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Theodore Roosevelt and his Times, by Harold Howland
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Project Gutenberg's Theodore Roosevelt and His Times, by Harold Howland
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
Title: Theodore Roosevelt and His Times
A Chronicle of the Progressive Movement; Volume 47 in The
Chronicles Of America Series
Author: Harold Howland
Editor: Allen Johnson
Release Date: January 8, 2009 [EBook #2724]
[Last updated: April 18, 2015]
Language: English
Character set encoding: ASCII
*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIMES ***
Produced by The James J. Kelly Library of St. Gregory's
University, Alev Akman, Dianne Bean, and David Widger
</pre>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<h1>
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIMES,
</h1>
<p>
<br />
</p>
<h2>
A CHRONICLE OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT
</h2>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<h2>
By Harold Howland
</h2>
<p>
<br /> <br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<br /> <br />
</p>
<blockquote>
<p class="toc">
<big><b>CONTENTS</b></big>
</p>
<p>
<br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0001"> <b>THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIMES</b>
</a> <br /><br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0001"> CHAPTER I. </a> THE
YOUNG FIGHTER <br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0002"> CHAPTER II. </a> IN
THE NEW YORK ASSEMBLY <br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0003"> CHAPTER III.
</a> THE CHAMPION OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM <br /><br /> <a
href="#link2HCH0004"> CHAPTER IV. </a> HAROUN AL ROOSEVELT
<br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0005"> CHAPTER V. </a> FIGHTING
AND BREAKFASTING WITH PLATT <br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0006"> CHAPTER
VI. </a> ROOSEVELT BECOMES PRESIDENT <br /><br /> <a
href="#link2HCH0007"> CHAPTER VII. </a> THE SQUARE DEAL FOR
BUSINESS <br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0008"> CHAPTER VIII. </a> THE
SQUARE DEAL FOR LABOR <br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0009"> CHAPTER IX.
</a> RECLAMATION AND CONSERVATION <br /><br /> <a
href="#link2HCH0010"> CHAPTER X. </a> BEING WISE IN TIME
<br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0011"> CHAPTER XI. </a> RIGHTS,
DUTIES, AND REVOLUTIONS <br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0012"> CHAPTER
XIII. </a> THE TAFT ADMINISTRATION <br /><br /> <a
href="#link2HCH0013"> CHAPTER XIII. </a> THE
PROGRESSIVE PARTY <br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0014"> CHAPTER XIV. </a> THE
GLORIOUS FAILURE <br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0015"> CHAPTER XV. </a> THE
FIGHTING EDGE <br /><br /> <a href="#link2HCH0016"> CHAPTER XVI. </a> THE
LAST FOUR YEARS <br /><br />
</p>
</blockquote>
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0001" id="link2H_4_0001">
<!-- H2 anchor --> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h1>
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIMES
</h1>
<p>
<a name="link2HCH0001" id="link2HCH0001">
<!-- H2 anchor --> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER I. THE YOUNG FIGHTER
</h2>
<p>
There is a line of Browning's that should stand as epitaph for Theodore
Roosevelt: "I WAS EVER A FIGHTER." That was the essence of the man, that
the keynote of his career. He met everything in life with a challenge. If
it was righteous, he fought for it; if it was evil, he hurled the full
weight of his finality against it. He never capitulated, never
sidestepped, never fought foul. He carried the fight to the enemy.
</p>
<p>
His first fight was for health and bodily vigor. It began at the age of
nine. Physically he was a weakling, his thin and ill-developed body racked
with asthma. But it was only the physical power that was wanting, never
the intellectual or the spiritual. He owed to his father, the first
Theodore, the wise counsel that launched him on his determined contest
against ill health. On the third floor of the house on East Twentieth
Street in New York where he was born, October 27, 1858, his father had
constructed an outdoor gymnasium, fitted with all the usual paraphernalia.
It was an impressive moment, Roosevelt used to say in later years, when
his father first led him into that gymnasium and said to him, "Theodore,
you have the brains, but brains are of comparatively little use without
the body; you have got to make your body, and it lies with you to make it.
It's dull, hard work, but you can do it." The boy knew that his father was
right; and he set those white, powerful teeth of his and took up the
drudgery of daily, monotonous exercise with bars and rings and weights. "I
can see him now," says his sister, "faithfully going through various
exercises, at different times of the day, to broaden the chest narrowed by
this terrible shortness of breath, to make the limbs and back strong, and
able to bear the weight of what was coming to him later in life."
</p>
<p>
All through his boyhood the young Theodore Roosevelt kept up his fight for
strength. He was too delicate to attend school, and was taught by private
tutors. He spent many of his summers, and sometimes some of the winter
months, in the woods of Maine. These outings he thoroughly enjoyed, but it
is certain that the main motive which sent him into the rough life of the
woods to hunt and tramp, to paddle and row and swing an axe, was the
obstinate determination to make himself physically fit.
</p>
<p>
His fight for bodily power went on through his college course at Harvard
and during the years that he spent in ranch life in the West. He was
always intensely interested in boxing, although he was never of anything
like championship caliber in the ring. His first impulse to learn to
defend himself with his hands had a characteristic birth.
</p>
<p>
During one of his periodical attacks of asthma he was sent alone to
Moosehead Lake in Maine. On the stagecoach that took him the last stage of
the journey he met two boys of about his own age. They quickly found, he
says, in his "Autobiography", that he was "a foreordained and predestined
victim" for their rough teasing, and they "industriously proceeded to make
life miserable" for their fellow traveler. At last young Roosevelt could
endure their persecutions no loner, and tried to fight. Great was his
discomfiture when he discovered that either of them alone could handle him
"with easy contempt." They hurt him little, but, what was doubtless far
more humiliating, they prevented him from doing any damage whatever in
return.
</p>
<p>
The experience taught the boy, better than any good advice could have
done, that he must learn to defend himself. Since he had little natural
prowess, he realized that he must supply its place by training. He secured
his father's approval for a course of boxing lessons, upon which he
entered at once. He has described himself as a "painfully slow and awkward
pupil," who worked for two or three years before he made any perceptible
progress.
</p>
<p>
In college Roosevelt kept at boxing practice. Even in those days no
antagonist, no matter how much his superior, ever made him "quit." In his
ranching days, that training with his fists stood him in good stead. Those
were still primitive days out in the Dakotas, though now, as Roosevelt has
said, that land of the West has "'gone, gone with the lost Atlantis,' gone
to the isle of ghosts and of strange dead memories." A man needed to be
able to take care of himself in that Wild West then. Roosevelt had many
stirring experiences but only one that he called "serious trouble."
</p>
<p>
He was out after lost horses and came to a primitive little hotel,
consisting of a bar-room, a dining-room, a lean-to kitchen, and above a
loft with fifteen or twenty beds in it. When he entered the bar-room late
in the evening—it was a cold night and there was nowhere else to go—a
would-be "bad man," with a cocked revolver in each hand, was striding up
and down the floor, talking with crude profanity. There were several
bullet holes in the clock face, at which he had evidently been shooting.
This bully greeted the newcomer as "Four Eyes," in reference to his
spectacles, and announced, "Four Eyes is going to treat." Roosevelt joined
in the laugh that followed and sat down behind the stove, thinking to
escape notice. But the "bad man" followed him, and in spite of Roosevelt's
attempt to pass the matter over as a joke, stood over him, with a gun in
each hand and using the foulest language. "He was foolish," said
Roosevelt, in describing the incident, "to stand so near, and moreover,
his heels were closer together, so that his position was unstable." When
he repeated his demand that Four Eyes should treat, Roosevelt rose as if
to comply. As he rose he struck quick and hard with his right fist just to
the left side of the point of the jaw, and, as he straightened up hit with
his left, and again with his right. The bully's guns went off, whether
intentionally or involuntarily no one ever knew. His head struck the
corner of the bar as he fell, and he lay senseless. "When my assailant
came to," said Roosevelt, "he went down to the station and left on a
freight." It was eminently characteristic of Roosevelt that he tried his
best to avoid trouble, but that, when he could not avoid it honorably, he
took care to make it "serious trouble" for the other fellow.
</p>
<p>
Even after he became President, Roosevelt liked to box, until an accident,
of which for many years only his intimate friends were aware, convinced
him of the unwisdom of the game for a man of his age and optical
disabilities. A young artillery captain, with whom he was boxing in the
White House, cross-countered him on the left eye, and the blow broke the
little blood-vessels. Ever afterward, the sight of that eye was dim; and,
as he said, "if it had been the right eye I should have been entirely
unable to shoot." To "a mighty hunter before the Lord" like Theodore
Roosevelt, such a result would have been a cardinal calamity.
</p>
<p>
By the time his experiences in the West were over, Roosevelt's fight for
health had achieved its purpose. Bill Sewall, the woodsman who had
introduced the young Roosevelt to the life of the out-of-doors in Maine,
and who afterward went out West with him to take up the cattle business,
offers this testimony: "He went to Dakota a frail young man, suffering
from asthma and stomach trouble. When he got back into the world again, he
was as husky as almost any man I have ever seen who wasn't dependent on
his arms for his livelihood. He weighed one hundred and fifty pounds, and
was clear bone, muscle, and grit."
</p>
<p>
This battle won by the force of sheer determination, the young Roosevelt
never ceased fighting. He knew that the man who neglects exercise and
training, no matter how perfect his physical trim, is certain to "go
back." One day many years afterward on Twenty-third Street, on the way
back from an Outlook editorial luncheon, I ran against his shoulder, as
one often will with a companion on crowded city streets, and felt as if it
were a massive oak tree into which I had bumped. Roosevelt the grown man
of hardened physique was certainly a transformation from that "reed shaken
with the wind" of his boyhood days.
</p>
<p>
When Theodore Roosevelt left Harvard in 1880, he plunged promptly into a
new fight—in the political arena. He had no need to earn his living;
his father had left him enough money to take care of that. But he had no
intention or desire to live a life of leisure. He always believed that the
first duty of a man was to "pull his own weight in the boat"; and his
irrepressible energy demanded an outlet in hard, constructive work. So he
took to politics, and as a good Republican ("at that day" he said, "a
young man of my bringing up and convictions, could only join the
Republican party") he knocked at the door of the Twenty-first District
Republican Association in the city of New York. His friends among the New
Yorkers of cultivated taste and comfortable life disapproved of his desire
to enter this new environment. They told him that politics were "low";
that the political organizations were not run by "gentlemen," and that he
would find there saloonkeepers, horse-car conductors, and similar persons,
whose methods he would find rough and coarse and unpleasant. Roosevelt
merely replied that, if this were the case, it was those men and not his
"silk-stocking" friends who constituted the governing class—and that
he intended to be one of the governing class himself. If he could not hold
his own with those who were really in practical politics, he supposed he
would have to quit; but he did not intend to quit without making the
experiment.
</p>
<p>
At every step in his career Theodore Roosevelt made friends. He made them
not "unadvisedly or lightly" but with the directness, the warmth, and the
permanence that were inseparable from the Roosevelt character. One such
friend he acquired at this stage of his progress. In that District
Association, from which his friends had warned him away, he found a young
Irishman who had been a gang leader in the rough-and-tumble politics of
the East Side. Driven by the winter wind of man's ingratitude from Tammany
Hall into the ranks of the opposite party, Joe Murray was at this time one
of the lesser captains in "the Twenty-first." Roosevelt soon came to like
him. He was "by nature as straight a man, as fearless, and as staunchly
loyal," said Roosevelt, "as any one whom I have ever met, a man to be
trusted in any position demanding courage, integrity, and good faith." The
liking was returned by the eager and belligerent young Irishman, though he
has confessed that he was first led to consider Roosevelt as a political
ally from the point of view of his advantages as a vote-getter.
</p>
<p>
The year after Roosevelt joined "the governing class" in Morton Hall, "a
large barn-like room over a saloon," with furniture "of the canonical
kind; dingy benches, spittoons, a dais at one end with a table and chair,
and a stout pitcher for iced water, and on the walls pictures of General
Grant, and of Levi P. Morton," Joe Murray was engaged in a conflict with
"the boss" and wanted a candidate of his own for the Assembly. He picked
out Roosevelt, because he thought that with him he would be most likely to
win. Win they did; the nomination was snatched away from the boss's man,
and election followed. The defeated boss good-humoredly turned in to help
elect the young silk-stocking who had been the instrument of his
discomfiture.
</p>
<p>
<a name="link2HCH0002" id="link2HCH0002">
<!-- H2 anchor --> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER II. IN THE NEW YORK ASSEMBLY
</h2>
<p>
Roosevelt was twice reelected to the Assembly, the second time in 1883, a
year when a Republican success was an outstanding exception to the general
course of events in the State. His career at Albany was marked by a series
of fights for decency and honesty. Each new contest showed him a fearless
antagonist, a hard hitter, and a man of practical common sense and growing
political wisdom. Those were the days of the famous "black horse cavalry"
in the New York Legislature—a group of men whose votes could always
be counted on by the special interests and those corporations whose
managers proceeded on the theory that the way to get the legislation they
wanted, or to block the legislation they did not want, was to buy the
necessary votes. Perhaps one-third of the members of the Legislature,
according to Roosevelt's estimate, were purchasable. Others were timid.
Others again were either stupid or honestly so convinced of the importance
of "business" to the general welfare that they were blind to corporate
faults. But Theodore Roosevelt was neither purchasable, nor timid, nor
unable to distinguish between the legitimate requirements of business and
its unjustifiable demands. He developed as a natural leader of the honest
opposition to the "black horse cavalry."
</p>
<p>
The situation was complicated by what were known as "strike bills." These
were bills which, if passed, might or might not have been in the public
interest, but would certainly have been highly embarrassing to the private
interests involved. The purpose of their introduction was, of course, to
compel the corporations to pay bribes to ensure their defeat. Roosevelt
had one interesting and illuminating experience with the "black horse
cavalry." He was Chairman of the Committee on Cities. The representatives
of one of the great railways brought to him a bill to permit the extension
of its terminal facilities in one of the big cities of the State, and
asked him to take charge of it. Roosevelt looked into the proposed bill
and found that it was a measure that ought to be passed quite as much in
the public interest as is the interest of the railroad. He agreed to stand
sponsor for the bill, provided he were assured that no money would be used
to push it. The assurance was given. When the bill came before his
committee for consideration, Roosevelt found that he could not get it
reported out either favorably or unfavorably. So he decided to force
matters. In accordance with his life-long practice, he went into the
decisive committee meeting perfectly sure what he was going to do, and
otherwise fully prepared.
</p>
<p>
There was a broken chair in the room, and when he took his seat a leg of
that chair was unobtrusively ready to his hand. He moved that the bill be
reported favorably.
</p>
<p>
The gang, without debate, voted "No." He moved that it be reported
unfavorably. Again the gang voted "No." Then he put the bill in his pocket
and announced that he proposed to report it anyhow. There was almost a
riot. He was warned that his conduct would be exposed on the floor of the
Assembly. He replied that in that case he would explain publicly in the
Assembly the reasons which made him believe that the rest of the committee
were trying, from motives of blackmail, to prevent any report of the bill.
The bill was reported without further protest, and the threatened riot did
not come off, partly, said Roosevelt, "because of the opportune production
of the chair-leg." But the young fighter found that he was no farther
along: the bill slumbered soundly on the calendar, and nothing that he
could do availed to secure consideration of it. At last the representative
of the railroad suggested that some older and more experienced leader
might be able to get the bill passed where he had failed. Roosevelt could
do nothing but assent. The bill was put in charge of an "old Parliamentary
hand," and after a decent lapse of time, went through without opposition.
The complete change of heart on the part of the black horsemen under the
new leadership was vastly significant. Nothing could be proved; but much
could be surmised.
</p>
<p>
Another incident of Roosevelt's legislative career reveals the bull-dog
tenacity of the man. Evidence had been procured that a State judge had
been guilty of improper, if not of corrupt, relations with certain
corporate interests. This judge had held court in a room of one of the
"big business" leaders of that time. He had written in a letter to this
financier, "I am willing to go to the very verge of judicial discretion to
serve your vast interests." There was strong evidence that he had not
stopped at the verge. The blood of the young Roosevelt boiled at the
thought of this stain on the judicial ermine. His party elders sought
patronizingly to reassure him; but he would have none of it. He rose in
the Assembly and demanded the impeachment of the unworthy judge. With
perfect candor and the naked vigor that in the years to come was to become
known the world around he said precisely what he meant. Under the genial
sardonic advice of the veteran Republican leader, who "wished to give
young Mr. Roosevelt time to think about the wisdom of his course," the
Assembly voted not to take up his "loose charges." It looked like
ignominious defeat. But the next day the young firebrand was back to the
attack again, and the next day, and the next. For eight days he kept up
the fight; each day the reputation of this contest for a forlorn hope grew
and spread throughout the State. On the eighth day he demanded that the
resolution be voted on again, and the opposition collapsed. Only six votes
were cast against his motion. It is true that the investigation ended in a
coat of whitewash. But the evidence was so strong that no one could be in
doubt that it WAS whitewash. The young legislator, whose party mentors had
seen before him nothing but a ruined career, had won a smashing moral
victory.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt was not only a fighter from his first day in public life to the
last, but he was a fighter always against the same evils. Two incidents
more than a quarter of a century apart illustrate this fact. A bill was
introduced in the Assembly in those earlier days to prohibit the
manufacture of cigars in tenement houses in New York City. It was proposed
by the Cigar-Makers' Union. Roosevelt was appointed one of a committee of
three to investigate the subject. Of the other two members, one did not
believe in the bill but confessed privately that he must support it
because the labor unions were strong in his district. The other, with
equal frankness, confessed that he had to oppose the bill because certain
interests who had a strong hold upon him disapproved it, but declared his
belief that if Roosevelt would look into the matter he would find that the
proposed legislation was good. Politics, and politicians, were like that
in those days—as perhaps they still are in these. The young
aristocrat, who was fast becoming a stalwart and aggressive democrat,
expected to find himself against the bill; for, as he has said, the
"respectable people" and the "business men" whom he knew did not believe
in such intrusions upon the right even of workingmen to do what they would
with their own. The laissez faire doctrine of economic life was good form
in those days.
</p>
<p>
But the only member of that committee that approached the question with an
open mind found that his first impressions were wrong. He went down into
the tenement houses to see for himself. He found cigars being made under
conditions that were appalling. For example, he discovered an apartment of
one room in which three men, two women, and several children—the
members of two families and a male boarder—ate, slept, lived, and
made cigars. "The tobacco was stowed about everywhere, alongside the foul
bedding, and in a corner where there were scraps of food." These
conditions were not exceptional; they were only a little worse than was
usual.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt did not oppose the bill; he fought for it and it passed. Then he
appeared before Governor Cleveland to argue for it on behalf of the
Cigar-Makers' Union. The Governor hesitated, but finally signed it. The
Court of Appeals declared it unconstitutional, in a smug and well-fed
decision, which spoke unctuously of the "hallowed" influences of the
"home." It was a wicked decision, because it was purely academic, and was
removed as far as the fixed stars from the actual facts of life. But it
had one good result. It began the making of Theodore Roosevelt into a
champion of social justice, for, as he himself said, it was this case
which first waked him "to a dim and partial understanding of the fact that
the courts were not necessarily the best judges of what should be done to
better social and industrial conditions."
</p>
<p>
When, a quarter of a century later, Roosevelt left the Presidency and
became Contributing Editor of The Outlook, almost his first contribution
to that journal was entitled "A Judicial Experience." It told the story of
this law and its annulment by the court. Mr. William Travers Jerome wrote
a letter to The Outlook, taking Roosevelt sharply to task for his
criticism of the court. It fell to the happy lot of the writer as a cub
editor to reply editorially to Mr. Jerome. I did so with gusto and with
particularity. As Mr. Roosevelt left the office on his way to the steamer
that was to take him to Africa to hunt non-political big game, he said to
me, who had seen him only once before: "That was bully. You have done just
what my Cabinet members used to do for me in Washington. When a question
rose that demanded action, I used to act. Then I would tell Root or Taft
to find out and tell me why what I had done was legal and justified. Well
done, coworker." Is it any wonder that Theodore Roosevelt had made in that
moment another ardent supporter?
</p>
<p>
Those first years in the political arena were not only a fighting time,
they were a formative time. The young Roosevelt had to discover a
philosophy of political action which would satisfy him. He speedily found
one that suited his temperament and his keen sense of reality. He found no
reason to depart from it to the day of his death. Long afterward he told
his good friend Jacob Riis how he arrived at it. This was the way of it:
</p>
<p>
"I suppose that my head was swelled. It would not be strange if it was. I
stood out for my own opinion, alone. I took the best mugwump stand: my own
conscience, my own judgment, were to decide in all things. I would listen
to no argument, no advice. I took the isolated peak on every issue, and my
people left me. When I looked around, before the session was well under
way, I found myself alone. I was absolutely deserted. The people didn't
understand. The men from Erie, from Suffolk, from anywhere, would not work
with me. 'He won't listen to anybody,' they said, and I would not. My
isolated peak had become a valley; every bit of influence I had was gone.
The things I wanted to do I was powerless to accomplish. What did I do? I
looked the ground over and made up my mind that there were several other
excellent people there, with honest opinions of the right, even though
they differed from me. I turned in to help them, and they turned to and
gave me a hand. And so we were able to get things done. We did not agree
in all things, but we did in some, and those we pulled at together. That
was my first lesson in real politics. It is just this: if you are cast on
a desert island with only a screw-driver, a hatchet, and a chisel to make
a boat with, why, go make the best one you can. It would be better if you
had a saw, but you haven't. So with men. Here is my friend in Congress who
is a good man, a strong man, but cannot be made to believe in some things
which I trust. It is too bad that he doesn't look at it as I do, but he
DOES NOT, and we have to work together as we can. There is a point, of
course, where a man must take the isolated peak and break with it all for
clear principle, but until it comes he must work, if he would be of use,
with men as they are. As long as the good in them overbalances the evil,
let him work with that for the best that can be got."
</p>
<p>
From the moment that he had learned this valuable lesson—and
Roosevelt never needed to learn a lesson twice—he had his course in
public life marked out before him. He believed ardently in getting things
done. He was no theoretical reformer. He would never take the wrong road;
but, if he could not go as far as he wanted to along the right road, he
would go as far as he could, and bide his time for the rest. He would not
compromise a hair's breadth on a principle; he would compromise cheerfully
on a method which did not mean surrender of the principle. He perceived
that there were in political life many bad men who were thoroughly
efficient and many good men who would have liked to accomplish high
results but who were thoroughly inefficient. He realized that if he wished
to accomplish anything for the country his business was to combine decency
and efficiency; to be a thoroughly practical man of high ideals who did
his best to reduce those ideals to actual practice. This was the choice
that he made in those first days, the companionable road of practical
idealism rather than the isolated peak of idealistic ineffectiveness.
</p>
<p>
A hard test of his political philosophy came in 1884 just after he had
left the Legislature. He was selected as one of the four delegates at
large from New York to the Republican National Convention. There he
advocated vigorously the nomination of Senator George F. Edmunds for the
Presidency. But the more popular candidate with the delegates was James G.
Blaine. Roosevelt did not believe in Blaine, who was a politician of the
professional type and who had a reputation that was not immaculate. The
better element among the delegates fought hard against Blaine's
nomination, with Roosevelt wherever the blows were shrewdest. But their
efforts were of no avail. Too many party hacks had come to the Convention,
determined to nominate Blaine, and they put the slate through with a
whoop.
</p>
<p>
Then, every Republican in active politics who was anything but a rubber
stamp politician had a difficult problem to face. Should he support
Blaine, in whom he could have no confidence and for whom he could have no
respect, or should he "bolt"? A large group decided to bolt. They
organized the Mugwump party—the epithet was flung at them with no
friendly intent by Charles A. Dana of the New York Sun, but they made of
it an honorable title—under the leadership of George William Curtis
and Carl Schurz. Their announced purpose was to defeat the Republicans,
from whose ranks they had seceded, and in this attempt they were
successful.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt, however, made the opposite decision. Indeed, he had made the
decision before he entered the Convention. It was characteristic of him
not to wait until the choice was upon him but to look ahead and make up
his mind just which course he would take if and when a certain contingency
arose. I remember that once in the later days at Oyster Bay he said to me,
"They say I am impulsive. It isn't true. The fact is that on all the
important things that may come up for decision in my life, I have thought
the thing out in advance and know what I will do. So when the moment
comes, I don't have to stop to work it out then. My decision is already
made. I have only to put it into action. It looks like impulsiveness. It
is nothing of the sort."
</p>
<p>
So, in 1884, when Roosevelt met his first problem in national politics, he
already knew what he would do. He would support Blaine, for he was a party
man. The decision wounded many of his friends. But it was the natural
result of his political philosophy. He believed in political parties as
instruments for securing the translation into action of the popular will.
He perceived that the party system, as distinguished from the group system
of the continental peoples, was the Anglo-Saxon, the American way of doing
things. He wanted to get things done. There was only one thing that he
valued more than achievement and that was the right. Therefore, until it
became a clean issue between right and wrong, he would stick to the
instrument which seemed to him the most efficient for getting things done.
So he stuck to his party, in spite of his distaste for its candidate, and
saw it go down in defeat.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt never changed his mind about this important matter. He was a
party man to the end. In 1912 he left his old party on what he believed to
be—and what was—a naked moral issue. But he did not become an
independent. He created a new party.
</p>
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<h2>
CHAPTER III. THE CHAMPION OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM
</h2>
<p>
The four years after the Cleveland-Blaine campaign were divided into two
parts for Roosevelt by another political experience, which also resulted
in defeat. He was nominated by the Republicans and a group of independents
for Mayor of New York. His two opponents were Abram S. Hewitt, a business
man of standing who had been inveigled, no one knows how, into lending
respectability to the Tammany ticket in a critical moment, and Henry
George, the father of the Single Tax doctrine, who had been nominated by a
conference of some one hundred and seventy-five labor organizations.
Roosevelt fought his best on a personal platform of "no class or caste"
but "honest and economical government on behalf of the general wellbeing."
But the inevitable happened. Tammany slipped in between its divided
enemies and made off with the victory.
</p>
<p>
The rest of the four years he spent partly in ranch life out in the
Dakotas, partly in writing history and biography at home and in travel.
The life on the ranch and in the hunting camps finished the business, so
resolutely begun in the outdoor gymnasium on Twentieth Street, of
developing a physical equipment adequate for any call he could make upon
it. This sojourn on the plains gave him, too, an intimate knowledge of the
frontier type of American. Theodore Roosevelt loved his fellow men. What
is more, he was always interested in them, not abstractly and in the mass,
but concretely and in the individual. He believed in them. He knew their
strength and their virtues, and he rejoiced in them. He realized their
weaknesses and their softnesses and fought them hard. It was all this that
made him the thoroughgoing democrat that he was. "The average American," I
have heard him say a hundred times to all kinds of audiences, "is a pretty
good fellow, and his wife is a still better fellow." He not only enjoyed
those years in the West to the full, but he profited by them as well. They
broadened and deepened his knowledge of what the American people were and
meant. They made vivid to him the value of the simple, robust virtues of
self-reliance, courage, self-denial, tolerance, and justice. The influence
of those hard-riding years was with him as a great asset to the end of his
life.
</p>
<p>
In the Presidential campaign of 1888, Roosevelt was on the firing line
again, fighting for the Republican candidate, Benjamin Harrison. When Mr.
Harrison was elected, he would have liked to put the young campaigner into
the State Department. But Mr. Blaine, who became Secretary of State, did
not care to have his plain-spoken opponent and critic under him. So the
President offered Roosevelt the post of Civil Service Commissioner.
</p>
<p>
The spoils system had become habitual and traditional in American public
life by sixty years of practice. It had received its first high sanction
in the cynical words of a New York politician, "To the victor belong the
spoils." Politicians looked upon it as a normal accompaniment of their
activities. The public looked upon it with indifference. But finally a
group of irrepressible reformers succeeded in getting the camel's nose
under the flap of the tent. A law was passed establishing a Commission
which was to introduce the merit system. But even then neither the
politicians nor the public, nor the Commission itself, took the matter
very seriously. The Commission was in the habit of carrying on its
functions perfunctorily and unobtrusively. But nothing could be
perfunctory where Roosevelt was. He would never permit things to be done—or
left undone unobtrusively, when what was needed was to obtrude the matter
forcibly on the public mind. He was a profound believer in the value of
publicity.
</p>
<p>
When Roosevelt became Commissioner things began swiftly to happen. He had
two firm convictions: that laws were made to be enforced, in the letter
and in the spirit; and that the only thing worth while in the world was to
get things done. He believed with a hot conviction in decency, honesty,
and efficiency in public as in private life.
</p>
<p>
For six years he fought and infused his fellow Commissioners with some of
his fighting spirit. They were good men but easy-going until the right
leadership came along. The first effort of the Commission under the new
leadership was to secure the genuine enforcement of the law. The backbone
of the merit system was the competitive examination. This was not because
such examinations are the infallible way to get good public servants, but
because they are the best way that has yet been devised to keep out bad
public servants, selected for private reasons having nothing to do with
the public welfare. The effort to make these examinations and the
subsequent appointments of real service to the nation rather than to the
politicians naturally brought the Commission into conflict with many men
of low ideals, both in Congress and without. Roosevelt found a number of
men in Congress—like Senator Lodge, Senator Davis of Minnesota,
Senator Platt of Connecticut, and Congressman (afterward President)
McKinley—who were sincerely and vigorously opposed to the spoils
system. But there were numbers of other Senators and Congressmen who hated
the whole reform—everything connected with it and everybody who
championed it. "Sometimes," Roosevelt said of these men, "to use a legal
phrase, their hatred was for cause, and sometimes it was peremptory—that
is, sometimes the Commission interfered with their most efficient, and
incidentally most corrupt and unscrupulous supporters, and at other times,
where there was no such interference, a man nevertheless had an innate
dislike of anything that tended to decency in government."
</p>
<p>
Conflict with these men was inevitable. Sometimes their opposition took
the form of trying to cut down the appropriation for the Commission.
</p>
<p>
Then the Commission, on Roosevelt's suggestion, would try the effect of
holding no examinations in the districts of the Senators or Congressmen
who had voted against the appropriation. The response from the districts
was instantaneous. Frantic appeals came to the Commission from aspirants
for office. The reply would be suave and courteous. One can imagine
Roosevelt dictating it with a glint in his eye and a snap of the jaw, and
when it was typed, inserting a sting in the tail in the form of an
interpolated sentence in his own vigorous and rugged script. Those added
sentences, without which any typewritten Roosevelt letter might almost be
declared to be a forgery, so uniformly did the impulse to add them seize
him, were always the most interesting feature of a communication from him.
The letter would inform the protesting one that unfortunately the
appropriation had been cut, so that examinations could not be held in
every district, and that obviously the Commission could not neglect the
districts of those Congressmen who believed in the reform and therefore in
the examinations. The logical next step for the hungry aspirant was to
transfer the attack to his Congressman or Senator. In the long run, by
this simple device of backfiring, which may well have been a reminiscence
of prairie fire days in the West, the Commission obtained enough money to
carry on.
</p>
<p>
There were other forms of attack tried by the spoils-loving legislators.
One was investigation by a congressional committee. But the appearance of
Roosevelt before such an investigating body invariably resulted in a
"bully time" for him and a peculiarly disconcerting time for his
opponents.
</p>
<p>
One of the Republican floor leaders in the House in those days was
Congressman Grosvenor from Ohio. In an unwary moment Mr. Grosvenor
attacked the Commission on the floor of the House in picturesque fashion.
Roosevelt promptly asked that Mr. Grosvenor be invited to meet him before
a congressional committee which was at that moment investigating the
activities of the Commission. The Congressman did not accept the
invitation until he heard that Roosevelt was leaving Washington for his
ranch in the West. Then he notified the committee that he would be glad to
meet Commissioner Roosevelt at one of its sessions. Roosevelt immediately
postponed his journey and met him. Mr. Grosvenor, says Roosevelt in his
Autobiography, "proved to be a person of happily treacherous memory, so
that the simple expedient of arranging his statements in pairs was
sufficient to reduce him to confusion." He declared to the committee, for
instance, that he did not want to repeal the Civil Service Law and had
never said so. Roosevelt produced one of Mr. Grosvenor's speeches in which
he had said, "I will not only vote to strike out this provision, but I
will vote to repeal the whole law." Grosvenor declared that there was no
inconsistency between these two statements. At another point in his
testimony, he asserted that a certain applicant for office, who had, as he
put it, been fraudulently credited to his congressional district, had
never lived in that district or in Ohio, so far as he knew. Roosevelt
brought forth a letter in which the Congressman himself had categorically
stated that the man in question was not only a legal resident of his
district but was actually living there then. He explained, says Roosevelt,
"first, that he had not written the letter; second, that he had forgotten
he had written the letter; and, third, that he was grossly deceived when
he wrote it." Grosvenor at length accused Roosevelt of a lack of humor in
not appreciating that his statements were made "in a jesting way," and
declared that "a Congressman making a speech on the floor of the House of
Representatives was perhaps in a little different position from a witness
on the witness stand." Finally he rose with dignity and, asserting his
constitutional right not to be questioned elsewhere as to what he said on
the floor of the House, withdrew, leaving Roosevelt and the Committee
equally delighted with the opera bouffe in which he had played the leading
part.
</p>
<p>
In the Roosevelt days the Commission carried on its work, as of course it
should, without thought of party. It can be imagined how it made the
"good" Republicans rage when one of the results of the impartial
application system was to put into office from the Southern States a
hundred or two Democrats. The critics of the Commission were equally
non-partisan; there was no politics in spoilsmanship. The case of Mr.
