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diff --git a/28393-0.txt b/28393-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..27a61c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/28393-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2842 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of China, Japan and the U.S.A., by John Dewey + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: China, Japan and the U.S.A. + Present-Day Conditions in the Far East and Their Bearing + on the Washington Conference + +Author: John Dewey + +Release Date: October 25, 2009 [EBook #28393] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHINA, JAPAN AND THE U.S.A. *** + + + + +Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + CHINA, JAPAN AND THE U. S. A. + + Present-day Conditions + in the Far East + and Their Bearing on + the Washington + Conference + + + _by_ + + + JOHN DEWEY + + Professor of Philosophy at + Columbia University + + + _New Republic Pamphlet No. 1_ + + Published by the + REPUBLIC PUBLISHING CO., INC. + 421 West Twenty-first Street + _New York City_ + 1921 + + + + + Copyright 1921 + REPUBLIC PUBLISHING CO. INC. + + + + +_Introductory Note_ + + +_The articles following are reprinted as they were written in spite of +the fact that any picture of contemporary events is modified by +subsequent increase of knowledge and by later events. In the main, +however, the writer would still stand by what was said at the time. A +few foot notes have been inserted where the text is likely to give +rise to misapprehensions. The date of writing has been retained as a +guide to the reader._ + + + + +I + +On Two Sides of the Eastern Seas + + +It is three days' easy journey from Japan to China. It is doubtful +whether anywhere in the world another journey of the same length +brings with it such a complete change of political temper and belief. +Certainly it is greater than the alteration perceived in journeying +directly from San Francisco to Shanghai. The difference is not one in +customs and modes of life; that goes without saying. It concerns the +ideas, beliefs and alleged information current about one and the same +fact: the status of Japan in the international world and especially +its attitude toward China. One finds everywhere in Japan a feeling of +uncertainty, hesitation, even of weakness. There is a subtle nervous +tension in the atmosphere as of a country on the verge of change but +not knowing where the change will take it. Liberalism is in the air, +but genuine liberals are encompassed with all sorts of difficulties +especially in combining their liberalism with the devotion to +theocratic robes which the imperialist militarists who rule Japan have +so skilfully thrown about the Throne and the Government. But what one +senses in China from the first moment is the feeling of the +all-pervading power of Japan which is working as surely as fate to its +unhesitating conclusion--the domination of Chinese politics and +industry by Japan with a view to its final absorption. It is not my +object to analyze the realities of the situation or to inquire whether +the universal feeling in China is a collective hallucination or is +grounded in fact. The phenomenon is worthy of record on its own +account. Even if it be merely psychological, it is a fact which must +be reckoned with in both its Chinese and its Japanese aspects. In the +first place, as to the differences in psychological atmosphere. +Everybody who knows anything about Japan knows that it is the land of +reserves and reticences. The half-informed American will tell you that +this is put on for the misleading of foreigners. The informed know +that it is an attitude shown to foreigners only because it is deeply +engrained in the moral and social tradition of Japan; and that, if +anything, the Japanese are more likely to be communicative--about many +things at least--to a sympathetic foreigner, than to one another. The +habit of reserve is so deeply embedded in all the etiquette, +convention and daily ceremony of living, as well as in the ideals of +strength of character, that only the Japanese who have subjected +themselves to foreign influences escape it--and many of them revert. +To put it mildly, the Japanese are not a loquacious people; they have +the gift of doing rather than of gab. + +When accordingly a Japanese statesman or visiting diplomatist engages +in unusually prolonged and frank discourse setting forth the aims and +procedures of Japan, the student of politics who has been long in the +East at once becomes alert, not to say suspicious. A recent +illustration is so extreme that it will doubtless seem fantastic +beyond belief. But the student at home will have to take these seeming +fantasies seriously if he wishes to appreciate the present atmosphere +of China. Cables have brought fragmentary reports of some addresses of +Baron Goto in America. Doubtless in the American atmosphere these have +the effect of reassuring America as to any improper ambitions on the +part of Japan. In China, they were taken as announcements that Japan +has about completed its plans for the absorption of China, and that +the lucubration preliminary to operations of swallowing are about to +begin. The reader is forgiven in advance any scepticism he feels about +both the fact itself and the correctness of my report of the belief in +the alleged fact. His scepticism will not surpass what I should feel +in his place. But the suspicion aroused by such statements as this and +the recent interview of Foreign Minister Uchida and Baron Ishii must +be noted as evidences of the universal belief in China that Japan has +one mode of diplomacy for the East and another for the West, and that +what is said in the West must be read in reverse in the East. + +China, whatever else it is, is not the land of privacies. It is a +proverb that nothing long remains secret in China. The Chinese talk +more easily than they act--especially in politics. They are adepts in +revealing their own shortcomings. They dissect their own weaknesses +and failures with the most extraordinary reasonableness. One of the +defects upon which they dwell is the love of finding substitutes for +positive action, of avoiding entering upon a course of action which +might be irrevocable. One almost wonders whether their power of +self-criticism is not itself another of these substitutes. At all +events, they are frank to the point of loquacity. Between the opposite +camps there are always communications flowing. Among official enemies +there are "sworn friends." In a land of perpetual compromise, +etiquette as well as necessity demands that the ways for later +accommodations be kept open. Consequently things which are spoken of +only under the breath in Japan are shouted from the housetops in +China. It would hardly be good taste in Japan to allude to the report +that influential Chinese ministers are in constant receipt of Japanese +funds and these corrupt officials are the agencies by which political +and economic concessions were wrung from China while Europe and +America were busy with the war. But in China nobody even takes the +trouble to deny it or even to discuss it. What is psychologically most +impressive is the fact that it is merely taken for granted. When it is +spoken of, it is as one mentions the heat on an unusually hot day. + +In speaking of the feeling of weakness current in Japan about Japan +itself, one must refer to the economic situation because of its +obvious connection with the international situation. In the first +place, there is the strong impression that Japan is over-extended. +Even in normal times, Japan relies more upon production for foreign +markets than is regarded in most countries as safe policy. And there +is the belief that Japan _must_ do so, because only by large foreign +sellings--large in comparison with the purchasing power of a people +still having a low standard of life--can it purchase the raw +materials--and even food--it has to have. But during the war, the +dependence of manufacturing and trade at home upon the foreign market +was greatly increased. The domestic increase of wealth, though very +great, is still too much in the hands of the few to affect seriously +the internal demand for goods. Item one, which awakens sympathy for +Japan as being in a somewhat precarious situation. + +Another item concerns the labor situation. Japan seems to feel itself +in a dilemma. If she passes even reasonably decent factory laws (or +rather attempts their enforcement) and regulates child and women's +labor, she will lose that advantage of cheap labor which she now +counts on to offset her many disadvantages. On the other hand, +strikes, labor difficulties, agitation for unions, etc., are +constantly increasing, and the tension in the atmosphere is +unmistakable. The rice riots are not often spoken of, but their memory +persists, and the fact that they came very near to assuming a directly +political aspect. Is there a race between fulfillment of the +aspirations of the military clans who still hold the reins, and the +growth of genuinely democratic forces which will forever terminate +those aspirations? Certainly the defeat of Germany gave a blow to +bureaucratic militarism in Japan which in time will go far. Will it +have the time required to take effect on foreign policy? The hope that +it will is a large factor in stimulating liberal sympathy for a Japan +which is beginning to undergo the throes of transition. + +As for the direct international situation of Japan, the feeling in +Japan is that of the threatening danger of isolation. Germany is gone; +Russia is gone. While those facts simplify matters for Japan somewhat, +there is also the belief that in taking away potential allies, they +have weakened Japan in the general game of balance and counter-balance +of power. Particularly does the removal of imperialistic Russia +relieve the threat on India which was such a factor in the willingness +of Great Britain to make the offensive-defensive alliance. The +revelation of the militaristic possibilities of America is another +serious factor. Certainly the new triple entente cordiale of Japan, +Italy and France is no adequate substitute for a realignment of +international forces in which a common understanding between Great +Britain and America is a dominant factor. This factor explains, if it +does not excuse, some of the querulousness and studied discourtesies +with which the Japanese press for some months treated President +Wilson, the United States in general and its relation to the League of +Nations in particular, while it also throws light on the ardor with +which the opportune question of racial discrimination was discussed. +(The Chinese have an unfailing refuge in a sense of humor. It was +interesting to note the delight with which they received the utterance +of the Japanese Foreign Minister, after Japanese success at Paris, +that "his attention had recently been called" to various press attacks +on America which he much deprecated). In any case there is no +mistaking the air of tension and nervous overstrain which now attends +all discussion of Japanese foreign relations. In all directions, there +are characteristic signs of hesitation, shaking of old beliefs and +movement along new lines. Japan seems to be much in the same mood as +that which it experienced in the early eighties before, toward the +close of that decade, it crystallized its institutions through +acceptance of the German constitution, militarism, educational system, +and diplomatic methods. So that, once more, the observer gets the +impression that substantially all of Japan's energy, abundant as that +is, must be devoted to her urgent problems of readjustment. + +Come to China, and the difference is incredible. It almost seems as if +one were living in a dream; or as if some new Alice had ventured +behind an international looking-glass wherein everything is reversed. +That we in America should have little idea of the state of things and +the frame of mind in China is not astonishing--especially in view of +the censorship and the distraction of attention of the last few years. +But that Japan and China should be so geographically near, and yet +every fact that concerns them appear in precisely opposite +perspective, is an experience of a life time. Japanese liberalism? +Yes, it is heard of, but only in connection with one form which the +longing for the miraculous _deus ex machina_ takes. Perhaps a +revolution in Japan may intervene to save China from the fate which +now hangs over her. But there is no suggestion that anything less than +a complete revolution will alter or even retard the course which is +attributed to Japanese diplomacy working hand in hand with Japanese +business interests and militarism. The collapse of Russia and Germany? +These things only mean that Japan has in a few years fallen complete +heir to Russian hopes, achievements and possessions in Manchuria and +Outer Mongolia, and has had opportunities in Siberia thrown into her +hands which she could hardly have hoped for in her most optimistic +moments. And now Japan has, with the blessing of the great Powers at +Paris, become also the heir of German concessions, intrigues and +ambitions, with added concessions, wrung (or bought) from incompetent +and corrupt officials by secret agreements when the world was busy +with war. If all the great Powers are so afraid of Japan that they +give way to her every wish, what is China that she can escape the doom +prepared for her? That is the cry of helplessness going up all over +China. And Japanese propagandists take advantage of the situation, +pointing to the action of the Peace Conference as proof that the +Allies care nothing for China, and that China must throw herself into +the arms of Japan if she is to have any protection at all. In short, +Japan stands ready as she stood ready in Korea to guarantee the +integrity and independence of China. And the fear that the latter +must, in spite of her animosity toward Japan, accept this fate in +order to escape something worse swims in the sinister air. It is the +exact counterpart of the feeling current among the liberals in Japan +that Japan has alienated China permanently when a considerate and +slower course might have united the two countries. If the economic +straits of Japan are alluded to, it is only as a reason why Japan has +hurried her diplomatic coercion, her corrupt and secret bargainings +with Chinese traitors and her industrial invasion. While the western +world supposes that the military and the industrial party in Japan +have opposite ideas as to best methods of securing Japanese supremacy +in the East, it is the universal opinion in China that they two are +working in complete understanding with one another, and the +differences that sometimes occur between the Foreign Office in Tokyo +and the Ministry of War (which is extra-constitutional in its status) +are staged for effect. + +These are some of the aspects of the most complete transformation +scene that it has ever been the lot of the writer to experience. May +it turn out to be only an extraordinary psychological experience! But +in the interests of truth it must be recorded that every resident of +China, Chinese or American, with whom I have talked in the last four +weeks has volunteered the belief that all the seeds of a future great +war are now deeply implanted in China. To avert such a calamity they +look to the League of Nations or to some other force outside the +immediate scene. Unfortunately the press of Japan treats every attempt +to discuss the state of opinion in China or the state of facts as +evidence that America, having tasted blood in the war, now has its +eyes on Asia with the expectation later on of getting its hands on +Asia. Consequently America is interested in trying to foster ill-will +between China and Japan. If the pro-American Japanese do not enlighten +their fellow-countrymen as to the facts, then America ought to return +some of the propaganda that visits its shores. But every American who +goes to Japan ought also to visit China--if only to complete his +education. + +May, 1919. + + + + +II + +Shantung, As Seen From Within + + +1. + +American apologists for that part of the Peace Treaty which relates to +China have the advantage of the illusions of distance. Most of the +arguments seem strange to anyone who lives in China even for a few +months. He finds the Japanese on the spot using the old saying about +territory consecrated by treasure spent and blood shed. He reads in +Japanese papers and hears from moderately liberal Japanese that Japan +must protect China, as well as Japan, against herself, against her own +weak or corrupt government, by keeping control of Shantung to prevent +China from again alienating that territory to some other power. + +The history of European aggression in China gives this argument great +force among the Japanese, who for the most part know nothing more +about what actually goes on in China than they used to know about +Korean conditions. These considerations, together with the immense +expectations raised among the Japanese during the war concerning their +coming domination of the Far East and the unswerving demand of excited +public opinion in Japan during the Versailles Conference for the +settlement that actually resulted, give an ironic turn to the +statement so often made that Japan may be trusted to carry out her +promises. Yes, one is often tempted to say, that is precisely what +China fears, that Japan will carry out her promises, for then China is +doomed. To one who knows the history of foreign aggression in China, +especially the technique of conquest by railway and finance, the irony +of promising to keep economic rights while returning sovereignty lies +so on the surface that it is hardly irony. China might as well be +offered Kant's Critique of Pure Reason on a silver platter as be +offered sovereignty under such conditions. The latter is equally +metaphysical. + +A visit to Shantung and a short residence in its capital city, Tsinan, +made the conclusions, which so far as I know every foreigner in China +has arrived at, a living thing. It gave a vivid picture of the many +and intimate ways in which economic and political rights are +inextricably entangled together. It made one realize afresh that only +a President who kept himself innocent of any knowledge of secret +treaties during the war, could be naïve enough to believe that the +promise to return complete sovereignty retaining _only_ economic +rights is a satisfactory solution. It threw fresh light upon the +contention that at most and at worst Japan had only taken over German +rights, and that since we had acquiesced in the latter's arrogations +we had no call to make a fuss about Japan. It revealed the hollowness +of the claim that pro-Chinese propaganda had wilfully misled Americans +into confusing the few hundred square miles around the port of +Tsing-tao with the Province of Shantung with its thirty millions of +Chinese population. + +As for the comparison of Germany and Japan one might suppose that the +objects for which America nominally entered the war had made, in any +case, a difference. But aside from this consideration, the Germans +exclusively employed Chinese in the railway shops and for all the +minor positions on the railway itself. The railway guards (the +difference between police and soldiers is nominal in China) were all +Chinese, the Germans merely training them. As soon as Japan invaded +Shantung and took over the railway, Chinese workmen and Chinese +military guards were at once dismissed and Japanese imported to take +their places. Tsinan-fu, the inland terminus of the ex-German railway, +is over two hundred miles from Tsing-tao. When the Japanese took over +the German railway business office, they at once built barracks, and +today there are several hundred soldiers still there--where Germany +kept none. Since the armistice even, Japan has erected a powerful +military wireless within the grounds of the garrison, against of +course the unavailing protest of Chinese authorities. No foreigner can +be found who will state that Germany used her ownership of port and +railway to discriminate against other nations. No Chinese can be found +who will claim that this ownership was used to force the Chinese out +of business, or to extend German economic rights beyond those +definitely assigned her by treaty. Common sense should also teach even +the highest paid propagandist in America that there is, from the +standpoint of China, an immense distinction between a national menace +located half way around the globe, and one within two days' sail over +an inland sea absolutely controlled by a foreign navy, especially as +the remote nation has no other foothold and the nearby one already +dominates additional territory of enormous strategic and economic +value--namely, Manchuria. + +These facts bear upon the shadowy distinction between the Tsing-tao +and the Shantung claim, as well as upon the solid distinction between +German and Japanese occupancy. If there still seemed to be a thin wall +between Japanese possession of the port of Tsing-tao and usurpation of +Shantung, it was enough to stop off the train in Tsinan-fu to see the +wall crumble. For the Japanese wireless and the barracks of the army +of occupation are the first things that greet your eyes. Within a few +hundred feet of the railway that connects Shanghai, via the important +center of Tientsin, with the capital, Peking, you see Japanese +soldiers on the nominally Chinese street, guarding their barracks. +Then you learn that if you travel upon the ex-German railway towards +Tsing-tao, you are ordered to show your passport as if you were +entering a foreign country. And as you travel along the road +(remembering that you are over two hundred miles from Tsing-tao) you +find Japanese soldiers at every station, and several garrisons and +barracks at important towns on the line. Then you realize that at the +shortest possible notice, Japan could cut all communications between +southern China (together with the rich Yangste region) and the +capital, and with the aid of the Southern Manchurian Railway at the +north of the capital, hold the entire coast and descend at its good +pleasure upon Peking. + +You are then prepared to learn from eye-witnesses that when Japan made +its Twenty-one Demands upon China, machine guns were actually in +position at strategic points throughout Shantung, with trenches dug +and sandbags placed. You know that the Japanese liberal spoke the +truth, who told you, after a visit to China and his return to protest +against the action of his government, that the Japanese already had +such a military hold upon China that they could control the country +within a week, after a minimum of fighting, if war should arise. You +also realize the efficiency of official control of information and +domestic propaganda as you recall that he also told you that these +things were true at the time of his visit, under the Terauchi cabinet, +but had been completely reversed by the present Hara ministry. For I +have yet to find a single foreigner or Chinese who is conscious of any +difference of policy, save as the end of the war has forced the +necessity of caution, since other nations can now look China-wards as +they could not during the war. + +An American can get an idea of the realities of the present situation +if he imagines a foreign garrison and military wireless in Wilmington, +with a railway from that point to a fortified sea-port controlled by +the foreign power, at which the foreign nation can land, without +resistance, troops as fast as they can be transported, and with bases +of supply, munitions, food, uniforms, etc., already located at +Wilmington, at the sea-port and several places along the line. Reverse +the directions from south to north, and Wilmington will stand for +Tsinan-fu, Shanghai for New York, Nanking for Philadelphia with Peking +standing for the seat of government at Washington, and Tientsin for +Baltimore. Suppose in addition that the Pennsylvania road is the sole +means of communication between Washington and the chief commercial and +industrial centers, and you have the framework of the Shantung picture +as it presents itself daily to the inhabitants of China. Upon second +thought, however, the parallel is not quite accurate. You have to add +that the same foreign nation controls also all coast communications +from, say, Raleigh southwards, with railway lines both to the nearby +coast and to New Orleans. For (still reversing directions) this +corresponds to the position of Imperial Japan in Manchuria with its +railways to Dairen and through Korea to a port twelve hours sail from +a great military center in Japan proper. These are not remote +possibilities nor vague prognostications. They are accomplished facts. + +Yet the facts give _only_ the framework of the picture. What is +actually going on within Shantung? One of the demands of the +"postponed" group of the Twenty-one Demands was that Japan should +supply military and police advisers to China. They are not so much +postponed but that Japan enforced specific concessions from China +during the war by diplomatic threats to reintroduce their discussion, +or so postponed that Japanese advisers are not already installed in +the police headquarters of the city of Tsinan, the capital city of +Shantung of three hundred thousand population where the Provincial +Assembly meets and all the Provincial officials reside. Within recent +months the Japanese consul has taken a company of armed soldiers with +him when he visited the Provincial Governor to make certain demands +upon him, the visit being punctuated by an ostentatious surrounding of +the Governor's yamen by these troops. Within the past few weeks, two +hundred cavalry came to Tsinan and remained there while Japanese +officials demanded of the Governor drastic measures to suppress the +boycott, while it was threatened to send Japanese troops to police the +foreign settlement if the demand was not heeded. + +A former consul was indiscreet enough to put into writing that if the +Chinese Governor did not stop the boycott and the students' movement +by force if need be, he would take matters into his own hands. The +chief tangible charge he brought against the Chinese as a basis of his +demand for "protection" was that Chinese store-keepers actually +refused to accept Japanese money in payment for goods, not ordinary +Japanese money at that, but the military notes with which, so as to +save drain upon the bullion reserves, the army of occupation is paid. +And all this, be it remembered, is more than two hundred miles from +Tsing-tao and from eight to twelve months after the armistice. Today's +paper reports a visit of Japanese to the Governor to inform him that +unless he should prevent a private theatrical performance from being +given in Tsinan by the students, they would send their own forces into +the settlement to protect themselves. And the utmost they might need +protection from, was that the students were to give some plays +designed to foster the boycott! + +Japanese troops overran the Province before they made any serious +attempt to capture Tsing-tao. It is only a slight exaggeration to say +that they "took" the Chinese Tsinan before they took the German +Tsing-tao. Propaganda in America has justified this act on the ground +that a German railway to the rear of Japanese forces would have been a +menace. As there were no troops but only legal and diplomatic papers +with which to attack the Japanese, it is a fair inference that the +"menace" was located in Versailles rather than in Shantung, and +concerned the danger of Chinese control of their own territory. +Chinese have been arrested by Japanese gendarmes in Tsinan and +subjected to a torturing third degree of the kind that Korea has made +sickeningly familiar. The Japanese claim that the injuries were +received while the men were resisting arrest. Considering that there +was no more legal ground for arrest than there would be if Japanese +police arrested Americans in New York, almost anybody but the pacifist +Chinese certainly would have resisted. But official hospital reports +testify to bayonet wounds and the marks of flogging. In the interior +where the Japanese had been disconcerted by the student propaganda +they raided a High School, seized a school boy at random, and took him +to a distant point and kept him locked up several days. When the +Japanese consul at Tsinan was visited by Chinese officials in protest +against these illegal arrests, the consul disclaimed all jurisdiction. +The matter, he said, was wholly in the hands of the military +authorities in Tsing-tao. His disclaimer was emphasized by the fact +that some of the kidnapped Chinese were taken to Tsing-tao for +"trial." + +The matter of economic rights in relation to political domination will +be discussed later in this article. It is no pleasure for one with +many warm friends in Japan, who has a great admiration for the +Japanese people as distinct from the ruling military and bureaucratic +class, to report such facts as have been stated. One might almost say, +one might positively say from the standpoint of Japan itself, that the +worst thing that can be charged against the policy of Japan in China +for the last six years is its immeasurable stupidity. No nation has +ever misjudged the national psychology of another people as Japan has +that of China. The alienation of China is widespread, deep, bitter. +Even the most pessimistic of the Chinese who think that China is to +undergo a complete economic and political domination by Japan do not +think it can last, even without outside intervention, more than half a +century. + +Today, at the beginning of a new year, (1920) the boycott is much more +complete and efficient than in the most tense days of last summer. +Unfortunately, the Japanese policy seems to be under a truly Greek +fate which drives it on. Concessions that would have produced a +revulsion of feeling in favor of Japan a year ago will now merely +salve the surface of the wound. What would have been welcomed even +eight months ago would now be received with contempt. There is but one +way in which Japan can now restore herself. It is nothing less than +complete withdrawal from Shantung, with possibly a strictly commercial +concession at Tsing-tao and a real, not a Manchurian, Open Door. + +According to the Japanese-owned newspapers published in Tsinan, the +Japanese military commander in Tsing-tao recently made a speech to +visiting journalists from Tokyo in which he said: "The suspicions of +China cannot now be allayed merely by repeating that we have no +territorial ambitions in China. We must attain complete economic +domination of the Far East. But if Chino-Japanese relations do not +improve, some third party will reap the benefit. Japanese residing in +China incur the hatred of the Chinese. For they regard themselves as +the proud citizens of a conquering country. When the Japanese go into +partnership with the Chinese they manage in the greater number of +cases to have the profits accrue to themselves. If friendship between +China and Japan is to depend wholly upon the government it will come +to nothing. Diplomatists, soldiers, merchants, journalists should +repent the past. The change must be complete." But it will not be +complete until the Japanese withdraw from Shantung leaving their +nationals there upon the footing of other foreigners in China. + + +2. + +In discussing the return to China by Japan of a metaphysical +sovereignty while economic rights are retained, I shall not repeat the +details of German treaty rights as to the railway and the mines. The +reader is assumed to be familiar with those facts. The German seizure +was outrageous. It was a flagrant case of Might making Right. As von +Buelow cynically but frankly told the Reichstag, while Germany did not +intend to partition China, she also did not intend to be the passenger +left behind in the station when the train started. Germany had the +excuse of prior European aggressions, and in turn her usurpation was +the precedent for further foreign rape. If judgments are made on a +comparative basis, Japan is entitled to all of the white-washing that +can be derived from the provocations of European imperialistic powers, +including those countries that in domestic policy are democratic. And +every fairminded person will recognize that, leaving China out of the +reckoning, Japan's proximity to China gives her aggressions the color +of self-defence in a way that cannot be urged in behalf of any +European power. + +It is possible to look at European aggressions in, say, Africa as +incidents of a colonization movement. But no foreign policy in Asia +can shelter itself behind any colonization plea. For continental Asia +is, for practical purposes, India and China, representing two of the +oldest civilizations of the globe and presenting two of its densest +populations. If there is any such thing in truth as a philosophy of +history with its own inner and inevitable logic, one may well shudder +to think of what the closing acts of the drama of the intercourse of +the West and East are to be. In any case, and with whatever comfort +may be derived from the fact that the American continents have not +taken part in the aggression and hence may act as a mediator to avert +the final tragedy, residence in China forces upon one the realization +that Asia is, after all, a large figure in the future reckoning of +history. Asia is really here after all. It is not simply a symbol in +western algebraic balances of trade. And in the future, so to speak, +it is going to be even more here, with its awakened national +consciousness of about half the population of the whole globe. + +Let the agreements of France and Great Britain made with Japan during +the war stand for the measure of western consciousness of the reality +of only a small part of Asia, a consciousness generated by the +patriotism of Japan backed by its powerful army and navy. The same +agreement measures western unconsciousness of the reality of that part +of Asia which lies within the confines of China. An even better +measure of western unconsciousness may be found perhaps in such a +trifling incident as this:--An English friend long resident in +Shantung told me of writing indignantly home concerning the British +part in the Shantung settlement. The reply came, complacently stating +that Japanese ships did so much in the war that the Allies could not +properly refuse to recognize Japan's claims. The secret agreements +themselves hardly speak as eloquently for the absence of China from +the average western consciousness. In saying that China and Asia are +to be enormously significant figures in future reckonings, the spectre +of a military Yellow Peril is not meant nor even the more credible +spectre of an industrial Yellow Peril. But Asia has come to +consciousness, and her consciousness of herself will soon be such a +massive and persistent thing that it will force itself upon the +reluctant consciousness of the west, and lie heavily upon its +conscience. And for this fact, China and the western world are +indebted to Japan. + +These remarks are more relevant to a consideration of the relationship +of economic and political rights in Shantung than they perhaps seem. +For a moment's reflection will call to mind that all political foreign +aggression in China has been carried out for commercial and financial +ends, and usually upon some economic pretext. As to the immediate part +played by Japan in bringing about a consciousness which will from the +present time completely change the relations of the western powers to +China, let one little story testify. Some representatives of an +English missionary board were making a tour of inspection through +China. They went into an interior town in Shantung. They were received +with extraordinary cordiality by the entire population. Some time +afterwards some of their accompanying friends returned to the village +and were received with equally surprising coldness. It came out upon +inquiry that the inhabitants had first been moved by the rumor that +these people were sent by the British government to secure the removal +of the Japanese. Later they were moved by indignation that they had +been disappointed. + +It takes no forcing to see a symbol in this incident. Part of it +stands for the almost incredible ignorance which has rendered China so +impotent nationally speaking. The other part of it stands for the new +spirit which has been aroused even among the common people in remote +districts. Those who fear, or who pretend to fear, a new Boxer +movement, or a definite general anti-foreign movement, are, I think, +mistaken. The new consciousness goes much deeper. Foreign policies +that fail to take it into account and that think that relations with +China can be conducted upon the old basis will find this new +consciousness obtruding in the most unexpected and perplexing ways. + +One might fairly say, still speaking comparatively, that it is part of +the bad luck of Japan that her proximity to China, and the