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diff --git a/28278-8.txt b/28278-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ec3d1b --- /dev/null +++ b/28278-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5049 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Liberalism, by L. T. Hobhouse + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Liberalism + +Author: L. T. Hobhouse + +Release Date: March 8, 2009 [EBook #28278] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LIBERALISM *** + + + + +Produced by Steven Gibbs, Martin Pettit and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +THE HOME UNIVERSITY LIBRARY OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE + +XXI + + + + +LIBERALISM + + * * * * * + +_EDITORS OF_ + +THE HOME UNIVERSITY LIBRARY OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE + +PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY, O.M., LL.D., F.B.A. + +PROFESSOR G. N. CLARK, LL.D., F.B.A. + +SIR HENRY TIZARD, K.C.B., F.R.S. + + * * * * * + +LIBERALISM + +_By_ + +L. T. HOBHOUSE + +OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS +LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO + + +_First published in 1911, and reprinted in 1919, 1923, 1927, 1929, +1934, 1942 and 1944_ + +PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN + + + + +CONTENTS + +CHAP. PAGE + + I BEFORE LIBERALISM 7 + + II THE ELEMENTS OF LIBERALISM + 1. Civil Liberty. 2. Fiscal + Liberty. 3. Personal Liberty. + 4. Social Liberty. 5. Economic + Liberty. 6. Domestic Liberty. + 7. Local, Racial, and National + Liberty. 8. International + Liberty. 9. Political Liberty + and Popular Sovereignty 21 + + III THE MOVEMENT OF THEORY 50 + + IV 'LAISSEZ-FAIRE' 78 + + V GLADSTONE AND MILL 102 + + VI THE HEART OF LIBERALISM 116 + + VII THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL 138 + +VIII ECONOMIC LIBERALISM 167 + + IX THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM 214 + + BIBLIOGRAPHY 252 + + INDEX 253 + + + + +LIBERALISM + + + + +CHAPTER I + +BEFORE LIBERALISM + + +The modern State is the distinctive product of a unique civilization. +But it is a product which is still in the making, and a part of the +process is a struggle between new and old principles of social order. To +understand the new, which is our main purpose, we must first cast a +glance at the old. We must understand what the social structure was, +which--mainly, as I shall show, under the inspiration of Liberal +ideas--is slowly but surely giving place to the new fabric of the civic +State. The older structure itself was by no means primitive. What is +truly primitive is very hard to say. But one thing is pretty clear. At +all times men have lived in societies, and ties of kinship and of simple +neighbourhood underlie every form of social organization. In the +simplest societies it seems probable that these ties--reinforced and +extended, perhaps, by religious or other beliefs--are the only ones that +seriously count. It is certain that of the warp of descent and the woof +of intermarriage there is woven a tissue out of which small and rude but +close and compact communities are formed. But the ties of kinship and +neighbourhood are effective only within narrow limits. While the local +group, the clan, or the village community are often the centres of +vigorous life, the larger aggregate of the Tribe seldom attains true +social and political unity unless it rests upon a military organization. +But military organization may serve not only to hold one tribe together +but also to hold other tribes in subjection, and thereby, at the cost of +much that is most valuable in primitive life, to establish a larger and +at the same time a more orderly society. Such an order once established +does not, indeed, rest on naked force. The rulers become invested with a +sacrosanct authority. It may be that they are gods or descendants of +gods. It may be that they are blessed and upheld by an independent +priesthood. In either case the powers that be extend their sway not +merely over the bodies but over the minds of men. They are ordained of +God because they arrange the ordination. Such a government is not +necessarily abhorrent to the people nor indifferent to them. But it is +essentially government from above. So far as it affects the life of the +people at all, it does so by imposing on them duties, as of military +service, tribute, ordinances, and even new laws, in such wise and on +such principles as seem good to itself. It is not true, as a certain +school of jurisprudence held, that law is, as such, a command imposed by +a superior upon an inferior, and backed by the sanctions of punishment. +But though this is not true of law in general it is a roughly true +description of law in that particular stage of society which we may +conveniently describe as the Authoritarian. + +Now, in the greater part of the world and throughout the greater part of +history the two forms of social organization that have been +distinguished are the only forms to be found. Of course, they themselves +admit of every possible variation of detail, but looking below these +variations we find the two recurrent types. On the one hand, there are +the small kinship groups, often vigorous enough in themselves, but +feeble for purposes of united action. On the other hand, there are +larger societies varying in extent and in degree of civilization from a +petty negro kingdom to the Chinese Empire, resting on a certain union of +military force and religious or quasi-religious belief which, to select +a neutral name, we have called the principle of Authority. In the lower +stages of civilization there appears, as a rule, to be only one method +of suppressing the strife of hostile clans, maintaining the frontier +against a common enemy, or establishing the elements of outward order. +The alternative to authoritarian rule is relapse into the comparative +anarchy of savage life. + +But another method made its appearance in classical antiquity. The city +state of ancient Greece and Italy was a new type of social organization. +It differed from the clan and the commune in several ways. In the first +place it contained many clans and villages, and perhaps owed its origin +to the coming together of separate clans on the basis not of conquest +but of comparatively equal alliance. Though very small as compared with +an ancient empire or a modern state it was much larger than a primitive +kindred. Its life was more varied and complex. It allowed more free play +to the individual, and, indeed, as it developed, it suppressed the old +clan organization and substituted new divisions, geographical or other. +It was based, in fact, not on kinship as such, but on civic right, and +this it was which distinguished it not only from the commune, but from +the Oriental monarchy. The law which it recognized and by which it lived +was not a command imposed by a superior government on a subject mass. On +the contrary, government was itself subject to law, and law was the life +of the state, willingly supported by the entire body of free citizens. +In this sense the city state was a community of free men. Considered +collectively its citizens owned no master. They governed themselves, +subject only to principles and rules of life descending from antiquity +and owing their force to the spontaneous allegiance of successive +generations. In such a community some of the problems that vex us most +presented themselves in a very simple form. In particular the relation +of the individual to the community was close, direct, and natural. +Their interests were obviously bound up together. Unless each man did +his duty the State might easily be destroyed and the population +enslaved. Unless the State took thought for its citizens it might easily +decay. What was still more important, there was no opposition of church +and state, no fissure between political and religious life, between the +claims of the secular and the spiritual, to distract the allegiance of +the citizens, and to set the authority of conscience against the duties +of patriotism. It was no feat of the philosophical imagination, but a +quite simple and natural expression of the facts to describe such a +community as an association of men for the purpose of living well. +Ideals to which we win our way back with difficulty and doubt arose +naturally out of the conditions of life in ancient Greece. + +On the other hand, this simple harmony had very serious limitations, +which in the end involved the downfall of the city system. The +responsibilities and privileges of the associated life were based not on +the rights of human personality but on the rights of citizenship, and +citizenship was never co-extensive with the community. The population +included slaves or serfs, and in many cities there were large classes +descended from the original conquered population, personally free but +excluded from the governing circle. Notwithstanding the relative +simplicity of social conditions the city was constantly torn by the +disputes of faction--in part probably a legacy from the old clan +organization, in part a consequence of the growth of wealth and the +newer distinction of classes. The evil of faction was aggravated by the +ill-success of the city organization in dealing with the problem of +inter-state relations. The Greek city clung to its autonomy, and though +the principle of federalism which might have solved the problem was +ultimately brought into play, it came too late in Greek history to save +the nation. + +The constructive genius of Rome devised a different method of dealing +with the political problems involved in expanding relations. Roman +citizenship was extended till it included all Italy and, later on, till +it comprised the whole free population of the Mediterranean basin. But +this extension was even more fatal to the free self-government of a city +state. The population of Italy could not meet in the Forum of Rome or +the Plain of Mars to elect consuls and pass laws, and the more wisely +it was extended the less valuable for any political purpose did +citizenship become. The history of Rome, in fact, might be taken as a +vast illustration of the difficulty of building up an extended empire on +any basis but that of personal despotism resting on military force and +maintaining peace and order through the efficiency of the bureaucratic +machine. In this vast mechanism it was the army that was the seat of +power, or rather it was each army at its post on some distant frontier +that was a potential seat of power. The "secret of the empire" that was +early divulged was that an emperor could be made elsewhere than at Rome, +and though a certain sanctity remained to the person of the emperor, and +legists cherished a dim remembrance of the theory that he embodied the +popular will, the fact was that he was the choice of a powerful army, +ratified by the God of Battles, and maintaining his power as long as he +could suppress any rival pretender. The break-up of the Empire through +the continual repetition of military strife was accelerated, not caused, +by the presence of barbarism both within and without the frontiers. To +restore the elements of order a compromise between central and local +jurisdictions was necessary, and the vassal became a local prince owning +an allegiance, more or less real as the case might be, to a distant +sovereign. Meanwhile, with the prevailing disorder the mass of the +population in Western Europe lost its freedom, partly through conquest, +partly through the necessity of finding a protector in troublous times. +The social structure of the Middle Ages accordingly assumed the +hierarchical form which we speak of as the Feudal system. In this +thorough-going application of the principle of authority every man, in +theory, had his master. The serf held of his lord, who held of a great +seigneur, who held of the king. The king in the completer theory held of +the emperor who was crowned by the Pope, who held of St. Peter. The +chain of descent was complete from the Ruler of the universe to the +humblest of the serfs.[1] But within this order the growth of industry +and commerce raised up new centres of freedom. The towns in which men +were learning anew the lessons of association for united defence and the +regulation of common interests, obtained charters of rights from +seigneur or king, and on the Continent even succeeded in establishing +complete independence. Even in England, where from the Conquest the +central power was at its strongest, the corporate towns became for many +purposes self-governing communities. The city state was born again, and +with it came an outburst of activity, the revival of literature and the +arts, the rediscovery of ancient learning, the rebirth of philosophy and +science. + +The mediæval city state was superior to the ancient in that slavery was +no essential element in its existence. On the contrary, by welcoming the +fugitive serf and vindicating his freedom it contributed powerfully to +the decline of the milder form of servitude. But like the ancient state +it was seriously and permanently weakened by internal faction, and like +the ancient state it rested the privileges of its members not on the +rights of human personality, but on the responsibilities of citizenship. +It knew not so much liberty as "liberties," rights of corporations +secured by charter, its own rights as a whole secured against king or +feudatory and the rest of the world, rights of gilds and crafts within +it, and to men or women only as they were members of such bodies. But +the real weakness of the city state was once more its isolation. It was +but an islet of relative freedom on, or actually within, the borders of +a feudal society which grew more powerful with the generations. With the +improvement of communications and of the arts of life, the central +power, particularly in France and England, began to gain upon its +vassals. Feudal disobedience and disorder were suppressed, and by the +end of the fifteenth century great unified states, the foundation of +modern nations, were already in being. Their emergence involved the +widening and in some respects the improvement of the social order; and +in its earlier stages it favoured civic autonomy by suppressing local +anarchy and feudal privilege. But the growth of centralization was in +the end incompatible with the genius of civic independence, and perilous +to such elements of political right as had been gained for the +population in general as the result of earlier conflicts between the +crown and its vassals. + +We enter on the modern period, accordingly, with society constituted on +a thoroughly authoritarian basis, the kingly power supreme and tending +towards arbitrary despotism, and below the king the social hierarchy +extending from the great territorial lord to the day-labourer. There is +one point gained as compared to earlier forms of society. The base of +the pyramid is a class which at least enjoys personal freedom. Serfdom +has virtually disappeared in England, and in the greater part of France +has either vanished or become attenuated to certain obnoxious incidents +of the tenure of land. On the other hand, the divorce of the English +peasant from the soil has begun, and has laid the foundation of the +future social problem as it is to appear in this country. + +The modern State accordingly starts from the basis of an authoritarian +order, and the protest against that order, a protest religious, +political, economic, social, and ethical, is the historic beginning of +Liberalism. Thus Liberalism appears at first as a criticism, sometimes +even as a destructive and revolutionary criticism. Its negative aspect +is for centuries foremost. Its business seems to be not so much to build +up as to pull down, to remove obstacles which block human progress, +rather than to point the positive goal of endeavour or fashion the +fabric of civilization. It finds humanity oppressed, and would set it +free. It finds a people groaning under arbitrary rule, a nation in +bondage to a conquering race, industrial enterprise obstructed by social +privileges or crippled by taxation, and it offers relief. Everywhere it +is removing superincumbent weights, knocking off fetters, clearing away +obstructions. Is it doing as much for the reconstruction that will be +necessary when the demolition is complete? Is Liberalism at bottom a +constructive or only a destructive principle? Is it of permanent +significance? Does it express some vital truth of social life as such, +or is it a temporary phenomenon called forth by the special +circumstances of Western Europe, and is its work already so far +complete that it can be content to hand on the torch to a newer and more +constructive principle, retiring for its own part from the race, or +perchance seeking more backward lands for missionary work? These are +among the questions that we shall have to answer. We note, for the +moment, that the circumstances of its origin suffice to explain the +predominance of critical and destructive work without therefrom +inferring the lack of ultimate reconstructive power. In point of fact, +whether by the aid of Liberalism or through the conservative instincts +of the race, the work of reconstruction has gone on side by side with +that of demolition, and becomes more important generation by generation. +The modern State, as I shall show, goes far towards incorporating the +elements of Liberal principle, and when we have seen what these are, and +to what extent they are actually realized, we shall be in a better +position to understand the essentials of Liberalism, and to determine +the question of its permanent value. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] This is, of course, only one side of mediæval theory, but it is the +side which lay nearest to the facts. The reverse view, which derives the +authority of government from the governed, made its appearance in the +Middle Ages partly under the influence of classical tradition. But its +main interest and importance is that it served as a starting-point for +the thought of a later time. On the whole subject the reader may consult +Gierke, _Political Theories of the Middle Age_, translated by Maitland +(Cambridge University Press). + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE ELEMENTS OF LIBERALISM + + +I cannot here attempt so much as a sketch of the historical progress of +the Liberalizing movement. I would call attention only to the main +points at which it assailed the old order, and to the fundamental ideas +directing its advance. + + +1. _Civil Liberty._ + +Both logically and historically the first point of attack is arbitrary +government, and the first liberty to be secured is the right to be dealt +with in accordance with law. A man who has no legal rights against +another, but stands entirely at his disposal, to be treated according to +his caprice, is a slave to that other. He is "rightless," devoid of +rights. Now, in some barbaric monarchies the system of rightlessness has +at times been consistently carried through in the relations of subjects +to the king. Here men and women, though enjoying customary rights of +person and property as against one another, have no rights at all as +against the king's pleasure. No European monarch or seignior has ever +admittedly enjoyed power of this kind, but European governments have at +various times and in various directions exercised or claimed powers no +less arbitrary in principle. Thus, by the side of the regular courts of +law which prescribe specific penalties for defined offences proved +against a man by a regular form of trial, arbitrary governments resort +to various extrajudicial forms of arrest, detention, and punishment, +depending on their own will and pleasure. Of such a character is +punishment by "administrative" process in Russia at the present day; +imprisonment by _lettre de cachet_ in France under the _ancien régime_; +all executions by so-called martial law in times of rebellion, and the +suspension of various ordinary guarantees of immediate and fair trial in +Ireland. Arbitrary government in this form was one of the first objects +of attack by the English Parliament in the seventeenth century, and this +first liberty of the subject was vindicated by the Petition of Right, +and again by the Habeas Corpus Act. It is significant of much that this +first step in liberty should be in reality nothing more nor less than a +demand for law. "Freedom of men under government," says Locke, summing +up one whole chapter of seventeenth-century controversy, "is to have a +standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society and made +by the legislative power erected in it." + +The first condition of universal freedom, that is to say, is a measure +of universal restraint. Without such restraint some men may be free but +others will be unfree. One man may be able to do all his will, but the +rest will have no will except that which he sees fit to allow them. To +put the same point from another side, the first condition of free +government is government not by the arbitrary determination of the +ruler, but by fixed rules of law, to which the ruler himself is subject. +We draw the important inference that there is no essential antithesis +between liberty and law. On the contrary, law is essential to liberty. +Law, of course, restrains the individual; it is therefore opposed to his +liberty at a given moment and in a given direction. But, equally, law +restrains others from doing with him as they will. It liberates him +from the fear of arbitrary aggression or coercion, and this is the only +way, indeed, the only sense, in which liberty _for an entire community_ +is attainable. + +There is one point tacitly postulated in this argument which should not +be overlooked. In assuming that the reign of law guarantees liberty to +the whole community, we are assuming that it is impartial. If there is +one law for the Government and another for its subjects, one for noble +and another for commoner, one for rich and another for poor, the law +does not guarantee liberty for all. Liberty in this respect implies +equality. Hence the demand of Liberalism for such a procedure as will +ensure the impartial application of law. Hence the demand for the +independence of the judiciary to secure equality as between the +Government and its subjects. Hence the demand for cheap procedure and +accessible courts. Hence the abolition of privileges of class.[2] Hence +will come in time the demand for the abolition of the power of money to +purchase skilled advocacy. + + +2. _Fiscal Liberty._ + +Closely connected with juristic liberty, and more widely felt in +everyday life, is the question of fiscal liberty. The Stuarts brought +things to a head in this country by arbitrary taxation. George III +brought things to a head in America by the same infallible method. The +immediate cause of the French Revolution was the refusal of the nobles +and the clergy to bear their share of the financial burden. But fiscal +liberty raises more searching questions than juristic liberty. It is not +enough that taxes should be fixed by a law applying universally and +impartially, for taxes vary from year to year in accordance with public +needs, and while other laws may remain stable and unchanged for an +indefinite period, taxation must, in the nature of the case, be +adjustable. It is a matter, properly considered, for the Executive +rather than the Legislature. Hence the liberty of the subject in fiscal +matters means the restraint of the Executive, not merely by established +and written laws, but by a more direct and constant supervision. It +means, in a word, responsible government, and that is why we have more +often heard the cry, "No taxation without representation," than the cry, +"No legislation without representation." Hence, from the seventeenth +century onwards, fiscal liberty was seen to involve what is called +political liberty. + + +3. _Personal Liberty._ + +Of political liberty it will be more convenient to speak later. But let +us here observe that there is another avenue by which it can be, and, in +fact, was, approached. We have seen that the reign of law is the first +step to liberty. A man is not free when he is controlled by other men, +but only when he is controlled by principles and rules which all society +must obey, for the community is the true master of the free man. But +here we are only at the beginning of the matter. There may be law, and +there may be no attempt, such as the Stuarts made, to set law aside, yet +(1) the making and maintenance of law may depend on the will of the +sovereign or of an oligarchy, and (2) the content of the law may be +unjust and oppressive to some, to many, or to all except those who make +it. The first point brings us back to the problem of political liberty, +which we defer. The second opens questions which have occupied a great +part of the history of Liberalism, and to deal with them we have to ask +what types of law have been felt as peculiarly oppressive, and in what +respects it has been necessary to claim liberty not merely through law, +but by the abolition of bad law and tyrannical administration. + +In the first place, there is the sphere of what is called personal +liberty--a sphere most difficult to define, but the arena of the +fiercest strife of passion and the deepest feelings of mankind. At the +basis lies liberty of thought--freedom from inquisition into opinions +that a man forms in his own mind[3]--the inner citadel where, if +anywhere, the individual must rule. But liberty of thought is of very +little avail without liberty to exchange thoughts--since thought is +mainly a social product; and so with liberty of thought goes liberty of +speech and liberty of writing, printing, and peaceable discussion. These +rights are not free from difficulty and dubiety. There is a point at +which speech becomes indistinguishable from action, and free speech may +mean the right to create disorder. The limits of just liberty here are +easy to draw neither in theory nor in practice. They lead us immediately +to one of the points at which liberty and order may be in conflict, and +it is with conflicts of this kind that we shall have to deal. The +possibilities of conflict are not less in relation to the connected +right of liberty in religion. That this liberty is absolute cannot be +contended. No modern state would tolerate a form of religious worship +which should include cannibalism, human sacrifice, or the burning of +witches. In point of fact, practices of this kind--which follow quite +naturally from various forms of primitive belief that are most sincerely +held--are habitually put down by civilized peoples that are responsible +for the government of less developed races. The British law recognizes +polygamy in India, but I imagine it would not be open either to a +Mahommedan or a Hindu to contract two marriages in England. Nor is it +for liberty of this kind that the battle has been fought. + +What, then, is the primary meaning of religious liberty? Externally, I +take it to include the liberties of thought and expression, and to add +to these the right of worship in any form which does not inflict injury +on others or involve a breach of public order. This limitation appears +to carry with it a certain decency and restraint in expression which +avoids unnecessary insult to the feelings of others; and I think this +implication must be allowed, though it makes some room for strained and +unfair applications. Externally, again, we must note that the demand for +religious liberty soon goes beyond mere toleration. Religious liberty is +incomplete as long as any belief is penalized, as, for example, by +carrying with it exclusion from office or from educational advantages. +On this side, again, full liberty implies full equality. Turning to the +internal side, the spirit of religious liberty rests on the conception +that a man's religion ranks with his own innermost thought and feelings. +It is the most concrete expression of his personal attitude to life, to +his kind, to the world, to his own origin and destiny. There is no real +religion that is not thus drenched in personality; and the more religion +is recognized for spiritual the starker the contradiction is felt to be +that any one should seek to impose a religion on another. Properly +regarded, the attempt is not wicked, but impossible. Yet those sin most +against true religion who try to convert men from the outside by +mechanical means. They have the lie in the soul, being most ignorant of +the nature of that for which they feel most deeply. + +Yet here again we stumble on difficulties. Religion is personal. Yet is +not religion also eminently social? What is more vital to the social +order than its beliefs? If we send a man to gaol for stealing trash, +what shall we do to him whom, in our conscience and on our honour, we +believe to be corrupting the hearts of mankind, and perhaps leading them +to eternal perdition? Again, what in the name of liberty are we to do to +men whose preaching, if followed out in act, would bring back the rack +and the stake? Once more there is a difficulty of delimitation which +will have to be fully sifted. I will only remark here that our practice +has arrived at a solution which, upon the whole, appears to have worked +well hitherto, and which has its roots in principle. It is open to a man +to preach the principles of Torquemada or the religion of Mahomet. It is +not open to men to practise such of their precepts as would violate the +rights of others or cause a breach of the peace. Expression is free, and +worship is free as far as it is the expression of personal devotion. So +far as they infringe the freedom, or, more generally, the rights of +others, the practices inculcated by a religion cannot enjoy unqualified +freedom. + + +4. _Social Liberty._ + +From the spiritual we turn to the practical side of life. On this side +we may observe, first, that Liberalism has had to deal with those +restraints on the individual which flow from the hierarchic organization +of society, and reserve certain offices, certain forms of occupation, +and perhaps the right or at least the opportunity of education +generally, to people of a certain rank or class. In its more extreme +form this is a caste system, and its restrictions are religious or legal +as well as social. In Europe it has taken more than one form. There is +the monopoly of certain occupations by corporations, prominent in the +minds of eighteenth-century French reformers. There is the reservation +of public appointments and ecclesiastical patronage for those who are +"born," and there is a more subtly pervading spirit of class which +produces a hostile attitude to those who could and would rise; and this +spirit finds a more material ally in the educational difficulties that +beset brains unendowed with wealth. I need not labour points which will +be apparent to all, but have again to remark two things. (1) Once more +the struggle for liberty is also, when pushed through, a struggle for +equality. Freedom to choose and follow an occupation, if it is to become +fully effective, means equality with others in the opportunities for +following such occupation. This is, in fact, one among the various +considerations which lead Liberalism to support a national system of +free education, and will lead it further yet on the same lines. (2) Once +again, though we may insist on the rights of the individual, the social +value of the corporation or quasi-corporation, like the Trade Union, +cannot be ignored. Experience shows the necessity of some measure of +collective regulation in industrial matters, and in the adjustment of +such regulation to individual liberty serious difficulties of principle +emerge. We shall have to refer to these in the next section. But one +point is relevant at this stage. It is clearly a matter of Liberal +principle that membership of a corporation should not depend on any +hereditary qualification, nor be set about with any artificial +difficulty of entry, where by the term artificial is meant any +difficulty not involved in the nature of the occupation concerned, but +designed for purposes of exclusiveness. As against all such methods of +restriction, the Liberal case is clear. + +It has only to be added here that restrictions of sex are in every +respect parallel to restrictions of class. There are, doubtless, +occupations for which women are unfit. But, if so, the test of fitness +is sufficient to exclude them. The "open road for women" is one +application, and a very big one, of the "open road for talent," and to +secure them both is of the essence of Liberalism. + + +5. _Economic Liberty_ + +Apart from monopolies, industry was shackled in the earlier part of the +modern period by restrictive legislation in various forms, by navigation +laws, and by tariffs. In particular, the tariff was not merely an +obstruction to free enterprise, but a source of inequality as between +trade and trade. Its fundamental effect is to transfer capital and +labour from the objects on which they can be most profitably employed in +a given locality, to objects on which they are less profitably employed, +by endowing certain industries to the disadvantage of the general +consumer. Here, again, the Liberal movement is at once an attack on an +obstruction and on an inequality. In most countries the attack has +succeeded in breaking down local tariffs and establishing relatively +large Free Trade units. It is only in England, and only owing to our +early manufacturing supremacy, that it has fully succeeded in overcoming +the Protective principle, and even in England the Protectionist reaction +would undoubtedly have gained at least a temporary victory but for our +dependence on foreign countries for food and the materials of industry. +The most striking victory of Liberal ideas is one of the most +precarious. At the same time, the battle is one which Liberalism is +always prepared to fight over again. It has led to no back stroke, no +counter-movement within the Liberal ranks themselves. + +It is otherwise with organized restrictions upon industry. The old +regulations, which were quite unsuited to the conditions of the time, +either fell into desuetude during the eighteenth century, or were +formally abolished during the earlier years of the industrial +revolution. For a while it seemed as though wholly unrestricted +industrial enterprise was to be the progressive watchword, and the +echoes of that time still linger. But the old restrictions had not been +formally withdrawn before a new process of regulation began. The +conditions produced by the new factory system shocked the public +conscience; and as early as 1802 we find the first of a long series of +laws, out of which has grown an industrial code that year by year +follows the life of the operative, in his relations with his employer, +into more minute detail. The first stages of this movement were +contemplated with doubt and distrust by many men of Liberal sympathies. +The intention was, doubtless, to protect the weaker party, but the +method was that of interference with freedom of contract. Now the +freedom of the sane adult individual--even such strong individualists as +Cobden recognized that the case of children stood apart--carried with it +the right of concluding such agreements as seemed best to suit his own +interests, and involved both the right and the duty of determining the +lines of his life for himself. Free contract and personal responsibility +lay close to the heart of the whole Liberal movement. Hence the doubts +felt by so many Liberals as to the regulation of industry by law. None +the less, as time has gone on, men of the keenest Liberal sympathies +have come not merely to accept but eagerly to advance the extension of +public control in the industrial sphere, and of collective +responsibility in the matter of the education and even the feeding of +children, the housing of the industrial population, the care of the sick +and aged, the provision of the means of regular employment. On this side +Liberalism seems