Grosvenor was matched by that of Senator Gorman of Maryland, the
Democratic leader in the Senate. Mr. Gorman told upon the floor of the
Senate the affecting story of "a bright young man from Baltimore," a
Sunday School scholar, well recommended by his pastor, who aspired to be a
letter carrier. He appeared before the Commission for examination, and,
according to Mr. Gorman, he was first asked to describe the shortest route
from Baltimore to China. The "bright young man" replied brightly,
according to Mr. Gorman, that he didn't want to go from Baltimore to
China, and therefore had never concerned himself about the choice of
routes. He was then asked, according to Mr. Gorman, all about the
steamship lines from America to Europe; then came questions in geology,
and finally in chemistry. The Commission thereupon turned the bright young
applicant down. The Senator's speech was masterly. It must have made the
spoilsmen chuckle and the friends of civil service reform squirm. It had
neither of these effects on Roosevelt. It merely exploded him into action
like a finger on a hair-trigger. First of all, he set about hunting down
the facts. Facts were his favorite ammunition in a fight. They have such a
powerful punch. A careful investigation of all the examination papers
which the Commission had set revealed not a single question like those
from which the "bright young man," according to Mr. Gorman, had suffered.
So Roosevelt wrote to the Senator asking for the name of the "bright young
man." There was no response. He also asked, in case Mr. Gorman did not
care to reveal his identity, the date of the examination. Still no reply.
Roosevelt offered to give to any representative whom Mr. Gorman would send
to the Commission's offices all the aid he could in discovering in the
files any such questions. The offer was ignored. But the Senator expressed
himself as so shocked at this doubting of the word of his brilliant
protege that he was unable to answer the letter at all.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt thereupon announced publicly that no such questions had ever
been asked. Mr. Gorman was gravely injured by the whole incident. Later he
declared in the Senate that he had received a "very impudent letter" from
the young Commissioner, and that he had been "cruelly" called to account
because he had tried to right a "great wrong" which the Commission had
committed. Roosevelt's retort was to tell the whole story publicly,
closing with this delightful passage:
</p>
<p>
"High-minded, sensitive Mr. Gorman. Clinging, trustful Mr. Gorman. Nothing
could shake his belief in the "bright young man." Apparently he did not
even try to find out his name—if he had a name; in fact, his name
like everything else about him, remains to this day wrapped in the Stygian
mantle of an abysmal mystery. Still less has Mr. Gorman tried to verify
the statements made to him. It is enough for him that they were made. No
harsh suspicion, no stern demand for evidence or proof, appeals to his
artless and unspoiled soul. He believes whatever he is told, even when he
has forgotten the name of the teller, or never knew it. It would indeed be
difficult to find an instance of a more abiding confidence in human nature—even
in anonymous human nature. And this is the end of the tale of the Arcadian
Mr. Gorman and his elusive friend, the bright young man without a name."
</p>
<p>
Even so near the beginning of his career, Roosevelt showed himself
perfectly fearless in attack. He would as soon enter the lists against a
Senator as a Congressman, as soon challenge a Cabinet member as either. He
did not even hesitate to make it uncomfortable for the President to whom
he owed his continuance in office. His only concern was for the honor of
the public service which he was in office to defend.
</p>
<p>
One day he appeared at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Civil
Service Reform Association. George William Curtis was presiding, and
Roosevelt's old friend, George Haven Putnam, who tells the story, was also
present. Roosevelt began by hurling a solemn but hearty imprecation at the
head of the Postmaster General. He went on to explain that his explosive
wrath was due to the fact that that particular gentleman was the most
pernicious of all the enemies of the merit system. It was one of the
functions of the Civil Service Commission, as Roosevelt saw it, to put a
stop to improper political activities by Federal employees. Such
activities were among the things that the Civil Service law was intended
to prevent. They strengthened the hands of the political machines and the
bosses, and at the same time weakened the efficiency of the service.
Roosevelt had from time to time reported to the Postmaster General what
some of the Post Office employees were doing in political ways to the
detriment of the service. His account of what happened was this:
</p>
<p>
"I placed before the Postmaster-General sworn statements in regard to
these political activities and the only reply I could secure was, 'This is
all second-hand evidence.' Then I went up to Baltimore at the invitation
of our good friend, a member of the National Committee, Charles J.
Bonaparte. Bonaparte said that he could bring me into direct touch with
some of the matters complained about. He took me to the primary meetings
with some associate who knew by name the carriers and the customs
officials. I was able to see going on the work of political assessments,
and I heard the instructions given to the carriers and others in regard to
the moneys that they were to collect. I got the names of some of these men
recorded in my memorandum book. I then went back to Washington, swore
myself in as a witness before myself as Commissioner, and sent the sworn
statement to the Postmaster-General with the word, 'This at least is
firsthand evidence.' I still got no reply, and after waiting a few days, I
put the whole material before the President with a report. This report has
been pigeonholed by the President, and I have now come to New York to see
what can be done to get the evidence before the public. You will
understand that the head of a department, having made a report to the
President, can do nothing further with the material until the President
permits."
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt went back to Washington with the sage advice to ask the Civil
Service Committee of the House to call upon him to give evidence in regard
to the working of the Civil Service Act. He could then get into the record
his first-hand evidence as well as a general statement of the bad
practices which were going on. This evidence, when printed as a report of
the congressional committee, could be circulated by the Association.
Roosevelt bettered the advice by asking to have the Postmaster General
called before the committee at the same time as himself. This was done,
but that timid politician replied to the Chairman of the committee that
"he would hold himself at the service of the Committee for any date on
which Mr. Roosevelt was not to be present." The politicians with uneasy
consciences were getting a little wary about face-to-face encounters with
the young fighter. Nevertheless Roosevelt's testimony was given and
circulated broadcast, as Major Putnam writes, "much to the dissatisfaction
of the Postmaster General and probably of the President."
</p>
<p>
The six years which Roosevelt spent on the Civil Service Commission were
for him years of splendid training in the methods and practices of
political life. What he learned then stood him in good stead when he came
to the Presidency. Those years of Roosevelt's gave an impetus to the cause
of civil reform which far surpassed anything it had received until his
time. Indeed, it is probably not unfair to say that it has received no
greater impulse since.
</p>
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<h2>
CHAPTER IV. HAROUN AL ROOSEVELT
</h2>
<p>
In 1895, at the age of thirty-six, Roosevelt was asked by Mayor Strong of
New York City, who had just been elected on an anti-Tammany ticket, to
become a member of his Administration. Mayor Strong wanted him for Street
Cleaning Commissioner. Roosevelt definitely refused that office, on the
ground that he had no special fitness for it, but accepted readily the
Mayor's subsequent proposal that he should become President of the Police
Commission, knowing that there was a job that he could do.
</p>
<p>
There was plenty of work to be done in the Police Department. The
conditions under which it must be done were dishearteningly unfavorable.
In the first place, the whole scheme of things was wrong. The Police
Department was governed by one of those bi-partisan commissions which
well-meaning theorists are wont sometimes to set up when they think that
the important thing in government is to have things arranged so that
nobody can do anything harmful. The result often is that nobody can do
anything at all. There were four Commissioners, two supposed to belong to
one party and two to the other. There was also a Chief of Police,
appointed by the Commission, who could not be removed without a trial
subject to review by the courts. The scheme put a premium on intriguing
and obstruction. It was far inferior to the present plan of a single
Commissioner with full power, subject only to the Mayor who appoints him.
</p>
<p>
But there is an interesting lesson to be learned from a comparison between
the New York Police Department as it is today and as it was twenty-five
years ago. Then the scheme of organization was thoroughly bad—and
the department was at its high-water mark of honest and effective
activity. Now the scheme of organization is excellent—but the less
said about the way it works the better. The answer to the riddle is this:
today the New York police force is headed by Tammany; the name of the
particular Tammany man who is Commissioner does not matter. In those days
the head was Roosevelt.
</p>
<p>
There were many good men on the force then as now. What Roosevelt said of
the men of his time is as true today: "There are no better men anywhere
than the men of the New York police force; and when they go bad it is
because the system is wrong, and because they are not given the chance to
do the good work they can do and would rather do." The first fight that
Roosevelt found on his hands was to keep politics and every kind of
favoritism absolutely out of the force. During his six years as Civil
Service Commissioner he had learned much about the way to get good men
into the public service. He was now able to put his own theories into
practice. His method was utterly simple and incontestably right. "As far
as was humanly possible, the appointments and promotions were made without
regard to any question except the fitness of the man and the needs of the
service." That was all. "We paid," he said, "not the slightest attention
to a man's politics or creed, or where he was born, so long as he was an
American citizen." But it was not easy to convince either the politicians
or the public that the Commission really meant what it said. In view of
the long record of unblushing corruption in connection with every activity
in the Police Department, and of the existence, which was a matter of
common knowledge, of a regular tariff for appointments and promotions, it
is little wonder that the news that every one on, or desiring to get on,
the force would have a square deal was received with scepticism. But such
was the fact. Roosevelt brought the whole situation out into the open,
gave the widest possible publicity to what the Commission was doing, and
went hotly after any intimation of corruption.
</p>
<p>
One secret of his success here as everywhere else was that he did things
himself. He knew things of his own knowledge. One evening he went down to
the Bowery to speak at a branch of the Young Men's Christian Association.
There he met a young Jew, named Raphael, who had recently displayed
unusual courage and physical prowess in rescuing women and children from a
burning building. Roosevelt suggested that he try the examination for
entrance to the force. Young Raphael did so, was successful, and became a
policeman of the best type. He and his family, said Roosevelt, "have been
close friends of mine ever since." Another comment which he added is
delicious and illuminating: "To show our community of feeling and our
grasp of the facts of life, I may mention that we were almost the only men
in the Police Department who picked Fitzsimmons as a winner against
Corbett." There is doubtless much in this little incident shocking to the
susceptibilities of many who would consider themselves among the "best"
people. But Roosevelt would care little for that. He was a real democrat;
and to his great soul there was nothing either incongruous or undesirable
in having—and in admitting that he had—close friends in an
East Side Jewish family just over from Russia. He believed, too, in "the
strenuous life," in boxing and in prize fighting when it was clean. He
could meet a subordinate as man to man on the basis of such a personal
matter as their respective judgment of two prize fighters, without
relaxing in the slightest degree their official relations. He was a man of
realities, who knew how to preserve the real distinctions of life without
insisting on the artificial ones.
</p>
<p>
One of the best allies that Roosevelt had was Jacob A. Riis, that
extraordinary man with the heart of a child, the courage of a lion, and
the spirit of a crusader, who came from Denmark as an immigrant, tramped
the streets of New York and the country roads without a place to lay his
head, became one of the best police reporters New York ever knew, and grew
to be a flaming force for righteousness in the city of his adoption. His
book, "How the Other Half Lives", did more to clean up the worst slums of
the city than any other single thing. When the book appeared, Roosevelt
went to Mr. Riis's office, found him out, and left a card which said
simply, "I have read your book. I have come down to help." When Roosevelt
became Police Commissioner, Riis was in the Tribune Police Bureau in
Mulberry Street, opposite Police Headquarters, already a well valued
friend. Roosevelt took him for guide, and together they tramped about the
dark spots of the city in the night hours when the underworld slips its
mask and bares its arm to strike. Roosevelt had to know for himself. He
considered that he had two duties as Police Commissioner: one to make the
police force an honest and effective public servant; the other to use his
position "to help in making the city a better place in which to live and
work for those to whom the conditions of life and labor were hardest."
These night wanderings of "Haroun al Roosevelt," as some one successfully
ticketed him in allusion to the great Caliph's similar expeditions, were
powerful aids to the tightening up of discipline and to the encouragement
of good work by patrolmen and roundsmen. The unfaithful or the easy-going
man on the beat, who allowed himself to be beguiled by the warmth and
cheer of a saloon back-room, or to wander away from his duty for his own
purposes, was likely to be confronted by the black slouch hat and the
gleaming spectacles of a tough-set figure that he knew as the embodiment
of relentless justice. But the faithful knew no less surely that he was
their best friend and champion.
</p>
<p>
In the old days of "the system," not only appointment to the force and
promotion, but recognition of exceptional achievement went by favor. The
policeman who risked his life in the pursuit of duty and accomplished some
big thing against great odds could not be sure of the reward to which he
was entitled unless he had political pull. It was even the rule in the
Department that the officer who spoiled his uniform in rescuing man,
woman, or child from the waters of the river must get a new one at his own
expense. "The system" knew neither justice nor fair play. It knew nothing
but the cynical phrase of Richard Croker, Tammany Hall's famous boss, "my
own pocket all the time." But Roosevelt changed all that. He had not been
in Mulberry Street a month before that despicable rule about the uniform
was blotted out. His whole term of office on the Police Board was marked
by acts of recognition of bravery and faithful service. Many times he had
to dig the facts out for himself or ran upon them by accident. There was
no practice in the Department of recording the good work done by the men
on the force so that whoever would might read.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt enjoyed this part of his task heartily. He believed vigorously
in courage, hardihood, and daring. What is more, he believed with his
whole soul in men. It filled him with pure joy when he discovered a man of
the true stalwart breed who held his own life as nothing when his duty was
at stake.
</p>
<p>
During his two years' service, he and his fellow Commissioners singled out
more than a hundred men for special mention because of some feat of
heroism. Two cases which he describes in his "Autobiography" are typical
of the rest. One was that of an old fellow, a veteran of the Civil War,
who was a roundsman. Roosevelt noticed one day that he had saved a woman
from drowning and called him before him to investigate the matter. The
veteran officer was not a little nervous and agitated as he produced his
record. He had grown gray in the service and had performed feat after feat
of heroism; but his complete lack of political backing had kept him from
further promotion. In twenty-two years on the force he had saved some
twenty-five persons from drowning, to say nothing of rescuing several from
burning buildings. Twice Congress had passed special acts to permit the
Secretary of the Treasury to give him a medal for distinguished gallantry
in saving life. He had received other medals from the Life Saving Society
and from the Police Department itself. The one thing that he could not
achieve was adequate promotion, although his record was spotless. When
Roosevelt's attention was attracted to him, he received his promotion then
and there. "It may be worth mentioning," says Roosevelt, "that he kept on
saving life after he was given his sergeantcy."
</p>
<p>
The other case was that of a patrolman who seemed to have fallen into the
habit of catching burglars. Roosevelt noticed that he caught two in
successive weeks, the second time under unusual conditions. The policeman
saw the burglar emerging from a house soon after midnight and gave chase.
The fugitive ran toward Park Avenue. The New York Central Railroad runs
under that avenue, and there is a succession of openings in the top of the
tunnel. The burglar took a desperate chance by dropping through one of the
openings, at the imminent risk of breaking his neck. "Now the burglar,"
says Roosevelt, "was running for his liberty, and it was the part of
wisdom for him to imperil life and limb; but the policeman was merely
doing his duty, and nobody could have blamed him for not taking the jump.
However, he jumped; and in this particular case the hand of the Lord was
heavy upon the unrighteous. The burglar had the breath knocked out of him,
and the 'cop' didn't. When his victim could walk, the officer trotted him
around to the station house." When Roosevelt had discovered that the
patrolman's record showed him to be sober, trustworthy, and strictly
attentive to duty, he secured his promotion at once.
</p>
<p>
So the Police Commission, during those two years, under the driving force
of Roosevelt's example and spirit, went about the regeneration of the
force whose former proud title of "The Finest" had been besmirched by
those who should have been its champions and defenders. Politics,
favoritism, and corruption were knocked out of the department with all the
thoroughness that the absurd bipartisan scheme of administration would
permit.
</p>
<p>
The most spectacular fight of all was against the illegal operations of
the saloons. The excise law forbade the sale of liquor on Sunday. But the
police, under orders from "higher up," enforced the law with discretion.
The saloons which paid blackmail, or which enjoyed the protection of some
powerful Tammany chieftain, sold liquor on Sunday with impunity. Only
those whose owners were recalcitrant or without influence were compelled
to obey the law.
</p>
<p>
Now a goodly proportion of the population of New York, as of any great
city, objects strenuously to having its personal habits interfered with by
the community. This is just as true now in the days of prohibition as it
was then in the days of "Sunday closing." So when Roosevelt came into
office with the simple, straightforward conviction that laws on the
statute books were intended to be enforced and proceeded to close all the
saloons on Sunday, the result was inevitable. The professional politicians
foamed at the mouth. The yellow press shrieked and lied. The
saloon-keepers and the sharers of their illicit profits wriggled and
squirmed. But the saloons were closed. The law was enforced without fear
or favor. The Sunday sale of liquor disappeared from the city, until a
complaisant judge, ruling upon the provision of the law which permitted
drink to be sold with a meal, decreed that one pretzel, even when
accompanied by seventeen beers, made a "meal." No amount of honesty and
fearlessness in the enforcement of the law could prevail against such
judicial aid and comfort to the cause of nullification. The main purpose
of Roosevelt's fight for Sunday closing, the stopping of blackmail, was,
however, achieved. A standard of law enforcement was set which shows what
can be done even with an unpopular law, and in New York City itself, if
the will to deal honestly and without cowardice is there.
</p>
<p>
So the young man who was "ever a fighter" went on his way, fighting evil
to the death wherever he found it, achieving results, making friends
eagerly and enemies blithely, learning, broadening, growing. Already he
had made a distinct impression upon his times.
</p>
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<h2>
CHAPTER V. FIGHTING AND BREAKFASTING WITH PLATT
</h2>
<p>
From the New York Police Department Roosevelt was called by President
McKinley to Washington in 1897, to become Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
After a year there—the story of which belongs elsewhere in this
volume—he resigned to go to Cuba as Lieutenant-Colonel of the Rough
Riders. He was just as prominent in that war for liberty and justice as
the dimensions of the conflict permitted. He was accustomed in after years
to say with deprecating humor, when talking to veterans of the Civil War,
"It wasn't much of a war, but it was all the war we had." It made him
Governor of New York.
</p>
<p>
When he landed with his regiment at Montauk Point from Cuba, he was met by
two delegations. One consisted of friends from his own State who were
political independents; the other came from the head of the Republican
political machine.
</p>
<p>
Both wanted him as a candidate for Governor. The independents were anxious
to have him make a campaign against the Old Guard of both the standard
parties, fighting Richard Croker, the cynical Tammany boss, on the one
side, and Thomas C. Platt, the "easy boss" of the Republicans, on the
other. Tom Platt did not want him at all. But he did want to win the
election, and he knew that he must have something superlatively fine to
offer, if he was to have any hope of carrying the discredited Republican
party to victory. So he swallowed whatever antipathy he may have had and
offered the nomination to Roosevelt. This was before the days when the
direct primary gave the plain voters an opportunity to upset the
calculations of a political boss.
</p>
<p>
Senator Platt's emissary, Lemuel Ely Quigg, in a two hours' conversation
in the tent at Montauk, asked some straight-from-the-shoulder questions.
The answers he received were just as unequivocal. Mr. Quigg wanted a plain
statement as to whether or not Roosevelt wanted the nomination. He wanted
to know what Roosevelt's attitude would be toward the organization in the
event of his election, whether or not he would "make war" on Mr. Platt and
his friends, or whether he would confer with them and give fair
consideration to their point of view as to party policy and public
interest. In short, he wanted a frank definition of Roosevelt's attitude
towards existing party conditions. He got precisely that. Here it is, in
Roosevelt's own words:
</p>
<p>
"I replied that I should like to be nominated, and if nominated would
promise to throw myself into the campaign with all possible energy. I said
that I should not make war on Mr. Platt or anybody else if war could be
avoided; that what I wanted was to be Governor and not a faction leader;
that I certainly would confer with the organization men, as with everybody
else who seemed to me to have knowledge of and interest in public affairs,
and that as to Mr. Platt and the organization leaders, I would do so in
the sincere hope that there might always result harmony of opinion and
purpose; but that while I would try to get on well with the organization,
the organization must with equal sincerity strive to do what I regarded as
essential for the public good; and that in every case, after full
consideration of what everybody had to say who might possess real
knowledge of the matter, I should have to act finally as my own judgment
and conscience dictated and administer the State government as I thought
it ought to be administered.... I told him to tell the Senator that while
I would talk freely with him, and had no intention of becoming a factional
leader with a personal organization, yet I must have direct personal
relations with everybody, and get their views at first hand whenever I so
desired, because I could not have one man speaking for all." *
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
*Autobiography (Scribner), pp. 271-72.
</pre>
<p>
This was straight Roosevelt talk. It was probably the first time that the
"easy boss" had received such a response to his overtures. History does
not record how he liked it; but at least he accepted it. Subsequent events
suggest that he was either unwilling to believe or incapable of
understanding that the Colonel of the Rough Riders meant precisely what he
said. But Platt found out his mistake. He was not the first or the last
politician to have that experience.
</p>
<p>
So Roosevelt was nominated, made a gruelling campaign, was elected by a
small but sufficient majority, in a year when any other Republican
candidate would probably have been "snowed under," and became Governor
seventeen years after he entered public life. He was now forty years old.
</p>
<p>
The governorship of Theodore Roosevelt was marked by a deal of fine
constructive legislation and administration. But it was even more notable
for the new standard which it set for the relationship in which the
executive of a great State should stand to his office, to the public
welfare, to private interests, and to the leaders of his party. Before
Roosevelt's election there was need for a revision of the standard. In
those days it was accepted as a matter of course, at least in practice,
that the party boss was the overlord of the constitutional representatives
of the people. Appointments were made primarily for the good of the party
and only incidentally in the public interest. The welfare of the party was
closely bound up with the profit of special interests, such as public
service corporations and insurance companies. The prevalent condition of
affairs was shrewdly summed up in a satiric paraphrase of Lincoln's
conception of the American ideal: "Government of the people, by the
bosses, for the special interests." The interests naturally repaid this
zealous care for their well-being by contributions to the party funds.
</p>
<p>
Platt was one of the most nearly absolute party bosses that the American
system of machine politics has produced. In spite of the fair warning
which he had already received, both directly from Roosevelt's own words,
and indirectly from his whole previous career, he was apparently surprised
and unquestionably annoyed when he found that he was not to be the new
Governor's master. The trouble began before Roosevelt took office. At a
conference one day Platt asked Roosevelt if there were any members of the
Assembly whom he would like to have assigned to special committees.
Roosevelt was surprised at the question, as he had not known that the
Speaker of the Assembly, who appoints the committees, had yet been agreed
upon by the Assemblymen-elect. He expressed his surprise. But Mr. Platt
enlightened him, saying, "Of course, whoever we choose as Speaker will
agree beforehand to make the appointments we wish." Roosevelt has recorded
the mental note which he thereupon made, that if they tried the same
process with the Governor-elect they would find themselves mistaken. In a
few days they did try it—and discovered their mistake.
</p>
<p>
Platt asked Roosevelt to come to see him. The Senator being an old and
physically feeble man, Roosevelt went. Platt handed him a telegram from a
certain man, accepting with pleasure his appointment as Superintendent of
Public Works. This was one of the most important appointive offices in the
State Administration. It was especially so at this time in view of the
scandals which had arisen under the previous Administration over the Erie
Canal, the most important responsibility of this department. Now, the man
whom the boss had picked out was an excellent fellow, whom Roosevelt liked
and whom, incidentally, he later appointed to an office which he filled in
admirable fashion. But Roosevelt had no intention of having any one but
himself select the members of his Administration. He said so frankly and
simply. The Senator raged. He was unaccustomed to such independence of
spirit. Roosevelt was courteous but firm. The irresistible force had met
the immovable obstacle—and the force capitulated. The telegraphic
acceptance was not accepted. The appointment was not made.
</p>
<p>
Mr. Platt was a wise man, even if he was arrogant. He knew when he had met
one whom he could not drive. So he did not break with the new Governor.
Roosevelt was wise, too, although he was honest. So he did not break with
the "easy boss." His failure to do so was a disappointment to his
impractical friends and supporters, who were more concerned with
theoretical goodness than with achievement.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt worked with Platt and the party machine whenever he could. He
fought only when he must. When he fought, he won. In Senator Platt's
"Autobiography", the old boss paid this tribute to the young fighter whom
he had made Governor: "Roosevelt had from the first agreed that he would
consult me on all questions of appointments, Legislature or party policy.
He religiously fulfilled this pledge, although he frequently did just what
he pleased."
</p>
<p>
One of the things that particularly grieved the theoretical idealists and
the chronic objectors was the fact that Roosevelt used on occasion to take
breakfast with Senator Platt. They did not seem to think it possible that
a Governor could accept the hospitality of a boss without taking orders
from him. But Mr. Platt knew better, if they did not. He was never under
any illusions as to the extent of his influence with Roosevelt. It
vanished precisely at the point where the selfish interests of the party
and the wishes of the boss collided with the public welfare. The facts
about the famous breakfasts are plain enough. The Governor was in Albany,
the Senator in Washington. Both found it easy to get to New York on
Saturday. It was natural that they should from time to time have matters
to discuss for both were leaders in their party. Mr. Platt was a feeble
man, who found it difficult to get about. Roosevelt was a chivalrous man,
who believed that courtesy and consideration were due to age and weakness.
In addition, he liked to make every minute count. So he used to go,
frankly and openly, to the Senator's hotel for breakfast. He was not one
of that class which he has described as composed of "solemn reformers of
the tom-fool variety, who, according to their custom, paid attention to
the name and not the thing." He cared only for the reality; the appearance
mattered little to him.
</p>
<p>
The tom-fool reformers who criticized Roosevelt for meeting Platt at
breakfast were not even good observers. If they had been, they would have
realized that when Roosevelt breakfasted with Platt, it generally meant
that he was trying to reconcile the Senator to something he was going to
do which the worthy boss did not like. For instance, Roosevelt once wrote
to Platt, who was trying to get him to promote a certain judge over the
head of another judge: "There is a strong feeling among the judges and the
leading members of the bar that Judge Y ought not to have Judge X jumped
over his head, and I do not see my way clear to doing it. I am inclined to
think that the solution I mentioned to you is the solution I shall have to
adopt. Remember the breakfast at Douglas Robinson's at 8:30." It is
probable that the Governor enjoyed that breakfast more than did the
Senator. So it usually was with the famous breakfasts. "A series of
breakfasts was always the prelude to some active warfare."
</p>
<p>
For Roosevelt and Platt still had their pitched battles. The most epic of
them all was fought over the reappointment of the State Superintendent of
Insurance. The incumbent was Louis F. Payn, a veteran petty boss from a
country district and one of Platt's right-hand men. Roosevelt discovered
that Payn had been involved in compromising relations with certain
financiers in New York with whom he "did not deem it expedient that the
Superintendent of Insurance, while such, should have any intimate and
money-making relations." The Governor therefore decided not to reappoint
him. Platt issued an ultimatum that Payn must be reappointed or he would
fight. He pointed out that in case of a fight Payn would stay in anyway,
since the consent of the State Senate was necessary not only to appoint a
man to office but to remove him from office. The Governor replied
cheerfully that he had made up his mind and that Payn would not be
retained. If he could not get his successor confirmed, he would make the
appointment as soon as the Legislature adjourned, and the appointment
would stand at least until the Legislature met again. Platt declared in
turn that Payn would be reinstated as soon as the Legislature reconvened.
Roosevelt admitted the possibility, but assured his opponent that the
process would be repeated as soon as that session came to an end. He added
his conviction that, while he might have an uncomfortable time himself, he
would guarantee that his opponents would be made more uncomfortable still.
Thus the matter stood in the weeks before final action could be taken.
Platt was sure that Roosevelt must yield. But once more he did not know
his man. It is curious how long it takes feudal overlords to get the
measure of a fearless free man.
</p>
<p>
The political power which the boss wielded was reinforced by pressure from
big business interests in New York. Officials of the large insurance
companies adopted resolutions asking for Payn's reappointment. But some of
them privately and hastily assured the Governor that these resolutions
were for public consumption only, and that they would be delighted to have
Payn superseded. Roosevelt strove to make it clear again and again that he
was not fighting the organization as such, and announced his readiness to
appoint any one of several men who were good organization men—only
he would not retain Lou Payn nor appoint any man of his type. The matter
moved along to the final scene, which took place at the Union League Club
in New York.
</p>
<p>
Mr. Platt's chief lieutenant asked for a meeting with the Governor. The
request was granted. The emissary went over the ground thoroughly. He
declared that Platt would never yield. He explained that he was certain to
win the fight, and that he wished to save Roosevelt from such a lamentable
disaster as the end of his political career. Roosevelt again explained at
length his position. After half an hour he rose to go. The "subsequent
proceedings" he described as follows:
</p>
<p>
"My visitor repeated that I had this last chance, and that ruin was ahead
of me if I refused it; whereas, if I accepted, everything would be made
easy. I shook my head and answered, 'There is nothing to add to what I
have already said.' He responded, 'You have made up your mind?' and I
said, 'I have." He then said, 'You know it means your ruin?' and I
answered, 'Well, we will see about that,' and walked toward the door. He
said, 'You understand, the fight will begin tomorrow and will be carried
on to the bitter end.' I said, 'Yes,' and added, as I reached the door,
'Good night.' Then, as the door opened my opponent, or visitor, whichever
one chooses to call him, whose face was as impassive and as inscrutable as
that of Mr. John Hamlin in a poker game, said: 'Hold on! We accept. Send
in so-and-so (the man I had named). The Senator is very sorry, but he will
make no further opposition!' I never saw a bluff carried more resolutely
through to the final limit." *
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* Autobiography (Scribner), pp. 293-94.
</pre>
<p>
One other Homeric fight with the machine was Roosevelt's portion during
his Governorship. This time it was not directly with the boss himself but
with the boss's liegemen in the Legislature. But the kernel of the whole
matter was the same—the selfish interests of big corporations
against the public good.
</p>
<p>
In those days corporations were by common practice privileged creatures.
They were accustomed to special treatment from legislatures and
administrations. But when Roosevelt was elected Governor, he was
determined that no corporation should get a valuable privilege from the
State without paying for it. Before long he had become convinced that they
ought also to pay for those which they already had, free gifts of the
State in those purblind days when corporations were young and coddled. He
proposed that public service corporations doing business on franchises
granted by the State and by municipalities should be taxed upon the value
of the privileges they enjoyed. The corporations naturally enough did not
like the proposal. But it was made in no spirit or tone of antagonism to
business or of demagogic outcry against those who were prosperous. All
that the Governor demanded was a square deal. In his message to the
Legislature, he wrote as follows:
</p>
<p>
"There is evident injustice in the light taxation of corporations. I have
not the slightest sympathy with the outcry against corporations as such,
or against prosperous men of business. Most of the great material works by
which the entire country benefits have been due to the action of
individual men, or of aggregates of men, who made money for themselves by
doing that which was in the interest of the people as a whole. From an
armor plant to a street railway, no work which is really beneficial to the
public can be performed to the best advantage of the public save by men of
such business capacity that they will not do the work unless they
themselves receive ample reward for doing it. The effort to deprive them
of an ample reward merely means that they will turn their energies in some
other direction; and the public will be just so much the loser.... But
while I freely admit all this, it yet remains true that a corporation
which derives its powers from the State should pay to the State a just
percentage of its earnings as a return for the privileges it enjoys."
</p>
<p>
This was quietly reasonable and uninflammatory doctrine. But the
corporations would have none of it. The Republican machine, which had a
majority in the Legislature, promptly repudiated it as well. The campaign
contributions from the corporations were too precious to be jeopardized by
legislation which the corporations did not want. The Governor argued,
pleasantly and cheerfully. The organization balked sullenly. The
corporations grinned knowingly. They had plenty of money with which to
kill the bill, but they did not need to use it. The machine was working
smoothly in their behalf. The bill was introduced and referred to a
committee, and there it lay. No amount of argument and persuasion that the
Governor could bring to bear availed to bring the bill out of hiding. So
he sent in a special message, on almost the last day of the session.
According to the rules of the New York Assembly, when the Governor sends
in a special message on a given measure, the bill must be reported out and
given consideration. But the machine was dazzled with its own arrogance.
The Speaker would not have the message read. Some one actually tore it up.
</p>
<p>
This was more than a crime—it was a blunder. The wise ones in the
organization realized it. They had no desire to have the Governor appeal
to the people with his torn message in his hand. Roosevelt saw the error
too, and laughed happily. He wrote another message and sent it over with
the curt statement that, if it were not read forthwith, he would come over
and read it himself. They knew that he would! So the Speaker read the
message, and the bill was reported and hastily passed on the last day of
the session.
</p>
<p>
Then the complacent corporations woke up. They had trusted the machine too
far. What was more, they had underestimated the Governor's striking power.
Now they came to him, hat in hand, and suggested some fault in the bill.
He agreed with them. They asked if he would not call a special session to
amend the bill. Again he agreed. The session was called, and the
amendments were proposed. In addition, however, certain amendments that
would have frustrated the whole purpose of the bill were suggested. The
organization, still at its old tricks, tried to get back into its
possession the bill already passed. But the Governor was not easily caught
napping. He knew as well as they did that possession of the bill gave him
the whip hand. He served notice that the second bill would contain
precisely the amendments agreed upon and no others. Otherwise he would
sign the first bill and let it become law, with all its imperfections on
its head. Once more the organization and the corporations emulated Davy
Crockett's coon and begged him not to shoot, for they would come down. The
amended bill was passed and became law. But there was an epilogue to this
little drama. The corporations proceeded to attack the constitutionality
of the law on the ground of the very amendment for which they had so
clamorously pleaded. But they failed. The Supreme Court of the United
States, after Roosevelt had become President, affirmed the
constitutionality of the law.