opportunity +the war gave her to outdo the aggressions of European powers, have +made her the first victim of this disconcerting change. Whatever the +motives of the American Senators in completely disassociating the +United States from the peace settlement as regards China, their action +is a permanent asset to China, not only in respect to Japan but with +respect to all Chinese foreign relations. Just before our visit to +Tsinan, the Shantung Provincial Assembly had passed a resolution of +thanks to the American Senate. More significant is the fact that they +passed another resolution to be cabled to the English Parliament, +calling attention to the action of the American Senate and inviting +similar action. China in general and Shantung in particular feels the +reinforcement of an external approval. With this duplication, its +national consciousness has as it were solidified. Japan is simply the +first object to be affected. + +The concrete working out of economic rights in Shantung will be +illustrated by a single case which will have to stand as typical. +Po-shan is an interior mining village. The mines were not part of the +German booty; they were Chinese owned. The Germans, whatever their +ulterior aims, had made no attempt at dispossessing the Chinese. The +mines, however, are at the end of a branch line of the new Japanese +owned railway--owned by the government, not by a private corporation, +and guarded by Japanese soldiers. Of the forty mines, the Japanese +have worked their way, in only four years, into all but four. +Different methods are used. The simplest is, of course, discrimination +in the use of the railway for shipping. Downright refusal to furnish +cars while competitors who accepted Japanese partners got them, is one +method. Another more elaborate method is to send but one car when a +large number is asked for, and then when it is too late to use cars, +send the whole number asked for or even more, and then charge a large +sum for demurrage in spite of the fact the mine no longer wants them +or has cancelled the order. Redress there is none. + +Tsinan has no special foreign concessions. It is, however, a "treaty +port" where nationals of all friendly powers can do business. But +Po-shan is not even a treaty port. Legally speaking no foreigners can +lease land or carry on any business there. Yet the Japanese have +forced a settlement as large in area as the entire foreign settlement +in the much larger town of Tsinan. A Chinese refused to lease land +where the Japanese wished to relocate their railway station. Nothing +happened to him directly. But merchants could not get shipping space, +or receive goods by rail. Some of them were beaten up by thugs. After +a time, they used their influence with their compatriot to lease his +land. Immediately the persecutions ceased. Not all the land has been +secured by threats or coercion; some has been leased directly by +Chinese moved by high prices, in spite of the absence of any legal +sanction. In addition, the Japanese have obtained control of the +electric light works and some pottery factories, etc. + +Now even admitting that this is typical of the methods by which the +Japanese plant themselves, a natural American reaction would be to say +that, after all, the country is built up industrially by these +enterprises, and that though the rights of some individuals may have +been violated, there is nothing to make a national, much less an +international fuss about. More or less unconsciously we translate +foreign incidents into terms of our own experience and environment, +and thus miss the entire point. Since America was largely developed by +foreign capital to our own economic benefit and without political +encroachments, we lazily suppose some such separation of the economic +and political to be possible in China. But it must be remembered that +China is not an open country. Foreigners can lease land, carry on +business, and manufacture only in accord with express treaty +agreements. There are no such agreements in the cases typified by the +Po-shan incident. We may profoundly disagree with the closed economic +policy of China, or we may believe that under existing circumstances +it represents the part of prudence for her. That makes no difference. +_Given the frequent occurrence of such economic invasions, with the +backing of soldiers of the Imperial Army, with the overt aid of the +Imperial Railway, and with the refusal of Imperial officials to +intervene, there is clear evidence of the attitude and intention of +the Japanese government in Shantung._ + +Because the population of Shantung is directly confronted with an +immense amount of just such evidence, it cannot take seriously the +professions of vague diplomatic utterances. What foreign nation is +going to intervene to enforce Chinese rights in such a case as +Po-shan? Which one is going effectively to call the attention of Japan +to such evidences of its failure to carry out its promise? Yet the +accumulation of precisely such seemingly petty incidents, and not any +single dramatic great wrong, will secure Japan's economic and +political domination of Shantung. It is for this reason that +foreigners resident in Shantung, no matter in what part, say that they +see no sign whatever that Japan is going to get out; that, on the +contrary, everything points to a determination to consolidate her +position. How long ago was the Portsmouth treaty signed, and what were +its nominal pledges about evacuation of Manchurian territory? + +Not a month will pass without something happening which will give a +pretext for delay, and for making the surrender of Shantung +conditional upon this, that and the other thing. Meantime the +penetration of Shantung by means of railway discrimination, railway +military guards, continual nibblings here and there, will be going on. +It would make the chapter too long to speak of the part played by +manipulation of finance in achieving this process of attrition of +sovereignty. Two incidents must suffice. During the war, Japanese +traders with the connivance of their government gathered up immense +amounts of copper cash from Shantung and shipped it to Japan against +the protests of the Chinese government. What does sovereignty amount +to when a country cannot control even its own currency system? In +Manchuria the Japanese have forced the introduction of several hundred +million dollars of paper currency, nominally, of course, based on a +gold reserve. These notes are redeemable, however, only in Japan +proper. And there is a law in Japan forbidding the exportation of +gold. And there you are. + +Japan itself has recently afforded an object lesson in the actual +connection of economic and political rights in China. It is so +beautifully complete a demonstration that it was surely unconscious. +Within the last two weeks, Mr. Obata, the Japanese minister in Peking, +has waited upon the government with a memorandum saying that the +Foochow incident was the culminating result of the boycott; that if +the boycott continues, a series of such incidents is to be +apprehended, saying that the situation has become "intolerable" for +Japan, and disavowing all responsibility for further consequences +unless the government makes a serious effort to stop the boycott. +Japan then immediately makes certain specific demands. China must stop +the circulation of handbills, the holding of meetings to urge the +boycott, the destruction of Japanese goods that have become Chinese +property--none have been destroyed that are Japanese owned. Volumes +could not say more as to the real conception of Japan of the +connection between the economic and the political relations of the two +countries. Surely the pale ghost of "Sovereignty" smiled ironically as +he read this official note. President Wilson after having made in the +case of Shantung a sharp and complete separation of economic and +political rights, also said that a nation boycotted is within sight of +surrender. Disassociation of words from acts has gone so far in his +case that he will hardly be able to see the meaning of Mr. Obata's +communication. The American sense of humor and fair-play may however +be counted upon to get its point. + +January, 1920. + + + + +III + +Hinterlands in China + + +One of the two Presidents of China--it is unnecessary to specify +which--recently stated that a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance +meant a partition of China. In this division, Japan would take the +north and Great Britain the south. Probably the remark was not meant +to be taken literally in the sense of formal conquest or annexation, +but rather symbolically with reference to the tendency of policies and +events. Even so, the statement will appear exaggerated or wild to +persons outside of China, who either believe that the Open Door policy +is now irrevocably established or that Japan is the only foreign Power +which China has to fear. But a recent visit to the south revealed that +in that section, especially in Canton, the British occupy much the +same position of suspicion and dread which is held by the Japanese in +the north. + +Upon the negative side, the Japanese menace is negligible in the +province of Kwantung, in which Canton is situated. There are said to +be more Americans in Canton than Japanese, and the American colony is +not extensive. Upon the positive side the history of the Cassell +collieries contract is instructive. It illustrates the cause of the +popular attitude toward the British, and quite possibly explains the +bitterness in the remark quoted. The contract is noteworthy from +whatever standpoint it is viewed, whether that of time, of the +conditions it contains or of the circumstances which accompany it. + +Premising that the contract delivers to a British company a monopoly +of the rich coal deposits of the province for a period of ninety years +and--quite incidentally of course--the right to use all means of +transportation, water or rail, wharves and ports now in existence, and +also to "construct, manage, superintend and work other roads, railways +waterways as may be deemed advisable"--which reads like a monopoly of +all further transportation facilities of the province--first take up +the time of the making of the contract. It was drawn in April, 1920 +and confirmed a few months later. It was made, of course, with the +authorities of the Kwantung province, subject to confirmation at +Peking. During this period, Kwantung province was governed by military +carpet-baggers from the neighboring province of Kwangsei, which was +practically alone of the southern provinces allied with the northern +government, then under the control of the Anfu party. It was matter of +common knowledge that the people of Canton and of the province were +bitterly hostile to this outside control and submitted to it only +because of military coercion. Civil strife for the expulsion of the +outsiders was already going on, continually gaining headway, and a few +months later the Kwangsei troops were defeated and expelled from the +province by the forces of General Chen, now the civil governor of +Kwantung, who received a triumphal ovation upon his entrance into +Canton. At this time the present native government was established, a +change which made possible the return of Sun Yat Sen and his followers +from their exile in Shanghai. It is evident, then, that the collieries +contract giving away the natural resources of the people of the +province, was knowingly made by a British company with a government +which no more represented the people of the province than the military +government of Germany represented the people of Belgium during the +war. + +As to the terms of the contract, the statement that it gave the +British company a monopoly of all the coal mines in the province, was +not literally accurate. Verbally, twenty-two districts are enumerated. +But these are the districts along the lines of the only railways in +the province and the only ones soon to be built, including the as yet +uncompleted Hankow-Canton railway. Possibly this fact accounts for the +anxiety of the British partners in the Consortium that the completion +of this line be the first undertaking financed by the Consortium. The +document also includes what is perhaps a novelty in legal documents +having such a momentous economic importance, namely, the words "etc." +after the districts enumerated by name. + +For this concession, the British syndicate agreed to pay the +provincial government the sum of $1,000,000 (silver of course). This +million dollars is to bear six per cent interest to the company, and +capital and interest are to be paid back to the company by the +provincial government out of the dividends (if any) it is to receive. +The nature of these "dividends" is set forth in an article which +should receive the careful attention of promoters elsewhere as a model +of the possibilities of exploiting contracts. The ten million capital +is divided equally into "A" shares and "B" shares. The "A" shares go +unreservedly to the directors of the company, and three millions of +the "B" shares are to be allotted by the directors of the company at +their discretion. The other two million are again divided into equal +portions, one portion representing the sum advanced by the company to +the province and to be paid back as just specified, while the other +million--one-tenth of the capitalization--is to be a trust fund the +dividends of which are to go for the "benefit of the poor people of +the province" and for an educational fund for the province. But before +any dividends are paid upon the "B" shares, eight per cent dividends +are to be paid upon the "A" shares and a _dollar a ton royalty_ upon +all coal mined. Those having any familiarity with the coal business +with its usual royalty of about ten cents a ton can easily calculate +the splendid prospects of the "poor people" and the schools, prospects +which represent the total return to the provinces of a concession of +untold worth. The contract also guarantees to the company the +assistance of the provincial government in expropriating the owners of +all coal mines which have been granted to other companies but not yet +worked. These technical details make dry reading, but they throw light +upon the spirit with which the British company undertook its predatory +negotiations with a government renounced by the people it professed to +govern. In comparison with the relatively crude methods of Japan in +Shantung, they show the advantages of wide business experience. + +As for the circumstances and context which give added menace to the +contract, the following facts are significant. Hong Kong, a British +crown colony, lies directly opposite the river upon which Canton is +situated. It is the port of export and import for the vast districts +served by the mines and railways of the province. It is unnecessary to +point out the hold upon all economic development which is given +through a monopolistic control of coal. It is hardly too much to say +that the enforcement of the contract would enable British interests in +Hong Kong to control the entire industrial development of the most +flourishing of the provinces of China. It would be a comparatively +easy and inexpensive matter to provide the main land with a first +class modern harbor and port near Canton. But such a port would tend +to reduce the assets of Hong Kong to the possession of the most +beautiful scenery in the world. There is already fear that a new +harbor will be built. Many persons think that the concession of +building such railways etc., "as are deemed advisable for the purpose +of the business of the company and to improve those now existing" is +the object of the contract, even more than the coal monopoly. For the +British already own a considerable part of the mainland, including +part of the railway connecting the littoral with Canton. By building a +cross-cut from the British owned portion of this railway to the +Hankow-Canton line, the latter would become virtually the Hankow-Hong +Kong line, and Canton would be a way-station. With the advantages thus +secured, the project for building a new port could be indefinitely +blocked. + +During the period in which the contract was being secured, a congress +of British Chambers of Commerce was held in Shanghai. Resolutions were +passed in favor of abolishing henceforth the whole principle of +special nationalistic concessions, and of cooperating with the Chinese +for the upbuilding of China. At the close of the meeting the Chairman +announced that a new era for China had finally dawned. All of the +British newspapers in China lauded the wise action of the Chambers. At +the same time, Mr. Lamont was in Peking, and was setting forth that +the object of the Consortium was the abolition of further concessions, +and the uniting of the financial resources of the banks in the +Consortium for the economic development of China itself. By an +ironical coincidence, the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank, which is the +financial power behind the contract and the new company, is the +leading British partner in the Consortium. It is difficult to see how +the British can henceforth accuse the Japanese of bad faith if any of +the banking interests of that country should enter upon independent +negotiations with any government in China. + +By the time the scene of action was transferred to Peking in order to +secure the confirmation of the central government, the Anfu regime was +no more, and as yet no confirmation has been secured. The new +government at Canton has declined to recognize the contract as having +any validity. An official of the Hong Kong government has told an +official of the Canton government that the Hong Kong government stands +behind the enforcement of the contract, and that Kwantung province is +a British Hinterland. Within the last few weeks the Governor of Hong +Kong and a leading Chinese banker of Hong Kong who is a British +subject have visited Peking. Rumors were rife in the south as to the +object of the visit. British sources published the report that one +object was to return Weihaiwei to China--in case Peking agreed to turn +over more of the Kwantung mainland to Hong Kong as a quid pro quo. +Chinese opinion in the south was that one main object was to secure +the Peking confirmation of the Cassell contract, in which case +$900,000 more would be forthcoming, $100,000 having been paid down +when the contract was signed with the provincial government. Peking +does not recognize the present Canton government but regards it as an +outlaw. The crowd that signed the contract is still in control of the +neighboring province of Kwangsei and they are relied upon by the north +to effect the military subjugation of the seceded province. Fighting +has already, indeed, begun, but the Kwangsei militarists are badly in +need of money; if Peking ratifies the contract, a large part of the +funds will be paid over to them--all that isn't lost by the wayside to +the northern militarists.