definitely to have retraced its steps, and we shall +have to inquire closely into the question whether the reversal is a +change of principle or of application. + +Closely connected with freedom of contract is freedom of association. If +men may make any agreement with one another in their mutual interest so +long as they do not injure a third party, they may apparently agree to +act together permanently for any purposes of common interest on the same +conditions. That is, they may form associations. Yet at bottom the +powers of an association are something very different from the powers of +the individuals composing it; and it is only by legal pedantry that the +attempt can be made to regulate the behaviour of an association on +principles derived from and suitable to the relations of individuals. An +association might become so powerful as to form a state within the +state, and to contend with government on no unequal terms. The history +of some revolutionary societies, of some ecclesiastical organizations, +even of some American trusts might be quoted to show that the danger is +not imaginary. Short of this, an association may act oppressively +towards others and even towards its own members, and the function of +Liberalism may be rather to protect the individual against the power of +the association than to protect the right of association against the +restriction of the law. In fact, in this regard, the principle of +liberty cuts both ways, and this double application is reflected in +history. The emancipation of trade unions, however, extending over the +period from 1824 to 1906, and perhaps not yet complete, was in the main +a liberating movement, because combination was necessary to place the +workman on something approaching terms of equality with the employer, +and because tacit combinations of employers could never, in fact, be +prevented by law. It was, again, a movement to liberty through equality. +On the other hand, the oppressive capacities of a trade union could +never be left out of account, while combinations of capital, which might +be infinitely more powerful, have justly been regarded with distrust. In +this there is no inconsistency of principle, but a just appreciation of +a real difference of circumstance. Upon the whole it may be said that +the function of Liberalism is not so much to maintain a general right of +free association as to define the right in each case in such terms as +make for the maximum of real liberty and equality. + + +6. _Domestic Liberty._ + +Of all associations within the State, the miniature community of the +Family is the most universal and of the strongest independent vitality. +The authoritarian state was reflected in the authoritarian family, in +which the husband was within wide limits absolute lord of the person and +property of wife and children. The movement of liberation consists (1) +in rendering the wife a fully responsible individual, capable of holding +property, suing and being sued, conducting business on her own account, +and enjoying full personal protection against her husband; (2) in +establishing marriage as far as the law is concerned on a purely +contractual basis, and leaving the sacramental aspect of marriage to the +ordinances of the religion professed by the parties; (3) in securing the +physical, mental, and moral care of the children, partly by imposing +definite responsibilities on the parents and punishing them for neglect, +partly by elaborating a public system of education and of hygiene. The +first two movements are sufficiently typical cases of the +interdependence of liberty and equality. The third is more often +conceived as a Socialistic than a Liberal tendency, and, in point of +fact, the State control of education gives rise to some searching +questions of principle, which have not yet been fully solved. If, in +general, education is a duty which the State has a right to enforce, +there is a countervailing right of choice as to the lines of education +which it would be ill to ignore, and the mode of adjustment has not yet +been adequately determined either in theory or in practice. I would, +however, strongly maintain that the general conception of the State as +Over-parent is quite as truly Liberal as Socialistic. It is the basis of +the rights of the child, of his protection against parental neglect, of +the equality of opportunity which he may claim as a future citizen, of +his training to fill his place as a grown-up person in the social +system. Liberty once more involves control and restraint. + + +7. _Local, Racial, and National Liberty._ + +From the smallest social unit we pass to the largest. A great part of +the liberating movement is occupied with the struggle of entire nations +against alien rule, with the revolt of Europe against Napoleon, with the +struggle of Italy for freedom, with the fate of the Christian subjects +of Turkey, with the emancipation of the negro, with the national +movement in Ireland and in India. Many of these struggles present the +problem of liberty in its simplest form. It has been and is too often a +question of securing the most elementary rights for the weaker party; +and those who are not touched by the appeal are deficient rather in +imagination than in logic or ethics. But at the back of national +movements very difficult questions do arise. What is a nation as +distinct from a state? What sort of unity does it constitute, and what +are its rights? If Ireland is a nation, is Ulster one? and if Ulster is +a British and Protestant nation, what of the Catholic half of Ulster? +History has in some cases given us a practical answer. Thus, it has +shown that, enjoying the gift of responsible government, French and +British, despite all historical quarrels and all differences of +religious belief, language, and social structure, have fused into the +nation of Canada. History has justified the conviction that Germany was +a nation, and thrown ridicule on the contemptuous saying of Metternich +that Italy was a geographical expression. But how to anticipate history, +what rights to concede to a people that claims to be a self-determining +unit, is less easy to decide. There is no doubt that the general +tendency of Liberalism is to favour autonomy, but, faced as it is with +the problems of subdivision and the complexity of group with group, it +has to rely on the concrete teaching of history and the practical +insight of statesmanship to determine how the lines of autonomy are to +be drawn. There is, however, one empirical test which seems generally +applicable. Where a weaker nation incorporated with a larger or stronger +one can be governed by ordinary law applicable to both parties to the +union, and fulfilling all the ordinary principles of liberty, the +arrangement may be the best for both parties. But where this system +fails, where the government is constantly forced to resort to +exceptional legislation or perhaps to de-liberalize its own +institutions, the case becomes urgent. Under such conditions the most +liberally-minded democracy is maintaining a system which must undermine +its own principles. The Assyrian conqueror, Mr. Herbert Spencer +remarks, who is depicted in the bas-reliefs leading his captive by a +cord, is bound with that cord himself. He forfeits his liberty as long +as he retains his power. + +Somewhat similar questions arise about race, which many people wrongly +confuse with nationality. So far as elementary rights are concerned +there can be no question as to the attitude of Liberalism. When the +political power which should guarantee such rights is brought into view, +questions of fact arise. Is the Negro or the Kaffir mentally and morally +capable of self-government or of taking part in a self-governing State? +The experience of Cape Colony tends to the affirmative view. American +experience of the negro gives, I take it, a more doubtful answer. A +specious extension of the white man's rights to the black may be the +best way of ruining the black. To destroy tribal custom by introducing +conceptions of individual property, the free disposal of land, and the +free purchase of gin may be the handiest method for the expropriator. In +all relations with weaker peoples we move in an atmosphere vitiated by +the insincere use of high-sounding words. If men say equality, they mean +oppression by forms of justice. If they say tutelage, they appear to +mean the kind of tutelage extended to the fattened goose. In such an +atmosphere, perhaps, our safest course, so far as principles and +deductions avail at all, is to fix our eyes on the elements of the +matter, and in any part of the world to support whatever method succeeds +in securing the "coloured" man from personal violence, from the lash, +from expropriation, and from gin; above all, so far as it may yet be, +from the white man himself. Until the white man has fully learnt to rule +his own life, the best of all things that he can do with the dark man is +to do nothing with him. In this relation, the day of a more constructive +Liberalism is yet to come. + + +8. _International Liberty._ + +If non-interference is the best thing for the barbarian many Liberals +have thought it to be the supreme wisdom in international affairs +generally. I shall examine this view later. Here I merely remark: (1) It +is of the essence of Liberalism to oppose the use of force, the basis of +all tyranny. (2) It is one of its practical necessities to withstand the +tyranny of armaments. Not only may the military force be directly +turned against liberty, as in Russia, but there are more subtle ways, as +in Western Europe, in which the military spirit eats into free +institutions and absorbs the public resources which might go to the +advancement of civilization. (3) In proportion as the world becomes +free, the use of force becomes meaningless. There is no purpose in +aggression if it is not to issue in one form or another of national +subjection. + + +9. _Political Liberty and Popular Sovereignty._ + +Underlying all these questions of right is the question how they are to +be secured and maintained. By enforcing the responsibility of the +executive and legislature to the community as a whole? Such is the +general answer, and it indicates one of the lines of connection between +the general theory of liberty and the doctrine of universal suffrage and +the sovereignty of the people. The answer, however, does not meet all +the possibilities of the case. The people as a whole might be careless +of their rights and incapable of managing them. They might be set on the +conquest of others, the expropriation of the rich, or on any form of +collective tyranny or folly. It is perfectly possible that from the +point of view of general liberty and social progress a limited franchise +might give better results than one that is more extended. Even in this +country it is a tenable view that the extension of the suffrage in 1884 +tended for some years to arrest the development of liberty in various +directions. On what theory does the principle of popular sovereignty +rest, and within what limits does it hold good? Is it a part of the +general principles of liberty and equality, or are other ideas involved? +These are among the questions which we shall have to examine. + +We have now passed the main phases of the Liberal movement in very +summary review, and we have noted, first, that it is co-extensive with +life. It is concerned with the individual, the family, the State. It +touches industry, law, religion, ethics. It would not be difficult, if +space allowed, to illustrate its influence in literature and art, to +describe the war with convention, insincerity, and patronage, and the +struggle for free self-expression, for reality, for the artist's soul. +Liberalism is an all-penetrating element of the life-structure of the +modern world. Secondly, it is an effective historical force. If its work +is nowhere complete, it is almost everywhere in progress. The modern +State as we see it in Europe outside Russia, in the British colonies, in +North and South America, as we begin to see it in the Russian empire and +throughout the vast continent of Asia, is the old authoritarian society +modified in greater or less degree by the absorption of Liberal +principles. Turning, thirdly, to those principles themselves, we have +recognized Liberalism in every department as a movement fairly denoted +by the name--a movement of liberation, a clearance of obstructions, an +opening of channels for the flow of free spontaneous vital activity. +Fourthly, we have seen that in a large number of cases what is under one +aspect a movement for liberty is on another side a movement towards +equality, and the habitual association of these principles is so far +confirmed. On the other hand, lastly, we have seen numerous cases in +which the exacter definition of liberty and the precise meaning of +equality remain obscure, and to discuss these will be our task. We have, +moreover, admittedly regarded Liberalism mainly in its earlier and more +negative aspect. We have seen it as a force working within an old +society and modifying it by the loosening of the bonds which its +structure imposed on human activity. We have yet to ask what +constructive social scheme, if any, could be formed on Liberal +principles; and it is here, if at all, that the fuller meaning of the +principles of Liberty and Equality should appear, and the methods of +applying them be made out. The problem of popular sovereignty pointed to +the same need. Thus the lines of the remainder of our task are clearly +laid down. We have to get at the fundamentals of Liberalism, and to +consider what kind of structure can be raised upon the basis which they +offer. We will approach the question by tracing the historic movement of +Liberal thought through certain well-marked phases. We shall see how the +problems which have been indicated were attacked by successive thinkers, +and how partial solutions gave occasion for deeper probings. Following +the guidance of the actual movement of ideas, we shall reach the centre +and heart of Liberalism, and we shall try to form a conception of the +essentials of the Liberal creed as a constructive theory of society. +This conception we shall then apply to the greater questions, political +and economic, of our own day; and this will enable us finally to +estimate the present position of Liberalism as a living force in the +modern world and the prospect of transforming its ideals into +actualities. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2] In England "benefit of clergy" was still a good plea for remission +of sentence for a number of crimes in the seventeenth century. At that +time all who could read could claim benefit, which was therefore of the +nature of a privilege for the educated class. The requirement of +reading, which had become a form, was abolished in 1705, but peers and +clerks in holy orders could still plead their clergy in the eighteenth +century, and the last relics of the privilege were not finally abolished +till the nineteenth century. + +[3] See an interesting chapter in Faguet's _Liberalisme_, which points +out that the common saying that thought is free is negated by any +inquisition which compels a man to disclose opinions, and penalizes him +if they are not such as to suit the inquisitor. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE MOVEMENT OF THEORY + + +Great changes are not caused by ideas alone; but they are not effected +without ideas. The passions of men must be aroused if the frost of +custom is to be broken or the chains of authority burst; but passion of +itself is blind and its world is chaotic. To be effective men must act +together, and to act together they must have a common understanding and +a common object. When it comes to be a question of any far-reaching +change, they must not merely conceive their own immediate end with +clearness. They must convert others, they must communicate sympathy and +win over the unconvinced. Upon the whole, they must show that their +object is possible, that it is compatible with existing institutions, or +at any rate with some workable form of social life. They are, in fact, +driven on by the requirements of their position to the elaboration of +ideas, and in the end to some sort of social philosophy; and the +philosophies that have driving force behind them are those which arise +after this fashion out of the practical demands of human feeling. The +philosophies that remain ineffectual and academic are those that are +formed by abstract reflection without relation to the thirsty souls of +human kind. + +In England, it is true, where men are apt to be shy and unhandy in the +region of theory, the Liberal movement has often sought to dispense with +general principles. In its early days and in its more moderate forms, it +sought its ends under the guise of constitutionalism. As against the +claims of the Stuart monarchy, there was a historic case as well as a +philosophic argument, and the earlier leaders of the Parliament relied +more on precedent than on principle. This method was embodied in the +Whig tradition, and runs on to our own time, as one of the elements that +go to make up the working constitution of the Liberal mind. It is, so to +say, the Conservative element in Liberalism, valuable in resistance to +encroachments, valuable in securing continuity of development, for +purposes of re-construction insufficient. To maintain the old order +under changed circumstances may be, in fact, to initiate a revolution. +It was so in the seventeenth century. Pym and his followers could find +justification for their contentions in our constitutional history, but +to do so they had to go behind both the Stuarts and the Tudors; and to +apply the principles of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in 1640 +was, in effect, to institute a revolution. In our own time, to maintain +the right of the Commons against the Lords is, on the face of it, to +adhere to old constitutional right, but to do so under the new +circumstances which have made the Commons representative of the nation +as a whole is, in reality, to establish democracy for the first time on +a firm footing, and this, again, is to accomplish a revolution. + +Now, those who effect a revolution ought to know whither they are +leading the world. They have need of a social theory--and in point of +fact the more thorough-going apostles of movement always have such a +theory; and though, as we have remarked, the theory emerges from the +practical needs which they feel, and is therefore apt to invest ideas +of merely temporary value with the character of eternal truths, it is +not on this account to be dismissed as of secondary importance. Once +formed, it reacts upon the minds of its adherents, and gives direction +and unity to their efforts. It becomes, in its turn, a real historic +force, and the degree of its coherence and adequacy is matter, not +merely of academic interest, but of practical moment. Moreover, the +onward course of a movement is more clearly understood by appreciating +the successive points of view which its thinkers and statesmen have +occupied than by following the devious turnings of political events and +the tangle of party controversy. The point of view naturally affects the +whole method of handling problems, whether speculative or practical, and +to the historian it serves as a centre around which ideas and policies +that perhaps differ, and even conflict with one another, may be so +grouped as to show their underlying affinities. Let us then seek to +determine the principal points of view which the Liberal movement has +occupied, and distinguish the main types of theory in which the passion +for freedom has sought to express itself. + +The first of these types I will call the theory of the Natural Order. + +The earlier Liberalism had to deal with authoritarian government in +church and state. It had to vindicate the elements of personal, civil, +and economic freedom; and in so doing it took its stand on the rights of +man, and, in proportion as it was forced to be constructive, on the +supposed harmony of the natural order. Government claimed supernatural +sanction and divine ordinance. Liberal theory replied in effect that the +rights of man rested on the law of Nature, and those of government on +human institution. The oldest "institution" in this view was the +individual, and the primordial society the natural grouping of human +beings under the influence of family affection, and for the sake of +mutual aid. Political society was a more artificial arrangement, a +convention arrived at for the specific purpose of securing a better +order and maintaining the common safety. It was, perhaps, as Locke held, +founded on a contract between king and people, a contract which was +brought to an end if either party violated its terms. Or, as in +Rousseau's view, it was essentially a contract of the people with one +another, an arrangement by means of which, out of many conflicting +individual wills, a common or general will could be formed. A government +might be instituted as the organ of this will, but it would, from the +nature of the case, be subordinate to the people from whom it derived +authority. The people were sovereign. The government was their delegate. + +Whatever the differences of outlook that divide these theories, those +who from Locke to Rousseau and Paine worked with this order of ideas +agreed in conceiving political society as a restraint to which men +voluntarily submitted themselves for specific purposes. Political +institutions were the source of subjection and inequality. Before and +behind them stood the assemblage of free and equal individuals. But the +isolated individual was powerless. He had rights which were limited only +by the corresponding rights of others, but he could not, unless chance +gave him the upper hand, enforce them. Accordingly, he found it best to +enter into an arrangement with others for the mutual respect of rights; +and for this purpose he instituted a government to maintain his rights +within the community and to guard the community from assault from +without. It followed that the function of government was limited and +definable. It was to maintain the natural rights of man as accurately as +the conditions of society allowed, and to do naught beside. Any further +action employing the compulsory power of the State was of the nature of +an infringement of the understanding on which government rested. In +entering into the compact, the individual gave up so much of his rights +as was necessitated by the condition of submitting to a common rule--so +much, and no more. He gave up his natural rights and received in return +civil rights, something less complete, perhaps, but more effective as +resting on the guarantee of the collective power. If you would discover, +then, what the civil rights of man in society should be, you must +inquire what are the natural rights of man,[4] and how far they are +unavoidably modified in accommodating the conflicting claims of men +with one another. Any interference that goes beyond this necessary +accommodation is oppression. Civil rights should agree as nearly as +possible with natural rights, or, as Paine says, a civil right is a +natural right exchanged. + +This conception of the relations of the State and the individual long +outlived the theory on which it rested. It underlies the entire teaching +of the Manchester school. Its spirit was absorbed, as we shall see, by +many of the Utilitarians. It operated, though in diminishing force, +throughout the nineteenth century; and it is strongly held by +contemporary Liberals like M. Faguet, who frankly abrogate its +speculative foundations and rest their case on social utility. Its +strength is, in effect, not in its logical principles, but in the +compactness and consistency which it gives to a view of the functions of +the State which responds to certain needs of modern society. As long as +those needs were uppermost, the theory was of living value. In +proportion as they have been satisfied and other needs have emerged, the +requirement has arisen for a fuller and sounder principle. + +But there was another side to the theory of nature which we must not +ignore. If in this theory government is the marplot and authority the +source of oppression and stagnation, where are the springs of progress +and civilization? Clearly, in the action of individuals. The more the +individual receives free scope for the play of his faculties, the more +rapidly will society as a whole advance. There are here the elements of +an important truth, but what is the implication? If the individual is +free, any two individuals, each pursuing his own ends, may find +themselves in conflict. It was, in fact, the possibility of such +conflict which was recognized by our theory as the origin and foundation +of society. Men had to agree to some measure of mutual restraint in +order that their liberty might be effective. But in the course of the +eighteenth century, and particularly in the economic sphere, there arose +a view that the conflict of wills is based on misunderstanding and +ignorance, and that its mischiefs are accentuated by governmental +repression. At bottom there is a natural harmony of interests. Maintain +external order, suppress violence, assure men in the possession of their +property, and enforce the fulfilment of contracts, and the rest will go +of itself. Each man will be guided by self-interest, but interest will +lead him along the lines of greatest productivity. If all artificial +barriers are removed, he will find the occupation which best suits his +capacities, and this will be the occupation in which he will be most +productive, and therefore, socially, most valuable. He will have to sell +his goods to a willing purchaser, therefore he must devote himself to +the production of things which others need, things, therefore, of social +value. He will, by preference, make that for which he can obtain the +highest price, and this will be that for which, at the particular time +and place and in relation to his particular capacities, there is the +greatest need. He will, again, find the employer who will pay him best, +and that will be the employer to whom he can do the best service. +Self-interest, if enlightened and unfettered, will, in short, lead him +to conduct coincident with public interest. There is, in this sense, a +natural harmony between the individual and society. True, this harmony +might require a certain amount of education and enlightenment to make it +effective. What it did not require was governmental "interference," +which would always hamper the causes making for its smooth and +effectual operation. Government must keep the ring, and leave it for +individuals to play out the game. The theory of the natural rights of +the individual is thus supplemented by a theory of the mutual harmony of +individual and social needs, and, so completed, forms a conception of +human society which is _primâ facie_ workable, which, in fact, contains +important elements of truth, and which was responsive to the needs of a +great class, and to many of the requirements of society as a whole, +during a considerable period. + +On both sides, however, the theory exhibits, under criticism, +fundamental weaknesses which have both a historical and a speculative +significance. Let us first consider the conception of natural rights. +What were these rights, and on what did they rest? On the first point +men sought to be explicit. By way of illustration we cannot do better +than quote the leading clauses of the Declaration of 1789.[5] + +_Article I._--Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social +distinctions can only be founded on common utility. + +_Article II._--The end of every political association is the +conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.[6] These +rights are liberty, property, security (_la sûreté_), and resistance to +oppression. + +_Article III._--The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in +the nation.... + +_Article IV._--Liberty consists in the power to do anything that does +not injure others; thus, the exercise of the natural rights of every man +has only such limits as assure to other members of society the enjoyment +of the same rights. These limits can only be determined by law. + +_Article VI._--The law is the expression of the general will. All +citizens have a right to take part (_concourir_), personally or by their +representatives, in its formation. + +The remainder of this article insists on the impartiality of law and the +equal admission of all citizens to office. The Declaration of 1793 is +more emphatic about equality, and more rhetorical. Article III reads, +"All men are equal by nature and before the law." + +It is easy to subject these articles to a niggling form of criticism in +which their spirit is altogether missed. I would ask attention only to +one or two points of principle. + +(_a_) What are the rights actually claimed? "Security" and "resistance +to oppression" are not in principle distinct, and, moreover, may be +taken as covered by the definition of liberty. The meaning at bottom is +"Security for liberty in respect of his person and property is the right +of every man." So expressed, it will be seen that this right postulates +the existence of an ordered society, and lays down that it is the duty +of such a society to secure the liberty of its members. The right of the +individual, then, is not something independent of society, but one of +the principles which a good social order must recognize. + +(_b_) Observe that equality is limited by the "common utility," and that +the sphere of liberty is ultimately to be defined by "law." In both +cases we are referred back from the individual either to the needs or to +the decision of society as a whole. There are, moreover, two +definitions of liberty. (1) It is the power to do what does not injure +others. (2) It is a right limited by the consideration that others must +enjoy the same rights. It is important to bear in mind that these two +definitions are highly discrepant. If my right to knock a man down is +only limited by his equal right to knock me down, the law has no +business to interfere when we take to our fists. If, on the other hand, +I have no right to injure another, the law should interfere. Very little +reflection suffices to show that this is the sounder principle, and that +respect for the equal liberty of another is not an adequate definition +of liberty. My right to keep my neighbour awake by playing the piano all +night is not satisfactorily counterbalanced by his right to keep a dog +which howls all the time the piano is being played. The right of a +"sweater" to pay starvation wages is not satisfactorily limited by the +corresponding right which his employee would enjoy if he were in a +position to impose the same terms on some one else. Generally, the right +to injure or take advantage of another is not sufficiently limited by +the right of that other if he should have the power to retaliate in +kind. There is no right to injure another; and if we ask what is injury +we are again thrown back on some general principle which will override +the individual claim to do what one will. + +(_c_) The doctrine of popular sovereignty rests on two principles. (1) +It is said to reside in the nation. Law is the expression of the general +will. Here the "nation" is conceived as a collective whole, as a unit. +(2) Every citizen has the right to take part in making the law. Here the +question is one of individual right. Which is the real ground of +democratic representation--the unity of the national life, or the +inherent right of the individual to be consulted about that which +concerns himself? + +Further, and this is a very serious question, which is the ultimate +authority--the will of the nation, or the rights of the individual? +Suppose the nation deliberately decides on laws which deny the rights of +the individual, ought such laws to be obeyed in the name of popular +sovereignty, or to be disobeyed in the name of natural rights? It is a +real issue, and on these lines it is unfortunately quite insoluble. + +These difficulties were among the considerations which led to the +formation of the second type of Liberal theory, and what has to be said +about the harmony of the natural order may be taken in conjunction with +this second theory to which we may now pass, and which is famous as The +Greatest Happiness Principle. + +Bentham, who spent the greater part of his life in elaborating the +greatest happiness principle as a basis of social reconstruction, was +fully alive to the difficulties which we have found in the theory of +natural rights. The alleged rights of man were for him so many +anarchical fallacies. They were founded on no clearly assignable +principle, and admitted of no demonstration. "I say I have a right." "I +say you have no such right." Between the disputants who or what is to +decide? What was the supposed law of nature? When was it written, and by +whose authority? On what ground do we maintain that men are free or +equal? On what principle and within what limits do we or can we maintain +the right of property? There were points on which, by universal +admission, all these rights have to give way. What is the right of +property worth in times of war or of any overwhelming general need? The +Declaration itself recognized the need of appeal to common utility or to +the law to define the limits of individual right. Bentham would frankly +make all rights dependent on common utility, and therewith he would make +it possible to examine all conflicting claims in the light of a general +principle. He would measure them all by a common standard. Has a man the +right to express his opinion freely? To determine the question on +Bentham's lines we must ask whether it is, on the whole, useful to +society that the free expression of opinion should be allowed, and this, +he would say, is a question which may be decided by general reasoning +and by experience of results. Of course, we must take the rough with the +smooth. If the free expression of opinion is allowed, false opinion will +find utterance and will mislead many. The question would be, does the +loss involved in the promulgation of error counterbalance the gain to be +derived from unfettered discussion? and Bentham would hold himself free +to judge by results. Should the State maintain the rights of private +property? Yes, if the admission of those rights is useful to the +community as a whole. No, if it is not useful. Some rights of property, +again, may be advantageous, others disadvantageous. The community is +free to make a selection. If it finds that certain forms of property are +working to the exclusive benefit of individuals and the prejudice of the +common weal, it has good ground for the suppression of those forms of +property, while it may, with equal justice, maintain other forms of +property which it holds sound as judged by the effect on the common +welfare. It is limited by no "imprescriptible" right of the individual. +It may do with the individual what it pleases provided that it has the +good of the whole in view. So far as the question of right is concerned +the Benthamite principle might be regarded as decidedly socialistic or +even authoritarian. It contemplates, at least as a possibility, the +complete subordination of individual to social claims. + +There is, however, another side to the Benthamite principle, to +understand which we must state the heads of the theory itself as a +positive doctrine. What is this social utility of which we have spoken? +In what does it consist? What is useful to society, and what harmful? +The answer has the merit of great clearness and simplicity. An action +is good which tends to promote the greatest possible happiness of the +greatest possible number of those affected by it. As with an action, so, +of course, with an institution or a social system. That is useful which +conforms to this principle. That is harmful which conflicts with it. +That is right which conforms to it, that is