</p>
<p>
The spectacular events of Roosevelt's governorship were incidents in this
conflict between two political philosophies, the one held by Platt and his
tribe, the other by Roosevelt. Extracts from two letters exchanged by the
Senator and the Governor bring the contrast between these philosophies
into clear relief. Platt wrote as follows:
</p>
<p>
"When the subject of your nomination was under consideration, there was
one matter that gave me real anxiety.... I had heard from a good many
sources that you were a little loose on the relations of capital and
labor, on trusts and combinations, and, indeed, on those numerous
questions which have recently arisen in politics affecting the security of
earnings and the right of a man to run his business in his own way, with
due respect, of course, to the Ten Commandments and the Penal Code. Or, to
get at it even more clearly, I understood from a number of business men,
and among them many of your own personal friends, that you entertained
various altruistic ideas, all very well in their way, but which before
they could safely be put into law needed very profound consideration." *
</p>
<p>
* Roosevelt, "Autobiography" (Scribner), p. 299.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt replied that he had known very well that the Senator had just
these feelings about him, and then proceeded to set forth his own view of
the matter. With his usual almost uncanny wisdom in human relations, he
based his argument on party expediency, which he knew Platt would
comprehend, rather than on abstract considerations of right and wrong, in
which realm the boss would be sure to feel rather at sea. He wrote thus:
</p>
<p>
"I know that when parties divide on such issues [as Bryanism] the tendency
is to force everybody into one of two camps, and to throw out entirely men
like myself, who are as strongly opposed to Populism in every stage as the
greatest representative of corporate wealth but who also feel strongly
that many of these representatives of enormous corporate wealth have
themselves been responsible for a portion of the conditions against which
Bryanism is in ignorant revolt. I do not believe that it is wise or safe
for us as a party to take refuge in mere negation and to say that there
are no evils to be corrected. It seems to me that our attitude should be
one of correcting the evils and thereby showing that whereas the
Populists, Socialists, and others do not correct the evils at all, or else
do so at the expense of producing others in aggravated form, on the
contrary we Republicans hold the just balance and set ourselves as
resolutely against improper corporate influence on the one hand as against
demagogy and mob rule on the other."*
</p>
<p>
*Roosevelt, Autobiography (Scribner), p. 300.
</p>
<p>
This was the fight that Roosevelt was waging in every hour of his
political career. It was a middle-of-the-road fight, not because of any
timidity or slack-fibered thinking which prevented a committal to one
extreme or the other, but because of a stern conviction that in the golden
middle course was to be found truth and the right. It was an inevitable
consequence that first one side and then the other—and sometimes
both at once—should attack him as a champion of the other. It became
a commonplace of his experience to be inveighed against by reformers as a
reactionary and to be assailed by conservatives as a radical. But this
paradoxical experience did not disturb him at all. He was concerned only
to have the testimony of his own mind and conscience that he was right.
</p>
<p>
The contests which he had as Governor were spectacular and exhilarating;
but they did not fill all the hours of his working days. A tremendous
amount of spade work was actually accomplished. For example, he brought
about the reenactment of the Civil Service Law, which under his
predecessor had been repealed, and put through a mass of labor legislation
for the betterment of conditions under which the workers carried on their
daily lives. This legislation included laws to increase the number of
factory inspectors, to create a tenement-house commission, to regulate
sweatshop labor, to make the eight-hour and prevailing rate of wages law
effective, to compel railways to equip freight trains with air brakes, to
regulate the working hours of women, to protect women and children from
dangerous machinery, to enforce good scaffolding provisions for workmen on
buildings, to provide seats for the use of waitresses in hotels and
restaurants, to reduce the hours of labor for drug-store clerks, to
provide for the registration of laborers for municipal employment. He
worked hard to secure an employers' liability law, but the time for this
was not yet come.
</p>
<p>
Many of these reforms are now matters of course that no employer would
think of attempting to eliminate. But they were new ideas then; and it
took vision and courage to fight for them.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt would have been glad to be elected Governor for a second term.
But destiny, working through curious instruments, would not have it so. He
left behind him in the Empire State, not only a splendid record of
concrete achievement but something more than that. Jacob Riis has told
how, some time after, an old State official at Albany, who had seen many
Governors come and go, revealed this intangible something. Mr. Riis had
said to him that he did not care much for Albany since Roosevelt had gone,
and his friend replied: "Yes, we think so, many of us. The place seemed
dreary when he was gone. But I know now that he left something behind that
was worth our losing him to get. This past winter, for the first time, I
heard the question spring up spontaneously, as it seemed, when a measure
was up in the Legislature 'Is it right?' Not 'Is it expedient?' not 'How
is it going to help me?' not 'What is it worth to the party?' Not any of
these, but 'Is it right?' That is Roosevelt's legacy to Albany. And it was
worth his coming and his going to have that."
</p>
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<h2>
CHAPTER VI. ROOSEVELT BECOMES PRESIDENT
</h2>
<p>
There was chance in Theodore Roosevelt's coming into the Presidency as he
did, but there was irony as well. An evil chance dropped William McKinley
before an assassin's bullet; but there was a fitting irony in the fact
that the man who must step into his place had been put where he was in
large measure by the very men who would least like to see him become
President.
</p>
<p>
The Republican convention of 1900 was a singularly unanimous body.
President McKinley was renominated without a murmur of dissent. But there
was no Vice-President to renominate, as Mr. Hobart had died in office.
There was no logical candidate for the second place on the ticket. Senator
Platt, however, had a man whom he wanted to get rid of, since Governor
Roosevelt had made himself persona non grata alike to the machine
politicians of his State and to the corporations allied with them. The
Governor, however, did not propose to be disposed of so easily. His
reasons were characteristic. He wrote thus to Senator Platt about the
matter:
</p>
<p>
"I can't help feeling more and more that the Vice-Presidency is not an
office in which I could do anything and not an office in which a man who
is still vigorous and not past middle life has much chance of doing
anything.... Now, I should like to be Governor for another term,
especially if we are able to take hold of the canals in serious shape.
But, as Vice-President, I don't see there is anything I can do. I would be
simply a presiding officer, and that I should find a bore."
</p>
<p>
Now Mr. Platt knew that nothing but "sidetracking" could stop another
nomination of Roosevelt for the Governorship, and this Rough Rider was a
thorn in his flesh. So he went on his subterranean way to have him
nominated for the most innocuous political berth in the gift of the
American people. He secured the cooperation of Senator Quay of
Pennsylvania and another boss or two of the same indelible stripe; but all
their political strength would not have accomplished the desired result
without assistance from quite a different source. Roosevelt had already
achieved great popularity in the Middle and the Far West for the very
reasons which made Mr. Platt want him out of the way. So, while the New
York boss and his acquiescent delegates were stopped from presenting his
name to the convention by Roosevelt's assurance that he would fight a
l'outrance any movement from his own State to nominate him, other
delegates took matters into their own hands and the nomination was finally
made unanimously.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt gave great strength to the Republican ticket in the campaign
which followed. William Jennings Bryan was again the Democratic candidate,
but the "paramount issue" of his campaign had changed since four years
before from free silver to anti-imperialism. President McKinley, according
to his custom, made no active campaign; but Bryan and Roosevelt competed
with each other in whirlwind speaking tours from one end of the country to
the other. The war-cry of the Republicans was the "full dinner pail"; the
keynote of Bryan's bid for popular support was opposition to the
Republican policy of expansion and criticism of Republican tendencies
toward plutocratic control. The success of the Republican ticket was
overwhelming; McKinley and Roosevelt received nearly twice as many
electoral votes as Bryan and Stevenson.
</p>
<p>
When President McKinley was shot at Buffalo six months after his second
term began, it looked for a time as though he would recover. So Roosevelt,
after an immediate visit to Buffalo, went to join his family in the
Adirondacks. The news of the President's impending death found him out in
the wilderness on the top of Mount Tahawus, not far from the tiny Lake
Tear-of-the-Clouds, the source of the Hudson River. A ten-mile dash down
the mountain trail, in the course of which he outstripped all his
companions but one; a wild forty-mile drive through the night to the
railroad, the new President and his single companion changing the horses
two or three times with their own hands; a fast journey by special train
across the State—and on the evening of September 14, 1901, Theodore
Roosevelt took the oath of office as the twenty-sixth President of the
United States.
</p>
<p>
Before taking the oath, Roosevelt announced that it would be his aim "to
continue absolutely unbroken the policy of President McKinley for the
peace, prosperity, and honor of our beloved country." He immediately asked
every member of the late President's Cabinet to continue in office. The
Cabinet was an excellent one, and Mr. Roosevelt found it necessary to make
no other changes than those that came in the ordinary course of events.
The policies were not altered in broad general outline, for Roosevelt was
as stalwart a Republican as McKinley himself, and was as firmly convinced
of the soundness of the fundamentals of the Republican doctrine.
</p>
<p>
But the fears of some of his friends that Roosevelt would seem, if he
carried out his purpose of continuity, "a pale copy of McKinley" were not
justified in the event. They should have known better. A copy of any one
Roosevelt could neither be nor seem, and "pale" was the last epithet to be
applied to him with justice. It could not be long before the difference in
the two Administrations would appear in unmistakable terms. The one which
had just passed was first of all a party Administration and secondly a
McKinley Administration. The one which followed was first, last, and all
the time a Roosevelt Administration. "Where Macgregor sits, there is the
head of the table." Not because Roosevelt consciously willed it so, but
because the force and power and magnetism of his vigorous mind and
personality inevitably made it so. McKinley had been a great harmonizer.
"He oiled the machinery of government with loving and imperturbable
patience," said an observer of his time, "and the wheels ran with an ease
unknown since Washington's first term of office." It had been a constant
reproach of the critics of the former President that "his ear was always
to the ground." But he kept it there because it was his sincere conviction
that it belonged there, ready to apprize him of the vibrations of the
popular will. Roosevelt was the born leader with an innate instinct of
command. He did not scorn or flout the popular will; he had too confirmed
a conviction of the sovereign right of the people to rule for that. But he
did not wait pusillanimously for the popular mind to make itself up; he
had too high a conception of the duty of leadership for that. He esteemed
it his peculiar function as the man entrusted by a great people with the
headship of their common affairs—to lead the popular mind, to
educate it, to inspire it, sometimes to run before it in action, serene in
the confidence that tardy popular judgment would confirm the rightness of
the deed.
</p>
<p>
By the end of Roosevelt's first Administration two of the three groups
that had taken a hand in choosing him for the Vice-Presidency were
thoroughly sick of their bargain. The machine politicians and the great
corporations found that their cunning plan to stifle with the wet blanket
of that depressing office the fires of his moral earnestness and
pugnacious honesty had overreached itself. Fate had freed him and, once
freed, he was neither to hold nor to bind. It was less than two years
before Wall Street was convinced that he was "unsafe," and sadly shook its
head over his "impetuosity." When Wall Street stamps a man "unsafe," the
last word in condemnation has been said. It was an even shorter time
before the politicians found him unsatisfactory. "The breach between Mr.
Roosevelt and the politicians was, however, inevitable. His rigid
insistence upon the maintenance and the extension of the merit system
alone assured the discontent which precedes dislike," wrote another
observer. "The era of patronage mongering in the petty offices ceased
suddenly, and the spoilsmen had the right to say that in this respect the
policy of McKinley had not been followed." It was true. When Roosevelt
became President the civil service was thoroughly demoralized. Senators
and Congressmen, by tacit agreement with the executive, used the
appointing power for the payment of political debts, the reward of party
services, the strengthening of their personal "fences." But within three
months it was possible to say with absolute truth that "a marvelous change
has already been wrought in the morale of the civil service." At the end
of Roosevelt's first term an unusually acute and informed foreign
journalist was moved to write, "No President has so persistently
eliminated politics from his nominations, none has been more unbending in
making efficiency his sole test."
</p>
<p>
There was the kernel of the whole matter: the President's insistence upon
efficiency. Roosevelt, however, did not snatch rudely away from the
Congressmen and Senators the appointing power which his predecessors had
allowed them gradually to usurp. He continued to consult each member of
the Congress upon appointments in that member's State or district and
merely demanded that the men recommended for office should be honest,
capable, and fitted for the places they were to fill.
</p>
<p>
President Roosevelt was not only ready and glad to consult with Senators
but he sought and often took the advice of party leaders outside of
Congress, and even took into consideration the opinions of bosses. In New
York, for instance, the two Republican leaders, Governor Odell and Senator
Platt, were sometimes in accord and sometimes in disagreement, but each
was always desirous of being consulted. A letter written by Roosevelt in
the middle of his first term to a friendly Congressman well illustrates
his theory and practice in such cases:
</p>
<p>
"I want to work with Platt. I want to work with Odell. I want to support
both and take the advice of both. But, of course, ultimately I must be the
judge as to acting on the advice given. When, as in the case of the
judgeship, I am convinced that the advice of both is wrong, I shall act as
I did when I appointed Holt. When I can find a friend of Odell's like
Cooley, who is thoroughly fit for the position I desire to fill, it gives
me the greatest pleasure to appoint him. When Platt proposes to me a man
like Hamilton Fish, it is equally a pleasure to appoint him."
</p>
<p>
This high-minded and common-sense course did not, however, seem to please
the politicians, for dyed-in-the-wool politicians are curious persons to
whom half a loaf is no consolation whatever, even when the other half of
the loaf is to go to the people—without whom there would be no
policies at all. Strangely enough, Roosevelt's policy was equally
displeasing to those of the doctrinaire reformer type, to whom there is no
word in the language more distasteful than "politician," unless it be the
word "practical." But there was one class to whom the results of this
common-sense brand of political action were eminently satisfactory, and
this class made up the third group that had a part in the selection of
Theodore Roosevelt for the Vice-Presidency. The plain people, especially
in the more westerly portions of the country, were increasingly delighted
with the honesty, the virility, and the effectiveness of the Roosevelt
Administration. Just before the convention which was to nominate Roosevelt
for the Presidency to succeed himself, an editorial writer expressed the
fact thus: "The people at large are not oblivious of the fact that, while
others are talking and carping, Mr. Roosevelt is carrying on in the White
House a persistent and never-ending moral struggle with every powerful
selfish and exploiting interest in the country."
</p>
<p>
Oblivious of it? They were acutely conscious of it. They approved of it
with heartiness. They liked it so well that, when the time came to
nominate and elect another President, they swept aside with a mighty rush
not only the scruples and antagonisms of the Republican politicians and
the "special interests" but party lines as well, and chose Roosevelt with
a unanimous voice in the convention and a majority of two and a half
million votes at the polls.
</p>
<p>
As President, Theodore Roosevelt achieved many concrete results. But his
greatest contribution to the forward movement of the times was in the
rousing of the public conscience, the strengthening of the nation's moral
purpose, and the erecting of a new standard of public service in the
management of the nation's affairs. It was no little thing that when
Roosevelt was ready to hand over to another the responsibilities of his
high office, James Bryce, America's best friend and keenest student from
across the seas, was able to say that in a long life, during which he had
studied intimately the government of many different countries, he had
never in any country seen a more eager, high-minded, and efficient set of
public servants, men more useful and more creditable to their country,
than the men then doing the work of the American Government in Washington
and in the field.
</p>
<p>
<a name="link2HCH0007" id="link2HCH0007">
<!-- H2 anchor --> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER VII. THE SQUARE DEAL FOR BUSINESS
</h2>
<p>
During the times of Roosevelt, the American people were profoundly
concerned with the trust problem. So was Roosevelt himself. In this
important field of the relations between "big business" and the people he
had a perfectly definite point of view, though he did not have a cut and
dried programme. He was always more interested in a point of view than in
a programme, for he realized that the one is lasting, the other shifting.
He knew that if you stand on sound footing and look at a subject from the
true angle, you may safely modify your plan of action as often and as
rapidly as may be necessary to fit changing conditions. But if your
footing is insecure or your angle of vision distorted, the most attractive
programme in the world may come to ignominious disaster.
</p>
<p>
There were, broadly speaking, three attitudes toward the trust problem
which were strongly held by different groups in the United States. At one
extreme was the threatening growl of big business, "Let us alone!" At the
other pole was the shrill outcry of William Jennings Bryan and his fellow
exhorters, "Smash the trusts!" In the golden middle ground was the
vigorous demand of Roosevelt for a "square deal."
</p>
<p>
In his first message to Congress, the President set forth his point of
view with frankness and clarity. His comprehensive discussion of the
matter may be summarized thus: The tremendous and highly complex
industrial development which went on with great rapidity during the latter
half of the nineteenth century produced serious social problems. The old
laws and the old customs which had almost the binding force of law were
once quite sufficient to regulate the accumulation and distribution of
wealth. Since the industrial changes which have so enormously increased
the productive power of mankind, these regulations are no longer
sufficient. The process of the creation of great corporate fortunes has
aroused much antagonism; but much of this antagonism has been without
warrant. There have been, it is true, abuses connected with the
accumulation of wealth; yet no fortune can be accumulated in legitimate
business except by conferring immense incidental benefits upon others. The
men who have driven the great railways across the continent, who have
built up commerce and developed manufactures, have on the whole done great
good to the people at large. Without such men the material development of
which Americans are so justly proud never could have taken place. They
should therefore recognize the immense importance of this material
development by leaving as unhampered as is compatible with the public good
the strong men upon whom the success of business inevitably rests. It
cannot too often be pointed out that to strike with ignorant violence at
the interests of one set of men almost inevitably endangers the interests
of all. The fundamental rule in American national life is that, on the
whole and in the long run, we shall all go up or down together. Many of
those who have made it their vocation to denounce the great industrial
combinations appeal especially to the primitive instincts of hatred and
fear. These are precisely the two emotions which unfit men for cool and
steady judgment. The whole history of the world shows that legislation, in
facing new industrial conditions, will generally be both unwise and
ineffective unless it is undertaken only after calm inquiry and with sober
self-restraint.
</p>
<p>
This is one side of the picture as it was presented by the President in
his message to Congress. It was characteristic that this aspect should be
put first, for Roosevelt always insisted upon doing justice to the other
side before he demanded justice for his own. But he then proceeded to set
forth the other side with equal vigor: There is a widespread conviction in
the minds of the American people that the great corporations are in
certain of their features and tendencies hurtful to the general welfare.
It is true that real and grave evils have arisen, one of the chief of them
being overcapitalization, with its many baleful consequences. This state
of affairs demands that combination and concentration in business should
be, not prohibited, but supervised and controlled. Corporations engaged in
interstate commerce should be regulated if they are found to exercise a
license working to the public injury. The first essential in determining
how to deal with the great industrial combinations is knowledge of the
facts. This is to be obtained only through publicity, which is the one
sure remedy we can now invoke before it can be determined what further
remedies are needed. Corporations should be subject to proper governmental
supervision, and full and accurate information as to their operations
should be made public at regular intervals. The nation should assume
powers of supervision and regulation over all corporations doing an
interstate business. This is especially true where the corporation derives
a portion of its wealth from the existence of some monopolistic element or
tendency in its business. The Federal Government should regulate the
activities of corporations doing an interstate business, just as it
regulates the activities of national banks, and, through the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the operations of the railroads.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt was destined, however, not to achieve the full measure of
national control of corporations that he desired. The elements opposed to
his view were too powerful. There was a fortuitous involuntary partnership
though it was not admitted and was even violently denied between the
advocates of "Let us alone!" and of "Smash the trusts!" against the
champion of the middle way. In his "Autobiography" Roosevelt has described
this situation:
</p>
<p>
"One of the main troubles was the fact that the men who saw the evils and
who tried to remedy them attempted to work in two wholly different ways,
and the great majority of them in a way that offered little promise of
real betterment. They tried (by the Sherman law method) to bolster up an
individualism already proved to be both futile and mischievous; to remedy
by more individualism the concentration that was the inevitable result of
the already existing individualism. They saw the evil done by the big
combinations, and sought to remedy it by destroying them and restoring the
country to the economic conditions of the middle of the nineteenth
century. This was a hopeless effort, and those who went into it, although
they regarded themselves as radical progressives, really represented a
form of sincere rural toryism. They confounded monopolies with big
business combinations, and in the effort to prohibit both alike, instead
of where possible prohibiting one and drastically controlling the other,
they succeeded merely in preventing any effective control of either.
</p>
<p>
"On the other hand, a few men recognized that corporations and
combinations had become indispensable in the business world, that it was
folly to try to prohibit them, but that it was also folly to leave them
without thoroughgoing control. These men realized that the doctrine of the
old laissez faire economists, of the believers in unlimited competition,
unlimited individualism, were, in the actual state of affairs, false and
mischievous. They realized that the Government must now interfere to
protect labor, to subordinate the big corporation to the public welfare,
and to shackle cunning and fraud exactly as centuries before it had
interfered to shackle the physical force which does wrong by violence. The
big reactionaries of the business world and their allies and instruments
among politicians and newspaper editors took advantage of this division of
opinion, and especially of the fact that most of their opponents were on
the wrong path; and fought to keep matters absolutely unchanged. These men
demanded for themselves an immunity from government control which, if
granted, would have been as wicked and as foolish as immunity to the
barons of the twelfth century. Many of them were evil men. Many others
were just as good men as were some of these same barons; but they were as
utterly unable as any medieval castle-owner to understand what the public
interest really was. There have been aristocracies which have played a
great and beneficent part at stages in the growth of mankind; but we had
come to a stage where for our people what was needed was a real democracy;
and of all forms of tyranny the least attractive and the most vulgar is
the tyranny of mere wealth, the tyranny of a plutocracy." *
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* Autobiography (Scribner), pp. 424-25.
</pre>
<p>
When Roosevelt became President, there were three directions in which
energy needed to be applied to the solution of the trust problem: in the
more vigorous enforcement of the laws already on the statute books; in the
enactment of necessary new laws on various phases of the subject; and in
the arousing of an intelligent and militant public opinion in relation to
the whole question. To each of these purposes the new President applied
himself with characteristic vigor.
</p>
<p>
The Sherman Anti-Trust law, which had already been on the Federal statute
books for eleven years, forbade "combinations in restraint of trade" in
the field of interstate commerce. During three administrations, eighteen
actions had been brought by the Government for its enforcement. At the
opening of the twentieth century it was a grave question whether the
Sherman law was of any real efficacy in preventing the evils that arose
from unregulated combination in business. A decision of the United States
Supreme Court, rendered in 1895 in the so-called Knight case, against the
American Sugar Refining Company, had, in the general belief, taken the
teeth out of the Sherman law. In the words of Mr. Taft, "The effect of the
decision in the Knight case upon the popular mind, and indeed upon
Congress as well, was to discourage hope that the statute could be used to
accomplish its manifest purpose and curb the great industrial trusts
which, by the acquisition of all or a large percentage of the plants
engaged in the manufacture of a commodity, by the dismantling of some and
regulating the output of others, were making every effort to restrict
production, control prices, and monopolize the business." It was obviously
necessary that the Sherman act, unless it were to pass into innocuous
desuetude, should have the original vigor intended by Congress restored to
it by a new interpretation of the law on the part of the Supreme Court.
Fortunately an opportunity for such a change presented itself with
promptness. A small group of powerful financiers had arranged to take
control of practically the entire system of railways in the Northwest,
"possibly," Roosevelt has said, "as the first step toward controlling the
entire railway system of the country." They had brought this about by
organizing the Northern Securities Company to hold the majority of the
stock of two competing railways, the Great Northern and the Northern
Pacific. At the direction of President Roosevelt, suit was brought by the
Government to prevent the merger. The defendants relied for protection
upon the immunity afforded by the decision in the Knight case. But the
Supreme Court now took more advanced ground, decreed that the Northern
Securities Company was an illegal combination, and ordered its
dissolution.
</p>
<p>
By the successful prosecution of this case the Sherman act was made once
more a potentially valuable instrument for the prevention of the more
flagrant evils that flow from "combinations in restraint of trade." During
the remaining years of the Roosevelt Administrations, this legal
instrument was used with aggressive force for the purpose for which it was
intended. In seven years and a half, forty-four prosecutions were brought
under it by the Government, as compared with eighteen in the preceding
eleven years. The two most famous trust cases, next to the Northern
Securities case and even surpassing it in popular interest, because of the
stupendous size of the corporations involved, were those against the
Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company. These companion
cases were not finally decided in the Supreme Court until the
Administration of President Taft; but their prosecution was begun while
Roosevelt was in office and by his direction. They were therefore a
definite part of his campaign for the solution of the vexed trust problem.
Both cases were decided, by every court through which they passed, in
favor of the Government. The Supreme Court finally in 1911 decreed that
both the Standard Oil and the Tobacco trusts were in violation of the
Sherman act and ordered their dissolution. There could now no longer be
any question that the Government could in fact exercise its sovereign will
over even the greatest and the most powerful of modern business
organizations.
</p>
<p>
The two cases had one other deep significance which at first blush looked
like a weakening of the force of the anti-trust law but which was in
reality a strengthening of it. There had been long and ardent debate
whether the Sherman act should be held to apply to all restraints of trade
or only to such as were unreasonable. It was held by some that it applied
to ALL restraints and therefore should be amended to cover only
unreasonable restraints. It was held by others that it applied to all
restraints and properly so. It was held by still others that it applied
only to unreasonable restraints. But the matter had never been decided by
competent authority. The decision of the Supreme Court in these two
outstanding cases, however, put an end to the previous uncertainty. Chief
Justice White, in his two opinions, laid it down with definiteness that in
construing and applying the law recourse must be had to the "rule of
reason." He made clear the conviction of the court that it was "undue"
restraints of trade which the law forbade and not incidental or
inconsiderable ones. This definitive interpretation of the law, while it
caused considerable criticism at the moment, in ultimate effect so cleared
the air about the Sherman act as effectually to dispose of the demands for
its amendment in the direction of greater leniency or severity.
</p>
<p>
But the proving of the anti-trust law as an effective weapon against the
flagrantly offending trusts, according to Roosevelt's conviction, was only
a part of the battle. As he said, "monopolies can, although in rather
cumbrous fashion, be broken up by lawsuits. Great business combinations,
however, cannot possibly be made useful instead of noxious industrial
agencies merely by lawsuits, and especially by lawsuits supposed to be
carried on for their destruction and not for their control and
regulation." He took, as usual, the constructive point of view. He saw
both sides of the trust question—the inevitability and the
beneficence of combination in modern business, and the danger to the
public good that lay in the unregulated and uncontrolled wielding of great
power by private individuals. He believed that the thing to do with great
power was not to destroy it but to use it, not to forbid its acquisition
but to direct its application. So he set himself to the task of securing
fresh legislation regarding the regulation of corporate activities.
</p>
<p>
Such legislation was not easy to get; for the forces of reaction were
strong in Congress. But several significant steps in this direction were
taken before Roosevelt went out of office. The new Federal Department of
Commerce and Labor was created, and its head became a member of the
Cabinet. The Bureau of Corporations was established in the same
department. These new executive agencies were given no regulatory powers,
but they did perform excellent service in that field of publicity on the
value of which Roosevelt laid so much stress.
</p>
<p>
In the year 1906 the passing of the Hepburn railway rate bill for the
first time gave the Interstate Commerce Commission a measure of real
control over the railways, by granting to the Commission the power to fix
maximum rates for the transportation of freight in interstate commerce.
The Commission had in previous years, under the authority of the act which
created it and which permitted the Commission to decide in particular
cases whether rates were just and reasonable, attempted to exercise this
power to fix in these specific cases maximum rates. But the courts had
decided that the Commission did not possess this right. The Hepburn act
also extended the authority of the Commission over express companies,
sleeping-car companies, pipe lines, private car lines, and private
terminal and connecting lines. It prohibited railways from transporting in
interstate commerce any commodities produced or owned by themselves. It
abolished free passes and transportation except for railway employees and
certain other small classes of persons, including the poor and unfortunate
classes and those engaged in religious and charitable work. Under the old
law, the Commission was compelled to apply to a Federal court on its own
initiative for the enforcement of any order which it might issue. Under
the Hepburn act the order went into effect at once; the railroad must
begin to obey the order within thirty days; it must itself appeal to the
court for the suspension and revocation of the order, or it must suffer a
penalty of $5000 a day during the time that the order was disobeyed. The
act further gave the Commission the power to prescribe accounting methods
which must be followed by the railways, in order to make more difficult
the concealment of illegal rates and improper favors to individual
shippers. This extension and strengthening of the authority of the
Interstate Commerce Commission was an extremely valuable forward step, not
only as concerned the relations of the public and the railways, but in
connection with the development of predatory corporations of the Standard
Oil type. Miss Ida Tarbell, in her frankly revealing "History of the
Standard Oil Company", which had been published in 1904, had shown in
striking fashion how secret concessions from the railways had helped to
build up that great structure of business monopoly. In Miss Tarbell's
words, "Mr. Rockefeller's great purpose had been made possible by his
remarkable manipulation of the railroads. It was the rebate which had made
the Standard Oil trust, the rebate, amplified, systematized, glorified
into a power never equalled before or since by any business of the
country." The rebate was the device by which favored shippers—favored
by the railways either voluntarily or under the compulsion of the threats
of retaliation which the powerful shippers were able to make—paid
openly the established freight rates on their products and then received
back from the railways a substantial proportion of the charges. The
advantage to the favored shipper is obvious. There were other more adroit
ways in which the favoritism could be accomplished; but the general
principle was the same. It was one important purpose—and effect—of
the Hepburn act to close the door to this form of discrimination.
</p>
<p>
One more step was necessary in order to eradicate completely this
mischievous condition and to "keep the highway of commerce open to all on
equal terms." It was imperative that the law relative to these abuses
should be enforced. On this point Roosevelt's own words are significant:
"Although under the decision of the courts the National Government had
power over the railways, I found, when I became President, that this power
was either not exercised at all or exercised with utter inefficiency. The
law against rebates was a dead letter. All the unscrupulous railway men
had been allowed to violate it with impunity; and because of this, as was
inevitable, the scrupulous and decent railway men had been forced to
violate it themselves, under penalty of being beaten by their less
scrupulous rivals. It was not the fault of these decent railway men. It
was the fault of the Government."
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt did not propose that this condition should continue to be the
fault of the Government while he was at its head, and he inaugurated a
vigorous campaign against railways that had given rebates and against
corporations that had accepted—or extorted-them. The campaign
reached a spectacular peak in a prosecution of the Standard Oil Company,
in which fines aggregating over $29,000,000 were imposed by Judge Kenesaw
M. Landis of the United States District Court at Chicago for the offense
of accepting rebates. The Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately determined
that the fine was improperly large, since it had been based on the
untenable theory that each shipment on which a rebate was paid constituted
a separate offense. At the second trial the presiding judge ordered an
acquittal. In spite, however, of the failure of this particular case, with
its spectacular features, the net result of the rebate prosecutions was
that the rebate evil was eliminated for good and all from American railway
and commercial life.
</p>
<p>
When Roosevelt demanded the "square deal" between business and the people,
he meant precisely what he said. He had no intention of permitting justice
to be required from the great corporations without insisting that justice
be done to them in turn. The most interesting case in point was that of
the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company. To this day the action which
Roosevelt took in the matter is looked upon, by many of those extremists
who can see nothing good in "big business," as a proof of his undue
sympathy with the capitalist. But thirteen years later the United States
Supreme Court in deciding the case against the United States Steel
Corporation in favor of the Corporation, added an obiter dictum which
completely justified Roosevelt's action.
</p>
<p>
In the fall of 1907 the United States was in the grip of a financial
panic. Much damage was done, and much more was threatened. One great New
York trust company was compelled to close its doors, and others were on
the verge of disaster. One evening in the midst of this most trying time,
the President was informed that two representatives of the United States
Steel Corporation wished to call upon him the next morning. As he was at
breakfast the next day word came to him that Judge Gary and Mr. Frick were
waiting in the Executive Office. The President went over at once, sending
word to Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, to join him. Judge Gary and
Mr. Frick informed the President that a certain great firm in the New York
financial district was upon the point of failure. This firm held a large
quantity of the stock of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company. The Steel
Corporation had been urged to purchase this stock in order to avert the
failure. The heads of the Steel Corporation asserted that they did not
wish to purchase this stock from the point of view of a business
transaction, as the value which the property might be to the Corporation
would be more than offset by the criticism to which they would be
subjected. They said that they were sure to be charged with trying to
secure a monopoly and to stifle competition. They told the President that
it had been the consistent policy of the Steel Corporation to have in its
control no more than sixty per cent of the steel properties of the
country; that their proportion of those properties was in fact somewhat
less than sixty per cent; and that the acquisition of the holdings of the
Tennessee Company would raise it only a little above that point. They
felt, however, that it would be extremely desirable for them to make the
suggested purchase in order to prevent the damage which would result from
the failure of the firm in question. They were willing to buy the stocks
offered because in the best judgment of many of the strongest bankers in
New York the transaction would be an influential factor in preventing a
further extension of the panic. Judge Gary and Mr. Frick declared that
they were ready to make the purchase with this end in view but that they
would not act without the President's approval of their action.
</p>
<p>
Immediate action was imperative. It was important that the purchase, if it
were to be made, should be announced at the opening of the New York Stock
Exchange at ten o'clock that morning. Fortunately Roosevelt never
shilly-shallied when a crisis confronted him. His decision was
instantaneous. He assured his callers that while, of course, he could not
advise them to take the action, proposed, he felt that he had no public
duty to interpose any objection.
</p>
<p>
This assurance was quite sufficient. The pure chase was made and
announced, the firm in question did not fail, and the panic was arrested.
The immediate reaction of practically the whole country was one of relief.
It was only later, when the danger was past, that critics began to make
themselves heard. Any one who had taken the trouble to ascertain the facts
would have known beyond question that the acquisition of the Tennessee
properties was not sufficient to change the status of the Steel
Corporation under the anti-trust law. But the critics did not want to know
the facts. They wanted—most of them, at least—to have a stick
with which to beat Roosevelt. Besides, many of them did not hold
Roosevelt's views about the square deal. Their belief was that whatever
big business did was ipso facto evil and that it was the duty of public
officials to find out what big business wanted to do and then prevent its
accomplishment.
