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diff --git a/28377.txt b/28377.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0dddb68 --- /dev/null +++ b/28377.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6624 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Lessons of the war with Spain and other +articles, by Alfred T. Mahan + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Lessons of the war with Spain and other articles + +Author: Alfred T. Mahan + +Release Date: March 21, 2009 [EBook #28377] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN *** + + + + +Produced by Mark C. Orton, Jeannie Howse and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This +book was created from images of public domain material +made available by the University of Toronto Libraries +(http://link.library.utoronto.ca/booksonline/).) + + + + + + + * * * * * + + +-----------------------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Note: | + | | + | Inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has | + | been preserved. | + | | + | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. For | + | a complete list, please see the end of this document. | + | | + +-----------------------------------------------------------+ + + * * * * * + + + + +Lessons of the War with Spain + +And Other Articles + + + + +Lessons of the War +with Spain + +_And Other Articles_ + + +BY +ALFRED T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D. +Captain United States Navy + +AUTHOR OF "THE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN SEA POWER," "THE INFLUENCE +OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783," "THE INFLUENCE +OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE," +"THE LIFE OF NELSON, THE EMBODIMENT OF THE +SEA POWER OF GREAT BRITAIN," AND OF +A "LIFE OF FARRAGUT" + + +BOSTON +LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY +1899 + + + + +_Copyright, 1898, 1899,_ +BY THE S.S. MCCLURE CO. + +_Copyright, 1898,_ +BY HARPER AND BROTHERS + +_Copyright, 1899,_ +BY THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW PUBLISHING CO. + +_Copyright, 1899,_ +BY JOHN R. DUNLAP + +_Copyright, 1899,_ +BY ALFRED T. MAHAN + +_All rights reserved_ + + +University Press +JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A. + + + + +PREFACE + + +The original intention, with which the leading articles of the present +collection were undertaken, was to elicit some of the lessons +derivable from the war between the United States and Spain; but in the +process of conception and of treatment there was imparted to them the +further purpose of presenting, in a form as little technical and as +much popular as is consistent with seriousness of treatment, some of +the elementary conceptions of warfare in general and of naval warfare +in particular. The importance of popular understanding in such matters +is twofold. It promotes interest and induces intelligent pressure upon +the representatives of the people, to provide during peace the +organization of force demanded by the conditions of the nation; and it +also tends to avert the unintelligent pressure which, when war exists, +is apt to assume the form of unreasoning and unreasonable panic. As a +British admiral said two hundred years ago, "It is better to be +alarmed now, as I am, than next summer when the French fleet may be in +the Channel." Indifference in times of quiet leads directly to +perturbation in emergency; for when emergency comes, indifference is +found to have resulted in ignorance, and fear is never so overpowering +as when, through want of comprehension, there is no check upon the +luxuriance of the imagination. + +It is, of course, vain to expect that the great majority of men should +attain even an elementary knowledge of what constitutes the strength +or weakness of a military situation; but it does not seem extravagant +to hope that the individuals, who will interest themselves thus far, +may be numerous enough, and so distributed throughout a country, as to +constitute rallying points for the establishment of a sound public +opinion, and thus, in critical moments, to liberate the responsible +authorities from demands which, however unreasonable, no +representative government can wholly withstand. + +The articles do not in any sense constitute a series. Written for +various occasions, at various times, there is in them no sequence of +treatment, or even of conception. Except the last, however, they all +have had a common origin in the war with Spain. This may seem somewhat +questionable as regards the one on the Peace Conference; but, without +assuming to divine all the motives which led to the call for that +assembly, the writer is persuaded that between it and the war there +was the direct sequence of a corollary to its proposition. The +hostilities with Spain brought doubtless the usual train of +sufferings, but these were not on such a scale as in themselves to +provoke an outcry for universal peace. The political consequences, on +the other hand, were much in excess of those commonly resultant from +war,--even from maritime war. The quiet, superficially peaceful +progress with which Russia was successfully advancing her boundaries +in Asia, adding gain to gain, unrestrained and apparently +irrestrainable, was suddenly confronted with the appearance of the +United States in the Philippines, under conditions which made +inevitable both a continuance of occupancy and a great increase of +military and naval strength. This intrusion, into a sphere hitherto +alien to it, of a new military power, capable of becoming one of the +first force, if it so willed, was momentous in itself; but it was +attended further with circumstances which caused Great Britain, and +Great Britain alone among the nations of the earth, to appear the +friend of the United States in the latter's conflict. How this +friendliness was emphasized in the Philippines is a matter of common +report. + +Coincident with all this, though also partly preceding it, has been +the growing recognition by the western nations, and by Japan, of the +imminence of great political issues at stake in the near future of +China. Whether regarded as a field for commerce, or for the exercise +of the varied activities by which the waste places of the earth are +redeemed and developed, it is evidently a matter of economical--and +therefore of political--importance to civilized nations to prevent the +too preponderant control there of any one of their number, lest the +energies of their own citizens be debarred from a fair opportunity to +share in these advantages. The present conditions, and the recent +manifestations of antagonism and rivalry, are too well known for +repetition. The general situation is sufficiently understood, yet it +is doubtful whether the completeness and rapidity of the revolution +which has taken place in men's thoughts about the Pacific are duly +appreciated. They are shown not only by overt aggressive demands of +various European states, or by the extraordinary change of sentiment +on the subject of expansion that has swept over America, but very +emphatically by the fact, little noted yet well assured, that leading +statesmen of Japan--which only three years ago warned the United +States Government that even the annexation of Hawaii could not by her +be seen with indifference--now welcome our presence in the +Philippines. + +This altered attitude, on the part of a people of such keen +intelligence, has a justification which should not be ignored, and a +significance which should not be overlooked. It bears vivid testimony +to the rate at which events, as well as their appreciation of events +and of conditions, have been advancing. It is one of the symptoms of a +gathering accord of conviction upon a momentous subject. At such a +time, and on such a scene, the sympathetic drawing together of the two +great English-speaking nations, intensely commercial and enterprising, +yet also intensely warlike when aroused, and which exceed all others +in their possibilities of maritime greatness, gave reason for +reflection far exceeding that which springs from imaginative +calculations of the future devastations of war. It was a direct result +of the war with Spain, inevitably suggesting a probable drift towards +concurrent action upon the greatest question of the immediate future, +in which the influence of force will be none the less real because +sedulously kept in the background of controversies. If, however, the +organic development of military strength could be temporarily arrested +by general agreement, or by the prevalence of an opinion that war is +practically a thing of the past, the odds would be in favor of the +state which at the moment of such arrest enjoys the most advantageous +conditions of position, and of power already created. + +In reproducing these articles, the writer has done a little editing, +of which it is needless to speak except in one respect. His views on +the utility of coast fortification have met with pronounced adverse +criticism in some quarters in England. Of this he has neither cause +nor wish to complain; but he is somewhat surprised that his opinions +on the subject here expressed are thought to be essentially opposed to +those he has previously avowed in his books,--the Influence of +Sea-Power upon History, and upon the French Revolution. While wholly +convinced of the primacy of the navy in maritime warfare, and +maintaining the subordination to it of the elements of power which +rest mainly upon land positions, he has always clearly recognized, and +incidentally stated, not only the importance of the latter, but the +general necessity of affording them the security of fortification, +which enables a weaker force to hold its own against sudden attack, +and until relief can be given. Fortifications, like natural accidents +of ground, serve to counterbalance superiority of numbers, or other +disparity of means; both in land and sea warfare, therefore, and in +both strategy and tactics, they are valuable adjuncts to a defence, +for they constitute a passive reinforcement of strength, which +liberates an active equivalent, in troops or in ships, for offensive +operations. Nor was it anticipated that when coast defence by +fortification was affirmed to be a nearly constant element, the word +"constant" would be understood to mean the same for all countries, or +under varying conditions of popular panic, instead of applying to the +deliberate conclusions of competent experts dealing with a particular +military problem. + +Of the needs of Great Britain, British officers should be the best +judge, although even there there is divergence of opinion; but to his +own countrymen the author would say that our experience has shown that +adequate protection of a frontier, by permanent works judiciously +planned, conduces to the energetic prosecution of offensive war. The +fears for Washington in the Civil War, and for our chief seaports in +the war with Spain, alike illustrate the injurious effects of +insufficient home defence upon movements of the armies in the field, +or of the navies in campaign. In both instances dispositions of the +mobile forces, vicious from a purely military standpoint, were imposed +by fears for stationary positions believed, whether rightly or +wrongly, to be in peril. + +For the permission to republish these articles the author begs to +thank the proprietors of the several periodicals in which they first +appeared. The names of these, and the dates, are given, together with +the title of each article, in the Table of Contents. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, 1898. + McClure's Magazine, December, 1898-April, 1899. + + PAGE + INTRODUCTORY: COMPREHENSION OF MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS + POSSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE, AND IMPORTANT TO THE NATION 3 + + I. How the Motive of the War gave Direction to its Earlier + Movements.--Strategic Value of Puerto + Rico.--Considerations on the Size and Qualities of + Battleships.--Mutual Relations of Coast Defence and Navy 21 + + II. The Effect of Deficient Coast-Defence upon the Movements + of the Navy.--The Military and Naval Conditions of Spain + at the Outbreak of the War 53 + + III. Possibilities open to the Spanish Navy at the Beginning + of the War.--The Reasons for Blockading Cuba.--First + Movements of the Squadrons under Admirals Sampson and + Cervera 90 + + IV. Problems presented by Cervera's Appearance in West Indian + Waters.--Movements of the United States Divisions and of + the _Oregon_.--Functions of Cruisers in a Naval Campaign 126 + + V. The Guard set over Cervera.--Influence of Inadequate + Numbers upon the Conduct of Naval and Military + Operations.--Camara's Rush through the Mediterranean, and + Consequent Measures taken by the United States 170 + +THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE MORAL ASPECT OF WAR 207 + North American Review, October, 1899. + +THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR NEW DEPENDENCIES 241 + Engineering Magazine, January, 1899. + +DISTINGUISHING QUALITIES OF SHIPS OF WAR 257 + Scripps-McRae Newspaper League, November, 1898. + +CURRENT FALLACIES UPON NAVAL SUBJECTS 277 + Harpers' Monthly Magazine, June, 1898. + + + + +MAPS + +ISLAND OF CUBA _To face page_ 59 + +THE CARIBBEAN SEA _To face page_ 113 + + + + +LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN + +AND OTHER ARTICLES + + + + +LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN + + + + +INTRODUCTORY + +COMPREHENSION OF MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS POSSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE, +AND IMPORTANT TO THE NATION. + + +It is somewhat of a commonplace among writers upon the Art of War, +that with it, as with Art in general, the leading principles remain +unimpaired from age to age. When recognized and truly mastered, not +held by a passive acquiescence in the statements of another, but +really appropriated, so as to enter decisively into a man's habit of +thought, forming in that direction the fibre of his mind, they not +only illuminate conditions apparently novel, by revealing the +essential analogies between them and the past, but they supply the +clue by which the intricacies of the present can best be threaded. +Nothing could be more utterly superficial, for instance, than the +remark of a popular writer that "the days of tacks and sheets"--of +sailing ships, that is--"have no value as lessons for the days of +steam and armor." Contrast with such an utterance the saying of the +great master of the art,--Napoleon: "If a man will surprise the +secrets of warfare, let him study the campaigns of Hannibal and of +Caesar, as well as those of Frederick the Great and my own." + +Comprehension of warfare, therefore, consists, first, in the +apprehension and acceptance--the mental grasp--of a few simple general +principles, elucidated and formulated by admitted authorities upon the +subject, and, second, in copious illustration of these principles by +the application of them to numerous specific instances, drawn from +actual experiences of war--from history. Such illustration, adequately +developed by exposition of facts and of principles in the several +cases, pointing out, where necessary, substantial identity underlying +superficial diversity, establishes gradually a body of precedents, +which reinforce, by all the weight of cumulative authority, the +principle that they illuminate. Thus is laid the substantial +foundation upon which the Art of War securely rests. It is perhaps +advisable--though it should be needless--to say that, when a student +has achieved such comprehension, when his mind has mastered the +principles, and his memory is richly stored with well-ordered +precedents, he is, in war, as in all other active pursuits of life, +but at the beginning of his labors. He has girded on his armor, but he +has not yet proved it,--far less is qualified to boast as one about to +put it off after a good life's fight. It remains yet to be seen +whether he has the gifts and the manhood to use that which he has +laboriously acquired, or whether, as happens with many other men +apparently well qualified, and actually well furnished with the raw +material of knowledge in various professions, he will be unable to +turn power into success. This question trial alone can decide in each +individual case; but while experience thus forces all to realize that +knowledge does not necessarily imply capacity to use it, that there +may be foundation upon which no superstructure will be raised, +few--and those not the wisest--are inclined to dispute that antecedent +training, well-ordered equipment, where other things are equal, does +give a distinct advantage to the man who has received it. The blaze +of glory and of success which, after forty years of patient waiting, +crowned the last six months of Havelock's life, raising him from +obscurity to a place among the immortals, attests the rapidity with +which the perfect flower of achievement can bud and fully bloom, when, +and only when, good seed has been sown in ground fitly prepared. + +There are two principal methods of imparting the illustrations that, +in their entirety, compose the body of precedents, by which the +primary teachings of the Art of War are at once elucidated and +established. By the first, the several principles may be separately +stated, more or less at large, each being followed closely by the +appropriate illustrations, drawn, as these in such a treatment most +suitably may, from different periods and from conditions which on the +surface appear most divergent. Or, on the other hand, the consecutive +narrative of a particular series of operations may be given, in such +detail as is necessary, accompanied by a running commentary or +criticism, in which the successive occurrences are brought to the test +of recognized standards; inference being drawn, or judgment passed, +accordingly. The former is the more formal and methodical; it serves +better, perhaps, for starting upon his career the beginner who +proposes to make war the profession of his life; for it provides him, +in a compact and systematic manner, with certain brief rules, by the +use of which he can most readily apply, to his subsequent reading of +military history, criteria drawn from the experience of centuries. He +is thus supplied, in short, with digested knowledge. But digestion by +other minds can in no wise take the place of assimilation performed by +one's own mental processes. The cut and dried information of the +lecture room, and of the treatise, must in every profession be +supplemented by the hard work of personal practice; and failing the +experience of the campaign,--of actual warfare,--the one school of +progress for the soldier or seaman is to be found in the study of +military and naval history, which embodies the experience of others. +To such study the second method contributes; it bears to the first the +relation of an advanced course. + +Nor let it be supposed that the experience of others, thus imparted, +is a poor substitute for that acquired by the actual hard work of the +field, or of the ocean. By the process, the fruit possibly may not be +fully matured; but it arrives at that perfection of form which +requires but a few suns to ripen. This, moreover, if not the only way +by which experience in the art of directing operations of war--of +command-in-chief--can be stored, is by far the most comprehensive and +thorough; for while utility cannot be denied to annual manoeuvres, and +to the practice of the sham battle, it must be remembered that these, +dealing with circumstances limited both in time and place, give a very +narrow range of observation; and, still more important, as was +remarked by the late General Sherman, the moral elements of danger and +uncertainty, which count for so much in real warfare, cannot be +adequately reproduced in mimic. The field of military history, on the +other hand, has no limit short of the military experience of the race; +it records the effect of moral influences of every kind, as well as of +the most diverse material conditions; the personal observation of even +the greatest of captains is in comparison but narrow. "What +experience of command," says one of the most eminent, "can a general +have, before he is called to command? and the experience of what one +commander, even after years of warfare, can cover all cases?" +Therefore he prescribes study; and as a help thereto tells the story +of one of his most successful campaigns, accompanying it with a +commentary in which he by no means spares himself. Napoleon abounds in +the same sense. "On the field of battle the happiest inspiration is +often but a recollection,"--not necessarily of one's own past; and he +admitted in after years that no finer work had been done by him than +in his first campaign, to which he came--a genius indeed, but--with +the acquisitions chiefly of a student, deep-steeped in reading and +reflection upon the history of warfare. + +The utility of such study of military history to the intending warrior +is established, not only by a few such eminent authorities, but by a +consensus among the leading soldiers and seamen of our own day, +whether they personally have, or have not, had the opportunity of +command in war. It may be asserted to be a matter of contemporary +professional agreement, as much as any other current opinion that now +obtains. In such study, native individual capacity and individual +temperament will largely affect inference and opinion; not only +causing them to differ more or less, but resulting frequently in +direct opposition of conclusion. It cannot be otherwise; for, like all +other callings of active life, war is a matter, not merely of +knowledge and of general principles, but of sound judgment, without +which both information and rules, being wrongly applied, become +useless. Opinions, even of the most eminent, while accorded the +respect due to their reputation, should therefore be brought to the +test of personal reflection. + +The study of the Art and History of War is pre-eminently necessary to +men of the profession, but there are reasons which commend it also, +suitably presented, to all citizens of our country. Questions +connected with war--when resort to war is justifiable, preparation for +war, the conduct of war--are questions of national moment, in which +each voter--nay, each talker--has an influence for intelligent and +adequate action, by the formation of sound public opinion; and public +opinion, in operation, constitutes national policy. Hence it is +greatly to be desired that there should be more diffused interest in +the critical study of warfare in its broader lines. Knowledge of +technical details is not necessary to the apprehension of the greater +general principles, nor to an understanding of the application of +those principles to particular cases, when made by individual +students,--officers or others. The remark is sometimes heard, "When +military or naval officers agree, Congress--or the people--may be +expected to act." The same idea applied to other professions--waiting +for universal agreement--would bring the world to a standstill. Better +must be accepted without waiting for best. Better is more worth having +to-day than best is the day after the need has come and gone. +Hesitation and inaction, continued till the doctors agree, may result +in the death of the patient; yet such hesitation is almost inevitable +where there is no formed public opinion, and quite inevitable where +there is no public interest antecedent to the emergency arising. + +It may be due to the bias of personal or professional inclination that +the present writer believes that military history,--including therein +naval,--simply and clearly presented in its leading outlines, divested +of superfluous and merely technical details, would be found to possess +an interest far exceeding that which is commonly imagined. The logical +coherence of any series of events, as of any process of Nature, +possesses an innate attraction for the inquisitive element of which +few intelligent minds are devoid. Unfortunately, technical men are +prone to delight in their technicalities, and to depreciate, with the +adjective "popular," attempts to bring their specialties within the +comprehension of the general public, or to make them pleasing and +attractive to it. However it may be with other specialties, the +utility of which is more willingly admitted, the navy and army in our +country cannot afford to take such an attitude. The brilliant, but +vague, excitement and glory of war, in its more stirring phases, +touches readily the popular imagination, as does intense action of +every description. It has all the charm of the dramatic, heightened by +the splendor of the heroic. But where there is no appeal beyond the +imagination to the intellect, such impressions lack distinctness, and +leave no really useful results. While there is a certain exaltation in +sharing, through vivid narrative, the emotions of those who have borne +a part in some deed of conspicuous daring, the fascination does not +equal that wrought upon the intellect, as it traces for the first time +the long-drawn sequence by which successive occurrences are seen to +issue in their necessary results, or causes apparently remote to +converge upon a common end, and understanding succeeds to the previous +sense of bewilderment, which is produced by military events as too +commonly treated. + +There is, moreover, no science--or art--which lends itself to such +exposition more readily than does the Art of War. Its principles are +clear, and not numerous. Outlines of operations, presented in +skeleton, as they usually may be, are in most instances surprisingly +clear; and, these once grasped, the details fall into place with a +readiness and a precision that convey an ever increasing intellectual +enjoyment. The writer has more than once been witness of the pleasure +thus occasioned to men wholly strangers to military matters; a +pleasure partly of novelty, but which possesses the elements of +endurance because the stimulus is one that renews itself continually, +opening field after field for the exercise of the mind. + +If such pleasure were the sole result, however, there might be +well-founded diffidence in recommending the study. The advantage +conferred upon the nation by a more wide-spread and intelligent +understanding of military matters, as a factor in national life that +must exist for some ages to come, and one which recent events, so far +from lessening, have rendered more conspicuous and more necessary, +affords a sounder ground for insisting that it is an obligation of +each citizen to understand something of the principles of warfare, and +of the national needs in respect of preparation, as well as thrill +with patriotic emotion over an heroic episode or a brilliant victory. + +It is with the object of contributing to such intelligent +comprehension that the following critical narrative, which first +appeared in one of our popular monthlies, is again submitted to the +public in its present form. It professes no more than to be an +attempt, by a student of military as well as naval warfare, to +present a reasoned outline of a part of the operations of the war, +interspersed with such reflections upon naval warfare, in its generals +and its particulars, as have arisen naturally in the course of the +story. The method adopted, consequently, is the second of those +mentioned in the beginning of these remarks; a consecutive narrative, +utilized as a medium for illustrating the principles of war. The +application of those principles in this discussion represents the +views of one man, believed by him to be in accordance with a +considerable body of professional thought, although for this he has no +commission to speak; but to some of them also there is, in other +quarters, a certain distinct professional opposition. + +The aim of the author here, as in all his writings, has been so to +present his theme as to invest it with the rational interest attaching +to a clear exposition of causes and effects, as shown in a series of +events. Where he may have failed, the failure is in himself, not in +his subject. The recent Spanish-American War, while possessing, as +every war does, characteristics of its own, differentiating it from +others, nevertheless, in its broad analogies, falls into line with +its predecessors, evidencing that unity of teaching which pervades the +art from its beginnings unto this day. It has, moreover, the special +value of illustrating the reciprocal needs and offices of the army and +the navy, than which no lesson is more valuable to a nation situated +as ours is. Protected from any serious attempt at invasion by our +isolated position, and by our vast intrinsic strength, we are +nevertheless vulnerable in an extensive seaboard, greater, relatively +to our population and wealth--great as they are--than that of any +other state. Upon this, moreover, rests an immense coasting trade, the +importance of which to our internal commercial system is now scarcely +realized, but will be keenly felt if we ever are unable to insure its +freedom of movement. + +We also are committed, inevitably and irrevocably, to an over-sea +policy, to the successful maintenance of which will be needed, not +only lofty political conceptions of right and of honor, but also the +power to support, and if need be to enforce, the course of action +which such conceptions shall from time to time demand. Such +maintenance will depend primarily upon the navy, but not upon it +alone; there will be needed besides an adequate and extremely mobile +army, and an efficient correlation of the one with the other, based +upon an accurate conception of their respective functions. The true +corrective to the natural tendency of each to exaggerate its own +importance to the common end is to be found only in some general +understanding of the subject diffused throughout the body of the +people, who are the ultimate arbiters of national policy. + +In short, the people of the United States will need to understand, not +only what righteousness dictates, but what power, military and naval, +requires, in order duly to assert itself. The disappointment and +impatience, now being manifested in too many quarters, over the +inevitable protraction of the military situation in the Philippines, +indicates a lack of such understanding; for, did it exist, men would +not need to be told that even out of the best material, of which we +have an abundance, a soldier is not made in a day, nor an army in a +season; that when these, the necessary tools, are wanting, or are +insufficient in number, the work cannot but lag until they are +supplied; in short, that in war, as in every calling, he who wills the +end must also understand and will the means. It was the same with the +wide-spread panic that swept along our seaboard at the beginning of +the late war. So far as it was excusable, it was due to the want of +previous preparation; so far as it was unreasonable, it was due to +ignorance; but both the want of preparation and the ignorance were the +result of the preceding general indifference of the nation to military +and naval affairs, an indifference which necessarily had found its +reflection in the halting and inadequate provisions made by Congress. + +Although changes and additions have been introduced where it has +seemed expedient, the author has decided to allow these articles to +stand, in the main, substantially as written immediately after the +close of hostilities. The opening paragraphs, while less applicable, +in their immediate purport, to the present moment, are nevertheless +not inappropriate as an explanation of the general tenor of the work +itself; and they suggest, moreover, another line of reflection upon +the influence, imperceptibly exerted, and passively accepted in men's +minds, by the quiet passing of even a single calendar year. + +The very lapse of time and subsidence of excitement which tend to +insure dispassionate and impartial treatment by the historian, and a +juster proportion of impression in spectators, tend also to produce +indifference and lethargy in the people at large; whereas in fact the +need for sustained interest of a practical character still exists. +Intelligent provision for the present and future ought now to succeed +to the emotional experiences of the actual war. The reading public has +been gorged and surfeited with war literature, a fact which has been +only too painfully realized by publishers and editors, who purvey for +its appetite and have overstocked the larder. Coincident with this has +come an immense wave of national prosperity and consequent business +activity, which increasingly engross the attention of men's minds. So +far as the mere movement of the imagination, or the stirring of the +heart is concerned, this reaction to indifference after excessive +agitation was inevitable, and is not in itself unduly to be deplored; +but it will be a matter, not merely of lasting regret, but of +permanent harm, if the nation again sinks into the general apathy +concerning its military and naval necessities which previously +existed, and which, as the experience of Great Britain has shown, is +unfortunately characteristic of popular representative governments, +where present votes are more considered than future emergencies. Not +the least striking among the analogies of warfare are the sufferings +undergone, and the risks of failure incurred, through imperfect +organization, in the Crimea, and in our own recent hostilities with +Spain. And let not the public deceive itself, nor lay the fault +exclusively, or even chiefly, upon its servants, whether in the +military services or in the halls of Congress. The one and the other +will respond adequately to any demand made upon them, if the means are +placed betimes in their hands; and the officers of the army and navy +certainly have not to reproach themselves, as a body, with official +failure to represent the dangers, the exposure, and the needs of the +commonwealth. It should be needless to add that circumstances now are +greatly changed, through the occurrences of last year; and that +henceforth the risks from neglect, if continued, will vastly exceed +those of former days. The issue lies with the voters. + + + + +I + + HOW THE MOTIVE OF THE WAR GAVE DIRECTION TO ITS EARLIER + MOVEMENTS.--STRATEGIC VALUE OF PUERTO RICO.-- + CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SIZE AND QUALITIES OF + BATTLESHIPS.--MUTUAL RELATIONS OF COAST DEFENCE AND + NAVY. + + +It is a common and a true remark that final judgment cannot be passed +upon events still recent. Not only is time required for the mere +process of collecting data, of assorting and testing the numerous +statements, always imperfect and often conflicting, which form the +material for history, but a certain and not very short interval must +be permitted to elapse during which men's brains and feelings may +return to normal conditions, and permit the various incidents which +have exalted or depressed them to be seen in their totality, as well +as in their true relative importance. There are thus at least two +distinct operations essential to that accuracy of judgment to which +alone finality can be attributed,--first, the diligent and close study +of detail, by which knowledge is completed; and, second, a certain +detachment of the mind from the prejudgments and passions engendered +by immediate contact, a certain remoteness, corresponding to the idea +of physical distance, in virtue of which confusion and distortion of +impression disappear, and one is enabled not only to distinguish the +decisive outlines of a period, but also to relegate to their true +place in the scheme subordinate details which, at the moment of +occurrence, had made an exaggerated impression from their very +nearness. + +It is yet too soon to look for such fulness and justness of treatment +in respect to the late hostilities with Spain. Mere literal truth of +narrative cannot yet be attained, even in the always limited degree to +which historical truth is gradually elicited from a mass of partial +and often irreconcilable testimony; and literal truth, when presented, +needs to be accompanied by a discriminating analysis and estimate of +the influence exerted upon the general result by individual +occurrences, positive or negative. I say positive or negative, for we +are too apt to overlook the vast importance of negative factors, of +inaction as compared to action, of things not done in comparison with +those that were done, of mistakes of omission as contrasted with those +of commission. Too frequently men, spectators or actors in careers +essentially of action, imagine that a safe course is being held +because things continue seemingly as they were; whereas, at least in +war, failure to dare greatly is often to run the greatest of risks. +"Admiral Hotham," wrote Nelson in 1795, "is perfectly satisfied that +each month passes without any losses on our side." The result of this +purely negative conduct, of this military sin of mere omission, was +that Bonaparte's great Italian campaign of 1796 became possible, that +the British Fleet was forced to quit the Mediterranean, and the map of +Europe was changed. It is, of course, a commonplace that things never +really remain as they were; that they are always getting better or +worse, at least relatively. + +But while it is true that men must perforce be content to wait a while +for the full and sure accounts, and for the summing up which shall +pass a final judgment upon the importance of events and upon the +reputations of the actors in them, it is also true that in the drive +of life, and for the practical guidance of life, which, like time and +tide, waits for no man, a rapid, and therefore rough, but still a +working decision must be formed from the new experiences, and +inferences must be drawn for our governance in the present and the +near future, whose exigencies attend us. Absolutely correct +conclusions, if ever attained in practical life, are reached by a +series of approximations; and it will not do to postpone action until +exhaustive certainty has been gained. We have tried it at least once +in the navy, watching for a finality of results in the experimental +progress of European services. What the condition of our own fleet was +at the end of those years might be fresh in all our memories, if we +had time to remember. Delayed action maybe eminently proper at one +moment; at another it may mean the loss of opportunity. Nor is the +process of rapid decision--essential in the field--wholly unsafe in +council, if inference and conclusion are checked by reference to +well-settled principles and fortified by knowledge of the experience +of ages upon whose broad bases those principles rest. Pottering over +mechanical details doubtless has its place, but it tends to foster a +hesitancy of action which wastes time more valuable than the resultant +gain. + +The preceding remarks indicate sufficiently the scope of these papers. +It is not proposed to give a complete story of the operations, for +which the material is not yet available. Neither will it be attempted +to pronounce decisions absolutely final, for the time is not yet ripe. +The effort will be rather to suggest general directions to thought, +which may be useful to a reader as he follows the many narratives, +official or personal, given to the public; to draw attention to facts +and to analogies; to point out experiences, the lessons from which may +be profitable in determining the character of the action that must +speedily be taken to place the sea power of the Republic upon a proper +material basis; and, finally, to bring the course of this war into +relation with the teachings of previous history,--the experiences of +the recent past to reinforce or to modify those of the remoter past; +for under superficial diversity, due to differences of conditions, +there often rests fundamental identity, the recognition of which +equips the mind, quickens it, and strengthens it for grappling with +the problems of the present and the future. The value of history to us +is as a record of human experience; but experiences must be +understood. + +The character and the direction of the first movements of the United +States in this conflict with Spain were determined by the occasion, +and by the professed object, of the hostilities. As frequently +happens, the latter began before any formal declaration of war had +been made; and, as the avowed purpose and cause of our action were not +primarily redress for grievances of the United States against Spain, +but to enforce the departure of the latter from Cuba, it followed +logically that the island became the objective of our military +movements, as its deliverance from oppression was the object of the +war. Had a more general appreciation of the situation been adopted, a +view embracing the undeniable injury to the United States, from the +then existing conditions, and the generally iniquitous character of +Spanish rule in the colonies, and had war for these reasons been +declared, the objective of our operations might have been differently +chosen for strategic reasons; for our leading object in such case +would not have been to help Cuba, but to constrain Spain, and to +compel her to such terms as we might demand. It would have been open, +for instance, to urge that Puerto Rico, being between five and six +hundred miles from the eastern end of Cuba and nearly double that +distance from the two ports of the island most important to +Spain,--Havana on the north and Cienfuegos on the south,--would be +invaluable to the mother country as an intermediate naval station and +as a base of supplies and reinforcements for both her fleet and army; +that, if left in her undisturbed possession, it would enable her, +practically, to enjoy the same advantage of nearness to the great +scene of operations that the United States had in virtue of our +geographical situation; and that, therefore, the first objective of +the war should be the eastern island, and its reduction the first +object. The effect of this would have been to throw Spain back upon +her home territory for the support of any operations in Cuba, thus +entailing upon her an extremely long line of communications, exposed +everywhere throughout its course, but especially to the molestation of +small cruisers issuing from the harbors of Puerto Rico, which flank +the routes, and which, upon the supposition, would have passed into +our hands. This view of the matter was urged upon the writer, a few +days before hostilities began, by a very old and intelligent naval +officer who had served in our own navy and in that of the Confederate +States. To a European nation the argument must have been quite +decisive; for to it, as distant, or more distant than Spain from Cuba, +such an intermediate station would have been an almost insurmountable +obstacle while in an enemy's hands, and an equally valuable base if +wrested from him. To the United States these considerations were +applicable only in part; for, while the inconvenience to Spain would +be the same, the gain to us would be but little, as our lines of +communication to Cuba neither required the support of Puerto Rico, nor +were by it particularly endangered. + +This estimate of the military importance of Puerto Rico should never +be lost sight of by us as long as we have any responsibility, direct +or indirect, for the safety or independence of Cuba. Puerto Rico, +considered militarily, is to Cuba, to the future Isthmian canal, and +to our Pacific coast, what Malta is, or may be, to Egypt and the +beyond; and there is for us the like necessity to hold and strengthen +the one, in its entirety and in its immediate surroundings, that there +is for Great Britain to hold the other for the security of her +position in Egypt, for her use of the Suez Canal, and for the control +of the route to India. It would be extremely difficult for a European +state to sustain operations in the eastern Mediterranean with a +British fleet at Malta. Similarly, it would be very difficult for a +transatlantic state to maintain operations in the western Caribbean +with a United States fleet based upon Puerto Rico and the adjacent +islands. The same reasons prompted Bonaparte to seize Malta in his +expedition against Egypt and India in 1798. In his masterly eyes, as +in those of Nelson, it was essential to the communications between +France, Egypt, and India. His scheme failed, not because Malta was +less than invaluable, but for want of adequate naval strength, +without which no maritime position possesses value. + +There were, therefore, in America two possible objectives for the +United States, in case of a war against Spain waged upon grounds at +all general in their nature; but to proceed against either was purely +a question of relative naval strength. Unless, and until, the United +States fleet available for service in the Caribbean Sea was strong +enough to control permanently the waters which separated the Spanish +islands from our territory nearest to them, the admitted vast +superiority of this country in potential resources for land warfare +was completely neutralized. If the Spanish Navy preponderated over +ours, it would be evidently impossible for transports carrying troops +and supplies to traverse the seas safely; and, unless they could so +do, operations of war in the enemy's colonies could neither be begun +nor continued. If, again, the two fleets were so equally balanced as +to make the question of ultimate preponderance doubtful, it was +clearly foolish to land in the islands men whom we might be compelled, +by an unlucky sea-fight, to abandon there. + +This last condition was that which obtained, as war became imminent. +The force of the Spanish Navy--on paper, as the expression goes--was +so nearly equal to our own that it was well within the limits of +possibility that an unlucky incident--the loss, for example, of a +battleship--might make the Spaniard decisively superior in nominal, or +even in actual, available force. An excellent authority told the +writer that he considered that the loss of the _Maine_ had changed the +balance--that is, that whereas with the _Maine_ our fleet had been +slightly superior, so after her destruction the advantage, still +nominal, was rather the other way. We had, of course, a well-founded +confidence in the superior efficiency of our officers and men, and in +the probable better condition of our ships and guns; but where so much +is at stake as the result of a war, or even as the unnecessary +prolongation of war, with its sufferings and anxieties, the only safe +rule is to regard the apparent as the actual, until its reality has +been tested. However good their information, nations, like fencers, +must try their adversary's force before they take liberties. +Reconnaissance must precede decisive action. There was, on the part +of the Navy Department, no indisposition to take risks, provided +success, if obtained, would give an adequate gain. It was clearly +recognized that war cannot be made without running risks; but it was +also held, unwaveringly, that no merely possible success justified +risk, unless it gave a fair promise of diminishing the enemy's naval +force, and so of deciding the control of the sea, upon which the issue +of the war depended. This single