wrong which conflicts with +it. The greatest happiness principle is the one and supreme principle of +conduct. Observe that it imposes on us two considerations. One is the +_greatest_ happiness. Now happiness is defined as consisting positively +in the presence of pleasure, negatively in the absence of pain. A +greater pleasure is then preferable to a lesser, a pleasure +unaccompanied by pain to one involving pain. Conceiving pain as a minus +quantity of pleasure, we may say that the principle requires us always +to take quantity and pleasure into account, and nothing else. But, +secondly, the _number_ of individuals affected is material. An act might +cause pleasure to one and pain to two. Then it is wrong, unless, indeed, +the pleasure were very great and the pain in each case small. We must +balance the consequences, taking all individuals affected into account, +and "everybody must count for one and nobody for more than one." This +comment is an integral part of the original formula. As between the +happiness of his father, his child, or himself, and the happiness of a +stranger, a man must be impartial. He must only consider the quantity of +pleasure secured or pain inflicted. + +Now, in this conception of measurable quantities of pleasure and pain +there is, as many critics have insisted, something unreal and academic. +We shall have to return to the point, but let us first endeavour to +understand the bearing of Bentham's teaching on the problems of his own +time and on the subsequent development of Liberal thought. For this +purpose we will keep to what is real in his doctrine, even if it is not +always defined with academic precision. The salient points that we note, +then, are (1) the subordination of all considerations of right to the +considerations of happiness, (2) the importance of number, and (3) as +the other side of the same doctrine, the insistence on equality or +impartiality between man and man. The common utility which Bentham +considers is the happiness experienced by a number of individuals, all +of whom are reckoned for this purpose as of equal value. This is the +radical individualism of the Benthamite creed, to be set against that +socialistic tendency which struck us in our preliminary account. + +In this individualism, equality is fundamental. Everybody is to count +for one, nobody for more than one, for every one can feel pain and +pleasure. Liberty, on the other hand, is not fundamental, it is a means +to an end. Popular sovereignty is not fundamental, for all government is +a means to an end. Nevertheless, the school of Bentham, upon the whole, +stood by both liberty and democracy. Let us consider their attitude. + +As to popular government, Bentham and James Mill reasoned after this +fashion. Men, if left to themselves, that is to say, if neither trained +by an educational discipline nor checked by responsibility, do not +consider the good of the greatest number. They consider their own good. +A king, if his power is unchecked, will rule in his own interest. A +class, if its power is unchecked, will rule in its own interest. The +only way to secure fair consideration for the happiness of all is to +allow to all an equal share of power. True, if there is a conflict the +majority will prevail, but they will be moved each by consideration of +his own happiness, and the majority as a whole, therefore, by the +happiness of the greater number. There is no inherent right in the +individual to take a part in government. There is a claim to be +considered in the distribution of the means of happiness, and to share +in the work of government as a means to this end. It would follow, among +other things, that if one man or one class could be shown to be so much +wiser and better than others that his or their rule would, in fact, +conduce more to the happiness of the greater number than a popular +system, then the business of government ought to be entrusted to that +man or that class and no one else ought to interfere with it. + +The whole argument, however, implies a crude view of the problem of +government. It is, of course, theoretically possible that a question +should present itself, detached from other questions, in which a +definite measurable interest of each of the seven millions or more of +voters is at stake. For example, the great majority of English people +drink tea. Comparatively few drink wine. Should a particular sum be +raised by a duty on tea or on wine? Here the majority of tea-drinkers +have a measurable interest, the same in kind and roughly the same in +degree for each; and the vote of the majority, if it could be taken on +this question alone and based on self-interest alone, might be conceived +without absurdity as representing a sum of individual interests. Even +here, however, observe that, though the greatest number is considered, +the greatest happiness does not fare so well. For to raise the same sum +the tax on wine will, as less is drunk, have to be much larger than the +tax on tea, so that a little gain to many tea-drinkers might inflict a +heavy loss on the few wine-drinkers, and on the Benthamite principle it +is not clear that this would be just. In point of fact it is possible +for a majority to act tyrannically, by insisting on a slight convenience +to itself at the expense, perhaps, of real suffering to a minority. Now +the Utilitarian principle by no means justifies such tyranny, but it +does seem to contemplate the weighing of one man's loss against +another's gain, and such a method of balancing does not at bottom +commend itself to our sense of justice. We may lay down that if there is +a rational social order at all it must be one which never rests the +essential indispensable condition of the happiness of one man on the +unavoidable misery of another, nor the happiness of forty millions of +men on the misery of one. It may be temporarily expedient, but it is +eternally unjust, that one man should die for the people. + +We may go further. The case of the contemplated tax is, as applied to +the politics of a modern State, an unreal one. Political questions +cannot be thus isolated. Even if we could vote by referendum on a +special tax, the question which voters would have to consider would +never be the revenue from and the incidence of that tax alone. All the +indirect social and economic bearings of the tax would come up for +consideration, and in the illustration chosen people would be swayed, +and rightly swayed, by their opinion, for example, of the comparative +effects of tea-drinking and wine-drinking. No one element of the social +life stands separate from the rest, any more than any one element of the +animal body stands separate from the rest. In this sense the life of +society is rightly held to be organic, and all considered public policy +must be conceived in its bearing on the life of society as a whole. But +the moment that we apply this view to politics, the Benthamite mode of +stating the case for democracy is seen to be insufficient. The interests +of every man are no doubt in the end bound up with the welfare of the +whole community, but the relation is infinitely subtle and indirect. +Moreover, it takes time to work itself out, and the evil that is done in +the present day may only bear fruit when the generation that has done it +has passed away. Thus, the direct and calculable benefit of the majority +may by no means coincide with the ultimate good of society as a whole; +and to suppose that the majority must, on grounds of self-interest, +govern in the interests of the community as a whole is in reality to +attribute to the mass of men full insight into problems which tax the +highest efforts of science and of statesmanship. Lastly, to suppose that +men are governed entirely by a sense of their interests is a many-sided +fallacy. Men are neither so intelligent nor so selfish. They are swayed +by emotion and by impulse, and both for good and for evil they will lend +enthusiastic support to courses of public policy from which, as +individuals, they have nothing to gain. To understand the real value of +democratic government, we shall have to probe far deeper into the +relations of the individual and society. + +I turn lastly to the question of liberty. On Benthamite principles there +could be no question here of indefeasible individual right. There were +even, as we saw, possibilities of a thorough-going Socialism or of an +authoritarian paternalism in the Benthamite principle. But two great +considerations told in the opposite direction. One arose from the +circumstances of the day. Bentham, originally a man of somewhat +conservative temper, was driven into Radicalism comparatively late in +life by the indifference or hostility of the governing classes to his +schemes of reform. Government, as he saw it, was of the nature of a +close corporation with a vested interest hostile to the public weal, and +his work is penetrated by distrust of power as such. There was much in +the history of the time to justify his attitude. It was difficult at +that time to believe in an honest officialdom putting the commonwealth +above every personal or corporate interest, and reformers naturally +looked to individual initiative as the source of progress. Secondly, +and this was a more philosophic argument, the individual was supposed to +understand his own interest best, and as the common good was the sum of +individual interests, it followed that so far as every man was free to +seek his own good, the good of the greatest number would be most +effectually realized by general freedom of choice. That there were +difficulties in reconciling self-interest with the general good was not +denied. But men like James Mill, who especially worked at this side of +the problem, held that they could be overcome by moral education. +Trained from childhood to associate the good of others with his own, a +man would come, he thought, to care for the happiness of others as for +the happiness of self. For, in the long run, the two things were +coincident. Particularly in a free economic system, as remarked above, +each individual, moving along the line of greatest personal profit, +would be found to fulfil the function of greatest profit to society. Let +this be understood, and we should have true social harmony based on the +spontaneous operation of personal interest enlightened by intelligence +and chastened by the discipline of unruly instinct. + +Thus, though their starting-point was different, the Benthamites arrived +at practical results not notably divergent from those of the doctrine of +natural liberty; and, on the whole, the two influences worked together +in the formation of that school who in the reform period exercised so +notable an influence on English Liberalism, and to whose work we must +now turn. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] _Cf._ the preamble to the Declaration of the Rights of Man by the +French National Assembly in 1789. The Assembly lays down "the natural, +inalienable, and sacred rights of man," in order, among other things, +"that the acts of the legislative power and those of the executive +power, being capable of being at every instant compared with the end of +every political institution, may be more respected accordingly." + +[5] The comparison of the Declaration of the Assembly in 1789 with that +of the Convention in 1793 is full of interest, both for the points of +agreement and difference, but would require a lengthy examination. I +note one or two points in passing. + +[6] Contrast 1793, Art. I: "The end of society is the common happiness. +Government is instituted to guarantee to man the enjoyment of his +natural and imprescriptible rights." + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +'LAISSEZ-FAIRE' + + +The school of Cobden is affiliated in general outlook both to the +doctrine of natural liberty and to the discipline of Bentham. It shared +with the Benthamites the thoroughly practical attitude dear to the +English mind. It has much less to say of natural rights than the French +theorists. On the other hand, it is saturated with the conviction that +the unfettered action of the individual is the mainspring of all +progress.[7] Its starting-point is economic. Trade is still in fetters. +The worst of the archaic internal restrictions have, indeed, been +thrown off. But even here Cobden is active in the work of finally +emancipating Manchester from manorial rights that have no place in the +nineteenth century. The main work, however, is the liberation of foreign +trade. The Corn Laws, as even the tariff reformers of our own day admit, +were conceived in the interest of the governing classes. They frankly +imposed a tax on the food of the masses for the benefit of the +landlords, and as the result of the agricultural and industrial +revolutions which had been in progress since 1760, the masses had been +brought to the lowest point of economic misery. Give to every man the +right to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market, urged the +Cobdenite, and trade would automatically expand. The business career +would be open to the talents. The good workman would command the full +money's worth of his work, and his money would buy him food and clothing +at the lowest rate in the world's market. Only so would he get the full +value of his work, paying toll to none. Taxes there must be to carry on +government, but if we looked into the cost of government we found that +it depended mostly on armaments. Why did we need armaments? First, +because of the national antagonisms aroused and maintained by a +protective system. Free commercial intercourse between nations would +engender mutual knowledge, and knit the severed peoples by countless +ties of business interests. Free Trade meant peace, and once taught by +the example of Great Britain's prosperity, other nations would follow +suit, and Free Trade would be universal. The other root of national +danger was the principle of intervention. We took it on ourselves to set +other nations right. How could we judge for other nations? Force was no +remedy. Let every people be free to work out its own salvation. Things +were not so perfect with us that we need go about setting the houses of +other people in order. To complete personal freedom, there must be +national freedom. There must also be colonial freedom. The colonies +could no longer be governed in the interests of the mother country, nor +ought they to require standing garrisons maintained by the mother +country. They were distant lands, each, if we gave it freedom, with a +great future of its own, capable of protecting itself, and developing +with freedom into true nationhood. Personal freedom, colonial freedom, +international freedom, were parts of one whole. Non-intervention, peace, +restriction of armaments, retrenchment of expenditure, reduction of +taxation, were the connected series of practical consequences. The money +retrenched from wasteful military expenditure need not all be remitted +to the taxpayer. A fraction of it devoted to education--free, secular, +and universal--would do as much good as when spent on guns and ships it +did harm. For education was necessary to raise the standard of +intelligence, and provide the substantial equality of opportunity at the +start without which the mass of men could not make use of the freedom +given by the removal of legislative restrictions. There were here +elements of a more constructive view for which Cobden and his friends +have not always received sufficient credit. + +In the main, however, the teaching of the Manchester school tended both +in external and in internal affairs to a restricted view of the function +of government. Government had to maintain order, to restrain men from +violence and fraud, to hold them secure in person and property against +foreign and domestic enemies, to give them redress against injury, that +so they may rely on reaping where they have sown, may enjoy the fruits +of their industry, may enter unimpeded into what arrangements they will +with one another for their mutual benefit. Let us see what criticism was +passed on this view by the contemporaries of Cobden and by the loud +voice of the facts themselves. The old economic régime had been in decay +throughout the eighteenth century. The divorce of the labourer from the +land was complete at the time when the Anti-Corn Law League was formed. +The mass of the English peasantry were landless labourers working for a +weekly wage of about ten or twelve shillings, and often for a good deal +less. The rise of machine industry since 1760 had destroyed the old +domestic system and reduced the operative in the towns to the position +of a factory hand under an employer, who found the road to wealth easy +in the monopoly of manufacture enjoyed by this country for two +generations after the Napoleonic war. The factory system early brought +matters to a head at one point by the systematic employment of women and +young children under conditions which outraged the public conscience +when they became known. In the case of children it was admitted from an +early date, it was urged by Cobden himself, that the principle of free +contract could not apply. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that the +adult could make a better bargain for himself or herself than any one +could do for him or her, no one could contend that the pauper child +apprenticed by Poor Law guardians to a manufacturer had any say or could +have any judgment as to the work which it was set to do. It had to be +protected, and experience showed that it had to be protected by law. +Free contract did not solve the question of the helpless child. It left +it to be "exploited" by the employer in his own interest, and whatever +regard might be shown for its health and well-being by individuals was a +matter of individual benevolence, not a right secured by the necessary +operation of the system of liberty. + +But these arguments admitted of great extension. If the child was +helpless, was the grown-up person, man or woman, in a much better +position? Here was the owner of a mill employing five hundred hands. +Here was an operative possessed of no alternative means of subsistence +seeking employment. Suppose them to bargain as to terms. If the bargain +failed, the employer lost one man and had four hundred and ninety-nine +to keep his mill going. At worst he might for a day or two, until +another operative appeared, have a little difficulty in working a single +machine. During the same days the operative might have nothing to eat, +and might see his children going hungry. Where was the effective liberty +in such an arrangement? The operatives themselves speedily found that +there was none, and had from an early period in the rise of the machine +industry sought to redress the balance by combination. Now, combination +was naturally disliked by employers, and it was strongly suspect to +believers in liberty because it put constraint upon individuals. Yet +trade unions gained the first step in emancipation through the action of +Place and the Radicals in 1824, more perhaps because these men conceived +trade unions as the response of labour to oppressive laws which true +freedom of competition would render superfluous than because they +founded any serious hopes of permanent social progress upon Trade +Unionism itself. In point of fact, the critical attitude was not without +its justification. Trade Unionism can be protective in spirit and +oppressive in action. Nevertheless, it was essential to the maintenance +of their industrial standard by the artisan classes, because it alone, +in the absence of drastic legislative protection, could do something to +redress the inequality between employer and employed. It gave, upon the +whole, far more freedom to the workman than it took away, and in this we +learn an important lesson which has far wider application. In the matter +of contract true freedom postulates substantial equality between the +parties. In proportion as one party is in a position of vantage, he is +able to dictate his terms. In proportion as the other party is in a weak +position, he must accept unfavourable terms. Hence the truth of Walker's +dictum that economic injuries tend to perpetuate themselves. The more a +class is brought low, the greater its difficulty in rising again without +assistance. For purposes of legislation the State has been exceedingly +slow to accept this view. It began, as we saw, with the child, where +the case was overwhelming. It went on to include the "young person" and +the woman--not without criticism from those who held by woman's rights, +and saw in this extension of tutelage an enlargement of male domination. +Be that as it may, public opinion was brought to this point by the +belief that it was intervening in an exceptional manner to protect a +definite class not strong enough to bargain for itself. It drew the line +at the adult male; and it is only within our own time, and as the result +of a controversy waged for many years within the trade union world +itself, that legislation has avowedly undertaken the task of controlling +the conditions of industry, the hours, and at length, through the +institution of Wages Boards in "sweated industries," the actual +remuneration of working people without limitation of age or sex. To this +it has been driven by the manifest teaching of experience that liberty +without equality is a name of noble sound and squalid result. + +In place of the system of unfettered agreements between individual and +individual which the school of Cobden contemplated, the industrial +system which has actually grown up and is in process of further +development rests on conditions prescribed by the State, and within the +limits of those conditions is very largely governed by collective +arrangements between associations of employers and employed. The law +provides for the safety of the worker and the sanitary conditions of +employment. It prescribes the length of the working day for women and +children in factories and workshops, and for men in mines and on +railways.[8] In the future it will probably deal freely with the hours +of men. It enables wages boards to establish a legal minimum wage in +scheduled industries which will undoubtedly grow in number. It makes +employers liable for all injuries suffered by operatives in the course +of their employment, and forbids any one to "contract out" of this +obligation. Within these limits, it allows freedom of contract. But at +this point, in the more highly developed trades, the work is taken up by +voluntary associations. Combinations of men have been met by +combinations of employers, and wages, hours, and all the details of the +industrial bargain are settled by collective agreement through the +agency of a joint board with an impartial chairman or referee in case of +necessity for an entire locality and even an entire trade. So far have +we gone from the free competition of isolated individuals. + +This development is sometimes held to have involved the decay and death +of the older Liberalism. It is true that in the beginning factory +legislation enjoyed a large measure of Conservative support. It was at +that stage in accordance with the best traditions of paternal rule, and +it commended itself to the religious convictions of men of whom Lord +Shaftesbury was the typical example. It is true, also, that it was +bitterly opposed by Cobden and Bright. On the other hand, Radicals like +J. Cam Hobhouse took a leading part in the earlier legislation, and Whig +Governments passed the very important Acts of 1833 and 1847. The +cleavage of opinion, in fact, cut across the ordinary divisions of +party. What is more to the purpose is that, as experience ripened, the +implications of the new legislation became clearer, and men came to see +that by industrial control they were not destroying liberty but +confirming it. A new and more concrete conception of liberty arose and +many old presuppositions were challenged. + +Let us look for a moment at these presuppositions. We have seen that the +theory of _laissez-faire_ assumed that the State would hold the ring. +That is to say, it would suppress force and fraud, keep property safe, +and aid men in enforcing contracts. On these conditions, it was +maintained, men should be absolutely free to compete with one another, +so that their best energies should be called forth, so that each should +feel himself responsible for the guidance of his own life, and exert his +manhood to the utmost. But why, it might be asked, on these conditions, +just these and no others? Why should the State ensure protection of +person and property? The time was when the strong man armed kept his +goods, and incidentally his neighbour's goods too if he could get hold +of them. Why should the State intervene to do for a man that which his +ancestor did for himself? Why should a man who has been soundly beaten +in physical fight go to a public authority for redress? How much more +manly to fight his own battle! Was it not a kind of pauperization to +make men secure in person and property through no efforts of their own, +by the agency of a state machinery operating over their heads? Would not +a really consistent individualism abolish this machinery? "But," the +advocate of _laissez-faire_ may reply, "the use of force is criminal, +and the State must suppress crime." So men held in the nineteenth +century. But there was an earlier time when they did not take this view, +but left it to individuals and their kinsfolk to revenge their own +injuries by their own might. Was not this a time of more unrestricted +individual liberty? Yet the nineteenth century regarded it, and justly, +as an age of barbarism. What, we may ask in our turn, is the essence of +crime? May we not say that any intentional injury to another may be +legitimately punished by a public authority, and may we not say that to +impose twelve hours' daily labour on a child was to inflict a greater +injury than the theft of a purse for which a century ago a man might be +hanged? On what principle, then, is the line drawn, so as to specify +certain injuries which the State may prohibit and to mark off others +which it must leave untouched? Well, it may be said, _volenti non fit +injuria_. No wrong is done to a man by a bargain to which he is a +willing party. That may be, though there are doubtful cases. But in the +field that has been in question the contention is that one party is not +willing. The bargain is a forced bargain. The weaker man consents as one +slipping over a precipice might consent to give all his fortune to one +who will throw him a rope on no other terms. This is not true consent. +True consent is free consent, and full freedom of consent implies +equality on the part of both parties to the bargain. Just as government +first secured the elements of freedom for all when it prevented the +physically stronger man from slaying, beating, despoiling his +neighbours, so it secures a larger measure of freedom for all by every +restriction which it imposes with a view to preventing one man from +making use of any of his advantages to the disadvantage of others. + +There emerges a distinction between unsocial and social freedom. +Unsocial freedom is the right of a man to use his powers without regard +to the wishes or interests of any one but himself. Such freedom is +theoretically possible for an individual. It is antithetic to all public +control. It is theoretically impossible for a plurality of individuals +living in mutual contact. Socially it is a contradiction, unless the +desires of all men were automatically attuned to social ends. Social +freedom, then, for any epoch short of the millennium rests on restraint. +It is a freedom that can be enjoyed by all the members of a community, +and it is the freedom to choose among those lines of activity which do +not involve injury to others. As experience of the social effects of +action ripens, and as the social conscience is awakened, the conception +of injury is widened and insight into its causes is deepened. The area +of restraint is therefore increased. But, inasmuch as injury inflicted +is itself crippling to the sufferer, as it lowers his health, confines +his life, cramps his powers, so the prevention of such injury sets him +free. The restraint of the aggressor is the freedom of the sufferer, and +only by restraint on the actions by which men injure one another do they +as a whole community gain freedom in all courses of conduct that can be +pursued without ultimate social disharmony. + +It is, therefore, a very shallow wit that taunts contemporary Liberalism +with inconsistency in opposing economic protection while it supports +protective legislation for the manual labourer. The two things have +nothing in common but that they are restraints intended to operate in +the interests of somebody. The one is a restraint which, in the Liberal +view, would operate in favour of certain industries and interests to the +prejudice of others, and, on the whole, in favour of those who are +already more fortunately placed and against the poorer classes. The +other is a restraint conceived in the interest primarily of the poorer +classes with the object of securing to them a more effective freedom and +a nearer approach to equality of conditions in industrial relations. +There is point in the argument only for those who conceive liberty as +opposed to restraint as such. For those who understand that all social +liberty rests upon restraint, that restraint of one man in one respect +is the condition of the freedom of other men in that respect, the taunt +has no meaning whatever. The liberty which is good is not the liberty of +one gained at the expense of others, but the liberty which can be +enjoyed by all who dwell together, and this liberty depends on and is +measured by the completeness with which by law, custom, or their own +feelings they are restrained from mutual injury. + +Individualism, as ordinarily understood, not only takes the policeman +and the law court for granted. It also takes the rights of property for +granted. But what is meant by the rights of property? In ordinary use +the phrase means just that system to which long usage has accustomed us. +This is a system under which a man is free to acquire by any method of +production or exchange within the limits of the law whatever he can of +land, consumable goods, or capital; to dispose of it at his own will and +pleasure for his own purposes, to destroy it if he likes, to give it +away or sell it as it suits him, and at death to bequeath it to +whomsoever he will. The State, it is admitted, can take a part of a +man's property by taxation. For the State is a necessity, and men must +pay a price for security; but in all taxation the State on this view is +taking something from a man which is "his," and in so doing is justified +only by necessity. It has no "right" to deprive the individual of +anything that is his in order to promote objects of its own which are +not necessary to the common order. To do so is to infringe individual +rights and make a man contribute by force to objects which he may view +with indifference or even with dislike. "Socialistic" taxation is an +infringement of individual freedom, the freedom to hold one's own and do +as one will with one's own. Such seems to be the ordinary view. + +But a consistent theory of liberty could not rest wholly satisfied with +the actual system under which property is held. The first point of +attack, already pressed by the disciples of Cobden, was the barrier to +free exchange in the matter of land. It was not and still is not easy +for the landless to acquire land, and in the name of free contract +Cobden and his disciples pressed for cheap and unimpeded transfer. But a +more searching criticism was possible. Land is limited in amount, +certain kinds of land very narrowly limited. Where there is limitation +of supply monopoly is always possible, and against monopoly the +principles of free competition declared war. To Cobden himself, free +trade in land was the pendant to free trade in goods. But the attack on +the land monopoly could be carried much further, and might lead the +individualist who was in earnest about his principles to march a +certain distance on parallel lines with the Socialist enemy. This has, +in fact, occurred in the school of Henry George. This school holds by +competition, but by competition only on the basis of a genuine freedom +and equality for all individuals. To secure this basis, it would purge +the social system of all elements of monopoly, of which the private +ownership of land is in its view the most important. This object, it +maintains, can be secured only through the absorption by the State of +all elements of monopoly value. Now, monopoly value accrues whenever +anything of worth to men of which the supply is limited falls into +private hands. In this case competition fails. There is no check upon +the owner except the limitations of demand. He can exact a price which +bears no necessary relation to the cost of any effort of his own. In +addition to normal wages and profits, he can extract from the +necessities of others a surplus, to which the name of economic rent is +given. He can also hold up his property and refuse to allow others to +make use of it until the time when its full value has accrued, thereby +increasing the rent which he will ultimately receive at the cost of +much loss in the interim to society. + +Monopolies in our country fall into three classes. There is, first, the +monopoly of land. Urban rents, for example, represent not merely the +cost of building, nor the cost of building plus the site, as it would be +if sites of the kind required were unlimited in amount. They represent +the cost of a site where the supply falls short of the demand, that is +to say, where there is an element of monopoly. And site value--the +element in the actual cost of a house or factory that depends on its +position--varies directly with the degree of this monopoly. This value +the land nationalizer contends is not created by the owner. It is +created by society. In part it is due to the general growth of the +country to which the increase of population and the rise of town life is +to be attributed. In part it depends on the growth of the particular +locality, and in part on the direct expenditure of the ratepayers' money +in sanitation and other improvements which make the place one where +people can live and industry can thrive. Directly and indirectly, the +community creates the site value. The landlord receives it, and, +receiving it, can charge any one who wants to live or carry on industry +upon the site with rent to the full amount. The land-nationalizer, +looking at rights of property purely from the point of view of the +individual, denies the justice of this arrangement, and he sees no +solution except this--that the monopoly value should pass back to the +community which creates it. Accordingly, he favours the taxation of site +value to its full amount. Another element of monopoly arises from +industries in which competition is inapplicable--the supply of gas and +water, for example, a tramway service, and in some conditions a railway +service. Here competition may be wasteful if not altogether impossible; +and here again, on the lines of a strictly consistent individualism, if +the industry is allowed to fall into private hands the owners will be +able to secure something more than the normal profits of competitive +industry. They will profit by monopoly at the expense of the general +consumer, and the remedy is public control or public ownership. The +latter is the more complete and efficacious remedy, and it is also the +remedy of municipal socialism. Lastly, there may be forms of monopoly +created by the State, such as the sale of liquor as restricted by the +licensing system. In accordance with competitive ideas the value so +created ought not to pass into private hands, and if on social grounds +the monopoly is maintained, the taxation of licensed premises ought to +be so arranged that the monopoly value returns to the community. + +Up to this point a thoroughly consistent individualism can work in +harmony with socialism, and it is this partial alliance which has, in +fact, laid down the lines of later Liberal finance. The great Budget of +1909 had behind it the united forces of Socialist and individualist +opinion. It may be added that there is a fourth form of monopoly which +would be open to the same double attack, but it is one of which less has +been heard in Great Britain than in the United States. It is possible +under a competitive system for rivals to come to an agreement. The more +powerful may coerce the weaker, or a number of equals may agree to work +together. Thus competition may defeat itself, and industry may be +marshalled into trusts or other combinations for the private advantage +against the public interest. Such combinations, predicted by Karl Marx +as the appointed means of dissolving the competitive system, have been +kept at bay in this country by Free Trade. Under Protection they +constitute the most urgent problem of the day. Even here the railways, +to take one example, are rapidly moving to a system of combination, the +economies of which are obvious, while its immediate result is monopoly, +and its assured end is nationalization. + +Thus individualism, when it grapples with the facts, is driven no small +distance along Socialist lines. Once again we have found that to +maintain individual freedom and equality we have to extend the sphere of +social control. But to carry through the real principles of Liberalism, +to achieve social liberty and living equality of rights, we shall have +to probe still deeper. We must not assume any of the rights of property +as axiomatic. We must look at their actual working and consider how they +affect the life of society. We shall have to ask whether, if we could +abolish all monopoly on articles of limited supply, we should yet have +dealt with all the causes that contribute to social injustice and +industrial disorder, whether we should have rescued the sweated worker, +afforded to every man adequate security for a fair return for an honest +day's toil, and prevented the use of economic advantage to procure gain +for one man at the expense of another. We should have to ask whether we +had the basis of a just delimitation between the rights of the community +and those of the individual, and therewith a due appreciation of the +appropriate ends of the State and the equitable basis of taxation. These +inquiries take us to first principles, and to approach that part of our +discussion it is desirable to carry further our sketch of the historic +development of Liberalism in thought and action. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[7] "If I were asked to sum up in a sentence the difference and the +connection (between the two schools) I would say that the Manchester men +were the disciples of Adam Smith and Bentham, while the Philosophical +Radicals followed Bentham and Adam Smith" (F. W. Hirst, _The Manchester +School_, Introd., p. xi). Lord Morley, in the concluding chapter of his +_Life of Cobden_, points out that it was the view of "policy as a whole" +in connection with the economic movement of society which distinguished +the school of Cobden from that of the Benthamites. + +[8] Indirectly it has for long limited the hours of men in factories +owing to the interdependence of the adult male with the female and child +operative. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +GLADSTONE AND MILL + + +From the middle of the nineteenth century two great names stand out in +the history of British Liberalism--that of Gladstone in the world of +action, that of Mill in the world of thought. Differing in much, they +agreed in one respect. They had the supreme virtue of keeping their +minds fresh and open to new ideas, and both of them in consequence +advanced to a deeper interpretation of social life as they grew older. +In 1846 Gladstone ranked as a Conservative, but he parted from his old +traditions under the leadership of Peel on the question of Free Trade, +and for many years to come the most notable of his public services lay +in the completion of the Cobdenite policy of financial emancipation. In +the pursuit of this policy he was brought into collision with the House +of Lords, and it was his active intervention in 1859-60 which saved the +Commons from a humiliating surrender, and secured its financial +supremacy unimpaired until 1909. In the following decade he stood for +the extension of the suffrage, and it was his Government which, in 1884, +carried the extension of the representative principle to the point at +which it rested twenty-seven years later. In economics Gladstone kept +upon the whole to the Cobdenite principles which he acquired in middle +life. He was not sympathetically disposed to the "New Unionism" and the +semi-socialistic ideas that came at the end of the 'eighties, which, in +fact, constituted a powerful cross current to the political work that he +had immediately in hand. Yet in relation to Irish land he entered upon a +new departure which threw over freedom of contract in a leading case +where the two parties were on glaringly unequal terms. No abstract +thinker, he had a passion for justice in the concrete which was capable +of carrying him far. He knew tyranny when he saw it, and upon it he +waged unremitting and many-sided war. + +But his most original work was done in the sphere of imperial relations. +The maligned Majuba settlement was an act of justice which came too +late to effect a permanent undoing of mischief. All the greater was the +courage of the statesman who could throw himself at that time upon the +inherent force of national liberty and international fair dealing. In +the case of Ireland Gladstone again relied on the same principles, but +another force was necessary to carry the day, a force which no man can +command, the force of time. In international dealings generally +Gladstone was a pioneer. His principle was not precisely that of Cobden. +He was not a non-interventionist. He took action on behalf of Greece, +and would have done so on behalf of the Armenians, to save the national +honour and prevent a monstrous wrong. The Gladstonian principle may be +defined by antithesis to that of Machiavelli, and to that of Bismarck, +and to the practice of every Foreign Office. As that practice proceeds +on the principle that reasons of State justify everything, so Gladstone +proceeded on the principle that reasons of State justify nothing that is +not justified already by the human conscience. The statesman is for him +a man charged with maintaining not only the material interests but the +honour of his country. He is a citizen of the world in that he +represents his nation, which is a member of the community of the world. +He has to recognize rights and duties, as every representative of every +other human organization has to recognize rights and duties. There is no +line drawn beyond which human obligations cease. There is no gulf across +which the voice of human suffering cannot be heard, beyond which +massacre and torture cease to be execrable. Simply as a patriot, again, +a man should recognize that a nation may become great not merely by +painting the map red, or extending her commerce beyond all precedent, +but also as the champion of justice, the succourer of the oppressed, the +established home of freedom. From the denunciation of the Opium War, +from the exposure of the Neapolitan prisons, to his last appearance on +the morrow of the Constantinople massacre this was the message which +Gladstone sought to convey. He was before his time. He was not always +able to maintain his principle in his own Cabinet, and on his retirement +the world appeared to relapse definitely into the older ways. His own +party gave itself up in large measure to opposite views. On the other +hand, careful and unprejudiced criticism will recognize that the chief +opponent of his old age, Lord Salisbury, had imbibed something of his +spirit, and under its influence did much to save the country from the +excesses of Imperialism, while his follower, Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, used the brief term of his power to reverse the +policy of racial domination in South Africa and to prove the value of +the old Gladstonian trust in the recuperative force of political +freedom. It may be added that, if cynicism has since appeared to hold +the field in international politics, it is the cynicism of terror rather +than the cynicism of ambition. The Scare has superseded the Vision as +the moving force in our external relations, and there are now signs that +the Scare in turn has spent its force and is making room at last for +Sense. + +In other respects, Gladstone was a moral rather than an intellectual +force. He raised the whole level of public life. By habitually calling +upon what was best in men, he deepened the sense of public +responsibility and paved the way, half unconsciously, for the fuller +exercise of the social conscience. Mill was also a moral force, and the +most persistent influence of his books is more an effect of character +than of intellect. But, in place of Gladstone's driving power and +practical capacity, Mill had the qualities of a life-long learner, and +in his single person he spans the interval between the old and the new +Liberalism. Brought up on the pure milk of the Benthamite word, he never +definitely abandoned the first principles of his father. But he was +perpetually bringing them into contact with fresh experience and new +trains of thought, considering how they worked, and how they ought to be +modified in order to maintain what was really sound and valuable in +their content. Hence, Mill is the easiest person in the world to convict +of inconsistency, incompleteness, and lack of rounded system. Hence, +also, his work will survive the death of many consistent, complete, and +perfectly rounded systems. + +As a utilitarian, Mill cannot appeal to any rights of the individual +that can be set in opposition to the public welfare. His method is to +show that the permanent welfare of the public is bound up with the +rights of the individual. Of course, there are occasions on which the +immediate expediency of the public would be met by ignoring personal +rights. But if the rule of expediency were followed there would be +neither right nor law at all. There would be no fixed rules in social +life, and nothing to which men could trust in guiding their conduct. For +the utilitarian, then, the question of right resolves itself into the +question: What claim is it, in general and as a matter of principle, +advisable for society to recognize? What in any given relation are the +permanent conditions of social health? In regard to liberty Mill's reply +turns on the moral or spiritual forces which determine the life of +society. First, particularly as regards freedom of thought and +discussion, society needs light. Truth has a social value, and we are +never to suppose that we are in the possession of complete and final +truth. But truth is only to be sought by experience in the world of +thought, and of action as well. In the process of experimentation there +are endless opportunities of error, and the free search for truth +therefore involves friction and waste. The promulgation of error will do +harm, a harm that might be averted if error were suppressed. But +suppression by any other means than those of rational suasion is one of +those remedies which cure the disease by killing the patient. It +paralyzes the free search for truth. Not only so, but there is an +element of positive value in honest error which places it above +mechanically accepted truth. So far as it is honest it springs from the +spontaneous operation of the mind on the basis of some partial and +incomplete experience. It is, so far as it goes, an interpretation of +experience, though a faulty one, whereas the belief imposed by authority +is no interpretation of experience at all. It involves no personal +effort. Its blind acceptance seals the resignation of the will and the +intellect to effacement and stultification. + +The argument on this side does not rest on human fallibility. It appeals +in its full strength to those who are most confident that they possess +truth final and complete. They are asked to recognize that the way in +which this truth must be communicated to others is not by material but +by spiritual means, and that if they hold out physical threats as a +deterrent, or worldly advantage as a means of persuasion, they are +destroying not merely the fruits but the very root of truth as it grows +within the human mind. Yet the argument receives additional force when +we consider the actual history of human belief. The candid man who knows +anything of the movements of thought will recognize that even the faith +which is most vital to him is something that has grown through the +generations, and he may infer, if he is reasonable, that as it has grown +in the past so, if it has the vital seed within it, it will grow in the +future. It may be permanent in outline, but in content it will change. +But, if truth itself is an expanding circle of ideas that grows through +criticism and by modification, we need say no more as to the rough and +imperfect apprehension of truth which constitutes the dominant opinion +of society at any given moment. It needs little effort of detachment to +appreciate the danger of any limitation of inquiry by the collective +will whether its organ be law or the repressive force of public opinion. + +The foundation of liberty on this side, then, is the conception of +thought as a growth dependent on spiritual laws, flourishing in the +movement of ideas as guided by experience, reflection and feeling, +corrupted by the intrusion of material considerations, slain by the +guillotine of finality. The same conception is broadened out to cover +the whole idea of personality. Social well-being cannot be incompatible +with individual well-being. But individual well-being has as its +foundation the responsible life of the rational creature. Manhood, and +Mill would emphatically add womanhood too, rests on the spontaneous +development of faculty. To find vent for the capacities of feeling, of +emotion, of thought, of action, is to find oneself. The result is no +anarchy. The self so found has as the pivot of its life the power of +control. To introduce some unity into life, some harmony into thought, +action and feeling, is its central achievement, and to realize its +relation to others and guide its own life thereby, its noblest rule. But +the essential of control is that it should be self-control. Compulsion +may be necessary for the purposes of external order, but it adds nothing +to the inward life that is the true being of man. It even threatens it +with loss of authority and infringes the sphere of its responsibility. +It is a means and not an end, and a means that readily becomes a danger +to ends that are very vital. Under self-guidance individuals will +diverge widely, and some of their eccentricities will be futile, others +wasteful, others even painful and abhorrent to witness. But, upon the +whole, it is good that they should differ. Individuality is an element +of well-being, and that not only because it is the necessary consequence +of self-government, but because, after all allowances for waste, the +common life is fuller and richer for the multiplicity of types that it +includes, and that go to enlarge the area of collective experience. The +larger wrong done by the repression of women is not the loss to women +themselves who constitute one half of the community, but the +impoverishment of the community as a whole, the loss of all the elements +in the common stock which the free play of the woman's mind would +contribute. + +Similar principles underlie Mill's treatment of representative +government. If the adult citizen, male or female, has a right to vote, +it is not so much as a means to the enforcement of his claims upon +society, but rather as a means of enforcing his personal responsibility +for the actions of the community. The problem of character is the +determining issue in the question of government. If men could be +spoon-fed with happiness, a benevolent despotism would be the ideal +system. If they are to take a part in working out their own salvation, +they must be summoned to their share in the task of directing the common +life. Carrying this principle further, Mill turned the edge of the +common objection to the extension of the suffrage based on the ignorance +and the irresponsibility of the voters. To learn anything men must +practise. They must be trusted with more responsibility if they are to +acquire the sense of responsibility. There were dangers in the process, +but there were greater dangers and there were fewer elements of hope as +long as the mass of the population was left outside the circle of civic +rights and duties. The greatest danger that Mill saw in democracy was +that of the tyranny of the majority. He emphasized, perhaps more than +any Liberal teacher before him, the difference between the desire of the +majority and the good of the community. He recognized that the different +rights for which the Liberal was wont to plead might turn out in +practice hard to reconcile with one another, that if personal liberty +were fundamental it might only be imperilled by a so-called political +liberty which would give to the majority unlimited powers of coercion. +He was, therefore, for many years anxiously concerned with the means of +securing a fair hearing and fair representation to minorities, and as a +pioneer of the movement for Proportional Representation he sought to +make Parliament the reflection not of a portion of the people, however +preponderant numerically, but of the whole. + +On the economic side of social life Mill recognized in principle the +necessity of controlling contract where the parties were not on equal +terms, but his insistence on personal responsibility made him chary in +extending the principle to grown-up persons, and his especial attachment +to the cause of feminine emancipation led him to resist the tide of +feeling which was, in fact, securing the first elements of emancipation +for the woman worker. He trusted at the outset of his career to the +elevation of the standard of comfort as the best means of improving the +position of the wage-earner, and in this elevation he regarded the +limitation of the family as an essential condition. As he advanced in +life, however, he became more and more dissatisfied with the whole +structure of a system which left the mass of the population in the +position of wage-earners, while the minority lived on rents, profits, +and the interest on invested capital. He came to look forward to a +co-operative organization of society in which a man would learn to "dig +and weave for his country," as he now is prepared to fight for it, and +in which the surplus products of industry would be distributed among the +producers. In middle life voluntary co-operation appeared to him the +best means to this end, but towards the close he recognized that his +change of views was such as, on the whole, to rank him with the +Socialists, and the brief exposition of the Socialist ideal given in his +Autobiography remains perhaps the best summary statement of Liberal +Socialism that we possess. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE HEART OF LIBERALISM + + +The teaching of Mill brings us close to the heart of Liberalism. We +learn from him, in the first place, that liberty is no mere formula of +law, or of the restriction of law. There may be a tyranny of custom, a +tyranny of opinion, even a tyranny of circumstance, as real as any +tyranny of government and more pervasive. Nor does liberty rest on the +self-assertion of the individual. There is scope abundant for Liberalism +and illiberalism in personal conduct. Nor is liberty opposed to +discipline, to organization, to strenuous conviction as to what is true +and just. Nor is it to be identified with tolerance of opposed opinions. +The Liberal does not meet opinions which he conceives to be false with +toleration, as though they did not matter. He meets them with justice, +and exacts for them a fair hearing as though they mattered just as much +as his own. He is always ready to put his own convictions to the proof, +not because he doubts them, but because he believes in them. For, both +as to that which he holds for true and as to that which he holds for +false, he believes that one final test applies. Let error have free +play, and one of two things will happen. Either as it develops, as its +implications and consequences become clear, some elements of truth will +appear within it. They will separate themselves out; they will go to +enrich the stock of human ideas; they will add something to the truth +which he himself mistakenly took as final; they will serve to explain +the root of the error; for error itself is generally a truth +misconceived, and it is only when it is explained that it is finally and +satisfactorily confuted. Or, in the alternative, no element of truth +will appear. In that case the more fully the error is understood, the +more patiently it is followed up in all the windings of its implications +and consequences, the more thoroughly will it refute itself. The +cancerous growth cannot be extirpated by the knife. The root is always +left, and it is only the evolution of the self-protecting anti-toxin +that works the final cure. Exactly parallel is the logic of truth. The +more the truth is developed in all its implications, the greater is the +opportunity of detecting any element of error that it may contain; and, +conversely, if no error appears, the more completely does it establish +itself as the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Liberalism applies +the wisdom of Gamaliel in no spirit of indifference, but in the full +conviction of the potency of truth. If this thing be of man, _i. e._ if +it is not rooted in actual verity, it will come to nought. If it be of +God, let us take care that we be not found fighting against God. + +Divergences of opinion, of character, of conduct are not unimportant +matters. They may be most serious matters, and no one is called on in +the name of Liberalism to overlook their seriousness. There are, for +example, certain disqualifications inherent in the profession of certain +opinions. It is not illiberal to recognize such disqualifications. It is +not illiberal for a Protestant in choosing a tutor for his son to reject +a conscientious Roman Catholic who avows that all his teaching is +centred on the doctrine of his Church. It would be illiberal to reject +the same man for the specific purpose of teaching arithmetic, if he +avowed that he had no intention of using his position for the purpose +of religious propagandism. For the former purpose the divergence of +religious opinion is an inherent disqualification. It negates the object +propounded, which is the general education of the boy on lines in which +the father believes. For the latter purpose the opinion is no +disqualification. The devout Catholic accepts the multiplication table, +and can impart his knowledge without reference to the infallibility of +the Pope. To refuse to employ him is to impose an extraneous penalty on +his convictions. It is not illiberal for an editor to decline the +services of a member of the opposite party as a leader writer, or even +as a political reviewer or in any capacity in which his opinions would +affect his work. It is illiberal to reject him as a compositor or as a +clerk, or in any capacity in which his opinions would not affect his +work for the paper. It is not illiberal to refuse a position of trust to +the man whose record shows that he is likely to abuse such a trust. It +is illiberal--and this the "moralist" has yet to learn--to punish a man +who has done a wrong in one relation by excluding him from the +performance of useful social functions for which he is perfectly +fitted, by which he could at once serve society and re-establish his own +self-respect. There may, however, yet come a time when Liberalism, +already recognized as a duty in religion and in politics, will take its +true place at the centre of our ethical conceptions, and will be seen to +have its application not only to him whom we conceive to be the teacher +of false opinions, but to the man whom we hold a sinner. + +The ground of Liberalism so understood is certainly not the view that a +man's personal opinions are socially indifferent, nor that his personal +morality matters nothing to others. So far as Mill rested his case on +the distinction between self-regarding actions and actions that affect +others, he was still dominated by the older individualism. We should +frankly recognize that there is no side of a man's life which is +unimportant to society, for whatever he is, does, or thinks may affect +his own well-being, which is and ought to be matter of common concern, +and may also directly or indirectly affect the thought, action, and +character of those with whom he comes in contact. The underlying +principle may be put in two ways. In the first place, the man is much +more than his opinions and his actions. Carlyle and Sterling did not +differ "except in opinion." To most of us that is just what difference +means. Carlyle was aware that there was something much deeper, something +that opinion just crassly formulates, and for the most part formulates +inadequately, that is the real man. The real man is something more than +is ever adequately expressed in terms which his fellows can understand; +and just as his essential humanity lies deeper than all distinctions of +rank, and class, and colour, and even, though in a different sense, of +sex, so also it goes far below those comparatively external events which +make one man figure as a saint and another as a criminal. This sense of +ultimate oneness is the real meaning of equality, as it is the +foundation of social solidarity and the bond which, if genuinely +experienced, resists the disruptive force of all conflict, intellectual, +religious, and ethical. + +But, further, while personal opinions and social institutions are like +crystallized results, achievements that have been won by certain +definite processes of individual or collective effort, human personality +is that within which lives and grows, which can be destroyed but cannot +be made, which cannot be taken to pieces and repaired, but can be placed +under conditions in which it will flourish and expand, or, if it is +diseased, under conditions in which it will heal itself by its own +recuperative powers. The foundation of liberty is the idea of growth. +Life is learning, but whether in theory or practice what a man genuinely +learns is what he absorbs, and what he absorbs depends on the energy +which he himself puts forth in response to his surroundings. Thus, to +come at once to the real crux, the question of moral discipline, it is +of course possible to reduce a man to order and prevent him from being a +nuisance to his neighbours by arbitrary control and harsh punishment. +This may be to the comfort of the neighbours, as is admitted, but +regarded as a moral discipline it is a contradiction in terms. It is +doing less than nothing for the character of the man himself. It is +merely crushing him, and unless his will is killed the effect will be +seen if ever the superincumbent pressure is by chance removed. It is +also possible, though it takes a much higher skill, to teach the same +man to discipline himself, and this is to foster the development of +will, of personality, of self control, or whatever we please to call +that central harmonizing power which makes us capable of directing our +own lives. Liberalism is the belief that society can safely be founded +on this self-directing power of personality, that it is only on this +foundation that a true community can be built, and that so established +its foundations are so deep and so wide that there is no limit that we +can place to the extent of the building. Liberty then becomes not so +much a right of the individual as a necessity of society. It rests not +on the claim of A to be let alone by B, but on the duty of B to treat A +as a rational being. It is not right to let crime alone or to let error +alone, but it is imperative to treat the criminal or the mistaken or the +ignorant as beings capable of right and truth, and to lead them on +instead of merely beating them down. The rule of liberty is just the +application of rational method. It is the opening of the door to the +appeal of reason, of imagination, of social feeling; and except through +the response to this appeal there is no assured progress of society. + +Now, I am not contending that these principles are free from difficulty +in application. At many points they suggest difficulties both in theory +and in practice, with some of which I shall try to deal later on. Nor, +again, am I contending that freedom is the universal solvent, or the +idea of liberty the sole foundation on which a true social philosophy +can be based. On the contrary, freedom is only one side of social life. +Mutual aid is not less important than mutual forbearance, the theory of +collective action no less fundamental than the theory of personal +freedom. But, in an inquiry where all the elements are so closely +interwoven as they are in the field of social life, the point of +departure becomes almost indifferent. Wherever we start we shall, if we +are quite frank and consistent, be led on to look at the whole from some +central point, and this, I think, has happened to us in working with the +conception of 'liberty.' For, beginning with the right of the +individual, and the antithesis between personal freedom and social +control, we have been led on to a point at which we regard liberty as +primarily a matter of social interest, as something flowing from the +necessities of continuous advance in those regions of truth and of +ethics which constitute the matters of highest social concern. At the +same time, we have come to look for the effect of liberty in the firmer +establishment of social solidarity, as the only foundation on which such +solidarity can securely rest. We have, in fact, arrived by a path of our +own at that which is ordinarily described as the organic conception of +the relation between the individual and society--a conception towards +which Mill worked through his career, and which forms the starting-point +of T. H. Green's philosophy alike in ethics and in politics. + +The term organic is so much used and abused that it is best to state +simply what it means. A thing is called organic when it is made up of +parts which are quite distinct from one another, but which are destroyed +or vitally altered when they are removed from the whole. Thus, the human +body is organic because its life depends on the functions performed by +many organs, while each of these organs depends in turn on the life of +the body, perishing and decomposing if removed therefrom. Now, the +organic view of society is equally simple. It means that, while the life +of society is nothing but the life of individuals as they act one upon +another, the life of the individual in turn would be something utterly +different if he could be separated from society. A great deal of him +would not exist at all. Even if he himself could maintain physical +existence by the luck and skill of a Robinson Crusoe, his mental and +moral being would, if it existed at all, be something quite different +from anything that we know. By language, by training, by simply living +with others, each of us absorbs into his system the social atmosphere +that surrounds us. In particular, in the matter of rights and duties +which is cardinal for Liberal theory, the relation of the individual to +the community is everything. His rights and his duties are alike defined +by the common good. What, for example, is my right? On the face of it, +it is something that I claim. But a mere claim is nothing. I might claim +anything and everything. If my claim is of right it is because it is +sound, well grounded, in the judgment of an impartial observer. But an +impartial observer will not consider me alone. He will equally weigh the +opposed claims of others. He will take us in relation to one another, +that is to say, as individuals involved in a social relationship. +Further, if his decision is in any sense a rational one, it must rest on +a principle of some kind; and again, as a rational man, any principle +which he asserts he must found on some good result which it serves or +embodies, and as an impartial man he must take the good of every one +affected into account. That is to say, he must found his judgment on the +common good. An individual right, then, cannot conflict with the common +good, nor could any right exist apart from the common good. + +The argument might seem to make the individual too subservient to +society. But this is to forget the other side of the original +supposition. Society consists wholly of persons. It has no distinct +personality separate from and superior to those of its members. It has, +indeed, a certain collective life and character. The British nation is a +unity with a life of its own. But the unity is constituted by certain +ties that bind together all British subjects, which ties are in the last +resort feelings and ideas, sentiments of patriotism, of kinship, a +common pride, and a thousand more subtle sentiments that bind together +men who speak a common language, have behind them a common history, and +understand one another as they can understand no one else. The British +nation is not a mysterious entity over and above the forty odd millions +of living souls who dwell together under a common law. Its life is their +life, its well-being or ill-fortune their well-being or ill-fortune. +Thus, the common good to which each man's rights are subordinate is a +good in which each man has a share. This share consists in realizing his +capacities of feeling, of loving, of mental and physical energy, and in +realizing these he plays his part in the social life, or, in Green's +phrase, he finds his own good in the common good. + +Now, this phrase, it must be admitted, involves a certain assumption, +which may be regarded as the fundamental postulate of the organic view +of society. It implies that such a fulfilment or full development of +personality is practically possible not for one man only but for all +members of a community. There must be a line of development open along +which each can move in harmony with others. Harmony in the full sense +would involve not merely absence of conflict but actual support. There +must be for each, then, possibilities of development such as not merely +to permit but actively to further the development of others. Now, the +older economists conceived a natural harmony, such that the interests of +each would, if properly understood and unchecked by outside +interference, inevitably lead him in courses profitable to others and to +society at large. We saw that this assumption was too optimistic. The +conception which we have now reached does not assume so much. It +postulates, not that there is an actually existing harmony requiring +nothing but prudence and coolness of judgment for its effective +operation, but only that there is a possible ethical harmony, to which, +partly by discipline, partly by the improvement of the conditions of +life, men might attain, and that in such attainment lies the social +ideal. To attempt the systematic proof of this postulate would take us +into the field of philosophical first principles. It is the point at +which the philosophy of politics comes into contact with that of ethics. +It must suffice to say here that, just as the endeavour to establish +coherent system in the world of thought is the characteristic of the +rational impulse which lies at the root of science and philosophy, so +the impulse to establish harmony in the world of feeling and action--a +harmony which must include all those who think and feel--is of the +essence of the rational impulse in the world of practice. To move +towards harmony is the persistent impulse of the rational being, even if +the goal lies always beyond the reach of accomplished effort. + +These principles may appear very abstract, remote from practical life, +and valueless for concrete teaching. But this remoteness is of the +nature of first principles when taken without the connecting links that +bind them to the details of experience. To find some of these links let +us take up again our old Liberal principles, and see how they look in +the light of the organic, or, as we may now call it, the harmonic +conception. We shall readily see, to begin with, that the old idea of +equality has its place. For the common good includes every individual. +It is founded on personality, and postulates free scope for the +development of personality in each member of the community. This is the +foundation not only of equal rights before the law, but also of what is +called equality of opportunity. It does not necessarily imply actual +equality of treatment for all persons any more than it implies original +equality of powers.