</p>
<p>
Under a later Administration, Roosevelt was invited to come before a
Congressional investigating committee to explain what he did in this
famous case. There he told the complete story of the occurrence simply,
frankly, and emphatically, and ended with this statement: "If I were on a
sailboat, I should not ordinarily meddle with any of the gear; but if a
sudden squall struck us, and the main sheet jammed, so that the boat
threatened to capsize, I would unhesitatingly cut the main sheet, even
though I were sure that the owner, no matter how grateful to me at the
moment for having saved his life, would a few weeks later, when he had
forgotten his danger and his fear, decide to sue me for the value of the
cut rope. But I would feel a hearty contempt for the owner who so acted."
</p>
<p>
Two laws passed during the second Roosevelt Administration had an
important bearing on the conduct of American business, though in a
different way from those which have already been considered. They were the
Pure Food law, and the Meat Inspection act. Both were measures for the
protection of the public health; but both were at the same time measures
for the control of private business. The Pure Food law did three things:
it prohibited the sale of foods or drugs which were not pure and
unadulterated; it prohibited the sale of drugs which contained opium,
cocaine, alcohol, and other narcotics unless the exact proportion of them
in the preparation were stated on the package; and it prohibited the sale
of foods and drugs as anything else than what they actually were. The Meat
Inspection law required rigid inspection by Government officials of all
slaughterhouses and packing concerns preparing meat food products for
distribution in interstate commerce. The imperative need for the passage
of this law was brought forcibly and vividly to the popular attention
through a novel, "The Jungle", written by Upton Sinclair, in which the
disgraceful conditions of uncleanliness and revolting carelessness in the
Chicago packing houses were described with vitriolic intensity. An
official investigation ordered by the President confirmed the truth of
these timely revelations.
</p>
<p>
These achievements on the part of the Roosevelt Administrations were of
high value. But, after all Roosevelt performed an even greater service in
arousing the public mind to a realization of facts of national
significance and stimulating the public conscience to a desire to deal
with them vigorously and justly. From the very beginning of his
Presidential career he realized the gravity of the problems created by the
rise of big business; and he began forthwith to impress upon the people
with hammer blows the conditions as he saw them, the need for definite
corrective action, and the absolute necessity for such treatment of the
case as would constitute the "square deal." An interesting example of his
method and of the response which it received is to be found in the report
of an address which he made in 1907. It runs thus:
</p>
<p>
"From the standpoint of our material prosperity there is only one other
thing as important as the discouragement of a spirit of envy and hostility
toward business men, toward honest men of means; this is the
discouragement of dishonest business men. [Great applause.]
</p>
<p>
"Wait a moment; I don't want you to applaud this part unless you are
willing to applaud also the part I read first, to which you listened in
silence. [Laughter and applause.] I want you to understand that I will
stand just as straight for the rights of the honest man who wins his
fortune by honest methods as I will stand against the dishonest man who
wins a fortune by dishonest methods. And I challenge the right to your
support in one attitude just as much as in the other. I am glad you
applauded when you did, but I want you to go back now and applaud the
other statement. I will read a little of it over again. 'Every
manifestation of ignorant envy and hostility toward honest men who acquire
wealth by honest means should be crushed at the outset by the weight of a
sensible public opinion.' [Tremendous applause.] Thank you. Now I'll go
on."
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt's incessant emphasis was placed upon conduct as the proper
standard by which to judge the actions of men. "We are," he once said, "no
respecters of persons. If a labor union does wrong, we oppose it as firmly
as we oppose a corporation which does wrong; and we stand equally stoutly
for the rights of the man of wealth and for the rights of the wage-worker.
We seek to protect the property of every man who acts honestly, of every
corporation that represents wealth honestly accumulated and honestly used.
We seek to stop wrongdoing, and we desire to punish the wrongdoer only so
far as is necessary to achieve this end."
</p>
<p>
At another time he sounded the same note—sounded it indeed with a
"damnable iteration" that only proved how deeply it was imbedded in his
conviction.
</p>
<p>
"Let us strive steadily to secure justice as between man and man without
regard to the man's position, social or otherwise. Let us remember that
justice can never be justice unless it is equal. Do justice to the rich
man and exact justice from him; do justice to the poor man and exact
justice from him—justice to the capitalist and justice to the
wage-worker.... I have an equally hearty aversion for the reactionary and
the demagogue; but I am not going to be driven out of fealty to my
principles because certain of them are championed by the reactionary and
certain others by the demagogue. The reactionary is always strongly for
the rights of property; so am I.... I will not be driven away from
championship of the rights of property upon which all our civilization
rests because they happen to be championed by people who champion
furthermore the abuses of wealth.... Most demagogues advocate some
excellent popular principles, and nothing could be more foolish than for
decent men to permit themselves to be put into an attitude of ignorant and
perverse opposition to all reforms demanded in the name of the people
because it happens that some of them are demanded by demagogues."
</p>
<p>
Such an attitude on the part of a man like Roosevelt could not fail to be
misunderstood, misinterpreted, and assailed. Toward the end of his
Presidential career, when he was attacking with peculiar vigor the
"malefactors of great wealth" whom the Government had found it necessary
to punish for their predatory acts in corporate guise, it was gently
intimated by certain defenders of privilege that he was insane. At other
times, when he was insisting upon justice even to men who had achieved
material success, he was placed by the more rabid of the radical opponents
of privilege in the hierarchy of the worshipers of the golden calf. His
course along the middle of the onward way exposed him peculiarly to the
missiles of invective and scorn from the partisans on either side. But
neither could drive him into the arms of the other.
</p>
<p>
The best evidence of the soundness of the strategy with which he assailed
the enemies of the common good, with whirling war-club but with scrupulous
observance of the demands of justice and fair play, is to be found in the
measure of what he actually achieved. He did arouse the popular mind and
sting the popular conscience broad awake. He did enforce the law without
fear or favor. He did leave upon the statute-book and in the machinery of
government new means and methods for the control of business and for the
protection of the general welfare against predatory wealth.
</p>
<p>
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</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER VIII. THE SQUARE DEAL FOR LABOR
</h2>
<p>
It should go without saying that Roosevelt was vigorously and deeply
concerned with the relations between capital and labor, for he was
interested in everything that concerned the men and women of America,
everything that had to do with human relations. From the very beginning of
his public life he had been a champion of the workingman when the
workingman needed defense against exploitation and injustice. But his
advocacy of the workers' rights was never demagogic nor partial. In
industrial relations, as in the relations between business and the
community, he believed in the square deal. The rights of labor and the
rights of capital must, he firmly held, be respected each by the other—and
the rights of the public by both.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt believed thoroughly in trade unions. He realized that one of the
striking accompaniments of the gigantic developments in business and
industry of the past few generations was a gross inequality in the
bargaining relation between the employer and the individual employee
standing alone.
</p>
<p>
Speaking of the great coal strike which occurred while he was President,
he developed the idea in this way:
</p>
<p>
"The great coal-mining and coal-carrying companies, which employed their
tens of thousands, could easily dispense with the services of any
particular miner. The miner, on the other hand, however expert, could not
dispense with the companies. He needed a job; his wife and children would
starve if he did not get one. What the miner had to sell—his labor—was
a perishable commodity; the labor of today—if not sold today was
lost forever. Moreover, his labor was not like most commodities—a
mere thing; it was a part of a living, human being. The workman saw, and
all citizens who gave earnest thought to the matter saw that the labor
problem was not only an economic, but also a moral, a human problem.
Individually the miners were impotent when they sought to enter a wage
contract with the great companies; they could make fair terms only by
uniting into trade unions to bargain collectively. The men were forced to
cooperate to secure not only their economic, but their simple human
rights. They, like other workmen, were compelled by the very conditions
under which they lived to unite in unions of their industry or trade, and
those unions were bound to grow in size, in strength, and in power for
good and evil as the industries in which the men were employed grew larger
and larger." *
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* Autobiography (Scribner), pp. 471-78.
</pre>
<p>
He was fond of quoting three statements of Lincoln's as expressing
precisely what he himself believed about capital and labor. The first of
these sayings was this: "Labor is prior to, and independent of, capital.
Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor
had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much
the higher consideration."
</p>
<p>
This statement, Roosevelt used to say, would have made him, if it had been
original with him, even more strongly denounced as a communist agitator
than he already was! Then he would turn from this, which the capitalist
ought to hear, to another saying of Lincoln's which the workingman ought
to hear: "Capital has its rights, which are as worthy of protection as any
other rights.. .. Nor should this lead to a war upon the owners of
property. Property is the fruit of labor;... property is desirable; it is
a positive good in the world."
</p>
<p>
Then would come the final word from Lincoln, driven home by Roosevelt with
all his usual vigor and fire: "Let not him who is houseless pull down the
house of another, but let him work diligently and build one for himself,
thus by example assuring that his own shall be safe from violence when
built."
</p>
<p>
In these three sayings, Roosevelt declared, Lincoln "showed the proper
sense of proportion in his relative estimates of capital and labor, of
human rights and property rights." Roosevelt's own most famous statement
of the matter was made in an address which he delivered before the
Sorbonne in Paris, on his way back from Africa: "In every civilized
society property rights must be carefully safeguarded. Ordinarily, and in
the great majority of cases, human rights and property rights are
fundamentally and in the long run identical; but when it clearly appears
that there is a real conflict between them, human rights must have the
upper hand, for property belongs to man and not man to property."
</p>
<p>
Several times it happened to Roosevelt to be confronted with the necessity
of meeting with force the threat of violence on the part of striking
workers. He never refused the challenge, and his firmness never lost him
the respect of any but the worthless among the workingmen. When he was
Police Commissioner, strikers in New York were coming into continual
conflict with the police. Roosevelt asked the strike leaders to meet him
in order to talk things over. These leaders did not know the man with whom
they were dealing; they tried to bully him. They truculently announced the
things that they would do if the police were not compliant to their
wishes. But they did not get far in that direction. Roosevelt called a
halt with a snap of his jaws. "Gentlemen!" he said, "we want to understand
one another. That was my object in coming here. Remember, please, that he
who counsels violence does the cause of labor the poorest service. Also,
he loses his case. Understand distinctly that order will be kept. The
police will keep it. Now, gentlemen!" There was surprised silence for a
moment, and then smashing applause. They had learned suddenly what kind of
a man Roosevelt was. All their respect was his.
</p>
<p>
It was after he became President that his greatest opportunity occurred to
put into effect his convictions about the industrial problem. In 1909
there was a strike which brought about a complete stoppage of work for
several months in the anthracite coal regions. Both operators and workers
were determined to make no concession. The coal famine became a national
menace as the winter approached. "The big coal operators had banded
together," so Roosevelt has described the situation, "and positively
refused to take any steps looking toward an accommodation. They knew that
the suffering among the miners was great; they were confident that if
order was kept, and nothing further done by the Government, they would
win; and they refused to consider that the public had any rights in the
matter."
</p>
<p>
As the situation grew more and more dangerous, the President directed the
head of the Federal Labor Bureau to make an investigation of the whole
matter. From this investigation it appeared that the most feasible
solution of the problem was to prevail upon both sides to agree to a
commission of arbitration and promise to accept its findings. To this
proposal the miners agreed; the mine owners insolently declined it.
Nevertheless, Roosevelt persisted, and ultimately the operators yielded on
condition that the commission, which was to be named by the President,
should contain no representative of labor. They insisted that it should be
composed of (1) an officer of the engineer corps of the army or navy, (2)
a man with experience in mining, (3) a "man of prominence, eminent as a
sociologist," (4) a Federal Judge of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
and (5) a mining engineer. In the course of a long and grueling conference
it looked as though a deadlock could be the only outcome, since the mine
owners would have no representative of labor on any terms. But it suddenly
dawned on Roosevelt that the owners were objecting not to the thing but to
the name. He discovered that they would not object to the appointment of
any man, labor man or not, so long as he was not appointed as a labor man
or as a representative of labor. "I shall never forget," he says in his
"Autobiography", "the mixture of relief and amusement I felt when I
thoroughly grasped the fact that while they would heroically submit to
anarchy rather than have Tweedledum, yet if I would call it Tweedledee
they would accept with rapture." All that he needed to do was to "commit a
technical and nominal absurdity with a solemn face." When he realized that
this was the case, Roosevelt announced that he was glad to accept the
terms laid down, and proceeded to appoint to the third position on the
Commission the labor man whom he had wanted from the first to appoint, Mr.
E. E. Clark, the head of the Brotherhood of Railway Conductors. He called
him, however, an "eminent sociologist," adding in his announcement of the
appointment this explanation: "For the purposes of such a Commission, the
term sociologist means a man who has thought and studied deeply on social
questions and has practically applied his knowledge."
</p>
<p>
The Commission as finally constituted was an admirable one. Its report,
which removed every menace to peace in the coal industry, was an
outstanding event in the history of the relations of labor and capital in
the United States.
</p>
<p>
But the most interesting and significant part of Roosevelt's relation to
the great coal strike concerned something that did not happen. It
illustrates his habit of seeing clearly through a situation to the end and
knowing far in advance just what action he was prepared to take in any
contingency that might possibly arise. He was determined that work should
be resumed in the mines and that the country should have coal. He did not
propose to allow the operators to maintain the deadlock by sheer refusal
to make any compromise. In case he could not succeed in making them
reconsider their position, he had prepared a definite and drastic course
of action. The facts in regard to this plan did not become public until
many years after the strike was settled, and then only when Roosevelt
described it in his "Autobiography".
</p>
<p>
The method of action which Roosevelt had determined upon in the last
resort was to get the Governor of Pennsylvania to appeal to him as
President to restore order. He had then determined to put Federal troops
into the coal fields under the command of some first-rate general, with
instructions not only to preserve order but to dispossess the mine
operators and to run the mines as a receiver, until such time as the
Commission should make its report and the President should issue further
orders in view of that report. Roosevelt found an army officer with the
requisite good sense, judgment, and nerve to act in such a crisis in the
person of Major General Schofield. Roosevelt sent for the General and
explained the seriousness of the crisis. "He was a fine fellow," says
Roosevelt in his "Autobiography", "a most respectable-looking old boy,
with side whiskers and a black skull-cap, without any of the outward
aspect of the conventional military dictator; but in both nerve and
judgment he was all right." Schofield quietly assured the President that
if the order was given he would take possession of the mines, and would
guarantee to open them and run them without permitting any interference
either by the owners or by the strikers or by any one else, so long as the
President told him to stay. Fortunately Roosevelt's efforts to bring about
arbitration were ultimately successful and recourse to the novel expedient
of having the army operate the coal mines proved unnecessary. No one was
more pleased than Roosevelt himself at the harmonious adjustment of the
trouble, for, as he said, "It is never well to take drastic action if the
result can be achieved with equal efficiency in less drastic fashion." But
there can be no question that the drastic action would have followed if
the coal operators had not seen the light when they did.
</p>
<p>
In other phases of national life Roosevelt made his influence equally
felt. As President he found that there was little which the Federal
Government could do directly for the practical betterment of living and
working conditions among the mass of the people compared with what the
State Governments could do. He determined, however, to strive to make the
National Government an ideal employer. He hoped to make the Federal
employee feel, just as much as did the Cabinet officer, that he was one of
the partners engaged in the service of the public, proud of his work,
eager to do it efficiently, and confident of just treatment. The Federal
Government could act in relation to laboring conditions only in the
Territories, in the District of Columbia, and in connection with
interstate commerce. But in those fields it accomplished much.
</p>
<p>
The eight-hour law for workers in the executive departments had become a
mere farce and was continually violated by officials who made their
subordinates work longer hours than the law stipulated. This condition the
President remedied by executive action, at the same time seeing to it that
the shirk and the dawdler received no mercy. A good law protecting the
lives and health of miners in the Territories was passed; and laws were
enacted for the District of Columbia, providing for the supervision of
employment agencies, for safeguarding workers against accidents, and for
the restriction of child labor. A workmen's compensation law for
government employees, inadequate but at least a beginning, was put on the
statute books. A similar law for workers on interstate railways was
declared unconstitutional by the courts; but a second law was passed and
stood the test.
</p>
<p>
It was chiefly in the field of executive action, however, that Roosevelt
was able to put his theories into practice. There he did not have to deal
with recalcitrant, stupid, or medieval-minded politicians, as he so often
did in matters of legislation. One case which confronted him found him on
the side against the labor unions, but, being sure that he was right, he
did not let that fact disturb him. A printer in the Government Printing
Office, named Miller, had been discharged because he was a non-union man.
The President immediately ordered him reinstated.
</p>
<p>
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, with
several members of its Executive Council, called upon him to protest. The
President was courteous but inflexible. He answered their protest by
declaring that, in the employment and dismissal of men in the Government
service, he could no more recognize the fact that a man did or did not
belong to a union as being for or against him, than he could recognize the
fact that he was a Protestant or a Catholic, a Jew or a Gentile, as being
for or against him. He declared his belief in trade unions and said that
if he were a worker himself he would unquestionably join a union. He
always preferred to see a union shop. But he could not allow his personal
preferences to control his public actions. The Government was bound to
treat union and non-union men exactly alike. His action in causing Miller
to be reinstated was final.
</p>
<p>
Another instance which illustrated Roosevelt's skill in handling a
difficult situation occurred in 1908 when the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad and certain other lines announced a reduction in wages. The heads
of that particular road laid the necessity for the reduction at the door
of "the drastic laws inimical to the interests of the railroads that have
in the past year or two been enacted." A general strike, with all the
attendant discomfort and disorder, was threatened in retaliation. The
President wrote a letter to the Interstate Commerce Commission, in which
he said:
</p>
<p>
"These reductions in wages may be justified or they may not. As to this
the public, which is a vitally interested party, can form no judgment
without a more complete knowledge of the essential facts and real merits
of the case than it now has or than it can possibly obtain from the
special pleadings, certain to be put forth by each side in case their
dispute should bring about serious interruption to traffic. If the
reduction in wages is due to natural causes, the loss of business being
such that the burden should be, and is, equitably distributed, between
capitalist and wageworker, the public should know it. If it is caused by
legislation, the public and Congress should know it; and if it is caused
by misconduct in the past financial or other operations of any railroad,
then everybody should know it, especially if the excuse of unfriendly
legislation is advanced as a method of covering up past business
misconduct by the railroad managers, or as a justification for failure to
treat fairly the wage-earning employees of the company."
</p>
<p>
The letter closed with a request to the Commission to investigate the
whole matter with these points in view. But the investigation proved
unnecessary; the letter was enough. The proposed reduction of wages was
never heard of again. The strength of the President's position in a case
of this sort was that he was cheerfully prepared to accept whatever an
investigation should show to be right. If the reduction should prove to be
required by natural causes, very well—let the reduction be made. If
it was the result of unfair and unwise legislation, very well—repeal
the legislation. If it was caused by misconduct on the part of railroad
managers, very well—let them be punished. It was hard to get the
better of a man who wanted only the truth, and was ready to act upon it,
no matter which way it cut.
</p>
<p>
In 1910, after his return from Africa, a speaking trip happened to take
him to Columbus, Ohio, which had for months been in the grasp of a street
railway strike. There had been much violence, many policemen had refused
to do their duty, and many officials had failed in theirs. It was an
uncomfortable time for an outsider to come and make a speech. But
Roosevelt did not dodge. He spoke, and straight to the point. His speech
had been announced as on Law and Order. When he rose to speak, however, he
declared that he would speak on Law, Order, and Justice. Here are some of
the incisive things that he said:
</p>
<p>
"Now, the first requisite is to establish order; and the first duty of
every official, in State and city alike, high and low, is to see that
order obtains and that violence is definitely stopped .... I have the
greatest regard for the policeman who does his duty. I put him high among
the props of the State, but the policeman who mutinies, or refuses to
perform his duty, stands on a lower level than that of the professional
lawbreaker.... I ask, then, not only that civic officials perform their
duties, but that you, the people, insist upon their performing them... . I
ask this particularly of the wage-workers, and employees, and men on
strike.... I ask them, not merely passively, but actively, to aid in
restoring order. I ask them to clear their skirts of all suspicion of
sympathizing with disorder, and, above all, the suspicion of sympathizing
with those who commit brutal and cowardly assaults.... What I have said of
the laboring men applies just as much to the capitalists and the
capitalists' representatives.... The wage-workers and the representatives
of the companies should make it evident that they wish the law absolutely
obeyed; that there is no chance of saying that either the labor
organization or the corporation favors lawbreakers or lawbreaking. But let
your public servants trust, not in the good will of either side, but in
the might of the civil arm, and see that law rules, that order obtains,
and that every miscreant, every scoundrel who seeks brutally to assault
any other man—whatever that man's status—is punished with the
utmost severity.... When you have obtained law and order, remember that it
is useless to have obtained them unless upon them you build a
superstructure of justice. After finding out the facts, see that justice
is done; see that injustice that has been perpetrated in the past is
remedied, and see that the chance of doing injustice in the future is
minimized."
</p>
<p>
Now, any one might in his closet write an essay on Law, Order, and
Justice, which would contain every idea that is here expressed. The
essayist might even feel somewhat ashamed of his production on the ground
that all the ideas that it contained were platitudes. But it is one thing
to write an essay far from the madding crowd, and it was quite another to
face an audience every member of which was probably a partisan of either
the workers, the employers, or the officials, and give them straight from
the shoulder simple platitudinous truths of this sort applicable to the
situation in which they found themselves. Any one of them would have been
delighted to hear these things said about his opponents; it was when they
were addressed to himself and his associates that they stung. The best
part of it, however, was the fact that those things were precisely what
the situation needed. They were the truth; and Roosevelt knew it. His
sword had a double edge, and he habitually used it with a sweep that cut
both ways. As a result he was generally hated or feared by the extremists
on both sides. But the average citizen heartily approved the impartiality
of his strokes.
</p>
<p>
In the year 1905 the Governor of Idaho was killed by a bomb as he was
leaving his house. A former miner, who had been driven from the State six
years before by United States troops engaged in putting down industrial
disorder, was arrested and confessed the crime. In his confession he
implicated three officers of the Western Federation of Miners, Moyer,
Haywood, and Pettibone. These three men were brought from Colorado into
Idaho by a method that closely resembled kidnaping, though it subsequently
received the sanction of the United States Supreme Court. While these
prominent labor leaders were awaiting trial, Colorado, Idaho, and Nevada
seethed and burst into eruption. Parts of the mining districts were
transformed into two hostile armed camps. Violence was common. At this
time Roosevelt coupled the name of a giant among American railroad
financiers, with those of Moyer and Haywood, and described them all as
"undesirable citizens." The outbursts of resentment from both sides were
instantaneous and vicious. There was little to choose between them.
Finally the President took advantage of a letter of criticism from a
supporter of the accused labor leaders to reply to both groups of critics.
He referred to the fact that certain representatives of the great
capitalists had protested, because he had included a prominent financier
with Moyer and Haywood, while certain representatives of labor had
protested on precisely the opposite grounds. Then Roosevelt went on to
say:
</p>
<p>
"I am as profoundly indifferent to the condemnation in one case as in the
other. I challenge as a right the support of all good Americans, whether
wage-workers or capitalists, whatever their occupation or creed, or in
whatever portion of the country they live, when I condemn both the types
of bad citizenship which I have held up to reprobation.... You ask for a
'square deal' for Messrs. Moyer and Haywood. So do I. When I say 'square
deal', I mean a square deal to every one; it is equally a violation of the
policy of the square deal for a capitalist to protest against denunciation
of a capitalist who is guilty of wrongdoing and for a labor leader to
protest against the denunciation of a labor leader who has been guilty of
wrongdoing. I stand for equal justice to both; and so far as in my power
lies I shall uphold justice, whether the man accused of guilt has behind
him the wealthiest corporation, the greatest aggregations of riches in the
country, or whether he has behind him the most influential labor
organizations in the country."
</p>
<p>
It should be recorded for the sake of avoiding misapprehension that
Roosevelt's denunciation of Moyer and Haywood was not based on the
assumption that they were guilty of the death of the murdered Governor,
but was predicated on their general attitude and conduct in the industrial
conflicts in the mining fields.
</p>
<p>
The criticisms of Roosevelt because of his actions in the complex
relations of capital and labor were often puerile. For instance, he was
sternly taken to task on one or two occasions because he had labor leaders
lunch with him at the White House. He replied to one of his critics with
this statement of his position: "While I am President I wish the labor man
to feel that he has the same right of access to me that the capitalist
has; that the doors swing open as easily to the wageworker as to the head
of a big corporation—AND NO EASIER."
</p>
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<h2>
CHAPTER IX. RECLAMATION AND CONSERVATION
</h2>
<p>
The first message of President Roosevelt to Congress contained these
words: "The forest and water problems are perhaps the most vital internal
questions of the United States." At that moment, on December 3, 1901, the
impulse was given that was to add to the American vocabulary two new
words, "reclamation" and "conservation," that was to create two great
constructive movements for the preservation, the increase, and the
utilization of natural resources, and that was to establish a new
relationship on the part of the Federal Government to the nation's natural
wealth.
</p>
<p>
Reclamation and conservation had this in common: the purpose of both was
the intelligent and efficient utilization of the natural resources of the
country for the benefit of the people of the country. But they differed in
one respect, and with conspicuous practical effects. Reclamation, which
meant the spending of public moneys to render fertile and usable arid
lands hitherto deemed worthless, trod on no one's toes. It took from no
one anything that he had; it interfered with no one's enjoyment of
benefits which it was not in the public interest that he should continue
to enjoy unchecked. It was therefore popular from the first, and the new
policy went through Congress as though on well-oiled wheels. Only six
months passed between its first statement in the Presidential message and
its enactment into law. Conservation, on the other hand, had to begin by
withholding the natural resources from exploitation and extravagant use.
It had, first of all, to establish in the national mind the principle that
the forests and mines of the nation are not an inexhaustible grab-bag into
which whosoever will may thrust greedy and wasteful hands, and by this new
understanding to stop the squandering of vast national resources until
they could be economically developed and intelligently used. So it was
inevitable that conservation should prove unpopular, while reclamation
gained an easy popularity, and that those who had been feeding fat off the
country's stores of forest and mineral wealth should oppose, with tooth
and nail, the very suggestion of conservation. It was on the first Sunday
after he reached Washington as President, before he had moved into the
White House, that Roosevelt discussed with two men, Gifford Pinchot and F.
H. Newell, the twin policies that were to become two of the finest
contributions to American progress of the Roosevelt Administrations. Both
men were already in the Government service, both were men of broad vision
and high constructive ability; with both Roosevelt had already worked when
he was Governor of New York. The name of Newell, who became chief engineer
of the Reclamation Service, ought to be better known popularly than it is
in connection with the wonderful work that has been accomplished in making
the desert lands of western America blossom and produce abundantly. The
name of Pinchot, by a more fortunate combination of events, has become
synonymous in the popular mind with the conservation movement.
</p>
<p>
On the very day that the first Roosevelt message was read to the Congress,
a committee of Western Senators and Congressmen was organized, under the
leadership of Senator Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, to prepare a
Reclamation Bill. The only obstacle to the prompt enactment of the bill
was the undue insistence upon State Rights by certain Congressmen, "who
consistently fought for local and private interests as against the
interests of the people as a whole." In spite of this shortsighted
opposition, the bill became law on June 17, 1902, and the work of
reclamation began without an instant's delay. The Reclamation Act set
aside the proceeds of the sale of public lands for the purpose of
reclaiming the waste areas of the arid West.
</p>
<p>
Lands otherwise worthless were to be irrigated and in those new regions of
agricultural productivity homes were to be established. The money so
expended was to be repaid in due course by the settlers on the land and
the sums repaid were to be used as a revolving fund for the continuous
prosecution of the reclamation work. Nearly five million dollars was made
immediately available for the work. Within four years, twenty-six
"projects" had been approved by the Secretary of the Interior and work was
well under way on practically all of them. They were situated in fourteen
States—Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska,
Washington, Utah, Wyoming, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, California,
South Dakota. The individual projects were intended to irrigate areas of
from eight thousand to two hundred thousand acres each; and the grand
total of arid lands to which water was thus to be brought by canals,
tunnels, aqueducts, and ditches was more than a million and a half acres.
</p>
<p>
The work had to be carried out under the most difficult and adventurous
conditions. The men of the Reclamation Service were in the truest sense
pioneers, building great engineering works far from the railroads, where
the very problem of living for the great numbers of workers required was
no simple one. On the Shoshone in Wyoming these men built the highest dam
in the world, 310 feet from base to crest. They pierced a mountain range
in Colorado and carried the waters of the Gunnison River nearly six miles
to the Uncompahgre Valley through a tunnel in the solid rock. The great
Roosevelt dam on the Salt River in Arizona with its gigantic curved wall
of masonry 280 feet high, created a lake with a capacity of fifty-six
billion cubic feet, and watered in 1915 an area of 750,000 acres.
</p>
<p>
The work of these bold pioneers was made possible by the fearless backing
which they received from the Administration at Washington. The President
demanded of them certain definite results and gave them unquestioning
support. In Roosevelt's own words, "the men in charge were given to
understand that they must get into the water if they would learn to swim;
and, furthermore, they learned to know that if they acted honestly, and
boldly and fearlessly accepted responsibility, I would stand by them to
the limit. In this, as in every other case, in the end the boldness of the
action fully justified itself."
</p>
<p>
The work of reclamation was first prosecuted under the United States
Geological Survey; but in the spring of 1908 the United States Reclamation
Service was established to carry it on, under the direction of Mr. Newell,
to whom the inception of the plan was due. Roosevelt paid a fine and
well-deserved tribute to the man who originated and carried through this
great national achievement when he said that "Newell's single-minded
devotion to this great task, the constructive imagination which enabled
him to conceive it, and the executive power and high character through
which he and his assistant, Arthur P. Davis, built up a model service—all
these made him a model servant. The final proof of his merit is supplied
by the character and records of the men who later assailed him."
</p>
<p>
The assault to which Roosevelt thus refers was the inevitable aftermath of
great accomplishment. Reclamation was popular, when it was proposed, while
it was being carried out, and when the water began to flow in the ditches,
making new lands of fertile abundance for settlers and farmers. But the
reaction of unpopularity came the minute the beneficiaries had to begin to
pay for the benefits received. Then arose a concerted movement for the
repudiation of the obligation of the settlers to repay the Government for
what had been spent to reclaim the land. The baser part of human nature
always seeks a scapegoat; and it might naturally be expected that the
repudiators and their supporters should concentrate their attacks upon the
head of the Reclamation Service, to whose outstanding ability and
continuous labor they owed that for which they were now unwilling to pay.
But no attack, not even the adverse report of an ill-humored congressional
committee, can alter the fact of the tremendous service that Newell and
his loyal associates in the Reclamation Service did for the nation and the
people of the United States. By 1915 reclamation had added to the arable
land of the country a million and a quarter acres, of which nearly eight
hundred thousand acres were already "under water," and largely under
tillage, producing yearly more than eighteen million dollars' worth of
crops.
</p>
<p>
When Roosevelt became President there was a Bureau of Forestry in the
Department of Agriculture, but it was a body entrusted with merely the
study of forestry problems and principles. It contained all the trained
foresters in the employ of the Government; but it had no public forest
lands whatever to which the knowledge and skill of these men could be
applied. All the forest reserves of that day were in the charge of the
Public Land Office in the Department of the Interior. This was managed by
clerks who knew nothing of forestry, and most, if not all, of whom had
never seen a stick of the timber or an acre of the woodlands for which
they were responsible. The mapping and description of the timber lay with
the Geological Survey. So the national forests had no foresters and the
Government foresters no forests.
</p>
<p>
It was a characteristic arrangement of the old days. More than that, it
was a characteristic expression of the old attitude of thought and action
on the part of the American people toward their natural resources. Dazzled
and intoxicated by the inexhaustible riches of their bountiful land, they
had concerned themselves only with the agreeable task of utilizing and
consuming them. To their shortsighted vision there seemed always plenty
more beyond. With the beginning of the twentieth century a prophet arose
in the land to warn the people that the supply was not inexhaustible. He
declared not only that the "plenty more beyond" had an end, but that the
end was already in sight. This prophet was Gifford Pinchot. His warning
went forth reinforced by all the authority of the Presidential office and
all the conviction and driving power of the personality of Roosevelt
himself. Pinchot's warning cry was startling:
</p>
<p>
"The growth of our forests is but one-third of the annual cut; and we have
in store timber enough for only twenty or thirty years at our present rate
of use.... Our coal supplies are so far from being inexhaustible that if
the increasing rate of consumption shown by the figures of the last
seventy-five years continues to prevail, our supplies of anthracite coal
will last but fifty years and of bituminous coal less than two hundred
years.... Many oil and gas fields, as in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and
the Mississippi Valley, have already failed, yet vast quantities of gas
continue to be poured into the air and great quantities of oil into the
streams. Cases are known in which great volumes of oil were systematically
burned in order to get rid of it.... In 1896, Professor Shaler, than whom
no one has spoken with greater authority on this subject, estimated that
in the upland regions of the States South of Pennsylvania, three thousand
square miles of soil have been destroyed as the result of forest
denudation, and that destruction was then proceeding at the rate of one
hundred square miles of fertile soil per year.. .. The Mississippi River
alone is estimated to transport yearly four hundred million tons of
sediment, or about twice the amount of material to be excavated from the
Panama Canal. This material is the most fertile portion of the richest
fields, transformed from a blessing to a curse by unrestricted erosion....
The destruction of forage plants by overgrazing has resulted, in the
opinion of men most capable of judging, in reducing the grazing value of
the public lands by one-half."