[1] Meantime British news agencies keep up a +constant circulation of reports tending to discredit the Kwantung +government, although all impartial observers on the spot regard it as +altogether the most promising one in China. + + [1] Since the text was written, the newspapers have stated + that the Peking Government has officially refused to + validate the agreement. + +These considerations not only throw light on some of the difficulties +of the functioning of the Consortium, but they give an indispensable +background for judging the actual effect of the renewal of the +Anglo-Japanese alliance. By force of circumstances each government, +even against its own wish, will be compelled to wink at the predatory +policies of the other; and the tendency will be to create a division +of spheres of influence between the north and south in order to avoid +more direct conflicts. The English liberals who stand for the renewal +of the alliance on the ground that it will enable England to exercise +a check on Japanese policies, are more naïve than was Mr. Wilson with +his belief in the separation of the economic and political control of +Shantung. + +It cannot be too often repeated that the real point of friction +between the United States and Japan is not in California but in China. +It is silly--unless it is calculated--for English authorities to keep +repeating that under no circumstances does the alliance mean that +Great Britain would support Japan in a war with the United States. The +day the alliance is renewed, the hands of the militarists in Japan +will be strengthened and the hands of the liberals--already weak +enough--be still further weakened. In consequence, all the sources of +friction in China between the United States and Japan will be +intensified. I do not believe in the predicted war. But should it +come, the first act of Japan--so everyone in China believes--will be +to seize the ports of northern China and its railways in order to make +sure of an uninterrupted supply of food and raw materials. The act +would be justified as necessary to national existence. Great Britain +in alliance with Japan would be in no position to protest in anything +but the most perfunctory way. The guarantee of such abstinence would +be for Japan the next best thing to open naval and financial support. +Without the guarantee they would not dare the seizure of Chinese +ports. In recent years diplomatists have shown themselves capable of +unlimited stupidity. But it is not possible that the men in the +British Foreign Office are not aware of these elementary facts. If +they renew the alliance they knowingly take the responsibility for the +consequences. + +May 24, 1921. + + + + +IV + +A Political Upheaval in China + + +Even in America we have heard of one Chinese revolution, that which +thrust the Manchu dynasty from the throne. The visitor in China gets +used to casual references to the second revolution, that which +frustrated Yuan Shi Kai's aspirations to be emperor, and the third, +the defeat in 1917 of the abortive attempt to put the Manchu boy +emperor back into power. And within the last few weeks the (September +1920) fourth upheaval has taken place. It may not be dignified by the +name of the fourth revolution, for the head of the state has not been +changed by it. But as a manifestation of the forces that shape Chinese +political events, for evil and for good, perhaps this last disturbance +surpasses the last two "revolutions" in significance. + +Chinese politics in detail are highly complicated, a mess of +personalities and factions whose oscillations no one can follow who +does not know a multitude of personal, family and provincial +histories. But occasionally something happens which simplifies the +tangle. Definite outlines frame themselves out of the swirling +criss-cross of strife, intrigue and ambition. So, at present, the +complete collapse of the Anfu clique which owned the central +government for two years marks the end of that union of internal +militarism and Japanese foreign influence which was, for China, the +most marked fruit of the war. When China entered the war a "War +Participation" army was formed. It never participated; probably it was +never meant to. But its formation threw power wholly into the hands of +the military clique, as against the civilian constitutionalists. And +in return for concessions, secret agreements relating to Manchuria, +Shantung, new railways, etc., Japan supplied money, munitions, +instructors for the army and a benevolent supervision of foreign and +domestic politics. The war came to an unexpected and untimely end, but +by this time the offspring of the marriage of the militarism of Yuan +Shi Kai and Japanese money and influence was a lusty youth. Bolshevism +was induced to take the place of Germany as a menace requiring the +keeping up of the army, and loans and teachers. Mongolia was persuaded +to cut her strenuous ties with Russia, to renounce her independence +and come again under Chinese sovereignty. + +The army and its Japanese support and instruction was, accordingly, +continued. In place of the "War Participation" army appeared the +"Frontier Defense" army. Marshal Tuan, the head of the military party, +remained the nominal political power behind the presidential chair, +and General Hsu (commonly known as little Hsu, in distinction from old +Hsu, the president) was the energetic manager of the Mongolian +adventure which, by a happy coincidence, required a bank, land +development companies and railway schemes, as well as an army. About +this military centre as a nucleus gathered the vultures who fed on the +carrion. This flock took the name of the Anfu Club. It did not control +the entire cabinet, but to it belonged the Minister of Justice, who +manipulated the police and the courts, persecuted the students, +suppressed liberal journals and imprisoned inconvenient critics. And +the Club owned the ministers of finance and communications, the two +cabinet places that dispense revenues, give out jobs and make loans. +It also regulated the distribution of intelligence by mail and +telegraph. The reign of corruption and despotic inefficiency, tempered +only by the student revolt, set in. In two years the Anfu Club got +away with two hundred millions of public funds directly, to say +nothing of what was wasted by incompetency and upon the army. The +Allies had set out to get China into the war. They succeeded in +getting Japan into control of Peking and getting China, politically +speaking, into a seemingly hopeless state of corruption and confusion. + +The militaristic or Pei-Yang party was, however, divided into two +factions, each called after a province. The Anwhei party gathered +about little Hsu and was almost identical with the Anfus. The Chili +faction had been obliged, so far as Peking was concerned, to content +itself with such leavings as the Anfu Club tossed to it. Apparently it +was hopelessly weaker than its rival, although Tuan, who was +personally honest and above financial scandal, was supported by both +factions and was the head of both. About three months ago there were a +few signs that, while the Anfu Club had been entrenching itself in +Peking, the rival faction had been quietly establishing itself in the +provinces. A league of Eight Tuchuns (military governors of the +provinces) came to the assistance of the president against some +unusually strong pressure from the Anfu Club. In spite of the fact +that the military governor of the three Manchurian provinces, Chang +Tso Lin, popularly known as the Emperor of Manchuria, lined up with +this league, practically nobody expected anything except some +manoeuvering to get a larger share of the spoils. + +But late in June the president invited Chang Tso Lin to Peking. The +latter saw Tuan, told him that he was surrounded by evil advisers, +demanded that he cut loose from little Hsu and the Anfu Club, and +declared open war upon little Hsu--the two had long and notoriously +been bitter enemies. Even then people had great difficulty in +believing that anything would happen except another Chinese +compromise. The president was known to be sympathetic upon the whole +with the Chili faction, but the president, if not a typical Chinese, +is at least typical of a certain kind of Chinese mandarin, +non-resistant, compromising, conciliating, procrastinating, covering +up, evading issues, face-saving. But finally something happened. A +mandate was issued dismissing little Hsu from office, military and +civil, dissolving the frontier defense corps as such, and bringing it +under the control of the Ministry of War (usually armies in China +belong to some general or Tuchun, not to the country). For almost +forty-eight hours it was thought that Tuan had consented to sacrifice +little Hsu and that the latter would submit at least temporarily. Then +with equally sensational abruptness Tuan brought pressure to bear on +the president. The latter was appointed head of a national defense +army, and rewards were issued for the heads of the chiefs of the Chili +faction, nothing, however, being said about Chang Tso Lin, who had +meanwhile returned to Mukden and who still professed allegiance to +Tuan. Troops were mobilized; there was a rush of officials and of the +wealthy to the concessions of Tientsin and to the hotels of the +legation quarter. + +This sketch is not meant as history, but simply as an indication of +the forces at work. Hence it is enough to say that two weeks after +Tuan and little Hsu had intimidated the president and proclaimed +themselves the saviors of the Republic, they were in hiding, their +enemies of the Chili party were in complete control of Peking, and +rewards from fifty thousand dollars down were offered for the arrest +of little Hsu, the ex-ministers of justice, finance and +communications, and other leaders of the Anfu Club. The political +turnover was as complete as it was sensational. The seemingly +impregnable masters of China were impotent fugitives. The carefully +built up Anfu Club, with its military, financial and foreign support, +had crumbled and fallen. No country at any time has ever seen a +political upheaval more sudden and more thoroughgoing. It was not so +much a defeat as a dissolution like that of death, a total +disappearance, an evaporation. + +Corruption had worked inward, as it has a way of doing. +Japanese-bought munitions would not explode; quartermasters vanished +with the funds with which stores were to be bought; troops went +without anything to eat for two or three days; large numbers, +including the larger part of one division, went over to the enemy en +masse; those who did not desert had no heart for fighting and ran away +or surrendered on the slightest provocation, saying they were willing +to fight for their country but saw no reason why they should fight for +a faction, especially a faction that had been selling the country to a +foreign nation. In the manner of the defeat of the Anfu clique at the +height of its supremacy, rather than in the mere fact of its defeat, +lies the credit side of the Chinese political balance sheet. It is a +striking exhibition of the oldest and best faith of the Chinese--the +power of moral considerations. Public opinion, even that of the coolie +on the street, was wholly against the Anfu party. It went down not so +much because of the strength of the other side as because of its own +rottenness. + +So far the results are to all appearances negative. The most marked is +the disappearance of Japanese prestige. As one of the leading men in +the War Office said: "For over a year now the people have been +strongly opposed to the Japanese government on account of Shantung. +But now even the generals do not care for Japan any more." It is +hardly logical to take the easy collapse of the Japanese-supported +Anfu party as a proof of the weakness of Japan, but prestige is always +a matter of feeling rather than of logic. Many who were intimidated to +the point of hypnotism by the idea of the irresistible power of Japan +are now freely laughing at the inefficiency of Japanese leadership. It +would not be safe to predict that Japan will not come back as a force +to be reckoned with in the internal as well as external politics of +China, but it is safe to say that never again will Japan figure as +superman to China. And such a negation is after all a positive result. + +And so in its way is the overthrow of the Anwhei faction of the +militarist party. The Chinese liberals do not feel very optimistic +about the immediate outcome. They have mostly given up the idea that +the country can be reformed by political means. They are sceptical +about the possibility of reforming even politics until a new +generation comes on the scene. They are now putting their faith in +education and in social changes which will take some years to +consummate themselves visibly. The self-styled southern republican +constitutional party has not shown itself in much better light than +the northern militarist party. In fact, its old leader Sun Yat Sen now +cuts one of the most ridiculous figures in China, as shortly before +this upheaval he had definitely aligned himself with Tuan and little +Hsu.[2] + + [2] This was written of course several months before Sun Yat + Sen was reinstated in control of Canton by the successful + revolt of his local adherents against the southern + militarists who had usurped power and driven out Sun Yat Sen + and his followers. But up to the time when I left China, in + July of this year, it was true that the liberals of northern + and central China who were bitterly opposed to the Peking + Government, did not look to the Southern Government with + much hope. The common attitude was a "plague upon both of + your houses" and a desire for a new start. The conflict + between North and South looms much larger in the United + States than it did in China. + +This does not mean, however, that democratic opinion thinks nothing +has been gained. The demonstration of the inherent weakness of corrupt +militarism will itself prevent the development of any militarism as +complete as that of the Anfus. As one Chinese gentleman said to me: +"When Yuan Shi Kai was overthrown, the tiger killed the lion. Now a +snake has killed the tiger. No matter how vicious the snake may +become, some smaller animal will be able to kill him, and his life +will be shorter than that of either lion or tiger." In short, each +successive upheaval brings nearer the day when civilian supremacy will +be established. This result will be achieved partly because of the +repeated demonstrations of the uncongeniality of military despotism to +the Chinese spirit, and partly because with every passing year +education will have done its work. Suppressed liberal papers are +coming to life, while over twenty Anfu subsidized newspapers and two +subsidized news agencies have gone out of being. The soldiers, +including many officers in the Anwhei army, clearly show the effects +of student propaganda. And it is worth while to note down the name of +one of the leaders on the victorious side, the only one whose troops +did any particular fighting, and that against great odds in numbers. +The name is Wu Pei Fu. He at least has not fought for the Chili +faction against the Anwhei faction. He has proclaimed from the first +that he was fighting to rid the country of military control of civil +government, and against traitors who would sell their country to +foreigners. He has come out strongly for a new popular assembly, to +form a new constitution and to unite the country. And although Chang +Tso Lin has remarked that Wu Pei Fu as a military subordinate could +not be expected to intervene in politics, he has not as yet found it +convenient to oppose the demand for a popular assembly. Meanwhile the +liberals are organizing their forces, hardly expecting to win a +victory, but resolved, win or lose, to take advantage of the +opportunity to carry further the education of the Chinese people in +the meaning of democracy. + +August, 1920. + + + + +V + +Divided China + + +1. + +In January 1920 the Peking government issued an edict proclaiming the +unification of China. On May 5th Sun Yat Sen was formally inaugurated +in Canton as president of all China. Thus China has within six months +been twice unified, once from the northern standpoint and once from +the southern. Each act of "unification" is in fact a symbol of the +division of China, a division expressing differences of language, +temperament, history, and political policy as well as of geography, +persons and factions. This division has been one of the outstanding +facts of Chinese history since the overthrow of the Manchus ten years +ago and it has manifested itself in intermittent civil war. Yet there +are two other statements which are equally true, although they flatly +contradict each other and the one just made. One statement is that so +far as the people of China are concerned there is no real division on +geographical lines, but only the common division occurring everywhere +between conservatives and progressives. The other is that instead of +two divisions in China, there are at least five, two parties in both +the north and south, and another in the central or Yangtse region,[3] +each one of the five splitting up again more or less on factional and +provincial lines. And so far as the future is concerned, probably this +last statement is the most significant of the three. That all three +statements are true is what makes Chinese politics so difficult to +understand even in their larger features. + + [3] Since the writing of this and the former chapter there + are some signs that Wu Pei Fu wants to set up in control of + the middle districts. + +By the good fortune of circumstances we were in Canton when the +inauguration occurred. Peking and Canton are a long way apart in more +than distance. There is little exchange of actual news between the two +places; what filters through into either city and gets published +consists mostly of rumors tending to discredit the other city. In +Canton, the monarchy is constantly being restored in Peking; and in +Peking, Canton is Bolshevized at least once a