idea, and concentration of purpose +upon it, underlay and dictated every step of the Navy Department from +first to last,--so far, at least, as the writer knows,--and it must be +borne in mind by any reader who wishes to pass intelligent judgment +upon the action or non-action of the Department in particular +instances. + +It was this consideration that brought the _Oregon_ from the Pacific +to the Atlantic,--a movement initiated before hostilities opened, +though not concluded until after they began. The wisdom of the step +was justified not merely, nor chiefly, by the fine part played by that +ship on July 3, but by the touch of certainty her presence imparted to +the grip of our fleet upon Cervera's squadron during the preceding +month, and the consequent power to move the army without fear by sea +to Santiago. Few realize the doubts, uncertainties, and difficulties +of the sustained watchfulness which attends such operations as the +"bottling" of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Sampson; for "bottling" a +hostile fleet does not resemble the chance and careless shoving of a +cork into a half-used bottle,--it is rather like the wiring down of +champagne by bonds that cannot be broken and through which nothing can +ooze. This it is which constitutes the claim of the American +Commander-in-Chief upon the gratitude of his countrymen; for to his +skill and tenacity in conducting that operation is primarily due the +early ending of the war, the opportunity to remove our stricken +soldiery from a sickly climate, the ending of suspense, and the saving +of many lives. "The moment Admiral Cervera's fleet was destroyed," +truly said the London "Times" (August 16), "the war was practically at +an end, unless Spain had elected to fight on to save the point of +honor;" for she could have saved nothing else by continued war. + +To such successful operation, however, there is needed not only ships +individually powerful, but numbers of such ships; and that the numbers +of Sampson's fleet were maintained--not drawn off to other, though +important, operations--even under such sore temptation as the dash of +Camara's fleet from Cadiz towards the Philippines, was due to the +Department's ability to hold fast the primary conception of +concentration upon a single purpose, even though running thereby such +a risk as was feared from Camara's armored ships reaching Dewey's +unarmored cruisers before they were reinforced. The chances of the +race to Manila, between Camara, when he started from Cadiz, and the +two monitors from San Francisco, were deliberately taken, in order to +ensure the retention of Cervera's squadron in Santiago, or its +destruction in case of attempted escape. Not till that was +sufficiently provided for would Watson's division be allowed to +depart. Such exclusive tenacity of purpose, under suspense, is more +difficult of maintenance than can be readily recognized by those who +have not undergone it. To avoid misconception, it should be added here +that our division at the Philippines was not itself endangered, +although it was quite possible that Manila Bay might have to be +temporarily abandoned if Camara kept on. The movements of the monitors +were well in hand, and their junction assured, even under the control +of a commander of less conspicuous ability than that already shown by +Admiral Dewey. The return of the united force would speedily have +ensured Camara's destruction and the restoration of previous +conditions. It is evident, however, that a certain amount of national +mortification, and possibly of political complication, might have +occurred in the interim. + +The necessity and the difficulty of thus watching the squadrons of an +enemy within his ports--of "blockading" them, to use a common +expression, of "containing" them, to conform to a strictly accurate +military terminology--are more familiar to the British naval mind than +to ours; for, both by long historical experience and by present-day +needs, the vital importance of so narrowly observing the enemy's +movements has been forced upon its consciousness. A committee of very +distinguished British admirals a few years since reported that, having +in view the difficulty of the operation in itself, and the chances of +the force detailed falling below its _minimum_ by accidents, or by +absence for coal or refits, British naval supremacy, vital to the +Empire, demanded the number of five British battleships to three of +the fleet thus to be controlled. Admiral Sampson's armored ships +numbered seven to Cervera's four, a proportion not dissimilar; but +those seven were all the armored ships, save monitors, worthless for +such purpose, that the United States owned, or would own for some +months yet to come. It should be instructive and convincing to the +American people to note that when two powerful armored ships of the +enemy were thus on their way to attack at one end of the world an +admiral and a division that had deserved so well of their country, our +whole battle-fleet, properly so called, was employed to maintain off +Santiago the proportions which foreign officers, writing long before +the conditions arose, had fixed as necessary. Yet the state with which +we were at war ranks very low among naval Powers. + +The circumstance possesses a furthermost practical present interest, +from its bearing upon the question between numbers and individual +size in the organization of the naval line of battle; for the ever +importunate demand for increase in dimensions in the single ship is +already upon the United States Navy, and to it no logical, no simply +rational, limit has yet been set This question may be stated as +follows: A country can, or will, pay only so much for its war fleet. +That amount of money means so much aggregate tonnage. How shall that +tonnage be allotted? And, especially, how shall the total tonnage +invested in armored ships be divided? Will you have a few very big +ships, or more numerous medium ships? Where will you strike your mean +between numbers and individual size? You cannot have both, unless your +purse is unlimited. The Santiago incident, alike in the battle, in the +preceding blockade, and in the concurrent necessity of sending +battleships to Dewey, illustrates various phases of the argument in +favor of numbers as against extremes of individual size. Heavier ships +were not needed; fewer ships might have allowed some enemy to escape; +when Cervera came out, the _Massachusetts_ was coaling at Guantanamo, +and the _New York_ necessarily several miles distant, circumstances +which, had the ships been bigger and fewer, would have taken much +more, proportionately, from the entire squadron at a critical moment. +Above all, had that aggregate, 65,934 of tonnage, in seven ships, been +divided among five only, of 13,000 each, I know not how the two ships +that were designated to go with Watson to the Philippines could +possibly have sailed. + +The question is momentous, and claims intelligent and immediate +decision; for tonnage once locked up in a built ship cannot be got out +and redistributed to meet the call of the moment. Neither may men +evade a definite conclusion by saying that they will have both +unlimited power--that is, size--and unlimited number; for this they +cannot have. A decision must be reached, and upon it purpose must be +concentrated unwaveringly; the disadvantages as well as the advantages +of the choice must be accepted with singleness of mind. Individual +size is needed, for specific reasons; numbers also are necessary. +Between the two opposing demands there is doubtless a mean of +individual size which will ensure the maximum offensive power _of the +fleet_; for that, and not the maximum power of the single ship, is +the true object of battleship construction. Battleships in all ages +are meant to act together, in fleets; not singly, as mere cruisers. + +A full discussion of all the considerations, on one side or the other, +of this question, would demand more space, and more of technical +detail, than the scope of these papers permits. As with most +conclusions of a concrete character dealing with contradictory +elements, the result reached will inevitably be rather an +approximation than an absolute demonstrable certainty; a broad general +statement, not a narrow formula. All rules of War, which is not an +exact science, but an art, have this characteristic. They do not tell +one exactly how to do right, but they give warning when a step is +being contemplated which the experience of ages asserts to be wrong. +To an instructed mind they cry silently, "Despite all plausible +arguments, this one element involved in that which you are thinking to +do shows that in it you will go wrong." In the judgment of the writer, +two conditions must be primarily considered in determining a class of +battleship to which, for the sake of homogeneousness, most of the +fleet should conform. Of these two, one must be given in general +terms; the other can be stated with more precision. The chief +requisite to be kept in view in the battleship is the offensive power +of the fleet of which it is a member. The aggregate gun-power of the +fleet remaining the same, the increase of its numbers, by limiting the +size of the individual ships, tends, up to a certain point, to +increase its offensive power; for war depends largely upon +combination, and facility of combination increases with numbers. +Numbers, therefore, mean increase of offensive power, other things +remaining equal. I do not quote in defence of this position Nelson's +saying, that "numbers only can annihilate," because in his day +experience had determined a certain mean size of working battleship, +and he probably meant merely that preponderant numbers of that type +were necessary; but weight may justly be laid upon the fact that our +forerunners had, under the test of experience, accepted a certain +working mean, and had rejected those above and below that mean, save +for exceptional uses. + +The second requisite to be fulfilled in the battleship is known +technically as coal endurance,--ability to steam a certain distance +without recoaling, allowing in the calculation a reasonable margin of +safety, as in all designs. This standard distance should be the +greatest that separates two coaling places, as they exist in the +scheme of fortified coaling ports which every naval nation should +frame for itself. In our own case, such distance is that from Honolulu +to Guam, in the Ladrones,--3,500 miles. The excellent results obtained +from our vessels already in commission, embodying as they do the +tentative experiences of other countries, as well as the reflective +powers of our own designers, make it antecedently probable that 10,000 +and 12,000 tons represent the extremes of normal displacement +advantageous for the United States battleship. When this limit is +exceeded, observation of foreign navies goes to show that the numbers +of the fleet will be diminished and its aggregate gun-power not +increased,--that is, ships of 15,000 tons actually have little more +gun-power than those of 10,000. Both results are deviations from the +ideal of the battle-fleet already given. In the United States Navy the +tendency to huge ships needs to be particularly watched, for we have +a tradition in their favor, inherited from the successes of our heavy +frigates in the early years of this century. It must be recalled, +therefore, that those ships were meant to act singly, but that long +experience has shown that for fleet operations a mean of size gives +greater aggregate efficiency, both in force and in precision of +manoeuvre. In the battleship great speed also is distinctly secondary +to offensive power and to coal endurance. + +To return from a long digression. Either Cuba or Puerto Rico might, in +an ordinary case of war, have been selected as the first objective of +the United States operations, with very good reasons for either +choice. What the British island Santa Lucia is to Jamaica, what +Martinique would be to France, engaged in important hostilities in the +Caribbean, that, in measure, Puerto Rico is to Cuba, and was to Spain. +To this was due the general and justifiable professional expectation +that Cervera's squadron would first make for that point, although the +anchorage at San Juan, the principal port, leaves very much to be +desired in the point of military security for a fleet,--a fact that +will call for close and intelligent attention on the part of the +professional advisers of the Navy Department. But, while either of the +Spanish islands was thus eligible, it would have been quite out of the +question to attempt both at the same time, our navy being only equal +to the nominal force of Spain; nor, it should be added, could a +decided superiority over the latter have justified operations against +both, unless our numbers had sufficed to overbear the whole of the +hostile war fleet at both points. To have the greater force and then +to divide it, so that the enemy can attack either or both fractions +with decisively superior numbers, is the acme of military stupidity; +nor is it the less stupid because in practice it has been frequently +done. In it has often consisted the vaunted operation of "surrounding +an enemy," "bringing him between two fires," and so forth; pompous and +troublesome combinations by which a divided force, that could +perfectly well move as a whole, starts from two or three widely +separated points to converge upon a concentrated enemy, permitting him +meanwhile the opportunity, if alert enough, to strike the divisions in +detail. + +Having this obvious consideration in mind, it is curious now to recall +that in the "North American Review," so lately as February, 1897, +appeared an article entitled, "Can the United States afford to fight +Spain?" by "A Foreign Naval Officer,"--evidently, from internal +indications, a Spaniard,--in which occurred this brilliant statement: +"For the purposes of an attack upon Spain in the West Indies, the +American fleet would necessarily divide itself into two squadrons, one +ostensibly destined for Puerto Rico, the other for Cuba.... Spain, +before attempting to inflict serious damage upon places on the +American coast, would certainly try to cut off the connection between +the two American squadrons operating in the West Indies, and to attack +each separately." The remark illustrates the fool's paradise in which +many Spaniards, even naval officers, were living before the war, as is +evidenced by articles in their own professional periodicals. To +attribute such folly to us was not complimentary; and I own my +remarks, upon first reading it, were not complimentary to the writer's +professional competency. + +All reasons, therefore, combined to direct the first movement of the +United States upon Cuba, and upon Cuba alone, leaving Spain in +undisputed possession of such advantages as Puerto Rico might give. +But Cuba and Puerto Rico, points for attack, were not, unluckily, the +only two considerations forced upon the attention of the United +States. We have a very long coast-line, and it was notorious that the +defences were not so far advanced, judged by modern standards, as to +inspire perfect confidence, either in professional men or in the +inhabitants. By some of the latter, indeed, were displayed evidences +of panic unworthy of men, unmeasured, irreflective, and therefore +irrational; due largely, it is to be feared, to that false gospel of +peace which preaches it for the physical comfort and ease of mind +attendant, and in its argument against war strives to smother +righteous indignation or noble ideals by appealing to the fear of +loss,--casting the pearls of peace before the swine of self-interest. +But a popular outcry, whether well or ill founded, cannot be wholly +disregarded by a representative Government; and, outside of the +dangers to the coast,--which, in the case of the larger cities at +least, were probably exaggerated,--there was certainly an opportunity +for an enterprising enemy to embarrass seriously the great coasting +trade carried on under our own flag. There was much idle talk, in +Spain and elsewhere, about the injury that could be done to United +States commerce by scattered cruisers, commerce-destroyers. It was +overlooked that our commerce under our own flag is inconsiderable: +there were very few American ships abroad to be captured. But the +coasting trade, being wholly under our own flag, was, and remains, an +extremely vulnerable interest, one the protection of which will make +heavy demands upon us in any maritime war. Nor can it be urged that +that interest alone will suffer by its own interruption. The bulky +cargoes carried by it cannot be transferred to the coastwise railroads +without overtaxing the capacities of the latter; all of which means, +ultimately, increase of cost and consequent suffering to the consumer, +together with serious injury to all related industries dependent upon +this traffic. + +Under these combined influences the United States Government found +itself confronted from the beginning with two objects of military +solicitude, widely divergent one from the other, both in geographical +position and in method of action; namely, the attack upon Cuba and the +protection of its own shores. As the defences did not inspire +confidence, the navy had to supplement their weakness, although it is +essentially an offensive, and not a defensive, organization. Upon this +the enemy counted much at the first. "To defend the Atlantic coasts in +case of war," wrote a Spanish lieutenant who had been Naval Attache in +Washington, "the United States will need one squadron to protect the +port of New York and another for the Gulf of Mexico. But if the +squadron which it now possesses is devoted to the defence of New York +(including Long Island Sound), the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico must +be entirely abandoned and left at the mercy of blockade and +bombardment." Our total force for the order of battle, prior to the +arrival of the _Oregon_, was nominally only equal to that of the +enemy, and, when divided between the two objects named, the halves +were not decisively superior to the single squadron under +Cervera,--which also might be reinforced by some of the armored ships +then in Spain. The situation, therefore, was one that is not +infrequent, but always embarrassing,--a double purpose and a single +force, which, although divisible, ought not to be divided. + +It is proper here to say, for the remark is both pertinent and most +important, that coast defences and naval force are not interchangeable +things; neither are they opponents, one of the other, but +complementary. The one is stationary, the other mobile; and, however +perfect in itself either may be, the other is necessary to its +completeness. In different nations the relative consequence of the two +may vary. In Great Britain, whose people are fed, and their raw +materials obtained, from the outside world, the need for a fleet +vastly exceeds that for coast defences. With us, able to live off +ourselves, there is more approach to parity. Men may even differ as to +which is the more important; but such difference, in this question, +which is purely military, is not according to knowledge. In equal +amounts, mobile offensive power is always, and under all conditions, +more effective to the ends of war than stationary defensive power. +Why, then, provide the latter? Because mobile force, whatever shape +it take, ships or men, is limited narrowly as to the weight it can +bear; whereas stationary force, generally, being tied to the earth, is +restricted in the same direction only by the ability of the designer +to cope with the conditions. Given a firm foundation, which +practically can always be had, and there is no limit to the amount of +armor,--mere defensive outfit,--be it wood, stone, bricks, or iron, +that you can erect upon it; neither is there any limit to the weight +of guns, the offensive element, that the earth can bear; only they +will be motionless guns. The power of a steam navy to move is +practically unfettered; its ability to carry weight, whether guns or +armor, is comparatively very small. Fortifications, on the contrary, +have almost unbounded power to bear weight, whereas their power to +move is _nil_; which again amounts to saying that, being chained, they +can put forth offensive power only at arm's length, as it were. Thus +stated, it is seen that these two elements of sea warfare are in the +strictest sense complementary, one possessing what the other has not; +and that the difference is fundamental, essential, unchangeable,--not +accidental or temporary. Given local conditions which are generally +to be found, greater power, defensive and offensive, can be +established in permanent works than can be brought to the spot by +fleets. When, therefore, circumstances permit ships to be squarely +pitted against fortifications,--not merely to pass swiftly by +them,--it is only because the builders of the shore works have not, +for some reason, possibly quite adequate, given them the power to +repel attack which they might have had. It will not be asserted that +there are no exceptions to this, as to most general rules; but as a +broad statement it is almost universally true. "I took the liberty to +observe," wrote Nelson at the siege of Calvi, when the commanding +general suggested that some vessels might batter the forts, "that the +business of laying wood against walls was much altered of late." +Precisely what was in his mind when he said "of late" does not appear, +but the phrase itself shows that the conditions which induced any +momentary equality between ships and forts when brought within range +were essentially transient. + +As seaports, and all entrances from the sea, are stationary, it +follows naturally that the arrangements for their defence also should, +as a rule, be permanent and stationary, for as such they are +strongest. Indeed, unless stationary, they are apt not to be +permanent, as was conclusively shown in the late hostilities, where +all the new monitors, six in number, intended for coast defence, were +diverted from that object and despatched to distant points; two going +to Manila, and stripping the Pacific coast of protection, so far as +based upon them. This is one of the essential vices of a system of +coast defence dependent upon ships, even when constructed for that +purpose; they are always liable to be withdrawn by an emergency, real +or fancied. Upon the danger of such diversion to the local security, +Nelson insisted, when charged with the guard of the Thames in 1801. +The block ships (floating batteries), he directed, were on no account +to be moved for any momentary advantage; for it might very well be +impossible for them to regain their carefully chosen positions when +wanted there. Our naval scheme in past years has been seriously +damaged, and now suffers, from two misleading conceptions: one that a +navy is for defence primarily, and not for offensive war; the other, +consequent mainly upon the first, that the monitor, being stronger +defensively than offensively, and of inferior mobility, was the best +type of warship. The Civil War, being, so far as the sea was +concerned, essentially a coast war, naturally fostered this opinion. +The monitor in smooth water is better able to stand up to shore guns +than ships are which present a larger target; but, for all that, it is +more vulnerable, both above water and below, than shore guns are if +these are properly distributed. It is a hybrid, neither able to bear +the weight that fortifications do, nor having the mobility of ships; +and it is, moreover, a poor gun-platform in a sea-way. + +There is no saying of Napoleon's known to the writer more pregnant of +the whole art and practice of war than this, "Exclusiveness of purpose +is the secret of great successes and of great operations." If, +therefore, in maritime war, you wish permanent defences for your +coasts, rely exclusively upon stationary works, if the conditions +admit, not upon floating batteries which have the weaknesses of ships. +If you wish offensive war carried on vigorously upon the seas, rely +exclusively upon ships that have the qualities of ships and not of +floating batteries. We had in the recent hostilities 26,000 tons of +shipping sealed up in monitors, of comparatively recent construction, +in the Atlantic and the Pacific. There was not an hour from first to +last, I will venture to say, that we would not gladly have exchanged +the whole six for two battleships of less aggregate displacement; and +that although, from the weakness of the Spanish defences, we were able +to hug pretty closely most parts of the Cuban coast. Had the Spanish +guns at Santiago kept our fleet at a greater distance, we should have +lamented still more bitterly the policy which gave us sluggish +monitors for mobile battleships. + + + + +II + + THE EFFECT OF DEFICIENT COAST-DEFENCE UPON THE MOVEMENTS OF + THE NAVY.--THE MILITARY AND NAVAL CONDITIONS OF SPAIN + AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR. + + +The unsatisfactory condition of the coast defences, whereby the navy +lost the support of its complementary factor in the scheme of national +sea power, imposed a vicious, though inevitable, change in the +initial plan of campaign, which should have been directed in full +force against the coast of Cuba. The four newer monitors on the +Atlantic coast, if distributed among our principal ports, were not +adequate, singly, to resist the attack which was suggested by the +possibilities of the case--though remote--and still more by the panic +among certain of our citizens. On the other hand, if the four were +massed and centrally placed, which is the correct disposition of any +mobile force, military or naval, intended to counteract the attack of +an enemy whose particular line of approach is as yet uncertain, their +sluggishness and defective nautical qualities would make them +comparatively inefficient. New York, for instance, is a singularly +central and suitable point, relatively to our northern Atlantic +seaboard, in which to station a division intended to meet and thwart +the plans of a squadron like Cervera's, if directed against our coast +ports, in accordance with the fertile imaginations of evil which were +the fashion in that hour. Did the enemy appear off either Boston, the +Delaware, or the Chesapeake, he could not effect material injury +before a division of ships of the _Oregon_ class would be upon him; +and within the limits named are found the major external commercial +interests of the country as well as the ocean approaches along which +they travel. But had the monitors been substituted for battleships, +not to speak of their greater slowness, their inferiority as steady +gun-platforms would have placed them at a serious disadvantage if the +enemy were met outside, as he perfectly well might be. + +It was probably such considerations as these, though the writer was +not privy to them, that determined the division of the battle fleet, +and the confiding to the section styled the Flying Squadron the +defence of the Atlantic coast for the time being. The monitors were +all sent to Key West, where they would be at hand to act against +Havana; the narrowness of the field in which that city, Key West, and +Matanzas are comprised making their slowness less of a drawback, while +the moderate weather which might be expected to prevail would permit +their shooting to be less inaccurate. The station of the Flying +Squadron in Hampton Roads, though not so central as New York +relatively to the more important commercial interests, upon which, if +upon any, the Spanish attack might fall, was more central as regards +the whole coast; and, above all, was nearer than New York to Havana +and to Puerto Rico. The time element also entered the calculations in +another way, for a fleet of heavy ships is more certainly able to put +to sea at a moment's notice, in all conditions of tide and weather, +from the Chesapeake than from New York Bay. In short, the position +chosen may be taken to indicate that, in the opinion of the Navy +Department and its advisers, Cervera was not likely to attempt a dash +at an Atlantic port, and that it was more important to be able to +reach the West Indies speedily than to protect New York or Boston,--a +conclusion which the writer entirely shared. + +The country, however, should not fail to note that the division of the +armored fleet into two sections, nearly a thousand miles apart, though +probably the best that could be done under all the circumstances of +the moment, was contrary to sound practice; and that the conditions +which made it necessary should not have existed. Thus, deficient coast +protection reacts unfavorably upon the war fleet, which in all its +movements should be free from any responsibility for the mere safety +of the ports it quits. Under such conditions as then obtained, it +might have been possible for Spain to force our entire battle fleet +from its offensive undertaking against Cuba, and to relegate it to +mere coast defence. Had Cervera's squadron, instead of being +despatched alone to the Antilles, been recalled to Spain, as it should +have been, and there reinforced by the two armored ships which +afterwards went to Suez with Camara, the approach of this compact body +would have compelled our fleet to concentrate; for each of our +divisions of three ships--prior to the arrival of the _Oregon_--would +have been too weak to hazard an engagement with the enemy's six. When +thus concentrated, where should it be placed? Off Havana, or at +Hampton Roads? It could not be at both. The answer undoubtedly should +be, "Off Havana;" for there it would be guarding the most important +part of the enemy's coast, blocking the access to it of the Spanish +fleet, and at the same time covering Key West, our naval base of +operations. But if the condition of our coast defences at all +corresponded to the tremors of our seaport citizens, the Government +manifestly would be unable to hold the fleet thus at the front. Had +it, on the contrary, been impossible for an enemy's fleet to approach +nearer than three miles to our sea-coast without great and evident +danger of having ships damaged which could not be replaced, and of +wasting ammunition at ranges too long even for bombardments, the +Spanish battle fleet would have kept away, and would have pursued its +proper object of supporting their campaign in Cuba by driving off our +fleet--if it could. It is true that no amount of fortification will +secure the coasting trade beyond easy gunshot of the works; but as the +enemy's battle fleet could not have devoted itself for long to +molesting the coasters--because our fleet would thereby be drawn to +the spot--that duty must have devolved upon vessels of another class, +against which we also would have provided, and did provide, by the +squadron of cruisers under Commodore Howell. In short, proper coast +defence, the true and necessary complement of an efficient navy, +releases the latter for its proper work,--offensive, upon the open +seas, or off the enemy's shores. + +[Illustration: Map of Cuba (map)] + +The subject receives further illumination when we consider, in +addition to the hypothetical case just discussed,--the approach of six +Spanish ships,--the actual conditions at the opening of the campaign. +We had chosen Cuba for our objective, had begun our operations, +Cervera was on his way across the ocean, and our battle fleet was +divided and posted as stated. It was reasonable for us to estimate +each division of our ships--one comprising the _New York_, _Iowa_, and +_Indiana_, the other the _Brooklyn_, _Massachusetts_, and _Texas_--as +able to meet Cervera's four, these being of a class slightly inferior +to the best of ours. We might at least flatter ourselves that, to use +a frequent phrase of Nelson's, by the time they had soundly beaten one +of these groups, they would give us no more trouble for the rest of +the year. We could, therefore, with perfect military propriety, have +applied the two divisions to separate tasks on the Cuban coast, if our +own coast had been adequately fortified. + +The advantage--nay, the necessity--of thus distributing our +battleships, having only four enemies to fear, will appear from a +glance at the map of Cuba. It will there be seen that the island is +particularly narrow abreast of Havana, and that from there, for a +couple of hundred miles to the eastward, extends the only tolerably +developed railroad system, by which the capital is kept in +communication with the seaports, on the north coast as far as Sagua la +Grande, and on the south with Cienfuegos and Batabano. This +narrowness, and the comparative facility of communication indicated by +the railroads, enabled Spain, during her occupation, effectually to +prevent combined movements between the insurgents in the east and +those in the west; a power which Weyler endeavored to increase by the +_trocha_ system,--a ditch or ditches, with closely supporting works, +extending across the island. Individuals, or small parties, might slip +by unperceived; but it should have been impossible for any serious +co-operation to take place. The coast-wise railroads, again, kept +Havana and the country adjacent to them in open, if limited, +communication with the sea, so long as any one port upon their lines +remained unblockaded. For reasons such as these, in this belt of land, +from Havana to Sagua and Cienfuegos, lay the chief strength of the +Spanish tenure, which centred upon Havana; and in it the greatest +part of the Spanish army was massed. Until, therefore, we were ready +to invade, which should not have been before the close of the rainy +season, the one obvious course open to us was to isolate the capital +and the army from the sea, through which supplies of all kinds--daily +bread, almost, of food and ammunition--were introduced; for Cuba, in +these respects, produces little. + +To perfect such isolation, however, it was necessary not only to place +before each port armed cruisers able to stop merchant steamers, but +also to give to the vessels so stationed, as well on the south as on +the north side, a backbone of support by the presence of an armored +fleet, which should both close the great ports--Havana and +Cienfuegos--and afford a rallying-point to the smaller ships, if +driven in by the appearance of Cervera's division. The main +fleet--three armored ships--on the north was thus used, although the +blockade, from the fewness of available cruisers, was not at first +extended beyond Cardenas. On the south a similar body--the Flying +Squadron--should from the first have been stationed before +Cienfuegos; for each division, as has been said, could with military +propriety have been risked singly against Cervera's four ships. This +was not done, because it was possible--though most improbable--that +the Spanish squadron might attempt one of our own ports; because we +had not perfect confidence in the harbor defences; and because, also, +of the popular outcry. Consequently, the extremely important port of +Cienfuegos, a back door to Havana, was blockaded only by a few light +cruisers; and when the Spanish squadron was reported at Curacao, these +had to be withdrawn. One only was left to maintain in form the +blockade which had been declared; and she had instructions to clear +out quickly if the enemy appeared. Neither one, nor a dozen, of such +ships would have been the slightest impediment to Cervera's entering +Cienfuegos, raising our blockade by force; and this, it is needless to +add, would have been hailed in Spain and throughout the Continent of +Europe as a distinct defeat for us,--which, in truth, it would have +been, carrying with it consequences political as well as military. + +This naval mishap, had it occurred, would have been due mainly to +inadequate armament of our coasts; for to retain the Flying Squadron +in the Chesapeake, merely as a guard to the coasting trade, would have +been a serious military error, subordinating an offensive +operation--off Cienfuegos--to one merely defensive, and not absolutely +vital. "The best protection against an enemy's fire," said Farragut, +"is a well-directed fire from our own guns." Analogically, the best +defence for one's own shores is to harass and threaten seriously those +of the opponent; but this best defence cannot be employed to the +utmost, if the inferior, passive defence of fortification has been +neglected. The fencer who wears also a breastplate may be looser in +his guard. Seaports cannot strike beyond the range of their guns; but +if the great commercial ports and naval stations can strike +effectively so far, the fleet can launch into the deep rejoicing, +knowing that its home interests, behind the buckler of the fixed +defences, are safe till it returns. + +The broader determining conditions, and the consequent dispositions +made by the Government of the United States and its naval authorities, +in the recent campaign, have now been stated and discussed. In them +is particularly to be noted the crippling effect upon naval operations +produced by the consciousness of inadequate coast defences of the +permanent type. The sane conclusion to be drawn is, that while +sea-coast fortification can never take the place of fleets; that +while, as a defence even, it, being passive, is far inferior to the +active measure of offensive defence, which protects its own interests +by carrying offensive war out on to the sea, and, it may be, to the +enemy's shores; nevertheless, by the fearless freedom of movement it +permits to the navy, it is to the latter complementary,--completes it; +the two words being etymologically equivalent. + +The other comments hitherto made upon our initial plan of +operations--for example, the impropriety of attempting simultaneous +movements against Puerto Rico and Cuba, and the advisability or +necessity, under the same conditions, of moving against both +Cienfuegos and Havana by the measure of a blockade--were simply +special applications of general principles of warfare, universally +true, to particular instances in this campaign. They address +themselves, it may be said, chiefly to the soldier or seaman, as +illustrating his especial business of directing war; and while their +value to the civilian cannot be denied,--for whatever really +enlightens public opinion in a country like ours facilitates military +operations,--nevertheless the function of coast defence, as +contributory to sea power, is a lesson most necessary to be absorbed +by laymen; for it, as well as the maintenance of the fleet, is in this +age the work of peace times, when the need of preparation for war is +too little heeded to be understood. The illustrations of the +embarrassment actually incurred from this deficiency in the late +hostilities are of the nature of an object lesson, and as such should +be pondered. + +At the same time, however, that attention is thus called to the +inevitable and far-reaching effect of such antecedent neglects, shown +in directions where men would not ordinarily have expected them, it is +necessary to check exaggeration of coast defence, in extent or in +degree, by remarking that in any true conception of war, +fortification, defence, inland and sea-coast alike, is of value merely +in so far as it conduces to offensive operations. This is +conspicuously illustrated by our recent experience. The great evil of +our deficiencies in coast armament was that they neutralized +temporarily a large part of our navy; prevented our sending it to +Cuba; made possible that Cervera's squadron, during quite an interval, +might do this or that thing of several things thus left open to him, +the result of which would have been to encourage the enemy, and +possibly to produce political action by our ill-wishers abroad. +Directly upon this consideration--of the use that the Flying Squadron +might have been, if not held up for coast defence--follows the further +reflection how much more useful still would have been a third +squadron; that is, a navy half as large again as we then had. +Expecting Cervera's force alone, a navy of such size, free from +anxiety about coast defence, could have barred to him San Juan de +Puerto Rico as well as Cienfuegos and Havana; or had Camara been +joined to Cervera, as he should have been, such a force would have +closed both Cienfuegos and Havana with divisions that need not have +feared the combined enemy. If, further, there had been a fourth +squadron--our coast defence in each case remaining the same--our +evident naval supremacy would probably have kept the Spanish fleet in +Europe. Not unlikely there would have been no war; in which event, the +anti-imperialist may observe there would, thanks to a great and +prepared navy, have been no question of the Philippines, and possibly +none of Hawaii. + +In short, it is with coast defence and the navy as it is with numbers +_versus_ size in battleships. Both being necessary, the question of +proportion demands close attention, but in both cases the same single +principle dominates: offensive power, not defensive, determines the +issues of war. In the solution of the problem, the extent to be given +coast defence by fortification depends, as do all military decisions, +whether of preparation or of actual warfare, upon certain +well-recognized principles; and for a given country or coast, since +the natural conditions remain permanent, the general dispositions, and +the relative power of the several works, if determined by men of +competent military knowledge, will remain practically constant during +long periods. It is true, doubtless, that purely military conclusions +must submit to some modification, in deference to the liability of a +population to panics. The fact illustrates again the urgent necessity +for the spread of sound elementary ideas on military subjects among +the people at large; but, if the great coast cities are satisfied of +their safety, a government will be able to resist the unreasonable +clamor--for such it is--of small towns and villages, which are +protected by their own insignificance. The navy is a more variable +element; for the demands upon it depend upon external conditions of a +political character, which may undergo changes not only sudden, but +extensive. The results of the war with Spain, for instance, have +affected but little the question of passive coast defence, by +fortification or otherwise; but they have greatly altered the +circumstances which hitherto have dictated the size of our active +forces, both land and sea. Upon the greater or less strength of the +navy depends, in a maritime conflict, the aggressive efficiency which +shortens war, and so mitigates its evils. In the general question of +preparation for naval war, therefore, the important centres and +internal waterways of commerce must receive local protection, where +they are exposed to attack from the sea; the rest must trust, and can +in such case safely trust, to the fleet, upon which, as the offensive +arm, all other expenditure for military maritime efficiency should be +made. The preposterous and humiliating terrors of the past months, +that a hostile fleet would waste coal and ammunition in shelling +villages and bathers on a beach, we may hope will not recur. + +Before proceeding to study the operations of the war, the military and +naval conditions of the enemy at its outbreak must be briefly +considered. + +Spain, being a state that maintains at all times a regular army, +respectable in numbers as well as in personal valor, had at the +beginning, and, from the shortness of the war, continued to the end to +have a decided land superiority over ourselves. Whatever we might hope +eventually to produce in the way of an effective army, large enough +for the work in Cuba, time was needed for the result, and time was not +allowed. In one respect only the condition of the Peninsula seems to +have resembled our own; that was in the inadequacy of the coast +defences. The matter there was even more serious than with us, +because not only were the preparations less, but several large +sea-coast cities--for instance, Barcelona, Malaga, Cadiz--lie +immediately upon the sea-shore; whereas most of ours are at the head +of considerable estuaries, remote from the entrance. The exposure of +important commercial centres to bombardment, therefore, was for them +much greater. This consideration was indeed so evident, that there was +in the United States Navy a perceptible current of feeling in favor of +carrying maritime war to the coast of Spain, and to its commercial +approaches. + +The objection to this, on the part of the Navy Department, was, with +slight modifications, the same as to the undertaking of operations +against Puerto Rico. There was not at our disposition, either in +armored ships or in cruisers, any superfluity of force over and above +the requirements of the projected blockade of Cuba. To divert ships +from this object, therefore, would be false to the golden rule of +concentration of effort,--to the single eye that gives light in +warfare. Moreover, in such a movement, the reliance, as represented in +the writer's hearing, would have been upon moral effect, upon the +dismay of the enemy; for we should soon have come to the end of our +physical coercion. As Nelson said of bombarding Copenhagen, "We should +have done our worst, and no nearer friends." The influence of moral +effect in war is indisputable, and often tremendous; but like some +drugs in the pharmacopoeia, it is very uncertain in its action. The +other party may not, as the boys say, "scare worth a cent;" whereas +material forces can be closely measured beforehand, and their results +reasonably predicted. This statement, generally true, is historically +especially true of the Spaniard, attacked in his own land. The +tenacity of the race has never come out so strongly as under such +conditions, as was witnessed in the old War of the Spanish Succession, +and during the usurpation of Napoleon. + +On the other hand, such an enterprise on our part, if directed against +Spanish commerce on the seas, as was suggested by several excellent +officers, would have had but a trivial objective. The commerce of +Spain was cut up, root and branch, by our expeditions against her +colonies, Cuba and Manila; for her most important trade depended upon +monopoly of the colonial markets. The slight stream of traffic +maintained in Spanish bottoms between the English Channel and the +Peninsula, was so small that it could readily have been transferred to +neutral ships, whose flag we had for this war engaged should protect +enemy's goods. Under these circumstances, the coasts of the +Philippines and of Cuba were to us the coast of Spain, and far more +conveniently so than that of the home country would have been. A +Spanish merchant captain, writing from Barcelona as early as the 7th +of May, had said: "At this moment we have shut up in this port the +[steam] fleets of five transatlantic companies," which he names. "The +sailing-vessels are tied up permanently. Several [named] ships have +fallen into the hands of the enemy. Meantime the blockade of Cuba, +Puerto Rico, and Manila continues, at least for our flag, and maritime +commerce is at a standstill. In Barcelona some foreign firms, +exporters to the Philippines, have failed, as well as several +custom-house brokers, owing to the total cessation of mercantile +movement. The losses already suffered by our trade are incalculable, +amounting to much more than the millions needed to maintain a +half-dozen armored ships, which would have prevented the Yankees from +daring so much." These vessels continued to lie idle in Barcelona +until the dread of Commodore Watson's threatened approach caused them +to be sent to Marseilles, seeking the protection of the neutral port. +A few weeks later the same Spanish writer comments: "The result of our +mistakes," in the management of the navy, "is the loss of the markets +of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and, in consequence, the +death of our merchant marine." Inquiries were addressed by the state +to the Chambers of Commerce, for suggestions as to the opening of new +markets, to compensate for the existing suspension of communications +with "the over-sea provinces." + +With such results from our operations in the Antilles and the +Philippines, there was no inducement, and indeed no justification, for +sending cruisers across the ocean, until we had enough and to spare +for the blockade of Cuba and Puerto Rico. This was at no time the +case, up to the close of the war, owing to a combination of causes. +The work of paralyzing Spanish trade was being effectually done by +the same measures that tended to strangle the Spanish armies in Cuba +and the Philippines, and which, when fully developed, would entirely +sever their necessary communications with the outside world. Besides +all this, the concentration of our efforts upon Cuba, with a +subsequent slight extension to the single port of San Juan in Puerto +Rico, imposed upon Spain the burden of sustaining the war between +three and four thousand miles from home, and spared us the like +additional strain. Every consideration so far entertained, therefore, +of energy as well as of prudence, dictated the application of all the +pressure at our disposal at the beginning of hostilities, and until +the destruction of Cervera's squadron, upon Cuba, and in a very minor +degree upon Puerto Rico. Indeed, the ships placed before San Juan were +not for blockade, properly so called, but to check any mischievous +display of energy by the torpedo cruiser within. + +After thus noting briefly the conditions of the enemy's coast defences +and commerce, there remains to consider the one other element of his +sea power--the combatant navy--with regard to its force and to its +disposition when war began. + +As was before said, the disparity between the armored fleets of the +two nations was nominally inconsiderable; and the Spaniards possessed +one extremely valuable--and by us unrivalled--advantage in a nearly +homogeneous group of five[1] armored cruisers, very fast, and very +similar both in nautical qualities and in armament. It is difficult to +estimate too highly the possibilities open to such a body of ships, +regarded as a "fleet in being," to use an expression that many of our +readers may have seen, but perhaps scarcely fully understood. + +The phrase "fleet in being," having within recent years gained much +currency in naval writing, demands--like the word "jingo"--preciseness +of definition; and this, in general acceptance, it has not yet +attained. It remains, therefore, somewhat vague, and so occasions +misunderstandings between men whose opinions perhaps do not materially +differ. The writer will not attempt to define, but a brief +explanation of the term and its origin may not be amiss. It was first +used, in 1690, by the British admiral Lord Torrington, when defending +his course in declining to engage decisively, with an inferior force, +a French fleet, then dominating in the Channel, and under cover of +which it was expected that a descent upon the English coast would be +made by a great French army. "Had I fought otherwise," he said, "our +fleet had been totally lost, and the kingdom had lain open to +invasion. As it was, most men were in fear that the French would +invade; but I was always of another opinion, for I always said that +whilst we had a fleet in being, they would not dare to make an +attempt." + +A "fleet in being," therefore, is one the existence and maintenance of +which, although inferior, on or near the scene of operations, is a +perpetual menace to the various more or less exposed interests of the +enemy, who cannot tell when a blow may fall, and who is therefore +compelled to restrict his operations, otherwise possible, until that +fleet can be destroyed or neutralized. It corresponds very closely to +"a position on the flank and rear" of an enemy, where the presence of +a smaller force, as every military student knows, harasses, and may +even paralyze offensive movements. When such a force is extremely +mobile, as a fleet of armored cruisers may be, its power of mischief +is very great; potentially, it is forever on the flank and rear, +threatening the lines of communications. It is indeed as a threat to +communications that the "fleet in being" is chiefly formidable. + +The theory received concrete and convincing illustration during the +recent hostilities, from the effect exerted--and justly exerted--upon +our plans and movements by Cervera's squadron, until there had been +assembled before Santiago a force at once so strong and so numerous as +to make his escape very improbable. Even so, when a telegram was +received from a capable officer that he had identified by night, off +the north coast of Cuba, an armored cruiser,--which, if of that class, +was most probably an enemy,--the sailing of Shafter's expedition was +stopped until the report could be verified. So much for the positive, +material influence--in the judgment of the writer, the reasonable +influence--of a "fleet in being." As regards the moral effect, the +effect upon the imagination, it is scarcely necessary more than to +allude to the extraordinary play of the fancy, the kaleidoscopic +effects elicited from our own people, and from some foreign critics, +in propounding dangers for ourselves and ubiquity for Cervera. Against +the infection of such tremors it is one of the tasks of those in +responsibility to guard themselves and, if possible, their people. +"Don't make pictures for yourself," was Napoleon's warning to his +generals. "Every naval operation since I became head of the government +has failed, because my admirals see double and have learned--where I +don't know--that war can be made without running risks." + +The probable value of a "fleet in being" has, in the opinion of the +writer, been much overstated; for, even at the best, the game of +evasion, which this is, if persisted in, can have but one issue. The +superior force will in the end run the inferior to earth. In the +meanwhile, however, vital time may have been lost. It is conceivable, +for instance, that Cervera's squadron, if thoroughly effective, might, +by swift and well-concealed movements, have detained our fleet in the +West Indies until the hurricane of September, 1898, swept over the +Caribbean. We had then no reserve to replace armored ships lost or +damaged. But, for such persistence of action, there is needed in each +unit of the "fleet in being" an efficiency rarely attainable, and +liable to be lost by unforeseen accident at a critical moment. Where +effect, nay, safety, depends upon mere celerity of movement, as in +retreat, a crippled ship means a lost ship; or a lost fleet, if the +body sticks to its disabled member. Such efficiency it is probable +Cervera's division never possessed. The length of its passage across +the Atlantic, however increased by the embarrassment of frequently +recoaling the torpedo destroyers, so far over-passed the extreme +calculations of our naval authorities, that ready credence was given +to an apparently authentic report that it had returned to Spain; the +more so that such concentration was strategically correct, and it was +incorrect to adventure an important detachment so far from home, +without the reinforcement it might have received in Cadiz. This delay, +in ships whose individual speed had originally been very high, has +been commonly attributed in our service to the inefficiency of the +engine-room force; and this opinion is confirmed by a Spanish officer +writing in their "Revista de la Marina." "The Americans," he says, +"keep their ships cruising constantly, in every sea, and therefore +have a large and qualified engine-room force. We have but few +machinists, and are almost destitute of firemen." This inequality, +however, is fundamentally due to the essential differences of +mechanical capacity and development in the two nations. An amusing +story was told the writer some years ago by one of our consuls in +Cuba. Making a rather rough passage between two ports, he saw an +elderly Cuban or Spanish gentleman peering frequently into the +engine-room, with evident uneasiness. When asked the cause of his +concern, the reply was, "I don't feel comfortable unless the man in +charge of the engines talks English to them." + +When to the need of constant and sustained ability to move at high +speed is added the necessity of frequent recoaling, allowing the +hostile navy time to come up, it is evident that the active use of a +"fleet in being," however perplexing to the enemy, must be both +anxious and precarious to its own commander. The contest is one of +strategic wits, and it is quite possible that the stronger, though +slower, force, centrally placed, may, in these days of cables, be able +to receive word and to corner its antagonist before the latter can +fill his bunkers. Of this fact we should probably have received a very +convincing illustration, had a satisfactory condition of our coast +defences permitted the Flying Squadron to be off Cienfuegos, or even +off Havana, instead of in Hampton Roads. Cervera's entrance to +Santiago was known to us within twenty-four hours. In twenty-four more +it could have been communicated off Cienfuegos by a fast despatch +boat, after which less than forty-eight would have placed our division +before Santiago. The uncertainty felt by Commodore Schley, when he +arrived off Cienfuegos, as to whether the Spanish division was inside +or no, would not have existed had his squadron been previously +blockading; and his consequent delay of over forty-eight hours--with +the rare chance thus offered to Cervera--would not have occurred. To +coal four great ships within that time was probably beyond the +resources of Santiago; whereas the speed predicated for our own +movements is rather below than above the dispositions contemplated to +ensure it. + +The great end of a war fleet, however, is not to chase, nor to fly, +but to control the seas. Had Cervera escaped our pursuit at Santiago, +it would have been only to be again paralyzed at Cienfuegos or at +Havana. When speed, not force, is the reliance, destruction may be +postponed, but can be escaped only by remaining in port. Let it not, +therefore, be inferred, from the possible, though temporary, effect of +a "fleet in being," that speed is the chief of all factors in the +battleship. This plausible, superficial notion, too easily accepted in +these days of hurry and of unreflecting dependence upon machinery as +the all in all, threatens much harm to the future efficiency of the +navy. Not speed, but power of offensive action, is the dominant factor +in war. The decisive preponderant element of great land forces has +ever been the infantry, which, it is needless to say, is also the +slowest. The homely summary of the art of war, "To get there first +with the most men," has with strange perverseness been so distorted +in naval--and still more in popular--conception, that the second and +more important consideration has been subordinated to the former and +less essential. Force does not exist for mobility, but mobility for +force. It is of no use to get there first unless, when the enemy in +turn arrives, you have also the most men,--the greater force. This is +especially true of the sea, because there inferiority of force--of gun +power--cannot be compensated, as on land it at times may be, by +judiciously using accidents of the ground. I do not propose to fall +into an absurdity of my own by questioning the usefulness of higher +speed, _provided_ the increase is not purchased at the expense of +strictly offensive power; but the time has come to say plainly that +its value is being exaggerated; that it is in the battleship secondary +to gun power; that a battle fleet can never attain, nor maintain, the +highest rate of any ship in it, except of that one which at the moment +is the slowest, for it is a commonplace of naval action that fleet +speed is that of the slowest ship; that not exaggerated speed, but +uniform speed--sustained speed--is the requisite of the battle fleet; +that it is not machinery, as is often affirmed, but brains and guns, +that win battles and control the sea. The true speed of war is not +headlong precipitancy, but the unremitting energy which wastes no +time. + +For the reasons that have been given, the safest, though not the most +effective, disposition of an inferior "fleet in being" is to lock it +up in an impregnable port or ports, imposing upon the enemy the +intense and continuous strain of watchfulness against escape. This it +was that Torrington, the author of the phrase, proposed for the time +to do. Thus it was that Napoleon, to some extent before Trafalgar, but +afterward with set and exclusive purpose, used the French Navy, which +he was continually augmenting, and yet never, to the end of his reign, +permitted again to undertake any serious expedition. The mere +maintenance of several formidable detachments, in apparent readiness, +from the Scheldt round to Toulon, presented to the British so many +possibilities of mischief that they were compelled to keep constantly +before each of the French ports a force superior to that within, +entailing an expense and an anxiety by which the Emperor hoped to +exhaust their endurance. To some extent this was Cervera's position +and function in Santiago, whence followed logically the advisability +of a land attack upon the port, to force to a decisive issue a +situation which was endurable only if incurable. "The destruction of +Cervera's squadron," justly commented an Italian writer, before the +result was known, "is the only really decisive fact that can result +from the expedition to Santiago, because it will reduce to impotence +the naval power of Spain. The determination of the conflict will +depend throughout upon the destruction of the Spanish sea power, and +not upon territorial descents, although the latter may aggravate the +situation." The American admiral from before Santiago, when urging the +expedition of a land force to make the bay untenable, telegraphed, +"The destruction of this squadron will end the war;" and it did. + +In other respects it is probable that the Spanish admiral had little +confidence in a squadron which, whatever the courage or other +qualities of the officers and seamen, had never manoeuvred together +until it left the Cape de Verde Islands. Since its destruction, a +writer in a Spanish naval magazine has told the following incident: +"A little more than a year ago we visited General Cervera in La +Carraca, [the Cadiz arsenal], and we said to him: 'You appear to be +indicated, by professional opinion, for the command of the squadron in +case war is declared.' 'In that case,' he replied, 'I shall accept, +knowing, however, that I am going to a Trafalgar.' 'And how could that +disaster be avoided?' 'By allowing me to expend beforehand fifty +thousand tons of coal in evolutions and ten thousand projectiles in +target practice. Otherwise we shall go to a Trafalgar. Remember what I +say.'" + +It is curious to contrast with this well-founded fear of an +experienced and gallant officer, expressed in private conversation, +the opinion of another Spanish officer, lately Minister of Marine, +reported to the Madrid public through a newspaper,--the "Heraldo," of +April 6, 1898. It illustrates, further, the curious illusions +entertained in high quarters in Spain: + +"We had an opportunity to-day of talking for a long time with General +Beranger, the last Secretary of the Navy under the Conservative +Cabinet. To the questions which we directed to him concerning the +conflict pending with the United States, he was kind enough to inform +us that he confided absolutely in the triumph of our naval forces.... +'We shall conquer on the sea, and I am now going to give you my +reasons. The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevails +on our warships; and the second, as soon as fire is opened, the crews +of the American ships will commence to desert, since we all know that +among them are people of all nationalities. Ship against ship, +therefore, a failure is not to be feared. I believe that the squadron +detained at Cape de Verde, and particularly the destroyers, should +have, and could have, continued the voyage to Cuba, since they have +nothing to fear from the American fleet.'" + +The review from which Cervera's opinion is quoted has, since the +disasters to the Spanish Navy, been full of complaints and of detailed +statements concerning the neglect of the navy, both in its material +and in drills, during the antecedent months of peace, owing to the +practice of a misplaced, if necessary, economy. But that economy, it +is justly argued, would not have been required to a disabling degree, +if so disproportionate an amount of money had not been expended upon +the army, by a state whose great colonial system could in war be +sustained only by a fleet. "In more than a year," writes a captain in +the Spanish Navy, "we have had only one target practice, and that +limited in extent, in order to expend the least possible amount of +ammunition." The short brilliant moments of triumph in war are the +sign and the seal of the long hours of obscure preparations, of which +target practice is but one item. Had even the nominal force of Spain +been kept in efficient condition for immediate action, the task of the +United States would have been greatly prolonged and far from so easy +as it has been since declared by those among our people who delight to +belittle the great work our country has just achieved, and to +undervalue the magnanimity of its resolution to put a stop to outrages +at our doors which were well said to have become intolerable. Neither +by land nor by sea was the state of the case so judged by professional +men, either at home or abroad. It was indeed evident that, if we +persevered, there could be but one issue; but this might have been +postponed, by an active opponent, long enough to have disheartened our +nation, if it was as easily to be discouraged by the difficulties and +dangers, now past, as it is in some quarters represented again to be +by the problems arising out of the war and its conquests. Such +discouragement, perplexity, and consequent frustration of the +adversary's purposes are indeed the prime function of a "fleet in +being,"--to create and to maintain moral effect, in short, rather than +physical, unless indeed the enemy, yielding to moral effect, divides +his forces in such wise as to give a chance for a blow at one portion +of them. The tendency to this also received illustration in our war. +"Our sea-coast," said a person then in authority to the present +writer, "was in a condition of unreasoning panic, and fought to have +little squadrons scattered along it everywhere, according to the +theory of defence always favored by stupid terror." The "stupidity," +by all military experience, was absolute--unqualified; but the Navy +Department succeeded in withstanding the "terror"--the moral +effect--so far as to compromise on the Flying Squadron; a rational +solution, though not unimpeachable. We thus, instead of a half-dozen +naval groups, had only two, the combination of which might perhaps be +effected in time enough. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] In this number is included the _Emperador Carlos V._; which, +however, did not accompany the other four under Cervera. + + + + +III + + POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO THE SPANISH NAVY AT THE BEGINNING OF + THE WAR.--THE REASONS FOR BLOCKADING CUBA.--FIRST + MOVEMENTS OF THE SQUADRONS UNDER ADMIRALS SAMPSON AND + CERVERA. + + +For the reasons just stated, it was upon Cervera's squadron that the +attention of instructed military students was chiefly turned at the +outset of the war. Grave suspicions as to its efficiency, indeed, were +felt in many quarters, based partly upon actual knowledge of the +neglect of the navy practised by the Spanish Government, and partly +upon the inference that the general incapacity evident for years past +in all the actions of the Spanish authorities, and notably in Cuba, +could not but extend to the navy,--one of the most sensitive and +delicate parts of any political organization; one of the first to go +to pieces when the social and political foundations of a State are +shaken, as was notably shown in the French Revolution. But, though +suspected, the ineffectiveness of that squadron could not be assumed +before proved. Until then--to use the words of an Italian writer who +has treated the whole subject of this war with comprehensive and +instructive perspicacity--Spain had "the possibility of contesting the +command of the sea, and even of securing a definite preponderance, by +means of a squadron possessed of truly exceptional characteristics, +both tactical and strategic,"--in short, by means of a "fleet in +being." + +It is true that in this estimate the writer quoted included the +_Carlos V._, a new and high-powered armored cruiser, and also a number +of protected cruisers and of torpedo vessels, of various kinds, all +possessing a rate of speed much superior to the more distinctly +fighting ships in which consisted the strength of the United States +squadrons. Such a fleet, homogeneous in respect to the particular +function which constitutes the power of a "fleet in being," whose +effectiveness lies in its legs and in its moral effect, in its power +to evade pursuit and to play upon the fears of an enemy, should be +capable of rapid continuous movement; and such a fleet Spain actually +possessed when the war broke out--only it was not ready. "This +splendid fleet," resumed our Italian critic, giving rein, perhaps, to +a Southern imagination, but not wholly without just reason, "would be +in a condition to impose upon the enemy the character which the +conflict should assume, alike in strategy and in tactics, and thereby +could draw the best and greatest advantage from the actual situation, +with a strong probability of partial results calculated to restore the +equilibrium between the two belligerent fleets, or even of successes +so decisive, if obtained immediately after the declaration of war, as +to include a possibility of a Spanish preponderance." The present +writer guards himself from being understood to accept fully this +extensive programme for a fleet distinctly inferior in actual +combative force; but the general assumption of the author quoted +indicates the direction of effort which alone held out a hope of +success, and which for that reason should have been vigorously +followed by the Spanish authorities. + +As the Spanish Navy--whatever its defects in organization and +practice--is not lacking in thoughtful and instructed officers, it is +probable that the despatch of Cervera with only four ships, instead of +at least the five armored cruisers well qualified to act together, +which he might have had, not to speak of the important auxiliaries +also disposable, was due to uninstructed popular and political +pressure, of the same kind that in our country sought to force the +division of our fleet among our ports. That the Spanish Government was +thus goaded and taunted, at the critical period when Cervera was lying +in Santiago, is certain. To that, most probably, judging from the +words used in the Cortes, we owe the desperate sortie which delivered +him into our hands and reduced Spain to inevitable submission. "The +continuance of Cervera's division in Santiago, and its apparent +inactivity," stated a leading naval periodical in Madrid, issued two +days before the destruction of the squadron, "is causing marked +currents of pessimism, and of disaffection towards the navy, +especially since the Yankees have succeeded in effecting their +proposed landing. This state of public feeling, which has been +expressed with unrestricted openness in some journals, has been +sanctioned in Congress by one of the Opposition members uttering very +unguarded opinions, and reflecting injuriously upon the navy itself, +as though upon it depended having more or fewer ships." The Minister +of Marine, replying in the Cortes, paraphrased as follows, without +contradiction, the words of this critic, which voiced, as it would +appear, a popular clamor: "You ask, 'Why, after reaching Santiago, has +the squadron not gone out, and why does it not now go out?' Why do +four ships not go out to fight twenty? You ask again: 'If it does not +go out, if it does not hasten to seek death, what is the use of +squadrons? For what are fleets built, if not to be lost?' We are bound +to believe, Senor Romero Robledo, that your words in this case express +neither what you intended to say nor your real opinion." Nevertheless, +they seem not to have received correction, nor to have been retracted; +and to the sting of them, and of others of like character, is +doubtless due the express order of the Ministry under which Cervera +quitted his anchorage. + +Like ourselves, our enemy at the outset of the war had his fleet in +two principal divisions: one still somewhat formless and as yet +unready, but of very considerable power, was in the ports of the +Peninsula; the other--Cervera's--at the Cape Verde Islands, a +possession of Portugal. The latter was really exceptional in its +qualities, as our Italian author has said. It was exceptional in a +general sense, because homogeneous and composed of vessels of very +high qualities, offensive and defensive; it was exceptional also, as +towards us in particular, because we had of the same class but two +ships,--one-half its own force,--the _New York_ and the _Brooklyn_; +and, moreover, we had no torpedo cruisers to oppose to the three which +accompanied it. These small vessels, while undoubtedly an encumbrance +to a fleet in extended strategic movements in boisterous seas, because +they cannot always keep up, are a formidable adjunct--tactical in +character--in the day of battle, especially if the enemy has none of +them; and in the mild Caribbean it was possible that they might not +greatly delay their heavy consorts in passages which would usually be +short. + +The two main divisions of the Spanish fleet were thus about fifteen +hundred miles apart when war began on the 25th of April. The +neutrality of Portugal made it impossible for Cervera to remain long +in his then anchorage, and an immediate decision was forced upon his +Government. It is incredible that among the advisers of the Minister +of Marine--himself a naval officer--there was no one to point out that +to send Cervera at once to the Antilles, no matter to what port, was +to make it possible for the United States to prevent any future +junction between himself and the remaining vessels of their navy. The +squadron of either Sampson or Schley was able to fight him on terms of +reasonable equality, to say the least. Either of our divisions, +therefore, was capable of blockading him, if caught in port; and it +was no more than just to us to infer that, when once thus cornered, we +should, as we actually did at Santiago, assemble both divisions, so as +to render escape most improbable and the junction of a reinforcement +practically impossible. Such, in fact, was the intention from the very +first: for, this done, all our other undertakings, Cuban blockade and +what not, would be carried on safely, under cover of our watching +fleet, were the latter distant ten miles or a thousand from such other +operations. The writer, personally, attaches but little importance to +the actual consequences of strictly offensive operations attempted by +a "fleet in being," when of so inferior force. As suggested by Spanish +and foreign officers, in various publications, they have appeared to +him fantastic pranks of the imagination, such as he himself indulged +in as a boy, rather than a sober judgment formed after considering +both sides of the case. "I cannot but admire Captain Owen's zeal," +wrote Nelson on one occasion, "in his anxious desire to get at the +enemy, but I am afraid it has made him overleap sandbanks and tides, +and laid him aboard the enemy. I am as little used to find out the +impossible as most folks, and I think I can discriminate between the +impracticable and the fair prospect of success." The potentialities of +Cervera's squadron, after reaching the Spanish Antilles, must be +considered under the limitations of his sandbanks and tides; of +telegraph cables betraying his secrets, of difficulties and delays in +coaling, of the chances of sudden occasional accidents to which all +machinery is liable, multiplied in a fleet by the number of vessels +composing it; and to these troubles, inevitable accompaniments of +such operations, must in fairness be added the assumption of +reasonable watchfulness and intelligence on the part of the United +States, in the distribution of its lookouts and of its ships. + +The obvious palliative to the disadvantage thus incurred by Spain +would have been to add to Cervera ships sufficient to force us at +least to unite our two divisions, and to keep them joined. This, +however, could not be done at once, because the contingent in Spain +was not yet ready; and fear of political consequences and public +criticism at home, such as that already quoted, probably deterred the +enemy from the correct military measure of drawing Cervera's squadron +back to the Canaries, some eight hundred or nine hundred miles; or +even to Spain, if necessary. This squadron itself had recently been +formed in just this way; two ships being drawn back from the Antilles +and two sent forward from the Peninsula. If Spain decided to carry on +the naval war in the Caribbean,--and to decide otherwise was to +abandon Cuba in accordance with our demand,--she should have sent all +the armored ships she could get together, and have thrown herself +frankly, and at whatever cost, upon a mere defensive policy for her +home waters, relying upon coast defences--or upon mere luck, if need +were--for the safety of the ports. War cannot be made without running +risks. When you have chosen your field for fighting, you must +concentrate upon it, letting your other interests take their chance. +To do this, however, men must have convictions, and conviction must +rest upon knowledge, or else ignorant clamor and contagious panic will +sweep away every reasonable teaching of military experience. And so +Cervera went forth with his four gallant ships, foredoomed to his fate +by folly, or by national false pride, exhibited in the form of +political pressure disregarding sound professional judgment and +military experience. We were not without manifestations here of the +same uninstructed and ignoble outcry; but fortunately our home +conditions permitted it to be disregarded without difficulty. +Nevertheless, although under circumstances thus favorable we escaped +the worst effects of such lack of understanding, the indications were +sufficient to show how hard, in a moment of real emergency, it will be +for the Government to adhere to sound military principles, if there +be not some appreciation of these in the mass of the people; or, at +the very least, among the leaders to whom the various parts of the +country are accustomed to look for guidance. + +It may be profitable at this point to recall a few dates; after which +the narrative, avoiding superfluous details, can be continued in such +outline as is required for profitable comment, and for eliciting the +more influential factors in the course of events, with the consequent +military lessons from them to be deduced. + +On April 20th the President of the United States approved the joint +resolution passed by the two Houses of Congress, declaring the +independence of Cuba, and demanding that Spain should relinquish her +authority there and withdraw her forces. A blockade, dated April 22nd, +was declared of the north coast of Cuba, from Cardenas on the east to +Bahia Honda, west of Havana, and of the port of Cienfuegos on the +south side of the island. On April 25th a bill declaring that war +between the United States and Spain existed, and had existed since the +21st of the month, was passed by Congress and approved the same +evening by the President, thus adding another instance to the now +commonplace observation that hostilities more frequently precede than +follow a formal declaration. On April 29th, Admiral Cervera's +division--four armored cruisers and three torpedo destroyers--quitted +the Cape de Verde Islands for an unknown destination, and disappeared +during near a fortnight from the knowledge of the United States +authorities. On May 1, Commodore Dewey by a dash, the rapidity and +audacity of which reflected the highest credit upon his professional +qualities, destroyed the Spanish squadron at Manila, thereby +paralyzing also all Spanish operations in the East. The Government of +the United States was thus, during an appreciable time, and as it +turned out finally, released from all military anxiety about the +course of events in that quarter. + +Meantime the blockade of the Cuban coasts, as indicated above, had +been established effectively, to the extent demanded by international +law, which requires the presence upon the coast, or before the port, +declared blockaded, of such a force as shall constitute a manifest +danger of capture to vessels seeking to enter or to depart. In the +reserved, not to say unfriendly, attitude assumed by many of the +European States, the precise character of which is not fully known, +and perhaps never will be, it was not only right, but practically +necessary, to limit the extent of coast barred to merchant ships to +that which could be thus effectually guarded, leaving to neutral +governments no sound ground for complaint. Blockade is one of the +rights conceded to belligerent States, by universal agreement, which +directly, as well as indirectly, injures neutrals, imposing pecuniary +losses by restraints upon trade previously in their hands. The ravages +of the insurrection and the narrow policy of Spain in seeking to +monopolize intercourse with her colonies had, indeed, already +grievously reduced the commerce of the island; but with our war there +was sure to spring up a vigorous effort, both legal and contraband, to +introduce stores of all kinds, especially the essentials of life, the +supply of which was deficient. Such cargoes, not being clearly +contraband, could be certainly excluded only by blockade; and the +latter, in order fully to serve our military objects, needed at the +least to cover every port In railway communication with Havana, where +the bulk of the Spanish army was assembled. This it was impossible to +effect at the first, because we had not ships enough; and therefore, +as always in such cases, a brisk neutral trade, starting from Jamaica +and from Mexico, as well as from Europe and the North American +Continent, was directed upon the harbors just outside the limits of +the blockade,--towards Sagua la Grande and adjacent waters in the +north, and to Batabano and other ports in the south. Such trade would +be strictly lawful, from an international standpoint, unless declared +by us to be contraband, because aiding to support the army of the +enemy; and such declarations, by which provisions are included in the +elastic, but ill-defined category of contraband, tend always to +provoke the recriminations and unfriendliness of neutral states. +Blockade avoids the necessity for definitions, for by it all goods +become contraband; the extension of it therefore was to us imperative. + +As things were, although this neutral trade frustrated our purposes to +a considerable degree, it afforded us no ground for complaint. On the +contrary, we were at times hard driven by want of vessels to avoid +laying ourselves open to reclamation, on the score of the blockade +being invalid, even within its limited range, because ineffective. +This was especially the case at the moment when the army was being +convoyed from Tampa, as well as immediately before, and for some days +after that occasion: before, because it was necessary then to detach +from the blockade and to assemble elsewhere the numerous small vessels +needed to check the possible harmful activity of the Spanish gunboats +along the northern coast, and afterwards, because the preliminary +operations about Santiago, concurring with dark nights favorable to +Cervera's escape, made it expedient to retain there many of the +lighter cruisers, which, moreover, needed recoaling,--a slow business +when so many ships were involved. Our operations throughout +labored--sometimes more, sometimes less--under this embarrassment, +which should be borne in mind as a constant, necessary, yet perplexing +element in the naval and military plans. The blockade, in fact, while +the army was still unready, and until the Spanish Navy came within +reach, was the one decisive measure, sure though slow in its working, +which could be taken; the necessary effect of which was to bring the +enemy's ships to this side of the ocean, unless Spain was prepared to +abandon the contest. The Italian writer already quoted, a fair critic, +though Spanish in his leanings, enumerates among the circumstances +most creditable to the direction of the war by the Navy Department the +perception that "blockade must inevitably cause collapse, given the +conditions of insurrection and of exhaustion already existing in the +island." + +From this specific instance, the same author, whose military judgments +show much breadth of view, later on draws a general conclusion which is +well worth the attention of American readers, because much of our +public thought is committed to the belief that at sea private property, +so called,--that is, merchant ships and their cargoes,--should not be +liable to capture in war; which, duly interpreted, means that the +commerce of one belligerent is not to be attacked or interrupted by the +other. "Blockade," says our Italian, "is the fundamental basis of the +conflict for the dominion of the seas, when the contest cannot be +brought to an immediate issue;" that is, to immediate battle. Blockade, +however, is but one form of the unbloody pressure brought to bear upon +an enemy by interruption of his commerce. The stoppage of commerce, in +whole or in part, exhausts without fighting. It compels peace without +sacrificing life. It is the most scientific warfare, because the least +sanguinary, and because, like the highest strategy, it is directed +against the communications,--the resources,--not the persons, of the +enemy. It has been the glory of sea-power that its ends are attained by +draining men of their dollars instead of their blood. Eliminate the +attack upon an enemy's sea-borne commerce from the conditions of naval +war,--in which heretofore it has been always a most important +factor,--and the sacrifice of life will be proportionately increased, +for two reasons: First, the whole decision of the contest will rest +upon actual conflict; and, second, failing decisive results in battle, +the war will be prolonged, because by retaining his trade uninjured the +enemy retains all his money power to keep up his armed forces. + +The establishment and maintenance of the blockade therefore was, in +the judgment of the present writer, not only the first step in order, +but also the first, by far, in importance, open to the Government of +the United States as things were; prior, that is, to the arrival of +Cervera's division at some known and accessible point. Its importance +lay in its twofold tendency; to exhaust the enemy's army in Cuba, and +to force his navy to come to the relief. No effect more decisive than +these two could be produced by us before the coming of the hostile +navy, or the readiness of our own army to take the field, permitted +the contest to be brought, using the words of our Italian commentator, +"to an immediate issue." Upon the blockade, therefore, the generally +accepted principles of warfare would demand that effort should be +concentrated, until some evident radical change in the conditions +dictated a change of object,--a new objective; upon which, when +accepted, effort should again be concentrated, with a certain amount +of "exclusiveness of purpose." + +Blockade, however, implies not merely a sufficient number of cruisers +to prevent the entry or departure of merchant ships. It further +implies, because it requires, a strong supporting force sufficient to +resist being driven off by an attack from within or from without the +port; for it is an accepted tenet of international law that a blockade +raised by force ceases to exist, and cannot be considered +re-established until a new proclamation and reoccupancy of the ground +in force. Hence it follows that, prior to such re-establishment, +merchant vessels trying to enter or to depart cannot be captured in +virtue of the previous proclamation. Consequent upon this requirement, +therefore, the blockades on the north and on the south side, to be +secure against this military accident, should each have been supported +by a division of armored ships capable of meeting Cervera's division +on fairly equal terms; for, considering the sea distance between +Cienfuegos and Havana, one such division could not support both +blockades. It has already been indicated why it was impossible so to +sustain the Cienfuegos blockaders. The reason, in the last analysis, +was our insufficient sea-coast fortification. The Flying Squadron was +kept in Hampton Roads to calm the fears of the seaboard, and to check +any enterprise there of Cervera, if intended or attempted. The other +division of the armored fleet, however, was placed before Havana, +where its presence not only strengthened adequately the blockading +force proper, but assured also the safety of our naval base at Key +West, both objects being attainable by the same squadron, on account +of their nearness to each other. + +It should likewise be noticed that the same principle of concentration +of effort upon the single purpose--the blockade--forbade, _a priori_, +any attempts at bombardment by which our armored ships should be +brought within range of disablement by heavy guns on shore. If the +blockade was our object, rightly or wrongly, and if a blockade, to be +secure against serious disturbance, required all the armored ships at +our disposal,--as it did,--it follows logically and rigorously that to +risk those ships by attacking forts is false to principle, unless +special reasons can be adduced sufficiently strong to bring such +action within the scope of the principle properly applied. It is here +necessary clearly to distinguish. Sound principles in warfare are as +useful and as necessary as in morals; when established, the +presumption in any case is all on their side, and there is no one of +them better established than concentration. But as in morals, so in +war, the application of principle, the certainty of right, is not +always clear. Could it always be, war would be an exact science; which +it is not, but an art, in which true artists are as few as in painting +or sculpture. It may be that a bombardment of the fortifications of +Havana, or of some other place, might have been expedient, for reasons +unknown to the writer; but it is clearly and decisively his opinion +that if it would have entailed even a remote risk of serious injury to +an armored ship, it stood condemned irretrievably (unless it conduced +to getting at the enemy's navy), because it would hazard the +maintenance of the blockade, our chosen object, upon which our efforts +should be concentrated.