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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Cavalry in Future Wars + +Author: Frederick von Bernhardi + +Translator: Charles Sydney Goldman + +Release Date: March 9, 2009 [EBook #28298] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS *** + + + + +Produced by Chris Curnow, Joseph Cooper, Christine P. +Travers and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + + + +<h1>CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS</h1> + + +<h2 class="b1">By HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT.-GENERAL<br> + FREDERICK VON BERNHARDI</h2> + +<p class="center">Commander of the Seventh Division of the German Army</p> + + +<h2 class="b1">Translated by CHARLES SYDNEY GOLDMAN</h2> + +<p class="center">Author of 'With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa'<br> + Editor of 'The Empire and the Century'</p> + +<p class="p4 center">With an Introduction by</p> + +<h2>LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH<br> + K.C.M.G., K.C.B., G.C.V.O.</h2> + +<p class="p4 center smaller">LONDON<br> + JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.<br> + 1909</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller"><i>First Edition, October, 1906</i><br> + <i>Second Edition, April, 1909</i></p> + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagev" name="pagev"></a>(p. v)</span> PREFACE</h2> + +<p>I ventured to express the opinion in my book, 'With General French and +the Cavalry in South Africa,' that if a high ideal of the duties and +possibilities of Cavalry is set before our officers, and the means of +instruction and training are placed within their reach, we shall +possess in our next great War a force which, if led by men of the +stamp of General Sir John French, will prove to the world that the day +of Cavalry is far indeed from being past.</p> + +<p>In other words, I am convinced that, with good leadership and the +right material in men, which the South African War has shown we +possess, all that we need to perfect our system is a proper +recognition of the changed conditions of modern Warfare, and a resolve +to break with the old and adapt ourselves to the new situation.</p> + +<p>Reforms such as this would necessitate must affect all arms of the +Service, but no branch more than the Cavalry, whose task in future +will be more difficult, yet whose compensation lies in the +possibilities of successes possessing greater significance than any +hitherto attained.</p> + +<p>The South African War has roused the Cavalry into a renewal of +activity, and has caused their leaders to encourage the study of +Cavalry literature likely to <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagevi" name="pagevi"></a>(p. vi)</span> develop the capacity of the +officer for writing on these special subjects.</p> + +<p>As a step in that direction, I gave whatever little co-operation I +could to the formation of the <i>Cavalry Journal</i>, in the hope that it +may be conducive to the creation of a class of literature in which our +Service is peculiarly deficient.</p> + +<p>It is of the first importance to realize the conditions that are +revolutionizing the conduct of Modern Warfare.</p> + +<p>Such knowledge can alone enable us to appreciate the task which is +given to the Cavalry, and to estimate the increased difficulties of +their function. As their range of activity has become restricted in +certain directions, their sphere of usefulness in others has largely +increased.</p> + +<p>The want of an up-to-date work dealing with these facts has, I +believe, been supplied by the recent publication of General von +Bernhardi's book, 'Our Cavalry in Future Wars,' translated in the +following pages with the object of making it more generally known in +this country.</p> + +<p>Not only is the contribution valuable as having been written by a +soldier of experience in the field, who has imbued his work with the +dash and fire of the spirit of Cavalry, but it also reveals a profound +insight into the modern conditions of War and the heightened demands +exacted from Cavalry training. The author lays continual emphasis on +the fact that Cavalry trained and organized on his lines should +produce in the early stages of a War effects so decisive as to +influence and even determine the succeeding phases of the campaign.</p> + +<p>General von Bernhardi has the gift of close and searching reasoning, +and the ability to present his <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagevii" name="pagevii"></a>(p. vii)</span> views in a vivid and +trenchant form, as convincing as the writings of the late Colonel +Henderson.</p> + +<p>His opening chapter deals with the conception of the conduct of War in +the sense of to-day, and he proceeds to analyze the functions of the +Cavalry as modified by the changes which have occurred.</p> + +<p>In lively detail he explains the difficulties which in future will +confront all Cavalry operations, and the sacrifices that will be +exacted from this Arm.</p> + +<p>Serious study and untiring perseverance must be claimed from the +individual in order to equip himself mentally and physically for the +task of overcoming these obstacles, while Bernhardi shows in +convincing argument the brilliant opportunities of success.</p> + +<p>Although the opportunity of tactical action on the battle-field may +have somewhat suffered, Bernhardi sees in the strategical handling of +the Arm its chief possibilities, and here he includes reconnaissance +and operations against the enemy's rearward communications and pursuit +of a defeated Army.</p> + +<p>He considers cohesion and mobility to be essential to insure superior +striking power by shock and fire action at the decisive point, and +emphasizes this principle again and again as the means of attaining a +high fighting efficiency.</p> + +<p>In the chapters on Tactical Leading in Mounted Combats and Tactical +Conduct of Dismounted Action, General von Bernhardi deals with the +merits of shock and fire action, and the enhanced importance of the +latter as an accessory to, though never as a substitute for, shock, +and he defines the respective dispositions for dismounted action when +serving an offensive or defensive purpose.</p> + +<p>At the same time, he avers that success must depend <span class="pagenum"><a id="pageviii" name="pageviii"></a>(p. viii)</span> upon +the ability of the leader to realize the situation, on his qualities +of decision, and on his capacity to maintain a correct balance between +the application respectively of shock and fire action.</p> + +<p>The qualifications which General von Bernhardi expects in the Cavalry +leader and those under him go to prove the scientific character of the +profession, which demands a standard of extreme efficiency.</p> + +<p>Successful Cavalry leading will only be possible when the machinery of +the instrument employed is technically perfected down to the minutest +detail, and this can only be attained by a very elaborate and thorough +training.</p> + +<p>The book should commend itself particularly to those critics who, +drawing conclusions from the South African War, contend that the +united offensive action of man and horse, culminating in the charge, +can no longer avail, and that the future lies with the mounted +riflemen, trained only to dismounted action. General von Bernhardi +makes it clear that the theatre of War in South Africa does not assist +us with any complete object-lessons from which to evolve a change of +tactical principles, inasmuch as the conditions were entirely +abnormal, and in European Warfare are unlikely to recur.</p> + +<p>It must be remembered that after the first few weeks of 1900 the +Cavalry in South Africa as an effective force had practically ceased +to exist, and that its offensive action was greatly hampered by the +strategical plan of campaign which we adopted subsequently to the +occupation of Bloemfontein.</p> + +<p>All that might be deduced from the defensive tactics of a mounted +force, such as the Boers put into the field, during this period, is +that, possessing greater mobility, <span class="pagenum"><a id="pageix" name="pageix"></a>(p. ix)</span> they were able to hold up, +during short intervals, Cavalry whose capacity for mounted action was +practically destroyed by the 'want of condition' of their horses.</p> + +<p>Acting strategically as they did at Colesberg, in the relief of +Kimberley, and in the operations leading up to Paardeberg, results +were obtained which affected the whole subsequent conduct of the War. +From then onwards, with the Cavalry acting tactically on the enemy's +flank, the Boer Army withdrew practically on Pretoria, and no decisive +tactical result was obtained.</p> + +<p>If that was the object which the Superior Command had in view, the +Cavalry carried out that purpose with remarkable distinction.</p> + +<p>It is, however, conceivable that their strategical employment in rear +of the Boer Army might have produced a situation compelling the Boers +to fight a pitched battle or to surrender.</p> + +<p>If the Cavalry failed to achieve more, it was not from any want of +opportunity which the theatre of War presented, but because their true +rôle was rarely assigned to them.</p> + +<p>That the Boers were able at a later period to develop a vigorous +scheme of action was largely owing to our conception of a plan of +campaign which made the occupation of small capitals rather than the +destruction of the enemy's Army the strategic objective.</p> + +<p>Had the Boers understood the Art of War and taken advantage of the +openings which their superior mobility gave them, or had they been +possessed of a body of Cavalry capable of mounted action, say at +Magersfontein, they might repeatedly have wrought confusion in our +ranks.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagex" name="pagex"></a>(p. x)</span> Although the Boer War was of an exceptional nature, and of a +character unlikely to be met with again, it furnishes some useful +object-lessons which exemplify the importance of preparedness in peace +for the sudden outbreak of War, so that the Army may take the field in +such force and so disposed as to compel decisive action on the part of +the enemy in the first stages of the War, and be in a position to +inflict a crushing defeat rather than a series of light blows, which +latter tend to disperse rather than destroy the enemy's forces.</p> + +<p>The War further shows how highly mobile forces, such as those of the +Boers, can withdraw from a combat to avoid defeat, and by scattering +to elude pursuit, and then, by reassembling where least expected, can +strike a sudden blow at the enemy's weakest point. That they failed to +accomplish more was due to their ignorance of the higher Art of War.</p> + +<p>To this neglect of the strategic advantage which mobility gives we +must add the many lost tactical opportunities of converting a British +reverse into a decisive defeat. The Boers did all that could be +expected of Mounted Infantry, but were powerless to crown victory as +only the dash of Cavalry can do.</p> + +<p>If we take into account the many opportunities which the Boers gave +for successful strategic and tactical employment to men trained to +fight on horseback, we arrive at the conclusion that the Boer War may +nevertheless, if studied carefully and intelligently, teach us the +indispensability of Cavalry in the rôle so clearly described in +General von Bernhardi's instructive work.</p> + +<p>In conclusion, I must express my thanks to His Excellency General von +Bernhardi for his courtesy <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexi" name="pagexi"></a>(p. xi)</span> towards me in concurring in the +idea of an English translation, and to General Sir John French for his +valuable introductory comments.</p> + +<p>I also wish to express to Colonel F. N. Maude my best thanks for his +friendly co-operation, which gave me the advantage of his expert +interpretation of German technicalities.</p> + +<p class="right10">C. S. GOLDMAN.</p> + +<p class="noindent">34, <span class="smcap">Queen Anne's Gate</span>,<br> +<span class="add2em smcap">Westminster,</span><br> +<span class="add4em"><i>September, 1906</i>.</span></p> + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexiii" name="pagexiii"></a>(p. xiii)</span> AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION</h2> + + +<p>When, in the Spring of 1899, I published the first edition of this +work, I ventured to express the hope that it might incite others both +to thought and exertion, and might further prove of practical +assistance to many.</p> + +<p>I think I may claim without undue immodesty that this wish of mine has +in many directions been fulfilled. Of the demands, however, which I +put forward concerning the organization and equipment of the Cavalry, +none have as yet been put into execution, but much wholesome spade +work has been accomplished, and the necessity of reforms, together +with due recognition of their importance, has everywhere made further +progress. It is to be hoped that the next few years will bring the +fulfilment of some of these our most earnest desires.</p> + +<p>The principles of training and of tactics which I have advanced and +endeavoured to establish have found very general acceptance throughout +the Arm, and have helped to clear up difficulties, although, as indeed +was to be expected, they have encountered opposition from several +quarters.</p> + +<p>This result of my labours has encouraged me in the preparation of this +new edition to make use of all the latest experience, to bring out +with additional <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexiv" name="pagexiv"></a>(p. xiv)</span> clearness essential points, and to add much +new material.</p> + +<p>I trust that in this manner I have materially increased the practical +value of the work, and hope that in its new form it will continue to +exert its silent influence, winning new supporters for my views, and +helping to gain for the splendid Arm to which I belong the place +which, in the interest of the whole Army, it deserves.</p> + +<p class="right10">THE AUTHOR.</p> + +<p class="smcap">Strazburg, in the winter of 1902.</p> + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexv" name="pagexv"></a>(p. xv)</span> AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION</h2> + + +<p>It would be difficult for a layman to form even an approximate +conception of the amount of work annually accomplished in the German +Army.</p> + +<p>The very vivid consciousness stirring everywhere as to the magnitude +of the demands the not far distant future may make upon us, and the +knowledge that the means with which we are compelled to work are +certainly not always in agreement with our ideals, incite us to strain +every nerve to make the most of what we have; and I believe I am not +far wrong in asserting that it is the Cavalry Arm which, under +pressure of circumstances, responds to these demands with the greatest +avidity. This is, in fact, but the necessary consequence of the +many-sidedness of our duties.</p> + +<p>Whether, however, the end and aim of all our exertions is everywhere +attained must remain an open question.</p> + +<p>In every long period of peace there lurks the danger that methods of +training may deviate after false ideals, lose themselves in the cult +of imposing appearances, and in the clash of individual opinions fail +to distinguish the essential—<i>i.e.</i>, what is really practicable under +the conditions of active service.</p> + +<p>This danger is all the more imminent when the <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexvi" name="pagexvi"></a>(p. xvi)</span> characters and +forms of Warfare itself are constantly changing; hence, ever new +demands have to be made upon the troops themselves, and the exact +bearing of each of these is not easily to be appreciated in the +humdrum surroundings of our peace-time duties.</p> + +<p>It seems, therefore, a most pressing necessity at the present moment, +when changes in social conditions and constant technical progress are +exerting on the external phenomena and conditions of Warfare a steady +pressure in the direction of modification, that we should compare our +peace training with the requirements likely to be made upon us in time +of War. Thus we can note where further adjustments between the two are +necessary and can be usefully made.</p> + +<p>In this process of analysis it will not suffice to take each changing +factor independently, following it out to its utmost ramifications, +but rather we must endeavour to take a general view of the whole, and +balance the variables one against the other.</p> + +<p>The man who concentrates his attention only on one detail easily loses +his grasp of relative values, and runs the risk of failing 'to see the +wood for the trees,' and only the mind trained to contemplate each +factor in its relation to the whole, and with a clear idea of the +ultimate purpose for which this whole is intended, will be able to +avoid this pitfall; for only an intellect thus prepared can +successfully harmonize the whole with its part, and, while keeping the +essentials clearly before its eyes, treat the unessential as it +deserves.</p> + +<p>It is in order to bring out this point of view that the following +pages have been undertaken.</p> + +<p>As I endeavoured to arrive at a thoroughly clear comprehension of the +many conflicting interests involved in the training of men and horses, +as I tried to decide how to apportion both time and means to each +<span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexvii" name="pagexvii"></a>(p. xvii)</span> individual branch of their education, and to see how far +the traditions of the past could be harmonized with the requirements +of the future, or where and how they need further development and +simplification, I found myself compelled at every turn to go back and +seek my ideal standard in the demands which War itself must make upon +all Arms.</p> + +<p>Thus my work must be considered as an attempt to represent in broad +outlines the conditions of the coming War, and from these to deduce +logically the requirements a rational system of organization and +training must satisfy.</p> + +<p>Those who hold different opinions as to the tasks which will be +entrusted to our particular Arm will naturally come to other +conclusions as to the values to be assigned to peace education, and I +do not wish to present my opinions as absolutely final, although I +have done my utmost to treat my subject-matter objectively and without +prejudice.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, the problems I have submitted for investigation are not +only of military interest, but of the utmost military importance, and +it has, therefore, seemed to me well worth while to discuss them from +every point of view.</p> + +<p>Further, because these investigations owe their origin to the +practical need I experienced during the course of my service to clear +up the many points I have dwelt on, I have considered it a duty to +make them accessible to all those who have at heart the development in +our Cavalry of a thoroughly sound spirit in full harmony with the +necessities of our present times.</p> + +<p class="right10">THE AUTHOR.</p> + +<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Berlin</span>,<br> +<span class="add2em"><i>March, 1899</i>.</span></p> + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexix" name="pagexix"></a>(p. xix)</span> CONTENTS</h2> + +<div class="toc"> +<a id="toc" name="toc"></a> + +<ul class="none"> +<li> <span class="ralign smcap">PAGE</span></li> +<li>INTRODUCTION <span class="ralign"><a href="#pagexxi">xxi</a></span></li> +</ul> + +<p class="p2 center">PART I</p> + +<p class="center">EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF + LEADERSHIP</p> + +<p class="smcap">CHAPTER</p> + +<ul class="roman smcap"> +<li>THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE + ON THE EMPLOYMENT AND USEFULNESS OF + CAVALRY <span class="ralign"><a href="#page003">3</a></span></li> + +<li>DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE + OF THE WAR <span class="ralign"><a href="#page019">19</a></span></li> + +<li>STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY <span class="ralign"><a href="#page038">38</a></span></li> + +<li>INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION <span class="ralign"><a href="#page049">49</a></span></li> + +<li>THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS <span class="ralign"><a href="#page062">62</a></span></li> + +<li>TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS <span class="ralign"><a href="#page090">90</a></span></li> + +<li>STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY <span class="ralign"><a href="#page104">104</a></span></li> + +<li>PATROLS—TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS—CYCLISTS <span class="ralign"><a href="#page132">132</a></span></li> +</ul> + +<p class="p2 center">PART II</p> + +<p class="center">ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING</p> + +<ul class="roman smcap"> +<li>NUMBERS <span class="ralign"><a href="#page151">151</a></span></li> + +<li>RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING <span class="ralign"><a href="#page184">184</a></span></li> + +<li>THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT <span class="ralign"><a href="#page213">213</a></span></li> + +<li>TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING <span class="ralign"><a href="#page247">247</a></span></li> + +<li>FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANŒUVRES <span class="ralign"><a href="#page265">265</a></span></li> + +<li>THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS <span class="ralign"><a href="#page286">286</a></span></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="none smcap"> +<li>CONCLUSION <span class="ralign"><a href="#page294">294</a></span></li> + +<li>INDEX <span class="ralign"><a href="#page298">298</a></span></li> +</ul> +</div> + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxi" name="pagexxi"></a>(p. xxi)</span> INTRODUCTION</h2> + + +<p>General von Bernhardi's work, 'Cavalry in Future Wars' (translated +from the German by Mr. C. S. Goldman), is a most valuable addition to +modern Cavalry literature, and appears at an opportune moment to +counteract and dispel some misleading conclusions which have been +drawn by certain writers (both English and foreign) from reported +operations in the late Manchurian War.</p> + +<p>One or two distinguished foreign soldiers who have publicly commented +upon that campaign have said that what is termed the 'Cavalry spirit' +is opposed to the idea of dismounted action. They hold that the +Cavalry disdain to dismount, and they see in riding the end instead of +the means. They consider that events in the Far East teach us that we +must render our Cavalry less devoted to 'manœuvres' and to +'tournaments,' in order to enable them to fit themselves to take part +in modern fighting; that the times have come when the methods of +Warfare should be changed; and that the Cavalry must determine to +defeat the enemy by dismounted action entirely.</p> + +<p>I cannot speak with any certainty as to what has happened in European +Armies, but as regards the <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxii" name="pagexxii"></a>(p. xxii)</span> British Cavalry, I am absolutely +convinced that the Cavalry spirit is and may be encouraged to the +utmost without in the least degree prejudicing either training in +dismounted duties or the acquirement of such tactical knowledge on the +part of leaders as will enable them to discern when and where to +resort to dismounted methods.</p> + +<p>How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its rôle in war until the enemy's +Cavalry is defeated and paralyzed? I challenge any Cavalry officer, +British or foreign, to deny the principle that Cavalry, acting as such +against its own Arm, can never attain complete success unless it is +proficient in shock tactics.</p> + +<p>Cavalry soldiers must of course learn to be expert rifle shots, but +the attainment of this desirable object will be brought no nearer by +ignoring the horse, the sword, or the lance. On the contrary, the +'élan' and dash which perfection in Cavalry manœuvre imparts to +large bodies of horsemen will be of inestimable value in their +employment as mounted riflemen when the field is laid open to their +enterprise in this rôle by the defeat of the hostile Cavalry.</p> + +<p>That the Cavalry on both sides in the recent War did not distinguish +themselves or their Arm is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quite +apparent. On the Japanese side they were indifferently mounted, the +riding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hence +were only enabled to fulfil generally the rôle of Divisional Cavalry, +which they appear to have done very well. The cause of failure on the +Russian side is to be found in the fact that for <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxiii" name="pagexxiii"></a>(p. xxiii)</span> years +they have been trained on <i>exactly the same principles</i> which these +writers now advocate. They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they +thought of nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence +they lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a +display of the highest form of Cavalry spirit.</p> + +<p>The author of this book is an eminent soldier, possessing an intimate +knowledge of practical fighting, gained chiefly in one of the greatest +Wars of modern times—the Franco-German Campaign of 1870-1871.</p> + +<p>His opinions are entitled to profound respect, and demand close +attention and consideration. The General has treated his subject and +marshalled his arguments and statements in so logical and intelligent +a manner, and the principles he deduces seem so sound and appropriate, +that the conclusions he arrives at appear to me unanswerable.</p> + +<p>In the exhaustive and capable summary of the work of Cavalry in War, +General von Bernhardi seems to follow very closely the line of thought +which has in recent years occupied the brains of many practical +Cavalry soldiers in this country. He appeals strongly to our +intellectual sympathy when he first of all discusses the strategical +employment of Cavalry in all its bearings, and afterwards proceeds to +unfold his views as to the rôle of the Cavalry Arm, first when the +enemy's Cavalry has been driven from the field, and secondly in +conjunction with the other Arms. Personally, I have never known the +'Case for the Cavalry' stated more clearly and intelligently.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxiv" name="pagexxiv"></a>(p. xxiv)</span> In recommending the study of the book to all British +soldiers, I would draw particular attention to the author's constant +and repeated references to the necessity of first seeking out and +fighting the hostile Cavalry and driving them from the field—in other +words, to the immediate and complete attainment of the moral +superiority.</p> + +<p>In support of his opinions, he reminds us forcibly that the important +results gained by the German Cavalry in the 1870-1871 campaign were +due to the absence of opposition on the part of the French Cavalry +more than to anything else, and he contends that in future Wars, where +the Cavalry on either side have been properly trained as such, this +supremacy will have to be fought for, and will involve an enormous +increase in the difficulty with which the Cavalry Arm will carry out +its rôle. He scoffs at the idea held by so many 'amateurs' that +'Cavalry duels' are superfluous.</p> + +<p>Only those who have led Cavalry on active service in the field, and +have been charged with their training in peace-time, can realize to +the full the absolute soundness of the conclusions at which General +von Bernhardi has arrived, and it is much to be feared that the +mischievous teaching which scoffs at 'manœuvres,' 'tournaments,' +and the 'Cavalry spirit,' proceeds almost entirely from the pens and +from the brains of men who have no practical knowledge of the handling +of the Cavalry Arm.</p> + +<p>The great value of this book to the British Cavalry officer of to-day +seems to me to lie in the fact that this <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxv" name="pagexxv"></a>(p. xxv)</span> particular vein of +thought and argument pervades it throughout.</p> + +<p>The General tells us, with the soundest arguments and the most +positive proofs, that 'the brilliant field of enterprise which is open +to the Cavalry soldier in his rôle as a mounted rifleman can only be +attained by him when he has overthrown the enemy's Cavalry.'</p> + +<p>The author, having unmistakably insisted upon the preliminary +overthrow of the enemy's Cavalry, proceeds to vindicate the idea that +the Cavalry spirit is in any degree opposed to the idea of dismounted +action when necessary. On the contrary, he declares emphatically that +the Cavalry fight is only a means to an end, and that the hostile +Cavalry once disposed of by means of horse and cold steel alone, a +brilliant rôle lies open to that Arm by reason of their possession of +an efficient firearm, in the use of which the cavalryman has received +a thorough training.</p> + +<p>The great difficulty, he tells us, lies in the necessity of +discovering a Leader who possesses the 'power of holding the balance +correctly between fire power and shock, and in the training for the +former never to allow troops to lose confidence in the latter.' +'Whether,' says the General, 'it be in the working out of some +strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain +by united fire action some common purpose, a balance of judgment and +absence of prejudice is implied which is of the rarest occurrence in +normal natures.'</p> + +<p>In dwelling so persistently upon the necessity for Cavalry being +trained to the highest possible pitch to <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxvi" name="pagexxvi"></a>(p. xxvi)</span> meet the enemy's +Cavalry, I do not wish to be misunderstood. I agree absolutely with +the author in the principle he lays down that the Cavalry fight is +only a means to an end, but it is the most important means, and I have +thought it right to comment upon this because it is a principle which +in this country, since the South African War, we have been very much +inclined to overlook. To place a force of Cavalry in the field in +support of a great Army which is deficient in the power to overcome +the opposing Cavalry is to act like one who would despatch a squadron +of war-vessels badly armed, badly trained, and ill found, to blockade +a distant coast-line defended by a powerful fleet. What is the naval +fight in the open sea but a means to an end? It would be as sensible +to dwell on the inutility and waste of a duel between hostile fleets +as to lay down the principle that the 'Cavalry battle' in no way +affects the mutual situation of hostile armies.</p> + +<p>But the 'end' in view which General von Bernhardi has so clearly laid +down must never be lost sight of.</p> + +<p>Whilst the conditions of modern War have rendered the service of +reconnaissance far more difficult, the same causes lend themselves to +a much easier deception of the enemy by means of feints, etc. Cavalry, +when working with the other Arms, can render valuable service in this +way, and also in bringing rapid support to a main or counter attack.</p> + +<p>Another most important point must be noticed. I allude to the +increasing tendency of umpires and superior officers to insist on +Cavalry at manœuvres <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxvii" name="pagexxvii"></a>(p. xxvii)</span> and elsewhere being +<i>ultra-cautious</i>. They try to inculcate such a respect for Infantry +fire that Cavalry is taught to shirk exposure, and the moment Infantry +come within sight, squadrons are made either to retire altogether, or +dismount and shoot, regardless of what the 'Cavalry value' of the +ground happens to be.</p> + +<p>I have no hesitation in saying that immense harm is done to the war +efficiency of Cavalry by decisions of this kind, which disregard +altogether the human factor in the problem. We ought the more to be on +our guard against false teaching of this nature, seeing that there are +many grave warnings to be found in history of the inevitable +consequences of thus placing the weapon above the men.</p> + +<p>After the war of 1866 the great von Moltke made the following report +to the King of Prussia:—</p> + +<p>'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in +<i>self-confidence</i>. All its initiative had been destroyed at +manœuvres, where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous, +and it therefore shirked independent bold action, and kept far in +rear, and as much as possible out of sight' (Moltke's +'Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze,' Berlin, 1900).</p> + +<p>By like methods in peace training prior to the War with Turkey such +timidity had been developed in the Russian Cavalry that, in the words +of General Baykow, Cavalry commanders showed a marked disinclination +to undertake operations which were well within their powers, but which +might bring them in contact with the Turkish Infantry, and so run risk +of suffering loss.</p> + +<p>History is full of similar instances of how <i>not</i> to <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxviii" name="pagexxviii"></a>(p. xxviii)</span> +train Cavalry, and I hold most strongly that the Arm must be educated +up to a readiness <i>to act</i>, to come to close quarters in co-operation +with the other Arms, and to risk casualties, as Infantry has often +done before without losing its 'battle' value.</p> + +<p>To sum up, training with a view to self-sacrifice during peace +exercises is essential for the success of all Arms in War, but +especially so for Cavalry.</p> + +<p>With remarkable perspicuity and telling conviction, General von +Bernhardi has dealt in an exhaustive manner with every subject +demanding a Cavalry soldier's study and thought. I am convinced that +he who thoroughly masters the contents of his book will feel no doubt +and will entertain no misapprehension as to the vast rôle his Arm is +called upon to fulfil in War, and he will realize how, in mastering +the great essentials of which it treats, he will himself be assisting +in the best possible manner to maintain the prestige and glory of the +great Service to which he belongs.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="page001" name="page001"></a>(p. 001)</span> I<br> + +EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP</h2> + + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page003" name="page003"></a>(p. 003)</span> CHAPTER I</h2> + +<p class="title">THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT +AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY</p> + + +<p>The Art of War has undergone a momentous change; indeed, it has been +revolutionized since the Franco-German War. Every condition that +affects the conduct of warlike operations seems changed in almost +every particular. Arms of precision have reached a degree of +perfection which compels us to take into account possibilities which +did not exist a few years ago, and for which the experience of the +past can offer no scale of comparison. The all but universal +introduction of Compulsory Service, and the consequent reduction in +length of time spent by the soldier with the colours, have changed the +character of almost all European Armies.</p> + +<p>All the most typical factors in the standing Armies of former days +disappear more or less on the issue of the order to mobilize. New +groupings of units are formed from the first outbreak of hostilities, +and the fact that these bodies are put together only on mobilization, +together with the reduction in the period of service which has been +very generally accepted, tend to depreciate the average value of the +troops, whilst at the same time the 'masses' have risen to +unimaginable dimensions. This '<i>folie des nombres</i>,' against which +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page004" name="page004"></a>(p. 004)</span> certain French Authorities have warned us, is a very stern +reality.</p> + +<p>Experience has shown that the mere preparation for War, penetrating +year by year more deeply into the very heart of nations, must in +future unchain, from the first moment that the Armies of the Continent +come into collision, all the horrors of a racial conflict, in which, +from the first, the interests of every individual are involved.</p> + +<p>The enormous development of railway communication has changed all +conditions of strategical operations. Whilst the power of the railway +to move masses since 1871 has increased, owing to the development both +in the number and condition of the great trunk lines, the Armies +themselves have become dependent on the railways in an ever-increasing +degree. Further developments in Steam and Electricity will probably +make these rearward communications both more necessary and at the same +time more susceptible to injury. Thus all strategical conditions +appear modified. Masses necessitate, even in the richest theatre of +War, the return to the magazine system; hence the lines of +communication are acquiring increased importance, and simultaneously +great vulnerability.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the increased power of the weapons in use offers +greater advantages to the local defence. The prospects of success in +the direct frontal attack of strong positions have diminished +enormously. The assailant, therefore, no longer able to succeed by +frontal attack, is compelled to endeavour to work round the enemy's +flanks, and thus exercise pressure upon his communications. His +endeavour must be, as Frederick the Great would have said, 'to compel +his opponent to fight outside of his chosen position.'</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page005" name="page005"></a>(p. 005)</span> This increased importance of the communications, which in +already exhausted districts will make itself particularly felt, will +compel the defenders to take greater measures for their protection.</p> + +<p>All these conditions taken together must of necessity increase the +importance of strategy in the Wars of the future to an extent which, +in my opinion, no sufficient conception has as yet been made. This +final conclusion at least we must recognise, however much we may +struggle against it (partly as a consequence of our somewhat one-sided +experiences in 1870, and partly through the increased difficulty of +all operations due to the increased masses and the more concentrated +susceptibility of the railway communication): that the decisive +factors in the next War must be 'superiority in the strategic +direction of the troops, together with the increased efficiency they +have attained and their endurance.'<a id="footnotetag1" name="footnotetag1"></a><a href="#footnote1" title="Go to footnote 1"><span class="smaller">[1]</span></a></p> + +<p>To meet this drastic revolution in all these conditions, the pressure +of which has compelled the artillery into new lines of development and +forced the infantry to change their whole constitution (whether to +their advantage or not may remain an open question), no changes at all +commensurate to their importance have as yet been initiated in the +Cavalry.</p> + +<p>Artillery and Infantry now have behind them the nation, from which +they can draw inexhaustible reserves of trained men for their constant +replenishment. The Cavalry alone remains a specialized service, +because, owing to the peculiar circumstances of its existence, it can +scarcely count on having the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page006" name="page006"></a>(p. 006)</span> wastage of War made good by +equally well-trained men and horses; still less is its complete +replacement in case of disaster to be hoped for. In spite of this, we +have to recognise the fact that the proportion the Cavalry bears in +all European Armies to the ever-increasing numerical proportion of the +other Arms has steadily receded. The Peace establishments show this +clearly. Thus, taking the Germans' figures for 1870, we had:</p> + +<table cellpadding="2" summary="German's figures"> +<colgroup> + <col width="30%"> + <col width="70%"> +</colgroup> + +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td>1870.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="right">463</td> +<td>Battalions.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="right">460</td> +<td>Squadrons.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="right">251</td> +<td>Batteries.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="right">15¾</td> +<td>Pioneer Battalions.</td> +</tr> +<tr><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td>1902.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="right">625</td> +<td>Battalions (including 18 of 'Rifles').</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="right">486</td> +<td>Squadrons (including 16 squadrons of Mounted Rifles).</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="right">562</td> +<td>Batteries.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="right">38</td> +<td>Battalions Heavy Artillery.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="right">28</td> +<td>Pioneer Battalions.</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p>This ratio to the disadvantage of the Cavalry is even more apparent on +mobilization for War, owing to the many Reserve and Landwehr +formations of Infantry and Artillery, in comparison with which the few +new units provided by the Cavalry are relatively unimportant. +Considering the mobilized Army as a whole, the Cavalry forms +numerically an almost insignificant factor.</p> + +<p>There remains yet another point of view to be considered. Undoubtedly +there has been in the Cavalry a most active spirit of reform. On the +basis of the experience derived from the great Wars of the last forty +years (in the list I include the American War of Secession), changes +in armament and equipment have taken place in every direction, more +particularly with regard to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page007" name="page007"></a>(p. 007)</span> armament. The necessity and +possibility of strategical reconnaissance by independent bodies of +Cavalry have been fully recognised.</p> + +<p>The conviction also has been arrived at that only when supplied with a +useful firearm and an adequate allowance of Horse Artillery will such +'masses' prove adequate for the accomplishment of this special task. +With the same object in view, the means have been granted to them with +which to destroy telegraphs and railways, to bridge rivers, and so +forth. The conviction also has been gained that the Cavalry require to +be so familiarized with tactical formations for their employment in +'mass' that they shall have become a second nature to them if they are +to fight with a reasonable prospect of success. But all that has been +done in these directions still remains insufficient. On the one hand, +the improvements introduced have not taken into account the decisive +changes in the general conditions which only the last few years have +brought about. On the other, we must not forget that neither the +Prussian Cavalry in 1870 in France nor the Russians against the Turks +in 1877-1878 had even approximately equal Cavalry to oppose them. Even +the great results achieved alternately by the Cavalry on both sides +during the American Civil War were obtained in general under +conditions which can no longer be anticipated, for at the moment of +collision neither encountered, as a rule, either equal quality or +numbers sufficient to develop their full power of attack.</p> + +<p>The very important data obtained during the campaign of 1899-1900 in +South Africa as to the employment of dismounted action by Cavalry were +also not then before us. One could only, therefore, reason from +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page008" name="page008"></a>(p. 008)</span> one-sided experiences, which can no longer be recognised as +generally sufficient for our purpose. In future the mere possibility +of results such as in 1870-1871 we so often gained owing to the +absence of any serious opposition on the part of the opposing Cavalry, +will nowadays have to be obstinately fought for, not without +considerable loss; and it needs no special proof to show what an +enormous increase in the difficulty of our task this involves, and +how, as a consequence, all the conditions of our future action must be +modified.</p> + +<p>Thus, the Cavalry stands face to face with new conditions, and sees +itself everywhere confronted—on the battle-field and in the wider +field of strategical operations—with new problems, towards the +solution of which the history of the past furnishes only very general +indications.</p> + +<p>If we mean to maintain our position as an effective Arm, and satisfy +the demands that of necessity must be made upon us by these new +conditions, <i>we must break</i> with many experiences of the past, and +work out for ourselves principles of action which must be deduced +essentially from the probable requirements of the future.</p> + +<p>Each epoch-making War makes new demands upon us and prescribes new +tasks, and he only will reap the palm of success who is able to meet +them, because, with wise prevision, he has prepared himself to solve +their difficulties in peace.</p> + +<p>If we wish to make an approximately correct picture of the future that +awaits us, we must first face the question, What will be the influence +that the changed conditions in the Art of War considered as a whole +must exercise on the possible scope of action of our Arm?</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page009" name="page009"></a>(p. 009)</span> From the answer to this we can deduce the demands on the +Cavalry in particular, and these demands give us a means for +determining the limits of its employment, its consequent organization, +and the training best suited to enable it to meet these requirements.</p> + +<p>If we summarize all the conditions which have modified the conduct of +War and contrast with them what Cavalry, from the very nature of its +being, is capable of performing, it would appear at first sight as if +every form of action of the mounted Arm has been impeded and rendered +more difficult in the highest degree; more particularly is this the +case when opposed to the increased power of modern arms. Certainly, +the impact of a modern bullet may at times produce less immediate +effect than formerly. Cases have occurred in which serious wounds did +not place the individual out of action immediately, and we may +therefore anticipate that many horses will not be stopped in the +charge, despite severe injuries. But this drawback the Infantry can +meet by opening fire sooner. To the Artillery this does not apply; +and, in any case, this objection is not of such importance as to +neutralize in any way the other advantages conferred by modern +weapons.</p> + +<p>Owing to the fact that the extent of the danger zone has been very +considerably increased, and that within these zones the amount of fire +which has to be faced in a given time has been intensified to a degree +which formerly could hardly have been dreamt of, it has ceased to be +possible to ride straight at the front of an unshaken enemy.</p> + +<p>Thus, essentially the Cavalry has been driven out of its former place +of honour on the battle-fields of the plains, and has been compelled +to seek the assistance <span class="pagenum"><a id="page010" name="page010"></a>(p. 010)</span> of the cover the ground affords in +order to carry its own power of destruction into immediate contact +with its enemy, and only under most exceptionally favourable +conditions will it still be possible to deliver a charge direct across +the open.</p> + +<p>Further, as far as the Infantry are concerned, it will be quite the +exception to encounter them in closed bodies; generally we shall have +to ride against extended lines, which offer a most unfavourable target +for our purpose.</p> + +<p>The difficulties both of observation and reconnaissance have also been +materially increased, for, on the one hand, the increased range of the +firearm compels one to keep further away from the enemy, thus making +it more difficult to judge with accuracy his strength and positions; +on the other, the use of smokeless powder, which no longer reveals the +position of the firing line, renders a more thorough searching of the +ground even more indispensable than formerly.</p> + +<p>The possible participation of the civilian inhabitants of the invaded +Nation in the War will hamper most severely all forms of Cavalry +action other than on the battle-field. In intersected districts it +may, indeed, suffice to paralyze completely the execution of all +patrolling duties; and thus the offensive finds itself confronted by a +new and permanent element of danger and delay, whose gravity we may +estimate by the events which occurred in the latter portion of the +Franco-German War, and we may be quite certain that in future all such +experiences will be very much intensified.</p> + +<p>Lastly, the fall in the numerical proportion of the Cavalry to the +other Arms is all to our disadvantage. The greater numbers of the +latter cover larger areas, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page011" name="page011"></a>(p. 011)</span> and whether to cover these or to +reconnoitre them, it will be necessary to embrace far larger spaces, +notwithstanding our relatively smaller numbers—<i>i.e.</i>, on each square +mile we shall only be able to employ, on an average, a largely reduced +number of patrols, etc.</p> + +<p>Tactically this want of numbers again affects us. If the necessity to +intervene arises, not only have we better firearms against us, but +relatively a larger number of troops. Each tactical advantage secured +will thus exercise far less effect than formerly upon our opponent, +since the fraction of the enemy's force ridden down represents a +smaller proportion of his whole Army.</p> + +<p>If an Infantry Brigade, one of a force of ten Army Corps, is +annihilated, the effect is not nearly so far-reaching as if this +Brigade formed part of an Army of two or even three Corps.</p> + +<p>If in these changed relations there are obviously factors which +materially limit the tactical importance of Cavalry, and which must +make the solution of their strategical tasks far more difficult, on +the other side we find opportunities in the probable phenomena of a +future War which, though less obvious, nevertheless on investigation +lead us to the conclusion that the importance of the Arm is even +greater than formerly, opening for it a wider sphere of activity, and +even on the battle-field revealing new chances of success.</p> + +<p>Let us consider these opportunities more closely. The greater the +pitch of nervous tension to which men are wrought up in battle, the +greater the pitch of excitement reached, the more decisive will be the +reaction when the flood-tide of defeat overwhelms them.</p> + +<p>Now that all European States are straining every nerve to employ +enormous masses of men from the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page012" name="page012"></a>(p. 012)</span> first moment of hostilities, +in order thus to gain an advantage whilst their enemy is still +concentrating, and when we further consider how these exertions must +increase the strain throughout the nation to the very utmost, it must +be apparent that the first great decision of Arms must be of +overwhelming importance. Not only the troops directly concerned, but +the 'masses' behind them, find themselves for the moment involved in +the consequences of victory or defeat. Hence the reaction in either +direction, owing to the lower average quality of the troops, their +greater numbers, the increased difficulties of moving them, and the +susceptibility to congestion of their rearward communications, must be +far greater and far more disastrous than hitherto under similar +tactical conditions.</p> + +<p>The more important it is to secure a favourable decision, the more +difficult with growing masses to divert an operation once commenced, +to give it a new direction or assign it a new objective, the less +possible it becomes to alter dispositions which may have been issued +on false premises; hence again <i>the greater grows the value of +thorough and active reconnoitring</i>.</p> + +<p>If this holds good, more especially for the first great collision, it +remains also a guiding principle for all future operations; for, on +the one side, it is probable that even in its later stages the War +will be conducted with comparatively great masses; on the other, as we +have seen, <i>the importance of the strategical element has +unquestionably grown</i>; hence the <i>value of efficient reconnaissance</i> +has been proportionably intensified.</p> + +<p>In similar measure the importance of screening has also developed. In +proportion as the assailant is compelled to resort to turning +movements and surprises, the defender is obliged to have recourse to +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page013" name="page013"></a>(p. 013)</span> timely changes of front and unexpected counter-attacks; +hence for both timely reconnaissance of the enemy's, as well as for +trustworthy screening of one's own operations, the extended employment +of the mounted Arms has become imperative. In other words, although +reconnaissance and screening for strategical purposes by the Cavalry +have been rendered more difficult by the conditions we must expect to +meet in the future, on the other hand, they have gained enormously in +importance. And it is not in this direction alone that the value of +the Arm has increased, but it has also had a new and important field +of activity thrown open to it owing to the increased susceptibility +the rearward communications of the enemy and his railways have +developed.</p> + +<p>As a consequence of the increased liability to interruption of these +communications, and also of the far more serious confusion to which +any such interruption can give rise, it has become far more difficult +than in the past to execute offensive flanking operations, changes of +front, or counter-attacks, all of which are movements which the +practical strategist must bear in mind. On paper and on the map such +undertakings appear to present no more elements of friction than +formerly, but on the ground itself those who have once seen masses of +several corps all huddled together know that things are very +different. All such movements nowadays are tied to the railway-lines, +and these, again, are congested by the flow of food and ammunition, +which must at all costs be maintained. Fresh units also of troops may +be coming up to the front, whose arrival is of the last importance in +the plans of the generalissimo, and a single broken viaduct may throw +confusion into the whole design.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page014" name="page014"></a>(p. 014)</span> In a densely-populated and fruitful district the resulting +failure of supply may be endured, but it is very different when in a +poverty-stricken district the supply of a whole Army depends on +perhaps a single line of railway.</p> + +<p>Thus the Cavalry sees itself confronted by a task in the solution of +which it can achieve results of <i>decisive importance</i> in a new +direction, for the following reasons: The relative importance of the +Arm during actual operations having been materially increased, the +period of concentration preceding actual collision (notwithstanding +the fact that the actual effectiveness of Cavalry in the face of +modern firearms has been decreased) offers opportunities which under +certain conditions promise higher results than formerly.</p> + +<p>If every delay in the march which may be caused by the action of +Cavalry against the flanking lines of advance of an Army concentrating +for battle is detrimental, how much greater would be the +disorganization resulting from similar operations after defeat! Very +rarely in such a case would it be possible to retire eccentrically by +the same roads which were used for advance. The beaten troops +generally drift back quite involuntarily in the direction into which +they have been compelled by the results of the tactical decision. The +wider the original front, the greater the masses of the troops +concerned (which are now not only in a demoralized condition, but are +compelled, under pressure of pursuit, to change their communications +into new directions, and for this purpose to disentangle the columns +drawn in for the concentration) and the greater the certainty that +conditions must arise which will give to an active <span class="pagenum"><a id="page015" name="page015"></a>(p. 015)</span> Cavalry +an even richer opportunity of harvest than was formerly open to them.</p> + +<p>This will in future be all the more the case when troops of lower +quality, and therefore more liable to become shaken and dispirited, +have to be employed. Reserve formations—Landwehr and the like—which +under favourable conditions might render excellent service, when once +beaten, without officers, weary and hungry, lose all cohesion, when, +with baggage, wounded, and stragglers, they are driven back over +crowded roads; and then, no matter how well they are armed, they are +an easy prey to a pursuing Cavalry.</p> + +<p>The man who throws his rifle away or shoots in the air will not find +salvation either in clip-loading or smokeless powder against the lance +in the hands of a relentless pursuing Cavalry.</p> + +<p>The same holds good for the fight itself. We cannot attack even +inferior Infantry as long as it only keeps the muzzles of its rifles +down and shoots straight; but once it is morally broken and surprised, +then the greatest results are still to be achieved even on an open +battle-field. That, at least, the campaign of 1870-1871 sufficiently +proved, although the Cavalry were so seldom allowed the opportunity to +reap the ripe harvest our strategy and the action of the other Arms +had so abundantly prepared for them.</p> + +<p>A further point in our favour is to be found in the fact that the +increased power of modern Artillery fire has rendered the defence of +villages and woods practically an impossibility. The Infantry are thus +compelled to seek open but rolling ground, and it is precisely such +ground which favours the concealed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page016" name="page016"></a>(p. 016)</span> approach and sudden +attack of the Cavalry; but surprise is the very essence of successful +Cavalry action.</p> + +<p>If we bring together all these points of view which have been hitherto +only indicated, we find, on the one hand, the absolute fighting value +of the Cavalry has considerably diminished, and that in modern War the +conditions of Cavalry employment will in every direction be rendered +more difficult; on the other hand, the strategical importance of the +Arm, as well as the scope of the duties which it may be called upon to +fulfil, have increased very decidedly, and very important new +opportunities for successes have been thrown open to it.</p> + +<p>We cannot sufficiently insist upon the cumulative effects which all +these general changes in the nature of War have exercised upon the +Cavalry Arm; for not only has public opinion taken up the opposite +view, but even in the Army itself these positive views have not +received the attention they deserve.</p> + +<p>The exploits of our Cavalry in 1870-1871 have been universally +admired, without, however, being appreciated at their true relative +value. On the other hand, reasoning from the mechanical perfection of +the firearm, the conclusion has been reached that, as against Infantry +and Artillery, the Cavalry can no longer hope to achieve any results +of importance. It has been shown that in 1870-1871 the German Cavalry +possessed a great numerical superiority over its adversary—that, in +fact, numerous regiments during the whole War either never came into +action at all or at least never had the opportunity to exhibit their +full value in other fields of employment, and hence it has been +concluded that an increase or organic reform of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page017" name="page017"></a>(p. 017)</span> what they +are pleased to consider a somewhat antiquated Cavalry is quite +superfluous.</p> + +<p>An attempt on the part of the Imperial Government to introduce an +increase of establishments had to give way to more important +considerations. In fact, practically the German Cavalry in number and +organization remains to-day the same as in 1870.</p> + +<p>But the duties which in future will fall to the Cavalry are so +wide-reaching, and for the conduct of the War are often of such +decisive importance, that on the manner of their execution the +ultimate results of a campaign must very materially depend.</p> + +<p>If the Cavalry is not in a condition to prove equal to these duties, +we shall find ourselves confronted with a situation of the gravest +danger. Hence it becomes unconditionally necessary to apply the +reforming hand where important deficiencies and practical +insufficiencies can be recognised. In order to apply the lever of +reform at once to the best advantage, we must be quite clear in our +own minds in which part of the conduct of War the importance of the +Cavalry will principally be felt. Only from the recognition of the +demands which will there be made upon it can we conclude in what +direction its further evolution can be initiated.</p> + +<p>We must, therefore, get a clear conception of the probable demands to +be made upon the Arm in each individual phase of a future War, test +them with a view to their relative importance towards the result as a +whole, and then endeavour to recognise on which factors the success in +each individual phase principally depends.</p> + +<p>In the first place stands naturally the demands which will be made on +the Cavalry during the early <span class="pagenum"><a id="page018" name="page018"></a>(p. 018)</span> periods after the declaration +of hostilities—that is, during mobilization and concentration. These +require all the more attention because, as we have seen, it is +particularly these introductory stages of future War which will be of +particular importance, and because it is precisely in these very +points that opinion is as yet not united.</p> + +<p>Then we must follow the employment of the Arm in the further course of +operations, and endeavour to determine in what direction the most +important results are to be obtained.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page019" name="page019"></a>(p. 019)</span> CHAPTER II</h2> + +<p class="title">DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR</p> + + +<p>The importance which attaches to the first tactical decisions, the +fact that their success is mainly determined by the uninterrupted +execution of the railway deployment, the safe arrival of the troops +and war material in the appointed zones of concentration, the +consideration that the continuance of the operation after the first +battle—retreat or pursuit—is mainly conditioned by the uninterrupted +action of the rearward communications, make it indubitable that it is +of the utmost importance to disturb the corresponding operations of +the enemy, and thus place one's own Army from the very beginning in a +position of material and strategic advantage.</p> + +<p>Since the Cavalry is not only able to cover great distances with +overwhelming rapidity, but also, owing to its special character as a +standing branch of the Army, is always ready to march and operate, +whilst the other portions of the Army are still occupied with their +mobilization, the opinion has been freely expressed that it would be +advantageous to utilize this period required for the mobilization and +railway transport of the other Arms for Cavalry raids, either into +the zone of concentration, or against the communications <span class="pagenum"><a id="page020" name="page020"></a>(p. 020)</span> of +the enemy. Russia has for this very purpose concentrated upon the +German and Austrian frontiers enormous Cavalry forces, supported by +light infantry. France also keeps a numerous Cavalry practically on a +war footing on the frontiers of Lorraine.</p> + +<p>On the outbreak of War these masses are ready at the shortest notice +to ride over our frontiers, to break up our railways, to seize our +horses and depots, to destroy our magazines, and to carry terror and +consternation into our zone of assembly.</p> + +<p>It cannot be denied that in such manner by no means inconsiderable +damage could be caused, and hence one must earnestly consider, first, +what chances of success such enterprises offer, and next, whether the +relative magnitude of the probable results are proportionate to the +probable losses they must necessarily entail.</p> + +<p>Cool and objective consideration of such ideas must, in my opinion, +lead us to negative such undertakings—on our side, at any rate. In +the first place, the enemy will always be in a position, by suitable +organization of his frontier guards and the situation selected for the +front of his strategic deployment, to withdraw himself either +altogether from the radius of action of the Cavalry, or at least +render its advance both difficult and dangerous. The danger will be +the greater the more it has been possible to provide for the armament +and organization of the population in the frontier provinces. Where +the conditions on the side of the defender are not unusually +unfavourable—as, for instance, in wide open districts—or where there +is a want of troops in strategically unimportant provinces, then even +if the invading masses break in on the very first day of mobilization, +they will find railways, defiles, river-crossings already defended by +infantry or <span class="pagenum"><a id="page021" name="page021"></a>(p. 021)</span> popular levies. If they come upon an insurgent +population they will find great difficulties both in reconnaissance +and subsistence.</p> + +<p>At every step they advance, the numbers of the opponent will be +constantly increasing, while their own strength diminishes. The +defiles will be occupied between their several columns, and they must +guard themselves in every direction. Their trains and baggage get into +confusion, and supply becomes all the more difficult the more rapidly +they advance, because the waggons cannot keep up with their movement, +and there is no time for requisitioning. Field batteries and lines of +infantry occupy the more important positions, the enemy's Cavalry +appears on the flanks, and man and horse break down at length under +the severity of the strain. Retreat becomes inevitable, and if they +ever get back at all, they can only reach their own Army after heavy +losses and with broken force. The damage which they can do to the +enemy remains small in proportion to his total power, even though it +is locally not inconsiderable. At the best one may hope to destroy +some railway not too far from the frontier, interrupt some telegraph +lines of communication, and disperse or capture some ammunition +depots, magazines, or snap up some convoys of reserve men and horses. +But the enemy has already taken these possibilities into account; they +will soon be overcome, and his arrangements in general will be hardly +disturbed.</p> + +<p>If, on the other hand, the Cavalry is accompanied by infantry, it will +be even more hampered in its movements than by its own trains, and +will soon have to decide whether it should make its movements +dependent on those of its escort, thereby renouncing all <span class="pagenum"><a id="page022" name="page022"></a>(p. 022)</span> +hopes of further results, or whether it should abandon the infantry to +its fate. Certain defiles in the vicinity of the frontier, which the +combined forces were able in advancing to occupy, the infantry may +well succeed in keeping open; but if it attempts to follow the tracks +of its own Cavalry, there can be no doubt it would be exposed to +inevitable destruction.</p> + +<p>This applies equally to the cyclist—at least, as far as the machine +has as yet been developed; for though one cannot deny the great +advantage which its mobility under certain circumstances offers, yet +it remains too dependent on roads and weather to insure that freedom +and certainty of movement which in such undertakings in conjunction +with Cavalry are unconditionally necessary.</p> + +<p>The attempt to break up communications by well-mounted officers +patrols boldly pushed forward in advance would seem to offer even less +chances of securing permanent results. They, too, will find the +country obstructed by the armed population, or by troops in the act of +concentration. Even weak detachments or patrols along the railway +would suffice to effectively resist them; they can depend for success +only on their rapidity and cunning. But most rivers are unfordable, +and in the woods patrols can hardly venture, because every tree may +shelter a man with a rifle. Once they leave the roads, their pace +diminishes; they easily lose their direction; nowhere can they obtain +security for rest and food, even if they are fortunate enough in +procuring any. If, in spite of all this, they do happen to succeed in +blowing up a railway or cutting a telegraph, the effect is +infinitesimal.</p> + +<p>The patrol itself will find its chances of escape <span class="pagenum"><a id="page023" name="page023"></a>(p. 023)</span> decreasing +in exact proportion to the distance it has penetrated into the enemy's +country.</p> + +<p>The greater the number of the patrols employed, the more irreplaceable +will the inevitable loss become; for it will always be the best +officers, the men who put most energy and determination into the +execution of their instructions, who are the most likely to fall +victims to their courage and audacity.</p> + +<p>Premature advance of the Cavalry during mobilization and concentration +can only procure information of little or no importance, for the +existing railways, the direction of the frontiers, and the peace-time +distribution of the troops reveal all this to the General Staff +beforehand. These, together with the secret service, political +conditions obtaining at the moment, and press intelligence, will +enable one to forecast with some degree of precision the general +situation.</p> + +<p>Now, the Cavalry can hardly expect to attain more—indeed, it is +doubtful whether they would succeed even in confirming what is already +known, for the difficulties to be overcome, as we have seen, are +numerous, and nowhere can one find completed situations from which to +make reliable deductions. At most they can determine that certain +places are already occupied, and that the traffic on certain lines is +considerable, things that one knew <i>a priori</i>, which, therefore, are +not worth any serious sacrifice. Moreover, it is exceedingly doubtful +whether, at such an early period, when conditions are changing from +day to day, such information has any practical value.</p> + +<p>Of course, it is not intended to maintain that one should not from the +very first moment after the declaration of War keep a sharp look-out +upon the enemy, work up to him, and seek to determine as <span class="pagenum"><a id="page024" name="page024"></a>(p. 024)</span> +much as rapidity and daring can succeed, with any probability of +success, in attaining—that goes without saying. Particular value will +always attach to the taking of prisoners, whose regimental numbers +enable us to check the accuracy of our existing information. But +against this we must emphasize all the more forcibly that in this +first period of hostilities an inundation of the enemy's zone of +concentration with masses or by far-flung lines of patrols is not only +not expedient, but absolutely detrimental, since the certain cost of +such undertakings stands in no reasonable proportion to the probably +negative, or at most insignificant, result to be expected. Further, +our own concentration has already been so prepared in peace that it +must be carried out with clock-like regularity, even should the +results of the reconnaissance disclose that the conditions on the side +of the enemy were not quite those that we had originally expected.</p> + +<p>Even the mere transference backwards of the line of strategic +deployment, which in 1870 could still be carried out without serious +difficulties or drawbacks, could nowadays, in view of the high tension +induced by modern conditions, only be executed with extraordinary +difficulty, whilst lateral displacement of such numbers is quite +inconceivable. For even if the railway organization would suffice for +the execution of such a design, the many other preparations in the +zone of concentration can neither be moved nor improvised.</p> + +<p>Summarizing the whole question, the conclusion, I think, must be, that +only that Army which has at its disposal a great preponderance of +Cavalry could allow itself the luxury of such premature commitment of +its mounted forces.</p> + +<p>In general, the difficulties of replacing the losses of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page025" name="page025"></a>(p. 025)</span> the +Cavalry with material of equal quality are so great that only the most +important reasons could justify any such attempts. Hence the side +which is weaker in Cavalry will meet the circumstances best by keeping +back its horsemen, and not sacrificing its officers for infinitesimal, +and probably unattainable, advantages. It will be better merely to +work up to the enemy as close as may be possible without serious +losses, allow the enemy's mounted forces to wreck themselves against +the opposing infantry and armed population, and only then to put in +its Cavalry for decisive action when the opponent has already wasted +his best elements in the pursuit of insignificant advantages. After +all, it is only then, when the strategical concentration commences, +after railway movement is completed, that reconnaissance becomes both +possible and important.</p> + +<p>Circumstances can, of course, arise in which, already during the first +period of operations, exhaustive independent activity may be demanded +from the Cavalry, as, for instance, when one has reason to believe +that the enemy has changed his previously-selected zone of +concentration, or, as when in 1870 on the German side, it becomes +necessary to take steps to protect the frontier districts against the +enemy's raids. In the first case the attempts to discover, by the +employment of Cavalry, the changed dispositions of the enemy are +certainly permissible. The patrols must then go forward until they can +settle the decisive questions, and strong detachments must be pushed +out so close behind them that the patrols and their following +squadrons can find a safe retreat, and insure the transmission of the +intelligence they have collected.</p> + +<p>In such enterprises tactical collision with the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page026" name="page026"></a>(p. 026)</span> enemy's +Cavalry and his frontier troops might ensue. It may therefore be +necessary to support our squadrons by Infantry and Artillery.</p> + +<p>But in every case we must be careful to keep within the limits which +are conditioned by the purpose of the undertaking, and not allow +ourselves to be involved in desperate and doubtful enterprises.</p> + +<p>In the next case the duties of the Cavalry are merely defensive. All +that then matters is to rob small bodies of the enemy of their +opportunities, to block the traffic across the frontier, and to work +round their patrols with our own forces; but in no case are they to +attempt to obtain positive advantages by force, or to hazard important +decisions against a superior enemy. Wherever possible every effort +should be made to supplement the troops assigned to this defensive +attitude by the armed population, or even to replace them by such +levies altogether. The fortification and defence of villages and +isolated farms, occupation of railways and watercourses, and, above +all, the defence of woods which might favour the concealed advance of +the enemy's patrols, can well be left to the care of these improvised +formations.</p> + +<p>Hostile attempts can be generally met by dismounted fire action in +well-chosen strong defensive country, possibly supported by +detachments of Infantry, Artillery, and 'Landsturm.' If the enemy's +superiority is great, then one must retire until the equilibrium of +the forces is re-established, the strategical necessity compels us to +fight, or, finally, the tactical situation gives good promise of +success.</p> + +<p>One must, however, always keep this clearly before one's mind: that +the essence of all Cavalry action in the opening stage of the War lies +neither in this purely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page027" name="page027"></a>(p. 027)</span> defensive attitude, nor in the +offensive enterprises previously alluded to, by which the +concentration of the enemy would be disturbed or other material +successes might be achieved, but that the decisive purpose only begins +when important and possible tasks can be given to the Cavalry—<i>i.e.</i>, +when the main bodies of the enemy become ready for operations.</p> + +<p>Then it becomes our duty to screen not only the advance of our own +troops and to secure to our Infantry the advantages of being able to +advance undisturbed, but the climax of all these duties will be +reached <i>in the far more important duty</i>, in the now indispensable +task, of securing the <i>widest possible sphere of intelligence</i>.</p> + +<p>Whereas, during the period of railway concentration the front of the +enemy was conditioned by the ends of the lines employed in bringing up +the troops, who in turn spread themselves out to utilize the resources +of the country (hence generally our patrols, if sent out, would come +in contact all along the threatened frontier or the enemy's line of +detrainment, with defended villages, etc.), the troops will now be +drawn into closer cantonments, or bivouacs, and group themselves +together into clearly-defined masses.</p> + +<p>There will therefore now arise between separate portions of his Army +and their lines of advance, spaces unoccupied by troops into which our +Cavalry can penetrate. The heads and flanks of his columns can now be +determined, and the direction in which they are marching, thus +ascertained, becomes of essential importance.</p> + +<p>Now is the time when the Cavalry must put in its full strength to +discover the strength and direction of the enemy's movements, and the +fact of this concentration <span class="pagenum"><a id="page028" name="page028"></a>(p. 028)</span> provides the Cavalry with the +opportunities necessary to solve the problem before it.