what we are unable to conceive as +existing. Briefly, the law of Excluded +Middle (to take this instance alone) is a law +of things only in its abstract form, “Everything +must be A or not A” (<i>extended</i>, if you +please, or <i>not extended</i>); but in its subordinate +form, “Everything extended must be +extended infinitely or finitely,” it is only +applicable, and only intended by Hamilton +to be applied, to those <i>phenomena</i> which are +already given as extended in some degree. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_BC' id='Footnote_BC'></a><a href='#FNanchor_BC'><span class='label'>[BC]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Discussions</i>, p. 603. +</p> +</div> +<p> +We have now examined the first six chapters +of Mr. Mill’s book, containing his +remarks on that portion of Sir W. Hamilton’s +philosophy which he justly regards as +comprising the most important of the doctrines +which specially belong to Hamilton +himself. The next chapter is an episode, +in which Mr. Mill turns aside from Sir W. +Hamilton to criticise Mr. Mansel’s <i>Bampton +Lectures</i>. As our limits do not permit +us to carry on the argument at present +through the remainder of Mr. Mill’s remarks +on Hamilton himself, we shall conclude our +notice with a few words on this chapter, as +closing the properly metaphysical portion of +Mr. Mill’s book, and as affording ample +proof that, in this department of philosophy +at least, Mr. Mill’s powers of misapprehension +do not cease when Sir W. Hamilton is +no longer their object. +</p> +<p> +Mr. Mill’s method of criticism makes it +generally necessary to commence with a +statement of the criticised theory as it really +is, before proceeding to his exposition of it as +it is not. The present instance offers no +exception to this rule. Mr. Mansel’s argument +may be briefly stated as follows. The +primary and essential conception of God, +imperatively demanded by our moral and +religious consciousness, is that of a <i>person</i>. +But personality implies intellectual and +moral attributes; and the only direct and +immediate knowledge which we have of such +attributes is derived from the testimony of +self-consciousness, bearing witness to their +existence in a certain manner in ourselves. +But when we endeavour to transfer the +conception of personality, thus obtained, to +the domain of theology, we meet with certain +difficulties, which, while they are not sufficient +to hinder us from <i>believing</i> in the +Divine Personality as a fact, yet hinder us +from <i>conceiving</i> the manner of its existence, +and prevent us from exhibiting our belief as +a philosophical conclusion, proved by irrefragable +reasoning and secured against all +objections. These difficulties are occasioned, +on the one hand, by the so-called Philosophy +of the Unconditioned, which in all ages has +shown a tendency towards Pantheism, and +which, in one of its latest and most finished +manifestations, announces itself as the exhibition +of God as He is in His eternal +nature before creation; and, on the other +hand, by the limitations and conditions to +which our own personality is subject, and +which, as we have pointed out in the earlier +part of this article, have, from the very +beginning of Christian theology, prevented +theologians from accepting the limited personality +of man as an exact image and +counterpart of the unlimited personality of +God. These difficulties Mr. Mansel endeavours +to meet in two ways. On the one +side, he maintains, in common with Sir W. +Hamilton, that the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, +by reason of its own incongruities +and self-contradictions, has no claim +to be accepted as a competent witness in the +matter; and on the other side, he maintains, +in common with many theologians before +him, that human personality cannot be assumed +as an exact copy of the Divine, but +only as that which is most nearly analogous +to it among finite things. But these two +positions, if admitted, involve a corresponding +practical conclusion as regards the criterion +of religious truth or falsehood. Were we +capable, either, on the one hand, of a clear +conception of the Unconditioned, or, on the +other, of a direct intuition of the Divine +Attributes as objects of consciousness, we +might be able to construct, deductively or +inductively, an exact science of Theology. +As it is, we are compelled to reason by +analogy; and analogy furnishes only probabilities, +varying, it may be, from slight +presumptions up to moral certainties, but +whose weight, in any given case, can only be +determined by comparison with other evidences. +There are three distinct sources +from which we may form a judgment about +the ways of God—first, from our own moral +and intellectual consciousness, by which we +judge <i>à priori</i> of what God ought to do in a +given case, by determining what we should +think it wise or right for ourselves to do in a +similar case; secondly, from the constitution +and course of nature, from which we may +learn by experience what God’s providence +in certain cases actually is; and thirdly, +from revelation, attested by its proper evidences. +Where these three agree in their +testimony (as in the great majority of cases +they do) we have the moral certainty which +results from the harmony of all accessible +evidences: where they appear to differ, we +have no right at once to conclude that the +second or the third must give way to the +first, and not <i>vice versâ</i>; because we have no +right to assume that the first alone is infallible. +In the author’s own words: “The +lesson to be learnt from an examination of +the Limits of Religious Thought is not that +man’s judgments are <i>worthless</i> in relation to +Divine things, but that they are <i>fallible</i>: and +the probability of error in any particular case +can never be fairly estimated without giving +their full weight to all collateral considerations. +We are indeed bound to believe that +a Revelation given by God can never contain +anything that is really unwise or unrighteous; +but we are not always capable of estimating +exactly the wisdom or righteousness of particular +doctrines or precepts. And we are +bound to bear in mind that <i>exactly in proportion +to the strength of the remaining +evidence for the Divine origin of a religion, is +the probability that we may be mistaken in +supposing this or that portion of its contents +to be unworthy of God.