</p>
<p>
Here, then, was a problem of national significance, and it was one which
the President attacked with his usual promptness and vigor. His first
message to Congress called for the unification of the care of the forest
lands of the public domain in a single body under the Department of
Agriculture. He asked that legal authority be granted to the President to
transfer to the Department of Agriculture lands for use as forest
reserves. He declared that "the forest reserves should be set apart
forever for the use and benefit of our people as a whole and not
sacrificed to the shortsighted greed of a few." He supplemented this
declaration with an explanation of the meaning and purpose of the forest
policy which he urged should be adopted: "Wise forest protection does not
mean the withdrawal of forest resources, whether of wood, water, or grass,
from contributing their full share to the welfare of the people, but, on
the contrary, gives the assurance of larger and more certain supplies. The
fundamental idea of forestry is the perpetuation of forests by use. Forest
protection is not an end in itself; it is a means to increase and sustain
the resources of our country and the industries which depend upon them.
The preservation of our forests is an imperative business necessity. We
have come to see clearly that whatever destroys the forest, except to make
way for agriculture, threatens our wellbeing."
</p>
<p>
Nevertheless it was four years before Congress could be brought to the
common-sense policy of administering the forest lands still belonging to
the Government. Pinchot and his associates in the Bureau of Forestry spent
the interval profitably, however, in investigating and studying the whole
problem of national forest resources and in drawing up enlightened and
effective plans for their protection and development. Accordingly, when
the act transferring the National Forests to the charge of the newly
created United States Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture was
passed early in 1905, they were ready for the responsibility.
</p>
<p>
The principles which they had formulated and which they now began to apply
had been summed up by Roosevelt in the statement "that the rights of the
public to the natural resources outweigh private rights and must be given
the first consideration." Until the establishment of the Forest Service,
private rights had almost always been allowed to overbalance public rights
in matters that concerned not only the National Forests, but the public
lands generally. It was the necessity of having this new principle
recognized and adopted that made the way of the newly created Forest
Service and of the whole Conservation movement so thorny. Those who had
been used to making personal profit from free and unrestricted
exploitation of the nation's natural resources would look only with
antagonism on a movement which put a consideration of the general welfare
first.
</p>
<p>
The Forest Service nevertheless put these principles immediately into
practical application. The National Forests were opened to a regulated use
of all their resources. A law was passed throwing open to settlement all
land in the National Forests which was found to be chiefly valuable for
agriculture. Hitherto all such land had been closed to the settler.
Regulations were established and enforced which favored the settler rather
than the large stockowner. It was provided that, when conditions required
the reduction in the number of head of stock grazed in any National
Forest, the vast herds of the wealthy owner should be affected before the
few head of the small man, upon which the living of his family depended.
The principle which excited the bitterest antagonism of all was the rule
that any one, except a bona fide settler on the land, who took public
property for private profit should pay for what he got. This was a new and
most unpalatable idea to the big stock and sheep raisers, who had been
accustomed to graze their animals at will on the richest lands of the
public forests, with no one but themselves a penny the better off thereby.
But the Attorney-General of the United States declared it legal to make
the men who pastured their cattle and sheep in the National Forests pay
for this privilege; and in the summer of 1906 such charges were for the
first time made and collected. The trained foresters of the service were
put in charge of the National Forests. As a result, improvement began to
manifest itself in other ways. Within two years the fire prevention work
alone had completely justified the new policy of forest regulation.
Eighty-six per cent of the fires that did occur in the National Forests
were held down to an area of five acres or less. The new service not only
made rapid progress in saving the timber, but it began to make money for
the nation by selling the timber. In 1905 the sales of timber brought in
$60,000; three years later the return was $850,000.
</p>
<p>
The National Forests were trebled in size during the two Roosevelt
Administrations with the result that there were 194,000,000 acres of
publicly owned and administered forest lands when Roosevelt went out of
office. The inclusion of these lands in the National Forests, where they
were safe from the selfish exploitation of greedy private interests, was
not accomplished without the bitterest opposition. The wisdom of the
serpent sometimes had to be called into play to circumvent the adroit
maneuvering of these interests and their servants in Congress. In 1907,
for example, Senator Charles W. Fulton of Oregon obtained an amendment to
the Agricultural Appropriation Bill forbidding the President to set aside
any additional National Forests in six Northwestern States. But the
President and the Forest Service were ready for this bold attempt to
deprive the public of some 16,000,000 acres for the benefit of land
grabbers and special interests. They knew exactly what lands ought to be
set aside in those States. So the President first unostentatiously signed
the necessary proclamations to erect those lands into National Forests,
and then quietly approved the Agricultural Bill. "The opponents of the
Forest Service," said Roosevelt, "turned handsprings in their wrath; and
dire were their threats against the Executive; but the threats could not
be carried out, and were really only a tribute to the efficiency of our
action."
</p>
<p>
The development of a sound and enlightened forest policy naturally led to
the consideration of a similar policy for dealing with the water power of
the country which had hitherto gone to waste or was in the hands of
private interests. It had been the immemorial custom that the water powers
on the navigable streams, on the public domain, and in the National
Forests should be given away for nothing, and practically without
question, to the first comer. This ancient custom ran right athwart the
newly enunciated principle that public property should not pass into
private possession without being paid for, and that permanent grants,
except for home-making, should not be made. The Forest Service now began
to apply this principle to the water powers in the National Forests,
granting permission for the development and use of such power for limited
periods only and requiring payment for the privilege. This was the
beginning of a general water power policy which, in the course of time,
commended itself to public approval; but it was long before it ceased to
be opposed by the private interests that wanted these rich resources for
their own undisputed use.
</p>
<p>
Out of the forest movement grew the conservation movement in its broader
sense. In the fall of 1907 Roosevelt made a trip down the Mississippi
River with the definite purpose of drawing general attention to the
subject of the development of the national inland waterways. Seven months
before, he had established the Inland Waterways Commission and had
directed it to "consider the relations of the streams to the use of all
the great permanent natural resources and their conservation for the
making and maintenance of permanent homes." During the trip a letter was
prepared by a group of men interested in the conservation movement and was
presented to him, asking him to summon a conference on the conservation of
natural resources. At a great meeting held at Memphis, Tennessee,
Roosevelt publicly announced his intention of calling such a conference.
</p>
<p>
In May of the following year the conference was held in the East Room of
the White House. There were assembled there the President, the
Vice-President, seven Cabinet members, the Supreme Court Justices, the
Governors of thirty-four States and representatives of the other twelve,
the Governors of all the Territories, including Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto
Rico, the President of the Board of Commissioners of the District of
Columbia, representatives of sixty-eight national societies, four special
guests, William Jennings Bryan, James J. Hill, Andrew Carnegie, and John
Mitchell, forty-eight general guests, and the members of the Inland
Waterways Commission. The object of the conference was stated by the
President in these words: "It seems to me time for the country to take
account of its natural resources, and to inquire how long they are likely
to last. We are prosperous now; we should not forget that it will be just
as important to our descendants to be prosperous in their time."
</p>
<p>
At the conclusion of the conference a declaration prepared by the
Governors of Louisiana, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Utah, and South Carolina,
was unanimously adopted. This Magna Charta of the conservation movement
declared "that the great natural resources supply the material basis upon
which our civilization must continue to depend and upon which the
perpetuity of the nation itself rests," that "this material basis is
threatened with exhaustion," and that "this conservation of our natural
resources is a subject of transcendent importance, which should engage
unremittingly the attention of the Nation, the States, and the people in
earnest cooperation." It set forth the practical implications of
Conservation in these words:
</p>
<p>
"We agree that the land should be so used that erosion and soil wash shall
cease; and that there should be reclamation of arid and semi-arid regions
by means of irrigation, and of swamp and overflowed regions by means of
drainage; that the waters should be so conserved and used as to promote
navigation, to enable the arid regions to be reclaimed by irrigation, and
to develop power in the interests of the people; that the forests which
regulate our rivers, support our industries, and promote the fertility and
productiveness of the soil should be preserved and perpetuated; that the
minerals found so abundantly beneath the surface should be so used as to
prolong their utility; that the beauty, healthfulness, and habitability of
our country should be preserved and increased; that sources of national
wealth exist for the benefit of the people, and that monopoly thereof
should not be tolerated."
</p>
<p>
The conference urged the continuation and extension of the forest policies
already established; the immediate adoption of a wise, active, and
thorough waterway policy for the prompt improvement of the streams, and
the conservation of water resources for irrigation, water supply, power,
and navigation; and the enactment of laws for the prevention of waste in
the mining and extraction of coal, oil, gas, and other minerals with a
view to their wise conservation for the use of the people. The declaration
closed with the timely adjuration, "Let us conserve the foundations of our
prosperity."
</p>
<p>
As a result of the conference President Roosevelt created the National
Conservation Commission, consisting of forty-nine men of prominence, about
one-third of whom were engaged in politics, one-third in various
industries, and one-third in scientific work. Gifford Pinchot was
appointed chairman. The Commission proceeded to make an inventory of the
natural resources of the United States. This inventory contains the only
authentic statement as to the amounts of the national resources of the
country, the degree to which they have already been exhausted, and their
probable duration. But with this inventory there came to an end the
activity of the Conservation Commission, for Congress not only refused any
appropriation for its use but decreed by law that no bureau of the
Government should do any work for any commission or similar body appointed
by the President, without reference to the question whether such work was
appropriate or not for such a bureau to undertake. Inasmuch as the
invaluable inventory already made had been almost entirely the work of
scientific bureaus of the Government instructed by the President to
cooperate with the Commission, the purpose and animus of this legislation
were easily apparent. Congress had once more shown its friendship for the
special interests and its indifference to the general welfare.
</p>
<p>
In February, 1909, on the invitation of President Roosevelt, a North
American Conservation Conference, attended by representatives of the
United States, Canada, and Mexico, was held at the White House. A
declaration of principles was drawn up and the suggestion made that all
the nations of the world should be invited to meet in a World Conservation
Conference. The President forthwith addressed to forty-five nations a
letter inviting them to assemble at The Hague for such a conference; but,
as he has laconically expressed it, "When I left the White House the
project lapsed."
</p>
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<h2>
CHAPTER X. BEING WISE IN TIME
</h2>
<p>
Perhaps the most famous of Roosevelt's epigrammatic sayings is, "Speak
softly and carry a big stick." The public, with its instinctive preference
for the dramatic over the significant, promptly seized upon the "big
stick" half of the aphorism and ignored the other half. But a study of the
various acts of Roosevelt when he was President readily shows that in his
mind the "big stick" was purely subordinate. It was merely the ultima
ratio, the possession of which would enable a nation to "speak softly" and
walk safely along the road of peace and justice and fair play.
</p>
<p>
The secret of Roosevelt's success in foreign affairs is to be found in
another of his favorite sayings: "Nine-tenths of wisdom is to be wise in
time." He has himself declared that his whole foreign policy "was based on
the exercise of intelligent foresight and of decisive action sufficiently
far in advance of any likely crisis to make it improbable that we would
run into serious trouble."
</p>
<p>
When Roosevelt became President, a perplexing controversy with Great
Britain over the boundary line between Alaska and Canada was in full
swing. The problem, which had become acute with the discovery of gold in
the Klondike in 1897, had already been considered, together with eleven
other subjects of dispute between Canada and the United States, by a Joint
Commission which had been able to reach no agreement. The essence of the
controversy was this: The treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia
had declared that the boundary, dividing British and Russian America on
that five-hundred-mile strip of land which depends from the Alaskan
elephant's head like a dangling halter rope, should be drawn "parallel to
the windings of the coast" at a distance inland of thirty miles. The
United States took the plain and literal interpretation of these words in
the treaty. The Canadian contention was that within the meaning of the
treaty the fiords or inlets which here break into the land were not part
of the sea, and that the line, instead of following, at the correct
distance inland, the indentations made by these arms of the sea, should
leap boldly across them, at the agreed distance from the points of the
headlands. This would give Canada the heads of several great inlets and
direct access to the sea far north of the point where the Canadian coast
had always been assumed to end. Canada and the United States were equally
resolute in upholding their claims. It looked as if the matter would end
in a deadlock.
</p>
<p>
John Hay, who had been Secretary of State in McKinley's Cabinet, as he now
was in Roosevelt's, had done his best to bring the matter to a settlement,
but had been unwilling to have the dispute arbitrated, for the very good
reason that, as he said, "although our claim is as clear as the sun in
heaven, we know enough of arbitration to foresee the fatal tendency of all
arbitrators to compromise." Roosevelt believed that the "claim of the
Canadians for access to deep water along any part of the Alaskan coast is
just exactly as indefensible as if they should now claim the island of
Nantucket." He was willing, however, to refer the question unconfused by
other issues to a second Joint Commission of six. The commission was duly
constituted. There was no odd neutral member of this body, as in an
arbitration, but merely three representatives from each side. Of the
British representatives two were Canadians and the third was the Lord
Chief Justice of England, Lord Alverstone.
</p>
<p>
But before the Commission met, the President took pains to have conveyed
to the British Cabinet, in an informal but diplomatically correct way, his
views and his intentions in the event of a disagreement. "I wish to make
one last effort," he said, "to bring about an agreement through the
Commission which will enable the people of both countries to say that the
result represents the feeling of the representatives of both countries.
But if there is a disagreement, I wish it distinctly understood, not only
that there will be no arbitration of the matter, but that in my message to
Congress I shall take a position which will prevent any possibility of
arbitration hereafter." If this should seem to any one too vigorous
flourishing of the "big stick," let him remember that it was all done
through confidential diplomatic channels, and that the judgment of the
Lord Chief Justice of England, when the final decision was made, fully
upheld Roosevelt's position.
</p>
<p>
The decision of the Commission was, with slight immaterial modifications,
in favor of the United States. Lord Alverstone voted against his Canadian
colleagues. It was a just decision, as most well-informed Canadians
knew at the time. The troublesome question was settled; the time-honored
friendship of two great peoples had suffered no interruption; and
Roosevelt had secured for his country its just due, without public parade
or bluster, by merely being wise—and inflexible—in time.
</p>
<p>
During the same early period of his Presidency, Roosevelt found himself
confronted with a situation in South America, which threatened a serious
violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Venezuela was repudiating certain debts
which the Venezuelan Government had guaranteed to European capitalists.
German capital was chiefly involved, and Germany proposed to collect the
debts by force. Great Britain and Italy were also concerned in the matter,
but Germany was the ringleader and the active partner in the undertaking.
Throughout the year 1902 a pacific blockade of the Venezuelan coast was
maintained and in December of that year an ultimatum demanding the
immediate payment of the debts was presented. When its terms were not
complied with, diplomatic relations were broken off and the Venezuelan
fleet was seized. At this point the United States entered upon the scene,
but with no blare of trumpets.
</p>
<p>
In fact, what really happened was not generally known until several years
later.
</p>
<p>
In his message of December, 1901, President Roosevelt had made two
significant statements. Speaking of the Monroe Doctrine, he said, "We do
not guarantee any state against punishment, if it misconducts itself."
This was very satisfactory to Germany. But he added—"provided the
punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any
non-American power." This did not suit the German book so well. For a year
the matter was discussed. Germany disclaimed any intention to make
"permanent" acquisitions in Venezuela but contended for its right to make
"temporary" ones. Now the world had already seen "temporary" acquisitions
made in China, and it was a matter of common knowledge that this
convenient word was often to be interpreted in a Pickwickian sense.
</p>
<p>
When the "pacific blockade" passed into the stage of active hostilities,
the patience of Roosevelt snapped. The German Ambassador, von Holleben,
was summoned to the White House. The President proposed to him that
Germany should arbitrate its differences with Venezuela. Von Holleben
assured him that his "Imperial Master" would not hear of such a course.
The President persisted that there must be no taking possession, even
temporarily, of Venezuelan territory. He informed the Ambassador that
Admiral Dewey was at that moment maneuvering in Caribbean waters, and that
if satisfactory assurances did not come from Berlin in ten days, he would
be ordered to proceed to Venezuela to see that no territory was seized by
German forces. The Ambassador was firm in his conviction that no
assurances would be forthcoming.
</p>
<p>
A week later Von Holleben appeared at the White House to talk of another
matter and was about to leave without mentioning Venezuela. The President
stopped him with a question. No, said the Ambassador, no word had come
from Berlin. Then, Roosevelt explained, it would not be necessary for him
to wait the remaining three days. Dewey would be instructed to sail a day
earlier than originally planned. He added that not a word of all this had
been put upon paper, and that if the German Emperor would consent to
arbitrate, the President would praise him publicly for his
broadmindedness. The Ambassador was still convinced that no arbitration
was conceivable.
</p>
<p>
But just twelve hours later he appeared at the White House, his face
wreathed in smiles. On behalf of his Imperial Master he had the honor to
request the President of the United States to act as arbitrator between
Germany and Venezuela. The orders to Dewey were never sent, the President
publicly congratulated the Kaiser on his loyalty to the principle of
arbitration, and, at Roosevelt's suggestion, the case went to The Hague.
Not an intimation of the real occurrences came out till long after, not a
public word or act marred the perfect friendliness of the two nations. The
Monroe Doctrine was just as unequivocally invoked and just as inflexibly
upheld as it had been by Grover Cleveland eight years before in another
Venezuelan case. But the quiet private warning had been substituted for
the loud public threat.
</p>
<p>
The question of the admission of Japanese immigrants to the United States
and of their treatment had long disturbed American international
relations. It became acute in the latter part of 1906, when the city of
San Francisco determined to exclude all Japanese pupils from the public
schools and to segregate them in a school of their own. This action seemed
to the Japanese a manifest violation of the rights guaranteed by treaty.
Diplomatic protests were instantly forthcoming at Washington; and popular
demonstrations against the United States boiled up in Tokyo. For the third
time there appeared splendid material for a serious conflict with a great
power which might conceivably lead to active hostilities. From such
beginnings wars have come before now.
</p>
<p>
The President was convinced that the Californians were utterly wrong in
what they had done, but perfectly right in the underlying conviction from
which their action sprang. He saw that justice and good faith demanded
that the Japanese in California be protected in their treaty rights, and
that the Californians be protected from the immigration of Japanese
laborers in mass. With characteristic promptness and vigor he set forth
these two considerations and took action to make them effective. In his
message to Congress in December he declared: "In the matter now before me,
affecting the Japanese, everything that is in my power to do will be done
and all of the forces, military and civil, of the United States which I
may lawfully employ will be so employed ... to enforce the rights of
aliens under treaties." Here was reassurance for the Japanese. But he also
added: "The Japanese would themselves not tolerate the intrusion into
their country of a mass of Americans who would displace Japanese in the
business of the land. The people of California are right in insisting that
the Japanese shall not come thither in mass." Here was reassurance for the
Californians.
</p>
<p>
The words were promptly followed by acts. The garrison of Federal troops
at San Francisco was reinforced and public notice was given that violence
against Japanese would be put down. Suits were brought both in the
California State courts and in the Federal courts there to uphold the
treaty rights of Japan. Mr. Victor H. Metcalf, the Secretary of Commerce
and Labor, himself a Californian, was sent to San Francisco to make a
study of the whole situation. It was made abundantly clear to the people
of San Francisco and the Coast that the provision of the Federal
Constitution making treaties a part of the supreme law of the land, with
which the Constitution and laws of no State can interfere, would be
strictly enforced. The report of Secretary Metcalf showed that the school
authorities of San Francisco had done not only an illegal thing but an
unnecessary and a stupid thing.
</p>
<p>
Meanwhile Roosevelt had been working with equal vigor upon the other side
of the problem. He esteemed it precisely as important to protect the
Californians from the Japanese as to protect the Japanese from the
Californians. As in the Alaskan and Venezuelan cases, he proceeded without
beat of drum or clash of cymbal. The matter was worked out in unobtrusive
conferences between the President and the State Department and the
Japanese representatives in Washington. It was all friendly, informal,
conciliatory—but the Japanese did not fail to recognize the
inflexible determination behind this courteous friendliness. Out of these
conferences came an informal agreement on the part of the Japanese
Government that no passports would be issued to Japanese workingmen
permitting them to leave Japan for ports of the United States. It was
further only necessary to prevent Japanese coolies from coming into the
United States through Canada and Mexico. This was done by executive order
just two days after the school authorities of San Francisco had rescinded
their discriminatory school decree.
</p>
<p>
The incident is eminently typical of Roosevelt's principles and practice:
to accord full measure of justice while demanding full measure in return;
to be content with the fact without care for the formality; to see
quickly, to look far, and to act boldly.
</p>
<p>
It had a sequel which rounded out the story. The President's ready
willingness to compel California to do justice to the Japanese was
misinterpreted in Japan as timidity. Certain chauvinistic elements in
Japan began to have thoughts which were in danger of becoming inimical to
the best interests of the United States. It seemed to President Roosevelt
an opportune moment, for many reasons, to send the American battle fleet
on a voyage around the world. The project was frowned on in this country
and viewed with doubt in other parts of the world. Many said the thing
could not be done, for no navy in the world had yet done it; but Roosevelt
knew that it could. European observers believed that it would lead to war
with Japan; but Roosevelt's conviction was precisely the opposite. In his
own words, "I did not expect it;... I believed that Japan would feel as
friendly in the matter as we did; but... if my expectations had proved
mistaken, it would have been proof positive that we were going to be
attacked anyhow, and... in such event it would have been an enormous gain
to have had the three months' preliminary preparation which enabled the
fleet to start perfectly equipped. In a personal interview before they
left, I had explained to the officers in command that I believed the trip
would be one of absolute peace, but that they were to take exactly the
same precautions against sudden attack of any kind as if we were at war
with all the nations of the earth; and that no excuse of any kind would be
accepted if there were a sudden attack of any kind and we were taken
unawares." Prominent inhabitants and newspapers of the Atlantic coast were
deeply concerned over the taking away of the fleet from the Atlantic to
the Pacific. The head of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, who hailed
from the State of Maine, declared that the fleet should not and could not
go because Congress would refuse to appropriate the money; Roosevelt
announced in response that he had enough money to take the fleet around
into the Pacific anyhow, that it would certainly go, and that if Congress
did not choose to appropriate enough money to bring the fleet back, it
could stay there. There was no further difficulty about the money.
</p>
<p>
The voyage was at once a hard training trip and a triumphant progress.
Everywhere the ships, their officers, and their men were received with
hearty cordiality and deep admiration, and nowhere more so than in Japan.
The nations of the world were profoundly impressed by the achievement. The
people of the United States were thoroughly aroused to a new pride in
their navy and an interest in its adequacy and efficiency. It was
definitely established in the minds of Americans and foreigners that the
United States navy is rightfully as much at home in the Pacific as in the
Atlantic. Any cloud the size of a man's hand that may have been gathering
above the Japanese horizon was forthwith swept away. Roosevelt's plan was
a novel and bold use of the instruments of war on behalf of peace which
was positively justified in the event.
</p>
<p>
<a name="link2HCH0011" id="link2HCH0011">
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</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER XI. RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND REVOLUTIONS
</h2>
<p>
It was a favorite conviction of Theodore Roosevelt that neither an
individual nor a nation can possess rights which do not carry with them
duties. Not long after the Venezuelan incident—in which the right of
the United States, as set forth in the Monroe Doctrine, to prevent
European powers from occupying territory in the Western Hemisphere was
successfully upheld—an occasion arose nearer home not only to insist
upon rights but to assume the duties involved. In a message to the Senate
in February, 1905, Roosevelt thus outlined his conception of the dual
nature of the Monroe Doctrine:
</p>
<p>
"It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe
Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which
it confers, and that the same statement applies to those who uphold the
doctrine.... An aggrieved nation can, without interfering with the Monroe
Doctrine, take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes
with American states, provided that action does not take the shape of
interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their
territory under any disguise. But short of this, when the question is one
of a money claim, the only way which remains finally to collect it is a
blockade or bombardment or seizure of the custom houses, and this means...
what is in effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession,
of territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because
under the Monroe Doctrine it cannot see any European power seize and
permanently occupy the territory of one of these republics; and yet such
seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually offer the
only way in which the power in question can collect its debts, unless
there is interference on the part of the United States."
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt had already found such interference necessary in the case of
Germany and Venezuela. But it had been interference in a purely negative
sense. He had merely insisted that the European power should not occupy
American territory even temporarily. In the later case of the Dominican
Republic he supplemented this negative interference with positive action
based upon his conviction of the inseparable nature of rights and
obligations.
</p>
<p>
Santo Domingo was in its usual state of chronic revolution. The stakes for
which the rival forces were continually fighting were the custom houses,
for they were the only certain sources of revenue and their receipts were
the only reliable security which could be offered to foreign capitalists
in support of loans. So thoroughgoing was the demoralization of the
Republic's affairs that at one time there were two rival "governments" in
the island and a revolution going on against each. One of these
governments was once to be found at sea in a small gunboat but still
insisting that, as the only legitimate government, it was entitled to
declare war or peace or, more particularly, to make loans. The national
debt of the Republic had mounted to $32,280,000 of which some $22,000,000
was owed to European creditors. The interest due on it in the year 1905
was two and a half million dollars. The whole situation was ripe for
intervention by one or more European governments.
</p>
<p>
Such action President Roosevelt could not permit. But he could not ignore
the validity of the debts which the Republic had contracted or the justice
of the demand for the payment of at least the interest. "It cannot in the
long run prove possible," he said, "for the United States to protect
delinquent American nations from punishment for the non-performance of
their duties unless she undertakes to make them perform their duties." So
he invented a plan, which, by reason of its success in the Dominican case
and its subsequent application and extension by later administrations, has
come to be a thoroughly accepted part of the foreign policy of the United
States. It ought to be known as the Roosevelt Plan, just as the
amplification of the Monroe Doctrine already outlined might well be known
as the Roosevelt Doctrine.
</p>
<p>
A naval commander in Dominican waters was instructed to see that no
revolutionary fighting was permitted to endanger the custom houses. These
instructions were carried out explicitly but without any actual use of
force or shedding of blood. On one occasion two rival forces had planned a
battle in a custom-house town. The American commander informed them
courteously but firmly that they would not be permitted to fight there,
for a battle might endanger the custom house. He had no objection,
however, to their fighting. In fact he had picked out a nice spot for them
outside the town where they might have their battle undisturbed. The
winner could have the town. Would they kindly step outside for their
fight. They would; they did. The American commander gravely welcomed the
victorious faction as the rightful rulers of the town. So much for keeping
the custom houses intact. But the Roosevelt Plan went much further. An
agreement was entered into with those governmental authorities "who for
the moment seemed best able to speak for the country" by means of which
the custom houses were placed under American control. United States forces
were to keep order and to protect the custom houses; United States
officials were to collect the customs dues; forty-five per cent of the
revenue was to be turned over to the Dominican Government, and fifty-five
per cent put into a sinking fund in New York for the benefit of the
creditors. The plan succeeded famously. The Dominicans got more out of
their forty-five per cent than they had been wont to get when presumably
the entire revenue was theirs. The creditors thoroughly approved, and
their Governments had no possible pretext left for interference. Although
the plan concerned itself not at all with the internal affairs of the
Republic, its indirect influence was strong for good and the island
enjoyed a degree of peace and prosperity such as it had not known before
for at least a century. There was, however, strong opposition in the
United States Senate to the ratification of the treaty with the Dominican
Republic. The Democrats, with one or two exceptions, voted against
ratification. A number of the more reactionary Republican Senators, also,
who were violently hostile to President Roosevelt because of his attitude
toward great corporations, lent their opposition. The Roosevelt Plan was
further attacked by certain sections of the press, already antagonistic on
other grounds, and by some of those whom Roosevelt called the
"professional interventional philanthropists." It was two years before the
Senate was ready to ratify the treaty, but meanwhile Roosevelt continued
to carry it out "as a simple agreement on the part of the Executive which
could be converted into a treaty whenever the Senate was ready to act."
</p>
<p>
The treaty as finally ratified differed in some particulars from the
protocol. In the protocol the United States agreed "to respect the
complete territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic." This covenant
was omitted in the final document in deference to Roosevelt's opponents
who could see no difference between "respecting" the integrity of
territory and "guaranteeing" it. Another clause pledging the assistance of
the United States in the internal affairs of the Republic, whenever the
judgment of the American Government deemed it to be wise, was also
omitted. The provision of the protocol making it the duty of the United
States to deal with the various creditors of the Dominican Republic in
order to determine the amount which each was to receive in settlement of
its claims was modified so that this responsibility remained with the
Government of the Republic. In Roosevelt's opinion, these modifications in
the protocol detracted nothing from the original plan. He ascribed the
delay in the ratification of the treaty to partisanship and bitterness
against himself; and it is certainly true that most of the treaty's
opponents were his consistent critics on other grounds.
</p>
<p>
A considerable portion of Roosevelt's success as a diplomat was the fruit
of personality, as must be the case with any diplomat who makes more than
a routine achievement. He disarmed suspicion by transparent honesty, and
he impelled respect for his words by always promising or giving warning of
not a hairsbreadth more than he was perfectly willing and thoroughly
prepared to perform. He was always cheerfully ready to let the other
fellow "save his face." He set no store by public triumphs. He was as
exigent that his country should do justly as he was insistent that it
should be done justly by. Phrases had no lure for him, appearances no
glamour.
</p>
<p>
It was inevitable that so commanding a personality should have an
influence beyond the normal sphere of his official activities. Only a man
who had earned the confidence and the respect of the statesmen of other
nations could have performed such a service as he did in 1905 in bringing
about peace between Russia and Japan in the conflict then raging in the
Far East. It was high time that the war should end, in the interest of
both contestants. The Russians had been consistently defeated on land and
had lost their entire fleet at the battle of Tsushima. The Japanese were
apparently on the highroad to victory. But in reality, Japan's success had
been bought at an exorbitant price. Intelligent observers in the
diplomatic world who were in a position to realize the truth knew that
neither nation could afford to go on.
</p>
<p>
On June 8, 1905, President Roosevelt sent to both Governments an identical
note in which he urged them, "not only for their own sakes, but in the
interest of the whole civilized world, to open direct negotiations for
peace with each other." This was the first that the world heard of the
proposal. But the President had already conducted, with the utmost
secrecy, confidential negotiations with Tokyo and with St. Petersburg to
induce both belligerents to consent to a face to face discussion of peace.
In Russia he had found it necessary to go directly to the Czar himself,
through the American Ambassador, George von Lengerke Meyer. Each
Government was assured that no breath of the matter would be made public
until both nations had signified their willingness to treat. Neither
nation was to know anything of the other's readiness until both had
committed themselves. These advances appear to have been made following a
suggestion from Japan that Roosevelt should attempt to secure peace. He
used to say, in discussing the matter, that, while it was not generally
known or even suspected, Japan was actually "bled white" by the herculean
efforts she had made. But Japan's position was the stronger, and peace was
more important for Russia than for her antagonist. The Japanese were more
clear-sighted than the selfish Russian bureaucracy; and they realized that
they had gained so much already that there was nothing to be won by
further fighting.
</p>
<p>
When the public invitation to peace negotiations was extended, the
conference had already been arranged and the confidential consent of both
Governments needed only to be made formal. Russia wished the meeting of
plenipotentiaries to take place at Paris, Japan preferred Chifu, in China.
Neither liked the other's suggestion, and Roosevelt's invitation to come
to Washington, with the privilege of adjourning to some place in New
England if the weather was too hot, was finally accepted. The formal
meeting between the plenipotentiaries took place at Oyster Bay on the 5th
of August on board the Presidential yacht, the Mayflower. Roosevelt
received his guests in the cabin and proposed a toast in these words:
"Gentlemen, I propose a toast to which there will be no answer and which I
ask you to drink in silence, standing. I drink to the welfare and
prosperity of the sovereigns and the peoples of the two great nations
whose representatives have met one another on this ship. It is my earnest
hope and prayer, in the interest not only of these two great powers, but
of all civilized mankind, that a just and lasting peace may speedily be
concluded between them."
</p>
<p>
The two groups of plenipotentiaries were carried, each on an American
naval vessel, to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and there at the Navy Yard
began their conference. Two-thirds of the terms proposed by Japan were
promptly accepted by the Russian envoys. But an irretrievable split on the
remainder seemed inevitable. Japan demanded a money indemnity and the
cession of the southern half of the island of Saghalien, which Japanese
forces had already occupied. These demands the Russians refused.
</p>
<p>
Then Roosevelt took a hand in the proceedings. He urged the Japanese
delegates, through the Japanese Ambassador, to give up their demand for an
indemnity. He pointed out that, when it came to "a question of rubles,"
the Russian Government and the Russian people were firmly resolved not to
yield. To Baron Rosen, one of the Russian delegates, he recommended
yielding in the matter of Saghalien, since the Japanese were already in
possession and there were racial and historical grounds for considering
the southern half of the island logically Japanese territory. The envoys
met again, and the Japanese renewed their demands. The Russians refused.
Then the Japanese offered to waive the indemnity if the Russians would
yield on Saghalien. The offer was accepted, and the peace was made.
</p>
<p>
Immediately Roosevelt was acclaimed by the world, including the Russians
and the Japanese, as a great peacemaker. The Nobel Peace Prize of a medal
and $40,000 was awarded to him. But it was not long before both in Russia
and Japan public opinion veered to the point of asserting that he had
caused peace to be made too soon and to the detriment of the interests of
the nation in question. That was just what he expected. He knew human
nature thoroughly; and from long experience he had learned to be
humorously philosophical about such manifestations of man's ingratitude.