</p> + +<p>Of course, immediately after detraining, troops will have to march to +the districts to which they are assigned for convenience of supply, +and this will lead to the formation of temporary groupings, which it +will be advisable, if possible, for us to observe. But it must not be +overlooked that observations during this period may easily lead to +false conclusions, as such movements serve only secondary purposes or +introductory measures, and seldom justify any conclusions bearing upon +the design of the ultimate operations. These latter only develop after +a certain degree of concentration has been attained, and hence the +essence of the whole question resolves itself into this—that the +Cavalry should not be put in until shortly before the strategical +concentration begins.</p> + +<p>From the results now obtained the success of the whole campaign may +entirely depend. At this climax no secondary consideration must be +allowed to distract attention from the principal object. Even the +desirability of screening the movements of one's own Army, in so far +as this duty is not fulfilled by the reconnaissance itself, must give +way to the attainment of the principal object in view, which is +<i>intelligence</i>, not <i>security</i>.</p> + +<p>This point requires to be more particularly insisted upon, because +fundamentally different arrangements are necessary to fulfil these two +purposes. Anyone who attempted to entrust both the provision of +intelligence and the protection of the troops to one and the same body +of men would in the vast majority of cases fail to secure either +purpose as long as the enemy's mounted forces still held the field.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page029" name="page029"></a>(p. 029)</span> To secure information—<i>i.e.</i>, intelligence—requires +concentration of force. The reconnoitring Cavalry must beat their +opponents out of the field in order to obtain opportunities for +discovering what is going on behind the enemy's protective screen. To +accomplish this, the Cavalry must endeavour to work round the +adversary's flanks, and may in consequence have to leave the front of +its own Army entirely uncovered. The protection of this Army, on the +other hand, requires a wide extension of front and consequent +subdivision of force, the exact opposite of the concentration the +provision of intelligence imperatively calls for.</p> + +<p>Naturally this view encounters opposition. Some contend that the whole +triumph of the Art consists in solving both problems simultaneously. +They reason that it is superfluous to seek an encounter with the +enemy's Cavalry. Cavalry duels only lead to the mutual destruction of +both parties. They maintain that one ought to advance, in the +interests both of security and screening, on a certain breadth of +front. If, then, circumstances compel one to fight, one must +concentrate quickly, and after the combat gain again the necessary +degree of extension to cover the front of the Army. They would leave +reconnaissance to be carried out by rapidly advancing patrols, which +evade those of the enemy, find cover in the ground, gain advantageous +points of observation on the flanks and in rear of the opponent, thus +obtaining their objects in spite of the enemy.</p> + +<p>I hold it to be a grave error of judgment to believe that any +systematic application of this line of action will give sufficient +results.</p> + +<p>Advantages in war must be fought for; they cannot be filched.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page030" name="page030"></a>(p. 030)</span> Was it not difficult enough in 1870-1871 to obtain reliable +information, although we had no true Cavalry opponent against us, and +still more difficult to get that news through to Headquarters in time? +How much more difficult, therefore, will it not be in the future, when +we can no longer count on controlling unconditionally the country +between the two Armies, and the enemy's Cavalry hold the field as well +as we!</p> + +<p>Who will then guarantee that our patrols will really penetrate the +enemy's screen; above all, that their reports will get back through +the district controlled by the enemy's Cavalry in time enough to be of +use to Headquarters in forming its decisions? If the patrols are +compelled to elude those of the enemy, to seek for intersected +country, and to make detours, one cannot count on the requisite +rapidity; and the greater the total numbers brought together in modern +War, the greater the distances become which have to be reckoned with.</p> + +<p>If from the very necessity of finding the shortest way and securing +communications with one's own Headquarters it becomes necessary to +beat the enemy's Cavalry out of the field to clear up the situation +sufficiently, the need of fighting is brought home to one with all the +greater force, because any other line of action leaves the enemy +chances at least as good as our own, which can never be the objective +of any form of military action, and ultimately fighting becomes +compulsory if, in addition to reconnaissance, one attempts to carry +out screen duties at the same time. It stands to reason that the +enemy's Cavalry can only be prevented from seeing by actually driving +them off the ground and depriving them of the power of breaking +through our own screen. That a numerically and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page031" name="page031"></a>(p. 031)</span> materially +inferior Cavalry does well to avoid action goes without saying, but +fundamentally the duty of the Cavalry must be to seek to bring about +collision with that of the enemy, so that from the very beginning it +secures command of the ground between the two armies, and that the +actual and moral superiority in the whole zone of operations between +the two armies is obtained from the outset for our own Cavalry.</p> + +<p>The victory of the 'masses' intensifies and invigorates the sense of +superiority in the individual combatant, and this sense of individual +superiority is essential if the patrols are to carry through their +duties in the true Cavalry spirit.</p> + +<p>On the one hand, they are only able to solve their tasks both of +screening and of reconnaissance by actually defeating the enemy's +patrols; on the other hand, the moral factor tells heavily in the +scale.</p> + +<p>How can one expect courage and determination or audacity from men who +have always been taught to avoid their opponent and only fight when +they are actually compelled?</p> + +<p>The man who leaves these psychic factors out of account will always +find himself mistaken in War.</p> + +<p>That in certain cases it may be useful to push forward officers as +stealthy patrols, with instruction to avoid being drawn into an +action, as far as time and opportunity will allow, goes without +saying; but nevertheless stress must be laid upon the point that +already in the period which is in general taken up with the encounter +with the enemy's Cavalry, no opportunity should be lost of keeping the +principal masses of the enemy's Army under direct observation, and +that therefore it is necessary from the very commencement <span class="pagenum"><a id="page032" name="page032"></a>(p. 032)</span> of +the advance to send out officers patrols for this special purpose.</p> + +<p>These patrols will derive their best support from a tactical victory +obtained over the enemy's Cavalry, which is manœuvring in their +rear.</p> + +<p>Thus the fact remains that we must fight to reconnoitre and fight to +screen, and that only a systematic division of the two spheres of +action can give us the freedom necessary to insure the adoption of the +proper form at the right time and place.</p> + +<p>A victory of the reconnoitring Cavalry by shattering the strength of +the enemy's horsemen must always result, both directly and indirectly, +in the advantage of our screening force.</p> + +<p>The whole consideration, therefore, leads me to the conclusion that +the chief task for the Cavalry consists in obtaining a victory over +the enemy's Cavalry in that direction which is of decisive importance +for the further prosecution of reconnaissance as soon after the +beginning of the great operations as possible.</p> + +<p>That it cannot be our object to seek the opponent's horsemen in the +direction which they themselves have selected—merely to beat +them—need scarcely be insisted upon. That would be to take the law +from the enemy and allow one's self to be diverted from the principal +direction in which reconnaissance is desirable.</p> + +<p>Time and direction of the advance must rather be so chosen that they +compel the enemy to move to meet us. At the same time our effort must +be to appear with numerical superiority, in order to be certain of +victory.</p> + +<p>In what concerns the Cavalry in the further course of the War, the +necessity both of screening and reconnoitring recurs again and again; +and in many cases <span class="pagenum"><a id="page033" name="page033"></a>(p. 033)</span> even after the enemy has been beaten out +of the field, these objects will still only be obtained by fighting. +Such cases will occur in the duties of screening and security when the +enemy still possesses enough offensive power to attempt a +reconnaissance, with the threat of attack combined, and we ourselves +are engaged in a similar manner; also in all such cases in which +turning movements entail too much delay, or are rendered impossible by +the extension of the enemy's front; or, again, when the enemy on their +part renew offensive operations.</p> + +<p>The necessity of breaking through the line of Infantry outposts in +order to discover the whereabouts of the enemy's principal masses and +the direction of their movements will also from time to time arise, +and it may become necessary to suppress rapidly and thoroughly +attempts at armed resistance by the civilian population.</p> + +<p>Further, our Cavalry will be called on for attempts against the +enemy's communications, the strategical importance of which has been +already discussed, and these will be all the more important in cases +where the district we are fighting over is too poor to supply the +enemy's forces, or where operations have assumed a stationary +character, as before Fredericksburg, Paris, and Plevna, and it becomes +desirable to hinder the use of the railways for the transport of +troops or evacuation of supplies.</p> + +<p>Lastly, the Cavalry may be called on to occupy wide stretches of +country and exploit their resources, to nip in their very inception +the formation of fresh bodies of armed defenders, or on the defensive, +to secure our own communications or districts against undertakings by +flying columns of the enemy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page034" name="page034"></a>(p. 034)</span> Such undertakings, particularly when they lead in rear of the +enemy's Armies, will frequently assume the character of 'raids' in +which the essential purpose is to cover great distances rapidly, often +with the sacrifice of all communications with one's own forces, to +appear suddenly at previously selected positions, and after completion +of one's immediate object to disappear suddenly, before the enemy can +bring overwhelming numbers against the assailant.</p> + +<p>The success of such undertakings will depend, on the one hand, on the +rapidity with which the opportunities secured by such surprise are +utilized, and, on the other, on the available fighting power, which +must suffice to break down all opposition with certainty and speed.</p> + +<p>Their execution, however, will always encounter many difficulties, +particularly when a hostile population has to be dealt with; but to +consider them on this account as impracticable seems to me all the +more impossible, because to my mind they embody an absolutely +indispensable element of future operations.</p> + +<p>If it is feasible to enter upon them with fresh horses, and to make +adequate provision for supply without delaying the rapidity of +movement, either by utilizing the resources of the country, by taking +suitably organized columns with one, or by living on stores captured +from the enemy himself, then such 'raids' will succeed and exercise +most far-reaching consequences.</p> + +<p>In my opinion all these conditions can be satisfied. We can preserve +our horses by exercising greater moderation in the pursuit of +non-essentials; difficulties of supply can be solved by suitable +preparations even in an enemy's country, and when working in our +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page035" name="page035"></a>(p. 035)</span> own, the sympathetic and persistent support of our own +population will level all obstacles; but in all cases we must never +leave out of sight the cardinal point that only the concentration of +sufficient force at the right time and place can guarantee the final +result.</p> + +<p>Our conduct, however, will be different when our purpose is solely +defensive, or when we have to occupy districts which the enemy does +not seek to defend. In such cases, as also when our object is only the +concealment of our own designs, a dispersion of force may be +necessary, if only in order to occupy important defiles and defensive +sections of the ground, or for the occupation of the most important +centres of population in the enemy's country. From such tasks, +however, it should be the business of the Supreme Command to preserve +us, in order that the whole Cavalry strength should be retained intact +for offensive purposes more in harmony with its whole character and +the spirit of the Arm.</p> + +<p>For these, if great results are to be attained, it requires in the +generality of cases concentration in time and space.</p> + +<p>With the execution of these strategical missions, which so far alone +have attracted our attention, the duties of the Cavalry Arm are by no +means exhausted.</p> + +<p>Nowadays, as formerly, it will still find work to its hands on the +battle-field itself, and this work will be all the more important in +proportion as the quality of the forces therein encountered is on a +lower level (<i>e.g.</i>, new formations, Militia, etc.). In any case, +however, great results on the battle-field can only be expected from +the employment of numerically formidable 'Masses.' This is conditioned +by the very fact of the numbers which we must in future expect to see +engaged.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page036" name="page036"></a>(p. 036)</span> The portion of the enemy's forces affected by the results of +a successful charge must be a sufficient part of the whole which, at a +given time and place, is concerned in the task of endeavouring to +secure a decision.</p> + +<p>Other factors also deserve consideration—above all, the increased +range of modern firearms. If the front of the attacking Cavalry is too +narrow, it will not only have to face the fire of the troops +immediately in its front, but it will be the focus of the fire from +all sides.</p> + +<p>If the formation for attack does not supply a sufficient sequence of +successive efforts, then in many cases it can have no hope of +permanent result, for an onslaught by a single line will not have +strength enough to pierce the fire zone, and will be shot to pieces +before it can reach the enemy.<a id="footnotetag2" name="footnotetag2"></a><a href="#footnote2" title="Go to footnote 2"><span class="smaller">[2]</span></a></p> + +<p>The masses to be encountered are numerically so considerable that +single squadrons, regiments, or brigades, hardly count in the scale of +a great decision. Partial results they may, indeed, attain, but to +bring about the defeat of a whole Army, or even of an important +fraction of it, to reap the fruits of such a victory or cover a great +retreat, numbers alone can avail.</p> + +<p>How many units to employ under any given circumstances it is, of +course, impossible to lay down beforehand; but the essence of the +matter is that the limit of force to be thus employed is far in excess +of what any existing tactical unit can supply.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page037" name="page037"></a>(p. 037)</span> If, after this short survey of the many fields of action open +to horsemen in the future, we ask the decisive question, Which tasks +in the future will need to be most carefully kept in mind in the +organization and training of this Arm in peace time? we shall not be +able to conceal from ourselves that it is in the strategical handling +of the Cavalry that by far the greatest possibilities lie. Charges +even of numerically considerable bodies on the battle-field can only +lead to success under very special conditions, and even for the +protection of a retreat our rôle can only be a subordinate one. But +for reconnaissance and screening, for operations against the enemy's +communications, for the pursuit of a beaten enemy, and all similar +operations of warfare, the Cavalry is, and remains, the principal Arm. +Here no other can take its place, for none possesses the requisite +mobility and independence.</p> + +<p>At the same time, it is in these fields that its power is +all-important to the Supreme Command. Battles, under pressure of +necessity, can be fought without Cavalry at all, and the results even +partially utilized; but it is impossible to issue suitable orders +without knowledge of the enemy's operations, and equally impossible to +act against an enemy's flanks and rear with Infantry alone.</p> + +<p>It is in these directions that the future of Cavalry lies, and it is +to fit ourselves for the tasks that we should bend all our energy in +peace.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page038" name="page038"></a>(p. 038)</span> CHAPTER III</h2> + +<p class="title">STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY</p> + + +<p>We have seen in the previous chapter that the principal duties which +can fall to the lot of Cavalry in modern War will require its +employment in considerable force; hence it follows that the greatest +economy in the use of detachments for secondary purposes must be +practised.</p> + +<p>This leads us to the consideration of the question in what manner we +can group our available means to meet these requirements in the best +possible way.</p> + +<p>Primarily we must start from this axiom—that no portion of the Army +can do without Cavalry altogether; hence it follows that we must +maintain both Divisional and independent Cavalry.</p> + +<p>The former remains permanently attached to each portion of the Army +whose composition, by reason of this addition of Cavalry, permits of +independent action. The latter is set aside for the great strategical +missions that may be assigned to that Arm, for execution. The question +now arises, In what proportion is this distribution to take place?</p> + +<p>The greater number of Infantry Divisions can, in my opinion, meet all +demands upon them with a very small allotment of mounted men, as long +as they are acting in combination with the rest of the Army.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page039" name="page039"></a>(p. 039)</span> The circulation of intelligence and orders within the columns +and their outposts can generally be entrusted to cyclists. Where +independent Cavalry is deployed to cover the front of an army, the +field of activity for the Divisional Cavalry in actual outpost duties +and reconnaissance is of necessity very much limited. All they are +really required to accomplish is to maintain the connection with the +former, and for this duty the cyclist detachments above referred to +will generally suffice.</p> + +<p>There remains, therefore, for the Divisional Cavalry only the service +with the most advanced sections of the Infantry outposts (orderly +duties with the Infantry piquets in cases where the ground precludes +the use of the cycle), duties connected with requisitioning; and +reconnaissance only during those periods in which the mass of the +independent Cavalry has been drawn away towards the wings of the Army +to clear its front for battle, carrying messages during the combat, +and actual reconnaissance during the progress of the engagement +itself. All these requirements can, I think, be met with a very small +amount of force, all the more so because reconnaissance under fire in +modern War seems to me practically impossible, and can generally only +be initiated by those Divisions which form the wings of the Army, but +even then their field would be a very limited one.</p> + +<p>Modern firearms compel us to remain at such a distance from the enemy +that observation is rendered much more difficult, and the distances to +be traversed are so great that before any reports from the wings can +get round to the position of Headquarters, and suitable orders based +on these reports can reach their destination, the whole situation may +have changed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page040" name="page040"></a>(p. 040)</span> again and again. We have only to remember the +cases which occurred in the last War (1870).</p> + +<p>In the majority of these instances it was quite impossible that +Cavalry patrols could have sent timely information of what was going +on within the limits of the enemy's positions, and in the future the +difficulties will be even greater.</p> + +<p>In no case, however, can such information during the progress of an +action be obtained by the actual employment of the fighting power of +the Divisional Cavalry.</p> + +<p>If it is to be done at all, then a few well-led officers patrols will +suffice, and therefore no considerable numerical strength in the +Divisional Cavalry is required. The lines of approach of the enemy and +points on which his wings are resting must certainly be kept under +observation, but this observation cannot in principle be initiated by +the Infantry Divisions, but it is the province of the Army +Headquarters to provide, for it will be precisely the wings and the +flanks which the enemy will himself seek to protect by the massing of +his own Cavalry.</p> + +<p>If the prospect of achieving anything by observation during the combat +through the action of the Divisional Cavalry may be considered as +well-nigh impossible, then any tactical action may also be considered +as precluded, unless it takes place in combination with the +independent Cavalry.</p> + +<p>Occasions may certainly even nowadays occur in which a few squadrons +may achieve results by taking part in a combat between the other Arms, +but such cases are too few and unimportant to be taken into account in +a distribution of the Cavalry as a matter of organization.</p> + +<p>In Armies deprived of the screen of independent <span class="pagenum"><a id="page041" name="page041"></a>(p. 041)</span> Cavalry the +want of Divisional Cavalry will certainly be more markedly felt even +in those Army Corps which form the flanks of Armies, and in the cases +of detached expeditions, and in similar exceptional circumstances. In +all these instances more Cavalry must be sent up to the outposts, and +it will have both to screen and reconnoitre.</p> + +<p>The demands on its fighting efficiency can, under such circumstances, +become of importance, and in these smaller operations, reconnaissance +during action is more possible than with extended battle-fronts. But +to demand for the Divisional Cavalry on these grounds a larger +proportion of sabres, and thus to paralyze a great portion of the Arm +by its inclusion in the long columns of march of the whole Army, is +not justifiable. The scale on which we must decide the apportionment +of Divisional Cavalry must depend on the fact that the Infantry does +not generally operate in small detachments, but works in large masses, +and it is the necessities of these large masses which fix the +standard.</p> + +<p>To apportion to single columns or Divisions for particular +circumstances an increased force of Cavalry, to be taken from the +available mass of independent Cavalry Divisions, ought not in general +to occasion unusual friction; but it is most difficult and troublesome +to take away from the Infantry the squadrons definitely assigned to it +by peace-time organization, and unite these in independent Cavalry +Commands.</p> + +<p>We must not allow ourselves to be misled in this matter by the +practice followed in peace manœuvres. Even the largest +concentration of troops for these purposes is, in proportion to the +masses to be employed in our future War, on a most limited scale.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page042" name="page042"></a>(p. 042)</span> Our smaller Brigade and Divisional manœuvres are +restricted within limits which can only be considered nowadays as +exceptional. They are only too well adapted to give rise to entirely +false conceptions as to the true character of the Cavalry service in +these great struggles for national survival, unless we keep steadily +in mind that they apply only to exceptional circumstances.</p> + +<p>We must, therefore, lay down as a principle that as much Cavalry as +possible is to be organized for strategical independence, and as +little as is expedient retained for the Infantry Divisions.</p> + +<p>My opinion is that, if we make fullest use of the bicycle, and, with +this object in view, reorganize our system of conveying orders and +intelligence, then two well-trained and effective squadrons should +amply suffice for the ordinary duties with an Infantry Division.</p> + +<p>As to the allotment of the independent Cavalry Divisions, it follows +from all that has been said above, that to divide them in equal +proportions among the several Armies, according to their numerical +strength, can only be considered as an obstacle to the full +utilization of their potential fighting capacity. It would be better +to arrange this distribution at the beginning of each War, in +accordance with the conditions which the situation imposes. Where it +appears expedient, we should not hesitate to form Divisions of +different strength, and to group several of these to constitute +Cavalry Corps, even to unite several of such Corps for employment in a +particular strategical direction—<i>i.e.</i>, in a particular portion of +the theatre of operation—whilst leaving only individual brigades, or +even regiments, to those fractions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page043" name="page043"></a>(p. 043)</span> of the Army which for the +moment can best dispense with Cavalry support.</p> + +<p>Of course, an Army taking the field with a great superiority of +Cavalry can afford to deal less sparingly with it for secondary +purposes; on the other hand, the numerically weaker side is driven to +the utmost economy of its forces, and the utmost energy in its +employment at the decisive moment. It will therefore be essential for +the latter to concentrate at the commencement of the campaign the bulk +of its Cavalry upon the decisive line of operations—that is to say, +on that line on which, from the general strategical situation, one can +expect to penetrate into the chief district of concentration of the +enemy's Armies, and hence to find out what it is of the greatest +importance for us to know, or, on the other hand, when it is to our +interests to conceal our own operations, and hence to beat the enemy's +Cavalry as thoroughly as possible wherever it shows itself. On the +remaining portion of the front we must endeavour to employ as little +Cavalry as possible, and to supplement it in the duties of security by +Infantry, whilst leaving reconnaissance to be dealt with by patrols. +If we thus gain the victory on the principal line, the results will +soon be apparent in a reduction of pressure on the adjacent sections +of the front, and then the Cavalry will find its opportunity for +increased activity in offensive enterprises. For, once the enemy's +horsemen are beaten, either he will concentrate his remaining Cavalry, +from every direction, towards the threatened points, or the victor +will be in a position to utilize the superiority he has acquired to +support any portion of his force which may have got into temporary +difficulties.</p> + +<p>If, thus, it is the necessity of beating the enemy's <span class="pagenum"><a id="page044" name="page044"></a>(p. 044)</span> Cavalry +out of the field at the very commencement of the campaign which +compels the concentration of important numbers in the decisive +direction, it follows naturally that this point of view must be fully +considered in the plan of strategical deployment.</p> + +<p>In the further stages of Cavalry activity—<i>i.e.</i>, after it has +defeated the mass of the enemy's Cavalry—the tasks which can confront +the Arm make the employment of considerable forces essential, unless, +as so often happened in 1870, its operations are to be interfered +with, if not altogether stopped, by weak Infantry detachments, or even +by an insurgent population. Against this concentration of large masses +of Cavalry many objections will naturally be raised; hence we must +consider how these are to be met, and whether, as a fact, they are of +sufficient importance to cause us to surrender the advantages they +offer.</p> + +<p>First comes the difficulty of feeding large numbers. But military +history, from the time of Frederick the Great and Napoleon down to the +American Civil War, the unusual conditions of which latter must not be +left out of account, show conclusively that it was possible to keep +masses of 5,000 men and more together, and in full mobility, even in +poor and almost roadless districts.</p> + +<p>If it was possible then, how much more will it be so now, with our +modern means of communication, if proper arrangements are made in +advance!</p> + +<p>It has been further objected that the rapid circulation of information +from the front to Army Headquarters will be jeopardized by the +insertion of an additional collecting station—viz., the Corps +Command, between the two ends of the chain. But this fear can be shown +to be groundless, for in any case where at <span class="pagenum"><a id="page045" name="page045"></a>(p. 045)</span> all large bodies +of Cavalry are sent out in advance, the service of intelligence must +be organized in such a manner that all really important information +will be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through the +usual channels. Since this is already necessary with Cavalry +Divisions, there can be no objection to applying it to yet higher +commands.</p> + +<p>More important than this question of intelligence is the consideration +that the command of Cavalry 'Masses' which exceed more than the +present Division of six regiments involves exceptional difficulties, +and this must be granted to a certain extent as long as the question +is limited to the actual tactical handling (execution of manœuvres) +of the Division on the battle-field.</p> + +<p>It is, in fact, no longer possible to handle a force of six regiments +according to any set scheme, such as that known as the +'Dreitreffentaktik'—at any rate, not in hilly or difficult country. +The transition from one formation to another, the deployment of the +whole unit for attack, or the interchange of the duties between the +separate lines, are certainly hardly possible on ground over which it +is difficult to manœuvre. It appears, however, to me that the +conduct of great Cavalry 'Masses' by ordinary drill methods is not +necessary to meet the condition of modern warfare.</p> + +<p>When once the Cavalry Corps Commander grasps the idea of handling the +units at his disposal as the Infantry Corps Commander handles his +Divisions, sending in first one Division, and then, according to +circumstances, reinforcing it or prolonging the fighting line by +drawing on the second one, or by employing the Divisions side by side, +assigning to each a definite share in the attainment of the purpose, +which he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page046" name="page046"></a>(p. 046)</span> himself keeps steadily in view, there seems no +reason why the leadership of such bodies should not be perfectly +practicable. Indeed, one may safely say that the result will be all +the more certain of attainment the more the final responsibility is +concentrated on the one head; for there is obviously a greater +possibility of a single mind pursuing consistently a given purpose +than of two or more Divisional Commanders following out the same idea +independently along the same lines.</p> + +<p>If, then, when the Corps is united for tactical action, the +maintenance of a single Command is quite conceivable, this will be all +the more the case in matters of Strategy. It is not so much a question +then of handling the corps as a closed unit, for instance, on a single +road, but of assigning within a certain sphere a united impulse to the +constituent parts of the Command in such directions that in all cases +they should reach the ground in force superior to anything the enemy +can oppose to them. According to circumstances, different tasks may be +assigned to the several Divisions. They may march on different roads, +some of them extended, some closed, the only condition being that they +all pursue a common strategic purpose, assigned to them by the Corps +Commander, according to the same fundamental principles, and are +prevented by this higher control from flying out in eccentric +directions.</p> + +<p>Objections based on the alleged difficulties of the conduct of such +masses are therefore untenable. On the contrary, the demand must be +made on the Chief Command that, always in accordance with the +strategical situation, it must clearly determine what it requires of +the Cavalry, and group them in a suitable manner and in sufficient +numerical strength under a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page047" name="page047"></a>(p. 047)</span> single Leader, even if in the +meanwhile there may be a deficiency of the Arm at less important +points. This fundamental principle must be adhered to at all costs if +full advantages are to be derived from the employment of our Arm, for +with none other can the consequences of a dispersal of force exact +more terrible retribution than with the Cavalry.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, though the principle must be held inviolate, its +application must not degenerate into hide-bound rigidity. 'Strategy is +founded on a system of expedients' (Moltke), and hence expediency +remains always our highest ideal.</p> + +<p>The essential point, however, is that our organization must be made so +elastic that we can alter the strength of our units to meet the +varying circumstances which may confront us, so that forces may not +remain unutilized in one place whilst they may be most urgently +required at another.</p> + +<p>It is no way essential that the units combined for the express +purposes apparent at the commencement of the campaign should remain +intact throughout the War. One should be able to detach from or +reinforce them, as circumstances require; break up Corps and +Divisions, to reform them elsewhere; and employ their Leaders and +Staff first with one, then with the other.</p> + +<p>As an example of what I have just said, I would cite the manner in +which the German Headquarters Command dealt with the Armies during the +war of 1870-1871. According to the demands of the moment, the +individual Corps or Divisions were grouped in manifold proportions to +constitute such units, and the adaptability of this organization +proved sufficient to cope with every eventuality.</p> + +<p>As an almost ideal type we can take the manner <span class="pagenum"><a id="page048" name="page048"></a>(p. 048)</span> in which +Napoleon dealt with his Cavalry Corps for the same purpose. At one +moment his bodies of horsemen unite into Divisions and Corps; at +another they dissolve into independent Brigades or regiments, +operating singly, only once more to be united into formidable +'Masses,' as circumstances dictate. Here we see no rigid adherence to +any rules, nothing pedantic in the method of employment, and the +leader and troops deftly adapt themselves to the ever-changing +conditions.</p> + +<p>This is the ideal to which we Germans should strive to attain, and all +the more so in proportion as we are threatened by superior numbers.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page049" name="page049"></a>(p. 049)</span> CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<p class="title">INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION</p> + + +<p>If the changed conditions of modern war have brought about new +conditions and demands which require to be considered in the +strategical combinations of the Cavalry, I believe that a similar +influence must make itself felt in the field of tactics. Whereas +formerly the <i>arme blanche</i> was recognized as the principal method by +which the Cavalry made its inherent fighting power felt, the +employment of dismounted action nowadays has gained in importance to +such an extent that the whole character of our activity appears +completely changed.</p> + +<p>Although hitherto the general conception has been that Cavalry should +only make use of the carbine for defence, nowadays its employment in +attack must be recognized as of the utmost importance.</p> + +<p>Undoubtedly, however, it is, and must remain even to-day, the chief +aim of every leader in whose veins flows the hot Cavalry blood to +seize his opportunities wherever they offer themselves, and, above +all, to attack the enemy's Cavalry wherever and whenever accessible +with cold steel; but we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that +nowadays numerous problems will present themselves to the Cavalry +which can only be solved by fire action.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page050" name="page050"></a>(p. 050)</span> In the first place, the opportunity will often arise for the +weaker side to avoid an encounter in the open field, and, with the +help of its firearm, at least to attempt behind defiles, or strong +positions, to defy the enemy's superior forces. In such cases the +assailant also will be compelled to have recourse to his carbine.</p> + +<p>Further considerations reveal that in future, quite apart from +encounter with the enemy's Cavalry, our own horsemen will find tasks +before them which will make appeal to the rifle inevitable.</p> + +<p>The enemy will cover his railways, and important depots by troops of +the second and third class. Reinforced by the resisting power of +popular levies, they will block woods, river crossings, and defiles. +Even the guards of their Convoys will be amply provided with +far-ranging firearms.</p> + +<p>In the pursuit of an enemy's beaten Cavalry we shall happen upon +Infantry detachments sent out to cover their retreat, or upon defiles +which have been occupied for a similar purpose. Important +communications will be held by strong detachments of cyclist Infantry, +who will find in woods and villages protection and favourable +opportunities to use their weapons.</p> + +<p>All these means of resistance lie beyond the field of mounted action, +but they must be overcome if success is to crown our efforts.</p> + +<p>Already in reconnaissances, particularly in those directed against the +enemy's communications, we shall meet with these impediments, and the +same will be the case when we come to the strategical pursuit, or the +protection of a retreat.<a id="footnotetag3" name="footnotetag3"></a><a href="#footnote3" title="Go to footnote 3"><span class="smaller">[3]</span></a> In the pursuit the main object is to keep +the beaten enemy on the run, to give him neither peace nor rest until +complete exhaustion sets in. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page051" name="page051"></a>(p. 051)</span> But for the mass of the Cavalry +the idea of a purely frontal pursuit should not be encouraged, for +Cavalry, even when supported by several batteries, can easily be held +up by any rearguard position in which a few intact troops remain.</p> + +<p>The frontal pursuit must in such cases be left to the other Arms, only +to be taken up again when the last resistance of the enemy is broken, +and the exhaustion of our own Infantry and Horse Artillery renders +further effort on their part impossible.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, all energy must be devoted to the initiation of a +pursuit on parallel lines, in order that we may appear unexpectedly +and repeatedly against the flanks of the enemy's columns, with the +ultimate intention of anticipating him at some point on the line of +his retreat, such as a defile, thus bringing him between two fires in +a sheerly desperate position.</p> + +<p>Man and horse must in these cases be driven to the utmost limit of +their powers of endurance.</p> + +<p>It is evident that in such situations the principal rôle falls to the +firearm, for only in the fire fight is it possible to break off an +attack without loss, in order to appear again at some other point and +recommence the engagement. In case of anticipating an enemy at a +defile, the rifle will be practically the only weapon that can find +employment.</p> + +<p>What can be achieved in this direction is best illustrated by +Sheridan's Cavalry, whose successful flanking operations against the +lines of communication of General Lee's heroic Army brought about the +capitulation of Clover Hill.</p> + +<p>The charge will only then secure a greater result than dismounted +action, when the tactical cohesion of the enemy has been dissolved, +and his fire power <span class="pagenum"><a id="page052" name="page052"></a>(p. 052)</span> utterly broken; that is to say, generally +it will be of greater service in tactical than in strategical +pursuits—unless, indeed, as at Waterloo, the defeat has led to the +complete and permanent dissolution of the enemy's fighting power.</p> + +<p>Further, in the endeavour to support the rearguard of a defeated Army +in retreat it will be necessary, as soon as we have got rid of the +pursuing Cavalry, to take to the rifle, because with the sword alone +we cannot hope to make any impression upon the Infantry and Artillery +of the victor.</p> + +<p>In such cases we must strive to attack with the firearm against the +flanks of the pursuing columns, in order to draw off their attention +from our beaten main body.</p> + +<p>Cases may frequently arise when we in turn can hold up the pursuit at +defiles and other positions by a purely frontal defence.</p> + +<p>In such circumstances a fresh and intact Cavalry, which has not +allowed itself to be dispirited or demoralized, may render invaluable +services to the beaten Infantry, and enable them, together with the +columns and the whole supply organization of the Army, to effect an +orderly withdrawal without being molested by the enemy, thus affording +to its commander an opportunity of restoring the lost cohesion and +tactical order. It will only be the rifle of the Cavalry which will +gain for our hard-pressed comrades what is most needed—<i>i.e.</i>, time.</p> + +<p>The idea is often put forward that Cavalry should not involve itself +in an obstinate fight on foot, that it should act only by short +surprise attacks, and that it possesses in its mobility the infallible +means of circumventing points of resistance. This conception, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page053" name="page053"></a>(p. 053)</span> which restricts the functions of Cavalry within their +narrowest limits, seems to me entirely untenable. It is essentially +indefensible when it is a matter of gaining time or of carrying a +given position, such as a defensible post on the lines of +communication, a convoy marching under escort, the destruction of a +defended railway, or in any similar undertaking. It will be impossible +to work round such positions—at least when engaged on the greater +operations of War—both on account of the widths of the fronts +occupied and the possibility of interfering with the sphere of +operations of the neighbouring detachments. Often, indeed, the nature +of the ground will preclude such attempts, and the experience of +1870-1871 should suffice to show how rarely such a circumvention can +hope to succeed. But even where neither the strategic situation nor +our immediate purpose compels us to fight, it is not always advisable +or expedient to attempt to evade the opportunity. For every evasion +leaves the front of our own Army clear, gives the enemy the very +opportunity he is looking for to reconnoitre the position of our main +bodies, uncovers our own communications (<i>i.e.</i>, our own Cavalry +trains and baggage), exposes our flank to the enemy, and thus offers +him many chances of obtaining tactical results.</p> + +<p>Again, these attempts at circumvention lead easily to a loss of +direction, which in certain cases might endanger the success of our +whole operations; and, finally, the amount of time required by such +outflanking attempts may not be justified by the possible results. In +such cases it might on the whole be better to attack direct, for +turning movements mean always a postponement of the tactical decision, +and hence are always a disadvantage to the attacking side.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page054" name="page054"></a>(p. 054)</span> The theory that Cavalry, thanks to its mobility, can always +ride round and turn the positions it encounters breaks down in +practice before the tactical and strategical demands upon the Arm, +partly by reason of the local conditions, and partly because of the +consideration which has to be given to time, to the endurance of the +horses, and the position of the following columns.</p> + +<p>The same applies to another theory with which one tries to explain +away the necessity of dismounted combats. It is maintained that the +fire power of the Horse Artillery will suffice to clear the road for +the Cavalry; hence the latter will rarely be placed in a position +which will require energetic dismounted action on their part. This +assumption involves, in my opinion, an altogether overrated estimate +of the power of Artillery. The same reasoning would lead us logically +to the false conclusion that even Infantry do not require their +rifles. One must demand from every reliable body of troops that they +will not allow themselves to be driven out of a covered position by +Artillery alone. All previous War experience testifies to the +impossibility of achieving such results against even moderate +Infantry, and it is only with such that we are here dealing. The fact +that in 1870-1871 the Artillery often did succeed in driving a weak +and demoralized enemy out of localities the possession of which was of +no material consequence to him cannot be considered as to the point. +Certainly the effect of modern guns is greater than anything of which +we have had experience, and will act upon the defender with +correspondingly greater intensity; but, on the other hand, it must be +insisted upon that the assailant's Artillery will have to act under +the increased effect of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page055" name="page055"></a>(p. 055)</span> the defender's fire power, and the +latter will choose different terrain, and utilize it far better than +in the past. The actual assault remains necessary now, as ever, to +bring about the final decision.</p> + +<p>Anyone who has had to conduct staff rides and similar operations of +large bodies of independent Cavalry, and has endeavoured to carry +these out in the spirit of actual warfare, can hardly have failed to +notice the tendency which displays itself with all leaders to take to +dismounted action, and will have realized that one has far more +frequently to check rather than encourage this tendency; but he will +also come to the conclusion, perhaps, that this desire is well founded +on existing conditions, and that even a determined Cavalry will have +to make use of their firearms almost every day; indeed, without +adequate employment of their carbines they are no longer able to carry +out the most important of their incumbent duties.</p> + +<p>Hence, if the use of the rifle is thus shown by instances taken from +the most divergent directions to be of absolute necessity, the +conclusion follows that even in the battle itself, that point on which +all military action is focussed, it can hardly fail to find both its +opportunities and its full justification.</p> + +<p>In this direction the horsemen of Stuart and Sheridan have set us a +brilliant example, taking part on foot in regular pitched battles +(Stuart at Fredericksburg, and Sheridan at Five Forks), and deciding, +rifle in hand, the fate of numerous engagements, in order immediately +afterwards to mount and pursue the enemy by a succession of vehement +charges (Stuart at Brandy Station).</p> + +<p>The South African War also has shown us what <span class="pagenum"><a id="page056" name="page056"></a>(p. 056)</span> can be done by +a mounted force supplied with a reliable firearm. The Boers fought +exclusively as Cavalry (<i>sic</i>), supported by Artillery, and some of +the most celebrated British Infantry regiments suffered defeat at +their hands as long as the numerical proportion was not altogether too +unfavourable to the assailants.</p> + +<p>Even in dismounted attack, particularly in the later period of the +war, they often attained very considerable successes, and thus proved +incontrovertibly that the double rôle of Cavalry on foot and on +horseback is thoroughly practical; for even the charge itself of these +same Boers often achieved brilliant results, although they were +lacking in any kind of tactical training for this particular +result.<a id="footnotetag4" name="footnotetag4"></a><a href="#footnote4" title="Go to footnote 4"><span class="smaller">[4]</span></a></p> + +<p>Certainly weapons and numbers have altered materially since the days +of the American Civil War, and the experiences of South Africa, +largely conditioned by the peculiar topographical conditions and the +out-of-door habits and sporting instincts of the Boers, cannot be +transferred to European circumstance without important modifications. +But even in Europe the Cavalry retain, thanks to their mobility, their +power of opening fire in a manner calculated to create the greatest +degree of surprise against the flanks and rear of the enemy as soon as +they make up their minds to cut themselves adrift from their own Army, +and get in rear of the enemy's troops. Such enterprises offer the best +guarantee of producing a great moral result. The history of the +Franco-German <span class="pagenum"><a id="page057" name="page057"></a>(p. 057)</span> War demonstrated this possibility. What might +not our Cavalry have achieved in 1870-1871 against the undisciplined +forces of the Republic had they been provided with a good firearm, and +sought of a set purpose for such opportunities?</p> + +<p>It would take us too far to produce the numerous proofs from the pages +of our War records; only, as an example, I should like to quote the +Battle of Bapaume. In this instance the 7th Cavalry Brigade belonging +to the 3rd Cavalry Division lay on the flank—in fact, almost in rear +of—the enemy's Army, without being able to come to the help of the +hard-pressed 15th Division. Had they on that occasion been able to act +by fire, by surprise, and with determination against the rear of the +French Army of the North, the results must have been invaluable.</p> + +<p>In future, beyond doubt, we shall have to deal with much larger masses +of the enemy than formerly, and against them one must make up for want +of numbers by an enormous expenditure of ammunition, and further +endeavour to reinforce our fire power by repeating-rifles. We must +also aim at intensifying the effect of our fire power by attacking +only at decisive points. On the other hand, it must be admitted, that +in the magnitude of the masses themselves there lies the germ of +weakness, and in our future wars we can hardly expect to find Infantry +as firmly welded together as in the Armies of the past. I therefore by +no means hold the opinion that dismounted Cavalry can achieve nothing +against Infantry, or that their chances are limited to only very +favourable opportunities.</p> + +<p>It is, of course, true that the Infantry receive a more thorough +musketry training, particularly at long <span class="pagenum"><a id="page058" name="page058"></a>(p. 058)</span> ranges, and that +their education in the use of the ground, as well as in fire control, +in peace is naturally better than with the Cavalry.</p> + +<p>But the results obtained by the Cavalry in the field practices are by +no means so much behind those of the Infantry that any superiority of +the latter on the battle-field need be expected. A better firearm for +the Cavalry is unquestionably a necessity, for the inferiority of the +carbine compared with the infantry rifle is undoubtedly a source of +weakness; but, on the other hand, we must insist that the Cavalry +possesses sources of strength peculiar to its whole organization which +render it materially superior to the Infantry.</p> + +<p>I have already pointed out that modern Infantry, when mobilized, +cannot be considered like the Cavalry as a standing force—that is to +say, that the latter possess much greater tactical and moral cohesion.</p> + +<p>Let us look at this question a little more closely.</p> + +<p>A squadron at War strength can dismount, after due deduction made of +the horse-holders, seventy carbines. These seventy men, if the annual +contingent is equally divided throughout the squadron, will consist +pretty uniformly of men belonging to all three terms of their service, +and will not include more than eight reserve men, so that there will +be at most twenty recruits amongst them, whilst the remainder will +consist half of men in their third year and half of men in their +second year; but these seventy men are led by three officers, +generally all on the active list, who in turn are supported by eight +non-commissioned officers and one trumpeter, who also mostly belong to +the active list.</p> + +<p>Against this a section of Infantry which, when raised to War strength, +is about seventy-five strong, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page059" name="page059"></a>(p. 059)</span> consists of about forty men on +the active list, of whom half are recruits, the other half men in +their second year of service, and of thirty-five reservists.</p> + +<p>It possesses, therefore, at the outside twenty trained colour +soldiers, and these are led in most cases by a Reserve or Landwehr +officer, supported by at most seven non-commissioned officers, of whom +four on an average will belong to the Reserve. This Infantry will, as +a rule, under normal peace-time conditions, as experience teaches us, +shoot very well; but it is scarcely necessary to discuss in which body +we shall find greater cohesion, or on which one is more likely to be +able to depend in cases where moral qualities and fire discipline are +all essential, and it is these qualities which primarily condition the +number of hits in the firing line. I should only like to add, apart +from all other considerations, that the direct influence of the +Leaders in the Cavalry and their knowledge of their men is much more +highly developed than in the Infantry. It must also be remembered that +there are generally much fewer skulkers in the mounted arms, partly +because of their longer period of service and closer supervision, and +partly because everybody endeavours not to be separated from his +horse, and finds in his presence with the men of his detachment the +best guarantee of getting back to it. In view of these considerations, +I think that our Cavalry can safely claim that they can engage the +best existing Continental Infantry with reasonable prospects of +success, and against inferior foot soldiers may always preserve its +sense of superiority.</p> + +<p>Granted this much, then, the scope of our activity is enormously +increased.</p> + +<p>We can now approach tasks which hitherto had <span class="pagenum"><a id="page060" name="page060"></a>(p. 060)</span> to be regarded +as impossible, because the conviction existed that on the appearance +of the enemy's Infantry the rôle of Cavalry <i>ipso facto</i> came to an +end, unless, indeed, an opportunity could be found for the Cavalry to +charge. For now we are in a position, in harmony with the whole spirit +of the Arm, to lay principal stress upon the offensive, even when +fighting on foot. We can carry through even serious engagements, with +chances of success which no longer depend on the favour of special +circumstances.</p> + +<p>Confident in our own strength, we can apply tactical compulsion where +formerly we could only trust to cunning, rapidity, or luck. I hold it +to be an altogether antiquated standpoint to assume that Cavalry on +foot can only attack with hope of success when it can approach on +horseback near to its enemy, suddenly deploy against him in the most +decisive directions, and generally is in a position to utilize any +special advantages offered by local circumstances.</p> + +<p>The campaign of 1870-1871 shows that in most cases in which the +Cavalry had to take to its firearms it was acting on the offensive, +and was compelled to attack the enemy—exactly like the Infantry—in +the most diverse situations, and to shoot its way up to him. Under +modern conditions it is clear this necessity will be even more +apparent, and it would be to deprive the Cavalry again of the +independence secured for it by the addition of the rifle to its +equipment if one were to limit its power of attack on foot only to +exceptionally favourable circumstances. The Cavalry must, in fact, be +able to attack on foot exactly like Infantry when the situation +imperatively demands it; but if it is to be handled in this spirit, +then it will require to be very strongly provided with Artillery.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page061" name="page061"></a>(p. 061)</span> If it is already considered almost impossible for Infantry to +turn well-covered defenders out of their position without Artillery +support, the same naturally applies to the Cavalry. In fact, a strong +Artillery will be all the more necessary, for the attack with Cavalry +should be carried through with the utmost rapidity, and when acting on +the defensive its purpose is to gain the greatest amount of time. +Against this must be borne in mind that the Infantry should not +without necessity be deprived of its due share of Artillery, but I +think the two views can be readily united. As long as the Cavalry +'Masses' are out in front of the Armies we can safely give them as +many horse batteries as they require, and the same is the case after a +victory or after a lost battle. In the decisive battle itself this +Artillery reinforcement to the Cavalry must not be expended +eccentrically, and must be utilized to the utmost in the most decisive +direction on the battle-field itself. Here, too, a certain elasticity +of organization is most desirable, and a strict adherence to a +prearranged order of battle can only act most prejudicially.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page062" name="page062"></a>(p. 062)</span> CHAPTER V</h2> + +<p class="title">THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS</p> + + +<p>Having admitted that dismounted action has increased considerably in +importance, particularly on the offensive, it nevertheless remains the +fact that the combat with cold steel remains the chief <i>raison d'être</i> +of the Cavalry, and when the principles have to be considered +according to which troops have to be employed upon the battle-field, +the actual collision of Cavalry 'Masses' remains the predominant +factor.</p> + +<p>The task of the Leader must be to transmit the mechanical power +inherent in the troops in the form of momentum upon the enemy. Where +he, with a clear purpose before him, acts with daring and thorough +comprehension, it is in his power to intensify this momentum many +times over; and this holds true with the Cavalry to a greater degree +than with any other Arm, for with the horsemen the personal impression +conveyed by the appearance and bearing of the Leader reacts on the +mass as in no other case. This reaction is further accentuated by the +fact that the excitement of motion on horseback, inherent in the +performance of Cavalry duties, contains something electrifying, +kindling to the imagination and exciting <span class="pagenum"><a id="page063" name="page063"></a>(p. 063)</span> to the nerves, +which communicates its influence to the Leader, and thus in turn +supports him.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the evils of an indifferent Command make themselves +nowhere more apparent than with Cavalry. In this Arm every impulse +works itself out relentlessly down to the last consequence. Mistakes +once made can rarely be remedied. This is the necessary consequence of +the short time interval to which their activity is limited, the +rapidity of their movements, and the irresistible momentum with which +a Cavalry charge once launched presses on with ever-increasing +momentum to its final decision.</p> + +<p>Whilst thus with the Cavalry the influence of the Command is the most +important factor of success, any deficiency in which can rarely be +made good by the excellence of the troops themselves, it is precisely +with this Arm that it is the least frequently found; for admittedly +there is nothing more difficult on the battle-field than correct +disposition and execution at the head of a great body of horsemen.</p> + +<p>Several factors unite to explain this circumstance. In the first +place, only the shortest moment of time is available for +consideration, and then this rapid consideration and decision have to +be given under the most unfavourable external conditions, at the +fullest speed of one's horse, or in the maddening confusion of the +mêlée. Further, in most, cases it will be quite impossible for the +Leader of a Cavalry 'Mass' to take in with accuracy the strength and +dispositions of the enemy. The more extended radius of action of +modern firearms and the greater distance between the contending forces +thereby conditioned must in the future render this much more difficult +than in the past. Very rarely will it be possible for the Leader +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page064" name="page064"></a>(p. 064)</span> either to alter or cancel an order once given in consequence +of information subsequently received. Even of the ground itself, the +importance of which is so much greater for the Cavalry than for any +other Arm, it will be impossible for the Leader to form for himself +any actual picture. Either it is already in possession of the enemy +and of his patrols, or at least in their sphere of action, or it +cannot be readily grasped from a single standpoint, and the rapidity +of movement allows no time to reconnoitre it sufficiently. Constant +reference to maps, even when available, is impossible, and the best of +these do not reveal exhaustively the actual nature of the ground to be +traversed. The orders must therefore be based on a general +consideration of the circumstances, for the Leader cannot gauge with +even approximate accuracy the strength of his enemy from the +resistance he encounters, like his more fortunate comrade of the +Infantry. His only remaining means of influencing the course of the +action lie in his intact reserves.</p> + +<p>For subordinates, indeed, the case is even worse, for they will rarely +find existing conditions in accordance with the conception on which +their orders were issued, and will seldom have time to refer to +Headquarters for further instructions.</p> + +<p>It must, therefore, be apparent that only the most exceptional Cavalry +training, combined with high executive talent, can suffice to +compensate for all these difficulties. Really successful leading will +only be assured to the Cavalry General when the machinery he sets in +motion is technically finished down to the last detail.</p> + +<p>In the first place, the least that can be demanded is that the +observation of the enemy and distribution of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page065" name="page065"></a>(p. 065)</span> orders are so +organized that the system works with absolute certainty. On the former +depends the correct choice of the moment of attack; on the latter that +the troops are employed in the required direction.</p> + +<p>The place of the responsible Leader until the moment of the charge is, +therefore, well out to the front, in a position from which he can best +overlook the situation as a whole. Even the Leaders of independent +units, if possible down to the Regimental Commanders, should remain +close to him, and try to see the situation through his eyes. The +greatest fault of all is to stick too close to your troops.</p> + +<p>Every Cavalry officer must carry his map in his head as well as in his +hand, particularly during the engagement. Every Leader must keep +before his mind the hang of the ground, the lie of the roads, the +peculiarities of the battle-field, with the chances it affords him. +Any defects he must try to make good by reconnaissance. Every possible +consequence of the collision must have been thought out beforehand.</p> + +<p>Never should the Chief Commander take part in the charge personally +until he puts in his last reserve, and even then only when he is clear +of all responsibility, which by that time will generally be the case. +In all circumstances he must be in a position to rally his troops +after they have dispersed themselves in a mêlée, and to take measures +either to exploit the success, or, in case of reverse, to avert its +worst consequences. This does not apply only to the Chief Commander.</p> + +<p>Here I would enter a particular protest against the opinion one hears +far too frequently emitted, that the place of every Cavalry Leader in +the charge is always in front of his command. This only holds good +when <span class="pagenum"><a id="page066" name="page066"></a>(p. 066)</span> units charge as parts of a higher organization, or +where smaller bodies—<i>e.g.</i>, squadrons, regiments, or +brigades—attack as a whole, with no rearward lines or supports to be +controlled, or further responsibilities arising out of the charge have +to be considered. But this does not relieve the Commander from the +necessity of setting a personal example in moments of wavering, or +when it appears better, after cool reflection, to risk everything, to +carry the men forward to the extreme limit of effort, rather than to +reserve himself for subsequent emergencies.</p> + +<p>In all other cases the Commander, and his Staff, must avoid becoming +entangled in the confusion of a fight in which he must lose all view +and control over his men, and at best could achieve nothing more than +any other equally brave and determined trooper. It is, on the +contrary, his first duty to move in such a direction that he may at +all times be ready to influence with rapidity and decision the +mechanism of his command as a whole.</p> + +<p>If he falls, then his Staff Officer or Adjutant assumes the +responsibility of the command until such time as the next senior can +be notified of the circumstance. In no case may the continuity of +action be interrupted by wasting time in looking for his successor.</p> + +<p>When the Cavalry is working in combination with the other Arms the +point of observation of its Commander must be connected with the +latter by suitable relays, and officers must be sent out into those +sections of the ground which cannot be overlooked from the position +the Leader has selected.</p> + +<p>Combat and security patrols must be sent out in all directions from +which the enemy's reserves or fresh bodies of his troops might +approach, and even towards <span class="pagenum"><a id="page067" name="page067"></a>(p. 067)</span> our own rear the ground must be +reconnoitred as far as possible by officers, who report the result of +their operations, not only to the superior Leader, but to the Brigade +and Regimental Commanders. It will also be advisable to keep the +officers of the other Arms, particularly of the reserves, as well +informed as possible about the nature of the ground and the observed +movements of the enemy's forces, so that these may always act with +full knowledge of the circumstances. A General Staff Officer should be +entrusted with the maintenance of communications with Army +Headquarters itself.</p> + +<p>As the crisis approaches the troops must be drawn in nearer to the +point of collision. As soon as the attack has been determined on, the +Leader will be well advised to take up a position on the flank of his +troops from which he will be able to overlook the whole field of +action and keep the enemy well in view. From this point, having +previously instructed his subordinates as to the situation and purpose +of the coming combat, and having sent them back to their troops, he +will despatch executive orders to the several échelons concerned. The +line of attack must be defined with particular care, and a point of +sight visible from a considerable distance must, if possible, be +assigned to them. No room for doubt must be left open as to which +troop it is which is responsible for the direction.</p> + +<p>But even with the finest system for reconnaissance and transmission of +orders it will be impossible to guarantee the combined action of large +'Masses' for a common purpose, and to put them into the fight, in a +thoroughly practical and not parade-ground fashion, unless good +observation, able leading, and circulation <span class="pagenum"><a id="page068" name="page068"></a>(p. 068)</span> of orders are +combined with two other most important factors:</p> + +<p>First comes the utmost possible independence of the subordinate +leaders, down to the limit of the Squadron Commander. Only when these +can help one out in cases where an order fails to arrive, or where the +circumstances compel a deviation from the letter of the order +received, or where these can only be indicated by word of mouth, +signs, bugle-calls, or even by riding in the required direction, can +there be any guarantee that all will combine intelligently for the +common purpose.</p> + +<p>This independence must never be allowed to degenerate into selfish +wilfulness; the actual situation, as encountered on the ground itself; +must never be considered from the subordinate's point of view only, +but rather must always be solved in the spirit of the original +conception formed in the Leader's mind.</p> + +<p>In the second place, the Leader requires tactical means and forms of +evolution which combine, with elementary simplicity and clearness, the +greatest possible degree of adaptability. Nowhere else so much as with +the Cavalry does the maxim hold good that 'In War only the simple +secures success.'<a id="footnotetag5" name="footnotetag5"></a><a href="#footnote5" title="Go to footnote 5"><span class="smaller">[5]</span></a></p> + +<p>The prescribed orders must not place a strain on the memory of the +Leader or troops, and must operate practically mechanically. Even the +most far-reaching movements should never require either detailed +instructions or commands.</p> + +<p>The application of the word of command should be limited to those +units which it can actually control—namely, the squadron.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page069" name="page069"></a>(p. 069)</span> The use of bugle-calls must be restricted to the utmost, and +only be permitted in circumstances where no possibility of +misunderstanding can arise—a danger not easily excluded where large +bodies are acting together.</p> + +<p>Even the use of signs can only be relied on in a limited degree. In +dust and closed country of course they cannot be seen.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, all movements depending on verbally transmitted +commands must be executed without loss of the spirit of uniformity.</p> + +<p>In practice this is the only form for the communication of orders +which can be depended on to act with any degree of certainty under all +circumstances.</p> + +<p>The Regulations must insure the possibility that, no matter under what +conditions, the unit can be formed without many words or commands into +the most diverse fighting formations in any required direction, either +from column of route, rendezvous formation, or even from the mêlée. +Fundamental principles of action against the different Arms must be +laid down so definitely that complicated orders in each particular +case will not be required.</p> + +<p>The rapid change from one fighting form to another must be absolutely +guaranteed, and equally so the possibility for each unit to assume +that formation in depth called for by the circumstances of the combat, +without recourse to complicated orders and movements.<a id="footnotetag6" name="footnotetag6"></a><a href="#footnote6" title="Go to footnote 6"><span class="smaller">[6]</span></a></p> + +<p>If these requirements are to be fulfilled, then only such elementary +movements must be prescribed and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page070" name="page070"></a>(p. 070)</span> regulated as can be +executed under all circumstances, as laid down in the Regulations.</p> + +<p>These matters being settled, then tactical regulations should lay down +no fixed evolutions, but should confine themselves essentially to +forms and principles of action, which should be treated with the +utmost clearness and precision.</p> + +<p>It is hardly necessary to adduce elaborate proof to show that our +existing Regulations by no means meet these requirements in all their +sections.</p> + +<p>Above all, the movements and deployments laid down for the Regiment +are far too formal, based too much on accurate intervals and fixed +prescriptions for the movements of the individual squadrons to be +suitable for use on the ground which Cavalry must nowadays be prepared +to traverse, or to be executed, exactly as laid down, in face of the +enemy. Such evolutions are only possible on the drill-ground, where +bugle-sounds and words of command can still be heard, and are far too +complicated for practical use.</p> + +<p>For instance, let us take the case of deployment to the front out of +any 'deep' formation—columns of fours, half troops, or the like, +which obviously cannot always be executed before the enemy precisely +in the manner prescribed, because all must depend on the space +available and the distance which separates us from the enemy. The head +of the column must suit its movements to these conditions, and in turn +the following sections must conform to the movements of the head; +greater freedom of choice must, therefore, be left to the latter.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, there are evolutions of the utmost importance +before the enemy for which the book gives no guidance +whatever—<i>e.g.</i>, the rapid passage from <span class="pagenum"><a id="page071" name="page071"></a>(p. 071)</span> the double column +into squadron columns, either to the front or flank.</p> + +<p>Even for the larger units all the prescriptions are by no means +adapted to the requirements of active service. For instance, the +relief of lines ('Treffen Wechsel') is an operation of no use except +on the drill-ground, and is never attempted even in manœuvres—at +least, personally I know no instance of its ever being tried, except +as a matter of drill.</p> + +<p>That a certain measure of justification may be found for this and +similar formations, I do not wish to dispute.</p> + +<p>They certainly possess great educational value as a means to the +acquisition of the requisite discipline and cohesion, and they are +also well adapted for movements beyond the danger zone, when it +becomes necessary to steady the troops by the most absolute insistence +on accuracy of movement and precision of drill; and that such cases do +arise no one who has had experience of War will for one moment +dispute.<a id="footnotetag7" name="footnotetag7"></a><a href="#footnote7" title="Go to footnote 7"><span class="smaller">[7]</span></a> Hence, even if one may hold the opinion that the same +purpose may be equally well served by less complicated means better +adapted to practical requirements, one can nevertheless subscribe +unconditionally to the soundness of the principle involved. But for +actual purposes of combat we require simpler forms and more freedom in +their application, and in so far as the Regulations tend towards this +end they show a very considerable degree of improvement; for the +squadron, Section 330 provides the necessary amount of independence, +and Sections 331 and 333 give sufficient freedom to the Regiment, +subject only to the limitations referred to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page072" name="page072"></a>(p. 072)</span> above. Section +346 in particular and Section 348 are also of fundamental importance +for the higher commands.<a id="footnotetag8" name="footnotetag8"></a><a href="#footnote8" title="Go to footnote 8"><span class="smaller">[8]</span></a> Indeed, I hold the former as the most +important concession contained in the whole book, for it practically +initiates a new phase in the whole course of our drill evolution, by +marking the commencement of the breach with the old doctrine of the +Three-Line system ('Drei Treffen Taktik'). It is true that it still +lays chief importance on this method, but it no longer regards it as +the one royal road to success. Thus we enter on a path on which the +Infantry already long ago preceded us, and which, <i>mutatis mutandis</i>, +offers also for the Cavalry similar great and undeniable advantages. +It is safe to predict that Section 346 will prove the starting-point, +by sheer pressure of natural conditions, of a fresh series of +development in our Cavalry Tactics.</p> + +<p>Thanks to these prescriptions, the Commander has now a free hand to +arrange his units (Brigades or Regiments) side by side, and to give +them the amount of depth that he considers necessary. Hence the +commands remain immeasurably more in the hands of their leaders than +was formerly the case—a point of particular importance on ground +where the view is restricted; and every unit Commander can also form +his own reserves, so that reinforcements from the rear will always +join their own Regiment (or Brigade), and thus the intermixture of the +different commands will be prevented as much as possible; and +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page073" name="page073"></a>(p. 073)</span> what a gain this will be towards rapid rallying after the +confusion of an encounter will be obvious to every reader.</p> + +<p>Finally, and perhaps this is of even greater importance, a far higher +measure of initiative will be given to the subordinate leaders than +was conceivable under the old scheme ('Treffen Taktik').</p> + +<p>These advantages can hardly be over-estimated. There remain, however, +yet two other directions in which this paragraph may lead to yet more +important consequences.</p> + +<p>In the first place, it secures for the Commander himself an immense +simplification of the whole mechanism he is called on to control—for +he has no longer to occupy his mind with the fundamental conception of +the 'Treffen'—<i>i.e.</i>, Three-Line System.