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diff --git a/26430.txt b/26430.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02b9815 --- /dev/null +++ b/26430.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11142 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Essay on the Creative Imagination, by Th. Ribot + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Essay on the Creative Imagination + +Author: Th. Ribot + +Translator: Albert H. N. Baron + +Release Date: August 25, 2008 [EBook #26430] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ESSAY ON THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION *** + + + + +Produced by Clare Boothby and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + +------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Note: | + | | + | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected in | + | this text. For a complete list, please see the bottom of | + | this document. | + | | + | The children's letters on page 108 have been reproduced in | + | this text as diagrams. | + +------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + +ESSAY ON THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION + +BY + +TH. RIBOT + + +TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH + +BY + +ALBERT H. N. BARON +FELLOW IN CLARK UNIVERSITY + + +LONDON +KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD. +1906 + +COPYRIGHT BY +THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO. +CHICAGO, U. S. A. +1906 +_All rights reserved._ + + +TO THE MEMORY OF MY TEACHER +AND FRIEND, + +Arthur Allin, Ph. D., + +PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION, +UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, + +WHO FIRST INTERESTED ME IN THE PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY, +THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED, WITH REVERENCE +AND GRATITUDE, BY + +THE TRANSLATOR. + + + + +TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. + + +The name of Th. Ribot has been for many years well known in America, and +his works have gained wide popularity. The present translation of one of +his more recent works is an attempt to render available in English what +has been received as a classic exposition of a subject that is often +discussed, but rarely with any attempt to understand its true nature. + +It is quite generally recognized that psychology has remained in the +semi-mythological, semi-scholastic period longer than most attempts at +scientific formulization. For a long time it has been the "spook +science" _per se_, and the imagination, now analyzed by M. Ribot in such +a masterly manner, has been one of the most persistent, apparently real, +though very indefinite, of psychological spooks. Whereas people have +been accustomed to speak of the imagination as an entity _sui generis_, +as a lofty something found only in long-haired, wild-eyed "geniuses," +constituting indeed the center of a cult, our author, Prometheus-like, +has brought it down from the heavens, and has clearly shown that +_imagination is a function of mind common to all men in some degree_, +and that it is shown in as highly developed form in commercial leaders +and practical inventors as in the most bizarre of romantic idealists. +The only difference is that the manifestation is not the same. + +That this view is not entirely original with M. Ribot is not to his +discredit--indeed, he does not claim any originality. We find the view +clearly expressed elsewhere, certainly as early as Aristotle, that the +greatest artist is he who actually embodies his vision and will in +permanent form, preferably in social institutions. This idea is so +clearly enunciated in the present monograph, which the author modestly +styles an essay, that when the end of the book is reached but little +remains of the great imagination-ghost, save the one great mystery +underlying all facts of mind. + +That the present rendering falls far below the lucid French of the +original, the translator is well aware; he trusts, however, that the +indulgent reader will take into account the good intent as offsetting in +part, at least, the numerous shortcomings of this version. + +I wish here to express my obligation to those friends who encouraged me +in the congenial task of translation. + +A. H. N. B. + + + + +AUTHOR'S PREFACE + + +Contemporary psychology has studied the purely reproductive imagination +with great eagerness and success. The works on the different +image-groups--visual, auditory, tactile, motor--are known to everyone, +and form a collection of inquiries solidly based on subjective and +objective observation, on pathological facts and laboratory experiments. +The study of the creative or constructive imagination, on the other +hand, has been almost entirely neglected. It would be easy to show that +the best, most complete, and most recent treatises on psychology devote +to it scarcely a page or two; often, indeed, do not even mention it. A +few articles, a few brief, scarce monographs, make up the sum of the +past twenty-five years' work on the subject. The subject does not, +however, at all deserve this indifferent or contemptuous attitude. Its +importance is unquestionable, and even though the study of the creative +imagination has hitherto remained almost inaccessible to experimentation +strictly so-called, there are yet other objective processes that permit +of our approaching it with some likelihood of success, and of continuing +the work of former psychologists, but with methods better adapted to +the requirements of contemporary thought. + +The present work is offered to the reader as an essay or first attempt +only. It is not our intention here to undertake a complete monograph +that would require a thick volume, but only to seek the underlying +conditions of the creative imagination, showing that it has its +beginning and principal source in the natural tendency of images to +become objectified (or, more simply, in the motor elements inherent in +the image), and then following it in its development under its manifold +forms, whatever they may be. For I cannot but maintain that, at present, +the psychology of the imagination is concerned almost wholly with its +part in esthetic creation and in the sciences. We scarcely get beyond +that; its other manifestations have been occasionally mentioned--never +investigated. Yet invention in the fine arts and in the sciences is only +a special case, and possibly not the principal one. We hope to show that +in practical life, in mechanical, military, industrial, and commercial +inventions, in religious, social, and political institutions, the human +mind has expended and made permanent as much imagination as in all other +fields. + +The constructive imagination is a faculty that in the course of ages has +undergone a reduction--or at least, some profound changes. So, for +reasons indicated later on, the mythic activity has been taken in this +work as the central point of our topic, as the primitive and typical +form out of which the greater number of the others have arisen. The +creative power is there shown entirely unconfined, freed from all +hindrance, careless of the possible and the impossible; in a pure state, +unadulterated by the opposing influence of imitation, of ratiocination, +of the knowledge of natural laws and their uniformity. + +In the first or analytical part, we shall try to resolve the +constructive imagination into its constitutive factors, and study each +of them singly. + +The second or genetic part will follow the imagination in its +development as a whole from the dimmest to the most complex forms. + +Finally, the third or concrete part, will be no longer devoted to the +imagination, but to imaginative beings, to the principal types of +imagination that observation shows us. + +May, 1900. + + + + +ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. + + + + PAGE + +Translator's Preface v + +Author's Preface vii + + +INTRODUCTION. + +THE MOTOR NATURE OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. + + Transition from the reproductive to the creative + imagination.--Do all representations contain motor + elements?--Unusual effects produced by images: vesication, + stigmata; their conditions; their meaning for our + subject.--The imagination is, on the intellectual side, + equivalent to will. Proof: Identity of development; + subjective, personal character of both; teleologic + character; analogy between the abortive forms of the + imagination and abulias. 3 + + +FIRST PART. + +ANALYSIS OF THE IMAGINATION. + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE INTELLECTUAL FACTOR. + + Dissociation, preparatory work.--Dissociation in complete, + incomplete and schematic images.--Dissociation in series. + Its principal causes: internal or subjective, external or + objective.--Association: its role reduced to a single + question, the formation of new combinations.--The principal + intellectual factor is thinking by analogy. Why it is an + almost inexhaustible source of creation. Its mechanism. Its + processes reducible to two, viz.: personification, + transformation. 15 + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE EMOTIONAL FACTOR. + + The great importance of this element.--All forms of the + creative imagination imply affective elements. Proofs: All + affective conditions may influence the imagination. Proofs: + Association of ideas on an emotional basis; new combinations + under ordinary and extraordinary forms.--Association by + contrast.--The motor element in tendencies.--There is no + creative instinct; invention has not _a_ source, but + _sources_, and always arises from a need.--The work of the + imagination reduced to two great classes, themselves + reducible to special needs.