week, while every other +week open war breaks out between the adherents of Sun Yat Sen, and +General Chen Kwang Ming, the civil governor of the province. There is +nothing to give the impression--even in circles which accept the +Peking government only as an evil necessity--that the pretensions of +Sun Yat Sen represent anything more than the desires of a small and +discredited group to get some slight power for themselves at the +expense of national unity. Even in Fukien, the province next north of +Kwantung, one found little but gossip whose effect was to minimize the +importance of the southern government. In foreign circles in the north +as well as in liberal Chinese circles upon the whole, the feeling is +general that bad as the de facto Peking government may be, it +represents the cause of national unity, while the southern government +represents a perpetuation of that division of China which makes her +weak and which offers the standing invitation to foreign intrigue and +aggression. Only occasionally during the last few months has some +returned traveller timidly advanced the opinion that we had the "wrong +dope" on the south, and that they were really trying "to do something +down there." + +Consequently there was little preparation on my part for the spectacle +afforded in Canton during the week of May 5th. This was the only +demonstration I have seen in China during the last two years which +gave any evidence of being a spontaneous popular movement. New Yorkers +are accustomed to crowds, processions, street decorations and +accompanying enthusiasm. I doubt if New York has ever seen a +demonstration which surpassed that of Canton in size, noise, color or +spontaneity--in spite of tropical rains. The country people flocked in +in such masses, that, being unable to find accommodation even in the +river boats, they kept up a parade all night. Guilds and localities +which were not able to get a place in the regular procession organized +minor ones on their own account on the day before and after the +official demonstration. Making all possible allowance for the +intensity of Cantonese local loyalty and the fact that they might be +celebrating a Cantonese affair rather than a principle, the scene was +sufficiently impressive to revise one's preconceived ideas and to make +one try to find out what it is that gives the southern movement its +vitality. + +A demonstration may be popular and still be superficial in +significance. However one found foreigners on the ground--at least +Americans--saying that in the last few months the men in power in +Canton were the only officials in China who were actually doing +something for the people instead of filling their own pockets and +magnifying their personal power. Even the northern newspapers had not +entirely omitted reference to the suppression of licensed gambling. On +the spot one learned that this suppression was not only genuine and +thorough, but that it meant a renunciation of an annual revenue of +nearly ten million dollars on the part of a government whose chief +difficulty is financial, and where--apart from motives of personal +squeeze--it would have been easy to argue that at least temporarily +the end justified the means in retaining this source of revenue. +English papers throughout China have given much praise to the +government of Hong Kong because it has cut down its opium revenue from +eight to four millions annually with the plan for ultimate extinction. +Yet Hong Kong is prosperous, it has not been touched by civil war, and +it only needs revenue for ordinary civil purposes, not as a means of +maintaining its existence in a crisis. + +Under the circumstances, the action of the southern government was +hardly less than heroic. This renunciation is the most sensational act +of the Canton government, but one soon learns that it is the +accompaniment of a considerable number of constructive administrative +undertakings. Among the most notable are attempts to reform the local +magistracies throughout the province, the establishment of municipal +government in Canton--something new in China where local officials are +all centrally appointed and controlled--based upon the American +Commission plan, and directed by graduates of schools of political +science in the United States; plans for introducing local +self-government throughout the province; a scheme for introduction of +universal primary education in Canton to be completed in three steps. + +These reforms are provincial and local. They are part of a general +movement against centralization and toward local autonomy which is +gaining headway all over China, a protest against the appointment of +officials from Peking and the management of local affairs in the +interests of factions--and pocketbooks--whose chief interest in local +affairs is what can be extracted in the way of profit. For the only +analogue of provincial government in China at the present time is the +carpet bag government of the south in the days following our civil +war. These things explain the restiveness of the country, including +central as well as southern provinces, under Peking domination. But +they do not explain the setting up of a new national, or federal +government, with the election of Mr. Sun Yat Sen as its president. To +understand this event it is necessary to go back into history. + +In June, 1917, the parliament in Peking was about to adopt a +constitution. The parliament was controlled by leaders of the old +revolutionary party who had been at loggerheads with Yuan and with the +executive generally. The latter accused them of being obstructionists, +wasting time in discussing and theorizing when the country needed +action. Japan had changed her tactics regarding the participation of +China in the war, and having got her position established through the +Twenty-one Demands, saw a way of controlling Chinese arsenals and +virtually amalgamating the Chinese armies with her own through +supervising China's entrance into the war. The British and French were +pressing desperately for the same end. Parliament was slow to act, and +Tang Shao Yi, Sun Yat Sen and other southern leaders were averse, +since they regarded the war as none of China's business and were upon +the whole more anti-British than anti-German--a fact which partly +accounts for the share of British journals in the present press +propaganda against the Canton government. But what brought matters to +a head was the fact that the constitution which was about to be +adopted eliminated the military governors or tuchuns of the provinces, +and restored the supremacy of civil authority which had been destroyed +by Yuan Shi Kai, in addition to introducing a policy of +decentralization. Coached by members of the so-called progressive +party which claimed to be constitutionalist and which had a +factionalist interest in overthrowing the revolutionaries who +controlled the legislative branch if not the executive, the military +governors demanded that the president suspend parliament and dismiss +the legislators. This demand was more than passively supported by all +the Allied diplomats in Peking with the honorable exception of the +American legation. The president weakly yielded and issued an edict +dispelling parliament, virtually admitting in the document the +illegality of his action. Less than a month afterwards he was a +refugee in the Dutch legation on account of the farce of monarchical +restoration staged by Chang Shun--who at the present time is again +coming to the front in the north as adjutant to the plans of Chang Tso +Lin, the present "strong man" of China. Later, elections were held and +a new parliament elected. This parliament has been functioning as the +legislature of China at Peking and elected the president, Hsu Shi +Chang, the head of the government recognized by the foreign Powers--in +short it is the Chinese government from an international standpoint, +the Peking government from a domestic standpoint. + +The revolutionary members of the old parliament never recognized the +legality of their dispersal, and consequently refused to admit the +legal status of the new parliament, called by them the bogus +parliament, and of the president elected by it, especially as the new +legislative body was not elected according to the rules laid down by +the constitution. Under the lead of some of the old members, the old +parliament, called by its opponents the defunct parliament, has led an +intermittent existence ever since. Claiming to be the sole authentic +constitutional body of China, it finally elected Dr. Sun president of +China and thus prepared the act of the fifth of May, already reported. + +Such is the technical and formal background of the present southern +government. Its attack upon the legality of the Peking government is +doubtless technically justified. But for various reasons its own +positive status is open to equally grave doubts. The terms "bogus" and +"defunct," so freely cast at each other, both seem to an outsider to +be justified. It is less necessary to go into the reasons which appear +to invalidate the position of the southern parliament because of the +belated character of its final action. A protest which waits four +years to assert itself in positive action is confronted not with legal +technicalities but with accomplished facts. In my opinion, legality +for legality, the southern government has a bare shade the better of +the technical argument. But in the face of a government which has +foreign recognition and which has maintained itself after a fashion +for four years, a legal shadow is a precarious political basis. It is +wiser to regard the southern government as a revolutionary government, +which in addition to the prestige of continuing the revolutionary +movement of ten years ago has also a considerable sentimental asset as +a protest of constitutionalism against the military usurpations of the +Peking government. + +It is an open secret that the southern movement has not received the +undivided support of all the forces present in Canton which are +opposed to the northern government. Tang Shao Yi, for example, was +notable for his absence at the time of the inauguration, having found +it convenient to visit the graves of his ancestors at that time. The +provincial governor, General Chen Kwang Ming, was in favor of +confining efforts to the establishment of provincial autonomy and the +encouragement of similar movements in other provinces, looking forward +to an eventual federal, or confederated, government of at least all +the provinces south of the Yangtse. Many of his generals wanted to +postpone action until Kwantung province had made a military alliance +with the generals in the other southwestern provinces, so as to be +able to resist the north should the latter undertake a military +expedition. Others thought the technical legal argument for the new +move was being overworked, and while having no objections to an out +and out revolutionary movement against Peking, thought that the time +for it had not yet come. They are counting on Chang Tso Lin's +attempting a monarchical restoration and think that the popular +revulsion against that move would create the opportune time for such a +movement as has now been prematurely undertaken. However in spite of +reports of open strife freely circulated by British and Peking +government newspapers, most of the opposition elements are now loyally +suppressing their opposition and supporting the government of Sun Yat +Sen. A compromise has been arranged by which the federal government +will confine its attention to foreign affairs, leaving provincial +matters wholly in the hands of Governor Chen and his adherents. There +is still room for friction however, especially as to the control of +revenues, since at present there are hardly enough funds for one +administration, let alone two. + + +2. + +The members of the new southern government are strikingly different in +type from those one meets elsewhere whether in Peking or the +provincial capitals. The latter men are literally mediaeval when they +are not late Roman Empire, though most of them have learned a little +modern patter to hand out to foreigners. The former are educated men, +not only in the school sense and in the sense that they have had some +special training for their jobs, but in the sense that they think the +ideas and speak the language current among progressive folk all over +the world. They welcome inquiry and talk freely of their plans, hopes +and fears. I had the opportunity of meeting all the men who are most +influential in both the local and federal governments; these +conversations did not take the form of interviews for publication, but +I learned that there are at least three angles from which the total +situation is viewed. + +Governor Chen has had no foreign education and speaks no English. He +is distinctively Chinese in his training and outlook. He is a man of +force, capable of drastic methods, straightforward intellectually and +physically, of unquestioned integrity and of almost Spartan life in a +country where official position is largely prized for the luxuries it +makes possible. For example, practically alone among Chinese +provincial officials of the first rank he has no concubines. Not only +this, but he proposed to the provincial assembly a measure to +disenfranchise all persons who have concubines. (The measure failed +because it is said its passage would have deprived the majority of the +assemblymen of their votes.) He is by all odds the most impressive of +all the officials whom I have met in China. If I were to select a man +likely to become a national figure of the first order in the future, +it would be, unhesitatingly, Governor Chen. He can give and also +command loyalty--a fact which in itself makes him almost unique. + +His views in gist are as follows: The problem of problems in China is +that of real unification. Industry and education are held back because +of lack of stability of government, and the better elements in society +seclude themselves from all public effort. The question is how this +unification is to be obtained. In the past it has been tried by force +used by strong individuals. Yuan Shi Kai tried and failed; Feng Kuo +Chang tried and failed; Tuan Chi Jui tried and failed. That method +must be surrendered. China can be unified only by the people +themselves, employing not force but the methods of normal political +evolution. The only way to engage the people in the task is to +decentralize the government. Futile efforts at centralization must be +abandoned. Peking and Canton alike must allow the provinces the +maximum of autonomy; the provincial capitals must give as much +authority as possible to the districts, and the districts to the +communities. Officials must be chosen by and from the local districts +and everything must be done to encourage local initiative. Governor +Chen's chief ambition is to introduce this system into Kwantung +province. He believes that other provinces will follow as soon as the +method has been demonstrated, and that national unity will then be a +pyramid built out of the local blocks. + +With extreme self-government in administrative matters, Governor Chen +will endeavor to enforce a policy of centralized economic control. He +says in effect that the west has developed economic anarchy along with +political control, with the result of capitalistic domination and +class struggle. He wishes to avert this consequence in China by having +government control from the first of all basic raw materials and all +basic industries, mines, transportation, factories for cement, steel, +etc. In this way the provincial authorities hope to secure an equable +industrial development of the province, while at the same time +procuring ample revenues without resorting to heavy taxation. Since +almost all the other governors in China are using their power, in +combination with the exploiting capitalists native and foreign, to +monopolize the natural resources of their provinces for private +profit, it is not surprising that Governor Chen's views are felt to be +a menace to privilege and that he is advertised all over China as a +devout Bolshevist. His views have special point in view of British +efforts to get an economic stranglehold upon the province--efforts +which are dealt with in a prior chapter. + +Another type of views lays chief stress upon the internal political +condition of China. Its adherents say in effect: Why make such a fuss +about having two governments for China, when, in point of fact, China +is torn into dozens of governments? In the north, war is sure to break +out sooner or later between Chang Tso Lin and his rivals. Each +military governor is afraid of his division generals. The brigade +generals intrigue against the division leaders, and even colonels are +doing all they can to further their personal power. The Peking +government is a stuffed sham, taking orders from the military +governors of the provinces, living only on account of jealousies among +these generals, and by the grace of foreign diplomatic support. It is +actually bankrupt, and this actual state will soon be formally +recognized. The thing for us to do is to go ahead, maintain in good +faith the work of the revolution, give this province the best possible +civil administration; then in the inevitable approaching débâcle, the +southern government will be ready to serve as the nucleus of a genuine +reconstruction. Meantime we want, if not the formal recognition of +foreign governments, at least their benevolent neutrality. + +Dr. Sun still embodies in himself the spirit of the revolution of +1911. So far as that was not anti-Manchu it was in essence +nationalistic, and only accidentally republican. The day after the +inauguration of Dr. Sun, a memorial was dedicated to the seventy-two +patriot heroes who fell in an abortive attempt in Canton to throw off +the Manchu yoke, some six months before the successful revolt. The +monument is the most instructive single lesson which I have seen in +the political history of the revolution. It is composed of seventy-two +granite blocks. Upon each is engraved: Given by the Chinese National +League of Jersey City, or Melbourne, or Mexico, or Liverpool, or +Singapore, etc. Chinese nationalism is a product of Chinese migration +to foreign countries; Chinese nationalism on foreign shores financed +the revolution, and largely furnished its leaders and provided its +organization. Sun Yat Sen was the incarnation of this nationalism, +which was more concerned with freeing China--and Asia--from all +foreign domination than with