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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: China, Japan and the U.S.A. + Present-Day Conditions in the Far East and Their Bearing + on the Washington Conference + +Author: John Dewey + +Release Date: October 25, 2009 [EBook #28393] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHINA, JAPAN AND THE U.S.A. *** + + + + +Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + +<div id="title-page"><a class="pagenum disguise" id="page1" title="1"> </a> + <h1>CHINA, JAPAN<br /> <span class="smaller">AND THE</span> U. S. A.</h1> + + <p class="second-title">Present-day Conditions<br /> + in the Far East<br /> + and Their Bearing on<br /> + the Washington<br /> + Conference</p> + + <p class="byline"><em>by</em><br /> + <span class="author">JOHN DEWEY</span><br /> + + <span class="affiliation">Professor of Philosophy at<br /> + Columbia University</span></p> + + <p class="number">New Republic Pamphlet No. 1</p> + + <p class="publisher">Published by the<br /> + <span class="pub-name">REPUBLIC PUBLISHING CO., INC.</span><br /> + 421 West Twenty-first Street<br /> + <span class="pub-city">New York City</span><br /> + <span class="pub-date">1921</span></p> +</div> +<div id="copyright-page"><a class="pagenum disguise" id="page2" title="2"> </a> + <p id="copyright-statement">Copyright 1921<br /> + <span class="pub-name">Republic Publishing Co. Inc.</span></p> +</div> +<div id="contents"> + <h2>Contents</h2> + <ol> + <li><a href="#essay1">On Two Sides of the Eastern Seas</a></li> + <li><a href="#essay2">Shantung, As Seen From Within</a></li> + <li><a href="#essay3">Hinterlands in China</a></li> + <li><a href="#essay4">A Political Upheaval in China</a></li> + <li><a href="#essay5">Divided China</a></li> + <li><a href="#essay6">Federalism in China</a></li> + <li><a href="#essay7">A Parting of the Ways for America</a></li> + </ol> +</div> +<div id="intro"><a class="pagenum" id="page3" title="3"> </a> + <p class="internal-title">CHINA, JAPAN and the U. S. A.</p> + <p class="intro-title">Introductory Note</p> + + <p>The articles following are reprinted as they were + written in spite of the fact that any picture of contemporary + events is modified by subsequent increase + of knowledge and by later events. In the + main, however, the writer would still stand by + what was said at the time. A few foot notes + have been inserted where the text is likely to + give rise to misapprehensions. The date of + writing has been retained as a guide to the reader.</p> +</div> +<div id="essay1" class="essay"> + <h2><abbr class="essay-number" title="one">I</abbr><br /> + On Two Sides of the Eastern Seas</h2> + + <p class="first_paragraph"><span class="first_word">It</span> is three days’ easy journey from Japan to China. It is + doubtful whether anywhere in the world another journey + of the same length brings with it such a complete change + of political temper and belief. Certainly it is greater than the + alteration perceived in journeying directly from San Francisco + to Shanghai. The difference is not one in customs and modes + of life; that goes without saying. It concerns the ideas, beliefs + and alleged information current about one and the same fact: + the status of Japan in the international world and especially + its attitude toward China. One finds everywhere in Japan a + feeling of uncertainty, hesitation, even of weakness. There + is a subtle nervous tension in the atmosphere as of a country + on the verge of change but not knowing where the change will + take it. Liberalism is in the air, but genuine liberals are encompassed + with all sorts of difficulties especially in combining + their liberalism with the devotion to theocratic robes which + the imperialist militarists who rule Japan have so skilfully + thrown about the Throne and the Government. But what one + senses in China from the first moment is the feeling of the all-pervading + power of Japan which is working as surely as fate + to its unhesitating conclusion—the domination of Chinese politics + and industry by Japan with a view to its final absorption. + It is not my object to analyze the realities of the situation + <a class="pagenum" id="page4" title="4"> </a>or to inquire whether the universal feeling in China is a collective + hallucination or is grounded in fact. The phenomenon + is worthy of record on its own account. Even if it be merely + psychological, it is a fact which must be reckoned with in both + its Chinese and its Japanese aspects. In the first place, + as to the differences in psychological atmosphere. Everybody + who knows anything about Japan knows that it is the land of + reserves and reticences. The half-informed American will tell + you that this is put on for the misleading of foreigners. The + informed know that it is an attitude shown to foreigners only + because it is deeply engrained in the moral and social tradition + of Japan; and that, if anything, the Japanese are more likely + to be communicative—about many things at least—to a sympathetic + foreigner, than to one another. The habit of reserve + is so deeply embedded in all the etiquette, convention + and daily ceremony of living, as well as in the ideals of strength + of character, that only the Japanese who have subjected themselves + to foreign influences escape it—and many of them revert. + To put it mildly, the Japanese are not a loquacious + people; they have the gift of doing rather than of gab.</p> + + <p>When accordingly a Japanese statesman or visiting diplomatist + engages in unusually prolonged and frank discourse setting + forth the aims and procedures of Japan, the student of + politics who has been long in the East at once becomes alert, + not to say suspicious. A recent illustration is so extreme that + it will doubtless seem fantastic beyond belief. But the student + at home will have to take these seeming fantasies seriously if + he wishes to appreciate the present atmosphere of China. + Cables have brought fragmentary reports of some addresses + of Baron Goto in America. Doubtless in the American atmosphere + these have the effect of reassuring America as to + any improper ambitions on the part of Japan. In China, they + were taken as announcements that Japan has about completed + its plans for the absorption of China, and that the lucubration + preliminary to operations of swallowing are about to begin. + The reader is forgiven in advance any scepticism he feels about + both the fact itself and the correctness of my report of the + belief in the alleged fact. His scepticism will not surpass what + I should feel in his place. But the suspicion aroused by such + statements as this and the recent interview of Foreign Minister + <a class="pagenum" id="page5" title="5"> </a>Uchida and Baron Ishii must be noted as evidences of the universal + belief in China that Japan has one mode of diplomacy + for the East and another for the West, and that what is said + in the West must be read in reverse in the East.</p> + + <p>China, whatever else it is, is not the land of privacies. It + is a proverb that nothing long remains secret in China. The + Chinese talk more easily than they act—especially in politics. + They are adepts in revealing their own shortcomings. They + dissect their own weaknesses and failures with the most extraordinary + reasonableness. One of the defects upon which they + dwell is the love of finding substitutes for positive action, of + avoiding entering upon a course of action which might be irrevocable. + One almost wonders whether their power of self-criticism + is not itself another of these substitutes. At all events, + they are frank to the point of loquacity. Between the opposite + camps there are always communications flowing. Among official + enemies there are “sworn friends.” In a land of perpetual + compromise, etiquette as well as necessity demands that + the ways for later accommodations be kept open. Consequently + things which are spoken of only under the breath in Japan + are shouted from the housetops in China. It would hardly be + good taste in Japan to allude to the report that influential + Chinese ministers are in constant receipt of Japanese funds + and these corrupt officials are the agencies by which political + and economic concessions were wrung from China while Europe + and America were busy with the war. But in China nobody + even takes the trouble to deny it or even to discuss it. + What is psychologically most impressive is the fact that it is + merely taken for granted. When it is spoken of, it is as one + mentions the heat on an unusually hot day.</p> + + <p>In speaking of the feeling of weakness current in Japan + about Japan itself, one must refer to the economic situation + because of its obvious connection with the international situation. + In the first place, there is the strong impression that + Japan is over-extended. Even in normal times, Japan relies + more upon production for foreign markets than is regarded + in most countries as safe policy. And there is the belief that + Japan <em>must</em> do so, because only by large foreign sellings—large + in comparison with the purchasing power of a people + still having a low standard of life—can it purchase the raw + <a class="pagenum" id="page6" title="6"> </a>materials—and even food—it has to have. But during the + war, the dependence of manufacturing and trade at home upon + the foreign market was greatly increased. The domestic increase + of wealth, though very great, is still too much in the + hands of the few to affect seriously the internal demand for + goods. Item one, which awakens sympathy for Japan as being + in a somewhat precarious situation.</p> + + <p>Another item concerns the labor situation. Japan seems to + feel itself in a dilemma. If she passes even reasonably decent + factory laws (or rather attempts their enforcement) and regulates + child and women’s labor, she will lose that advantage + of cheap labor which she now counts on to offset her many + disadvantages. On the other hand, strikes, labor difficulties, + agitation for unions, etc., are constantly increasing, and the + tension in the atmosphere is unmistakable. The rice riots are + not often spoken of, but their memory persists, and the fact + that they came very near to assuming a directly political aspect. + Is there a race between fulfillment of the aspirations of the + military clans who still hold the reins, and the growth of + genuinely democratic forces which will forever terminate those + aspirations? Certainly the defeat of Germany gave a blow to + bureaucratic militarism in Japan which in time will go far. + Will it have the time required to take effect on foreign policy? + The hope that it will is a large factor in stimulating liberal + sympathy for a Japan which is beginning to undergo the throes + of transition.</p> + + <p>As for the direct international situation of Japan, the feeling + in Japan is that of the threatening danger of isolation. + Germany is gone; Russia is gone. While those facts simplify + matters for Japan somewhat, there is also the belief that in + taking away potential allies, they have weakened Japan in the + general game of balance and counter-balance of power. Particularly + does the removal of imperialistic Russia relieve the + threat on India which was such a factor in the willingness of + Great Britain to make the offensive-defensive alliance. The + revelation of the militaristic possibilities of America is another + serious factor. Certainly the new triple entente cordiale of + Japan, Italy and France is no adequate substitute for a realignment + of international forces in which a common understanding + between Great Britain and America is a dominant + <a class="pagenum" id="page7" title="7"> </a>factor. This factor explains, if it does not excuse, some of + the querulousness and studied discourtesies with which the + Japanese press for some months treated President Wilson, + the United States in general and its relation to the League of + Nations in particular, while it also throws light on the ardor + with which the opportune question of racial discrimination was + discussed. (The Chinese have an unfailing refuge in a sense + of humor. It was interesting to note the delight with which + they received the utterance of the Japanese Foreign Minister, + after Japanese success at Paris, that “his attention had recently + been called” to various press attacks on America which + he much deprecated). In any case there is no mistaking the + air of tension and nervous overstrain which now attends all + discussion of Japanese foreign relations. In all directions, + there are characteristic signs of hesitation, shaking of old beliefs + and movement along new lines. Japan seems to be much + in the same mood as that which it experienced in the early + eighties before, toward the close of that decade, it crystallized + its institutions through acceptance of the German constitution, + militarism, educational system, and diplomatic methods. So + that, once more, the observer gets the impression that substantially + all of Japan’s energy, abundant as that is, must be devoted + to her urgent problems of readjustment.</p> + + <p>Come to China, and the difference is incredible. It almost + seems as if one were living in a dream; or as if some new + Alice had ventured behind an international looking-glass wherein + everything is reversed. That we in America should have + little idea of the state of things and the frame of mind in + China is not astonishing—especially in view of the censorship + and the distraction of attention of the last few years. But + that Japan and China should be so geographically near, and + yet every fact that concerns them appear in precisely opposite + perspective, is an experience of a life time. Japanese liberalism? + Yes, it is heard of, but only in connection with one form + which the longing for the miraculous <em lang="la" xml:lang="la">deus ex machina</em> takes. + Perhaps a revolution in Japan may intervene to save China + from the fate which now hangs over her. But there is no suggestion + that anything less than a complete revolution will + alter or even retard the course which is attributed to Japanese + diplomacy working hand in hand with Japanese business interests + <a class="pagenum" id="page8" title="8"> </a>and militarism. The collapse of Russia and Germany? + These things only mean that Japan has in a few years fallen + complete heir to Russian hopes, achievements and possessions + in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, and has had opportunities + in Siberia thrown into her hands which she could hardly have + hoped for in her most optimistic moments. And now Japan + has, with the blessing of the great Powers at Paris, become + also the heir of German concessions, intrigues and ambitions, + with added concessions, wrung (or bought) from incompetent + and corrupt officials by secret agreements when the world was + busy with war. If all the great Powers are so afraid of Japan + that they give way to her every wish, what is China that she + can escape the doom prepared for her? That is the cry of + helplessness going up all over China. And Japanese propagandists + take advantage of the situation, pointing to the action + of the Peace Conference as proof that the Allies care nothing + for China, and that China must throw herself into the arms + of Japan if she is to have any protection at all. In short, + Japan stands ready as she stood ready in Korea to guarantee + the integrity and independence of China. And the fear that + the latter must, in spite of her animosity toward Japan, accept + this fate in order to escape something worse swims in the + sinister air. It is the exact counterpart of the feeling current + among the liberals in Japan that Japan has alienated China + permanently when a considerate and slower course might have + united the two countries. If the economic straits of Japan are + alluded to, it is only as a reason why Japan has hurried her + diplomatic coercion, her corrupt and secret bargainings with + Chinese traitors and her industrial invasion. While the western + world supposes that the military and the industrial party in + Japan have opposite ideas as to best methods of securing Japanese + supremacy in the East, it is the universal opinion in China + that they two are working in complete understanding with one + another, and the differences that sometimes occur between the + Foreign Office in Tokyo and the Ministry of War (which is + extra-constitutional in its status) are staged for effect.</p> + + <p>These are some of the aspects of the most complete transformation + scene that it has ever been the lot of the writer to experience. + May it turn out to be only an extraordinary psychological + experience! But in the interests of truth it must + <a class="pagenum" id="page9" title="9"> </a>be recorded that every resident of China, Chinese or American, + with whom I have talked in the last four weeks has volunteered + the belief that all the seeds of a future great war are now deeply + implanted in China. To avert such a calamity they look to the + League of Nations or to some other force outside the immediate + scene. Unfortunately the press of Japan treats every attempt + to discuss the state of opinion in China or the state of facts + as evidence that America, having tasted blood in the war, now + has its eyes on Asia with the expectation later on of getting its + hands on Asia. Consequently America is interested in trying + to foster ill-will between China and Japan. If the pro-American + Japanese do not enlighten their fellow-countrymen as to the + facts, then America ought to return some of the propaganda + that visits its shores. But every American who goes to Japan + ought also to visit China—if only to complete his education.</p> + + <p class="dateline">May, 1919.</p> +</div> +<div id="essay2" class="essay"> + <h2><abbr class="essay-number" title="two">II</abbr><br /> + Shantung, As Seen From Within</h2> + + <h3>1.</h3> + + <p class="first_paragraph"><span class="first_word">American</span> apologists for that part of the Peace Treaty + which relates to China have the advantage of the illusions + of distance. Most of the arguments seem + strange to anyone who lives in China even for a few months. + He finds the Japanese on the spot using the old saying about + territory consecrated by treasure spent and blood shed. He + reads in Japanese papers and hears from moderately liberal + Japanese that Japan must protect China, as well as Japan, + against herself, against her own weak or corrupt government, + by keeping control of Shantung to prevent China from again + alienating that territory to some other power.</p> + + <p>The history of European aggression in China gives this argument + great force among the Japanese, who for the most + part know nothing more about what actually goes on in China + than they used to know about Korean conditions. These considerations, + together with the immense expectations raised + among the Japanese during the war concerning their coming + <a class="pagenum" id="page10" title="10"> </a>domination of the Far East and the unswerving demand of excited + public opinion in Japan during the Versailles Conference + for the settlement that actually resulted, give an ironic turn + to the statement so often made that Japan may be trusted to + carry out her promises. Yes, one is often tempted to say, that + is precisely what China fears, that Japan will carry out her + promises, for then China is doomed. To one who knows the + history of foreign aggression in China, especially the technique + of conquest by railway and finance, the irony of promising to + keep economic rights while returning sovereignty lies so on + the surface that it is hardly irony. China might as well be + offered Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason on a silver platter as + be offered sovereignty under such conditions. The latter is + equally metaphysical.