</p>
<p>
In the next year the influence of Roosevelt's personality was again felt
in affairs outside the traditional realm of American international
interests. Germany was attempting to intrude in Morocco, where France by
common consent had been the dominant foreign influence. The rattling of
the Potsdam saber was threatening the tranquillity of the status quo. A
conference of eleven European powers and the United States was held at
Algeciras to readjust the treaty provisions for the protection of
foreigners in the decadent Moroccan empire. In the words of a historian of
America's foreign relations, "Although the United States was of all
perhaps the least directly interested in the subject matter of dispute,
and might appropriately have held aloof from the meeting altogether, its
representatives were among the most influential of all, and it was largely
owing to their sane and irenic influence that in the end a treaty was
amicably made and signed." * But there was something behind all this. A
quiet conference had taken place one day in the remote city of Washington.
The President of the United States and the French Ambassador had discussed
the approaching meeting at Algeciras. There was a single danger-point in
the impending negotiations. The French must find a way around it. The
Ambassador had come to the right man. He went out with a few words
scratched on a card in the ragged Roosevelt handwriting containing a
proposal for a solution. ** The proposal went to Paris, then to Morocco.
The solution was adopted by the conference, and the Hohenzollern menace to
the peace of the world was averted for the moment. Once more Roosevelt had
shown how being wise in time was the sure way to peace.
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* Willie Fletcher Johnson, "America's Foreign Relations",
vol. II, p. 376.
** The author had this story direct from Mr. Roosevelt
himself.
</pre>
<p>
Roosevelt's most important single achievement as President of the United
States was the building of the Panama Canal. The preliminary steps which
he took in order to make its building possible have been, of all his
executive acts, the most consistently and vigorously criticized.
</p>
<p>
It is not our purpose here to follow at length the history of American
diplomatic relations with Colombia and Panama. We are primarily concerned
with the part which Roosevelt played in certain international occurrences,
of which the Panama incident was not the least interesting and
significant. In after years Roosevelt said laconically, "I took Panama."
In fact he did nothing of the sort. But it was like him to brush aside all
technical defenses of any act of his and to meet his critics on their own
ground. It was as though he said to them, "You roundly denounce me for
what I did at the time of the revolution which established the Republic of
Panama. You declare that my acts were contrary to international law and
international morals. I have a splendid technical defense on the legal
side; but I care little about technicalities when compared with reality.
Let us admit that I did what you charge me with. I will prove to you that
I was justified in so doing. I took Panama; but the taking was a righteous
act."
</p>
<p>
Fourteen years after that event, in a speech which he made in Washington,
Roosevelt expressed his dissatisfaction with the way in which President
Wilson was conducting the Great War. He reverted to what he had done in
relation to Panama and contrasted his action with the failure of the
Wilson Administration to take prompt possession of two hundred locomotives
which had been built in this country for the late Russian Government. This
is what he said:
</p>
<p>
"What I think, of course, in my view of the proper governmental policy,
should have been done was to take the two hundred locomotives and then
discuss. That was the course that I followed, and to which I have ever
since looked back with impenitent satisfaction, in reference to the Panama
Canal. If you remember, Panama declared itself independent and wanted to
complete the Panama Canal and opened negotiations with us. I had two
courses open. I might have taken the matter under advisement and put it
before the Senate, in which case we should have had a number of most able
speeches on the subject. We would have had a number of very profound
arguments, and they would have been going on now, and the Panama Canal
would be in the dim future yet. We would have had half a century of
discussion, and perhaps the Panama Canal. I preferred that we should have
the Panama Canal first and the half century of discussion afterward. And
now instead of discussing the canal before it was built, which would have
been harmful, they merely discuss me—a discussion which I regard
with benign interest."
</p>
<p>
The facts of the case are simple and in the main undisputed. Shortly after
the inauguration of Roosevelt as President, a treaty was negotiated with
Colombia for the building of a canal at Panama. It provided for the lease
to the United States of a strip six miles wide across the Isthmus, and for
the payment to Colombia of $10,000,000 down and $250,000 a year, beginning
nine years later. The treaty was promptly ratified by the United States
Senate. A special session of the Colombian Senate spent the summer marking
time and adjourned after rejecting the treaty by a unanimous vote. The
dominant motive for the rejection was greed. An attempt was first made by
the dictatorial government that held the Colombian Congress in its mailed
hand to extort a large payment from the French Canal Company, whose rights
and property on the Isthmus were to be bought by the United States for
$40,000,000. Then $15,000,000 instead of $10,000,000 was demanded from the
United States. Finally an adroit and conscienceless scheme was invented by
which the entire rights of the French Canal Company were to be stolen by
the Colombian Government. This last plot, however, would involve a delay
of a year or so. The treaty was therefore rejected in order to provide the
necessary delay.
</p>
<p>
But the people of Panama wanted the Canal. They were tired of serving as
the milch cow for the fattening of the Government at Bogota. So they
quietly organized a revolution. It was a matter of common knowledge that
it was coming. Roosevelt, as well as the rest of the world, knew it and,
believing in the virtue of being wise in time, prepared for it. Several
warships were dispatched to the Isthmus.
</p>
<p>
The revolution came off promptly as expected. It was bloodless, for the
American naval forces, fulfilling the treaty obligations of the United
States, prevented the Colombian troops on one side of the Isthmus from
using the Panama Railroad to cross to the other side where the
revolutionists were. So the revolutionists were undisturbed. A republic
was immediately declared and immediately recognized by the United States.
A treaty with the new Republic, which guaranteed its independence and
secured the cession of a zone ten miles wide across the Isthmus, was drawn
up inside of two weeks and ratified by both Senates within three months.
Six weeks later an American commission was on the ground to plan the work
of construction. The Canal was built. The "half century of discussion"
which Roosevelt foresaw is now more than a third over, and the discussion
shows no sign of lagging. But the Panama Canal is in use.
</p>
<p>
Was the President of the United States justified in preventing the
Colombian Government from fighting on the Isthmus to put down the
unanimous revolution of the people of Panama? That is precisely all that
he did. He merely gave orders to the American admiral on the spot to
"prevent the disembarkation of Colombian troops with hostile intent within
the limits of the state of Panama." But that action was enough, for the
Isthmus is separated from Colombia on the one hand by three hundred miles
of sea, and on the other by leagues of pathless jungle.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt himself has summed up the action of the United States in this
way:
</p>
<p>
"From the beginning to the end our course was straightforward and in
absolute accord with the highest of standards of international
morality.... To have acted otherwise than I did would have been on my part
betrayal of the interests of the United States, indifference to the
interests of Panama, and recreancy to the interests of the world at large.
Colombia had forfeited every claim to consideration; indeed, this is not
stating the case strongly enough: she had so acted that yielding to her
would have meant on our part that culpable form of weakness which stands
on a level with wickedness.... We gave to the people of Panama,
self-government, and freed them from subjection to alien oppressors. We
did our best to get Colombia to let us treat her with more than generous
justice; we exercised patience to beyond the verge of proper
forbearance.... I deeply regretted, and now deeply regret, the fact that
the Colombian Government rendered it imperative for me to take the action
I took; but I had no alternative, consistent with the full performance of
my duty to my own people, and to the nations of mankind."
</p>
<p>
The final verdict will be given only in another generation by the
historian and by the world at large. But no portrait of Theodore
Roosevelt, and no picture of his times, can be complete without the bold,
firm outlines of his Panama policy set as near as may be in their proper
perspective.
</p>
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<h2>
CHAPTER XII. THE TAFT ADMINISTRATION
</h2>
<p>
In the evening of that election day in 1904 which saw Roosevelt made
President in his own right, after three years of the Presidency given him
by fate, he issued a brief statement, in which he said: "The wise custom
which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the
form, and under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept
another nomination." From this determination, which in his mind related to
a third consecutive term, and to nothing else, he never wavered. Four
years later, in spite of a widespread demand that he should be a candidate
to succeed himself, he used the great influence and prestige of his
position as President and leader of his party to bring about the
nomination of his friend and close associate, William Howard Taft. The
choice received general approval from the Republican party and from the
country at large, although up to the very moment of the nomination in the
convention at Chicago there was no certainty that a successful effort to
stampede the convention for Roosevelt would not be made by his more
irreconcilable supporters.
</p>
<p>
Taft was elected by a huge popular plurality. His opponent was William
Jennings Bryan, who was then making his third unsuccessful campaign for
the Presidency. Taft's election, like his nomination, was assured by the
unreserved and dynamic support accorded him by President Roosevelt. Taft,
of course, was already an experienced statesman, high in the esteem of the
nation for his public record as Federal judge, as the first civil Governor
of the Philippines, and as Secretary of War in the Roosevelt Cabinet.
There was every reason to predict for him a successful and effective
Administration. His occupancy of the White House began under smiling
skies. He had behind him a united party and a satisfied public opinion.
Even his political opponents conceded that the country would be safe in
his hands. It was expected that he would be conservatively progressive and
progressively conservative. Everybody believed in him. Yet within a year
of the day of his inauguration the President's popularity was sharply on
the wane. Two years after his election the voters repudiated the party
which he led. By the end of his Presidential term the career which had
begun with such happy auguries had become a political tragedy. There were
then those who recalled the words of the Roman historian, "All would have
believed him capable of governing if only he had not come to govern."
</p>
<p>
It was not that the Taft Administration was barren of achievement. On the
contrary, its record of accomplishment was substantial. Of two amendments
to the Federal Constitution proposed by Congress, one was ratified by the
requisite number of States before Taft went out of office, and the other
was finally ratified less than a month after the close of his term. These
were the amendment authorizing the imposition of a Federal income tax and
that providing for the direct election of United States Senators. Two
States were admitted to the Union during Taft's term of office, New Mexico
and Arizona, the last Territories of the United States on the continent,
except Alaska.
</p>
<p>
Other achievements of importance during Taft's Administration were the
establishment of the parcels post and the postal savings banks; the
requirement of publicity, through sworn statements of the candidates, for
campaign contributions for the election of Senators and Representatives;
the extension of the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission over
telephone, telegraph, and cable lines; an act authorizing the President to
withdraw public lands from entry for the purpose of conserving the natural
resources which they may contain—something which Roosevelt had
already done without specific statutory authorization; the establishment
of a Commerce Court to hear appeals from decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission; the appointment of a commission, headed by President
Hadley of Yale, to investigate the subject of railway stock and bond
issues, and to propose a law for the Federal supervision of such railway
securities; the Mann "white slave" act, dealing with the transfer of women
from one State to another for immoral purposes; the establishment of the
Children's Bureau in the Department of Commerce and Labor; the empowering
of the Interstate Commerce Commission to investigate all railway
accidents; the creation of Forest Reserves in the White Mountains and in
the southern Appalachians.
</p>
<p>
Taft's Administration was further marked, by economy in expenditure, by a
considerable extension of the civil service law to cover positions in the
executive departments hitherto free plunder for the spoilsmen, and by
efforts on the part of the President to increase the efficiency and the
economical administration of the public service.
</p>
<p>
But this good record of things achieved was not enough to gain for Mr.
Taft popular approval. Items on the other side of the ledger were pointed
out. Of these the three most conspicuous were the Payne-Aldrich tariff,
the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, and the insurgent movement in Congress.
</p>
<p>
The Republican party was returned to power in 1908, committed to a
revision of the tariff. Though the party platform did not so state, this
was generally interpreted as a pledge of revision downward. Taft made it
clear during his campaign that such was his own reading of the party
pledge. He said, for instance, "It is my judgment that there are many
schedules of the tariff in which the rates are excessive, and there are a
few in which the rates are not sufficient to fill the measure of
conservative protection. It is my judgment that a revision of the tariff
in accordance with the pledge of the platform, will be, on the whole, a
substantial revision downward, though there probably will be a few
exceptions in this regard." Five months after Taft's inauguration the
Payne-Aldrich bill became law with his signature. In signing it the
President said, "The bill is not a perfect bill or a complete compliance
with the promises made, strictly interpreted"; but he further declared
that he signed it because he believed it to be "the result of a sincere
effort on the part of the Republican party to make downward revision."
</p>
<p>
This view was not shared by even all Republicans. Twenty of them in the
House voted against the bill on its final passage, and seven of them in
the Senate. They represented the Middle West and the new element and
spirit in the Republican party. Their dissatisfaction with the performance
of their party associates in Congress and in the White House was shared by
their constituents and by many other Republicans throughout the country. A
month after the signing of the tariff law, Taft made a speech at Winona,
Minnesota, in support of Congressman James A. Tawney, the one Republican
representative from Minnesota who had not voted against the bill. In the
course of that speech he said; "This is the best tariff bill that the
Republican party has ever passed, and, therefore, the best tariff bill
that has been passed at all."
</p>
<p>
He justified Mr. Tawney's action in voting for the bill and his own in
signing it on the ground that "the interests of the country, the interests
of the party" required the sacrifice of the accomplishment of certain
things in the revision of the tariff which had been hoped for, "in order
to maintain party solidity," which he believed to be much more important
than the reduction of rates in one or two schedules of the tariff.
</p>
<p>
A second disaster to the Taft Administration came in the famous
Ballinger-Pinchot controversy. Louis R. Glavis, who had served as a
special agent of the General Land Office to investigate alleged frauds in
certain claims to coal lands in Alaska, accused Richard Ballinger, the
Secretary of the Interior, of favoritism toward those who were attempting
to get public lands fraudulently. The charges were vigorously supported by
Mr. Pinchot, who broadened the accusation to cover a general indifference
on the part of the Secretary of the Interior to the whole conservation
movement. President Taft, however, completely exonerated Secretary
Ballinger from blame and removed Glavis for "filing a disingenuous
statement unjustly impeaching the official integrity of his superior
officer." Later Pinchot was also dismissed from the service. The charges
against Secretary Ballinger were investigated by a joint committee of
Congress, a majority of which exonerated the accused Cabinet officer.
Nevertheless the whole controversy, which raged with virulence for many
months, convinced many ardent supporters of the conservation movement, and
especially many admirers of Mr. Pinchot and of Roosevelt, that the Taft
Administration at the best was possessed of little enthusiasm for
conservation. There was a widespread belief, as well, that the President
had handled the whole matter maladroitly and that in permitting himself to
be driven to a point where he had to deprive the country of the services
of Gifford Pinchot, the originator of the conservation movement, he had
displayed unsound judgment and deplorable lack of administrative ability.
</p>
<p>
The first half of Mr. Taft's term was further marked by acute dissensions
in the Republican ranks in Congress. Joseph G. Cannon was Speaker of the
House, as he had been in three preceding Congresses. He was a reactionary
Republican of the most pronounced type. Under his leadership the system of
autocratic party control of legislation in the House had been developed to
a high point of effectiveness. The Speaker's authority had become in
practice almost unrestricted.
</p>
<p>
In the congressional session of 1909-10 a strong movement of insurgency
arose within the Republican party in Congress against the control of the
little band of leaders dominated by the Speaker. In March, 1910, the
Republican Insurgents, forty in number, united with the Democratic
minority to overrule a formal decision of the Speaker. A four days'
parliamentary battle resulted, culminating in a reorganization of the
all-powerful Rules Committee, with the Speaker no longer a member of it.
The right of the Speaker to appoint this committee was also taken away.
When the Democrats came into control of the House in 1911, they completed
the dethronement of the Speaker by depriving him of the appointment of all
committees.
</p>
<p>
The old system had not been without its advantages, when the power of the
Speaker and his small group of associate party leaders was not abused. It
at least concentrated responsibility in a few prominent members of the
majority party. But it made it possible for these few men to perpetuate a
machine and to ignore the desires of the rest of the party representatives
and of the voters of the party throughout the country. The defeat of
Cannonism put an end to the autocratic power of the Speaker and relegated
him to the position of a mere presiding officer. It had also a wider
significance, for it portended the division in the old Republican party
out of which was to come the new Progressive party.
</p>
<p>
When the mid-point of the Taft Administration was reached, a practical
test was given of the measure of popular approval which the President and
his party associates had achieved. The congressional elections went
decidedly against the Republicans. The Republican majority of forty-seven
in the House was changed to a Democratic majority of fifty-four. The
Republican majority in the Senate was cut down from twenty-eight to ten.
Not only were the Democrats successful in this substantial degree, but
many of the Western States elected Progressive Republicans instead of
Republicans of the old type. During the last two years of his term, the
President was consequently obliged to work with a Democratic House and
with a Senate in which Democrats and Insurgent Republicans predominated
over the old-line Republicans.
</p>
<p>
The second half of Taft's Presidency was productive of little but discord
and dissatisfaction. The Democrats in power in the House were quite ready
to harass the Republican President, especially in view of the approaching
Presidential election. The Insurgents in House and Senate were not
entirely unwilling to take a hand in the same game. Besides, they found
themselves more and more in sincere disagreement with the President on
matters of fundamental policy, though not one of them could fairly
question his integrity of purpose, impugn his purity of character, or deny
his charm of personality.
</p>
<p>
Three weeks after Taft's inauguration, Roosevelt sailed for Africa, to be
gone for a year hunting big game. He went with a warm feeling of
friendship and admiration for the man whom he had done so much to make
President. He had high confidence that Taft would be successful in his
great office. He had no reason to believe that any change would come in
the friendship between them, which had been peculiarly intimate. From the
steamer on which he sailed for Africa, he sent a long telegram of cordial
and hearty good wishes to his successor in Washington.
</p>
<p>
The next year Roosevelt came back to the United States, after a triumphal
tour of the capitals of Europe, to find his party disrupted and the
progressive movement in danger of shipwreck. He had no intention of
entering politics again. But he had no intention, either, of ceasing to
champion the things in which he believed. This he made obvious, in his
first speech after his return, to the cheering thousands who welcomed him
at the Battery. He said:
</p>
<p>
"I have thoroughly enjoyed myself; and now I am more glad than I can say
to get home, to be back in my own country, back among people I love. And I
am ready and eager to do my part so far as I am able, in helping solve
problems which must be solved, if we of this, the greatest democratic
republic upon which the sun has ever shone, are to see its destinies rise
to the high level of our hopes and its opportunities. This is the duty of
every citizen, but is peculiarly my duty; for any man who has ever been
honored by being made President of the United States is thereby forever
rendered the debtor of the American people and is bound throughout his
life to remember this, his prime obligation."
</p>
<p>
The welcome over, Roosevelt tried to take up the life of a private
citizen. He had become Contributing Editor of The Outlook and had planned
to give his energies largely to writing. But he was not to be let alone.
The people who loved him demanded that they be permitted to see and to
hear him. Those who were in the thick of the political fight on behalf of
progress and righteousness called loudly to him for aid. Only a few days
after Roosevelt had landed from Europe, Governor Hughes of New York met
him at the Commencement exercises at Harvard and urged him to help in the
fight which the Governor was then making for a direct primary law.
Roosevelt did not wish to enter the lists again until he had had more time
for orientation; but he always found it difficult to refuse a plea for
help on behalf of a good cause. He therefore sent a vigorous telegram to
the Republican legislators at Albany urging them to support Governor
Hughes and to vote for the primary bill. But the appeal went in vain: the
Legislature was too thoroughly boss-ridden. This telegram, however,
sounded a warning to the usurpers in the house of the Republican Penelope
that the fingers of the returned Odysseus had not lost their prowess with
the heroic bow.
</p>
<p>
During the summer of 1910, Roosevelt made a trip to the West and in a
speech at Ossawattomie, Kansas, set forth what came to be described as the
New Nationalism. It was his draft of a platform, not for himself, but for
the nation. A few fragments from that speech will suggest what Roosevelt
was thinking about in those days when the Progressive party was stirring
in the womb. "At many stages in the advance of humanity, this conflict
between the men who possess more than they have earned and the men who
have earned more than they possess is the central condition of progress.
In our day it appears as the struggle of free men to gain and hold the
right of self-government as against the special interests, who twist the
methods of free government into machinery for defeating the popular will.
At every stage, and under all circumstances, the essence of the struggle
is to equalize opportunity, destroy privilege, and give to the life and
citizenship of every individual the highest possible value both to himself
and to the commonwealth.
</p>
<p>
"Every special interest is entitled to justice, but not one is entitled to
a vote in Congress, to a voice on the bench, or to representation in any
public office. The Constitution guarantees protection to property, and we
must make that promise good. But it does not give the right of suffrage to
any corporation.
</p>
<p>
"The absence of effective state and, especially, national restraint upon
unfair money getting has tended to create a small class of enormously
wealthy and economically powerful men, whose chief object is to hold and
increase their power. The prime need is to change the conditions which
enable these men to accumulate power which it is not for the general
welfare that they should hold or exercise.
</p>
<p>
"We are face to face with new conceptions of the relations of property to
human welfare, chiefly because certain advocates of the rights of property
as against the rights of men have been pushing their claims too far.
</p>
<p>
"The State must be made efficient for the work which concerns only the
people of the State; and the nation for that which concerns all the
people. There must remain no neutral ground to serve as a refuge for
lawbreakers, and especially for lawbreakers of great wealth, who can hire
the vulpine legal cunning which will teach them how to avoid both
jurisdictions.
</p>
<p>
"I do not ask for overcentralization; but I do ask that we work in a
spirit of broad and far-reaching nationalism when we work for what
concerns our people as a whole.
</p>
<p>
"We must have the right kind of character—character that makes a
man, first of all, a good man in the home, a good father, a good husband—that
makes a man a good neighbor.... The prime problem of our nation is to get
the right kind of good citizenship, and to get it, we must have progress,
and our public men must be genuinely progressive.
</p>
<p>
"I stand for the Square Deal. But when I say that I am for the square deal
I mean not merely that I stand for fair play under the present rules of
the game, but that I stand for having those rules changed so as to work
for a more substantial equality of opportunity and of reward for equally
good service."
</p>
<p>
These generalizations Roosevelt accompanied by specific recommendations.
They included proposals for publicity of corporate affairs; prohibition of
the use of corporate funds for political purposes; governmental
supervision of the capitalization of all corporations doing an interstate
business; control and supervision of corporations and combinations
controlling necessaries of life; holding the officers and directors of
corporations personally liable when any corporation breaks the law; an
expert tariff commission and revision of the tariff schedule by schedule;
a graduated income tax and a graduated inheritance tax, increasing rapidly
in amount with the size of the estate; conservation of natural resources
and their use for the benefit of all rather than their monopolization for
the benefit of the few; public accounting for all campaign funds before
election; comprehensive workmen's compensation acts, state and national
laws to regulate child labor and work for women, the enforcement of
sanitary conditions for workers and the compulsory use of safety
appliances in industry.
</p>
<p>
There was nothing in all these proposals that should have seemed
revolutionary or extreme. But there was much that disturbed the
reactionaries who were thinking primarily in terms of property and only
belatedly or not at all of human rights. The Bourbons in the Republican
party and their supporters among the special interests "viewed with
alarm" this frank attack upon their intrenched privileges. The
Progressives, however, welcomed with eagerness this robust leadership. The
breach in the Republican party was widening with steadily accelerating
speed.
</p>
<p>
In the fall of 1910 a new demand arose that Roosevelt should enter
actively into politics. Though it came from his own State, he resisted it
with energy and determination. Nevertheless the pressure from his close
political associates in New York finally became too much for him, and he
yielded. They wanted him to go as a delegate to the Republican State
Convention at Saratoga and to be a candidate for Temporary Chairman of the
Convention—the officer whose opening speech is traditionally
presumed to sound the keynote of the campaign. Roosevelt went and, after a
bitter fight with the reactionists in the party, led by William Barnes of
Albany, was elected Temporary Chairman over Vice-President James S.
Sherman. The keynote was sounded in no uncertain tones, while Mr. Barnes
and his associates fidgeted and suffered.
</p>
<p>
Then came a Homeric conflict, with a dramatic climax. The reactionary gang
did not know that it was beaten. Its members resisted stridently an
attempt to write a direct primary plank into the party platform. They
wished to rebuke Governor Hughes, who was as little to their liking as
Roosevelt himself, and they did not want the direct primary. After
speeches by young James Wadsworth, later United States Senator, Job
Hedges, and Barnes himself, in which they bewailed the impending demise of
representative government and the coming of mob rule, it was clear that
the primary plank was defeated. Then rose Roosevelt. In a speech that
lashed and flayed the forces of reaction and obscurantism, he demanded
that the party stand by the right of the people to rule. Single-handed he
drove a majority of the delegates into line. The plank was adopted.
Thenceforward the convention was his. It selected, as candidate for
Governor, Henry W. Stimson, who had been a Federal attorney in New York
under Roosevelt and Secretary of War in Taft's Cabinet. When this victory
had been won, Roosevelt threw himself into the campaign with his usual
abandon and toured the State, making fighting speeches in scores of cities
and towns. But in spite of Roosevelt's best efforts, Stimson was defeated.
</p>
<p>
All this active participation in local political conflicts seriously
distressed many of Roosevelt's friends and associates. They felt that he
was too big to fritter himself away on small matters from which he—and
the cause whose great champion he was—had so little to gain and so
much to lose. They wanted him to wait patiently for the moment of destiny
which they felt sure would come. But it was never easy for Roosevelt to
wait. It was the hardest thing in the world for him to decline an
invitation to enter a fight—when the cause was a righteous one.
</p>
<p>
So the year 1911 passed by, with the Taft Administration steadily losing
prestige, and the revolt of the Progressives within the Republican party
continually gathering momentum. Then came 1912, the year of the Glorious
Failure.
</p>
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<h2>
CHAPTER XIII. THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY
</h2>
<p>
The Progressive party and the Progressive movement were two things. The
one was born on a day, lived a stirring, strenuous span of life, suffered
its fatal wound, lingered on for a few more years, and received its coup
de grace. The other sprang like a great river system from a multitude of
sources, flowed onward by a hundred channels, always converging and
uniting, until a single mighty stream emerged to water and enrich and
serve a broad country and a great people. The one was ephemeral, abortive—a
failure. The other was permanent, creative—a triumph. The two were
inseparable, each indispensable to the other. Just as the party would
never have existed if there had been no movement, so the movement would
not have attained such a surpassing measure of achievement so swiftly
without the party.
</p>
<p>
The Progressive party came into full being at the convention held in
Chicago on August 5, 1912 under dramatic circumstances. Every drama must
have a beginning and this one had opened for the public when, on the 10th
of February in the same year, the Republican Governors of West Virginia,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Wyoming, Michigan, Kansas, and Missouri addressed
a letter to Roosevelt, in which they declared that, in considering what
would best insure the continuation of the Republican party as a useful
agency of good government, they had reached the conclusion that a large
majority of the Republican voters of the country favored Roosevelt's
nomination, and a large majority of the people favored his election as the
next President. They asserted their belief that, in view of this public
demand, he should soon declare whether, if the nomination came to him
unsolicited and unsought, he would accept it. They concluded their request
with this paragraph:
</p>
<p>
"In submitting this request we are not considering your personal
interests. We do not regard it as proper to consider either the interest
or the preference of any man as regards the nomination for the Presidency.
We are expressing our sincere belief and best judgment as to what is
demanded of you in the interests of the people as a whole. And we feel
that you would be unresponsive to a plain public duty if you should
decline to accept the nomination, coming as the voluntary expression of
the wishes of a majority of the Republican voters of the United States,
through the action of their delegates in the next National Convention."
</p>
<p>
The sincerity and whole-heartedness of the convictions here expressed are
in no wise vitiated by the fact that the letter was not written until the
seven Governors were assured what the answer to it would be. For the very
beginning of our drama, then, we must go back a little farther to that day
in late January of 1912 when Theodore Roosevelt himself came face to face
with a momentous decision. On that day he definitely determined that his
duty to the things in which he profoundly believed—and no less to
the friends and associates who shared his beliefs—constrained him
once more to enter the arena of political conflict and lead the fight.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt had come to this conclusion with extreme reluctance. He had no
illusions as to the probable effect upon his personal fortunes. Twice he
had been President once by the hand of fate, once by a great popular vote.
To be President again could add nothing to his prestige or fame; it could
only subject him for four years to the dangerous vagaries of the unstable
popular mood. He had nothing to gain for himself by entering the ring of
political conflict again; the chances for personal loss were great. His
enemies, his critics, and his political adversaries would have it that he
was eaten up with ambition, that he came back from his African and
European trip eager to thrust himself again into the limelight of national
political life and to demand for himself again a great political prize.
But his friends, his associates, and those who, knowing him at close
range, understood him, realized that this was no picture of the truth. He
accepted what hundreds of Progressive leaders and followers throughout the
country—for the man in the ranks had as ready access to him as the
most prominent leader, and received as warm consideration—asserted
was his clear duty and obligation.
</p>
<p>
A letter which he had written two days before Christmas, 1911, shows
unmistakably how his mind was working in those days of prologue to the
great decision. The letter was entirely private, and was addressed to my
father who was a publisher and a friend and not a politician. There is,
therefore, no reason whatever why the letter should not be accepted as an
accurate picture of Mr. Roosevelt's mind at that time: "Now for the
message Harold gave me, that I should write you a little concerning
political conditions. They are very, very mixed. Curiously enough, my
article on the trusts was generally accepted as bringing me forward for
the Presidential nomination. Evidently what really happened was that there
had been a strong undercurrent of feeling about me, and that the talk
concerning the article enabled this feeling to come to the surface. I do
not think it amounts to anything. It merely means that a great many people
do not get the leadership they are looking for from any of the prominent
men in public life, and that under the circumstances they grasp at any
one; and as my article on the McNamaras possessed at least the merit of
being entirely clearcut and of showing that I knew my own mind and had
definite views, a good many plain people turned longingly to me as a
leader. Taft is very weak, but La Follette has not developed real strength
east of the Mississippi River, excepting of course in Wisconsin. West of
the River he has a large following, although there is a good deal of
opposition to him even in States like Kansas, Washington, and California.
East of the Mississippi, I believe he can only pick up a few delegates
here and there. Taft will have most of the Southern delegates, he will
have the officeholders, and also the tepid and acquiescent, rather than
active, support of the ordinary people who do not feel very strongly one
way or the other, and who think it is the usual thing to renominate a
President. If there were a strong candidate against him, he would I
believe be beaten, but there are plenty of men, many of the leaders not
only here but in Texas, for instance, in Ohio, in New Hampshire and
Illinois, who are against him, but who are even more against La Follette,
and who regard themselves as limited to the alternative between the two.
There is, of course, always the danger that there may be a movement for
me, the danger coming partly because the men who may be candidates are
very anxious that the ticket shall be strengthened and care nothing for
the fate of the man who strengthens it, and partly because there is a good
deal of honest feeling for me among plain simple people who wish
leadership, but who will not accept leadership unless they believe it to
be sincere, fearless, and intelligent. I most emphatically do not wish the
nomination. Personally I should regard it as a calamity to be nominated.
In the first place, I might very possibly be beaten, and in the next
place, even if elected I should be confronted with almost impossible
conditions out of which to make good results. In the tariff, for instance,
I would have to face the fact that men would keep comparing what I did,
not with what the Democrats would or could have done but with an ideal, or
rather with a multitude of entirely separate and really incompatible
ideals. I am not a candidate, I will never be a candidate; but I have to
tell the La Follette men and the Taft men that while I am absolutely
sincere in saying that I am not a candidate and do not wish the
nomination, yet that I do not feel it would be right or proper for me to
say that under no circumstances would I accept it if it came; because,
while wildly improbable, it is yet possible that there might be a public
demand which would present the matter to me in the light of a duty which I
could not shirk. In other words, while I emphatically do not want office,
and have not the slightest idea that any demand for me will come, yet if
there were a real public demand that in the public interest I should do a
given job, it MIGHT be that I would not feel like flinching from the task.
However, this is all in the air, and I do not for one moment believe that
it will be necessary for me even to consider the matter. As for the
Democrats, they have their troubles too. Wilson, although still the
strongest man the Democrats could nominate, is much weaker than he was. He
has given a good many people a feeling that he is very ambitious and not
entirely sincere, and his demand for the Carnegie pension created an
unpleasant impression. Harmon is a good old solid Democrat, with the
standards of political and commercial morality of twenty years ago, who
would be eagerly welcomed by all the conservative crowd. Champ Clark is a
good fellow, but impossible as President.
</p>
<p>
"I think a good deal will depend upon what this Congress does. Taft may
redeem himself. He was fairly strong at the end of the last session, but
went off lamentably on account of his wavering and shillyshallying on so
many matters during his speaking trip. His speeches generally hurt him,
and rarely benefit him. But it is possible that the Democrats in Congress
may play the fool, and give him the chance to appear as the strong leader,
the man who must be accepted to oppose them."
</p>
<p>
This was what Roosevelt at the end, of December sincerely believed would
be the situation as time went on. But he underestimated the strength and
the volume of the tide that was rising.
</p>
<p>
The crucial decision was made on the 18th of January. I was in the closest
possible touch with Roosevelt in those pregnant days, and I know, as well
as any but the man himself could know, how his mind was working. An entry
in my diary on that date shows the origin of the letter of the seven
governors:
</p>
<p>
"Senator Beveridge called on T. R. to urge him to make a public statement
soon. T. R. impressed by his arguments and by letters just received from
three Governors, Hadley, Glasscock, and Bass. Practically determined to
ask these Governors, and Stubbs and Osborne, to send him a joint letter
asking him to make a public statement to the effect that if there is a
genuine popular demand for his nomination he will not refuse-in other
words to say to him in a joint letter for publication just what they have
each said to him in private letters. Such joint action would give him a
proper reason—or occasion—for making a public declaration. T.
R. telegraphed Frank Knox, Republican State Chairman of Michigan and
former member of his regiment, to come down, with intention of asking him
to see the various governors. H. H., at Ernest Abbott's suggestion, asked
him not to make final decision till he has had conference—already
arranged—with editorial staff. T. R. agrees, but the inevitableness
of the matter is evident."
</p>
<p>
After that day, things moved rapidly. Two days later the diary contains
this record: "Everett Colby, William Fellowes Morgan, and Mark Sullivan
call on T. R. All inclined to agree that time for statement is practically
here. T. R.—The time to use a man is when the people want to use
him." M. S.—"The time to set a hen is when the hen wants to set."