--Reasons for the prejudice in + favor of a creative instinct. 31 + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE UNCONSCIOUS FACTOR. + + Various views of the "inspired state." Its essential + characteristics; suddenness, impersonality.--Its relations + to unconscious activity.--Resemblances to hypermnesia, the + initial state of alcoholic intoxication and somnambulism on + waking.--Disagreements concerning the ultimate nature of + unconsciousness: two hypotheses.--The "inspired state" is + not a cause, but an index.--Associations in unconscious + form.--Mediate or latent association: recent experiments and + discussions on this subject.--"Constellation" the result of + a summation of predominant tendencies. Its mechanism. 50 + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE ORGANIC CONDITIONS OF THE IMAGINATION. + + Anatomical conditions: various hypotheses. Obscurity of the + question. Flechsig's theory.--Physiological conditions: are + they cause, effect, or accompaniment? Chief factor: change + in cerebral and local circulation.--Attempts at + experimentation.--The oddities of inventors brought under + two heads: the explicable and inexplicable. They are helpers + of inspiration.--Is there any analogy between physical and + psychic creation? A philosophical hypothesis on the + subject.--Limitation of the question. Impossibility of an + exact answer. 65 + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY. + + Importance of the unifying principle. It is a fixed idea or + a fixed emotion.--Their equivalence.--Distinction between + the synthetic principle and the ideal, which is the + principle of unity in motion: the ideal is a construction in + images, merely outlined.--The principal forms of the + unifying principles: unstable, organic or middle, extreme or + semi-morbid.--Obsession of the inventor and the sick: + insufficiency of a purely psychological criterion. 79 + + +SECOND PART. + +THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMAGINATION. + + +CHAPTER I. + +IMAGINATION IN ANIMALS. + + Difficulties of the subject.--The degree of imagination in + animals.--Does creative synthesis exist in them? Affirmation + and denials.--The special form of animal imagination is + motor, and shows itself through play: its numerous + varieties.--Why the animal imagination must be above all + motor: lack of intellectual development.--Comparison with + young children, in whom the motor system predominates: the + roles of movements in infantile insanity. 93 + + +CHAPTER II. + +IMAGINATION IN THE CHILD. + + Division of its development into four principal + periods.--Transition from passive to creative imagination: + perception and illusion.--Animating everything: analysis of + the elements constituting this moment: the role of + belief.--Creation in play: period of imitation, attempts at + invention.--Fanciful invention. 103 + + +CHAPTER III. + +PRIMITIVE MAN AND THE CREATION OF MYTHS. + + The golden age of the creative imagination.--Myths: + hypotheses as to the origin: the myth is the psycho-physical + objectification of man in the phenomena that he perceives. + The role of imagination.--How myths are formed. The moment + of creation: two operations--animating everything, + qualifying everything. Romantic invention lacking in peoples + without imagination. The role of analogy and of association + through "constellation."--The evolution of myths: ascension, + acme, decline.--The explanatory myths undergo a radical + transformation: the work of depersonification of the myth. + Survivals.--The non-explanatory myths suffer a partial + transformation: Literature is a fallen and rationalized + mythology.--Popular imagination and legends: the legend is + to the myth what illusion is to hallucination.--Unconscious + processes that the imagination employs in order to create + legends: fusion, idealization. 118 + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE HIGHER FORMS OF INVENTION. + + Is a psychology of great inventors possible? Pathological + and physiological theories of genius.--General characters of + great inventors. Precocity: chronological order of the + development of the creative power. Psychological reasons + for this order. Why the creator commences by + imitating.--Necessity or fatalism of vocation.--The + representative character of great creators. Discussion as to + the origin of this character--is it in the individual or in + the environment?--Mechanism of creation. Two principal + processes--complete, abridged. Their three phases; their + resemblances and differences.--The role of chance in + invention: it supposes the meeting of two factors--one + internal, the other external.--Chance is an occasion for, + not an agent of, creation. 140 + + +CHAPTER V. + +LAW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMAGINATION. + + Is the creative imagination, in its evolution, subject to + any law?--It passes through two stages separated by a + critical phase.--Period of autonomy; critical period; period + of definite constitution. Two cases: decay or transformation + through logical form, through deviation.--Subsidiary law of + increasing complexity.--Historical verification. 167 + + +THIRD PART. + +THE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF IMAGINATION. + +PRELIMINARY. + + The need of a concrete study.--The varieties of the creative + imagination, analogous to the varieties of character. 179 + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE PLASTIC IMAGINATION. + + It makes use of clear images, well determined in space, and + of associations of objective relations.--Its external + character.--Inferiority of the affective element.--Its + principal manifestations: in the arts dealing with form; in + poetry (transformation of sonorous into visual images); in + myths with clear outline; in mechanical invention.--The dry + and rational imagination its elements. 184 + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE DIFFLUENT IMAGINATION. + + It makes use of vague images linked according to the least + rigorous modes of association. Emotional abstractions; their + nature.--Its characteristic of inwardness.--Its principal + manifestations: revery, the romantic spirit, the chimerical + spirit; myths and religious conceptions, literature and the + fine arts (the symbolists), the class of the marvelous and + fantastic.--Varieties of the diffluent imagination: first, + numerical imagination; its nature; two principal forms, + cosmogonic and scientific conceptions; second, musical + imagination, the type of the affective imagination. Its + characteristics; it does not develop save after an interval + of time.--Natural transposition of events in + musicians.--Antagonism between true musical imagination and + plastic imagination. Inquiry and facts on the subject.--Two + great types of imagination. 195 + + +CHAPTER III. + +MYSTIC IMAGINATION. + + Its elements; its special characteristics.--Thinking + symbolically.--Nature of this symbolism.--The mystic changes + concrete images into symbolic images.--Their obscurity; + whence it arises.--Extraordinary abuse of analogy.--Mystic + labor on letters, numbers, etc.--Nature and extent of the + belief accompanying this form of imagination: it is + unconditional and permanent.--The mystic conception of the + world a general symbolism.--Mystic imagination in religion + and in metaphysics. 221 + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION. + + It is distinguishable into genera and species.--The need for + monographs that have not yet appeared.--The imagination in + growing sciences--belief is at its maximum; in the organized + sciences--the negative role of method.--The conjectural + phase; proof of its importance.--Abortive and dethroned + hypotheses.--The imagination in the processes of + verification.--The metaphysician's imagination arises from + the same need as the scientist's.--Metaphysics is a + rationalized myth.--Three moments.--Imaginative and + rationalist. 236 + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE PRACTICAL AND MECHANICAL IMAGINATION. + + Indetermination of this imaginative form.--Inferior forms: + the industrious, the unstable, the eccentric. Why people of + lively imagination are changeable.--Superstitious beliefs. + Origin of this form of imagination--its mental mechanism and + its elements.--The higher form--mechanical imagination.--Man + has expended at least as much imagination there as in + esthetic creation.--Why the contrary view + prevails.--Resemblances between these two forms of + imagination.--Identity of development. Detail + observation--four phases.--General characters. This form, at + its best, supposes inspiration; periods of preparation, of + maturity, and of decline.--Special characters: invention + occurs in layers. Principal steps of its development.--It + depends strictly on physical conditions.--A phase of pure + imagination--mechanical romances. Examples.--Identical + nature of the imagination of the mechanic and that of the + artist. 256 + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE COMMERCIAL IMAGINATION. + + Its internal and external conditions.--Two classes of + creators--the cautious, the daring.--The initial moment of + invention.--The importance of the intuitive + mind.--Hypotheses in regard to its psychologic nature.--Its + development: the creation of increasingly more simple + processes of substitution.--Characters in common with the + forms of creation already studied.--Characters peculiar to + it--the combining imagination of the tactician; it is a form + of war.--Creative intoxication.--Exclusive use of schematic + representations.--Remarks on the various types of + images.--The creators of great financial systems.