</p> + + <p>A visit to Shantung and a short residence in its capital city, + Tsinan, made the conclusions, which so far as I know every + foreigner in China has arrived at, a living thing. It gave a + vivid picture of the many and intimate ways in which economic + and political rights are inextricably entangled together. It + made one realize afresh that only a President who kept himself + innocent of any knowledge of secret treaties during the + war, could be naïve enough to believe that the promise to return + complete sovereignty retaining <em>only</em> economic rights is a + satisfactory solution. It threw fresh light upon the contention + that at most and at worst Japan had only taken over German + rights, and that since we had acquiesced in the latter’s arrogations + we had no call to make a fuss about Japan. It revealed + the hollowness of the claim that pro-Chinese propaganda had + wilfully misled Americans into confusing the few hundred + square miles around the port of Tsing-tao with the Province + of Shantung with its thirty millions of Chinese population.</p> + + <p>As for the comparison of Germany and Japan one might suppose + that the objects for which America nominally entered the + war had made, in any case, a difference. But aside from this + consideration, the Germans exclusively employed Chinese in + the railway shops and for all the minor positions on the railway + itself. The railway guards (the difference between police + and soldiers is nominal in China) were all Chinese, the Germans + merely training them. As soon as Japan invaded Shantung and + took over the railway, Chinese workmen and Chinese military + <a class="pagenum" id="page11" title="11"> </a>guards were at once dismissed and Japanese imported to take + their places. Tsinan-fu, the inland terminus of the ex-German + railway, is over two hundred miles from Tsing-tao. When the + Japanese took over the German railway business office, they + at once built barracks, and today there are several hundred + soldiers still there—where Germany kept none. Since the armistice + even, Japan has erected a powerful military wireless + within the grounds of the garrison, against of course the unavailing + protest of Chinese authorities. No foreigner can be + found who will state that Germany used her ownership of port + and railway to discriminate against other nations. No Chinese + can be found who will claim that this ownership was used to + force the Chinese out of business, or to extend German economic + rights beyond those definitely assigned her by treaty. + Common sense should also teach even the highest paid propagandist + in America that there is, from the standpoint of China, + an immense distinction between a national menace located half + way around the globe, and one within two days’ sail over an + inland sea absolutely controlled by a foreign navy, especially + as the remote nation has no other foothold and the nearby + one already dominates additional territory of enormous strategic + and economic value—namely, Manchuria.</p> + + <p>These facts bear upon the shadowy distinction between the + Tsing-tao and the Shantung claim, as well as upon the solid + distinction between German and Japanese occupancy. If there + still seemed to be a thin wall between Japanese possession of + the port of Tsing-tao and usurpation of Shantung, it was + enough to stop off the train in Tsinan-fu to see the wall crumble. + For the Japanese wireless and the barracks of the army of + occupation are the first things that greet your eyes. Within + a few hundred feet of the railway that connects Shanghai, via + the important center of Tientsin, with the capital, Peking, you + see Japanese soldiers on the nominally Chinese street, guarding + their barracks. Then you learn that if you travel upon the + ex-German railway towards Tsing-tao, you are ordered to show + your passport as if you were entering a foreign country. And + as you travel along the road (remembering that you are over + two hundred miles from Tsing-tao) you find Japanese soldiers + at every station, and several garrisons and barracks at important + towns on the line. Then you realize that at the shortest + <a class="pagenum" id="page12" title="12"> </a>possible notice, Japan could cut all communications between + southern China (together with the rich Yangste region) and the + capital, and with the aid of the Southern Manchurian Railway + at the north of the capital, hold the entire coast and descend at + its good pleasure upon Peking.</p> + + <p>You are then prepared to learn from eye-witnesses that when + Japan made its Twenty-one Demands upon China, machine guns + were actually in position at strategic points throughout Shantung, + with trenches dug and sandbags placed. You know that + the Japanese liberal spoke the truth, who told you, after a + visit to China and his return to protest against the action of his + government, that the Japanese already had such a military hold + upon China that they could control the country within a week, + after a minimum of fighting, if war should arise. You also + realize the efficiency of official control of information and + domestic propaganda as you recall that he also told you that + these things were true at the time of his visit, under the Terauchi + cabinet, but had been completely reversed by the present Hara + ministry. For I have yet to find a single foreigner or Chinese + who is conscious of any difference of policy, save as the end + of the war has forced the necessity of caution, since other + nations can now look China-wards as they could not during + the war.</p> + + <p>An American can get an idea of the realities of the present + situation if he imagines a foreign garrison and military wireless in + Wilmington, with a railway from that point to a fortified sea-port + controlled by the foreign power, at which the foreign nation + can land, without resistance, troops as fast as they can be + transported, and with bases of supply, munitions, food, uniforms, + etc., already located at Wilmington, at the sea-port and + several places along the line. Reverse the directions from south + to north, and Wilmington will stand for Tsinan-fu, Shanghai + for New York, Nanking for Philadelphia with Peking standing + for the seat of government at Washington, and Tientsin for + Baltimore. Suppose in addition that the Pennsylvania road is + the sole means of communication between Washington and the + chief commercial and industrial centers, and you have the framework + of the Shantung picture as it presents itself daily to the + inhabitants of China. Upon second thought, however, the + parallel is not quite accurate. You have to add that the same + <a class="pagenum" id="page13" title="13"> </a>foreign nation controls also all coast communications from, say, + Raleigh southwards, with railway lines both to the nearby coast + and to New Orleans. For (still reversing directions) this corresponds + to the position of Imperial Japan in Manchuria with + its railways to Dairen and through Korea to a port twelve + hours sail from a great military center in Japan proper. These + are not remote possibilities nor vague prognostications. They + are accomplished facts.</p> + + <p>Yet the facts give <em>only</em> the framework of the picture. What + is actually going on within Shantung? One of the demands of + the “postponed” group of the Twenty-one Demands was that + Japan should supply military and police advisers to China. + They are not so much postponed but that Japan enforced specific + concessions from China during the war by diplomatic threats + to reintroduce their discussion, or so postponed that Japanese + advisers are not already installed in the police headquarters of + the city of Tsinan, the capital city of Shantung of three hundred + thousand population where the Provincial Assembly meets and + all the Provincial officials reside. Within recent months the + Japanese consul has taken a company of armed soldiers with + him when he visited the Provincial Governor to make certain + demands upon him, the visit being punctuated by an ostentatious + surrounding of the Governor’s yamen by these troops. Within + the past few weeks, two hundred cavalry came to Tsinan and + remained there while Japanese officials demanded of the Governor + drastic measures to suppress the boycott, while it was threatened + to send Japanese troops to police the foreign settlement + if the demand was not heeded.</p> + + <p>A former consul was indiscreet enough to put into writing + that if the Chinese Governor did not stop the boycott and the + students’ movement by force if need be, he would take matters + into his own hands. The chief tangible charge he brought + against the Chinese as a basis of his demand for “protection” + was that Chinese store-keepers actually refused to accept Japanese + money in payment for goods, not ordinary Japanese + money at that, but the military notes with which, so as + to save drain upon the bullion reserves, the army of occupation + is paid. And all this, be it remembered, is more than two hundred + miles from Tsing-tao and from eight to twelve months + after the armistice. Today’s paper reports a visit of Japanese + <a class="pagenum" id="page14" title="14"> </a>to the Governor to inform him that unless he should prevent + a private theatrical performance from being given in Tsinan + by the students, they would send their own forces into the settlement + to protect themselves. And the utmost they might + need protection from, was that the students were to give some + plays designed to foster the boycott!</p> + + <p>Japanese troops overran the Province before they made any + serious attempt to capture Tsing-tao. It is only a slight exaggeration + to say that they “took” the Chinese Tsinan before + they took the German Tsing-tao. Propaganda in America has + justified this act on the ground that a German railway to the + rear of Japanese forces would have been a menace. As there + were no troops but only legal and diplomatic papers with which + to attack the Japanese, it is a fair inference that the “menace” + was located in Versailles rather than in Shantung, and concerned + the danger of Chinese control of their own territory. Chinese + have been arrested by Japanese gendarmes in Tsinan and subjected + to a torturing third degree of the kind that Korea has + made sickeningly familiar. The Japanese claim that the injuries + were received while the men were resisting arrest. Considering + that there was no more legal ground for arrest than there + would be if Japanese police arrested Americans in New York, + almost anybody but the pacifist Chinese certainly would have + resisted. But official hospital reports testify to bayonet wounds + and the marks of flogging. In the interior where the Japanese + had been disconcerted by the student propaganda they raided a + High School, seized a school boy at random, and took him to + a distant point and kept him locked up several days. When + the Japanese consul at Tsinan was visited by Chinese officials + in protest against these illegal arrests, the consul disclaimed + all jurisdiction. The matter, he said, was wholly in the hands + of the military authorities in Tsing-tao. His disclaimer was emphasized + by the fact that some of the kidnapped Chinese were + taken to Tsing-tao for “trial.”</p> + + <p>The matter of economic rights in relation to political domination + will be discussed later in this article. It is no + pleasure for one with many warm friends in Japan, who has + a great admiration for the Japanese people as distinct from the + ruling military and bureaucratic class, to report such facts as + have been stated. One might almost say, one might positively + <a class="pagenum" id="page15" title="15"> </a>say from the standpoint of Japan itself, that the worst thing + that can be charged against the policy of Japan in China for the + last six years is its immeasurable stupidity. No nation has ever + misjudged the national psychology of another people as Japan + has that of China. The alienation of China is widespread, deep, + bitter. Even the most pessimistic of the Chinese who think that + China is to undergo a complete economic and political domination + by Japan do not think it can last, even without outside intervention, + more than half a century.</p> + + <p>Today, at the beginning of a new year, (1920) the boycott is + much more complete and efficient than in the most tense days of + last summer. Unfortunately, the Japanese policy seems to be under + a truly Greek fate which drives it on. Concessions that would + have produced a revulsion of feeling in favor of Japan a year + ago will now merely salve the surface of the wound. What + would have been welcomed even eight months ago would now + be received with contempt. There is but one way in which + Japan can now restore herself. It is nothing less than complete + withdrawal from Shantung, with possibly a strictly commercial + concession at Tsing-tao and a real, not a Manchurian, Open + Door.</p> + + <p>According to the Japanese-owned newspapers published in + Tsinan, the Japanese military commander in Tsing-tao recently + made a speech to visiting journalists from Tokyo in which he + said: “The suspicions of China cannot now be allayed merely + by repeating that we have no territorial ambitions in China. We + must attain complete economic domination of the Far East. But + if Chino-Japanese relations do not improve, some third party will + reap the benefit. Japanese residing in China incur the hatred of + the Chinese. For they regard themselves as the proud citizens + of a conquering country. When the Japanese go into partnership + with the Chinese they manage in the greater number of + cases to have the profits accrue to themselves. If friendship + between China and Japan is to depend wholly upon the government + it will come to nothing. Diplomatists, soldiers, merchants, + journalists should repent the past. The change must be complete.” + But it will not be complete until the Japanese withdraw + from Shantung leaving their nationals there upon the footing of + other foreigners in China.</p> + + <h3><a class="pagenum" id="page16" title="16"> </a>2.</h3> + + <p>In discussing the return to China by Japan of a metaphysical + sovereignty while economic rights are retained, I shall not repeat + the details of German treaty rights as to the railway and the + mines. The reader is assumed to be familiar with those facts. + The German seizure was outrageous. It was a flagrant case of + Might making Right. As von Buelow cynically but frankly told + the Reichstag, while Germany did not intend to partition China, + she also did not intend to be the passenger left behind in the + station when the train started. Germany had the excuse of + prior European aggressions, and in turn her usurpation was the + precedent for further foreign rape. If judgments are made on + a comparative basis, Japan is entitled to all of the white-washing + that can be derived from the provocations of European imperialistic + powers, including those countries that in domestic + policy are democratic. And every fairminded person will recognize + that, leaving China out of the reckoning, Japan’s proximity + to China gives her aggressions the color of self-defence in a way + that cannot be urged in behalf of any European power.</p> + + <p>It is possible to look at European aggressions in, say, Africa + as incidents of a colonization movement. But no foreign policy + in Asia can shelter itself behind any colonization plea. For + continental Asia is, for practical purposes, India and China, + representing two of the oldest civilizations of the globe and + presenting two of its densest populations. If there is any such + thing in truth as a philosophy of history with its own inner and + inevitable logic, one may well shudder to think of what the + closing acts of the drama of the intercourse of the West and + East are to be. In any case, and with whatever comfort may + be derived from the fact that the American continents have not + taken part in the aggression and hence may act as a mediator + to avert the final tragedy, residence in China forces upon one + the realization that Asia is, after all, a large figure in the future + reckoning of history. Asia is really here after all. It is not + simply a symbol in western algebraic balances of trade. And in + the future, so to speak, it is going to be even more here, with + its awakened national consciousness of about half the population + of the whole globe.</p> + + <p>Let the agreements of France and Great Britain made with + <a class="pagenum" id="page17" title="17"> </a>Japan during the war stand for the measure of western consciousness + of the reality of only a small part of Asia, a consciousness + generated by the patriotism of Japan backed by its powerful + army and navy. The same agreement measures western unconsciousness + of the reality of that part of Asia which lies within + the confines of China. An even better measure of western + unconsciousness may be found perhaps in such a trifling incident + as this:—An English friend long resident in Shantung told me + of writing indignantly home concerning the British part in the + Shantung settlement. The reply came, complacently stating that + Japanese ships did so much in the war that the Allies could not + properly refuse to recognize Japan’s claims. The secret agreements + themselves hardly speak as eloquently for the absence of + China from the average western consciousness. In saying that + China and Asia are to be enormously significant figures in future + reckonings, the spectre of a military Yellow Peril is not meant + nor even the more credible spectre of an industrial Yellow Peril. + But Asia has come to consciousness, and her consciousness of + herself will soon be such a massive and persistent thing that it + will force itself upon the reluctant consciousness of the west, + and lie heavily upon its conscience. And for this fact, China and + the western world are indebted to Japan.</p> + + <p>These remarks are more relevant to a consideration of the + relationship of economic and political rights in Shantung than + they perhaps seem. For a moment’s reflection will call to mind + that all political foreign aggression in China has been carried + out for commercial and financial ends, and usually upon some + economic pretext. As to the immediate part played by Japan + in bringing about a consciousness which will from the present + time completely change the relations of the western powers to + China, let one little story testify. Some representatives of an + English missionary board were making a tour of inspection + through China. They went into an interior town in Shantung. + They were received with extraordinary cordiality by the entire + population. Some time afterwards some of their accompanying + friends returned to the village and were received with equally + surprising coldness. It came out upon inquiry that the inhabitants + had first been moved by the rumor that these people + were sent by the British government to secure the removal of + the Japanese. Later they were moved by indignation that they + had been disappointed.