</i> Taken in conjunction, +the two arguments may confirm or +correct each other: taken singly and absolutely, +each may vitiate the result which +should follow from their joint application.”<a name="FNanchor_BD" id="FNanchor_BD"></a><a href="#Footnote_BD" class="fnanchor">[BD]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_BD' id='Footnote_BD'></a><a href='#FNanchor_BD'><span class='label'>[BD]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Bampton Lectures</i>, p. 156, 4th edition. +</p> +</div> +<p> +In criticising the first part of this argument—that +which is directed against the deductive +philosophy of the Unconditioned—Mr. Mill +manifests the same want of acquaintance with +its meanings, and with the previous history of +the question; which he had before exhibited +in his attack on Sir W. Hamilton. He +begins by finding fault with the definition of +the Absolute, which Mr. Mansel (herein +departing, and purposely departing, from Sir +W. Hamilton’s use of the term) defines as +“that which exists in and by itself, having +no necessary relation to any other Being.” +On this, Mr. Mill remarks: “The first words +of his definition would serve for the description +of a Noumenon; but Mr. Mansel’s +Absolute is only meant to denote one Being, +identified with God, and God is not the only +Noumenon.” The description of a Noumenon! +This is almost equal to the +discovery of a Noumenon Space. Does Mr. +Mill really suppose that all noumena are self-existent? +A <i>noumenon</i> (in the sense in +which we suppose Mr. Mill to understand +the term, for it has different meanings in +different philosophies) implies an existence +out of relation to the human mind.<a name="FNanchor_BE" id="FNanchor_BE"></a><a href="#Footnote_BE" class="fnanchor">[BE]</a> But is +this the same as being out of all relation +whatever, as existing “in and by itself?” +Does Mr. Mill mean to say that a creature, +whether perceived by us or not, has no relation +to its Creator? But Mr. Mill, as we +have seen before, is not much at home when +he gets among “noumena.” We must proceed +to his criticism of the second part of the +definition,—“having no necessary relation to +any other being.” Of these words he says, +that “they admit of two constructions. The +words in their natural sense only mean, +<i>capable of existing out of relation to anything +else</i>. The argument requires that they should +mean <i>incapable of existing in relation with +anything else</i>.” And why is this non-natural +sense to be forced upon very plain words? +Because, says Mr. Mill,— +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_BE' id='Footnote_BE'></a><a href='#FNanchor_BE'><span class='label'>[BE]</span></a> +<p> +Strictly speaking, the term <i>noumenon</i>, as meaning that which +can be apprehended only by the intellect, implies a relation to the +intellect apprehending it; and in this sense τὸ νοούμενον is opposed +by Plato to τὸ ὁρώμενον—the object of intellect to the object of +sight. But as the intellect was supposed to take cognisance of +things as they are, in opposition to the sensitive perception of +things as they appear, the term <i>noumenon</i> became synonymous +with <i>thing in itself</i> (τὸ ὃν καθ’ αὑτό). And this meaning is retained +in the Kantian philosophy, in which the <i>noumenon</i> is identical +with the <i>Ding an sich</i>. But as Kant denied to the human intellect +any immediate intuition of things as they are (though such an +intuition may be possible to a superhuman intellect), hence the +term <i>noumenon</i> in the Kantian philosophy is opposed to all of +which the human intellect can take positive cognisance. Hamilton, +in this respect, agrees with Kant. But neither Kant nor Hamilton, +in opposing the <i>thing in itself</i> to the <i>phenomenon</i>, meant to imply +that the former is necessarily self-existent, and therefore uncreated. +</p> +</div> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“In what manner is a possible existence out of all relation, +incompatible with the notion of a cause? Have not +causes a possible existence apart from their effects? Would +the sun, for example, not exist if there were no earth or +planets for it to illuminate? Mr. Mansel seems to think +that what is capable of existing out of relation, cannot +possibly be conceived or known in relation. But this is +not so.... Freed from this confusion of ideas, Mr. Mansel’s +argument resolves itself into this,—The same Being +cannot be thought by us both as Cause and as Absolute, +because a Cause <i>as such</i> is not Absolute, and Absolute, as +such, is not a Cause; which is exactly as if he had said +that Newton cannot be thought by us both as an Englishman +and as a mathematician, because an Englishman, as +such, is not a mathematician, nor a mathematician, as such, +an Englishman.”