[2] There is concentration of purpose, as well +as concentration in place, and ex-centric action in either sphere is +contrary to sound military principle. + +The question of keeping the armored division under Admiral Sampson in +the immediate neighborhood of Havana, for the purpose of supporting +the blockade by the lighter vessels, was one upon which some diversity +of opinion might be expected to arise. Cervera's destination was +believed--as it turned out, rightly believed--to be the West Indies. +His precise point of arrival was a matter of inference only, as in +fact was his general purpose. A natural surmise was that he would go +first to Puerto Rico, for reasons previously indicated. But if coal +enough remained to him, it was very possible that he might push on at +once to his ultimate objective, if that were a Cuban port, thus +avoiding the betrayal of his presence at all until within striking +distance of his objective. That he could get to the United States +coast without first entering a coaling port, whence he would be +reported, was antecedently most improbable; and, indeed, it was fair +to suppose that, if bound to Havana, coal exigencies would compel him +to take a pretty short route, and to pass within scouting range of the +Windward Passage, between Cuba and Haiti. Whatever the particular +course of reasoning, it was decided that a squadron under Admiral +Sampson's command should proceed to the Windward Passage for the +purpose of observation, with a view to going further eastward if it +should appear advisable. Accordingly, on the 4th of May, five days +after Cervera left the Cape de Verde, the Admiral sailed for the +appointed position, taking with him all his armored sea-going +ships--the _Iowa_, the _Indiana_, and the _New York_--and two +monitors, the _Amphitrite_ and the _Terror_. Of course, some smaller +cruisers and a collier accompanied him. + +It is almost too obvious for mention that this movement, if undertaken +at all, should be made, as it was, with all the force disposable, this +being too small to be safely divided. The monitors promptly, though +passively, proceeded to enforce another ancient maritime +teaching,--the necessity for homogeneousness, especially of speed and +manoeuvring qualities, in vessels intending to act together. Of +inferior speed at the best, they had, owing to their small coal +endurance, and to minimize the delay in the progress of the whole +body, consequent upon their stopping frequently to coal, to be towed +each by an armored ship,--an expedient which, although the best that +could be adopted, entailed endless trouble and frequent stoppages +through the breaking of the tow-lines. + +[Illustration: The Caribbean Sea (map)] + +Shortly before midnight of May 7th, the squadron was twenty miles +north of Cape Haitien, about six hundred sea miles east of Havana. It +was there learned, by telegrams received from the Department, that no +information had yet been obtained as to the movements of the Spanish +division, but that two swift steamers, lately of the American +Transatlantic line, had been sent to scout to the eastward of +Martinique and Guadaloupe. The instructions to these vessels were to +cruise along a north and south line, eighty miles from the islands +named. They met at the middle once a day, communicated, and then went +back in opposite directions to the extremities of the beat. In case +the enemy were discovered, word of course would be sent from the +nearest cable port to Washington, and to the Admiral, if accessible. +The two vessels were directed to continue on this service up to a +certain time, which was carefully calculated to meet the extreme +possibilities of slowness on the part of the Spanish division, if +coming that way; afterwards they were to go to a given place, and +report. It may be added that they remained their full time, and yet +missed by a hair's breadth sighting the enemy. The captain of one of +them, the _Harvard_, afterwards told the writer that he believed +another stretch to the south would have rewarded him with success. The +case was one in which blame could be imputed to nobody; unless it were +to the Spaniards, in disappointing our very modest expectations +concerning their speed as a squadron, which is a very different thing +from the speed of a single ship. + +Among the telegrams received at this time by the Admiral from the +Department were reports of rumors that colliers for the Spanish +division had been seen near Guadaloupe; also that Spanish vessels +were coaling and loading ammunition at St. Thomas. Neither of these +was well founded, nor was it likely that the enemy's division would +pause for such purpose at a neutral island, distant, as St. Thomas is, +less than one hundred miles from their own harbors in Puerto Rico. + +Immediately after the receipt of these telegrams, the Admiral summoned +all his captains between 12 and 4 A.M., May 9th, to a consultation +regarding the situation. He then decided to go on to San Juan, the +chief seaport of Puerto Rico, upon the chance of finding the Spanish +squadron there. The coaling of the monitors, which had begun when the +squadron stopped the previous afternoon, was resumed next morning. At +11.15, May 9th, a telegram from the Department reported a story, +"published in the newspapers," that the Spanish division had been seen +on the night of the 7th, near Martinique. The Department's telegram +betrayed also some anxiety about Key West and the Havana blockade; +but, while urging a speedy return, the details of the Admiral's +movements were left to his own discretion. The squadron then stood +east, and on the early morning of the 12th arrived off San Juan. An +attack upon the forts followed at once, lasting from 5.30 to 7.45 +A.M.; but, as it was evident that the Spanish division was not there, +the Admiral decided not to continue the attack, although satisfied +that he could force a surrender. His reasons for desisting are given +in his official report as follows:-- + + "The fact that we should be held several days in completing + arrangements for holding the place; that part [of the + squadron] would have to be left to await the arrival of + troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish + squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the + Flying Squadron was still north and not in a position to + render any aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was + thus open to entry by such a force as his, while we were a + thousand miles distant,--made our immediate movement toward + Havana imperative." + +It will be noted that the Admiral's conclusions, as here given, +coincided substantially with the feeling of the Department as +expressed in the telegram last mentioned. The squadron started back +immediately to the westward. During the night of this same day, +Thursday, May 12th, towards midnight, reliable information was +received at the Navy Department that Cervera's squadron had arrived +off Martinique,--four armored cruisers and three torpedo destroyers, +one of the latter entering the principal port of the island. + +The movements of the Spanish division immediately preceding its +appearance off Martinique can be recovered in the main from the log of +the _Cristobal Colon_, which was found on board that ship by the +United States officers upon taking possession after her surrender on +July 3. Some uncertainty attends the conclusions reached from its +examination, because the record is brief and not always precise in its +statements; but, whatever inaccuracy of detail there may be, the +general result is clear enough. + +At noon on May 10th the division was one hundred and thirty miles east +of the longitude of Martinique, and fifteen miles south of its +southernmost point. Being thus within twelve hours' run of the island, +Admiral Cervera evidently, and reasonably, considered that he might +now be in the neighborhood of danger, if the United States Government +had decided to attempt to intercept him with an armored division, +instead of sticking to the dispositions known to him when he +sailed,--the blockade of Cuba and the holding the Flying Squadron in +reserve. In order not to fall in with an enemy unexpectedly, +especially during the night, the speed of the division was reduced to +something less than four knots, and the torpedo destroyer _Terror_ was +sent ahead to reconnoitre and report. The incident of her separating +from her consorts is not noted,--a singular omission, due possibly to +its occurring at night and so escaping observation by the _Colon_; but +it is duly logged that she was sighted "to port" next morning, May +11th, at 9 A.M., and that, until she was recognized, the crew were +sent to their quarters for action. This precaution had also been +observed during the previous night, the men sleeping beside their +guns,--a sufficient evidence of the suspicions entertained by the +Spanish Admiral. + +At 10 A.M.--by which hour, or very soon afterwards, the communication +of the _Terror_ with the Admiral recorded by the log must have taken +place--there had been abundance of time since daybreak for a 15-knot +torpedo destroyer, low-lying in the water, to remain unseen within +easy scouting distance of Martinique, and thence to rejoin the +squadron, which would then be forty or fifty miles distant from the +island. She could even, by putting forth all her speed, have +communicated with the shore; possibly without the knowledge of the +American representatives on the spot, if the sympathies of the +inhabitants were with the Spaniards, as has been generally believed. +However that may be, shortly after her junction the division went +ahead again seven knots, the speed logged at noon of May 11th, which, +as steam formed, was increased to ten knots. At 4 P.M. Martinique was +abeam on the starboard hand--north. At sundown the ships went to +general quarters, and the crews were again kept at their guns during +the night. By this time Cervera doubtless had been informed that +Sampson's division had gone east from Cuba, but its destination could +have been only a matter of inference with him, for the attack upon San +Juan did not take place till the following morning. The fact of +keeping his men at quarters also justifies the conclusion that he was +thus uncertain about Sampson, for the stationariness of the Flying +Squadron would be known at Martinique. + +After mentioning that the ship's company went to quarters, the log of +the _Colon_ adds: "Stopped from 5.15 to 6 A.M." Whether the 5.15 was +A.M. or P.M., whether, in short, the squadron continued practically +motionless during the night of May 11th-12th, can only be conjectured, +but there can be little doubt that it did so remain. The Spaniards +still observe the old-fashioned sea-day of a century ago, abandoned +long since by the British and ourselves, according to which May 12th +begins at noon of May 11th. A continuous transaction, such as stopping +from evening to morning, would fall, therefore, in the log of the same +day, as it here does; whereas in a United States ship of war, even +were our records as brief and fragmentary as the _Colon's_, the fact +of the stoppage, extending over the logs of two days, would have been +mentioned in each. It is odd, after passing an hour or two in putting +this and that together out of so incomplete a narrative, to find +recorded in full, a few days later, the following notable incident: +"At 2.30 P.M. flagship made signal: 'If you want fresh beef, send +boat.' Answered: 'Many thanks; do not require any.'" Log-books do +state such occurrences, particularly when matters of signal; but then +they are supposed also to give a reasonably full account of each day's +important proceedings. + +Whatever the movements back and forth, or the absence of movement, by +the Spanish ships during the night, at 7.10 A.M. the next day, May +12th, while Sampson's division was still engaged with the forts at San +Juan, they were close to Martinique, "four miles from Diamond Rock," a +detached islet at its southern end. The next entry, the first for the +sea-day of May 13th, is: "At 12.20 P.M. lost sight of Martinique." As +the land there is high enough to be visible forty or fifty miles under +favorable conditions, and as the squadron on its way to Curacao +averaged 11 knots per hour, it seems reasonable to infer that the +Spanish Admiral, having received news of the attack on San Juan, +though possibly not of the result, had determined upon a hasty +departure and a hurried run to the end of his journey, before he could +be intercepted by Sampson, the original speed of whose ships was +inferior to that of his own, and whom he knew to be hampered by +monitors. + +The Spaniards did not take coal at Martinique. This may have been due +to refusal by the French officials to permit it, according to a common +neutral rule which allows a neutral only to give enough to reach the +nearest national port. As the ships still had enough to reach Curacao, +they had more than enough to go to Puerto Rico. It may very well be, +also, that Cervera, not caring to meet Sampson, whose force, counting +the monitors, was superior to his own, thought best to disappear at +once again from our knowledge. He did indeed prolong his journey to +Santiago, if that were his original destination, by nearly two hundred +miles, through going to Curacao; not to speak of the delay there in +coaling. But, if the Dutch allowed him to take all that he wanted, he +would in his final start be much nearer Cuba than at Martinique, and +he would be able, as far as fuel went, to reach either Santiago, +Cienfuegos, or Puerto Rico, or even Havana itself,--all which +possibilities would tend to perplex us. It is scarcely probable, +however, that he would have attempted the last-named port. To do so, +not to speak of the greater hazard through the greater distance, +would, in case of his success, not merely have enabled, but invited, +the United States to concentrate its fleet in the very best position +for us, where it would not only have "contained" the enemy, but have +best protected our own base at Key West. + +In the absence of certain knowledge, conjectural opinions, such as the +writer has here educed, are not unprofitable; rather the reverse. To +form them, the writer and the reader place themselves perforce nearly +in Cervera's actual position, and pass through their own minds the +grist of unsolved difficulties which confronted him. The result of +such a process is a much more real mental possession than is yielded +by a quiet perusal of any ascertained facts, because it involves an +argumentative consideration of opposing conditions, and not a mere +passive acceptance of statements. The general conclusion of the +present writer, from this consideration of Cervera's position, and of +that of our own Government, is that the course of the Spanish Admiral +was opportunist, solely and simply. Such, in general, and necessarily, +must be that of any "fleet in being," in the strict sense of the +phrase, which involves inferiority of force; whereas the stronger +force, if handled with sagacity and strength, constrains the weaker +in its orbit as the earth governs the moon. Placed in an extremely +false position by the fault, militarily unpardonable, of his +Government, Admiral Cervera doubtless did the best he could. That in +so doing he caused the United States authorities to pass through some +moments of perplexity is certain, but it was the perplexity of +interest rather than of apprehension; and in so far as the latter was +felt at all, it was due to antecedent faults of disposition on our own +part, the causes of which have been in great measure indicated +already. The writer is not an angler, but he understands that there is +an anxious pleasure in the suspense of playing a fish, as in any +important contest involving skill. + +To say that there was any remarkable merit in the movements of the +Spanish Admiral is as absurd as to attribute particular cleverness to +a child who, with his hands behind his back, asks the old conundrum, +"Right or left?" "It is all a matter of guess," said Nelson, "and the +world attributes wisdom to him who guesses right;" but all the same, +by unremitting watchfulness, sagacious inference, and diligent +pursuit, he ran the French fleet down. At Martinique, Admiral Cervera +had all the West Indies before him where to choose, and the United +States coast too, conditioned by coal and other needs, foreseen or +unforeseen. We ran him down at Santiago; and had he vanished from +there, we should have caught him somewhere else. The attempt of the +Spanish authorities to create an impression that some marvellous feat +of strategy was in process of execution, to the extreme discomfiture +of the United States navy, was natural enough, considering the straits +they were in, and the consciousness of the capable among them that a +squadron of that force never should have been sent across the sea; +but, though natural, the pretension was absurd, and, though echoed by +all the partisan Press in Europe, it did not for a moment impose as +true upon those who were directing the movements of the United States +ships. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2] A principal object of these papers, as has been stated, is to form +a correct public opinion; for by public opinion, if misguided, great +embarrassment is often caused to those responsible for the conduct of a +war. As concrete examples teach far better than abstract principles, +the writer suggests to the consideration of his readers how seriously +would have been felt, during the hostilities, the accident which befell +the battleship _Massachusetts_, on Dec. 14, 1898, a month after the +above sentences were written. An injury in battle, engaged without +adequate object, would have had the same effect, and been +indefensible. + + + + +IV + + PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY CERVERA'S APPEARANCE IN WEST INDIAN + WATERS.--MOVEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DIVISIONS AND + OF THE OREGON.--FUNCTIONS OF CRUISERS IN A NAVAL + CAMPAIGN. + + +The departure of Admiral Cervera from Martinique for Curacao was +almost simultaneous with that of Admiral Sampson from San Juan for Key +West. The immediate return of the latter to the westward was dictated +by reasons, already given in his own words, the weight of which he +doubtless felt more forcibly because he found himself actually so far +away from the centre of the blockade and from his base at Key West. +When he began thus to retrace his steps, he was still ignorant of +Cervera's arrival. The following night, indeed, he heard from a +passing vessel the rumor of the Spanish squadron's regaining Cadiz, +with which the Navy Department had been for a moment amused. He +stopped, therefore, to communicate with Washington, intending, if the +rumor were confirmed, to resume the attack upon San Juan. But on the +morning of the 15th--Sunday--at 3.30, his despatch-boat returned to +him with the official intelligence, not only of the enemy's being off +Martinique, but of his arrival at Curacao, which occurred shortly +after daylight of the 14th. The same telegram informed him that the +Flying Squadron was on its way to Key West, and directed him to regain +that point himself with all possible rapidity. + +Cervera left behind him at Martinique one of his torpedo destroyers, +the _Terror_. A demonstration was made by this vessel, probably, +though it may have been by one of her fellows, before St. +Pierre,--another port of the island,--where the _Harvard_ was lying; +and as the latter had been sent hurriedly from home with but a +trifling battery, some anxiety was felt lest the enemy might score a +point upon her, if the local authorities compelled her to leave. If +the Spaniard had been as fast as represented, he would have had an +advantage over the American in both speed and armament,--very serious +odds. The machinery of the former, however, was in bad order, and she +soon had to seek a harbor in Fort de France, also in Martinique; after +which the usual rule, that two belligerents may not leave the same +neutral port within twenty-four hours of each other, assured the +_Harvard_ a safe start. This incident, otherwise trivial, is worthy of +note, for it shows one of the results of our imperfect national +preparation for war. If the conditions had allowed time to equip the +_Harvard_ with suitable guns, she could have repulsed such an enemy, +as a ship of the same class, the _St. Paul_, did a few weeks later off +San Juan, whither the _Terror_ afterwards repaired, and where she +remained till the war was over. + +The news of Cervera's appearance off Martinique was first received at +the Navy Department about midnight of May 12th-13th, nearly thirty-six +hours after the fact. As our representatives there, and generally +throughout the West Indies, were very much on the alert, it seems not +improbable that their telegrams, to say the least, were not given +undue precedence of other matters. That, however, is one of the +chances of life, and most especially of war. It is more to the +purpose, because more useful to future guidance, to consider the +general situation at the moment the telegram was received, the means +at hand to meet the exigencies of the case, and what instructive light +is thereby thrown back upon preceding movements, which had resulted in +the actual conditions. + +Admiral Cervera's division had been at Martinique, and, after a brief +period of suspense, was known to have disappeared to the westward. The +direction taken, however, might, nay, almost certainly must, be +misleading,--that was part of his game. From it nothing could be +decisively inferred. The last news of the _Oregon_ was that she had +left Bahia, in Brazil, on the 9th of the month. Her whereabouts and +intended movements were as unknown to the United States authorities as +to the enemy. An obvious precaution, to assure getting assistance to +her, would have been to prescribe the exact route she should follow, +subject only to the conditional discretion which can never wisely be +taken from the officer in command on the spot. In that way it would +have been possible to send a division to meet her, if indications at +any moment countenanced the suspicion entertained by some--the author +among others--that Cervera would attempt to intercept her. After +careful consideration, this precaution had not been attempted, +because the tight censorship of the Press had not then been +effectually enforced, and it was feared that even so vital and evident +a necessity as that of concealing her movements would not avail +against the desire of some newspapers to manifest enterprise, at +whatever cost to national interests. If we ever again get into a +serious war, a close supervision of the Press, punitive as well as +preventive, will be one of the first military necessities, unless the +tone and disposition, not of the best, but of the worst, of its +members shall have become sensibly improved; for occasional +unintentional leakage, by well-meaning officials possessing more +information than native secretiveness, cannot be wholly obviated, and +must be accepted, practically, as one of the inevitable difficulties +of conducting war. + +The _Oregon_, therefore, was left a loose end, and was considered to +be safer so than if more closely looked after. From the time she left +Bahia till she arrived at Barbados, and from thence till she turned up +off Jupiter Inlet, on the Florida coast, no one in Washington knew +where she was. Nevertheless, she continued a most important and +exposed fraction of the national naval force. That Cervera had turned +west when last seen from Martinique meant nothing. It was more +significant and reassuring to know that he had not got coal there. +Still, it was possible that he might take a chance off Barbados, +trusting, as he with perfect reason could, that when he had waited +there as long as his coal then on hand permitted, the British +authorities would let him take enough more to reach Puerto Rico, as +they did give Captain Clark sufficient to gain a United States port. +When the _Oregon_ got to Barbados at 3.20 A.M. of May 18th, less than +six days had elapsed since Cervera quitted Martinique; and the two +islands are barely one hundred miles apart. All this, of course, is +very much more clear to our present knowledge than it could possibly +be to the Spanish Admiral, who probably, and not unnaturally, thought +it far better to get his "fleet in being" under the guns of a friendly +port than to hazard it on what might prove a wild-goose chase; for, +after all, Captain Clark might not have gone to Barbados. + +It may be interesting to the reader to say here that the Navy +Department,--which was as much in the dark as Cervera +himself,--although it was necessarily concerned about the _Oregon_, and +gave much thought to the problem how best to assure her safety, was +comforted by the certainty that, whatever befell the ship, the national +interests would not be gravely compromised if she did meet the enemy. +The situation was not novel or unprecedented, and historical precedents +are an immense support to the spirit in doubtful moments. Conscious of +the power of the ship herself, and confident in her captain and +officers, whom it knew well, the Department was assured, to use words +of Nelson when he was expecting to be similarly outnumbered, "Before we +are destroyed, I have little doubt but the enemy will have their wings +so completely clipped that they will be easily overtaken." Such odds +for our ship were certainly not desired; but, the best having been done +that could be in the circumstances, there was reasonable ground to +believe that, by the time the enemy got through with her, they would +not amount to much as a fighting squadron. + +Some little while after the return of Admiral Sampson's squadron to +New York, the writer chanced to see, quoted as an after-dinner speech +by the chief engineer of the _Oregon_, the statement that Captain +Clark had communicated to his officers the tactics he meant to pursue, +if he fell in with the Spanish division. His purpose, as so explained, +deserves to be noted; for it assures our people, if they need any +further assurance, that in the single ship, as in the squadrons, +intelligent skill as well as courage presided in the councils of the +officers in charge. The probability was that the Spanish vessels, +though all reputed faster than the _Oregon_, had different rates of +speed, and each singly was inferior to her in fighting force, in +addition to which the American ship had a very heavy stern battery. +The intention therefore was, in case of a meeting, to turn the stern +to the enemy and to make a running fight. This not only gave a +superiority of fire to the _Oregon_ so long as the relative positions +lasted, but it tended, of course, to prolong it, confining the enemy +to their bow fire and postponing to the utmost possible the time of +their drawing near enough to open with the broadside rapid-fire +batteries. Moreover, if the Spanish vessels were not equally fast, +and if their rate of speed did not much exceed that of the _Oregon_, +both very probable conditions, it was quite possible that in the +course of the action the leading ship would outstrip her followers so +much as to be engaged singly, and even that two or more might thus be +successively beaten in detail. If it be replied that this is assuming +a great deal, and attributing stupidity to the enemy, the answer is +that the result here supposed has not infrequently followed upon +similar action, and that war is full of uncertainties,--an instance +again of the benefit and comfort which some historical acquaintance +with the experience of others imparts to a man engaged with present +perplexities. Deliberately to incur such odds would be unjustifiable; +but when unavoidably confronted with them, resolution enlightened by +knowledge may dare still to hope. + +An instructive instance of drawing such support from the very fountain +heads of military history, in the remote and even legendary past, is +given by Captain Clark in a letter replying to inquiries from the +present writer:-- + + "There is little to add to what you already know about the + way I hoped to fight Cervera's fleet, if we fell in with it. + What I feared was that he would be able to bring his ships up + within range together, supposing that the slowest was faster + than the _Oregon_; but there was the chance that their + machinery was in different stages of deterioration, and there + was also the hope that impetuosity or excitement might after + a time make some press on in advance of the others. I, of + course, had in mind the tactics of the last of the Horatii, + and hopefully referred to them. The announcement Milligan + (the chief engineer) spoke of was made before we reached + Bahia, I think before we turned Cape Frio, as it was off that + headland that I decided to leave the _Marietta_ and + _Nictheroy_, (now the _Buffalo_), and to push on alone. You + may be sure that was an anxious night for me when I decided + to part company. The Department was, of course, obliged to + leave much to my discretion, and I knew that the Spaniards + might all close to rapid-fire range, overpower all but our + turret guns, and then send in their torpedo boats." + +It was upon the _Marietta_ that he had previously depended, in a +measure, to thwart the attacks of these small vessels; but in such a +contest as that with four armored cruisers she could scarcely count, +and she was delaying his progress in the run immediately before him. + + "The torpedo boat [he continues] was a rattlesnake to me, + that I feared would get in his work while I was fighting the + tiger; but I felt that the chances were that Cervera was + bound to the West Indies, and so that the need of the + _Oregon_ there was so great that the risk of his turning + south to meet me should be run, so I hurried to Bahia, and + cabled to the Department my opinion of what the _Oregon_ + might do alone and in a running fight.... My object was to + add the _Oregon_ to our fleet, and not to meet the Spaniards, + if it could be avoided." + +It may be added that in this his intention coincided with the wish of +the Department. + + "So when, in Barbados, the reports came off that the Spanish + fleet (and rumors had greatly increased its size) was at + Martinique, that three torpedo boats had been seen from the + island, I ordered coal to be loaded till after midnight, but + left soon after dark, started west, then turned and went + around the island"--that is, well to the eastward--"and made + to the northward." + +This was on the evening of May 18th. Six days later the ship was off +the coast of Florida, and in communication with the Department. + +The _Oregon_ may properly be regarded as one of the three principal +detachments into which the United States fleet was divided at the +opening of the eventful week, May 12th-19th, and which, however they +might afterwards be distributed around the strategic centre,--which we +had chosen should be about Havana and Cienfuegos,--needed to be +brought to it as rapidly as possible. No time was avoidably lost. On +the evening of May 13th, eighteen hours after Cervera's appearance at +Martinique was reported, the two larger divisions, under Sampson and +Schley, were consciously converging upon our point of concentration at +Key West; while the third, the _Oregon_, far more distant, was also +moving to the same place in the purpose of the Department, though, as +yet, unconsciously to herself. Sampson had over twenty-four hours' +start of the Flying Squadron; and the distances to be traversed, from +Puerto Rico and Hampton Roads, were practically the same.[3] But the +former was much delayed by the slowness of the monitors, and, great as +he felt the need of haste to be, and urgent as was the Department's +telegram, received on the 15th, he very properly would not allow his +vessels to separate until nearer their destination. Precautionary +orders were sent by him to the _Harvard_ and _Yale_--two swift +despatch vessels then under his immediate orders--to coal to the +utmost and to hold themselves at the end of a cable ready for +immediate orders; while Commodore Remey, commanding at Key West, was +directed to have every preparation complete for coaling the squadron +on the 18th, when it might be expected to arrive. The _St. Louis_, a +vessel of the same type as the _Harvard_, met the Admiral while these +telegrams were being written. She was ordered to cut the cables at +Santiago and Guantanamo Bay, and afterwards at Ponce, Puerto Rico. + +The Flying Squadron had sailed at 4 P.M. of the 13th. Its fighting +force consisted of the _Brooklyn_, armored cruiser, flagship; the +_Massachusetts_, first-class, and the _Texas_, second-class, +battleships. It is to be inferred from the departure of these vessels +that the alarm about our own coast, felt while the whereabouts of the +hostile division was unknown, vanished when it made its appearance. +The result was, perhaps, not strictly logical; but the logic of the +step is of less consequence than its undoubted military correctness. +We had chosen our objective, and now we were concentrating upon it,--a +measure delayed too long, though unavoidably. Commodore Schley was +directed to call off Charleston for orders; for, while it is essential +to have a settled strategic idea in any campaign, it is also +necessary, in maritime warfare, at all events, to be ready to change a +purpose suddenly and to turn at once upon the great objective,--which +dominates and supersedes all others,--the enemy's navy, when a +reasonable prospect of destroying it, or any large fraction of it, +offers. When Schley left Hampton Roads, it was known only that the +Spanish division had appeared off Martinique. The general intention, +that our own should go to Key West, must therefore be held subject to +possible modification, and to that end communication at a half-way +point was imperative. No detention was thereby caused. At 4.30 P.M. of +the 15th the Flying Squadron, which had been somewhat delayed by ten +hours of dense fog, came off Charleston Bar, where a lighthouse +steamer had been waiting since the previous midnight. From the officer +in charge of her the Commodore received his orders, and at 6 P.M. was +again under way for Key West, where he arrived on the 18th, +anticipating by several hours Sampson's arrival in person, and by a +day the coming of the slower ships of the other division. + +But if it is desirable to ensure frequent direct communication with +the larger divisions of the fleet, at such a moment, when their +movements must be held subject to sudden change to meet the as yet +uncertain developments of the enemy's strategy, it is still more +essential to keep touch from a central station with the swift single +cruisers, the purveyors of intelligence and distributors of the +information upon which the conduct of the war depends. If the broad +strategic conception of the naval campaign is correct, and the +consequent action consistent, the greater fighting units--squadrons or +fleets--may be well, or better, left to themselves, after the initial +impulse of direction is given, and general instructions have been +issued to their commanders. These greater units, however, cannot +usually be kept at the end of a telegraph cable; yet they must, +through cables, maintain, with their centres of intelligence, +communication so frequent as to be practically constant. The Flying +Squadron when off Cienfuegos, and Admiral Sampson's division at the +time now under consideration, while on its passage from San Juan to +Key West, are instances in point. Conversely, dependence may be placed +upon local agents to report an enemy when he enters port; but when at +sea for an unknown destination, it is necessary, if practicable, to +get and keep touch with him, and to have his movements, actual and +probable, reported. In short, steady communication must be maintained, +as far as possible, between the always fixed points where the cables +end, and the more variable positions where the enemy's squadrons and +our own are, whether for a stay or in transit. This can be done only +through swift despatch vessels; and for these, great as is the need +that no time be wasted in their missions, the homely proverb, "more +haste, less speed," has to be kept in mind. To stop off at a wayside +port, to diverge even considerably from the shortest route, may often +be a real economy of time. + +The office of cruisers thus employed is to substitute certainty for +conjecture; to correct or to confirm, by fuller knowledge, the +inferences upon which the conduct of operations otherwise so much +depends. Accurate intelligence is one of the very first _desiderata_ +of war, and as the means of obtaining and transmitting it are never in +excess of the necessities, those means have to be carefully +administered. Historically, no navy ever has had cruisers enough; +partly because the lookout and despatch duties themselves are so +extensive and onerous; partly because vessels of the class are wanted +for other purposes also,--as, for instance, in our late war, for the +blockade of the Cuban ports, which was never much more than +technically "effective," and for the patrolling of our Atlantic +seaboard. True economical use of the disposable vessels, obtaining the +largest results with the least expenditure of means never adequate, +demands much forethought and more management, and is best effected by +so arranging that the individual cruisers can be quickly got hold of +when wanted. This is accomplished by requiring them to call at cable +ports and report; or by circumscribing the area in which they are to +cruise, so that they can be readily found; or by prescribing the +course and speed they are to observe,--in short, by ensuring a pretty +close knowledge of their position at every moment. + +For the purposes of intelligence, a cruiser with a roving commission, +or one which neglects to report its movements when opportunity offers, +is nearly useless; and few things are more justly exasperating than +the failure of a cruiser to realize this truth in practice. Of course, +no rule is hard and fast to bind the high discretion of the officer +senior on the spot; but if the captains of cruisers will bear in mind, +as a primary principle, that they, their admirals, and the central +office, are in this respect parts of one highly specialized and most +important system in which co-operation must be observed, discretion +will more rarely err in these matters, where errors may be so serious. +That with a central office, admirals, and captains, all seeking the +same ends, matters will at times work at cross purposes, only proves +the common experience that things will not always go straight here +below. When Nelson was hunting for the French fleet before the battle +of the Nile, his flagship was dismasted in a gale of wind off Corsica. +The commander of the frigates, his lookout ships, having become +separated in the gale, concluded that the Admiral would have to return +to Gibraltar, and took his frigates there. "I thought he knew me +better," commented Nelson. "Every moment I have to regret the frigates +having left me," he wrote later; "the return to Syracuse," due to want +of intelligence, "broke my heart, which on any extraordinary anxiety +now shows itself." It is not possible strictly to define official +discretion, nor to guard infallibly against its misuse; but, all the +same, it is injurious to an officer to show that he lacks sound +judgment. + +When the Flying Squadron sailed, there were lying in Hampton Roads +three swift cruisers,--the _New Orleans_, the _St. Paul_, and the +_Minneapolis_. Two auxiliary cruisers, the _Yosemite_ and the _Dixie_, +were nearly but not quite ready for sea. It was for some time justly +considered imperative to keep one such ship there ready for an +immediate mission. The _New Orleans_ was so retained, subject to +further requirements of the Department; but the _Minneapolis_ and the +_St. Paul_ sailed as soon as their coaling was completed,--within +twenty-four hours of the squadron. The former was to cruise between +Haiti and the Caicos Bank, on the road which Cervera would probably +follow if he went north of Haiti; the other was to watch between Haiti +and Jamaica, where he might be encountered if he took the Windward +Passage, going south of Haiti. At the time these orders were issued +the indications were that the Spanish division was hanging about +Martinique, hoping for permission to coal there; and as both of our +cruisers were very fast vessels and directed to go at full speed, the +chances were more than good that they would reach their cruising +ground before Cervera could pass it. + +These intended movements were telegraphed to Sampson, and it was +added, "Very important that your fast cruisers keep touch with the +Spanish squadron." This he received May 15th. With his still imperfect +information he gave no immediate orders which would lose him his hold +of the _Harvard_ and the _Yale_; but shortly after midnight he +learned, off Cape Haitien, that the Spanish division was to have left +Curacao the previous evening at six o'clock--only six hours before +this despatch reached him. He at once cabled the _Harvard_ and the +_Yale_, to which, as being under his immediate charge, the Department +had given no orders, to go to sea, the former to cruise in the Mona +Passage, to detect the enemy if he passed through it for Puerto Rico, +the _Yale_ to assist the _St. Paul_ at the station of which he had +been notified from Washington. The Department was informed by him of +these dispositions. Sampson at the same time cabled Remey at Key West +to warn the blockaders off Cienfuegos--none of which were armored--of +the possible appearance of the enemy at that port. In this step he had +been anticipated by the Department, which, feeling the urgency of the +case and uncertain of communicating betimes through him, had issued an +order direct to Remey, thirty-six hours before, that those ships, with +a single exception, should be withdrawn; and that the vessels on the +north coast should be notified, but not removed. + +These various movements indicate the usefulness and the employments of +the cruiser class, one of which also carried the news to Cienfuegos, +another along the north coast, while a third took Sampson's telegrams +from his position at sea to the cable port. Owing to our insufficient +number of vessels of the kind required, torpedo boats, of great speed +in smooth water, but of delicate machinery and liable to serious +retardation in a sea-way, were much used for these missions, to the +great hurt of their engines, not intended for long-continued high +exertion, and to their own consequent injury for their particular +duties. The _St. Paul's_ career exemplified also the changes of +direction to which cruisers are liable, and the consequent necessity +of keeping them well in hand both as regards position and preparation, +especially of coal. Between the time the _Minneapolis_ sailed and her +own departure, at 6 P.M., of May 14th, the news of the Spanish +division's arrival at Curacao was received; and as there had been +previous independent information that colliers had been ordered to +meet it in the Gulf of Venezuela, only a hundred miles from Curacao, +the conclusion was fair that the enemy needed coal and hoped to get it +in that neighborhood. Why else, indeed, if as fast as reported, and +aware, as he must be, that Sampson was as far east as San Juan, had he +not pushed direct for Cuba, his probable objective? In regard to +colliers being due in the Gulf of Venezuela, the reports proved +incorrect; but the inference as to the need of coal was accurate, and +that meant delay. The _St. Paul_ was therefore ordered to Key West, +instructions being telegraphed there to coal her full immediately on +arriving. She would there be as near the Windward Passage as Curacao +is, and yet able, in case of necessity, to proceed by the Yucatan +Passage or in any direction that might meanwhile become expedient. It +may be added that the _St. Paul_ reached Key West and was coaled ready +for sea by the evening of May 18th, four days from the time she left +Hampton Roads, a thousand miles distant. + +While on her passage, the Department had entertained the purpose of +sending her to the Gulf of Venezuela and adding to her the _Harvard_ +and the _Minneapolis_, the object being not only to find the enemy, if +there, but that one of the three should report him, while the other +two dogged his path until no doubt of his destination could remain. +Their great speed, considered relatively to that which the enemy had +so far shown, gave reasonable probability that thus his approach +could be communicated by them, and by cables, throughout the whole +field of operations, with such rapidity as to ensure cornering him at +once, which was the first great essential of our campaign. A cruiser +reporting at Cape Haitien was picked up and sent to the _Minneapolis_, +whose whereabouts was sufficiently known, because circumscribed, and +she received her orders; but they served only to develop the weakness +of that ship and of the _Columbia_, considered as cruisers. The coal +left after her rapid steaming to her cruising ground did not justify +the further sweep required, and her captain thought it imperative to +go first to St. Thomas to recoal,--a process which involved more delay +than on the surface appears. The bunkers of this ship and of her +sister, the _Columbia_, are minutely subdivided,--an arrangement very +suitable, even imperative, in a battleship, in order to localize +strictly any injury received in battle, but inconsequent and illogical +in a vessel meant primarily for speed. A moment's reflection upon the +services required of cruisers will show that their efficiency does not +depend merely upon rapid going through the water, but upon prompt +readiness to leave port, of which promptness quick coaling is a most +important factor. This is gravely retarded by bunkers much subdivided. +The design of these two ships, meant for speed, involves this lack of +facility for recoaling. There is, therefore, in them a grave failure +in that unity of conception which should dominate all designs. + +The movements, actual and projected, of the cruisers at this moment +have purposely been dwelt upon at some length. Such movements and the +management of them play a most important part in all campaigns, and it +is desirable that they should be understood, through illustration such +as this; because the provision for the service should be antecedently +thorough and consistent in plan and in execution, in order to +efficiency. Confusion of thought, and consequent confusion of object, +is fatal to any conception,--at least, to any military conception; it +is absolutely opposed to concentration, for it implies duality of +object. In the designing of a cruiser, as of any class of warship, the +first step, before which none should be taken, is to decide the +primary object to be realized,--what is this ship meant to do? To +this primary requirement every other feature should be subordinated. +Its primacy is not only one of time, but of importance also. The +recognition, in practice, of this requisite does not abolish nor +exclude the others by its predominance. It simply regulates their +development; for they not only must not militate against it, they must +minister to it. It is exactly as in a novel or in a work of art, for +every military conception, from the design of a ship up, should be a +work of art. Perfection does not exclude a multiplicity of detail, but +it does demand unity of motive, a single central idea, to which all +detail is strictly accessory, to emphasize or to enhance,--not to +distract. The cruiser requirements offer a concrete illustration of +the application of this thought. Rapidity of action is the primary +object. In it is involved both coal endurance and facility for +recoaling; for each economizes time, as speed does. Defensive +strength--of which subdivision of coal bunkers is an element--conduces +only secondarily to rapidity of movement, as does offensive power; +they must, therefore, be very strictly subordinated. They must not +detract from speed; yet so far as they do not injure that, they +should be developed, for by the power to repel an enemy--to avert +detention--they minister to rapidity. With the battleship, in this +contrary to the cruiser, offensive power is the dominant feature. +While, therefore, speed is desirable to it, excessive speed is not +admissible, if, as the author believes, it can be obtained only at +some sacrifice of offensive strength. + +When Admiral Sampson sent off the telegrams last mentioned, before +daylight of May 16th, the flagship was off Cape Haitien. During her +stoppage for this purpose, the squadron continued to stand west, in +order not to increase the loss of time due to the slowness of the +monitors, through which the progress of the whole body did not exceed +from seven to eight sea miles per hour. Cape Haitien is distant from +Key West nearly seven hundred miles; and throughout this distance, +being almost wholly along the coast of Cuba, no close telegraphic +communication could be expected. At the squadron's rate of advance it +could not count upon arriving at Key West, and so regaining touch with +Washington, before the morning of the 19th, and the Department was +thus notified. Thirty-six hours later, at 11.30 A.M., May 17th, being +then in the Old Bahama Channel, between Cuba and the Bahama Banks, the +Admiral felt that his personal presence, under existing conditions, +was more necessary near Havana and Key West. Leaving the division, +therefore, in charge of the senior officer, Captain Evans, of the +_Iowa_, he pushed forward with the flagship _New York_, the fastest of +the armored vessels. Six hours later he was met by the torpedo boat +_Dupont_, bringing him a telegram from the Department, dated the 16th, +forwarded through Key West, directing him to send his most suitable +armored ship ahead to join the Flying Squadron. This order was based +on information that Cervera was bringing munitions of war essential to +the defence of Havana, and that his instructions were peremptory to +reach either Havana or a port connected with it by railroad. Such +commands pointed evidently to Cienfuegos, which place, moreover, was +clearly indicated from the beginning of the campaign, as already shown +in these papers, as the station for one division of our armored +fleet. + +The Department could calculate certainly that, by the time its message +reached Sampson, his division would be so far advanced as to ensure +interposing between Havana and the Spaniards, if the latter came by +the Windward Passage--from the eastward. It was safe, therefore, or at +least involved less risk of missing the enemy, to send the Flying +Squadron to Cienfuegos, either heading him off there, or with a chance +of meeting him in the Yucatan Channel, if he tried to reach Havana by +going west of Cuba. But as Cienfuegos was thought the more likely +destination, and was for every reason a port to be effectually +blockaded, it was desirable to reinforce Schley, not by detaining him, +under the pressing need of his getting to Cienfuegos, but by a +battleship following him as soon as possible. Of course, such a ship +might be somewhat exposed to encountering the enemy's division +single-handed, which is contrary to rule. But rules are made to be +broken on occasion, as well as to be observed generally; and again, +and always, war cannot be made without running risks, of which the +greatest is misplaced or exaggerated caution. From the moment the +Spanish ships were reported at Curacao, a close lookout had been +established in the Yucatan Channel. + +By his personal action, in quitting his squadron in order to hasten +forward, Admiral Sampson had anticipated the wishes of the Department. +At 4 P.M., May 18th, he reached Key West, where he found the Flying +Squadron and the _St. Paul_, anchored in the outer roads. His own +telegrams, and those from the Secretary of the Navy, had ensured +preparations for coaling all vessels as they arrived, to the utmost +rapidity that the facilities of the port admitted. The _St. Paul_, +whose orders had been again changed, sailed the same evening for Cape +Haitien. The Flying Squadron started for Cienfuegos at 9 A.M. the +following day, the 19th, and was followed twenty-six hours later by +the battleship _Iowa_. Shortly after the Admiral left the fleet, it +had been overtaken by the torpedo boat _Porter_, from Cape Haitien, +bearing a despatch which showed the urgency of the general situation, +although it in no way fettered the discretion of the officer in +charge. Captain Evans, therefore, very judiciously imitated Sampson's +action, quitted the fleet, and hastened with his own ship to Key +West, arriving at dark of the 18th. Being a vessel of large coal +endurance, she did not delay there to fill up, but she took with her +the collier _Merrimac_ for the ships before Cienfuegos. + +The remainder of Sampson's division arrived on the 19th. The monitors +_Puritan_ and _Miantonomoh_, which had not been to San Juan, sailed on +the 20th for the Havana blockade, where they were joined before noon +of the 21st by the _Indiana_, and the _New York_, the latter having +the Admiral on board. Commodore Schley, with the Flying Squadron, +arrived off Cienfuegos toward midnight of the same day. The _Iowa_, +came up twelve hours later, about noon of the 22nd, and some four or +five light cruisers joined on that or the following days. On the 24th +the _Oregon_ communicated with Washington off Jupiter Inlet, on the +east coast of Florida. Her engines being reported perfectly ready, +after her long cruise, she was directed to go to Key West, where she +coaled, and on the 28th left for the Havana blockade. It is difficult +to exaggerate the honor which this result does to Chief Engineer +Milligan and to the officers responsible under him for the condition +of her machinery. The combination of skill and care thus evidenced is +of the highest order. + +Such, in general outline, omitting details superfluous to correct +comprehension, was the course of incidents on our side, in the Cuban +campaign, during the ten days, May 12th-21st; from the bombardment of +San Juan de Puerto Rico to the establishment of the two armored +divisions in the positions which, under better conditions of national +preparation, they should have occupied by the 1st of the month. All is +well that ends well--so far at least as the wholly past is concerned; +but for the instruction of the future it is necessary not to cast the +past entirely behind our backs before its teachings have been pondered +and assimilated. We cannot expect ever again to have an enemy so +entirely inapt as Spain showed herself to be; yet, even so, Cervera's +division reached Santiago on the 19th of May, two days before our +divisions appeared in the full force they could muster before Havana +and Cienfuegos. Had the Spanish Admiral been trying for one of those +ports, even at the low rate of speed observed in going from Curacao +to Santiago--about seven and five-tenth knots--he could have left +Curacao on the evening of May 15th, and have reached Cienfuegos on the +21st, between midnight and daybreak, enabling him to enter the harbor +by 8 A.M.