</p> + + <p><a class="pagenum" id="page18" title="18"> </a>It takes no forcing to see a symbol in this incident. Part of + it stands for the almost incredible ignorance which has rendered + China so impotent nationally speaking. The other part of it + stands for the new spirit which has been aroused even among + the common people in remote districts. Those who fear, or + who pretend to fear, a new Boxer movement, or a definite general + anti-foreign movement, are, I think, mistaken. The new + consciousness goes much deeper. Foreign policies that fail to + take it into account and that think that relations with China + can be conducted upon the old basis will find this new consciousness + obtruding in the most unexpected and perplexing ways.</p> + + <p>One might fairly say, still speaking comparatively, that it is + part of the bad luck of Japan that her proximity to China, and + the opportunity the war gave her to outdo the aggressions of + European powers, have made her the first victim of this disconcerting + change. Whatever the motives of the American + Senators in completely disassociating the United States from the + peace settlement as regards China, their action is a permanent + asset to China, not only in respect to Japan but with respect to + all Chinese foreign relations. Just before our visit to Tsinan, + the Shantung Provincial Assembly had passed a resolution of + thanks to the American Senate. More significant is the fact + that they passed another resolution to be cabled to the English + Parliament, calling attention to the action of the American + Senate and inviting similar action. China in general and + Shantung in particular feels the reinforcement of an external + approval. With this duplication, its national consciousness has + as it were solidified. Japan is simply the first object to be + affected.</p> + + <p>The concrete working out of economic rights in Shantung + will be illustrated by a single case which will have to stand as + typical. Po-shan is an interior mining village. The mines were + not part of the German booty; they were Chinese owned. The + Germans, whatever their ulterior aims, had made no attempt + at dispossessing the Chinese. The mines, however, are at the + end of a branch line of the new Japanese owned railway—owned + by the government, not by a private corporation, and + guarded by Japanese soldiers. Of the forty mines, the Japanese + have worked their way, in only four years, into all but four. + Different methods are used. The simplest is, of course, discrimination + in the use of the railway for shipping. Downright + <a class="pagenum" id="page19" title="19"> </a>refusal to furnish cars while competitors who accepted Japanese + partners got them, is one method. Another more elaborate + method is to send but one car when a large number is asked for, + and then when it is too late to use cars, send the whole number + asked for or even more, and then charge a large sum for + demurrage in spite of the fact the mine no longer wants them + or has cancelled the order. Redress there is none.</p> + + <p>Tsinan has no special foreign concessions. It is, however, a + “treaty port” where nationals of all friendly powers can do + business. But Po-shan is not even a treaty port. Legally speaking + no foreigners can lease land or carry on any business there. + Yet the Japanese have forced a settlement as large in area as + the entire foreign settlement in the much larger town of Tsinan. + A Chinese refused to lease land where the Japanese wished to + relocate their railway station. Nothing happened to him directly. + But merchants could not get shipping space, or receive goods by + rail. Some of them were beaten up by thugs. After a time, they + used their influence with their compatriot to lease his land. Immediately + the persecutions ceased. Not all the land has been + secured by threats or coercion; some has been leased directly + by Chinese moved by high prices, in spite of the absence of any + legal sanction. In addition, the Japanese have obtained control + of the electric light works and some pottery factories, etc.</p> + + <p>Now even admitting that this is typical of the methods by + which the Japanese plant themselves, a natural American reaction + would be to say that, after all, the country is built up + industrially by these enterprises, and that though the rights of + some individuals may have been violated, there is nothing to + make a national, much less an international fuss about. More + or less unconsciously we translate foreign incidents into terms + of our own experience and environment, and thus miss the + entire point. Since America was largely developed by foreign + capital to our own economic benefit and without political encroachments, + we lazily suppose some such separation of the + economic and political to be possible in China. But it must be + remembered that China is not an open country. Foreigners can + lease land, carry on business, and manufacture only in accord + with express treaty agreements. There are no such agreements + in the cases typified by the Po-shan incident. We may profoundly + disagree with the closed economic policy of China, or + we may believe that under existing circumstances it represents + <a class="pagenum" id="page20" title="20"> </a>the part of prudence for her. That makes no difference. <em>Given + the frequent occurrence of such economic invasions, with the + backing of soldiers of the Imperial Army, with the overt aid + of the Imperial Railway, and with the refusal of Imperial officials + to intervene, there is clear evidence of the attitude and + intention of the Japanese government in Shantung.</em></p> + + <p>Because the population of Shantung is directly confronted + with an immense amount of just such evidence, it cannot take + seriously the professions of vague diplomatic utterances. What + foreign nation is going to intervene to enforce Chinese rights in + such a case as Po-shan? Which one is going effectively to call + the attention of Japan to such evidences of its failure to carry + out its promise? Yet the accumulation of precisely such seemingly + petty incidents, and not any single dramatic great wrong, + will secure Japan’s economic and political domination of + Shantung. It is for this reason that foreigners resident in + Shantung, no matter in what part, say that they see no sign + whatever that Japan is going to get out; that, on the contrary, + everything points to a determination to consolidate her position. + How long ago was the Portsmouth treaty signed, and what + were its nominal pledges about evacuation of Manchurian + territory?</p> + + <p>Not a month will pass without something happening which + will give a pretext for delay, and for making the surrender of + Shantung conditional upon this, that and the other thing. Meantime + the penetration of Shantung by means of railway discrimination, + railway military guards, continual nibblings here and + there, will be going on. It would make the chapter too long to + speak of the part played by manipulation of finance in achieving + this process of attrition of sovereignty. Two incidents must + suffice. During the war, Japanese traders with the connivance + of their government gathered up immense amounts of copper + cash from Shantung and shipped it to Japan against the protests + of the Chinese government. What does sovereignty amount to + when a country cannot control even its own currency system? + In Manchuria the Japanese have forced the introduction of + several hundred million dollars of paper currency, nominally, + of course, based on a gold reserve. These notes are redeemable, + however, only in Japan proper. And there is a law in Japan + forbidding the exportation of gold. And there you are.</p> + + <p>Japan itself has recently afforded an object lesson in the actual + <a class="pagenum" id="page21" title="21"> </a>connection of economic and political rights in China. It is so + beautifully complete a demonstration that it was surely unconscious. + Within the last two weeks, Mr. Obata, the Japanese + minister in Peking, has waited upon the government with a + memorandum saying that the Foochow incident was the culminating + result of the boycott; that if the boycott continues, + a series of such incidents is to be apprehended, saying that the + situation has become “intolerable” for Japan, and disavowing + all responsibility for further consequences unless the government + makes a serious effort to stop the boycott. Japan then + immediately makes certain specific demands. China must stop + the circulation of handbills, the holding of meetings to urge the + boycott, the destruction of Japanese goods that have become + Chinese property—none have been destroyed that are Japanese + owned. Volumes could not say more as to the real conception + of Japan of the connection between the economic and the political + relations of the two countries. Surely the pale ghost of + “Sovereignty” smiled ironically as he read this official note. + President Wilson after having made in the case of Shantung a + sharp and complete separation of economic and political rights, + also said that a nation boycotted is within sight of surrender. + Disassociation of words from acts has gone so far in his case + that he will hardly be able to see the meaning of Mr. Obata’s + communication. The American sense of humor and fair-play + may however be counted upon to get its point.</p> + + <p class="dateline">January, 1920.</p> +</div> +<div id="essay3" class="essay"> + <h2><abbr class="essay-number" title="three">III</abbr><br /> + Hinterlands in China</h2> + + <p class="first_paragraph"><span class="first_word">One</span> of the two Presidents of China—it is unnecessary + to specify which—recently stated that a renewal of + the Anglo-Japanese alliance meant a partition of + China. In this division, Japan would take the north and Great + Britain the south. Probably the remark was not meant to be + taken literally in the sense of formal conquest or annexation, + but rather symbolically with reference to the tendency of policies + <a class="pagenum" id="page22" title="22"> </a>and events. Even so, the statement will appear exaggerated + or wild to persons outside of China, who either believe + that the Open Door policy is now irrevocably established or + that Japan is the only foreign Power which China has to fear. + But a recent visit to the south revealed that in that section, + especially in Canton, the British occupy much the same position + of suspicion and dread which is held by the Japanese in the + north.</p> + + <p>Upon the negative side, the Japanese menace is negligible + in the province of Kwantung, in which Canton is situated. + There are said to be more Americans in Canton than Japanese, + and the American colony is not extensive. Upon the positive + side the history of the Cassell collieries contract is instructive. + It illustrates the cause of the popular attitude toward the + British, and quite possibly explains the bitterness in the remark + quoted. The contract is noteworthy from whatever standpoint + it is viewed, whether that of time, of the conditions it + contains or of the circumstances which accompany it.</p> + + <p>Premising that the contract delivers to a British company + a monopoly of the rich coal deposits of the province for a + period of ninety years and—quite incidentally of course—the + right to use all means of transportation, water or rail, wharves + and ports now in existence, and also to “construct, manage, + superintend and work other roads, railways waterways as may + be deemed advisable”—which reads like a monopoly of all + further transportation facilities of the province—first take up + the time of the making of the contract. It was drawn in April, + 1920 and confirmed a few months later. It was made, + of course, with the authorities of the Kwantung province, subject + to confirmation at Peking. During this period, Kwantung + province was governed by military carpet-baggers from the + neighboring province of Kwangsei, which was practically alone + of the southern provinces allied with the northern government, + then under the control of the Anfu party. It was matter of + common knowledge that the people of Canton and of the province + were bitterly hostile to this outside control and submitted + to it only because of military coercion. Civil strife for the expulsion + of the outsiders was already going on, continually gaining + headway, and a few months later the Kwangsei troops were + defeated and expelled from the province by the forces of General + <a class="pagenum" id="page23" title="23"> </a>Chen, now the civil governor of Kwantung, who received + a triumphal ovation upon his entrance into Canton. At this + time the present native government was established, a change + which made possible the return of Sun Yat Sen and his followers + from their exile in Shanghai. It is evident, then, that the collieries + contract giving away the natural resources of the people + of the province, was knowingly made by a British company + with a government which no more represented the people of the + province than the military government of Germany represented + the people of Belgium during the war.</p> + + <p>As to the terms of the contract, the statement that it gave + the British company a monopoly of all the coal mines in the + province, was not literally accurate. Verbally, twenty-two districts + are enumerated. But these are the districts along the + lines of the only railways in the province and the only ones soon + to be built, including the as yet uncompleted Hankow-Canton + railway. Possibly this fact accounts for the anxiety of the + British partners in the Consortium that the completion of this + line be the first undertaking financed by the Consortium. The + document also includes what is perhaps a novelty in legal documents + having such a momentous economic importance, namely, + the words “etc.” after the districts enumerated by name.</p> + + <p>For this concession, the British syndicate agreed to pay the + provincial government the sum of $1,000,000 (silver of + course). This million dollars is to bear six per cent interest + to the company, and capital and interest are to be paid back + to the company by the provincial government out of the dividends + (if any) it is to receive. The nature of these “dividends” + is set forth in an article which should receive the careful + attention of promoters elsewhere as a model of the possibilities + of exploiting contracts. The ten million capital is divided + equally into “A” shares and “B” shares. The “A” shares + go unreservedly to the directors of the company, and three millions + of the “B” shares are to be allotted by the directors of + the company at their discretion. The other two million are + again divided into equal portions, one portion representing the + sum advanced by the company to the province and to be paid + back as just specified, while the other million—one-tenth of the + capitalization—is to be a trust fund the dividends of which are + to go for the “benefit of the poor people of the province” and + <a class="pagenum" id="page24" title="24"> </a>for an educational fund for the province. But before any dividends + are paid upon the “B” shares, eight per cent dividends + are to be paid upon the “A” shares and a <em>dollar a ton royalty</em> + upon all coal mined. Those having any familiarity with the + coal business with its usual royalty of about ten cents a ton can + easily calculate the splendid prospects of the “poor people” and + the schools, prospects which represent the total return to the + provinces of a concession of untold worth. The contract also + guarantees to the company the assistance of the provincial government + in expropriating the owners of all coal mines which + have been granted to other companies but not yet worked. + These technical details make dry reading, but they throw light + upon the spirit with which the British company undertook its + predatory negotiations with a government renounced by the + people it professed to govern. In comparison with the relatively + crude methods of Japan in Shantung, they show the advantages + of wide business experience.</p> + + <p>As for the circumstances and context which give added menace + to the contract, the following facts are significant. Hong + Kong, a British crown colony, lies directly opposite the river + upon which Canton is situated. It is the port of export and + import for the vast districts served by the mines and railways + of the province. It is unnecessary to point out the hold upon + all economic development which is given through a monopolistic + control of coal. It is hardly too much to say that the enforcement + of the contract would enable British interests in Hong + Kong to control the entire industrial development of the most + flourishing of the provinces of China. It would be a comparatively + easy and inexpensive matter to provide the main land + with a first class modern harbor and port near Canton. But + such a port would tend to reduce the assets of Hong Kong to + the possession of the most beautiful scenery in the world. There + is already fear that a new harbor will be built. Many persons + think that the concession of building such railways etc., “as + are deemed advisable for the purpose of the business of the + company and to improve those now existing” is the object of + the contract, even more than the coal monopoly. For the British + already own a considerable part of the mainland, including + part of the railway connecting the littoral with Canton. By + building a cross-cut from the British owned portion of this railway + <a class="pagenum" id="page25" title="25"> </a>to the Hankow-Canton line, the latter would become virtually + the Hankow-Hong Kong line, and Canton would be a + way-station. With the advantages thus secured, the project + for building a new port could be indefinitely blocked.</p> + + <p>During the period in which the contract was being secured, + a congress of British Chambers of Commerce was held in + Shanghai. Resolutions were passed in favor of abolishing + henceforth the whole principle of special nationalistic concessions, + and of cooperating with the Chinese for the upbuilding + of China. At the close of the meeting the Chairman announced + that a new era for China had finally dawned. All of the British + newspapers in China lauded the wise action of the Chambers. + At the same time, Mr. Lamont was in Peking, and was setting + forth that the object of the Consortium was the abolition of + further concessions, and the uniting of the financial resources + of the banks in the Consortium for the economic development + of China itself. By an ironical coincidence, the Hong Kong-Shanghai + Bank, which is the financial power behind the contract + and the new company, is the leading British partner in the + Consortium. It is difficult to see how the British can henceforth + accuse the Japanese of bad faith if any of the banking + interests of that country should enter upon independent negotiations + with any government in China.</p> + + <p>By the time the scene of action was transferred to Peking + in order to secure the confirmation of the central government, + the Anfu regime was no more, and as yet no confirmation has + been secured. The new government at Canton has declined to + recognize the contract as having any validity. An official of + the Hong Kong government has told an official of the Canton + government that the Hong Kong government stands behind the + enforcement of the contract, and that Kwantung province is a + British Hinterland. Within the last few weeks the Governor + of Hong Kong and a leading Chinese banker of Hong Kong + who is a British subject have visited Peking. Rumors were rife + in the south as to the object of the visit. British sources published + the report that one object was to return Weihaiwei to + China—in case Peking agreed to turn over more of the Kwantung + mainland to Hong Kong as a quid pro quo. Chinese opinion + in the south was that one main object was to secure the + Peking confirmation of the Cassell contract, in which case + <a class="pagenum" id="page26" title="26"> </a>$900,000 more would be forthcoming, $100,000 having been + paid down when the contract was signed with the provincial + government. Peking does not recognize the present Canton + government but regards it as an outlaw. The crowd that + signed the contract is still in control of the neighboring province + of Kwangsei and they are relied upon by the north to effect + the military subjugation of the seceded province. Fighting + has already, indeed, begun, but the Kwangsei militarists are + badly in need of money; if Peking ratifies the contract, a large + part of the funds will be paid over to them—all that isn’t lost + by the wayside to the northern militarists.