<a id="footnotetag9" name="footnotetag9"></a><a href="#footnote9" title="Go to footnote 9"><span class="smaller">[9]</span></a></p> + +<p>The term 'Treffen' (Lines), in the true spirit of Frederick the +Great's day, defines the relation between a leading Line and one or +more following Lines, which succeed one another in due sequence. The +tactical evolution of the last few years has, however, led <span class="pagenum"><a id="page074" name="page074"></a>(p. 074)</span> +to this result—that this definition is no longer in harmony with the +modern conception attaching to the word 'Treffen.' According to the +existing regulations and practice, the second or third Line, or both +together, may just as well form the fighting Line as the one which is +momentarily called the first. The latter may equally be used for a +flank attack or, under a change of circumstances, form the Reserve.</p> + +<p>The supporting squadrons, as defined in the new Regulations, or the +second or third Line in the attack against Infantry or Artillery, are +nowadays the only ones to which the original conception of the +'Treffen' applies.</p> + +<p>Whilst at present the designation of particular Brigades, etc., as +first, second, or third 'Treffen' (Lines), has practically no bearing +on their use in action, but only assigns them a temporary place during +the particular manœuvre, we have had to invent, to express the +actual conception of the 'Treffen,' or Line—which, after all, one +cannot do without—all sorts of designations, such as supporting +squadrons, formations according to depth, waves, and so forth. Hence +the word 'Treffen' has introduced a complication which finds no +justification in the true spirit of the matter. These disadvantages, +of course, are least evident when the Division is brought into action +from a previous position of assembly; but they are very apparent +indeed when it is a question of uniting a Division which has +previously been acting in separate detachments upon the field of +battle itself. Then we come face to face with the difficulty—in fact, +almost impossibility—of adopting the modern idea of the 'Three +Lines.'</p> + +<p>On the line of march a Division is divided into <span class="pagenum"><a id="page075" name="page075"></a>(p. 075)</span> Advance +guard and Main body, and if moving on several roads, then into a +number of such constituent parts (two to each road). From this state +of subdivision there result a number of Tactical units which it is +practically impossible to fit into the 'Three-Line' formation without +incurring great loss of time, and possibly the loss of one's +opportunity. Hence, from the retention of this 'Three-Line' idea, we +arrive at a tactical dilemma which must react detrimentally on the +handling of the whole Arm, as long as the Leaders are compelled by +Regulations to assume their 'Three-Line formation' before they can +fight at all. It is from this contradiction that Section 346 releases +us.</p> + +<p>Of equal importance is a further possibility which the wording of the +same paragraph throws open to us. It allows, in fact, the Cavalry, no +matter in what tactical connection it may find itself, to fight always +in accordance with the same principles.</p> + +<p>As long as we adhered to the 'Three-Line system,' this, if not +impossible, was at least practically inexpedient, for the Regulations +took cognizance only of a Division composed of three Brigades of equal +strength, were founded on this idea, and did not allow of adaptation +to any other distribution of force which might have to be employed.</p> + +<p>It has already been pointed out in Chapter III. that they do not apply +to a Corps made up of several Divisions, and the same holds good of +Divisions of other than strictly normal composition. Everywhere, in +cases such as referred to above, the subdivision into Lines +('Treffen') in the spirit of the Regulations would very soon lead to +even worse disruption of the units than already happens with normal +Divisions of three Brigades. The want of proportion between the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page076" name="page076"></a>(p. 076)</span> number of the Lines and the columns from which they have to +be formed would be more glaring then than nowadays, when the number of +Brigades happen to be the same as the number of Lines; with the larger +units the difficulty of uniform speed and control would be a factor.</p> + +<p>Now, Section 346 helps us over all these difficulties by +disembarrassing us of all stereotyped formations based upon numbers +alone, and leaves the Commander free to choose in what proportion and +in what order he will divide and move these masses.</p> + +<p>Under modern conditions this latitude is indispensable, for the amount +of force to be applied depends on what is known about the enemy; but +the special shape the attack itself assumes, and more particularly its +breadth of front, will be determined by the width of front the enemy +opposes and the nature of the ground it has to move over; whilst as to +depth, this must be decided by our estimate of the quality of the +adversary's force, hence his shock power and the amount of his +possible reserves.</p> + +<p>The consideration of all these conditions may, in proportion to the +numbers in hand, lead us to employ whole Brigades, Divisions, Corps, +or portions of these units, arranged in the most varied succession to +one another. Whether we should attack by 'Wings' or by 'Lines' must +depend on the circumstances of the movement, the order in which the +troops reach the field, and the nature of the country to be traversed; +and generally the preference will have to be given to the 'Wing +Attack,' for the reasons we have above developed.</p> + +<p>This 'Wing Attack' will, therefore, always have to be employed when +time is available to form up the troops systematically for action, or +when the lines of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page077" name="page077"></a>(p. 077)</span> approach of the units lead naturally to +the adoption of the formation. 'Lines' only then, when it is +absolutely necessary to deliver an attack from column of route as +rapidly as possible, and hence the time is lacking for a more +systematic formation. Such cases can, for instance, arise in the +deployment at the issue of a defile, or in bringing up troops from +Assembly formation through the intervals of a crowded battle-field, or +under analogous conditions; but even in these cases a foreseeing +command will endeavour to facilitate the execution of the 'Wing +Attack' by the choice of some such formation as the 'double column,' +which admits of deployment to either hand.</p> + +<p>Thus we see that our Regulations at least give to the Leader the +possibility of choosing the best and most suitable formations for the +execution of his purpose, but the latter also must be sufficiently +master of his art to know which to select.</p> + +<p>Further, it is the duty of the Leader, in the case of mutual encounter +between manœuvring bodies of the Arm, to choose the momentarily +most favourable form of attack with reference to his own line of +approach. It is not easy to lay down in general terms in what manner +this can be best insured, for the circumstances of the operations +themselves and the nature of the ground are capable of influencing the +decision in too many ways. One can only lay down certain general +principles which may form a basis in the appreciation of each +situation as it happens to arise.</p> + +<p>In the first place, one must select one's own base of attack in such a +direction that the following blow will force the enemy to retire in +what will be for him the most disadvantageous direction, and, +conversely, for one's own purposes the best.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page078" name="page078"></a>(p. 078)</span> But, naturally, in making this choice the tactical advantages +or otherwise of the ground must not be overlooked or left to the +enemy, for the tactical victory is the necessary preliminary to +further results. Further, we should always endeavour to secure the +advantage of the 'outer lines' so as to act concentrically upon the +enemy. In this position, if beaten, his lines of retreat cross one +another, and to avoid this predicament he will be compelled to +endeavour to manœuvre across our front, always a most dangerous +undertaking.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, if our attack fails, we have still the advantage of +eccentric retreat, which compels the adversary to divide his forces, +and thus opens to us the opportunity of further tactical success if we +can concentrate our own men with sufficient rapidity, whilst at the +worst we run no risk of seeing our own troops entangled with one +another.</p> + +<p>It should be our constant endeavour to gain these positions on the +'outer lines' by previous strategical operations, in order to avoid +the danger of being compelled at the last moment to initiate wide +flanking movements in face of the enemy. Again, a further advantage +accrues if we can rest one flank on inaccessible or difficult ground. +This flank at least will be secure, so we can spare troops from it to +strengthen the other, and thus, perhaps, act with decisive effect.</p> + +<p>Finally, when it is presumable that we shall have to deal with +considerable numerical superiority, we should direct all our efforts +to throwing the whole weight of our charge against the enemy's flank, +so as to compel him at the last moment to change his front to meet the +blow. The opportunity for such action will arise in cases in which, +thanks to our previous <span class="pagenum"><a id="page079" name="page079"></a>(p. 079)</span> strategic direction, we can succeed +in uniting the mass of our forces more rapidly than our opponent is +able to do, and this may often be the case where the ground favours +our advance and conceals the direction of our march.</p> + +<p>Generally, it may be laid down that a simultaneous attack directed +against the enemy's front and flank is justified when we have the +advantage of a considerable numerical superiority, or when our +opponent retains for too long a faulty distribution of his forces; but +in all other cases a blow with united force against his flank will +give the most far-reaching consequences, as it brings immediate +pressure against the adversary's line of retreat, and compels him to +employ his own forces in succession, not in a concentrated effort. +Hence this form of attack gives the chance of a success even to a +force in a numerical minority, as it will often afford it the +opportunity of beating the enemy in detail, whereas against a +concentrated mass there would be no hope of success at all.</p> + +<p>It will be evident that for the execution of such an attack the forms +laid down in the Regulations to be observed in the transition from +rendezvous to attack formations are—one is almost tempted to +write—about as unfavourable as they well can be. It is true they +afford, as already pointed out, the possibility of presenting the same +fighting formation in succession to any required point of the compass, +an advantage which has no practical importance in warfare; but against +this they increase the difficulties of deployment for attack to the +front to the utmost. If it is necessary, for instance, to send the +first Line at the enemy's flank, because at the moment that happens to +be the shortest way, the front of one of the following <span class="pagenum"><a id="page080" name="page080"></a>(p. 080)</span> +Brigades is at once masked, and the latter hampered in its movements. +Or if it is desirable to employ one of the rearward Brigades for a +flank movement or any similar purposes, then either the leading 'Line' +must be checked until the others have gained the required position, or +it is certain that these latter will arrive too late to co-operate.</p> + +<p>Further, the forms prescribed by the Regulations render it more +difficult to make use of such assistance as the nature of the ground +may offer us.</p> + +<p>Plainly, it is very much more to our advantage in the conduct of +offensive operations to bring up those units which one has at one's +disposal—with the sole exception of a Reserve, which is not to be +kept too weak, at deploying intervals on the same alignment—in +formations which adapt themselves well to the ground, and insure rapid +deployment to the front, with the necessary depth in the supports +following. For this purpose I recommend primarily the 'double column' +either in Brigades or in Regiments.</p> + +<p>This arrangement of the troops satisfies all practical conditions, and +insures, above all, the possibility of bringing all forces +simultaneously into action, and of carrying out offensive flanking +operations; further, it makes it easier for the Commander to take +advantage of such support as the ground affords, and to mass his chief +strength on one wing; and, finally, it gives us the shortest line of +attack upon the enemy, and makes it easier to avoid the use of inner +lines. It unites thus all the advantages of the regulation 'Line' +('Treffen') formation, and avoids its many serious disadvantages; +hence it should be employed fundamentally wherever possible.</p> + +<p>Turning now to the employment of Cavalry on the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page081" name="page081"></a>(p. 081)</span> +battle-field, the first condition which has to be satisfied is to +assign to the 'Masses' their proper place in the line of battle. They +must not only be at hand when wanted, but also at the spot which +promises the most favourable tactical chances and the greatest +prospect of decisive results. Further, they must be able to recognise +the right moment to take part in the combat.</p> + +<p>With reference to the first point, I should, above all, like to call +attention to the writings of General von Schlichting.<a id="footnotetag10" name="footnotetag10"></a><a href="#footnote10" title="Go to footnote 10"><span class="smaller">[10]</span></a></p> + +<p>Theoretically, the Cavalry 'Mass' is best united on that wing of the +battle front which is not supported, but destined for further +manœuvres, hence on which the Arm will enjoy freedom of movement as +far as the ground allows. Naturally, it will not always be possible to +assign them such a place, but their position will result generally +from the course of the previous manœuvring.</p> + +<p>Either the Cavalry must clear the front of the Army in preparation for +the battle, in which case it is not always a matter of free choice in +which direction one has to clear off, nor can the Cavalry Commander +from his standpoint always determine which wing of the battle front +will have to manœuvre; or it must close in from a flank for the +decision, in which case the nearest wing is their natural destination. +But they must always endeavour—and here I differ from General von +Schlichting—to range themselves forwards and sidewards of their own +Army. It will only be in cases where it is necessary to keep them in +rear of the general alignment—as, for instance, it is proposed +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page082" name="page082"></a>(p. 082)</span> to use them as a last resort in the interests of the other +Arms, as at Mars la Tour—or where the battle front itself is broken +up by the nature of the ground or the grouping of the forces in such +manner that the whole engagement is divided into a series of +individual actions, as may often be the case in future Wars, that this +rule must be departed from.</p> + +<p>Such dispositions are always less favourable because they imply in a +certain degree defensive action, whereas when placed forward in the +framework of the battle the offensive element of the Arm finds its +fullest opportunity.</p> + +<p>That the desire to occupy such positions must not become stereotyped +goes without saying; it must always be conditioned by the general and +particular circumstances of the moment.</p> + +<p>The course of events may, indeed, require us to take up a position to +the flank and rear of the Army, but fundamentally, forwards and to the +flank, remains the most desirable disposition. In this position the +Cavalry 'Masses' are best prepared to act against the enemy's flank, +and can best combine the fire of their own Artillery concentrically +with that of the guns and Infantry of the main body without losing +their tactical connection, and thus divert the forces of the enemy +into eccentric operations. Here they occupy the most suitable position +to initiate without loss of time a parallel pursuit of the enemy, or +to counter his attempts at pursuit; and here also they are best placed +to accept the inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry.</p> + +<p>General von Schlichting considers these combats as generally +superfluous—a kind of family concern which affects the rival +Cavalries only—having no <span class="pagenum"><a id="page083" name="page083"></a>(p. 083)</span> connection with the ultimate +decision between the two armies.<a id="footnotetag11" name="footnotetag11"></a><a href="#footnote11" title="Go to footnote 11"><span class="smaller">[11]</span></a></p> + +<p>I cannot share this opinion, which seems to me to be based mainly on +peace-time experiences, in which the opposing Cavalry forces generally +neutralize one another. In actual War, however, victory more usually +opens the path to other and proportionately more far-reaching results. +I hold, therefore, not only that such Cavalry duels are essential, but +that the opportunity for engaging in them should be sought out from +the first; for it is only the defeat of the enemy's horse which can +open the door for further successful action against his other troops; +otherwise the two Cavalries mutually paralyze one another, as at Mars +la Tour.</p> + +<p>If in practice it has often happened that this Cavalry deadlock has +supervened, and the result of their encounter has remained unimportant +on the decision of the day, this result, in my opinion, has always +been due to a reluctance on one or the other sides to press the combat +to its utmost limitations, as in the above-mentioned instance of Mars +la Tour, or because the victorious side has retained neither force nor +cohesion sufficient to act against the enemy's flanks, as at Chotusitz +and at Prague.</p> + +<p>Matters, however, will be very different when the Cavalry is really +adequate to its duties—when it not only beats the enemy out of the +field, but remains, as at Roszbach and Soor, fit for further efforts +in pursuit.</p> + +<p>To reach this ideal we must strain every fibre of our being, and never +rest satisfied, as on the plateau <span class="pagenum"><a id="page084" name="page084"></a>(p. 084)</span> of Ville sur Yron (Mars la +Tour), with half results as long as a single trooper remains fit to +gallop and handle his lance. The last man and the last breath of his +horse must be risked, and he who is not willing to stake his soul is +no true 'Cavalry Soldier.'</p> + +<p>If we have successfully achieved this first result—<i>i.e.</i>, victory +over the enemy's horsemen—then the next step is to secure rapid +rallying and the pursuit of the beaten enemy till they are finally +driven from the field; and whilst detachments follow up, the main +force of our Cavalry must wheel in upon the flank and rear of the +enemy's Army, ready to act with all vigour and determination to bring +about the final decision when and where the opportunity offers.</p> + +<p>That we failed in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 to obtain this +crowning purpose of the Arm is no evidence in itself that the ideal is +inaccessible, only proof that neither our training nor comprehension +of our duties was on a level with the requirements of the time.</p> + +<p>It is certainly possible that our opponent may seek to withdraw his +horsemen from the Duel to save their strength for the protection of +his threatened flanks; but the consideration remains that by such +conduct he voluntarily renounces the best sphere of his own +activity—a degree of renunciation on his part hardly to be +expected—and precisely because its action to avert defeat may prove +of essential consequence, it is our part, in accordance with the +offensive spirit of the Arm, to seek him out and destroy his forces +before such opportunity arrives.</p> + +<p>For this purpose, again, the position to the front and flank is most +suitable. The constant threat upon the enemy's communications it +implies cannot be disregarded, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page085" name="page085"></a>(p. 085)</span> and will compel him to find +means to rid himself of such embarrassment.</p> + +<p>Having, therefore, made it clear where the Cavalry should seek its +position on the battle-field, the next step is to settle how it should +be formed. In this direction General von Schlichting has reached the +most practicable solution in laying down that a position in which each +Division retains full space for deployment and room to manœuvre for +the common purpose is theoretically the ideal, and this would still +apply to Divisions united to form a Corps.</p> + +<p>It is, indeed, evident that it is far easier to unite troops for +action towards the front than, under the circumstances of the +battle-field, to deploy them outwards from a common centre. This +latter operation will be all the more difficult in proportion as the +troops themselves have been brought forward to the front to meet a +coming crisis. The danger then is ever present that, by the necessity +of gaining room for deployment,<a id="footnotetag12" name="footnotetag12"></a><a href="#footnote12" title="Go to footnote 12"><span class="smaller">[12]</span></a> the opportunity to strike will be +lost, or that the endeavour to seize the opportunity will lead to the +troops being put in without order and in confusion.</p> + +<p>The fundamental principle, therefore, follows that troops, whether +Corps, Divisions, or Brigades, should be grouped on the battle-field, +preserving always their full deploying intervals.</p> + +<p>Of course, local conditions must be taken into account, above all +things the necessity of finding cover both from view and fire in the +shape of the ground. In practice, therefore, it is only the actual +facts as one finds them which can decide as to the best formation to +be assumed, but it must always be of advantage to be perfectly clear +in one's own <span class="pagenum"><a id="page086" name="page086"></a>(p. 086)</span> mind as to which disposition to adopt and the +consequences which must follow from one's choice.</p> + +<p>The chief difficulty always remains—viz., the chance of seizing the +opportunity. In the Battle of Mars la Tour our Cavalry failed to solve +the problem, and in the subsequent course of the War—particularly +against the forces of the Republic—it might often have obtained far +better results had it possessed a clearer conception of its mission +and better tactical training, as, for instance, in the action at +Coulmiers, where we missed a grand opportunity.</p> + +<p>The more difficult it becomes, with every increment in the range of +firearms, to recognise our opportunities, the more essential is it +that we should take the field with a thorough knowledge of our +tactical power and its limitations, and it is above all things +necessary that we should keep well up to the front, and not shirk even +<i>heavy punishment</i> if by so doing we can best secure opportunities for +great results.</p> + +<p>If this end is to be obtained, then every Cavalry Commander requires +to have a complete grasp of the nature of the Infantry combat. He must +be able to estimate with as equal certainty as an Infantry General the +general course of an engagement, the consumption of reserves, and the +gradual moral degradation of the enemy's foot soldiers.</p> + +<p>At any moment he must be able to grasp in his mind the whole balance +of forces in conflict on any point of the battle-field, so as to be +able to decide whether the employment of his own command at any +particular point and time is justified by the general situation of +affairs.</p> + +<p>It is, and always must be, the moments of great crises which give the +Cavalry the best opportunities.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page087" name="page087"></a>(p. 087)</span> Since attempts to ride through the zone controlled and swept +by effective Infantry fire may be looked on as synonymous with +self-destruction, only such moments must be chosen for a charge during +which the enemy is prevented from bringing his full fire power to bear +against the assailants. These, however, only occur—except always +where the nature of the ground allows of a thorough surprise +action—when the moral disintegration of the enemy's Infantry is such +that, under the impression of the threatening Cavalry attack, they are +no longer under control, or when they are so completely taken up with +their own fire action that it is impossible for them to concern +themselves with the coming danger. Where such opportunities arise they +must be seized with lightning-like decision and be exploited with the +utmost energy. On the other hand, one should never allow one's self to +be induced to undertake charges in which the probable losses bear no +reasonable proportion to the possible results. Such conduct could only +lead to the purposeless sacrifice of men and horses, just as happened +to the French Cavalry at Woerth and Sedan.</p> + +<p>We can always take as an example the wise restraint exercised by von +Seidlitz at Zorndorf, who, in spite of the Royal Command, refused to +attack because he did not consider that the right moment had arrived.</p> + +<p>The Leader must always keep before his eyes the demands which either +pursuit or retreat may make on his horses. One should never sacrifice, +to secure results of secondary consideration, means that can be used +to better purposes at other times and other places, for the calls +which may be made upon Cavalry after the battle are quite exceptional +in their nature.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page088" name="page088"></a>(p. 088)</span> When, after long marches, hours of fighting, and heavy +losses, the exhausted victor bivouacs on the hard-won field, when the +day is drawing to its close and the shadows are spreading far across +the pastures, then the real work of the Cavalry begins; then, without +drawing rein, the horsemen must press forward to intercept the enemy's +retreat, attack him anywhere where he least expects it, and harry him +to utter exhaustion and dispersal (see Book I., Chap. IV., 1.4); or it +must, under the difficult conditions of a retreat at night, sacrifice +itself in charges or in protracted fire action in every direction in +which the pursuing Army can threaten danger to the retreating columns. +In such situations they must be prepared to hold suitable positions by +the hour, without thought for their own retreat, without any knowledge +of the general situation, and without any connection with the +remainder of their forces. Threatened in flank and rear, and yet +unshaken by the general collapse, by the flight and panic of their +comrades, they must hold their own, relying on their own strength and +self-reliance. These are the conditions which make the highest demands +both on the material and moral excellence of the men, as well as on +the indomitable energy and skill of the Cavalry Leader, and to few +mortals is it given to prove equal to such contingencies; hence one +must prepare one's self beforehand for such situations.</p> + +<p>Primarily one must remember to give opportunities to both men and +horses to feed, water, and rest even during the progress of the +battle. One must endeavour, even while the fight is still raging, to +become perfectly clear in one's own mind as to the possible lines of +retreat, and the probable ulterior operations. One <span class="pagenum"><a id="page089" name="page089"></a>(p. 089)</span> must try +to impress upon one's memory the lie of the roads according to the +map, and the important defiles and positions which might be favourable +either to pursuit or retreat, in order to be able to act at the right +moment, without loss of time or hesitation, in full cognizance of the +circumstances of the case. <i>Nothing helps a decision more than a +complete intellectual command of the situation.</i></p> + +<p>Hence we see that the leading of Cavalry has been rendered +immeasurably more difficult by a whole series of external +considerations, as we have shown at the beginning of the chapter; that +at every moment the highest demands will be made on the intellectual +perception, the boldness and strength of character of the Leader, if +on the battle-field of the future he is to handle the Arm with any +prospect of success; and that the best Cavalry under modern +circumstances must fail if their Leaders prove unequal to their task.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page090" name="page090"></a>(p. 090)</span> CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<p class="title">TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS</p> + + +<p>If, in the shock between mounted men, the genius of the Leader is the +principal factor of success, nevertheless, the successful conduct of a +dismounted combat and of all the variations this form of action may +assume make almost equal demands upon his capacity. For the timely +recognition of opportunities which can only be turned to account by +recourse to fire power, the transition from one form of action to +another, the skilful and systematic arrangement of a dismounted +engagement, require such a complete command of the situation and such +certainty of military judgment and decision of character that the +combination will be almost as rarely found.</p> + +<p>Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between fire +power and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow the +troops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence of the +Cavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of some great +strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain +by united fire action some common purpose, implies a balance of +judgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest occurrence in normal +natures.</p> + +<p>The essential point which differentiates the action <span class="pagenum"><a id="page091" name="page091"></a>(p. 091)</span> of +Cavalry fighting on foot and of Infantry engaged in the same operation +is the dependence of the former on their horses; and to arrange that +under all circumstances of the combat the relation of the men on foot +to their means of locomotion shall be suitably maintained is at once +the most important and the most difficult task that falls to the lot +of the Leader.</p> + +<p>Primarily we have to decide whether we intend to fight with mobile or +immobile horses,<a id="footnotetag13" name="footnotetag13"></a><a href="#footnote13" title="Go to footnote 13"><span class="smaller">[13]</span></a> and in every case the question arises how the +conditions of the moment, whether in attack or defence, can best be +dealt with.</p> + +<p>Turning first to the attack, as the most important form of action, +consideration leads to the following conclusions: If the advance is +made with 'mobile' detachments, then in case of success the horses can +be led forward after us. It is then easy to remount, and continue the +prosecution of our ultimate purpose. If, on the other hand, we fight +with 'immobile' detachments, one cannot at once pursue one's successes +with the same body of troops with which such success has been won. +Either the position which has been captured must be retained for some +considerable period, or we must go back to where the horses were left, +at the cost of considerable loss of time, and at the risk of +intervening circumstances robbing us of further opportunity. Neither +operation commends itself to the true Cavalry spirit.</p> + +<p>On the whole, in attack the difficulty is best met by working with +'mobile' detachments, and the requisite number of rifles in the +fighting line can <span class="pagenum"><a id="page092" name="page092"></a>(p. 092)</span> then be provided by dismounting men from a +larger number of units—Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades.</p> + +<p>From this principle one should only deviate when, owing to the +proximity of the enemy's Cavalry or other circumstances, it is +absolutely indispensable to keep a strong mounted reserve at hand, or +when it can be foreseen that the number of rifles available, if the +'mobile' form is preferred, will obviously not be sufficient for the +appointed task; for it must never be forgotten that the rapid +attainment of fire superiority must be striven for under all +circumstances.</p> + +<p>If we turn to the consideration of the Defensive, our conclusion must +be the exact converse.</p> + +<p>The maintenance of fire superiority now becomes the primary objective, +and since, in case of success, a general advance is precluded by the +very conditions which compelled us to adopt the defensive rôle in the +first instance, and further, owing to the conditions which surround a +defensive combat generally, particularly the nature of the ground, it +is usually practicable to bring the led horses closer up to the firing +line, which remains stationary, and does not, as in the attack, +constantly increase the distance between the two, it will be wiser to +adopt the 'immobile' detachment as a fundamental proposition.</p> + +<p>This gives us the further advantage of being able to retain a larger +mounted reserve in hand for the initiation of a possible pursuit, and +one should only depart from this principle when special circumstances +make it appear desirable to advance rapidly after the decision of the +fire fight, and the ground compels us to leave the led horses far +behind the actual shooting line of the position.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page093" name="page093"></a>(p. 093)</span> Next to this question of 'mobile' or 'immobile' detachments, +the Commander must decide how far away from the actual field of action +he should dismount his men.</p> + +<p>Fundamentally, the idea must hold good that one must ride up as close +as possible to the line to be held or the position from whence the +advance is to be made; and the limit to the mounted approach is only +set by the necessity of retaining cover, at least from sight, for the +led horses, and time enough, in the event of failure, to insure that +the men can remount before fire can be brought upon them, even from a +distance. The possibilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fire +of Artillery must not be left out of consideration altogether in the +solution of this question.</p> + +<p>Hence, it can only happen very rarely, and then only under +exceptionally favourable topographical conditions, that a suitable +position for the led horses can be found in immediate proximity to the +actual line of action.</p> + +<p>We may, however, be less particular when, in fairly favourable +country, it is advisable to engage, without the intention of courting +a decision, our object being only to annoy the enemy by sudden fire, +disappearing again as soon as he retaliates, or when one is reasonably +certain of success, as against inferior or badly shaken troops.</p> + +<p>But when such favourable conditions are not present, and a tactical +repulse is always possible, then the place for the led horses can only +be found so far to the rear that the enemy cannot take us under fire +whilst in the act of remounting, and circumstances render it +improbable that this emergency can arise <span class="pagenum"><a id="page094" name="page094"></a>(p. 094)</span> before we have +succeeded in breaking off fighting contact with the enemy.</p> + +<p>The Commander, therefore, who decides to undertake a serious fire +action must be perfectly clear in his own mind that by the act of +dismounting he has severed his connection with his horses for a very +considerable time; for if the enemy's resistance proves more obstinate +than originally anticipated, and it becomes clear that the original +purpose is not to be attained with the available means, the +expectation that after once engaging the enemy the fight can be broken +off and the horses remounted will in most cases prove entirely +illusory.</p> + +<p>Since this operation of discontinuing a fire combat is most difficult +to carry through, even for Infantry, the dangers are immensely greater +for mounted men, owing to the added complication of their led horses. +Only the passivity of the enemy, or unusually favourable topographical +conditions, as in South Africa, can alter the general soundness of +this conclusion; and it is entirely impracticable to escape these +consequences by any attempt to lay down a limit and distance beyond +which the fight is not to be prosecuted, in the hope that by so doing +we can safely break off a combat once commenced. Generally it must be +accepted, as laid down in Cavalry Regulations, Sections 362 and 364, +that a fire action once accepted must be carried out to the end, +unless the arrival of fresh troops on the flanks makes its +interruption possible.</p> + +<p>One must never, therefore, in reliance on this possibility of +withdrawal, allow one's self to be led into the mistake of keeping the +led horses too close at hand; but the resolution to engage in a +dismounted action must always involve measures which fully recognise +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page095" name="page095"></a>(p. 095)</span> the serious possibilities such decision entails, and must be +on a scale which will insure the necessary vigour of execution.</p> + +<p>Hence, since in all cases in which a serious dismounted combat is +absolutely necessary it is essential that the horses should be left in +the greatest attainable security, the place for them should be +selected in such a manner that they are protected against possible +turning movements by the enemy—that is to say, behind suitable +shelter provided by the ground, or behind defiles that can be easily +defended. In cases in which these conditions cannot be complied with, +which in practice will often arise, their security must be provided +for by a sufficient reserve of mounted men, particularly when the +enemy's Cavalry is in the vicinity, for 'immobile' detachments are +practically at the mercy of every mounted patrol; and as a further +precaution it will be well to spread around them a sufficient web of +reconnoitring and security patrols, and to arrange for the support of +one's own batteries.</p> + +<p>The covering of the led horses, however, is not the only duty of the +mounted reserve: the protection of the Artillery also devolves upon +it, and generally it must be ready to meet any of the demands for +which Reserves are usually set aside. Hence it will have to provide +not only for the safety of its own side and all pertaining thereto, +but it must also threaten the enemy's flanks, undertake turning +movements, reinforce, if necessary, the fighting lines, pursue the +enemy, or cover the possible withdrawal of its own dismounted +combatants; and, further on the offensive, it is its special mission +to hold the conquered ground when the dismounted detachments are +called off to remount, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page096" name="page096"></a>(p. 096)</span> and to continue to carry on the +original mission, interrupted by the combat, until relieved by the men +who in the meanwhile have regained their horses, and again assumed the +rôle of mounted combatants.</p> + +<p>The first point the Commander will therefore have to decide is, how +strong it will be necessary to make his mounted reserve if it is to +suffice to meet all these requirements, and then whether, with the +remainder of the men in hand, he has any prospect of successfully +carrying out his immediate purpose. From this it will depend whether +he determines to fight or to reach his object by other means. In +general, the Reserve can be reduced in proportion to the weakness of +the enemy's Cavalry, and to the depth of the zone of security his +patrols have been able to secure for him.</p> + +<p>Having by this line of reasoning determined the number of men he can +afford to employ on foot, he must next make up his mind as to their +tactical distribution.</p> + +<p>In this case there can be no doubt that the method of employment by +'Wings' must commend itself even more than in cases involving only +mounted combat, for, quite apart from all the many admitted advantages +of this form, in no other way is it possible to guarantee that the +dismounted men can safely and rapidly regain their horses.</p> + +<p>The 'Line' system would involve endless confusion and loss of time in +sorting them out amongst their respective commands.</p> + +<p>As regards the general considerations of width of front and depth, the +same principles apply as in the case of Infantry. In the defence to +gain time is the main object, and the problem to be solved is to +secure <span class="pagenum"><a id="page097" name="page097"></a>(p. 097)</span> at one and the same moment both fire superiority and +a sufficient reserve to meet all possible emergencies. A skilful +utilization of the ground, previous ascertainment of the ranges, ample +ammunition and sound fire discipline, will, as with the Infantry, be +the best means of attaining one's object.</p> + +<p>Special conditions only arise in the defence of villages where the +horses can be brought under cover close to the men, and here it seems +to be necessary to distinguish between several possibilities, all of +which require different treatment.</p> + +<p>If the place is to be obstinately defended, then the horses must be +kept on the side away from the enemy, or in the centre of the +buildings, the defence of the boundaries be suitably arranged, and the +men told off to their several sections. The exits must be barricaded, +and the approaches entangled with wire.</p> + +<p>A strong inlying piquet, to act eventually as a reserve, must be +placed in a central position.</p> + +<p>If, however, the place is to be given up when seriously attacked, and +resistance is only to be sufficient to cover withdrawal, then the +horses should be kept saddled up in the stables, etc., and +arrangements made to withdraw them rapidly without exciting attention.</p> + +<p>In the first case, as against Infantry or mounted Cavalry only, one +can count on holding one's own without serious losses for a +considerable time; but the matter becomes very different if the +enemy's Artillery is also to be reckoned with, for modern shell fire +will soon involve the destruction of all the horses, and one must be +prepared to find retreat practically impossible once one has allowed +one's self to be committed to an engagement of this nature. Hence such +positions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page098" name="page098"></a>(p. 098)</span> should only be occupied and defended when it is +safe to count on support from following troops, or when it is +improbable that the enemy will be able to bring Artillery into action. +Such situations may frequently arise in the advanced lines of a +concentration zone, in which the villages nearest the enemy form part +of the general system of security.</p> + +<p>In all other cases, and particularly as regards the advanced +squadrons, it will be better to take up 'Alarm' quarters, and the more +unexpectedly the enemy can attack us the more stringent must be the +precautions we adopt.</p> + +<p>If we decide to retire, a portion of the men will be detached to take +the horses out of the village, or to have them drawn up in readiness +for mounting behind the position selected, and meanwhile the remainder +of the garrison must compensate for their diminution in numbers by a +greater expenditure of ammunition, thus holding the enemy till all is +ready, and then slipping rapidly back to their horses. Without +losses—amounting, perhaps, to the sacrifice of the last covering +party—such withdrawal can hardly hope to succeed; but previous +systematic arrangements give the best chance of success, and the same +prevision will be equally necessary, even if the place is to be held +at all costs, for the situation may always change, and a retreat +become advisable.</p> + +<p>At night, however, the aspect of affairs changes; then any attempt at +withdrawal is to be deprecated, and, as a matter of principle, must +not be contemplated. Even if the enemy breaks into the place by +surprise, it is still better to fight him on the spot rather than to +risk the certain destruction of the whole detachment by retreat. A +successful resistance is in such cases <span class="pagenum"><a id="page099" name="page099"></a>(p. 099)</span> all the more +probable, since in the darkness the use of the enemy's Artillery is +practically precluded—at any rate, can attain but little result. Only +the squadrons far out in advance, and thus liable to be surrounded on +all sides and captured before help can arrive, will have to be +prepared for a night withdrawal before the assailants can close in +around them.</p> + +<p>As to the principles to be observed in such cases, there should be no +room for doubt. Everyone should know what he has to do when the case +arises.</p> + +<p>Turning now to the consideration of the conduct to be observed in +attack, it is clear that here also the same fundamental ideas apply as +with the Infantry. Dismounted Cavalry must be prepared to work their +way up to decisive distances, to break down from this limit the +enemy's resistance, and finally to carry the position by storm. Hence +the fighting line has need of constant reinforcements to give the +necessary forward impulse, and hence we require the same distribution +in regard to 'depth.'</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to adopt on this point any +stereotyped formation. It must not be overlooked that the essence of +such Cavalry attacks is rapidity of execution. Hence in all cases +where this necessity for rapidity arises the endeavour must be made to +bring from the very first as many rifles into the firing line as +possible, and it follows that the greater the fire power thus obtained +the less the need for subsequent reinforcement.</p> + +<p>If we try to picture to ourselves the conditions under which these +dismounted Cavalry attacks can occur, it is evident that only in the +most unusual instances will the necessity arise of launching them +against wide fronts of dense lines of unbroken Infantry; on the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page100" name="page100"></a>(p. 100)</span> other hand, we shall often be called upon to capture +isolated villages, etc., such as posts on the line of communication, +railway-stations, and important defiles, and in all such cases it will +always be possible to combine attacks simultaneously against both +flanks, front and rear. Thanks to its mobility, the Cavalry is +exceptionally well suited to the performance of such undertakings, +because it can combine both attack and surprise to the best advantage.</p> + +<p>If, thanks to this possibility, it is practicable to diminish the +weight of the front attack, it follows, again, that less +depth—<i>i.e.</i>, fewer successive reinforcements—will require to be +provided; but these can only be suppressed altogether when the object +aimed at does not imply the actual maintenance of the position to be +assaulted, but our purpose is only to reach a point from whence to +overwhelm the enemy with fire, previous to riding him down by our +closed squadrons, or to break off the action again and retire as soon +as a counter-attack develops. These are cases which will often present +themselves: either when in pursuit it is desirable to strike +unexpectedly at the enemy's columns, or during a battle, when it is +feasible to molest and disturb his reserves.</p> + +<p>In the above paragraphs I have put together the chief points to be +considered in the action of dismounted Cavalry when acting +unsupported; it remains now to consider the rôle assigned to the Horse +Artillery allotted to it, if only to bring out those parts which, in +my opinion, lie beyond its proper field.</p> + +<p>If we admit that in general, as between two great Cavalry masses in +actual collision, the guns can play an important part, I must yet +insist that the measure of this importance should not be overdrawn; +for it is <span class="pagenum"><a id="page101" name="page101"></a>(p. 101)</span> only when the former are confined to a defensive +attitude—for instance, when they are still under cover or behind +sheltering folds of the ground, or when moving in a widely-extended +screen to mislead the enemy and tempt him into fire-swept ground, in +order to fall upon him when he has ventured into the trap—that much +is to be expected from their co-operation.</p> + +<p>But as soon as the Cavalry begins to advance, the part the Artillery +has to play drops into the background. Then the guns become simply an +impediment, because, since they generally require a special escort, +they subtract from the total force available for the actual shock, and +always act more or less as a pivot, which hampers the free movement of +the Cavalry.</p> + +<p>On the contrary, the Cavalry must never allow itself to be influenced +in its movements by the position of its own Artillery. The latter must +adapt itself unconditionally to the movements of the former, and must +endeavour to conform to its evolutions, so as not only to co-operate +with it, but, if possible, to dispense with a special escort.</p> + +<p>It must, therefore, be the endeavour of the Artillery to keep well out +in front of the Cavalry, so as to take the enemy under fire, and +anticipate his batteries by coming into action first. The latter is a +most important point, for it is the essential duty of the enemy's +gunners to divert and beat down the fire which we endeavour to bring +against their horsemen.</p> + +<p>If we can only succeed in unlimbering first, they are bound to accept +the law from us, and are thereby prevented either of availing +themselves of the advantages of the ground or of conforming to the +tactical intentions of their Leader.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page102" name="page102"></a>(p. 102)</span> The best position for Artillery must always be behind some +sheltering roll of the ground, where it requires none, or at the most +a weak, escort; and this desideratum will be best fulfilled when it is +on the inner—that is, the supported—flank of its Cavalry, because in +this position it can presumably remain in action longest, and hampers +the movements of its own force least. Similarly, in pursuit or in +covering a retreat its sphere of activity is distinctly limited. Its +action can only then become effective when the actual tactical +pursuit—<i>i.e.</i>, with cold steel—ceases, the combatants have +disentangled themselves, and the strategic pursuit sets in.</p> + +<p>The mobility of the target must naturally influence the fire effect to +be expected from the guns, as it increases the difficulty of +'ranging,' and limits the possible duration of action to a few +moments.</p> + +<p>The batteries will only then be able to turn their fire on the enemy's +Cavalry when the latter show themselves in considerable masses moving +at the slower paces. But when the Cavalry sweep forward at full speed, +the most they can do will be to take some stretch of ground through +which the opposing Cavalry must pass, and on which there is still time +to range, and then turn on shrapnel fire to its utmost intensity.</p> + +<p>But even for this the opportunity will only then arise when either our +own Cavalry holds back, the enemy's Artillery does not require our +full attention and fire power, or, finally, if our own guns are not +attacked by the enemy's Cavalry.</p> + +<p>In view of all these considerations, it follows that it is impossible +to assign a decisive importance to the participation of a few Horse +Batteries in the actual shock of the opposing squadrons. Nevertheless, +one <span class="pagenum"><a id="page103" name="page103"></a>(p. 103)</span> should always do one's best to use to the utmost such +Artillery power as is available, and particularly if there is any +doubt as to the strength of the enemy, and we have reason to suspect +that he possesses a marked numerical superiority.</p> + +<p>The chief rôle of the Artillery must always remain the support of +dismounted action of Cavalry in attack and defence; in the battle, +protected by their own horsemen, to strike against the enemy's flank +and rear, shell his columns on the march, to drive him out of +weakly-defended places or defiles, and in all similar circumstances, +such as war always develops afresh, to inflict upon him the utmost +possible damage.</p> + +<p>In all these cases the batteries can choose their own positions and +the nature of their fire with absolute freedom, according to the +fundamental principles of their own Arm; they have time to pick up +their own range, and to insure results by the duration of their +action.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page104" name="page104"></a>(p. 104)</span> CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<p class="title">STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY</p> + + +<p>The attempt has often been made to advance formal principles and rules +for the strategical, as well as tactical employment of the Arm, which +will give a more or less safe foundation on which to base the grouping +and employment of the available forces.</p> + +<p>Some regard a Cavalry Division as normally deployed when two brigades +march on separate roads in first line, with the third following behind +the centre in Reserve. Others want to see all brigades on one front, +side by side; whilst yet others wish to see two brigades on one road, +whilst the third pursues the same objective on a country lane.</p> + +<p>Even our Cavalry Regulations—which on this subject actually ventures +to trespass on strategical ground—lays down (see Section 318) that +'in Reconnaissance the mass of the Division must be kept together +until the enemy's Cavalry has been beaten out of the field.'</p> + +<p>I hold all these attempts which only hamper the free strategic +employment of the Arm as not only mistaken, but contrary to the very +essence of our being, and for the same reason I hold them even to be +detrimental, because they are calculated to produce thoroughly false +views as to the conditions and demands with which in practical +warfare we are confronted. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page105" name="page105"></a>(p. 105)</span> All these regulations fall to the +ground the moment they have to be applied to strategical units of +variable dimensions. Further, as I have developed above, the tasks +which may fall to us are of such different natures that they cannot +possibly be all solved by the same formulae.</p> + +<p>The strength of the enemy must naturally exercise decisive importance +on the whole character of our action and the distribution of our +forces. The lie of the roads and the nature of the country also +exercise their influence on our decision.</p> + +<p>To this must be added the fact that, in view of the many strategical +necessities of a great Army, the Headquarters cannot always be in a +position to allot to the Cavalry a clearly-defined task either of +reconnaissance or security, attack or defence; thus higher +considerations may prevent the massing of the Cavalry on a single road +or any other similar simple distribution. More often than not one will +have to suggest the simultaneous attainment of the most varied +objectives, and the Cavalry Leader will be lucky if he is not called +upon to solve problems of the most heterogeneous nature, things which +in their execution mutually exclude one another.</p> + +<p>Hence one can only lay down the most general principles to govern the +strategical employment of the Arm, and to meet this difficulty it +becomes all the more important to develop the capacity for endurance +of the troops to the utmost, so that they can successfully deal with +these many variable demands.</p> + +<p>As to how far the independent Cavalry should be thrust out in front of +the following columns of the Army, all that can be laid down is, that +the wider the fronts and the deeper the Army—hence the longer time +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page106" name="page106"></a>(p. 106)</span> the Army will take to deploy, concentrate, change its +position, or execute any similar operation depending on the reports of +the Cavalry—the further that Cavalry must gain ground to the front.</p> + +<p>As to the principles governing the formal arrangement of the troops in +contradiction to all attempts to lay down stereotyped formations, all +that can be said is that every strategical operation, if for no other +reason than to allow of reconnaissance and secure safety, requires a +certain extension in breadth; but the combat itself demands +concentration.</p> + +<p>It follows from the above that the Cavalry Commander must in every +initial case weigh in his own mind how much the existing circumstances +may allow him to extend, and, on the other hand, how closely they +compel him to keep concentrated, and he will only be able to reconcile +the dilemma when he is actually clear in his own mind as to the +tactical and strategical results his conduct in either case will +involve.</p> + +<p>If the essence of his duty is to secure and to screen, then, as stated +above, extension and subdivision of his command naturally follows. But +one must keep clearly before one's own eyes that any concentration for +a combat jeopardizes the performances of these tasks, for the +concentration for combat necessitates the uncovering of the front, +which it is the very object of the enemy to bring about and take +advantage of. Further, the wider the front, the less becomes the +possibility of timely tactical concentration; hence, under such +conditions, one would generally have to renounce the temptation to +engage in combat with a positive object, and content one's self with +keeping the enemy at a distance, for this purpose availing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page107" name="page107"></a>(p. 107)</span> +one's self to the utmost of the advantages the ground may confer, and +such support as the reinforced Horse Artillery and mobile Infantry (in +vehicles) can afford.</p> + +<p>When the width of extension becomes very great it will be an absolute +mistake to keep back reserves, since by doing so the actual front is +weakened, whilst there is no guarantee that the reserve can arrive in +time at the threatened point.</p> + +<p>Further, the wider the front becomes, the greater the difficulty of +strategical change of direction.</p> + +<p>A similar extension of front as that above indicated in this resume of +'Security' duties may also become advisable when engaged on +'Reconnaissance'—for instance, when lengthy obstacles, such as +watercourses, mountains, etc., only traversable at bridges, dams, or +defiles, have to be surmounted.</p> + +<p>In such cases, especially when resistance is to be anticipated, it +will rarely be possible to count on being able to surmount the +obstacle in one single column, since even unimportant forces under +such circumstances can oppose a very protracted defence, and +neutralize a large numerical superiority. When these difficulties are +met with, it will be necessary even in reconnaissance to divide one's +force into several columns, as then there is always the chance of +successfully piercing the enemy's front at some one point, and thence +rolling up his resistance all along the line.</p> + +<p>Even in open country conditions may be encountered that render the +subdivision of one's forces over a considerable extent of front +desirable—<i>i.e.</i>, when it is necessary to find the enemy, and fix the +fact of his presence in certain specific districts. As an example, +the conduct of the Cavalry after the Battle of Gravelotte <span class="pagenum"><a id="page108" name="page108"></a>(p. 108)</span> +(August 18, 1870), when it became imperative to ascertain whether +MacMahon's Army was marching to the north-eastward or not.</p> + +<p>Here it was indispensable to sweep out a wide area. To attempt such +tasks with patrols alone is unadvisable, for these always require a +certain tactical support behind them, by which they can be either +reinforced or relieved.</p> + +<p>Still, the point must never be lost sight of, that, since the enemy +will also seek to screen his operations, a decisive collision may +become necessary at any moment to tear his screen asunder. Hence it +will be better, in opposition to the principles laid down for +'security' only, to keep one's principal force in groups or masses, +possessing considerable striking force, and to march in such manner +that a certain degree of concentration is always attainable while +meeting the necessity for extension in breadth by smaller +reconnoitring patrols.</p> + +<p>Against an opponent whose general whereabouts has been ascertained, +whom one is determined at any price to beat, in order then to +reconnoitre, one's troops must be kept in hand, so that their complete +concentration is assured in all cases, and only to divide them to the +degree rendered indispensable by the general direction of the roads +and the nature of the ground to be traversed. The same conditions also +hold good where surprise is the essence of the undertaking. In this +case it may even be advisable to suppress one's own dispositions for +security, and accept the risk of being taken at a disadvantage rather +than run the risk of having one's intentions prematurely disclosed.</p> + +<p>Tactically the greater concentration guarantees <span class="pagenum"><a id="page109" name="page109"></a>(p. 109)</span> tactical +success, and strategically it allows greater freedom of movement and +changes of direction to meet altered conditions; but one must never +lose sight of the technical drawbacks such closer concentration +entails.</p> + +<p>The zone of reconnaissance is naturally always of less breadth than +with divided columns; hence the possibility of screening the march of +troops in the rear is diminished, the risk of being turned is +increased, and the possibility of delivering a stroke in the air is +not inconsiderable.</p> + +<p>If the enemy wishes to evade us, we have scarcely any means of holding +him until our main force can arrive; and finally, this condition of +close concentration by no means guarantees always and everywhere +either superior readiness for action or a more favourable deployment. +Cases can arise in which strategic dispersion will prepare the way for +tactical encounter even better than the concentrated advance; and this +is particularly so when, to attain the object of our mission, a wide +turning movement is necessary, for this will generally be best brought +about by previous strategic dispositions; whilst the deployment of a +mass from a defile or its retreat may be entirely prevented if +attempted in a single column.</p> + +<p>Hence every principle has its limitations, and circumstances will +always arise which defy all stereotyped formations. Thus, even for +'screening' and 'security' cases can arise under which concentration +is justified, even where the nature of the ground does not +imperatively dictate it, as when, for instance, the insufficiency of +one's own force excludes any distribution in breadth, and compels one +to combine all efforts for the defence of decisive points. And it is +precisely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page110" name="page110"></a>(p. 110)</span> on the defensive that it may be of advantage to +deal a blow with the concentrated strength. Equally on the strategic +offensive, dispersion may be necessary, as when the enemy retreats +eccentrically; or if it is necessary to occupy districts of +considerable size to break down the resistance of the hostile +population, or to interrupt railway communication over a considerable +area.</p> + +<p>Finally, all principles fall to the ground where the enemy's Cavalry +is finally beaten out of the field, or by a succession of mistakes he +gives openings which we can seize with advantage. Thus our conduct +always remains dependent on the topographical nature of the country, +on our own purpose and the opposition of the enemy, and only one law +governs all cases—namely, expediency. The greater art of leading will +naturally be required when the necessity arises to operate with more +or less widely-separated columns. In all such cases everything depends +on the endurance of one's troops. The principal difficulty in the way +of execution lies in harmonizing and maintaining the movements of the +separate detachments.</p> + +<p>If one has to deal with Infantry only, then, since their rate of march +is almost always the same, it is easy to calculate approximately where +the several columns may be found; but it is quite different when one +comes to deal with Cavalry, where the different Leaders may adopt very +different rates of movement, or may have such variations forced upon +them by other circumstances, and hence one has always to deal with +quite indeterminable factors. This difficulty can never be altogether +eliminated; one can only counteract it by laying down from the very +first <span class="pagenum"><a id="page111" name="page111"></a>(p. 111)</span> instructions for the advance of the several columns, +according to time and space, from which no deviation is to be +permitted without sufficient reasons, and organizing the circulation +of orders and intelligence in such a manner that it will work with +certainty. These two precautions supplement one another. If one can +calculate approximately where the several detachments are to be found +at a given time, then reports can be sent by the shortest way, and +will reach their destination without delay.</p> + +<p>It will be decidedly advisable that all detachments should report to +Headquarters, and if possible to all adjacent columns, without +distinct instructions, and at certain time intervals, both as to their +advance, their bearing in relation to adjacent columns, as also any +news they may have obtained about the enemy.</p> + +<p>Nothing is more important to the Cavalry Leader than to be constantly +informed as to the general situation of the units he controls; but it +is equally important that the several groups should know what is +happening to one another, for only then can they act in the spirit and +in combination with the whole.</p> + +<p>This is all the more essential because, owing to the rapidity of all +movements, and to the great extension which has often to be given to +the front, it is impossible for the higher Command to interfere in +good time, or to obtain information from its subordinates in any +emergency that may suddenly arise. The results, then, depend entirely +on the independent judgment of the man on the spot, and suitable +action can only be obtained when the latter is kept fully informed as +to the nature of the general situation.</p> + +<p>We should, therefore, avoid as far as possible the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page112" name="page112"></a>(p. 112)</span> despatch +of orders to individual Commanders without at the same time informing +their comrades of the bearing of such instructions.</p> + +<p>Wherever possible in strategical operations, the orders should be +comprehensive, and should be circulated simultaneously to all +subordinates. Where it is impossible to convey an order simultaneously +to all, those not immediately concerned in their execution should be +informed of its issue as soon as possible. Certainly, this method +requires a large number of gallopers, orderlies, and so forth; but +this apparent waste of energy will in the end prove the best economy, +because the troops will thereby be spared many unnecessary movements.</p> + +<p>However great the endeavour may be to diminish the difficulties of the +united action of separated bodies in the combat itself, the issue of +the Cavalry fight is decided so rapidly that its consequences must +have begun to show themselves before either the adjacent columns or +Headquarters have learnt of its commencement. We must, therefore, be +clear in our own minds that successful combination of separated bodies +in action can generally only be effected when the opponent is either +stationary, in which case one can time one's movements against him, or +when, by a protracted defence at other points, the more distant bodies +have time and opportunity to reach the field.</p> + +<p>Even when the approach of the opponent's forces has been discovered in +time, it will be difficult to calculate with any degree of precision +the exact point at which collision will occur, as the marching rate of +the enemy's Cavalry must always remain an uncertain factor. Hence it +will not suffice to evade the enemy's advance until the adjacent +columns can unite, as one <span class="pagenum"><a id="page113" name="page113"></a>(p. 113)</span> cannot assign to them any definite +point of concentration where the distance between the columns is at +all considerable. Any attempt to concentrate strategically against an +enemy in movement without at some point fighting to gain time must be +dismissed as illusory. In all these cases one must not hesitate to +take to the rifle, and to utilize all available means of defence.</p> + +<p>Similarly, when advancing in separated columns, it will be well to +advance from one defensive section to another in rushes, and not to go +beyond any one of these until fairly assured that one can reach the +next without encountering the enemy's Cavalry.</p> + +<p>If one should have the misfortune of being surprised in a district +which affords no points of support, then one must retire to the next +best one in order to give the adjacent columns time to swing in +against the enemy's flanks. The sound of the guns will be indication +enough to these to hasten their pace.</p> + +<p>The more important it is, therefore, to march to the sound of the guns +in order to save time, the more careful must one be in opening fire +without sufficient cause. On the one hand, the side which wishes to +attract support will not be satisfied with a few rounds, but will +endeavour by continuous and heavy firing to make the danger of his +situation evident; on the other, the adjacent columns will only then +be justified in approaching if they are convinced that it is not a +mere matter of local and transitory advantage. The Cavalry Commander +must keep, therefore, a firm hand over his guns, and never allow these +to come into action without express sanction, except in extreme +necessity. Generally, the batteries should always march with the +advance or the rear guard in order to break down <span class="pagenum"><a id="page114" name="page114"></a>(p. 114)</span> rapidly any +minor resistance, and to make the fullest use of such short +opportunities as may arise for the utilization of their full power.</p> + +<p>The application of these principles is, of course, much simpler when +it is possible to keep the several columns close together on a +convenient group of roads, all running fairly near to one another. The +disadvantages which then arise make less demand on the skill of the +Leader, but more on the necessarily cramped form of the disposition +which, as we have above pointed out, he is compelled to adopt.</p> + +<p>For every operation, in fact, except the direct attack, there is a +certain degree of extension, which favours the immediate purpose the +most, and this depends on the shape and nature of the ground; but one +has always to resist the temptation to dispersion which arises, +particularly when it is necessary to keep in mind the solution of +several possible problems. Only very occasionally will it be expedient +to divide one's troops to meet every emergency.</p> + +<p>The General must use his judgment to decide where the chief weight of +his mission lies, the principal characteristics he must impress upon +his operations, and how the subsidiary purposes can be best served +without applying half-purposes to the primary object. It is these +considerations—the reduction of the complicated to the simple—which +create the chief difficulties which weigh upon the mind of the Leader. +The capacity of coming to a correct decision in every special case is +a mark of the intellectually capable Commander, and of itself gives a +certain guarantee of its success by rendering possible the +concentration of the force upon the decisive point; but it will not +alone suffice to insure success. Boldness and energy of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page115" name="page115"></a>(p. 115)</span> +character is the final determining cause of successful results.</p> + +<p>Above all, every Cavalry leader must be inspired by the determination +to keep the initiative under all circumstances, and never to +relinquish it to his opponent. The initiative alone guarantees +successes, often in a degree which one was hardly entitled to expect, +for it forces the enemy to accept the law from our hands, disturbs his +strategical combination, compels him to fight before his troops are +united, and often gives to the numerically weaker the opportunity of +establishing a relative local superiority. One must, therefore, +endeavour to introduce as much of the initiative and offensive element +as circumstances will permit even in the execution of defensive +missions.</p> + +<p>A Leader must never allow himself to be hindered in an advance, or be +driven into an attitude of expectation by the passive opposition of +the enemy's Cavalry, as so often happens in peace.</p> + +<p>In all such cases, when a direct frontal attack holds out no prospect +of success, he must immediately initiate a wide turning movement +outside the effective range of the enemy's Artillery, and sacrifice +without hesitation his own line of retreat. Victory restores at once +the original line of advance, and the outflanking movement threatens +also the enemy's retreat.</p> + +<p>It is never permissible to wait until driven into action by superior +commands, but one must always endeavour to reap, on one's own +initiative, the utmost possibilities the situation holds out.</p> + +<p>In this way we shall save the troops excessive exertions and +purposeless riding about, for since the Headquarters can never grasp +the situation as rapidly or as thoroughly as the General actually on +the spot, it <span class="pagenum"><a id="page116" name="page116"></a>(p. 116)</span> follows that their orders will generally arrive +too late. Hence they often lag behind events, and call for excessive +exertions, night and forced marches if the purpose is to be attained. +The records of the Campaign of 1870-1871 give innumerable instances of +these facts, based on experience. Finally, resolutions should never be +made dependent on circumstances which may happen in the future, but +must always be based on something positive, which must be followed up +with all conceivable energy and circumspection. This most necessary +circumspection on the part of the Leader demands a clearness of +expression in the issue of orders which must never leave the +subordinate officers and troops in doubt, and should always reflect a +clear and determined purpose.</p> + +<p>It is, however, equally necessary that the superior Leader must +himself be clear as to how he means to carry out his purpose, has also +considered all other possibilities, and has made his arrangements in +such a manner that, if necessary, he can give his operations a +different direction. This must be particularly the case where success +depends on cunning surprise. As concerns the first point, this will +require the more thorough consideration, because it is most +particularly difficult to change the strategic direction of a large +body of Cavalry when once it has been launched forward on a broad +front. In such a case the whole carefully-elaborated network of +patrols would be left, so to speak, hanging in the air. To divert it +sideways into a new direction is generally impracticable; it would, in +fact, in most cases be impossible to transmit to all the advanced +detachments the news of the change in the dispositions.</p> + +<p>A new system of patrols will, therefore, be absolutely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page117" name="page117"></a>(p. 117)</span> +necessary to save both energy and time, and the necessity for +instituting this new service will be particularly detrimental to our +whole operations, because the information from the new direction will +generally arrive too late to be of service.</p> + +<p>It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the Cavalry Leader +should not only reconnoitre in the direction prescribed by the higher +Command for its particular purpose, but should also scout +independently in every direction, and inform himself of all the +circumstances in the whole district over which he is operating; if +necessary, organize for himself an intelligence system.<a id="footnotetag14" name="footnotetag14"></a><a href="#footnote14" title="Go to footnote 14"><span class="smaller">[14]</span></a></p> + +<p>In short, he must exercise such prevision that he can never be +overtaken by circumstances; and in every case in which action is +called for in a new, and, perhaps, unexpected direction, he should be +prepared to meet the emergency. In this way he will save himself much +time and energy, but it will facilitate his very difficult task +essentially if he is always kept informed in sufficient time of the +views and possible intention of the Chief Command; for unless this +condition is complied with, it will be impossible to insure that the +whole energy of the Arm will be directed to the carrying out of its +reconnoitring functions in conformity with the views entertained at +Headquarters. It must be characterized as one of the most suicidal +errors when the superior Command conceals its purposes from its +executive organs. Diffused activity, waste of energy, +misunderstandings, and confusion would be the inevitable consequences, +and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page118" name="page118"></a>(p. 118)</span> military history—not the least that of 1870-1871—gives +a long rôle of illustrative examples.</p> + +<p>As regards all those operations which depend on surprise, the +circumspection of the Leader becomes the decisive factor. Everything +must be thought out beforehand, and carefully considered. The very +soul and being of the Leader must be grasped by the men under his +Command, and the utmost energy in the execution of his design be +demanded from every individual. As a general rule, smaller bodies, +which can conceal themselves behind features of the ground, and hardly +require a service of security, can act quite differently to larger +ones, which cannot conceal their presence and always require a certain +degree of precaution for reconnaissance and security. Above all, +mobility is the essence of the whole situation, and darkness will +serve as a most important contributor to success.