--more than twelve hours before the arrival there of our +Flying Squadron. + +The writer assumes that, had our coast defences been such as to put +our minds at ease concerning the safety of our chief seaboard cities, +the Flying Squadron would from the first have been off Cienfuegos. He +is forced to assume so, because his own military conviction has always +been that such would have been the proper course. Whatever _coup de +main_ might have been possible against a harbor inadequately defended +as were some of ours,--the fears of which, even, he considered +exaggerated,--no serious operations against a defended seaboard were +possible to any enemy after a transatlantic voyage, until recoaled. It +would have been safe, militarily speaking, to place our two divisions +before the ports named. It was safer to do so than to keep one at +Hampton Roads; for offence is a safer course than defence. + +Consider the conditions. The Spaniards, after crossing the Atlantic, +would have to coal. There were four principal ports at which they +might do so,--Havana, Cienfuegos, Santiago, and San Juan de Puerto +Rico. The first two, on the assumption, would be closed to them, +unless they chose to fight a division so nearly equal to their own +force that, whatever the result of the battle, the question of coaling +would have possessed no further immediate interest for them. Santiago +and San Juan, and any other suitable eastern port open to them--if +such there was--were simply so many special instances of a particular +case; and of these San Juan was the most favorable to them, because, +being the most distant, it ensured more time for coaling and getting +away again before our divisions could arrive. After their departure +from Curacao was known, but not their subsequent intentions, and while +our divisions were proceeding to Havana and Cienfuegos, measures were +under consideration at the Navy Department which would have made it +even then difficult for them to escape action, if they went to San +Juan for coal; but which would have raised the difficult close to the +point of the impossible, had our divisions from the first been placed +before Havana and Cienfuegos, which strategic conditions dictated, but +fears for our own inadequately defended coast prevented. + +To ensure this result, the contemplated method, one simply of +sustained readiness, was as follows. Adequate lookouts around Puerto +Rico were to be stationed, by whom the enemy's approach would be +detected and quickly cabled; and our two divisions were to be kept +ready to proceed at an instant's notice, coaled to their best steaming +lines, as far as this was compatible with a sufficiency of fuel to +hold their ground after arriving off San Juan. Two of our fastest +despatch vessels, likewise at their best steaming immersion, were to +be held at Key West ready to start at once for Cienfuegos to notify +the squadron there; two, in order that if one broke down on the way, +one would surely arrive within twenty-four hours. Thus planned, the +receipt of a cable at the Department from one of the lookouts off +Puerto Rico would be like the touching of a button. The Havana +division, reached within six hours, would start at once; that at +Cienfuegos eighteen hours after the former. Barring accidents, we +should, in five days after the enemy's arrival, have had off San Juan +the conditions which it took over a week to establish at Santiago; +but, allowing for accidents, there would, within five days, have been +at least one division, a force sufficient to hold the enemy in check. + +Five days, it may be said, is not soon enough. It would have been +quite soon enough in the case of Spaniards after a sea voyage of +twenty-five hundred miles, in which the larger vessels had to share +their coal with the torpedo destroyers. In case of a quicker enemy of +more executive despatch, and granting, which will be rare, that a +fleet's readiness to depart will be conditioned only by coal, and not +by necessary engine repairs to some one vessel, it is to be remarked +that the speed which can be, and has been, assumed for our ships in +this particular case, nine knots, is far less than the most modest +demands for a battleship,--such as those made even by the present +writer, who is far from an advocate of extreme speed. Had not our +deficiency of dry docks left our ships very foul, they could have +covered the distance well within four days. Ships steady at thirteen +knots would have needed little over three; and it is _sustained_ speed +like this, not a spurt of eighteen knots for twelve hours, that is +wanted. No one, however, need be at pains to dispute that +circumstances alter cases; or that the promptness and executive +ability of an enemy are very material circumstances. Similarly, +although the method proposed would have had probable success at San +Juan, and almost certain success at any shorter distance, it would at +two thousand miles be very doubtfully expedient. + +Assuming, moreover, that it had been thought unadvisable to move +against San Juan, because doubtful of arriving in time, what would +have been the situation had Cervera reached there, our armored +divisions being off Havana and Cienfuegos? He would have been watched +by the four lookouts--which were ordered before Santiago immediately +upon his arrival there--and by them followed when he quitted port. +Four leaves a good margin for detaching successively to cable ports +before giving up this following game, and by that time his intentions +would be apparent. Where, indeed, should he go? Before Havana and +Cienfuegos would be divisions capable of fighting him. Santiago, or +any eastern port, is San Juan over again, with disadvantage of +distance. Matanzas is but Havana; he would find himself anticipated +there, because one of those vessels dogging his path would have +hurried on to announce his approach. Were his destination, however, +evidently a North Atlantic port, as some among us had fondly feared, +our division before Havana would be recalled by cable, and that before +Cienfuegos drawn back to Havana, leaving, of course, lookouts before +the southern port. Cienfuegos is thereby uncovered, doubtless; but +either the Spaniard fails to get there, not knowing our movements, or, +if he rightly divines them and turns back, our coast is saved. + +Strategy is a game of wits, with many unknown quantities; as Napoleon +and Nelson have said--and not they alone--the unforeseen and chance +must always be allowed for. But, if there are in it no absolute +certainties, there are practical certainties, raised by experience to +maxims, reasonable observance of which gives long odds. Prominent +among these certainties are the value of the offensive over the +defensive, the advantage of a central position, and of interior lines. +All these would have been united, strategically, by placing our +armored divisions before Havana and Cienfuegos. As an offensive step, +this supported, beyond any chance of defeat, the blockade of the Cuban +coast, as proclaimed, with the incidental additional advantage that +Key West, our base, was not only accessible to us, but defended +against serious attack, by the mere situation of our Havana squadron. +Central position and interior lines were maintained, for, Havana being +nearly equidistant from Puerto Rico and the Chesapeake, the squadrons +could be moved in the shortest time in either direction, and they +covered all points of offence and defence within the limits of the +theatre of war by lines shorter than those open to the enemy, which is +what "interior lines" practically means. + +If this disposition did possess these advantages, the question +naturally arises whether it was expedient for the Havana division, +before Cervera's arrival was known, and with the Flying Squadron still +at Hampton Roads, to move to the eastward to San Juan, as was done. +The motive of this step, in which the Navy Department acquiesced, was +the probability, which must be fully admitted, that San Juan was +Cervera's primary destination. If it so proved, our squadron would be +nearer at hand. It was likely, of course, that Cervera would first +communicate with a neutral port, as he did at Martinique, to learn if +the coast were clear before pushing for San Juan. The result of his +going to the latter place would have been to present the strategic +problem already discussed. + +Cervera heard that our fleet was at San Juan, went to Curacao, and +afterwards to Santiago, because, as the Spanish Minister of Marine +declared in the Cortes, it was the only port to which he could go. Our +Admiral's official report, summing up the conditions after the +bombardment of San Juan, as they suggested themselves to his mind at +the time, has been quoted in a previous section. In the present we +have sought to trace as vividly as possible the hurried and various +measures consequent upon Cervera's movements; to reproduce, if may be, +the perplexities--the anxieties, perhaps, but certainly not the +apprehensions--of the next ten days, in which, though we did not fear +being beaten, we did fear being outwitted, which is to no man +agreeable. + +If Sampson's division had been before Havana and Schley's at Hampton +Roads when Cervera appeared, the latter could have entered San Juan +undisturbed. What could we then have done? In virtue of our central +position, three courses were open. 1. We could have sent our Havana +division to San Juan, as before proposed, and the Flying Squadron +direct to the same point, with the disadvantage, however, as compared +with the disposition advocated last, that the distance to it from +Hampton Roads is four hundred miles more than from Cienfuegos. 2. We +could have moved the Havana Squadron to San Juan, sending the Flying +Squadron to Key West to coal and await further orders. This is only a +modification of No. 1. Or, 3, we could have ordered the Flying +Squadron to Key West, and at the same moment sent the Havana division +before Cienfuegos,--a simultaneous movement which would have effected +a great economy of time, yet involved no risk, owing to the distance +of the Spanish division from the centre of operations. + +Of these three measures the last would have commended itself to the +writer had Cervera's appearance, reported at Martinique, left it at +all doubtful whether or not he were aiming for Havana or Cienfuegos. +In our estimation, that was the strategic centre, and therefore to be +covered before all else. So long as Cervera's destination was unknown, +and might, however improbable, be our coast, there was possible +justification for keeping the Flying Squadron there; the instant he +was known to be in the West Indies, to close the two Cuban ports +became the prime necessity. But had he entered San Juan without +previous appearance, the first or the second should have been adopted, +in accordance with the sound general principle that the enemy's fleet, +if it probably can be reached, is the objective paramount to all +others; because the control of the sea, by reducing the enemy's navy, +is the determining consideration in a naval war. + +Without dogmatizing, however, upon a situation which did not obtain, +it appears now to the writer, not only that the eastward voyage of our +Havana division was unfortunate, viewed in the light of subsequent +events, but that it should have been seen beforehand to be a mistake +because inconsistent with a well-founded and generally accepted +principle of war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by the +conditions. The principle is that which condemns "eccentric" +movements. The secondary definition of this word--"odd" or +"peculiar"--has so dislodged all other meanings in common speech that +it seems necessary to recall that primarily, by derivation, it +signifies "away from the centre," to which sense it is confined in +technical military phrase. Our centre of operations had been fixed, +and rightly fixed, at Havana and Cienfuegos. It was subject, properly, +to change--instant change--when the enemy's fleet was known to be +within striking distance; but to leave the centre otherwise, on a +calculation of probabilities however plausible, was a proposition that +should have been squarely confronted with the principle, which itself +is only the concrete expression of many past experiences. It is far +from the writer's wish to advocate slavery to rule; no bondage is more +hopeless or more crushing; but when one thinks of acting contrary to +the weight of experience, the reasons for such action should be most +closely scrutinized, and their preponderance in the particular case +determined. + +These remarks are offered with no view of empty criticism of a +mistake--if such it were--in which the writer was not without his +share. In military judgments error is not necessarily censurable. One +of the greatest captains has said: "The general who has made no +mistake has made few campaigns." There are mistakes and mistakes; +errors of judgment, such as the most capable man makes in the course +of a life, and errors of conduct which demonstrate essential unfitness +for office. Of the latter class was that of Admiral Byng, when he +retired from Minorca; a weakness not unparalleled in later times, but +which, whatever the indulgence accorded to the offender, is a military +sin that should for itself receive no condonement of judgment. As +instances of the former, both Nelson and Napoleon admitted, to quote +the latter's words: "I have been so often mistaken that I no longer +blush for it." My wish is to illustrate, by a recent particular +instance, a lesson professionally useful to the future,--the value of +rules. By the disregard of rule in this case we uncovered both Havana +and Cienfuegos, which it was our object to close to the enemy's +division. Had the latter been more efficient, he could have reached +one or the other before we regained the centre. Our movement was +contrary to rule; and while the inferences upon which it was based +were plausible, they were not, in the writer's judgment, adequate to +constitute the exception. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[3] The distance from Hampton Roads to Key West is increased, owing to +the adverse current of the Gulf Stream through much of the route. + + + + +V + + THE GUARD SET OVER CERVERA.--INFLUENCE OF INADEQUATE + NUMBERS UPON THE CONDUCT OF NAVAL AND MILITARY + OPERATIONS.--CAMARA'S RUSH THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN, + AND CONSEQUENT MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES. + + +The result of the various movements so far narrated was to leave the +Flying Squadron May 22nd, off Cienfuegos, and Admiral Sampson's +division off Havana, on the 21st. The latter was seriously diminished +in mobile combatant force by the removal of the _Iowa_, detached to +the south of the island to join the ships under Schley. It was +confidently expected that there, rather than at any northern port, +the enemy would make his first appearance; and for that reason the +Flying Squadron was strengthened by, and that off Havana deprived of, +a vessel whose qualities would tell heavily in conflict with an active +antagonist, such as a body of armored cruisers ought to be. Only by +great good fortune could it be expected that the monitors, upon which +Sampson for the moment had largely to depend, could impose an +engagement upon Cervera's division if the latter sought to enter +Havana by a dash. By taking from the Admiral his most powerful vessel, +he was exposed to the mortification of seeing the enemy slip by and +show his heels to our sluggish, low-freeboard, turreted vessels; but +the solution was the best that could be reached under the conditions. +It was not till the 28th of the month that the junction of the +_Oregon_ put our division before Havana on terms approaching equality +as regards quickness of movement. + +On the 19th of May the Department received probable, but not certain, +information that the enemy's division had entered Santiago. This, as +is now known, had occurred on the early morning of the same day. +Singularly enough, less than twenty-four hours before, on the 18th, +the auxiliary steamer _St. Louis_, Captain Goodrich, lately one of the +American Transatlantic liners, had been close in with the mouth of +this port, which had hitherto lain outside our sphere of operations, +and had made a determined and successful attempt to cut the telegraph +cable leading from Santiago to Jamaica. In doing this, the _St. +Louis_, which, like her sister ships (except the _St. Paul_), had not +yet received an armament suitable to her size or duties, lay for +three-quarters of an hour under the fire of the enemy, at a distance +of little over a mile. Fortunately a six-inch rifled gun on the Socapa +battery, which was then being mounted, was not ready until the +following day; and the _St. Louis_ held her ground without injury +until a piece had been cut out of the cable. In this work she was +assisted by the tug _Wompatuck_, Lieutenant-Commander Jungen. The two +vessels then moved away to Guantanamo Bay, having been off Santiago +nearly forty-eight hours. It may certainly be charged as good luck to +Cervera that their departure before his arrival kept our Government +long in uncertainty as to the fact, which we needed to know in the +most positive manner before stripping the Havana blockade in order to +concentrate at Santiago. The writer remembers that the captain of the +_St. Louis_, having soon afterwards to come north for coal, found it +difficult to believe that he could have missed the Spanish vessels by +so little; and the more so because he had spent the 19th off +Guantanamo, less than fifty miles distant. By that time, however, our +information, though still less than eye-witness, was so far probable +as to preponderate over his doubts; but much perplexity would have +been spared us had the enemy been seen by this ship, whose great speed +would have brought immediate positive intelligence that all, and not +only a part, had entered the port. On this point we did not obtain +certainty until three weeks later. + +In yet another respect luck, as it is commonly called, went against us +at this time. The _Wompatuck_ was sent by Captain Goodrich into the +mouth of the harbor at Guantanamo to attempt to grapple the cable +there. The tug and the _St. Louis_ were both forced to retire, not by +the weight of fire from the coast, but by a petty Spanish gunboat, +aided by "a small gun on shore." Could this fact have been +communicated to Commodore Schley when he decided to return to Key West +on the 26th, on account of the difficulty of coaling, he might have +seen the facility with which the place could be secured and utilized +for a coaling station, as it subsequently was by Admiral Sampson, and +that there thus was no necessity of starting back some seven hundred +miles to Key West, when he had with him four thousand tons of coal in +a collier. When the lower bay was occupied, on the 8th of June, our +attacking vessels were only the naval unprotected cruiser _Marblehead_ +and the auxiliary cruiser _Yankee_, the former of which was with the +Flying Squadron during its passage from Cienfuegos to Santiago, and +throughout the subsequent proceedings up to Sampson's arrival off the +latter port. No resistance to them was made by the Spanish gunboat, +before which the vulnerable and inadequately armed _St. Louis_ and +_Wompatuck_ had very properly retired. + +Although the information received of Cervera's entering Santiago was +not reliable enough to justify detaching Sampson's ships from before +Havana, it was probable to a degree that made it imperative to watch +the port in force at once. Telegrams were immediately sent out to +assemble the four auxiliary cruisers--_St. Paul_, _St. Louis_, +_Harvard_, and _Yale_--and the fast naval cruiser _Minneapolis_ before +the mouth of the harbor. The number of these ships shows the +importance attached to the duty. It was necessary to allow largely for +the chapter of accidents; for, to apply a pithy saying of the Chief of +the Naval Bureau of Equipment,--"the only way to have coal enough is +to have too much,"--the only way to assemble ships enough when things +grow critical, is to send more than barely enough. All those that +received their orders proceeded as rapidly as their conditions +allowed, but the Department could not get hold of the _St. Louis_. +This failure illustrates strongly the remark before made concerning +the importance of knowing just where cruisers are to be found; for of +all the five ships thus sought to be gathered, the _St. Louis_ was, at +the moment, the most important, through her experience of the +defenceless state of the harbor at Guantanamo, which she could have +communicated to Schley. The latter, when he arrived off Santiago on +the evening of the 26th, found the _Minneapolis_, the _St. Paul_, and +the _Yale_ on the ground. The _Harvard_ had already been there, but +had gone for the moment to St. Nicolas Mole, with despatches that the +Commodore had sent before him from Cienfuegos. She joined the squadron +again early next day, May 27th. + +On the morning of the 25th, the _St. Paul_ had captured the British +steamer _Restormel_, with 2,400 tons of coal for the Spanish squadron. +This vessel had gone first to Puerto Rico, and from there had been +directed to Curacao, where she arrived two days after Cervera had +departed. When taken she reported that two other colliers were in +Puerto Rico when she sailed thence. This would seem to indicate that +that port, and not Santiago, had been the original destination of the +enemy, for it would have been quite as easy for the colliers to go to +Santiago at once; probably safer, for we were not then thinking of +Santiago in comparison with San Juan. This conjecture is strengthened +by the fact that there were only 2,300 tons of Cardiff coal in +Santiago, a condition which shows both how little the Spanish +Government expected to use the port and how serious this capture at +this instant was to the enemy. + +The intention of Commodore Schley to return to Key West precipitated +the movement of Admiral Sampson, with his two fastest ships, to +Santiago; but the step would certainly have been taken as soon as the +doubt whether all the Spanish division had entered was removed. The +Department, under its growing conviction that the enemy was there, had +already been increasingly disturbed by the delay of the Flying +Squadron before Cienfuegos. This delay was due to the uncertainty of +its commander as to whether or not Cervera was in the latter port; nor +was there then known reason to censure the decision of the officer on +the spot, whose information, dependent upon despatch vessels, or upon +local scouting, was necessarily, in some respects, more meagre than +that of the Department, in cable communication with many quarters. +Nevertheless, he was mistaken, and each succeeding hour made the +mistake more palpable and more serious to those in Washington; not, +indeed, that demonstrative proof had been received there--far from +it--but there was that degree of reasonable probability which +justifies practical action in all life, and especially in war. There +was not certainty enough to draw away our ships from before +Havana,--to the exposure also of Key West,--but there was quite +sufficient certainty to take the chance of leaving Cienfuegos and +going off Santiago; for, to put the case at its weakest, we could not +close both ports, and had, therefore, to make a choice. Against the +risk of the enemy trying to dash out of Santiago and run for some +other point, provision was made by a telegram to the _Yale_ to inform +every vessel off Santiago that the Flying Squadron was off Cienfuegos, +and that orders had been sent it to proceed with all possible despatch +off Santiago. If, therefore, the enemy did run out before the arrival +of Schley, our scouts would know where to look for the latter; that +is, somewhere on the shortest line between the two ports. + +The embarrassment imposed upon the Department, under the telegram that +the Flying Squadron was returning to Key West, was increased greatly +by the fact that the five cruisers ordered before the port were +getting very short of coal. If the squadron held its ground, this was +comparatively immaterial. It would be injurious, unquestionably, to +the communications and to the lookout, but not necessarily fatal to +the object in view, which was that Cervera should not get out without +a fight and slip away again into the unknown. But, if the squadron +went, the cruisers could not stay, and the enemy might escape +unobserved. Fortunately, on second thoughts, the Commodore decided to +remain; but before that was known to the Department, Sampson had been +directed, on May 29th, to proceed with the _New York_ and the +_Oregon_, the latter of which had only joined him on the 28th. The +telegram announcing that the Flying Squadron would hold on came indeed +before the two ships started, but it was not thought expedient to +change their orders. Word also had then been received that two of the +Spanish division had been sighted inside from our own vessels, and +though this still left a doubt as to the whereabouts of the others, it +removed the necessity of covering Key West, which had caused the +Department, on the first knowledge of Schley's returning, to limit its +orders to Sampson to be ready to set out for Santiago the instant the +Flying Squadron returned. By the departure of the _New York_ and the +_Oregon_, the _Indiana_ was left the only battleship to the westward. +Her speed was insufficient to keep up with the two others, and it was +determined to employ her in convoying the army when it was ready,--a +duty originally designed for Sampson's division as a whole. + +Admiral Sampson with his two ships arrived off Santiago on the 1st of +June at 6 A.M., and established at once the close watch of the port +which lasted until the sally and destruction of Cervera's squadron. +"From that time on," says the Spanish Lieutenant Muller, who was in +the port from the first, as second in command of the naval forces of +the province, "the hostile ships, which were afterwards increased in +number, established day and night a constant watch, without +withdrawing at nightfall, as they used to do." Into the particulars of +this watch, which lasted for a month and which effectively prevented +any attempt of the enemy to go out by night, the writer does not +purpose to enter, as his object in this series of papers is rather to +elicit the general lessons derivable from the war than to give the +details of particular operations. It is only just to say, however, +that all the dispositions of the blockade,--to use the common, but +not strictly accurate, expression,--from the beginning of June to the +day of the battle, were prescribed by the commander-in-chief on the +spot, without controlling orders, and with little, if any, suggestion +on the subject from the Department. The writer remembers none; but he +does well remember the interest with which, during the dark nights of +the month, he watched the size of the moon, which was new on the 18th, +and the anxiety each morning lest news might be received of a +successful attempt to get away on the part of the enemy, whose reputed +speed so far exceeded that of most of our ships. It was not then known +that, by reason of the methods unremittingly enforced by our squadron, +it was harder to escape from Santiago by night than by day, because of +the difficulty of steering a ship through an extremely narrow channel, +with the beam of an electric light shining straight in the eyes, as +would there have been the case for a mile before reaching the harbor's +mouth. + +The history of the time--now nearly a year--that has elapsed since +these lines were first written, impels the author, speaking as a +careful student of the naval operations that have illustrated the past +two centuries and a half, to say that in his judgment no more onerous +and important duty than the guard off Santiago fell upon any officer +of the United States during the hostilities; and that the judgment, +energy, and watchfulness with which it was fulfilled by Admiral +Sampson merits the highest praise. The lack of widely diffused popular +appreciation of military conditions, before referred to in these +papers, has been in nothing more manifest than in the failure to +recognize generally, and by suitable national reward, both the +difficulty of his task, and that the dispositions maintained by him +ensured the impossibility of Cervera's escaping undetected, as well as +the success of the action which followed his attempt at flight. This +made further fighting on Spain's part hopeless and vindicated, if +vindication were needed, the Department's choice of the +commander-in-chief; but, as a matter of fact, the reply of that great +admiral and experienced administrator, Lord St. Vincent, when he sent +Nelson to the Nile, meets decisively all such cases: "Those who are +responsible for results"--as the Navy Department (under the +President), was--"must be allowed the choice of their agents." The +writer may perhaps be excused for adding, that, having had no share, +direct or indirect, in this selection, which entirely preceded his +connection with the Department, he can have no motive of +self-justification regarding an appointment for which he could deserve +neither credit nor blame. + +The office of the Navy Department at that moment, so far as Santiago +itself was concerned, was chiefly administrative: to maintain the +number of ships and their necessary supplies of coal, ammunition, and +healthy food at the highest point consistent with the requirements of +other parts of the field of war. During the month of June, being, as +it was, the really decisive period of the campaign, these demands for +increase of force naturally rose higher in every quarter. A numerous +convoy had to be provided for the army expedition; the battle fleet +had to be supplemented with several light cruisers; it became evident +that the sphere of the blockade must be extended, which meant many +more ships; and in the midst of all this, Camara started for Suez. All +this only instances the common saying, "It never rains but it pours." +Our battle fleet before Santiago was more than powerful enough to +crush the hostile squadron in a very short time, if the latter +attempted a stand-up fight. The fact was so evident that it was +perfectly clear nothing of the kind would be hazarded; but, +nevertheless, we could not afford to diminish the number of armored +vessels on this spot, now become the determining centre of the +conflict. The possibility of the situation was twofold. Either the +enemy might succeed in an effort at evasion, a chance which required +us to maintain a distinctly superior force of battleships in order to +allow the occasional absence of one or two for coaling or repairs, +besides as many lighter cruisers as could be mustered for purposes of +lookout, or, by merely remaining quietly at anchor, protected from +attack by the lines of torpedoes, he might protract a situation which +tended not only to wear out our ships, but also to keep them there +into the hurricane season,--a risk which was not, perhaps, adequately +realized by the people of the United States. + +It is desirable at this point to present certain other elements of the +naval situation which weightily affected naval action at the moment, +and which, also, were probably overlooked by the nation at large, for +they give a concrete illustration of conditions which ought to +influence our national policy, as regards the navy, in the present and +immediate future. We had to economize our ships because they were too +few. There was no reserve. The Navy Department had throughout, and +especially at this period, to keep in mind, not merely the exigencies +at Santiago, but the fact that we had not a battleship in the home +ports that could in six months be made ready to replace one lost or +seriously disabled, as the _Massachusetts_, for instance, not long +afterwards was, by running on an obstruction in New York Bay. Surprise +approaching disdain was expressed, both before and after the +destruction of Cervera's squadron, that the battle fleet was not sent +into Santiago either to grapple the enemy's ships there, or to support +the operations of the army, in the same way, for instance, that +Farragut crossed the torpedo lines at Mobile. The reply--and, in the +writer's judgment, the more than adequate reason--was that the country +could not at that time, under the political conditions which then +obtained, afford to risk the loss or disablement of a single +battleship, unless the enterprise in which it was hazarded carried a +reasonable probability of equal or greater loss to the enemy, leaving +us, therefore, as strong as before relatively to the naval power which +in the course of events might yet be arrayed against us. If we lost +ten thousand men, the country could replace them; if we lost a +battleship, it could not be replaced. The issue of the war, as a whole +and in every locality to which it extended, depended upon naval force, +and it was imperative to achieve, not success only, but success +delayed no longer than necessary. A million of the best soldiers would +have been powerless in face of hostile control of the sea. Dewey had +not a battleship, but there can be no doubt that that capable admiral +thought he ought to have one or more; and so he ought, if we had had +them to spare. The two monitors would be something, doubtless, when +they arrived; but, like all their class, they lacked mobility. + +When Camara started by way of Suez for the East, it was no more +evident than it was before that we ought to have battleships there. +That was perfectly plain from the beginning; but battleships no more +than men can be in two places at once, and until Camara's movement had +passed beyond the chance of turning west, the Spanish fleet in the +Peninsula had, as regarded the two fields of war, the West Indies and +the Philippines, the recognized military advantage of an interior +position. In accepting inferiority in the East, and concentrating our +available force in the West Indies, thereby ensuring a superiority +over any possible combination of Spanish vessels in the latter +quarter, the Department acted rightly and in accordance with sound +military precedent; but it must be remembered that the Spanish Navy +was not the only possibility of the day. The writer was not in a +position to know then, and does not know now, what weight the United +States Government attached to the current rumors of possible political +friction with other states whose people were notoriously sympathizers +with our enemy. The public knows as much about that as he does; but it +was clear that if a disposition to interfere did exist anywhere, it +would not be lessened by a serious naval disaster to us, such as the +loss of one of our few battleships would be. Just as in the +maintenance of a technically "effective" blockade of the Cuban ports, +so, also, in sustaining the entireness and vigor of the battle fleet, +the attitude of foreign Powers as well as the strength of the +immediate enemy had to be considered. For such reasons it was +recommended that the orders on this point to Admiral Sampson should be +peremptory; not that any doubt existed as to the discretion of that +officer, who justly characterized the proposition to throw the ships +upon the mine fields of Santiago as suicidal folly, but because it was +felt that the burden of such a decision should be assumed by a +superior authority, less liable to suffer in personal reputation from +the idle imputations of over-caution, which at times were ignorantly +made by some who ought to have known better, but did not. "The matter +is left to your discretion," the telegram read, "except that the +United States armored vessels must not be risked." + +When Cervera's squadron was once cornered, an intelligent opponent +would, under any state of naval preparedness, have seen the +advisability of forcing him out of the port by an attack in the rear, +which could be made only by an army. As Nelson said on one occasion, +"What is wanted now is not more ships, but troops." Under few +conditions should such a situation be prolonged. But the reasons +adduced in the last paragraph made it doubly incumbent upon us to +bring the matter speedily to an issue, and the combined expedition +from Tampa was at once ordered. Having in view the number of hostile +troops in the country surrounding Santiago, as shown by the subsequent +returns of prisoners, and shrewdly suspected by ourselves beforehand, +it was undoubtedly desirable to employ a larger force than was sent. +The criticism made upon the inadequate number of troops engaged in +this really daring movement is intrinsically sound, and would be +wholly accurate if directed, not against the enterprise itself, but +against the national shortsightedness which gave us so trivial an army +at the outbreak of the war. The really hazardous nature of the +movement is shown by the fact that the column of Escario, three +thousand strong, from Manzanillo, reached Santiago on July 3rd; too +late, it is true, abundantly too late, to take part in the defence of +San Juan and El Caney, upon holding which the city depended for food +and water; yet not so late but that it gives a shivering suggestion +how much more arduous would have been the task of our troops had +Escario come up in time. The incident but adds another to history's +long list of instances where desperate energy and economy of time have +wrested safety out of the jaws of imminent disaster. The occasion was +one that called upon us to take big risks; and success merely +justifies doubly an attempt which, from the obvious balance of +advantages and disadvantages, was antecedently justified by its +necessity, and would not have been fair subject for blame, even had it +failed. + +The Navy Department did not, however, think that even a small chance +of injury should be taken which could be avoided; and it may be +remarked that, while the man is unfit for command who, on emergency, +is unable to run a very great risk for the sake of decisive advantage, +he, on the other hand, is only less culpable who takes even a small +risk of serious harm against which reasonable precaution can provide. +It has been well said that Nelson took more care of his topgallant +masts,[4] in ordinary cruising, than he did of his whole fleet when +the enemy was to be checked or beaten; and this combination of +qualities apparently opposed is found in all strong military +characters to the perfection of which both are necessary. It was +determined, accordingly, to collect for the transports a numerous +naval guard or convoy, to secure them against possible attacks by the +Spanish gunboats distributed along the north coast of Cuba, by which +route the voyage was to be made. The care was probably thought +excessive by many and capable men; but the unforeseen is ever +happening in war. Here or there a young Spanish officer might +unexpectedly prove, not merely brave, as they all are, but +enterprising, which few of them seem to be. The transport fleet had no +habit of manoeuvring together; the captains, many of them, were +without interest in the war, and with much interest in their owners, +upon whom they commonly depended for employment; straggling, and panic +in case of attack, could be surely predicted; and, finally, as we +scarcely had men enough for the work before them, why incur the hazard +of sacrificing even one ship-load of our most efficient but all too +small regular army? For such reasons it was decided to collect a +dozen of the smaller cruisers, any one of which could handle a Spanish +gunboat, and which, in virtue of their numbers, could be so +distributed about the transports as to forestall attack at all points. +The mere notoriety that so powerful a flotilla accompanied the +movement was protection greater, perhaps, than the force itself; for +it would impose quiescence even upon a more active enemy. As a further +measure of precaution, directions were given to watch also the torpedo +destroyer in San Juan during the passage of the army. The _Indiana_, +as has been said, formed part of the convoy; the dispositions and +order of sailing being arranged, and throughout superintended, by her +commanding officer, Captain Henry C. Taylor. + +On Saturday, June 4th, Commodore Remey, commanding the naval base at +Key West, telegraphed that the naval vessels composing the convoy +would be ready to sail that evening. The army was embarked and ready +to move on the 8th, but early that morning was received the report, +alluded to in a previous paper, that an armored cruiser with three +vessels in company had been sighted by one of our blockading fleet +the evening before, in the Nicolas Channel, on the north coast of +Cuba. Upon being referred back, the statement was confirmed by the +officer making it, and also by another vessel which had passed over +the same ground at nearly the same time. The account being thus both +specific and positive, the sailing of the transports was +countermanded,--the naval vessels of the convoy being sent out from +Key West to scour the waters where the suspicious ships had been seen, +and Admiral Sampson directed to send his two fastest armored vessels +to Key West, in order that the expedition might proceed in force. The +Admiral, being satisfied that the report was a mistake, of a character +similar to others made to him at the same time, did not comply; a +decision which, under the circumstances of his fuller knowledge, must +be considered proper as well as fortunate. The incident was mortifying +at the time, and--considering by how little Escario arrived +late--might have been disastrous; but it is one of those in which it +is difficult to assign blame, though easy to draw a very obvious moral +for outlooks. + +The expedition finally got away from Tampa on the 14th of June, and +arrived off Santiago on the 20th. The process of collecting and +preparing the convoy, the voyage itself, and the delay caused by the +false alarm, constituted together a period of three weeks, during +which the naval vessels of the expedition were taken away from the +blockade. Some days more were needed to coal them, and to get them +again to their stations. Meanwhile it was becoming evident that the +limits of the blockade must be extended, in order that full benefit +might be derived from it as a military measure. The southern ports of +Cuba west of Santiago, and especially the waters about the Isle of +Pines and Batabano, which is in close rail connection with Havana, +were receiving more numerous vessels, as was also the case with Sagua +la Grande, on the north. In short, the