—(P. 92.) +</p> +<p> +The “confusion of ideas” is entirely of +Mr. Mill’s own making, and is owing to his +having mutilated the argument before criticising +it. The argument in its original form +consists of two parts; the first intended to +show that the Absolute is not conceived <i>as +such</i> in being conceived as a Cause; the +second to show that the Absolute cannot be +conceived under different aspects at different +times—first as Absolute, and then as Cause. +It was the impossibility of this latter alternative +which drove Cousin to the hypothesis of +a necessary causation from all eternity. Mr. +Mill entirely omits the latter part of the +argument, and treats the former part as if it +were the whole. The part criticised by Mr. +Mill is intended to prove exactly what it +does prove, and no more; namely, that a +cause <i>as such</i> is not the absolute, and that to +know a cause <i>as such</i> is not to know the +absolute. We presume Mr. Mill himself +will admit that to know Newton as a mathematician +is not to know him as an Englishman. +Whether he can be known separately +as both, and whether the Absolute in +this respect is a parallel case, depends on +another consideration, which Mr. Mill has +not noticed. The continuation of Mr. Mill’s +criticism is equally confused. He says:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“The whole of Mr. Mansel’s argument for the inconceivability +of the Infinite and of the Absolute is one long +<i>ignoratio elenchi</i>. It has been pointed out in a former +chapter that the words Absolute and Infinite have no real +meaning, unless we understand by them that which is +absolute or infinite in some given attribute; as space is +called infinite, meaning that it is infinite in extension; +and as God is termed infinite, in the sense of possessing +infinite power, and absolute in the sense of absolute goodness +or knowledge. It has also been shown that Sir W. +Hamilton’s arguments for the unknowableness of the Unconditioned +do not prove that we cannot know an object +which is absolute or infinite in some specific attribute, but +only that we cannot know an abstraction called ‘The +Absolute’ or ‘The Infinite,’ which is supposed to have all +attributes at once.”—(P. 93.) +</p> +<p> +The fallacy of this criticism, as regards +Sir W. Hamilton, has been already pointed +out: as regards Mr. Mansel, it is still more +glaring, inasmuch as that writer expressly +states that he uses the term <i>absolute</i> in a +different sense from that which Mr. Mill +attributes to Sir W. Hamilton. When Mr. +Mill charges Mr. Mansel with “undertaking +to prove the impossibility” of conceiving “a +Being <i>absolutely</i> just or <i>absolutely</i> wise”<a name="FNanchor_BF" id="FNanchor_BF"></a><a href="#Footnote_BF" class="fnanchor">[BF]</a> +(<i>i.e.</i>, as he supposes, <i>perfectly</i> just or wise), +he actually forgets that he has just been +criticising Mr. Hansel’s definition of the +Absolute, as something having a possible +existence “out of all relation.” Will Mr. +Mill have the kindness to tell us what he +means by goodness and knowledge “out of +all relation;” <i>i.e.</i>, a goodness and knowledge +related to no object on which they can be +exercised; a goodness which is good to +nothing, a knowledge which knows nothing? +Mr. Mill had better be cautious in talking +about <i>ignoratio elenchi</i>. +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_BF' id='Footnote_BF'></a><a href='#FNanchor_BF'><span class='label'>[BF]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Examination</i>, p. 95. +</p> +</div> +<p> +From the Absolute, Mr. Mill proceeds to +the Infinite; and here he commits the same +mistake as before, treating a portion of an +argument as if it were the whole, and citing +a portion intended to prove one point as if it +were intended to prove another. He cites a +passage from Mr. Mansel, in which it is said +that “the Infinite, if it is to be conceived at +all, must be conceived as potentially everything +and actually nothing; for if there is +anything in general which it cannot become, +it is thereby limited; and if there is anything +in particular which it actually is, it is +thereby excluded from being any other thing. +But, again, it must also be conceived as +actually everything and potentially nothing; +for an unrealised potentiality is likewise a +limitation. If the Infinite can be that which +it is not, it is by that very possibility marked +out as incomplete, and capable of a higher +perfection. If it is actually everything, it +possesses no characteristic feature by which +it can be distinguished from anything else, +and discerned as an object of consciousness.” +On this passage Mr. Mill remarks, “Can a +writer be serious who bids us conjure up a +conception of something which possesses infinitely +all conflicting attributes, and because +we cannot do this without contradiction, +would have us believe that there is a contradiction +in the idea of infinite goodness or +infinite wisdom?” The answer to this criticism +is very simple. The argument is not +employed for the purpose which Mr. Mill +supposes. It is employed to show that the +metaphysical notion of the absolute-infinite, +as the sum, potential or actual, of all possible +existence, is inconceivable under the laws of +human consciousness; and thus that the +absolutely first existence, related to nothing +and limited by nothing, the <i>ens realissimum</i> +of the older philosophers, the <i>pure being</i> of +the Hegelians, cannot be attained as a starting-point +from which to deduce all relative +and derived existence. How far the empirical +conception of certain mental attributes, +such as goodness or wisdom, derived in the +first instance from our own personal consciousness, +can be positively conceived as extended +to infinity, is considered in a separate +argument, which Mr. Mill does not notice. +</p> +<p> +Mr. Mill continues, “Instead of ’the Infinite,’ +substitute ’an infinitely good Being’ +[<i>i.e.