particular political problems. And in +spite of the movement of events since that day, he remains essentially +at that stage, being closer in spirit to the nationalists of the +European irredentist type than to the spirit of contemporary young +China. A convinced republican, he nevertheless measures events and men +in the concrete by what he thinks they will do to promote the +independence of China from foreign control, rather than by what they +will do to promote a truly democratic government. This is the sole +explanation that can be given for his unfortunate coquetting a year +ago with the leaders of the now fallen Anfu Club. He allowed himself +to be deceived into thinking that they were ready to turn against the +Japanese if he would give them his support; and his nationalist +imagination was inflamed by the grandiose schemes of little Hsu for +the Chinese subjugation of Mongolia. + +More openly than others, Dr. Sun admits and justifies the new southern +government as representing a division of China. If, he insists, it had +not been for the secession of the south in 1917, Japan would now be in +virtually complete control of all China. A unified China would have +meant a China ready to be swallowed whole by Japan. The secession +localized Japanese aggressions, made it evident that the south would +fight rather than be devoured, and gave a breathing spell in which +public opinion in the north rallied against the Twenty-one Demands and +against the military pact with Japan. Thus it saved the independence +of China. But, while it checked Japan, it did not checkmate her. She +still expects with the assistance of Chang Tso Lin to make northern +China her vassal. The support which foreign governments in general and +the United States in particular are giving Peking is merely playing +into the hands of the Japanese. The independent south affords the only +obstacle which causes Japan to pause in her plan of making northern +China in effect a Japanese province. A more than usually authentic +rumor says that upon the occasion of the visit of the Japanese consul +general to the new president (no other foreign official has made an +official visit), the former offered from his government the official +recognition of Dr. Sun as president of all China, if the latter would +recognize the Twenty-one Demands as an accomplished fact. From the +Japanese standpoint the offer was a safe one, as this acceptance of +Japanese claims is the one thing impossible to the new government. But +meantime the offer naturally confirms the nationalists of Dr. Sun's +type in their belief that the southern split is the key to maintaining +the political independence of China; or, as Dr. Sun puts it, that a +divided China is for the time being the only means to an ultimately +independent China. + +These views are not given as stating the whole truth of the situation. +They are ex parte. But they are given as setting forth in good faith +the conceptions of the leaders of the southern movement and as +requiring serious attention if the situation of China, domestic and +international, is to be understood. Upon my own account, and not +simply as expressing the views of others, I have reached a conclusion +quite foreign to my thought before I visited the south. While it is +not possible to attach too much importance to the unity of China as a +part of the foreign policy of the United States, it is possible to +attach altogether too much importance to the Peking government as a +symbol of that unity. To borrow and adapt the words of one southern +leader, while the United States can hardly be expected to do other +than recognize the Peking as the de facto government, there is no need +to coddle that government and give it face. Such a course maintains a +nominal and formal unity while in fact encouraging the military and +corrupt forces that keep China divided and which make for foreign +aggression. + +In my opinion as the outcome of two years' observation of the Chinese +situation, the real interests of both China and the United States +would be served if, in the first place, the United States should take +the lead in securing from the diplomatic body in Peking the serving of +express notice upon the Peking government that in no case would a +restoration of the monarchy be recognized by the Powers. This may seem +in America like an unwarranted intervention in the domestic affairs of +a foreign country. But in fact such intervention is already a fact. +The present government endures only in virtue of the support of +foreign Powers. The notice would put an end to one kind of intrigue, +one kind of rumor and suspicion, which is holding industry and +education back and which is keeping China in a state of unrest and +instability. It would establish a period of comparative quiet in which +whatever constructive forces exist may come to the front. The second +measure would be more extreme. The diplomacy of the United States +should take the lead in making it clear that unless the promises about +the disbanding of the army, and the introduction of general +retrenchment are honestly and immediately carried out, the Powers will +pursue a harsh rather than a benevolent policy toward the Peking +government, insisting upon immediate payment of interest and loans as +they fall due and holding up the government to the strictest meeting +of all its obligations. The notification to be effective might well +include a virtual threat of withdrawal of recognition in case the +government does not seriously try to put its profuse promises into +execution. It should also include a definite discouragement of any +expenditures designed for military conquest of the south. + +Diplomatic recognition of the southern government is out of the +question at present. It is not out of the question to put on the +financial screws so that the southern government will be allowed space +and time to demonstrate what it can do by peaceful means to give one +or more provinces a decent, honest and progressive civil +administration. It is unnecessary to enumerate the obstacles in the +way of carrying out such a policy. But in my judgment it is the only +policy by which the Great Powers will not become accomplices in +perpetuating the weakness and division of China. It is the most +straightforward way of meeting whatever plans of aggression Japan may +entertain. + +May, 1921. + + + + +VI + +Federalism in China + + +The newcomer in China in observing and judging events usually makes +the mistake of attaching too much significance to current happenings. +Occurrences take place which in the western world would portend +important changes--and nothing important results. It is not easy to +loosen the habit of years; and so the visitor assumes that an event +which is striking to the point of sensationalism must surely be part +of a train of events having a definite trend; some deep-laid plan must +be behind it. It takes a degree of intellectual patience added to time +and experience to make one realize that even when there is a rhythm in +events the tempo is so retarded that one must wait a long time to +judge what is really going on. Most political events are like daily +changes in the weather, fluctuations back and forth which may +seriously affect individuals but which taken one by one tell little +about the movement of the seasons. Even the occurrences which are due +to human intention are usually sporadic and casual, and the observer +errs by reading into them too much plot, too comprehensive a scheme, +too farsighted a plan. The aim behind the event is likely to be only +some immediate advantage, some direct increase of power, the overthrow +of a rival, the grasping at greater wealth by an isolated act, without +any consecutive or systematic looking ahead. + +Foreigners are not the only ones who have erred, however, in judging +the Chinese political situation of the last few years. Beginning two +years ago, one heard experienced Chinese with political affiliations +saying that it was impossible for things to go on as they were for +more than three months longer. Some decisive change must occur. Yet +outwardly the situation has remained much the same not only for three +months but for two years, the exception being the overthrow of the +Anfu faction a year ago. And this occurrence hardly marked a definite +turn in events, as it was, to a considerable extent, only a shifting +of power from the hands of one set of tuchuns to another set. +Nevertheless at the risk of becoming a victim of the fallacy which I +have been setting forth, I will hazard the remark that the last few +months _have_ revealed a definite and enduring trend--that through the +diurnal fluctuations of the strife for personal power and wealth a +seasonal political change in society is now showing itself. Certain +lines of cleavage seem to show themselves, so that through the welter +of striking, picturesque, sensational but meaningless events, a +definite pattern is revealed. + +This pattern is indicated by the title of this chapter--a movement +toward the development of a federal form of government. In calling the +movement one toward federalism, there is, however, more of a jump into +the remote future than circumstances justify. It would be more +accurate, as well as more modest, to say that there is a well defined +and seemingly permanent trend toward provincial autonomy and local +self-government accompanied by a hope and a vague plan that in the +future the more or less independent units will recombine into the +United or Federated States of China. Some who look far into the future +anticipate three stages; the first being the completion of the present +secessionist movement; the second the formation of northern and +southern confederations respectively; the third a reunion into a +single state. + +To go into the detailed evidence for the existence of a definite and +lasting movement of this sort would presume too much on the reader's +knowledge of Chinese geography and his acquaintance with specific +recent events. I shall confine myself to quite general features of the +situation. The first feature is the new phase which has been assumed +by the long historic antagonism of the north and the south. Roughly +speaking, the revolution which established the republic and overthrew +the Manchus represented a victory for the south. But the +transformation during the last five years of the nominal republic into +a corrupt oligarchy of satraps or military governors or feudal lords +has represented a victory for the north. It is a significant fact, +symbolically at least, that the most powerful remaining tuchun or +military governor in China--in some respects the only powerful one who +has survived the vicissitudes of the last few years--namely Chang Tso +Lin, is the uncrowned king of the three Manchurian provinces. The +so-called civil war of the north and south is not, however, to be +understood as a conflict of republicanism located in the south and +militarism in the north. Such a notion is directly contrary to facts. +The "civil war" till six or eight months ago was mainly a conflict of +military governors and factions, part of that struggle for personal +power and wealth which has been going on all over China. + +But recently events have taken a different course. In four of the +southern provinces, tuchuns who seemed all powerful have toppled over, +and the provinces have proclaimed or tacitly assumed their +independence of both the Peking and the former military Canton +governments--the province in which Canton situated being one of the +four. I happened to be in Hunan, the first of the southerly provinces +to get comparative independence, last fall, not long after the +overthrow of the vicious despot who had ruled the province with the +aid of northern troops. For a week a series of meetings were held in +Changsha, the capital of the province. The burden of every speech was +"Hunan for the Hunanese." The slogan embodies the spirit of two powers +each aiming at becoming the central authority; it is a conflict of the +principle of provincial autonomy, represented by the politically more +mature south, with that of militaristic centralization, represented by +Peking. + +As I write, in early September (1921), the immediate issue is obscured +by the fight which Wu Pei Fu is waging with the Hunanese who with +nominal independence are in aim and interest allied with the south. +If, as is likely, Wu Pei Fu wins, he may take one of two courses. He +may use his added power to turn against Chang Tso Lin and the northern +militarists which will bring him into virtual alliance with the +southerners and establish him as the antagonist of the federal +principle. This is the course which his earlier record would call for. +Or he may yield to the usual official lust for power and money and try +once more the Yuan Shi Kai policy of military centralization with +himself as head, after trying out conclusions with Chang Tso Lin as +his rival. This is the course which the past record of military +leaders indicates. But even if Wu Pei Fu follows precedent and goes +bad, he will only hasten his own final end. This is not prophecy. It +is only a statement of what has uniformly happened in China just at +the moment a military leader seemed to have complete power in his +grasp. In other words, a victory for Wu Pei Fu may either accelerate +or may retard the development of provincial autonomy according to the +course he pursues. It cannot permanently prevent or deflect it. + +The basic factor that makes one sure that this trend toward local +autonomy is a reality and not merely one of those meaningless +shiftings of power which confuse the observer, is that it is in accord +with Chinese temperament, tradition and circumstance. Feudalism is +past and gone two thousand years ago, and at no period since has China +possessed a working centralized government. The absolute empires which +have come and gone in the last two millenniums existed by virtue of +non-interference and a religious aura. The latter can never be +restored; and every episode of the republic demonstrates that China +with its vast and diversified territories, its population of between +three hundred and fifty and four hundred million, its multitude of +languages and lack of communications, its enormous local attachments +sanctified by the family system and ancestral worship, cannot be +managed from a single and remote centre. China rests upon a network of +local and voluntary associations cemented by custom. This fact has +given it its unparallelled stability and its power to progress even +under the disturbed political conditions of the past ten years. I +sometimes think that Americans with their own traditional contempt for +politics and their spontaneous reliance upon self-help and local +organization are the ones who are naturally fitted to understand +China's course. The Japanese with their ingrained reliance upon the +state have continually misjudged and misacted. The British understand +better than we do the significance of local self-government; but they +are misled by their reverence for politics so that they cannot readily +find or see government when it does not take political form. + +It is not too much to say that one great cause for the overthrow of +the Manchus was the fact that because of the pressure of international +relations they attempted to force, especially in fiscal matters, a +centralization upon the provinces wholly foreign to the spirit of the +people. This created hostility where before there had been +indifference. China may possibly not emerge from her troubles a +unified nation, any more than a much smaller and less populous Europe +emerged from the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, a single state. +Indeed one often wonders, not that China is divided, but that she is +not much more broken up than she is. But one thing is certain. +Whatever progress China finally succeeds in making will come from a +variety of local centres, not from Peking or Canton. It will be +effected by means of associations and organizations which even though +they assume a political form are not primarily political in nature. + +Criticisms are passed, especially by foreigners, upon the present +trend of events. The criticisms are more than plausible. It is evident +that the present weakness of China is due to her divided condition. +Hence it is natural to argue that the present movement being one of +secession and general disintegration will increase the weakness of the +country. It is also evident that many of China's troubles are due to +the absence of any efficient administrative system; it is reasonable +to argue that China cannot get even railways and universal education +without a strong and stable central government. There is no doubt +about the facts. It is not surprising that many friends of China +deeply deplore the present tendency while some regard it as the final +accomplishment of the long predicted breakup of China. But remedies +for China's ills based upon ignoring history, psychology and actual +conditions are so utopian that it is not worth while to argue whether +or not they are theoretically desirable. The remedy of China's +troubles by a strong, centralized government is on a par with curing +disease by the expulsion of a devil. The evil of sectionalism is real, +but since it is real it cannot be dealt with by trying a method which +implies its non-existence. If the devil is really there, he will not +be exorcized by a formula. If the trouble is internal, not due to an +external demon, the disease can be cured only by using the factors of +health and vigor which the patient already possesses. And in China +while these factors of recuperation and growth are numerous, they all +exist in connection with local organizations and voluntary +associations. The increasing volume of the cry that the "tuchuns must +go" comes from the provincial and local interests which have been +insulted and violated by a nominally centralized but actually chaotic +situation. After this negative work is completed, the constructive +rebuilding of China can proceed only by utilizing local interests and +abilities. In China the movement will be the opposite of that which +occurred in Japan. It will be from the periphery to the centre. + +Another objection to the present tendency has force especially from +the foreign standpoint. As already stated, the efforts of the Manchu +dynasty in its latter days to enhance central power were due to +international pressure. Foreign nations treated Peking as if it were a +capital like London, Paris or Berlin, and in its efforts to