--Brief + remarks on the military imagination. 281 + + +CHAPTER VII. + +THE UTOPIAN IMAGINATION. + + Successive appearances of ideal conceptions.--Creators in + ethics and in the social realm.--Chimerical forms. Social + novelists.--Ch. Fourrier, type of the great + imaginer.--Practical invention--the collective + ideal.--Imaginative regression. 299 + + +CONCLUSION. + +I. _The foundations of the creative imagination._ + + Why man is able to create: two principal + conditions.--"Creative spontaneity," which resolves itself + into needs, tendencies, desires.--Every imaginative creation + has a motor origin.--The spontaneous revival of images.--The + creative imagination reduced to three forms: outlined, + fixed, objectified. Their peculiar characteristics. 313 + +II. _The imaginative type._ + + A view of the imaginative life in all its stages.--Reduction + to a psychologic law.--Four stages characterized: 1, by the + _quantity_ of images; 2, by their _quantity and intensity_; + 3, by quantity, intensity and duration; 4, by the complete + and permanent systematization of the imaginary + life.--Summary. 320 + + +APPENDICES. + + +OBSERVATIONS AND DOCUMENTS. + + A. The various forms of inspiration. 335 + + B. On the nature of the unconscious factor. Two + categories--static unconscious, dynamic + unconscious.--Theories as to the nature of the + unconscious.--Objections, criticisms. 338 + + C. Cosmic and human imagination. 346 + + D. Evidence in regard to musical imagination. 350 + + E. The imaginative type and association of ideas. 353 + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + + + +INTRODUCTION + +THE MOTOR NATURE OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION + +I + + +It has been often repeated that one of the principal conquests of +contemporary psychology is the fact that it has firmly established the +place and importance of movements; that it has especially through +observation and experiment shown the representation of a movement to be +a movement begun, a movement in the nascent state. Yet those who have +most strenuously insisted on this proposition have hardly gone beyond +the realm of the passive imagination; they have clung to facts of pure +reproduction. My aim is to extend their formula, and to show that it +explains, in large measure at least, the origin of the creative +imagination. + +Let us follow step by step the passage from reproduction pure and simple +to the creative stage, showing therein the persistence and preponderance +of the motor element in proportion as we rise from mere repetition to +invention. + +First of all, do all representations include motor elements? Yes, I +say, because every perception presupposes movements to some extent, and +representations are the remnants of past perceptions. Certain it is +that, without our examining the question in detail, this statement holds +good for the great majority of cases. So far as visual and tactile +images are concerned there is no possible doubt as to the importance of +the motor elements that enter into their composition. The eye is very +poorly endowed with movements for its office as a higher sense-organ; +but if we take into account its intimate connection with the vocal +organs, so rich in capacity for motor combinations, we note a kind of +compensation. Smell and taste, secondary in human psychology, rise to a +very high rank indeed among many animals, and the olfactory apparatus +thus obtains with them a complexity of movements proportionate to its +importance, and one that at times approaches that of sight. There yet +remains the group of internal sensations that might cause discussion. +Setting aside the fact that the vague impressions bound up with chemical +changes within the tissues are scarcely factors in representation, we +find that the sensations resulting from changes in respiration, +circulation, and digestion are not lacking in motor elements. The mere +fact that, in some persons, vomiting, hiccoughs, micturition, etc., can +be caused by perceptions of sight or of hearing proves that +representations of this character have a tendency to become translated +into acts. + +Without emphasizing the matter we may, then, say that this thesis rests +on a weighty mass of facts; that the motor element of the image tends to +cause it to lose its purely "inner" character, to objectify it, to +externalize it, to project it outside of ourselves. + +It should, however, be noted that what has just been said does not take +us beyond the reproductive imagination--beyond memory. All these revived +images are _repetitions_; but the creative imagination requires +something _new_--this is its peculiar and essential mark. In order to +grasp the transition from reproduction to production, from repetition to +creation, it is necessary to consider other, more rare, and more +extraordinary facts, found only among some favored beings. These facts, +known for a long time, surrounded with some mystery, and attributed in a +vague manner "to the power of the imagination," have been studied in our +own day with much more system and exactness. For our purpose we need to +recall only a few of them. + +Many instances have been reported of tingling or of pains that may +appear in different parts of the body solely through the effect of the +imagination. Certain people can increase or inhibit the beating of their +hearts at will, i.e., by means of an intense and persistent +representation. The renowned physiologist, E. F. Weber, possessed this +power, and has described the mechanism of the phenomenon. Still more +remarkable are the cases of vesication produced in hypnotized subjects +by means of suggestion. Finally, let us recall the persistent story of +the stigmatized individuals, who, from the thirteenth century down to +our own day, have been quite numerous and present some interesting +varieties--some having only the mark of the crucifix, others of the +scourging, or of the crown of thorns.[1] Let us add the profound changes +of the organism, results of the suggestive therapeutics of +contemporaries; the wonderful effects of the "faith cure," i.e., the +miracles of all religions in all times and in all places; and this brief +list will suffice to recall certain creative activities of the human +imagination that we have a tendency to forget. + +It is proper to add that the image acts not altogether in a positive +manner. Sometimes it has an inhibitory power. A vivid representation of +a movement arrested is the beginning of the stoppage of that movement; +it may even end in complete arrest of the movement. Such are the cases +of "paralysis by ideas" first described by Reynolds, and later by +Charcot and his school under the name of "psychic paralysis." The +patient's inward conviction that he cannot move a limb renders him +powerless for any movement, and he recovers his motor power only when +the morbid representation has disappeared. + +These and similar facts suggest a few remarks. + +First, that we have here creation in the strict sense of the word, +though it be limited to the organism. What appears is _new_. Though one +may strictly maintain that from our own experience we have a knowledge +of formication, rapid and slow beating of the heart, even though we may +not be able ordinarily to produce them at will, this position is +absolutely untenable when we consider cases of vesication, stigmata, and +other alleged miraculous phenomena: _these are without precedent in the +life of the individual_. + +Second, in order that these unusual states may occur, there are required +additional elements in the producing mechanism. At bottom this mechanism +is very obscure. To invoke "the power of the imagination" is merely to +substitute a word where an explanation is needed. Fortunately, we do not +need to penetrate into the inmost part of this mystery. It is enough for +us to make sure of the facts, to prove that they have a representation +as the starting point, and to show that the representation by itself is +not enough. What more then is needed? Let us note first of all that +these occurrences are rare. It is not within the power of everybody to +acquire stigmata or to become cured of a paralysis pronounced incurable. +This happens only to those having an ardent faith, a strong desire _that +it shall come to pass_. This is an indispensable psychic condition. What +is concerned in such a case is not a single state, but a double one: an +image followed by a particular emotional state (desire, aversion, etc.). +In other words, there are two conditions: In the first are concerned the +motor elements included in the image, the remains of previous +perceptions; in the second, there are concerned the foregoing, _plus_ +affective states, tendencies that sum up the individual's energy. It is +the latter fact that explains their power. + +To conclude: This group of facts shows us the existence, beyond images, +of another factor, instinctive or emotional in form, which we shall have +to study later and which will lead us to the ultimate source of the +creative imagination. + +I fear that the distance between the facts here given and the creative +imagination proper will seem to the reader very great indeed. And why +so? First, because the creative activity here has as its only material +the organism, and is not separated from the creator. Then, too, because +these facts are extremely simple, and the creative imagination, in the +ordinary sense, is extremely complex; here there is one operating cause, +a single representation more or less complex, while in imaginative +creation we have several co-operating images with combinations, +coordination, arrangement, grouping. But it must not be forgotten that +our present aim is simply