</i>, substitute what is not intended], and +Mr. Mansel’s argument reads thus:—‘If +there is anything which an infinitely good +Being cannot become—if he cannot become +bad—that is a limitation, and the goodness +cannot be infinite. If there is anything +which an infinitely good Being actually is +(namely, good), he is excluded from being +any other thing, as being wise or powerful.’” +To the first part of this objection we reply +by simply asking, “Is becoming bad a +‘higher perfection?’” To the second part +we reply by Mr. Mill’s favourite mode of +reasoning—a parallel case. A writer asserts +that a creature which is a horse is thereby +excluded from being a dog; and that, in so +far as it has the nature of a horse, it has not +the nature of a dog. “What!” exclaims Mr. +Mill, “is it not the nature of a dog to have +four legs? and does the man mean to say +that a horse has not four legs?” We venture +respectfully to ask Mr. Mill whether he +supposes that being wise is being “a thing,” +and being good is being another “thing?” +</p> +<p> +But, seriously, it is much to be wished +that when a writer like Mr. Mill undertakes +to discuss philosophical questions, he should +acquire some slight acquaintance with the +history of the questions discussed. Had this +been done by our critic in the present case, +it might possibly have occurred to him to +doubt whether a doctrine supported by philosophers +of such different schools of thought +as Spinoza, Malebranche, Wolf, Kant, Schelling, +could be quite such a piece of transparent +nonsense as he supposes it to be. +All these writers are cited in Mr. Mansel’s +note, as maintaining the theory that the +Absolute is the <i>ens realissimum</i>, or sum of +all existence; and their names might have +saved Mr. Mill from the absurdity of supposing +that by this expression was meant +something “absolutely good and absolutely +bad; absolutely wise and absolutely stupid; +and so forth.” The real meaning of the +expression has been already sufficiently explained +in our earlier remarks. The problem +of the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, as +sketched by Plato and generally adopted by +subsequent philosophers, is, as we have seen, +to ascend up to the first principle of all +things, and thence to deduce, as from their +cause, all dependent and derived existences. +The Unconditioned, as the one first principle, +must necessarily contain in itself, potentially +or actually, all that is derived from it, and +thus must comprehend, in embryo or in +development, the sum of all existence. To +reconcile this conclusion with the phenomenal +existence of evil and imperfection, is the +difficulty with which philosophy has had to +struggle ever since philosophy began. The +Manichean, by referring evil to an independent +cause, denies the existence of an +absolute first principle at all; the Leibnitzian, +with his hypothesis of the best +possible world, virtually sets bounds to the +Divine omnipotence: the Pantheist identifies +God with all actual existence, and either +denies the real existence of evil at all, or +merges the distinction between evil and good +in some higher indifference. All these conclusions +may be alike untenable, but all +alike testify to the existence of the problem, +and to the vast though unsuccessful efforts +which man’s reason has made to solve it. +</p> +<p> +The reader may now, perhaps, understand +the reason of an assertion which Mr. Mill +regards as supremely absurd,—namely, that +we must believe in the existence of an absolute +and infinite Being, though unable to +conceive the nature of such a Being. To +believe in such a Being, is simply to believe +that God made the world: to declare the +nature of such a Being inconceivable, is +simply to say that we do not know how the +world was made. If we believe that God +made the world, we must believe that there +was a time when the world was not, and +when God alone existed, out of relation to +any other being. But the mode of that sole +existence we are unable to conceive, nor in +what manner the first act took place by +which the absolute and self-existent gave +existence to the relative and dependent. +“The contradictions,” says Mr. Mill, “which +Mr. Mansel asserts to be involved in the +notions, do not follow from an imperfect +mode of apprehending the Infinite and the +Absolute, but lie in the definitions of them, +in the meaning of the words themselves.” +They do no such thing: the meaning of the +words is perfectly intelligible, and is exactly +what is expressed by their definitions: the +contradictions arise from the attempt to +combine the attributes expressed by the +words in one representation with others, so +as to form a positive object of consciousness. +Where is the incongruity of saying, “I +believe that a being exists possessing certain +attributes, though I am unable in my present +state of knowledge to conceive the manner of +that existence?” Mr. Mill, at all events, is +the last man in the world who has any right +to complain of such a distinction—Mr. Mill, +who considers it not incredible that in some +part of the universe two straight lines may +enclose a space, or two and two make five; +though he is compelled to allow that under +our present laws of thought, or, if he pleases, +of association, we are unable to conceive how +these things can be. +</p> +<p> +It is wearisome work to wade through this +mass of misconceptions; yet we must entreat +the reader’s patience a little longer, while we +say a few words in conclusion on perhaps the +greatest misconception of all—though that is +bold language to use with regard to Mr. +Mill’s metaphysics,—at any rate, the one +which he expresses in the most vehement +language. Mr. Mansel, as we have said, +asserts, as many others have asserted before +him, that the relation between the communicable +attributes of God and the corresponding +attributes of man is one not of +identity, but of analogy; that is to say, that +the Divine attributes have the same relation +to the Divine nature that the human