meet +foreign demands it had to try to become such a centre. The result was +disaster. But foreign nations still want to have a single centre which +may be held responsible. And subconsciously, if not consciously, this +desire is responsible for much of the objection of foreign nationals +to the local autonomy movement. They well know that it is going to +take a long time to realize the ideal of federation, and meantime +where and what is to be the agency responsible for diplomatic +relations, the enforcing of indemnities and the securing of +concessions? + +In one respect the secessionist tendency is dangerous to China herself +as well as inconvenient to the powers. It will readily stimulate the +desire and ability of foreign nations to interfere in China's domestic +affairs. There will be many centres at which to carry on intrigues and +from which to get concessions instead of one or two. There is also +danger that one foreign nation may line up with one group of +provinces, and another foreign nation with another group, so that +international friction will increase. Even now some Japanese sources +and even such an independent liberal paper as Robert Young's Japan +Chronicle are starting or reporting the rumor that the Cantonese +experiment is supported by subsidies supplied by American capitalists +in the hope of economic concessions. The rumor was invented for a +sinister purpose. But it illustrates the sort of situation that may +come into existence if there are several political centres in China +and one foreign nation backs one and another nation, another. + +The danger is real enough. But it cannot be dealt with by attempting +the impossible--namely checking the movement toward local autonomy, +even though disintegration may temporarily accompany it. The danger +only emphasizes the fundamental fact of the whole Chinese situation; +that its essence is time. The evils and troubles of China are real +enough, and there is no blinking the fact that they are largely of her +own making, due to corruption, inefficiency and absence of popular +education. But no one who knows the common people doubts that they +will win through if they are given time. And in the concrete this +means that they be left politically alone to work out their own +destiny. There will doubtless be proposals at the Pacific Conference +to place China under some kind of international tutelage. This chapter +and the events connected with the tendency which it reports will be +cited as showing this need. Some of the schemes will spring from +motives that are hostile to China. Some will be benevolently conceived +in a desire to save China from herself and shorten her period of chaos +and confusion. But the hope of the world's peace, as well as of +China's freedom, lies in adhering to a policy of Hands Off. Give China +a chance. Give her time. The danger lies in being in a hurry, in +impatience, possibly in the desire of America to show that we are a +power in international affairs and that we too have a positive foreign +policy. And a benevolent policy of supporting China from without, +instead of promoting her aspirations from within, may in the end do +China about as much harm as a policy conceived in malevolence. + +July, 1921. + + + + +VII + +A Parting of the Ways for America + + +1 + +The realities of American policy in China and toward China are going +to be more seriously tested in the future than they ever have been in +the past. Japanese papers have been full of protests against any +attempt by the Pacific Conference to place Japan on trial. Would that +American journals were full of warnings that America is on trial at +the Conference as to the sincerity and intelligent goodwill behind her +amiable professions. The world will not stop with the Pacific +Conference; the latter, however important, will not arrest future +developments, and the United States will continue to be on trial till +she has established by her acts a permanent and definite attitude. For +the realities of the situation cannot be exhausted in any formula or +in any set of diplomatic agreements, even if the Conference confounds +the fears of pessimists and results in a harmonious union of the +powers in support of China's legitimate aspirations for free political +and economic growth. + +The Conference, however, stands as a symbol of the larger situation; +and its decisions or lack of them will be a considerable factor in the +determination of subsequent events. Sometimes one is obliged to fall +back on a trite phrase. We are genuinely at a parting of the ways. +Even if we should follow in our old path, there would none the less be +a parting of the ways, for we cannot consistently tread the old path +unless we are animated by a much more conscious purpose and a more +general and intelligent knowledge of affairs than have controlled our +activities in the past. + +The ideas expressed by an English correspondent about the fear that +America is soon to be an active source of danger in the Far East are +not confined to persons on foreign shores. The prevailing attitude in +some circles of American opinion is that called by President Hibben +cynical pessimism. All professed radicals and many liberals believe +that if our course has been better in the past it has been due to +geographical accidents combined with indifference and with our +undeveloped economic status. Consequently they believe that since we +have now become what is called a world-power and a nation which +exports instead of importing capital, our course will soon be as bad +as that of any of the rest of them. In some quarters this opinion is +clearly an emotional reaction following the disillusionments of +Versailles. In others, it is due to adherence to a formula: nothing in +international affairs can come out of capitalism and America is +emphatically a capitalistic country. Whether or not these feelings are +correct, they are not discussable; neither an emotion nor an absolute +formula is subject to analysis. + +But there are specific elements in the situation which give grounds +for apprehension as to the future. These specific elements are capable +of detection and analysis. An adequate realization of their nature +will be a large factor in preventing cynical apprehensions from +becoming actual. This chapter is an attempt at a preliminary listing, +inadequate, of course, as any preliminary examination must be. While +an a priori argument based on a fatalistic formula as to how a +"capitalistic nation" must conduct itself does not appeal to me, there +are nevertheless concrete facts which are suggested by that formula. +Part of our comparatively better course in China in the past is due to +the fact that we have not had the continuous and close alliance +between the State Department and big banking interests which is found +in the case of foreign powers. No honest well-informed history of +developments in China could be written in which the Russian Asiatic +Bank, the Foreign Bank of Belgium, the French Indo-China Bank and +Banque Industrielle, the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Hongkong-Shanghai +Bank, etc., did not figure prominently. These banks work in the +closest harmony, not only with railway and construction syndicates and +big manufacturing interests at home, but also with their respective +foreign offices. It is hardly too much to say that legations and banks +have been in most important matters the right and left hands of the +same body. American business interests have complained an the past +that the American government does not give to American traders abroad +the same support that the nationals of other states receive. In the +past these complaints have centred largely about actual wrongs +suffered or believed to have been suffered by American business +undertakings carried on in a foreign country. With the present +expansion of capital and of commerce, the same complaints and demands +are going to be made not with reference to grievances suffered, but +with reference to furthering, to pushing American commercial interests +in connection with large banking groups. It would take a credulous +person to deny the influence of big business in domestic politics. As +we become more interested in commerce and banking enterprises what +assurance have we that the alliance will not be transferred to +international politics? + +It should be noted that the policy of the open door as affirmed by the +great powers--and as frequently violated by them--even if it be +henceforth observed in good faith, does not adequately protect us from +this danger. The open door policy is not primarily a policy about +China herself but rather about the policies of foreign powers toward +one another with respect to China. It demands equality of economic +opportunity for different nations. Were it enforced, it would prevent +the granting of monopolies to any one nation: there is nothing in it +to render impossible a conjoint exploitation of China by foreign +powers, an organized monopoly in which each nation has its due share +with respect to others. Such an organization might conceivably reduce +friction among the great powers, and thereby reduce the danger of +future wars--as long as China herself is impotent to go to war. The +agreement might conceivably for a considerable time be of benefit to +China herself. But it is clear that for the United States to become a +partner in any such arrangement would involve a reversal of our +historic policy in the Far East. It might be technically consistent +with the open door policy, but it would be a violation of the larger +sense in which the American people has understood and praised that +ideal. He is blind who does not see that there are forces making for +such a reversal. And since we are all more or less blind, an opening +of our eyes to the danger is one of the conditions of its not being +realized. + +One of the forces which is operative is indicated by the phrase that +an international agreement on an economic and financial basis might be +of value to China herself. The mere suggestion that such a thing is +possible is abhorrent to many, especially to radicals. There seems to +be something sinister in it. So it is worth explaining how and why it +might be so. In the first place, it would obviously terminate the +particularistic grabbing for "leased" territory, concessions and +spheres of influence which has so damaged China. At the present time, +the point of this remark lies in its implied reference to Japan, as at +one time it might have applied to Russia. Fear of Japan's aims in +China is not confined to China; the fear is widespread. An +international economic arrangement may therefore be plausibly +presented as the easiest and most direct method of relieving China of +the Japanese menace. For Japan to stay out would be to give herself +away; if she came in, it would subject Japanese activities to constant +scrutiny and control. There is no doubt that part of the fear of Japan +regarding the Pacific Conference is due to a belief that some such +arrangement is contemplated. The case is easily capable of such +presentation as to make it appeal to Americans who are really friendly +to China and who haven't the remotest interest in her economic +exploitation. + +The arrangement would, for example, automatically eliminate the +Lansing-Ishii agreement with its embarrassing ambiguous recognition of +Japan's _special_ interests in China. + +The other factor is domestic. The distraction and civil wars of China +are commonplaces. So is the power exercised by the military governors +and generals. The greater one's knowledge, the more one perceives how +intimately the former evil is dependent upon the latter. The financial +plight of the Chinese government, its continual foreign borrowings +which threaten bankruptcy in the near future, depend upon militaristic +domination and wild expenditure for unproductive purposes and squeeze. +Without this expense, China would have no great difficulty henceforth +in maintaining a balance in her budget. The retardation of public +education whose advancement--especially in elementary schools--is +China's greatest single need is due to the same cause. So is the +growth in official corruption which is rapidly extending into business +and private life. + +In fact, every one of the obstacles to the progress of China is +connected with the rule of military factions and their struggles with +one another for complete mastery. An economic international agreement +among the great powers can be made which would surely reduce and +possibly eliminate the greatest evils of "militarism." Many liberal +Chinese say in private that they would be willing to have a temporary +international receivership for government finance, provided they could +be assured of its nature and the exact date and conditions of its +termination--a proviso which they are sensible enough to recognize +would be extremely difficult of attainment. American leadership in +forming and executing any such scheme would, they feel, afford the +best reassurance as to its nature and terms. Under such circumstances +a plausible case can be made out for proposals which, under the guise +of traditional American friendship for China, would in fact commit us +to a reversal of our historic policy. + +There are radicals abroad and at home who think that our entrance into +a Consortium already proves that we have entered upon the road of +reversal and who naturally see in the Pacific Conference the next +logical step. I have previously stated my own belief that our State +Department proposed the Consortium primarily for political ends, as a +means of checking the policy pursued by Japan of making unproductive +loans to China in return for which she was getting an immediate grip +on China's natural resources and preparing the way for direct +administrative and financial control when the day of reckoning and +foreclosure should finally come. I also said that the Consortium was +between two stools, the financial and the political and that up to the +present its chief value had been negative and preventive, and that +jealousy or lack of interest by Japan and Great Britain in any +constructive policy on the part of the Consortium was likely to +maintain the same condition. I have seen no reason thus far to change +my mind on this point, nor in regard to the further belief that +probably the interests of China in the end will be best served by the +continuation of this deterrent function. But the question is bound to +arise: why continue the Consortium if it isn't doing anything? The +pressure of foreign powers interested in the exploitation of China and +of impatient American economic interests may combine to put an end to +the present rather otiose existence led by the Consortium. The two +stools between which the past action of the American government has +managed to swing the Consortium may be united to form a single solid +bench. + +At the risk of being charged with credulous gullibility, or something +worse, I add that up to the present time the American phase of the +Consortium hasn't shown perceptible signs of becoming a club exercised +by American finance over China's economic integrity and independence. +I believe the repeated statements of the American representative that +he himself and the interests he represents would be glad if China +proved her ability to finance her own public utilities without +resorting to foreign loans. This belief is confirmed by the first +public utterance of the new American minister to China who in his +reference to the Consortium laid emphasis upon its deterrent function +and upon the stimulation it has given to Chinese bankers to finance +public utilities. And it is the merest justice to Mr. Stevens, the +American representative, to say that he represents the conservative +investment type of banker, not the "promotion" type, and that thus far +his great concern has been the problem of protecting the buyer of such +securities as are passed on by the banks to the ultimate investor--so +much so that he has aroused criticism from American business interests +impatient for speedy action. But there is a larger phase of the +Consortium concerning which I think apprehensions may reasonably be +entertained. + +Suppose, if merely by way of hypothesis, that the American government +is genuinely interested in China and in making the policy of the open +door and Chinese territorial and administrative integrity a reality, +not merely a name, and suppose that it is interested in doing so from +an American self-interest sufficiently enlightened to perceive that +the political and economic advancement of the United States is best +furthered by a policy which is identical with China's ability to +develop herself freely and independently: what then would be the wise +American course? In short, it would be to view our existing European +interests and issues (due to the war) and our Far Eastern interests +and issues as parts of one and the same problem. If we are actuated by +the motive hypothetically imputed to our government and we fail in its +realization, the chief reason will be that we regard the European +question and the Asiatic problem as two different questions, or +because we identify them from the wrong end. + +Our present financial interest in Europe is enormous. It involves not +merely foreign governmental loans but a multitude of private advances +and commitments. These financial entanglements affect not merely our +industry and commerce but our politics. They involve much more +immediately pressing concerns than to our Asiatic relations, and they +involve billions where the latter involve millions. The danger under +such conditions that our Asiatic relations will be sacrificed to our +European is hardly fanciful. + +To make this abstract statement concrete, the firm of bankers, J. P. +Morgan & Co., which is most heavily involved in European indebtedness +to the United States, is the firm which is the leading spirit in the +Consortium for China. It seems almost inevitable that the Asiatic +problem should look like small potatoes in comparison with the +European one, especially as our own industrial recuperation is so +closely connected with European relations, while the Far East cuts a +negligible figure. To my mind the real danger to set out upon selfish +exploitation of China: intelligent self-interest, tradition and the +fact that our chief asset in China is our past freedom from a +predatory course, dictate a course of cooperation with China. The +danger is that China will be subordinated and sacrificed because of +primary preoccupation