demand for necessaries was +producing an increasing supply, dependent upon Jamaica and Mexico in +the south, upon Europe and North American ports in the north, and the +whole was developing into a system which would go far to defeat our +aims, unless counteracted by more widespread and closer-knit measures +on our part. It was decided, therefore, to proclaim a blockade of the +south coast of Cuba from Cape Cruz, a little west of Santiago, to Cape +Frances, where the foul ground west of the Isle of Pines terminates. +The Isle of Pines itself was to be seized, in order to establish there +a secure base, for coal and against hurricanes, for the small vessels +which alone could operate in the surrounding shoal water; and an +expedition, composed mainly of the battalion of marines, was actually +on the way for that purpose when the protocol was signed. During the +three weeks occupied by the preparation and passage of the Santiago +expedition, the blockade had been barely "effective," technically; it +could not at all be considered satisfactory from our point of view, +although we were stripping the coast defence fleet of its cruisers, +one by one, for the service in Cuba. Our utmost hope at the time, and +with every available vessel we could muster, was so far to satisfy the +claims of technicality, as to forestall any charges of ineffectiveness +by neutrals, whose cruisers at times seemed somewhat curious. + +In the midst of all this extra strain Camara's squadron left Cadiz and +made its hurried rush eastward. One effect of this was to release, +and instantly, all the patrol vessels on our northern coast. These +were immediately ordered to Key West for blockade duty, Commodore +Howell also going in person to take charge of this work. On the other +hand, however, uneasiness could not but be felt for Dewey in case +Camara actually went on, for, except the monitor _Monterey_, we could +get no armored ship out before the two Spanish armored vessels +arrived; and if they had the same speed which they maintained to +Suez--ten knots--it was doubtful whether the _Monterey_ would +anticipate them. It may be mentioned here, as an interesting +coincidence, that the same day that word came that Camara had started +back for Spain, a telegram was also received that the _Monterey_ had +had to put back to Honolulu, for repairs to the collier which +accompanied her. This, of course, was news then ten days old, +communication from Honolulu to San Francisco being by steamer, not by +cable. + +The strengthening of our blockade by the vessels of the northern +patrol fleet was therefore the first and, as it proved, the only +lasting result of Camara's move. What the object was of that singular +"vagabondaggio," as it is not inaptly called by an Italian critic, is +to the author incomprehensible, to use also the qualifying word of the +same foreign writer. That the intention was merely to provoke us to +some "eccentric" movement, by playing upon our fears about our forces +at Manila, would be perfectly reconcilable with going as far as Port +Said, and remaining there for some days, as was done, in difficulty, +actual or feigned, about getting coal; but why the large expense was +incurred of passing through the canal, merely to double the amount by +returning, is beyond understanding. It may have been simply to carry +bluff to the extreme point; but it is difficult not to suspect some +motive not yet revealed, and perhaps never to be known. + +Possibly, however, the measures taken by ourselves may have had upon +the Spanish Government the effect which, in part, they were intended to +produce. A squadron of two battleships and four cruisers, drawn from +Admiral Sampson's fleet, was constituted to go to Manila by way of +Suez, under the command of Commodore Watson, until then in charge of +the blockade on the north coast of Cuba. Colliers to accompany these +were at the same time prepared in our Atlantic ports. Upon the +representations of the Admiral, he was authorized to suspend the +sailing of the detachment until all the armored vessels were fully +coaled, in order to ensure maintaining before Santiago for a +considerable period the five that would be left to him. To this +modification of the first order contributed also the darkness of the +nights at that moment; for the moon, though growing, was still young. +But, as our object was even more to prevent Camara from proceeding than +to send the reinforcement, it was desired that these dispositions +should have full publicity, and, to ensure it the more fully, Watson +was directed to go in all haste to Santiago with his flagship, the +_Newark_, to take over his new command, the avowed objective of which +was the Spanish coast, then deprived of much of its defence by the +departure of Camara's ships, and most imperfectly provided with local +fortifications. Had Camara gone on to the East, Watson would have +followed him, and, although arriving later, there was no insuperable +difficulty to so combining the movements of our two divisions--Dewey's +and Watson's--as to decide the final result, and to leave Spain without +her second division of ships. + +Camara's delay at the Mediterranean end of the Canal, which extended +over several days, suggested either doubts as to the reality of his +rumored destination, or a belief that the equipment and +preparation--in coal especially--for so distant an expedition had been +imperfect. This contributed to postpone Watson's departure, and the +first passage of the Canal (July 2nd) by the Spaniards coincided in +date very closely with the destruction of their other division under +Cervera. After the action off Santiago the battleships needed to be +again supplied with ammunition, and before that could be effected +Camara was on his way back to Spain. + +This abandonment by the enemy of their projected voyage to Manila +concurred with the critical position of the army before Santiago to +postpone the project of reinforcing Dewey, who no longer needed +battleships so far as his immediate operations were concerned. +Besides, the arrival of both the _Monterey_ and the _Monadnock_ was +now assured, even if the enemy resumed his movement, which was +scarcely possible. When Santiago fell, however, it was felt to be +necessary to re-establish our fleet in the Pacific, by way either of +the Straits of Magellan or of the Suez Canal. The latter was chosen, +and the entire battle fleet--except the _Texas_, rejected on account +of her small coal endurance--was directed to join the movement and to +accompany some distance within the straits the two battleships which, +with their smaller cruisers and colliers, were to go to Manila. The +preparations for this movement were kept secret for quite a time, +under the cover of an avowed intention to proceed against Puerto Rico; +but nothing, apparently, can wholly escape the prying curiosity of the +Press, which dignifies this not always reputable quality with the +title of "enterprise." No great harm resulted; possibly even the +evident wish of the Government for secrecy, though thus betrayed, may +have increased the apprehension of the enemy as to the damage intended +to their coasts. + +On the latter point the position of our Government, as understood by +the writer, was perfectly simple. In case the enemy refused peace when +resistance was obviously and utterly hopeless, bombardment of a +seaport might be resorted to, but with the utmost reluctance, and +merely to compel submission and acquiescence in demonstrated facts. It +is not possible to allow one's own people to be killed and their +substance wasted merely because an adversary will not admit he is +whipped, when he is. When our fleet reached the Spanish coast that +case might have arisen; but probably the unwillingness of our +Government so to act would have postponed its decision to the very +last moment, in order to spare the enemy the final humiliation of +yielding, not to reasonable acceptance of facts, but to direct threat +of violence. The purpose of bombardment, so freely asserted by the +Press, was one of the numerous baseless discoveries with which it +enlightened its reader during the hostilities,--mixtures of truth and +error, so ingeniously proportioned as to constitute an antidote, than +which none better could then be had against its numerous +indiscretions. + +The determining factor in this proposed movement of the battle fleet +as a whole was the necessity, or at least the advantage, of +reinforcing Dewey, and of placing two battleships in the Pacific. It +was not thought expedient now to send them by themselves, as at first +proposed, for the reason already given in another instance in this +paper; that is, the impropriety of taking even a small risk, if +unnecessary. Camara's two ships had now returned to Spain, and there +were besides in the ports of the Peninsula other armed vessels, which, +though evidently unfit for a distant voyage, might be good for some +work in the Straits of Gibraltar, where our two ships must pass. That +the latter would beat them all, if assembled, we quite believed, as we +had hoped that the _Oregon_ might do had she met Cervera; but the +_Oregon_ could not be helped without neglecting more immediately +pressing duties, whereas, at the end of July, there was nothing to +detain our heavy ships in the West Indies. It was determined, +therefore, to keep them massed and to send them across the ocean. It +was probable, nearly to the extent of absolute certainty, that neither +before nor after the separation of the division bound for the East +would the entire Spanish Navy venture an attack upon the formidable +force thus confronting its ports. To ensure success without fighting +is always a proper object of military dispositions; and, moreover, +there were reasons before alluded to for maintaining in perfect +integrity vessels whose organized fighting efficiency had now been +fully vindicated to the world. Even during peace negotiations, one's +position is not injured by the readiness of the battle fleet. In +short, it should be an accepted apothegm, with those responsible for +the conduct of military operations, that "War is business," to which +actual fighting is incidental. As in all businesses, the true aim is +the best results at the least cost; or, as the great French admiral, +Tourville, said two centuries ago, "The best victories are those which +expend least of blood, of hemp, and of iron." Such results, it is +true, are more often granted to intelligent daring than to excessive +caution; but no general rule can supersede the individual judgment +upon the conditions before it. There are no specifics in warfare. + +To this main reason, others less immediately important concurred. The +ships would be taken out of a trying climate, and removed from the +chance of hurricanes; while the crews would receive a benefit, the +value of which is avouched by naval history, in change of scene, of +occupation, and of interests. The possibility of the enemy attempting +to divert us from our aim, by sending vessels to the West Indies, was +considered, and, although regarded as wildly improbable, provision +against it was made. As Nelson wrote to his commander-in-chief before +the advance on Copenhagen: "There are those who think, if you leave +the Sound open, that the Danish fleet may sail from Copenhagen to join +the Dutch or French. I own I have no fears on that subject; for it is +not likely that whilst their capital is menaced with an attack, nine +thousand of her best men should be sent out of the kingdom." It was +still less probable that Spain in the present case would attempt any +diversion to the West Indies, and the movement of our heavy-armored +vessels to her shores could now justly be considered to cover all our +operations on this side of the Atlantic. The detailed arrangements +made for frequent communication, however, would have kept the +Department practically in touch with our fleet throughout, and have +enabled us to counteract any despairing effort of the enemy. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] The lighter upper masts, upon which speed much depended in moderate +weather. + + + + +THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE MORAL ASPECT OF WAR + + + + +THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE MORAL ASPECT OF WAR + + +To determine the consequences of an historical episode, such as the +recent Peace Conference at The Hague, is not a matter for prophecy, +but for experience, which alone can decide what positive issues, for +good or for ill, shall hereafter trace their source to this beginning. +The most that the present can do is to take note of the point so far +reached, and of apparent tendencies manifested; to seek for the latter +a right direction; to guide, where it can, currents of general +thought, the outcome of which will be beneficial or injurious, +according as their course is governed by a just appreciation of +fundamental truths. + +The calling of the Conference of The Hague originated in an avowed +desire to obtain relief from immediate economical burdens, by the +adoption of some agreement to restrict the preparations for war, and +the consequent expense involved in national armaments; but before its +meeting the hope of disarmament had fallen into the background, the +vacant place being taken by the project of abating the remoter evils +of recurrent warfare, by giving a further impulse, and a more clearly +defined application, to the principle of arbitration, which +thenceforth assumed pre-eminence in the councils of the Conference. +This may be considered the point at which we have arrived. The +assembled representatives of many nations, including all the greatest +upon the earth, have decided that it is to arbitration men must look +for relief, rather than to partial disarmament, or even to an arrest +in the progress of preparations for war. Of the beneficence of the +practice of arbitration, of the wisdom of substituting it, when +possible, for the appeal to arms, with all the misery therefrom +resulting, there can be no doubt; but it will be expected that in its +application, and in its attempted development, the tendencies of the +day, both good and bad, will make themselves felt. If, on the one +hand, there is solid ground for rejoicing in the growing inclination +to resort first to an impartial arbiter, if such can be found, when +occasion for collision arises, there is, on the other hand, cause for +serious reflection when this most humane impulse is seen to favor +methods, which by compulsion shall vitally impair the moral freedom, +and the consequent moral responsibility, which are the distinguishing +glory of the rational man, and of the sovereign state. + +One of the most unfortunate characteristics of our present age is the +disposition to impose by legislative enactment--by external +compulsion, that is--restrictions of a moral character, which are +either fundamentally unjust, or at least do not carry with them the +moral sense of the community, as a whole. It is not religious faith +alone that in the past has sought to propagate itself by force of law, +which ultimately is force of physical coercion. If the religious +liberty of the individual has been at last won, as we hope forever, it +is sufficiently notorious that the propensity of majorities to control +the freedom of minorities, in matters of disputed right and wrong, +still exists, as certain and as tyrannical as ever was the will of +Philip II. that there should be no heretic within his dominion. Many +cannot so much as comprehend the thought of the English Bishop, that +it was better to see England free than England sober. + +In matters internal to a state, the bare existence of a law imposes an +obligation upon the individual citizen, whatever his personal +conviction of its rightfulness or its wisdom. Yet is such obligation +not absolute. The primary duty, attested alike by the law and the +gospel, is submission. The presumption is in favor of the law; and if +there lie against it just cause for accusation, on the score either of +justice or of expediency, the interests of the Commonwealth and the +precepts of religion alike demand that opposition shall be conducted +according to the methods, and within the limits, which the law of the +land itself prescribes. But it may be--it has been, and yet again may +be--that the law, however regular in its enactment, and therefore +unquestionable on the score of formal authority, either outrages +fundamental political right, or violates the moral dictates of the +individual conscience. Of the former may be cited as an instance the +Stamp Act, perfectly regular as regarded statutory validity, which +kindled the flame of revolution in America. Of the second, the +Fugitive Slave Law, within the memory of many yet living, is a +conspicuous illustration. Under such conditions, the moral right of +resistance is conceded--nay, is affirmed and emphasized--by the moral +consciousness of the races from which the most part of the American +people have their origin, and to which, almost wholly, we owe our +political and religious traditions. Such resistance may be passive, +accepting meekly the penalty for disobedience, as the martyr who for +conscience' sake refused the political requirement of sacrificing to +the image of the Caesar; or it may be active and violent, as when our +forefathers repelled taxation without representation, or when men and +women, of a generation not yet wholly passed away, refused to violate +their consciences by acquiescing in the return of a slave to his +bondage, resorting to evasion or to violence, according to their +conditions or temperaments, but in every case deriving the sanction +for their unlawful action from the mandate of their personal +conscience. + +And let it be carefully kept in mind that it is not the absolute right +or wrong of the particular act, as seen in the clearer light of a +later day, that justified men, whether in the particular instances +cited, or in other noteworthy incidents in the long series of steps by +which the English-speaking races have ascended to their present +political development. It is not the demonstrable rightfulness of a +particular action, as seen in the dispassionate light of the arbiter, +posterity, that has chiefly constituted the merit of the individual +rebel against the law in which he beheld iniquity; the saving salt, +which has preserved the healthfulness of the body politic, has been +the fidelity to Conscience, to the faithful, if passionate, arbiter of +the moment, whose glorious predominance in the individual or in the +nation gives a better assurance of the highest life than does the +clearest intellectual perception of the rightfulness, or of the +expediency, of a particular course. One may now see, or think that he +sees, as does the writer, with Lincoln, that if slavery is not wrong, +nothing is wrong. It was not so clear half a century ago; and while no +honor is too great for those early heroes, who for this sublime +conviction withstood obloquy and persecution, legal and illegal, it +should be never forgotten that the then slave States, in their +resolute determination to maintain, by arms, if need be, and against +superior force, that which they believed to be their constitutional +political right, made no small contribution to the record of fidelity +to conscience and to duty, which is the highest title of a nation to +honor. Be it by action or be it by submission, by action positive or +by action negative, whatsoever is not of faith--of conviction--is sin. + +The just and necessary exaltation of the law as the guarantee of true +liberty, with the consequent accepted submission of the individual to +it, and the recognized presumption in favor of such submission, have +tended to blind us to the fact that the individual, in our highest +consciousness, has never surrendered his moral freedom,--his +independence of conscience. No human law overbears that supreme +appeal, which carries the matter from the tribunal of man into the +presence of God; nor can human law be pleaded at this bar as the +excuse for a violation of conscience. It is a dangerous doctrine, +doubtless, to preach that there may be a "higher law" than obedience +to law; but truth is not to be rejected because dangerous, and the +time is not long past when the phrase voiced a conviction, the +forcible assertion of which brought slavery to an end forever. + +The resort to arms by a nation, when right cannot otherwise be +enforced, corresponds, or should correspond, precisely to the acts of +the individual man which have been cited; for the old conception of an +appeal to the Almighty, resembling in principle the mediaeval trial by +battle, is at best but a partial view of the truth, seen from one side +only. However the result may afterwards be interpreted as indicative +of the justice of a cause,--an interpretation always questionable,--a +state, when it goes to war, should do so not to test the rightfulness +of its claims, but because, being convinced in its conscience of that +rightfulness, no other means of overcoming evil remains. + +Nations, like men, have a conscience. Like men, too, the light of +conscience is in nations often clouded, or misguided, by passion or by +interest. But what of that? Does a man discard his allegiance to +conscience because he knows that, itself in harmony with right, its +message to him is perplexed and obscured by his own infirmities? Not +so. Fidelity to conscience implies not only obedience to its +dictates, but earnest heart-searching, the use of every means, to +ascertain its true command; yet withal, whatever the mistrust of the +message, the supremacy of the conscience is not impeached. When it is +recognized that its final word is spoken, nothing remains but +obedience. Even if mistaken, the moral wrong of acting against +conviction works a deeper injury to the man, and to his kind, than can +the merely material disasters that may follow upon obedience. Even the +material evils of war are less than the moral evil of compliance with +wrong. + +"Yes, my friend," replied to me a foreign diplomatist to whom I was +saying some such things, "but remember that only a few years ago the +conscience of your people was pressing you into war with Great Britain +in the Venezuelan question." "Admitting," I replied, "that the first +national impulse, the first movement of the conscience, if you like, +was mistaken,--which is at least open to argument,--it remains that +there was no war; time for deliberation was taken, and more than that +can be asked of no conscience, national or personal. But, further, +had the final decision of conscience been that just cause for war +existed, no evil that war brings could equal the moral declension +which a nation inflicts upon itself, and upon mankind, by deliberate +acquiescence in wrong, which it recognizes and which it might right." +Nor is this conclusion vitiated by the fact that war is made at times +upon mistaken conviction. It is not the accuracy of the decision, but +the faithfulness to conviction, that constitutes the moral worth of an +action, national or individual. + +The general consciousness of this truth is witnessed by a common +phrase, which excludes from suggested schemes of arbitration all +questions which involve "national honor or vital interests." No one +thing struck me more forcibly during the Conference at The Hague than +the exception taken and expressed, although in a very few quarters, to +the word "honor," in this connection. There is for this good reason; +for the word, admirable in itself and if rightly understood, has lost +materially in the clearness of its image and superscription, by much +handling and by some misapplication. Honor does not forbid a nation to +acknowledge that it is wrong, or to recede from a step which it has +taken through wrong motives or mistaken reasons; yet it has at times +been so thought, to the grievous injury of the conception of honor. It +is not honor, necessarily, but sound policy, which prescribes that +peace with a semi-civilized foe should not be made after a defeat; +but, however justifiable the policy, the word "honor" is defaced by +thus misapplying it. + +The varying fortunes, the ups and downs of the idea of arbitration at +the Conference of The Hague, as far as my intelligence could follow +them, produced in me two principal conclusions, which so far confirmed +my previous points of view that I think I may now fairly claim for +them that they have ripened into _opinions_, between which word, and +the cruder, looser views received passively as _impressions_, I have +been ever careful to mark a distinction. In the first place, +compulsory arbitration stands at present no chance of general +acceptance. There is but one way as yet in which arbitration can be +compulsory; for the dream of some advanced thinkers, of an +International Army, charged with imposing the decrees of an +International Tribunal upon a recalcitrant state, may be dismissed as +being outside of practical international politics, until at least the +nations are ready for the intermediate step of moral compulsion, +imposed by a self-assumed obligation--by a promise. Compulsory +arbitration as yet means only the moral compulsion of a pledge, taken +beforehand, and more or less comprehensive, to submit to arbitration +questions which rest still in the unknown future; the very terms of +which therefore cannot be foreseen. Although there is a certain active +current of agitation in favor of such stipulations, there is no +general disposition of governments to accede, except under very narrow +and precise limitations, and in questions of less than secondary +importance. + +Secondly, there appears to be, on the other hand, a much greater +disposition than formerly to entertain favorably the idea of +arbitration, as a means to be in all cases considered, and where +possible to be adopted, in order to solve peaceably difficulties which +threaten peace. In short, the consciences of the nations are awake to +the wickedness of unnecessary war, and are disposed, as a general +rule, to seek first, and where admissible, the counterpoise of an +impartial judge, where such can be found, to correct the bias of +national self-will; but there is an absolute indisposition, an +instinctive revolt, against signing away, beforehand, the national +conscience, by a promise that any other arbiter than itself shall be +accepted in questions of the future, the import of which cannot yet be +discerned. Of this feeling the vague and somewhat clumsy phrase, +"national honor and vital interests," has in the past been the +expression; for its very indeterminateness reserved to conscience in +every case the decision,--"May another judge for me here, or must I be +bound by my own sense of right?" + +Under these circumstances, and having reached so momentous a stage in +progress as is indicated by the very calling together of a world +conference for the better assuring of peace, may it not be well for us +to pause a moment and take full account of the idea, Arbitration, on +the right hand and on the left? Noble and beneficent in its true +outlines, it too may share, may even now be sharing, the liability of +the loftiest conceptions to degenerate into catchwords, or into cant. +"Liberty, what crimes have been wrought in thy name!" and does not +religion share the same reproach, and conscience also? Yet will we not +away with any of the three. + +The conviction of a nation is the conviction of the mass of the +individuals thereof, and each individual has therefore a personal +responsibility for the opinion he holds on a question of great +national, or international, moment. Let us look, each of us,--and +especially each of us who fears God,--into his own inner heart, and +ask himself how far, in his personal life, he is prepared to accept +arbitration. Is it not so that the reply must be, "In doubtful +questions of moment, wherever I possibly can, knowing my necessary, +inevitable proneness to one-sided views, I will seek an impartial +adviser, that my bias may be corrected; but when that has been done, +when I have sought what aid I can, if conscience still commands, it I +must obey. From that duty, burdensome though it may be, no man can +relieve me. Conscience, diligently consulted, is to the man the voice +of God; between God and the man no other arbiter comes." And if this +be so, a pledge beforehand is impossible. I cannot bind myself for a +future of which I as yet know nothing, to abide by the decision of +any other judge than my own conscience. Much humor--less wit--has been +expended upon the Emperor of Germany's supposed carefulness to reject +arbitration because an infringement of his divine rights; a phrase +which may well be no more than a blunt expression of the sense that no +third party can relieve a man from the obligations of the position to +which he is called by God, and that for the duties of that position +the man can confidently expect divine guidance and help. Be that as it +may, the divine right of conscience will, among Americans, receive +rare challenge. + +It has been urged, however, that a higher organization of the nations, +the provision of a supreme tribunal issuing and enforcing judgments, +settling thereby quarrels and disputed rights, would produce for the +nations of the earth a condition analogous to that of the individual +citizen of the state, who no longer defends his own cause, nor is +bound in conscience to maintain his own sense of right, when the law +decides against him. The conception is not novel, not even modern; +something much like it was put forth centuries ago by the Papacy +concerning its own functions. It contains two fallacies. First, the +submission of the individual citizen is to force, to the constitution +of which he personally contributes little, save his individual and +general assent. To an unjust law he submits under protest, doubtless +often silent; but he submits, not because he consents to the wrong, +whether to himself personally or to others, but because he cannot help +it. This will perhaps be denied, with the assertion that willing, +intelligent submission to law, even when unjust, is yielded by most +for the general good. One has, however, only to consider the +disposition of the average man to evade payment of taxes, to recognize +how far force daily enters into the maintenance and execution of law. +Nations, on the contrary, since no force exists, or without their +volition can exist, to compel them to accept the institution of an +authority superior to their own conscience, yield a willing +acquiescence to wrong, when they so yield in obedience to an external +authority imposed by themselves. The matter is not helped by the fact +of a previous promise to accept such decisions. The wrong-doing of an +individual, in consequence of an antecedent promise, does not relieve +the conscience thus rashly fettered. The ancient warning still stands, +"Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin." For the individual +or the nation, arbitration is not possible where the decision may +violate conscience; it therefore can be accepted only when it is known +that interest merely, not duty, will be affected by the judgment, and +such knowledge cannot exist antecedent to the difficulty arising. + +There is a further--a second--fallacy in the supposed analogy between +the submission of individuals to law, and the advocated submission of +states to a central tribunal. The law of the state, overwhelming as is +its power relatively to that of the individual citizen, can neither +bind nor loose in matters pertaining to the conscience. Still less can +any tribunal, however solemnly constituted, liberate a state from its +obligation to do right; still less, I say, because the state retains, +what the individual has in great part lost, the power to maintain what +it believes to be right. Many considerations may make it more right--I +do not say _more expedient_--for a man or for a nation, to submit to, +or to acquiesce in, wrong than to resist; but in such cases it is +conscience still that decides where the balance of justice turns +distinctly to the side of wrong. It is, I presume, universally +admitted, that occasions may arise where conscience not only +justifies, but compels, resistance to law; whether it be the Christian +citizen refusing to sacrifice, or the free citizen to subject himself +to unconstitutional taxation, or to become the instrument of returning +the slave to his master. So also for the Christian state. Existing +wrong may have to be allowed, lest a greater wrong be done. Conscience +only can decide; and for that very reason conscience must be kept +free, that it may decide according to its sense of right, when the +case is presented. + +There is, therefore, the very serious consideration attendant upon +what is loosely styled "compulsory" arbitration,--arbitration +stipulated, that is, in advance of a question originating, or of its +conditions being appreciated,--that a state may thereby do that which +a citizen as towards the state does not do; namely, may voluntarily +assume a moral obligation to do, or to allow, wrong. And it must be +remembered, also, that many of the difficulties which arise among +states involve considerations distinctly beyond and higher than law as +international law now exists; whereas the advocated Permanent +Tribunal, to which the ultra-organizers look, to take cognizance of +all cases, must perforce be governed by law as it exists. It is not, +in fact, to be supposed that nations will submit themselves to a +tribunal, the general principles of which have not been crystallized +into a code of some sort. + +A concrete instance, however, is always more comprehensible and +instructive than a general discussion. Let us therefore take the +incidents and conditions which preceded our recent war with Spain. The +facts, as seen by us, may, I apprehend, be fairly stated as follows: +In the island of Cuba, a powerful military force,--government it +scarcely could be called,--foreign to the island, was holding a small +portion of it in enforced subjection, and was endeavoring, +unsuccessfully, to reduce the remainder. In pursuance of this attempt, +measures were adopted that inflicted immense misery and death upon +great numbers of the population. Such suffering is indeed attendant +upon war; but it may be stated as a fundamental principle of +civilized warfare that useless suffering is condemned, and it had +become apparent to military eyes that Spain could not subdue the +island, nor restore orderly conditions. The suffering was terrible, +and was unavailing. + +Under such circumstances, does any moral obligation lie upon a +powerful neighboring state? Or, more exactly, if there is borne in +upon the moral consciousness of a mighty people that such an afflicted +community as that of Cuba at their doors is like Lazarus at the gate +of the rich man, and that the duty of stopping the evil rests upon +them, what is to be done with such a case of conscience? Could the +decision of another, whether nation or court, excuse our nation from +the ultimate responsibility of its own decision? But, granting that it +might have proved expedient to call in other judges, when we had full +knowledge of the circumstances, what would have been our dilemma if, +conscience commanding one course, we had found ourselves antecedently +bound to abide by the conclusions of another arbiter? For let us not +deceive ourselves. Absolutely justifiable, nay, imperative, as most of +us believe our action to have been, when tried at the bar of +conscience, no arbitral court, acceptable to the two nations, would +have decided as our own conscience did. A European diplomatist of +distinguished reputation, of a small nation likeliest to be unbiassed, +so said to me personally, and it is known that more than one of our +own ablest international lawyers held that we were acting in defiance +of international law as it now exists; just as the men who resisted +the Fugitive Slave Law acted in defiance of the statute law of the +land. Decision must have gone against us, so these men think, on the +legal merits of the case. Of the moral question the arbiter could take +no account; it is not there, indeed, that moral questions must find +their solution, but in the court of conscience. Referred to +arbitration, doubtless the Spanish flag would still fly over Cuba. + +There is unquestionably a higher law than Law, concerning obedience to +which no other than the man himself, or the state, can give account to +Him that shall judge. The freedom of the conscience may be fettered or +signed away by him who owes to it allegiance, yet its supremacy, +though thus disavowed, cannot be overthrown. The Conference at The +Hague has facilitated future recourse to arbitration, by providing +means through which, a case arising, a court is more easily +constituted, and rules governing its procedure are ready to hand; but +it has refrained from any engagements binding states to have recourse +to the tribunal thus created. The responsibility of the state to its +own conscience remains unimpeached and independent. The progress thus +made and thus limited is to a halting place, at which, whether well +chosen or not, the nations must perforce stop for a time; and it will +be wise to employ that time in considering the bearings, alike of that +which has been done, and of that which has been left undone. + +Our own country has a special need thus carefully to consider the +possible consequences of arbitration, understood in the sense of an +antecedent pledge to resort to it; unless under limitations very +carefully hedged. There is an undoubted popular tendency in direction +of such arbitration, which would be "compulsory" in the highest moral +sense,--the compulsion of a promise. The world at large, and we +especially, stand at the opening of a new era, concerning whose +problems little can be foreseen. Among the peoples, there is +manifested intense interest in the maturing of our national +convictions, as being, through Asia, new-comers into active +international life, concerning whose course it is impossible to +predict; and in many quarters, probably in all except Great Britain, +the attitude toward us is watchful rather than sympathetic. The +experience of Crete and of Armenia does not suggest beneficent results +from the arbitration of many counsellors; especially if contrasted +with the more favorable issue when Russia, in 1877, acting on her own +single initiative, forced by the conscience of her people, herself +alone struck the fetters from Bulgaria; or when we ourselves last +year, rejecting intermediation, loosed the bonds from Cuba, and lifted +the yoke from the neck of the oppressed. + +It was inevitable that thoughts like these should recur frequently to +one of the writer's habit of thought, when in constant touch with the +atmosphere that hung around the Conference, although the latter was by +it but little affected. The poet's words, "The Parliament of man, the +federation of the world," were much in men's mouths this past summer. +There is no denying the beauty of the ideal, but there was apparent +also a disposition, in contemplating it, to contemn the slow processes +of evolution by which Nature commonly attains her ends, and to impose +at once, by convention, the methods that commended themselves to the +sanguine. Fruit is not best ripened by premature plucking, nor can the +goal be reached by such short cuts. Step by step, in the past, man has +ascended by means of the sword, and his more recent gains, as well as +present conditions, show that the time has not yet come to kick down +the ladder which has so far served him. Three hundred years ago, the +people of the land in which the Conference was assembled wrenched with +the sword civil and religious peace and national independence from the +tyranny of Spain. Then began the disintegration of her empire, and the +deliverance of peoples from her oppression, but this was completed +only last year, and then again by the sword--of the United States. + +In the centuries which have since intervened, what has not "justice, +with valor armed," when confronted by evil in high places, found +itself compelled to effect by resort to the sword? To it was due the +birth of our own nation, not least among the benefits of which was the +stern experience that has made Great Britain no longer the mistress, +but the mother, of her dependencies. The control, to good from evil, +of the devastating fire of the French Revolution and of Napoleon was +due to the sword. The long line of illustrious names and deeds, of +those who bore it not in vain, has in our times culminated--if indeed +the end is even yet nearly reached--in the new birth of the United +States by the extirpation of human slavery, and in the downfall, but +yesterday, of a colonial empire identified with tyranny. What the +sword, and it supremely, tempered only by the stern demands of justice +and of conscience, and the loving voice of charity, has done for India +and for Egypt, is a tale at once too long and too well known for +repetition here. Peace, indeed, is not adequate to all progress; there +are resistances that can be overcome only by explosion. What means +less violent than war would in a half-year have solved the Caribbean +problem, shattered national ideas deep rooted in the prepossessions of +a century, and planted the United States in Asia, face to face with +the great world problem of the immediate future? What but war rent the +veil which prevented the English-speaking communities from seeing eye +to eye, and revealed to each the face of a brother? Little wonder that +a war which, with comparatively little bloodshed, brought such +consequences, was followed by the call for a Peace Conference! + +Power, force, is a faculty of national life; one of the talents +committed to nations by God. Like every other endowment of a complex +organization, it must be held under control of the enlightened +intellect and of the upright heart; but no more than any other can it +be carelessly or lightly abjured, without incurring the responsibility +of one who buries in the earth that which was intrusted to him for +use. And this obligation to maintain right, by force if need be, while +common to all states, rests peculiarly upon the greater, in proportion +to their means. Much is required of those to whom much is given. So +viewed, the ability speedily to put forth the nation's power, by +adequate organization and other necessary preparation, according to +the reasonable demands of the nation's intrinsic strength and of its +position in the world, is one of the clear duties involved in the +Christian word "watchfulness,"--readiness for the call that may come, +whether expectedly or not. Until it is demonstrable that no evil +exists, or threatens the world, which cannot be obviated without +recourse to force, the obligation to readiness must remain; and, where +evil is mighty and defiant, the obligation to use force--that is, +war--arises. Nor is it possible, antecedently, to bring these +conditions and obligations under the letter of precise and codified +law, to be administered by a tribunal; and in the spirit legalism is +marked by blemishes as real as those commonly attributed to +"militarism," and not more elevated. The considerations which +determine good and evil, right and wrong, in crises of national life, +or of the world's history, are questions of equity often too +complicated for decision upon mere rules, or even principles, of law, +international or other. The instances of Bulgaria, of Armenia, and of +Cuba, are entirely in point, and it is most probable that the +contentions about the future of China will afford further +illustration. Even in matters where the interest of nations is +concerned, the moral element enters; because each generation in its +day is the guardian of those which shall follow it. Like all +guardians, therefore, while it has the power to act according to its +best judgment, it has no right, for the mere sake of peace, to permit +known injustice to be done to its wards. + +The present strong feeling, throughout the nations of the world, in +favor of arbitration, is in itself a subject for congratulation almost +unalloyed. It carries indeed a promise, to the certainty of which no +paper covenants can pretend; for it influences the conscience by +inward conviction, not by external fetter. But it must be remembered +that such sentiments, from their very universality and evident +laudableness, need correctives, for they bear in themselves a great +danger of excess or of precipitancy. Excess is seen in the +disposition, far too prevalent, to look upon war not only as an evil, +but as an evil unmixed, unnecessary, and therefore always +unjustifiable; while precipitancy, to reach results considered +desirable, is evidenced by the wish to _impose_ arbitration, to +prevent recourse to war, by a general pledge previously made. Both +frames of mind receive expression in the words of speakers, among whom +a leading characteristic is lack of measuredness and of proportion. +Thus an eminent citizen is reported to have said: "There is no more +occasion for two nations to go to war than for two men to settle their +difficulties with clubs." Singularly enough, this point of view +assumes to represent peculiarly Christian teaching, willingly ignorant +of the truth that Christianity, while it will not force the conscience +by other than spiritual weapons, as "compulsory" arbitration might, +distinctly recognizes the sword as the resister and remedier of evil +in the sphere "of this world." + +Arbitration's great opportunity has come in the advancing moral +standards of states, whereby the disposition to deliberate wrong-doing +has diminished, and consequently the occasions for redressing wrong by +force the less frequent to arise. In view of recent events however, +and very especially of notorious, high-handed oppression, initiated +since the calling of the Peace Conference, and resolutely continued +during its sessions in defiance of the public opinion--the +conviction--of the world at large, it is premature to assume that such +occasions belong wholly to the past. Much less can it be assumed that +there will be no further instances of a community believing, +conscientiously and entirely, that honor and duty require of it a +certain course, which another community with equal integrity may hold +to be inconsistent with the rights and obligations of its own members. +It is quite possible, especially to one who has recently visited +Holland, to conceive that Great Britain and the Boers are alike +satisfied of the substantial justice of their respective claims. It is +permissible most earnestly to hope that, in disputes between sovereign +states, arbitration may find a way to reconcile peace with fidelity to +conscience, in the case of both; but if the conviction of conscience +remains unshaken, war is better than disobedience,--better than +acquiescence in recognized wrong. The great danger of undiscriminating +advocacy of arbitration, which threatens even the cause it seeks to +maintain, is that it may lead men to tamper with equity, to compromise +with unrighteousness, soothing their conscience with the belief that +war is so entirely wrong that beside it no other tolerated evil is +wrong. Witness Armenia, and witness Crete. War has been avoided; but +what of the national consciences that beheld such iniquity and +withheld the hand? + + NOTE.