attributes +have to human nature. Thus, for +example, there is a Divine justice and there +is a human justice; but God is just as the +Creator and Governor of the world, having +unlimited authority over all His creatures +and unlimited jurisdiction over all their acts; +and man is just in certain special relations, +as having authority over some persons and +some acts only, so far as is required for the +needs of human society. So, again, there is +a Divine mercy and there is a human mercy; +but God is merciful in such a manner as is +fitting compatibly with the righteous government +of the universe; and man is merciful +in a certain limited range, the exercise of +the attribute being guided by considerations +affecting the welfare of society or of individuals. +Or to take a more general case: +Man has in himself a rule of right and +wrong, implying subjection to the authority +of a superior (for conscience has authority +only as reflecting the law of God); while +God has in Himself a rule of right and +wrong, implying no higher authority, and +determined absolutely by His own nature. +The case is the same when we look at +moral attributes, not externally, in their +active manifestations, but internally, in their +psychological constitution. If we do not +attribute to God the same complex mental +constitution of reason, passion, and will, the +same relation to motives and inducements, +the same deliberation and choice of alternatives, +the same temporal succession of facts +in consciousness, which we ascribe to man,—it +will follow that those psychological relations +between reason, will, and desire, which +are implied in the conception of human +action, cannot represent the Divine excellences +in themselves, but can only illustrate +them by analogies from finite things. And +if man is liable to error in judging of the +conduct of his fellow-men, in proportion +as he is unable to place himself in their +position, or to realise to himself their modes +of thought and principles of action—if the +child, for instance, is liable to error in +judging the actions of the man,—or the +savage of the civilised man,—surely there +is far more room for error in men’s judgment +of the ways of God, in proportion as the +difference between God and man is greater +than the difference between a man and a +child. +</p> +<p> +This doctrine elicits from Mr. Mill the following +extraordinary outburst of rhetoric:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“If, instead of the glad tidings that there exists a Being +in whom all the excellences which the highest human +mind can conceive, exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I +am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose +attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, +nor what are the principles of his government, except that +’the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving’ +does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I +will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I +must believe this, and at the same time call this being by +the names which express and affirm the highest human +morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever +power such a being may have over me, there is one thing +which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship +him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean +when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if +such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling +him, to hell I will go.”—(P. 103.) +</p> +<p> +We will not pause to comment on the +temper and taste of this declamation; we will +simply ask whether Mr. Mill really supposes +the word <i>good</i> to lose all community of meaning, +when it is applied, as it constantly is, +to different persons among our “fellow-creatures,” +with express reference to their +different duties and different qualifications for +performing them? The duties of a father are +not the same as those of a son; is the word +therefore wholly equivocal when we speak +of one person as a <i>good father</i>, and another +as a <i>good son</i>? Nay, when we speak generally +of a man as <i>good</i>, has not the epithet a +tacit reference to human nature and human +duties? and yet is there no community of +meaning when the same epithet is applied to +other Creatures? Ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸs τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον—the goodness of any being whatever +has relation to the nature and office of that +being. We may therefore test Mr. Mill’s +declamation by a parallel case. A wise and +experienced father addresses a young and +inexperienced son: “My son,” he says, “there +may be some of my actions which do not +seem to you to be wise or good, or such as +you would do in my place. Remember, +however, that your duties are different from +mine; that your knowledge of my duties is +very imperfect; and that there may be +things which you cannot now see to be wise +and good, but which you may hereafter +discover to be so.” “Father,” says the son, +“your principles of action are not the same +as mine; the highest morality which I can +conceive at present does not sanction them; +and as for believing that you are good in +anything of which I do not plainly see the +goodness,”—We will not repeat Mr. Mill’s +alternative; we will only ask whether it is +not just possible that there may be as much +difference between man and God as there is +between a child and his father? +</p> +<p> +This declamation is followed by a sneer, +which is worth quoting, not on its own +account, but as an evidence of the generosity +with which Mr. Mill deals with the supposed +motives of his antagonists, and of the accuracy +of his acquaintance with the subject +discussed. He says:— +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“It