<a href="#footnote_1" id="fnm1" title="Since the text was written..." class="fnmarker">1</a> + Meantime British + news agencies keep up a constant circulation of reports tending + to discredit the Kwantung government, although all impartial + observers on the spot regard it as altogether the most promising + one in China.</p> + + <p>These considerations not only throw light on some of the difficulties + of the functioning of the Consortium, but they give an indispensable + background for judging the actual effect of the renewal + of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. By force of circumstances each + government, even against its own wish, will be compelled to wink + at the predatory policies of the other; and the tendency will be to + create a division of spheres of influence between the north and + south in order to avoid more direct conflicts. The English liberals + who stand for the renewal of the alliance on the ground that + it will enable England to exercise a check on Japanese policies, + are more naïve than was Mr. Wilson with his belief in the separation + of the economic and political control of Shantung.</p> + + <p>It cannot be too often repeated that the real point of friction + between the United States and Japan is not in California but + in China. It is silly—unless it is calculated—for English authorities + to keep repeating that under no circumstances does + the alliance mean that Great Britain would support Japan in + a war with the United States. The day the alliance is renewed, + the hands of the militarists in Japan will be strengthened and + the hands of the liberals—already weak enough—be still further + weakened. In consequence, all the sources of friction in + China between the United States and Japan will be intensified. + I do not believe in the predicted war. But should it come, the + <a class="pagenum" id="page27" title="27"> </a>first act of Japan—so everyone in China believes—will be to + seize the ports of northern China and its railways in order to + make sure of an uninterrupted supply of food and raw materials. + The act would be justified as necessary to national + existence. Great Britain in alliance with Japan would be in + no position to protest in anything but the most perfunctory + way. The guarantee of such abstinence would be for Japan + the next best thing to open naval and financial support. Without + the guarantee they would not dare the seizure of Chinese + ports. In recent years diplomatists have shown themselves capable + of unlimited stupidity. But it is not possible that the + men in the British Foreign Office are not aware of these elementary + facts. If they renew the alliance they knowingly take + the responsibility for the consequences.</p> + + <p class="dateline">May 24, 1921.</p> +</div> +<div id="essay4" class="essay"> + <h2><abbr class="essay-number" title="four">IV</abbr><br /> + A Political Upheaval in China</h2> + + <p class="first_paragraph"><span class="first_word">Even</span> in America we have heard of one Chinese revolution, + that which thrust the Manchu dynasty from the + throne. The visitor in China gets used to casual references + to the second revolution, that which frustrated Yuan Shi + Kai’s aspirations to be emperor, and the third, the defeat in 1917 + of the abortive attempt to put the Manchu boy emperor back + into power. And within the last few weeks the (September 1920) + fourth upheaval has taken place. It may not be dignified by + the name of the fourth revolution, for the head of the state + has not been changed by it. But as a manifestation of the + forces that shape Chinese political events, for evil and for + good, perhaps this last disturbance surpasses the last two “revolutions” + in significance.</p> + + <p>Chinese politics in detail are highly complicated, a mess of + personalities and factions whose oscillations no one can follow + who does not know a multitude of personal, family and provincial + histories. But occasionally something happens which + simplifies the tangle. Definite outlines frame themselves out + of the swirling criss-cross of strife, intrigue and ambition. So, + <a class="pagenum" id="page28" title="28"> </a>at present, the complete collapse of the Anfu clique which + owned the central government for two years marks the end of + that union of internal militarism and Japanese foreign influence + which was, for China, the most marked fruit of the war. When + China entered the war a “War Participation” army was formed. + It never participated; probably it was never meant to. But + its formation threw power wholly into the hands of the military + clique, as against the civilian constitutionalists. And in + return for concessions, secret agreements relating to Manchuria, + Shantung, new railways, etc., Japan supplied money, munitions, + instructors for the army and a benevolent supervision of foreign + and domestic politics. The war came to an unexpected + and untimely end, but by this time the offspring of the marriage + of the militarism of Yuan Shi Kai and Japanese money and + influence was a lusty youth. Bolshevism was induced to take + the place of Germany as a menace requiring the keeping up + of the army, and loans and teachers. Mongolia was persuaded + to cut her strenuous ties with Russia, to renounce her independence + and come again under Chinese sovereignty.</p> + + <p>The army and its Japanese support and instruction was, accordingly, + continued. In place of the “War Participation” + army appeared the “Frontier Defense” army. Marshal Tuan, + the head of the military party, remained the nominal political + power behind the presidential chair, and General Hsu (commonly + known as little Hsu, in distinction from old Hsu, the + president) was the energetic manager of the Mongolian adventure + which, by a happy coincidence, required a bank, land + development companies and railway schemes, as well as an + army. About this military centre as a nucleus gathered the + vultures who fed on the carrion. This flock took the name of + the Anfu Club. It did not control the entire cabinet, but to + it belonged the Minister of Justice, who manipulated the police + and the courts, persecuted the students, suppressed liberal + journals and imprisoned inconvenient critics. And the Club + owned the ministers of finance and communications, the two + cabinet places that dispense revenues, give out jobs and make + loans. It also regulated the distribution of intelligence by mail + and telegraph. The reign of corruption and despotic inefficiency, + tempered only by the student revolt, set in. In two + years the Anfu Club got away with two hundred millions of + <a class="pagenum" id="page29" title="29"> </a>public funds directly, to say nothing of what was wasted by + incompetency and upon the army. The Allies had set out to + get China into the war. They succeeded in getting Japan into + control of Peking and getting China, politically speaking, into + a seemingly hopeless state of corruption and confusion.</p> + + <p>The militaristic or Pei-Yang party was, however, divided into + two factions, each called after a province. The Anwhei + party gathered about little Hsu and was almost identical with + the Anfus. The Chili faction had been obliged, so far as Peking + was concerned, to content itself with such leavings as the Anfu + Club tossed to it. Apparently it was hopelessly weaker than + its rival, although Tuan, who was personally honest and above + financial scandal, was supported by both factions and was the + head of both. About three months ago there were a few signs + that, while the Anfu Club had been entrenching itself in Peking, + the rival faction had been quietly establishing itself in the + provinces. A league of Eight Tuchuns (military governors of + the provinces) came to the assistance of the president against + some unusually strong pressure from the Anfu Club. In spite + of the fact that the military governor of the three Manchurian + provinces, Chang Tso Lin, popularly known as the Emperor + of Manchuria, lined up with this league, practically nobody expected + anything except some manœuvering to get a larger share + of the spoils.</p> + + <p>But late in June the president invited Chang Tso Lin to + Peking. The latter saw Tuan, told him that he was surrounded + by evil advisers, demanded that he cut loose from little Hsu + and the Anfu Club, and declared open war upon little Hsu—the + two had long and notoriously been bitter enemies. Even + then people had great difficulty in believing that anything would + happen except another Chinese compromise. The president + was known to be sympathetic upon the whole with the Chili + faction, but the president, if not a typical Chinese, is at least + typical of a certain kind of Chinese mandarin, non-resistant, + compromising, conciliating, procrastinating, covering up, evading + issues, face-saving. But finally something happened. A + mandate was issued dismissing little Hsu from office, military + and civil, dissolving the frontier defense corps as such, and + bringing it under the control of the Ministry of War (usually + armies in China belong to some general or Tuchun, not to the + <a class="pagenum" id="page30" title="30"> </a>country). For almost forty-eight hours it was thought that + Tuan had consented to sacrifice little Hsu and that the latter + would submit at least temporarily. Then with equally sensational + abruptness Tuan brought pressure to bear on the president. + The latter was appointed head of a national defense + army, and rewards were issued for the heads of the chiefs of + the Chili faction, nothing, however, being said about Chang + Tso Lin, who had meanwhile returned to Mukden and who + still professed allegiance to Tuan. Troops were mobilized; + there was a rush of officials and of the wealthy to the concessions + of Tientsin and to the hotels of the legation quarter.</p> + + <p>This sketch is not meant as history, but simply as an indication + of the forces at work. Hence it is enough to say that + two weeks after Tuan and little Hsu had intimidated the president + and proclaimed themselves the saviors of the Republic, + they were in hiding, their enemies of the Chili party were in + complete control of Peking, and rewards from fifty thousand + dollars down were offered for the arrest of little Hsu, the ex-ministers + of justice, finance and communications, and other leaders + of the Anfu Club. The political turnover was as complete + as it was sensational. The seemingly impregnable masters of + China were impotent fugitives. The carefully built up Anfu + Club, with its military, financial and foreign support, had crumbled + and fallen. No country at any time has ever seen a political + upheaval more sudden and more thoroughgoing. It was + not so much a defeat as a dissolution like that of death, a total + disappearance, an evaporation.</p> + + <p>Corruption had worked inward, as it has a way of doing. + Japanese-bought munitions would not explode; quartermasters + vanished with the funds with which stores were to be bought; + troops went without anything to eat for two or three days; + large numbers, including the larger part of one division, went + over to the enemy en masse; those who did not desert had no + heart for fighting and ran away or surrendered on the slightest + provocation, saying they were willing to fight for their country + but saw no reason why they should fight for a faction, especially + a faction that had been selling the country to a foreign nation. + In the manner of the defeat of the Anfu clique at the height + of its supremacy, rather than in the mere fact of its defeat, lies + the credit side of the Chinese political balance sheet. It is a striking + <a class="pagenum" id="page31" title="31"> </a>exhibition of the oldest and best faith of the Chinese—the + power of moral considerations. Public opinion, even that of + the coolie on the street, was wholly against the Anfu party. + It went down not so much because of the strength of the other + side as because of its own rottenness.</p> + + <p>So far the results are to all appearances negative. The most + marked is the disappearance of Japanese prestige. As one of + the leading men in the War Office said: “For over a year + now the people have been strongly opposed to the Japanese + government on account of Shantung. But now even the generals + do not care for Japan any more.” It is hardly logical to + take the easy collapse of the Japanese-supported Anfu party as + a proof of the weakness of Japan, but prestige is always a + matter of feeling rather than of logic. Many who were intimidated + to the point of hypnotism by the idea of the irresistible + power of Japan are now freely laughing at the inefficiency + of Japanese leadership. It would not be safe to predict + that Japan will not come back as a force to be reckoned + with in the internal as well as external politics of China, but + it is safe to say that never again will Japan figure as superman + to China. And such a negation is after all a positive result.</p> + + <p>And so in its way is the overthrow of the Anwhei faction of + the militarist party. The Chinese liberals do not feel very + optimistic about the immediate outcome. They have mostly + given up the idea that the country can be reformed by political + means. They are sceptical about the possibility of reforming + even politics until a new generation comes on the scene. They + are now putting their faith in education and in social changes + which will take some years to consummate themselves visibly. + The self-styled southern republican constitutional party has not + shown itself in much better light than the northern militarist + party. In fact, its old leader Sun Yat Sen now cuts one of the + most ridiculous figures in China, as shortly before this upheaval + he had definitely aligned himself with Tuan and little Hsu.<a href="#footnote_2" id="fnm2" title="This was written of course..." class="fnmarker">2</a></p> + + <p><a class="pagenum" id="page32" title="32"> </a>This does not mean, however, that democratic opinion thinks + nothing has been gained. The demonstration of the inherent + weakness of corrupt militarism will itself prevent the development + of any militarism as complete as that of the Anfus. As + one Chinese gentleman said to me: “When Yuan Shi Kai was + overthrown, the tiger killed the lion. Now a snake has killed + the tiger. No matter how vicious the snake may become, some + smaller animal will be able to kill him, and his life will be + shorter than that of either lion or tiger.” In short, each successive + upheaval brings nearer the day when civilian supremacy + will be established. This result will be achieved partly because + of the repeated demonstrations of the uncongeniality of military + despotism to the Chinese spirit, and partly because with every + passing year education will have done its work. Suppressed + liberal papers are coming to life, while over twenty Anfu subsidized + newspapers and two subsidized news agencies have gone + out of being. The soldiers, including many officers in the Anwhei + army, clearly show the effects of student propaganda. + And it is worth while to note down the name of one of the + leaders on the victorious side, the only one whose troops did + any particular fighting, and that against great odds in numbers. + The name is Wu Pei Fu. He at least has not fought + for the Chili faction against the Anwhei faction. He has proclaimed + from the first that he was fighting to rid the country of + military control of civil government, and against traitors who + would sell their country to foreigners. He has come out + strongly for a new popular assembly, to form a new constitution + and to unite the country. And although Chang Tso Lin + has remarked that Wu Pei Fu as a military subordinate could + not be expected to intervene in politics, he has not as yet found + it convenient to oppose the demand for a popular assembly. + Meanwhile the liberals are organizing their forces, hardly expecting + to win a victory, but resolved, win or lose, to take advantage + of the opportunity to carry further the education of + the Chinese people in the meaning of democracy.</p> + + <p class="dateline">August, 1920.</p> + +</div> +<div id="essay5" class="essay"> + <h2><a class="pagenum" id="page33" title="33"> </a><abbr class="essay-number" title="five">V</abbr><br /> + Divided China</h2> + + <h3>1.</h3> + + <p class="first_paragraph"><span class="first_word">In</span> January 1920 the Peking government issued an + edict proclaiming the unification of China. On May + 5th Sun Yat Sen was formally inaugurated in Canton + as president of all China. Thus China has within six months + been twice unified, once from the northern standpoint and once + from the southern. Each act of “unification” is in fact a symbol + of the division of China, a division expressing differences + of language, temperament, history, and political policy as well + as of geography, persons and factions. This division has been + one of the outstanding facts of Chinese history since the overthrow + of the Manchus ten years ago and it has manifested itself + in intermittent civil war. Yet there are two other statements + which are equally true, although they flatly contradict each + other and the one just made. One statement is that so far as + the people of China are concerned there is no real division on + geographical lines, but only the common division occurring everywhere + between conservatives and progressives. The other + is that instead of two divisions in China, there are at least + five, two parties in both the north and south, and another + in the central or Yangtse region,<a href="#footnote_3" id="fnm3" title="Since the writing..." class="fnmarker">3</a> each one of the five splitting + up again more or less on factional and provincial lines. + And so far as the future is concerned, probably this last statement + is the most significant of the three. That all three statements + are true is what makes Chinese politics so difficult to understand + even in their larger features.</p> + + <p>By the good fortune of circumstances we were in Canton + when the inauguration occurred. Peking and Canton are a + long way apart in more than distance. There is little exchange + of actual news between the two places; what filters through + into either city and gets published consists mostly of rumors + <a class="pagenum" id="page34" title="34"> </a>tending to discredit the other city. In Canton, the monarchy + is constantly being restored in Peking; and in Peking, Canton + is Bolshevized at least once a week, while every other week + open war breaks out between the adherents of Sun Yat Sen, and + General Chen Kwang Ming, the civil governor of the province. + There is nothing to give the impression—even in circles which + accept the Peking government only as an evil necessity—that + the pretensions of Sun Yat Sen represent anything more than + the desires of a small and discredited group to get some slight + power for themselves at the expense of national unity. Even + in Fukien, the province next north of Kwantung, one found little + but gossip whose effect was to minimize the importance of + the southern government. In foreign circles in the north as + well as in liberal Chinese circles upon the whole, the feeling is + general that bad as the de facto Peking government may be, it + represents the cause of national unity, while the southern government + represents a perpetuation of that division of China + which makes her weak and which offers the standing invitation + to foreign intrigue and aggression. Only occasionally during + the last few months has some returned traveller timidly advanced + the opinion that we had the “wrong dope” on the south, + and that they were really trying “to do something down there.”