--This paper was the means of bringing into the author's + hands a letter by the late General Sherman, which forcibly + illustrates how easily, in quiet moments, men forget what + they have owed, and still owe, to the sword. From the + coincidence of its thought with that of the article itself, + permission to print it here has been asked and received. + + NEW YORK, February 5th, 1890. + + DEAR GENERAL MEIGS,--I attended the Centennial Ceremonies in + honor of the Supreme Court yesterday, four full hours in the + morning at the Metropolitan Opera House, and about the same + measure of time at the Grand Banquet of 850 lawyers in the + evening at the Lenox Lyceum. + + The whole was superb in all its proportions, but it was no + place for a soldier. I was bidden to the feast solely and + exclusively because in 1858 for a few short months I was an + attorney at Leavenworth, Kansas. + + The Bar Association of the United States has manifestly cast + aside the Sword of Liberty. Justice and Law have ignored the + significance of the Great Seal of the United States, with its + emblematic olive branch and thirteen arrows, "all proper," + and now claim that, without force, Law and moral suasion have + carried us through one hundred years of history. Of course, + in your study you will read at leisure these speeches, and if + in them you discover any sense of obligation to the Soldier + element, you will be luckier than I, a listener. + + From 1861 to 1865 the Supreme Court was absolutely paralyzed; + their decrees and writs were treated with contempt south of + the Potomac and Ohio; they could not summon a witness or send + a Deputy Marshal. War, and the armed Power of the Nation, + alone removed the barrier and restored to the U.S. courts + their lawful jurisdiction. Yet, from these honied words of + flattery, a stranger would have inferred that at last the + lawyers of America had discovered the sovereign panacea of a + Government without force, either visible or in reserve. + + I was in hopes the Civil War had dispelled this dangerous + illusion, but it seems not. + + You and I can fold our hands and truly say we have done a + man's share, and leave the consequences to younger men who + must buffet with the next storms; but a Government which + ignores the great truths illuminated in heraldic language + over its very Capitol is not yet at the end of its woes. + + With profound respect, + W.T. SHERMAN. + + + + +THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR NEW DEPENDENCIES + + + + +THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR NEW DEPENDENCIES + + +In modern times there have been two principal colonizing nations, +which not merely have occupied and administered a great transmarine +domain, but have impressed upon it their own identity--the totality of +their political and racial characteristics--to a degree that is likely +to affect permanently the history of the world at large. + +These two nations, it is needless to say, are Great Britain and Spain. +Russia, their one competitor, differs from them in that her sustained +advance over alien regions is as wholly by land as theirs has been by +sea. France and Holland have occupied and administered, and continue +to occupy and administer, large extents of territory; but it is +scarcely necessary to argue that in neither case has the race +possessed the land, nor have the national characteristics been +transmitted to the dwellers therein as a whole. They have realized, +rather, the idea recently formulated by Mr. Benjamin Kidd for the +development of tropical regions,--administration from without. + +The unexpected appearance of the United States as in legal control of +transmarine territory, which as yet they have not had opportunity +either to occupy or to administer, coincides in time with the final +downfall of Spain's colonial empire, and with a stage in the upward +progress of that of Great Britain, so marked, in the contrast it +presents to the ruin of Spain, as to compel attention and comparison, +with an ultimate purpose to draw therefrom instruction for the United +States in the new career forced upon them. The larger colonies of +Great Britain are not indeed reaching their majority, for that they +did long ago; but the idea formulated in the phrase "imperial +federation" shows that they, and the mother country herself, have +passed through and left behind the epoch when the accepted thought in +both was that they should in the end separate, as sons leave the +father's roof, to set up, each for himself. To that transition phase +has succeeded the ideal of partnership, more complex indeed and +difficult of attainment, but trebly strong if realized. The terms of +partnership, the share of each member in the burdens and in the +profits, present difficulties which will delay, and may prevent, the +consummation; time alone can show. The noticeable factor in this +change of mind, however, is the affectionate desire manifested by both +parent and children to ensure the desired end. Between nations long +alien we have high warrant for saying that interest alone determines +action; but between communities of the same blood, and when the ties +of dependence on the one part are still recent, sentiments--love and +mutual pride--are powerful, provided there be good cause for them. And +good cause there is. Since she lost what is now the United States, +Great Britain has become benevolent and beneficent to her colonies. + +It is not in colonies only, however, that Great Britain has been +beneficent to weaker communities; nor are benevolence and beneficence +the only qualities she has shown. She has been strong also,--strong in +her own interior life, whence all true strength issues; strong in the +quality of the men she has sent forth to colonize and to administer; +strong to protect by the arm of her power, by land, and, above all, by +sea. The advantage of the latter safeguard is common to all her +dependencies; but it is among subject and alien races, and not in +colonies properly so called, that her terrestrial energy chiefly +manifests itself, to control, to protect, and to elevate. Of these +functions, admirably discharged in the main, India and Egypt are the +conspicuous illustrations. In them she administers from without, and +cannot be said to colonize, for the land was already full. + +Conspicuous result constitutes example: for imitation, if honorable; +for warning, if shameful. Experience is the great teacher, and is at +its best when personal; but in the opening of a career such experience +is wanting to the individual, and must be sought in the record of +other lives, or of other nations. The United States are just about to +enter on a task of government--of administration--over regions which, +in inhabitants, in climate, and in political tradition, differ +essentially from themselves. What are the conditions of success? + +We have the two great examples. Great Britain has been, in the main, +and increasingly, beneficent and strong. Spain, from the very first, +as the records show, was inhumanly oppressive to the inferior races; +and, after her own descendants in the colonies became aliens in habit +to the home country, she to them also became tyrannically exacting. +But, still more, Spain became weaker and weaker as the years passed, +the tyranny of her extortions being partially due to exigencies of her +political weakness and to her economical declension. Let us, however, +not fail to observe that the beneficence, as well as the strength, of +Great Britain has been a matter of growth. She was not always what she +now is to the alien subject. There is, therefore, no reason to +despair, as some do, that the United States, who share her traditions, +can attain her success. The task is novel to us; we may make blunders; +but, guided by her experience, we should reach the goal more quickly. + +And it is to our interest to do so. Enlightened self-interest demands +of us to recognize not merely, and in general, the imminence of the +great question of the farther East, which is rising so rapidly before +us, but also, specifically, the importance to us of a strong and +beneficent occupation of adjacent territory. In the domain of color, +black and white are contradictory; but it is not so with self-interest +and beneficence in the realm of ideas. This paradox is now too +generally accepted for insistence, although in the practical life of +states the proper order of the two is too often inverted. But, where +the relations are those of trustee to ward, as are those of any state +which rules over a weaker community not admitted to the full +privileges of home citizenship, the first test to which measures must +be brought is the good of the ward. It is the first interest of the +guardian, for it concerns his honor. Whatever the part of the United +States in the growing conflict of European interests around China and +the East, we deal there with equals, and may battle like men; but our +new possessions, with their yet minor races, are the objects only of +solicitude. + +Ideas underlie action. If the paramount idea of beneficence becomes a +national conviction, we may stumble and err, we may at times sin, or +be betrayed by unworthy representatives; but we shall advance +unfailingly. I have been asked to contribute to the discussion of this +matter something from my own usual point of view; which is, of +course, the bearing of sea power upon the security and the progress of +nations. Well, one great element of sea power, which, it will be +remembered, is commercial before it is military, is that there be +territorial bases of action in the regions important to its commerce. +That is self-interest. But the history of Spain's decline, and the +history of Great Britain's advance,--in the latter of which the stern +lesson given by the revolt of the United States is certainly a +conspicuous factor, as also, perhaps, the other revolt known as the +Indian Mutiny, in 1857,--alike teach us that territories beyond the +sea can be securely held only when the advantage and interests of the +inhabitants are the primary object of the administration. The +inhabitants may not return love for their benefits,--comprehension or +gratitude may fail them; but the sense of duty achieved, and the +security of the tenure, are the reward of the ruler. + +I have understood also that, through the pages of "The Engineering +Magazine," I should speak to the men who stand at the head of the +great mechanical industries of the country,--the great inventors and +the leaders in home development,--and that they would be willing to +hear me. But what can I say to them that they do not know? Their own +businesses are beyond my scope and comprehension. The opportunities +offered by the new acquisitions of the United States to the pursuits +with which they are identified they can understand better than I. +Neither is it necessary to say that adequate--nay, great--naval +development is a condition of success, although such an assertion is +more within my competence, as a student of navies and of history. That +form of national strength which is called sea power becomes now doubly +incumbent. It is needed not merely for national self-assertion, but +for beneficence; to ensure to the new subjects of the nation peace and +industry, uninterrupted by wars, the great protection against which is +preparation--to use that one counsel of Washington's which the +anti-imperialist considers to be out of date. + +I have, therefore, but one thing which I have not already often said +to offer to such men, who affect these great issues through their own +aptitudes and through their far-reaching influence upon public +opinion, which they touch through many channels. Sea power, as a +national interest, commercial and military, rests not upon fleets +only, but also upon local territorial bases in distant commercial +regions. It rests upon them most securely when they are extensive, and +when they have a numerous population bound to the sovereign country by +those ties of interest which rest upon the beneficence of the ruler; +of which beneficence power to protect is not the least factor. Mere +just dealing and protection, however, do not exhaust the demands of +beneficence towards alien subjects, still in race-childhood. The firm +but judicious remedying of evils, the opportunities for fuller and +happier lives, which local industries and local development afford, +these also are a part of the duty of the sovereign power. Above all, +there must be constant recognition that self-interest and beneficence +alike demand that the local welfare be first taken into account. It is +possible, of course, that it may at times have to yield to the +necessities of the whole body; but it should be first considered. + +The task is great; who is sufficient for it? The writer believes +firmly in the ultimate power of ideas. Napoleon is reported to have +said: "Imagination rules the world." If this be generally so, how +much more the true imaginations which are worthy to be called ideas! +There is a nobility in man which welcomes the appeal to beneficence. +May it find its way quickly now to the heads and hearts of the +American people, before less worthy ambitions fill them; and, above +all, to the kings of men, in thought and in action, under whose +leadership our land makes its giant strides. There is in this no +Quixotism. Materially, the interest of the nation is one with its +beneficence; but if the ideas get inverted, and the nation sees in its +new responsibilities, first of all, markets and profits, with +incidental resultant benefit to the natives, it will go wrong. Through +such mistakes Great Britain passed. She lost the United States; she +suffered bitter anguish in India; but India and Egypt testify to-day +to the nobility of her repentance. Spain repented not. The examples +are before us. Which shall we follow? + +And is there not a stimulus to our imagination, and to high ambition, +to read, as we easily may, how the oppressed have been freed, and the +degraded lifted, in India and in Egypt, not only by political +sagacity and courage, but by administrative capacity directing the +great engineering enterprises, which change the face of a land and +increase a hundredfold the opportunities for life and happiness? The +profession of the writer, and the subject consequently of most of his +writing, stands for organized force, which, if duly developed, is the +concrete expression of the nation's strength. But while he has never +concealed his opinion that the endurance of civilization, during a +future far beyond our present foresight, depends ultimately upon due +organization of force, he has ever held, and striven to say, that such +force is but the means to an end, which end is durable peace and +progress, and therefore beneficence. The triumphs and the sufferings +of the past months have drawn men's eyes to the necessity for increase +of force, not merely to sustain over-sea dominion, but also to ensure +timely use, in action, of the latent military and naval strength which +the nation possesses. The speedy and inevitable submission of Spain +has demonstrated beyond contradiction the primacy of navies in +determining the issue of transmarine wars; for after Cavite and +Santiago had crippled hopelessly the enemy's navy, the end could not +be averted, though it might have been postponed. On the other hand, +the numerical inadequacy of the troops sent to Santiago, and their +apparently inadequate equipment, have shown the necessity for greater +and more skilfully organized land forces. The deficiency of the United +States in this respect would have permitted a prolonged resistance by +the enemy's army in Cuba,--a course which, though sure ultimately to +fail, appealed strongly to military punctilio. + +These lessons are so obvious that it is not supposable that the +national intelligence, which has determined the American demand for +the Philippines, can overlook them; certainly not readers of the +character of those to whom this paper is primarily addressed. But when +all this has been admitted and provided for, it still remains that +force is but the minister, under whose guardianship industry does its +work and enjoys peaceably the fruits of its labor. To the mechanical +industries of the country, in their multifold forms, our new +responsibilities propound the questions, not merely of naval and +military protection, but of material development, which, first +beneficent to the inhabitants and to the land, gives also, and +thereby, those firm foundations of a numerous and contented +population, and of ample local resources, upon which alone military +power can securely rest. + + + + +DISTINGUISHING QUALITIES OF SHIPS OF WAR + + + + +DISTINGUISHING QUALITIES OF SHIPS OF WAR + + +From the descriptions of warships usually published, it would +naturally be inferred that the determination of their various +qualities concern primarily the naval architect and the marine +engineer. This is an error. Warships exist for war. Their powers, +being for the operations of war, are military necessities, the +appreciation of which, and the consequent qualities demanded, are +military questions. Only when these have been decided, upon military +reasons, begins the office of the technologist; namely, to produce the +qualities prescribed by the sea officer. An eminent British naval +architect used to say, "I hold that it is the part of the naval +officers to tell us just what qualities--speed, gun-power, armor, coal +endurance, etc.--are required in a ship to be built, and then leave it +to us to produce the ship." These words distinguish accurately and +summarily the functions of the military and the technical experts in +the development of navies. It is from the military standpoint, solely, +that this article is written. + +The military function of a navy is to control the sea, so far as the +sea contributes to the maintenance of the war. The sea is the theatre +of naval war; it is the field in which the naval campaign is waged; +and, like other fields of military operations, it does not resemble a +blank sheet of paper, every point of which is equally important with +every other point. Like the land, the sea, as a military field, has +its important centres, and it is not controlled by spreading your +force, whatever its composition, evenly over an entire field of +operations, like butter over bread, but by occupying the centres with +aggregated forces--fleets or armies--ready to act in masses, in +various directions from the centres. This commonplace of warfare is +its first principle. It is called concentration, because the forces +are not spread out, but drawn together at the centres which for the +moment are most important. + +Concentrated forces, therefore, are those upon which warfare depends +for efficient control, and for efficient energy in the operations of +war. They have two chief essential characteristics: force, which is +gained by concentration of numbers; and mobility, which is the ability +to carry the force rapidly, as well as effectively, from the centre to +any point of the outlying field where action, offensive or defensive, +becomes necessary. It is essential to keep in mind both these factors, +and to study them in their true mutual relations of priority, in order +and in importance,--force first, mobility second; for the force does +not exist for the mobility, but the mobility for the force, which it +subserves. Force without mobility is useful; even though limited, as +in coast fortifications; mobility without force is almost useless for +the greater purposes of war. Consequently, when it is found, as is +frequently the case, that one must yield somewhat, in order to the +full development of the other, it is extreme mobility, extreme speed, +which must give way to greater force. + +This caution may seem superfluous, but it is not so; for in the +popular fancy, and in the appreciation of the technical expert, and +to some extent also in the official mind as well,--owing to that +peculiar fad of the day which lays all stress on machinery,--mobility, +speed, is considered the most important characteristic in every kind +of ship of war. Let the reader ask himself what is the most pronounced +impression left upon his mind by newspaper accounts of a new ship. Is +it not that she is expected to make so many knots? Compared with that, +what does the average man know of the fighting she can do, when she +has reached the end of that preposterously misleading performance +called her trial trip? The error is of the nature of a half-truth, the +most dangerous of errors; for it is true that, as compared with land +forces, the great characteristic of navies is mobility; but it is not +true that, between different classes of naval vessels, the swiftest +are the most efficient for control of the sea. Force is for that the +determining element. + +Keeping these relations of force and mobility constantly in mind, +there is a further consideration, easily evident, but which needs to +be distinctly stated and remembered. When a ship is once built, she +cannot be divided. If you have on land concentrated ten thousand men, +you can detach any fraction of them you wish for a particular purpose; +you can send one man or ten, or a company, or a regiment. You can, in +short, make of them any fresh combination you choose. With ships, the +least you can send is one ship, and the smallest you have may be more +than you wish to spare. From this (as well as for other reasons) +arises a necessity for ships of different classes and sizes, which +must be determined beforehand. The determination must be reached not +merely by _a priori_ reasoning, as though the problem were wholly new; +but regard must be had to the experience of the past,--to the teaching +of history. History is experience, and as such underlies progress, +just as the cognate idea, experiment, underlies scientific advance. + +Both history and reasoning, of the character already outlined in these +papers, concur in telling us that control of the sea is exercised by +vessels individually very large for their day, concentrated into +bodies called fleets, stationed at such central points as the +emergency demands. Our predecessors of the past two centuries called +these vessels "ships of the line of battle," from which probably +derives our briefer modern name "battleship," which is appropriate +only if the word "battle" be confined to fleet actions. + +Among the naval entities, fleets are at once the most powerful and the +least mobile; yet they are the only really determining elements in +naval war. They are the most powerful, because in them are +concentrated many ships, each of which is extremely strong for +fighting. They are the least mobile, because many ships, which must +keep together, can proceed only at the rate of the slowest among them. +It is natural to ask why not build them all equally fast? The reply +is, it is possible to do so within very narrow limits, but it is not +possible to keep them so. Every deterioration, accident, or adverse +incident, which affects one involves all, as regards speed, though not +as regards fighting force. In our recent war, when an extensive +operation was contemplated, the speed of one battleship reduced the +calculated speed of the fleet by one knot,--one sea mile per hour. +But, it may be urged, will not your slowest speed be much increased, +if every vessel be originally faster? Doubtless; but speed means +tonnage,--part of the ship's weight devoted to engines; and weight, if +given to speed, is taken from other qualities; and if, to increase +speed, you reduce fighting power, you increase something you cannot +certainly hold, at the expense of something at once much more +important and more constant--less liable to impairment. In the +operation just cited the loss of speed was comparatively of little +account; but the question of fighting force upon arrival was serious. + +An escape from this dilemma is sought by the advocates of very high +speed for battleships by increasing the size of the individual ship. +If this increase of size is accompanied by increase of speed, but not +proportionately of fighting power, the measure, in the opinion of the +writer, stands self-condemned. But, granting that force gains equally +with speed, there is a further objection already mentioned. The +exigencies of war demand at times division, as well as concentration; +and, in fact, concentration, properly understood, does not mean +keeping ships necessarily within sight of one another, but so disposed +that they can unite readily at will,--a consideration which space +forbids me more than to state. Now, a big ship cannot be divided into +two; or, more pertinently, eight ships cannot be made into ten when +you want two bodies of five each. The necessity, or supposed +necessity, of maintaining the Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads during +the late hostilities exactly illustrates this idea. Under all the +conditions, this disposition was not wholly false to concentration, +rightly considered; but had the ships been fewer and bigger, it could +not have been made. + +The net result, therefore, of the argument, supported, as the writer +believes, by the testimony of history, is: (1) that a navy which +wishes to affect decisively the issues of a maritime war must be +composed of heavy ships--"battleships"--possessing a maximum of +fighting power, and so similar in type as to facilitate that +uniformity of movement and of evolution upon which concentration, once +effected, must depend for its maintenance, whether during a passage or +in actual engagement; (2) that in such ships, regarded as fighting +factors, which is their primary function, size is limited, as to the +minimum, by the advisability of concentrating as much fighting power +as possible under the hand of a single captain; but, on the other +hand, size is also limited, as to its maximum, by the need of +retaining ability to subdivide the whole fleet, according to +particular exigencies; (3) as regards that particular form of mobility +called speed, the writer regards it as distinctly secondary for the +battleship; that, to say the least, the present proportions of weight +assigned to fighting force should not be sacrificed to obtain increase +of speed. Neither should the size of the individual ships be increased +merely to obtain rates of speed higher than that already shown by some +of our present battleships. + +Concerning that particular function of mobility which is called coal +endurance,--that is, the ability to steam a certain distance without +stopping to recoal,--the convenience to military operations of such a +quality is evident; but it is obvious that it cannot, with the fuels +now available, be possessed beyond very narrow limits. A battleship +that can steam the greatest distance that separates two fortified +coaling stations of her nation, with a reasonable margin above that to +meet emergencies, will evidently be able to remain for a long while +with the fleet, when this is concentrated to remain under reduced +steam at a particular point. The recoaling of ships is a difficulty +which must be met by improving the methods of that operation, not by +sacrificing the military considerations which should control the size +and other qualities of the vessel. + +It is the belief of the writer that ten thousand tons represent very +nearly the minimum, and twelve thousand the maximum, of size for the +battleship. Our present battleships fall within those limits, and, +although less uniform in their qualities than might be desired, they +give perfectly satisfactory indications that the requisite qualities +can all be had without increase of size. When more is wanted--and we +should always be striving for perfection--it should be sought in the +improvement of processes, and not in the adding of ton to ton, like a +man running up a bill. It is the difference between economy and +extravagance. Into battleships such as these should go the greater +proportion of the tonnage a nation gives to its navy. Ships so +designed may reach the ground of action later than those which have +more speed; but when they arrive, the enemy, if of weaker fighting +power, must go, and what then has been the good of their speed? War +is won by holding on, or driving off; not by successful running away. + +An important consideration in determining the necessary composition of +a navy is the subdivision of fighting power into offensive and +defensive. The latter is represented chiefly by armor, the former by +guns; although other factors contribute to both. The relative +importance of the two depends upon no mere opinion of the writer, but +upon a consensus of authority practically unanimous, and which, +therefore, demands no argument, but simple statement. Offensive +action--not defensive--determines the issues of war. "The best defence +against the enemy's fire is a rapid fire from our own guns," was a +pithy phrase of our Admiral Farragut; and in no mere punning sense it +may be added that it is for this reason that the rapid-fire gun of the +present day made such big strides in professional favor, the instant +it was brought to the test of battle. The rapid-fire gun is smaller +than the great cannon mounted in the turrets; but, while the latter +have their proper usefulness, the immensely larger number of +projectiles fired in a given time, and valid against the target +presented to them, makes the rapid-fire battery a much stronger +weapon, offensively, than the slow-acting giants. Here is the great +defect of the monitor, properly so-called; that is, the low-freeboard +monitor. Defensively, the monitor is very strong; offensively, judged +by present-day standards, it is weak, possessing the heavy cannon, but +deficient in rapid fire. Consequently, its usefulness is limited +chiefly to work against fortifications,--a target exceptional in +resistance, and rarely a proper object for naval attack. It is the +opinion of the writer that no more monitors should be built, except as +accessory to the defence of those harbors where submarine mines cannot +be depended upon,--as at San Francisco and Puget Sound. It should be +added that the monitor at sea rolls twice as rapidly as the +battleship, which injuriously affects accuracy of aim; that is, +offensive power. + +The general principle of the decisive superiority of offensive power +over defensive is applicable throughout,--to the operations of a war, +to the design of a battleship, to the scheme of building a whole navy. +It is to the erroneous belief in mere defence that we owe much of the +faith in the monitor, and some of the insistence upon armor; while the +cry that went up for local naval defence along our coast, when war +threatened in the spring of 1898, showed an ignorance of the first +principles of warfare, which, if not resisted, would have left us +impotent even before Spain. + +Brief mention only can be given to the other classes of vessels needed +by the navy. Concerning them, one general remark must be made. They +are subsidiary to the fighting fleet, and represent rather that +subdivision of a whole navy which is opposed to the idea of +concentration, upon which the battleship rests. As already noted, a +built ship cannot be divided; therefore, battleships must be +supplemented by weaker or smaller vessels, to perform numerous +detached and often petty services. + +From this characteristic of detachment--often singly--important +engagements will rarely be fought by these smaller vessels. Therefore, +in them fighting power declines in relative importance, and speed, to +perform their missions, increases in proportion. As their essential +use is not to remain at the centres, but to move about, they are +called generically cruisers, from the French word _croiser_,--to +cross. They cross back and forth, they rove the sea,--despatch boats, +lookouts, scouts, or raiders. They are the cavalry of the fleet. + +Prominent among these in modern navies is the so-called "armored" +cruiser,--a type to which belonged the four principal vessels of +Cervera's squadron. The name itself is interesting, as indicating the +inveterate tendency of mankind to straddle,--the reluctance to choose +one of two opposite things, and frankly to give up the other. Armor, +being an element of fighting power, belongs properly to the battleship +rather than the cruiser; and in the latter, if the weight spent in +armor detracts from speed or coal endurance, it contravenes the +leading idea of a cruiser,--mobility. But, while the name is +incongruous, the type has its place as an armored vessel, though not +as a cruiser. In our service at least--where it is represented by the +_New York_ and the _Brooklyn_--it is practically a second-class +battleship, in which weight taken from fighting power is given to +enginery and to speed. The advantage arising from this is purely +tactical; that is, it comes into play only when in touch with the +enemy. The armored cruiser belongs with the fleet, therefore her +superior speed does not tell in making passages; but when fleets are +in presence, or in the relative conditions of chase and pursuit, there +is an advantage in being able to throw to the front, rear, or flanks, +vessels which on a pinch can either fight or fly. This, be it noted in +passing, is no new thing, but as old as naval history. A squadron of +fast battleships of the day, thrown to the front of a fleet to harass +the flanks of the enemy, is a commonplace of naval tactics, alike of +galleys and sailing ships. Off Santiago, the _New York_ and _Brooklyn_ +were, by Admiral Sampson, placed on the flanks of his squadron. +Whichever way Cervera turned he would find a vessel of speed and +fighting power equal to those of his own ships. Though unequal in +fighting power to a first-class battleship, many circumstances may +arise which would justify the armored cruiser in engaging one, +provided her own fleet was in supporting distance. From their hybrid +type, and from the exceptional circumstances under which they can be +used, the tonnage put into these vessels should be but a small +percentage of that given to the battle fleet, to which, and not to the +cruisers, they really belong. + +Concerning all other cruisers, mobility, represented in speed and coal +endurance, is the chief requisite. Notwithstanding occasional +aberrations in the past, the development of the cruiser classes may be +safely entrusted by the public to the technical experts; provided it +be left to naval officers, military men, to say what qualities should +predominate. Moreover, as such vessels generally act singly, it is of +less importance that they vary much in type, and the need of +subdivision carries with it that of numerous sizes; but battleships, +including armored cruisers, are meant to work together, and insistence +should be made upon homogeneousness, especially in manoeuvring +qualities. + +To sum up: the attention of the public should be centred upon the +armored fleet, to which the bulk of expenditure should be devoted; the +monitor, pure and simple,--save for very exceptional uses,--should be +eliminated; the development of the true cruiser,--not armored,--both +in type and in numbers, does not require great interest of the +public; much of the duties of this class, also, can be discharged +fairly well by purchased vessels, although such will never have the +proportion of fighting power which every type of ship of war should +possess. As a rule, it is undesirable that a military force, land or +sea, should have to retreat before one of equal size, as auxiliary +cruisers often would. + + + + +CURRENT FALLACIES UPON NAVAL SUBJECTS + + + + +CURRENT FALLACIES UPON NAVAL SUBJECTS + + +All matters connected with the sea tend to have, in a greater or less +degree, a distinctly specialized character, due to the unfamiliarity +which the sea, as a scene of _action_, has for the mass of mankind. +Nothing is more trite than the remark continually made to naval +officers, that life at sea must give them a great deal of leisure for +reading and other forms of personal culture. Without going so far as +to say that there is no more leisure in a naval officer's life than in +some other pursuits--social engagements, for instance, are largely +eliminated when at sea--there is very much less than persons imagine; +and what there is is broken up by numerous petty duties and incidents, +of which people living on shore have no conception, because they have +no experience. It is evident that the remark proceeds in most cases +from the speaker's own consciousness of the unoccupied monotony of an +ocean passage, in which, unless exceptionally observant, he has not +even detected the many small but essential functions discharged by the +officers of the ship, whom he sees moving about, but the aim of whose +movements he does not understand. The passenger, as regards the +economy of the vessel, is passive; he fails to comprehend, often even +to perceive, the intense functional activity of brain and body which +goes on around him--the real life of the organism. + +In the progress of the world, nautical matters of every kind are to +most men what the transactions of a single ship are to the passenger. +They receive impressions, which they mistake for opinions--a most +common form of error. These impressions are repeated from mouth to +mouth, and having the common note of superficial observation, they are +found to possess a certain resemblance. So they serve mutually to +fortify one another, and to constitute a _quasi_ public opinion. The +repetition and stereotyping of impressions are greatly forwarded by +the system of organized gossip which we call the press. + +It is in consequence of this, quite as much as of the extravagances +in a certain far from reputable form of journalism, that the power of +the press, great as it unquestionably still is, is not what it should +be. It intensifies the feeling of its own constituents, who usually +take the paper because they agree with it; but if candid +representation of all sides constitutes a fair attempt to instruct the +public, no man expects a matter to be fairly put forward. So far does +this go, in the experience of the present writer, that one of the most +reputable journals in the country, in order to establish a certain +extreme position, quoted his opinion in one paragraph, while omitting +to give the carefully guarded qualification expressed in the very +succeeding paragraph; whereby was conveyed, by implication, the +endorsement of the extreme opinion advocated, which the writer +certainly never held. + +Direct misrepresentation, however, whether by commission or by +omission, careless or wilful, is probably less harmful than the +indirect injury produced by continual repetition of unintentional +misconceptions. The former occurs generally in the case of living, +present-moment questions; it reaches chiefly those already convinced; +and it has its counteraction in the arguments of the other party, +which are read by the appropriate constituency. The real work of those +questions of the day goes on behind the scenes; and the press affects +them, not because of its intrinsic power, but only in so far as it is +thought to represent the trend of thought in a body of voters. On +subjects of less immediate moment, as military and naval matters +are--except when war looms near, and preparation is too late--men's +brains, already full enough of pressing cares, refuse to work, and +submit passively to impressions, as the eye, without conscious action, +takes note of and records external incidents. Unfortunately these +impressions, uncorrected by reflection, exaggerated in narration, and +intensified by the repetition of a number of writers, come to +constitute a body of public belief, not strictly rational in its birth +or subsequent growth, but as impassive in its resistance to argument +as it was innocent of mental process during its formation. + +The intention of the present paper is to meet, and as far as possible +to remove, some such current errors of the day on naval +matters--popular misconceptions, continually encountered in +conversation and in the newspapers. + +Accepting the existence of the navy, and the necessity for its +continuance--for some starting-point must be assumed--the errors to be +touched upon are: + +1. That the United States needs a navy "for defence only." + +2. That a navy "for defence only" means for the immediate defence of +our seaports and coast-line; an allowance also being made for +scattered cruisers to prey upon an enemy's commerce. + +3. That if we go beyond this, by acquiring any territory overseas, +either by negotiation or conquest, we step at once to the need of +having a navy larger than the largest, which is that of Great Britain, +now the largest in the world. + +4. That the difficulty of doing this, and the expense involved, are +the greater because of the rapid advances in naval improvement, which +it is gravely said make a ship obsolete in a very few years; or, to +use a very favorite hyperbole, she becomes obsolete before she can be +launched. The assertion of the rapid obsolescence of ships of war +will be dwelt upon, in the hopes of contravening it. + +5. After this paper had been written, the calamity to the United +States ship _Maine_, in the harbor of Havana, elicited, from the +mourning and consternation of the country, the evident tokens of other +unreasoning apprehensions--springing from imperfect knowledge and +vague impressions--which at least should be noticed cursorily, and if +possible appeased. + +_First_, the view that the United States should plan its navy--in +numbers and in sizes of ships--for defence only, rests upon a +confusion of ideas--a political idea and a military idea--under the +one term of "defence." Politically, it has always been assumed in the +United States, and very properly, that our policy should never be +wantonly aggressive; that we should never seek our own advantage, +however evident, by an unjust pressure upon another nation, much less +by open war. This, it will be seen, is a political idea, one which +serves for the guidance of the people and of the statesmen of the +country in determining--not _how_ war is to be carried on, which is a +military question, but--under what circumstances war is permissible, +or unjust. This is a question of civil policy, pure and simple, and by +no means a military question. As a nation, we have always vehemently +avowed that we will, and do, act justly; in practice, like other +states, and like mankind generally, when we have wanted anything very +badly, we have--at least at times--managed to see that it was just +that we should have it. In the matter of general policy our hands are +by no means clean from aggression. General Grant, after retiring from +public life, maintained that the war with Mexico was an unjust war; a +stigma which, if true, stains our possession of California and much +other territory. The acquisition of Louisiana was as great an outrage +upon the technical rights of Spain as the acquisition of Hawaii would +be upon the technical rights of the fast-disappearing aborigines; and +there can be little doubt that, although we did not go to war with +Spain to get Florida, we made things so uncomfortable for her that she +was practically forced at last to get out. It does not follow +necessarily that any of these actions were wrong, even if we consider +that the so-called _legal_ rights of Mexico and Spain were set aside +by the strong hand; for law is simply an invention of mankind to +secure justice, and when justice, the natural rights of the greater +number, is prevented by the legal, not the natural, rights of a few, +the latter may be set aside, as it is at every election, where large +minorities of people are forced to submit to what they consider +grievous wrong. The danger incurred by overleaping law to secure what +is right may be freely admitted; but no great responsibility, such as +the use of power always is, can be exercised at all without some +danger of abuse. However, be that as it may, there can be no question +that in times past we have aggressed upon the legal rights of other +states; and in the annexation of Louisiana we infringed the letter of +our own Constitution. We broke the law in order to reach an end +eminently beneficial to the majority of those concerned. Nevertheless, +while thus aggressive on occasion, warring for offence and not for +defence only, it is distinctly a good thing that we hold up the ideal, +and persuade ourselves that we cherish it; that we prepare means of +war only for defence. It is better honestly to profess a high +standard, even if we fall from it at times, than wilfully to adopt a +lower ideal of conduct. + +The phrase "War for defence only" conveys, therefore, a political +idea, and, as such, a proper and noble idea. Unfortunately, in our +country, where almost all activities fall under two chief +heads--politics and business--politics, the less sensitively organized +but more forceful of the two, intrudes everywhere and masters +everything. We dread standing armies. Why? Because standing armies, +being organized masses of men, trained to obey capable leaders, may +overcome the resistance of a people which is far greater in numbers, +but unorganized. What are our politics now but organized masses of +men, habituated to obey their leaders, among whom to change their vote +is stigmatized as the treason of an Arnold, and between which the +popular will is driven helplessly from side to side, like a +shuttlecock between two battledores? Politics cleans our streets, +regulates our education, and so on; it is not to be wondered at that +it intrudes into the military sphere, with confidence all the greater +because it is there especially ignorant. Let there be no +misunderstanding, however. It is perfectly right that the policy of +the country should dictate the character and strength of the military +establishment; the evil is when policy is controlled by ignorance, +summed up in a mistaken but captivating catchword--"for defence only." + +Among all masters of military art--including therein naval art--it is +a thoroughly accepted principle that mere defensive war means military +ruin, and therefore national disaster. It is vain to maintain a +military or naval force whose power is not equal to assuming the +offensive soon or late; which cannot, first or last, go out, assail +the enemy, and hurt him in his vital interests. A navy for defence +only, in the _political_ sense, means a navy that will only be used in +case we are forced into war; a navy for defence only, in the +_military_ sense, means a navy that can only await attack and defend +its own, leaving the enemy at ease as regards his own interests, and +at liberty to choose his own time and manner of fighting. + +It is to be observed also that the most beneficial use of a military +force is not to _wage_ war, however successfully, but to _prevent_ +war, with all its suffering, expense, and complication of +embarrassments. Of course, therefore, a navy for defence only, from +which an enemy need fear no harm, is of small account in diplomatic +relations, for it is nearly useless as a deterrent from war. Whatever +there may be in our conditions otherwise to prevent states from +attacking us, a navy "for defence only" will not add to them. For mere +harbor defence, fortifications are decisively superior to ships, +except where peculiar local conditions