</p> + +<p>On main roads, where it is impossible to lose one's way, darkness can +be used for forced marches to advantage if beforehand we are clear +about the conditions on the side of the enemy, and hence can act with +a certain degree of confidence.</p> + +<p>One factor must never be left out of consideration—viz., that under +modern conditions the difficulties of action by surprise have been +enormously increased, and the enemy is under certain circumstances +enabled to paralyze the tactical results of surprise. This factor +arises from the existence of railways and telegraphs, and it will act +most detrimentally against us when moving in the enemy's country, +where both arrangements favour our opponents. Telegraphs carry the +news of the appearance of Cavalry far and wide beyond the points where +they have been seen by the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page119" name="page119"></a>(p. 119)</span> enemy's troops, and the railways +forward supports to the threatened districts.</p> + +<p>It is, therefore, of particular importance to destroy by means of +advanced patrols both telegraphs and railways all over the district on +which one hopes to act by surprise, and to repeat such active +destruction again and again. In such enterprises there is a wide field +for slimness and craftiness—qualities which might very well be +combined in greater undertakings.</p> + +<p>Sudden changes in the line of advance behind the screen of advanced +troops, unexpected concentration of separate columns at decisive +points, separation and surprise reunions of one's forces, +dissemination of false news, feints on points of subsidiary importance +to distract the attention of the enemy—all these things can lead to +the deception of the enemy, and in one's own country they will be +materially supported by a friendly population; but timely and accurate +information of all the circumstances of the enemy remains always a +most necessary condition.</p> + +<p>If the importance of these measures is particularly striking in these +cases where we are dealing with surprises, ambushes, and so forth, +they form also in every other type of Cavalry action one of the +principal foundations of success, for they alone insure timely +resolutions and the consequent initiation of the movements necessary +to bring about concentration and separation.</p> + +<p>The Cavalry Commander must, therefore, always choose his position when +on the march, with the troops in immediate contact with the enemy; or +if his troops are quartered in the neighbouring villages, then +immediately behind the advanced line of cantonments, so that whenever +possible he can see with his own <span class="pagenum"><a id="page120" name="page120"></a>(p. 120)</span> eyes and base his decisions +on first-hand evidence, where he can receive all reports as soon as +possible, and make his dispositions in good time. Otherwise it will +only too frequently happen that his orders and dispositions will drag +behind events, and disorder and defeat will be the consequence.</p> + +<p>This personal supervision of matters in his front is also necessary to +enable him to come to a correct decision as to his line of action, +whereas a Commander of all Arms can better decide by the map, because +his troops are less dependent on the ground than Independent Cavalry, +move more slowly, and hence are more accessible to subsequent orders. +But even the utmost energy in the Leader will not alone suffice to +lead things into their proper lines without the most successful and +rapid reconnaissance. Hence the practical organization of the system +of reconnaissance remains the essential task of all strategical +Cavalry leadership; but it requires to be supplemented by an equally +practical system of security.</p> + +<p>On the two subjects so much has already been written that it is +impossible to find anything new to say about them. Only one point has +not been brought out sufficiently—namely, that both security and +reconnaissance, in so far as both depend on patrols, will only then +work successfully when they are based on a thoroughly systematized +method of procedure. The subject is of such importance that I have +considered it necessary to devote a short chapter to it (Book I., +Chap. VIII.).</p> + +<p>If reconnaissance—apart from the fact that the roads must be cleared +for it in the first instance by the defeat of the enemy's +Cavalry—lies exclusively in the hands of the patrols, nevertheless +security depends on the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page121" name="page121"></a>(p. 121)</span> arrangement and activity of the +other branches, such as advance guards, rear guards, flanking +detachments, and outposts, and the conduct of these depends, again, on +thorough systematization.</p> + +<p>When on the move, safety lies in the distance that separates the main +body from the advanced detachments, and it is scarcely necessary to +point out that only systematic arrangements can guarantee the +necessary time for the exploration of the ground and the enemy which +is requisite for safety.</p> + +<p>Threatened flanks require special detachments, moving on the same +level and at sufficient distance, and their co-operation will be +insured by a careful regulation of the mutual rate of march.</p> + +<p>A uniform rate of advance in the whole mechanism is an essential +condition of complete security. Hence every means must be exhausted +down to the smallest detail. It will not be necessary to assign minor +flanking detachments for the duration of a whole march. During such a +period it is practically impossible to retain their relation to the +main body without keeping them within sight, which in most cases is +quite impracticable, for circumstances may suddenly check the main +body, or necessitate a change of direction. To advise the flanking +detachments of such occurrences will generally be impossible, or at +any rate very difficult, if one has permanently detached them, and +therefore has no certainty of finding them at any particular point. +Hence it is advisable to work them always in sections—that is to say, +when they have reached certain points to withdraw them to the main +body, and send out reliefs for the next section.</p> + +<p>But in order that the security should never for one instant be +relaxed, these fresh reliefs should always be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page122" name="page122"></a>(p. 122)</span> sent out at +some little distance before the point at which the former detachment +is to be drawn in.</p> + +<p>Almost more important than security at night is security during +prolonged periods of rest. In that case the arrangements must be made +not only in accordance with tactical requirements, but the fact must +be taken into account that horses, in order to remain permanently +useful, require quite a different nature of rest than is needed by +men.</p> + +<p>It is most desirable that as many horses as possible should every day +be brought under shelter and unsaddled, and all bivouacking should be +avoided as far as practicable.</p> + +<p>The readiness for action from a purely tactical point of view +certainly suffers, but as rest at night is an absolute necessity for +the horses, one has to make the best of the matter and minimize this +disadvantage as much as possible by suitable arrangements.</p> + +<p>Against this view it is often urged that Cavalry used to bivouac much +more frequently in former wars, and nevertheless remained fit for +service, hence they ought to be able to do the same to-day. I consider +this an entirely wrong deduction. In the first place, the demands upon +the troops in former days were generally much less than at present. +The periods of crisis in which great exertions had to be made by them +were on the whole less frequent, and the subsequent intervals for rest +and recuperation were usually longer.</p> + +<p>Considering the average marches of the Napoleonic Cavalry as a whole, +they cannot be considered particularly great, and still less was this +the case under Frederick the Great, although under both Generals we +find instances of great individual exertion.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the horses in those days were much less <span class="pagenum"><a id="page123" name="page123"></a>(p. 123)</span> well bred, +and the commoner cold-blooded strain can stand bivouacs, cold and wet, +much better than our present high-bred material, although the latter +stand heat and exertion very much better. The leadership must adapt +itself to these conditions. Where circumstances allow the bulk of the +horses to take shelter behind the Infantry outposts, the most must be +made of the opportunity, and only the more distant patrolling service +be left to the Cavalry. Outpost service makes far less demands on the +Infantry soldier than on the Cavalry horse, for the former is allowed +to sleep when on piquet, the Cavalry horse cannot.</p> + +<p>The Cavalry soldier certainly gains an advantage here over the +much-harassed Infantry man, for naturally the man derives advantage +from the care bestowed on the horse; but I hold this point is of far +too trifling a nature to take into consideration when the matter +affects such a necessary and important factor of strength of the whole +Army. Further, this advantage is more apparent than real, and is only +intended to give us the means, while sparing the material in one +direction, to make greater demands on it in another. When in critical +moments bold and wide-sweeping movements on the enemy's flanks and +rear become necessary, where our object is to keep the enemy's +movements under constant observation while screening our own; where, +finally, on the close of a battle we must pursue the enemy +relentlessly, or sacrifice ourselves to cover and protect the weary +and retreating Infantry, then the Cavalry which has been properly +nursed will be capable of exertions far beyond what could be expected +of troops less thoughtfully managed. These exertions can then be +unconditionally demanded, and will repay a hundredfold, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page124" name="page124"></a>(p. 124)</span> both +tactically and strategically, the care bestowed in easier days.</p> + +<p>Only rarely, however, will cases arise in which Cavalry can avail +themselves of the shelter of the Infantry, for the essence of all +Cavalry activity lies in the future in its independent undertakings. +If we were to apply to them the same principles as to the +Infantry—that is to say, make a principle of bivouacking the outposts +and exposing them daily to the effects of the weather—this would +result in a steady drain upon the horses, which would lead to serious +deterioration in their endurance. Hence the question of bringing them +under cover does not apply merely to the mass of the forces, but must +be extended to the whole system of outposts, and wherever practicable +the greatest possible number of horses must be placed under shelter in +full and complete security. This security must be sought for by the +increased depth assigned to the outpost system. Even after a +victorious advance one must not hesitate, under certain circumstances, +to withdraw the troops in order to obtain the necessary distances +between the enemy and the advance guard, as also between the advance +guard and the main body. Slightly increased distance to be covered +next day is nothing as compared to the advantage of greater security. +It will be particularly desirable to make the most of all positions +the ground may afford, which, being traversable at only certain +points, hinders the approach of the enemy—such as rivers, which can +only be crossed at the bridges, woods in which movement is confined to +the roads, marshes, and so forth. Behind these one can generally go +into cantonments without anxiety, and they offer the further advantage +that they can generally be held by small forces of dismounted +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page125" name="page125"></a>(p. 125)</span> men. Hence the horses can generally be sent back and brought +under shelter at a distance, and in case of alarm can be saddled up +and be made ready by men detailed for that purpose.</p> + +<p>Where such positions are not available, one must either go back +further, or, if not altogether too near to the enemy, make the most +advanced cantonments serve the purpose of the line of security.</p> + +<p>Every evening these localities must be hastily prepared for defence, +with the determination, in case of attack, of defending them carbine +in hand, and without bringing out the horses until the support can +come up from the rearward cantonments.</p> + +<p>The details of such defence I have already discussed elsewhere.</p> + +<p>This method of defence, however, must be supplemented by a suitable +system of observation sent out towards the enemy. Even detachments far +advanced towards the enemy may, under favourable circumstances, find +temporary cover in villages, and every such period of rest is of +advantage for the horse.</p> + +<p>The Cavalry, however, which, in full confidence of its firearms and +the alertness of its patrols, can venture to go into cantonments, and +thus save its horses from bivouacking, will very soon assert its +superiority over an enemy which seeks for safety by remaining +constantly under arms, and thus dissipates its inherent energy.</p> + +<p>This tendency towards cantonments must not be allowed to become +stereotyped. Occasions will constantly arise when the Cavalry must +remain in immediate touch with the enemy; then it will be compelled +not only to bivouac, but will have to stand to its horses, ready to +mount at a moment's notice. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page126" name="page126"></a>(p. 126)</span> Such occasions will only arise +in critical situations necessarily of short duration, and the +conditions both of the weather and the ground must be taken into +careful consideration in making the arrangements for the outposts.</p> + +<p>Thus it is evident that it is not possible to lay down fixed rules of +conduct either for operations or for the outposts, but all must be +left to the capacity of the Leader and the adaptability of his men. On +this capacity depends in the last resort the greater or less strategic +value of the Arm. Its foundation can only be laid in peace, and will +depend on thorough and successful training, together with suitable +preparation of the whole organization for War. To both points I will +recur in the second part of this work. Here I would only insist that +naturally the collective strategic employment of the Arm must take a +thoroughly different form in proportion as the troops are rendered +more or less independent by their equipment, the leaders of all ranks +are qualified to act on their own responsibility, and mobility is not +hampered by difficulties in the provisioning of man and horse, and in +the supply of ammunition. In the one case the Leader can act with +courage and daring in the true Cavalry spirit; in the other he will +feel himself hampered at every step, will not be able to act with the +necessary degree of self-confidence, and will have to renounce the +most promising undertakings because the inefficiency of his troops +leaves him no alternative. However great his genius, no Leader can +compensate for want of efficiency in his command; but it is the duty +of such leader to maintain and increase the endurance inherent in his +material to the utmost limits of its capacity.</p> + +<p>In this connection a well-thought-out system of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page127" name="page127"></a>(p. 127)</span> saving and +caring for one's horses occupies the first position, for this is the +bed-rock foundation of all subsequent developments. We have seen of +what immense importance in this respect the sheltering and +arrangements for the outposts may be. But there are other factors to +be considered—above all, a rational arrangement of the marches. In +the first instance, it is a mistake to believe that Cavalry in the +long-run can out-stay and out-march the Infantry—that, in other +words, the Cavalry horse can endure greater hardships than +well-trained Infantry. For a few days that may well be so, but for +continuous exertion it is by no means proved.</p> + +<p>The German Cavalry horse is much more dependent on a sufficiency of +food than the man; the nature of his load, together with the rapidity +of movement, and hence the greater intensity of the exertions demanded +of him, attack the animal in a far greater degree than the more +uniform march performance of the men, who, moreover, are susceptible +to moral influences, capable of greatly increasing their powers; +finally, sore backs and lameness in long-continued exertions decimate +the ranks of the horses to a much greater degree than a well-trained +and equipped Infantry suffers from similar causes.</p> + +<p>In normal conditions demands should not be made upon the Cavalry which +would be justified only in moments of a crisis. We must endeavour to +reduce the daily performance to the lowest limit that our purpose +allows. Only in exceptional instances should one move off at such an +early hour as to interfere materially with the night rest of the +horses. Unfortunately, there are still officers who will not be +convinced that it is the horse which most requires rest, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page128" name="page128"></a>(p. 128)</span> and +who are never satisfied unless they keep the Cavalry night after night +on their legs, although in darkness they are useless either for +reconnaissance or for fighting.</p> + +<p>Further, in War games and Staff rides it is a custom to make demands +which in practice are absolutely impossible, mostly by superior +officers who have never ridden 100 kilometres (66 miles) in a single +day.</p> + +<p>An average of twenty to twenty-five miles a day is in practice a very +considerable performance. To demand much more of them, day in and day +out, is impracticable. On the march itself a suitable change of pace +is very necessary.</p> + +<p>To trot hour after hour is the most fruitful source of ruin to our +horseflesh. Where it becomes necessary it is usually due to the want +of care on the part of the Leader. Much may be done to spare the +horses if we never march with considerable numbers on a single road +without absolute necessity; and when this is not to be avoided, then +we must seek to maintain an even pace throughout the column by the +intercalation of suitable distances between the several bodies; +otherwise there is a continuous hurrying up or checking of the +rearward detachments, which strains the horses to the very utmost.</p> + +<p>One must always arrange for the halts necessary for the horses, water +them whenever opportunity offers, and never continue a movement to the +complete exhaustion of the animals. Well-timed periods of rest +increase the collective power of endurance of the horses most +materially, and as the training improves, the demands made upon them +can gradually be raised.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page129" name="page129"></a>(p. 129)</span> To bring this greater improvement into harmony with the +military requirements of the situation, next in importance to an +intelligent execution of a rational marching system comes a wise +economy of forces with regard to the performance of detached duties +and patrolling. It is particularly with the Divisional Cavalry that +the lavish assignment of orderlies and messengers to the leaders of +the other Arms and to the Infantry outposts has to be kept in check, +and it must be insisted upon that the men thus allotted should be +returned punctually to their commands, and not be employed in duties +for which they are not intended.</p> + +<p>Thus one finds Generals who use their messengers as patrols even when +special patrols have been entrusted with this duty; others who keep +the detachments assigned to the outposts long after the outposts +themselves have been relieved. In all these things there is a +tremendous waste of energy, which must be all the more injurious the +smaller the proportion of Cavalry which can be detailed to the +Infantry Divisions.</p> + +<p>It is a special duty of every Cavalry Commander to resist this +tendency to the utmost of his power.</p> + +<p>Apart from the regulation of the marching column and the economy of +forces above referred to, a rational treatment of the rearward +communications, particularly with the Independent Cavalry, will go far +to maintain the troops in efficiency, and is also from the strategic +point of view an important part of the Leader's duty. The daily +despatch of numerous requisitioning detachments to great distances +weakens and diminishes the troops to an inadmissible degree, unless it +is managed with a wise foresight and on a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page130" name="page130"></a>(p. 130)</span> rational system; +often on great marches it will be altogether impossible. Then the +horses must manage with what they find at their halting-places for the +night. In the case of great concentration this will be altogether +insufficient. Short rations reduce the horses very rapidly and only +too thoroughly. It is, therefore, necessary in all independent +operations of great Cavalry 'Masses' to take with one an organized and +mobile supply train, and, where circumstances require, to arrange for +its defence.</p> + +<p>The timely arrival of the supply waggons, the rational utilization of +the resources of the district, the contiguous replenishment of the +moving supply reserves, are matters which cannot be left entirely to +the Army Service Corps, but the Cavalry General must himself overlook +the whole matter, and keep the general control in his own hands. For +these arrangements must be regulated from the strategic point of view +since the power of operating at all depends essentially upon them. Of +course, the Supreme Command must lend assistance also.</p> + +<p>In general, it will be advisable to carry with one a five to six days' +ration of corn if one is to be prepared for all emergencies. That, at +least, was the practical teaching of the War of 1870-1871. But one +must add, the further the Cavalry is separated from the masses of the +Army, and the more it renounces its communications with the latter, +the greater must be the bulk of supply it takes with it; and the +closer these supplies have to be kept to the troops, the more thorough +must be the arrangements for their protection. The latter will be of +particular importance when operating on a narrow front which favours +an enemy's outflanking endeavours, whereas wider fronts of themselves +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page131" name="page131"></a>(p. 131)</span> give a certain degree of security to the rearward +communications.</p> + +<p>If we are entirely cut off from our home resources, then we must +select some point to be occupied on the flank or in the rear of the +enemy's Army, and there arrange a supply centre of our own, and make +it the point of departure for separate operations.</p> + +<p>All means are, then, proper to accumulate in such places a sufficient +forage reserve, for the subsistence of the horses is the most +important task which falls upon the Commander. A delay in this +direction can wreck the most brilliant undertakings—jeopardize the +result even of the best executed ones. Theory does not attach +sufficient importance to the point here involved.</p> + +<p>Thus we see that the tasks of the independent Cavalry Leader are both +many-sided and responsible. He can only then prove equal to them when +all subordinates on whom he has to count support him with the utmost +goodwill and reliability.</p> + +<p>With this necessity a new demand is made upon him—namely, to raise +the spirit of the men he commands in such a manner that they will be +equal to the highest requirements. Only a bold, self-confident, and +active man, who everywhere sets the best example, will be able in this +manner to inspire and stimulate his command. The sum of the stimulated +individual performances brings with it also increased opportunities of +success.</p> + +<p>Hence the last and greatest demand for the successful conduct of a +Cavalry Mass remains always the man who will inspire and stimulate the +troops under him, and thus lead them to victory.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page132" name="page132"></a>(p. 132)</span> CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<p class="title">PATROLS—TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS—CYCLISTS</p> + + +<p>I have already, in a former section, insisted on the fundamental +proposition that reconnaissance and security are two diametrically +opposite conceptions, and cannot on a large scale be confided to one +and the same body of troops. This conflict of purpose becomes most +evident when we come to the service of patrols in the field.</p> + +<p>Reconnoitring patrols regulate their movements on those of the enemy. +They must keep touch with and follow him, quite irrespective of the +movement of their own side, often being compelled to creep after +him—<i>i.e.</i>, to utilize intersected ground in order to avoid the +necessity of fighting.</p> + +<p>Security patrols, on the other hand, flanking detachments, piquets, +vedettes, and the like, have to choose their position with reference +to the force it is their purpose to cover, and with which they must +remain in communication. It is their duty to attack and beat off the +enemy's patrols, as far as their strength will allow them, to prevent +these latter gaining an insight into the conditions of the marching or +resting troops whose safety they are intended to secure.</p> + +<p>If they were to attempt to follow up their enemy to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page133" name="page133"></a>(p. 133)</span> find out +his position—<i>i.e.</i>, to reconnoitre—they would lose their connection +with their own troops, and endanger the security of the latter by +relinquishing the special object they are set apart to provide for.</p> + +<p>Hence it is absolutely necessary that the two systems should be kept +separate one from the other, and that each patrol should know clearly +and distinctly for which of the two purposes it is specifically +intended. Only then can the troops in rear rely on being kept +thoroughly informed, and at the same time secure from the possible +attempts of the enemy.</p> + +<p>The more clear and precise the mission, the more can the patrols be +relied on to execute it; but this, of course, does not exclude the +necessity for them to keep their eyes open for other things, and to +report all they may notice.</p> + +<p>Such a systematic arrangement brings other advantages in its train. It +effects a marked economy of one's available forces, for being certain +that every mission will be settled by a special party detailed for +that purpose, it ceases to be necessary to keep on despatching fresh +patrols again and again in the same direction, a practice most +detrimental to the troops, which is constantly followed in peace-time; +and it can never happen that a body is surprised by the enemy because +its scouts are absent reconnoitring, or that it fails to receive +information because its patrols are busy with security. If, therefore, +all patrols thus naturally fall into one of these two +groups—reconnoitring and security patrols—there is still another +line of distinction to be observed between these patrols themselves, +arising from the nature of the tasks which the circumstances impose +upon them.</p> + +<p>It is impossible to lay down any distinct rules in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page134" name="page134"></a>(p. 134)</span> this +matter—for War will always present new and changing problems—but +broadly two points of view must be kept in sight, which require +fundamentally different treatment, and are conditioned by our distance +from the enemy.</p> + +<p>If the opposing forces are still engaged in preliminary approaches one +to the other, and separated by wide stretches of country, the +procedure will be altogether distinct from that to be adopted when the +outposts mutually confront one another.</p> + +<p>Between the two extremes there are innumerable intermediate degrees, +to which one's conduct must be adapted without losing sight of the +guiding points involved.</p> + +<p>Let us take first the period of approach, and consider the +reconnoitring problem from this aspect, taking into consideration the +broad requirements of modern War.</p> + +<p>It will be apparent at once that there is here a double purpose to be +fulfilled—viz., to ascertain the whereabouts and direction of +movement of the elements of the enemy's main fighting force, the +primary object of all reconnaissance; and, secondly, to find the +enemy's preceding Cavalry screen, whose purpose it is, on the one +hand, to prevent our object, and, on the other hand, to conceal their +own main body. This cavalry we shall have to defeat, but we cannot +afford to await this event, but must initiate our own reconnaissance +before the decision, and endeavour to carry this through, even if the +latter prove unfavourable to us.</p> + +<p>Hence it follows that our patrols must be systematically divided from +the first into strategical and tactical patrols, according as to +whether they are intended to find the enemy's main army or to beat his +Cavalry.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page135" name="page135"></a>(p. 135)</span> The former must not allow themselves to be held up by the +enemy's Cavalry, but must endeavour to ride through the opposing +screen—straight for the heads of the enemy's marching columns. They +must, therefore, avoid all fighting, and act by cunning and stealth, +and hence their conduct should be entrusted always to officers. They +will be directed against the probable lines of the enemy's approach, +as determined by the general strategic situation, and will further be +given all possible information as to the known whereabouts of the +enemy, together with the intentions of their own Superior Command, in +order that they may be in a position to distinguish between important +and unimportant details, and adapt their action accordingly.</p> + +<p>That the position of heads of columns in time and place, their depths, +the flanks of the enemy's positions, extent of his outposts, districts +in which troops are quartered, the appearance of new uniforms, +indicating the presence of regiments believed to be elsewhere, etc., +should all be carefully determined, forms part of their normal +instructions; but, in spite of that, it is very desirable to direct +their attention very particularly to all such points as are at the +moment of preponderating consequence. They must also be kept well +informed as to the mission of their neighbouring patrols, so that +under all circumstances the systematic subdivision of their several +tasks can be maintained intact.</p> + +<p>For these patrols one must choose the best mounted officers and men +and horses, since long distances must be covered under difficult +circumstances, and it would be well to allot to each a competent +non-commissioned officer, who can carry through the task if his +Commander <span class="pagenum"><a id="page136" name="page136"></a>(p. 136)</span> is killed or taken prisoner. If possible, they +should also be supplied with a concentrated horse-ration, so as to be +as far as possible independent of the resources of the country. (See +Part II., Section I.)</p> + +<p>As to the strength of these patrols, it will be necessary to keep +within very narrow limits, because if they are large it is difficult +for them to escape observation; on the other hand, a certain degree of +strength is necessary, because one cannot, of course, count on being +able to send back one's information by single messengers. Since it is +a prime condition of the problem that a district thoroughly commanded +by the enemy must be ridden through, the safe return of a single +messenger can never be guaranteed; hence the Commander will either be +obliged to send his reports in duplicate or triplicate, or in the last +resort fight his way through with them himself. Hence it will be +advisable to compose each party of two or three patrols, each of three +men, assigning a smart lance-corporal to each.</p> + +<p>One officer, one non-commissioned officer, two lance-corporals, and +five men must, therefore, be considered as a fairly normal type.</p> + +<p>The Commander can then despatch two reports, and the third he must +bring in himself, and must well consider how long it will be safe to +continue his observation, and what it is of real importance for his +superiors to know.</p> + +<p>But he must never allow himself to be hurried into the despatch of +unimportant information. He must always keep before his mind the +essential strategical elements of the whole situation. It seems to me +altogether wrong to send off such patrols with general instructions to +keep in touch with the enemy, a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page137" name="page137"></a>(p. 137)</span> common manœuvre practice. +Since these latter generally last only a few days, there is not much +difficulty in maintaining such a system, particularly when information +is sent by single messengers. But in War everything is very different. +One would very soon have got through all one's officers and still not +be well informed. The patrols must, therefore, be told to return +within a certain time limit, and their reliefs, who are to be fully +instructed as far as the information available goes, must be +despatched before this time limit is expired. Even then we shall soon +exhaust the available supply of officers who will have been driven to +the limit of their endurance in purely strategic missions, and in the +end we shall have to fall back upon Non-commissioned Officers for +tactical observation.</p> + +<p>This tactical reconnaissance will, in the first place, devote its +attention to the enemy's Cavalry. The patrols assigned to these duties +will attack the enemy wherever they meet him, to find out what is +going on, and as soon as possible establish a moral superiority over +them.</p> + +<p>But even they cannot remain permanently in touch with the enemy, +because they, too, must send in their information by messenger, their +strength thus rapidly diminishing, and they, in turn, will require +relief.</p> + +<p>If permanent observation of a yet distant enemy is necessary, we must +turn to other means. It will, then, be as well to send out whole +reconnoitring squadrons or troops (F.D.O.,<a id="footnotetag15" name="footnotetag15"></a><a href="#footnote15" title="Go to footnote 15"><span class="smaller">[15]</span></a> 128) towards the enemy, +and through them maintain a permanent tactical observation.</p> + +<p>These serve as a patrol reserve and collecting station for +information, remaining day and night in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page138" name="page138"></a>(p. 138)</span> touch with the +enemy, and, of course, will also require periodical reliefs.</p> + +<p>It goes without saying that, in addition to these squadrons, single +patrols may be despatched in important directions from the main body +of the Cavalry, whose duty it will be to report to the latter direct.</p> + +<p>These, again, must send off their reports by several men, whilst those +despatched from the patrols sent out by the reconnoitring squadrons +will often, owing to the shorter distance and the nearness of the +support, be able to avail themselves of the despatch riders. In +general, it cannot be insisted upon too much that the despatch rider, +so very popular in peace, can only be very occasionally employed in +War in the interval before the enemy's Cavalry is completely beaten +out of the field. In peace a man is always riding in his own country; +if he himself has not a map, he has at least been instructed from a +map, and every civilian will help him out. Even if he stumbles up +against an enemy's patrol they will generally let him pass unnoticed; +but it is quite different in War. Here even a patrol leader has rarely +got a map. The despatch rider rides across thoroughly unknown +districts, coming in contact with a foreign, perhaps hostile, +population; he cannot make himself understood, if, indeed, he is not +obliged to avoid them. The enemy's patrols are also everywhere, and if +anything happens to his horse the message does not arrive. Further, +the enormously increased distances to be traversed in modern War have +to be taken into account, and these alone render the despatch of +single horsemen a very doubtful undertaking. We must, therefore, +recognise that the conveyance of reports by individual despatch riders +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page139" name="page139"></a>(p. 139)</span> is only possible under very limited conditions, and within +the districts fully controlled by one's own troops, and that even in +one's own country reconnoitring patrols sent out to a great distance +can only be very occasionally employed.</p> + +<p>Here we come upon an increased difficulty in the whole system of +intelligence, and yet all reconnaissance is useless unless the return +of information works without a hitch. We must, therefore, endeavour to +regulate it accordingly.</p> + +<p>Above all, the connection between the reconnoitring squadrons and the +main body by relays must be very carefully assured, and their strength +must be proportionate to the number of the enemy's patrols moving in +the district. In these cases a co-operation between Cavalry and +cyclists will be of service, whilst within the radius which we +completely command the whole rearward intelligence service, so far as +it can move upon roads, must be left as much as possible to cyclists.</p> + +<p><i>Fundamentally, no Cavalry soldier should be allowed to ride to the +rear without pressing circumstances.</i> This is an absolute necessity if +we are to spare our valuable and almost irreplaceable horses. Towards +these safe lines of communication all reports must be directed, in +order to be forwarded with the utmost rapidity by fresh horses or +cyclists.</p> + +<p>If these main roads do not run as far as the reconnoitring squadrons, +in order to allow of the patrols making use of them without long +detours, then further collecting stations, protected by other troops, +must be interpolated. (F.D.O., 273.)</p> + +<p>Occasionally the Cavalry Telegraph equipment may be of assistance, but +we must not expect too much <span class="pagenum"><a id="page140" name="page140"></a>(p. 140)</span> from it in periods of rapid +movement, because since its application depends upon a number of +favourable circumstances, its value in such changing conditions is +more or less illusory.</p> + +<p>Results obtained in manœuvres, in my opinion, convey no correct +experience in this matter.</p> + +<p>Another point, however, must be specially brought out—namely, the +necessity, not only of sending back information through the proper +channels, but also of forwarding all important news direct to the +principal Commander of the Cavalry or to the Army Headquarters. It is +of the utmost importance that the Headquarters in each theatre of the +War should receive information about the enemy simultaneously with +their subordinates, so that they always remain in the position to +dispose of their troops according to their own ideas, and do not find +themselves bound by instructions previously issued by their +subordinates. It is precisely this evil which made itself felt in +1870-1871. Very often the most important information never reached +Headquarters at all, and hence no action could be taken upon it.</p> + +<p>The fault lay chiefly in the fact that the subordinates, not being +informed as to the connection of events, did not perceive the +importance of the information, and therefore did not forward it on, +and partly because the telegraph wires were overburdened by the +private messages of distinguished persons who had nothing whatever to +do with the conduct of operations.</p> + +<p>The control of the wires for purely military purposes must, therefore, +be maintained with rigid severity, and information to Headquarters or +Army Commands must have precedence over all other business.</p> + +<p>If collecting stations for information are not available, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page141" name="page141"></a>(p. 141)</span> +the question arises, Which groups should be Authorized to report +direct to Headquarters? In my opinion this cannot be determined by the +strength of the troops concerned, but must always depend on the +strategic situation. Generally it may be laid down that the lie of the +roads must decide.</p> + +<p>Those detachments entrusted with the reconnaissance of a single line +of road will report direct any important information gained within +their own sphere if no stronger body should be moving along the same +line, and this reporting body may, therefore, according to +circumstances, be a patrol, a regiment, or a brigade. It is desirable +from this point of view that all Cavalry officers down to patrol +leaders should be kept so thoroughly informed as to the general +situation that they may judge of the importance of the information +obtained, and hence know where to send the information they have +secured.</p> + +<p>As the opposing Cavalries first, then the larger bodies of the Army, +approach one another the situation changes. The reconnoitring +squadrons clear the front and turn their attention to the enemy's +flanks. The advanced squadrons are withdrawn, and the larger Cavalry +bodies drawn off towards the wings of the Army, and seek shelter +behind the Infantry columns, if they have been defeated in the Cavalry +duel, or turn against flank and rear of the enemy's Army if they have +been victorious. In front of the Armies reconnaissance now falls to +the Divisional Cavalry. Here the strategical and tactical duties +coincide. What the conduct of the Independent Cavalry will be must +depend on whether it is still held in check by the enemy or not. If +the latter have been finally beaten out of the field so that one has a +free hand, then the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page142" name="page142"></a>(p. 142)</span> strategic patrols will direct their +attention to the enemy's rearward communications, and will seek to +determine the approach of his reserves, but tactical reconnaissance +will be directed against his flanks.</p> + +<p>The principles governing our conduct remain the same, only the +reconnoitring and advanced squadrons now act primarily as supports to +the strategic patrols. If, however, a decision between the two +Cavalries has not been finally arrived at, one will now endeavour to +bring it about, and for this purpose unite all available forces, +leaving meanwhile the reconnaissance to strong patrols, who in this +period of the combat must never avoid those of the enemy, for now our +object is to get information quickly, and the time for circumvention +and evasion is at an end.</p> + +<p>When the first battle has been decided, there follows either pursuit +or retreat—operations in which the tactical reconnaissance cannot for +one moment be omitted. Then by degrees, as the defeated side succeeds +in disembarrassing itself of its pursuers, things revert to normal +conditions again. The two Armies are separated by a certain area in +depth, and a new series of operations commences, in which, as before, +reconnaissance is required.</p> + +<p>Matters are somewhat different as regards security. Here also in +general a distinction must be drawn between safety obtained by bodies +detached in advance and that derived from piquets, etc., immediately +at hand. But too much importance cannot be laid upon the principle +that, as above pointed out, reconnaissance alone cannot suffice to +insure safety; the reconnoitring detachments must rather always be +followed by a line of security troops, so that as a general type +three lines of patrols result—viz., strategical <span class="pagenum"><a id="page143" name="page143"></a>(p. 143)</span> patrols far +in advance, tactical patrols, and security patrols, which latter, when +the main body is halted, become the standing outposts.</p> + +<p>Coming next to the measures of security necessary for Independent +Cavalry when in movement, the tactical reconnoitring patrols, by +sending in early information of the enemy, will make a far-spread line +of security patrols unnecessary. In general, the ordinary point of the +advance guard and flankers will suffice. For the latter the same holds +good which has been said in the previous section on the subject of +flanking detachments altogether—viz., that they must be worked by +sections, and arranged in a proper system of reliefs.</p> + +<p>If the necessity arises to screen, as well as to secure—<i>i.e.</i>, to +hide absolutely our movements from the enemy—then all roads leading +towards him and the section of the ground comprised between them must +be occupied in such manner that the enemy cannot find intervals at +which to break through, and this will be best attained by a system of +local patrols, tied to definite beats. These patrols must fight the +enemy wherever he appears, and must, therefore, be given sufficient +strength and be followed by small supports duly allotted to each +section of the whole front.</p> + +<p>When the main body is stationary, the conditions are different, +because the troops require a certain time to turn out; therefore more +precautions are necessary, and the end can be best attained by placing +the patrols further to the front. Hence we arrive at a double system +of security—the first line formed by outpost squadrons, with +officers, non-commissioned officers, and small patrols, to which a +certain district to be ridden over will be assigned, and which must +maintain <span class="pagenum"><a id="page144" name="page144"></a>(p. 144)</span> a systematic connection by patrols between its +separate parts, to insure absolutely the control of the ground around +them; and the second, formed of far advanced posts of observation at +suitable points—road crossings, defiles, etc.—from whence they can +detect at the earliest moment any approach of the enemy. These are +indispensable at night, when reconnaissance is always more or less +liable to break down, for darkness interferes with sight, and the +horses require rest. Their importance also increases naturally with +the vicinity of the enemy, and the consequent greater risk of +surprise. In the case of the larger bodies, whole squadrons (see +F.D.O., No. 272) must be detached for this purpose, and communication +with them assured by strong relay lines. These strong advanced +detachments can, under favourable circumstances, get shelter in +villages, so that the horses at least obtain better rest and care for +a few hours, and the same applies naturally to the reconnoitring +squadrons. In all such instances the guiding idea must be to evacuate +the village the moment the enemy appears, and evade collision with +him. How this is to be managed has been already explained (Book I., +Chap. VI.). Accurate knowledge of where all the roads lead to, the +barricading of those running towards the enemy's position, and extreme +alertness on the part of the patrols, are in such cases all-important.</p> + +<p>Above all, the Commander must be confident in the steadiness and +coolness of his men.</p> + +<p>As to the immediate security of the Army itself, this depends in the +first place on the Divisional Cavalry, but during the advance the +Independent Cavalry on the front and flanks guarantees this security +so thoroughly that the former can confine themselves to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page145" name="page145"></a>(p. 145)</span> the +most elementary precautions, which must include primarily the +maintenance of connection with the latter for this purpose. Then they +will not only have to provide for security in the most thorough +manner, but will also have to reconnoitre, and for this purpose follow +the same rules which we have laid down for the Independent Cavalry. If +the enemy's horse prove overpowering, then they will use their power +of defence to the utmost, and seek to increase it by cyclists +belonging to the Infantry, Maxims, and Artillery, in order to beat off +the enemy with loss, and to clear the path for the reconnoitring +patrols.</p> + +<p>Speaking generally, the system I propose is in harmony with the +spirit, if not with the letter, of our Field Service Regulations, in +which the systematic distinction between reconnoitring and security, +as also between strategic and tactical patrols, is, in my opinion, not +sufficiently defined. The essential point which necessitates this +distinction has not been grasped with sufficient precision. If we are +to follow literally the wording of the Field Service Regulations, and +not the spirit which pervades it, which disregards all stereotyped +formations and keeps always the practical in view, then it would be +impossible to carry out screening operations on the scale which the +conditions of modern War will render indispensable. Sufficient stress +has not been laid on the necessary systematizing of the whole +procedure. Finally, too, much weight has been laid upon the employment +of the despatch rider (<i>Meldereiter</i>), although the experience of +1870-1871 has sufficiently shown that this system was unreliable. I +recall as an instance the pursuit of Vinoy's Corps (after Sedan), in +which case the most important report was entrusted to a despatch +rider, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page146" name="page146"></a>(p. 146)</span> who only reached his destination twenty-four hours +after he was despatched, and by that time it was too late to take any +action on the information he conveyed.</p> + +<p>The Field Service Regulations should also contain detailed +instructions as to the employment of cyclists with the Cavalry, for +the rapid development of this mode of locomotion has rendered this +absolutely indispensable. But the point must be brought out that the +use of a cyclist is always only conditional, as it depends on the +weather, the roads, and the country. On heavy, steep, and stony roads, +on which the tyres are only too apt to be punctured, the cyclists are +obliged to dismount; against a head wind they can only make progress +with difficulty. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that for the +transmission of reports from the advanced lines, as well as for +communication between separated bodies of troops within the district +controlled by our Cavalry, they are of inestimable service. Granted +that in particularly unfavourable weather and bad roads they must be +supplemented by Cavalry, they, nevertheless, on the whole, make it +possible to expedite materially the delivery of despatches. This is of +all the greater importance because in case of War the German Armies +will be relatively weak in Cavalry, and under certain circumstances +they will have to fight against a great numerical superiority.</p> + +<p>Even though the principal use of the cyclists lies in the transmission +of information in which they can help the Divisional Cavalry most +materially, nevertheless one must not base too sanguine hopes on their +activity.</p> + +<p>The reason is that because of their wheels they are tied to the roads, +and in consequence they can neither reconnoitre nor provide for +security independently. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page147" name="page147"></a>(p. 147)</span> If for these purposes Cavalry +patrols are attached to them, the chief advantage of their greater +mobility is sacrificed, but without such supports in difficult country +they are tolerably helpless against surprise attacks. If one further +takes into account that a hill takes off from their speed to such a +degree that a horseman can easily catch them up, one must admit that +they afford no sufficient guarantee for the fulfilment of independent +missions outside of the country which our own Cavalry commands. In +such districts they can only be employed on relays, as already pointed +out. Here the duty of providing safety can best be fulfilled by the +Cavalry, because it is not a question of rapid advance, but only of +the protection of stationary posts and certain defined road stretches. +But for the defence of these posts, and for the transmission of +intelligence, the cyclists will do even better service than the +horsemen, because they can cover the ground faster, and when fighting +are not hampered by their horses. Their employment here is all the +more desirable because the relay service makes enormous demands upon +the Cavalry. That was proved up to the hilt in the War of 1870-1871; +the complaints under this head repeat themselves over and over again, +as the records of the Campaign abundantly testify.</p> + +<p>Besides, on these relay duties the cyclists can be tactically employed +in the district which our Cavalry by its patrols commands, for the +rapid occupation of far-advanced posts which neither Cavalry nor +Infantry can reach with sufficient celerity and in adequate force; for +the defence of defiles lying to our rear, which must be kept open to +secure the retreat of the Cavalry; for the support of Independent +Cavalry on outpost duty, particularly at night; and for other similar +purposes. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page148" name="page148"></a>(p. 148)</span> To satisfy all these conditions, these cyclist +detachments require a sufficient tactical training, but in times of +peace one sees in this respect feats performed whose impracticability +in War are glaringly apparent. For instance, men keep their cycles +with them right up in the firing line, and when they want to retreat +or break off the fight they try to mount under fire. As they are +generally tied to the roads, they then file off to the flanks. I have, +indeed, often seen Cyclist detachments lay down their cycles in the +front of the position, and then advance to mount them again in the +teeth of the enemy's fire. All these kind of things are absurd. The +cycles must be treated like the led horses of the Cavalry—that is to +say, the men must dismount under cover, then move up to the firing +line, and then move back to cover in order to mount again. The +position must, moreover, be so chosen as to enable them to move off +without exposing themselves. All these points, which in practice are +rendered difficult, diminish very materially the usefulness of +cyclists, and take away from them, above all, their power of offence; +and in all missions entrusted to them these limitations must be +carefully kept in mind.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="page149" name="page149"></a>(p. 149)</span> II<br> + +ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING</h2> + + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page151" name="page151"></a>(p. 151)</span> CHAPTER I</h2> + +<p class="title">NUMBERS</p> + +<p class="center smcap">Organization and Training</p> + + +<p>When we take into consideration the conditions of modern Warfare, as I +have endeavoured in the foregoing pages to develop them—the numerical +strength of modern Armies; the numerous formations of Artillery and +Infantry set on foot on the outbreak of hostilities; the area of +future theatres of operations—when, further, we consider how many +important tasks await the Cavalry from the moment when the first shot +is fired, and how the most important of these, as I have endeavoured +to establish, can only be dealt with satisfactorily by the employment +of Cavalry 'Masses,' the conviction must force itself home to every +mind that our German Cavalry is numerically inadequate to meet even +the principal demands the future must make upon it.</p> + +<p>If, further, we reflect that, owing to causes which it would be out of +place to deal with in these pages at length, it is precisely upon our +Cavalry that the rôle of fighting against crushing numerical +superiority must devolve, this conviction must give rise to the +gravest anxiety, more especially when it is remembered that the +difficulty of securing a supply of reinforcements adequate for the +performance of our duties is <span class="pagenum"><a id="page152" name="page152"></a>(p. 152)</span> greater with the Cavalry than +with any other Arm. A few days' training at a pinch will turn out an +Infantry soldier or gunner, whose presence need not necessarily be +either dangerous or even detrimental to the efficiency of his company +or battery. An unbroken horse or a bad rider may create confusion in +the ranks of the steadiest squadron.</p> + +<p>The danger is still further aggravated by the fact that a rapid +reduction in their available numbers is certain to take place, owing +to the increased demands which the future must make upon the endurance +of our horsemen, and presumably also the heavier losses they will be +called upon to suffer in action, both of which must be intensified in +proportion as their numerical inadequacy for the tasks incurring on +them increases. Germany is certainly comparatively well supplied with +horses; but owing to the demands of the aforesaid new formations, +which must be set on foot immediately on the declaration of +hostilities, upon the complement of animals fit for War purposes +within our own frontiers, the country will be practically denuded, and +only those horses still too young or those too old for the field will +be left behind.</p> + +<p>Even among those classified as 'fit for War' but few are fit for +Cavalry purposes. Riding horses good enough for the Infantry and +Train—even for the Artillery—may, no doubt, be found; but equal to +the requirements made on the Cavalry horse there are but few indeed, +and even this number is diminishing yearly. As regards the supply from +foreign sources, this must depend on the political situation—i.e., on +conditions which lie beyond our control. Even when these conditions +are favourable, horses cannot be usefully drafted into the ranks +without prolonged <span class="pagenum"><a id="page153" name="page153"></a>(p. 153)</span> training and breaking to fit them for +their new duties. Hence the conclusion is inevitable that the +numerical strength of our Cavalry, already, as I have shown, so +inadequate, must fall off very rapidly at the commencement of a +campaign, because its rapid reinforcement with satisfactory material +is, under the circumstances, quite out of the question.</p> + +<p>From this conclusion there is no escape; and in view of the increased +importance I have above assigned to the due performance of all Cavalry +duties, its recognition carries with it, as its corollary, the +absolute need for the numerical augmentation of this branch of the +service.</p> + +<p>The enormous mechanism of our modern Armies can only work normally and +successfully when its constituent 'power factors'—<i>i.e.</i>, the three +Arms—have been apportioned with due regard to the work to be +accomplished. If driving-power fails any one portion, the danger lies +near that at some critical moment the whole apparatus will suffer in +sympathy, and fail to respond to the strain it is called upon to +endure.</p> + +<p>The question of this increase in the Cavalry has, indeed, often before +been raised, but never with the weight of concentrated conviction the +situation, in my opinion, deserves. For the most part, only expedients +to avoid the bitter necessity of a serious augmentation have been +suggested. Thus it has been proposed to form new regiments of four +squadrons each by taking away from the existing ones their fifth +squadron, and the suggestion has been supported by an appeal to the +fact that in War-time only four squadrons per regiment take the field.</p> + +<p>No expert, however, can fail to agree with Lieutenant-General +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page154" name="page154"></a>(p. 154)</span> von Pelet-Narbonne, who maintains in his 'Cavalry Regiments +of Four Squadrons' (<i>Kreuz Zeitung</i>, January 17, 1899) that such a +measure would entail the ruin of our Cavalry, and would destroy with +one blow all that the reorganizations of 1859 and 1860 have done for +the War efficiency of our regiments by entailing a depreciation of the +value of the squadrons at the very moment when called on to move out +and face the enemy.</p> + +<p>Thus he writes: 405 squadrons are in Peace retained on the lower +establishment of 133, or the middle one of 137. Their numbers are 170 +of the former, 235 of the latter, and the War strength averages 150 +per squadron. To attain this figure those on the lower establishment +need 17 horses, those on the middle 13.</p> + +<p>With no fifth squadron to draw upon for horses, as at present, these +vacancies would have to be filled by 'augmentation horses'—<i>i.e.</i>, +animals straight from the country, thoroughly raw and unaccustomed to +work under the rider, often also of inferior quality. But these 13 to +17 horses per squadron by no means exhaust the situation. The field +squadrons must leave their youngest remounts—say 15 in number—still +too young and unbroken, behind them; for the experiences of the last +War proved abundantly that where this precaution was neglected the +greater part of them broke down under the hardships of the Campaign. +Taking even the most favourable time of year for mobilization—viz., +in May—then out of the 15 young remounts of good material, and with +careful choice, not more than 8 will be found fit for the ranks; the +remainder will have to be left behind with the 'Depot' squadron, to +be sent on afterwards. Any <span class="pagenum"><a id="page155" name="page155"></a>(p. 155)</span> other procedure would only lead to +the useless sacrifice of these valuable young animals. The places of +the horses thus left behind will, therefore, also have to be filled by +augmentation horses, thus bringing the number of these up to 24 and 20 +respectively.</p> + +<p>Then we still have to provide for the wants of the Depot squadron, +which has to train the recruits, and for these a further number of +trained horses, averaging 32, must be left behind, or another 8 from +each squadron; and, finally, another 2 per squadron will be required +for Staff orderlies and Staff guard duties.</p> + +<p>According to this calculation, the Field squadron would have to move +out with from 34 to 30 augmentation horses (the sixty squadrons on the +higher establishment with 27).</p> + +<p>The matter, however, presents a totally different appearance when in +peace five squadrons are in existence, of which one remains behind as +a depot. Taking away the 35 horses for recruits, and following our +previous calculation of 7 young remounts, there would remain on the +lower establishment 91 efficient horses to be divided amongst the +other four squadrons, or 23 each, so that these would take the field +with only 11, 7, or 4 'augmentation horses,' according to the +respective peace establishments of the regiments. With these numbers +the squadron suffers no reduction of its efficiency, for these few can +always be employed—in the squadron carts, etc.—at any rate, need not +be in the ranks.</p> + +<p>These figures, worked out in the spring of 1899, are still +substantially correct, and it appears to me General von Pelet-Narbonne +deals too leniently with this proposal for forming the fifth squadrons +into new <span class="pagenum"><a id="page156" name="page156"></a>(p. 156)</span> regiments, because many of the calls made on the +squadrons are even heavier than he assumes; besides, there are always +in every squadron some inefficient or sick horses, which will +presently have to be cast. Further, I consider it impracticable to +take eight remounts into the field, for these young animals are by no +means equal to the demands which modern conditions must make upon them +from the very first days of mobilization.</p> + +<p>Hence the number of augmentation horses will be considerably increased +above General von Pelet's estimate, but he is unquestionably correct +in his opinion that a large number of these untrained animals will +exercise a more detrimental influence under existing conditions than +formerly, when, after completed mobilization, the squadrons often had +a considerable time in hand to weld into cohesion their constituent +elements. Nowadays the regiments will be rapidly forwarded to the +front by rail, and from the very commencement of hostilities the +fullest demands will be made on their efficiency. Unbroken horses, and +others not trained to the long gallops and trots of to-day, cannot +possibly carry weights of from 230 to 240 pounds for many hours a day +straight across country. After a very short spell most of the +augmentation horses would be useless, and their presence would only +have brought confusion and unsteadiness into the ranks of their +squadrons.</p> + +<p>These disadvantages might indeed be partially mitigated if the +squadrons were raised in Peace to their full War establishment and +somewhat above it—say to 160 horses. But, on the one hand, this would +mean a not inconsiderable increase in the Cavalry; on the other, our +Peace conditions would be difficult <span class="pagenum"><a id="page157" name="page157"></a>(p. 157)</span> to adapt to such an +organization. Without going closer into these details, it will be +sufficient to point out that all our barracks and riding-schools are +designed for five squadrons; and further, that we do not need +numerically stronger regiments, but a greater number, in order to +satisfy all requirements.</p> + +<p>Hence, if it is admitted that swamping our squadrons with thirty or +more augmentation horses must diminish most seriously the efficiency +of our Cavalry, then it follows that a still further increase in their +number will make matters still worse. Such proposals have no doubt +been made, and it certainly would be convenient if our Cavalry could +thus easily on mobilization be increased by one-third to one-half its +strength; but after what has been said, above all such suggestions +must be seen to be impracticable, for squadrons which consisted, for +instance, of one-half augmentation horses would be simply useless for +War purposes. A proceeding, therefore, which brought such results in +its train would imply no increase of the Arm, but rather the +destruction of the existing standard of Peace-time efficiency.</p> + +<p>Even as Divisional Cavalry such squadrons would be useless, for these +require good individual horsemanship even more than those of the +Independent Division for the performance of their special duties, and +the necessary standard can never be attained with untrained horses.</p> + +<p>All who put forward proposals of this nature are labouring under the +dominion of a fundamental fallacy. They overlook the fact I have +explained in the foregoing section, that Cavalry by its very nature +can never be other than a highly-specialized Arm, and hence that the +system adopted by the Infantry of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page158" name="page158"></a>(p. 158)</span> raising the cadres to War +strength by the absorption of reserve men is for the Cavalry +fundamentally impossible. For in the Infantry the ranks are filled by +the addition of trained men; in the Cavalry they must be completed +with untrained horses, and the untrained horses break down under +service conditions much more rapidly than the men.</p> + +<p>Our experience in 1870-1871 was conclusive on this point. Already +towards the end of August—<i>i.e.</i>, in less than six weeks from the +outbreak of the War—the greater part of the augmentation horses were +quite useless for field purposes. If one looks up the reports in the +War Archives, everywhere this complaint about the untrained animals is +recurrent.</p> + +<p>From all the above-mentioned circumstances it must be clear that a +numerical increase in the Cavalry is most urgently called for, and in +my opinion it would be best if this indispensable increase, the need +for which is becoming apparent even to public opinion, were grafted +upon the existing five-squadron system, which at least guarantees a +certain amount of preparation of the augmentation horses, without +entailing the reduction of the squadrons below the minimum standard +necessary for efficiency. I would, however, be willing to support any +other method which would give a sensible increase in the Cavalry +strength of our Peace establishment, and only protest against any +scheme which would seek to swell out the ranks or create new units on +mobilization; for all these are mere self-delusion, increasing, no +doubt, the numbers on paper, but in reality striking at the efficiency +of the Arm in the most vital manner.</p> + +<p>If, then, at the moment there may be conditions outside my ken which +render a measure of the nature <span class="pagenum"><a id="page159" name="page159"></a>(p. 159)</span> I have indicated +impracticable, we must, nevertheless, not close our eyes to the fact +that, after the recent reorganization of the Artillery, the creation +of an adequate number of Cavalry regiments in the nearest future is an +absolute necessity, and that in the meanwhile any such palliative as a +recourse to the cadre system must be absolutely rejected.</p> + +<p>As an indispensable complement of the proposal to form new regiments, +so that we shall not be compelled to fall back on an inferior class of +horse to meet their requirements, and at the same time to insure as +far as possible a supply of suitable remounts to replace our losses in +War, further encouragement of horse-breeding operations in our own +territories is most urgently called for. This can only be attained by +a further reasonable increase in the price paid for remounts.<a id="footnotetag16" name="footnotetag16"></a><a href="#footnote16" title="Go to footnote 16"><span class="smaller">[16]</span></a></p> + +<p>Such a measure must form a preliminary to the coming increase of the +Arm, and the sooner it is undertaken the better will be the result.</p> + +<p>These points of view cannot be insisted upon too vehemently, since +even in Military circles they have not everywhere received the +consideration they deserve, and it is most necessary that public +opinion, which finds its ultimate expression within the walls of the +Reichstag, should receive adequate instruction as to the vital +interests involved.</p> + +<p>In any case, the difficulties attending any adequate increase of our +Cavalry must not be underrated, and we must remain prepared to face +the strain of a European <span class="pagenum"><a id="page160" name="page160"></a>(p. 160)</span> Campaign with a strength inadequate +for the difficult and most momentous problems we shall be called on to +face—problems which, according to the measure of success or the +reverse attending their solution, will exercise the most far-reaching +consequences on the whole course of the War.</p> + +<p>Under all circumstances we shall have to endeavour to attain at least +that measure of success which the Army Headquarters unconditionally +require to render possible their own effective operations.</p> + +<p>Superior energy and skill in the conduct of our operations, +concentration of our forces, increased care for the maintenance both +of the moral and material in our Commands, increased boldness in our +undertakings, together with wise moderation in the choice of our +objectives, must all help to compensate for our numerical weakness, +and while consciously leaving on one side everything not directly +conducive to our immediate purpose, we must seek to appear at the +psychological moment, and from the decisive direction, with forces in +hand, and by the energetic use of the relative and local superiority +such concentration confers, to gain and keep an advantage to the end +of the campaign. The higher, however, the demands which, with this +purpose in view, we are compelled to make on the moral, physical, and +material strength of the troops, the more we are justified in +demanding that, at least as regards organization and training, they +shall be equal to all demands modern conditions may impose upon them. +If in these points we have no sufficient security guaranteeing the +highest possible performances, it would be impossible to count even on +the most necessary results in time of War.</p> + +<p>The question, then, arises whether from these points <span class="pagenum"><a id="page161" name="page161"></a>(p. 161)</span> of view +our German Cavalry is equal to the maximum strain it may be called on +to endure.</p> + +<p>As concerns our organization, there is a widespread demand that those +commands which form the basis of our War organization—<i>i.e.</i>, the +Cavalry Divisions—should exist already in Peace as concrete units; +and in support of this it is urged that men and leaders must know each +other mutually if the full effect of their combined power is to be +realized in War. It is also held that if once these Divisions were +definitely formed, then as a consequence of their existence they would +more frequently be brought together for manœuvres on a large scale, +to the benefit of the tactical training of all concerned.</p> + +<p>It appears to me that the real centre of gravity in this question of +organization lies less in this permanent constitution of the Division +in Peace than people generally imagine.</p> + +<p>The requirement that leaders and men should know one another I cannot +accept as an indispensable condition of War-time efficiency. However +desirable it may appear that such a relation should exist, it is one +which has never been, and never can be, guaranteed in War. The +practicable ideal rather consists in this, that the principles in +accordance with which the commands are handled should be so thoroughly +flesh and blood of both leaders and led, that under all circumstances +a sufficient result is secure. To reach this ideal is the true purpose +of our training.</p> + +<p>In the permanent existence of Divisions it seems to me there is great +danger that such a guarantee for their successful employment would be +sacrificed.</p> + +<p>We have seen that the demands likely to be made on the Cavalry require +widely different arrangement <span class="pagenum"><a id="page162" name="page162"></a>(p. 162)</span> of the disposable forces; that +this requirement increases in importance as the Arm falls numerically +beneath the needs of the situation, and that only a most adaptable +organization can deal adequately with the emergencies this numerical +insufficiency may entail. Hence it is to be feared that a permanent +constitution in Divisions might lose this requisite adaptability, and, +however highly we may appreciate the advantages of a firmly welded War +organization, one should never allow the form to interfere with the +practical application of the means—<i>i.e.</i>, never allow the troops to +become so rigid as to hamper their employment in the field. But this +is just what would happen if the Divisions were maintained on a +permanent War footing.</p> + +<p>Every application of Cavalry Masses requires a certain measure of +drill control, because it depends always on the movement of closed +bodies of troops, and if the Cavalry Divisions are constantly drilled +together under the same Leader in Peace, there is at least a very +great risk that this certain degree of drill control, which we +recognise as indispensable, will degenerate into hard-and-fast +prescription, since the Leader has always the same number of units at +his disposal, and will thus by degrees habituate himself to consider +these as invariable quantities in the solution of every tactical +problem.</p> + +<p>Our experiences with the Regulations for 1876 show that this danger is +by no means imaginary, for by the constant practice of the so-called +'Three-Line Tactics' we had already progressed far on the downward +path which leads to tactical destruction. If the 'Form' would not fit +the conditions, so much the worse for the conditions. Fortunately, +thanks to subsequent changes, we have shed the worst of these +tendencies, and are on the high-road towards freer and more <span class="pagenum"><a id="page163" name="page163"></a>(p. 163)</span> +adaptable tactical formations, but to me it seems that any attempt to +fetter this progress by the adoption of a more or less rigid +organization can only result in evil for the whole Arm. Rather should +we lay down as a fixed principle that all Cavalry units must be able +both to move and fight according to the same tactical principles, no +matter in what order these units may be grouped together.</p> + +<p>The question now arises whether our present formation of six regiments +to a Division is really equal to all demands which may be made upon +it; whether, in fact, in view of the strategical requirements it may +be called on to fulfil, and the degree of resistance to their +execution it is likely to encounter, six regiments will prove +numerically equal to their task.</p> + +<p>Considered in relation to the enormous Armies of the present day, and +the still greater possibilities a general call to arms of a whole +nation may involve, six regiments represent a very small actual factor +of strength. If they should have to take the field for an independent +mission, it would not even be possible to keep them all together. The +protection of the flanks, and of the necessary baggage and supply +trains, the far-reaching reconnaissances, and the need for extended +requisitions, all unite to compel the creation of detachments, which +in the aggregate must make considerable inroads on the total strength. +Then there is the inevitable tale of losses on the march, the +necessity for subdivision of one's forces for the passage or the +turning of defiles; in fact, the demands are so many that the true +fighting body of the Division—<i>i.e.</i>, the squadrons available for the +ultimate decisive shock—is represented by a very small fraction of +its original forces. If a complete Division can place only 3,600 +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page164" name="page164"></a>(p. 164)</span> sabres in the field, or, dismounted, from 1,680 to 3,000 +rifles, according to the number of horse-holders required—figures +which even without the above-mentioned detachments are quite +inconsiderable in relation to what even an inconsiderable Infantry +opponent can bring into action—what prospect of success is there for +the weakened Independent Division in the execution of quite minor +operations, when even in 1870-1871, not once, but frequently, the main +body of our Cavalry Divisions shrank often to six or seven weak +squadrons.