[9] It does, I think, imply that whatever inequality +of actual treatment, of income, rank, office, consideration, there be in +a good social system, it would rest, not on the interest of the favoured +individual as such, but on the common good. If the existence of +millionaires on the one hand and of paupers on the other is just, it +must be because such contrasts are the result of an economic system +which upon the whole works out for the common good, the good of the +pauper being included therein as well as the good of the millionaire; +that is to say, that when we have well weighed the good and the evil of +all parties concerned we can find no alternative open to us which could +do better for the good of all. I am not for the moment either attacking +or defending any economic system. I point out only that this is the +position which according to the organic or harmonic view of society must +be made good by any rational defence of grave inequality in the +distribution of wealth. In relation to equality, indeed, it appears, +oddly enough, that the harmonic principle can adopt wholesale, and even +expand, one of the "Rights of Man" as formulated in 1789--"Social +distinctions can only be founded upon common utility." If it is really +just that A should be superior to B in wealth or power or position, it +is only because when the good of all concerned is considered, among whom +B is one, it turns out that there is a net gain in the arrangement as +compared with any alternative that we can devise. + +If we turn from equality to liberty, the general lines of argument have +already been indicated, and the discussion of difficulties in detail +must be left for the next chapter. It need only be repeated here that on +the harmonic principle the fundamental importance of liberty rests on +the nature of the "good" itself, and that whether we are thinking of the +good of society or the good of the individual. The good is something +attained by the development of the basal factors of personality; a +development proceeding by the widening of ideas, the awakening of the +imagination, the play of affection and passion, the strengthening and +extension of rational control. As it is the development of these +factors in each human being that makes his life worth having, so it is +their harmonious interaction, the response of each to each, that makes +of society a living whole. Liberty so interpreted cannot, as we have +seen, dispense with restraint; restraint, however, is not an end but a +means to an end, and one of the principal elements in that end is the +enlargement of liberty. + +But the collective activity of the community does not necessarily +proceed by coercion or restraint. The more securely it is founded on +freedom and general willing assent, the more it is free to work out all +the achievements in which the individual is feeble or powerless while +combined action is strong. Human progress, on whatever side we consider +it, is found to be in the main social progress, the work of conscious or +unconscious co-operation. In this work voluntary association plays a +large and increasing part. But the State is one form of association +among others, distinguished by its use of coercive power, by its +supremacy, and by its claim to control all who dwell within its +geographical limits. What the functions of such a form of association +are to be we shall have to consider a little further in connection with +the other questions which we have already raised. But that, in general, +we are justified in regarding the State as one among many forms of human +association for the maintenance and improvement of life is the general +principle that we have to point out here, and this is the point at which +we stand furthest from the older Liberalism. We have, however, already +seen some reason for thinking that the older doctrines led, when +carefully examined, to a more enlarged conception of State action than +appeared on the surface; and we shall see more fully before we have done +that the "positive" conception of the State which we have now reached +not only involves no conflict with the true principle of personal +liberty, but is necessary to its effective realization. + +There is, in addition, one principle of historic Liberalism with which +our present conception of the State is in full sympathy. The conception +of the common good as it has been explained can be realized in its +fullness only through the common will. There are, of course, elements of +value in the good government of a benevolent despot or of a fatherly +aristocracy. Within any peaceful order there is room for many good +things to flourish. But the full fruit of social progress is only to be +reaped by a society in which the generality of men and women are not +only passive recipients but practical contributors. To make the rights +and responsibilities of citizens real and living, and to extend them as +widely as the conditions of society allow, is thus an integral part of +the organic conception of society, and the justification of the +democratic principle. It is, at the same time, the justification of +nationalism so far as nationalism is founded on a true interpretation of +history. For, inasmuch as the true social harmony rests on feeling and +makes use of all the natural ties of kinship, of neighbourliness, of +congruity of character and belief, and of language and mode of life, the +best, healthiest, and most vigorous political unit is that to which men +are by their own feelings strongly drawn. Any breach of such unity, +whether by forcible disruption or by compulsory inclusion in a larger +society of alien sentiments and laws, tends to mutilate--or, at lowest, +to cramp--the spontaneous development of social life. National and +personal freedom are growths of the same root, and their historic +connection rests on no accident, but on ultimate identity of idea. + +Thus in the organic conception of society each of the leading ideas of +historic Liberalism has its part to play. The ideal society is conceived +as a whole which lives and flourishes by the harmonious growth of its +parts, each of which in developing on its own lines and in accordance +with its own nature tends on the whole to further the development of +others. There is some elementary trace of such harmony in every form of +social life that can maintain itself, for if the conflicting impulses +predominated society would break up, and when they do predominate +society does break up. At the other extreme, true harmony is an ideal +which it is perhaps beyond the power of man to realize, but which serves +to indicate the line of advance. But to admit this is to admit that the +lines of possible development for each individual or, to use a more +general phrase, for each constituent of the social order are not limited +and fixed. There are many possibilities, and the course that will in the +end make for social harmony is only one among them, while the +possibilities of disharmony and conflict are many. The progress of +society like that of the individual depends, then, ultimately on choice. +It is not "natural," in the sense in which a physical law is natural, +that is, in the sense of going forward automatically from stage to stage +without backward turnings, deflections to the left, or fallings away on +the right. It is natural only in this sense, that it is the expression +of deep-seated forces of human nature which come to their own only by an +infinitely slow and cumbersome process of mutual adjustment. Every +constructive social doctrine rests on the conception of human progress. +The heart of Liberalism is the understanding that progress is not a +matter of mechanical contrivance, but of the liberation of living +spiritual energy. Good mechanism is that which provides the channels +wherein such energy can flow unimpeded, unobstructed by its own +exuberance of output, vivifying the social structure, expanding and +ennobling the life of mind. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[9] An absurd misconception fostered principally by opponents of +equality for controversial purposes. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL + + +We have seen something of the principle underlying the Liberal idea and +of its various applications. We have now to put the test question. Are +these different applications compatible? Will they work together to make +that harmonious whole of which it is easy enough to talk in abstract +terms? Are they themselves really harmonious in theory and in practice? +Does scope for individual development, for example, consort with the +idea of equality? Is popular sovereignty a practicable basis of personal +freedom, or does it open an avenue to the tyranny of the mob? Will the +sentiment of nationality dwell in unison with the ideal of peace? Is the +love of liberty compatible with the full realization of the common will? +If reconcilable in theory, may not these ideals collide in practice? Are +there not clearly occasions demonstrable in history when development in +one direction involves retrogression in another? If so, how are we to +strike the balance of gain and loss? Does political progress offer us +nothing but a choice of evils, or may we have some confidence that, in +solving the most pressing problem of the moment, we shall in the end be +in a better position for grappling with the obstacles that come next in +turn? + +I shall deal with these questions as far as limits of space allow, and I +will take first the question of liberty and the common will upon which +everything turns. Enough has already been said on this topic to enable +us to shorten the discussion. We have seen that social liberty rests on +restraint. A man can be free to direct his own life only in so far as +others are prevented from molesting and interfering with him. So far +there is no real departure from the strictest tenets of individualism. +We have, indeed, had occasion to examine the application of the doctrine +to freedom of contract on the one hand, and to the action of +combinations on the other, and have seen reason to think that in either +case nominal freedom, that is to say, the absence of legal restraint, +might have the effect of impairing real freedom, that is to say, would +allow the stronger party to coerce the weaker. We have also seen that +the effect of combination may be double edged, that it may restrict +freedom on one side and enlarge it on the other. In all these cases our +contention has been simply that we should be guided by real and not by +verbal considerations,--that we should ask in every case what policy +will yield effective freedom--and we have found a close connection in +each instance between freedom and equality. In these cases, however, we +were dealing with the relations of one man with another, or of one body +of men with another, and we could regard the community as an arbiter +between them whose business it was to see justice done and prevent the +abuse of coercive power. Hence we could treat a very large part of the +modern development of social control as motived by the desire for a more +effective liberty. The case is not so clear when we find the will of the +individual in conflict with the will of the community as a whole. When +such conflict occurs, it would seem that we must be prepared for one of +two things. Either we must admit the legitimacy of coercion, avowedly +not in the interests of freedom but in furtherance, without regard to +freedom, of other ends which the community deems good. Or we must admit +limitations which may cramp the development of the general will, and +perchance prove a serious obstacle to collective progress. Is there any +means of avoiding this conflict? Must we leave the question to be fought +out in each case by a balance of advantages and disadvantages, or are +there any general considerations which help us to determine the true +sphere of collective and of private action? + +Let us first observe that, as Mill pointed out long ago, there are many +forms of collective action which do not involve coercion. The State may +provide for certain objects which it deems good without compelling any +one to make use of them. Thus it may maintain hospitals, though any one +who can pay for them remains free to employ his own doctors and nurses. +It may and does maintain a great educational system, while leaving every +one free to maintain or to attend a private school. It maintains parks +and picture galleries without driving any one into them. There is a +municipal tramway service, which does not prevent private people from +running motor 'buses along the same streets, and so on. It is true that +for the support of these objects rates and taxes are compulsorily +levied, but this form of compulsion raises a set of questions of which +we shall have to speak in another connection, and does not concern us +here. For the moment we have to deal only with those actions of State +which compel all citizens, or all whom they concern, to fall in with +them and allow of no divergence. This kind of coercion tends to +increase. Is its extension necessarily an encroachment upon liberty, or +are the elements of value secured by collective control distinct from +the elements of value secured by individual choice, so that within due +limits each may develop side by side? + +We have already declined to solve the problem by applying Mill's +distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions, first +because there are no actions which may not directly or indirectly affect +others, secondly because even if there were they would not cease to be +matter of concern to others. The common good includes the good of every +member of the community, and the injury which a man inflicts upon +himself is matter of common concern, even apart from any ulterior +effect upon others. If we refrain from coercing a man for his own good, +it is not because his good is indifferent to us, but because it cannot +be furthered by coercion. The difficulty is founded on the nature of the +good itself, which on its personal side depends on the spontaneous flow +of feeling checked and guided not by external restraint but by rational +self-control. To try to form character by coercion is to destroy it in +the making. Personality is not built up from without but grows from +within, and the function of the outer order is not to create it, but to +provide for it the most suitable conditions of growth. Thus, to the +common question whether it is possible to make men good by Act of +Parliament, the reply is that it is not possible to compel morality +because morality is the act or character of a free agent, but that it is +possible to create the conditions under which morality can develop, and +among these not the least important is freedom from compulsion by +others. + +The argument suggests that compulsion is limited not by +indifference--how could the character of its members be matter of +indifference to the community?--but by its own incapacity to achieve +its ends. The spirit cannot be forced. Nor, conversely, can it prevail +by force. It may require social expression. It may build up an +association, a church for example, to carry out the common objects and +maintain the common life of all who are like-minded. But the association +must be free, because spiritually everything depends not on what is done +but on the will with which it is done. The limit to the value of +coercion thus lies not in the restriction of social purpose, but in the +conditions of personal life. No force can compel growth. Whatever +elements of social value depend on the accord of feeling, on +comprehension of meaning, on the assent of will, must come through +liberty. Here is the sphere and function of liberty in the social +harmony. + +Where, then, is the sphere of compulsion, and what is its value? The +reply is that compulsion is of value where outward conformity is of +value, and this may be in any case where the non-conformity of one +wrecks the purpose of others. We have already remarked that liberty +itself only rests upon restraint. Thus a religious body is not, properly +speaking, free to march in procession through the streets unless people +of a different religion are restrained from pelting the procession with +stones and pursuing it with insolence. We restrain them from disorder +not to teach them the genuine spirit of religion, which they will not +learn in the police court, but to secure to the other party the right of +worship unmolested. The enforced restraint has its value in the action +that it sets free. But we may not only restrain one man from obstructing +another--and the extent to which we do this is the measure of the +freedom that we maintain--but we may also restrain him from obstructing +the general will; and this we have to do whenever uniformity is +necessary to the end which the general will has in view. The majority of +employers in a trade we may suppose would be willing to adopt certain +precautions for the health or safety of their workers, to lower hours or +to raise the rate of wages. They are unable to do so, however, as long +as a minority, perhaps as long as a single employer, stands out. He +would beat them in competition if they were voluntarily to undertake +expenses from which he is free. In this case, the will of a minority, +possibly the will of one man, thwarts that of the remainder. It coerces +them, indirectly, but quite as effectively as if he were their master. +If they, by combination, can coerce him no principle of liberty is +violated. It is coercion against coercion, differing possibly in form +and method, but not in principle or in spirit. Further, if the community +as a whole sympathizes with the one side rather than the other, it can +reasonably bring the law into play. Its object is not the moral +education of the recusant individuals. Its object is to secure certain +conditions which it believes necessary for the welfare of its members, +and which can only be secured by an enforced uniformity. + +It appears, then, that the true distinction is not between +self-regarding and other-regarding actions, but between coercive and +non-coercive actions. The function of State coercion is to override +individual coercion, and, of course, coercion exercised by any +association of individuals within the State. It is by this means that it +maintains liberty of expression, security of person and property, +genuine freedom of contract, the rights of public meeting and +association, and finally its own power to carry out common objects +undefeated by the recalcitrance of individual members. Undoubtedly it +endows both individuals and associations with powers as well as with +rights. But over these powers it must exercise supervision in the +interests of equal justice. Just as compulsion failed in the sphere of +liberty, the sphere of spiritual growth, so liberty fails in the +external order wherever, by the mere absence of supervisory restriction, +men are able directly or indirectly to put constraint on one another. +This is why there is no intrinsic and inevitable conflict between +liberty and compulsion, but at bottom a mutual need. The object of +compulsion is to secure the most favourable external conditions of +inward growth and happiness so far as these conditions depend on +combined action and uniform observance. The sphere of liberty is the +sphere of growth itself. There is no true opposition between liberty as +such and control as such, for every liberty rests on a corresponding act +of control. The true opposition is between the control that cramps the +personal life and the spiritual order, and the control that is aimed at +securing the external and material conditions of their free and +unimpeded development. + +I do not pretend that this delimitation solves all problems. The +"inward" life will seek to express itself in outward acts. A religious +ordinance may bid the devout refuse military service, or withhold the +payment of a tax, or decline to submit a building to inspection. Here +are external matters where conscience and the State come into direct +conflict, and where is the court of appeal that is to decide between +them? In any given case the right, as judged by the ultimate effect on +human welfare, may, of course, be on the one side, or on the other, or +between the two. But is there anything to guide the two parties as long +as each believes itself to be in the right and sees no ground for +waiving its opinion? To begin with, clearly the State does well to avoid +such conflicts by substituting alternatives. Other duties than that of +military service may be found for a follower of Tolstoy, and as long as +he is willing to take his full share of burdens the difficulty is fairly +met. Again, the mere convenience of the majority cannot be fairly +weighed against the religious convictions of the few. It might be +convenient that certain public work should be done on Saturday, but mere +convenience would be an insufficient ground for compelling Jews to +participate in it. Religious and ethical conviction must be weighed +against religious and ethical conviction. It is not number that counts +morally, but the belief that is reasoned out according to the best of +one's lights as to the necessities of the common good. But the +conscience of the community has its rights just as much as the +conscience of the individual. If we are convinced that the inspection of +a convent laundry is required in the interest, not of mere official +routine, but of justice and humanity, we can do nothing but insist upon +it, and when all has been done that can be done to save the individual +conscience the common conviction of the common good must have its way. +In the end the external order belongs to the community, and the right of +protest to the individual. + +On the other side, the individual owes more to the community than is +always recognized. Under modern conditions he is too much inclined to +take for granted what the State does for him and to use the personal +security and liberty of speech which it affords him as a vantage ground +from which he can in safety denounce its works and repudiate its +authority. He assumes the right to be in or out of the social system as +he chooses. He relies on the general law which protects him, and +emancipates himself from some particular law which he finds oppressive +to his conscience. He forgets or does not take the trouble to reflect +that, if every one were to act as he does, the social machine would come +to a stop. He certainly fails to make it clear how a society would +subsist in which every man should claim the right of unrestricted +disobedience to a law which he happens to think wrong. In fact, it is +possible for an over-tender conscience to consort with an insufficient +sense of social responsibility. The combination is unfortunate; and we +may fairly say that, if the State owes the utmost consideration to the +conscience, its owner owes a corresponding debt to the State. With such +mutual consideration, and with the development of the civic sense, +conflicts between law and conscience are capable of being brought within +very narrow limits, though their complete reconciliation will always +remain a problem until men are generally agreed as to the fundamental +conditions of the social harmony. + +It may be asked, on the other hand, whether in insisting on the free +development of personality we have not understated the duty of society +to its members. We all admit a collective responsibility for children. +Are there not grown-up people who stand just as much in need of care? +What of the idiot, the imbecile, the feeble-minded or the drunkard? What +does rational self-determination mean for these classes? They may injure +no one but themselves except by the contagion of bad example. But have +we no duty towards them, having in view their own good alone and leaving +every other consideration aside? Have we not the right to take the +feeble-minded under our care and to keep the drunkard from drink, purely +for their own good and apart from every ulterior consideration? And, if +so, must we not extend the whole sphere of permissible coercion, and +admit that a man may for his own sake and with no ulterior object, be +compelled to do what we think right and avoid what we think wrong? + +The reply is that the argument is weak just where it seeks to +generalize. We are compelled to put the insane under restraint for +social reasons apart from their own benefit. But their own benefit +would be a fully sufficient reason if no other existed. To them, by +their misfortune, liberty, as we understand the term, has no +application, because they are incapable of rational choice and therefore +of the kind of growth for the sake of which freedom is valuable. The +same thing is true of the feeble-minded, and if they are not yet treated +on the same principle it is merely because the recognition of their type +as a type is relatively modern. But the same thing is also in its degree +true of the drunkard, so far as he is the victim of an impulse which he +has allowed to grow beyond his own control; and the question whether he +should be regarded as a fit object for tutelage or not is to be decided +in each case by asking whether such capacity of self-control as he +retains would be impaired or repaired by a period of tutelar restraint. +There is nothing in all this to touch the essential of liberty which is +the value of the power of self-governance where it exists. All that is +proved is that where it does not exist it is right to save men from +suffering, and if the case admits to put them under conditions in which +the normal balance of impulse is most likely to be restored. It may be +added that, in the case of the drunkard--and I think the argument +applies to all cases where overwhelming impulse is apt to master the +will--it is a still more obvious and elementary duty to remove the +sources of temptation, and to treat as anti-social in the highest degree +every attempt to make profit out of human weakness, misery, and +wrong-doing. The case is not unlike that of a very unequal contract. The +tempter is coolly seeking his profit, and the sufferer is beset with a +fiend within. There is a form of coercion here which the genuine spirit +of liberty will not fail to recognize as its enemy, and a form of injury +to another which is not the less real because its weapon is an impulse +which forces that other to the consent which he yields. + +I conclude that there is nothing in the doctrine of liberty to hinder +the movement of general will in the sphere in which it is really +efficient, and nothing in a just conception of the objects and methods +of the general will to curtail liberty in the performance of the +functions, social and personal, in which its value lies. Liberty and +compulsion have complementary functions, and the self-governing State +is at once the product and the condition of the self-governing +individual. + +Thus there is no difficulty in understanding why the extension of State +control on one side goes along with determined resistance to +encroachments on another. It is a question not of increasing or +diminishing, but of reorganizing, restraints. The period which has +witnessed a rapid extension of industrial legislation has seen as +determined a resistance to anything like the establishment of doctrinal +religious teaching by a State authority,[10] and the distinction is +perfectly just. At bottom it is the same conception of liberty and the +same conception of the common will that prompts the regulation of +industry and the severance of religious worship and doctrinal teaching +from the mechanism of State control. + +So far we have been considering what the State compels the individual to +do. If we pass to the question what the State is to do for the +individual, a different but parallel question arises, and we have to +note a corresponding movement of opinion. If the State does for the +individual what he ought to do for himself what will be the effect on +character, initiative, enterprise? It is a question now not of freedom, +but of responsibility, and it is one that has caused many searchings of +heart, and in respect of which opinion has undergone a remarkable +change. Thus, in relation to poverty the older view was that the first +thing needful was self-help. It was the business of every man to provide +for himself and his family. If, indeed, he utterly failed, neither he +nor they could be left to starve, and there was the Poor Law machinery +to deal with his case. But the aim of every sincere friend of the poor +must be to keep them away from the Poor Law machine. Experience of the +forty years before 1834 had taught us what came of free resort to public +funds by way of subvention to inadequate wages. It meant simply that the +standard of remuneration was lowered in proportion as men could rely on +public aid to make good the deficiency, while at the same time the +incentives to independent labour were weakened when the pauper stood on +an equal footing with the hard-working man. In general, if the attempt +was made to substitute for personal effort the help of others, the +result would only sap individual initiative and in the end bring down +the rate of industrial remuneration. It was thought, for example--and +this very point was urged against proposals for Old Age Pensions--that +if any of the objects for which a man will, if possible, provide were +removed from the scope of his own activity, he would in consequence be +content with proportionally lower wages; if the employer was to +compensate him for accident, he would fail to make provision for +accidents on his own account; if his children were fed by the +ratepayers, he would not earn the money wherewith to feed them. Hence, +on the one hand, it was urged that the rate of wages would tend to adapt +itself to the necessities of the wage earner, that in proportion as his +necessities were met from other sources his wages would fall, that +accordingly the apparent relief would be in large measure illusory, +while finally, in view of the diminished stimulus to individual +exertion, the productivity of labour would fall off, the incentives to +industry would be diminished, and the community as a whole would be +poorer. Upon the other hand, it was conceived that, however deplorable +the condition of the working classes might be, the right way of raising +them was to trust to individual enterprise and possibly, according to +some thinkers, to voluntary combination. By these means the efficiency +of labour might be enhanced and its regular remuneration raised. By +sternly withholding all external supports we should teach the working +classes to stand alone, and if there were pain in the disciplinary +process there was yet hope in the future. They would come by degrees to +a position of economic independence in which they would be able to face +the risks of life, not in reliance upon the State, but by the force of +their own brains and the strength of their own right arms. + +These views no longer command the same measure of assent. On all sides +we find the State making active provision for the poorer classes and not +by any means for the destitute alone. We find it educating the children, +providing medical inspection, authorizing the feeding of the necessitous +at the expense of the ratepayers, helping them to obtain employment +through free Labour Exchanges, seeking to organize the labour market +with a view to the mitigation of unemployment, and providing old age +pensions for all whose incomes fall below thirteen shillings a week, +without exacting any contribution. Now, in all this, we may well ask, is +the State going forward blindly on the paths of broad and generous but +unconsidered charity? Is it and can it remain indifferent to the effect +on individual initiative and personal or parental responsibility? Or may +we suppose that the wiser heads are well aware of what they are about, +have looked at the matter on all sides, and are guided by a reasonable +conception of the duty of the State and the responsibilities of the +individual? Are we, in fact--for this is really the question--seeking +charity or justice? + +We said above that it was the function of the State to secure the +conditions upon which mind and character may develop themselves. +Similarly we may say now that the function of the State is to secure +conditions upon which its citizens are able to win by their own efforts +all that is necessary to a full civic efficiency. It is not for the +State to feed, house, or clothe them. It is for the State to take care +that the economic conditions are such that the normal man who is not +defective in mind or body or will can by useful labour feed, house, and +clothe himself and his family. The "right to work" and the right to a +"living wage" are just as valid as the rights of person or property. +That is to say, they are integral conditions of a good social order. A +society in which a single honest man of normal capacity is definitely +unable to find the means of maintaining himself by useful work is to +that extent suffering from malorganization. There is somewhere a defect +in the social system, a hitch in the economic machine. Now, the +individual workman cannot put the machine straight. He is the last +person to have any say in the control of the market. It is not his fault +if there is over-production in his industry, or if a new and cheaper +process has been introduced which makes his particular skill, perhaps +the product of years of application, a drug in the market. He does not +direct or regulate industry. He is not responsible for its ups and +downs, but he has to pay for them. That is why it is not charity but +justice for which he is asking. Now, it may be infinitely difficult to +meet his demand. To do so may involve a far-reaching economic +reconstruction. The industrial questions involved may be so little +understood that we may easily make matters worse in the attempt to make +them better. All this shows the difficulty in finding means of meeting +this particular claim of justice, but it does not shake its position as +a claim of justice. A right is a right none the less though the means of +securing it be imperfectly known; and the workman who is unemployed or +underpaid through economic malorganization will remain a reproach not to +the charity but to the justice of society as long as he is to be seen in +the land. + +If this view of the duty of the State and the right of the workman is +coming to prevail, it is owing partly to an enhanced sense of common +responsibility, and partly to the teaching of experience. In the earlier +days of the Free Trade era, it was permissible to hope that self-help +would be an adequate solvent, and that with cheap food and expanding +commerce the average workman would be able by the exercise of prudence +and thrift not only to maintain himself in good times, but to lay by for +sickness, unemployment, and old age. The actual course of events has in +large measure disappointed