is worthy of remark, that the doubt whether words +applied to God have their human signification, is only felt +when the words relate to his moral attributes; it is never +heard of with regard to his power. We are never told +that God’s omnipotence must not be supposed to mean an +infinite degree of the power we know in man and nature, +and that perhaps it does not mean that he is able to kill +us, or consign us to eternal flames. The Divine Power is +always interpreted in a completely human signification; +but the Divine Goodness and Justice must be understood +to be such only in an unintelligible sense. Is it unfair to +surmise that this is because those who speak in the name +of God, have need of the human conception of his power, +since an idea which can overawe and enforce obedience +must address itself to real feelings; but are content that +his goodness should be conceived only as something inconceivable, +because they are so often required to teach doctrines +respecting him which conflict irreconcilably with all +goodness that we can conceive?”—(P. 104.) +</p> +<p> +On the latter part of this paragraph we +will not attempt to comment. But as regards +the former part, we meet Mr. Mill’s +confident assertion with a direct denial, and +take the opportunity of informing him that +the conception of infinite Power has suggested +the same difficulties; and has been +discussed by philosophers and theologians in +the same manner, as those of infinite Wisdom +and infinite Goodness. Has Mr. Mill never +heard of such questions as, Whether Omnipotence +can reverse the past?—Whether +God can do that which He does not will to +do?—Whether God’s perfect foreknowledge +is compatible with his own perfect liberty?—Whether +God could have made a better +world than the existing one? Nay, has not +our critic, in this very chapter, been arguing +against Mr. Mansel on the question, whether +the Absolute can be conceived as a Cause +acting in time: and what is this but a form +of the question, whether power, when predicated +of God is exactly the same thing as +power when predicated of man? Or why +has it been said that creation <i>ex nihilo</i>—an +absolutely first act of causation, is inconceivable +by us, but from the impossibility of +finding in human power an exact type of +Divine power? To attribute discreditable +motives to an opponent, even to account for +unquestionable facts, is usually considered as +an abuse of criticism. What shall we say +when the facts are fictitious as well as the +motives? With regard to Mr. Mansel, the +only person who is included by name in this +accusation, it is “worthy of remark,” that the +earliest mention of the obnoxious theory in +his writings occurs in connection with a +difficulty relating solely to the conception +of infinite power, and not at all to the moral +attributes of God.<a name="FNanchor_BG" id="FNanchor_BG"></a><a href="#Footnote_BG" class="fnanchor">[BG]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_BG' id='Footnote_BG'></a><a href='#FNanchor_BG'><span class='label'>[BG]</span></a> +<p> +See <i>Prolegomena Logica</i>, p. 77 (2nd ed., p. 85.) +</p> +</div> +<p> +Mr. Mill concludes this chapter with +another instance of that <i>ignoratio elenchi</i> +which has been so abundantly manifested +throughout his previous criticisms. His opponent, +he allows, “would and does admit +that the qualities as conceived by us bear +<i>some likeness</i> to the justice and goodness +which belong to God, since man was made +in God’s image.” But he considers that +this “semi-concession” “destroys the whole +fabric” of Mr. Mansel’s argument. “The +Divine goodness,” he says, “which is said to +be a different thing from human goodness, +but of which the human conception of goodness +is some imperfect reflexion or resemblance, +does it agree with what men call +goodness in the <i>essence</i> of the quality—in +what <i>constitutes</i> it goodness? If it does, the +‘Rationalists’ are right; it is not illicit to +reason from the one to the other. If not, the +divine attribute, whatever else it may be, is +not goodness, and ought not to be called by +the name.” Now the question really at issue +is not whether the “Rationalist” argument is +licit or illicit, but whether, in its lawful use, +it is to be regarded as infallible or fallible. +We have already quoted a portion of Mr. +Mansel’s language on this point; we will now +quote two more passages, which, without any +comment, will sufficiently show how utterly +Mr. Mill has mistaken the purport of the argument +which he has undertaken to examine. +</p> +<p style='font-size: 0.9em; margin-left:4em; margin-right:4%'> +“We do not certainly know the exact nature and operation +of the moral attributes of God: we can but infer and +conjecture from what we know of the moral attributes of +man: and the analogy between the Finite and the Infinite +can never be so perfect as to preclude all possibility of +error in the process. But the possibility becomes almost +a certainty, when any one human faculty is elevated by +itself into an authoritative criterion of religious truth, +without regard to those collateral evidences by which its +decisions may be modified and corrected.”