</p> + +<p>It is chiefly the consequences of our, on the whole, satisfactory +experiences in the above Campaign which have led us to accept the +existing Division of six regiments as a satisfactory solution of this +problem of strength; but we forget that in those days we had no +Cavalry opponent to encounter, and that our sphere of action, owing to +the want on our side of an adequate equipment of firearms, was small +indeed in comparison with what we must expect in the future. We are +encouraged in our illusion by the fact that in our Peace manœuvres +the strength of the opposing forces is generally nearly equal, and +also because the actual demands War will make upon the Arm are still +in these exercises very imperfectly realized, and from the nature of +the case cannot receive full recognition. Further, there is the fact +that our possible opponents have adopted the same organization, and +last, but not least, there remains the view that every tactical unit +of the Cavalry must not only be capable of being strategically +employed as a whole, but must also be in point of size within the +control of its Leader as a tactical unit.</p> + +<p>Our unfortunate experiences with larger formations in 1866 are often +cited in favour of our present system, the point being ignored that it +was not the size of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page165" name="page165"></a>(p. 165)</span> these bodies, but the faulty methods in +which they were employed, both strategically and tactically, that led +to our disappointment.</p> + +<p>I think, therefore, that unprejudiced consideration must come to the +conclusion that our Divisions as they now exist are too weak for the +many and most decisive operations they will be called on to undertake. +The absolute necessity to secure the victory over the enemy's Cavalry +at the decisive point under all circumstances, and at the same time to +retain a sufficient force in hand to reap all the consequences of that +victory, will, I am convinced, lead to a materially greater +concentration of power in the single unit.</p> + +<p>If from this point of view the permanent constitution of Cavalry +Divisions cannot be upheld, it follows that even less is to be said +for the formation of still stronger units in Peace-time, for this +measure would entail in even greater degree the very same strategical +and tactical limitations we have noted in the case of the Divisions, +and still further cramp the necessary adaptability of the organization +to meet the conditions of our Peace-time training. At the same time, +it is clear that it is of the utmost importance that the formation of +these stronger formations, Corps, or Divisions of greater numerical +strength, the necessity for which can be recognised in advance, should +be arranged for in the mobilization plans, and not built up afterwards +by the mere combination of existing Divisions.</p> + +<p>For such bodies cannot be improvised altogether. In order to develop +their full efficiency they require a carefully selected and ample +staff of men who can be trusted to pull well together, and who have at +their disposal all the auxiliary services necessary for greater +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page166" name="page166"></a>(p. 166)</span> independent operations. For these both trains and columns +are needed, which must be larger than those of two or even three +single Divisions; for, on the one hand, the greater size of the Corps +entails closer concentration of its units, thus making heavier demands +on the provision columns; and, on the other, the Corps must be capable +of carrying out longer and more obstinate engagements than a single +Division.</p> + +<p>It is, therefore, most essential that the several Staffs required for +the Corps to be created in War-time should be thoroughly trained so as +to insure their working together, and the trains and columns necessary +to complete these units should be held ready for them in time of +Peace.<a id="footnotetag17" name="footnotetag17"></a><a href="#footnote17" title="Go to footnote 17"><span class="smaller">[17]</span></a></p> + +<p>To hand over the functions of Corps Commander to the senior of the two +or three Divisional Commanders would hardly be an adequate means of +securing satisfactory results even for a single day of battle; still +less could it suffice in the case of an independent strategic +operation. On the other hand, it is not at all essential that the +Corps thus formed at the outset of operations should be retained +intact throughout their whole period. One can make detachments from +them, or reinforce them according to circumstances, and thus attain +that very flexibility of organization which I have endeavoured to +prove to be an absolutely indispensable factor to meet the conditions +of our times.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page167" name="page167"></a>(p. 167)</span> It appears to me also that the same advantage which it is +hoped to realize by the creation of permanent Divisions can be reached +by other roads, and with still better results.</p> + +<p>I would divide the whole territory of the German Empire into a number +of territorial districts, and call them Cavalry Inspections, or +Corps—the name is immaterial—each to comprise about twenty +regiments, and subdivide these again into sub-Inspections (<i>i.e.</i>, +Divisions and Brigades), and thus obtain, not only the foundations and +the Staffs for a practical War formation, but for a systematic +preparation of the Arm in time of Peace. The Inspections would detail +annually the necessary squadrons on a War strength for manœuvres of +the three Arms, according to a changing roster, and hold special +Cavalry manœuvres in a manner I propose to develop hereafter.</p> + +<p>We should thus, from the point of view of organization, gain the +advantage of having the cadres for both Corps and Divisions ready in +time of Peace, without being bound once for all to a hard-and-fast +strength for the Division.</p> + +<p>It may be objected that it would be illogical to separate the Cavalry +from the Army Corps and Divisional Commands at the very moment that we +have assigned the whole of the Artillery to the Infantry Divisions, +but for the latter Arm the conditions are quite different. It always +fights in combination with the other Arms; by itself it cannot fight +at all.</p> + +<p>The Cavalry, on the other hand, as regards its principal masses, is +quite independent, and only occasionally in moments of crisis +intervenes in the action of the other Arms, even then still as an +independent <span class="pagenum"><a id="page168" name="page168"></a>(p. 168)</span> unit. The connection with the remainder of the +Army would be sufficiently secured by its participation in the annual +manœuvres of the three Arms, and, as at present, Cavalry Brigade +Commanders would still have to be employed in the arrangement of the +Brigade manœuvres. The participation of the Cavalry Regiments in +the Garrison Field Service exercises would remain matter of +arrangement between the respective Commands, but definite rules would +have to be drawn up to secure their effective co-operation.</p> + +<p>The necessary trains for the Inspections and Divisions would be kept +ready in time of Peace, and, whether Horse Artillery—possibly also +Maxim guns—should be permanently allotted to them or otherwise, might +remain open for further discussion, though there is undoubtedly much +to be urged in favour of the suggestion.</p> + +<p>In this manner I believe an organization could be created which would +meet all reasonable requirements. Certain new Staffs, fully equipped +with both General Staff Officers and those necessary for the +contemplated trains, etc., would be of course necessary, for in case +of War such creations cannot be improvised to work together without +most detrimental friction for any units, and least of all for those +which from the first moment of hostilities will be called on for +decisive action, and thus have less time and opportunity to shake down +into their new duties.</p> + +<p>A practical Peace Organization, such as in fact we do not at present +possess, is a necessity of the first importance. But 'Mobility' in the +Arm itself remains the prime condition of efficiency in its +strategical activity, which, as we have seen above, must henceforward +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page169" name="page169"></a>(p. 169)</span> be considered the most important sphere of its duties.</p> + +<p>To secure this mobility is, therefore, our unconditional duty, and it +is in this direction in particular that, in my opinion, our Cavalry is +as yet hardly sufficiently prepared for the tasks that await it.</p> + +<p>Strategical 'mobility' certainly depends in the first place on the +excellence of the horse supply and the suitable 'training' both of man +and horse; but the tactical independence of the troops themselves, and +the means of maintaining them in condition—<i>i.e.</i>, conditions of +supply—are at least of equal importance. Owing to our experiences in +the French Campaign, where food and fodder were generally abundant, +sufficient attention has not been given universally to this factor. +Had we been compelled to undergo the same hardships as the Russians in +1877-1878, our views would doubtless have been very different.</p> + +<p>The amount of forage that even under most favourable circumstances can +be carried on the horses is very small. To count on finding even that +amount always in the country through which we may have to operate +would be more than imprudent. Even in 1870-1871 we could not always +find what we needed in spite of the very favourable agricultural +conditions, and with the enormous Armies of the present day we shall +probably find the country even more exhausted of supplies than +formerly, particularly in the latter phases of the struggle, except +when one has the good-fortune to fall upon rich stretches of the +country which by chance may have escaped the devastation of previous +operations.</p> + +<p>We may also be called on to work in sparsely settled districts with a +large export trade in corn, in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page170" name="page170"></a>(p. 170)</span> which at times stocks may +sink very low. In short, unless we wish to be hampered at every step +of our movements by the necessity for wide-reaching foraging +expeditions, we shall have to rely upon our magazines and the supplies +which can be transmitted from them to the front through the agency of +our supply columns. The carrying capacity and mobility of the latter, +therefore, condition inexorably the degree of mobility in strategical +operations which, under all circumstances, the Cavalry can be counted +on to develop. Whoever relies on more will lay himself open to most +bitter disappointments exactly at the decisive moments.</p> + +<p>The supply trains must, therefore, be able to march at least as fast +as the troops themselves, for only on this condition is there any +guarantee that even under difficult circumstances the necessary +supplies will be forthcoming; yet though experience most abundantly +demonstrates the difficulties of maintaining the supplies of the +Infantry in spite of the fact that, as a rule, their columns can cover +the ground faster than the men can march, there appears to be a tacit +assumption that with the Cavalry the trains will always arrive in +time, although they move far slower than the troops they follow and +supply.</p> + +<p>There was, indeed, a certain amount of justification for this idea in +the days when Cavalry were more or less tied to the movements of the +rest of the Army; but nowadays, when Cavalry operates independently, +and must cover long distances in the shortest time, it has become +simply preposterous.</p> + +<p>We have only to consider that we have now to reckon with average daily +marches of from twenty-five to thirty miles, and that a beaten or +evading force may have to retrace the same distance, perhaps even +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page171" name="page171"></a>(p. 171)</span> on the very same day, at a much faster rate than that at +which it advanced, to perceive its absurdity. What chance would there +be for waggons which could not go out of a walk, and cannot reverse on +the road itself, which check at every hill, and sink to the axles in +mud or sand? How can strategically independent Cavalry provide for the +security of its baggage when it must often be left some days' marches +behind? And yet it is precisely when operating against an active +opposing Cavalry or an insurgent population that protection for the +baggage becomes most indispensable. Again, how are such trains to be +cleared away from the front when the main bodies of the two armies are +closing on one another for battle? or how, after it is decided, can +they be brought forward again to follow their Cavalry in pursuit, and +convey to it the supplies which in such moments it will most need, and +on whose prompt arrival its striking radius will depend? How, with +insufficient mobility, will they maintain the connection between the +combatants in front and the standing magazines, or even with the +movable supply depots following behind the marching Army?</p> + +<p>Here we come upon one of the most difficult problems of the day, and +it cannot be insisted on too strongly that its solution during Peace +is an indispensable condition of the efficiency of the Arm in War. The +Cavalry trains must be organized in such a manner that they will be +able to march at least as fast as the Cavalry itself, and be adequate +in number to carry from five to six days' corn. Only when this demand +has been complied with will it be possible to count on the attainment +of the strategical independence at which we aim, and to attempt all +that this implies <span class="pagenum"><a id="page172" name="page172"></a>(p. 172)</span> with less would only lead to the complete +breakdown of the Arm, which, as we have already seen, under existing +conditions, can never be efficiently replaced during the same +Campaign.</p> + +<p>It is not alone with the splendid chaussées of France that we must +reckon, but with the sand roads of East and West Prussia, the swamps +of Poland and Russia, and so forth, on all of which the same degree of +mobility must be developed, for the speed of the Cavalry itself is +practically independent of the nature of the roads. Without going +further into the detailed measures necessary to attain this ideal, the +importance of which must be evident to every practical soldier. I +would call attention to only one fundamental consideration: the desire +to curtail the length of supply columns by concentrating the loads, +with the object of lessening the congestion of the roads and +diminishing the time needed to bring their contents to the troops, is +sound as long as it attains its object, fatal everywhere else.<a id="footnotetag18" name="footnotetag18"></a><a href="#footnote18" title="Go to footnote 18"><span class="smaller">[18]</span></a></p> + +<p>Now, the Cavalry Masses move under different conditions to the rest of +the Army. Either they are in the front of or on the flanks; in the +latter case, they have roads at their own disposal, in the former, +being generally some days' march in advance, they clear the front when +collision is imminent by moving to the flanks, and only quite +exceptionally retire through the advancing columns, and in all cases +they must be able to get off the roads quickly. The depth of these +columns is comparatively unimportant.</p> + +<p>Hence, from the strategical relations of the Cavalry Masses to the +rest of the Army there arises no particular <span class="pagenum"><a id="page173" name="page173"></a>(p. 173)</span> reason to +endeavour to shorten their trains. If the heavy baggage of a Cavalry +Division is two and a half or five kilometres in length it is +tolerably immaterial, but it is imperative, as we have seen, that they +should be able to move and get out of the way. Hence, it is not the +number of waggons which concerns us, but their individual lightness +and mobility, so that on all roads they can follow their units at a +trot, and only in the case of Divisional Cavalry can the other point +of view be admitted.</p> + +<p>The possibility must also not be overlooked that it may not always be +practical for Cavalry masses to fill up their supply columns direct +from the Army reserves; and to meet this, second échelons of waggons +will be required, in every degree as mobile as the first, and so +organized as to require a minimum escort for their safety.</p> + +<p>For such escorts Cavalry Reservists and men of the Landwehr exist in +adequate numbers, and armed with a useful carbine and mounted on +horses, only as a means of locomotion, they will answer their purpose +well enough.</p> + +<p>No matter, however, how ample the supply of these columns may be, or +how mobile, circumstances will still arise during periods of great +concentration in which it will be impossible to bring up supply +waggons in sufficient numbers. In these cases we require an emergency +horse ration, which within a small compass contains great nourishment.</p> + +<p>Too much cannot be expected from such a ration; for instance, it +cannot be bulky enough to fill the animal's stomach. All that is +necessary is that it should be willingly eaten by the horses, keep +well, and be easily carried. It should contain about three <span class="pagenum"><a id="page174" name="page174"></a>(p. 174)</span> +times the nutritive qualities, weight for weight, of oats, and should +suffice to keep horses in condition for three or four days in +succession. These demands are fairly satisfied by a food manufactured +by Marck at Darmstadt. It should be always carried in the field and +replenished as consumed, and with it even the most advanced patrols +might be made independent of requisitions, a matter which appears to +me of the greatest importance.</p> + +<p>The fundamental condition of mobility being thus satisfied, the next +step will be to insure the technical and tactical independence of the +units under all circumstances which can be reasonably foreseen.</p> + +<p>In this direction much has been done, and materials for the +destruction of railways, folding pontoons, and a field telegraph, now +form part of our equipment. The opportunities for the use of the +latter in the course of rapid movements—<i>i.e.</i>, just in the most +important sphere of our activities—seem to me highly problematical, +as I have already pointed out; and the waggons which transport the +bridging equipment are too heavy to be always at hand when most +needed. Essentially, it seems only fitted to facilitate the progress +of smaller bodies of troops, and would hardly suffice to secure rapid +and safe passage of Cavalry Masses with all their attendant trains +over the rivers for which we ought to be prepared. For such purposes +they would only suffice if all the boats of a whole Division were +united into one bridging train.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the collapsible boats are a most useful concession, and +they would be still more so if the load was more suitably subdivided; +as it is, the weight of the whole waggon ties us too much to the made +roads. For the Divisional Cavalry, which always moves in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page175" name="page175"></a>(p. 175)</span> +close connection with the Infantry, and in need can always fall back +upon the Divisional Bridge Train, it has no particular value, and it +would therefore be better if, in War-time, all the collapsible boat +equipment were handed over to the independent Cavalry Divisions, and +their bridging equipment thus augmented.</p> + +<p>More important, however, than this collapsible boat question is the +matter of the pioneer detachments to be assigned to the Cavalry +Divisions which require further equipment. A waggon of bridging +material just sufficient to cross smaller ditches and watercourses, +which can neither be jumped nor scrambled over, but which require only +one, or at most two, bays, would be invaluable, for it is just these +little hindrances, whose importance cannot be measured or deduced from +the map, which may bring most important Cavalry undertakings +unexpectedly to a check, particularly when in an enemy's country all +the culverts, etc., have been destroyed. In the days of Frederick the +Great such bridging equipment was often assigned to the Cavalry +marching at the head of the Columns, in order to help them over +similar obstacles.</p> + +<p>Given, however, that all has been done to attain the degree of +collective mobility we require, a point of equal importance is that +the troops should be adequately provided with all they require for +their tactical action. In this respect, it cannot be too much insisted +upon that carbine ammunition should be placed in the very first line; +our present allowance is altogether insufficient.</p> + +<p>The importance of dismounted action, as we have already seen, has +enormously increased. Almost daily, under certain conditions, we shall +have to have <span class="pagenum"><a id="page176" name="page176"></a>(p. 176)</span> recourse to our firearms, and often be obliged +to expend very considerable quantities of ammunition to attain the +object we fight for. The replenishment of this consumption is far more +difficult in our case than with the Infantry, particularly in +operations partaking of the nature of raids, in which our +communications are likely to be interrupted. These conditions require +first of all a considerable increase in the number of rounds carried +on the man's person, and also in the number of Small Arm Ammunition +waggons attached to the units, and the regulations for the +replenishment of these require also corresponding development.</p> + +<p>Further, it must be pointed out with all possible insistence that the +present equipment of the trooper is thoroughly impracticable. That the +carbine should be carried on the horse and the sword on the man is +opposed to common sense, for the latter is only of use when mounted, +the former only on foot. The sword should, therefore, be attached to +the saddle, the carbine to the man, as is, in fact, the practice of +all races of born horsemen. A practicable method of attachment is +certainly capable of being devised; it is probably only the question +of expense that stands in the way of its solution. The consequences, +however, of the existing attachment to the saddle are that the weapon +must be shorter than that of the Infantry soldier, and hence has a +lesser range; but it is precisely the Cavalry that requires to be able +to obtain good results at long ranges. Even against Infantry it must +always be in a position to obtain decisive results in the shortest +time. To obtain these ends it needs a weapon at least equal, if +possible superior, to that of the Infantry; and instead it has only +the carbine, a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page177" name="page177"></a>(p. 177)</span> weapon of most restricted range, and most +inadequately sighted. It is required of Cavalry that it should break +off an engagement when the enemy approaches within 700 metres (Drill +Regulations, No. 562), and all the training the man gets in Peace is +at 600 metres at target practice, and only quite occasionally, if at +all, at greater distances at field practice.</p> + +<p>I consider it most important that the Cavalry should be supplied with +a weapon which admits of accurate practice at long ranges, and for +which the greatest number of rounds can be carried. This would entail, +on the one hand, an increase in the length of the weapon carried; on +the other, a reduction in calibre, which should be made as small as +possible. We might thus safely go down to a 6-millimetre bore, and +increase the ammunition accordingly. The desire to retain the same +cartridge as the Infantry, to facilitate mutual assistance in +ammunition supply on occasions, seems to me of quite secondary +importance. As long as the Cavalry were still tied to the Infantry on +the line of march this consideration had indeed some weight; but now +that it moves far in front of, or on the flanks of, the Infantry +columns, and has its own arrangements for ammunition supply, the case +is quite different. The point nowadays is to make sure of that degree +of effect which is unconditionally necessary to our purpose, and for +this we require a weapon specially adapted to our particular need.</p> + +<p>Our method of carrying our cartridges in the pouch attached to the +cross-belt is also impracticable. The bandoliers of the Boers would be +undoubtedly preferable, and could at the same time be made use of to +secure the carbine on the back.</p> + +<p>It is also a matter for serious consideration whether <span class="pagenum"><a id="page178" name="page178"></a>(p. 178)</span> cycle +detachments should not be attached to the Cavalry,<a id="footnotetag19" name="footnotetag19"></a><a href="#footnote19" title="Go to footnote 19"><span class="smaller">[19]</span></a> and I think I +am not going too far in estimating fifteen to twenty cyclists per +regiment as a suitable number to perform the many duties which may +fall to their lot. On the advantages they confer I have already dwelt +(Book I., Chap. VIII.), and further, I would advocate the addition of +portable or wheelable Maxims to the Cavalry to add to their fire +power. The latest patterns of this weapon are capable of easy +transportation, and can come into action very rapidly. Naturally such +heavy batteries as we now possess should be avoided. As regards this +latter weapon, one should not think of it primarily as destined to +take part in the real Cavalry duel; one should do nothing in this +direction to rob the horsemen of their confidence in themselves by +teaching them to lean on the firearm for support. Even the effect of +the Artillery in this respect is not always and everywhere +advantageous. One is too much inclined to make the action of the +Cavalry depend on the effect of the guns, and thus to sacrifice the +initiative when opposed to an enemy's horse. Nor would there be many +opportunities in practice for the Maxims to render support to the +charge. In the introductory phases of an engagement—<i>i.e.</i>, when the +enemy is still at a considerable distance—they promise little +results, and in the moments when the 'Masses' are sent forward to the +attack, they would get in the way and hinder their freedom of +movement. On the other hand, they would be of great use in cases where +it is necessary to overcome or parry an Infantry opponent, and in +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page179" name="page179"></a>(p. 179)</span> the battle, or in pursuit, when the Cavalry succeed in +getting in on the flanks or rear of the enemy's chief masses, they +might prove invaluable. Here, where reserves, columns, and trains all +form suitable targets, they would not only add materially to the +striking power of the Cavalry, but increase its radius of action very +materially.</p> + +<p>By their side the Artillery will always maintain its high importance +for the fight against localities, woods, and defiles, and with this +Arm the German Cavalry is, in my opinion, sufficiently supplied; +only—and this is of the greatest importance—more adequate steps to +insure ammunition supply are essential in the case of the Independent +Cavalry Masses. Here, too, we shall have to reckon with far higher +consumption than in 1870-1871, and the greater distances will make it +impossible to replenish from the general Reserves of the Army. The +Cavalry, therefore, require sufficient ammunition columns of its very +own.</p> + +<p>The nature of Cavalry operations indicate yet another +requirement—namely, batteries so organized that to every brigade of +two regiments one battery of four pieces should be assigned. Many will +be the occasions in our strategical operations on which guns will be +required, and in most of these it is more a question of having <i>some</i> +Artillery at hand rather than of the development of superior fire +power—<i>i.e.</i>, a few shells into a village at the right time may be +all that is needed for our purpose. Further, in operating on several +roads it can seldom be foretold with exactness on which road the need +may first arise.</p> + +<p>Under these conditions it is of the greatest importance to be able, if +necessary, to assign a battery to each brigade, and at the same time +not to allow the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page180" name="page180"></a>(p. 180)</span> half of the whole available Artillery to +escape from control.<a id="footnotetag20" name="footnotetag20"></a><a href="#footnote20" title="Go to footnote 20"><span class="smaller">[20]</span></a></p> + +<p>Further, these small batteries are both handier and more mobile in +themselves; they are, therefore, better suited to Cavalry +requirements, and at the same time the power of concentration when +such is required is fully retained.</p> + +<p>The advantage of this proposed division seems, therefore, to me +sufficiently clear to need no further recommendation.<a id="footnotetag21" name="footnotetag21"></a><a href="#footnote21" title="Go to footnote 21"><span class="smaller">[21]</span></a></p> + +<p>This organization of the Artillery requires, however, to be +supplemented by the introduction of a true quick-firing gun, even if +it is necessary to reduce the calibre somewhat to keep down the +weight. For it is particularly with the Cavalry, and especially in the +Cavalry duel, when the opportunities for Artillery action are often +compressed into a very few moments, and yet a great effect must be +attained, that a gun without recoil and a great rapidity of loading is +most urgently required. If the Cavalry is thus equipped with all that +the conditions of War demand and modern technical skill can supply, +then it will find in these—at least in part—compensation for its +numerical weakness on condition that at the same time it also succeeds +in raising its training to a corresponding height.</p> + +<p>It cannot be denied that in this direction all ranks have worked with +most devoted and admirable industry, and that new points of view, new +methods, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page181" name="page181"></a>(p. 181)</span> and new aims towards which to strive have been +opened up. But, on the whole, this question of the training of our +Cavalry is still based upon the ideas of a period which lies behind +us. There has been no conscious breach with the past, even in those +very fields wherein the developments and demands of modern times have +brought about a complete disturbance of all military relations.</p> + +<p>That a method of training which does not take into account the +phenomena of modern Warfare, and follow them even to their furthermost +consequences, can never give satisfactory results, needs no +demonstration. But a method free from these objections we have to +find. In its training our Cavalry <i>must</i> excel all others if it would +maintain its position on the field of battle, and it can do so, for it +possesses by far the best material both in men and horses of any +country in the Continent of Europe. There are only two essentials +which we must bear in mind. First, we must be absolutely clear as to +those points in which our system is behind the requirements of the +time, and what objectives we must now pursue. Secondly, being +satisfied as to the above, that we should take the straightest way +which leads towards them, not hesitating to break with tradition +wherever it hinders our advance.</p> + +<p>If we now consider in the spirit of this first requirement the +separate branches of Cavalry work which our training must embrace, the +very first point which attracts attention is the vastly increased +demands on the endurance of our horseflesh that will now be made, far +exceeding what was required in our last Wars. Increase of endurance is +thus an unconditional necessity.</p> + +<p>Further, it is perfectly clear that in the combat of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page182" name="page182"></a>(p. 182)</span> Cavalry +against Cavalry, the decision will depend on the action of the great +tactical units, and that with regard to dismounted fighting, a +complete revolution in the conditions has occurred. In future this +will tend evermore to come to the front, and both points of view must +be kept in mind in our training.</p> + +<p>Finally, it is evident that the centre of gravity of these two factors +is no longer in the same position. As long as decisive results in the +combat itself were expected from the Cavalry, it was quite right and +expedient to train them to meet this special requirement. But now, +when it is clear that the combat is only a means to an end—that end +being the possibility opened up by successful fighting to reconnoitre, +screen, or break the enemy's communications—this change in the +conditions must be taken into account in the process of our education.</p> + +<p>Of course this is not to be understood in the sense that we can afford +to neglect the training for the actual combat: the defeat of the +enemy's Cavalry remains now, as always, the necessary condition of all +subsequent activity; but the Arm must be taught to understand that +victory in combat is only the first link in the chain of operations, +and to extend its outlook beyond the point of actual collision, and to +appreciate the tasks which are the consequence of success.</p> + +<p>To this end we must undergo a preparation of a quite different +character, for nowadays, freed from the chains which formerly bound us +to conform to the action of the other Arms, we appear within the +framework of the Great Armies indeed, but operating in independent +'Masses,' and this change in conditions extends its influence even to +the smallest reconnoitring patrol.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page183" name="page183"></a>(p. 183)</span> In this new field our training must seek to follow the +demands of War. It must accustom the troops to the greatness of their +mission both with regard to time and space, attain higher results with +the individual, raise the education of its officers above the sphere +of the technicalities special to the Arm, and give them a wider +horizon of general military conditions.</p> + +<p>In what way we can reach these new ideals, in the best and most +practical manner, I propose to investigate in the following chapters, +and need only point out here that it is not my object to discuss every +detail of military education, but rather to bring out the essentials, +and lay stress on those questions which, in my opinion, compel us to +strike out new ways to find our objective.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page184" name="page184"></a>(p. 184)</span> CHAPTER II</h2> + +<p class="title">RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING</p> + + +<p>When we discuss the training of the Cavalry, the first point which +naturally occurs to us is the question of 'horsemanship'—<i>i.e.</i>, the +breaking-in of the horses and the teaching of equitation to the men. +Horsemanship is so absolutely the bed-rock of all Cavalry +performances, that the advantages of improved methods of breaking and +of equitation must bear fruit in every branch of their activity. Above +all, they exercise the most enduring influence both on the +conservation and endurance of the horses themselves.</p> + +<p>Anglomaniacs and faddists, who, in spite of many a healthy impulse +they have imparted, have nevertheless exercised, and still seek to +exercise, an influence the reverse of favourable upon our Cavalry, +maintain that for certain purposes one can obtain better results with +horses broken by one of their short-cuts to the object, and then +'trained' in the sense that racehorses and hunters are prepared for +their work, than with those who have been gradually brought forward by +the methods in use in our Cavalry schools, and at the same time secure +the advantage of 'unconditional obedience' in the horse, a result +which they allege cannot be always counted on with our existing +methods.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page185" name="page185"></a>(p. 185)</span> On the other hand, the fact remains that our recruits, in the +short time available for their education, can only be well and quickly +taught on well-trained pliable horses. That such horses, with +sufficient exercise, go better and more safely across country than +those brought forward by more hasty methods, is sufficiently proved by +the fact that all our steeplechase riders in the Army take the +greatest pains to prepare their horses thoroughly (by school methods +understood), because experience shows that this preparation alone +gives them a chance against the more highly-priced animals with which +they are called on to compete. Only this thorough training guarantees +good individual riding, and insures the 'pliability' which alone makes +it possible to correct disobedience rapidly should it arise. And, +further, there can be no question that this prolonged preparation +improves the endurance of the horse—on that point at least experience +leaves no room for doubt. The thoroughly broken horse, which moves in +easy balance, with all its muscle thoroughly well and equally +developed, not only saves its forelegs and joints, and supports the +spinal arch better, but trots easier, and hence for longer periods +with less fatigue, than the unpliable animal, who stiffens itself +against the rider's load, and thus expends its power uselessly, and +the rider himself is far less shaken about under the former, a point +by no means to be neglected.</p> + +<p>The recognition of these facts has at length led us to break with the +Anglomania of former years, and the tendency towards improved +preparation has become more evident, whilst the centrifugal strivings +of individuals no longer find acceptance. On the other hand, it seems +to me beyond a doubt that the objects which <span class="pagenum"><a id="page186" name="page186"></a>(p. 186)</span> we wish to +obtain from our Military school of horsemanship could in many respects +be reached more directly and better than is at present the case.</p> + +<p>In conformity with the whole essence of modern War, the individual +training of both man and horse must form the foundation of our whole +education—that is to say, steadiness in the movement of closed bodies +must be the consequence of individual horsemanship. Only in this way +can the bodily, intellectual, and moral qualities of both man and +horse be brought into useful activity, and in this way only can we +conquer the gregarious instincts of the horses and develop in their +riders the individuality which modern conditions absolutely demand.</p> + +<p>More stress requires to be laid on riding with one hand only and with +arms (<i>i.e.</i>, drawn swords), for the bit, with or without a feeling on +the bridoon, is in War the only practical method of direction; and the +use of his weapons when mounted must have become second nature to the +man if they are not to be a constant impediment to him in the control +of his horse. Finally, independent riding across country must be +encouraged by every conceivable means.</p> + +<p>To attain all this will only be possible if we succeed in overcoming +the preliminary steps of the man's education—<i>i.e.</i>, the elementary +training of man and horse—more rapidly than has hitherto been the +case, and thus gain time for the true practical preparation for the +field. If from this standpoint we look at our present system, it will +soon be clear where to apply the lever.</p> + +<p>First, it should be possible, with the better bred and stauncher +material we now receive, to make more rapid progress in the first year +than has hitherto been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page187" name="page187"></a>(p. 187)</span> generally the case. By the increased +demands and the greater freedom in the choice of means allowed us by +the new Regulations as compared with the conditions formerly +prevalent, considerable changes have been made; the point now is, in +what manner to derive the fullest advantage from this greater freedom +for the practical curtailment of the periods previously allotted for +each stage in the training.</p> + +<p>But prudence is necessary in this direction. That the English +thoroughbred, for instance, develops better under work in its early +years, admits of no doubt whatever; but there is room to question +whether this experience can be transferred without modification to our +present Remounts, although many of them have a strong strain of +English blood. Our Prussian horses, for instance, only reach their +full development between the seventh and eighth years; it would, +therefore, be a mistake to attempt to force them up to the full +demands made on a Cavalry horse before that age. This slowness of +growth must always be considered, and the animals be saved as much as +possible; but there is still room to unite with this necessary +concession increased demands on the degree of training.</p> + +<p>Without any detriment to their efficiency, the young remounts can be +taken in hand immediately on joining their regiments, instead of +waiting till the conclusion of the manœuvres, as is still a common +practice. It seems feasible, also, to begin with the gallop earlier +than was formerly the custom; and, finally, it is by no means +absolutely necessary to go back to the bridoon again at the +commencement of their second year's training.<a id="footnotetag22" name="footnotetag22"></a><a href="#footnote22" title="Go to footnote 22"><span class="smaller">[22]</span></a> One can well go on +with riding on the bit <span class="pagenum"><a id="page188" name="page188"></a>(p. 188)</span> at the point where the course was +interrupted by the manœuvres.</p> + +<p>All these measures together produce quite a remarkable saving of time, +and there cannot well be any doubt that in this way, as far as +concerns the riding education of the horse alone—<i>i.e.</i>, without +arms—the same standard of progress can be reached by Christmas of the +second year as was formerly often only reached at the end of the +second winter.</p> + +<p>If from this foundation we go on to specific training of the +charger—still working, of course, concurrently at the gymnastic side +of his training also—to accustoming him to the curb, then by the end +of February the remount ought easily to be ready to be placed in the +ranks.</p> + +<p>Side by side with this increase of rapidity in his training, we both +can and must make the individual training the foundation of his whole +education, so that from the very first the horse learns to go alone +and with safety in all kinds of ground.</p> + +<p>The very first lessons to accustom him to both saddle and rider are +better given on the lunging rein than when led by an older horse, for +nothing teaches the bad habit of 'sticking' more than this last +practice. And since now the first months of training fall in the +summer, we can avail ourselves of the fine weather to send out the +young horses in charge of trustworthy riders, some of whom must be +left behind even during the manœuvres, to go singly or in small +groups under suitable supervision, which can easily be arranged, out +into the country, if possible into woods and fairly difficult ground, +to habituate them to minor obstacles and the objects one meets with, +instead of, as formerly, keeping them in the school or manège, and +making <span class="pagenum"><a id="page189" name="page189"></a>(p. 189)</span> them into 'stickers' first, only to have the trouble +of breaking them of the habit, often after many a hard tussle, +afterwards.</p> + +<p>All through their subsequent training they must constantly be sent out +singly into the country, and even in the school itself they should be +exercised as little as possible in squads one behind the other.</p> + +<p>It goes without saying that only the best horsemen should be trusted +with the young horses, for bad habits developed at the beginning of +their instruction are of all the most difficult to correct hereafter, +and may ruin the result of all one's trouble.</p> + +<p>That in this way we can meet the requirements of the service much more +rapidly than by existing methods cannot be open to question and may be +taken as practically settled, and similar considerations apply to the +recruits.</p> + +<p>The system laid down in the regulations does not go directly enough to +the purpose, a consequence, no doubt, of the fact that we have now +better horses on which to instruct them than at the time these +instructions were evolved.</p> + +<p>If one begins as soon as possible with the gallop and individual +riding—if necessary on the lunge—and allows the recruit as soon as +he has acquired anything approaching a firm seat to practise the aids +for the leg and the side paces—passage and shoulder-in—one will +attain quite different results than from riding only on straight lines +and practising closing in the ranks. The practice in the use of the +legs makes the men more independent and individual, compels them to +trust to their seat, and not to hang on by the reins.</p> + +<p>The individual riding makes the man drive his horse forward by the +pressure of his legs, which he is not <span class="pagenum"><a id="page190" name="page190"></a>(p. 190)</span> compelled to do in the +squad, where the horses follow one another almost automatically. The +horses, too, are saved from becoming dull and heavy, as they are only +too apt to do under the recruits of the old system.</p> + +<p>By Christmas the recruits can thus be brought forward as far and +farther than they now are by the time of the inspection on the +bridoon, and can then go on to riding on the curb, so that by February +they should be able to ride the side paces, gallop and change, and all +other school paces, without arms, and generally be so firm in the +saddle that they may be advanced to drilling with arms, and can begin +their real instruction as troopers. Of course, it is not to be +expected that these school paces should be ridden as yet in perfect +form, but the men must understand what these lessons are intended for, +and the effort to get the correct bend should be recognisable. And we +may add that to teach them to rely on their seat and not on their +hands suitable exercises with the lance may be introduced even at an +earlier period.</p> + +<p>As regards the remainder of the squadron, the so-called 'Dressur'<a id="footnotetag23" name="footnotetag23"></a><a href="#footnote23" title="Go to footnote 23"><span class="smaller">[23]</span></a> +detachment, it is hardly necessary to point out that one can ask of it +at least all that can be attained by the remounts and the +recruits—that is to say, that by the beginning of February the men +and horses should reach the highest point of their purely riding +training. Of course, to achieve this they must not be put back every +autumn to the very ABC of their work—riding on the bridoon. They must +go on with the curb, to which by this time they are accustomed, and in +the place of the bridoon work, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page191" name="page191"></a>(p. 191)</span> individual riding must be +encouraged as much as possible.</p> + +<p>Only those squads will require somewhat different treatment in which +the best men of the second year are being trained on the best horses +for the riding of the remounts in the following year. These men will +certainly require more bridoon work in the autumn, but even these +should be sufficiently forward by Christmas-time to pass on to the +bit, so that, in spite of the very high degree of perfection required +from their horses, they can be dismissed the school by the middle of +February.</p> + +<p>From the increased demands made on the individual training of man and +horse, it follows as a necessary consequence that a different kind of +inspection in equitation will be required to that hitherto in vogue.</p> + +<p>The presentation of closed detachments must be restricted as much as +possible, and all previous rehearsals of a special inspection +programme absolutely prohibited. Horse and rider, since they have been +trained individually, must be inspected and judged on their individual +merits, not otherwise. In this manner not only is it easier to +appreciate difficulties, but good work also has a fairer chance of +securing recognition. It needs an expert to bring together the sum of +all the performances, and express a fair judgment on the total result. +In any case, however, such a judgment will be nearer the truth because +it is uninfluenced by 'eye-wash' and mere externals.</p> + +<p>Hence we arrive at the conclusion that in the manner we have above +indicated the whole squadron can have completed its training in +equitation by the middle of February.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page192" name="page192"></a>(p. 192)</span> That many objections will have to be met and many +difficulties overcome before this end is attained goes without saying; +but where in human affairs can it be said that this is not the case?</p> + +<p>It may be urged that both for horses and men there is a distinct +advantage in beginning again every year with bridoon riding.</p> + +<p>The action of the rider is easier to control than on the bit, and if +once the men take to holding on by the curb, the consequences are much +worse than with the former. On the other hand, also, it is easier for +the horses on the curb to assume a false bend or poise, or to refuse +to go up to their bits, and thus deceive the instructor. Wrong +application of the aids with the bit entail worse consequences on the +horses than with the bridoon; hence almost exclusive work on the bit +requires better teachers and lighter hands, and if one has few of +these at one's disposal, undoubtedly a disadvantage will accrue.</p> + +<p>It may further be objected that for such a thorough extension of the +course of individual riding as I have demanded there is neither time, +school accommodation, nor teachers available, and it must be granted +that the regulation allowance of three schools per regiment is, in +fact, insufficient for the attainment of the required standard by the +methods I have in view. Nor will it suffice to allow each training +detachment only three-quarters of an hour in the school at a time. +Detachments of average strength require daily one hour and a quarter, +if the necessary skill in individual riding is to be acquired, and +recruit squads even longer. Further, it will not do to exclude +recruits who begin early with the side paces and the gallop altogether +from the school; on the contrary, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page193" name="page193"></a>(p. 193)</span> they require to attend it +at least once or twice a week.</p> + +<p>But with only three schools per regiment, particularly in our northern +provinces, these requirements cannot be fulfilled. Four I consider as +the least number, and it would be still better if each squadron had +its own school, so that difficult animals and backward men could be +taken individually, and work on the lunge and circle thoroughly +carried out.</p> + +<p>Still, all these obstacles can be overcome. With increased practice, +comprehension of the management of the bit in military riding would +gradually increase both with teacher and pupils, and work with the +reins in both hands be usefully employed to facilitate the transition +from the bridoon to the bit and counteract the possible evils of +riding on the bit alone.</p> + +<p>The better training of the Remounts, which will be obtained by the +means I have indicated, will in course of time give us better, more +obedient, and more pliable horses, and better-trained recruits again +will give us a better choice of riders for the young remounts.</p> + +<p>Our instructional staff for equitation is thoroughly satisfactory. In +this respect the Riding-School in Hanover has done excellent work. We +have also amongst our senior non-commissioned officers some excellent +instructors.</p> + +<p>The necessary time for all my demands can very well be saved if we +make up our minds to leave out all superfluities in the daily routine +of duty; and as regards the question of school accommodation, it is +well within the bounds of possibility for most regiments to provide +themselves with a fourth school—eventually even with a fifth—out of +their own <span class="pagenum"><a id="page194" name="page194"></a>(p. 194)</span> financial resources. No investment could be more +remunerative. Certainly under circumstances red tape may stand in the +way; but when his superiors will support the Regimental Commander, and +sometimes without, one will generally find appreciative backing, even +from the War Office (<i>Intendantur</i>).</p> + +<p>If the drawbacks and difficulties in the way of the proposed changes +are, as I have endeavoured to show, to be surmounted, on the other +hand, the advantages accruing therefrom are so enormous that the +former need not be taken into consideration at all. In the first +place, as we have seen, better individual horsemanship and more +practice in riding on the bit are in themselves advantages which react +directly on the War efficiency of the whole squadron. Secondly, the +earlier completion of the remount training is a direct gain, for, in +case of mobilization, we shall be better able to place remounts in the +mobilized squadrons, leaving in exchange older horses behind, which is +again an advantage for the training of the recruits destined hereafter +to join us at the front. I cannot too earnestly warn against the +taking of <i>all</i> the old horses into the field. No man can foretell how +great the losses will be, but that they will be great admits of no +doubt whatever. Nor is it at all certain that future Wars will be of +short duration; on the contrary, they may drag on for a very long +time. Hence it is absolutely indispensable that suitable horses for +recruit training should be left behind, even if the marching out +strength per squadron should be reduced by a file or two—it cannot be +many in any case. For the rest, the quicker and better training of the +recruits will be all to the good in case of War breaking out, as one +will be able to detail men for the field squadrons <span class="pagenum"><a id="page195" name="page195"></a>(p. 195)</span> towards +the close of the winter season—<i>i.e.</i>, some weeks sooner than under +the old system; and finally the proposed procedure brings with it an +enormous gain of time in the training of the whole arm.</p> + +<p>To begin with, we gain in winter the months from the middle of +February to the beginning of the Drill Season (April). This time can +be devoted to direct training for the demands War must make upon us. +We can practise again, and confirm the men in the fundamental +principle of dressing in motion, the exact squareness of the horses to +the alignment and rallying, with which one had already commenced in +the early months of winter, before being driven into the schools by +frost and snow; and, further, take advantage of fine days and similar +circumstances to practise men in taking jumps, scrambling, etc., the +development of the regulation drill gallop (fifteen miles an hour), +whilst still maintaining the control and standard of equitation for +which the school training is specially adapted. The winter exercises +in field service duties, which, as long as they are allowed constantly +to interrupt the formal lessons in equitation, do more harm than good, +can be postponed to this period, when the recruits will now be able to +take part in them—a point of essential importance in case War breaks +out. Above all, the time thus saved must be devoted to individual +riding and single combat.</p> + +<p>Our Regulations (Sections 129 and 324) lay special stress on this +latter point, and in most regiments it is constantly practised. The +results, however, are sometimes questionable, and many Squadron +Commanders are of opinion that such training can be overdone. Nor is +this view without foundation. If single combats are carried out in the +regulation way on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page196" name="page196"></a>(p. 196)</span> imperfectly broken horses, the horse is +not only spoilt, but the rider also, and a clumsy rider will very soon +make a good horse hard in the mouth and refractory.</p> + +<p>Now, since we have neither ideal horses nor riders at our disposal, +there is much danger in overdoing these exercises, because the method +of their execution is often thoroughly unpractical. The combatants +ride round one another in unnatural circles, one retreats, the other +pursues, and both tear at their horses' mouths to turn them sharply +about, all things which, except the latter, they never do in action.</p> + +<p>Nor should we overlook the really imminent danger which lies in +teaching the men to run away before an opponent. Few of them are +'Horatios,' and if, in fact, they once turn about, it is, to say the +least, highly problematical whether, in a real fight, they will ever +stop again. In the field matters are very different. If one has but +one adversary, one tries to ride him down, and, if unsuccessful, then +after one turn about both get locked together, turning only on the +fore hand; and the man who turns a second time can only trust to the +speed of his horse—he has given up the fight.</p> + +<p>Such duels are rare indeed; in most engagements the man fights between +crowds of his own comrades and the other side, in wild confusion, +under clouds of dust. He must attack at one moment to the right, at +the next to the left, and guard himself. The essential here is not so +much the skilful use of the lance, as complete command over the horse, +and the determination to <i>kill</i>, which must rise to the height of +<i>fanaticism</i>. He who can twist and turn his horse by his weight alone, +without dragging at its mouth, whose arm does not tire, and who can +make sure of striking what he aims <span class="pagenum"><a id="page197" name="page197"></a>(p. 197)</span> at, even at speed, and +with the energy born of hatred, thinking only of destroying his enemy, +never on retreating—he alone can hope to remain the conqueror; but +such a one very soon learns all that is practical in the use of sword +or lance.</p> + +<p>The exercises in single combats, therefore, must be based mainly on +preparatory practice, intended to strengthen the arm, give command of +the weapon, heighten the man's energy, and, above all, aim at securing +the most perfect harmony between man and horse by constant exercise in +those forms of individual riding which are really needed in the fight: +the rapid turning about of the horse; serpentining between, and +cutting and thrusting at, different objects in varying directions, as +far as possible without reins, and never according to a prescribed +formula.</p> + +<p>The actual combats between squads should follow only when considerable +excellence in these preliminary exercises has been attained—<i>i.e.</i>, +for recruits—about the end of the summer, before the manœuvres; +and they should always be kept down to the lowest limits, and then +only carried out in thoroughly practical form—<i>i.e.</i>, between squads, +and not larger detachments. I believe that in this way a far higher +standard will be reached, and with less damage to the horses than is +possible under existing conditions, in which one generally begins with +single combats, man against man, at the very commencement of the drill +season. In any case, we shall at least obtain this advantage—that the +work to be done in the latter will be materially reduced if the +exercises I have suggested are begun already in the winter months.</p> + +<p>The more the men have learnt to ride with a light hand on the bit, the +greater command they possess over <span class="pagenum"><a id="page198" name="page198"></a>(p. 198)</span> their lances—thanks to +more constant practice—and the more thoroughly they have been +grounded in the principles of direction, pace, alignment, and +rallying. Further, the more quietly the horses move—and even at rapid +paces have learnt to carry their heads not too high, with a firm +bearing on the reins—the easier it will be for the Commander to drill +his squadron, and to eliminate all the plunging and surging in +movement which is fatal to all excellence in manœuvring.</p> + +<p>The drill season can thus be cut down, and the time thus saved devoted +to field service practices and riding across country, because the +whole system, thanks to this considerable saving of time it effects, +enables one to extend the education of man and horse over the whole +year instead of confining it to the winter months.</p> + +<p>Though every efficient squadron possesses a considerable number of +horses that do not require six months' practice in 'shouldering in,' +and in 'collected paces,' on the other hand, everyone has some horses +that do urgently need 're-making,' but which one has to entrust to +inferior riders, because the better ones are all needed for the +remounts and young horses.</p> + +<p>This is a consequence of the whole system in which the training of the +horses and of the men eventually react on one another. There will be +remounts which need correction, and horses ridden by recruits to be +cured of acquired bad habits; and on my system there will now be time +and opportunity to hand these over, say from the beginning of +February, to non-commissioned officers and the better riders, either +by forming them in a special squad or entrusting them to individuals, +and the process of re-making the horses can be continued throughout +the whole summer, for now there will be ample time.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page199" name="page199"></a>(p. 199)</span> On the importance of this latter point I would especially +insist. If this work of equitation ceases for the whole summer, and +the difficult horses are kept incessantly at drill and field service, +it is inevitable that their defects will develop and become more +firmly fixed; hence one will never get a good average of well-broken +horses in the ranks. That some of them must always be taken for drill +goes without saying; but the point is, that from February onwards, and +throughout the summer, they should be constantly taken in hand and +corrected by good riders. If this idea is applied with thoroughgoing +energy, particularly with the young horses—even if it entails at +first a diminution in the number of files on parade—the number of +difficult horses in the squadron will soon show a most encouraging +diminution.</p> + +<p>To all these advantages there comes yet another, to my mind even more +important. According to established custom, after the inspection in +riding on the bit which forms the conclusion of the winter's training, +the whole squadron is completely reformed before it begins the drills. +The new exercises in unaccustomed surroundings are begun by the men on +strange horses, to which they have had no opportunity to accustom +themselves. This drawback can be obviated, if the squadron is +definitely made up already in February—<i>i.e.</i>, after the close of the +purely equitation course. The men can now ride the same horses in the +school on the drill-ground, and in the country, which they are to +retain throughout the summer, and the squadron will commence the drill +season with much steadier ranks than would otherwise be the case, +particularly if its Commander understands how to make the most of all +the advantages his good methods and well-broken <span class="pagenum"><a id="page200" name="page200"></a>(p. 200)</span> horses secure +for him by changing them about individually as circumstances require.</p> + +<p>Much, no doubt, may be urged against this proposal, and the expert +will hardly need my assistance to recognise the difficulties that +await him. But they can be overcome, and their advantages thus +secured—and these seem to me the essential points—enormously +outweigh the minor troubles that follow in their train.</p> + +<p>I do not believe that either thorough or essential changes are needed +in our Regulations to adapt them to the principles I have developed. +All that is important is that we should definitely break with the +routine of the several courses and inspections.</p> + +<p>To constitute a framework, not with a view of developing a fresh +network of red tape, I here submit an outline programme of the +time-table I suggest, so far as concerns the equitation and the +training of the horses in their several periods.</p> + +<p>Commencement of Remount training, at the latest, the end of July. It +is worth consideration whether the young horses could not be sent to +the Regiments even earlier.</p> + +<p>Inspection of recruits on the bridoon, and of the Second Ride Second +Class shortly before Christmas.</p> + +<p>Inspection of the second year's remounts on the bit of the whole of +the remount training squads, and of the recruits, concluding with the +latter and Second Ride Second Class about the middle of February. Then +constitution of the squadron to meet the requirements of the coming +drill season.</p> + +<p>End of March, or beginning of April, bridoon inspection of the young +remounts, in which generally side-paces, collected canter, and the +canter and change, may be demanded.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page201" name="page201"></a>(p. 201)</span> Inspection of the squadron in 'Military riding' (<i>i.e.</i>, with +arms, and on the curb); preparatory exercises for single combat, +thrusting at targets, regulation gallop, riding in the ranks, together +with a careful investigation of the teaching received in the school. +Inspection of all difficult horses.</p> + +<p>Shortly before the manœuvres, inspection of the young remounts on +the bit. Inspection of the second year remounts in 'rides' (at the +same time note their condition after the drill). Inspection of the +difficult horses.</p> + +<p>Inspection of single combats.</p> + +<p>If one tries, naturally with due regard to local and climatic +variations, to adapt the course of training to this plan of +inspection, and endeavours to arrange that every man, if only for a +few minutes every day, should practise lance exercises to develop his +hand and arm, that he should ride every day individually, and every +difficult horse should be taken in hand and corrected at once; that +the principles of dressing, alignment, and of wheeling, are daily +impressed on the men in the school, as I have already indicated; and, +if further, wherever it is in any way possible, the men are exercised +in boldly riding across country—for which purpose funds to cover +possible damage to crops, etc., must be provided by the +authorities—then I believe, and base my belief on the result of my +practical experience, that not only will a higher standard of training +for specifically military purposes be attained, but also a +considerable improvement in equitation.</p> + +<p>It will be worth while here to add a few words on the methods of +training the horses I recommend, for it is precisely on this point +that ideas so often divide, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page202" name="page202"></a>(p. 202)</span> and the most opposite views on +this subject find their expression in current literature. To stir up +all these controversies is not my object, but I want to state quite +generally that it is under all circumstances a downright evil to try +to follow out any theoretical system to its logical development, +whether the one selected be that of Captain Plinzner<a id="footnotetag24" name="footnotetag24"></a><a href="#footnote24" title="Go to footnote 24"><span class="smaller">[24]</span></a> or another's. +We have neither such a uniform type of horse nor sufficiently skilled +riders as to be able to employ the same method to all +indiscriminately.</p> + +<p>We must exercise our powers of selection, and find the best method to +meet the idiosyncrasies of each man and each horse, always keeping in +mind the aim to be obtained. What we want are horses that can use +their back muscles, especially in the gallop, with pliable necks, +light on the hand, able to turn easily, and safe across country (with +special reference to rat-holes, etc., not fences), that do not refuse +to quit the ranks, and are not headstrong. To reach this aim with our +material, our present riding instructions applied in their spirit, not +their letter, are for the present, I think, a sufficiently firm +foundation.</p> + +<p>A higher standard of riding alone will not, however, suffice. We have +seen that modern War makes also increased demands on the endurance of +the horses, and, in fact, in two directions: first, on their marching +power, and secondly, on their capacity to execute the long gallops at +the regulation pace which are indispensable for the manœuvring of +large masses and of attacks against modern firearms. That a thorough +physical preparation of the horse increases indirectly its endurance +has been already pointed out, and when <span class="pagenum"><a id="page203" name="page203"></a>(p. 203)</span> exceptional exertions +are called for, breeding plays a great part; but great as is the +influence of these two factors, the ultimate foundation on which the +endurance of our horses depends is the general 'condition' of the +animal, and this again is a consequence of the quality of his food and +his 'training,' used here in the same sense as in a racing stable. I +lay special stress on this question of food, because great demands, +both in the way of covering long distances and on the drill ground, +can only be met without injury to the horses if they are supplied with +a sufficient quantity of nourishment, and our peace-time ration is +undoubtedly too small to satisfy this condition. No regiment could +maintain itself always at the high pitch of condition we have +undoubtedly attained if it did not have recourse to all manner of +expedients to increase, at any rate for the time, the amount of the +ration. Of these expedients there are quite an imposing number, and +since, however desirable an increase of the ration may be, we are not +likely to obtain it, it seems to me well worth while to develop them +to the utmost.</p> + +<p>How this is to be done will depend mainly on the local conditions of +each garrison. The point is to make the most of the opportunities each +locality offers, and as an example it may be of interest to give my +personal experience on this head.</p> + +<p>Thanks to the confidence reposed in me by my General and to his +liberality, I was allowed to draw the equivalent of sixty rations of +oats per day and per squadron in cash, and to handle this money to the +best of my judgment.</p> + +<p>Since peas, beans, and white American maize—the yellow Hungarian +quality is generally considered inferior—were ninepence to one +shilling cheaper per <span class="pagenum"><a id="page204" name="page204"></a>(p. 204)</span> hundredweight than oats, I laid in a +stock of them, and was able to give not only an increased weight of +ration, but one of considerably greater nutritive value. Thus I gained +the double advantage, not only of not being compelled to stint the +corn ration in winter in order to save up for the harder work of the +summers, but I was able to increase even the winter ration itself. +This I consider an essential gain, for horses that after the winter +season are well fed and in their full condition are equal to far +higher exertions than those which have been kept low, and then fed up +for perhaps a very short time before the increased strain is thrown +upon them.</p> + +<p>The food was thus divided: After the manœuvres, in cases where an +increased ration was required, American maize was issued, and the +ration improved by half a pound. From about Christmas-time onwards +peas and beans were served out, and the amount increased until midway +through the Squadron drills, after which it was kept at the same level +until the manœuvres. In the end it amounted to the equivalent of 15 +pounds of oats, which can be considered as the normal scale for our +medium and light Cavalry horses. The peas and beans were soaked for +twelve hours, the water being twice changed during this time to +prevent their turning sour.</p> + +<p>During the manœuvres, according to circumstances, I laid down at +suitable points in the district stores of forage, or gave the Squadron +Commanders money with which to supply themselves locally, and thus was +able to keep up the increase in the ration during the greater part of +this trying period.</p> + +<p>The experiment was continued for nearly two years, and its results +were astonishingly satisfactory. Not only did the visible condition of +the horses develop <span class="pagenum"><a id="page205" name="page205"></a>(p. 205)</span> markedly, and maintain itself throughout +the greatest exertions, both during the manœuvres and the +Divisional exercises, but in spite of increased performances the +numbers of breakdowns and cases of lameness sensibly diminished; the +paces were fresher; in short, the material improved most noticeably. +Are not these breakdowns, lameness, and dulness in the horses, in the +great majority of cases but the consequences of over-exertion of the +animals when in a low state of condition? The cases of colic, too, +diminished rather than increased, which speaks well for the +harmlessness of the foods employed, but may in part also have been due +to the fact that both the bulk of the ration and the amount of +exertion demanded were only gradually diminished after the +manœuvres.</p> + +<p>The experiment also showed that most horses would not touch the white +beans at all, or only unwillingly, and the best proved to be either +the green Smyrna or brown Dutch beans, which for the same weight and +nutritive value bulked bigger, for instance, than the peas, and were +very willingly eaten. Peas and beans as a ration alone were found not +to answer, as the horse misses the mechanical action—irritation of +the bowel and stomach—and requires also certain chemical constituents +present in oats to assist digestion. Even with the proportion of oats +and beans actually used—seventy-six to seventy-eight oats to sixty +beans—it was found advisable to increase the 'Rauffutter' ration to +replace the missing oat-husks. But to provide this addition there were +ample means, since the manure fund of the regiment, or of the +squadron, was available; and in spite of the increased ration it +became possible to make savings which in a single year sufficed to +build a spacious riding-school, and thus contributed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page206" name="page206"></a>(p. 206)</span> in +another way to the training and general efficiency of the squadrons.</p> + +<p>In the third year the price of oats fell, and that of the other feed +rose; hence, and for other reasons also, the conversion of the oat +ration into other more nourishing materials had to be abandoned, +although it would still have been possible to maintain a considerable +increase in the nutritive value of the food issued. To keep the ration +up to approximately the same level as in the preceding year, recourse +had to be had to other means.</p> + +<p>It was found by experiment that a couple of pounds of straw per horse +could easily be saved per day, and again ample funds for a supplement +to the ration were available, a measure particularly applicable when +the price of straw rules high. This year, too, as the expenditure on +the riding-school was closed, the manure fund was also available, and +the horses did nearly as well as before.</p> + +<p>I would not maintain that similar results are everywhere obtainable. +The price of grains varies; the receipts from manure are everywhere +different; in some garrisons peas and beans are difficult to obtain; +the cost of transport also fluctuates. But all this is no reason why +we should not seize an advantage even if we cannot always retain it. +Even a few years of more and better food bring about an improvement in +the horses, which lasts for a considerable time, and every effort, +therefore, should be made to obtain these advantages offered by price +variations whenever it is possible to do so.</p> + +<p>It is well to call attention to the fact that to accustom horses to +the most varied food—rye, barley, wheat, etc.—is part of their +indispensable training for War, where <span class="pagenum"><a id="page207" name="page207"></a>(p. 207)</span> such foods are all +they can get, as the experience of our last War sufficiently +demonstrated. To this end it is necessary—and I wish particularly to +insist upon this point—that our Regimental Commanders should have the +utmost latitude of action within certain fixed limits, and should not +be dependent on the consideration of the Commissariat, with its +innumerable regulations and formal considerations. I consider the +objection sometimes urged against me that in the purchase of +supplementary foods by the Regimental Commander there would be an +opening for fraud and speculation on the part of under officials quite +untenable, for a proper system of audit and check could be quite +easily devised.</p> + +<p>The capacity of the Commander to manage affairs in a businesslike +manner can hardly be called in question, and his interest in the +matter would grow in proportion to the degree of freedom allowed to +him.</p> + +<p>Next in importance to the question of food comes the preparation of +the horses for efforts of long duration. That this preparation must go +hand in hand with the food question is obvious, but apart from this +interdependence, it is not possible to keep horses always up to the +necessary standard of endurance; for this training not only throws +heavy strains on the muscles, joints, and sinews, but on the nervous +system of the animal, and in particular attacks the nerves of the +stomach if maintained too long. If one wishes to preserve one's +material, the horses must be allowed from time to time a thorough +rest, during which their feeding must enable them to put on the degree +of fat which is requisite for health.</p> + +<p>The best time for this rest is about Christmas, during which one can +reduce the work to the very minimum, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page208" name="page208"></a>(p. 208)</span> and feed with +'Rastfutter' hay, maize, malt—dried brewer's—molasses, even +potatoes; and also, after reaching the highest points of the training +for galloping, there must be a certain relaxation of the strain to +give the nerves time to recuperate.</p> + +<p>Generally, the course of training must be conducted from the +standpoint of what War demands, and never allowed to assume the +characteristics of the racing stable, for the purposes of the two are +entirely distinct, and this is particularly the case with regard to +the gallop.</p> + +<p>It is precisely in this respect that the necessities of War are not +always seen with sufficient clearness.</p> + +<p>We obtain from our troops by means of most careful preparation quite +remarkable performances in galloping. I have myself seen whole +regiments cover 8,800 yards (5 miles) at the regulation gallop, and +the horses at the end of it had still both strength and wind to +increase the pace. On such and similar performances we then base our +tactical exercises both for the Brigade and Division, and many horses +are sacrificed as a consequence. Now, I am the last man to suggest +that accurate drill at the gallop is not the crowning work of all +tactical education, but it must be accomplished under War conditions, +and it cannot be too persistently insisted on that all these tactical +pictures and the deductions founded thereon, which we attain in the +manner indicated, have practically nothing to do with real War at all.