</p> + + <p>Consequently there was little preparation on my part for the + spectacle afforded in Canton during the week of May 5th. + This was the only demonstration I have seen in China during + the last two years which gave any evidence of being a spontaneous + popular movement. New Yorkers are accustomed to + crowds, processions, street decorations and accompanying enthusiasm. + I doubt if New York has ever seen a demonstration + which surpassed that of Canton in size, noise, color or spontaneity—in + spite of tropical rains. The country people flocked + in in such masses, that, being unable to find accommodation + even in the river boats, they kept up a parade all night. Guilds + and localities which were not able to get a place in the regular + procession organized minor ones on their own account on the + day before and after the official demonstration. Making all possible + allowance for the intensity of Cantonese local loyalty and + the fact that they might be celebrating a Cantonese affair rather + than a principle, the scene was sufficiently impressive to revise + one’s preconceived ideas and to make one try to find out what + <a class="pagenum" id="page35" title="35"> </a>it is that gives the southern movement its vitality.</p> + + <p>A demonstration may be popular and still be superficial in + significance. However one found foreigners on the ground—at + least Americans—saying that in the last few months the + men in power in Canton were the only officials in China who + were actually doing something for the people instead of filling + their own pockets and magnifying their personal power. Even + the northern newspapers had not entirely omitted reference to + the suppression of licensed gambling. On the spot one learned + that this suppression was not only genuine and thorough, but + that it meant a renunciation of an annual revenue of nearly + ten million dollars on the part of a government whose chief + difficulty is financial, and where—apart from motives of personal + squeeze—it would have been easy to argue that at least + temporarily the end justified the means in retaining this source + of revenue. English papers throughout China have given + much praise to the government of Hong Kong because it has + cut down its opium revenue from eight to four millions annually + with the plan for ultimate extinction. Yet Hong Kong + is prosperous, it has not been touched by civil war, and it only + needs revenue for ordinary civil purposes, not as a means of + maintaining its existence in a crisis.</p> + + <p>Under the circumstances, the action of the southern government + was hardly less than heroic. This renunciation is the + most sensational act of the Canton government, but one soon + learns that it is the accompaniment of a considerable number + of constructive administrative undertakings. Among the most + notable are attempts to reform the local magistracies throughout + the province, the establishment of municipal government in + Canton—something new in China where local officials are all + centrally appointed and controlled—based upon the American + Commission plan, and directed by graduates of schools of political + science in the United States; plans for introducing local + self-government throughout the province; a scheme for introduction + of universal primary education in Canton to be completed + in three steps.</p> + + <p>These reforms are provincial and local. They are part of + a general movement against centralization and toward local autonomy + which is gaining headway all over China, a protest + against the appointment of officials from Peking and the management + <a class="pagenum" id="page36" title="36"> </a>of local affairs in the interests of factions—and pocketbooks—whose + chief interest in local affairs is what can be extracted + in the way of profit. For the only analogue of provincial + government in China at the present time is the carpet + bag government of the south in the days following our civil + war. These things explain the restiveness of the country, including + central as well as southern provinces, under Peking + domination. But they do not explain the setting up of a new + national, or federal government, with the election of Mr. Sun + Yat Sen as its president. To understand this event it is necessary + to go back into history.</p> + + <p>In June, 1917, the parliament in Peking was about to adopt + a constitution. The parliament was controlled by leaders of the + old revolutionary party who had been at loggerheads with Yuan + and with the executive generally. The latter accused them of + being obstructionists, wasting time in discussing and theorizing + when the country needed action. Japan had changed her tactics + regarding the participation of China in the war, and having got + her position established through the Twenty-one Demands, saw + a way of controlling Chinese arsenals and virtually amalgamating + the Chinese armies with her own through supervising China’s + entrance into the war. The British and French were pressing + desperately for the same end. Parliament was slow to act, and + Tang Shao Yi, Sun Yat Sen and other southern leaders were + averse, since they regarded the war as none of China’s business + and were upon the whole more anti-British than anti-German—a + fact which partly accounts for the share of British journals in + the present press propaganda against the Canton government. + But what brought matters to a head was the fact that the constitution + which was about to be adopted eliminated the military + governors or tuchuns of the provinces, and restored the supremacy + of civil authority which had been destroyed by Yuan Shi + Kai, in addition to introducing a policy of decentralization. + Coached by members of the so-called progressive party which + claimed to be constitutionalist and which had a factionalist interest + in overthrowing the revolutionaries who controlled the + legislative branch if not the executive, the military governors + demanded that the president suspend parliament and dismiss + the legislators. This demand was more than passively supported + by all the Allied diplomats in Peking with the honorable exception + <a class="pagenum" id="page37" title="37"> </a>of the American legation. The president weakly yielded + and issued an edict dispelling parliament, virtually admitting in + the document the illegality of his action. Less than a month + afterwards he was a refugee in the Dutch legation on account + of the farce of monarchical restoration staged by Chang Shun—who + at the present time is again coming to the front in the + north as adjutant to the plans of Chang Tso Lin, the present + “strong man” of China. Later, elections were held and a new + parliament elected. This parliament has been functioning as + the legislature of China at Peking and elected the president, + Hsu Shi Chang, the head of the government recognized by the + foreign Powers—in short it is the Chinese government from an + international standpoint, the Peking government from a domestic + standpoint.</p> + + <p>The revolutionary members of the old parliament never recognized + the legality of their dispersal, and consequently refused to + admit the legal status of the new parliament, called by them the + bogus parliament, and of the president elected by it, especially + as the new legislative body was not elected according to the + rules laid down by the constitution. Under the lead of some of + the old members, the old parliament, called by its opponents the + defunct parliament, has led an intermittent existence ever since. + Claiming to be the sole authentic constitutional body of China, + it finally elected Dr. Sun president of China and thus prepared + the act of the fifth of May, already reported.</p> + + <p>Such is the technical and formal background of the present + southern government. Its attack upon the legality of the Peking + government is doubtless technically justified. But for various + reasons its own positive status is open to equally grave doubts. + The terms “bogus” and “defunct,” so freely cast at each other, + both seem to an outsider to be justified. It is less necessary to + go into the reasons which appear to invalidate the position of the + southern parliament because of the belated character of its final + action. A protest which waits four years to assert itself in positive + action is confronted not with legal technicalities but with + accomplished facts. In my opinion, legality for legality, the + southern government has a bare shade the better of the technical + argument. But in the face of a government which has foreign + recognition and which has maintained itself after a fashion for + four years, a legal shadow is a precarious political basis. It is + <a class="pagenum" id="page38" title="38"> </a>wiser to regard the southern government as a revolutionary government, + which in addition to the prestige of continuing the + revolutionary movement of ten years ago has also a considerable + sentimental asset as a protest of constitutionalism against the + military usurpations of the Peking government.</p> + + <p>It is an open secret that the southern movement has not received + the undivided support of all the forces present in Canton + which are opposed to the northern government. Tang Shao Yi, + for example, was notable for his absence at the time of the inauguration, + having found it convenient to visit the graves of + his ancestors at that time. The provincial governor, General + Chen Kwang Ming, was in favor of confining efforts to the + establishment of provincial autonomy and the encouragement + of similar movements in other provinces, looking forward to an + eventual federal, or confederated, government of at least all + the provinces south of the Yangtse. Many of his generals + wanted to postpone action until Kwantung province had made a + military alliance with the generals in the other southwestern + provinces, so as to be able to resist the north should the latter + undertake a military expedition. Others thought the technical + legal argument for the new move was being overworked, and + while having no objections to an out and out revolutionary + movement against Peking, thought that the time for it had not + yet come. They are counting on Chang Tso Lin’s attempting + a monarchical restoration and think that the popular revulsion + against that move would create the opportune time for such a + movement as has now been prematurely undertaken. However + in spite of reports of open strife freely circulated by British and + Peking government newspapers, most of the opposition elements + are now loyally suppressing their opposition and supporting the + government of Sun Yat Sen. A compromise has been arranged + by which the federal government will confine its attention to + foreign affairs, leaving provincial matters wholly in the hands + of Governor Chen and his adherents. There is still room for + friction however, especially as to the control of revenues, since + at present there are hardly enough funds for one administration, + let alone two.</p> + + <h3><a class="pagenum" id="page39" title="39"> </a>2.</h3> + + <p>The members of the new southern government are + strikingly different in type from those one meets elsewhere + whether in Peking or the provincial capitals. + The latter men are literally mediaeval when they are not late + Roman Empire, though most of them have learned a little modern + patter to hand out to foreigners. The former are educated + men, not only in the school sense and in the sense that they + have had some special training for their jobs, but in the sense + that they think the ideas and speak the language current among + progressive folk all over the world. They welcome inquiry and + talk freely of their plans, hopes and fears. I had the opportunity + of meeting all the men who are most influential in both the local + and federal governments; these conversations did not take the + form of interviews for publication, but I learned that there are + at least three angles from which the total situation is viewed.</p> + + <p>Governor Chen has had no foreign education and speaks no + English. He is distinctively Chinese in his training and outlook. + He is a man of force, capable of drastic methods, straightforward + intellectually and physically, of unquestioned integrity + and of almost Spartan life in a country where official position + is largely prized for the luxuries it makes possible. For example, + practically alone among Chinese provincial officials of the first + rank he has no concubines. Not only this, but he proposed to + the provincial assembly a measure to disenfranchise all persons + who have concubines. (The measure failed because it is said + its passage would have deprived the majority of the assemblymen + of their votes.) He is by all odds the most impressive of + all the officials whom I have met in China. If I were to select + a man likely to become a national figure of the first order in the + future, it would be, unhesitatingly, Governor Chen. He can + give and also command loyalty—a fact which in itself makes + him almost unique.</p> + + <p>His views in gist are as follows: The problem of problems + in China is that of real unification. Industry and education are + held back because of lack of stability of government, and the + better elements in society seclude themselves from all public + effort. The question is how this unification is to be obtained. + In the past it has been tried by force used by strong individuals. + Yuan Shi Kai tried and failed; Feng Kuo Chang tried and + <a class="pagenum" id="page40" title="40"> </a>failed; Tuan Chi Jui tried and failed. That method must be + surrendered. China can be unified only by the people themselves, + employing not force but the methods of normal political + evolution. The only way to engage the people in the task is to + decentralize the government. Futile efforts at centralization + must be abandoned. Peking and Canton alike must allow the + provinces the maximum of autonomy; the provincial capitals + must give as much authority as possible to the districts, and the + districts to the communities. Officials must be chosen by and + from the local districts and everything must be done to encourage + local initiative. Governor Chen’s chief ambition is to introduce + this system into Kwantung province. He believes that + other provinces will follow as soon as the method has been demonstrated, + and that national unity will then be a pyramid built + out of the local blocks.</p> + + <p>With extreme self-government in administrative matters, + Governor Chen will endeavor to enforce a policy of centralized + economic control. He says in effect that the west has developed + economic anarchy along with political control, with the result + of capitalistic domination and class struggle. He wishes to avert + this consequence in China by having government control from + the first of all basic raw materials and all basic industries, mines, + transportation, factories for cement, steel, etc. In this way the + provincial authorities hope to secure an equable industrial + development of the province, while at the same time procuring + ample revenues without resorting to heavy taxation. Since almost + all the other governors in China are using their power, in + combination with the exploiting capitalists native and foreign, + to monopolize the natural resources of their provinces for private + profit, it is not surprising that Governor Chen’s views are + felt to be a menace to privilege and that he is advertised + all over China as a devout Bolshevist. His views have + special point in view of British efforts to get an economic + stranglehold upon the province—efforts which are dealt with + in a prior chapter.</p> + + <p>Another type of views lays chief stress upon the internal political + condition of China. Its adherents say in effect: Why make + such a fuss about having two governments for China, when, in + point of fact, China is torn into dozens of governments? In the + north, war is sure to break out sooner or later between Chang + <a class="pagenum" id="page41" title="41"> </a>Tso Lin and his rivals. Each military governor is afraid of his + division generals. The brigade generals intrigue against the + division leaders, and even colonels are doing all they can to + further their personal power. The Peking government is a + stuffed sham, taking orders from the military governors of the + provinces, living only on account of jealousies among these generals, + and by the grace of foreign diplomatic support. It is + actually bankrupt, and this actual state will soon be formally + recognized. The thing for us to do is to go ahead, maintain + in good faith the work of the revolution, give this province the + best possible civil administration; then in the inevitable approaching + débâcle, the southern government will be ready to + serve as the nucleus of a genuine reconstruction. Meantime we + want, if not the formal recognition of foreign governments, at + least their benevolent neutrality.</p> + + <p>Dr. Sun still embodies in himself the spirit of the revolution + of 1911. So far as that was not anti-Manchu it was in essence + nationalistic, and only accidentally republican. The day after + the inauguration of Dr. Sun, a memorial was dedicated to the + seventy-two patriot heroes who fell in an abortive attempt in + Canton to throw off the Manchu yoke, some six months before + the successful revolt. The monument is the most instructive + single lesson which I have seen in the political history of the + revolution. It is composed of seventy-two granite blocks. Upon + each is engraved: Given by the Chinese National League of + Jersey City, or Melbourne, or Mexico, or Liverpool, or Singapore, + etc. Chinese nationalism is a product of Chinese migration + to foreign countries; Chinese nationalism on foreign shores + financed the revolution, and largely furnished its leaders and + provided its organization. Sun Yat Sen was the incarnation + of this nationalism, which was more concerned with freeing + China—and Asia—from all foreign domination than with + particular political problems. And in spite of the movement of + events since that day, he remains essentially at that stage, being + closer in spirit to the nationalists of the European irredentist + type than to the spirit of contemporary young China. A convinced + republican, he nevertheless measures events and men in the + concrete by what he thinks they will do to promote the independence + of China from foreign control, rather than by what + they will do to promote a truly democratic government. This + <a class="pagenum" id="page42" title="42"> </a>is the sole explanation that can be given for his unfortunate + coquetting a year ago with the leaders of the now fallen Anfu + Club. He allowed himself to be deceived into thinking that + they were ready to turn against the Japanese if he would give + them his support; and his nationalist imagination was inflamed + by the grandiose schemes of little Hsu for the Chinese subjugation + of Mongolia.