these hopes. It is true that the standard of +living in England has progressively advanced throughout the nineteenth +century. It is true, in particular, that, since the disastrous period +that preceded the Repeal of the Corn Laws and the passing of the Ten +Hours' Act, social improvement has been real and marked. Trade Unionism +and co-operation have grown, wages upon the whole have increased, the +cost of living has diminished, housing and sanitation have improved, the +death rate has fallen from about twenty-two to less than fifteen per +thousand. But with all this improvement the prospect of a complete and +lifelong economic independence for the average workman upon the lines of +individual competition, even when supplemented and guarded by the +collective bargaining of the Trade Union, appears exceedingly remote. +The increase of wages does not appear to be by any means proportionate +to the general growth of wealth. The whole standard of living has risen; +the very provision of education has brought with it new needs and has +almost compelled a higher standard of life in order to satisfy them. As +a whole, the working classes of England, though less thrifty than those +of some Continental countries, cannot be accused of undue negligence +with regard to the future. The accumulation of savings in Friendly +Societies, Trade Unions, Co-operative Societies, and Savings Banks shows +an increase which has more than kept pace with the rise in the level of +wages; yet there appears no likelihood that the average manual worker +will attain the goal of that full independence, covering all the risks +of life for self and family, which can alone render the competitive +system really adequate to the demands of a civilized conscience. The +careful researches of Mr. Booth in London and Mr. Rowntree in York, and +of others in country districts, have revealed that a considerable +percentage of the working classes are actually unable to earn a sum of +money representing the full cost of the barest physical necessities for +an average family; and, though the bulk of the working classes are +undoubtedly in a better position than this, these researches go to show +that even the relatively well-to-do gravitate towards this line of +primary poverty in seasons of stress, at the time when the children are +still at school, for example, or from the moment when the principal +wage-earner begins to fail, in the decline of middle life. If only some +ten per cent. of the population are actually living upon the poverty +line at any given time,[11] twice or three times that number, it is +reasonable to suppose, must approach the line in one period or other of +their lives. But when we ascend from the conception of a bare physical +maintenance for an average family to such a wage as would provide the +real minimum requirements of a civilized life and meet all its +contingencies without having to lean on any external prop, we should +have to make additions to Mr. Rowntree's figure which have not yet been +computed, but as to which it is probably well within the mark to say +that none but the most highly skilled artisans are able to earn a +remuneration meeting the requirements of the case. But, if that is so, +it is clear that the system of industrial competition fails to meet the +ethical demand embodied in the conception of the "living wage." That +system holds out no hope of an improvement which shall bring the means +of such a healthy and independent existence as should be the birthright +of every citizen of a free state within the grasp of the mass of the +people of the United Kingdom. It is this belief slowly penetrating the +public mind which has turned it to new thoughts of social regeneration. +The sum and substance of the changes that I have mentioned may be +expressed in the principle that the individual cannot stand alone, but +that between him and the State there is a reciprocal obligation. He owes +the State the duty of industriously working for himself and his family. +He is not to exploit the labour of his young children, but to submit to +the public requirements for their education, health, cleanliness and +general well-being. On the other side society owes to him the means of +maintaining a civilized standard of life, and this debt is not +adequately discharged by leaving him to secure such wages as he can in +the higgling of the market. + +This view of social obligation lays increased stress on public but by no +means ignores private responsibility. It is a simple principle of +applied ethics that responsibility should be commensurate with power. +Now, given the opportunity of adequately remunerated work, a man has the +power to earn his living. It is his right and his duty to make the best +use of his opportunity, and if he fails he may fairly suffer the penalty +of being treated as a pauper or even, in an extreme case, as a criminal. +But the opportunity itself he cannot command with the same freedom. It +is only within narrow limits that it comes within the sphere of his +control. The opportunities of work and the remuneration for work are +determined by a complex mass of social forces which no individual, +certainly no individual workman, can shape. They can be controlled, if +at all, by the organized action of the community, and therefore, by a +just apportionment of responsibility, it is for the community to deal +with them. + +But this, it will be said, is not Liberalism but Socialism. Pursuing the +economic rights of the individual we have been led to contemplate a +Socialistic organization of industry. But a word like Socialism has many +meanings, and it is possible that there should be a Liberal Socialism, +as well as a Socialism that is illiberal. Let us, then, without sticking +at a word, seek to follow out the Liberal view of the State in the +sphere of economics. Let us try to determine in very general terms what +is involved in realizing those primary conditions of industrial +well-being which have been laid down, and how they consort with the +rights of property and the claims of free industrial enterprise. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[10] The objection most often taken to "undenominationalism" itself is +that it is in reality a form of doctrinal teaching seeking State +endowment. + +[11] I do not include those living in "secondary poverty," as defined by +Mr. Rowntree, as the responsibility in this case is partly personal. It +must, however, be remembered that great poverty increases the difficulty +of efficient management. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +ECONOMIC LIBERALISM + + +There are two forms of Socialism with which Liberalism has nothing to +do. These I will call the mechanical and the official. Mechanical +Socialism is founded on a false interpretation of history. It attributes +the phenomena of social life and development to the sole operation of +the economic factor, whereas the beginning of sound sociology is to +conceive society as a whole in which all the parts interact. The +economic factor, to take a single point, is at least as much the effect +as it is the cause of scientific invention. There would be no world-wide +system of telegraphy if there was no need of world-wide +intercommunication. But there would be no electric telegraph at all but +for the scientific interest which determined the experiments of Gauss +and Weber. Mechanical Socialism, further, is founded on a false economic +analysis which attributes all value to labour, denying, confounding or +distorting the distinct functions of the direction of enterprise, the +unavoidable payment for the use of capital, the productivity of nature, +and the very complex social forces which, by determining the movements +of demand and supply actually fix the rates at which goods exchange with +one another. Politically, mechanical Socialism supposes a class war, +resting on a clear-cut distinction of classes which does not exist. Far +from tending to clear and simple lines of cleavage, modern society +exhibits a more and more complex interweaving of interests, and it is +impossible for a modern revolutionist to assail "property" in the +interest of "labour" without finding that half the "labour" to which he +appeals has a direct or indirect interest in "property." As to the +future, mechanical Socialism conceives a logically developed system of +the control of industry by government. Of this all that need be said is +that the construction of Utopias is not a sound method of social +science; that this particular Utopia makes insufficient provision for +liberty, movement, and growth; and that in order to bring his ideals +into the region of practical discussion, what the Socialist needs is to +formulate not a system to be substituted as a whole for our present +arrangements but a principle to guide statesmanship in the practical +work of reforming what is amiss and developing what is good in the +actual fabric of industry. A principle so applied grows if it has seeds +of good in it, and so in particular the collective control of industry +will be extended in proportion as it is found in practice to yield good +results. The fancied clearness of Utopian vision is illusory, because +its objects are artificial ideas and not living facts. The "system" of +the world of books must be reconstructed as a principle that can be +applied to the railway, the mine, the workshop, and the office that we +know, before it can even be sensibly discussed. The evolution of +Socialism as a practical force in politics has, in point of fact, +proceeded by such a reconstruction, and this change carries with it the +end of the materialistic Utopia. + +Official Socialism is a creed of different brand. Beginning with a +contempt for ideals of liberty based on a confusion between liberty and +competition, it proceeds to a measure of contempt for average humanity +in general. It conceives mankind as in the mass a helpless and feeble +race, which it is its duty to treat kindly. True kindness, of course, +must be combined with firmness, and the life of the average man must be +organized for his own good. He need not know that he is being organized. +The socialistic organization will work in the background, and there will +be wheels within wheels, or rather wires pulling wires. Ostensibly there +will be a class of the elect, an aristocracy of character and intellect +which will fill the civil services and do the practical work of +administration. Behind these will be committees of union and progress +who will direct operations, and behind the committees again one or more +master minds from whom will emanate the ideas that are to direct the +world. The play of democratic government will go on for a time, but the +idea of a common will that should actually undertake the organization of +social life is held the most childish of illusions. The master minds can +for the moment work more easily through democratic forms, because they +are here, and to destroy them would cause an upheaval. But the essence +of government lies in the method of capture. The ostensible leaders of +democracy are ignorant creatures who can with a little management be set +to walk in the way in which they should go, and whom the crowd will +follow like sheep. The art of governing consists in making men do what +you wish without knowing what they are doing, to lead them on without +showing them whither until it is too late for them to retrace their +steps. Socialism so conceived has in essentials nothing to do with +democracy or with liberty. It is a scheme of the organization of life by +the superior person, who will decide for each man how he should work, +how he should live, and indeed, with the aid of the Eugenist, whether he +should live at all or whether he has any business to be born. At any +rate, if he ought not to have been born--if, that is, he comes of a +stock whose qualities are not approved--the Samurai will take care that +he does not perpetuate his race. + +Now the average Liberal might have more sympathy with this view of life +if he did not feel that for his part he is just a very ordinary man. He +is quite sure that he cannot manage the lives of other people for them. +He finds it enough to manage his own. But with the leave of the +Superior he would rather do this in his own way than in the way of +another, whose way may be much wiser but is not his. He would rather +marry the woman of his own choice, than the one who would be sure to +bring forth children of the standard type. He does not want to be +standardized. He does not conceive himself as essentially an item in a +census return. He does not want the standard clothes or the standard +food, he wants the clothes which he finds comfortable and the food which +he likes. With this unregenerate Adam in him, I fear that the Liberalism +that is also within him is quite ready to make terms. Indeed, it incites +him to go still further. It bids him consider that other men are, on the +whole, very like himself and look on life in much the same way, and when +it speaks within him of social duty it encourages him to aim not at a +position of superiority which will enable him to govern his fellow +creatures for their own good, but at a spirit of comradeship in which he +will stand shoulder to shoulder with them on behalf of common aims. + +If, then, there be such a thing as a Liberal Socialism--and whether +there be is still a subject for inquiry--it must clearly fulfil two +conditions. In the first place, it must be democratic. It must come from +below, not from above. Or rather, it must emerge from the efforts of +society as a whole to secure a fuller measure of justice, and a better +organization of mutual aid. It must engage the efforts and respond to +the genuine desires not of a handful of superior beings, but of great +masses of men. And, secondly, and for that very reason, it must make its +account with the human individual. It must give the average man free +play in the personal life for which he really cares. It must be founded +on liberty, and must make not for the suppression but for the +development of personality. How far, it may be asked, are these objects +compatible? How far is it possible to organize industry in the interest +of the common welfare without either overriding the freedom of +individual choice or drying up the springs of initiative and energy? How +far is it possible to abolish poverty, or to institute economic equality +without arresting industrial progress? We cannot put the question +without raising more fundamental issues. What is the real meaning of +"equality" in economics? Would it mean, for example, that all should +enjoy equal rewards, or that equal efforts should enjoy equal rewards, +or that equal attainments should enjoy equal rewards? What is the +province of justice in economics? Where does justice end and charity +begin? And what, behind all this, is the basis of property? What is its +social function and value? What is the measure of consideration due to +vested interest and prescriptive right? It is impossible, within the +limits of a volume, to deal exhaustively with such fundamental +questions. The best course will be to follow out the lines of +development which appear to proceed from those principles of Liberalism +which have been already indicated and to see how far they lead to a +solution. + +We saw that it was the duty of the State to secure the conditions of +self-maintenance for the normal healthy citizen. There are two lines +along which the fulfilment of this duty may be sought. One would consist +in providing access to the means of production, the other in +guaranteeing to the individual a certain share in the common stock. In +point of fact, both lines have been followed by Liberal legislation. On +the one side this legislation has set itself, however timidly and +ineffectively as yet, to reversing the process which divorced the +English peasantry from the soil. Contemporary research is making it +clear that this divorce was not the inevitable result of slowly +operating economic forces. It was brought about by the deliberate policy +of the enclosure of the common fields begun in the fifteenth century, +partially arrested from the middle of the sixteenth to the eighteenth, +and completed between the reigns of George II and Queen Victoria. As +this process was furthered by an aristocracy, so there is every reason +to hope that it can be successfully reversed by a democracy, and that it +will be possible to reconstitute a class of independent peasantry as the +backbone of the working population. The experiment, however, involves +one form or another of communal ownership. The labourer can only obtain +the land with the financial help of the State, and it is certainly not +the view of Liberals that the State, having once regained the fee +simple, should part with it again. On the contrary, in an equitable +division of the fruits of agriculture all advantages that are derived +from the qualities or position of the soil itself, or from the +enhancement of prices by tariffs would, since they are the product of no +man's labour, fall to no man's share, or, what is the same thing, they +should fall to every man, that is, to the community. This is why Liberal +legislation seeks to create a class not of small landlords but of small +tenants. It would give to this class access to the land and would reward +them with the fruits of their own work--and no more. The surplus it +would take to itself in the form of rent, and while it is desirable to +give the State tenant full security against disturbance, rents must at +stated periods be adjustable to prices and to cost. So, while +Conservative policy is to establish a peasant proprietary which would +reinforce the voting strength of property, the Liberal policy is to +establish a State tenantry from whose prosperity the whole community +would profit. The one solution is individualist. The other, as far as it +goes, is nearer to the Socialist ideal. + +But, though British agriculture may have a great future before it, it +will never regain its dominant position in our economic life, nor are +small holdings ever likely to be the prevalent form of agriculture. The +bulk of industry is, and probably will be, more and more in the hands +of large undertakings with which the individual workman could not +compete whatever instruments of production were placed in his hands. For +the mass of the people, therefore, to be assured of the means of a +decent livelihood must mean to be assured of continuous employment at a +living wage, or, as an alternative, of public assistance. Now, as has +been remarked, experience goes to show that the wage of the average +worker, as fixed by competition, is not and is not likely to become +sufficient to cover all the fortunes and misfortunes of life, to provide +for sickness, accident, unemployment and old age, in addition to the +regular needs of an average family. In the case of accident the State +has put the burden of making provision on the employer. In the case of +old age it has, acting, as I think, upon a sounder principle, taken the +burden upon itself. It is very important to realize precisely what the +new departure involved in the Old Age Pensions Act amounted to in point +of principle. The Poor Law already guaranteed the aged person and the +poor in general against actual starvation. But the Poor Law came into +operation only at the point of sheer destitution. It failed to help +those who had helped themselves. Indeed, to many it held out little +inducement to help themselves if they could not hope to lay by so much +as would enable them to live more comfortably on their means than they +would live in the workhouse. The pension system throws over the test of +destitution. It provides a certain minimum, a basis to go upon, a +foundation upon which independent thrift may hope to build up a +sufficiency. It is not a narcotic but a stimulus to self help and to +friendly aid or filial support, and it is, up to a limit, available for +all alike. It is precisely one of the conditions of independence of +which voluntary effort can make use, but requiring voluntary effort to +make it fully available. + +The suggestion underlying the movement for the break up of the Poor Law +is just the general application of this principle. It is that, instead +of redeeming the destitute, we should seek to render generally available +the means of avoiding destitution, though in doing so we should +uniformly call on the individual for a corresponding effort on his part. +One method of meeting these conditions is to supply a basis for private +effort to work upon, as is done in the case of the aged. Another method +is that of State-aided insurance, and on these lines Liberal legislators +have been experimenting in the hope of dealing with sickness, +invalidity, and one portion of the problem of unemployment. A third may +be illustrated by the method by which the Minority of the Poor Law +Commissioners would deal with the case, at present so often full of +tragic import, of the widowed or deserted mother of young children. +Hitherto she has been regarded as an object of charity. It has been a +matter for the benevolent to help her to retain her home, while it has +been regarded as her duty to keep "off the rates" at the cost of no +matter what expenditure of labour away from home. The newer conception +of rights and duties comes out clearly in the argument of the +commissioners, that if we take in earnest all that we say of the duties +and responsibilities of motherhood, we shall recognize that the mother +of young children is doing better service to the community and one more +worthy of pecuniary remuneration when she stays at home and minds her +children than when she goes out charing and leaves them to the chances +of the street or to the perfunctory care of a neighbour. In proportion +as we realize the force of this argument, we reverse our view as to the +nature of public assistance in such a case. We no longer consider it +desirable to drive the mother out to her charing work if we possibly +can, nor do we consider her degraded by receiving public money. We +cease, in fact, to regard the public money as a dole, we treat it as a +payment for a civic service, and the condition that we are inclined to +exact is precisely that she should not endeavour to add to it by earning +wages, but rather that she should keep her home respectable and bring up +her children in health and happiness. + +In defence of the competitive system two arguments have been familiar +from old days. One is based on the habits of the working classes. It is +said that they spend their surplus incomes on drink, and that if they +have no margin for saving, it is because they have sunk it in the +public-house. That argument is rapidly being met by the actual change of +habits. The wave of temperance which two generations ago reformed the +habits of the well-to-do in England is rapidly spreading through all +classes in our own time. The drink bill is still excessive, the +proportion of his weekly wages spent on drink by the average workman is +still too great, but it is a diminishing quantity, and the fear which +might have been legitimately expressed in old days that to add to wages +was to add to the drink bill could no longer be felt as a valid +objection to any improvement in the material condition of the working +population in our own time. We no longer find the drink bill heavily +increasing in years of commercial prosperity as of old. The second +argument has experienced an even more decisive fate. Down to my own time +it was forcibly contended that any improvement in the material condition +of the mass of the people would result in an increase of the birth rate +which, by extending the supply of labour, would bring down wages by an +automatic process to the old level. There would be more people and they +would all be as miserable as before. The actual decline of the birth +rate, whatever its other consequences may be, has driven this argument +from the field. The birth rate does not increase with prosperity, but +diminishes. There is no fear of over-population; if there is any +present danger, it is upon the other side. The fate of these two +arguments must be reckoned as a very important factor in the changes of +opinion which we have noted. + +Nevertheless, it may be thought that the system that I have outlined is +no better than a vast organization of State charity, and that as such it +must carry the consequences associated with charity on a large scale. It +must dry up the sources of energy and undermine the independence of the +individual. On the first point, I have already referred to certain +cogent arguments for a contrary view. What the State is doing, what it +would be doing if the whole series of contemplated changes were carried +through to the end, would by no means suffice to meet the needs of the +normal man. He would still have to labour to earn his own living. But he +would have a basis to go upon, a sub-structure on which it would be +possible for him to rear the fabric of a real sufficiency. He would have +greater security, a brighter outlook, a more confident hope of being +able to keep his head above water. The experience of life suggests that +hope is a better stimulus than fear, confidence a better mental +environment than insecurity. If desperation will sometimes spur men to +exceptional exertion the effect is fleeting, and, for a permanence, a +more stable condition is better suited to foster that blend of restraint +and energy which makes up the tissue of a life of normal health. There +would be those who would abuse their advantages as there are those who +abuse every form of social institution. But upon the whole it is thought +that individual responsibility can be more clearly fixed and more +rigorously insisted on when its legitimate sphere is properly defined, +that is to say, when the burden on the shoulders of the individual is +not too great for average human nature to bear. + +But, it may be urged, any reliance on external assistance is destructive +of independence. It is true that to look for support to private +philanthropy has this effect, because it makes one man dependent on the +good graces of another. But it is submitted that a form of support on +which a man can count as a matter of legal right has not necessarily the +same effect. Charity, again, tends to diminish the value of independent +effort because it flows in the direction of the failures. It is a +compensation for misfortune which easily slides into an encouragement to +carelessness. What is matter of right, on the other hand, is enjoyed +equally by the successful and the unsuccessful. It is not a handicap in +favour of the one, but an equal distance deducted from the race to be +run against fate by both. This brings us to the real question. Are +measures of the kind under discussion to be regarded as measures of +philanthropy or measures of justice, as the expression of collective +benevolence or as the recognition of a general right? The full +discussion of the question involves complex and in some respects novel +conceptions of economics and of social ethics to which I can hardly do +justice within the limits of this chapter. But I will endeavour to +indicate in outline the conception of social and economic justice which +underlies the movement of modern Liberal opinion. + +We may approach the subject by observing that, whatever the legal +theory, in practice the existing English Poor Law recognizes the right +of every person to the bare necessaries of life. The destitute man or +woman can come to a public authority, and the public authority is bound +to give him food and shelter. He has to that extent a lien on the public +resources in virtue of his needs as a human being and on no other +ground. This lien, however, only operates when he is destitute; and he +can only exercise it by submitting to such conditions as the authorities +impose, which when the workhouse test is enforced means loss of liberty. +It was the leading "principle of 1834" that the lot of the pauper should +be made "less eligible" than that of the independent labourer. Perhaps +we may express the change of opinion which has come about in our day by +saying that according to the newer principle the duty of society is +rather to ensure that the lot of the independent labourer be more +eligible than that of the pauper. With this object the lien on the +common wealth is enlarged and reconstituted. Its exercise does not +entail the penal consequence of the loss of freedom unless there is +proved misfeasance or neglect on the part of the individual. The +underlying contention is that, in a State so wealthy as the United +Kingdom, every citizen should have full means of earning by socially +useful labour so much material support as experience proves to be the +necessary basis of a healthy, civilized existence. And if in the actual +working of the industrial system the means are not in actual fact +sufficiently available he is held to have a claim not as of charity but +as of right on the national resources to make good the deficiency. + +That there are rights of property we all admit. Is there not perhaps a +general right _to_ property? Is there not something radically wrong with +an economic system under which through the laws of inheritance and +bequest vast inequalities are perpetuated? Ought we to acquiesce in a +condition in which the great majority are born to nothing except what +they can earn, while some are born to more than the social value of any +individual of whatever merit? May it not be that in a reasoned scheme of +economic ethics we should have to allow a true right of property in the +member of the community as such which would take the form of a certain +minimum claim on the public resources? A pretty idea, it may be said, +but ethics apart, what are the resources on which the less fortunate is +to draw? The British State has little or no collective property +available for any such purpose. Its revenues are based on taxation, and +in the end what all this means is that the rich are to be taxed for the +benefit of the poor, which we may be told is neither justice nor charity +but sheer spoliation. To this I would reply that the depletion of public +resources is a symptom of profound economic disorganization. Wealth, I +would contend, has a social as well as a personal basis. Some forms of +wealth, such as ground rents in and about cities, are substantially the +creation of society, and it is only through the misfeasance of +government in times past that such wealth has been allowed to fall into +private hands. Other great sources of wealth are found in financial and +speculative operations, often of distinctly anti-social tendency and +possible only through the defective organization of our economy. Other +causes rest in the partial monopolies which our liquor laws, on the one +side, and the old practice of allowing the supply of municipal services +to fall into private hands have built up. Through the principle of +inheritance, property so accumulated is handed on; and the result is +that while there is a small class born to the inheritance of a share in +the material benefits of civilization, there is a far larger class which +can say "naked we enter, naked we leave." This system, as a whole, it +is maintained, requires revision. Property in this condition of things +ceases, it is urged, to be essentially an institution by which each man +can secure to himself the fruits of his own labour, and becomes an +instrument whereby the owner can command the labour of others on terms +which he is in general able to dictate. This tendency is held to be +undesirable, and to be capable of a remedy through a concerted series of +fiscal, industrial, and social measures which would have the effect of +augmenting the common stock at the disposal of society, and so applying +it as to secure the economic independence of all who do not forfeit +their advantages by idleness, incapacity, or crime. There are early +forms of communal society in which each person is born to his +appropriate status, carrying its appropriate share of the common land. +In destroying the last relics of this system economic individualism has +laid the basis of great material advances, but at great cost to the +happiness of the masses. The ground problem in economics is not to +destroy property, but to restore the social conception of property to +its right place under conditions suitable to modern needs. This is not +to be done by crude measures of redistribution, such as those of which +we hear in ancient history. It is to be done by distinguishing the +social from the individual factors in wealth, by bringing the elements +of social wealth into the public coffers, and by holding it at the +disposal of society to administer to the prime needs of its members. + +The basis of property is social, and that in two senses. On the one +hand, it is the organized force of society that maintains the rights of +owners by protecting them against thieves and depredators. In spite of +all criticism many people still seem to speak of the rights of property +as though they were conferred by Nature or by Providence upon certain +fortunate individuals, and as though these individuals had an unlimited +right to command the State, as their servant, to secure them by the free +use of the machinery of law in the undisturbed enjoyment of their +possessions. They forget that without the organized force of society +their rights are not worth a week's purchase. They do not ask themselves +where they would be without the judge and the policeman and the settled +order which society maintains. The prosperous business man who thinks +that he has made his fortune entirely by self help does not pause to +consider what single step he could have taken on the road to his success +but for the ordered tranquillity which has made commercial development +possible, the security by road, and rail, and sea, the masses of skilled +labour, and the sum of intelligence which civilization has placed at his +disposal, the very demand for the goods which he produces which the +general progress of the world has created, the inventions which he uses +as a matter of course and which have been built up by the collective +effort of generations of men of science and organizers of industry. If +he dug to the foundations of his fortune he would recognize that, as it +is society that maintains and guarantees his possessions, so also it is +society which is an indispensable partner in its original creation. + +This brings us to the second sense in which property is social. There is +a social element in value and a social element in production. In modern +industry there is very little that the individual can do by his unaided +efforts. Labour is minutely divided; and in proportion as it is divided +it is forced to be co-operative. Men produce goods to sell, and the +rate of exchange, that is, price, is fixed by relations of demand and +supply the rates of which are determined by complex social forces. In +the methods of production every man makes use, to the best of his +ability, of the whole available means of civilization, of the machinery +which the brains of other men have devised, of the human apparatus which +is the gift of acquired civilization. Society thus provides conditions +or opportunities of which one man will make much better use than +another, and the use to which they are put is the individual or personal +element in production which is the basis of the personal claim to +reward. To maintain and stimulate this personal effort is a necessity of +good economic organization, and without asking here whether any +particular conception of Socialism would or would not meet this need we +may lay down with confidence that no form of Socialism which should +ignore it could possibly enjoy enduring success. On the other hand, an +individualism which ignores the social factor in wealth will deplete the +national resources, deprive the community of its just share in the +fruits of industry and so result in a one-sided and inequitable +distribution of wealth. Economic justice is to