Frank Knox comes in response to telegram. Nat Wright also present at
interview where Knox is informed of the job proposed for him. Gifford
Pinchot also present at beginning of interview while T. R. tells how he
views the situation, but leaves (at T. R.'s suggestion) before real
business of conference begins. Plan outlined to Knox, who likes it, and
subsequently, in H. H.'s office, draws up letter for Governors. Draft
shown to T. R., who suggests a couple of added sentences emphasizing that
the nomination must come as a real popular demand, and declaring that the
Governors are taking their action not for his sake, but for the sake of
the country. Knox takes copy of letter and starts for home, to go out to
see Governors as soon as possible.
</p>
<p>
On the 22d of January the Conference with The Outlook editorial staff took
place and is thus described in my diary:
</p>
<p>
"T. R. had long conference with entire staff. All except R. D. T. [Mr.
Townsend, Managing Editor of The Outlook] and H. H. inclined to deprecate
a public statement now. T. R.—'I have had all the honor the American
public can give me. If I should be elected I would go back not so young as
I once was, with all the first fine flavor gone, and take up the horrible
task of going in and out, in and out, of the same hole over and over
again. But I cannot decline the call. Too many of those who have fought
with me the good fight for the things we believe in together, declare that
at this critical moment I am the instrument that ought to be used to make
it possible for me to refuse. I BELIEVE I SHALL BE BROKEN IN THE USING.
But I cannot refuse to permit myself to be used. I am not going to get
those good fellows out on the end of a limb and then saw off the limb.' R.
D. T. suggested that it be said frankly that the Governors wrote the joint
letter at T. R.'s request. T. R. accepted like a shot. Went into H. H.'s
room, dictated two or three sentences to that effect, which H. H. later
incorporated in letter. [This plan was later given up, I believe on the
urging of some or all of the Governors involved.] T. R.—'I can't go
on telling my friends in private letters what my position is, but asking
them not to make it public, without seeming furtive.' In afternoon H. H.
suggests that T. R. write first draft of his letter of reply soon as
possible to give all possible time for consideration and revision. T. R.
has two inspirations—to propose presidential primaries in order to
be sure of popular demand, and to use statement made at Battery when he
returned home from Europe."
</p>
<p>
The next day's entry reads as follows:
</p>
<p>
"Sent revised letter to Knox. T. R. said, "Not to make a public statement
soon would be to violate my cardinal principle—never hit if you can
help it, but when you have to, hit hard. NEVER hit soft. You'll never get
any thanks for hitting soft." McHarg called with three men from St. Louis.
T. R. said exactly the same thing as usual—he would never accept the
nomination if it came as the result of an intrigue, only if it came as the
result of a genuine and widespread popular demand. The thing he wants to
be sure of is that there is this widespread popular demand that he "do a
job," and that the demand is genuine."
</p>
<p>
Meanwhile Frank Knox was consulting the seven Governors, each one of whom
was delighted to have an opportunity to say to Roosevelt in this formal,
public way just what they had each said to him privately and forcefully.
The letter was signed and delivered to T. R. On the 24th of February
Roosevelt replied to the letter of the seven Governors in unequivocal
terms, "I will accept the nomination for President if it is tendered to
me, and I will adhere to this decision until—the convention has
expressed its preference." He added the hope that so far as possible the
people might be given the chance, through direct primaries, to record
their wish as to who should be the nominee. A month later, in a great
address at Carnegie Hall in New York, he gave voice publicly to the same
thought that he had expressed to his friends in that editorial conference:
"The leader for the time being, whoever he may be, is but an instrument,
to be used until broken and then cast aside; and if he is worth his salt
he will care no more when he is broken than a soldier cares when he is
sent where his life is forfeit that the victory may be won. In the long
fight for righteousness the watchword for all is, 'Spend and be spent.' It
is of little matter whether any one man fails or succeeds; but the cause
shall not fail, for it is the cause of mankind."
</p>
<p>
The decision once made, Roosevelt threw himself into the contest for
delegates to the nominating convention with his unparalleled vigor and
forcefulness. His main opponent was, of course, the man who had been his
friend and associate and whom he had done more than any other single force
to make President as his successor. William Howard Taft had the undivided
support of the national party organization; but the Progressive
Republicans the country over thronged to Roosevelt's support with wild
enthusiasm. The campaign for the nomination quickly developed two aspects,
one of which delighted every Progressive in the Republican party, the
other of which grieved every one of Roosevelt's levelheaded friends. It
became a clean-cut conflict between progress and reaction, between the
interests of the people, both as rulers and as governed, and the special
interests, political and business. But it also became a bitter conflict of
personalities between the erstwhile friends. The breach between the two
men was afterwards healed, but it was several years after the reek of the
battle had drifted away before even formal relations were restored between
them.
</p>
<p>
A complicating factor in the campaign was the candidacy of Senator La
Follette of Wisconsin. In July, 1911, La Follette had begun, at the
earnest solicitation of many Progressive leaders in Congress and out, an
active campaign for the Republican nomination. Progressive organizations
were perfected in numerous States and "in less than three months," as La
Follette has written in his Autobiography, his candidacy "had taken on
proportions which compelled recognition." Four months later a conference
of some three hundred Progressives from thirty States, meeting in Chicago,
declared that La Follette was, because of his record, the logical
candidate for the Presidency. Following this conference he continued to
campaign with increasing vigor, but concurrently the enthusiasm of some of
his leading supporters began to cool and their support of his candidacy to
weaken. Senator La Follette ascribes this effect to the surreptitious
maneuvering of Roosevelt, whom he credits with an overwhelming appetite
for another Presidential term, kept in check only by his fear that he
could not be nominated or elected. But there is no evidence of any value
whatever that Roosevelt was conducting underground operations or that he
desired to be President again. The true explanation of the change in those
Progressives who had favored the candidacy of La Follette and yet had
gradually ceased to support him, is to be found in their growing
conviction that Taft and the reactionary forces in the Republican party
which he represented could be defeated only by one man—and that not
the Senator from Wisconsin. In any event the La Follette candidacy rapidly
declined until it ceased to be a serious element in the situation.
Although the Senator, with characteristic consistency and pertinacity,
stayed in the fight till the end, he entered the Convention with the
delegates of but two States, his own Wisconsin and North Dakota, pledged
to support him.
</p>
<p>
The pre-convention campaign was made unusually dramatic by the fact that,
for the first time in the history of Presidential elections, the voters of
thirteen States were privileged not only to select the delegates to the
Convention by direct primary vote but to instruct them in the same way as
to the candidate for whom they should cast their ballots. There were 388
such popularly instructed delegates from California, Georgia, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. It was naturally in these
States that the two candidates concentrated their campaigning efforts. The
result of the selection of delegates and of the preferential vote in these
States was the best possible evidence of the desire of the rank and file
of the party as to the Presidential candidate. Of these 388 delegates,
Senator La Follette secured 36; President Taft 71—28 in Georgia, 2
in Illinois, 18 in Massachusetts, 14 in Ohio, and 9 in Pennsylvania; and
Roosevelt 281—26 in California, 56 in Illinois, 16 in Maryland, 18
in Massachusetts, 16 in Nebraska, 28 in New Jersey, 34 in Ohio, 10 in
Oregon, 67 in Pennsylvania, and 10 in South Dakota. Roosevelt therefore,
in those States where the voters could actually declare at primary
elections which candidate they preferred, was the expressed choice of more
than five times as many voters as Taft.
</p>
<p>
When the Republican convention met in Chicago an interesting and peculiar
situation presented itself. There were 1078 seats in the Convention. Of
the delegates elected to those seats Taft had committed to him the vast
majority of the delegates from the States which have never cast an
electoral vote for a Republican candidate for President since there was a
Republican party. Roosevelt had in support of him the great majority of
the delegates from the States which are normally Republican and which must
be relied upon at election time if a Republican President is to be chosen.
Of the 1078 seats more than 200 were contested. Aside from these contested
seats, neither candidate had a majority of the delegates. The problem that
confronted each side was to secure the filling of a sufficient number of
the disputed seats with its retainers to insure a majority for its
candidate. In the solution of this problem the Taft forces had one
insuperable advantage. The temporary roll of a nominating convention is
made up by the National Committee of the party. The Republican National
Committee had been selected at the close of the last national convention
four years before. It accordingly represented the party as it had then
stood, regardless of the significant changes that three and a quarter
years of Taft's Presidency had wrought in party opinion.
</p>
<p>
In the National Committee the Taft forces had a strength of more than two
to one; and all but an insignificant number of the contests were decided
out of hand in favor of Mr. Taft. The temporary roll of the Convention
therefore showed a distinct majority against Roosevelt. From the fall of
the gavel, the Roosevelt forces fought with vigor and determination for
what they described as the "purging of the roll" of those Taft delegates
whose names they declared had been placed upon it by fraud. But at every
turn the force of numbers was against them; and the Taft majority which
the National Committee had constituted in the Convention remained intact,
an impregnable defense against the Progressive attack.
</p>
<p>
These preliminary engagements concerned with the determination of the
final membership of the Convention had occupied several days. Meanwhile
the temper of the Roosevelt delegates had burned hotter and hotter.
Roosevelt was present, leading the fight in person—not, of course,
on the floor of the Convention, to which he was not a delegate, but at
headquarters in the Congress Hotel. There were not wanting in the
Progressive forces counsels of moderation and compromise. It was suggested
by those of less fiery mettle that harmony might be arrived at on the
basis of the elimination of both Roosevelt and Taft and the selection of a
candidate not unsatisfactory to either side. But Roosevelt, backed by the
majority of the Progressive delegates, stood firm and immovable on the
ground that the "roll must be purged" and that he would consent to no
traffic with a Convention whose make-up contained delegates holding their
seats by virtue of fraud. "Let them purge the roll," he declared again and
again, "and I will accept any candidate the Convention may name." But the
organization leaders knew that a yielding to this demand for a
reconstitution of the personnel of the Convention would result in but one
thing—the nomination for Roosevelt—and this was the one thing
they were resolved not to permit.
</p>
<p>
As the hours of conflict and turmoil passed, there grew steadily and
surely in the Roosevelt ranks a demand for a severance of relations with
the fraudulent Convention and the formation of a new party devoted,
without equivocation or compromise, to Progressive principles. A typical
incident of these days of confusion and uncertainty was the drawing up of
a declaration of purpose by a Progressive alternate from New Jersey,
disgusted with the progress of the machine steam roller and disappointed
at the delayed appearance of a positive Progressive programme of action.
Circulated privately, with the knowledge and approval of Roosevelt, it was
promptly signed by dozens of Progressive delegates. It read as follows:
</p>
<p>
"We, the undersigned, in the event that the Republican National Convention
as at present constituted refuses to purge its roll of the delegates
fraudulently placed upon it by the action of the majority of the
Republican National Committee, pledge ourselves, as American citizens
devoted to the progressive principles of genuine popular rule and social
justice, to join in the organization of a new party founded upon those
principles, under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt."
</p>
<p>
The first signer of the declaration was Governor Hiram W. Johnson of
California, the second, Governor Robert S. Vessey of South Dakota, the
third, Governor Joseph M. Carey of Wyoming, and farther down the list were
the names of Gifford and Amos Pinchot, James R. Garfield, ex-Governor John
Franklin Fort of New Jersey, with Everett Colby and George L. Record of
the same State, Matthew Hale of Massachusetts, "Jack" Greenway of Arizona,
Judge Ben B. Lindsey of Colorado, Medill McCormick of Illinois, George
Rublee of New Hampshire, and Elon Huntington Hooker, of New York, who was
to become the National Treasurer of the new party. The document was, of
course, a purely informal assertion of purpose; but it was the first
substantial straw to predict the whirlwind which the masters of the
convention were to reap.
</p>
<p>
When at last it had become unmistakably clear that the Taft forces were
and would remain to the end in control of the Convention, the Progressive
delegates, with a few exceptions, united in dramatic action. Speaking for
them with passion and intensity Henry J. Allen of Kansas announced their
intention to participate no longer in the actions of a convention vitiated
by fraud. The Progressive delegates would, he declared, remain in their
places but they would neither vote nor take any part whatever in the
proceedings. He then read, by permission of the Convention, a statement
from Roosevelt, in which he pronounced the following indictment:
</p>
<p>
"The Convention has now declined to purge the roll of the fraudulent
delegates placed thereon by the defunct National Committee, and the
majority which has thus indorsed the fraud was made a majority only
because it included the fraudulent delegates themselves who all sat as
judges on one another's cases.... The Convention as now composed has no
claim to represent the voters of the Republican party.... Any man
nominated by the Convention as now constituted would merely be the
beneficiary of this successful fraud; it would be deeply discreditable for
any man to accept the Convention's nomination under these circumstances;
and any man thus accepting it would have no claim to the support of any
Republican on party grounds and would have forfeited the right to ask the
support of any honest man of any party on moral grounds."
</p>
<p>
So while most of the Roosevelt delegates sat in ominous quiet and refused
to vote, the Convention proceeded to nominate Taft for President by the
following vote: Taft 561—21 votes more than a majority; Roosevelt
107; La Follette 41; Cummins 17; Hughes 2; absent 6; present and not
voting 344.
</p>
<p>
Then the Taft delegates went home to meditate on the fight which they had
won and the more portentous fight which they must wage in the coming
months on a broader field. The Roosevelt delegates, on the other hand,
went out to Orchestra Hall, and in an exalted mood of passionate devotion
to their cause and their beloved leader proceeded to nominate Theodore
Roosevelt for the Presidency and Hiram Johnson for the Vice-Presidency. A
committee was sent to notify Roosevelt of the nomination and when he
appeared in the hall all precedents of spontaneous enthusiasm were broken.
This was no conventional—if the double entendre may be permitted—demonstration.
It had rather the quality of religious exaltation.
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt made a short speech, in which he adjured his hearers to go to
their several homes "to find out the sentiment of the people at home and
then again come together, I suggest by mass convention, to nominate for
the Presidency a Progressive on a Progressive platform that will enable us
to appeal to Northerner and Southerner, Easterner and Westerner,
Republican and Democrat alike, in the name of our common American
citizenship. If you wish me to make the fight I will make it, even if only
one State should support me."
</p>
<p>
Thus ended the first act in the drama. The second opened with the
gathering of some two thousand men and women at Chicago on August 5, 1912.
It was a unique gathering. Many of the delegates were women; one of the
"keynote" speeches was delivered by Miss Jane Addams of Hull House. The
whole tone and atmosphere of the occasion seemed religious rather than
political. The old-timers among the delegates, who found themselves in the
new party for diverse reasons, selfish, sincere, or mixed, must have felt
astonishment at themselves as they stood and shouted out Onward Christian
Soldiers as the battle-hymn of their new allegiance. The long address
which Roosevelt made to the Convention he denominated his "Confession of
Faith." The platform which the gathering adopted was entitled "A Contract
with the People." The sessions of the Convention seethed with enthusiasm
and burned hot with earnest devotion to high purpose. There could be no
doubt in the mind of any but the most cynical of political reactionaries
that here was the manifestation of a new and revivifying force to be
reckoned with in the future development of American political life.
</p>
<p>
The platform adopted by the Progressive Convention was no less a novelty.
Its very title—even the fact that it had a title marked it off from
the pompous and shopworn documents emanating from the usual nominating
Convention—declared a reversal of the time-honored view of a
platform as, like that of a street-car, "something to get in on, not
something to stand on." The delegates to that Convention were perfectly
ready to have their party sued before the bar of public opinion for breach
of contract if their candidates when elected did not do everything in
their power to carry out the pledges of the platform. The planks of the
platform grouped themselves into three main sections: political reforms,
control of trusts and combinations, and measures of "social and industrial
justice."
</p>
<p>
In the first section were included direct primaries, nation-wide
preferential primaries for the selection of candidates for the Presidency,
direct popular election of United States Senators, the short ballot, the
initiative, referendum and recall, an easier method of amending the
Federal constitution, woman suffrage, and the recall of judicial decisions
in the form of a popular review of any decision annulling a law passed
under the police power of the State.
</p>
<p>
The platform in the second place opposed vigorously the indiscriminate
dissolution of trusts and combinations, on the ground that combination in
the business field was not only inevitable but necessary and desirable for
the promotion of national and international efficiency. It condemned the
evils of inflated capitalization and unfair competition; and it proposed,
in order to eliminate those evils while preserving the unquestioned
advantages that flow from combination, the establishment of a strong
Federal commission empowered and directed to maintain permanent active
supervision over industrial corporations engaged in interstate commerce,
doing for them what the Federal Government now does for the national banks
and, through the Interstate Commerce Commission, for the transportation
lines.
</p>
<p>
Finally in the field of social justice the platform pledged the party to
the abolition of child labor, to minimum wage laws, the eight-hour day,
publicity in regard to working conditions, compensation for industrial
accidents, continuation schools for industrial education, and to
legislation to prevent industrial accidents, occupational diseases,
overwork, involuntary unemployment, and other injurious effects incident
to modern industry.
</p>
<p>
To stand upon this platform and to carry out the terms of this "contract
with the people," the Convention nominated without debate or dissent
Theodore Roosevelt for President and Hiram W. Johnson of California for
Vice-President. Governor Johnson was an appropriate running mate for
Roosevelt. In his own State he had led one of the most virile and fast
moving of the local Progressive movements. He burned with a white-hot
enthusiasm for the democratic ideal and the rights of man as embodied in
equality of opportunity, freedom of individual development, and protection
from the "dark forces" of special privilege, political autocracy and
concentrated wealth. He was a brilliant and fiery campaigner where his
convictions were enlisted.
</p>
<p>
So passed the second act in the drama of the Progressive party.
</p>
<p>
<a name="link2HCH0014" id="link2HCH0014">
<!-- H2 anchor --> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER XIV. THE GLORIOUS FAILURE
</h2>
<p>
The third act in the drama of the Progressive party was filled with the
campaign for the Presidency. It was a three-cornered fight. Taft stood for
Republican conservatism and clung to the old things. Roosevelt fought for
the progressive rewriting of Republican principles with added emphasis on
popular government and social justice as defined in the New Nationalism.
The Democratic party under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson espoused with
more or less enthusiasm the old Democratic principles freshly interpreted
and revivified in the declaration they called the New Freedom. The
campaign marked the definite entrance of the nation upon a new era. One
thing was clear from the beginning: the day of conservatism and reaction
was over; the people of the United States had definitely crossed their
Rubicon and had committed themselves to spiritual and moral progress.
</p>
<p>
The campaign had one dramatic incident. On the 14th of October, just
before entering the Auditorium at Milwaukee, Roosevelt was shot by a
fanatic. His immediate action was above everything characteristic. Some
time later in reply to a remark that he had been foolhardy in going on
with his speech just after the attack, Roosevelt said, "Why, you know, I
didn't think I had been mortally wounded. If I had been mortally wounded,
I would have bled from the lungs. When I got into the motor I coughed hard
three times, and put my hand up to my mouth; as I did not find any blood,
I thought that I was not seriously hurt, and went on with my speech."
</p>
<p>
The opening words of the speech which followed were equally typical:
</p>
<p>
"Friends, I shall ask you to be as quiet as possible. I don't know whether
you fully understand that I have just been shot; but it takes more than
that to kill a Bull Moose.... The bullet is in me now, so that I cannot
make a very long speech, but I will try my best.... First of all, I want
to say this about myself; I have altogether too important things to think
of to feel any concern over my own death; and now I cannot speak
insincerely to you within five minutes of being shot. I am telling you the
literal truth when I say that my concern is for many other things. It is
not in the least for my own life. I want you to understand that I am ahead
of the game anyway. No man has had a happier life than I have led; a
happier life in every way. I have been able to do certain things that I
greatly wished to do, and I am interested in doing other things. I can
tell you with absolute truthfulness that I am very much uninterested in
whether I am shot or not. It was just as when I was colonel of my
regiment. I always felt that a private was to be excused for feeling at
times some pangs of anxiety about his personal safety, but I cannot
understand a man fit to be a colonel who can pay any heed to his personal
safety when he is occupied as he ought to be occupied with the absorbing
desire to do his duty."
</p>
<p>
There was a great deal of self-revelation in these words. Even the critic
accustomed to ascribe to Roosevelt egotism and love of gallery applause
must concede the courage, will-power, and self-forgetfulness disclosed by
the incident.
</p>
<p>
The election was a debacle for reaction, a victory for Democracy, a
triumph in defeat for the Progressive party. Taft carried two States, Utah
and Vermont, with eight electoral votes; Woodrow Wilson carried forty
States, with 435 electoral votes; and Roosevelt carried five States,
Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington, and
eleven out of the thirteen votes of California, giving him 88 electoral
votes. Taft's popular vote was 3,484,956; Wilson's was 6,293,019; while
Roosevelt's was 4,119,507. The fact that Wilson was elected by a minority
popular vote is not the significant thing, for it is far beyond the
capability of any political observer to declare what would have been the
result if there had been but two parties in the field. The triumph for the
Progressive party lay in the certainty that its emergence had compelled
the election of a President whose face was toward the future. If the
Roosevelt delegates at Chicago in June had acquiesced in the result of the
steam-roller Convention, it is highly probable that Woodrow Wilson would
not have been the choice of the Democratic Convention that met later at
Baltimore.
</p>
<p>
During the succeeding four years the Progressive party, as a national
organization, continued steadily to "dwindle, peak, and pine." More and
more of its members and supporters slipped or stepped boldly back to the
Republican party. Its quondam Democratic members had largely returned to
their former allegiance with Wilson, either at the election or after it.
Roosevelt once more withdrew from active participation in public life,
until the Great War, with its gradually increasing intrusions upon
American interests and American rights, aroused him to vigorous and
aggressive utterance on American responsibility and American duty. He
became a vigorous critic of the Administration.
</p>
<p>
Once more a demand began to spring up for his nomination for the
Presidency; the Progressive party began to show signs of reviving
consciousness. There had persisted through the years a little band of
irreconcilables who were Progressives or nothing. They wanted a new party
of radical ideas regardless of anything in the way of reformation and
progress that the old parties might achieve. There were others who
preferred to go back to the Republican party rather than to keep up the
Progressive party as a mere minority party of protest, but who hoped in
going back to be able to influence their old party along the lines of
progress. There were those who were Rooseveltians pure and simple and who
would follow him wherever he led.
</p>
<p>
All these groups wanted Roosevelt as President. They united to hold a
convention of the Progressive party at Chicago in 1916 on the same days on
which the Republican Convention met there. Each convention opened with a
calculating eye upon the activities of the other. But both watched with
even more anxious surmise for some sign of intention from the Progressive
leader back at Oyster Bay. He held in his single hand the power of life
and death for the Progressive party. His decision as to cooperative action
with the Republicans or individual action as a Progressive would be the
most important single factor in the campaign against Woodrow Wilson, who
was certain of renomination. Three questions confronted and puzzled the
two bodies of delegates: Would the Republicans nominate Roosevelt or
another? If another, what would Roosevelt do? If another, what would the
Progressives do?
</p>
<p>
For three days the Republican National Convention proceeded steadily and
stolidly upon its appointed course. Everything had been done in the
stereotyped way on the stereotyped time-table in the stereotyped language.
No impropriety or infelicity had been permitted to mar the smooth texture
of its surface. The temporary chairman in his keynote speech had been as
mildly oratorical, as diffusely patriotic, and as nobly sentimental as any
Fourth of July orator of a bygone day. The whole tone of the Convention
had been subdued and decorous with the decorum of incertitude and
timidity. That Convention did not know what it wanted. It only knew that
there was one thing that it did not want and that it was afraid of, and
another thing it would rather not have and was afraid it would have to
take. It wanted neither Theodore Roosevelt nor Charles E. Hughes, and its
members were distinctly uncomfortable at the thought that they might have
to take one or the other. It was an old-fashioned convention of the
hand-picked variety. It smacked of the former days when the direct primary
had not yet introduced the disturbing thought that the voters and not the
office-holders and party leaders ought to select their candidates.
</p>
<p>
It was a docile, submissive convention, not because it was ruled by a
strong group of men who knew what they wanted and proposed to compel their
followers to give it to them, but because it was composed of politicians
great and small to whom party regularity was the breath of their nostrils.
They were ready to do the regular thing; but the only two things in sight
were confoundedly irregular.
</p>
<p>
Two drafts were ready for their drinking and they dreaded both. They could
nominate one of two men, and to nominate either of them was to fling open
the gates of the citadel of party regularity and conformity and let the
enemy in. Was it to be Roosevelt or Hughes? Roosevelt they would not have.
Hughes they would give their eye teeth not to take. No wonder they were
subdued and inarticulate. No wonder they suffered and were unhappy. So
they droned along through their stereotyped routine, hoping dully against
fate.
</p>
<p>
The hot-heads in the Progressive Convention wanted no delay, no
compromise. They would have nominated Theodore Roosevelt out of hand with
a whoop, and let the Republican Convention take him or leave him. But the
cooler leaders realized the importance of union between the two parties
and knew, or accurately guessed, what the attitude of Roosevelt would be.
With firm hand they kept the Convention from hasty and irrevocable action.
They proposed that overtures be made to the Republican Convention with a
view to harmonious agreement. A conference was held between committees of
the two conventions to see if common ground could be discovered. At the
first session of the joint committee it appeared that there was sincere
desire on both sides to get together, but that the Progressives would have
no one but Roosevelt, while the Republicans would not have him but were
united on no one else. When the balloting began in the Republican
Convention, the only candidate who received even a respectable block of
votes was Hughes, but his total was hardly more than half of the necessary
majority. For several ballots there was no considerable gain for any of
the numerous candidates, and when the Convention adjourned late Friday
night the outcome was as uncertain as ever. But by Saturday morning the
Republican leaders and delegates had resigned themselves to the
inevitable, and the nomination of Hughes was assured. When the Progressive
Convention met that morning, the conference committee reported that the
Republican members of the committee had proposed unanimously the selection
of Hughes as the candidate of both parties.
</p>
<p>
Thus began the final scene in the Progressive drama, and a more thrilling
and intense occasion it would be difficult to imagine. It was apparent
that the Progressive delegates would have none of it. They were there to
nominate their own beloved leader and they intended to do it. A telegram
was received from Oyster Bay proposing Senator Lodge as the compromise
candidate, and the restive delegates in the Auditorium could with the
greatest difficulty be held back until the telegram could be received and
read at the Coliseum. A direct telephone wire from the Coliseum to a
receiver on the stage of the Auditorium kept the Progressive body in
instant touch with events in the other Convention. In the Auditorium the
atmosphere was electric. The delegates bubbled with excitement. They
wanted to nominate Roosevelt and be done with it. The fear that the other
Convention would steal a march on them and make its nomination first set
them crazy with impatience. The hall rumbled and sputtered and fizzed and
detonated. The floor looked like a giant corn popper with the kernels
jumping and exploding like mad.
</p>
<p>
The delegates wanted action; the leaders wanted to be sure that they had
kept faith with Roosevelt and with the general situation by giving the
Republican delegates a chance to hear his last proposal. Bainbridge Colby,
of New York, put Roosevelt in nomination with brevity and vigor; Hiram
Johnson seconded the nomination with his accustomed fire. Then, as the
word came over the wire that balloting had been resumed in the Coliseum,
the question was put at thirty-one minutes past twelve, and every delegate
and every alternate in the Convention leaped to his feet with upstretched
arm and shouted "Aye."
</p>
<p>
Doubtless more thrilling moments may come to some men at some time,
somewhere, but you will hardly find a delegate of that Progressive
Convention to believe it. Then the Convention adjourned, to meet again at
three to hear what the man they had nominated would say.
</p>
<p>
At five o'clock in the afternoon, after a couple of hours of impatient and
anxious marking time with routine matters, the Progressive delegates
received the reply from their leader. It read thus:
</p>
<p>
"I am very grateful for the honor you confer upon me by nominating me as
President. I cannot accept it at this time. I do not know the attitude of
the candidate of the Republican party toward the vital questions of the
day. Therefore, if you desire an immediate decision, I must decline the
nomination.
</p>
<p>
"But if you prefer to wait, I suggest that my conditional refusal to run
be placed in the hands of the Progressive National Committee. If Mr.
Hughes's statements, when he makes them, shall satisfy the committee that
it is for the interest of the country that he be elected, they can act
accordingly and treat my refusal as definitely accepted.
</p>
<p>
"If they are not satisfied, they can so notify the Progressive party, and
at the same time they can confer with me, and then determine on whatever
action we may severally deem appropriate to meet the needs of the country.
</p>
<p>
"THEODORE ROOSEVELT."
</p>
<p>
Puzzled, disheartened, overwhelmed, the Progressive delegates went away.
They could not then see how wise, how farsighted, how inevitable
Roosevelt's decision was. Some of them will never see it. Probably few of
them as they went out of those doors realized that they had taken part in
the last act of the romantic and tragic drama of the National Progressive
party. But such was the fact, for the march of events was too much for it.
Fate, not its enemies, brought it to an end.
</p>
<p>
So was born, lived a little space, and died the Progressive party. At its
birth it caused the nomination, by the Democrats, and the election, by the
people, of Woodrow Wilson. At its death it brought about the nomination of
Charles E. Hughes by the Republicans. It forced the writing into the
platforms of the more conservative parties of principles and programmes of
popular rights and social regeneration. The Progressive party never
attained to power, but it wielded a potent power. It was a glorious
failure.
</p>
<p>
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<h2>
CHAPTER XV. THE FIGHTING EDGE
</h2>
<p>
Theodore Roosevelt was a prodigious coiner of phrases. He added scores of
them, full of virility, picturesqueness, and flavor to the every-day
speech of the American people. They stuck, because they expressed ideas
that needed expressing and because they expressed them so well that no
other combinations of words could quite equal them. One of the best,
though not the most popular, of his phrases is contained in the following
quotation:
</p>
<p>
"One of the prime dangers of civilization has always been its tendency to
cause the loss of virile fighting virtues, of the fighting edge. When men
get too comfortable and lead too luxurious lives, there is always danger
lest the softness eat like an acid into their manliness of fiber."
</p>
<p>
He used the same phrase many times. Here is another instance:
</p>
<p>
"Unjust war is to be abhorred; but woe to the nation that does not make
ready to hold its own in time of need against all who would harm it! And
woe, thrice over, to the nation in which the average man loses the
fighting edge, loses the power to serve as a soldier if the day of need
should arise!"
</p>
<p>
That was it—THE FIGHTING EDGE. Roosevelt had it, if ever man had.
The conviction of the need for that combination of physical and spiritual
qualities that this represented, if a man is to take his place and keep it
in the world, became an inseparable part of his consciousness early in
life. It grew in strength and depth with every year that he lived. He
learned the need of preparedness on that day in Maine when he found
himself helpless before the tormenting of his young fellow travelers. In
the gymnasium on Twentieth Street, within the boxing ring at Harvard, in
the New York Assembly, in the conflicts with the spoilsmen in Washington,
on the frontier in cowboy land, in Mulberry Street and on Capitol Hill,
and in the jungle before Santiago, the lesson was hammered into him by the
stern reality of events. The strokes fell on malleable metal.
</p>
<p>
In the spring of 1897, Roosevelt had been appointed Assistant Secretary of
the Navy, largely through the efforts of his friend, Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge of Massachusetts. The appointment was excellent from every point of
view. Though Roosevelt had received no training for the post so far as
technical education was concerned, he brought to his duties a profound
belief in the navy and a keen interest in its development. His first
published book had been "The Naval War of 1812"; and the lessons of that
war had not been lost upon him. It was indeed a fortuitous circumstance
that placed him in this branch of the national service just as relations
between Spain and the United States were reaching the breaking point. When
the battleship Maine was sunk in Havana Harbor, his reaction to that
startling event was instantaneous. He was convinced that the sinking of
the Maine made war inevitable, but he had long been certain that war ought
to come. He believed that the United States had a moral duty toward the
Cuban people, oppressed, abused, starved, and murdered at the hands of
Spain.
</p>
<p>
He was not the head of the Navy Department, but that made little
difference. The Secretary was a fine old gentleman, formerly president of
the Massachusetts Peace Society, and by temperament indisposed to any
rapid moves toward war. But he liked his Assistant Secretary and did not
put too stern a curb upon his impetuous activity and Roosevelt's activity
was vigorous and unceasing. Secretary Long has described it, rather with
justice than with enthusiasm.
</p>
<p>
"His activity was characteristic. He was zealous in the work of putting
the navy in condition for the apprehended struggle. His ardor sometimes
went faster than the President or the Department approved.... He worked
indefatigably, frequently incorporating his views in memoranda which he
would place every morning on my desk. Most of his suggestions had,
however, so far as applicable, been already adopted by the various
bureaus, the chiefs of which were straining every nerve and leaving
nothing undone. When I suggested to him that some future historian reading
his memoranda, if they were put on record, would get the impression that
the bureaus were inefficient, he accepted the suggestion with the generous
good nature which is so marked in him. Indeed, nothing could be pleasanter
than our relations. He was heart and soul in his work. His typewriters had
no rest. He, like most of us, lacks the rare knack of brevity. He was
especially stimulating to the younger officers who gathered about him and
made his office as busy as a hive. He was especially helpful in the
purchasing of ships and in every line where he could push on the work of
preparation for war."
</p>
<p>
One suspects that the Secretary may have been more complacently convinced
of the forehandedness of the bureau chiefs than was his impatient
associate. For, while the navy was apparently in better shape than the
army in those days, there must have been, even in the Department where
Roosevelt's typewriters knew no rest, some of that class of desk-bound
officers whom he met later when he was organizing the Rough Riders. His
experience with one such officer in the War Department was humorous. This
bureaucrat was continually refusing Roosevelt's applications because they
were irregular. In each case Roosevelt would appeal to the Secretary of
War, with whom he was on the best of terms, and would get from him an
order countenancing the irregularity. After a number of experiences of
this kind, the harassed slave of red tape threw himself back in his chair
and exclaimed, "Oh, dear! I had this office running in such good shape—and
then along came the war and upset everything!"