</p> + +<p>In these peace exercises we usually ride with considerably less than +field service weights, on specially selected and favourable ground, +and on specially trained horses. All these conditions are wanting in +War. Then horses must carry their full marching-order <span class="pagenum"><a id="page209" name="page209"></a>(p. 209)</span> kit, +and generally they will be entirely lacking in specific training for +this fast kind of work. The ordinary pace on the march and patrol is +the marching trot; only single patrols have now and again to gallop, +the troops as a whole only on the rare occasions when a charge has +actually to be delivered. Then, the carefully-selected conditions of +the drill ground are generally lacking; and, finally, in all War +strength squadrons there are always some augmentation horses and +remounts, whose weaknesses must be taken into account if they are not +to be broken down at the very beginning of operations, as too often +happened in 1870, in which case it would have been better to have left +them behind from the first. Thus the galloping possibilities are +reduced most considerably, and it is only with these reduced +possibilities that the Leader can safely reckon.</p> + +<p>That these conditions have a most important influence on tactics is +apparent. The question is whether it is worth while to strain towards +false ideals, at a considerable cost in horseflesh, when in War they +are quite unattainable, and only serve to call up in men's minds false +pictures of the reality.</p> + +<p>To this I return an unqualified negative. Certainly, it is +indisputable that the horses must be trained to gallop for long +distances and in suitable poise, and that men should learn to retain a +correct seat even in gallops of long duration; that they should have +their horses under complete control, and learn to turn and check by +the use of the weight of their bodies; but these demands can only be +satisfied by continuous practice under conditions which render control +over the poise both of man and horse comparatively easy to +maintain—that is to say, singly on the galloping <span class="pagenum"><a id="page210" name="page210"></a>(p. 210)</span> track or +in squads, and also as closed tactical units.</p> + +<p>Speaking generally, however, such exercises do not need to be extended +materially beyond the limit which can be attained by horses not +specifically trained to galloping under full marching order weights.</p> + +<p>This limit depends on the degree of breeding, the strength and +condition of the horses, and may be estimated at the most at two and a +half miles for our Light Cavalry, and somewhat less for the +Cuirassiers. To exceed these distances seems both superfluous and +injurious, particularly when it goes so far as to risk permanent +depreciation of the material.</p> + +<p>It is far more important, in my opinion, to habituate the horses to +gallop with their full marching order weights, under service +conditions, and in all kinds of ground; for nothing is more difficult +than to preserve the proper rates of movement and keep the ranks +closed under such circumstances, as experience even in the +manœuvres abundantly shows.</p> + +<p>The 'trot' tends always to get shorter, for the regulation pace is +already as much as Light Cavalry can manage on the Drill ground; and +the gallop, too, falls generally behind the prescribed rate, the +reason being, in my opinion, that as a rule the distances demanded are +too great, and that we do not drill with sufficient frequency in full +marching order, partly to save wear and tear of the kit, but also +because with lighter weights we can undertake in the same time more +exercises, covering a greater area, than would otherwise be possible +without knocking up the horses. Much may be used in defence of this +procedure from the point of view of the training of the Leaders, but +the dangers to the true training of the troops themselves <span class="pagenum"><a id="page211" name="page211"></a>(p. 211)</span> +for War must not be overlooked, and practice under full War service +conditions must thus ever remain the keystone of our whole educational +edifice.</p> + +<p>But it is not only the training in galloping which suffers from this +practice of riding light. The preparation of the horses as regards +endurance suffers equally, for patrols and long-distance rides are +generally undertaken with stripped saddles; it is only for +manœuvres and the larger tactical exercises away from the garrison +that marching order is carried. To me this system seems hardly +rational. Rather, it would appear to me, must such sudden increase in +the weights on the horses tend to break them down, and experience +confirms this view, for the first day's marches in the manœuvres in +marching order tire out the horses to a quite disproportionate degree.</p> + +<p>We can never eliminate this evil altogether, for the attempt would +entail either marching order all the year round, or the limitation of +practical exercises to certain periods of the year only, both or +either of which would conflict on the one hand with the necessity of +saving the horses as much as possible, on the other with the needs of +the military training of the men; but a gradual increase in the loads +carried and distances covered seems well within the scope of a +practical policy.</p> + +<p>The Company Commander, who wishes to get his men fit for marching, +increases quite gradually and systematically the weight in the men's +knapsacks, till these are scarcely noticed as a hindrance by their +wearers, and similarly one could arrange in the Cavalry. In each +period we should begin with stripped saddles, progressing onwards to +the full kit; but the inspections of tactical units, and the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page212" name="page212"></a>(p. 212)</span> +final inspection in individual combat, should fundamentally be taken +in full marching order always, and horses should be prepared gradually +for the full weight carried in the manœuvres.</p> + +<p>I believe such a system would not only bring about a considerable +improvement in the training for War both of men and horses, but would +secure us from many disappointments by insuring in the Leaders a true +idea of what may reasonably be expected from their commands in the +field. Naturally the demands made on them in the inspections must +undergo a corresponding diminution.</p> + +<p>Only by constantly keeping these points in view and combining them in +harmonious progression will it be possible to attain the degree of +perfection in the elementary instruction of men and horses which can +alone guarantee the highest results in practice.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page213" name="page213"></a>(p. 213)</span> CHAPTER III</h2> + +<p class="title">THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT</p> + + +<p>In the same manner as, in the previous chapter, I have endeavoured to +show that in many points in equitation, in the school of individual +combat, and in the 'training' both of man and horse, we can, by +alterations of method, attain more directly to a possibly higher +standard in our performances than is at present achieved, I now +propose to consider the tactical education of the troops as a whole, +with a view to their best utilization in mounted engagements.</p> + +<p>According to the existing Regulations, the chief importance is still +laid on the efficiency of the small and medium-sized combinations. +Squadrons, Regiments, and Brigades are prepared with the utmost care +and attention, but exercises of the larger bodies only take place more +or less exceptionally, and on a very restricted scale. The systematic +education of the Cavalry does not, in fact, extend beyond the Brigade.</p> + +<p>That this state of affairs no longer responds to the changed nature of +Warfare follows from all that I have already said, and does not +require to be insisted on.</p> + +<p>If in War the employment of 'Masses' has become the decisive element, +our system of training must be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page214" name="page214"></a>(p. 214)</span> correspondingly extended, so +as to insure the existence of the skill and power needed for their +successful application. To this end all, even the most elementary, +exercises must be permeated thoroughly by the idea of preparing the +troops for united action in adequate numbers; and the relative +importance of the several periods of training, the allotment of time +to each step in the progression, as well as the exercises themselves, +must all be dominated by the same idea.</p> + +<p>The foundation of all sound tactical training will remain now, as +ever, the school of the squadron. The cohesion of this unit and the +ease with which it can be moved is the first condition of its useful +employment at the right time and place, and the importance of +thoroughness in this branch of training grows with every increment in +the total number to be handled. Even more attention, therefore, should +be given to squadron drill in the future than in the past.</p> + +<p>Next comes the question of regimental drill. Here, as we shall +presently see, the chief point is to develop the independence of the +Squadron Commander and the tactical handiness of his unit; and as I +understand the problem, this calls for a more extended framework, +within which the regiment must be prepared, than was formerly the +case.</p> + +<p>If, even under present conditions, it is scarcely possible in the few +days allowed by the Field Service Regulations to train the squadrons +up to the requirements of active service, even on a level drill +ground, it is obvious that in the future this difficulty will become +intensified. It is a question, therefore, to be considered, whether it +would not be better to remove these time limitations altogether, and +leave it to the Cavalry Commanders themselves to determine +everywhere, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page215" name="page215"></a>(p. 215)</span> with regard to local conditions, how to make the +best use of the total time available. Where considerable expense would +be incurred in bringing in squadrons detached at a distance, the +consent of the War Ministry would, of course, have to be obtained.</p> + +<p>Brigade drill, however, stands on quite a different footing; it forms, +as it were, the preparatory school for the movement of 'Masses,' in +which the principle of the employment of the constituent parts of the +'Mass,' whether in 'Lines' or by 'Wings,' has to be inculcated. But as +one has now to deal with tactically thoroughly trained bodies, less +time is required than for either squadron or regimental drill.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, it is most essential that the 'Mass' itself, +consisting as it does of several Brigades, should be thoroughly +drilled as a Division or Corps, for it is with these units, and not +with Brigades, that one has to deal in War, and their duties are so +many-sided, and require for their due performance such +thoroughly-trained Commanders, that perfection is not to be attained +in a few days, which are not even available every year. On this point, +in my opinion, there is no room for doubt, and hence it becomes +absolutely essential that, if necessary, Brigade drill must be +curtailed in order to give to all Brigades an annual opportunity of +exercising, as part of the higher units.</p> + +<p>It might well be possible to allow a wider latitude to the Brigade +Commanders in regard to the choice of time for their special +exercises, in which they might be guided by the special circumstances +of the locality in which they are quartered, and by the advice of +their superiors.</p> + +<p>For the exercise of the greater 'Masses,' for which, under all +circumstances, troops have to be brought <span class="pagenum"><a id="page216" name="page216"></a>(p. 216)</span> together from +considerable distances, a particular period must, of necessity, be +fixed by regulations; but it must be borne in mind that these 'Masses' +should not always be formed of equal strength in Divisions of three +Brigades, for the danger to the higher education which lies in always +working with units of similar composition has already been +sufficiently dwelt on. The conditions of War absolutely demand that +the higher Cavalry Leaders should be equally at home in handling +'Masses' with certainty and precision, no matter what their +composition, and the troops themselves must learn to apply the +principles on which efficiency in action really depends under all and +every circumstance.</p> + +<p>As regards the manner in which the several periods into which the +training is divided should follow one another, the question arises +whether the squadron, regimental, and brigade drill periods should +follow one another as a continuous whole, or whether they should go +hand in hand with Field Service Exercises.</p> + +<p>This seems to me to need a specific reply, because, as a fact, it is +differently answered in different Army Corps.</p> + +<p>Where the troops have to leave their garrisons in order to be +quartered in the vicinity of the ground specially selected for those +purposes, the question of expense must play an important part in the +decision; but the principle involved can hardly be affected by these +exceptional circumstances, for in by far the greater number of cases +the troops can find room to drill either within the district of their +own garrisons or on the manœuvre grounds in the vicinity, and in +these latter the question of extra cost should hardly stand in the way +of an extension of the time allowance. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page217" name="page217"></a>(p. 217)</span> Hence, if such an +extension, due to the intercalation of Field Service practices, really +does offer advantages, one could decide in principle in favour of this +solution, in spite of all other circumstances; but it still seems to +me open to discussion whether it is advisable to make the same +principle applicable in equal measure to all the time intervals.</p> + +<p>For the squadron drill, which begins with an entirely untrained troop, +the conditions are obviously quite different to those in the +subsequent exercises, in which the point lies in the working together +of units already finished and completed in themselves; and taking +these differences into account, we must first examine more especially +the case of the squadron.</p> + +<p>At the beginning of its drill season, the exertions demanded are +comparatively slight. The distance covered either at the trot or +gallop is only gradually increased, and the paces are at first kept +somewhat below the regulation limits—at least, from practical +experience I should recommend that they should be, for the Instructor +can control and correct the precision of all movements, and the +individual conduct both of man and horse, better at the slower paces +than when moving fast. Riders and horses accustom themselves +gradually, and hence more easily, to movement in closed bodies, and it +is of decisive importance for the whole subsequent course of their +training that at the very beginning of the drills this harmony between +man and horse under the new and unaccustomed conditions should be +secured to the utmost possible degree.</p> + +<p>If this point of view be kept in mind, then I think the drills should +be continued daily, for, on the one hand, there is no risk of +overtiring the horses, and, on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page218" name="page218"></a>(p. 218)</span> the other, the object is to +weld the men into a cohesive whole, and impress on them the essential +principles of the elementary tactical evolutions, in order to make +them as soon as possible into a combatant unit.</p> + +<p>Towards the latter end of the squadron drills, however, the conditions +change. Now, it becomes necessary to drive into the whole body a +proper appreciation of the several 'paces,' to fit them for long +gallops, and to train them for actual combat. At this period I +consider it better to interpolate one or more Field Service days, +partly because it is of practical moment to press on this side of +their training as quick as possible, and, further, because the drills +now begin to make very considerable demands upon the horses. These +Field Service days afford an opportunity to rest the horses, and thus +to prevent small and inconsiderable injuries developing into severe +lameness and ultimate breakdowns. Further, a quiet ride in the country +gives those horses which have become nervously excited by the +unaccustomed conditions of the drill ground a chance of cooling down, +and thus saving themselves very materially; and this must certainly be +considered as one of the most important functions of the Commander, +whether in Peace or War, to keep his horses fresh on their legs, and +ready to turn out in good condition at whatever hour the call may +sound. Of course, these precautions must not go so far as to endanger +the training for service of the squadron, but drill and manœuvre +results at excessive cost of horseflesh must be absolutely condemned.</p> + +<p>If these reasons speak for an intercalation of Field Service exercises +between the drill days, I am further of opinion that the result which +would be arrived at <span class="pagenum"><a id="page219" name="page219"></a>(p. 219)</span> by this system would give a better +standard of the drill efficiency of the unit for War than can be +attained by continuous drill alone.</p> + +<p>With the latter, it is certainly much easier to secure unity, +cohesion, and precision in the movements; but we must remember that in +War the emergency calling for drill performances may arise after weeks +of marching, during which no drill has been practised at all, and our +Peace training must take into account such conditions, and accustom +the troops to execute with safety and cohesion such drill movement as +may be necessary without having practised them day for day.</p> + +<p>In still greater degree do these principles apply both to regimental +and brigade drills; since in these the demands on the horses are +constantly increasing, the need to give them opportunity for rest and +recovery becomes even more pronounced.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the purpose of these exercises is not so much to secure a +single representation of acquired skill in the exhibition of drill +evolutions, but rather to develop and confirm in the men an +ever-increasing familiarity with the principles of their tactical +employment, and this will only then be attained when, as far as +possible, these practices are continued during the whole summer, so +that the Grand Manœuvres either in the Division or in the Corps +form the natural conclusion of the whole series. In the period of +combined manœuvres, it is, of course, impossible, in order to save +the horses, to lengthen the fixed period allotted to them; but all the +more necessary, therefore, does it appear to spare them as much as +possible by the introduction of these Field Service days (exclusive of +the ordinary 'rest days') during the time of the drill <span class="pagenum"><a id="page220" name="page220"></a>(p. 220)</span> +exercises. In the course of the subsequent considerations, we shall +see that not only will our horses gain thereby, but many other +important objects of our training be served as well.</p> + +<p>Turning now to the subject of these exercises themselves, it must be +laid down generally that throughout a steady intensification of the +exertions demanded must be maintained, and that the gallop is not to +be employed except when, under service conditions, its use would be +practicable. Further, whatever the Regulations prescribe must be +practised, no matter what the views of the Commanding Officer as to +their practicability or otherwise may be. This is absolutely essential +to secure a uniform standard of execution throughout the Arm.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, it makes a very essential difference in what spirit the +Regulations are approached, for the result will depend upon which +points in the training the chief stress is laid, and generally on the +character given to the exercises.</p> + +<p>In drilling the squadron this point is of less importance. Here, in +accordance with the spirit of the whole Arm, it is a matter of formal +drill, and nothing more. It is here that the foundation has to be laid +for smart, never-failing 'drill,' for the unconditional cohesion of +the squadron in itself, and for the certain interpretation of its +Leader's views, whether the latter makes use of commands, signals, or +merely rides in the required direction.</p> + +<p>Here the paces must be hammered into the troops till they become +mechanical habit, and the several forms of movement and attack be +practised, so that they can be executed in any direction, whether the +squadron has been told off or not. No matter how <span class="pagenum"><a id="page221" name="page221"></a>(p. 221)</span> hasty the +rally may be, the troop must charge at the moment and without +hesitation.</p> + +<p>The only difference that can arise here will be due to the +individuality of the Leader, and all are good which lead to the +required end, only the Regulations are not quite clear as to +practising the charge, and the guiding points might be laid down with +rather greater precision.</p> + +<p>In the charge against Cavalry cohesion is the first and dominating +condition. It must be absolutely impossible for the horses to swerve +either to right or left. Accurate dressing and the maintenance of the +two ranks come only in the second place. Against Infantry or +Artillery, on the other hand, the essential is that every horse should +have room to gallop in his own form, so that no crowding or jostling +arises, thus giving the horses a chance of avoiding or jumping clear +over falling men or animals. Hence, although on the level drill ground +the requirements of Regulations as regards dressing and the +maintenance of the two well-defined lines must be attended to, one +must remember that it may be impossible to comply with these demands +across country and be prepared in such cases to stick to the spirit, +not to the letter, of the law.</p> + +<p>In both cases it will hardly be of advantage to lay too much stress on +dressing and touch. Against Cavalry it is rather a case of jamming the +files together by pressure from the flanks, and the men must hold as a +vital article of faith that only the closest knee-to-knee riding will +guarantee either victory or their personal safety. Against Infantry, +on the contrary, the files must be loosened, and every horse go in his +normal stride, as in hunting; nor <span class="pagenum"><a id="page222" name="page222"></a>(p. 222)</span> must anyone allow himself +to be squeezed out of the ranks to the rear or remain behind as long +as the strength of his horse holds out.</p> + +<p>Utmost speed consistent with closely-locked files against Cavalry, a +natural extended gallop against Infantry or Artillery—these are the +two cardinal points to be observed in attacking. Maintenance of +dressing or of the ranks become positive evils if the above are +sacrificed to either. There, in my opinion, should be the essentials +to guide the decision of superior officers in their criticisms.</p> + +<p>With these exceptions the lines for the squadron training are so +closely drawn that differences in practice can scarcely arise. The +matter, however, assumes quite a different aspect with the regiment, +and still more with the higher units.</p> + +<p>Here it is not only a case of consolidating the cohesion of the troops +by the agency of the discipline of the drill ground, or of teaching +the forms of movement and of fighting, although, of course, these +points of view cannot be entirely disregarded; but the essential is to +teach the methods of employment of the forms laid down in the +Regulations for the combat.</p> + +<p>A regiment which can work through the Drill Book smoothly and with +precision is still far from being trained for battle, but at the most +has merely laid the foundations on which such a training can be +subsequently built up. The same applies to a Brigade or Division, each +of which has practised and made certain of the execution of such +movements as passages of defiles, deployments, attacks, changes of +front or of lines, and so forth. All these things are in themselves +necessary and useful, but they make no great demands on the skill of +the Leaders, only requiring an accurate <span class="pagenum"><a id="page223" name="page223"></a>(p. 223)</span> knowledge of the +book, and a certain degree of routine in the application of its +prescriptions; but War makes quite different demands on their ability, +and it is for War that we have to be prepared.</p> + +<p>First of all, in the purely formal side of the training, stress must +especially be laid on those forms of movement which can actually be +applied on the battle-field.</p> + +<p>Then, the troops must be exercised to apply these forms not only on +the drill ground, but over every kind of country. Further, the +tactical judgment and independence of the Leaders of all ranks must, +be thoroughly developed. They must not only learn to act on +fundamentally sound principles, but to apply these principles +everywhere where circumstances require rapid decision, utilizing at +once the tactical advantages the ground may offer, and adapting +practically the few forms which can be employed before the enemy in +the field instinctively; and, finally, opportunities must be granted +to the Commanders to practise the combination of locally separated +bodies to a single tactical purpose.</p> + +<p>In face of these requirements, it seems to me that our tactical +training remains far too elementary in character, and does not tend +with sufficient directness towards what is alone possible in War.</p> + +<p>The blame for this state of affairs rests by no means only on the +shoulders of the troops, but is due to a variety of complex causes +which are difficult to disentangle. In the first place comes the +passive resistance, that moment of inertia which custom and tradition +everywhere oppose to changes, and it is not to be expected that the +troops of their own initiative will be able to abandon the accustomed +ruts, when more <span class="pagenum"><a id="page224" name="page224"></a>(p. 224)</span> especially the methods applied in our +inspections are not always of a nature to encourage such attempts.</p> + +<p>A further cause is to be found in the Regulations themselves. These +give no firm foothold for the decision of the question as to what +forms and movements really are practicable in War-time, and, probably +in the endeavours not to hamper too much the initiative of the +Leaders, does not express the principle on which the conduct of the +combat is based with sufficient precision to preclude very different +opinions as to what these principles really are. Finally, the local +conditions of many of our garrisons often create an almost insuperable +difficulty for the proper training of the troops over country.</p> + +<p>In face of these conditions, we must strike out new paths for our +guidance if we do not intend to remain behind the times altogether.</p> + +<p>We must first, however, be perfectly clear in our own minds as to +which of the Regulation forms are really practicable, and hence +require increased attention. Then we must endeavour to formulate the +guiding principles for the conduct of an engagement in a manner so +clear and definite that they can easily be fixed in the memory, and +then work out the best way in which the troops can be thoroughly +grounded in their application. Finally, we must acquire a quite +distinct grasp of what can be practised over country, and from what +points of view such exercises are to be undertaken in order to make +them of direct utility in the solution of the problems modern Warfare +will set before us.</p> + +<p>To clear up the first point it will be best to sketch in its general +outline the course in which events succeed one another in an +engagement, and then <span class="pagenum"><a id="page225" name="page225"></a>(p. 225)</span> to deduce the forms of movement which +are essentially practical.</p> + +<p>Taking the case of Cavalry in combination with the other Arms, at the +commencement of the action we find the squadrons in 'rendezvous' +formation under cover outside the immediate danger sphere, either on +the flanks or behind the general line of battle.</p> + +<p>When the moment to act arrives, they advance at a rapid pace, either +in closed-up column of route or in any other dense formation which +permits of ready deployment in the direction of their allotted target. +Often in this movement they will have to overcome difficulties of the +ground—defiles and the like, of varying breadth.</p> + +<p>Arrived in the vicinity of the field of attack, they deploy into lines +of squadron columns, form line to the front, and execute the charge.</p> + +<p>In such cases it may often become necessary to secure one's own flanks +by forming protective échelons, or to endeavour to surround those of +the enemy by corresponding offensive movements.</p> + +<p>In the case of Cavalry acting alone, it will often be necessary to +form for action directly from column of route, and it will be +essential to establish co-operation not only between the advance guard +and the main body, but also between columns concentrating from +different directions upon the field of coming action.</p> + +<p>It is at once evident that for these few manœuvres few and simple +formations and movements will suffice, and that, in view of the +excitement of the battle-field, only such are, in fact, +applicable.<a id="footnotetag25" name="footnotetag25"></a><a href="#footnote25" title="Go to footnote 25"><span class="smaller">[25]</span></a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page226" name="page226"></a>(p. 226)</span> Hence it follows that all complicated movements and changes +of lines, and similar formations occurring in the Regulations, may be +classed in the category of evolutions intended mainly for disciplinary +purposes. On the other hand, we must practise, as thoroughly as +practicable, long movements at a rapid pace in the closest formations +for manœuvre—<i>i.e.</i>, in double and Regimental Columns; changes of +direction in these columns by shouldering, passage of defiles, +deployments into fighting formations with simultaneous slight +alterations in the line of advance; further, measures to secure one's +own flanks, or to threaten those of the enemy; deployments to the +front immediately out of column of route or after the passage of +defiles; the combination of detachments arriving from different +directions; and, finally, the charge itself under the most varied +assumptions, the transition from the mêlée to pursuit, and rallying in +order to attack again in a new direction against a fresh enemy. +Naturally, the most rapid deployments out of any and every formation +against a suddenly appearing enemy must also be practised, for such +surprises are always possible in War-time.</p> + +<p>To be avoided, on the other hand, as for the most part quite +impracticable, are all movements of a dilatory nature for the +formation of fronts of attack, as well as long movements of +manœuvres and considerable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page227" name="page227"></a>(p. 227)</span> changes of front when already +deployed into line.</p> + +<p>In all these exercises, as a general and fundamental principle, such a +grouping of the available forces must be striven for that the units +can be employed by 'Wings'; for, as I have endeavoured to point out, +it is this form of employment which best satisfies the requirements of +the combat and meets the needs of the Commander.</p> + +<p>For instance, under many circumstances the Regimental Column can be +employed as a practical tactical formation. Thus, if against Infantry +or Artillery, it is desirable to attack in many following 'Lines.' The +need is at once satisfied if our advance is made in a number of +Regimental Columns, wheeled into line to a flank. For a flank attack, +if the movement is initiated in a number of Regimental Columns formed +to the front and following one another, forming line by a subsequent +wheel. In both cases—in the latter after the wheel—one has only to +insure that the laterally adjacent squadrons move off together at +'Treffen' (<i>i.e.</i>, Line) distance to have all one's Lines complete. +Such a formation can secure its flanks with the greatest ease by the +retention of closed units, or, by bringing up the rearward squadrons, +can prolong its front to either flank. In any case it is preferable to +the triple column of troops, which makes all influence of the leader +impossible, mixes all units in the charge, and hence would best be +left out of the Regulations altogether. Nevertheless, practice in the +employment of 'Treffen' (<i>i.e.</i>, 'Lines' as opposed to 'Wings') must +not be entirely neglected, as under certain circumstances this form +may also become necessary.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page228" name="page228"></a>(p. 228)</span> This tendency to group the available forces by 'Wings' in the +larger units from the Brigade upwards must also be extended downwards +to the regiment, which represents the fundamental tactical unit of the +Cavalry, and those formations for manœuvre which favour the +arrangement of its constituent squadrons one behind the +other—formations which, at the same time, are both handier and +susceptible of more convenient control—must be constantly practised.</p> + +<p>That Squadron Columns to the Front hardly meet these demands ideally +can scarcely be denied. They are unhandy, render all changes of +direction materially more difficult, lose direction and distance very +easily, and necessitate complex movements in order to arrange them one +behind the other. Already in Brigade formations these drawbacks are +apparent, and in larger masses they prove most formidable. The +Squadron Column is, in fact, a formation derived exclusively with a +view to 'Line' tactics, and for this reason alone they hamper all +other demands. There is, however, no compelling reason why they should +be retained as the principal working formation for Cavalry, and +therefore as fundamentally beyond the reach of criticism.</p> + +<p>It seems to me that a formation which would group every two Squadron +Columns as a unit would be far preferable. The Regimental Commander +would then have only two units to direct, which would maintain their +mutual relations of distance and interval more easily than four, could +change direction more readily, and form line quicker, and allow of a +far easier transition to wing formations and other columns than is +possible at present.</p> + +<p>The Regulations certainly do not mention this <span class="pagenum"><a id="page229" name="page229"></a>(p. 229)</span> formation +specifically, but, on the other hand, this regimental double column +offers advantages for certain circumstances greater than can be found +in any of the forms it suggests. It allows in the simplest manner of +deployment into 'Lines,' either to the front or flank, the formation +of échelons in any desired direction; it is very mobile, easily +concealed in folds of the ground, and combines the advantages of +reduced depth both as a marching and as a manœuvre formation. As +the latter, it is peculiarly adapted to the purposes of large units in +close country; for, as already pointed out, it is easy to conceal, and +whilst keeping the troops well in the hands of the Regimental +Commander, allows also of the most rapid deployments into 'Lines' +either to the front or to the flank. It confers also the same +advantages in brigade when the regiments are formed side by side, and +is particularly applicable to flanking movements in which it is +especially desirable to be able at any moment to develop strong +fighting power in the direction of the movement, and after the wheel +into line, to be formed in successive lines and protected on the +uncovered flank.</p> + +<a id="img001" name="img001"></a> +<div class="figcenter"> +<img src="images/img001.jpg" width="400" height="67" alt="Formation." title=""> +</div> + +<p>It would take us too far at this point to compare in detail the +advantages and disadvantages of this or alternative formations. I only +desire to indicate in what direction practical progress is possible, +even in the domain of formal tactics, without exceeding the limits +laid down by Regulations, although it can only <span class="pagenum"><a id="page230" name="page230"></a>(p. 230)</span> be most +desirable that changes in the Regulations<a id="footnotetag26" name="footnotetag26"></a><a href="#footnote26" title="Go to footnote 26"><span class="smaller">[26]</span></a> themselves should be +forthwith undertaken. I would, in conclusion, only bring forward one +point which seems to me of particular importance.</p> + +<p>The more this employment of Cavalry by 'Wings' gains ground, the more +apparent becomes the advantages of the use of the bugle-calls assigned +to the several units, particularly of the regimental call; because +when it is used, the regiment or other unit remains as a closed body, +unmixed with other units, and hence can be employed as a distinct +tactical entity, which is not so much the case when working in +'Lines.'</p> + +<p>These sounds are the only ones which never lead to confusion, if they +are employed not as cautions only, but as a call on which the unit +moves at once, whether in line or in column—preferably the latter—in +the direction from which the call is heard. With the call the +Commander would have the means of collecting his men behind him, and +leading them in the direction he desires, no matter in what degree of +order or the reverse they might be, without any verbal commands or +instructions.</p> + +<p>Used in this sense these sounds—but particularly the regimental +call—might become the principal drill and manœuvre calls for the +Cavalry.</p> + +<p>Thus it appears to me we could achieve a considerable reduction in the +amount of practical drill necessary, and the change would tell all the +more the more frequently the call was employed, until at last it +became ingrained in the very flesh and blood of each man in the ranks.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page231" name="page231"></a>(p. 231)</span> Unfortunately the Regulations do not allow their employment +in this sense, but permit them only as cautionary sounds (Section 115, +note); but even in this restricted sense they deserve most constant +use in drilling, for they are always a means of preventing, in a +measure, misapprehensions in the execution of other sounds.</p> + +<p>We come now to the second portion of our requirements—viz., how to +obtain clearness in the appreciation of tactical principles. +Fortunately they are few in number, but it is absolutely indispensable +that every Cavalry Leader should most fully have mastered their +meaning. No knowledge, however accurate, of the formal prescriptions +of the Regulations can in any way compensate for a deficiency in this +respect. They are certainly not indicated as 'General Principles' in +the Regulations themselves, but may be read between the lines with +more or less precision from its several paragraphs.</p> + + +<h3><span class="smcap">For Cavalry versus Cavalry.</span></h3> + +<p>1. The German Cavalry must always endeavour to attack first in order +to utilize to the utmost its superior 'moral,' and to catch the enemy +in the act of deployment. If an opening for such an attack is offered, +then even the risks of a long preliminary gallop must be accepted +(Section 339).</p> + +<p>2. The leading lines must <i>always</i> be followed by supporting squadrons +in adequate numbers (Section 843, and note also Section 346); that is +to say, the enemy's Cavalry will always be attacked in two 'Lines,' +unless special circumstances compel departure from this prescription.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page232" name="page232"></a>(p. 232)</span> 3. One must always endeavour to keep the last closed Reserve +in hand, because in the mêlée the impetus of the last closed body +generally decides. One must never, therefore, as long as one suspects +that the enemy has still further Reserves in hand, engage a greater +number of squadrons than he shows, in order to save up Reserves.</p> + +<p>4. Success must be looked for in the vehemence of the onslaught, not +in superiority of numbers (Section 313). The greatest importance must +be attached to cohesion; hence, unless necessary to surprise the enemy +in the act of deployment, the 'gallop' should not be sounded too soon, +or the 'charge' too late (Section 339).</p> + +<p>5. Outflanking detachments, or troops in the following lines, turn +against the enemy's Reserves, or remain in reserve. They must never, +except in most pressing circumstances, throw themselves into a mêlée +already formed (Section 313). Following Lines must therefore not keep +too close to the leading ones—a mistake often committed in peace—as +otherwise they are committed to an attack in the same direction. They +should therefore keep so far to the rear that they can overlook the +line of collisions, and move in full freedom wherever their +intervention is most called for. This important principle was always +observed by Frederick the Great's Cavalry.</p> + +<p>6. One must always try to cover at least one flank by obstacles of the +ground or by one's own troops; but having satisfied this condition, +then attack on the outer Lines, and endeavour to gain them by previous +strategical directions.</p> + +<p>7. Superfluous forces, which do not follow the front as supporting +squadrons, échelon themselves in general, forwards or backwards of the +outer (unsupported) <span class="pagenum"><a id="page233" name="page233"></a>(p. 233)</span> wing, to protect one's own flank and +threaten that of the enemy, also to be ready to engage the enemy's +Reserves (Sections 323, 343, 345), or they are kept together as +Reserves behind the fighting line, if it is not possible to foresee in +what direction they may be required. They must not be too weak.</p> + +<p>8. Attempts to surround us made by the enemy are best met by a flank +movement on the original line without change of front (<i>cf.</i> Section +338). Defensive flanking cover, with the front turned outwards, gives +the worst conceivable direction for attack, since in case of failure +one is thrown back across the line of retreat of one's main body.</p> + +<p>9. Being in 'rendezvous formation,' the leading units are, if +possible, sent off for offensive flank movements, as they have the +shortest way to traverse. Such attacks only then promise success if +they are unnoticed by the enemy—<i>i.e.</i>, can be executed under the +concealment of the ground—or if the enemy has neither time nor space +to encounter them. The object of flank attacks is to induce the enemy +to use up his rearward Reserves to oppose them, or to induce him to +undertake manœuvres before attacking.</p> + +<p>10. Those units which are to be committed to the attack simultaneously +must never be arranged so that a part follows in échelon +backwards—they must always be disposed on the same alignment.</p> + +<p>11. In case of a mêlée, which threatens to terminate unsatisfactorily, +the Reserves must be put in on a broad front and straight forward, not +directed against the flanks. For the longer the line of collision, the +less effect do such flank attacks exercise; they are only too often +mere blows in the air, and lead to waste of energy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page234" name="page234"></a>(p. 234)</span> 12. Out of every victorious mêlée one must endeavour, as soon +as possible, to rally closed detachments (Section 326). For immediate +pursuit only fractions of the available troops will be employed +(Section 325). This pursuit, however, must be carried out with the +utmost energy, and the complete expenditure of the horses' power—if +possible, to the total extermination of the enemy. The forces employed +must be adequate for the attainment of this end.</p> + + +<h3><span class="smcap">Cavalry against Infantry and Artillery.</span></h3> + +<p>1. The attack must be as concentric as possible, and from different +directions, to compel the defender to scatter his fire. The units are +always to be employed by 'Wings.'</p> + +<p>2. If possible, the defender must be surprised, and if Artillery, he +should be attacked from the flank.</p> + +<p>3. Where a wide zone of fire has to be ridden through, though even +against Artillery, successive 'Lines' must be employed, and the less +shaken the enemy appears to be the greater the number of such 'Lines' +(Section 350). Artillery attacked frontally must be compelled by the +leading 'Lines' to change both elevation and the nature of their fire.</p> + +<p>4. The result, however, depends less on the Form employed than on the +rapid seizure of momentarily favourable circumstances.</p> + +<p>5. Only <i>closed</i> 'Lines' on a broad front can be relied on for +success. Where the squadrons each seek independently for an object of +attack, they generally miss it altogether, and to assign each +individual squadron a special target will mostly be impossible, for +the attack will be launched from such a distance that separate objects +in the defender's lines will hardly <span class="pagenum"><a id="page235" name="page235"></a>(p. 235)</span> be recognisable. Once +within the zone of serious losses it will be obviously impossible to +undertake those changes of direction which one sees unhappily so +constantly in peace. One rides, in general, straight at a long fire +line, and penetrates through as far as one can.</p> + +<p>6. Such frontal attacks require, generally, reserves on both flanks +for security against possible disengaging efforts of the enemy's +Cavalry.</p> + +<p>7. As the crisis of the engagement approaches, one must close well up +on the fighting line, no matter whether one incurs loss or not, in +order to be at hand to take advantage of opportunities.</p> + +<p>8. Deployment, changes of direction and of front, are only possible +outside the principal fire zone of the enemy.</p> + +<p>9. The distance between following lines varies according to the nature +of the enemy's fire.</p> + +<p>To make these principles familiar to the troops must be one's constant +care from the commencement of the regimental drill season onwards. At +the same time, the subordinate Leaders must learn to apply them +independently, even if no direct order reaches them, or if compelled +to act on only the shortest indication of the Superior Commander +(Sections 330, 333, 348), and this independence of the subordinate +must be the more practised the greater the size of the units (Section +317).</p> + +<p>To attain this object, as soon as the troops have sufficient mastery +of the purely mechanical part of their drill, it will be necessary to +append a series of exercises designed both to bring out the essentials +of these principles, and, at the same time, to develop the judgment +and independence of the junior officers.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page236" name="page236"></a>(p. 236)</span> Such exercises must hence always be based on a well-defined +tactical situation, from which it clearly appears whether the Cavalry +is 'Independent,' or whether it is acting on the flank or behind the +middle of a fighting line; and the corresponding conditions on the +enemy's side must also be readily deducible, and on such foundation, +under constantly changing assumptions, as to strength and distance of +the enemy, all such movements as changes from one tactical formation +to another—flank attacks, deployment from column of route or after +the passage of defiles—must be practised. In all these exercises the +point at issue must be clearly and comprehensively expressed. When one +has attained a certain degree of security in the application of these +principles, these exercises must be repeated under conditions of +ever-increasing difficulty.</p> + +<p>The order for deployment must be given whilst the troops are in rapid +motion. Observation, thought, and command when in full gallop have to +be learnt; they do not come naturally. The most various movements, +without command or bugle-call, must be executed from a message brought +by a galloper. The troops will be practised against a suddenly +appearing enemy on simple warnings such as 'Against Cavalry,' 'Against +Infantry,' or merely on the sound 'Alert,' and pains must always be +taken to see that the fundamentally right formation is adopted. In +these exercises it must be left to the initiative of the subordinates +to judge the situation for themselves, and always move to their proper +place in the prescribed formation by the shortest path. Of course, in +such movements the first principle is that the troops nearest the +enemy furnish the first 'Line'; the remainder fall into their +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page237" name="page237"></a>(p. 237)</span> places as flank coverers, supporting squadrons or reserve.</p> + +<p>If, in this manner, we succeed in imparting to the junior Leaders +thorough clearness as to the principles of the game, and to make them +both quick and skilful in their appreciation of the situation, then +the work of education on the drill ground is complete, and the troops +are ready for exercises over country. No pains must be spared to +separate the purely formal and ceremonial side of drill from the +practical field-training. The former keeps always, as I have indicated +in the first section, its full value for the creation of discipline +and alertness, but leads only too easily to a routine which has +nothing in common with the battle-field, and to that poverty-stricken +'schematisimus' to which human nature so readily inclines.</p> + +<p>To the formal school of training, which I have hitherto only had in +mind, a whole series of exercises must now be coupled, having for +their purpose the application of the acquired forms and principles +under all circumstances of the ground. But before we proceed to their +detail consideration, we must answer the question how far the drill +ground only suffices for the purpose of training. Generally, one can +subscribe to General von Schlichting's principle—that forms and +principles must be learnt in the drill book, but their application in +action only in the open country. Tactical exercises on the drill +ground, which have not for sole purposes to bring to expression +certain formal principles, are always an evil, and mislead the troops. +On the other hand, the principles of the tactical employment of +Cavalry are particularly suited to representation on the drill +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page238" name="page238"></a>(p. 238)</span> ground because they are frequently of a purely formal +nature.</p> + +<p>Keeping firmly to these established principles, then, to define the +limits of usefulness of the drill ground, we have only to answer the +question within what tactical units this formal drilling is still +instructive or possible. My opinion is that the Brigade marks the +highest limit, as within it all tactical principles find their +application, and it is the largest body which can still in any way be +handled by drill methods only. In the Division, and still more in the +higher units, the strategical element preponderates so greatly that +anything approaching real drill is out of the question, and all +movements which they can execute are based on a complete command of +these principles already. Of course, it is not intended to prohibit +altogether the formal working together of these masses at the +beginning in order to secure complete control and knowledge of them +for further instruction; but one must not delay over these formal +movements a moment longer than absolutely necessary, since the real +centre of gravity lies in the practical training, and no doubt must be +allowed to exist as to which exercises are intended as purely drill +and which as practical preparation for War.</p> + +<p>Nor would I have it implied that brigade and regimental training +should be entirely confined to the drill ground. On the contrary, the +exercises over country are absolutely essential for practical +training, and form the keystone of the whole edifice; but it seems to +me not merely permissible but desirable that a portion of these +exercises should be carried out on the drill ground in order to +expedite this portion of the work. But all the more energetically must +it be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page239" name="page239"></a>(p. 239)</span> insisted on that the remainder of the programme—the +greater part in regard to time—should be executed, as far as +possible, in variable ground, and that all exercises of the larger +formations should be confined to such ground as we shall have to work +over in War; not alone are they by far the most important for the +higher tactical education of the Arm, but they cannot be represented +on drill grounds at all; their whole essence is too entirely out of +harmony with the conditions of a level plain.</p> + +<p>That the degree of cultivation existing in the vicinity of the +garrisons may interfere seriously with these demands is obvious, and +in the absence of the necessary spaces to work over we must fall back +on the great training grounds (Truppenübungs Plätze); even the +possibilities of these are very soon exhausted. But this, at least, is +certain: that it is better to hold these exercises on these training +grounds than to confine them exclusively to the drill field. Every +effort must, therefore, be made to transfer all exercises of bodies +above the regiment to the training grounds, on which one will always +find some portion sufficiently suitable for the amount of drill +required, and to extend the period of work on these grounds so that in +all periods it will be possible to interpose between the drill days a +sufficient number of field service days, always supposing that these +training grounds offer sufficient diversity of contour, etc., for our +purposes. Where this is not the case, then, in spite of the expense +entailed by possible damage to crops, etc., suitable ground will have +to be acquired. The extra cost of a few thousand pounds cannot be +allowed to stand in the way of the adequate training of the Arm which, +owing to its numerical strength, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page240" name="page240"></a>(p. 240)</span> relatively small in +comparison with the magnitude of its tasks, is in the last resort +dependent for its success on its internal excellence alone.</p> + +<p>As concerns the nature of these exercises, with special reference to +the larger formations, first of all we must secure, by means of a +graduated series, the certain co-operation of the constituent elements +and of their leaders. Next, it must be insisted on that, for the +further actual practical training, as well as for the purely formal +drill, a systematic procedure should be the fundamental principle, so +that all who participate in them may become clearly aware of the +conditions of Warfare, and the means of dealing with them. It is +evident that these conditions must form the foundation of the required +system.</p> + +<p>As in War these are constantly changing, there seems a certain degree +of contradiction in this demand; but in reality this is not the case, +for no matter how the situation may vary, there will always be for its +proper criticism some one chief point which will characterize the +whole procedure, and thus be decisive for the systematic arrangement +of these exercises.</p> + +<p>The latter can then be divided into two principal groups, according as +to whether they are based on the assumption of a Cavalry force acting +as an independent unit or in combination with the other Arms. The +general conditions in both cases must be clearly brought out, and give +them the point of attachment for the further subdivision of the +exercises.</p> + +<p>Thus, with regard to the first case:</p> + +<p>Reconnaissance from a great distance. Deployment of one or more +columns out of defiles or in open country. The land in the vicinity of +the training ground can here be advantageously employed. It is +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page241" name="page241"></a>(p. 241)</span> not desirable to place the heads of the separate columns at +once on the scene of action, using these points as starting-points for +the forthcoming exercise. One must give the columns longer marches, +and demand that—assisted by a properly-working mechanism for +circulating information and orders—they should arrive at the point of +action at the proper time, in spite of possible delays or interference +on the road. The enemy, whether skeleton or otherwise, must, of +course, be handled so that collision occurs within the limits of the +training ground.</p> + +<p>Transition from the relations of advance (or rear) guard and main body +to the order these assume on the battle-field.</p> + +<p>Attacks on a railway or hostile post.</p> + +<p>Government boundaries form no support for the flanks; these can only +be considered as secure when protected by natural obstacles; hence, as +a rule, measures must be taken to cover both flanks.</p> + +<p>Transition from the tactical to the strategical form after completion +of an encounter; pursuit of the enemy with one fraction of the force, +and continuation of the operation with the remainder; for the latter, +only orders need be issued; but it is a matter of considerable +importance how this division of force rendered necessary by the +tactical encounters is arranged.</p> + +<p>Retreat after a repulse, in one or several columns.</p> + +<p>Retirement through defiles.</p> + +<p>In the second case:</p> + +<p>Selection of position on the battle-field in a proper relation to the +fighting line, zone of danger, etc., and reconnaissance to front and +flanks.</p> + +<p>Advance from a position in reserve to attack on the enemy's Cavalry +round one wing of an Army.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page242" name="page242"></a>(p. 242)</span> Transition from a victorious charge against Cavalry to a +further attack against the enemy's flank.</p> + +<p>Protection of the outer flank in either case.</p> + +<p>Retreat after defeat by the enemy's Cavalry to the protection of one's +own Army wing.</p> + +<p>Advance for frontal attack against the enemy's line of battle; passage +through the intervals of one's own Artillery and Cavalry. Protection +of both flanks. Attack upon Infantry, Artillery, or both; disengaging +a front attacked by Cavalry; combat against the latter.</p> + +<p>Flank attacks against retreating columns; ambushes at defiles.</p> + +<p>Of course, it is not intended in the above to lay down a hard-and-fast +scheme of instruction, but only to indicate how the work to be done +can be systematically arranged, and brought under one point of view, +so that the lessons they are intended to convey become impressed on +the mind. It is also evident that by the supposed conduct of the +enemy, and the strength assigned to him, the utmost variation can be +brought about in the grouping and representation of the several +conditioning circumstances. In short, these exercises must be taken +direct from the most diverse demands of War, and be based, as far as +possible, on an assumed general situation. They must never be allowed +to descend to mere fighting on horseback backwards and forwards across +the training ground, and with often quite unnatural sequence of ideas, +having no connection with the natural order of events. It is also most +desirable that Infantry and additional Artillery should be made +available for their execution.</p> + +<p>How far the dismounted action of the Arm is to be represented in these +series will be gone into in the next section; but in all cases, +whether working <span class="pagenum"><a id="page243" name="page243"></a>(p. 243)</span> mounted or on foot, the Leader must insist +that the troops are handled in accordance with tactical precepts +suitably applied in every case to the special circumstances of the +given situation; and for this, even on the smallest training grounds, +a proper utilization of the features of the country is essential.</p> + +<p>The desire to suit the formation to the ground; to carry out turning +movements under cover; to find support for the flanks in natural +obstacles, so that they cannot be surrounded; to choose the actual +field of encounter, so that every advantage of the ground, the +direction of the wind, of the sun, of covered approach, etc., all fall +to our advantage; to deal with defiles and passes on correct +principles; to utilize suitably strong defensive positions—all these +must be clearly brought to light, and in the 'Critique' these points +must be particularly borne in mind, for they are by no means +universally current in the Cavalry, which has a tendency always and +everywhere in peace to revert to the levellest ground obtainable. I +have seen at Cavalry Division Exercises troops handled without the +slightest regard to the nature of the country, and without the fact +attracting attention at the 'Critique'; but these are conditions +which, thanks to the energetic action of the Inspector-General, we may +hope, are now everywhere overcome.</p> + +<p>It must, further, be brought out in the clearest possible manner under +what conditions the employment of the units by 'Wings' is to be +recommended, and under which others their employment in 'Lines' +becomes necessary. The principles regulating this matter have already +received attention in Book I., Chap. V. The freedom which, as we have +seen, is given us by Section 346 of the Regulations must be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page244" name="page244"></a>(p. 244)</span> +utilized to the fullest extent, for it alone answers to the demands of +the modern battle-field.<a id="footnotetag27" name="footnotetag27"></a><a href="#footnote27" title="Go to footnote 27"><span class="smaller">[27]</span></a></p> + +<p>One last point requires further consideration, which is of +considerable importance for Cavalry exercises—viz., the use of +skeleton enemies.</p> + +<p>In no Arm does the skeleton enemy replace an actual enemy less than +with the Cavalry.</p> + +<p>If it rides the prescribed paces, then, as a consequence of the ease +of movement and rapidity of deployment, it has an unfair advantage; if +it rides slowly or halts altogether as a target, it makes things +altogether too easy for the other side. Besides, it is a very much +easier matter to judge a number of flags correctly than to estimate +the actual strength of a rapidly moving body of horse.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page245" name="page245"></a>(p. 245)</span> Most movements in practice develop so quickly, and, owing to +the ground, the direction in which the dust drives, etc., give such +changing pictures, that it is most difficult to judge them accurately +when one's self is in rapid motion.</p> + +<p>Often the Cavalry Commanders must decide, at least in general, on the +instant, strength, tactical distribution, and direction of movement of +a rapidly approaching enemy almost hidden in dense dust clouds; in the +same instant he must make up his mind with reference to the conditions +disclosed by the adversary and the nature of the ground, and issue his +orders clearly and intelligibly. The demand is such a great one that +both the physical and mental sight even of a born Leader needs +constant practice against real objects in order to be in any way equal +to it. Hence the necessity for bringing great Cavalry 'Masses'—at +least, Divisions—as frequently as possible together to manœuvre +against one another, and in such a manner that the strength of the +opposing forces remains unknown, which, with a little management, can +easily be arranged. If one knows beforehand the precise number of the +opposing forces, as with Divisions of uniform composition will +generally be the case, the matter is very much simplified indeed, but +in proportion it is less practical, a consideration which still +further supports our already formulated demand for Cavalry Divisions +differing as far as possible in their composition.</p> + +<p>Thus, it is clear that the field is wide indeed which opens itself for +the practical training of Cavalry as soon as one gets down to the +bed-rock conditions which determine success in actual War, and frees +one's self of all conventional suppositions. Whether we shall succeed +in satisfying the new conditions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page246" name="page246"></a>(p. 246)</span> which press upon us from +every side, taking into consideration the excellence of our existing +material, equal to the highest performances, will depend in the main +on the support of the superior authorities. For the manner in which +Cavalry are inspected decides how they practise and what they learn, +just as the way in which they are led determines what they can do.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page247" name="page247"></a>(p. 247)</span> CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<p class="title">TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING</p> + + +<p>If in the previous pages it has been shown that increased attention +must be devoted, in the training of our Cavalry for its mounted +duties, to the changed conditions we shall encounter in modern War—if +it is to do justice to itself on the battle-fields of the future—it +must, on the other hand, be insisted on that the foundation available +for such further effort is indeed an excellent one. Our squadrons are, +in general, exceptionally well trained, capable of great endeavour, +and well in the hands of their Commanders.</p> + +<p>It needs, therefore, in my opinion, but a slight change in the +direction, the practical consideration of certain new points, and, +above all, a wider range of practice in the higher Commands, to attain +the very highest mark.</p> + +<p>With its dismounted action, however, it is a different matter.</p> + +<p>In spite of the increased importance this form of fighting has +acquired in modern War, our Cavalry has not as yet paid anything like +the amount of attention to the subject that it deserves. Almost +everywhere it is treated as of quite minor importance, and many +Cavalrymen still close their eyes to the view that, without a training +at once as thorough and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page248" name="page248"></a>(p. 248)</span> earnest for dismounted action as +that bestowed on the Arm to fit it for its mounted duties, modern +Cavalry will hardly survive the trials it will encounter in the +future.</p> + +<p>This idea rests on long-standing tradition, which is difficult to +overcome. It is not so very long ago that on the rifle ranges some +officers caused volleys to be fired in order to get through their +cartridges so as to get back to quarters the sooner; but mainly, it is +up-borne and continued by the fact that in the Inspections the +superior Commanders generally treat dismounted fighting as a matter +hardly worth their serious consideration, or judge it by +false—<i>i.e.</i>, too narrow—standards. Further, because in the +manœuvres, as in the principal Cavalry exercises generally, +situations requiring dismounted action for their due solution hardly +ever arise; and lastly, because of the manner in which the whole +subject is discussed in the Regulations themselves.</p> + +<p>The latter approach the question from a far narrower standpoint than I +propose. They lay down quite openly that only under especially +favourable circumstances can Cavalry hope to obtain easy and minor +results from their carbine, fire, and that they are not in a position +to enter on and carry through obstinate encounters.</p> + +<p>They lay principal stress on the defensive, and practically exclude +the combat of larger 'Masses' altogether from their horizon.<a id="footnotetag28" name="footnotetag28"></a><a href="#footnote28" title="Go to footnote 28"><span class="smaller">[28]</span></a> In +fact, they consider only the minimum conditions which the Cavalry must +fulfil if it is not to fall into the background altogether.</p> + +<p>The final consequences of modern development, hardly even those +resulting from the experiences of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page249" name="page249"></a>(p. 249)</span> 1870-1871, they have +emphatically not yet even approached.</p> + +<p>Those who have studied the action of our Cavalry in that campaign +thoroughly—as I myself had full opportunity of doing—will agree that +we seldom had to have recourse to the carbine except on the offensive, +as I have pointed out above, and only in the rarest cases did we need +them for defensive purposes; and though in future against overwhelming +forces this necessity may arise more frequently, still, as in 1870, +this tendency towards a resolute offensive must always stand in the +foreground. Nevertheless, the Regulations, in spite of all practical +experience and theoretical considerations, lay down that in most cases +fire action will be confined to the defensive (Cavalry Regulations, +Section 357).</p> + +<p>It is quite natural that the troops themselves should not place their +ideal higher than the Regulations require; all the more necessary, +therefore, do I hold it to express with all emphasis that <i>our +training must go far beyond the limits prescribed for it officially</i> +if we are in any degree to satisfy the demands that War will make upon +us. But for these, I hold our Cavalry thoroughly capable (when +trained, understood), and even if they were not, one should never +breathe such a suspicion to the men themselves. For should such an +impression get abroad, one would dig at once the grave of initiative, +daring, and resolution in the execution of all necessary undertakings.</p> + +<p>Keenness, the very life and soul of all Cavalry action, can only grow +where the troops believe themselves fully equal to all eventualities. +The idea, therefore, that Cavalry, even when dismounted, is not equal +to any Infantry, must never be allowed to show <span class="pagenum"><a id="page250" name="page250"></a>(p. 250)</span> its head; +rather, the men must be brought up in the conviction that, owing to +their longer term of service, absence of reservists, etc., they are, +unit for unit, more than a match for the best. Only when they feel +this thoroughly will they develop their utmost fighting value. But it +is indispensable that they should be thoroughly at home in all forms +of the dismounted combat, for only then will they feel confidence in +the weapons they carry.</p> + +<p>This ideal is as yet far from being attained in our service, and we +must break entirely with the existing training and enter on new paths +if it is in any way to be attained.</p> + +<p>For the tactical subdivision of the squadron, and the elementary forms +of skirmishing action, the Regulations afford a sufficient foundation, +but their application must be brought home to the men in a totally +different manner to that at present in use.</p> + +<p>A few weeks after their arrival—at latest the beginning of +November—the recruits must be taken out into the country and +practised in utilizing all the advantages it offers, both as a group +and in firing lines, and at the same time they must be taught with the +carbine, aiming, judging distance, etc., always from the point of view +of making each man a practical independent shot, without any +theoretical mystification or pedantry. Soon after Christmas they must +be sufficiently far advanced to commence practice on the range, which +must be carried out with the utmost individual care.</p> + +<p><i>A considerable increase in the amount of ammunition is essential</i> to +keep the men constantly in practice, so that there are no long pauses +between the days set aside for shooting, that these are divided over +the whole <span class="pagenum"><a id="page251" name="page251"></a>(p. 251)</span> year, and that firing at long distances and under +field conditions can be carried out on a greater scale than at +present. Before the beginning of the squadron drills, the men must be +thoroughly at home both in mounting and dismounting for fire action; +with this object, vaulting exercises with horses in full kit must be +especially practised. They must also have progressed so far in the +elementary preliminaries that tactical training of the dismounted +squadron can be proceeded with at once; but the individual exercises +must be continued throughout the whole year if knowledge of them is to +pass over into the flesh and blood of the men.</p> + +<p>Special importance is to be attached to field firing, and for this in +particular far more ammunition must be provided. In this most +important respect Cavalry must be put on precisely the same footing as +the Infantry, and be able to practise at real service targets exactly +like the latter. But these exercises must not be begun until the men +are thoroughly at home in judging distance and aiming, the class +shooting is at an end, and the tactical training of the squadron +completed.</p> + +<p>In aiming practices, low targets, representing men lying down, or +well-covered shooting lines at great distances, are to be preferred; +but in field firing the targets should be so disposed as to make the +typical cases it is desired to represent, in which Cavalry will +generally have to employ their firearms on service, sufficiently clear +to the men's understanding—such, for instance, as the following:</p> + +<p>1. Attack of an occupied position.—Fire opens according to ground at +1,100 to 1,200 yards; gradual advances by rushes to decisive +distances, which, with <span class="pagenum"><a id="page252" name="page252"></a>(p. 252)</span> modern weapons and in open country, +may be put at 700 to 900 yards. Development of the principal fire +effort at this range, and beating down of the enemy's return fire. +After attainment of the fire superiority, rapid advance by rushes, and +in larger bodies. These rushes must be covered by the fire of those +still lying down, until the point for the commencement of their +assault is reached. Meanwhile, advance of the last Reserves, also by +rushes, to the last fire position to give the final impulse for +assault; assault; pursuit by fire. The strongest development possible +of concentric fire consistent with the retention of adequate reserves +to carry forward the fighting line.</p> + +<p>2. Defence of a position.—(<i>a</i>) Obstinate defence; object not to let +the assailant come too close; hence from 1,100 yards a considerable +development of fire power; continuation of the fight at decisive +range, and, according to the result, either pursuit by fire or rapid +evacuation of the position with ultimate sacrifice of the rearguard to +be formed by the last reserve. (<i>b</i>) Defence without the intention of +standing fast, either to gain time or compel the enemy to deploy. +Hence, principal fire effort between 1,000 and 1,300 yards, and then +gradual break-off of the fight before the enemy can approach too +close.</p> + +<p>N.B. In practice a favourable position is essential.</p> + +<p>3. Surprise fire against marching columns or reserves whilst +reconnoitring the enemy's approach, or whilst working round his flank +and rear in the battle, or in pursuit without the intention of +charging or defending one's self, mainly with the purpose of securing +a momentary but considerable moral and material effect, then +disappearing and renewing the attempt from another place, hence sudden +'Mass' fire from 1,500 to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page253" name="page253"></a>(p. 253)</span> not less than 1,000 yards. At the +same time, it must be explained that with our present carbine even a +nominal effect can hardly be secured at the greater distances. Here I +have anticipated the issue of a better weapon, an unconditional +necessity for the Cavalry in any case.</p> + +<p>All these practices, however, will only then be of value when the +officers possess a far more thorough knowledge of musketry and the +capabilities of their weapon than is at present the case with us. It +must therefore be insisted upon that, first our Regimental Commanders, +and then the junior officers, should be ordered to attend the Infantry +School of Musketry, in order that they may thoroughly master this new +branch of knowledge.</p> + +<p>It will be asserted that the time for such thorough training in +musketry cannot be found except at the cost of neglecting still more +important branches of our service. But from my practical experience I +cannot assent to this view. There is ample time, if it is not wasted +on unpractical affairs.</p> + +<p>Judging distance and the use of ground can be most thoroughly taught +during field-service practices, whilst the troops are on piquet, or +the squadron at the reserve of the outposts, when the men who do not +at the moment happen to be on patrol or vedette often lie about for +hours doing nothing. We have then opportunities to take these matters +in hand in the most practical manner; particularly the former, on +which shooting in the field so essentially depends, and whose +importance is so little appreciated by our Cavalry.</p> + +<p>The duties in the afternoon can also be much reduced to save time for +the same purpose. For instance, let me call attention to the waste of +time involved by <span class="pagenum"><a id="page254" name="page254"></a>(p. 254)</span> lengthy parades for lance exercise. No man +can keep on at lance practice for an hour at a time. The consequence +is that most of it is spent in standing easy, and therefore wasted. +But the object—viz., of gradually strengthening the muscles of the arm +and making the man handy with the weapon—can be equally well attained +by a couple of parades for the purpose weekly. Perhaps still better, +if before every afternoon parade and every mounted duty throughout the +year the men are exercised with the lance for a few minutes only. In +this manner the muscles of the arm will develop more rapidly and much +time will be saved. Similarly, more can be gained by the method of +imparting the instruction pursued, if attention is restrained to the +thing that the man must know only, and everything superfluous, such as +the learning by heart of the names of every portion of the weapon and +so forth—at any rate with the recruits—is left out, and at the same +time all such opportunities as occur in stable duty, on the march, in +the cleaning hour, etc., are made the most of.