render what is due not +only to each individual but to each function, social or personal, that +is engaged in the performance of useful service, and this due is +measured by the amount necessary to stimulate and maintain the efficient +exercise of that useful function. This equation between function and +sustenance is the true meaning of economic equality. + +Now to apply this principle to the adjustment of the claims of the +community on the one hand and the producers or inheritors of wealth on +the other would involve a discrimination of the factors of production +which is not easy to make in all instances. If we take the case of urban +land, referred to above, the distinction is tolerably clear. The value +of a site in London is something due essentially to London, not to the +landlord. More accurately a part of it is due to London, a part to the +British empire, a part, perhaps we should say, to Western civilization. +But while it would be impossible to disentangle these subsidiary +factors, the main point that the entire increment of value is due to one +social factor or another is sufficiently clear, and this explains why +Liberal opinion has fastened on the conception of site value as being +by right communal and not personal property. The monopoly value of +licensed premises, which is the direct creation of laws passed for the +control of the liquor traffic, is another case in point. The difficulty +which society finds in dealing with these cases is that it has allowed +these sources of wealth to pass out of its hands, and that property of +these kinds has freely passed from one man to another in the market, in +the belief that it stood and would stand on the same basis in law as any +other. Hence, it is not possible for society to insist on the whole of +its claim. It could only resume its full rights at the cost of great +hardship to individuals and a shock to the industrial system. What it +can do is to shift taxation step by step from the wealth due to +individual enterprise to the wealth that depends on its own collective +progress, thus by degrees regaining the ownership of the fruits of its +own collective work. + +Much more difficult in principle is the question of the more general +elements of social value which run through production as a whole. We are +dealing here with factors so intricately interwoven in their operation +that they can only be separated by an indirect process. What this +process would be we may best understand by imagining for a moment a +thoroughgoing centralized organization of the industrial system +endeavouring to carry out the principles of remuneration outlined above. +The central authority which we imagine as endowed with such wisdom and +justice as to find for every man his right place and to assign to every +man his due reward would, if our argument is sound, find it necessary to +assign to each producer, whether working with hand or brain, whether +directing a department of industry or serving under direction, such +remuneration as would stimulate him to put forth his best efforts and +would maintain him in the condition necessary for the life-long exercise +of his function. If we are right in considering that a great part of the +wealth produced from year to year is of social origin, it would follow +that, after the assignment of this remuneration, there would remain a +surplus, and this would fall to the coffers of the community and be +available for public purposes, for national defence, public works, +education, charity, and the furtherance of civilized life. + +Now, this is merely an imaginary picture, and I need not ask whether +such a measure of wisdom on the part of a Government is practically +attainable, or whether such a measure of centralization might not carry +consequences which would hamper progress in other directions. The +picture serves merely to illustrate the principles of equitable +distribution by which the State should be guided in dealing with +property. It serves to define our conception of economic justice, and +therewith the lines on which we should be guided in the adjustment of +taxation and the reorganization of industry. I may illustrate its +bearing by taking a couple of cases. + +One important source of private wealth under modern conditions is +speculation. Is this also a source of social wealth? Does it produce +anything for society? Does it perform a function for which our ideal +administration would think it necessary to pay? I buy some railway stock +at 110. A year or two later I seize a favourable opportunity and sell it +at 125. Is the increment earned or unearned? The answer in the single +case is clear, but it may be said that my good fortune in this case may +be balanced by ill luck in another. No doubt. But, to go no further, if +on balance I make a fortune or an income by this method it would seem to +be a fortune or an income not earned by productive service. To this it +may be replied that the buyers and sellers of stocks are indirectly +performing the function of adjusting demand and supply, and so +regulating industry. So far as they are expert business men trained in +the knowledge of a particular market this may be so. So far as they +dabble in the market in the hope of profiting from a favourable turn, +they appear rather as gamblers. I will not pretend to determine which of +the two is the larger class. I would point out only that, on the face of +the facts, the profits derived from this particular source appear to be +rather of the nature of a tax which astute or fortunate individuals are +able to levy on the producer than as the reward which they obtain for a +definite contribution on their own part to production. There are two +possible empirical tests of this view. One is that a form of collective +organization should be devised which should diminish the importance of +the speculative market. Our principle would suggest the propriety of an +attempt in that direction whenever opportunity offers. Another would be +the imposition of a special tax on incomes derived from this source, and +experience would rapidly show whether any such tax would actually hamper +the process of production and distribution at any stage. If not, it +would justify itself. It would prove that the total profit now absorbed +by individuals exceeds, at least by the amount of the tax, the +remuneration necessary to maintain that particular economic function. + +The other case I will take is that of inherited wealth. This is the main +determining factor in the social and economic structure of our time. It +is clear on our principle that it stands in quite a different position +from that of wealth which is being created from day to day. It can be +defended only on two grounds. One is prescriptive right, and the +difficulty of disturbing the basis of the economic order. This provides +an unanswerable argument against violent and hasty methods, but no +argument at all against a gentle and slow-moving policy of economic +reorganization. The other argument is that inherited wealth serves +several indirect functions. The desire to provide for children and to +found a family is a stimulus to effort. The existence of a leisured +class affords possibilities for the free development of originality, and +a supply of disinterested men and women for the service of the State. I +would suggest once again that the only real test to which the value of +these arguments can be submitted is the empirical test. On the face of +the facts inherited wealth stands on a different footing from acquired +wealth, and Liberal policy is on the right lines in beginning the +discrimination of earned from unearned income. The distinction is +misconceived only so far as income derived from capital or land may +represent the savings of the individual and not his inheritance. The +true distinction is between the inherited and the acquired, and while +the taxation of acquired wealth may operate, so far as it goes, to +diminish the profits, and so far to weaken the motive springs, of +industry, it is by no means self-evident that any increase of taxation +on inherited wealth would necessarily have that effect, or that it would +vitally derange any other social function. It is, again, a matter on +which only experience can decide, but if experience goes to show that +we can impose a given tax on inherited wealth without diminishing the +available supply of capital and without losing any service of value, the +result would be net gain. The State could never be the sole producer, +for in production the personal factor is vital, but there is no limit +set by the necessities of things to the extension of its control of +natural resources, on the one hand, and the accumulated heritage of the +past, on the other. + +If Liberal policy has committed itself not only to the discrimination of +earned and unearned incomes but also to a super-tax on large incomes +from whatever source, the ground principle, again, I take to be a +respectful doubt whether any single individual is worth to society by +any means as much as some individuals obtain. We might, indeed, have to +qualify this doubt if the great fortunes of the world fell to the great +geniuses. It would be impossible to determine what we ought to pay for a +Shakespere, a Browning, a Newton, or a Cobden. Impossible, but +fortunately unnecessary. For the man of genius is forced by his own +cravings to give, and the only reward that he asks from society is to +be let alone and have some quiet and fresh air. Nor is he in reality +entitled, notwithstanding his services, to ask more than the modest +sufficiency which enables him to obtain those primary needs of the life +of thought and creation, since his creative energy is the response to an +inward stimulus which goads him on without regard to the wishes of any +one else. The case of the great organizers of industry is rather +different, but they, again, so far as their work is socially sound, are +driven on more by internal necessity than by the genuine love of gain. +They make great profits because their works reach a scale at which, if +the balance is on the right side at all, it is certain to be a big +balance, and they no doubt tend to be interested in money as the sign of +their success, and also as the basis of increased social power. But I +believe the direct influence of the lust of gain on this type of mind to +have been immensely exaggerated; and as proof I would refer, first, to +the readiness of many men of this class to accept and in individual +cases actively to promote measures tending to diminish their material +gain, and, secondly, to the mass of high business capacity which is at +the command of the public administration for salaries which, as their +recipient must be perfectly conscious, bear no relation to the income +which it would be open to him to earn in commercial competition. + +On the whole, then, we may take it that the principle of the super-tax +is based on the conception that when we come to an income of some £5,000 +a year we approach the limit of the industrial value of the +individual.[12] We are not likely to discourage any service of genuine +social value by a rapidly increasing surtax on incomes above that +amount. It is more likely that we shall quench the anti-social ardour +for unmeasured wealth, for social power, and the vanity of display. + +These illustrations may suffice to give some concreteness to the +conception of economic justice as the maintenance of social function. +They serve also to show that the true resources of the State are larger +and more varied than is generally supposed. The true function of +taxation is to secure to society the element in wealth that is of social +origin, or, more broadly, all that does not owe its origin to the +efforts of living individuals. When taxation, based on these principles, +is utilized to secure healthy conditions of existence to the mass of the +people it is clear that this is no case of robbing Peter to pay Paul. +Peter is not robbed. Apart from the tax it is he who would be robbing +the State. A tax which enables the State to secure a certain share of +social value is not something deducted from that which the taxpayer has +an unlimited right to call his own, but rather a repayment of something +which was all along due to society. + +But why should the proceeds of the tax go to the poor in particular? +Granting that Peter is not robbed, why should Paul be paid? Why should +not the proceeds be expended on something of common concern to Peter and +Paul alike, for Peter is equally a member of the community? Undoubtedly +the only just method of dealing with the common funds is to expend them +in objects which subserve the common good, and there are many directions +in which public expenditure does in fact benefit all classes alike. +This, it is worth noting, is true even of some important branches of +expenditure which in their direct aim concern the poorer classes. +Consider, for example, the value of public sanitation, not merely to the +poorer regions which would suffer first if it were withheld, but to the +richer as well who, seclude themselves as they may, cannot escape +infection. In the old days judge and jury, as well as prisoners, would +die of gaol fever. Consider, again, the economic value of education, not +only to the worker, but to the employer whom he will serve. But when all +this is allowed for it must be admitted that we have throughout +contemplated a considerable measure of public expenditure in the +elimination of poverty. The prime justification of this expenditure is +that the prevention of suffering from the actual lack of adequate +physical comforts is an essential element in the common good, an object +in which all are bound to concern themselves, which all have the right +to demand and the duty to fulfil. Any common life based on the +avoidable suffering even of one of those who partake in it is a life not +of harmony, but of discord. + +But we can go further. We said at the outset that the function of +society was to secure to all normal adult members the means of earning +by useful work the material necessaries of a healthy and efficient life. +We can see now that this is one case and, properly understood, the +largest and most far reaching case falling under the general principle +of economic justice. This principle lays down that every social function +must receive the reward that is sufficient to stimulate and maintain it +through the life of the individual. Now, how much this reward may be in +any case it is probably impossible to determine otherwise than by +specific experiment. But if we grant, in accordance with the idea with +which we have been working all along, that it is demanded of all sane +adult men and women that they should live as civilized beings, as +industrious workers, as good parents, as orderly and efficient citizens, +it is, on the other side, the function of the economic organization of +society to secure them the material means of living such a life, and +the immediate duty of society is to mark the points at which such means +fail and to make good the deficiency. Thus the conditions of social +efficiency mark the minimum of industrial remuneration, and if they are +not secured without the deliberate action of the State they must be +secured by means of the deliberate action of the State. If it is the +business of good economic organization to secure the equation between +function and maintenance, the first and greatest application of this +principle is to the primary needs. These fix the minimum standard of +remuneration beyond which we require detailed experiment to tell us at +what rate increased value of service rendered necessitates corresponding +increase of reward. + +It may be objected that such a standard is unattainable. There are +those, it may be contended, who are not, and never will be, worth a full +efficiency wage. Whatever is done to secure them such a remuneration +will only involve net loss. Hence it violates our standard of economic +justice. It involves payment for a function of more than it is actually +worth, and the discrepancy might be so great as to cripple society. It +must, of course, be admitted that the population contains a certain +percentage of the physically incapable, the mentally defective, and the +morally uncontrolled. The treatment of these classes, all must agree, is +and must be based on other principles than those of economics. One class +requires punitive discipline, another needs life-long care, a third--the +mentally and morally sound but physically defective--must depend, to its +misfortune, on private and public charity. There is no question here of +payment for a function, but of ministering to human suffering. It is, of +course, desirable on economic as well as on broader grounds that the +ministration should be so conceived as to render its object as nearly as +possible independent and self-supporting. But in the main all that is +done for these classes of the population is, and must be, a charge on +the surplus. The real question that may be raised by a critic is whether +the considerable proportion of the working class whose earnings actually +fall short, as we should contend, of the minimum, could in point of fact +earn that minimum. Their actual value, he may urge, is measured by the +wage which they do in fact command in the competitive market, and if +their wage falls short of the standard society may make good the +deficiency if it will and can, but must not shut its eyes to the fact +that in doing so it is performing, not an act of economic justice, but +of charity. To this the reply is that the price which naked labour +without property can command in bargaining with employers who possess +property is no measure at all of the addition which such labour can +actually make to wealth. The bargain is unequal, and low remuneration is +itself a cause of low efficiency which in turn tends to react +unfavourably on remuneration. Conversely, a general improvement in the +conditions of life reacts favourably on the productivity of labour. Real +wages have risen considerably in the last half century, but the +income-tax returns indicate that the wealth of the business and +professional man has increased even more rapidly. Up to the efficiency +minimum there is, then, every reason to think that a general increase of +wages would positively increase the available surplus whether that +surplus goes to individuals as profits or to the State as national +revenue. The material improvement of working-class conditions will more +than pay its way regarded purely as an economic investment on behalf of +society. + +This conclusion is strengthened if we consider narrowly what elements of +cost the "living wage" ought in principle to cover. We are apt to assume +uncritically that the wages earned by the labour of an adult man ought +to suffice for the maintenance of an average family, providing for all +risks. It ought, we think, to cover not only the food and clothing of +wife and children, but the risks of sickness, accident, and +unemployment. It ought to provide for education and lay by for old age. +If it fails we are apt to think that the wage earner is not self +supporting. Now, it is certainly open to doubt whether the actual +addition to wealth made by an unskilled labourer denuded of all +inherited property would equal the cost represented by the sum of these +items. But here our further principle comes into play. He ought not to +be denuded of all inherited property. As a citizen he should have a +certain share in the social inheritance. This share should be his +support in the times of misfortune, of sickness, and of worklessness, +whether due to economic disorganization or to invalidity and old age. +His children's share, again, is the State-provided education. These +shares are charges on the social surplus. It does not, if fiscal +arrangements are what they should be, infringe upon the income of other +individuals, and the man who without further aid than the universally +available share in the social inheritance which is to fall to him as a +citizen pays his way through life is to be justly regarded as +self-supporting. + +The central point of Liberal economics, then, is the equation of social +service and reward. This is the principle that every function of social +value requires such remuneration as serves to stimulate and maintain its +effective performance; that every one who performs such a function has +the right, in the strict ethical sense of that term, to such +remuneration and to no more; that the residue of existing wealth should +be at the disposal of the community for social purposes. Further, it is +the right, in the same sense, of every person capable of performing some +useful social function that he should have the opportunity of so doing, +and it is his right that the remuneration that he receives for it should +be his property, _i. e._ that it should stand at his free disposal +enabling him to direct his personal concerns according to his own +preferences. These are rights in the sense that they are conditions of +the welfare of its members which a well-ordered State will seek by every +means to fulfil. But it is not suggested that the way of such fulfilment +is plain, or that it could be achieved at a stroke by a revolutionary +change in the tenure of property or the system of industry. It is, +indeed, implied that the State is vested with a certain overlordship +over property in general and a supervisory power over industry in +general, and this principle of economic sovereignty may be set side by +side with that of economic justice as a no less fundamental conception +of economic Liberalism. For here, as elsewhere, liberty implies control. +But the manner in which the State is to exercise its controlling power +is to be learnt by experience and even in large measure by cautious +experiment. We have sought to determine the principle which should +guide its action, the ends at which it is to aim. The systematic study +of the means lies rather within the province of economics; and the +teaching of history seems to be that progress is more continuous and +secure when men are content to deal with problems piecemeal than when +they seek to destroy root and branch in order to erect a complete system +which has captured the imagination. + +It is evident that these conceptions embody many of the ideas that go to +make up the framework of Socialist teaching, though they also emphasize +elements of individual right and personal independence, of which +Socialism at times appears oblivious. The distinction that I would claim +for economic Liberalism is that it seeks to do justice to the social and +individual factors in industry alike, as opposed to an abstract +Socialism which emphasizes the one side and an abstract Individualism +which leans its whole weight on the other. By keeping to the conception +of harmony as our clue we constantly define the rights of the individual +in terms of the common good, and think of the common good in terms of +the welfare of all the individuals who constitute a society. Thus in +economics we avoid the confusion of liberty with competition, and see no +virtue in the right of a man to get the better of others. At the same +time we are not led to minimize the share of personal initiative, +talent, or energy in production, but are free to contend for their claim +to adequate recognition. A Socialist who is convinced of the logical +coherence and practical applicability of his system may dismiss such +endeavours to harmonize divergent claims as a half-hearted and illogical +series of compromises. It is equally possible that a Socialist who +conceives Socialism as consisting in essence in the co-operative +organization of industry by consumers, and is convinced that the full +solution of industrial problems lies in that direction, should in +proportion as he considers the psychological factors in production and +investigates the means of realizing his ideal, find himself working back +along the path to a point where he will meet the men who are grappling +with the problems of the day on the principles here suggested, and will +find himself able to move forward in practice in the front ranks of +economic Liberalism. If this is so, the growing co-operation of +political Liberalism and Labour, which in the last few years has +replaced the antagonism of the 'nineties, is no mere accident of +temporary political convenience, but has its roots deep in the +necessities of Democracy. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[12] It is true that so long as it remains possible for a certain order +of ability to earn £50,000 a year, the community will not obtain its +services for £5,000. But if things should be so altered by taxation and +economic reorganization that £5,000 became in practice the highest limit +attainable, and remained attainable even for the ablest only by effort, +there is no reason to doubt that that effort would be forthcoming. It is +not the absolute amount of remuneration, but the increment of +remuneration in proportion to the output of industrial or commercial +capacity, which serves as the needed stimulus to energy. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM + + +The nineteenth century might be called the age of Liberalism, yet its +close saw the fortunes of that great movement brought to their lowest +ebb. Whether at home or abroad those who represented Liberal ideas had +suffered crushing defeats. But this was the least considerable of the +causes for anxiety. If Liberals had been defeated, something much worse +seemed about to befall Liberalism. Its faith in itself was waxing cold. +It seemed to have done its work. It had the air of a creed that is +becoming fossilized as an extinct form, a fossil that occupied, +moreover, an awkward position between two very active and energetically +moving grindstones--the upper grindstone of plutocratic imperialism, and +the nether grindstone of social democracy. "We know all about you," +these parties seemed to say to Liberalism; "we have been right through +you and come out on the other side. Respectable platitudes, you go +maundering on about Cobden and Gladstone, and the liberty of the +individual, and the rights of nationality, and government by the people. +What you say is not precisely untrue, but it is unreal and +uninteresting." So far in chorus. "It is not up to date," finished the +Imperialist, and the Socialist bureaucrat. "It is not bread and butter," +finished the Social democrat. Opposed in everything else, these two +parties agreed in one thing. They were to divide the future between +them. Unfortunately, however, for their agreement, the division was soon +seen to be no equal one. Whatever might be the ultimate recuperative +power of Social Democracy, for the time being, in the paralysis of +Liberalism, the Imperial reaction had things all to itself. The +governing classes of England were to assert themselves. They were to +consolidate the Empire, incidentally passing the steam roller over two +obstructive republics. They were to "teach the law" to the "sullen +new-caught peoples" abroad. They were to re-establish the Church at home +by the endowment of doctrinal education. At the same time they were to +establish the liquor interest--which is, after all, the really potent +instrument of government from above. They were to bind the colonies to +us by ties of fiscal preference, and to establish the great commercial +interests on the basis of protection. Their government, as conceived by +the best exponents of the new doctrine, was by no means to be +indifferent to the humanitarian claims of the social conscience. They +were to deal out factory acts, and establish wages boards. They were to +make an efficient and a disciplined people. In the idea of discipline +the military element rapidly assumed a greater prominence. But on this +side the evolution of opinion passed through two well-marked phases. The +first was the period of optimism and expansion. The Englishman was the +born ruler of the world. He might hold out a hand of friendship to the +German and the American, whom he recognized as his kindred and who lived +within the law. The rest of the world was peopled by dying nations whose +manifest destiny was to be "administered" by the coming races, and +exploited by their commercial syndicates. This mood of optimism did not +survive the South African War. It received its death-blow at Colenso +and Magersfontein, and within a few years fear had definitely taken the +place of ambition as the mainspring of the movement to national and +imperial consolidation. The Tariff Reform movement was largely inspired +by a sense of insecurity in our commercial position. The +half-patronizing friendship for Germany rapidly gave way, first to +commercial jealousy, and then to unconcealed alarm for our national +safety. All the powers of society were bent on lavish naval expenditure, +and of imposing the idea of compulsory service on a reluctant people. +The disciplined nation was needed no longer to dominate the world, but +to maintain its own territory. + +Now, we are not concerned here to follow up the devious windings of +modern Conservatism. We have to note only that what modern democracy has +to face is no mere inertia of tradition. It is a distinct reactionary +policy with a definite and not incoherent creed of its own, an ideal +which in its best expression--for example, in the daily comments of the +_Morning Post_--is certain to exercise a powerful attraction on many +generous minds--the ideal of the efficient, disciplined nation, centre +and dominating force of a powerful, self-contained, militant empire. +What concerns us more particularly is the reaction of Conservative +development upon the fortunes of democracy. But to understand this +reaction, and, indeed, to make any sound estimate of the present +position and prospects of Liberalism, we must cast a rapid glance over +the movement of progressive thought during the last generation. When +Gladstone formed his second Government in 1880 the old party system +stood secure in Great Britain. It was only a band of politicians from +the other side of St. George's Channel who disowned both the great +allegiances. For the British political mind the plain distinction of +Liberal and Conservative held the field, and the division was not yet a +class distinction. The great Whig families held their place, and they of +the aristocratic houses divided the spoil. But a new leaven was at work. +The prosperity which had culminated in 1872 was passing away. Industrial +progress slowed down; and, though the advance from the "Hungry 'Forties" +had been immense, men began to see the limit of what they could +reasonably expect from retrenchment and Free Trade. The work of Mr. +Henry George awakened new interest in problems of poverty, and the +idealism of William Morris gave new inspiration to Socialist propaganda. +Meanwhile, the teaching of Green and the enthusiasm of Toynbee were +setting Liberalism free from the shackles of an individualist conception +of liberty and paving the way for the legislation of our own time. +Lastly, the Fabian Society brought Socialism down from heaven and +established a contact with practical politics and municipal government. +Had Great Britain been an island in the mid-Pacific the onward movement +would have been rapid and undeviating in its course. As it was, the new +ideas were reflected in the parliament and the cabinet of 1880-1885, and +the Radicalism of Birmingham barely kept on terms with the Whiggery of +the clubs. A redistribution of social forces which would amalgamate the +interests of "property" on the one side and those of democracy on the +other was imminent, and on social questions democracy reinforced by the +enfranchisement of the rural labourers in 1884 stood to win. At this +stage the Irish question came to a head. Mr. Gladstone declared for Home +Rule, and the party fissure took place on false lines. The upper and +middle classes in the main went over to Unionism, but they took with +them a section of the Radicals, while Mr. Gladstone's personal force +retained on the Liberal side a number of men whose insight into the +needs of democracy was by no means profound. The political fight was for +the moment shifted from the social question to the single absorbing +issue of Home Rule, and the new Unionist party enjoyed twenty years of +almost unbroken supremacy. Again, had the Home Rule issue stood alone it +might have been settled in 1892, but meanwhile in the later 'eighties +the social question had become insistent. Socialism, ceasing to be a +merely academic force, had begun to influence organized labour, and had +inspired the more generous minds among the artisans with the +determination to grapple with the problem of the unskilled workmen. From +the Dockers' strike of 1889 the New Unionism became a fighting force in +public affairs, and the idea of a Labour party began to take shape. On +the new problems Liberalism, weakened as it already had been, was +further divided, and its failure in 1892 is to be ascribed far more to +this larger cause than to the dramatic personal incident of the Parnell +divorce. In office without legislative power from 1892 to 1895, the +Liberal party only experienced further loss of credit, and the rise of +Imperialism swept the whole current of public interest in a new +direction. The Labour movement itself was paralyzed, and the defeat of +the Engineers in 1897 put an end to the hope of achieving a great social +transformation by the method of the strike. But, in the meanwhile, +opinion was being silently transformed. The labours of Mr. Charles Booth +and his associates had at length stated the problem of poverty in +scientific terms. Social and economic history was gradually taking shape +as a virtually new branch of knowledge. The work of Mr. and Mrs. Sidney +Webb helped to clear up the relations between the organized efforts of +workmen and the functions of the State. The discerning observer could +trace the "organic filaments" of a fuller and more concrete social +theory. + +On the other hand, in the Liberal ranks many of the most influential men +had passed, without consciousness of the transition, under the sway of +quite opposite influences. They were becoming Imperialists in their +sleep, and it was only as the implications of Imperialism became +evident that they were awakened. It was with the outbreak of the South +African War that the new development of Conservative policy first +compelled the average Liberal to consider his position. It needed the +shock of an outspoken violation of right to stir him; and we may date +the revival of the idea of justice in the party as an organized force +from the speech in the summer of 1901 in which Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman set himself against the stream of militant sentiment +and challenged in a classic phrase the methods of the war. From the day +of this speech, which was supposed at the time to have irretrievably +ruined his political career, the name of the party-leader, hitherto +greeted with indifference, became a recognized signal for the cheers of +a political meeting, and a man with no marked genius but that of +character and the insight which character gave into the minds of his +followers acquired in his party the position of a Gladstone. This was +the first and fundamental victory, the reinstatement of the idea of +Right in the mind of Liberalism. Then, as the Conservative attack +developed and its implications became apparent, one interest after +another of the older Liberalism was rudely shaken into life. The +Education Act of 1902 brought the Nonconformists into action. The Tariff +Reform movement put Free Trade on its defence, and taught men to realize +what the older economics of Liberalism had done for them. The Socialists +of practical politics, the Labour Party, found that they could by no +means dispense with the discipline of Cobden. Free Trade finance was to +be the basis of social reform. Liberalism and Labour learned to +co-operate in resisting delusive promises of remedies for unemployment +and in maintaining