</p>
<p>
But there were plenty of good men in the navy; and one of them was
Commodore George Dewey. Roosevelt had kept his eye on him for some time as
an officer who "could be relied upon to prepare in advance, and to act
promptly, fearlessly, and on his own responsibility when the emergency
arose." When he began to foresee the probability of war, Roosevelt
succeeded in having Dewey sent to command the Asiatic squadron; and just
ten days after the Maine was blown up this cablegram went from Washington
to Hong Kong:
</p>
<p>
"DEWEY, Hong Kong:
</p>
<p>
"Order the squadron, except the Monocacy, to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal.
In the event of declaration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that
the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive
operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders.
Roosevelt."
</p>
<p>
The declaration of war lagged on for nearly two months, but when it
finally came, just one week elapsed between the sending of an order to
Dewey to proceed at once to the Philippines and to "capture vessels or
destroy" and the elimination of the sea power of Spain in the Orient. The
battle of Manila Bay was a practical demonstration of the value of the
"fighting edge," as exemplified in an Assistant Secretary who fought
procrastination, timidity, and political expedience at home and in a naval
officer who fought the enemy's ships on the other side of the world.
</p>
<p>
When war actually came, Roosevelt could not stand inactivity in
Washington. He was a fighter and he must go where the real fighting was.
With Leonard Wood, then a surgeon in the army, he organized the First
United States Volunteer Cavalry. He could have been appointed Colonel, but
he knew that Wood knew more about the soldier's job than he, and he
insisted upon taking the second place. The Secretary of War thought him
foolish to step aside thus and suggested that Roosevelt become Colonel and
Wood Lieutenant-Colonel, adding that Wood would do the work anyway. But
that was not the Roosevelt way. He replied that he did not wish to rise on
any man's shoulders, that he hoped to be given every chance that his deeds
and his abilities warranted, that he did not wish what he did not earn,
and that, above all, he did not wish to hold any position where any one
else did the work. Lieutenant-Colonel he was made.
</p>
<p>
The regiment, which will always be affectionately known as the Rough
Riders, was "raised, armed, equipped, drilled, mounted, dismounted, kept
for two weeks on a transport, and then put through two victorious
aggressive fights, in which it lost a third of the officers, and a fifth
of the enlisted men, all within a little over fifty days." Roosevelt began
as second in command, went through the battle of San Juan Hill as Colonel,
and ended the war in command of a brigade, with the brevet of
Brigadier-General. The title of Colonel stuck to him all his life.
</p>
<p>
When he became President, his instinctive commitment to the necessity of
being prepared had been stoutly reinforced by his experience in what he
called "the war of America the Unready." His first message to Congress was
a long and exhaustive paper, dealing with many matters of importance. But
almost one-fifth of it was devoted to the army and the navy. "It is not
possible," he said, "to improvise a navy after war breaks out. The ships
must be built and the men trained long in advance." He urged that Congress
forthwith provide for several additional battleships and heavy armored
cruisers, together with the proportionate number of smaller craft, and he
pointed out the need for many more officers and men. He declared that
"even in time of peace a warship should be used until it wears out, for
only so can it be kept fit to respond to any emergency. The officers and
men alike should be kept as much as possible on blue water, for it is
there only they can learn their duties as they should be learned." But his
most vigorous insistence was upon gunnery. "In battle," he said once to
the graduates of the Naval Academy, "the only shots that count are those
that hit, and marksmanship is a matter of long practice and intelligent
reasoning." To this end he demanded "unceasing" gunnery practice.
</p>
<p>
In every succeeding message to Congress for seven years he returned to the
subject of the navy, demanding ships, officers, men, and, above all,
training. His insistence on these essentials brought results, and by the
time the cruise of the battle fleet around the world had been achieved,
the American navy, ship for ship, was not surpassed by any in the world.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say, ship's crew for ship's crew; for
it was the officers and men of the American navy who made it possible for
the world cruise to be made without the smallest casualty.
</p>
<p>
The question of marksmanship had been burned into Roosevelt's mind in
those days when the Spanish War was brewing. He has related in his
"Autobiography" how it first came to his attention through a man whose
name has in more recent years become known the world over in connection
with the greatest task of the American navy. Roosevelt's account is as
follows:
</p>
<p>
"There was one deficiency... which there was no time to remedy, and of the
very existence of which, strange to say, most of our best men were
ignorant. Our navy had no idea how low our standard of marksmanship was.
We had not realized that the modern battleship had become such a
complicated piece of mechanism that the old methods of training in
marksmanship were as obsolete as the old muzzle-loading broadside guns
themselves. Almost the only man in the navy who fully realized this was
our naval attach at Paris, Lieutenant Sims. He wrote letter after letter
pointing out how frightfully backward we were in marksmanship. I was much
impressed by his letters.... As Sims proved to be mistaken in his belief
that the French had taught the Spaniards how to shoot, and as the
Spaniards proved to be much worse even than we were, in the service
generally Sims was treated as an alarmist. But although I at first partly
acquiesced in this view, I grew uneasy when I studied the small proportion
of hits to shots made by our vessels in battle. When I was President I
took up the matter, and speedily became convinced that we needed to
revolutionize our whole training in marksmanship. Sims was given the lead
in organizing and introducing the new system; and to him more than to any
other one man was due the astonishing progress made by our fleet in this
respect, a progress which made the fleet, gun for gun, at least three
times as effective, in point of fighting efficiency, in 1908, as it was in
1902" *.
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
*Autobiography (Scribner), pp. 212-13.
</pre>
<p>
Theodore Roosevelt was a thoroughgoing, bred-in-the-bone individualist,
but not as the term is ordinarily understood. He continually emphasized
not the rights of the individual, but his duties, obligations, and
opportunities. He knew that human character is the greatest thing in the
world and that men and women are the real forces that move and sway the
world's affairs. So in all his preaching and doing on behalf of a great
and efficient navy, the emphasis that he always laid was upon the men of
the navy, their efficiency and their spirit. He once remarked, "I believe
in the navy of the United States primarily because I believe in the
intelligence, the patriotism, and the fighting edge of the average man of
the navy." To the graduating class at Annapolis, he once said:
</p>
<p>
"There is not one of you who is not derelict in his duty to the whole
Nation if he fails to prepare himself with all the strength that in him
lies to do his duty should the occasion arise; and one of your great
duties is to see that shots hit. The result is going to depend largely
upon whether you or your adversary hits. I expect you to be brave. I
rather take that for granted.... But, in addition, you have got to prepare
yourselves in advance. Every naval action that has taken place in the last
twenty years ... has shown, as a rule, that the defeated party has
suffered not from lack of courage, but because it could not make the best
use of its weapons, or had not been given the right weapons... . I want
every one here to proceed upon the assumption that any foe he may meet
will have the courage. Of course, you have got to show the highest degree
of courage yourself or you will be beaten anyhow, and you will deserve to
be; but in addition to that you must prepare yourselves by careful
training so that you may make the best possible use of the delicate and
formidable mechanism of a modern warship."
</p>
<p>
Theodore Roosevelt was an apostle of preparedness from the hour that he
began to think at all about affairs of public moment—and that hour
came to him earlier in life than it does to most men. In the preface to
his history of the War of 1812, which he wrote at the age of twenty-four,
this sentence appears: "At present people are beginning to realize that it
is folly for the great English-speaking Republic to rely for defense upon
a navy composed partly of antiquated hulks, and partly of new vessels
rather more worthless than the old." His prime interest, from the point of
view of preparedness, lay in the navy. His sense of proportion told him
that the navy was the nation's first line of defense. He knew that without
an efficient navy a nation situated as the United States was would be
helpless before an aggressive enemy, and that, given a navy of sufficient
size and effectiveness, the nation could dispense with a great army. For
the army he demanded not size but merely efficiency. One of his principal
points of attack in his criticism of the army was the system of promotion
for officers. He assailed sharply the existing practice of "promotion by
mere seniority." In one of his messages to Congress he pointed out that a
system of promotion by merit existed in the Military Academy at West
Point. He then went on to say that from the time of the graduation of the
cadets into the army "all effort to find which man is best or worst and
reward or punish him accordingly, is abandoned: no brilliancy, no amount
of hard work, no eagerness in the performance of duty, can advance him,
and no slackness or indifference, that falls short of a court-martial
offense, can retard him. Until this system is changed we cannot hope that
our officers will be of as high grade as we have a right to expect,
considering the material from which we draw. Moreover, when a man renders
such service as Captain Pershing rendered last spring in the Moro
campaign, it ought to be possible to reward him without at once jumping
him to the grade of brigadier-general."
</p>
<p>
It is not surprising to find in this message also a name that was later to
become famous in the Great War. Roosevelt had an uncanny gift of prophecy.
</p>
<p>
More than once, as President, he picked out for appreciation and
commendation the very men who were to do the big things for America when
the critical hour came.
</p>
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<h2>
CHAPTER XVI. THE LAST FOUR YEARS
</h2>
<p>
When the Great War broke out in August, 1914, Roosevelt instantly
stiffened to attention. He immediately began to read the lessons that were
set for the world by the gigantic conflict across the sea and it was not
long before he was passing them on to the American people. Like every
other good citizen, he extended hearty support to the President in his
conduct of America's foreign relations in the crisis. At the same time,
however, he recognized the possibility that a time might come when it
would be a higher moral duty to criticize the Administration than to
continue unqualified support. Three weeks after war had begun, Roosevelt
wrote in "The Outlook":
</p>
<p>
"In common with the immense majority of our fellow countrymen, I shall
certainly stand by not only the public servants in control of the
Administration at Washington, but also all other public servants, no
matter of what party, during this crisis; asking only that they with
wisdom and good faith endeavor to take every step that can be taken to
safeguard the honor and interest of the United States, and, so far as the
opportunity offers, to promote the cause of peace and justice throughout
the world. My hope, of course, is that in their turn the public servants
of the people will take no action so fraught with possible harm to the
future of the people as to oblige farsighted and patriotic men to protest
against it."
</p>
<p>
One month later, in a long article in "The Outlook", Roosevelt reiterated
this view in these words:
</p>
<p>
".... We, all of us, without regard to party differences, must stand ready
loyally to support the Administration, asking nothing except that the
policy be one that in truth and in fact tells for the honor and interest
of our Nation and in truth and in fact is helpful to the cause of a
permanent and righteous world peace."
</p>
<p>
In the early months of the war, Roosevelt thus scrupulously endeavored to
uphold the President's hands, to utter no criticism that might hamper him,
and to carry out faithfully the President's adjuration to neutrality. He
recognized clearly, however, the price that we must pay for neutrality,
and he set it forth in the following passage from the same article: "A
deputation of Belgians has arrived in this country to invoke our
assistance in the time of their dreadful need. What action our Government
can or will take I know not. It has been announced that no action can be
taken that will interfere with our entire neutrality. It is certainly
eminently desirable that we should remain entirely neutral, and nothing
but urgent need would warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one
way or the other. Our first duty is to hold ourselves ready to do whatever
the changing circumstances demand in order to protect our own interests in
the present and in the future; although, for my own part, I desire to add
to this statement the proviso that under no circumstances must we do
anything dishonorable, especially toward unoffending weaker nations.
Neutrality may be of prime necessity in order to preserve our own
interests, to maintain peace in so much of the world as is not affected by
the war, and to conserve our influence for helping toward the
reestablishment of general peace when the time comes; for if any outside
Power is able at such time to be the medium for bringing peace, it is more
likely to be the United States than any other. But we pay the penalty of
this action on behalf of peace for ourselves, and possibly for others in
the future, by forfeiting our right to do anything on behalf of peace for
the Belgians in the present. We can maintain our neutrality only by
refusal to do anything to aid unoffending weak powers which are dragged
into the gulf of bloodshed and misery through no fault of their own. Of
course it would be folly to jump into the gulf ourselves to no good
purpose; and very probably nothing that we could have done would have
helped Belgium. We have not the smallest responsibility for what has
befallen her, and I am sure that the sympathy of this country for the men,
women, and children of Belgium is very real. Nevertheless, this sympathy
is compatible with full acknowledgment of the unwisdom of our uttering a
single word of official protest unless we are prepared to make that
protest effective; and only the clearest and most urgent national duty
would ever justify us in deviating from our rule of neutrality and
noninterference. But it is a grim comment on the professional pacifist
theories as hitherto developed that our duty to preserve peace for
ourselves may necessarily mean the abandonment of all effective efforts to
secure peace for other unoffending nations which through no fault of their
own are dragged into the War."
</p>
<p>
The rest of the article concerned itself with the lessons taught by the
war, the folly of pacifism, the need for preparedness if righteousness is
not to be sacrificed for peace, the worthlessness of treaties unsanctioned
by force, and the desirability of an association of nations for the
prevention of war. On this last point Roosevelt wrote as follows:
</p>
<p>
"But in view of what has occurred in this war, surely the time ought to be
ripe for the nations to consider a great world agreement among all the
civilized military powers TO BACK RIGHTEOUSNESS BY FORCE. Such an
agreement would establish an efficient World League for the Peace of
Righteousness. Such an agreement could limit the amount to be spent on
armaments and, after defining carefully the inalienable rights of each
nation which were not to be transgressed by any other, could also provide
that any cause of difference among them, or between one of them and one of
a certain number of designated outside non-military nations, should be
submitted to an international court, including citizens of all these
nations, chosen not as representatives of the nations, BUT AS JUDGES and
perhaps in any given case the particular judges could be chosen by lot
from the total number. To supplement and make this effectual it should be
solemnly covenanted that if any nation refused to abide by the decision of
such a court the others would draw the sword on behalf of peace and
justice, and would unitedly coerce the recalcitrant nation. This plan
would not automatically bring peace, and it may be too soon to hope for
its adoption; but if some such scheme could be adopted, in good faith and
with a genuine purpose behind it to make it effective, then we would have
come nearer to the day of world peace. World peace will not come save in
some such manner as that whereby we obtain peace within the borders of
each nation; that is, by the creation of reasonably impartial judges and
by putting an efficient police power—that is, by putting force in
efficient fashion—behind the decrees of the judges. At present each
nation must in the last resort trust to its own strength if it is to
preserve all that makes life worth having. At present this is imperative.
This state of things can be abolished only when we put force, when we put
the collective armed power of civilization, behind some body which shall
with reasonable justice and equity represent the collective determination
of civilization to do what is right."
</p>
<p>
From this beginning Roosevelt went on vigorously preaching preparedness
against war; and the Great War had been raging for a scant seven months
when he was irresistibly impelled to utter open criticism of President
Wilson. In April, 1915, in The Metropolitan Magazine, to which he had
transferred his writings, he declared that "the United States, thanks to
Messrs. Wilson and Bryan, has signally failed in its duty toward Belgium."
He maintained that the United States, under the obligations assumed by the
signature of The Hague Conventions, should have protested to Germany
against the invasion of Belgium.
</p>
<p>
For two years thereafter, while Germany slapped America first on one cheek
and then on the other, and treacherously stabbed her with slinking spies
and dishonored diplomats, Roosevelt preached, with growing indignation and
vehemence, the cause of preparedness and national honor. He found it
impossible to support the President further. In February, 1916, he wrote:
</p>
<p>
"Eighteen months have gone by since the Great War broke out. It needed no
prescience, no remarkable statesmanship or gift of forecasting the future,
to see that, when such mighty forces were unloosed, and when it had been
shown that all treaties and other methods hitherto relied upon for
national protection and for mitigating the horror and circumscribing the
area of war were literally 'scraps of paper,' it had become a vital
necessity that we should instantly and on a great and adequate scale
prepare for our own defense. Our men, women, and children—not in
isolated cases, but in scores and hundreds of cases—have been
murdered by Germany and Mexico; and we have tamely submitted to wrongs
from Germany and Mexico of a kind to which no nation can submit without
impairing its own self-respect and incurring the contempt of the rest of
mankind. Yet, during these eighteen months not one thing has been done....
Never in the country's history has there been a more stupendous instance
of folly than this crowning folly of waiting eighteen months after the
elemental crash of nations took place before even making a start in an
effort—and an utterly inefficient and insufficient effort-for some
kind of preparation to ward off disaster in the future.
</p>
<p>
"If President Wilson had shown the disinterested patriotism, courage, and
foresight demanded by this stupendous crisis, I would have supported him
with hearty enthusiasm. But his action, or rather inaction, has been such
that it has become a matter of high patriotic duty to oppose him.... No
man can support Mr. Wilson without at the same time supporting a policy of
criminal inefficiency as regards the United States Navy, of short-sighted
inadequacy as regards the army, of abandonment of the duty owed by the
United States to weak and well-behaved nations, and of failure to insist
on our just rights when we are ourselves maltreated by powerful and
unscrupulous nations."
</p>
<p>
Theodore Roosevelt could not, without violating the integrity of his own
soul, go on supporting either positively by word or negatively by silence
the man who had said, on the day after the Lusitania was sunk, "There is
such a thing as a nation being too proud to fight," and who later called
for a "peace without victory." He could have nothing but scorn for an
Administration whose Secretary of War could say, two months after the
United States had actually entered the war, that there was "difficulty. ..
disorder and confusion... in getting things started," and could then add,
"but it is a happy confusion. I delight in the fact that when we entered
this war we were not like our adversary, ready for it, anxious for it,
prepared for it, and inviting it."
</p>
<p>
Until America entered the war Roosevelt used his voice and his pen with
all his native energy and fire to convince the American people of three
things that righteousness demanded that the United States forsake its
supine neutrality and act; that the United States should prepare itself
thoroughly for any emergency that might arise; and that the hyphenated
Americanism of those who, while enjoying the benefits of American
citizenship, "intrigue and conspire against the United States, and do
their utmost to promote the success of Germany and to weaken the defense
of this nation" should be rigorously curbed. The sermons that he preached
on this triple theme were sorely needed. No leadership in this phase of
national life was forthcoming from the quarter where the American people
had every right to look for leadership. The White House had its face set
in the opposite direction.
</p>
<p>
In August, 1915, an incident occurred which set the contrast between the
Rooseveltian and Wilsonian lines of thought in bold relief. Largely
through the initiative of General Leonard Wood there had been organized at
Plattsburg, New York, an officers' training camp where American business
men were given an all too brief course of training in the art and duty of
leading soldiers in camp and in the field. General Wood was in command of
the Plattsburg camp. He invited Roosevelt to address the men in training.
Roosevelt accepted gladly, and in the course of his speech made these
significant statements:
</p>
<p>
"For thirteen months America has played an ignoble part among the nations.
We have tamely submitted to seeing the weak, whom we have covenanted to
protect, wronged. We have seen our men, women, and children murdered on
the high seas without protest. We have used elocution as a substitute for
action.
</p>
<p>
"During this time our government has not taken the smallest step in the
way of preparedness to defend our own rights. Yet these thirteen months
have made evident the lamentable fact that force is more dominant now in
the affairs of the world than ever before, that the most powerful of
modern military nations is utterly brutal and ruthless in its disregard of
international morality, and that righteousness divorced from force is
utterly futile. Reliance upon high sounding words, unbacked by deeds, is
proof of a mind that dwells only in the realm of shadow and of sham.
</p>
<p>
"It is not a lofty thing, on the contrary, it is an evil thing, to
practise a timid and selfish neutrality between right and wrong. It is
wrong for an individual. It is still more wrong for a nation.
</p>
<p>
"Therefore, friends, let us shape our conduct as a nation in accordance
with the highest rules of international morality. Let us treat others
justly and keep the engagements we have made, such as these in The Hague
conventions, to secure just treatment for others. But let us remember that
we shall be wholly unable to render service to others and wholly unable to
fulfill the prime law of national being, the law of self-preservation,
unless we are thoroughly prepared to hold our own. Let us show that a free
democracy can defend itself successfully against any organized and
aggressive military despotism."
</p>
<p>
The men in the camp heard him gladly and with enthusiasm. But the next day
the Secretary of War sent a telegram of censure to General Wood in which
he said:
</p>
<p>
"I have just seen the reports in the newspapers of the speech made by
ex-President Roosevelt at the Plattsburg camp. It is difficult to conceive
of anything which could have a more detrimental effect upon the real value
of this experiment than such an incident.... No opportunity should have
been furnished to any one to present to the men any matter excepting that
which was essential to the necessary training they were to receive.
Anything else could only have the effect of distracting attention from the
real nature of the experiment, diverting consideration to issues which
excite controversy, antagonism, and ill feeling and thereby impairing if
not destroying, what otherwise would have been so effective."
</p>
<p>
On this telegram Roosevelt's comment was pungent: "If the Administration
had displayed one-tenth the spirit and energy in holding Germany and
Mexico to account for the murder of men, women, and children that it is
now displaying in the endeavor to prevent our people from being taught the
need of preparation to prevent the repetition of such murders in the
future, it would be rendering a service to the people of the country."
</p>
<p>
Theodore Roosevelt could have little effect upon the material preparedness
of the United States for the struggle which it was ultimately to enter.
But he could and did have a powerful effect upon the spiritual
preparedness of the American people for the efforts, the trials, and the
sacrifices of that struggle. No voice was raised more persistently or more
consistently than his. No personality was thrown with more power and more
effect into the task of arousing the people of the United States to their
duty to take part in the struggle against Prussianism. No man, in public
or private life, urged so vigorously and effectively the call to arms
against evil and for the right. His was the "voice crying in the
wilderness," and to him the American spirit hearkened and awoke.
</p>
<p>
At last the moment came. Roosevelt had but one desire and one thought. He
wanted to get to the firing-line. This was no impulse, no newly formed
project. For two months he had been in correspondence with the Secretary
of War on the subject. A year or more before that he had offered, in case
America went into the war, to raise a volunteer force, train it, and take
it across to the front. The idea was not new to him, even then. As far
back as 1912 he had said on several different occasions, "If the United
States should get into another war, I should raise a brigade of cavalry
and lead it as I did my regiment in Cuba." It never occurred to him in
those days that a former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army,
with actual experience in the field, would be refused permission to
command troops in an American war. The idea would hardly have occurred to
any one else. But that is precisely what happened.
</p>
<p>
On February 2, 1917, Roosevelt wrote to the Secretary of War reminding him
that his application for permission to raise a division of infantry was
already on file in the Department, saying that he was about to sail for
Jamaica, and asking the Secretary to inform him if he believed there would
be war and a call for volunteers, for in that case he did not intend to
sail. Secretary Baker replied, "No situation has arisen which would
justify my suggesting a postponement of the trip you propose." Before this
reply was received Roosevelt had written a second letter saying that, as
the President had meanwhile broken off diplomatic relations with Germany,
he should of course not sail. He renewed his request for permission to
raise a division, and asked if a certain regular officer whom he would
like to have for his divisional Chief of Staff, if the division were
authorized, might be permitted to come to see him with a view to "making
all preparations that are possible in advance." To this the Secretary
replied, "No action in the direction suggested by you can be taken without
the express sanction of Congress. Should the contingency Occur which you
have in mind, it is to be expected that Congress will complete its
legislation relating to volunteer forces and provide, under its own
conditions, for the appointment of officers for the higher commands."
</p>
<p>
Roosevelt waited five weeks and then earnestly renewed his request. He
declared his purpose to take his division, after some six weeks of
preliminary training, direct to France for intensive training so that it
could be sent to the front in the shortest possible time. Secretary Baker
replied that no additional armies could be raised without the consent of
Congress, that a plan for a much larger army was ready for the action of
Congress when ever required, and that the general officers for all
volunteer forces were to be drawn from the regular army. To this Roosevelt
replied with the respectful suggestion that, as a retired
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, he was eligible to any
position of command over American troops. He recounted also his record of
actual military experience and referred the Secretary to his immediate
superiors in the field in Cuba as to his fitness for command of troops.
</p>
<p>
When war had been finally declared, Secretary Baker and Roosevelt
conferred together at length about the matter. Thereafter Mr. Baker wrote
definitely, declaring that he would be obliged to withhold his approval
from an expedition of the sort proposed. The grounds which he gave for the
decision were that the soldiers sent across must not be "deprived... of
the most experienced leadership available, in deference to any mere
sentimental consideration," and that it should appear from every aspect of
the expeditionary force, if one should be sent over (a point not yet
determined upon) that "military considerations alone had determined its
composition."
</p>
<p>
To this definite refusal on the part of the Secretary of War Roosevelt
replied at length. In his letter was a characteristic passage commenting
upon Secretary Baker's reference to "sentimental considerations":
</p>
<p>
"I have not asked you to consider any "sentimental value" in this matter.
I am speaking of moral effect, not of sentimental value. Sentimentality is
as different from morality as Rousseau's life from Abraham Lincoln's. I
have just received a letter from James Bryce urging "the dispatch of an
American force to the theater of war," and saying, "The moral effect of
the appearance in the war line of an American force would be immense."
From representatives of the French and British Governments and of the
French, British, and Canadian military authorities, I have received
statements to the same effect, in even more emphatic form, and earnest
hopes that I myself should be in the force. Apparently your military
advisers in this matter seek to persuade you that a "military policy" has
nothing to do with "moral effect." If so, their militarism is like that of
the Aulic Council of Vienna in the Napoleonic Wars, and not like that of
Napoleon, who stated that in war the moral was to the material as two to
one. These advisers will do well to follow the teachings of Napoleon and
not those of the pedantic militarists of the Aulic Council, who were the
helpless victims of Napoleon."
</p>
<p>
Secretary Baker replied with a reiteration of his refusal. Roosevelt made
one further attempt. When the Draft Law passed Congress, carrying with it
the authorization to use volunteer forces, he telegraphed the President
asking permission to raise two divisions, and four if so directed. The
President replied with a definite negative, declaring that his conclusions
were "based entirely upon imperative considerations of public policy and
not upon personal or private choice." Meanwhile applications had been
received from over three hundred thousand men desirous of joining
Roosevelt's volunteer force, of whom it was estimated that at least two
hundred thousand were physically fit, double the number needed for four
divisions. That a single private citizen, by "one blast upon his bugle
horn" should have been able to call forth three hundred thousand
volunteers, all over draft age, was a tremendous testimony to his power.
If his offer had been accepted when it was first made, there would have
been an American force on the field in France long before one actually
arrived there. It was widely believed, among men of intelligence and
insight, not only in America but in Great Britain and France, that the
arrival of such a force, under the command of a man known, admired, and
loved the world over, would have been a splendid reinforcement to the
Allied morale and a sudden blow to the German confidence. But the
Administration would not have it so.
</p>
<p>
I shall never forget one evening with Theodore Roosevelt on a speaking
tour which he was making through the South in 1912. There came to our
private car for dinner Senator Clarke of Arkansas and Jack Greenway, young
giant of football fame and experience with the Rough Riders in Cuba. After
dinner, Jack, who like many giants, is one of the most diffident men
alive, said hesitatingly:
</p>
<p>
"Colonel, I've long wanted to ask you something."
</p>
<p>
"Go right ahead," said T. R., "what is it?"
</p>
<p>
"Well, Colonel," said Jack, "I've always believed that it was your
ambition to die on the field of battle."
</p>
<p>
T. R. brought his hand down on the table with a crash that must have hurt
the wood.
</p>
<p>
"By Jove," said he, "how did you know that?"
</p>
<p>
"Well, Colonel," said Jack, "do you remember that day in Cuba, when you
and I were going along a trail and came upon ____ [one of the regiment]
propped against a tree, shot through the abdomen? It was evident that he
was done for. But instead of commiserating him, you grabbed his hand and
said something like this, 'Well, old man, isn't this splendid!' Ever since
then I've been sure you would be glad to die in battle yourself."
</p>
<p>
T. R.'s face sobered a little.
</p>
<p>
"You're right, Jack," he said. "I would."
</p>
<p>
The end of Theodore Roosevelt's life seemed to come to him not in action
but in quietness. But the truth was other than that. For it, let us turn
again to Browning's lines:
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
I was ever a fighter, so—one fight more,
The best and the last!
I would hate that death bandaged my eyes, and forbore,
And bade me creep past.
</pre>
<p>
On the fifth of January in 1919, after sixty years of life, full of
unwearied fighting against evil and injustice and falseness, he "fell on
sleep." The end came peacefully in the night hours at Sagamore Hill. But
until he laid him down that night, the fight he waged had known no
relaxation. Nine months before he had expected death, when a serious
mastoid operation had drained his vital forces. Then his one thought had
been, not for himself, but for his sons to whom had been given the
precious privilege, denied to him, of taking part in their country's and
the world's great fight for righteousness. His sister, Mrs. Corinne
Douglas Robinson, tells how in those shadowy hours he beckoned her to him
and in the frailest of whispers said, "I'm glad it's I that lie here and
that my boys are in the fight over there."
</p>
<p>
His last, best fight was worthy of all the rest. With voice and pen he
roused the minds and the hearts of his countrymen to their high mission in
defense of human rights. It was not given to him to fall on the field of
battle. But he went down with his face to the forces of evil with which he
had never sought a truce.
</p>
<p>
<br /> <br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<br /> <br />
</p>
<h2>
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
</h2>
<p>
The reader who is primarily interested in the career and personality of
Roosevelt would do well to begin with his own volume, "Theodore Roosevelt,
An Autobiography". But it was written in 1912, before the great campaign
which produced the Progressive party.
</p>
<p>
"Theodore Roosevelt the Citizen" (1904), by Jacob A. Riis, was published
just after Roosevelt became President. It is an intimate and naively
enthusiastic portrait by a man who was an intimate friend and an ardent
admirer.
</p>
<p>
There are two lives written since his death that are complete and
discriminating. They are "The Life of Theodore Roosevelt" (1919), by
William Draper Lewis, and "Theodore Roosevelt, an Intimate Biography"
(1919), by William Roscoe Thayer.
</p>
<p>
"Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt" (1919) is a volume of first-hand
experiences, written by Lawrence F. Abbott of "The Outlook". The author
was closely associated with Roosevelt on "The Outlook"; and after the
African hunting trip met him at Khartum and went with him on his tour of
the capitals of Europe.
</p>
<p>
A small volume by Charles G. Washburn, "Theodore Roosevelt, the Logic of
His Career" (1916), contains the interpretation of a long-time friend and
sincere admirer.
</p>
<p>
Collections of Roosevelt's writings and speeches covering the years from
his becoming Governor of New York to the end of his Presidential terms are
found in "The Roosevelt Policy", 2 vols. (1908) and "Presidential
Addresses and State Papers", 4 vols. (1904). "The New Nationalism" (1910)
is a collection of his speeches delivered between his return from Africa
and the beginning of the Progressive campaign. His writings and speeches
during the Great War are found in several volumes: "America and the World
War" (1915); "Fear God and Take Your Own Part" (1916); "The Foes of Our
Own Household" (1917); "The Great Adventure" (1919).
</p>
<p>
Material on the Progressive movement and the Progressive party are to be
found in "The Progressive Movement" (1915), by Benjamin Parke De Witt,
"The Progressive Movement, Its Principles and Its Programme" (1913), by S.
J. Duncan-Clark, "Presidential Nominations and Elections" (1916), by
Joseph Bucklin Bishop, and "Third Party Movements" (1916), by Fred E.
Haynes. The story of La Follette is set forth at greater length in his
"Autobiography; A Personal Narrative of Political Experiences" (1918).
Three other autobiographies contribute to an understanding of politics:
"The Autobiography of Thomas C. Platt" (1910); J. B. Foraker, "Notes of a
Busy Life", 2 vols. (1916). S. M. Cullom, "Fifty Years of Public Service"
(1911).
</p>
<p>
The history of the country during the years when Roosevelt became a
national figure is recounted by J. H. Latane in "America as a World Power"
and by F. A. Ogg in "National Progress", both volumes in the "American
Nation" Series. Briefer summaries of the general history of at least a
part of the period treated in the present volume are to be found in
Frederic L. Paxson's "The New Nation" (1915), and Charles A. Beard's
"Contemporary American History" (1914).
</p>
<p>
The prosecution of the trusts may be followed in "Trust Laws and Unfair
Competition" (Government Printing Office, 1916). Much useful material is
contained in "Trusts, Pools and Corporations", edited by W. Z. Ripley
(1916). W. H. Taft in "The Anti-Trust Law and the Supreme Court" (1914)
defends the Sherman Act as interpreted by the courts during his
administration.
</p>
<p>
The progress of social and industrial justice is outlined in "Principles
of Labor Legislation" (1916), by John R. Commons and John B. Andrews. The
problems of conservation and the history of governmental policy are set
forth by C. R. Van Hise in "The Conservation of Natural Resources in the
United States" (1910).
</p>
<p>
The "American Year Book" for the years 1910 to 1919 and the "New
International Year Book" for the years 1907 to 1919 are invaluable sources
of accurate and comprehensive information on the current history of the
United States for the period which they cover.
</p>
<p>
Willis Fletcher Johnson's "America's Foreign Relations", 2 vols. (1915) is
a history of the relations of the United States to the rest of the world.
A shorter account is given in C. R. Fish's "American Diplomacy" (1915).
</p>
<p>
But much of the best material for the historical study of the first decade
and a half of the twentieth century is to be found in the pages of the
magazines and periodicals published during those years. "The Outlook",
"The Independent", "The Literary Digest", "Collier's", "The Review of
Reviews", "The World's Work", "Current Opinion", "The Nation", "The
Commoner", La Follette's "Weekly"—all these are sources of great
value. The Outlook is of especial usefulness because of Mr. Roosevelt's
connection with it as Contributing Editor during the years between 1909
and 1914.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
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