with the high finance and politics of Europe, +that she will be lost in the shuffle. + +The European aspect of the problem can be made more concrete by +reference to Great Britain in particular. That country suffers from +the embarrassment of the Japanese alliance. She has already made it +sufficiently clear that she would like to draw America into the +alliance, making it tripartite, since that would be the easiest way of +maintaining good relations with both Japan and the United States. +There is no likelihood that any such step will be consummated. But +British diplomacy is experienced and astute. And by force of +circumstances our high finance has contracted a sort of economic +alliance with Great Britain. There is no wish to claim superior virtue +for America or to appeal to the strong current of anti-British +sentiment. But the British foreign office exists and operates apart +from the tradition of liberalism which has mainly actuated English +domestic politics. It stands peculiarly for the _Empire_ side of the +British Empire, no matter what party is in the saddle in domestic +affairs. Every resource will be employed to bring about a settlement +at the Pacific Conference which, even though it includes some degree +of compromise on the part of Great Britain, will bend the Asiatic +policy of the United States to the British traditions in the Far East, +instead of committing Great Britain to combining with the United +States in making a reality of the integrity of China to which both +countries are nominally committed. It does not seem an extreme +statement to say that the immediate issues of the Conference depend +upon the way in which our financial commitments in Europe are treated, +either as reasons for our making concessions to European policy or on +the other hand as a means of securing an adherence of the European +powers to the traditional American policy. + +A publicist in China who is of British origin and a sincere friend of +China remarked in private conversation that if the United States could +not secure the adherence of Great Britain to her Asiatic policy by +persuasion (he was deploring the Japanese alliance) she might do so by +buying it--through remission of her national debt to us. It is not +necessary to resort to the measure so baldly suggested. But the remark +at least suggests that our involvement in European, especially +British, finance and politics may be treated in either of two ways for +either of two results. + + +2 + +That the Chinese people generally speaking has a less antagonistic +feeling toward the United States than towards other powers seems to me +an undoubted fact. The feeling has been disturbed at divers times by +the treatment of the Chinese upon the Pacific coast, by the exclusion +act, by the turning over of our interest in the building of the +Peking-Canton (or Hankow) railway to a European group, by the +Lansing-Ishii agreement, and finally by the part played by President +Wilson in the Versailles decision regarding Shantung. Those +disturbances in the main, however, have made them dubious as to our +skill, energy and intelligence rather than as to our good-will. +Americans, taken individually and collectively, are to the Chinese--at +least such was my impression--a rather simple folk, taking the word in +its good and its deprecatory sense. In noting the Chinese reaction to +the proposed Pacific Conference, it was interesting to see the +combination of an almost unlimited hope that the United States was to +lead in protecting them from further aggressions and in rectifying +existing evils, with a lack of confidence, a fear that the United +States would have something put over on it. + +Friendly feeling is of course mainly based upon a negative fact, the +fact that the United States has taken no part in "leasing" +territories, establishing spheres and setting up extra-national +post-offices. On the positive side stands the contribution made by +Americans to education, especially medical, and that of girls and +women, and to philanthropy and relief. Politically, there are the +early service of Burlinghame, the open door policy of John Hay (though +failure to maintain it in fact while securing signatures to it on +paper is a considerable part of the Chinese belief in our defective +energy) and the part played by the United States in moderating the +terms of the settlement of the Boxer outbreak, in addition to a +considerable number of minor helpful acts. China also remembers that +we were the only nation to take exception to the treaties embodying +the Twenty-one Demands. While our exception was chiefly made on the +basis of our own interests which these treaties might injuriously +affect, a sentiment exists that the protest was a pledge of assistance +to China when the time should be opportune for raising the whole +question. And without doubt the reservation made on May 16, 1915, by +our State Department is a strong card at the forthcoming Conference if +the Department wishes to play it. + +From an American standpoint, the open door principle represents one of +the only two established principles of American diplomacy, the other +being, of course, the Monroe Doctrine. In connection with sentimental +or idealistic associations which have clustered about it, it +constitutes us in some vague fashion in both the Chinese and American +public opinion a sort of guardian or at least spokesman of the +interests of China in relation to foreign powers. Although, as was +pointed out in a former chapter, the open door policy directly +concerns other nations in their relation to China rather than China +herself, yet the violation of the policy by other powers has been so +frequent and so much to the detriment of China, that American +interest, prestige and moral sentiment are now implicated in such an +enforcement of it as will redound to the advantage of China. + +Citizens of other countries are often irritated by a suggestion of +such a relationship between the United States and China. It presents +itself as a proclamation of superior national virtue under cover of +which the United States aims to establish its influence in China at +the expense of other countries. The irritation is exasperated by the +fact that the situation as it stands is an undoubted economic and +political asset of the United States in China. We may concede without +argument any contention that the situation is not due to any superior +virtue but rather to contingencies of history and geography--in which +respect it is not unlike many things that pass for virtues with +individuals. The contention may be admitted without controversy +because it is not pertinent to the main issue. The question is not so +much how the state of affairs came about as what it now is, how it is +to be treated and what consequences are in flow from it. It is a fact +that up to the present an intelligent self-interest of America has +coincided with the interests of a stable, independent and progressive +China. It is also a fact that American traditions and sentiments have +gathered about this consideration so that now there is widespread +conviction in the American people of moral obligations of assistance +and friendly protection owed by us to China. At present, no policy can +be entered upon that does not bear the semblance of fairness and +goodwill. We have at least so much protection against the dangers +discussed in the prior chapter. + +Among Americans in China and presumably at home there is a strong +feeling that we should adopt for the future stronger and more positive +policies than we have maintained in the past. This feeling seems to me +fraught with dangers unless we make very clear to ourselves in just +what respects we are to continue and make good in a more positive +manner our traditional policy. To some extent our past policy has been +one of drifting. Radical change in this respect may go further than +appears upon the surface in altering other fundamental aspects of our +policy. What is condemned as drifting is in effect largely the same +thing that is also praised as non-interference. A detailed settled +policy, no matter how "constructive" it may appear to be, can hardly +help involving us in the domestic policies of China, an affair of +factions and a game which the Chinese understand and play much better +than any foreigners. Such an involvement would at once lessen a +present large asset in China, aloofness from internal intrigues and +struggles. + +The specific protests of Chinese in this country--mainly +Cantonese--against the Consortium seem to me mainly based on +misapprehension. But their _general_ attitude of opposition +nevertheless conveys an important lesson. It is based on a belief that +the effect of the Consortium will be to give the Peking government a +factitious advantage in the internal conflict which is waging in +China, so that to all intents and purposes it will mark a taking of +sides on our part. It is well remembered that the effect of the +"reorganization" loan of the prior Consortium--in which the United +States was _not_ a partner--was to give Yuan Shi Kai the funds which +seated him and the militarist faction after him, firmly in the +governmental saddle. Viewing the matter from a larger point of view +than that of Canton vs. Peking, the most fundamental objection I heard +brought by Chinese against the Consortium was in effect as follows: +The republican revolution in China has still to be wrought out; the +beginning of ten years ago has been arrested. It remains to fight it +out. The inevitable effect of increased foreign financial and economic +interest in China, even admitting that its industrial effect was +advantageous to China, would be to create an interest in _stabilizing_ +China politically, which in effect would mean to sanctify the status +quo, and prevent the development of a revolution which cannot be +accomplished without internal disorders that would affect foreign +investments unfavorably. These considerations are not mentioned for +the sake of throwing light on the Consortium: they are cited as an +illustration of the probability that a too positive and constructive +development of our tradition of goodwill to China would involve us in +an interference with Chinese domestic affairs injurious to China's +welfare, to that free and independent development in which we profess +such interest. + +But how, it will be asked, are we to protect China from foreign +depredations, particularly those of Japan, how are we to change our +nominal goodwill into a reality, if we do not enter much more positive +and detailed policies? If there was in existence at the present time +any such thing as a diplomacy of peoples as distinct from a diplomacy +of governments, the question would mean something quite different from +what it now means. As things now stand the people should profoundly +distrust the _politicians'_ love for China. It is too frequently the +reverse side of fear and incipient hatred of Japan, colored perhaps by +anti-British feeling. + +There should be no disguising of the situation. The aggressive +activities of other nations in China, centering but not exhausted at +this time in Japan, are not merely sources of trouble to China but +they are potential causes of trouble in our own international +relationships. We are committed by our tradition and by the present +actualities of the situation to attempting something positive for +China as respects her international status, to live up to our +responsibility is a most difficult and delicate matter. We have on the +one side to avoid getting entangled in quasi-imperialistic European +policies in Asia, whether under the guise of altruism, of putting +ourselves in a position where we can exercise a more effective +supervision of their behavior, or by means of economic expansion. On +the other side, we have to avoid drifting into that kind of covert or +avowed antagonism to European and Japanese imperialism which will only +increase friction, encourage a combination especially of Great Britain +and Japan---or of France and Japan--against us, and bring war +appreciably nearer. + +We need to bear in mind that China will not be saved from outside +herself. Even if by a successful war we should relieve China from +Japanese encroachments, from all encroachments, China would not of +necessity be brought nearer her legitimate goal of orderly and +prosperous internal development. Apart from the question of how far +war can now settle any fundamental issues without begetting others as +dangerous, China of all countries is the one where settlement by +force, especially by outside force, is least applicable, and most +likely to be enormously disserviceable. China is used to taking time +to deal with her problems: she can neither understand not profit by +impatient methods of the western world which are profoundly alien to +her genius. Moreover a civilization which is on a continental scale, +which is so old that the rest of us are parvenus in comparison, which +is thick and closely woven, cannot be hurried in its development +without disaster. Transformation from within is its sole way out, and +we can best help China by trying to see to it that she gets the time +she needs in order to effect this transformation, whether or not we +like the particular form it assumes at any particular time. + +A successful war in behalf of China would leave untouched her problems +of education, of factional and sectional forces, of political +immaturity showing itself in present incapacity for organization. It +would affect her industrial growth undoubtedly, but in all human +probability for the worse, increasing the likelihood that she would +enter upon an industrialization which would repeat the worst evils of +western industrial life, without the immunities, resistances and +remedial measures which the West has evolved. The imagination cannot +conceive a worse crime than fastening western industrialism upon China +before she has developed within herself the meaning of coping with the +forces which it would release. The danger is great enough as it is. +War waged in China's behalf by western powers and western methods +would make the danger practically irresistible. In addition we should +gain a permanent interest in China which is likely to be of the most +dangerous character to ourselves. If we were not committed by it to +future imperialism, we should be luckier than we have any right to +hope to be. These things are said against a mental protest to +admitting even by implication the prospect of war with Japan, but it +seems necessary to say them. + +These remarks are negative and vague as to our future course. They +imply a confession of lack of such wisdom as would enable me to make +positive definite proposals. But at least I have confidence in the +wisdom and goodwill of the American and other peoples to deal with the +problem, if they are only called into action. And the first condition +of calling wisdom and goodwill into effective existence is to +recognize the seriousness of the problem and the utter futility of +trying to force its solution by impatient and hurried methods. +Pro-Japanese apologetics is dangerous; it obscures the realities of +the situation. An irritated anti-Japanism that would hasten the +solution of the Chinese problem merely by attacking Japan is equally +fatal to discovering and applying a proper method. + +More specifically and also more generically, proper publicity is the +greatest need. If, as Secretary Hughes has intimated, a settlement of +the problems of the Pacific is made a condition of arriving at an +agreement regarding reduction and limitation of armaments, it is +likely that the Conference might better never be held. In eagerness to +do something which will pass as a settlement, either China's--and +Siberia's--interests will be sacrificed in some unfair compromise, or +irritation and friction will be increased--and in the end so will +armaments. In any literal sense, it is ridiculous to suppose that the +problems of the Pacific can be settled in a few weeks, or months--or +years. Yet the discussion of the problems, in separation from the +question of armament, may be of great use. For it may further that +publicity which is a pre-condition of any genuine settlement. This +involves the public in diplomacy. But it also involves a wider +publicity, one which will enlighten the world about the facts of Asia, +internal and international. + +Scepticism about Foreign Offices, as they are at present conducted, is +justified. But scepticism about the power of public opinion, if it can +be aroused and instructed, to reshape Foreign Office policies means +hopelessness about the future of the world. Let everything possible be +done to reduce armament, if only to secure a naval holiday on the part +of the three great naval powers, and if only for the sake of lessening +taxation. Let the Conference on Problems devote itself to discussing +and making known as fully and widely as possible the element and scope +of those problems, and the fears--or should one call them hopes?--of +the cynics will be frustrated. It is not so important that a decision +in the American sense of the Yap question be finally and forever +arrived at, as it is that the need of China and the Orient in general +for freer and fuller communications with the rest of the world be made +clear--and so on, down or up the list of agenda. The commercial open +door is needed. But the need is greater that the door be opened to +light, to knowledge and understanding. If these forces will not create +a public opinion which will in time secure a lasting and just +settlement of other problems, there is no recourse save despair of +civilization. Liberals can do something better than predicting failure +and impugning motives. They can work for the opened door of open +diplomacy, of continuous and intelligent inquiry, of discussion free +from propaganda. To shirk this responsibility on the alleged ground +that economic imperialism and organized greed will surely bring the +Conference to failure is supine and snobbish. It is one of the factors +that may lead the United States to take the wrong course in the +parting of the ways. + +October, 1921. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's China, Japan and the U.S.A., by John Dewey + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHINA, JAPAN AND THE U.S.A. *** + +***** This file should be named 28393-0.txt or 28393-0.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/8/3/9/28393/ + +Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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