the right of free international exchange. Meanwhile, +Labour itself had experienced the full brunt of the attack. It had come +not from the politicians but from the judges, but in this country we +have to realize that within wide limits the judges are in effect +legislators, and legislators with a certain persistent bent which can be +held in check only by the constant vigilance and repeated efforts of the +recognized organ for the making and repeal of law. In destroying the old +position of the Trade Unions, the judges created the modern Labour party +and cemented its alliance with Liberalism. Meanwhile, the aftermath of +Imperialism in South Africa was reaped, and Conservative disillusionment +unlocked the floodgates for the advancing tide of the Liberal revival. + +The tide has by no means spent itself. If it no longer rushes in an +electoral torrent as in 1906 it flows in a steady stream towards social +amelioration and democratic government. In this movement it is now +sufficiently clear to all parties that the distinctive ideas of +Liberalism have a permanent function. The Socialist recognizes with +perfect clearness, for example, that popular government is not a +meaningless shibboleth, but a reality that has to be maintained and +extended by fighting. He is well aware that he must deal with the House +of Lords and the Plural vote if he is to gain his own ends. He can no +longer regard these questions as difficulties interposed by half-hearted +Liberals to distract attention from the Social problem. He is aware that +the problem of Home Rule and of devolution generally is an integral part +of the organization of democracy. And, as a rule, he not merely +acquiesces in the demand of women for a purely political right, but only +quarrels with the Liberal party for its tardiness in meeting the +demand. The old Liberal idea of peace and retrenchment again is +recognized by the Socialistic, and indeed by the whole body of social +reformers, as equally essential for the successful prosecution of their +aims. Popular budgets will bring no relief to human suffering if the +revenues that they secure are all to go upon the most expensive ship +that is the fashion of the moment, nor can the popular mind devote +itself to the improvement of domestic conditions while it is distracted +either by ambitions or by scares. On the other side, the Liberal who +starts from the Gladstonian tradition has in large measure realized that +if he is to maintain the essence of his old ideas it must be through a +process of adaptation and growth. He has learnt that while Free Trade +laid the foundations of prosperity it did not erect the building. He has +to acknowledge that it has not solved the problems of unemployment, of +underpayment, of overcrowding. He has to look deeper into the meaning of +liberty and to take account of the bearing of actual conditions on the +meaning of equality. As an apostle of peace and an opponent of swollen +armaments, he has come to recognize that the expenditure of the social +surplus upon the instruments of progress is the real alternative to its +expenditure on the instruments of war. As a Temperance man he is coming +to rely more on the indirect effect of social improvement on the one +hand and the elimination of monopolist profit on the other, than on the +uncertain chances of absolute prohibition. + +There are, then, among the composite forces which maintained the Liberal +Government in power through the crisis of 1910, the elements of such an +organic view as may inspire and direct a genuine social progress. +Liberalism has passed through its Slough of Despond, and in the give and +take of ideas with Socialism has learnt, and taught, more than one +lesson. The result is a broader and deeper movement in which the cooler +and clearer minds recognize below the differences of party names and in +spite of certain real cross-currents a genuine unity of purpose. What +are the prospects of this movement? Will it be maintained? Is it the +steady stream to which we have compared it, or a wave which must +gradually sink into the trough? + +To put this question is to ask in effect whether democracy is in +substance as well as in form a possible mode of government. To answer +this question we must ask what democracy really means, and why it is the +necessary basis of the Liberal idea. The question has already been +raised incidentally, and we have seen reason to dismiss both the +individualist and the Benthamite argument for popular government as +unsatisfactory. We even admitted a doubt whether some of the concrete +essentials of liberty and social justice might not, under certain +conditions, be less fully realized under a widely-extended suffrage than +under the rule of a superior class or a well-ordered despotism. On what, +then, it may be asked, do we found our conception of democracy? Is it on +general principles of social philosophy, or on the special conditions of +our own country or of contemporary civilization? And how does our +conception relate itself to our other ideas of the social order? Do we +assume that the democracy will in the main accept these ideas, or if it +rejects them are we willing to acquiesce in its decision as final? And +in the end what do we expect? Will democracy assert itself, will it find +a common purpose and give it concrete shape? Or will it blunder on, the +passive subject of scares and ambitions, frenzies of enthusiasm and +dejection, clay in the hands of those whose profession it is to model it +to their will. + +First as to the general principle. Democracy is not founded merely on +the right or the private interest of the individual. This is only one +side of the shield. It is founded equally on the function of the +individual as a member of the community. It founds the common good upon +the common will, in forming which it bids every grown-up, intelligent +person to take a part. No doubt many good things may be achieved for a +people without responsive effort on its own part. It may be endowed with +a good police, with an equitable system of private law, with education, +with personal freedom, with a well-organized industry. It may receive +these blessings at the hands of a foreign ruler, or from an enlightened +bureaucracy or a benevolent monarch. However obtained, they are all very +good things. But the democratic theory is that, so obtained, they lack a +vitalizing element. A people so governed resembles an individual who has +received all the external gifts of fortune, good teachers, healthy +surroundings, a fair breeze to fill his sails, but owes his prosperous +voyage to little or no effort of his own. We do not rate such a man so +high as one who struggles through adversity to a much less eminent +position. What we possess has its intrinsic value, but how we came to +possess it is also an important question. It is so with a society. Good +government is much, but the good will is more, and even the imperfect, +halting, confused utterance of the common will may have in it the +potency of higher things than a perfection of machinery can ever attain. + +But this principle makes one very large assumption. It postulates the +existence of a common will. It assumes that the individuals whom it +would enfranchise can enter into the common life and contribute to the +formation of a common decision by a genuine interest in public +transactions. Where and in so far as this assumption definitely fails, +there is no case for democracy. Progress, in such a case, is not wholly +impossible, but it must depend on the number of those who do care for +the things that are of social value, who advance knowledge or "civilize +life through the discoveries of art," or form a narrow but effective +public opinion in support of liberty and order. We may go further. +Whatever the form of government progress always does in fact depend on +those who so think and live, and on the degree in which these common +interests envelop their life and thought. Now, complete and wholehearted +absorption in public interests is rare. It is the property not of the +mass but of the few, and the democrat is well aware that it is the +remnant which saves the people. He subjoins only that if their effort is +really to succeed the people must be willing to be saved. The masses who +spend their toilsome days in mine or factory struggling for bread have +not their heads for ever filled with the complex details of +international policy or industrial law. To expect this would be absurd. +What is not exaggerated is to expect them to respond and assent to the +things that make for the moral and material welfare of the country, and +the position of the democrat is that the "remnant" is better occupied in +convincing the people and carrying their minds and wills with it than in +imposing on them laws which they are concerned only to obey and enjoy. +At the same time, the remnant, be it never so select, has always much to +learn. Some men are much better and wiser than others, but experience +seems to show that hardly any man is so much better or wiser than others +that he can permanently stand the test of irresponsible power over them. +On the contrary, the best and wisest is he who is ready to go to the +humblest in a spirit of inquiry, to find out what he wants and why he +wants it before seeking to legislate for him. Admitting the utmost that +can be said for the necessity of leadership, we must at the same time +grant that the perfection of leadership itself lies in securing the +willing, convinced, open-eyed support of the mass. + +Thus individuals will contribute to the social will in very varying +degrees, but the democratic thesis is that the formation of such a will, +that is, in effect, the extension of intelligent interest in all manner +of public things, is in itself a good, and more than that, it is a +condition qualifying other good things. Now the extension of interest is +not to be created by democratic forms of government, and if it neither +exists nor can be brought into existence, democracy remains an empty +form and may even be worse than useless. On the other hand, where the +capacity exists the establishment of responsible government is the +first condition of its development. Even so it is not the sole +condition. The modern State is a vast and complex organism. The +individual voter feels himself lost among the millions. He is +imperfectly acquainted with the devious issues and large problems of the +day, and is sensible how little his solitary vote can affect their +decision. What he needs to give him support and direction is +organization with his neighbours and fellow workers. He can understand, +for example, the affairs of his trade union, or, again, of his chapel. +They are near to him. They affect him, and he feels that he can affect +them. Through these interests, again, he comes into touch with wider +questions--with a Factory Bill or an Education Bill--and in dealing with +these questions he will now act as one of an organized body, whose +combined voting strength will be no negligible quantity. Responsibility +comes home to him, and to bring home responsibility is the problem of +all government. The development of social interest--and that is +democracy--depends not only on adult suffrage and the supremacy of the +elected legislature, but on all the intermediate organizations which +link the individual to the whole. This is one among the reasons why +devolution and the revival of local government, at present crushed in +this country by a centralized bureaucracy, are of the essence of +democratic progress. + +The success of democracy depends on the response of the voters to the +opportunities given them. But, conversely, the opportunities must be +given in order to call forth the response. The exercise of popular +government is itself an education. In considering whether any class or +sex or race should be brought into the circle of enfranchisement, the +determining consideration is the response which that class or sex or +race would be likely to make to the trust. Would it enter effectively +into the questions of public life, or would it be so much passive voting +material, wax in the hands of the less scrupulous politicians? The +question is a fair one, but people are too ready to answer it in the +less favourable sense on the ground of the actual indifference or +ignorance which they find or think they find among the unenfranchised. +They forget that in that regard enfranchisement itself may be precisely +the stimulus needed to awaken interest, and while they are impressed +with the danger of admitting ignorant and irresponsible, and perhaps +corruptible voters to a voice in the government, they are apt to +overlook the counterbalancing danger of leaving a section of the +community outside the circle of civic responsibility. The actual work of +government must affect, and also it must be affected by, its relation to +all who live within the realm. To secure good adaptation it ought, I +will not say to reflect, but at least to take account of, the +dispositions and circumstances of every class in the population. If any +one class is dumb, the result is that Government is to that extent +uninformed. It is not merely that the interests of that class may +suffer, but that, even with the best will, mistakes may be made in +handling it, because it cannot speak for itself. Officious spokesmen +will pretend to represent its views, and will obtain, perhaps, undue +authority merely because there is no way of bringing them to book. So +among ourselves does the press constantly represent public opinion to be +one thing while the cold arithmetic of the polls conclusively declares +it to be another. The ballot alone effectively liberates the quiet +citizen from the tyranny of the shouter and the wire-puller. + +I conclude that an impression of existing inertness or ignorance is not +a sufficient reason for withholding responsible government or +restricting the area of the suffrage. There must be a well-grounded view +that political incapacity is so deep-rooted that the extension of +political rights would tend only to facilitate undue influence by the +less scrupulous sections of the more capable part of the people. Thus +where we have an oligarchy of white planters in the midst of a coloured +population, it is always open to doubt whether a general +colour-franchise will be a sound method of securing even-handed justice. +The economic and social conditions may be such that the "coloured" man +would just have to vote as his master told him, and if the elementary +rights are to be secured for all it may be that a semi-despotic system +like that of some of our Crown colonies is the best that can be devised. +On the other side, that which is most apt to frighten a governing class +or race, a clamour on the part of an unenfranchised people for political +rights, is to the democrat precisely the strongest reason that he can +have in the absence of direct experience for believing them fit for the +exercise of civic responsibility. He welcomes signs of dissatisfaction +among the disfranchised as the best proof of awakening interest in +public affairs, and he has none of those fears of ultimate social +disruption which are a nightmare to bureaucracies because experience has +sufficiently proved to him the healing power of freedom, of +responsibility, and of the sense of justice. Moreover, a democrat cannot +be a democrat for his own country alone. He cannot but recognize the +complex and subtle interactions of nation upon nation which make every +local success or failure of democracy tell upon other countries. Nothing +has been more encouraging to the Liberalism of Western Europe in recent +years than the signs of political awakening in the East. Until yesterday +it seemed as though it would in the end be impossible to resist the +ultimate "destiny" of the white races to be masters of the rest of the +world. The result would have been that, however far democracy might +develop within any Western State, it would always be confronted with a +contrary principle in the relation of that State to dependencies, and +this contradiction, as may easily be seen by the attentive student of +our own political constitutions, is a standing menace to domestic +freedom. The awakening of the Orient, from Constantinople to Pekin, is +the greatest and most hopeful political fact of our time, and it is with +the deepest shame that English Liberals have been compelled to look on +while our Foreign Office has made itself the accomplice in the attempt +to nip Persian freedom in the bud, and that in the interest of the most +ruthless tyranny that has ever crushed the liberties of a white people. + +The cause of democracy is bound up with that of internationalism. The +relation is many-sided. It is national pride, resentment, or ambition +one day that sweeps the public mind and diverts it from all interest in +domestic progress. The next day the same function is performed no less +adequately by a scare. The practice of playing on popular emotions has +been reduced to a fine art which neither of the great parties is ashamed +to employ. Military ideals possess the mind, and military expenditure +eats up the public resources. On the other side, the political economic +and social progress of other nations reacts on our own. The backwardness +of our commercial rivals in industrial legislation was long made an +argument against further advances among ourselves. Conversely, when they +go beyond us, as now they often do, we can learn from them. Physically +the world is rapidly becoming one, and its unity must ultimately be +reflected in political institutions. The old doctrine of absolute +sovereignty is dead. The greater States of the day exhibit a complex +system of government within government, authority limited by authority, +and the world-state of the not impossible future must be based on a free +national self-direction as full and satisfying as that enjoyed by Canada +or Australia within the British Empire at this moment. National +emulation will express itself less in the desire to extend territory or +to count up ships and guns, and more in the endeavour to magnify the +contribution of our own country to civilized life. Just as in the +rebirth of our municipal life we find a civic patriotism which takes +interest in the local university, which feels pride in the magnitude of +the local industry, which parades the lowest death rate in the country, +which is honestly ashamed of a bad record for crime or pauperism, so as +Englishmen we shall concern ourselves less with the question whether two +of our Dreadnoughts might not be pitted against one German, and more +with the question whether we cannot equal Germany in the development of +science, of education, and of industrial technique. Perhaps even, +recovering from our present artificially induced and radically insincere +mood of national self-abasement, we shall learn to take some pride in +our own characteristic contributions as a nation to the arts of +government, to the thought, the literature, the art, the mechanical +inventions which have made and are re-making modern civilization. + +Standing by national autonomy and international equality, Liberalism is +necessarily in conflict with the Imperial idea as it is ordinarily +presented. But this is not to say that it is indifferent to the +interests of the Empire as a whole, to the sentiment of unity pervading +its white population, to all the possibilities involved in the bare fact +that a fourth part of the human race recognizes one flag and one supreme +authority. In relation to the self-governing colonies the Liberal of +today has to face a change in the situation since Cobden's time not +unlike that which we have traced in other departments. The Colonial +Empire as it stands is in substance the creation of the older +Liberalism. It is founded on self-government, and self-government is the +root from which the existing sentiment of unity has sprung. The problem +of our time is to devise means for the more concrete and living +expression of this sentiment without impairing the rights of +self-government on which it depends. Hitherto the "Imperialist" has had +matters all his own way and has cleverly exploited Colonial opinion, or +an appearance of Colonial opinion, in favour of class ascendancy and +reactionary legislation in the mother country. But the colonies include +the most democratic communities in the world. Their natural sympathies +are not with the Conservatives, but with the most Progressive parties in +the United Kingdom. They favour Home Rule, they set the pace in social +legislation. There exist accordingly the political conditions of a +democratic alliance which it is the business of the British Liberal to +turn to account. He may hope to make his country the centre of a group +of self-governing, democratic communities, one of which, moreover, +serves as a natural link with the other great commonwealth of +English-speaking people. The constitutional mechanism of the new unity +begins to take shape in the Imperial Council, and its work begins to +define itself as the adjustment of interests as between different +portions of the Empire and the organization of common defence. Such a +union is no menace to the world's peace or to the cause of freedom. On +the contrary, as a natural outgrowth of a common sentiment, it is one of +the steps towards a wider unity which involves no backstroke against the +ideal of self-government. It is a model, and that on no mean scale, of +the International State. + +Internationalism on the one side, national self-government on the other, +are the radical conditions of the growth of a social mind which is the +essence, as opposed to the form, of democracy. But as to form itself a +word must, in conclusion, be said. If the forms are unsuitable the will +cannot express itself, and if it fails of adequate expression it is in +the end thwarted, repressed and paralyzed. In the matter of form the +inherent difficulty of democratic government, whether direct or +representative, is that it is government by majority, not government by +universal consent. Its decisions are those of the larger part of the +people, not of the whole. This defect is an unavoidable consequence of +the necessities of decision and the impossibility of securing universal +agreement. Statesmen have sought to remedy it by applying something of +the nature of a brake upon the process of change. They have felt that to +justify a new departure of any magnitude there must be something more +than a bare majority. There must either be a large majority, two-thirds +or three-fourths of the electorate, or there must be some friction to be +overcome which will serve to test the depth and force as well as the +numerical extent of the feeling behind the new proposal. In the United +Kingdom we have one official brake, the House of Lords, and several +unofficial ones, the civil service, the permanent determined opposition +of the Bench to democratic measures, the Press, and all that we call +Society. All these brakes act in one way only. There is no brake upon +reaction--a lack which becomes more serious in proportion as the +Conservative party acquires a definite and constructive policy of its +own. In this situation the Liberal party set itself to deal with the +official brake by the simple method of reducing its effective strength, +but, to be honest, without having made up its mind as to the nature of +the brake which it would like to substitute. On this question a few +general remarks would seem to be in place. The function of a check on +the House of Commons is to secure reconsideration. Conservative leaders +are in the right when they point to the accidental elements that go to +the constitution of parliamentary majorities. The programme of any +general election is always composite, and a man finds himself compelled, +for example, to choose between a Tariff Reformer whose views on +education he approves, and a Free Trader whose educational policy he +detests. In part this defect might be remedied by the Proportional +system to which, whether against the grain or not, Liberals will find +themselves driven the more they insist on the genuinely representative +character of the House of Commons. But even a Proportional system would +not wholly clear the issues before the electorate. The average man +gives his vote on the question which he takes to be most important in +itself, and which he supposes to be most likely to come up for immediate +settlement. But he is always liable to find his expectations defeated, +and a Parliament which is in reality elected on one issue may proceed to +deal with quite another. The remedy proposed by the Parliament Bill was +a two years' delay, which, it was held, would secure full discussion and +considerable opportunity for the manifestation of opinion should it be +adverse. This proposal had been put to the constituencies twice over, +and had been ratified by them if any legislative proposal ever was +ratified. It should enable the House of Commons, as the representatives +of the people, to decide freely on the permanent constitution of the +country. The Bill itself, however, does not lay down the lines of a +permanent settlement. For, to begin with, in leaving the constitution of +the House of Lords unaltered it provides a one-sided check, operating +only on democratic measures which in any case have to run the gauntlet +of the permanent officials, the judges, the Press, and Society. For +permanent use the brake must be two-sided. Secondly, it is to be feared +that the principle of delay would be an insufficient check upon a large +and headstrong majority. What is really needed is that the people should +have the opportunity of considering a proposal afresh. This could be +secured in either of two ways: (1) by allowing the suspensory veto of +the Second Chamber to hold a measure over to a new Parliament; (2) by +allowing the House of Commons to submit a bill in the form in which it +finally leaves the House to a direct popular vote. It is to my mind +regrettable that so many Liberals should have closed the door on the +Referendum. It is true that there are many measures to which it would be +ill suited. For example, measures affecting a particular class or a +particular locality would be apt to go by the board. They might command +a large and enthusiastic majority among those primarily affected by +them, but only receive a languid assent elsewhere, and they might be +defeated by a majority beaten up for extraneous purposes among those +without first-hand knowledge of the problems with which they are +intended to deal. Again, if a referendum were to work at all it would +only be in relation to measures of the first class, and only, if the +public convenience is to be consulted, on very rare occasions. In all +ordinary cases of insuperable difference between the Houses, the +government of the day would accept the postponement of the measure till +the new Parliament. But there are measures of urgency, measures of +fundamental import, above all, measures which cut across the ordinary +lines of party, and with which, in consequence, our system is impotent +to deal, and on these the direct consultation of the people would be the +most suitable method of solution.[13] + +What we need, then, is an impartial second chamber distinctly +subordinate to the House of Commons, incapable of touching finance and +therefore of overthrowing a ministry, but able to secure the submission +of a measure either to the direct vote of the people or to the verdict +of a second election--the government of the day having the choice +between the alternatives. Such a chamber might be instituted by direct +popular election. But the multiplication of elections is not good for +the working of democracy, and it would be difficult to reconcile a +directly elected house to a subordinate position. It might, therefore, +as an alternative, be elected on a proportional system by the House of +Commons itself, its members retaining their seat for two Parliaments. To +bridge over the change half of the chamber for the present Parliament +might be elected by the existing House of Lords, and their +representatives retiring at the end of this Parliament would leave the +next House of Commons and every future House of Commons with one-half of +the chamber to elect. This Second Chamber would then reflect in equal +proportions the existing and the last House of Commons, and the balance +between parties should be fairly held.[14] This chamber would have +ample power of securing reasonable amendments and would also have good +ground for exercising moderation in pressing its views. If the public +were behind the measure it would know that in the end the House of +Commons could carry it in its teeth, whether by referendum or by a +renewed vote of confidence at a general election. The Commons, on their +side, would have reasons for exhibiting a conciliatory temper. They +would not wish to be forced either to postpone or to appeal. As to which +method they would choose they would have absolute discretion, and if +they went to the country with a series of popular measures hung up and +awaiting their return for ratification, they would justly feel +themselves in a strong position. + +So far as to forms. The actual future of democracy, however, rests upon +deeper issues. It is bound up with the general advance of civilization. +The organic character of society is, we have seen, in one sense, an +ideal. In another sense it is an actuality. That is to say, nothing of +any import affects the social life on one side without setting up +reactions all through the tissue. Hence, for example, we cannot +maintain great political progress without some corresponding advance on +other sides. People are not fully free in their political capacity when +they are subject industrially to conditions which take the life and +heart out of them. A nation as a whole cannot be in the full sense free +while it fears another or gives cause of fear to another. The social +problem must be viewed as a whole. We touch here the greatest weakness +in modern reform movements. The spirit of specialism has invaded +political and social activity, and in greater and greater degree men +consecrate their whole energy to a particular cause to the almost +cynical disregard of all other considerations. "Not such the help, nor +these the defenders" which this moment of the world's progress needs. +Rather we want to learn our supreme lesson from the school of Cobden. +For them the political problem was one, manifold in its ramifications +but undivided in its essence. It was a problem of realizing liberty. We +have seen reason to think that their conception of liberty was too thin, +and that to appreciate its concrete content we must understand it as +resting upon mutual restraint and value it as a basis of mutual aid. +For us, therefore, harmony serves better as a unifying conception. It +remains for us to carry it through with the same logical cogency, the +same practical resourcefulness, the same driving force that inspired the +earlier Radicals, that gave fire to Cobden's statistics, and lent +compelling power to the eloquence of Bright. We need less of the +fanatics of sectarianism and more of the unifying mind. Our reformers +must learn to rely less on the advertising value of immediate success +and more on the deeper but less striking changes of practice or of +feeling, to think less of catching votes and more of convincing opinion. +We need a fuller co-operation among those of genuine democratic feeling +and more agreement as to the order of reform. At present progress is +blocked by the very competition of many causes for the first place in +the advance. Here, again, devolution will help us, but what would help +still more would be a clearer sense of the necessity of co-operation +between all who profess and call themselves democrats, based on a fuller +appreciation of the breadth and the depth of their own meaning. The +advice seems cold to the fiery spirits, but they may come to learn that +the vision of justice in the wholeness of her beauty kindles a passion +that may not flare up into moments of dramatic scintillation, but burns +with the enduring glow of the central heat. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[13] I need hardly add that financial measures are entirely unsuited to +a referendum. Financial and executive control go together, and to take +either of them out of the hands of the majority in the House of Commons +is not to reform our system but to destroy it root and branch. The same +is not true of legislative control. There are cases in which a +government might fairly submit a legislative measure to the people +without electing to stand or fall by it. + +[14] Probably the best alternative to these proposals is that of a small +directly elected Second Chamber, with a provision for a joint session in +case of insuperable disagreement, but with no provision for delay. This +proposal has the advantage, apparently, of commanding a measure of +Conservative support. + + + + +BIBLIOGRAPHY + + +LOCKE.--Second Treatise on Civil Government (1689). + +PAINE.--The Rights of Man (1792). + +BENTHAM.--Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789!). + +J. S. MILL.--Principles of Political Economy (Books IV and V). + + On Liberty. + + Representative Government. + + The Subjection of Women. + + Autobiography. + +COBDEN.--Political Writings. + +BRIGHT.--Speeches. + +MAZZINI.--The Duties of Man. + + Thoughts on Democracy in Europe. + +JEVONS.--The State in Relation to Labour. + +T. H. GREEN.--Principles of Political Obligation. +Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract (_Works_, vol. iii). + +MORLEY.--Life of Cobden. + Life of Gladstone. + +F. W. HIRST.--The Manchester School. + +G. LOWES DICKINSON.--Liberty and Justice. + +PROF. H. JONES.--The Working Faith of the Social Reformer. + +PROF. McCUNN.--Six Radical Thinkers. + + + + +INDEX + + +Association, right of, 37-8 + +Authoritarian rule, 8-10, 18, 21, 47, 54 + + +Birth rate, 181 + + +Charity, State, and Justice, 182 + +Church and State, 12 + +City States, 10-13, 16 + +Civil liberty, 21 + +Coercion, where justified, 139-154 + +Colonies, 41-4, 106, 216, 240 + +Conservatism, 88, 176, 217 + + +Democracy, future of, 227-236, 242-51 + + +Economic liberty, 34-8, 157 + +Education, 32, 40, 154 + + +Feudalism, 15-18 + +Fiscal liberty, 25-6, 34, 78-81 + +Foreign policy, 41, 104-5 + +Freedom, conditions of, 23-4, 28, 31, 58, 91-2, 140, 146 + + +Gladstone, W. E., 102-6 + +Greece, ancient, 10-13 + + +Habeas Corpus Act, 23 + + +Imperialism, 215, 221-4, 239 + +Industry, regulation of, 35-6, 82-8, 93 + +Inequality, the defence of, 131 + +Inherited wealth, 197-9 + +Ireland, 41, 103, 219, 224 + + +Laissez-faire, 78-101 + +Land question, 82, 95-8, 175-6, 192-3 + +Liberalism, beginning of, 19, 51 + + +Manchester school, 57 + +Militarism, 8, 45, 80, 148, 237-9 + +Mill, J. S., 107-15, 116 + +Monopolies, 97-100 + + +National liberty, 40-4 + +Natural order, theory of, 54-64 + + +Old Age Pensions, 156, 177 + +Opinion, Liberty and, 116-23 + +Organic Concept of Society, 125-30, 135 + + +Peace, International, 80-1, 225, 237 + +Personal liberty, 26-31 + +Petition of Right, 22 + +Poor Law, 155, 177-9, 184 + +Popular sovereignty, 45-8, 64, 112 + +Poverty line, 162 + +Progress, nature of, 137 + +Property, rights of, 94-5, 100, 168, 186, 188 + +Proportional representation, 114, 243 + + +Referendum, 245-6 + +Religions liberty, 29-31 + +Revolutionary Declarations, 60-2 + +Rome, ancient, 13-14 + + +Second Chamber, the, 242-8 + +Socialism, 165, 167-72, 191, 211, 215, 219 + +Social liberty, 31-3, 140 + +Speculation, 195 + +Super-tax, 199-201 + + +Temperance, 180, 226 + +Trade unions, 38, 84, 161, 220, 223 + + +Unemployed, 160 + +Utilitarianism, 57, 65-77, 107 + + +Wage," "living, 159, 163-4, 177, 205-8 + +Wealth, social basis of, 187-91, 194 + +Women, rights of, 33, 39, 86, 112, 114, 179 + +Work, right to, 159 + + +Printed by The Riverside Press, Edinburgh + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Liberalism, by L. 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