</p> + + <p>More openly than others, Dr. Sun admits and justifies the + new southern government as representing a division of China. + If, he insists, it had not been for the secession of the south in + 1917, Japan would now be in virtually complete control of all + China. A unified China would have meant a China ready to + be swallowed whole by Japan. The secession localized Japanese + aggressions, made it evident that the south would fight rather + than be devoured, and gave a breathing spell in which public + opinion in the north rallied against the Twenty-one Demands + and against the military pact with Japan. Thus it saved the independence + of China. But, while it checked Japan, it did not + checkmate her. She still expects with the assistance of Chang + Tso Lin to make northern China her vassal. The support which + foreign governments in general and the United States in particular + are giving Peking is merely playing into the hands of the + Japanese. The independent south affords the only obstacle + which causes Japan to pause in her plan of making northern + China in effect a Japanese province. A more than usually authentic + rumor says that upon the occasion of the visit of the + Japanese consul general to the new president (no other foreign + official has made an official visit), the former offered from his + government the official recognition of Dr. Sun as president of + all China, if the latter would recognize the Twenty-one Demands + as an accomplished fact. From the Japanese standpoint + the offer was a safe one, as this acceptance of Japanese claims + is the one thing impossible to the new government. But meantime + the offer naturally confirms the nationalists of Dr. Sun’s + type in their belief that the southern split is the key to maintaining + the political independence of China; or, as Dr. Sun puts it, + that a divided China is for the time being the only means to an + ultimately independent China.</p> + + <p>These views are not given as stating the whole truth of the + situation. They are ex parte. But they are given as setting + <a class="pagenum" id="page43" title="43"> </a>forth in good faith the conceptions of the leaders of the southern + movement and as requiring serious attention if the situation + of China, domestic and international, is to be understood. Upon + my own account, and not simply as expressing the views of + others, I have reached a conclusion quite foreign to my thought + before I visited the south. While it is not possible to attach + too much importance to the unity of China as a part of the + foreign policy of the United States, it is possible to attach altogether + too much importance to the Peking government as a + symbol of that unity. To borrow and adapt the words of one + southern leader, while the United States can hardly be expected + to do other than recognize the Peking as the de facto government, + there is no need to coddle that government and give it + face. Such a course maintains a nominal and formal unity while + in fact encouraging the military and corrupt forces that keep + China divided and which make for foreign aggression.</p> + + <p>In my opinion as the outcome of two years’ observation of + the Chinese situation, the real interests of both China and the + United States would be served if, in the first place, the United + States should take the lead in securing from the diplomatic body + in Peking the serving of express notice upon the Peking government + that in no case would a restoration of the monarchy be + recognized by the Powers. This may seem in America like an + unwarranted intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign + country. But in fact such intervention is already a fact. The + present government endures only in virtue of the support of + foreign Powers. The notice would put an end to one kind of + intrigue, one kind of rumor and suspicion, which is holding industry + and education back and which is keeping China in a state + of unrest and instability. It would establish a period of comparative + quiet in which whatever constructive forces exist may + come to the front. The second measure would be more extreme. + The diplomacy of the United States should take the lead in + making it clear that unless the promises about the disbanding + of the army, and the introduction of general retrenchment are + honestly and immediately carried out, the Powers will pursue + a harsh rather than a benevolent policy toward the Peking government, + insisting upon immediate payment of interest and loans + as they fall due and holding up the government to the strictest + meeting of all its obligations. The notification to be effective + <a class="pagenum" id="page44" title="44"> </a>might well include a virtual threat of withdrawal of recognition + in case the government does not seriously try to put its profuse + promises into execution. It should also include a definite discouragement + of any expenditures designed for military conquest + of the south.</p> + + <p>Diplomatic recognition of the southern government is out of + the question at present. It is not out of the question to put on + the financial screws so that the southern government will be allowed + space and time to demonstrate what it can do by peaceful + means to give one or more provinces a decent, honest and progressive + civil administration. It is unnecessary to enumerate + the obstacles in the way of carrying out such a policy. But in + my judgment it is the only policy by which the Great Powers + will not become accomplices in perpetuating the weakness and + division of China. It is the most straightforward way of meeting + whatever plans of aggression Japan may entertain.</p> + + <p class="dateline">May, 1921.</p> +</div> +<div id="essay6" class="essay"> + <h2><abbr class="essay-number" title="six">VI</abbr><br /> + Federalism in China</h2> + + <p class="first_paragraph"><span class="first_word">The</span> newcomer in China in observing and judging events + usually makes the mistake of attaching too much significance + to current happenings. Occurrences take + place which in the western world would portend important + changes—and nothing important results. It is not easy to loosen + the habit of years; and so the visitor assumes that an event + which is striking to the point of sensationalism must surely be + part of a train of events having a definite trend; some deep-laid + plan must be behind it. It takes a degree of intellectual patience + added to time and experience to make one realize that even + when there is a rhythm in events the tempo is so retarded that + one must wait a long time to judge what is really going on. + Most political events are like daily changes in the weather, + fluctuations back and forth which may seriously affect individuals + but which taken one by one tell little about the movement + of the seasons. Even the occurrences which are due to human + <a class="pagenum" id="page45" title="45"> </a>intention are usually sporadic and casual, and the observer errs + by reading into them too much plot, too comprehensive a scheme, + too farsighted a plan. The aim behind the event is likely to + be only some immediate advantage, some direct increase of + power, the overthrow of a rival, the grasping at greater wealth + by an isolated act, without any consecutive or systematic looking + ahead.</p> + + <p>Foreigners are not the only ones who have erred, however, + in judging the Chinese political situation of the last few years. + Beginning two years ago, one heard experienced Chinese with + political affiliations saying that it was impossible for things to + go on as they were for more than three months longer. Some + decisive change must occur. Yet outwardly the situation has + remained much the same not only for three months but for two + years, the exception being the overthrow of the Anfu faction a + year ago. And this occurrence hardly marked a definite turn in + events, as it was, to a considerable extent, only a shifting of + power from the hands of one set of tuchuns to another set. + Nevertheless at the risk of becoming a victim of the fallacy + which I have been setting forth, I will hazard the remark that + the last few months <em>have</em> revealed a definite and enduring trend—that + through the diurnal fluctuations of the strife for personal + power and wealth a seasonal political change in society is now + showing itself. Certain lines of cleavage seem to show themselves, + so that through the welter of striking, picturesque, sensational + but meaningless events, a definite pattern is revealed.</p> + + <p>This pattern is indicated by the title of this chapter—a movement + toward the development of a federal form of government. + In calling the movement one toward federalism, there is, however, + more of a jump into the remote future than circumstances + justify. It would be more accurate, as well as more modest, to + say that there is a well defined and seemingly permanent trend + toward provincial autonomy and local self-government accompanied + by a hope and a vague plan that in the future the more + or less independent units will recombine into the United or + Federated States of China. Some who look far into the future + anticipate three stages; the first being the completion of the + present secessionist movement; the second the formation of + northern and southern confederations respectively; the third a + reunion into a single state.</p> + + <p><a class="pagenum" id="page46" title="46"> </a>To go into the detailed evidence for the existence of a definite + and lasting movement of this sort would presume too much on + the reader’s knowledge of Chinese geography and his acquaintance + with specific recent events. I shall confine myself to quite + general features of the situation. The first feature is the new + phase which has been assumed by the long historic antagonism + of the north and the south. Roughly speaking, the revolution + which established the republic and overthrew the Manchus represented + a victory for the south. But the transformation during + the last five years of the nominal republic into a corrupt oligarchy + of satraps or military governors or feudal lords has represented + a victory for the north. It is a significant fact, symbolically at + least, that the most powerful remaining tuchun or military + governor in China—in some respects the only powerful one who + has survived the vicissitudes of the last few years—namely Chang + Tso Lin, is the uncrowned king of the three Manchurian provinces. + The so-called civil war of the north and south is not, + however, to be understood as a conflict of republicanism located + in the south and militarism in the north. Such a notion is directly + contrary to facts. The “civil war” till six or eight months ago + was mainly a conflict of military governors and factions, part + of that struggle for personal power and wealth which has been + going on all over China.</p> + + <p>But recently events have taken a different course. In four of + the southern provinces, tuchuns who seemed all powerful have + toppled over, and the provinces have proclaimed or tacitly assumed + their independence of both the Peking and the former + military Canton governments—the province in which Canton + situated being one of the four. I happened to be in Hunan, the + first of the southerly provinces to get comparative independence, + last fall, not long after the overthrow of the vicious despot + who had ruled the province with the aid of northern troops. + For a week a series of meetings were held in Changsha, the + capital of the province. The burden of every speech was “Hunan + for the Hunanese.” The slogan embodies the spirit of two + powers each aiming at becoming the central authority; it is a + conflict of the principle of provincial autonomy, represented by + the politically more mature south, with that of militaristic centralization, + represented by Peking.</p> + + <p>As I write, in early September (1921), the immediate issue is + <a class="pagenum" id="page47" title="47"> </a>obscured by the fight which Wu Pei Fu is waging with the Hunanese + who with nominal independence are in aim and interest allied + with the south. If, as is likely, Wu Pei Fu wins, he may take + one of two courses. He may use his added power to turn against + Chang Tso Lin and the northern militarists which will bring + him into virtual alliance with the southerners and establish him + as the antagonist of the federal principle. This is the course + which his earlier record would call for. Or he may yield to the + usual official lust for power and money and try once more the + Yuan Shi Kai policy of military centralization with himself as + head, after trying out conclusions with Chang Tso Lin as his + rival. This is the course which the past record of military + leaders indicates. But even if Wu Pei Fu follows precedent + and goes bad, he will only hasten his own final end. This is not + prophecy. It is only a statement of what has uniformly happened + in China just at the moment a military leader seemed to + have complete power in his grasp. In other words, a victory + for Wu Pei Fu may either accelerate or may retard the development + of provincial autonomy according to the course he pursues. + It cannot permanently prevent or deflect it.</p> + + <p>The basic factor that makes one sure that this trend toward + local autonomy is a reality and not merely one of those meaningless + shiftings of power which confuse the observer, is that it is + in accord with Chinese temperament, tradition and circumstance. + Feudalism is past and gone two thousand years ago, and at no + period since has China possessed a working centralized government. + The absolute empires which have come and gone in the + last two millenniums existed by virtue of non-interference and a + religious aura. The latter can never be restored; and every + episode of the republic demonstrates that China with its vast + and diversified territories, its population of between three hundred + and fifty and four hundred million, its multitude of languages + and lack of communications, its enormous local attachments + sanctified by the family system and ancestral worship, + cannot be managed from a single and remote centre. China + rests upon a network of local and voluntary associations cemented + by custom. This fact has given it its unparallelled stability + and its power to progress even under the disturbed political conditions + of the past ten years. I sometimes think that Americans + with their own traditional contempt for politics and their spontaneous + <a class="pagenum" id="page48" title="48"> </a>reliance upon self-help and local organization are the + ones who are naturally fitted to understand China’s course. + The Japanese with their ingrained reliance upon the state have + continually misjudged and misacted. The British understand + better than we do the significance of local self-government; but + they are misled by their reverence for politics so that they cannot + readily find or see government when it does not take political + form.</p> + + <p>It is not too much to say that one great cause for the overthrow + of the Manchus was the fact that because of the pressure + of international relations they attempted to force, especially in + fiscal matters, a centralization upon the provinces wholly foreign + to the spirit of the people. This created hostility where + before there had been indifference. China may possibly not + emerge from her troubles a unified nation, any more than a + much smaller and less populous Europe emerged from the break-up + of the Holy Roman Empire, a single state. Indeed one often + wonders, not that China is divided, but that she is not much + more broken up than she is. But one thing is certain. Whatever + progress China finally succeeds in making will come from + a variety of local centres, not from Peking or Canton. It will + be effected by means of associations and organizations which + even though they assume a political form are not primarily + political in nature.</p> + + <p>Criticisms are passed, especially by foreigners, upon the present + trend of events. The criticisms are more than plausible. + It is evident that the present weakness of China is due to her + divided condition. Hence it is natural to argue that the present + movement being one of secession and general disintegration will + increase the weakness of the country. It is also evident that + many of China’s troubles are due to the absence of any efficient + administrative system; it is reasonable to argue that China + cannot get even railways and universal education without a + strong and stable central government. There is no doubt about + the facts. It is not surprising that many friends of China deeply + deplore the present tendency while some regard it as the final + accomplishment of the long predicted breakup of China. But + remedies for China’s ills based upon ignoring history, psychology + and actual conditions are so utopian that it is not worth while + to argue whether or not they are theoretically desirable. The + <a class="pagenum" id="page49" title="49"> </a>remedy of China’s troubles by a strong, centralized government + is on a par with curing disease by the expulsion of a devil. The evil + of sectionalism is real, but since it is real it cannot be dealt with by + trying a method which implies its non-existence. If the devil is + really there, he will not be exorcized by a formula. If the trouble + is internal, not due to an external demon, the disease can be cured + only by using the factors of health and vigor which the patient + already possesses. And in China while these factors of recuperation + and growth are numerous, they all exist in connection with + local organizations and voluntary associations. The increasing + volume of the cry that the “tuchuns must go” comes from the + provincial and local interests which have been insulted and violated + by a nominally centralized but actually chaotic situation. After + this negative work is completed, the constructive rebuilding of + China can proceed only by utilizing local interests and abilities. + In China the movement will be the opposite of that which occurred + in Japan. It will be from the periphery to the centre.</p> + + <p>Another objection to the present tendency has force especially + from the foreign standpoint. As already stated, the efforts of + the Manchu dynasty in its latter days to enhance central power + were due to international pressure. Foreign nations treated + Peking as if it were a capital like London, Paris or Berlin, and + in its efforts to meet foreign demands it had to try to become + such a centre. The result was disaster. But foreign nations still + want to have a single centre which may be held responsible. + And subconsciously, if not consciously, this desire is responsible + for much of the objection of foreign nationals to the local + autonomy movement. They well know that it is going to take a + long time to realize the ideal of federation, and meantime where + and what is to be the agency responsible for diplomatic relations, + the enforcing of indemnities and the securing of concessions?