to find _a transition stage_[2] between +reproduction and production; to show the common origin of the two forms +of imagination--the purely representative faculty and the faculty of +creating by means of the intermediation of images;--and to show at the +same time the work of separation, of severance between the two. + + +II + +Since the chief aim of this study is to prove that the basis of +invention must be sought in motor manifestations, I shall not hesitate +to dwell on it, and I take the subject up again under another, clearer, +more precise, and more psychological form, in putting the following +question: Which one among the various modes of mind-activity offers the +closest analogy to the creative imagination? I unhesitatingly answer, +_voluntary activity_: Imagination, in the intellectual order, is the +equivalent of will in the realm of movements. Let us justify this +comparison by some proof. + +1. Likeness of development in the two instances. Growth of voluntary +control is progressive, slow, crossed and checked. The individual has to +become master of his muscles and by their agency extend his sway over +other things. Reflexes, instinctive movements, and movements expressive +of emotion constitute the primary material of voluntary movements. The +will has no movements of its own as an inheritance: it must coordinate +and associate, since it separates in order to form new associations. It +reigns by right of conquest, not by right of birth. In like manner, the +creative imagination does not rise completely armed. Its raw materials +are images, which here correspond to muscular movements. It goes through +a period of trial. It always is, at the start (for reasons indicated +later on), an imitation; it attains its complex forms only through a +process of growth. + +2. But this first comparison does not go to the bottom of the matter; +there are yet deeper analogies. First, the completely subjective +character of both instances. The imagination is subjective, personal, +anthropocentric; its movement is from within outwards toward an +objectification. The understanding, i.e., the intellect in the +restricted sense, has opposite characteristics--it is objective, +impersonal, receives from outside. For the creative imagination the +inner world is the regulator; there is a preponderance of the inner over +the outer. For the understanding, the outside world is the regulator; +there is a preponderance of the outer over the inner. The world of my +imagination is _my_ world as opposed to the world of my understanding, +which is the world of all my fellow creatures. On the other hand, as +regards the will, we might repeat exactly, word for word, what we have +just said of the imagination. This is unnecessary. Back of both, then, +we have our true cause, whatever may be our opinion concerning the +ultimate nature of causation and of will. + +3. Both imagination and will have a teleological character, and act only +with a view toward an end, being thus the opposite of the understanding, +which, as such, limits itself to proof. We are always wanting something, +be it worthless or important. We are always inventing for an +end--whether in the case of a Napoleon imagining a plan of campaign, or +a cook making up a new dish. In both instances there is now a simple end +attained by immediate means, now a complex and distant goal +presupposing subordinate ends which are means in relation to the final +end. In both cases there is a _vis a tergo_ designated by the vague term +"spontaneity," which we shall attempt to make clear later, and a _vis a +fronte_, an attracting movement. + +4. Added to this analogy as regards their nature, there are other, +secondary likenesses between the abortive forms of the creative +imagination and the impotent forms of the will. In its normal and +complete form will culminates in an act; but with wavering characters +and sufferers from abulia deliberation never ends, or the resolution +remains inert, incapable of realization, of asserting itself in +practice. The creative imagination also, in its complete form, has a +tendency to become objectified, to assert itself in a work that shall +exist not only for the creator but for everybody. On the contrary, with +dreamers pure and simple, the imagination remains a vaguely sketched +inner affair; it is not embodied in any esthetic or practical invention. +Revery is the equivalent of weak desires; dreamers are the abulics of +the creative imagination. + +It is unnecessary to add that the similarity established here between +the will and the imagination is only partial and has as its aim only to +bring to light the role of the motor elements. Surely no one will +confuse two aspects of our psychic life that are so distinct, and it +would be foolish to delay in order to enumerate the differences. The +characteristic of novelty should by itself suffice, since it is the +special and indispensable mark of invention, and for volition is only +accessory: The extraction of a tooth requires of the patient as much +effort the second time as the first, although it is no longer a novelty. + +After these preliminary remarks we must go on to the analysis of the +creative imagination, in order to understand its nature in so far as +that is accessible with our existing means. It is, indeed, a tertiary +formation in mental life, if we assume a primary layer (sensations and +simple emotions), and a secondary (images and their associations, +certain elementary logical operations, etc.). Being composite, it may be +decomposed into its constituent elements, which we shall study under +these three headings, viz., the intellectual factor, the affective or +emotional factor, and the unconscious factor. But that is not enough; +the analysis should be completed by a synthesis. All imaginative +creation, great or small, is organic, requires a unifying principle: +there is then also a synthetic factor, which it will be necessary to +determine. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] A. Maury, in his book _L'Astronomie et la Magie_, enumerates +fifty cases. + +[2] There are still others, as we shall see later on. + + + + +PART ONE + +ANALYSIS OF THE IMAGINATION + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE INTELLECTUAL FACTOR. + +I + + +Considered under its intellectual aspect, that is, in so far as it +borrows its elements from the understanding, the imagination presupposes +two fundamental operations--the one, negative and preparatory, +dissociation; the other, positive and constitutive, association. + +Dissociation is the "abstraction" of the older psychologists, who well +understood its importance for the subject with which we are now +concerned. Nevertheless, the term "dissociation" seems to me preferable, +because it is more comprehensive. It designates a genus of which the +other is a species. It is a spontaneous operation and of a more radical +nature than the other. Abstraction, strictly so-called, acts only on +isolated states of consciousness; dissociation acts, further, on series +of states of consciousness, which it sorts out, breaks up, dissolves, +and through this preparatory work makes suitable for entering into new +combinations. + +Perception is a synthetic process, but dissociation (or abstraction) is +already present in embryo in perception, just because the latter is a +complex state. Everyone perceives after an individual fashion, according +to his constitution and the impression of the moment. A painter, a +sportsman, a dealer, and an uninterested spectator do not see a given +horse in the same manner: the qualities that interest one are unnoticed +by another.[3] + +The image being a simplification of sensory data, and its nature +dependent on that of previous perceptions, it is inevitable that the +work of dissociation should go on in it. But this is far too mild a +statement. Observation and experiment show us that in the majority of +cases the process grows wonderfully. In order to follow the progressive +development of this dissolution, we may roughly differentiate images +into three categories--complete, incomplete, and schematic--and study +them in order. + +The group of images here termed _complete_ comprises first, objects +repeatedly presented in daily experience--my wife's face, my inkstand, +the sound of a church bell or of a neighboring clock, etc. In this class +are also included the images of things that we have perceived but a few +times, but which, for additional reasons, have remained clean-cut in our +memory. Are these images complete, in the strict sense of the word? They +cannot be; and the contrary belief is a delusion of consciousness that, +however, disappears when one confronts it with the reality. The mental +image can contain all the qualities of an object in even less degree +than the perception; the image is the result of selection, varying with +every case. The painter Fromentin, who was proud that he found after two +or three years "an exact recollection" of things he had barely noticed +on a journey, makes elsewhere, however, the following confession: "My +memory of things, although very faithful, has never the certainty +admissible as documentary evidence. The weaker it grows, the more is it +changed in becoming the property of my memory and the more valuable is +it for the work that I intend for it. In proportion as the exact form +becomes altered, another form, partly real, partly imaginary, which I +believe preferable, takes its place." Note that the person speaking thus +is a painter endowed with an unusual visual memory; but recent +investigations have shown that among men generally the so-called +complete and exact images undergo change and warping. One sees the truth +of this statement when, after a lapse of some time, one is placed in the +presence of the original object, so that comparison between the real +object and its image becomes possible.