</p> + +<p>Finally, speaking generally, not only is more time than is necessary +spent on squadron drill, but also more than is advantageous. If one is +constantly drilling for four weeks at a stretch, that is ample, and +then there is time for a considerable extension of our shooting +training; and if the inspection of the squadron is postponed for any +particular reason, then shooting and field-service days can be +interpolated, which in itself is a very good thing.</p> + +<p>If in these ways time for the elementary training for dismounted work +and for shooting can be gained, it is still easier to arrange things +for the foot training of the squadron as a unit. During the drill +period the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page255" name="page255"></a>(p. 255)</span> pauses to rest the horses which must be granted +to them can be utilized, and in the field-service exercise the schemes +must often be framed so as to afford practice in dismounted operations +in suitable ground. For the technical training of the men it is of +particular importance that they should be accustomed, with immobile +horses, to couple (? knee halter) them rapidly, and with mobile horses +in bringing them up or retiring them.</p> + +<p>These two essential practices receive far too little attention in the +German Cavalry. The chief difficulty of the latter lies in the way in +which the spare lances which the man cannot hold fast in his hand fly +backwards and forwards when in rapid motion; and the ease with which a +lance can be jerked out of the shoe, and then trail on the ground can +give rise to the gravest disorder, not to mention danger.</p> + +<p>It is most desirable that something should be done to remove this +evil. The best, perhaps, would be to devise some arrangement by which +each lance could be attached to its own horse. If that is possible, +then the shoe must be made so deep that the lance cannot be thrown +out. It is obvious that this problem will not be long in finding a +solution as soon as attention is directed to its absolute necessity.</p> + +<p>The above will suffice to make it abundantly clear that as far as +concerns the thorough training of the squadron for dismounted purposes +no serious difficulties exist. These only begin when we come to the +employment of larger forces, and principally because the Regulations +give us no point of support for the purpose, whilst our Cavalry +officers themselves are in no way prepared for this branch of their +duties. For the employment of the tactical units and the fundamental +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page256" name="page256"></a>(p. 256)</span> principles governing their use in action we are therefore +compelled to lean on the Infantry Regulations. But how many of our +Cavalry officers are sufficiently acquainted with these to employ them +practically? How is it to be expected that they should be, when nobody +expects such knowledge of them?</p> + +<p>Hence to prepare for the training of the Leaders, officers of all +ranks should be encouraged, whenever time and opportunity offers, to +attend the more important tactical exercises of the Infantry. It would +be better still if a sufficient number of Cavalry officers were to be +attached—Lieutenants to Companies, senior officers to Battalions and +Regiments—for suitable periods. But we must be quite clear in our +minds that in this way we have at most an expedient to meet a period +of transition, which will not suffice as a permanent remedy.</p> + +<p>It can never be considered otherwise than as a grave disadvantage when +one Arm is compelled to seek the instruction necessary for its +practical application in War from the Regulations and parade grounds +of another, and more especially when, as in this case, the principles +of the Cavalry are by no means applicable without modification to the +other.</p> + +<p>Actually, the peculiarities and the duties of Cavalry render many +variations from Infantry practice essential which require +consideration. For instance, the Infantry company is told off in +three, the dismounted squadron with mobile horses in two, with +immobile ones in three fractions, which are always very much weaker +than those of the Infantry, and, therefore, entail entirely different +methods of husbanding their respective strengths. I can only consider +it, therefore, as a most pressing need, and one which can no <span class="pagenum"><a id="page257" name="page257"></a>(p. 257)</span> +longer be delayed, that the Cavalry Regulations should receive the +necessary expansion to meet the different conditions, and that the +practical training of the men on foot should be carried on in the same +systematic way as their preparation for mounted duties.</p> + +<p>For these alterations in the Regulations the principles of the Company +Column tactics must, in my opinion, form the general groundwork. A +dismounted squadron with immobile horses bring 125, with mobile ones +about 70, carbines in the line of fire; a regiment, therefore, from +280 to 500—numbers, therefore, materially smaller than those of a +company or battalion respectively, and their power in action is +correspondingly reduced. Nevertheless, it will be well, with regard to +the conditions of command, to treat the squadron tactically on the +same footing as the company, and within these limits the principles +governing extensions, depth and arrangement of the units for attack or +defence must be laid down clear and distinct in the Regulations.</p> + +<p>These principles must be formulated in general on the lines which in +discussing the question of tactical direction (Book I., Chap. V.) I +have already attempted to develop. They must distinguish clearly +between the cases of the detachment acting for itself alone or with +either or both flanks protected, and lay down what distribution of +force and apportionment of reserves is of decisive importance, and, +therefore, requiring special instructions.</p> + +<p>The chief stress, in opposition to all previous prescriptions, must +now be laid on the combat of the regiment and the brigade, as those +units whose employment will be principally called for in modern +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page258" name="page258"></a>(p. 258)</span> War, and the principle of the offensive must be steadily +kept in view. Fights for localities and about defiles require especial +attention, and further, the conditions must be laid down by Regulation +in which action is to be engaged in with mobile or immobile horses, +and how these led horses are to be placed and protected.</p> + +<p>The present Regulations pass lightly over these questions, because, as +I have pointed out, the standpoint from which they view the matter is +fundamentally different. If, however, the increased importance of +dismounted action is granted, then these points call for decision, and +how they are to be dealt with as a matter of principle cannot be left +to the goodwill of the Leader.</p> + +<p>A very important defect in the Regulations lies in the uncertainty it +allows to exist as to the subdivision of the dismounted squadron, and +how the skirmishers on dismounting are to form.</p> + +<p>According to Section 54 the squadron dismounted is divided into four +troops of twelve files, or if the number of files does not suffice, +into three troops. According to Section 87, eight to twelve men form a +group, two or three groups a troop. In Section 155 the skirmishers of +a troop when dismounted, with mobile horses, form one group. How many +'troops' are to be formed is not indicated. 'The skirmishers fall in, +in front of or by the side of the squadron, arranged as on horseback.' +When working with immobile detachments, then, according to Section +156, the skirmishers form in front or by the side of the squadrons in +two ranks, and in how many groups or troops they are to be told off is +not specified.</p> + +<p>The confusion here cannot be explained away, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page259" name="page259"></a>(p. 259)</span> its +consequences are frequently manifested. It must be laid down once for +all that with mobile horses the dismounted men of a squadron form one +troop in four groups, or with immobile ones two troops, also of four +groups, and that they always form up in front of the squadrons, each +troop in line, and one behind the other. Then everyone should know +exactly what he has to do. It is altogether a misfortune that the +dismounted squadron and the squadron on foot parade are two entirely +different things. The latter is only required for ceremonial, and +everything relating to it should be consigned to Part IV. of the +Regulations (ceremonial, etc.); whilst the training of the squadron on +foot should from the beginning be based on the needs of the squadron +dismounted for action. Then there would be unity and system in the +matter.</p> + +<p>Turning now to the practical education in larger units, it is +necessary that the fundamental principles guiding the distribution of +the men in attack or defence in the typical kinds of encounter should +be taught and practised on the drill ground. The corresponding +positions of the led horses must also be represented. As typical +situations I would enumerate the following:</p> + +<p>Attack on localities, with or without the tendency to outflank.</p> + +<p>Attack by surprise, or after preparation.</p> + +<p>Defence of a section or of a locality, with known direction of the +enemy's advance, or when the flanks may be threatened.</p> + +<p>Obstinate defence and maintenance of an isolated locality.</p> + +<p>Keeping open the entrance of a defile, and its utilization for a +further offensive or retreat.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page260" name="page260"></a>(p. 260)</span> Deployment for surprise fire action, in order to disappear +again immediately.</p> + +<p>Combined action of dismounted men with a mounted reserve, to ward off +an attack or pursue a retreating enemy.</p> + +<p>In all these cases we require not only fundamentally different +methods, but the methods themselves will be different according to +whether the led horses are mobile or immobile, because in each case +the strength of the tactical units is an entirely different one.</p> + +<p>These more or less elementary exercises, after the squadron +inspections, both mounted and on foot, have been concluded, must be +principally carried out in the regiment, which also when dismounted +remains the true tactical unit of the Cavalry; but they must be +continued by the brigade, in which the employment of the regiments +formed side by side—<i>i.e.</i>, by 'Wings'—must be represented under +most varying circumstances.</p> + +<p>It appears to me that in the present state of our training it is +exactly these elementary exercises which are the most important, +because more than any others they are adapted to make clear and +comprehensible the general conditions of successful fire employment. +This comprehension, owing to the specifically Cavalry tendencies of +our training, is in general almost entirely lacking in our Cavalry +Commanders, so that in this direction the tactical education of our +officers requires to be built up almost from the ground.</p> + +<p>For the rest, these exercises, like the corresponding ones when +mounted, form only the basis for the true practical training, which it +is not possible to impart on a drill ground, and requires, as a first +condition, natural country, with all its changing features. For +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page261" name="page261"></a>(p. 261)</span> this reason it must be insisted on that a part of the +regimental and brigade drill season should be spent in the country and +on wide open spaces, with great variety of topographical expression. +Where such are not to be had, then we must go to the troop training +grounds; and hence the desire, above expressed, to extend as far as +possible the period spent by the troops in the district or on these +training grounds, and which I have based on the necessity for holding +annual exercises for the higher units, in which all regiments should +take part, finds additional support.</p> + +<p>Of course, this does not preclude the necessity of utilizing the +surroundings of the garrisons to their utmost.</p> + +<p>As regards the arrangement and nature of these exercises, when working +on the drill ground they will have to be inserted between the pauses +in mounted movements necessary to rest the horses, but they must never +on this account be allowed to be treated as of any less importance. +When out in the country in larger and continuous movements, this +opportunity, from the nature of things, will not be available.</p> + +<p>But it is precisely on the larger movements, if possible of whole +Divisions, that the principal stress should be laid. In these the +fight can be initiated under the most varied conditions, as a +consequence of the direction of approach, and after its execution +further operations arising out of the resulting situation can be set +on foot, which, as we have seen (Book I., Chap. VI.), will generally +entail the interaction of dismounted men with mounted reserves.</p> + +<p>Such exercises must naturally be laid out quite independently, and +must take rank in the programmes for Brigade and Divisional drills on +an equal footing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page262" name="page262"></a>(p. 262)</span> with the others. All Leaders must by +degrees learn to control the whole of this section, and find +themselves as much at home in every tactical situation on foot as if +they were in the saddle.</p> + +<p>Hence great importance must be laid on the capacity for exercising +independent resolve in all ranks of the subordinate officers; but, +above all, they must be made to acquire that relentless tendency to go +forward which is the very soul of their service, and generally the +best adapted to its tactical requirements. Officers and men must +realize that, once dismounted, victory alone can restore to them their +horses. These latter must be so disposed that the impossibility of +making use of them to break off the engagement springs in the eyes of +every man. Only in this way can one get clear ideas: so long as the +men do not look on their action on foot as in itself something +serious, but are thinking principally of how to get back to their +horses, as long as the Leader himself makes his action dependent on +this possibility, for just so long will the men fail to put their +whole soul into their work, and we shall obtain only partial results, +with uncertain handling.</p> + +<p>This point of view must be constantly kept in mind throughout the +training, and every effort be made to habituate the men to work up to +it. But we shall only then succeed in breaking with the old +traditions, and in fitting ourselves to meet the changed conditions of +War, when the superior officers in their inspections attach <i>as much +importance to the combat dismounted as they now do to the fight in the +saddle</i>, and submit the Leaders to an equally searching and practical +examination in each.</p> + +<p>Amongst these changed conditions we must include <span class="pagenum"><a id="page263" name="page263"></a>(p. 263)</span> the +intelligent co-operation of the Artillery with the skirmishers, and +also of the machine-guns, which latter may be expected to play a +considerable part in defence, and also on occasions requiring the +sudden development of a great intensity of fire. It is in this +connection that lies (Book I., Chap. VI.) the chief importance of the +Horse Artillery batteries, and yet in peace they have practically no +opportunity to make themselves familiar with its peculiarities.</p> + +<p>Instead, we find in the great Cavalry manœuvres the constantly +recurring tendency to theatrical display. Batteries accompany the +formal drill evolutions of the Divisions—a performance which, in my +opinion, has not the slightest practical value, but only subjects the +horses to unnecessary exertion, and prevents the Leaders from devoting +their attention to the really important elements of their +business—the enemy and the nature of the ground. Against all such +methods the sharpest protest should be entered.</p> + +<p>As long as formal evolutions are being practised, the Artillery has no +place on the drill ground; the Cavalry only require its services when +the tactical training commences, and the batteries belong to the +places they would occupy in War—<i>i.e.</i>, in the advance guard, or +before the front. But, above all, they must be given opportunity to +co-operate in the dismounted engagements, and not merely for their own +training—though this, of course, is of importance—but principally +for the education of the Cavalry officers, who must learn to employ +the power of this Arm tactically, wait for its effect, and utilize it.</p> + +<p>That this object can only partially be obtained on the larger +exercising grounds, and not at all on the drill grounds, is +sufficiently obvious, and it is only <span class="pagenum"><a id="page264" name="page264"></a>(p. 264)</span> necessary to call to +mind the attacks on villages, railway-stations, and the like, which +are not usually found on such places to make the difficulty apparent. +The keystone, therefore, for our purposes can only be found in the +country itself, or in manœuvres, in which the application of every +tactical form develops naturally, and finds its justification in the +general scheme of operations, and in which the varying conditions are +always creating new situations, more or less practical in their +nature.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page265" name="page265"></a>(p. 265)</span> CHAPTER V</h2> + +<p class="title">FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANŒUVRES</p> + + +<p>If in the above sections we have dealt almost exclusively with the +training of the Cavalry for actual combat, the cause lies in the +nature of things. Victory whether in the shock of 'Masses' or even in +the minor encounters of patrols, forms so much the foundation of every +possible success, whether strategical or otherwise, that training with +this end in view naturally comes first under our consideration.</p> + +<p>But as the chief importance of Cavalry no longer lies in its +application on the battle-field, but rather in the solution of the +strategical problems encountered in the progress of operations, so its +training for battle is no longer the one aim and object, but only one +element of its whole preparation for the field. Field service, its +true duties in reconnaissance and strategic movements, must all be +taken into account as factors of equal importance.</p> + +<p>I wish to bring this necessity most especially into the foreground, +since hitherto, and particularly in view of the changed conditions of +modern Warfare, it has not attracted anything approaching the +attention it deserves.</p> + +<p>What do we practise in the field-service exercises and in the +manœuvres beyond the normal Cavalry <span class="pagenum"><a id="page266" name="page266"></a>(p. 266)</span> versus Cavalry +encounters? Principally, only formal outpost duties in combination +with Infantry, the smallest incidents of War on the smallest scaled +tactical scouting, and the participation of small Cavalry bodies in +the encounter between the combined Arms—all matters which nowadays +come within the sphere of the Divisional Cavalry; and, indeed, only +then when the divisions to which they belong, or even smaller bodies, +are operating independently, for the daily routine of the Divisional +Cavalry in the enormous Armies of the present day will be on a most +modest scale. At most in the Army Corps manœuvres we may get as far +as the employment of Brigades, and perhaps to the shadowing of an +enemy's line of advance.</p> + +<p>For the most important field of our enterprise, which is to be sought +in the activity of the Independent Cavalry, all this is of small +account. The real duties of Cavalry in War are only practised in peace +on the most confined scale, and often not at all.</p> + +<p>Long marches of endurance, independent outposts, attack and defence of +localities, the forcing of defiles, passage of rivers, etc., which are +held by an enemy's dismounted men, reconnaissances in the widest +sense, undertakings against the enemy's communications, pursuit, +protracted engagements covering retreats, marches with columns and +convoys, finally, the arrangement and execution of wide strategic +movements under practical conditions, with accurate computation of +time and space, the suitable employment of fighting power for the +attainment of the strategical object, and the best strategic +introduction of the consciously sought-out combat, all within the +limits imposed by the magnitude of the masses handled, are <span class="pagenum"><a id="page267" name="page267"></a>(p. 267)</span> +matters which in future will form the principal sum of all Cavalry +activity, but find no place in our scheme of education.</p> + +<p>Even the Imperial Manœuvres do not meet the situation, because, in +the first place, only comparatively few regiments are annually +affected by them; and in the second, the forces are generally from the +outset in such close proximity with one another that it is only, +perhaps, on the first day that a suitable situation for their +strategic employment may be said to arise at all.</p> + +<p>Whilst in this manner our whole training is adopted for conditions +which in future campaigns can only arise exceptionally, whilst it +practically ignores the true sphere of action of the Cavalry, we are +working in a vicious circle of forms and misrepresentations which +belong to an extinct era of Warfare, and which have long since ceased +to have any but the smallest connection with the facts of stern +reality.</p> + +<p>That things were no better in the period before the last Wars the +negative results obtained by our Cavalry in 1866 and 1870 sufficiently +prove. In no sphere of their action during these campaigns did they +obtain the results the Arm is really capable of—not because the +material in the ranks was inferior, but simply and solely because in +equipment and training they had lagged behind the requirements of the +time. These experiences should have been to us a serious warning not +to fall into similar errors a second time; and yet at the present +there is most serious danger that a future War may again find us +regarding by far the most important branch of our duties from a +standpoint which has long since passed away.</p> + +<p>The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page268" name="page268"></a>(p. 268)</span> a +twofold character. In the first place, the tasks accruing to the Arm +in War do not receive either amongst its own officers, still less +amongst those of the rest of the Army, their proper appreciation, +because in this direction guidance and instruction are alike lacking; +in the second, because most serious difficulties lie in the way of a +practical adaptation of our training to modern conditions.</p> + +<p>In contradistinction to former times, the tasks which await the +Cavalry lie principally in the sphere of strategical operations, and +here is the root of our special difficulty.</p> + +<p>Great Armies, with their communications, reconnaissances and raids +under really warlike conditions—that is to say, with their full +allowance of trains and baggage—extended retreats with beaten troops, +and the consequent pursuit, can only with difficulty be represented in +peace, owing to their expense and the consideration necessary to be +shown to local circumstances; but it is precisely in exercises of this +description, which might give a really working representation of the +conditions we shall be called upon to deal with, that circumstances +leave us entirely deficient.</p> + +<p>Considering all these conditions, it must be recognised that an ideal +method of instruction is practically beyond the bounds of the +attainable; but for that very reason, in my opinion, we must pursue +with all energy the practically possible, and for the unattainable +find the best substitute we can.</p> + +<p>The first point which strikes one, and which lies at the bottom of all +Cavalry undertakings, but in which no real education ever takes place, +is the conduct of patrols, and particularly of those employed for +reconnoitring purposes.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page269" name="page269"></a>(p. 269)</span> Instruction in the matter is certainly universal, and in the +writing of reports the non-commissioned officers have considerable +practice, but no uniform or systematic method or fixed principle is +observed, and the practical performances of the men are subject to no +superior check. It is left to the Leaders to apply practically their, +for the most part, very nebulous, theoretical knowledge. The young +officer in particular is altogether left to his own devices; no one +takes the trouble to teach him what is essential, and yet he is +expected to instruct his inferiors. The consequences are what might be +anticipated. The performances of the patrols in covering distances are +generally most commendable, but their reports most deficient. Seldom +is a clear distinction drawn between the essential and the +non-essential; the most trivial news is forwarded with the same +expenditure of horses' power as matter of greatest moment; for most +patrol Leaders find it very difficult, for want of an imagination +trained by the study of military history, to think themselves into and +see the situation as it actually would be in War, and thus to act and +ride as the circumstances viewed in this light really require. Most +information, poor as it is, is thus obtained in an unpractical manner; +and seldom is the degree of instruction realized which the situation +affords, namely, to observe keenly and clearly from a distant point, +and to carry out the ride in the spirit of the general situation, with +a proper calculation of time and space. In this branch of duty change +is imperative; the training for scouting must be made the foundation +of the whole course, and carried through in a uniform manner. +Everywhere it must be based on the conditions of a great War.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page270" name="page270"></a>(p. 270)</span> How the scientific knowledge necessary for the officers, +which forms the basis of this instruction, is to be encouraged and +imparted forms the subject of this next section. Here we can only +consider what can and must be done within the regiments and brigades, +and the following suggestions seem to me to meet the difficulty.</p> + +<p>In the winter, as soon as the inspection 'on the curb' is over, the +Regimental Commander with his Staff Officer and Squadron Commanders +must take the training in hand. He must begin with a definite +strategical situation, and from this as a basis, devise corresponding +schemes for patrols, which can be worked out in the neighbourhood of +the garrison, and then ride out with his officers exactly as in +practice the patrols would have to do. Arrived in the vicinity in +which contact with the enemy would take place, he assumes what the +patrols would see, and lets the class form their own decisions, write +their reports, and determine the manner of their further procedure.</p> + +<p>In these opportunities he can instil the true principles to be +followed, and demonstrate their practicability by all sorts of +exercises, until he is convinced that his hearers have completely +assimilated his standpoint and method of thought. Particular +importance must be attached to the point that the patrol leaders never +lose sight of the whole problem, and refer their observations always +to this standard, for it is only then that things appear in their true +importance; further, it must always be borne in mind up to what time +the report must be in the hands of the Leader if it is to be of use +for the special operation.</p> + +<p>The best information may be valueless if, as in 1870 so often +happened, it arrives too late. This the patrol <span class="pagenum"><a id="page271" name="page271"></a>(p. 271)</span> leader must +keep in mind throughout his ride, and thence deduce the time at which +his report must be despatched. He must also not only state clearly and +precisely what he has seen, but call attention to its probable bearing +on the operations, and inform his superior as to any peculiarities of +the ground that may influence his future conduct. The object of the +ride must be constantly in view, and the report not be overburdened +with trivialities about the enemy's patrols and the like, which are +often in War of quite negligible importance.</p> + +<p>If the Commanding Officer chooses to take the whole of his officers +out to these expeditions, he is, of course, free to do so.</p> + +<p>The Squadron Commanders now take their subordinates in hand and pass +on the instruction in the same spirit and manner, or hand over the +matter to the senior lieutenant, if he has been thoroughly instructed +for the purpose. In this manner a good uniform system of patrol +leading based on sound principles can be attained if the Commanding +Officer and his subordinates take all types of patrol duty into the +sphere of their practical instruction. The Brigade Commander can use +his discretion in its supervision, and give any assistance he may +consider necessary.</p> + +<p>For the practical training of the men, the foundation must, of course, +be found in the squadron. But the teaching must start from constantly +changing standpoints, and must be systematically carried on in the +higher Commands, which is at present not the case. For though at times +such exercises are carried out by the regiments, there is no +systematic progress, and no consequent development or representation +of the most important elements, whilst higher up no attempt is +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page272" name="page272"></a>(p. 272)</span> even made to continue the instruction further. The influence +of the Brigadier is confined in general to the detail education and +drill, and though the Division is now and again drilled, it never +'operates' in the strategical sense.</p> + +<p>As concerns the education of the squadron, this must from the very +beginning be rooted in modern conditions, which in the first place +demand the development in the man of the greatest possible +individuality. War requires this, as well as the gift of grasp and +resolution even in difficult situations, from every Cavalry soldier, +from the highest to the lowest. The exercise, however, of such +qualities can only be demanded from men who bring with them at least a +certain degree of comprehension for the nature of War, and it is +therefore of the utmost importance that this comprehension should be +developed by suitable instruction. This is often sinned against, +because sufficient attention is not paid to such instruction, and also +because we still work on out-of-date lines, and without any +well-defined principles. In my opinion the recruit must not be +overwhelmed with a whole mass of thoroughly unpractical knowledge.</p> + +<p>In this period of education one must limit the scope to only the most +important and necessary matters, but teach these so that the men +understand them clearly and thoroughly.</p> + +<p>In the latter years one can build out systematically on this +foundation. Thus I consider it quite unnecessary to harass the recruit +with long-winded explanations of the military virtues—loyalty, +obedience, and courage—or with long lists of different salutes to be +given, the recipients of which never come within his ken. It is quite +superfluous to teach them the different <span class="pagenum"><a id="page273" name="page273"></a>(p. 273)</span> parts of the lock of +the carbine and their mutual interaction, all about stable duty and +guard mounting. Even the theoretical instruction about the +organization of the Army, treatment of sore backs, horse sickness, +etc., can be reduced to much smaller dimensions than at present. +Stable work and guard duties, and so forth, a man learns much quicker +and better from daily practice. On the other hand, the time gained by +curtailing these matters must be used most zealously to teach him what +he absolutely must know for War. That is to say, the simplest +principles of Field Service, the composition of mixed detachments, +practical shooting, and the exterior treatment of the carbine. The +instruction in Field Service, which interests us here the most, can, +for the recruits, be kept down to very narrow limits. The principles +to be observed in placing pickets, vedettes, etc., he can very well do +without. On the other hand, he must know thoroughly those things which +he will have to do himself—his duty on patrols, or as bearer of a +message, or orderly, also the general connection of the military +conditions amongst which he will have to move or to notice amongst the +enemy, such as organization of the troops, arrangement of the +outposts, relation of the commands, plan and appearance of +entrenchments, shelter trenches, gun epaulments, cover, etc.<a id="footnotetag29" name="footnotetag29"></a><a href="#footnote29" title="Go to footnote 29"><span class="smaller">[29]</span></a></p> + +<p>He must know, too, that if taken prisoner, he must give no correct +answers as to anything concerning his own Army.</p> + +<p>It is quite possible to awaken the intellectual faculties of the man +and to develop them even within these narrow limits, for the more +tersely the facts are stated, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page274" name="page274"></a>(p. 274)</span> and the more thorough the +instructions, the more is his thinking power stimulated, whereas a +mass of material to be absorbed merely confuses him. This intellectual +pressure of the instructor must not, of course, be limited solely to +the lesson hour, but he must seize every possible opportunity to +assert his influence. Especial attention is to be directed to +habituate the men to carry in their minds verbal messages for a +considerable period, and then to repeat them clearly and concisely. It +is of great assistance to the intellectual development of the men if +they are compelled always to express themselves in grammatically +complete sentences, instead of in broken phrases; but I should +consider it as a serious error to attempt to teach the recruit the +neighbourhood of the garrison, both on the map and on the ground. For +in this way one deprives the man of one of his few opportunities which +occur to him during his whole service of learning to find his way in +unknown country, and thus to develop the instinct of finding his way, +which requires considerable practice.</p> + +<p>That this faculty is one of the most important in War-time for every +Cavalry soldier can hardly be open to doubt. From the same point of +view I must enter a protest against the absurd misuse of maps in +Peace-time. Of course, the men, and particularly the patrol leaders, +must understand how to read a map and find their way by it, and all +non-commissioned officers and men out of their first year's service +must be trained in so doing, but it is altogether impractical, and +therefore a bad preparation for war, if in the interests of better +manœuvre results maps are issued in uncounted numbers even on the +larger scales, so that not only every patrol leader, but every +orderly, can obtain one <span class="pagenum"><a id="page275" name="page275"></a>(p. 275)</span> for a couple of pence. In War, and +particularly in an enemy's country, such extravagance in their issue +is obviously out of the question.</p> + +<p>The education of the non-commissioned officers must also be +systematically set in hand. They should be divided, according to their +intelligence and performances, in different groups—two will generally +suffice—and the abler men should not only receive instruction for the +higher branches of their duties, but must also be rationally taught +how to teach others. The non-commissioned officers' school must also +receive thorough attention; if it is not conducted seriously, it +involves a scandalous waste of time, but if the men receive a really +earnest and stimulating instruction, it helps most materially in their +intellectual development, and thus reacts most favourably on their +military capacity.</p> + +<p>As concerns the practical exercises of the squadron, these must, as +far as possible, cut themselves free from the spirit of minor tactics, +and work as directly as they can towards the requirements of War on a +great scale. The destruction of railways and bridges, service on +requisitioning duties, etc., must naturally continue to be practised; +for though in spirit they belong to minor tactics, they are also +required in great Wars. But, above all, one must break with the old +one-sided schemes of outpost squadron—officers and non-commissioned +officers, posts and vedettes—and the whole subject must be treated on +wider lines more in accordance with the changing requirements of +active service. The different purposes for which localities are held +and utilized in different manners, the use of woods, and waves of the +ground, must all be drawn most thoroughly into the scope of the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page276" name="page276"></a>(p. 276)</span> exercises; and whilst still at squadron work the men must be +made clearly to understand the difference between mixed outposts and +those of Independent Cavalry, and the chief importance of their whole +training in this branch of their duty must be laid on the latter, +which is even nowadays not yet sufficiently the case. Further, there +must be thorough training in duties of security and reconnoitring at +night, and in particular of the defence of cantonments against +nocturnal attacks.</p> + +<p>In general, it must be clearly understood that all squadron training +can only be elementary, and hence must be regarded as a stepping-stone +towards the whole field-service training. Where this is left +altogether to the squadrons, the men never have the opportunity of +becoming acquainted with the conditions of time and space which limit +their action when in large bodies. Continuous exercises also, always +in the same units, lead only too easily to empty repetition and many +misunderstandings. The Squadron Field Service training must, +therefore, be limited in time, and as soon as it is completed it must +be continued in the regiment, and where the conditions at all +allow—<i>i.e.</i>, where the garrisons are not too far apart—it must +culminate in brigade work.</p> + +<p>The 'training'—<i>i.e.</i>, the condition of the horses-must by this time +have made such progress that marches of twenty to thirty miles for the +main body are well within their power. Here a wide and profitable +field opens for the Brigade Commander, but it is important in every +case—security, screening, reconnaissance, raid, or surprise—to bring +out systematically and clearly the essential difference of procedure +required, so that all grades of Leaders learn <span class="pagenum"><a id="page277" name="page277"></a>(p. 277)</span> to realize the +fundamental distinction which exists between these various forms of +their several duties.</p> + +<p>It is also equally important that in each Command operations in +several detachments, the regulation of their marching speed, their +combined action in the fight, the proper working of the arrangements +for collecting information or transmitting orders, should be practised +again and again till certainty in their interaction is secured.</p> + +<p>It is further necessary to call attention to the necessity, in the +interests of a prudent economy of one's forces, to arrange the patrol +service systematically, not only as regards the sphere of action +allotted to each, but also as to the time of their departure.</p> + +<p>Thus, in the march of a single body, the duty of attending to its +security may be assigned to the troops themselves, whilst the +reconnoitring task is allotted by the officer directing the +operations; or, in the case of separate bodies, that each receives its +own particular scouting mission, with which, then, the Director +refrains from interfering. Otherwise it may easily happen that patrols +are despatched for the same purpose by different Commanders, with a +corresponding waste of power and the risks of leaving gaps in the +whole line.</p> + +<p>The Commanders of mixed detachments should also make this need of +systematic procedure clear to themselves, and either leave the whole +duty of reconnaissance in the hands of the Cavalry, or if they elect +to retain certain portions of the work in their own hands they should +inform the Cavalry Commander of the fact, and not interfere afterwards +with his arrangements, or fail to keep him acquainted with the +measures they have themselves taken.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page278" name="page278"></a>(p. 278)</span> The first course is correct in principle, and will always +give the best results when a competent Cavalry officer is kept +sufficiently acquainted with the views of his superior, and made +personally responsible for results.</p> + +<p>Finally, as concerns practice in conjunction with the other Arms, +these, too, must lead into different paths from those at present +pursued. Detachments of Infantry and Artillery need Cavalry for +reconnaissance, security, and orderly duties; but for the Cavalry +itself these exercises (of small bodies) have little importance, +except in so far as they familiarize the men with the organization and +development of the other Armies, and thus learn to form an opinion +when viewing these from a distance. The combined action of Cavalry +with companies, battalions, and regiments has no importance at all, +and is often the merest waste of time. It is much more important to +secure practice for the troops in judging the appearance of +considerable bodies of Infantry, either on the march or in position, +and thence deducing their probable numerical strength.</p> + +<p>The former class of exercises will, therefore, be on as restricted a +scale as possible, whilst more time is given to the former, and by +arrangement with neighbouring garrisons opportunities can often be +made. In this way much can be done in the garrison and the Brigade to +further the training of Cavalry for the work of a great War, although +such exercises can in no way replace the actual manœuvring of large +bodies.</p> + +<p>It must rather be insisted on that the whole Field-Service training of +the Arm can only be brought to its legitimate conclusion in the +strategical exercises of large and changing combinations of units. +Even the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page279" name="page279"></a>(p. 279)</span> manœuvres, important as they undoubtedly are, +can never replace them. They must, therefore, be placed on a footing +of equal importance with the great drill practices of the higher +units, since the strategical value of the Arm to the supreme Commander +of the Army depends on its intelligent handling in this particular +field, and it is here that the difficulties to be overcome are +especially great.</p> + +<p>Again, system must be inculcated if clearness of apprehension of the +several problems is to be produced.</p> + +<p>It will be of the utmost importance that baggage and, if possible, +trains corresponding to the conditions on mobilization should be +employed, and that men and horses should be fed from their contents; +otherwise we would only too easily drop into habits of +under-estimating the difficulties with which in real War we shall have +to contend. But to guard against this self-deception should be the end +and object of all our efforts.</p> + +<p>It will, therefore, be necessary to calculate distance and the width +of areas to be swept over, with reference to modern conditions, and +not to work on the scale that sufficed us in France in 1870. The +telegraph must also be taken into account, and it must be strictly +insisted on that it is only to be used for such reports and in such +cases in which it would be available on service. It should, therefore, +be laid down beforehand which side is to be considered as in an +enemy's country. For the representation of following portions of the +Army, flag columns and peace garrisons may be employed, as this is of +the utmost importance for the systematic practice of the patrol +service.</p> + +<p>The formation of territorial Cavalry Inspections <span class="pagenum"><a id="page280" name="page280"></a>(p. 280)</span> and +Sub-Inspections, already advocated above, would give the necessary +foundation for our purposes. After finding the Divisional Cavalry +necessary on a War strength, the remaining regiments in their several +districts could be formed in Divisions and Corps of always varying +composition in order to carry out Independent Cavalry manœuvres.</p> + +<p>To practise the participation of the other Arms, corresponding +arrangements with the adjacent Corps Commanders could be made, so that +their annual manœuvres could work in with the Cavalry scheme, but +the strategic side should have the preference. Operations would not +always culminate in a great Cavalry engagement, but a skilful conduct +of the manœuvres in practical country would generally insure such +encounters without too great a charge for agricultural compensation.</p> + +<p>I do not believe that such a scheme, though it would certainly mean a +complete break with established Routine, would materially increase the +cost of the manœuvres. The damage, now disseminated by the many +regiments without any corresponding gain to their efficiency, would +now be concentrated on the same district, but the gain to the Arm +itself, as well as for the whole Army, would be both decisive and +epoch-making.</p> + +<p>Great though the importance and necessity of such an arrangement seems +to me, yet, as circumstances at present exist, one could hardly count +on seeing it applied at once to the whole service, and meanwhile we +must search for expedients.</p> + +<p>From this point of view, also, we must strive to extend the period +allotted for the training of the larger Cavalry bodies to such a +degree that Field-Service days <span class="pagenum"><a id="page281" name="page281"></a>(p. 281)</span> can be interposed between the +drill days, in which at least the combined action of masses within the +limits of Field-Service exercises can be practised.</p> + +<p>The question then arises whether it would not be as well to sacrifice +a part of the tactical training of the Divisional Cavalry in the +interest of the proposed strategic manœuvres, and whether the +advantages we anticipate from these latter might not, at any rate +partially, be attained in another manner. It seems to me that to a +certain extent this may well be possible, if we can only make up our +minds to break with our existing arrangements regulating the present +exercises, and order a certain number of garrisons, detailed in +groups, to operate one against the other. If this grouping is carried +out without reference to Corps boundaries, and the exercises are so +managed that the troops need only spend one night out of quarters, +during which they can bivouac, very great advantages at very small +cost would be derived, because, since in these operations it is not at +all necessary to carry them through to their culmination in an +engagement, but only to concentrate them for the purpose, when +necessary, in a practical manner, and to set all the machinery for +reconnoitring, for transmission of orders, and reports, in operation, +the damages to cultivation might be kept within very reasonable +limits.</p> + +<p>An example will help to make the idea clearer. If from the regiments +in Metz, Thionville, and St. Avoid on the one side, and of those in +Saarburg, Saargemund, Saarbrucken on the other, two opposing forces +are constituted, it would be easy to draw up a general idea by which +each element of the group considered as an independent Cavalry screen +covering the advance of an Army had reached on a given night the +points at <span class="pagenum"><a id="page282" name="page282"></a>(p. 282)</span> which they are actually quartered. The distances +of the places named one from another are such that they fairly +represent a possible situation in War, and a single day's march might +well bring them into collision. Inexpensive bivouac places could +easily be found in the wooded districts of Lorraine or elsewhere, and +the Infantry in the respective garrisons might represent the heads of +the following Armies' columns without undue interference with their +programme of training. If the Cavalry march out with four squadrons +only per regiment, the fifth can find horses for a part of the train, +the point being not so much the number of such waggons provided as the +service loading of those that are taken. In the afternoon and night +preceding the march, outposts could be established, and the service of +exploration commenced. Thus in two or three days a strategic exercise +for the Cavalry on a large scale could be arranged at a very low cost +and with very little difficulty. Such operations would naturally be +conducted by the Inspectors-General of Cavalry, and, as the example +shows, they could be generally, if not everywhere, easily +organized.<a id="footnotetag30" name="footnotetag30"></a><a href="#footnote30" title="Go to footnote 30"><span class="smaller">[30]</span></a></p> + +<p>Since it is essential in all Cavalry exercises to take into account +the numbers and distances with which we shall have to deal in future +Warfare, it would be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page283" name="page283"></a>(p. 283)</span> a great gain to the Arm if in the +manœuvres, in which its action in combination with the other Arms +should be taught, this point of view was brought more into the +foreground.</p> + +<p>Of course it is not intended that the interests of the other Arms +should be sacrificed to those of the Cavalry; the question rather is +whether these interests are not identical even for the Infantry; the +importance of minor tactics has fallen very much into the background, +and both Infantry and Artillery require far more practice in 'masses.' +Detachment warfare can for the most part be quite sufficiently +practised in the garrisons, but the opportunities for exercising the +large units are far more difficult to find.</p> + +<p>I consider, therefore, that it would be of advantage to all Arms if +present Brigade manœuvres, with all their superannuated customs, +were abolished in favour of more Divisional and Corps manœuvres. +The Cavalry, at any rate, would welcome the innovation, for from its +point of view these manœuvres could be made far more practical, and +it would be easier to arrange schemes for the latter more in +accordance with reality.</p> + +<p>It is also most desirable that from time to time the Cavalry should +have opportunities of practising both pursuit and rearguard action on +a grand scale. At present these only arise in the manœuvres with +mixed Arms, since in the Independent Cavalry manœuvres they are +difficult of representation.</p> + +<p>The Director of the manœuvres can also do much to make the +operations instructive for the Cavalry, and also to stimulate the +interests of all engaged, if he takes care that the demands made upon +the Cavalry are kept within reasonable limits. It constantly happens +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page284" name="page284"></a>(p. 284)</span> that patrols are despatched at far too late an hour to make +it possible for their reports to arrive in time. Commanders, again, +frequently wish to be informed as to the exact position of every +battalion on the other side, although they generally know his total +force with accuracy, or they want to know the exact strength of the +Garrison holding a certain village or locality, as if Cavalry could +under any circumstances supply such information; and if at night no +sketch of the enemy's outpost line has been handed in, the Cavalry are +held to have failed in their duty. All these demands are, in my +opinion, entirely unpractical; in War one never has such precise +information, and no rational man dreams of wasting the strength of his +Cavalry in endeavouring to secure such details. These things are mere +remnants of the Paleolithic Age, and only justifiable as an extreme +case when perhaps planning a surprise. Further, it is thoroughly +unpractical to require under all circumstances complete information as +to the progress of an engagement. With modern weapons this is +impossible, unless favoured by unusual topographical conditions. Not +merely are such demands unpractical, but they exercise a most +prejudicial effect, for too accurate and too detailed information gets +the Generals into bad habits of command, and the Cavalry itself is +well-nigh ruined. Certainly, when circumstances demand it, the men +must not be afraid to keep well up to the enemy, and bring back +intelligence even out of the zone of his fire; but, generally, +reliable observations are only made out of range. The Cavalry must +learn principally to judge the enemy's arrangements from a distance; +they must direct their attention to the essential only, and not waste +their time in unnecessary <span class="pagenum"><a id="page285" name="page285"></a>(p. 285)</span> side issues. If justice is to be +done to these requirements, it is quite impossible to collect all the +information the Generals so frequently require. Thus they get in the +habit of observing in an unpractical manner, and the whole of this +most important branch of their education suffers accordingly. So much +is this the case that nowadays the patrol leaders often exchange +mutual confidences to one another, as it is practically impossible, +owing to conditions of time and space, to obtain the required +information otherwise, and they consider it better to get it in this +manner than to accustom their men to unpractical feats of riding.</p> + +<p>Reconnaissance and its results can only be of value to the training +when kept within the limits that the nature of things dictates.</p> + +<p>Whilst the constant presence of danger is the characteristic element +in which the faculties of observation have to work in War, it is the +constant pressure of uncertainty as to the exact movements of the +enemy which equally characteristically forms the conditioning element +in which the intellectual activity of the Leaders has also to work, +and neither one nor the other may be entirely ignored in our +Peace-time training.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + +<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page286" name="page286"></a>(p. 286)</span> CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<p class="title">THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS</p> + + +<p>The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to the +various fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditions +of modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made upon +the leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be an +absolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be ready +to enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations of +the Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmony +with them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methods +of fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be able +to intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must with +swift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and in +addition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possess +inexhaustible activity of mind and body.</p> + +<p>If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leaders +of the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensified +in similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mental +qualifications, they will need, for the solution of the various +problems with which they will be confronted, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page287" name="page287"></a>(p. 287)</span> an immensely +increased amount of military knowledge and executive ability.</p> + +<p>The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalry +engagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations of +the Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above, +and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the whole +situation will enable the individual to act opportunely when such +moments may arrive. It is not merely a general military education +which will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness, +and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of the +great operations, and the power of judging a military situation with +accuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader of +an independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the results +deduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed by +Officers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on a +large scale. Without such training only isolated facts will be +reported—deductions will not be drawn. There will be no +discrimination between important and unimportant details, and the +Officer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as to +the direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly what +it is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform. +They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deduce +the strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, to +divine the probable connection of his operations, and hence to +determine the most important points and directions in which to follow +up any available clue.</p> + +<p>If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied <span class="pagenum"><a id="page288" name="page288"></a>(p. 288)</span> position, +he should be able from the indications on the spot and from his map to +determine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what point +to direct his further advance.</p> + +<p>If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able to +decide whether it is more important to follow or watch their +subsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some other +direction. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatest +importance for the superior staff to know when his instructions in +face of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty.</p> + +<p>Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of all +points to the same conclusion—viz., that a comprehensive military +education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of the +Higher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. The +history of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerable +examples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in the +future.</p> + +<p>Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only—the point was +to determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress or +were marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whose +doings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence, +seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which would +have enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance for +the Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the direction +in which the troops they saw were moving—a matter of most vital +importance—or estimated the strength of the several encampments, or +reported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they were +all moving in the immediate <span class="pagenum"><a id="page289" name="page289"></a>(p. 289)</span> vicinity, and might easily have +ascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus, +because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations led +to false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence—the +actual position of the French right flank—could not be determined +until hours after the battle had been begun under an entire +misapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences have +repeated themselves times without number.</p> + +<p>When we now reflect upon the greatly increased importance of reliable +information in Modern War, we cannot escape the conclusion that a +proper training of our Cavalry Officers to meet their requirements is +of vital importance. Their present-day education does not sufficiently +guarantee their competence.</p> + +<p>The knowledge of the military sciences acquired at the War schools is +on a very modest scale, nor is it, indeed, the business of these +schools to give higher education in such subjects. Hence it is all the +more deplorable that the higher intellectual training of our Cavalry +Officers practically ceases after the War School, because the +practical day-to-day duties of their profession furnishes them with +nothing which can replace the need for a higher theoretical training. +Generally, their attention is absorbed by the smallest of details, +which, though each is of immense importance to the efficiency of the +whole Arm, are not calculated to widen their intellectual horizon, and +in the few great manœuvres in which an Officer might find an +opportunity of enlarging his knowledge, he finds himself lacking in +the foundation necessary to make full use of it.</p> + +<p>The usual course of instruction, in fact, is not adapted <span class="pagenum"><a id="page290" name="page290"></a>(p. 290)</span> to +the needs of the Cavalry Officer, who already in early youth may find +himself in situations requiring adequate strategical knowledge for +their solution; hence there is urgent need for the supreme military +authorities to concern themselves at once both with his theoretical +and practical education.</p> + +<p>The latter could best be provided for in connection with the +development of the Field-Service training of the Troops already dealt +with above. The former—<i>i.e.</i>, the scientific side—could be most +adequately met by the creation of a 'Cavalry School' on the lines of +the special Artillery and Engineer Schools which already provide for +the further education of the Officers of these Arms after they have +spent a couple of years or more in responsible command of men in their +own units.</p> + +<p>If on the broader foundations of the military sciences—principally +those relating to the conduct of operations, to Strategy and +Tactics—thus supplied, the Regimental Commanders were to build up by +practical instruction, as above indicated, and the whole spirit of the +training were modified in conformity with the views therein already +expressed, then I consider that, with the admirable material amongst +our Officers which already exists, and which for the most part needs +only opportunity to prove its value, most important results might be +achieved.</p> + +<p>Such a school would be most fittingly affiliated to the existing +School of Equitation in Hanover. The bright, attractive side of +Cavalry life, as we there find it, would be a useful counterpoise to +the risk of too much theory, and the district lends itself admirably +to practical exercises in reconnaissances and endurance rides.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page291" name="page291"></a>(p. 291)</span> So long as this most desirable reform remains only an ideal, +we must strive to do the utmost we can within the limits of our +existing educational system, for the need is urgent, and admits of no +delay.</p> + +<p>We must devote increased attention to this portion of our officers' +training from the very commencement of their career, and see that they +are so far initiated into the nature both of tactical and strategical +relations that they may be able, on the one hand, to reconnoitre an +enemy in the spirit of the intentions of the Supreme Command; on the +other, that they are capable of commanding their units in any given +strategical situation.</p> + +<p>All means must be strained towards the attainment of this purpose.</p> + +<p>One of the first stepping-stones in our progress must be the actual +horsemanship of the Officer himself. A man who under every +circumstance feels himself firm in the saddle does not need to exert +force to fight with or restrain his horse, and having learnt both how +to think and command at a gallop, will lead Cavalry and reconnoitre +before the enemy with far greater certainty and much better results +than one to whom these things are hardly second nature.</p> + +<p>Bold and determined horsemanship acts and reacts on all a man's other +soldierly characteristics, and forms thus a basis for further progress +of the highest order, apart from the fact that it impresses the men +most favourably, and induces them to follow with greater confidence.</p> + +<p>Hence, even from the standpoint of the higher education, the standard +of horsemanship can never be raised too high. Given this, and the +remainder can be acquired in the practical day-to-day work of the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page292" name="page292"></a>(p. 292)</span> unit, in the training of the men themselves, and in the +exercises in Field-Service duties, in manœuvres and Cavalry +exercises, always provided that these are all conducted in conformity +with the spirit of modern operations. But since we have seen this +practical duty, as at present carried on, nowhere meets the above +conditions, we must find a supplement to it by recourse to systematic +training in Field-Service rides, War Games, and Staff Tours, for +which, of course, the necessary funds must be provided.</p> + +<p>These exercises must be begun in the regiment, and continued through +each successive grade up to the 'Inspection,' the sphere of each being +enlarged with the increase in the importance of the Command.</p> + +<p>But they will only then possess value and importance when based on +connected military situations arising from the operations of modern +Armies, and afford opportunities to the participants for the solution +of problems far above their existing rank, for thus only can their +mental horizon be extended. Within the radius of action of his own +Command each Officer is already in daily contact with all that it is +necessary for him to understand, and in minor tactical situations he +has abundant opportunities for training his faculties. It seems to me, +therefore, mere waste of time to give him further employment with +these matters, and the attempt could only end in depriving them of all +interest. On the other hand, the Regimental Officer is seldom if ever +placed in positions which would enable him to form any adequate +conception of the execution and connection of the greater operations, +to realize the importance of the action of the unit within the +framework of the whole, or to notice how faults in details, apparently +trivial in themselves, can mount up in the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page293" name="page293"></a>(p. 293)</span> mass until they +may jeopardize the success of any given undertaking.</p> + +<p>The higher the intellectual pinnacle on which he is placed, the wider +becomes his horizon, and consequently his appreciation of the relative +importance of each individual link in the chain.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="page294" name="page294"></a>(p. 294)</span> CONCLUSION</h2> + + +<p>If now, at the conclusion of my investigations, we summarize the chief +results arrived at, we find the following sequence of thought:</p> + +<p>The value of Cavalry in relation to the other Arms has risen +materially; as a consequence of the whole range of changes introduced +into the conduct of modern War—viz., those due to changes in the +composition of Armies, to railways, telegraphs, supply, weapons, etc. +Its strategical tasks have increased in importance, and on the +battle-field new opportunities for successes have been disclosed.</p> + +<p>Mounted and dismounted action have now become functions of equal +importance. Great results—whether strategical or tactical—can only +be obtained by the employment of 'Masses.'</p> + +<p>The changing conditions of War demand increased mobility, both +organic, strategic, and tactical.</p> + +<p>The difficulties of leadership, in consequence of these conditions, +have increased very materially. On the other hand, the Cavalry has +remained in every respect relatively behind the other Arms, and hence +we stand face to face with a whole list of new requirements which it +must be the task of our peace-time preparation to satisfy, and of +which the following are the most important items:</p> + +<p>Increase in the price paid for our remounts.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page295" name="page295"></a>(p. 295)</span> Considerable increase in our numerical strength, if possible, +on the lines of our existing and well-tried organization.</p> + +<p>Rearmament of our Cavalry with a 6-millimetre carbine, ballistically +equal in all respects to the rifle of the Infantry.</p> + +<p>Considerable increase in the amount of ammunition carried both in +peace and War.</p> + +<p>Improvement in the whole equipment of man and horse.</p> + +<p>Formation of the horse batteries of four guns, with corresponding +increase in the number of batteries; introduction also of a true +quick-firer.</p> + +<p>Supply of Maxim guns to the Cavalry. Organization of the whole of the +supply columns and pioneer detachments required to give the necessary +strategical mobility.</p> + +<p>Improvement in the method of training horses and men, both +individually and for the purpose of securing better conditions in the +horses to stand the increased strain of modern operations.</p> + +<p>Complete reform of our course of training, both tactical and for field +service, to fit us for employment in 'Masses,' and to meet the new +strategic requirements. The increased importance of fire-action must +be taken into account.</p> + +<p>Further development of our Cavalry Regulations, which require not only +simplification in many details, but the addition of sections +developing the principles of the employment by 'Wings' of the several +units, an extension of the prescriptions for the use of fire-action, +and more precise formulation of tactical principles.</p> + +<p>Rearrangement of the instructions relating to reconnaissance, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page296" name="page296"></a>(p. 296)</span> security, and the forwarding of reports, in the field-service +regulations, with due regard to the employment of cyclists where +practicable.</p> + +<p>A more systematic, practical, and general education for our Officers; +creation of a Cavalry School, in which War should be taught on +scientific principles.</p> + +<p>Distribution of the whole Arm into independent territorial districts, +to be termed 'Inspections' (Corps) and 'Sub-inspections' (Divisions), +which are to be entirely independent of the existing Army Corps.</p> + +<p>Annual Cavalry Manœuvres.</p> + +<p>Improvement of discipline 'to meet the demands of modern Warfare.</p> + +<p>This is a considerable list of extreme requirements put together in a +few words, and I am well aware that they are not to be obtained by a +single stroke of the pen—indeed, it needs a considerable degree of +optimism to believe that they are to be obtained at all; but I am +equally conscious that sound evolution is only possible when the +extremest purpose of our endeavours is clearly placed before our +minds, and if we have the courage to recognise openly how far we fall +short of the standard the pitiless reality of War demands.</p> + +<p>Do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that excellence is to be +attained without exertion, or that the path of easy-going reforms, +safeguarding always existing interests, will lead us to a certain +victory.</p> + +<p>Half-measures do more harm than good, and it will not be those races +which will survive in the great 'world struggle for existence' which +seek only for a harmonious development of all their living forces, but +rather those which devote themselves with a single mind to the +evolution of the utmost fighting power It is the triumph of +force—fighting power—which conditions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page297" name="page297"></a>(p. 297)</span> the development of +all other social interests. If we possess the 'force,' the rest will +follow. Whilst, however, we seek to develop by every means in our +power the utmost strength of the nation, we must be quite clear in our +own minds as to the limits of the attainable. In War, no more than in +any other 'act of human intercourse,' is the 'best' ever reached by +mortal executants. But the palm of success beckons across the field of +destiny to the race which strives towards the highest, and has made +the greatest sacrifices and dared the most to deserve it.</p> + +<p>In this sense it is the duty of each individual unit amongst us, +unconcerned about results or consequences, to work with whole heart +and mind in the cause we serve; and the more resistance to be +encountered, the greater the obstacle to be overcome, the less may we +shun the struggle, for here also the old truth holds good: <i>Per aspera +ad Astra</i>.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + + + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="page298" name="page298"></a>(p. 298)</span> INDEX</h2> + +<div class="index"> + +<p> + <span class="min2em">Action,</span> typical case of Cavalry, +<a href="#page225">225</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">example of Mars la Tour,</span> +<a href="#page225">225</a> (footnote)<br> + + <span class="min2em">Advance,</span> time to be selected for, +<a href="#page032">32</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">rate of,</span> +<a href="#page121">121</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of enemy marks period for pushing forward,</span> +<a href="#page027">27</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Advantages,</span> in War, must be fought for, +<a href="#page029">29</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Ammunition,</span> carbine, insufficiency of, +<a href="#page175">175</a>, +<a href="#page179">179</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">increase in amount of,</span> for practice, +<a href="#page250">250</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Ammunition columns,</span> special, required for Cavalry, +<a href="#page179">179</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Armies,</span> change of character of modern, +<a href="#page003">3</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Art of War,</span> new conditions in, +<a href="#page003">3</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their effect on Cavalry,</span> +<a href="#page009">9</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">result of first engagement of overwhelming importance,</span> +<a href="#page012">12</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Artillery,</span> effect of modern, on defence of villages and woods, +<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">power of,</span> can be over-estimated, +<a href="#page054">54</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">support of dismounted Cavalry by,</span> +<a href="#page060">60</a>, +<a href="#page100">100</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">protection of,</span> +<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Horse Artillery must adapt itself to Cavalry's action,</span> +<a href="#page100">100</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">position for,</span> +<a href="#page101">101</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">one battery per brigade recommended,</span> +<a href="#page179">179</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">quick-firing guns wanted,</span> +<a href="#page180">180</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">should be attacked from flank,</span> +<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">co-operation in Cavalry training,</span> +<a href="#page263">263</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Attack,</span> stereotyped forms of, prohibited, +<a href="#page072">72</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">on flank when advisable,</span> +<a href="#page078">78</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">simultaneous, on front and flank,</span> +<a href="#page079">79</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'mobile' or 'immobile' horses during,</span> +<a href="#page091">91</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">by dismounted troops,</span> +<a href="#page099">99</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">change of direction of, when permissible,</span> +<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of vehemence of onslaught,</span> +<a href="#page232">232</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">formation for, against Infantry and Artillery,</span> +<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">distribution and duties of dismounted men in,</span> +<a href="#page259">259</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Baggage-train should be represented at manœuvres,</span> +<a href="#page279">279</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Bapaume, Battle of,</span> +<a href="#page057">57</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Barley as forage,</span> +<a href="#page206">206</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Battle-field, place of Cavalry in,</span> +<a href="#page081">81</a>, +<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">case of Mars la Tour,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">best formation for,</span> +<a href="#page085">85</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">decided by circumstances of case,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>, +<a href="#page085">85</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">simple formations alone applicable on,</span> +<a href="#page225">225</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mars la Tour,</span> +<a href="#page225">225</a> (footnote)<br> + + <span class="min2em">Beans as a ration,</span> +<a href="#page205">205</a><br> + +<a id="bit" name="bit"></a> + <span class="min2em">Bit and bridoon, merits of,</span> +<a href="#page192">192</a>, +<a href="#page197">197</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Bivouac, disadvantages of,</span> +<a href="#page122">122</a>, +<a href="#page125">125</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Breaking in.</span> See <a href="#training">'Training'</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Bridging material,</span> sufficient, needed to be carried to deal with small streams, etc., +<a href="#page175">175</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Bridoon.