</p> + + <p>In one respect the secessionist tendency is dangerous to China + herself as well as inconvenient to the powers. It will readily + stimulate the desire and ability of foreign nations to interfere + in China’s domestic affairs. There will be many centres at + which to carry on intrigues and from which to get concessions + instead of one or two. There is also danger that one foreign + nation may line up with one group of provinces, and another + foreign nation with another group, so that international friction + will increase. Even now some Japanese sources and even such + <a class="pagenum" id="page50" title="50"> </a>an independent liberal paper as Robert Young’s Japan Chronicle + are starting or reporting the rumor that the Cantonese experiment + is supported by subsidies supplied by American capitalists + in the hope of economic concessions. The rumor was invented + for a sinister purpose. But it illustrates the sort of situation + that may come into existence if there are several political centres + in China and one foreign nation backs one and another nation, + another.</p> + + <p>The danger is real enough. But it cannot be dealt with by + attempting the impossible—namely checking the movement toward + local autonomy, even though disintegration may temporarily + accompany it. The danger only emphasizes the fundamental + fact of the whole Chinese situation; that its essence is + time. The evils and troubles of China are real enough, and + there is no blinking the fact that they are largely of her own + making, due to corruption, inefficiency and absence of popular + education. But no one who knows the common people doubts + that they will win through if they are given time. And in the + concrete this means that they be left politically alone to work out + their own destiny. There will doubtless be proposals at the Pacific + Conference to place China under some kind of international + tutelage. This chapter and the events connected with the tendency + which it reports will be cited as showing this need. Some + of the schemes will spring from motives that are hostile to + China. Some will be benevolently conceived in a desire to save + China from herself and shorten her period of chaos and confusion. + But the hope of the world’s peace, as well as of China’s + freedom, lies in adhering to a policy of Hands Off. Give China + a chance. Give her time. The danger lies in being in a hurry, + in impatience, possibly in the desire of America to show that + we are a power in international affairs and that we too have a + positive foreign policy. And a benevolent policy of supporting + China from without, instead of promoting her aspirations from + within, may in the end do China about as much harm as a policy + conceived in malevolence.</p> + + <p class="dateline">July, 1921.</p> +</div> +<div id="essay7" class="essay"> + <h2><a class="pagenum" id="page51" title="51"> </a><abbr class="essay-number" title="seven">VII</abbr><br /> + A Parting of the Ways for America</h2> + + <h3>1</h3> + + <p class="first_paragraph"><span class="first_word">The</span> realities of American policy in China and toward + China are going to be more seriously tested in the future + than they ever have been in the past. Japanese + papers have been full of protests against any attempt by the + Pacific Conference to place Japan on trial. Would that American + journals were full of warnings that America is on trial at + the Conference as to the sincerity and intelligent goodwill behind + her amiable professions. The world will not stop with the + Pacific Conference; the latter, however important, will not arrest + future developments, and the United States will continue to be + on trial till she has established by her acts a permanent and + definite attitude. For the realities of the situation cannot be exhausted + in any formula or in any set of diplomatic agreements, + even if the Conference confounds the fears of pessimists and + results in a harmonious union of the powers in support of China’s + legitimate aspirations for free political and economic growth.</p> + + <p>The Conference, however, stands as a symbol of the larger + situation; and its decisions or lack of them will be a considerable + factor in the determination of subsequent events. Sometimes + one is obliged to fall back on a trite phrase. We are genuinely + at a parting of the ways. Even if we should follow in our old + path, there would none the less be a parting of the ways, for + we cannot consistently tread the old path unless we are animated + by a much more conscious purpose and a more general + and intelligent knowledge of affairs than have controlled our + activities in the past.</p> + + <p>The ideas expressed by an English correspondent about the + fear that America is soon to be an active source of danger in + the Far East are not confined to persons on foreign shores. The + prevailing attitude in some circles of American opinion is that + called by President Hibben cynical pessimism. All professed + radicals and many liberals believe that if our course has been + better in the past it has been due to geographical accidents combined + with indifference and with our undeveloped economic status. + Consequently they believe that since we have now become what is + <a class="pagenum" id="page52" title="52"> </a>called a world-power and a nation which exports instead of importing + capital, our course will soon be as bad as that of any of + the rest of them. In some quarters this opinion is clearly an + emotional reaction following the disillusionments of Versailles. + In others, it is due to adherence to a formula: nothing in international + affairs can come out of capitalism and America is emphatically + a capitalistic country. Whether or not these feelings + are correct, they are not discussable; neither an emotion nor an + absolute formula is subject to analysis.</p> + + <p>But there are specific elements in the situation which give + grounds for apprehension as to the future. These specific elements + are capable of detection and analysis. An adequate realization + of their nature will be a large factor in preventing cynical + apprehensions from becoming actual. This chapter is an attempt + at a preliminary listing, inadequate, of course, as any preliminary + examination must be. While an a priori argument based on a + fatalistic formula as to how a “capitalistic nation” must conduct + itself does not appeal to me, there are nevertheless concrete facts + which are suggested by that formula. Part of our comparatively + better course in China in the past is due to the fact that we have + not had the continuous and close alliance between the State + Department and big banking interests which is found in the + case of foreign powers. No honest well-informed history of + developments in China could be written in which the Russian + Asiatic Bank, the Foreign Bank of Belgium, the French Indo-China + Bank and Banque Industrielle, the Yokohama Specie + Bank, the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank, etc., did not figure prominently. + These banks work in the closest harmony, not only with + railway and construction syndicates and big manufacturing interests + at home, but also with their respective foreign offices. + It is hardly too much to say that legations and banks have been + in most important matters the right and left hands of the same + body. American business interests have complained an the past + that the American government does not give to American traders + abroad the same support that the nationals of other states + receive. In the past these complaints have centred largely about + actual wrongs suffered or believed to have been suffered by + American business undertakings carried on in a foreign country. + With the present expansion of capital and of commerce, the + same complaints and demands are going to be made not with + <a class="pagenum" id="page53" title="53"> </a>reference to grievances suffered, but with reference to furthering, + to pushing American commercial interests in connection + with large banking groups. It would take a credulous person + to deny the influence of big business in domestic politics. As + we become more interested in commerce and banking enterprises + what assurance have we that the alliance will not be transferred + to international politics?</p> + + <p>It should be noted that the policy of the open door as affirmed + by the great powers—and as frequently violated by them—even + if it be henceforth observed in good faith, does not adequately + protect us from this danger. The open door policy is + not primarily a policy about China herself but rather about the + policies of foreign powers toward one another with respect to + China. It demands equality of economic opportunity for different + nations. Were it enforced, it would prevent the granting + of monopolies to any one nation: there is nothing in it to render + impossible a conjoint exploitation of China by foreign powers, + an organized monopoly in which each nation has its due share + with respect to others. Such an organization might conceivably + reduce friction among the great powers, and thereby reduce the + danger of future wars—as long as China herself is impotent + to go to war. The agreement might conceivably for a considerable + time be of benefit to China herself. But it is clear that + for the United States to become a partner in any such arrangement + would involve a reversal of our historic policy in the Far + East. It might be technically consistent with the open door + policy, but it would be a violation of the larger sense in which + the American people has understood and praised that ideal. He + is blind who does not see that there are forces making for such + a reversal. And since we are all more or less blind, an opening + of our eyes to the danger is one of the conditions of its not being + realized.</p> + + <p>One of the forces which is operative is indicated by the phrase + that an international agreement on an economic and financial + basis might be of value to China herself. The mere suggestion + that such a thing is possible is abhorrent to many, especially to + radicals. There seems to be something sinister in it. So it is + worth explaining how and why it might be so. In the first place, + it would obviously terminate the particularistic grabbing for + “leased” territory, concessions and spheres of influence which + <a class="pagenum" id="page54" title="54"> </a>has so damaged China. At the present time, the point of this + remark lies in its implied reference to Japan, as at one time it + might have applied to Russia. Fear of Japan’s aims in China + is not confined to China; the fear is widespread. An international + economic arrangement may therefore be plausibly presented + as the easiest and most direct method of relieving China of + the Japanese menace. For Japan to stay out would be to give + herself away; if she came in, it would subject Japanese activities + to constant scrutiny and control. There is no doubt that part + of the fear of Japan regarding the Pacific Conference is due + to a belief that some such arrangement is contemplated. The + case is easily capable of such presentation as to make it appeal + to Americans who are really friendly to China and who haven’t + the remotest interest in her economic exploitation.</p> + + <p>The arrangement would, for example, automatically eliminate + the Lansing-Ishii agreement with its embarrassing ambiguous + recognition of Japan’s <em>special</em> interests in China.</p> + + <p>The other factor is domestic. The distraction and civil wars + of China are commonplaces. So is the power exercised by the + military governors and generals. The greater one’s knowledge, + the more one perceives how intimately the former evil is dependent + upon the latter. The financial plight of the Chinese + government, its continual foreign borrowings which threaten + bankruptcy in the near future, depend upon militaristic domination + and wild expenditure for unproductive purposes and + squeeze. Without this expense, China would have no great + difficulty henceforth in maintaining a balance in her budget. The + retardation of public education whose advancement—especially + in elementary schools—is China’s greatest single need is due to + the same cause. So is the growth in official corruption which is + rapidly extending into business and private life.</p> + + <p>In fact, every one of the obstacles to the progress of China + is connected with the rule of military factions and their struggles + with one another for complete mastery. An economic international + agreement among the great powers can be made which + would surely reduce and possibly eliminate the greatest evils + of “militarism.” Many liberal Chinese say in private that they + would be willing to have a temporary international receivership + for government finance, provided they could be assured of its + nature and the exact date and conditions of its termination—a + <a class="pagenum" id="page55" title="55"> </a>proviso which they are sensible enough to recognize would be + extremely difficult of attainment. American leadership in forming + and executing any such scheme would, they feel, afford the + best reassurance as to its nature and terms. Under such circumstances + a plausible case can be made out for proposals which, + under the guise of traditional American friendship for China, + would in fact commit us to a reversal of our historic policy.</p> + + <p>There are radicals abroad and at home who think that our + entrance into a Consortium already proves that we have entered + upon the road of reversal and who naturally see in the Pacific + Conference the next logical step. I have previously stated my + own belief that our State Department proposed the Consortium + primarily for political ends, as a means of checking the policy + pursued by Japan of making unproductive loans to China in + return for which she was getting an immediate grip on China’s + natural resources and preparing the way for direct administrative + and financial control when the day of reckoning and foreclosure + should finally come. I also said that the Consortium + was between two stools, the financial and the political and that + up to the present its chief value had been negative and preventive, + and that jealousy or lack of interest by Japan and Great + Britain in any constructive policy on the part of the Consortium + was likely to maintain the same condition. I have seen no reason + thus far to change my mind on this point, nor in regard to the + further belief that probably the interests of China in the end + will be best served by the continuation of this deterrent function. + But the question is bound to arise: why continue the Consortium + if it isn’t doing anything? The pressure of foreign powers interested + in the exploitation of China and of impatient American + economic interests may combine to put an end to the present + rather otiose existence led by the Consortium. The two stools + between which the past action of the American government has + managed to swing the Consortium may be united to form a single + solid bench.</p> + + <p>At the risk of being charged with credulous gullibility, or + something worse, I add that up to the present time the American + phase of the Consortium hasn’t shown perceptible signs of + becoming a club exercised by American finance over China’s + economic integrity and independence. I believe the repeated + statements of the American representative that he himself and + <a class="pagenum" id="page56" title="56"> </a>the interests he represents would be glad if China proved her + ability to finance her own public utilities without resorting to + foreign loans. This belief is confirmed by the first public utterance + of the new American minister to China who in his reference + to the Consortium laid emphasis upon its deterrent function + and upon the stimulation it has given to Chinese bankers + to finance public utilities. And it is the merest justice to Mr. + Stevens, the American representative, to say that he represents + the conservative investment type of banker, not the “promotion” + type, and that thus far his great concern has been the problem + of protecting the buyer of such securities as are passed on by + the banks to the ultimate investor—so much so that he has + aroused criticism from American business interests impatient + for speedy action. But there is a larger phase of the Consortium + concerning which I think apprehensions may reasonably + be entertained.</p> + + <p>Suppose, if merely by way of hypothesis, that the American + government is genuinely interested in China and in making the + policy of the open door and Chinese territorial and administrative + integrity a reality, not merely a name, and suppose that it + is interested in doing so from an American self-interest sufficiently + enlightened to perceive that the political and economic advancement + of the United States is best furthered by a policy + which is identical with China’s ability to develop herself freely + and independently: what then would be the wise American + course? In short, it would be to view our existing European + interests and issues (due to the war) and our Far Eastern interests + and issues as parts of one and the same problem. If + we are actuated by the motive hypothetically imputed to our + government and we fail in its realization, the chief reason will + be that we regard the European question and the Asiatic problem + as two different questions, or because we identify them from + the wrong end.</p> + + <p>Our present financial interest in Europe is enormous. It involves + not merely foreign governmental loans but a multitude + of private advances and commitments. These financial entanglements + affect not merely our industry and commerce but our + politics. They involve much more immediately pressing concerns + than to our Asiatic relations, and they involve billions + where the latter involve millions. The danger under such conditions + <a class="pagenum" id="page57" title="57"> </a>that our Asiatic relations will be sacrificed to our European + is hardly fanciful.</p> + + <p>To make this abstract statement concrete, the firm of bankers, + J. P. Morgan & Co., which is most heavily involved in European + indebtedness to the United States, is the firm which is the leading + spirit in the Consortium for China. It seems almost inevitable + that the Asiatic problem should look like small potatoes + in comparison with the European one, especially as our own industrial + recuperation is so closely connected with European relations, + while the Far East cuts a negligible figure. To my mind + the real danger to set out upon selfish exploitation of China: + intelligent self-interest, tradition and the fact that our chief asset + in China is our past freedom from a predatory course, dictate + a course of cooperation with China. The danger is that China + will be subordinated and sacrificed because of primary preoccupation + with the high finance and politics of Europe, that she will + be lost in the shuffle.</p> + + <p>The European aspect of the problem can be made more concrete + by reference to Great Britain in particular. That country + suffers from the embarrassment of the Japanese alliance. She + has already made it sufficiently clear that she would like to + draw America into the alliance, making it tripartite, since that + would be the easiest way of maintaining good relations with + both Japan and the United States. There is no likelihood that + any such step will be consummated. But British diplomacy is + experienced and astute. And by force of circumstances our + high finance has contracted a sort of economic alliance with + Great Britain. There is no wish to claim superior virtue for + America or to appeal to the strong current of anti-British sentiment. + But the British foreign office exists and operates apart + from the tradition of liberalism which has mainly actuated English + domestic politics. It stands peculiarly for the <em>Empire</em> side + of the British Empire, no matter what party is in the saddle + in domestic affairs. Every resource will be employed to bring + about a settlement at the Pacific Conference which, even though + it includes some degree of compromise on the part of Great + Britain, will bend the Asiatic policy of the United States to the + British traditions in the Far East, instead of committing Great + Britain to combining with the United States in making a reality + of the integrity of China to which both countries are nominally + <a class="pagenum" id="page58" title="58"> </a>committed. It does not seem an extreme statement to say that + the immediate issues of the Conference depend upon the way + in which our financial commitments in Europe are treated, either + as reasons for our making concessions to European policy or + on the other hand as a means of securing an adherence of the + European powers to the traditional American policy.