[4] Let us note that in this group +_the image always corresponds to certain individual objects_; it is not +the same with the other two groups. + +The group of _incomplete_ images, according to the testimony of +consciousness itself, comes from two distinct sources--first, from +perceptions insufficiently or ill-fixed; and again, from impressions of +like objects which, when too often repeated, end by becoming confused. +The latter case has been well described by Taine. A man, says he, who, +having gone through an avenue of poplars wants to picture a poplar; or, +having looked into a poultry-yard, wishes to call up a picture of a hen, +experiences a difficulty--his different memories rise up. The experiment +becomes a cause of effacement; the images canceling one another decline +to a state of imperceptible tendencies which their likeness and +unlikeness prevent from predominating. Images become blunted by their +collision just as do bodies by friction.[5] + +This group leads us to that of _schematic_ images, or those entirely +without mark--the indefinite image of a rosebush, of a pin, of a +cigarette, etc. This is the greatest degree of impoverishment; the +image, deprived little by little of its own characteristics, is nothing +more than a shadow. It has become that transitional form between image +and pure concept that we now term "generic image," or one that at least +resembles the latter. + +The image, then, is subject to an unending process of change, of +suppression and addition, of dissociation and corrosion. This means +that it is not a dead thing; it is not at all like a photographic plate +with which one may reproduce copies indefinitely. Being dependent on the +state of the brain, the image undergoes change like all living +substance,--it is subject to gains and losses, especially losses. But +each of the foregoing three classes has its use for the inventor. They +serve as material for different kinds of imagination--in their concrete +form, for the mechanic and the artist; in their schematic form, for the +scientist and for others. + +Thus far we have seen only a part of the work of dissociation and, +taking it all in all, the smallest part. We have, seemingly, considered +images as isolated facts, as psychic atoms; but that is a purely +theoretic position. Images are not solitary in actual life; they form +part of a chain, or rather of a woof or net, since, by reason of their +manifold relations they may radiate in all directions, through all the +senses. Dissociation, then, works also upon _series_, cuts them up, +mangles them, breaks them, and reduces them to ruins. + +The ideal law of the recurrence of images is that known since Hamilton's +time under the name of "law of redintegration,"[6] which consists in the +passing from a part to the whole, each element tending to reproduce the +complete state, each member of a series the whole of that series. If +this law existed alone, invention would be forever forbidden to us; we +could not emerge from repetition; we should be condemned to monotony. +But there is an opposite power that frees us--it is dissociation. + +It is very strange that, while psychologists have for so long a time +studied the laws of association, no one has investigated whether the +inverse process, dissociation, also has not laws of its own. We can not +here attempt such a task, which would be outside of our province; it +will suffice to indicate in passing two general conditions determining +the association of series. + +First, there are the internal or subjective causes. The revived image of +a face, a monument, a landscape, an occurrence, is, most often, only +partial. It depends on various conditions that revive the essential part +and drop the minor details, and this "essential" which survives +dissociation depends on subjective causes, the principal ones of which +are at first practical, utilitarian reasons. It is the tendency already +mentioned to ignore what is of no value, to exclude that from +consciousness. Helmholtz has shown that in the act of seeing, various +details remain unnoticed because they are immaterial in the concerns of +life; and there are many other like instances. Then, too, emotional +reasons governing the attention orientate it exclusively in one +direction--these will be studied in the course of this work. Lastly, +there are logical or intellectual reasons, if we understand by this term +the law of mental inertia or the law of least resistance by means of +which the mind tends toward the simplification and lightening of its +labor. + +Secondly, there are external or objective causes which are variations in +experience. When two or more qualities or events are given as constantly +associated in experience we do not dissociate them. The uniformity of +nature's laws is the great opponent of dissociation. Many truths (for +example, the existence of the antipodes) are established with +difficulty, because it is necessary to break up closely knit +associations. The oriental king whom Sully mentions, who had never seen +ice, refused to credit the existence of solid water. A total impression, +the elements of which had never been given us separately in experience, +would be unanalyzable. If all cold objects were moist, and all moist +objects cold; if all liquids were transparent and all non-liquids +opaque, we should find it difficult to distinguish cold from moisture +and liquidity from transparency. On his part, James adds further that +what has been associated sometimes with one thing and sometimes with +another tends to become dissociated from both. This might be called a +law of association by concomitant variations.[7] + +In order to thoroughly comprehend the absolute necessity for +dissociation, let us note that total redintegration is _per se_ a +hindrance to creation. Examples are given of people who can easily +remember twenty or thirty pages of a book, but if they want a particular +passage they are unable to pick it out--they must begin at the beginning +and continue down to the required place. Excessive ease of retention +thus becomes a serious inconvenience. Besides these rare cases, we know +that ignorant people, those intellectually limited, give the same +invariable story of every occurrence, in which all the parts--the +important and the accessory, the useful and the useless--are on a dead +level. They omit no detail, they cannot select. Minds of this kind are +inapt at invention. In short, we may say that there are two kinds of +memory: one is completely systematized, e.g., habits, routine, poetry +or prose learned by heart, faultless musical rendering, etc. The +acquisition forms a compact whole and cannot enter into new +combinations. The other is not systematized; it is composed of small, +more or less coherent groups. This kind of memory is plastic and capable +of becoming combined in new ways. + +We have enumerated the spontaneous, natural causes of association, +omitting the voluntary and artificial causes, which are but their +imitations. As a result of these various causes, images are taken to +pieces, shattered, broken up, but made all the readier as materials for +the inventor. This is a process analogous to that which, in geologic +time, produces new strata through the wearing away of old rocks. + + +II + +Association is one of the big questions of psychology; but as it does +not especially concern our subject, it will be discussed in strict +proportion to its use here. Nothing is easier than limiting ourselves. +Our task is reducible to a very clear and very brief question: What are +the forms of association that give rise to new combinations and under +what influences do they arise? All other forms of association, those +that are only repetitions, should be eliminated. Consequently, this +subject can not be treated in one single effort; it must be studied, in +turn, in its relations to our three factors--intellectual, emotional, +unconscious. + +It is generally admitted that the expression "association of ideas" is +faulty.[8] It is not comprehensive enough, association being active also +in psychic states other than ideas. It seems indicative rather of mere +juxtaposition, whereas associated states modify one another by the very +fact of their being connected. But, as it has been confirmed by long +usage, it would be difficult to eliminate the phrase. + +On the other hand, psychologists are not at all agreed as regards the +determination of the principal laws or forms of association. Without +taking sides in the debate, I adopt the most generally accepted +classification, the one most suitable for our subject--the one that +reduces everything to the two fundamental laws of contiguity and +resemblance. In recent years various attempts have been made to reduce +these two laws to one, some reducing resemblance to contiguity; others, +contiguity to resemblance. Putting aside the ground of this discussion, +which seems to me very useless, and which perhaps is due to excessive +zeal for unity, we must nevertheless recognize that this discussion is +not without interest for the study of the creative imagination, because +it has well shown that each of the two fundamental laws has a +characteristic mechanism. + +Association by contiguity (or continuity), which Wundt calls external, +is simple and homogeneous. It reproduces the order and connection of +things; it reduces itself to habits contracted by our nervous system. + +Is association by resemblance, which Wundt calls internal, strictly +speaking, an elementary law? Many doubt it. Without entering into the +long and frequently confused discussions to which this subject has given +rise, we may sum up their results as follows: In so-called association +by resemblance it is necessary to distinguish three moments--(a) That of +the presentation; a state _A_ is given in perception or +association-by-contiguity, and forms the starting point. (b) That of the +work of assimilation; _A_ is recognized as more or less like a state _a_ +previously experienced. (c) As a consequence of the coexistence of _A_ +and _a_ in consciousness, they can later be recalled reciprocally, +although the two original occurrences _A_ and _a_ have previously never +existed together, and sometimes, indeed, may not possibly have existed +together. It is evident that the crucial moment is the second, and that +it consists of an act of active assimilation. Thus James maintains that +"it is a relation that the mind perceives after the fact, just as it may +perceive the relations of superiority, of distance, of causality, of +container and content, of substance and accident, or of contrast between +an object, and some second object which the associative machinery calls +up."