</span> See <a href="#bit">'Bit'</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Brigade,</span> highest unit for drill purposes, +<a href="#page238">238</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Bugle calls,</span> when allowable, +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">value of,</span> +<a href="#page230">230</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">regimental calls,</span> +<a href="#page230">230</a>;<br> + <span class="min2em">movements to be practised without,</span> +<a href="#page236">236</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Cantonments,</span> advantages of providing, +<a href="#page125">125</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Carbine,</span> method of attachment, +<a href="#page176">176</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">improved pattern needed,</span> +<a href="#page177">177</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Cartridges,</span> method of carrying, +<a href="#page177">177</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Cavalry must be trained to act in 'mass,'</span> +<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">during Wars of 1870 and 1877-1878,</span> +<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">experiences of the past insufficient,</span> +<a href="#page008">8</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">proportion to other Arms,</span> +<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of,</span> greater than formerly, +<a href="#page011">11</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">new tasks for,</span> +<a href="#page014">14</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">actual fighting value diminished,</span> +<a href="#page016">16</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">best strategic value increased,</span> +<a href="#page016">16</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">public opinion at fault,</span> +<a href="#page016">16</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">exploits in 1870-1871 misjudged,</span> +<a href="#page016">16</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">German organization of,</span> requires reform, +<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">clear conception of requirements during each phase needed,</span> +<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">advance during mobilization deprecated,</span> +<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">should not act till enemy's strategic concentration begins,</span> +<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of superiority over enemy's Cavalry at commencement,</span> +<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in what cases the principal Arm,</span> +<a href="#page037">37</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Divisional,</span> +<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Independent,</span> +<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">fire action of,</span> during battles, +<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">greater tactical cohesion than Infantry,</span> +<a href="#page058">58</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">scope of,</span> enormously increased, +<a href="#page059">59</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of good leadership,</span> +<a href="#page063">63</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">place of,</span> in line of battle, +<a href="#page081">81</a>, +<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">formation of,</span> on battle-field, +<a href="#page085">85</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">factors determining strategic employment of,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">difficulty of supplying reinforcements,</span> +<a href="#page151">151</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">augmentation of German,</span> necessary, +<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">and not to be postponed till mobilization,</span> +<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">training of,</span> requires reforming, +<a href="#page181">181</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Regulations require amendment to meet dismounted needs,</span> +<a href="#page257">257</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">tasks for,</span> in future War not properly appreciated, +<a href="#page268">268</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Change of formation during action,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">from 'rendezvous' to 'attack,'</span> +<a href="#page079">79</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Charge,</span> the, when preferable to fire action, +<a href="#page052">52</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">example of Waterloo,</span> +<a href="#page052">52</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">position of Commander during,</span> +<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">choice of moment for,</span> +<a href="#page087">87</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">cohesion during,</span> +<a href="#page221">221</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">speed of,</span> +<a href="#page221">221</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Chargers.</span> See <a href="#horses">'Horses'</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Chotusitz,</span> Battle of, +<a href="#page083">83</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Civilians,</span> possible participation in future Wars by, +<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">armed resistance by,</span> to be suppressed, +<a href="#page033">33</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Column,</span> regimental, value of, for War, +<a href="#page227">227</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">squadron,</span> disadvantages of, +<a href="#page228">228</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Combined action,</span> factors essential to success of, +<a href="#page068">68</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Command of Cavalry masses exceeding six regiments,</span> +<a href="#page045">45</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must be under a single leader,</span> +<a href="#page046">46</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">efficiency of,</span> more important with Cavalry than Infantry, +<a href="#page063">63</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Commander,</span> qualities needed in a good, +<a href="#page064">64</a>, +<a href="#page286">286</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">place of,</span> before and during charges, +<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">when working with other Arms,</span> +<a href="#page066">66</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">choice of formation to be left to,</span> +<a href="#page072">72</a>, +<a href="#page076">76</a>, +<a href="#page077">77</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must be informed of progress of Infantry combat,</span> +<a href="#page086">86</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">qualities required in covering a retreat,</span> +<a href="#page086">86</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in dismounted action,</span> +<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must decide as to extension in strategy,</span> +<a href="#page106">106</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">and concentration in combat,</span> +<a href="#page106">106</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be kept informed of general situation,</span> +<a href="#page111">111</a>, +<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must organize his own reconnaissance,</span> +<a href="#page120">120</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">personal supervision of front by,</span> +<a href="#page121">121</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">forage reserve to be formed by,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to arrange times for drill,</span> +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">but not to deviate from Regulations,</span> +<a href="#page220">220</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of handling 'masses,'</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>.<br> + <span class="min1em">See also <a href="#leader">'Leader'</a></span><br> + + <span class="min2em">Commencement of War,</span> essence of all Cavalry action during, +<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">obtaining intelligence during,</span> +<a href="#page027">27</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Communications,</span> increased liability to interruption of, +<a href="#page013">13</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">greater opportunities for Cavalry to interfere with,</span> +<a href="#page014">14</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">especially after victory,</span> +<a href="#page014">14</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be maintained with Headquarters on field of battle,</span> +<a href="#page067">67</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Comparison between Cavalry and Infantry,</span> +<a href="#page059">59</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Concentration,</span> question of disturbing enemy's communications during, +<a href="#page019">19</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">views of other Powers on this,</span> +<a href="#page020">20</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">value of raids during,</span> +<a href="#page020">20</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">premature commitment of Cavalry during,</span> +<a href="#page024">24</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reasons against sacrificing Cavalry during,</span> +<a href="#page025">25</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">defensive duties during,</span> +<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">advantages of pushing forward during enemy's,</span> +<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of force for raids,</span> +<a href="#page035">35</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of considerable masses, when essential,</span> +<a href="#page044">44</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">for combat,</span> +<a href="#page106">106</a>, +<a href="#page108">108</a>, +<a href="#page109">109</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Corn, amount of,</span> to be carried by Cavalry, +<a href="#page130">130</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">author's experiment,</span> +<a href="#page203">203</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Coulmiers,</span> Battle of, +<a href="#page086">86</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Critique' after field days,</span> +<a href="#page243">243</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Cyclists,</span> value of, in conjunction with Cavalry, +<a href="#page022">22</a>, +<a href="#page147">147</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">circulation of intelligence by,</span> +<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">should enable Divisional Cavalry to be economized,</span> +<a href="#page042">42</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">further Regulations required,</span> +<a href="#page146">146</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">limitations of,</span> +<a href="#page148">148</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be attached to Cavalry,</span> +<a href="#page178">178</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Deception of enemy,</span> means towards, +<a href="#page119">119</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Defects in horses,</span> correction of, +<a href="#page199">199</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Defence of villages,</span> +<a href="#page097">97</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Defensive duties at commencement of War,</span> +<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">combat,</span> +<a href="#page092">92</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'immobile' detachments during,</span> +<a href="#page092">92</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">action, breaking off a,</span> +<a href="#page094">94</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">action,</span> duties of dismounted men during, +<a href="#page259">259</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Despatch riders,</span> +<a href="#page138">138</a>, +<a href="#page145">145</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Detachments,</span> economy in use of, +<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reports from,</span> to Headquarters, +<a href="#page111">111</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">outflanking,</span> during attack, +<a href="#page232">232</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Direction,</span> change of, during action, +<a href="#page117">117</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Dismounted action,</span> increased importance of, +<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">when desirable in attack,</span> +<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">when inevitable,</span> +<a href="#page050">50</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Sheridan's Cavalry in,</span> +<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">during rearguard actions,</span> +<a href="#page052">52</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">during general engagements,</span> +<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">examples of Fredericksburg and Five Forks,</span> +<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in South African War,</span> +<a href="#page056">56</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Franco-German War,</span> +<a href="#page057">57</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'mobile' and 'immobile' horses,</span> +<a href="#page091">91</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in defensive combat,</span> +<a href="#page092">92</a>, +<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">tactical distribution of men in,</span> +<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'Wing' or 'Line' systems,</span> +<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in defence of villages,</span> +<a href="#page097">97</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in attack,</span> +<a href="#page099">99</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">training for,</span> +<a href="#page247">247</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of,</span> not sufficiently appreciated, +<a href="#page248">248</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">not to be confined to the defensive,</span> +<a href="#page249">249</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">recruits' course,</span> +<a href="#page250">250</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Regulations as to,</span> require expansion, +<a href="#page257">257</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">as important as fighting in the saddle,</span> +<a href="#page262">262</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Dispersion of troops for raids,</span> +<a href="#page035">35</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">for screening and security,</span> +<a href="#page106">106</a>, +<a href="#page109">109</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Divisional Cavalry defined,</span> +<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">duties of,</span> +<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">apportionment of,</span> +<a href="#page041">41</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">as little as possible should be retained for Infantry Divisions,</span> +<a href="#page042">42</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reconnaissance duties of,</span> +<a href="#page141">141</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">security duties of,</span> +<a href="#page144">144</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Divisions of Cavalry,</span> maintenance of, during peace, +<a href="#page161">161</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">present strength insufficient,</span> +<a href="#page165">165</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">permanent creation of,</span> not advisable, +<a href="#page167">167</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Double-column' formation, when recommended,</span> +<a href="#page080">80</a>, +<a href="#page229">229</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Drei Treffen Taktik,'</span> +<a href="#page073">73</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Dressur' detachment,</span> +<a href="#page190">190</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Drill,</span> shortening of season for, +<a href="#page198">198</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of Squadron and Regimental,</span> +<a href="#page214">214</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">merits of Brigade and Divisional,</span> +<a href="#page215">215</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">ceremonial to be separated from practical,</span> +<a href="#page237">237</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Brigade,</span> the highest unit for formal, +<a href="#page238">238</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Education,</span> military, for man and horse, +<a href="#page186">186</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">tactical,</span> for troops generally, +<a href="#page213">213</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of recruits,</span> +<a href="#page272">272</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of non-commissioned ranks,</span> +<a href="#page275">275</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">higher,</span> of officers, +<a href="#page286">286</a> <i>et seq.</i><br> + + <span class="min2em">Efficiency of troops essential to good leadership,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Enemy,</span> advance of, marks period for pushing forward Cavalry, +<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Cavalry of,</span> must be beaten off field to obtain information, +<a href="#page030">30</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">outposts of,</span> to be broken through, +<a href="#page033">33</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">communications,</span> of, to be attacked, +<a href="#page033">33</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Equipment for bridging and telegraphs,</span> +<a href="#page174">174</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Equitation,</span> Staff for, +<a href="#page193">193</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">proposed new procedure,</span> +<a href="#page200">200</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">school of,</span> in Hanover, +<a href="#page290">290</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Exercises to develop 'tactical principles,'</span> +<a href="#page236">236</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of larger formations than Brigades,</span> +<a href="#page239">239</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'field-service' exercises,</span> +<a href="#page240">240</a> <i>et seq.</i><br> + + <span class="min2em">Expediency,</span> the highest ideal of strategy, +<a href="#page047">47</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Extension of front when advisable,</span> +<a href="#page107">107</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in action when favourable,</span> +<a href="#page240">240</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Field-firing,</span> increased importance of, +<a href="#page251">251</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">scheme for,</span> +<a href="#page252">252</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Field-service' exercises,</span> +<a href="#page218">218</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">nature of,</span> +<a href="#page240">240</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">ground for,</span> +<a href="#page239">239</a>;<br> + + <span class="min2em">Cavalry acting independently,</span> +<a href="#page240">240</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Cavalry in combination with other Arms,</span> +<a href="#page241">241</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">existing deficiencies in,</span> +<a href="#page266">266</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Fire action often imperative nowadays,</span> +<a href="#page047">47</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">occasions when it will decide the day,</span> +<a href="#page050">50</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">General Lee's capitulation,</span> +<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">South African War,</span> +<a href="#page056">56</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Franco-German War,</span> +<a href="#page057">57</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Firearms,</span> increased range of, +<a href="#page036">36</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">better class of,</span> needed by Cavalry, +<a href="#page058">58</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Flank attack,</span> when advisable, +<a href="#page078">78</a>, +<a href="#page079">79</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">after victory,</span> +<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">during charge,</span> +<a href="#page233">233</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Flanks of enemy to be worked round to obtain information,</span> +<a href="#page029">29</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Forage,</span> reserve of, +<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">amount to be carried on horses,</span> +<a href="#page169">169</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">author's experiment,</span> +<a href="#page203">203</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Force necessary to be employed in various circumstances,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Formation for attack,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">change of,</span> during action, +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">latitude to be allowed to Commander,</span> +<a href="#page076">76</a>, +<a href="#page077">77</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">merits of 'double column,'</span> +<a href="#page080">80</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'mass' when suitable,</span> +<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">on battle-field,</span> +<a href="#page085">85</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of dismounted men in action,</span> +<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in defence of villages,</span> +<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in dismounted attack,</span> +<a href="#page100">100</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">best,</span> suitable for War, +<a href="#page226">226</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be avoided,</span> +<a href="#page226">226</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">regimental column,</span> +<a href="#page227">227</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Four-squadron regiments,</span> +<a href="#page154">154</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Frederick the Great on length of marches,</span> +<a href="#page122">122</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Front,</span> extension and concentration of, +<a href="#page107">107</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Frontal attack against Infantry and Artillery,</span> +<a href="#page235">235</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Galloping,</span> exercises in, +<a href="#page209">209</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">German Cavalry,</span> numerically inadequate, +<a href="#page151">151</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">expedients for augmenting,</span> +<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">proposed territorial organization,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Gravelotte, example of faulty reconnaissance reports,</span> +<a href="#page288">288</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Ground,</span> value of tactical advantage of, +<a href="#page078">78</a>;<br> + <span class="min2em">acquisition of, for field-training,</span> +<a href="#page239">239</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Halts on march,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Headquarters,</span> reports to be sent to, from detachments, +<a href="#page111">111</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Horsemanship,</span> +<a href="#page184">184</a><br> + +<a id="horses" name="horses"></a> + <span class="min2em">Horses,</span> demands on, +<a href="#page087">87</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'mobile' or 'immobile,'</span> +<a href="#page091">91</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">position for led,</span> +<a href="#page093">93</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">protection of,</span> +<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">rest for,</span> +<a href="#page122">122</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">security of,</span> during rest, +<a href="#page122">122</a>, +<a href="#page124">124</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">bivouac on march,</span> +<a href="#page122">122</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">on outpost,</span> +<a href="#page123">123</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of care bestowed on,</span> +<a href="#page123">123</a>, +<a href="#page127">127</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">excessive demands on,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">shortage of,</span> in Germany, +<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'augmentation,'</span> +<a href="#page155">155</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'untrained,'</span> of small use, +<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">increased demands on,</span> +<a href="#page181">181</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">training of,</span> +<a href="#page185">185</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">English thoroughbreds,</span> +<a href="#page187">187</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Prussian,</span> +<a href="#page187">187</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">old,</span> +<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">food for,</span> increase of, +<a href="#page203">203</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">endurance of,</span> +<a href="#page202">202</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">feeding,</span> author's experiment in, +<a href="#page203">203</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">galloping powers,</span> +<a href="#page209">209</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">weight to be put on,</span> +<a href="#page212">212</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Increase of German Cavalry needed,</span> +<a href="#page158">158</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Independence,</span> when to be given to subordinates, +<a href="#page068">68</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Independent Cavalry' defined,</span> +<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">conditions which determine allotment of,</span> +<a href="#page042">42</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in what cases it should be concentrated on decisive lines,</span> +<a href="#page043">43</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">security duties of,</span> +<a href="#page144">144</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Individual superiority essential for patrols,</span> +<a href="#page031">31</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Infantry,</span> effect on Cavalry of extended zone of fire of, +<a href="#page009">9</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">difficult for Cavalry to encounter in close bodies,</span> +<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">when once broken offer great opportunity to Cavalry,</span> +<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">defence of villages and woods by,</span> more difficult now, +<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">compared with Cavalry,</span> +<a href="#page059">59</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Initial success,</span> great importance of, +<a href="#page012">12</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Initiative,</span> value of, +<a href="#page115">115</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Inspections,</span> new scheme of, for recruits and schools, +<a href="#page200">200</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of thorough,</span> +<a href="#page246">246</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Inspector-General of Cavalry,</span> position of, +<a href="#page282">282</a> and footnote<br> + + <span class="min2em">Intelligence indispensable at commencement of War,</span> +<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">spaces between enemy's columns to be penetrated to obtain,</span> +<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">when more important than security,</span> +<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">circulation of,</span> +<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">during progress of action,</span> +<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">experience of 1870,</span> +<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be transmitted direct to Headquarters,</span> as well as through usual channel, +<a href="#page045">45</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Lance-exercises,</span> +<a href="#page254">254</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">better attachment of,</span> necessary, +<a href="#page255">255</a><br> + +<a id="leader" name="leader"></a> + <span class="min2em">Leader,</span> importance of-independence of, in combined action, +<a href="#page068">68</a>, +<a href="#page076">76</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">more initiative to be given to,</span> +<a href="#page073">73</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be careful about his horses,</span> +<a href="#page087">87</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">duty when covering a retreat,</span> +<a href="#page088">88</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">modern requirements in a good,</span> +<a href="#page089">89</a>, +<a href="#page090">90</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be kept informed of the general situation,</span> +<a href="#page111">111</a>, +<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">clearness of intention,</span> +<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must organize his own intelligence,</span> +<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">capacity of,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of great Cavalry masses,</span> +<a href="#page286">286</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Led horses,</span> +<a href="#page091">91</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">place for,</span> +<a href="#page093">93</a>, +<a href="#page094">94</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in dismounted practice,</span> +<a href="#page259">259</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Lines—three-line system,</span> +<a href="#page073">73</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Locality,</span> faculty of finding way in unknown, +<a href="#page274">274</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Lunging rein,</span> +<a href="#page188">188</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Manœuvres,</span> Brigade and Divisional, little criterion of work in War, +<a href="#page042">42</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">trotting and galloping at,</span> +<a href="#page210">210</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">weight to be carried at,</span> +<a href="#page210">210</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">movements which are of use for War,</span> +<a href="#page226">226</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">theatrical display in great Cavalry,</span> +<a href="#page263">263</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">deficiencies in existing,</span> +<a href="#page266">266</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Imperial,</span> +<a href="#page267">267</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">baggage train to be represented at,</span> +<a href="#page279">279</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">limitations of telegraphs at,</span> +<a href="#page279">279</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of Brigades to be abolished in favour of Divisional and Corps,</span> +<a href="#page283">283</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">limitation of demands on Cavalry at,</span> +<a href="#page284">284</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Maps,</span> misuse of, +<a href="#page274">274</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Marches,</span> flanking detachments to, +<a href="#page121">121</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">length of,</span> +<a href="#page122">122</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">endurance of horses on,</span> +<a href="#page127">127</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">excessive lengths of,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">average lengths of,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">trotting and halts on,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Mars la Tour,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>, +<a href="#page083">83</a>, +<a href="#page086">86</a>, +<a href="#page225">225</a> (footnote)<br> + + <span class="min2em">'Mass' when suitable,</span> +<a href="#page081">81</a>, +<a href="#page082">82</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Masses,</span> training of Cavalry in large, +<a href="#page214">214</a>, +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">necessity for bringing Cavalry together frequently in,</span> +<a href="#page245">245</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Maxim guns with Cavalry,</span> +<a href="#page178">178</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Messengers,</span> employment of, to be limited, +<a href="#page129">129</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Mobility,</span> essential in surprise actions, +<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">German Cavalry deficient in,</span> +<a href="#page169">169</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of supply waggons,</span> +<a href="#page173">173</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Mounted Reserve,</span> duties of, +<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">strength of,</span> +<a href="#page096">96</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Movements most suitable for battle-field,</span> +<a href="#page226">226</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be avoided,</span> +<a href="#page226">226</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be practised on simple warnings,</span> +<a href="#page236">236</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Musketry,</span> importance of knowledge of, by officers, +<a href="#page253">253</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">judging distances,</span> +<a href="#page253">253</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Napoleon on length of Cavalry marches,</span> +<a href="#page122">122</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Narbonne,</span> General von Pelet, proposals of, +<a href="#page155">155</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Numbers alone can prevail in victory or in covering retreat,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">give opportunities of dismounted action,</span> +<a href="#page057">57</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Oats,</span> +<a href="#page205">205</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Observation of masses of enemy's army by officers patrol,</span> +<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">during combat,</span> +<a href="#page040">40</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Offensive against Infantry,</span> Cavalry capable of taking the, +<a href="#page060">60</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Officers of Cavalry have better knowledge of their men than in Infantry,</span> +<a href="#page059">59</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of training of,</span> +<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">increased importance of knowledge of musketry,</span> +<a href="#page253">253</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be attached to Infantry for instruction,</span> +<a href="#page256">256</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">higher education of,</span> +<a href="#page286">286</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">training in horsemanship of,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Officers patrols,</span> when necessary, +<a href="#page031">31</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Orderlies to be limited,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Orders,</span> simplicity essential in, +<a href="#page068">68</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">how to be transmitted in the field,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">by bugle call,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">verbal,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be circulated simultaneously to all subordinates,</span> +<a href="#page112">112</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of clearness in,</span> +<a href="#page116">116</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Organization of German Cavalry unchanged,</span> +<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">requires reform,</span> +<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must be elastic,</span> +<a href="#page047">47</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">example of 1870,</span> 47;<br> + <span class="min1em">also of Napoleon,</span> +<a href="#page048">48</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of German Cavalry to be by territorial districts,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Outer lines,'</span> advantages of, +<a href="#page078">78</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Outflanking tactics,</span> when undesirable, +<a href="#page053">53</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">detachments,</span> work of, during charge, +<a href="#page232">232</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Outposts,</span> necessity for breaking through enemy's, +<a href="#page033">33</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">fixed rules for,</span> impossible, +<a href="#page126">126</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Patrols,</span> causes of possible danger in the future, +<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">breaking up of enemy's communications by officers,</span> +<a href="#page022">22</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must ascertain changes in enemy's initial dispositions,</span> +<a href="#page025">25</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must protect frontier districts from raids,</span> +<a href="#page025">25</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must avoid becoming desperately involved,</span> +<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">superiority in individual patroller essential,</span> +<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">defeat of enemy's,</span> necessary, +<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'reconnoitring' distinct from 'security' patrols,</span> +<a href="#page133">133</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">strength of,</span> +<a href="#page136">136</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">duties of commander,</span> +<a href="#page136">136</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">transmission of despatches by,</span> +<a href="#page138">138</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must report to Headquarters as well as through ordinary channel,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'tactical,'</span> +<a href="#page143">143</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'security,'</span> +<a href="#page143">143</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">screening by,</span> +<a href="#page144">144</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Regulations need amendment,</span> +<a href="#page145">145</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">training for scouting basis of all reconnaissance instruction,</span> +<a href="#page269">269</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">suggestion as to instruction,</span> +<a href="#page270">270</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Place on battle-field of Cavalry,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a>, +<a href="#page085">85</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Prague,</span> Battle of, +<a href="#page083">83</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Principles,'</span> tactical, of Cavalry opposed to Cavalry, +<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of Cavalry opposed to Infantry and Artillery,</span> +<a href="#page234">234</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Prisoners,</span> value of capturing, during enemy's mobilization, +<a href="#page024">24</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Protection of main force,</span> steps required differ from those for obtaining information, +<a href="#page029">29</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">opposite views held,</span> +<a href="#page029">29</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Pursuit of beaten enemy imperative,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">methods of,</span> +<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">dismounted action during,</span> +<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Waterloo,</span> +<a href="#page052">52</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">wars of 1866 and 1870,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">duties during,</span> +<a href="#page088">88</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to be practised on a grand scale,</span> +<a href="#page283">283</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Quick-firing guns,</span> employment of +<a href="#page180">180</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Raids,</span> value of, on outbreak of War, +<a href="#page020">20</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">to exploit enemy's resources,</span> +<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">indispensable element in future,</span> +<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">depend on rapidity and surprise,</span> +<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">and on concentration of force at night-time,</span> +<a href="#page035">35</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">dispersion during,</span> +<a href="#page035">35</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Rapidity essential in raids,</span> +<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">and in dismounted attack,</span> +<a href="#page099">99</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Rations,</span> emergency, for horses, +<a href="#page174">174</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">author's experiment with forage,</span> +<a href="#page203">203</a> <i>et seq.</i><br> + + <span class="min2em">Rearguard actions,</span> to be practised on a grand scale, +<a href="#page283">283</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry necessary,</span> +<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">rendered more difficult by range of modern firearms,</span> +<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">and by smokeless powder,</span> +<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">value of intensified,</span> +<a href="#page012">12</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must be a separate service from screening,</span> +<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">an exception to this,</span> +<a href="#page041">41</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">advantage of defeating enemy's reconnoitrers,</span> +<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">under fire very difficult to effect,</span> +<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">on the battle-field,</span> +<a href="#page066">66</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">cavalry leader must organize his own,</span> +<a href="#page120">120</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">training for scouting the basis of instruction in,</span> +<a href="#page269">269</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">knowledge of principles of 'higher strategy' essential,</span> +<a href="#page288">288</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Reconnoitring patrols,</span> +<a href="#page134">134</a> <i>et seq.</i><br> + + <span class="min2em">Recruits,</span> training of, +<a href="#page188">188</a> <i>et seq.</i>, +<a href="#page273">273</a>. See also <a href="#training">'Training'</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Regiment,</span> the fundamental tactical unit, +<a href="#page228">228</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Regimental call,</span> value of, +<a href="#page230">230</a> <i>et seq.</i><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Regimental column'</span> formation, +<a href="#page227">227</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">merits of double,</span> +<a href="#page229">229</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Regulations should not lay down fixed evolutions,</span> +<a href="#page070">70</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">but only essential principles of action,</span> +<a href="#page070">70</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">existing edition of,</span> requires revision, +<a href="#page070">70</a>, +<a href="#page079">79</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance of Section 346,</span> +<a href="#page076">76</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">rearrangement recommended,</span> +<a href="#page244">244</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">as to training of dismounted squadrons,</span> +<a href="#page253">253</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Reinforcements,</span> difficulty of supplying Cavalry, +<a href="#page151">151</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Remounts,</span> supply of, in War, +<a href="#page159">159</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">English blood in,</span> +<a href="#page187">187</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">training of,</span> +<a href="#page187">187</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Reports in the field to be made to Headquarters and to adjacent columns,</span> +<a href="#page011">11</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">transmission of,</span> +<a href="#page138">138</a> <i>et seq.</i><br> + + <span class="min2em">Reserve forage,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Reserve squadrons,</span> position for, during attack, +<a href="#page232">232</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Reserve troops an easy prey to Cavalry when once beaten,</span> +<a href="#page015">15</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Rest,</span> importance of, to horses, +<a href="#page124">124</a>, +<a href="#page125">125</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Retreat,</span> advantages of 'outer lines' in, +<a href="#page078">78</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">duty of Cavalry covering a,</span> +<a href="#page088">88</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Riding,</span> cross-country, +<a href="#page186">186</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">individual,</span> +<a href="#page189">189</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Riding School,</span> +<a href="#page193">193</a> <i>et seq.</i><br> + + <span class="min2em">Roszbach,</span> Battle of, +<a href="#page083">83</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Rushes,</span> advancing by, +<a href="#page113">113</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Rye as forage,</span> +<a href="#page206">206</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Schlichting,</span> General von, writings of, +<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">criticism of,</span> +<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">on application of drill-book principles,</span> +<a href="#page237">237</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">School,</span> Riding, +<a href="#page192">192</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">War (see <a href="#warschool">'War School'</a>);</span><br> + <span class="min1em">of Cavalry,</span> +<a href="#page290">290</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Screening,</span> importance of, +<a href="#page012">12</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">during absence of troops,</span> +<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must give way to obtaining intelligence,</span> +<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">distinct from reconnoitring,</span> +<a href="#page032">32</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">must be fought for,</span> +<a href="#page033">33</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Security when secondary to obtaining intelligence,</span> +<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">during rest,</span> +<a href="#page122">122</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">general advantages of,</span> +<a href="#page124">124</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Sedan,</span> Battle of, +<a href="#page087">87</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Seidlitz,</span> Von, at Zorndorf, +<a href="#page087">87</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Simplicity essential to successful tactics,</span> +<a href="#page068">68</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Single combat exercises,</span> +<a href="#page195">195</a> <i>et seq.</i><br> + + <span class="min2em">Skeleton enemy,</span> +<a href="#page244">244</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Soor,</span> action of, +<a href="#page083">83</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Squadron School,</span> the basis of tactical training, +<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">drill,</span> +<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">tactical training of dismounted,</span> +<a href="#page258">258</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">general education of,</span> +<a href="#page272">272</a>, +<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">practical exercises for,</span> +<a href="#page275">275</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Squadron column,'</span> merits of, +<a href="#page228">228</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Staff required for Cavalry corps,</span> +<a href="#page228">228</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Strategical handling of Cavalry,</span> importance of, +<a href="#page037">37</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">fixed regulations inapplicable to,</span> +<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">general principles,</span> +<a href="#page105">105</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Subdivision of force,</span> +<a href="#page107">107</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Summary of opinions on Cavalry generally,</span> +<a href="#page294">294</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Supply trains must march as fast as Cavalry,</span> +<a href="#page171">171</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">length of,</span> +<a href="#page172">172</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">mobility of,</span> +<a href="#page173">173</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Supreme Commander,</span> presence of Cavalry essential to success of, +<a href="#page037">37</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Surprise the essence of Cavalry actions,</span> +<a href="#page016">16</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">indispensable in raids,</span> +<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">requirements for success in,</span> +<a href="#page118">118</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">System,</span> the 'three-line,' +<a href="#page074">74</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Tactical action by Divisional Cavalry precluded,</span> +<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of Cavalry changed by new conditions,</span> +<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">'Drei Treffen,'</span> +<a href="#page073">73</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">training for,</span> too elementary, +<a href="#page223">223</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Tactical education for troops generally,</span> +<a href="#page213">213</a> <i>et seq.</i><br> + + <span class="min2em">Tactical principles,</span> Cavalry <i>v.</i> Cavalry, +<a href="#page231">231</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Cavalry <i>v.</i> Infantry and Artillery,</span> +<a href="#page232">232</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">exercises to develop the,</span> +<a href="#page236">236</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Tactical and strategical principles of the future,</span> +<a href="#page083">83</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Telegraph,</span> control of, +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">limitations as to the use of,</span> in Manœuvres, +<a href="#page279">279</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Three-line' system,</span> +<a href="#page073">73</a><br> + +<a id="training" name="training"></a> + <span class="min2em">Training,</span> true purpose of, +<a href="#page161">161</a><br> + <span class="min1em">of Cavalry Staff,</span> +<a href="#page166">166</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Von Moltke's proposals,</span> +<a href="#page166">166</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">changes must be met by new methods,</span> +<a href="#page181">181</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of horses and men,</span> +<a href="#page184">184</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">length of period of,</span> +<a href="#page188">188</a>, +<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">proposed programme for,</span> +<a href="#page200">200</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">preparation for endurance,</span> +<a href="#page207">207</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">War conditions essential to,</span> +<a href="#page208">208</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">tactical,</span> too elementary at present, +<a href="#page223">223</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">for dismounted fighting,</span> +<a href="#page247">247</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">some deficiencies in present,</span> +<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">of squadrons a stepping-stone to field service,</span> +<a href="#page276">276</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Training grounds</span> ('Truppenübungs Plätze'), +<a href="#page239">239</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Transmission of orders during action,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Treffen,'</span> definition of, +<a href="#page074">74</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Trotting on march,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Turning movements,</span> when imperative, +<a href="#page115">115</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Verbal orders,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Villages,</span> dismounted defence of, +<a href="#page097">97</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> + <span class="min1em">withdrawal from,</span> +<a href="#page099">99</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Vionville,</span> Battle of, +<a href="#page107">107</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Von-Rosenberg at Mars la Tour,</span> +<a href="#page225">225</a> (footnote)</p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Waggons,</span> supply, pace of, +<a href="#page171">171</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">War conditions essential to training,</span> +<a href="#page208">208</a><br> + +<a id="warschool" name="warschool"></a> + <span class="min2em">War School,</span> extent of teaching at, +<a href="#page289">289</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">creation of school for Cavalry desirable,</span> +<a href="#page290">290</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Weight to be carried by horses,</span> +<a href="#page212">212</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Wheat as forage,</span> +<a href="#page206">206</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">'Wing attack,'</span> +<a href="#page076">76</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">best formation for requirements of combat,</span> +<a href="#page227">227</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in action against Infantry and Artillery,</span> +<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">freedom as to use of,</span> +<a href="#page244">244</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Woerth,</span> Battle of, +<a href="#page087">87</a></p> + +<p class="p2"> + <span class="min2em">Zone of fire,</span> results of extension of, +<a href="#page009">9</a><br> + + <span class="min2em">Zorndorf,</span> Battle of, +<a href="#page087">87</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="p4 center">THE END</p> + +<p class="center smaller">BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD</p> + +<p class="p4 book"><span class="min2em">THE ART OF RECONNAISSANCE.</span> +By Colonel <span class="smcap">David Henderson</span>, D.S.O. With Diagrams. Small Crown 8vo., 5s. +net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + 'The details of procedure suggested for a patrol are simpler, + more practicable, and more efficacious than I have yet seen in + any textbook. These chapters may be warmly recommended to every + officer who wishes to prepare himself and his men for the most + difficult and most important of those minor operations of war + which form so great a part of its every-day reality.'—<i>Morning + Post.</i></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE FRONTIERSMAN'S POCKET BOOK.</span> +Compiled and Edited by <span class="smcap">Roger Pocock</span>, on behalf of the Council of the +Legion of Frontiersmen. With Illustrations. Leather, 5s. net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + 'A very handy and well-packed little volume.... It brings + together a large amount of well-digested practical information + about camping, means of travel, signals, shooting, first-aid, + and, in short, everything that a pioneering, handy man ought to + know.... May be heartily recommended to all classes of scouts and + frontiersmen.'—<i>Scotsman.</i></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">IMPERIAL STRATEGY.</span> +By the Military Correspondent of <i>The Times</i>. With +Maps. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + '"Imperial Strategy" is one of the most valuable volumes + published within recent years. The admirable volume should stand + upon the shelf of every soldier, and of every thinker upon + Imperial things.'—<i>Army and Navy Gazette.</i></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">ARTILLERY AND EXPLOSIVES.</span> +Essays and Lectures written and delivered at +various times. By Sir <span class="smcap">Andrew Noble</span>, K.C.B., D.C.L., F.R.S. With +numerous Diagrams and Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + 'The experience of Sir Andrew Noble covers such a wide field, and + so many important changes have taken place in connection with + rifled guns, their ammunition and projectiles, during the long + period dealt with, that the views of so eminent an expert are of + an incalculable value. He is therefore to be congratulated on his + decision to bring into one volume the mass of important + information and invaluable details respecting the progress in + naval and artillery science.'—<i>Broad Arrow.</i></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">FORTIFICATION:</span> Its Past Achievements, Recent Developments, Future +Progress. By Colonel Sir <span class="smcap">George S. Clarke</span>, R.E., K.C.M.G., F.R.S., +Governor of Bombay. New Edition, enlarged. With numerous +Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 18s. net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + 'The reflections of this great soldier-statesman will be found as + fascinating as they are instructive, and that reasonable + intelligence is the only essential qualification for reading them + with profit as well as with interest and pleasure.'—<i>Westminster + Gazette.</i></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR.</span> By Monsieur <span class="smcap">E. K. Nojine</span>, Accredited +Russian War Correspondent during the Siege. Translated and abridged by +Captain <span class="smcap">A. B. Lindsay</span>. Edited by Major <span class="smcap">E. D. Swinton</span>, D.S.O. With Maps +and Illustrations. Demy 8vo., 15s. net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + 'M. Nojine is unusually well qualified to offer testimony on the + long beleaguerment. He writes with vivacity and force, and the + translation is competent and spirited, both on account of its + vivid narrative and by reason of the extraordinary revelations it + contains.... It is the most remarkable book about the war yet + issued.'—<i>Times.</i></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA.</span> Between the Japanese and Russian Fleets, +fought on 27th May, 1905. By Captain <span class="smcap">Vladimir Semenoff</span> (one of the +survivors). Translated by Captain <span class="smcap">A. B. Lindsay</span>. Crown 8vo., 3s. 6d. +net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + 'The most thrilling and touching records of naval warfare that we + have ever read, and its very simplicity and lack of literary + ornament make it the more impressive.... We share the emotions on + board, feel the nervous thrill behind the gallant spirit and the + cheerful countenance,'—<i>Westminster Gazette.</i></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">FROM LIBAU TO TSU-SHIMA.</span> A Narrative of the Voyage of Admiral +Rojdestvensky's Squadron to the East, including a Detailed Account of +the Dogger Bank Incident. By the late <span class="smcap">Eugene Politovsky</span>, Chief +Engineer of the Squadron. Translated by Major <span class="smcap">F. R. Godfrey</span>, R.M.L.I. +Large Crown 8vo., 2s. 6d. net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + 'Among terrible stories of the sea this is unique. In sentences + whose graphic power Defoe did not exceed, he jots down from day + to day what he sees and suffers.... The story of the sinking of + the British fishing-boats in the North Sea is told with superb + simplicity.'—<span class="smcap">Punch.</span></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR, 1878—1880.</span> Produced in the +Intelligence Branch, Army Headquarters, India. Abridged Official +Account. With numerous Maps and Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + 'An excellent compendium of the whole war, clearly written and + amply illustrated by photographs, maps, and diagrams.... It is a + narrative that will fascinate the many who love to read about + warlike movements.... It is a story of wise and patient + preparation, carefully arranged generalship, supreme daring, + amazing tenacity. Undoubtedly the right thing has been done in + giving to the world a stirring story, which has remained too + long, many will think, a secret record.'—<i>Sheffield + Independent.</i></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.</span> Prepared in +the Historical Section of the Great General Staff, Berlin. With Maps +and Plans. Demy 8vo., 15s. net each.</p> + +<p class="book2">Part I.—From its Commencement in 1899 the Capture of General Cronje's +Forces at Paardeburg. Translated by Colonel <span class="smcap">W. H. H. Waters</span>, R.A., +C.V.O.</p> + +<p class="book2">Part II.—The Advance to Pretoria, the Upper Tugela Campaign, etc., +etc. Translated by Colonel <span class="smcap">Hubert du Cane</span>, R.A., M.V.O.</p> +<p class="critic"> + 'The most valuable work in which, since its close, the war has + been discussed. It stands alone, because it is the only work in + which the war has been surveyed by trained and competent students + of war, the only one of which the judgments are based on a + familiarity with the modern theory of war. The best book that has + yet appeared on the South African War.'—<i>Morning Post.</i></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE BATTLE OF WAVRE AND GROUCHY'S RETREAT.</span> A Study of an obscure part +of the Waterloo Campaign. By <span class="smcap">W. Hyde Kelly</span>, R.E. With Maps and Plans. +Demy 8vo., 8s. net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + '... brings forward, with a vividness and brilliancy which compel + attention throughout one of the most obscure pages in the story + of the famous struggle.'—<i>Birmingham Post.</i></p> + +<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE BOOK OF WAR.</span> Translated into English by Captain <span class="smcap">E. F. Calthrop</span>, +R.A. Crown 8vo., 2s. 6d. net.</p> +<p class="critic"> + This work, the writings of Suntzu and Wutzu, Chinese strategists + of about the fifth century <span class="smcap">b.c.</span>, is the most famous work on the + art of war in the Far East. It deals with operations of war, + statecraft, moral and training of troops, stratagem, the use of + spies, etc., and for twenty-five centuries it has been the bible + of the Chinese or Japanese ruler. The book is distinguished alike + by the poetry and grandeur of its language and the modernity of + its spirit.</p> + + +<p class="p4 center"><span class="smcap">London</span>: JOHN MURRAY, <span class="smcap">Albemarle Street</span>, W.</p> + + +<p class="p4"><a id="footnote1" name="footnote1"></a> +<b>Footnote 1:</b> The contrary view to this was largely held by a certain +school in Germany, whose views the author is here endeavouring to +combat.<a href="#footnotetag1"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote2" name="footnote2"></a> +<b>Footnote 2:</b> The same point also arises both in pursuit and in the +covering of a retreat, two of our most important duties; for though, +as already pointed out, the conditions of the present day offer to the +Arm the opportunities of the richest harvests, it will only be able to +utilize them when employed with concentrated force.<a href="#footnotetag2"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote3" name="footnote3"></a> +<b>Footnote 3:</b> Compare 'Cavalry Regulations,' § 376.<a href="#footnotetag3"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote4" name="footnote4"></a> +<b>Footnote 4:</b> I venture to differ from the author. The Boers did not +fight as Cavalry. Their whole tactics were those of Mounted Infantry. +They did on one or two occasions bring about a decision by rifle fire +from their horses, but I can recall no instance where they actually +charged—<i>i.e.</i>, endeavoured to decide the action by shock.—C. S. G.<a href="#footnotetag4"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote5" name="footnote5"></a> +<b>Footnote 5:</b> Clausewitz, 'Im Krieg ist aller Einfach, aber, das +Einfache ist schwer.'<a href="#footnotetag5"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote6" name="footnote6"></a> +<b>Footnote 6:</b> The Regimental Commander, therefore, requires his +Adjutant and an Orderly Officer, so as to be able to transmit +simultaneously his order to both wings of his regiment.<a href="#footnotetag6"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote7" name="footnote7"></a> +<b>Footnote 7:</b> Rauch's Brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, +under von Schmidt, August 16, 1870.<a href="#footnotetag7"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote8" name="footnote8"></a> +<b>Footnote 8:</b> Section 346 reads: 'The above general principles applying +to the conduct and relations between the several "Lines" must not be +allowed to lead to the adoption of any stereotyped form of attack. The +Division Commander has full authority to employ his brigades as he +thinks best for the attainment of the purpose in view.'<a href="#footnotetag8"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote9" name="footnote9"></a> +<b>Footnote 9:</b> The 'Drei Treffen Taktik' owes its origin to the study of +the Wars of Frederick the Great, and claims to have again brought to +life the fundamental principles to which our Cavalry successes in +those days were due. Against this view I would point out that +Frederick's Cavalry were always formed in two Lines under one common +command. Besides these two Lines ('Treffen') there was generally, but +by no means always, a 'Reserve'—constituted usually of Hussars +only—who, if I do not err, are only once spoken of as a 'Treffen' +(Line). This Reserve, however, was under a special Commander, and was +quite independent of the two 'Treffen' proper above referred to. Now, +no one would venture to suggest that Frederick's Infantry fought +habitually in three Lines ('Drei Treffen'), although a Reserve was +frequently held back in third Line, exactly as with the Cavalry. The +truth really is that the modern idea of the 'Drei Treffen Taktik' has +actually nothing in common with the methods of employment of +Frederick's days at all.<a href="#footnotetag9"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote10" name="footnote10"></a> +<b>Footnote 10:</b> 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present +Day,' part i., chap, vii., B.<a href="#footnotetag10"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote11" name="footnote11"></a> +<b>Footnote 11:</b> See 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Future,' +p. 83. The view that Cavalry which has delivered one charge in the day +is useless for the rest of the operations, I cannot accept. It finds +no support in the facts of Military history—on the contrary, the most +complete refutation.<a href="#footnotetag11"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote12" name="footnote12"></a> +<b>Footnote 12:</b> The 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, August 16, 1870.<a href="#footnotetag12"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote13" name="footnote13"></a> +<b>Footnote 13:</b> When only three men in four dismount the horses are said +to be 'mobile.' When the proportion is greater the horses become +'immobile.'<a href="#footnotetag13"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote14" name="footnote14"></a> +<b>Footnote 14:</b> I here call attention to the instructions of Frederick +the Great on this subject, as well as to the circumspection with which +General J. E. B. Stuart prepared for his own undertakings.<a href="#footnotetag14"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote15" name="footnote15"></a> +<b>Footnote 15:</b> Feld Dienst Ordnung.<a href="#footnotetag15"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote16" name="footnote16"></a> +<b>Footnote 16:</b> In passing, I may note that some portions of Lorraine +are amongst the richest in horseflesh in all Germany. Here, by the +introduction of suitable stallions, an excellent Artillery horse might +be bred; but nothing is being done in this direction.<a href="#footnotetag16"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote17" name="footnote17"></a> +<b>Footnote 17:</b> In a report addressed to H.M. the King in 1868 by +General von Moltke on the experiences deduced from the events of 1866, +it is proposed that there should be at Army Headquarters the Staff of +a Cavalry Corps Command, together with its necessary Administrative +services, always ready for the field. As Field Marshal he returns to +the idea in another place, adding, 'particularly when we have found +the right "Murat" to lead it' (Moltke's 'Militarische Werke,' II., +Second Part, First Group, B).<a href="#footnotetag17"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote18" name="footnote18"></a> +<b>Footnote 18:</b> Generally defeats its own object; the heavy load +destroys the roads, causes breakdowns and delays, etc.<a href="#footnotetag18"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote19" name="footnote19"></a> +<b>Footnote 19:</b> The wheel should be so low that the man could use his +rifle without dismounting, and, if possible, it should be +'transportable' (?'folding').<a href="#footnotetag19"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote20" name="footnote20"></a> +<b>Footnote 20:</b> With stronger Divisions, a corresponding increase in +Artillery must, of course, be made.<a href="#footnotetag20"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote21" name="footnote21"></a> +<b>Footnote 21:</b> King William I. had already suggested the formation of +batteries of four guns for the Cavalry in 1869—in a marginal note on +the report of Moltke's of 1868—already referred to in the note on p. +166 above.<a href="#footnotetag21"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote22" name="footnote22"></a> +<b>Footnote 22:</b> Under the new Regulations this is now left to the +discretion of the Regimental Commander.<a href="#footnotetag22"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote23" name="footnote23"></a> +<b>Footnote 23:</b> 'Dressur' literally means 'preparation.' We use the term +'breaking-in.' Note the difference.—<span class="smcap">Translator.</span><a href="#footnotetag23"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote24" name="footnote24"></a> +<b>Footnote 24:</b> Captain Plinzner was Equerry to H.M. the Emperor, and is +author of a well-known work on equitation.<a href="#footnotetag24"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote25" name="footnote25"></a> +<b>Footnote 25:</b> As a measure of this excitement the following example +may be useful. During the great Cavalry engagement on the plateau west +of the Yron brook near Mars-la-Tour a squadron under most brilliant +leadership galloped out in column of troops to threaten the enemy's +flank. When, however, the order to wheel into line was given, the men +were so excited that it was only with the utmost difficulty that its +Captain succeeded in getting three troops to obey, whilst the leading +one continued on in its original direction. The Squadron Commander was +Rittmeister von Rosenberg, who afterwards became Inspector-General of +Cavalry, and the above-mentioned incident was related by him +personally to the author.<a href="#footnotetag25"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote26" name="footnote26"></a> +<b>Footnote 26:</b> This formation has since been adopted, and is almost +invariably employed.—<span class="smcap">Translator.</span><a href="#footnotetag26"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote27" name="footnote27"></a> +<b>Footnote 27:</b> If, in the course of time, as I fully anticipate, the +necessity should become apparent to give further expression in the +form of Regulations to the point of view laid down in Section 346, it +would certainly necessitate a complete rearrangement of the whole +Regulations, out of which, in that case, other defects might then be +eliminated. The following ideas might then be taken into +consideration:</p> + +<p>1. Fundamental and formal separation of tactical prescription from +instructions concerning the methods of training.</p> + +<p>2. Simplification of the Regimental drill in the direction of +conferring increased freedom of movements to the Squadrons and double +Squadrons. Limitations in the application of Squadron Columns, and +their partial replacement by more suitable formations.</p> + +<p>3. More precise wording of the tactical principles, and their +extension to prescriptions as to the use of 'Wing' or 'Line' +formation.</p> + +<p>4. Re-introduction of the true idea of 'Line tactics,' limitation of +the word 'Échelon' to troops overlapping the first line, of 'Reserve' +for all held back behind it.</p> + +<p>5. The preparation for all instructions for the movement and combat of +masses larger than Brigades without reference to any fixed standard of +strength.</p> + +<p>6. More extended use of the different bugle sounds.</p> + +<p>7. Extension of the instructions for dismounted action to cover the +employment of several Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades, and with +especial stress on the decisive offensive. (See next section.)<a href="#footnotetag27"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote28" name="footnote28"></a> +<b>Footnote 28:</b> Section 355, and note 357, 363, 365, 366.<a href="#footnotetag28"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote29" name="footnote29"></a> +<b>Footnote 29:</b> Instruction with models helps the man quickest; it is +very difficult for the recruit to form a mental picture of military +things.<a href="#footnotetag29"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote30" name="footnote30"></a> +<b>Footnote 30:</b> Taking into account these and similar demands on the +Inspectors-General, the question arises whether the time has not come +to attach to them permanently officers of the General Staff. Every +increase in the number of these officers employed in peace is a great +advantage for War, because the War formations require far more Staff +Officers to fill the new positions created on mobilization than are +employed in peace—a very serious disadvantage. I consider it +absolutely essential that each Inspector-General of Cavalry should be +provided with a permanent Staff.<a href="#footnotetag30"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Cavalry in Future Wars, by Frederick von Bernhardi + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS *** + +***** This file should be named 28298-h.htm or 28298-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/8/2/9/28298/ + +Produced by Chris Curnow, Joseph Cooper, Christine P. +Travers and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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