</p> + + <p>A publicist in China who is of British origin and a sincere + friend of China remarked in private conversation that if the + United States could not secure the adherence of Great Britain + to her Asiatic policy by persuasion (he was deploring the Japanese + alliance) she might do so by buying it—through remission + of her national debt to us. It is not necessary to resort to the + measure so baldly suggested. But the remark at least suggests + that our involvement in European, especially British, finance and + politics may be treated in either of two ways for either of two + results.</p> + + <h3>2</h3> + + <p>That the Chinese people generally speaking has a less + antagonistic feeling toward the United States than towards + other powers seems to me an undoubted fact. + The feeling has been disturbed at divers times by the treatment + of the Chinese upon the Pacific coast, by the exclusion act, by + the turning over of our interest in the building of the Peking-Canton + (or Hankow) railway to a European group, by the + Lansing-Ishii agreement, and finally by the part played by + President Wilson in the Versailles decision regarding Shantung. + Those disturbances in the main, however, have made them dubious + as to our skill, energy and intelligence rather than as to our + good-will. Americans, taken individually and collectively, are + to the Chinese—at least such was my impression—a rather simple + folk, taking the word in its good and its deprecatory sense. + In noting the Chinese reaction to the proposed Pacific Conference, + it was interesting to see the combination of an almost unlimited + hope that the United States was to lead in protecting + them from further aggressions and in rectifying existing evils, + with a lack of confidence, a fear that the United States would + have something put over on it.</p> + + <p>Friendly feeling is of course mainly based upon a negative + <a class="pagenum" id="page59" title="59"> </a>fact, the fact that the United States has taken no part in “leasing” + territories, establishing spheres and setting up extra-national + post-offices. On the positive side stands the contribution + made by Americans to education, especially medical, and + that of girls and women, and to philanthropy and relief. Politically, + there are the early service of Burlinghame, the open + door policy of John Hay (though failure to maintain it in fact + while securing signatures to it on paper is a considerable part + of the Chinese belief in our defective energy) and the part + played by the United States in moderating the terms of the settlement + of the Boxer outbreak, in addition to a considerable + number of minor helpful acts. China also remembers that we + were the only nation to take exception to the treaties embodying + the Twenty-one Demands. While our exception was chiefly + made on the basis of our own interests which these treaties might + injuriously affect, a sentiment exists that the protest was a pledge + of assistance to China when the time should be opportune for + raising the whole question. And without doubt the reservation + made on May 16, 1915, by our State Department is a strong + card at the forthcoming Conference if the Department wishes + to play it.</p> + + <p>From an American standpoint, the open door principle represents + one of the only two established principles of American + diplomacy, the other being, of course, the Monroe Doctrine. + In connection with sentimental or idealistic associations which + have clustered about it, it constitutes us in some vague fashion + in both the Chinese and American public opinion a sort of guardian + or at least spokesman of the interests of China in relation + to foreign powers. Although, as was pointed out in a former + chapter, the open door policy directly concerns other nations in + their relation to China rather than China herself, yet the violation + of the policy by other powers has been so frequent and so + much to the detriment of China, that American interest, prestige + and moral sentiment are now implicated in such an enforcement + of it as will redound to the advantage of China.</p> + + <p>Citizens of other countries are often irritated by a suggestion + of such a relationship between the United States and China. + It presents itself as a proclamation of superior national virtue + under cover of which the United States aims to establish its + influence in China at the expense of other countries. The irritation + <a class="pagenum" id="page60" title="60"> </a>is exasperated by the fact that the situation as it stands + is an undoubted economic and political asset of the United States + in China. We may concede without argument any contention + that the situation is not due to any superior virtue but rather to + contingencies of history and geography—in which respect it is + not unlike many things that pass for virtues with individuals. + The contention may be admitted without controversy because it + is not pertinent to the main issue. The question is not so much + how the state of affairs came about as what it now is, how it is to + be treated and what consequences are in flow from it. It is + a fact that up to the present an intelligent self-interest of America + has coincided with the interests of a stable, independent and + progressive China. It is also a fact that American traditions + and sentiments have gathered about this consideration so that + now there is widespread conviction in the American people of + moral obligations of assistance and friendly protection owed by + us to China. At present, no policy can be entered upon that + does not bear the semblance of fairness and goodwill. We have + at least so much protection against the dangers discussed in the + prior chapter.</p> + + <p>Among Americans in China and presumably at home there is + a strong feeling that we should adopt for the future stronger + and more positive policies than we have maintained in the past. + This feeling seems to me fraught with dangers unless we make + very clear to ourselves in just what respects we are to continue + and make good in a more positive manner our traditional policy. + To some extent our past policy has been one of drifting. Radical + change in this respect may go further than appears upon + the surface in altering other fundamental aspects of our policy. + What is condemned as drifting is in effect largely the same thing + that is also praised as non-interference. A detailed settled policy, + no matter how “constructive” it may appear to be, can + hardly help involving us in the domestic policies of China, an + affair of factions and a game which the Chinese understand and + play much better than any foreigners. Such an involvement + would at once lessen a present large asset in China, aloofness + from internal intrigues and struggles.</p> + + <p>The specific protests of Chinese in this country—mainly Cantonese—against + the Consortium seem to me mainly based on + misapprehension. But their <em>general</em> attitude of opposition nevertheless + <a class="pagenum" id="page61" title="61"> </a>conveys an important lesson. It is based on a belief + that the effect of the Consortium will be to give the Peking government + a factitious advantage in the internal conflict which is + waging in China, so that to all intents and purposes it will mark + a taking of sides on our part. It is well remembered that the + effect of the “reorganization” loan of the prior Consortium—in + which the United States was <em>not</em> a partner—was to give + Yuan Shi Kai the funds which seated him and the militarist + faction after him, firmly in the governmental saddle. Viewing + the matter from a larger point of view than that of Canton vs. + Peking, the most fundamental objection I heard brought by + Chinese against the Consortium was in effect as follows: The + republican revolution in China has still to be wrought out; the + beginning of ten years ago has been arrested. It remains to + fight it out. The inevitable effect of increased foreign financial + and economic interest in China, even admitting that its industrial + effect was advantageous to China, would be to create an interest + in <em>stabilizing</em> China politically, which in effect would mean to + sanctify the status quo, and prevent the development of a revolution + which cannot be accomplished without internal disorders + that would affect foreign investments unfavorably. These considerations + are not mentioned for the sake of throwing light + on the Consortium: they are cited as an illustration of the + probability that a too positive and constructive development of + our tradition of goodwill to China would involve us in an interference + with Chinese domestic affairs injurious to China’s welfare, + to that free and independent development in which we + profess such interest.</p> + + <p>But how, it will be asked, are we to protect China from foreign + depredations, particularly those of Japan, how are we to + change our nominal goodwill into a reality, if we do not enter + much more positive and detailed policies? If there was in + existence at the present time any such thing as a diplomacy of + peoples as distinct from a diplomacy of governments, the question + would mean something quite different from what it now + means. As things now stand the people should profoundly distrust + the <em>politicians’</em> love for China. It is too frequently the + reverse side of fear and incipient hatred of Japan, colored perhaps + by anti-British feeling.</p> + + <p>There should be no disguising of the situation. The aggressive + <a class="pagenum" id="page62" title="62"> </a>activities of other nations in China, centering but not exhausted + at this time in Japan, are not merely sources of trouble + to China but they are potential causes of trouble in our own + international relationships. We are committed by our tradition + and by the present actualities of the situation to attempting + something positive for China as respects her international status, + to live up to our responsibility is a most difficult and delicate + matter. We have on the one side to avoid getting entangled + in quasi-imperialistic European policies in Asia, whether under + the guise of altruism, of putting ourselves in a position where + we can exercise a more effective supervision of their behavior, + or by means of economic expansion. On the other side, we + have to avoid drifting into that kind of covert or avowed antagonism + to European and Japanese imperialism which will only + increase friction, encourage a combination especially of Great + Britain and Japan—-or of France and Japan—against us, and + bring war appreciably nearer.</p> + + <p>We need to bear in mind that China will not be saved from + outside herself. Even if by a successful war we should relieve + China from Japanese encroachments, from all encroachments, + China would not of necessity be brought nearer her legitimate + goal of orderly and prosperous internal development. Apart + from the question of how far war can now settle any fundamental + issues without begetting others as dangerous, China of + all countries is the one where settlement by force, especially by + outside force, is least applicable, and most likely to be enormously + disserviceable. China is used to taking time to deal with her + problems: she can neither understand not profit by impatient + methods of the western world which are profoundly alien to + her genius. Moreover a civilization which is on a continental + scale, which is so old that the rest of us are parvenus in comparison, + which is thick and closely woven, cannot be hurried in + its development without disaster. Transformation from within + is its sole way out, and we can best help China by trying to see + to it that she gets the time she needs in order to effect this transformation, + whether or not we like the particular form it assumes + at any particular time.</p> + + <p>A successful war in behalf of China would leave untouched + her problems of education, of factional and sectional forces, of + political immaturity showing itself in present incapacity for organization. + <a class="pagenum" id="page63" title="63"> </a>It would affect her industrial growth undoubtedly, + but in all human probability for the worse, increasing the likelihood + that she would enter upon an industrialization which + would repeat the worst evils of western industrial life, without + the immunities, resistances and remedial measures which the + West has evolved. The imagination cannot conceive a worse + crime than fastening western industrialism upon China before + she has developed within herself the meaning of coping with + the forces which it would release. The danger is great enough + as it is. War waged in China’s behalf by western powers and + western methods would make the danger practically irresistible. + In addition we should gain a permanent interest in China which + is likely to be of the most dangerous character to ourselves. If + we were not committed by it to future imperialism, we should + be luckier than we have any right to hope to be. These things + are said against a mental protest to admitting even by implication + the prospect of war with Japan, but it seems necessary to + say them.</p> + + <p>These remarks are negative and vague as to our future + course. They imply a confession of lack of such wisdom as + would enable me to make positive definite proposals. But at + least I have confidence in the wisdom and goodwill of the American + and other peoples to deal with the problem, if they are + only called into action. And the first condition of calling wisdom + and goodwill into effective existence is to recognize the + seriousness of the problem and the utter futility of trying to + force its solution by impatient and hurried methods. Pro-Japanese + apologetics is dangerous; it obscures the realities of the + situation. An irritated anti-Japanism that would hasten the + solution of the Chinese problem merely by attacking Japan is + equally fatal to discovering and applying a proper method.</p> + + <p>More specifically and also more generically, proper publicity + is the greatest need. If, as Secretary Hughes has intimated, + a settlement of the problems of the Pacific is made a condition + of arriving at an agreement regarding reduction and limitation + of armaments, it is likely that the Conference might better never + be held. In eagerness to do something which will pass as a settlement, + either China’s—and Siberia’s—interests will be sacrificed + in some unfair compromise, or irritation and friction will + be increased—and in the end so will armaments. In any literal + <a class="pagenum" id="page64" title="64"> </a>sense, it is ridiculous to suppose that the problems of the Pacific + can be settled in a few weeks, or months—or years. Yet the + discussion of the problems, in separation from the question of + armament, may be of great use. For it may further that publicity + which is a pre-condition of any genuine settlement. This + involves the public in diplomacy. But it also involves a wider + publicity, one which will enlighten the world about the facts of + Asia, internal and international.</p> + + <p>Scepticism about Foreign Offices, as they are at present conducted, + is justified. But scepticism about the power of public opinion, + if it can be aroused and instructed, to reshape Foreign Office + policies means hopelessness about the future of the world. Let + everything possible be done to reduce armament, if only to secure + a naval holiday on the part of the three great naval powers, + and if only for the sake of lessening taxation. Let the Conference + on Problems devote itself to discussing and making + known as fully and widely as possible the element and scope + of those problems, and the fears—or should one call them + hopes?—of the cynics will be frustrated. It is not so important + that a decision in the American sense of the Yap question be + finally and forever arrived at, as it is that the need of China + and the Orient in general for freer and fuller communications + with the rest of the world be made clear—and so on, down or + up the list of agenda. The commercial open door is needed. + But the need is greater that the door be opened to light, to + knowledge and understanding. If these forces will not create + a public opinion which will in time secure a lasting and just settlement + of other problems, there is no recourse save despair of + civilization. Liberals can do something better than predicting + failure and impugning motives. They can work for the opened + door of open diplomacy, of continuous and intelligent inquiry, + of discussion free from propaganda. To shirk this responsibility + on the alleged ground that economic imperialism and organized + greed will surely bring the Conference to failure is + supine and snobbish. It is one of the factors that may lead the + United States to take the wrong course in the parting of the ways.</p> + + <p class="dateline">October, 1921.</p> +</div> +<div id="footnotes" class="section"> + <h2>Footnotes</h2> + <ol> + <li id="footnote_1">Since the text was written, the newspapers have stated that the Peking Government + has officially refused to validate the agreement. + <a href="#fnm1" title="Return to marker 1" class="returnFN">Return</a> + </li> + <li id="footnote_2"> + This was written of course several months before Sun Yat Sen was reinstated + in control of Canton by the successful revolt of his local adherents against + the southern militarists who had usurped power and driven out Sun Yat Sen and + his followers. But up to the time when I left China, in July of this year, it was + true that the liberals of northern and central China who were bitterly opposed to + the Peking Government, did not look to the Southern Government with much hope. + The common attitude was a “plague upon both of your houses” and a desire for + a new start. The conflict between North and South looms much larger in the + United States than it did in China. + <a href="#fnm2" title="Return to marker 2" class="returnFN">Return</a> + </li> + <li id="footnote_3"> + Since the writing of this and the former chapter there are some signs that + Wu Pei Fu wants to set up in control of the middle districts. + <a href="#fnm3" title="Return to marker 3" class="returnFN">Return</a> + </li> + + </ol> +</div> +<div id="transcriber-note"> + <h2>Transcriber’s Note</h2> + <p>Obvious typographical errors have been repaired. The <a href="#contents">Table of Contents</a> was added.</p> +</div> +<div id="outro"> + +</div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's China, Japan and the U.S.A., by John Dewey + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHINA, JAPAN AND THE U.S.A. *** + +***** This file should be named 28393-h.htm or 28393-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/8/3/9/28393/ + +Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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