[9] + +Association by resemblance presupposes a joint labor of association and +dissociation--it is an active form. Consequently it is the principal +source of the material of the creative imagination, as the sequel of +this work will sufficiently show. + +After this rather long but necessary preface, we come to the +intellectual factor rightly so termed, which we have been little by +little approaching. The essential, fundamental element of the creative +imagination in the intellectual sphere is the capacity of thinking by +analogy; that is, by partial and often accidental resemblance. By +analogy we mean an imperfect kind of resemblance: like is a genus of +which analogue is a species. + +Let us examine in some detail the mechanism of this mode of thought in +order that we may understand how analogy is, by its very nature, an +almost inexhaustible instrument of creation. + +1. Analogy may be based solely on the _number of attributes compared_. +Let _a b c d e f_ and _r s t u d v_ be two beings or objects, each +letter representing symbolically one of the constitutive attributes. It +is evident that the analogy between the two is very weak, since there is +only one common element, _d_. If the number of the elements common to +both increases, the analogy will grow in the same proportion. But the +agreement represented above is not infrequent among minds unused to a +somewhat severe discipline. A child sees in the moon and stars a mother +surrounded by her daughters. The aborigines of Australia called a book +"mussel," merely because it opens and shuts like the valves of a +shellfish.[10] + +2. Analogy may have for its basis the _quality_ or _value_ of the +compound attributes. It rests on a variable element, which oscillates +from the essential to the accidental, from the reality to the +appearance. To the layman, the likeness between cetacians and fishes are +great; to the scientist, slight. Here, again, numerous agreements are +possible, provided one take no account either of their solidity or their +frailty. + +3. Lastly, in minds without power, there occurs a semi-unconscious +operation that we may call a transfer through the omission of the middle +term. There is analogy between _a b c d e_ and _g h a i f_ through the +common letter _a_; between _g h a i f_ and _x y f z q_ through the +common letter _f_; and finally an analogy becomes established between _a +b c d e_ and _x y f z q_ for no other reason than that of their common +analogy with _g h a i f_. In the realm of the affective states, +transfers of this sort are not at all rare. + +Analogy, an unstable process, undulating and multiform, gives rise to +the most unforeseen and novel groupings. Through its pliability, which +is almost unlimited, it produces in equal measure absurd comparisons and +very original inventions. + +After these remarks on the mechanism of thinking by analogy, let us +glance at the processes it employs in its creative work. The problem is, +apparently, inextricable. Analogies are so numerous, so various, so +arbitrary, that we may despair of finding any regularity whatever in +creative work. Despite this it seems, however, reducible to two +principal types or processes, which are personification, and +transformation or metamorphosis. + +Personification is the earlier process. It is radical, always identical +with itself, but transitory. It goes out from ourselves toward other +things. It consists in attributing life to everything, in supposing in +everything that shows signs of life--and even in inanimate +objects--desires, passions, and acts of will analogous to ours, acting +like ourselves in view of definite ends. This state of mind is +incomprehensible to an adult civilized man; but it must be admitted, +since there are facts without number that show its existence. We do not +need to cite them--they are too well known. They fill the works of +ethnologists, of travelers in savage lands, of books of mythology. +Besides, all of us, at the commencement of our lives, during our +earliest childhood, have passed through this inevitable stage of +universal animism. Works on child-psychology abound in observations that +leave no possible room for doubt on this point. The child endows +everything with life, and he does so the more in proportion as he is +more imaginative. But this stage, which among civilized people lasts +only a brief period, remains in the primitive man a permanent +disposition and one that is always active. This process of +personification is the perennial fount whence have gushed the greater +number of myths, an enormous mass of superstitions, and a large number +of esthetic productions. To sum up in a word, all things that have been +invented _ex analogia hominis_. + +Transformation or metamorphosis is a general, permanent process under +many forms, proceeding not from the thinking subject towards objects, +but from one object to another, from one thing to another. It consists +of a transfer through partial resemblance. This operation rests on two +fundamental bases--depending at one time on vague resemblances (a cloud +becomes a mountain, or a mountain a fantastic animal; the sound of the +wind a plaintive cry, etc.), or again, on a resemblance with a +predominating emotional element: A perception provokes a feeling, and +becomes the mark, sign, or plastic form thereof (the lion represents +courage; the cat, artifice; the cypress, sorrow; and so on). All this, +doubtless, is erroneous or arbitrary; but the function of the +imagination is to invent, not to perceive. All know that this process +creates metaphors, allegories, symbols; it should not, however, be +believed on that account that it remains restricted to the realm of art +or of the development of language. We meet it every moment in practical +life, in mechanical, industrial, commercial, and scientific invention, +and we shall, later, give a large number of examples in support of this +statement. + +Let us note, briefly, that analogy, as an imperfect form of +resemblance--as was said above, if we assume among the objects compared a +totality of likenesses and differences in varying proportions--necessarily +allows all degrees. At one end of the scale, the comparison is made +between valueless or exaggerated likenesses. At the other end, analogy is +restricted to exact resemblance; it approaches cognition, strictly so +called; for example, in mechanical and scientific invention. Hence it is +not at all surprising that the imagination is often a substitute for, and +as Goethe expressed it, "a forerunner of," reason. Between the creative +imagination and rational investigation there is a community of +nature--both presuppose the ability of seizing upon likenesses. On the +other hand, the predominance of the exact process establishes from the +outset a difference between "thinkers" and imaginative dreamers +("visionaries").[11] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[3] Cf. the well-known aphorism, "_Apperception ist alles_." (Tr.) + +[4] See especially J. Philippe, "La deformation et les +transformations des images" in _Revue Philosophique_, May and +November, 1897. Although these investigations had in view only +visual representations, it is not at all doubtful that the results +hold good for others, especially those of hearing (voice, song, +harmony). + +[5] _On Intelligence_, Vol. I, Bk. ii, Chap. 2. + +[6] In his recent history of the theories of the imagination, _La +psicologia dell' immaginazione, nella storia filosofia_ (Rome, 1898) +Ambrosi shows that this law is found already formulated in the +_Psychologia Empirica_ of Christian Wolff [d. 1754]: "_Perceptio +praeterita integra recurrit cujus praesens continet partem._" + +[7] Sully, _Human Mind_, I, p. 365; James, _Psychology_, I, p. 502. + +[8] For a good criticism of the term, consult Titchener, _Outlines +of Psychology_ (New York, 1896), p. 190. + +[9] For the discussions on the reduction to a unity, a detailed +bibliography will be found in Jodl, _Lehrbuch der Psychologie_ +(Stuttgart, 1896), p. 490. On the comparison of the two laws, James, +_op. cit._, I, 590; Sully, _op. cit._, I, 331 ff; Hoeffding, +_Psychologie_, 213 ff. (Eng. ed. _Outlines of Psychology_, pp. 152 +ff.). + +[10] Note here a characteristically naive working of the primitive +intellect in explaining the unknown in terms of the known. Cf. Part +II, Chap. iii, below. (Tr.) + +[11] It is yet, and will probably long remain, an open question +whether we can draw any clear distinction between the two kinds of +mind here discussed. The author is careful to base his distinction +on the "predominance" of the "rational" or of the "imaginative" +process. So-called "thinkers," who _do_ nothing, can not, certainly, +be ranked with the persons of great intellectual attainment through +whose efforts the progress of the world is made; on the other hand, +the author seeks to make _results_ or accomplishments the crucial +test of true imagination (see Introduction). + +As regards the relative value or rank of the two bents of mind there +has ever been, and probably forever will be, great difference of +opinion. Even in this intensely "practical" age there is an +undercurrent of feeling that the narrowly "practical" individual is +not the final ideal, and the innermost conviction of many is the +same as that of the poet who declares that "a dreamer lives forever, +but a thinker dies in a day." (Tr.) + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE EMOTIONAL FACTOR. + + +The influence of emotional states on the working of the imagination is a +matter of current observation. But it has been studied chiefly by +moralists, who most often have criticised or condemned it as an endless +cause of mistakes. The point of view of the psychologist is altogether +different. He does not need at all to investigate whether emotions and +passions give rise to mental phantoms--which is an indisputable +fact--but _why_ and _how_ they arise. For, the emotional factor yields +in importance to no other; it is the ferment without which no creation +is possible. Let us study it in its principal forms, although we may not +be able at this moment to exhaust the topic. + + +I + +It is necessary to show at the outset that the influence of the +emotional life is unlimited, that it penetrates the entire field of +invention with no restriction whatever; that this is not a gratuitous +assertion, but is, on the contrary, strictly justified by facts, and +that we are right in maintaining the following two propositions: + +1. _All forms of the creative imagination imply elements of feeling._ + +This statement has been challenged by authoritative psychologists, who +hold that "emotion is added to imagination in its esthetic aspect, not +in its mechanical and intellectual form." This is an error of fact +resulting from the confusion, or from the imperfect analysis, of two +distinct cases. In the case of non-esthetic creation, the role of the +emotional life is simple; in esthetic creation, the role of emotional +element is double. + +Let us consider invention, first, in its most general form. The +emotional element is the primal, original factor; for all invention +presupposes a want, a craving, a tendency, an unsatisfied impulse, often +even a state of gestation full of discomfort. Moreover, it is +concomitant, that is, under its form of pleasure or of pain, of hope, of +spite, of anger, etc., it accompanies all the phases or turns of +creation. The creator may, haphazard, go through the most diverse forms +of exaltation and depression; may feel in turn the dejection of repulse +and the joy of success; finally the satisfaction of being freed from a +heavy burden. I challenge anyone to produce a solitary example of +invention wrought out _in abstracto_, and free from any factors of +feeling. Human nature does not allow such a miracle. + +Now, let us take up the special case of esthetic creation, and of forms +approaching thereto. Here again we find the original emotional element +as at first motor, then attached to various aspects of creation, as an +accompaniment. But, _in addition, affective states become material for +the creative activity_. It is a well-known fact, almost a rule, that the +poet, the novelist, the dramatist, and the musician--often, indeed, even +the sculptor and the painter--experience the thoughts and feeling of +their characters, become identified with them. There are, then, in this +second instance, two currents of feeling--the one, constituting emotion +as material for art, the other, drawing out creative activity and +developing along with it. + +The difference between the two cases that we have distinguished consists +in this and nothing more than this. The existence of an emotion-content +belonging to esthetic production changes in no way the psychologic +mechanism of invention generally. Its absence in other forms of +imagination does not at all prevent the necessary existence of affective +elements everywhere and always. + +2. _All emotional dispositions whatever may influence the creative +imagination._ + +Here, again, I find opponents, notably Oelzelt-Newin, in his short and +substantial monograph on the imagination.[12] Adopting the twofold +division of emotions as sthenic and asthenic, or exciting and +depressing, he attributes to the first the exclusive privilege of +influencing creative activity; but though the author limits his study +exclusively to the esthetic imagination, his thesis, even understood +thus, is untenable. The facts contradict it completely, and it is easy +to demonstrate that all forms of emotion, without exception, act as +leaven for imagination. + +No one will deny that fear is the type of asthenic manifestations. Yet +is it not the mother of phantoms, of numberless superstitions, of +altogether irrational and chimerical religious practices? + +Anger, in its exalted, violent form, is rather an agent of destruction, +which seems to contradict my thesis; but let us pass over the storm, +which is always of short duration, and we find in its place milder +intellectualized forms, which are various modifications of primitive +fury, passing from the acute to the chronic state: envy, jealousy, +enmity, premeditated vengeance, and so forth. Are not these dispositions +of the mind fertile in artifices, stratagems, inventions of all kinds? +To keep even to esthetic creation, is it necessary to recall the saying +_facit indignatio versum_? + +It is not necessary to demonstrate the fecundity of joy. As for love, +everyone knows that its work consists of creating an imaginary being, +which is substituted for the beloved object; then, when the passion has +vanished, the disenchanted lover finds himself face to face with the +bare reality. + +Sorrow rightly belongs in the category of depressing emotions, and yet, +it has as great influence on invention as any other emotion. Do we not +know that melancholy and even profound sorrow has furnished poets, +musicians, painters, and sculptors with their most beautiful +inspirations? Is there not an art frankly and deliberately pessimistic? +And this influence is not at all limited to esthetic creation. Dare we +hold that hypochondria and insanity following upon the delirium of +persecution are devoid of imagination? Their morbid character is, on the +contrary, the well whence strange inventions incessantly bubble. + +Lastly, that complex emotion termed "self-feeling," which reduces itself +finally to the pleasure of asserting our power and of feeling its +expansion, or to the pitiable feeling of our shackled, enfeebled power, +leads us directly to the motor elements that are the fundamental +conditions of invention. Above all, in this personal feeling, there is +the satisfaction of being a causal factor, i.e., a creator, and every +creator has a consciousness of his superiority over non-creators. +However petty his invention, it confers upon him a superiority over +those who have invented nothing. Although we have been surfeited with +the repeated statement that the characteristic mark of esthetic creation +is "being disinterested," it must be recognized, as Groos has so truly +remarked,[13] that the artist does not create out of the simple pleasure +of creating, but in order that he may behold a mastery over other +minds.[14] Production is the natural extension of "self-feeling," and +the accompanying pleasure is the pleasure of conquest. + +Thus, on condition that we extend "imagination" to its full sense, +without limiting it unduly to esthetics, there is, among the many forms +of the emotional life, not one that may not stimulate invention. It +remains to see this emotional factor at work,--to note how it can give +rise to new combinations; and this brings us to the association of +ideas. + + +II + +We have said above that the ideal and theoretic law of the recurrence of +images is that of "total redintegration," as e.g., recalling all the +incidents of a long voyage in chronological order, with neither +additions nor omissions. But this formula expresses what ought to be, +not what actually occurs. It supposes man reduced to a state of pure +intelligence, and sheltered from all disturbing influences. It suits the +completely systematized forms of memory, hardened into routine and +habit; but, outside of these cases, it remains an abstract concept. + +To this law of ideal value, there is opposed the real and practical law +that actually obtains in the revival of images. It is rightly styled the +"law of interest" or the affective law, and may be stated thus: In every +past event the interesting parts alone revive, or with more intensity +than the others. "Interesting" here means _what affects us in some way +under a pleasing or painful form_. Let us note that the importance of +this fact has been pointed out not by the associationists (a fact +especially worth remembering) but by less systematic writers, strangers +to that school,--Coleridge, Shadworth Hodgson, and before them, +Schopenhauer. William James calls it the "ordinary or mixed +association."