<a name="FNanchor_BH" id="FNanchor_BH"></a><a href="#Footnote_BH" class="fnanchor">[BH]</a>... “Beyond +question, every doubt which our reason may suggest in +matters of religion is entitled to its due place in the +examination of the evidences of religion; if we will treat +it as a part only, and not the whole; if we will not insist +on a positive solution of that which, it may be, is given us +for another purpose than to be solved. It is reasonable to +believe that, in matters of belief as well as of practice, God +has not thought fit to annihilate the free will of man, but +has permitted speculative difficulties to exist as the trial +and the discipline of sharp and subtle intellects, as He has +permitted moral temptations to form the trial and the discipline +of strong and eager passions.... We do not +doubt that the conditions of our moral trial tend towards +good, and not towards evil; that human nature, even in +its fallen state, bears traces of the image of its Maker, and +is fitted to be an instrument in His moral government. +And we believe this, notwithstanding the existence of passions +and appetites which, isolated and uncontrolled, +appear to lead in an opposite direction. Is it then more +reasonable to deny that a system of revealed religion, +whose unquestionable tendency as a whole is to promote +the glory of God and the welfare of mankind, can have +proceeded from the same Author, merely because we may +be unable to detect the same character in some of its +minuter features, viewed apart from the system to which +they belong?”<a name="FNanchor_BI" id="FNanchor_BI"></a><a href="#Footnote_BI" class="fnanchor">[BI]</a> +</p> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_BH' id='Footnote_BH'></a><a href='#FNanchor_BH'><span class='label'>[BH]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Bampton Lectures</i>, p. 157, Fourth Edition. +</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote'><a name='Footnote_BI' id='Footnote_BI'></a><a href='#FNanchor_BI'><span class='label'>[BI]</span></a> +<p> +<i>Bampton Lectures</i>, p. 166, Fourth Edition. +</p> +</div> +<p> +Surely this is very different from denouncing +all reasoning from human goodness +to Divine as “illicit.” To take a parallel case. +The manufacture of gunpowder is a dangerous +process, and, if carried on without due precautions, +is very likely to lead to disastrous +consequences. Surely it is one thing to point +out what precautions are necessary, and what +evils are to be apprehended from the neglect +of them, and another to forbid the manufacture +altogether. Mr. Mill does not seem +to see the difference. +</p> +<p> +We have now considered in detail all that +part of Mr. Mill’s book which is devoted to +the examination of Sir W. Hamilton’s chief +and most characteristic doctrines—those +which constitute the Philosophy of the Conditioned. +The remainder of the work, which +deals chiefly with subordinate questions of +psychology and logic, contains much from +which we widely dissent, but which we +cannot at present submit to a special examination. +Nor is it necessary, so far as Sir W. +Hamilton’s reputation is concerned, that we +should do so. If the Philosophy of the Conditioned +is really nothing better than the mass +of crudities and blunders which Mr. Mill +supposes it to be, the warmest admirers of +Hamilton will do little in his behalf, even +should they succeed in vindicating some of +the minor details of his teaching. If, on the +other hand, it can be shown, as we have +attempted to show, that Mr. Mill is utterly +incapable of dealing with Hamilton’s philosophy +in its higher branches, his readers may +be left to judge for themselves whether he is +implicitly to be trusted as regards the lower. +In point of fact, they will do Mr. Mill no +injustice, if they regard the above specimens +as samples of his entire criticism. We gladly +except, as of a far higher order, those chapters +in which he is content with stating his +own views; but in the perpetual baiting of +Sir W. Hamilton, which occupies the greater +part of the volume, we recognise, in general, +the same captiousness and the same incompetence +which we have so often had occasion to +point out in the course of our previous remarks. +</p> +<p> +It is, we confess, an unpleasant and an +invidious task, to pick to pieces, bit by bit, +the work of an author of high reputation. +But Mr. Mill has chosen to put the question +on this issue, and he has left those who +dissent from him no alternative but to +follow his example. He has tasked all the +resources of minute criticism to destroy piece-meal +the reputation of one who has hitherto +borne an honoured name in philosophy: he +has no right to complain if the same measure +is meted to himself:— +</p> +<div class="poetry"> + <p> + “Neque enim lex æquior ulla + </p> + <p> + Quam necis artifices arte perire sua.” + </p> +</div> +<p> +But it is not so much the justice as the +necessity of the case which we would plead +as our excuse. Mr. Mill’s method of criticism +has reduced the question to a very +narrow compass. Either Sir W. Hamilton, +instead of being a great philosopher, is +the veriest blunderer that ever put pen to +paper, or the blunders are Mr. Mill’s own. +To those who accept the first of these +alternatives it must always remain a marvel +how Sir W. Hamilton could ever have +acquired that reputation which compels even +his critic to admit that “he alone, of our +metaphysicians of this and the preceding +generation, has acquired, merely as such, +an European celebrity;” how he could have +been designated by his illustrious opponent, +Cousin, as the “greatest critic of our age,” +or described by the learned Brandis as +“almost unparalleled in the profound knowledge +of ancient and modern philosophy.” +The marvel may perhaps disappear, should +it be the case, as we believe it to be, that +the second alternative is the true one. +</p> +<p> +But even in this case, it should be borne +in mind that the blow will by no means fall +on Mr. Mill with the same weight with +which he designed it to fall on the object of +his criticism. Sir W. Hamilton had devoted +his whole life to the study of metaphysics; +he was probably more deeply read in that +study than any of his contemporaries; and +if all his reading could produce nothing +better than the confusion and self-contradiction +which Mr. Mill imputes to him, the +result would be pitiable indeed. Mr. Mill, +on the other