are found. All our greatest +cities on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts can be locally defended better +by forts than by ships; but if, instead of a navy "for defence only," +there be one so large that the enemy must send a great many ships +across the Atlantic, if he sends any, then the question whether he can +spare so great a number is very serious, considering the ever-critical +condition of European politics. Suppose, for instance, we could put +twenty battleships in commission for war in thirty days, and that we +had threatening trouble with either Germany, France, Great Britain, or +Russia. There is not one of these, except Great Britain, that could +afford to send over here twenty-five battleships, which would be the +very fewest needed, seeing the distance of their operations from +home; while Great Britain, relying wholly on her navy for the +integrity of her empire, equally cannot afford the hostility of a +nation having twenty battleships, and with whom her points of +difference are as inconsequential to her as they are with us. + +It should be remembered, too, that any war which may arise with the +naval nations of Europe--or with Japan, which will soon rank with +them--will not be with reference to our own territories, but to our +external relations. In the Monroe doctrine, as now understood and +viewed in the light of the Venezuela incident, with the utterances +then made by our statesmen of all parties, we have on hand one of the +biggest contracts any modern state has undertaken. Nor may we +anticipate from other nations the easy acquiescence of Great Britain. +The way the latter sticks by Canada should warn us that we prevailed +in Venezuela because the matter to her was not worth war. Great +Britain is gorged with land. Her statesmen are weary of looking after +it, and of the persistence with which one advance compels another. It +is not so with Germany and France. The latter is traditionally our +friend, however, and her ambitions, even when she held Canada, have +ever pointed east rather than west. But how about Germany? It is the +fashion here to proclaim the Emperor a fool, for his shibboleth is +imperialistic and not republican; but if he be, it is with the folly +of the age on the European Continent--the hunger for ships, colonies, +and commerce, after which the great Napoleon so hankered, and upon +which the prosperity of Great Britain has been built. + +Ships, colonies, commerce, mean to a European nation of to-day just +what our vast, half-improved, heavily tariffed territory means to us. +They mean to those nations room to expand, land wherewith to portion +off the sons and daughters that cannot find living space at home, +widespread political and international influence, through blood +affiliation with prosperous colonies, the power of which, in the +sentiment of brotherhood, received such illustration in the Queen's +Jubilee--one of the most majestic sights of the ages; for no Roman +triumph ever equalled for variety of interest the Jubilee, in which +not victorious force, but love, the all-powerful, was the tie that +knit the diversities of the great pageant into one coherent, living +whole. What political power is stable save that which holds men's +hearts? And what holds men's hearts like blood-relationship, permitted +free course and given occasional manifestation and exchange? German +colonies, like unto those of Great Britain--such is the foolish +day-dream of the German Emperor, if folly it be; but if he be a fool, +he knows at least that reciprocal advantage, reciprocal interests, +promote the exchange of kindly offices, by which has been kept alive +the love between Englishmen at home and Englishmen in the colonies. He +knows, also, that such advantages derive from power, from force--not +force exerted necessarily but force possessed--and that force, power, +depends not upon fleets and armies only, but upon positions also--war +being, as Napoleon used to say, "a business of positions"--one of +those pregnant phrases of the great captain upon which a man may +meditate many hours without exhausting it. A state that aims at +maritime power and at colonial empire, as Germany unquestionably--nay, +avowedly--now does, needs not only large and widely dispersed +colonies; she further needs influence upon those routes of commerce +which connect together countries and colonies, and for that she wants +possession of minor points, whose value is rather military than +commercial, but which essentially affect the control of the sea and of +the communications. + +Now the secrets of the Emperor and of his more confidential advisers +are not all worn upon the sleeve, as might be inferred from the +audacity and apparent imprudence of occasional utterances. It is +known, however, not only from his words, which might be discounted, +but from his acts, that he wants a big navy, that he has meddled in +South Africa, and that he has on a slight pretext, but not, it may +well be believed, in any frivolous spirit, seized Kiao-chou, in China. +What all this means to himself can be only a matter of inference. The +present writer, after inquiring in quarters likely to be well +informed, has been able to obtain nothing more positive than +deductions, reasonably made, by men whose business it is to watch +current events in Europe; but the idea has long been forming in the +minds of political thinkers, looking not only upon the moves of the +political chess-board as they superficially appear in each day's news, +and are dictated largely by momentary emergencies, but seeking also to +detect the purpose and temperament of the players--be they men in +power or national tendencies--that the German Emperor is but +continuing and expanding a scheme of policy inherited from his +predecessors in the government of the state. Nay, more; it is thought +that this policy represents a tendency and a need of the German people +itself, in the movement towards national unity between its racial +constituents, in which so great an advance has already been +accomplished in the last thirty years. Elements long estranged, but of +the same blood, can in no way more surely attain to community of +interest and of view than by the development of an external policy, of +which the benefits and the pride may be common to all. True unity +requires some common object, around which diverse interests may cling +and crystallize. Nations, like families, need to look outside +themselves, if they would escape, on the one hand, narrow +self-satisfaction, or, on the other, pitiful internal dissensions. +The far-reaching external activities fostered in Great Britain by her +insular position have not only intensified patriotism, but have given +also a certain nobility of breadth to her statesmanship up to the +middle of this century. + +Why, then, should not Germany, whose political unity was effected near +two centuries after that of Great Britain, do wisely in imitating a +policy whereby the older state has become an empire, that still +travels onward to a further and greater unity, which, if realized, +shall embrace in one fold remote quarters of the world? Where is the +folly of the one conception or of the other? The folly, if it prove +such, has as yet no demonstrable existence, save in the imaginations +of a portion of the people of the United States, who, clinging to +certain maxims of a century ago--when they were quite applicable--or +violently opposed to any active interest in matters outside our family +of States, find that those who differ from themselves are, if +Americans, jingoes, and if foreigners, like the present Emperor +William and Mr. Chamberlain, fools. The virtues and the powers of the +British and German peoples may prove unequal to their ambitions--time +alone can show; but it is a noble aim in their rulers to seek to +extend their influence, to establish their positions, and to knit them +together, in such wise that as races they may play a mighty part in +the world's history. The ambition is noble, even if it fail; if it +succeed, our posterity may take a different view of its folly, and of +our own wisdom in this generation. + +For there are at least two steps, in other directions than those as +yet taken, by which the Emperor, when he feels strong enough at +sea--he is yet scarcely in middle life--might greatly and suddenly +increase the maritime empire of Germany, using means which are by no +means unprecedented, historically, but which would certainly arouse +vehement wrath in the United States, and subject to a severe test our +maxim of a navy for defence only. There is a large and growing German +colony in southern Brazil, and I am credibly informed that there is a +distinct effort to divert thither, by means direct and indirect, a +considerable part of the emigration which now comes to the United +States, and therefore is lost politically to Germany--for she has, of +course, no prospect of colonization here. The inference is that the +Emperor hopes at a future day, for which he is young enough to wait, +to find in southern Brazil a strong German population, which in due +time may seek to detach itself from the Brazilian Republic, as Texas +once detached itself from Mexico; and which may then seek political +union with Germany, as Texas sought political union with the United +States, to obtain support against her former owners and masters. +Without advancing any particular opinion as to the advisable +geographical limits of the Monroe doctrine, we may be pretty sure that +the American people would wordily resent an act which in our press +would be called "the aggression of a European military monarchy upon +the political or territorial rights of an American republic." This +also could be accompanied with the liberal denunciation of William II. +which now ornaments our editorial columns; but hard words break no +bones, and the practical question would remain, "What are you going to +do about it?" with a navy "for defence only." If you cannot offend +Germany, in the military sense of "offend"--that is, if you cannot +seek her out and _hurt_ her--how are you going to control her? In +contemplation of the future contingencies of our national policy, let +us contrast our own projected naval force with that now recommended to +the German Reichstag by the Budget Committee, despite the many +prophecies that the Emperor could not obtain his desired navy. "The +Budget Committee of the Reichstag to-day adopted, in accordance with +the government proposals, parts of the naval bill, fixing the number +of ships to be held in readiness for service as follows: 1 flagship, +18 battleships, 12 large cruisers, 30 small cruisers, 8 coast-defence +ironclads, and 13 gunboats, besides torpedo-boats, schoolships, and +small gunboats."[5] That these numbers were fixed with reference to +the United States is indeed improbable; but the United States should +take note. + +A second means of expanding Germany as a colonial power would be to +induce the Dutch--who are the Germans of the lower Rhine and the North +Sea--to seek union with the German Empire, the empire of the Germans +of the upper Rhine, of the Elbe, and of the Baltic. This, it may be +said, would be far less difficult in consummation than the scheme last +suggested; for in Brazil, as in the United States and elsewhere, the +German emigrant tends to identify himself with the institutions he +finds around him, and shows little disposition to political +independence--a fact which emphasizes the necessity of strictly German +colonies, if the race, outside of Europe, is not to undergo political +absorption. The difficulties or the advantages which the annexation of +Holland might involve, as regards the political balance of power in +Europe, and the vast Asiatic colonies of the Dutch--Sumatra, Java, New +Guinea, etc.--are a consideration outside the present scope of +American policy; but the transaction would involve one little incident +as to which, unlike southern Brazil, a decided opinion may be +expressed, and that incident would be the transference of the island +of Curacao, in the West Indies, to Germany. If Curacao and its +political tenure do not fall within the purview of the Monroe +doctrine, the Monroe doctrine has no existence; for the island, though +small, has a wellnigh impregnable harbor, and lies close beside the +routes to the Central American Isthmus, which is to us what Egypt and +Suez are to England. But what objection can we urge, or what can we +do, with a navy "for defence only," in the military sense of the word +"defence"? + +The way out of this confusion of thought, the logical method of +reconciling the political principle of non-aggression with a naval +power capable of taking the offensive, if necessary, is to recognize, +and to say, that defence means not merely defence of our territory, +but defence of our just national interests, whatever they be and +wherever they are. For example, the exclusion of direct European +political control from the Isthmus of Panama is as really a matter of +national defence as is the protection of New York Harbor. Take this as +the political meaning of the phrase "a navy for defence only," and +naval men, I think, must admit that it is no longer inapplicable as a +military phrase, but expresses adequately the naval needs of the +nation. But no military student can consider efficient a force so +limited, in quantity or in quality, that it must await attack before +it can act. + +Now admitting this view as to the scope of the word "defence," what is +the best method of defending your interests when you know that +another intends to attack them? Is it to busy yourself with +precautions here, and precautions there, in every direction, to head +him off when he comes? Or is it to take the simpler means of so +preparing that you have the power to hurt him, and to make him afraid +that, if he moves, he will be the worse hurt of the two? In life +generally a man who means mischief is kept in check best by fear of +being hurt; if he has no more to dread than failure to do harm, no +reason to apprehend receiving harm, he will make his attempt. But +while this is probably true of life in general, it is notably true of +warfare. The state which in war relies simply upon defending itself, +instead of upon hurting the enemy, is bound to incur disaster, and for +the very simple reason that the party which proposes to strike a blow +has but one thing to do; whereas he who proposes only to ward off +blows has a dozen things, for he cannot know upon which interest, of a +dozen that he may have, the coming blow may fall. For this reason, +again, a "navy for defence only" is a wholly misleading phrase, unless +defence be construed to include _all_ national interests, and not only +the national territory; and further, unless it be understood that the +best defence of one's own interests is power to injure those of the +enemy. + +In the summary of points to be dealt with has been included the +opinion that offensive action by a navy may be limited to merely +preying upon the enemy's commerce--that being considered not only a +real injury, but one great enough to bring him to peace. Concerning +this, it will suffice here to say that national maritime commerce does +not consist in a number of ships sprinkled, as by a pepper-pot, over +the surface of the ocean. Rightly viewed, it constitutes a great +system, with the strength and weakness of such. Its strength is that +possessed by all organized power, namely, that it can undergo a good +deal of local injury, such as scattered cruisers may inflict, causing +inconvenience and suffering, without receiving vital harm. A strong +man cannot be made to quit his work by sticking pins in him, or by +bruising his shins or blacking his eyes; he must be hit in a vital +part, or have a bone broken, to be laid up. The weaknesses of +commerce--the fatally vulnerable parts of its system--are the +commercial routes over which ships pass. They are the bones, the +skeleton, the framework of the organism. Hold them, break them, and +commerce falls with a crash, even though no ship is taken, but all +locked up in safe ports. But to effect this is not the work of +dispersed cruisers picking up ships here and there, as birds pick up +crumbs, but of vessels massed into powerful fleets, holding the sea, +or at the least making the highways too dangerous for use. A navy so +planned is for defence indeed, in the true sense that the best defence +is to crush your enemy by depriving him of the use of the sea. + +We now come to the assertion that if the United States takes to itself +interests beyond the sea--of which Hawaii is an instance--it not only +adds to its liabilities, which is true, but incurs an unnecessary +exposure, to guard against which we need no less than the greatest +navy in the world. + +It might be retorted that, willy-nilly, we already, by general +national consent, have accepted numerous external interests--embraced +under the Monroe doctrine; and that, as regards Hawaii, many even who +reject annexation admit that our interests will not tolerate any other +nation taking those islands. But how shall we enforce even that +limited amount of interest if any other power--Great Britain, Germany, +or Japan--decide to take, and the islanders acquiesce? In such cases +we should even be worse off, militarily, than with annexation +completed. Let us, however, put aside this argument--of the many +already existing external interests--and combat this allegation, that +an immense navy would be needed, by recurring to the true military +conception of defence already developed. The subject will thus tend to +unity of treatment, centring round that word "defence." Effective +defence does not consist primarily in power to protect, but in power +to injure. A man's defence against a snake, if cornered--if he must +have to do with it--is not to protect himself, but to kill the snake. +If a snake got into the room, as often happens in India, the position +should not be estimated by ability to get out of the room one's self, +but by power to get rid of the snake. In fact, a very interesting +illustration of the true theory of defence is found in a casual remark +in a natural history about snakes--that comparatively few are +dangerous to man, but that the whole family is protected by the fear +those few inspire. If attacked by a dog, safety is not sought chiefly +in the means of warding him off, but by showing him the means +possessed of hurting him, as by picking up a stone; and with a man, +where an appeal lies to the intelligence, the argument from power to +injure is peculiarly strong. If a burglar, thinking to enter a room, +knows that he may--or will--kill the occupant, but that the latter may +break his leg, he will not enter. The game would not be worth the +candle. + +Apply this thought now to the United States and its naval needs. As +Great Britain is by very far the greatest naval power, let us take her +to be the supposed enemy. If we possessed the Hawaiian Islands, and +war unhappily broke out with Great Britain, she could now, if she +desired, take them without trouble, so far as our navy is concerned; +so could France; so possibly, five years hence, could Japan. That is, +under our present conditions of naval weakness, either France or Great +Britain could spare ships enough to overcome our force, without +fatally crippling her European fleet; whereas, were our navy half the +size of the British, she could not afford to send half her fleet so +far away from home; nor, if we had half ours in the Pacific and half +in the Atlantic, could she afford to send one-third or one-fourth of +her entire navy so far from her greater interests, independent of the +fact that, even if victorious, it would be very badly used before our +force was defeated. Hawaii is not worth that to Great Britain; whereas +it is of so much consequence to us that, even if lost, it would +probably be returned at a peace, as Martinique and Guadeloupe +invariably have been to France. Great Britain would not find its value +equivalent to our resentment at her holding it. Now the argument as to +the British fleet is still stronger as to France, for she is as +distant as Great Britain and has a smaller navy. The argument is +different as regards Japan, for she is nearer by far than they, only +half as far again as we, and that power has recently given us an +intimation which, if we disregard, we do so in face of the facts. Her +remonstrance about the annexation of Hawaii, however far it went, gave +us fair warning that a great naval state was about to come into being +in the Pacific, prepared to watch, and perhaps to contest, our action +in what we thought our interests demanded. From that instant the navy +of Japan becomes a standard, showing, whether we annex the islands or +not, a minimum beneath which our Pacific fleet cannot be allowed to +fall, without becoming a "navy for defence only," in the very worst +sense. + +This brief train of reasoning will suggest why it is not necessary to +have a navy equal to the greatest, in order to insure that sense of +fear which deters a rival from war, or handicaps his action in war. +The biggest navy that ever existed cannot all be sent on one mission, +in any probable state of the political world. A much smaller force, +favorably placed, produces an effect far beyond its proportionate +numbers; for, to quote again Napoleon's phrase, "War is a business of +positions." This idea is by no means new, even to unprofessional men; +on the contrary, it is so old that it is deplorable to see such +fatuous arguments as the necessity of equalling Great Britain's navy +adduced against any scheme of external policy. The annexation of +Hawaii, to recur to that, may be bad policy for many reasons, of which +I am no good judge; but, as a naval student, I hesitate not to say +that, while annexation _may_ entail a bigger navy than is demanded +for the mere exclusion of other states from the islands--though I +personally do not think so--it is absurd to say that we should need a +navy equal to that of Great Britain. In 1794 Gouverneur Morris wrote +that if the United States had twenty ships of the line in commission, +no other state would provoke her enmity. At that time Great Britain's +navy was relatively more powerful than it is now, while she and France +were rivalling each other in testing the capacity of our country to +stand kicking; but Morris's estimate was perfectly correct, and shows +how readily a sagacious layman can understand a military question, if +only he will put his mind to it, and not merely echo the press. Great +Britain then could not--and much more France could not--afford to have +twenty ships of the line operating against her interests on the other +side of the Atlantic. They could not afford it in actual war; they +could not afford it even in peace, because not only might war arise at +any time, but it would be much more likely to happen if either party +provoked the United States to hostility. The mere menace of such a +force, its mere existence, would have insured decent treatment +without war; and Morris, who was an able financier, conjectured that +to support a navy of such size for twenty years would cost the public +treasury less than five years of war would,--not to mention the +private losses of individuals in war. + +All policy that involves external action is sought to be discredited +by this assertion, that it entails the expense of a navy equal to the +greatest now existing on the sea, no heed being given to the fact that +we already have assumed such external responsibilities, if any weight +is to be attached to the evident existence of a strong popular feeling +in favor of the Monroe doctrine, or to Presidential or Congressional +utterances in the Venezuela business, or in that of Hawaii. The +assertion is as old as the century; as is also the complementary +ignorance of the real influence of an inferior military or naval force +in contemporary policy, when such force either is favored by position, +or can incline decisively, to one side or the other, the scales in a +doubtful balance. To such misapprehensions we owed, in the early part +of this century, the impressment of hundreds of American seamen, and +the despotic control of our commerce by foreign governments; to this, +the blockading of our coasts, the harrying of the shores of Chesapeake +Bay, the burning of Washington, and a host of less remembered +attendant evils. All these things might have been prevented by the +timely maintenance of a navy of tolerable strength, deterring the +warring powers from wanton outrage. + +In the present day the argument that none but the greatest navy is of +any avail, and that such is too expensive for us to contemplate--as it +probably is--is re-enforced by the common statement that the ship +built to-day becomes obsolete in an extremely short time, the period +stated being generally a rhetorical figure rather than an exact +estimate. The word "obsolete" itself is used here vaguely. Strictly, +it means no more than "gone out of use;" but it is understood, +correctly, I think, to mean "become useless." A lady's bonnet may +become obsolete, being gone out of use because no longer in fashion, +though it may still be an adequate head-covering; but an obsolete ship +of war can only be one that is put out of use because it is useless. A +ship momentarily out of use, because not needed, is no more obsolete +than a hat hung up when the owner comes in. When a ship is called +obsolete, therefore, it is meant that she is out of use for the same +reason that many old English words are--because they are no longer +good for their purpose; their meaning being lost to mankind in +general, they no longer serve for the exchange of thought. + +In this sense the obsolescence of modern ships of war is just one of +those half-truths which, as Tennyson has it, are ever the worst of +lies; it is harder to meet and fight outright than an unqualified +untruth. It is true that improvement is continually going on in the +various parts of the complex mechanism which constitutes a modern ship +of war; although it is also true that many changes are made which are +not improvements, and that reversion to an earlier type, the +abandonment of a once fancied improvement, is no unprecedented +incident in recent naval architecture and naval ordnance. The +revulsion from the monitor, the turreted ship pure and simple, to the +broadside battery analogous to that carried by the old ships of +Farragut and Nelson, is one of the most singular and interesting +changes in men's thoughts that the writer has met, either in his +experience or in his professional reading. The day can be recalled +when the broadside battleship was considered as dead as +Cock-Robin--her knell was rung, and herself buried without honors; +yet, not only has she revived, but I imagine that I should have a very +respectable following among naval officers now in believing, as I do, +that the broadside guns, and not those in the turrets, are the primary +battery of the ship--primary, I mean, in fighting value. Whatever the +worth of this opinion,--which is immaterial to the present +contention,--a change so radical as from broadside battery to turreted +ships, and from the latter back to broadside, though without entirely +giving up turrets, should cause some reasonable hesitancy in imputing +obsoleteness to any armored steamship. The present battleship +reproduces, in essential principles, the ships that preceded the +epoch-making monitor--the pivot guns of the earlier vessels being +represented by the present turrets, and their broadsides by the +present broadside. The prevalence of the monitor type was an +interlude, powerfully affecting the development of navies, but making +nothing obsolete. It did not effect a revolution, but a +modification--much as homoeopathy did in the "regular practice." + +There is, of course, a line on one side of which the term "obsolete" +applies, but it may be said that no ship is obsolete for which +fighting-work can be found, with a tolerable chance--a fighting +chance--of her being successful; because, though unequal to this or +that position of exposure, she, by occupying an inferior one, releases +a better ship. And here again we must guard ourselves from thinking +that inferior force--inferior in number or inferior in quality--has +_no_ chance against a superior. The idea is simply another phase of "a +navy equal to the greatest," another military heresy. A ship under the +guns of one thrice her force, from which her speed cannot carry her, +is doubtless a lost ship. She may be called even obsolete, though she +be the last product of naval science, just from a dock-yard. Before +such extreme conditions are reached, however, by a ship or a fleet, +many other factors than merely relative force come into play; +primarily, man, with all that his personality implies--skill, +courage, discipline,--after that, chance, opportunity, accidents of +time, accidents of place, accidents of ground,--the whole +unforeseeable chapter of incidents which go to form military history. +A military situation is made up of many factors, and before a ship can +be called obsolete, useless to the great general result, it must be +determined that she can contribute no more than zero to either side of +the equation--or of the inequality. From the time she left the hands +of the designers, a unit of maximum value, throughout the period of +her gradual declension, many years will elapse during which a ship +once first-rate will be an object of consideration to friend and foe. +She will wear out like a garment, but she does not necessarily become +obsolete till worn out. It may be added that the indications now are +that radical changes of design are not to be expected shortly, and +that we have reached a type likely to endure. A ship built five years +hence may have various advantages of detail over one now about to be +launched, but the chances are they will not be of a kind that reverse +the odds of battle. This, of course, is only a forecast, not an +assertion; a man who has witnessed the coming and going of the monitor +type will forbear prophecy. + +Now, as always, the best ships in the greatest number, as on shore the +best troops in the greatest masses, will be carried as speedily as +possible, and maintained as efficiently as possible, on the front of +operations. But in various directions and at various points behind +that front there are other interests to be subserved, by vessels of +inferior class, as garrisons may be made up wholly or in part of +troops no longer well fitted for the field. But should disaster occur, +or the foe prove unexpectedly strong, the first line of reserved ships +will move forward to fill the gaps, analogous in this to the various +corps of reserved troops who have passed their first youth, with which +the Continental organizations of military service have made us +familiar. This possibility has been recognized so well by modern naval +men that some even have looked for decisive results, not at the hands +of the first and most powerful ships, but from the readiness and +number of those which have passed into the reserve, and will come into +play after the first shock of war. That a reserve force should decide +a doubtful battle or campaign is a frequent military experience--an +instance of superior staying power. + +There is no reason, therefore, to worry about a ship becoming +obsolete, any more than there is over the fact that the best suit of +to-day may be that for the office next year, and may finally descend +to a dependent, or be cut down for a child. Whatever money a nation is +willing to spend on maintaining its first line of ships, it is not +weaker, but stronger, when one of these drops into the reserve and is +replaced by a newer ship. The great anxiety, in truth, is not lest the +ships should not continue valid, but lest there be not trained men +enough to man both the first line and the reserve. + +Here the present article, as at first contemplated, would have closed; +but the recent disaster to the _Maine_ has produced its own crop of +sudden and magnified apprehensions. These, to the professional mind, +are necessarily a matter of concern, but chiefly because they have +showed the seeds of a popular distrust before sown in men's minds. As +evinced, however, they too are fallacies born of imperfect knowledge. +The magnitude of the calamity was indisputable; but the calm +self-possession of the nation and of the better portion of the press, +face to face with the possible international troubles that might +ensue, contrasted singularly with the unreasoned imaginations that +immediately found voice concerning the nature and dangers of +battleships. The political self-possession and dignity reposed upon +knowledge--not, indeed, of the eventual effect upon our international +relations--but knowledge, bred of long acquaintance with public +affairs, that, before further action, there must be investigation; and +that after investigation, action, if it must follow, would be taken +with due deliberation. So men were content to wait for justice to +pursue its even course. + +But the fact that such an appalling catastrophe had befallen one +battleship fell upon the minds imperfectly informed in naval matters, +and already possessed by various exaggerated impressions, loosely +picked up from time to time. Men knew not what to think, and so +thought the worst--as we are all apt to do when in the dark. It is +possible that naval officers, being accustomed to live over a +magazine, and ordinarily to eat their meals within a dozen yards of +the powder, may have a too great, though inevitable, familiarity with +the conditions. There is, however, no contempt for them among us; and +the precautions taken are so well known, the remoteness of danger so +well understood, that it is difficult to comprehend the panic terror +that found utterance in the remarks of some men, presumably well +informed on general matters. It is evidently a very long and quite +illogical step to infer that, because the results of an accident may +be dreadful, therefore the danger of the accident occurring at all is +very great. On land, a slight derangement of a rail, a slight obstacle +on a track, the breaking of a wheel or of an axle, may plunge a +railroad train to frightful disaster; but we know from annual +experience that while such accidents do happen, and sometimes with +appalling consequences, the chance of their happening in a particular +case is so remote that we disregard it. At sea, every day of every +year for centuries back, a couple of hundred warships--to speak +moderately--have been traversing the ocean or lying in port, like the +_Maine_, with abundance of powder on board; and for the last quarter +of a century very many of these have been, and now are, essentially of +the type of that unfortunate vessel. The accident that befell her, if +its origin be precisely determined, may possibly impose some further +precaution not hitherto taken; but whatever the cause may prove to +have been, it is clear that the danger of such an event happening is +at no time great, because it is almost, if not quite, unprecedented +among the great number of warships now continuously in service. +Similarly, on the seas, the disasters to the _Ville du Havre_, to the +_Oregon_, and, only three years ago, to the _Elbe_, show the terrific +results of collision, to which every ship crossing the ocean is +liable. Collisions between vessels less known than those named are of +weekly occurrence. Yet no general outcry is raised against the general +safety of the transatlantic liners. People unconsciously realize that, +where accidents are so infrequent, the risk to themselves in the +individual case is slight, though the results, when they happen, are +dreadful. Men know instinctively that the precautions taken must be +practically adequate, or safety would not be the almost universal rule +which it is. + +It should be remembered, too, that the present battleship is not a +sudden invention, springing up in a night, like Jonah's gourd, or +newly contrived by a council sitting for the purpose, like a brand-new +Constitution of the French Revolution. The battleship of to-day is the +outcome of a gradual evolution extending over forty years. Its +development has been governed by experience, showing defects or +suggesting improvements; and the entire process has been superintended +by men of the highest practical and scientific intelligence, naval +architects and seamen, constantly exchanging ideas, not only with +their own countrymen, but, through the scientific publications of the +day, with the whole world. What Ruskin said of the old ship of the +line is still more true of the modern battleship: no higher exhibition +of man's creative faculties is probably anywhere to be found. In view, +therefore, of its genesis, and of the practical results of yearly +cruisings, the battleship in its service of peace is entitled to the +confidence we give to the work of competent men in all departments; +nor should that confidence be withdrawn because of a single +occurrence, if the _Maine_ prove to have fallen victim to internal +accident. If, on the other hand, her destruction proceeded from an +external cause,--that is, if she fell as ships fall in war,--it may +safely be said that, in actions between ships, no means of injury now +in use on shipboard could effect the instantaneous and widespread +destruction manifested in her case, unless by a shell finding its way +to her magazine. This is a remote possibility, though it exists; but +when it comes to fighting, men must remember that it is not possible +to make war without running risks, and that it is highly improbable +that one-tenth as many seamen will die from the explosion of their own +magazines, so occasioned, as from the direct blow of the enemy's +projectiles. + + NOTE.--Since this article was written, in January, 1898, it + has become known that the attitude of Japan towards the + United States, regarded as a power of the Pacific, has been + reversed, and that--as already remarked in the preface to + this volume--her leading statesmen, instead of resenting the + annexation of Hawaii, now welcome cordially the advance of + the United States to the Philippines. This change, occurring + as it has within four years, affords a striking indication + of the degree to which the attention of mankind has been + aroused by the character of Russia's progress in northeastern + Asia, and upon the Pacific, as well as of the influence + thereby exerted upon the currents of men's thoughts, and upon + international relations. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[5] From a telegram from Berlin of March 2, 1898. + + + + +[Illustration] + + + + +_Uniform with "Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles."_ + +THE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN SEA POWER, Present and Future. +By CAPT. A.T. MAHAN. With two maps showing strategic points. +Crown 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. $2.00. + +CONTENTS + + I. The United States Looking Outward. + II. Hawaii and our Sea Power. + III. The Isthmus and our Sea Power. + IV. Anglo-American Alliance. + V. The Future in Relation to American Naval Power. + VI. Preparedness for Naval War. + VII. A Twentieth Century Outlook. +VIII. Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. + +All the civilized world knows Captain Mahan is an expert on naval +matters. His present position on the Board of Strategy, directing the +American fleets, has made him even more conspicuous than usual. These +papers, in the light of the present war, prove Captain Mahan a most +sane and sure prophet. It seems hard to imagine any topics more +fascinating at the present time. No romance, no novel, could possibly +equal such essays as these, by such an author, in present public +interest. So many of his theories have come to reality as to be +positively remarkable.--_The Criterion._ + +The last paper, "Strategic Features of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf +of Mexico," written only last year, deals with problems that now +confront the people of the United States in the shape of practical +questions that will have to be decided for the present and the future. +It is well within the bounds of truth to say that an intelligent +comprehension of these questions is not possible without a reading of +the present volume.--_Philadelphia Inquirer._ + +His paper on Hawaii is timely at this moment, as it treats of the +annexation of the Sandwich Islands from the point of view which our +statesmen might well take, rather than from the professional view +which a naval officer might be expected to hold.--_Philadelphia +Telegraph._ + +The substance of all these essays concerns every intelligent voter in +this country.--_Boston Herald._ + +LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, Publishers +254 Washington Street, Boston. + + + + +THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783. +By CAPT. A.T. MAHAN. With 25 charts illustrative of great naval +battles. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. $4.00. + +Captain Mahan has been recognized by all competent judges, not merely +as the most distinguished living writer on naval strategy, but as the +originator and first exponent of what may be called the philosophy of +naval history.--_London Times._ + +No book of recent publication has been received with such enthusiasm +of grateful admiration as that written by an officer of the American +Navy, Captain Mahan, upon Sea Power and Naval Achievements. It simply +supplants all other books on the subject, and takes its place in our +libraries as the standard work.--DEAN HOLE, in "_More Memories_." + +An altogether exceptional work; there is nothing like it in the whole +range of naval literature.... The work is entirely original in +conception, masterful in construction, and scholarly in +execution.--_The Critic._ + +Captain Mahan, whose name is famous all the world over as that of the +author of "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," a work, or rather +a series of works, which may fairly be said to have codified the laws +of naval strategy.--_The Westminster Gazette._ + +An instructive work of the highest value and interest to students and +to the reading public, and should find its way into all the libraries +and homes of the land.--_Magazine of American History._ + +A book that must be read. _First_, it must be read by all +schoolmasters, from the head-master of Eton to the head of the +humblest board-school in the country. No man is fit to train English +boys to fulfil their duties as Englishmen who has not marked, learned, +and inwardly digested it. _Secondly_, it must be read by every +Englishman and Englishwoman who wishes to be worthy of that name. It +is no hard or irksome task to which I call them. The writing is +throughout clear, vigorous, and incisive.... The book deserves and +must attain a world-wide reputation.--COLONEL MAURICE, _of the British +Army, in the "United Service Magazine_." + + +LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, Publishers +254 Washington Street, Boston + + + + +THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER upon the French Revolution and Empire. +By CAPT. A.T. MAHAN. +With 13 maps and battle plans, 2 vols. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. $6.00. + +A highly interesting and an important work, having lessons and +suggestions which are calculated to be of high value to the people of +the United States. His pages abound with spirited and careful accounts +of the great naval battles and manoeuvres which occurred during the +period treated.--_New York Tribune._ + +Captain Mahan has done more than to write a new book upon naval +history. He has even done more than to write the best book that has +ever been written upon naval history, though he has done this +likewise; for he has written a book which may be regarded as founding +a new school of naval historical writing. Captain Mahan's volumes are +already accepted as the standard authorities of their kind, not only +here, but in England and in Europe generally. It should be a matter of +pride to all Americans that an officer of our own navy should have +written such books.--THEODORE ROOSEVELT, in "_Political Science +Quarterly_." + + + + +THE LIFE OF NELSON: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain. +By CAPT. A.T. MAHAN. With 19 portraits and plates in photogravure and +21 maps and battle plans. 2 vols. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. $8.00. + +Captain Mahan's work will become one of the greatest naval +classics.--_London Times._ + +The greatest literary achievement of the author of "The Influence of +Sea Power upon History." Never before have charm of style, perfect +professional knowledge, the insight and balanced judgment of a great +historian, and deep admiration for the hero been blended in any +biography of Nelson.--_London Standard._ + +LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, Publishers +254 Washington Street, Boston + + + + +CAPTAIN MAHAN'S LIFE OF NELSON + +NEW POPULAR EDITION +COMPLETE IN ONE VOLUME + +THE LIFE OF NELSON. The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain. +By CAPT. A.T. MAHAN. With 12 portraits and plates in half-tone and a +photogravure frontispiece. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 750 pages, $3.00. + +It is not astonishing that this standard life is already passing into +a new edition. It has simply displaced all its predecessors except +one, that of Southey, which is the vade-mecum of British patriotism, a +stimulant of British loyalty, literature of high quality, but in no +sense a serious historical or psychological study.... The reader will +find in this book three things; an unbroken series of verified +historical facts related in minute detail; a complete picture of the +hero, with every virtue justly estimated but with no palliation of +weakness or fault; and lastly a triumphant vindication of a theses +novel and startling to most, that the earth's barriers are +continental, its easy ad defensible highways those of the trackless +ocean.... Captain Mahan has revealed the modern world to +itself.--_American Historical Review, July, 1899._ + +Captain Mahan's masterly life of Nelson has already taken its place as +the final book on the subject.--_Mail and Express_, New York. + +One never tires of reading or reflecting upon the marvellous career of +Horatio Nelson, the greatest sea captain the world has known. Captain +Mahan has written the best biography of Lord Nelson that has yet been +given to the world.--_Chicago Evening Post._ + +His biography is not merely the best life of Nelson that has ever been +written, but it is also perfect, and a model among all the biographies +of the world.--_Pall Mall Gazette._ + + +LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, Publishers +254, Washington Street, Boston + + * * * * * + + +-----------------------------------------------------------+ + | Typographical errors corrected in text: | + | | + | Page 31: Reconnoissance replaced with Reconnaissance | + | Page 297: transferrence replaced with transference | + | | + +-----------------------------------------------------------+ + + * * * * * + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lessons of the war with Spain and +other articles, by Alfred T. 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