hand, we strongly suspect, +despises metaphysics too much to be at the +pains of studying them at all, and seems to +think that a critic is duly equipped for his +task with that amount of knowledge which, +like Dogberry’s reading and writing, “comes +by nature.” His work has a superficial +cleverness which, together with the author’s +previous reputation, will insure it a certain +kind of popularity; but we venture to predict +that its estimation by its readers will be +in the inverse ratio to their knowledge of the +subject. But Mr. Mill’s general reputation +rests on grounds quite distinct from his performances +in metaphysics; and though we +could hardly name one of his writings from +whose main principles we do not dissent, +there is hardly one which is not better fitted +to sustain his character as a thinker than +this last, in which the fatal charms of the +goddess Necessity seem to have betrayed +her champion into an unusual excess of +polemical zeal, coupled, it must be added, +with an unusual deficiency of philosophical +knowledge. +</p> +<hr class='ppg-pb' /> +<hr class='major' /> +<div style='margin: auto; text-align: center; padding-top: 2em; padding-bottom: 1em'> +<h2>POSTSCRIPT.</h2> +</div> + +<p> +It was not till after the preceding pages had been +sent to press that I became acquainted with a little +work recently published under the title of <i>The +Battle of the two Philosophies, by an Inquirer</i>. The +author appears to have been a personal pupil of +Sir W. Hamilton’s, as well as a diligent student +of his writings. At all events, he has “inquired” +to some purpose, and obtained a far more intelligent +knowledge of Hamilton’s system than is +exhibited by the majority of recent critics. It is +gratifying to find many of my remarks confirmed +by the concurrent testimony of so competent a +witness. The following would have been noticed +in their proper places had I been sooner acquainted +with them. +</p> +<p> +Of the popular confusion between the <i>infinite</i> +and the <i>indefinite</i>, noticed above, pp. 50, 112, “An +Inquirer” observes:— +</p> +<p> +“If we could realise in thought infinite space, +that conception would be a perfectly definite one; +but the notion that is here offered us in its place, +though it may be real, is certainly not definite; +it is merely the conception of an indefinite extension.... +In truth, when we strive +to think of infinite space, the nearest approach +we can make to it is this notion of an indefinite +space, which Mr. Mill has substituted for it. But +these two conceptions are not only verbally, they +are really wholly distinct. An indefinite space is +a space of the extent of which we think vaguely, +without knowing or without thinking where its +boundaries are. Infinite space has certainly, and +quite distinctly, no boundaries anywhere.”—(Pp. +18-20.) +</p> +<p> +On Mr. Mill’s strange distinction between the +Divine Attributes, as some infinite and others absolute, +the author’s remarks are substantially in agreement +with what has been said above on pp. 105-6. +</p> +<p> +“Mr. Mill argues that all the attributes of God +cannot be infinite; but that some, as power, may +be infinite; and some, as goodness and knowledge, +must be absolute, because neither can knowledge be +more than complete, nor goodness more than perfect. +When we know all there is to be known, +he says, knowledge has attained its utmost limit. +But this is merely begging the whole question. If +there be an Infinite Being, He cannot know all +there is to be known unless He know Himself; and +adequately to know what is infinite is to have infinite +knowledge. The same thing would be true +if there could be a Being whose power and duration +only were infinite. ’The will,’ he adds, ‘is +either entirely right, or wrong in different degrees: +downwards there are as many gradations as we +choose to distinguish; but upwards there is an +ideal limit. Goodness can be imagined complete,—such +that there can be no greater goodness beyond +it,’... But a Being of infinite power and +finite goodness would not be perfectly good, because +His power would not be wholly, but only in +part directed by His goodness. Nay, as that which +is finite bears no proportion whatever to what is infinite: +as, however great it be absolutely, it is still +infinitely less than infinity, such a Being would +be partly good and yet infinitely evil, which is +absurd in reason and impossible in fact.”—(Pp. +24, 25.) +</p> +<p> +The following estimate of Mr. Mill’s merits as a +metaphysician coincides with that which, contrary +to my expectation, I found forced upon myself after +a careful examination of his book.—(See above, +Pp. 62, 182.) +</p> +<p> +“We cannot but think that Mr. Mill in this, his +first work in pure metaphysics, has disappointed +just expectation. In leaving the fields of practical +philosophy, he seems to have left his genius behind +him. Even the peculiar ‘cunning of his right hand’—even +his unexcelled logical power avails him +little, so continually does he fail to see distinctly +the conception with which he is fencing.... +As long as he is applying given principles to the +solution of practical questions; as long as he has +to do with the process of an argument, he proves +himself a most able instructor and guide. But +when he has to grapple with a metaphysical problem, +it almost invariably arrives that the central, +the metaphysical difficulty, escapes him.”—(Pp. 78-80.) +</p> +<hr class='ppg-pb' /> +<p style='text-align: center'> +MUIR AND PATERSON, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH. +</p> +<!-- generated by ppgen.rb version: 2.74 --> +<!-- timestamp: Thu Apr 02 15:32:25 -0700 2009 --> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Philosophy of the Conditioned, by H. L. 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