[15] The "law of interest" doubtless is less exact than the +intellectual laws of contiguity and resemblance. Nevertheless, it seems +to penetrate all the more in later reasoning. If, indeed, in the problem +of association we distinguish these three things--facts, laws, +causes--the practical law brings us near to causes. + +Whatever the truth may be in this matter, the emotional factor brings +about new combinations by several processes. + +There are the ordinary, simple cases, with a natural, emotional +foundation, depending on momentary dispositions. They exist because of +the fact that representations that have been accompanied by the same +emotional state tend later to become associated: the emotional +resemblance reunites and links disparate images. This differs from +association by contiguity, which is a repetition of experience, and from +association by resemblance in the intellectual sense. The states of +consciousness become combined, not because they have been previously +given together, not because we perceive the agreement of resemblance +between them, but because they have a common _emotional_ note. Joy, +sorrow, love, hatred, admiration, ennui, pride, fatigue, etc., may +become a center of attraction that groups images or events having +otherwise no rational relations between them, but having the same +emotional stamp,--joyous, melancholy, erotic, etc. This form of +association is very frequent in dreams and reveries, i.e., in a state +of mind in which the imagination enjoys complete freedom and works +haphazard. We easily see that this influence, active or latent, of the +emotional factor, must cause entirely unexpected grouping to arise, and +offers an almost unlimited field for novel combinations, the number of +images having a common emotional factor being very great. + +There are unusual and remarkable cases with an exceptional emotional +base. Of such is "colored hearing." We know that several hypotheses have +been offered in regard to the origin of this phenomenon. +Embryologically, it would seem to be the result of an incomplete +separation between the sense of sight and that of hearing, and the +survival, it is said, from a distant period of humanity, when this state +must have been the rule; anatomically, the result of supposed +anastamoses between the cerebral centers for visual and auditory +sensations; physiologically, the result of nervous irradiation; +psychologically, the result of association. This latter hypothesis seems +to account for the greater number of instances, if not for all; but, as +Flournoy has observed, it is a matter of "affective" imagination. Two +sensations absolutely unlike (for instance, the color blue and the +sound _i_) may resemble one another through the equal retentive quality +that they possess in the organism of some favored individuals, and this +emotional factor becomes a bond of association. Observe that this +hypothesis explains also the much more unusual cases of "colored" smell, +taste, and pain; that is, an abnormal association between given colors +and tastes, smells, or pains. + +Although we meet them only as exceptional cases, these modes of +association are susceptible to analysis, and seem clear, almost +self-evident, if we compare them with other, subtle, refined, barely +perceptible cases, the origin of which is a subject for supposition, for +guessing rather than for clear comprehension. It is, moreover, a sort of +imagination belonging to very few people: certain artists and some +eccentric or unbalanced minds, scarcely ever found outside the esthetic +or practical life. I wish to speak of the forms of invention that permit +only fantastic conceptions, of a strangeness pushed to the extreme +(Hoffman, Poe, Baudelaire, Goya, Wiertz, etc.), or surprising, +extraordinary thoughts, known of no other men (the symbolists and +decadents that flourish at the present time in various countries of +Europe and America, who believe, rightly or wrongly, that they are +preparing the esthetics of the future). It must be here admitted that +there exists an altogether special manner of _feeling_, dependent on +temperament at first, which many cultivate and refine as though it were +a precious rarity. There lies the true source of their invention. +Doubtless, to assert this pertinently, it would be necessary to +establish the direct relations between their physical and psychical +constitution and that of their work; to note even the particular states +at the moment of the creative act. To me at least, it seems evident that +the novelty, the strangeness of combinations, through its deep +subjective character, indicates an emotional rather than an intellectual +origin. Let us merely add that these abnormal manifestations of the +creative imagination belong to the province of pathology rather than to +that of psychology. + +Association by contrast is, from its very nature, vague, arbitrary, +indeterminate. It rests, in truth, on an essentially subjective and +fleeting conception, that of contrariety, which it is almost impossible +to delimit scientifically; for, most often, contraries exist only by and +for us. We know that this form of association is not primary and +irreducible. It is brought down by some to contiguity, by most others to +resemblance. These two views do not seem to me irreconcilable. In +association by contrast we may distinguish two layers,--the one, +superficial, consists of contiguity: all of us have in memory associated +couples, such as large-small, rich-poor, high-low, right-left, etc., +which result from repetition and habit; the other, deep, is resemblance; +_contrast exists only where a common measure between two terms is +possible_. As Wundt remarks, a wedding may be compared to a burial (the +union and separation of a couple), but not to a toothache. There is +contrast between two colors, contrast between sounds, but not between a +sound and a color, at least in that there may not be a common basis to +which we may relate them, as in the previously given instances of +"colored" sound. In association by contrast, there are conscious +elements opposed to one another, and below, an unconscious element, +resemblance,--not clearly and logically perceived, but felt--that evokes +and relates the conscious elements. + +Whether this explanation be right or not, let us remark that association +by contrast could not be left out, because its mechanism, full of +unforeseen possibilities, lends itself easily to novel relations. +Otherwise, I do not at all claim that it is entirely dependent upon the +emotional factor. But, as Hoeffding observes,[16] the special property of +the emotional life is moving among contraries; it is altogether +determined by the great opposition between pleasure and pain. Thus, the +effects of contrasts are much stronger than in the realm of sensation. +This form of association predominates in esthetic and mythic creation, +that is to say, in creation of the free fancy; it becomes dimmed in the +precise forms of practical, mechanical, and scientific invention. + + +III + +Hitherto we have considered the emotional factor under a single aspect +only--the purely emotional--that which is manifested in consciousness +under an agreeable or disagreeable or mixed form. But thoughts, +feelings, and emotions include elements that are deeper--motor, i.e., +impulsive or inhibitory--which we may neglect the less since it is in +movements that we seek the origin of the creative imagination. This +motor element is what current speech and often even psychological +treatises designate under the terms "creative instinct," "inventive +instinct;" what we express in another form when we say that creators are +guided by instinct and "are pushed like animals toward the +accomplishment of certain acts." + +If I mistake not, this indicates that the "creative instinct" exists in +all men to some extent--feeble in some, perceptible in others, brilliant +in the great inventors. + +For I do not hesitate to maintain that the creative instinct, taken in +this strict meaning, compared to animal instinct, is a mere figure of +speech, an "entity" regarded as a reality, an abstraction. There are +needs, appetites, tendencies, desires, common to all men, which, in a +given individual at a given moment can result in a creative act; but +there is no special psychic manifestation that may be the "creative +instinct." What, indeed, could it be? Every instinct has its own +particular end:--hunger, thirst, sex, the specific instincts of the bee, +ant, beaver, consist of a group of movements adapted for a determinate +end that is always the same. Now, what would be a creative instinct _in +general_ which, by hypothesis, could produce in turn an opera, a +machine, a metaphysical theory, a system of finance, a plan of military +campaign, and so forth? It is a pure fancy. Inventive genius has not _a_ +source, but _sources_. + +Let us consider from our present viewpoint the human duality, the _homo +duplex_: + +Suppose man reduced to a state of pure intelligence, that is, capable of +perceiving, remembering, associating, dissociating, reasoning, and +nothing else. All creative activity is then impossible, because there is +nothing to solicit it. + +Suppose, again, man reduced to organic manifestations; he is then no +more than a bundle of wants, appetites, instincts,--that is, of motor +activities, blind forces that, lacking a sufficient cerebral organ, will +produce nothing. + +The cooperation of both these factors is indispensable: without the +first, nothing begins; without the second, nothing results. I hold that +it is in needs that we must seek for the primary cause of all +inventions; it is evident that the motor element alone is insufficient. +If the needs are strong, energetic, they may determine a production, or, +if the intellectual factor is insufficient, may spoil it. Many want to +make discoveries but discover nothing. A want so common as hunger or +thirst suggests to one some ingenious method of satisfying it; another +remains entirely destitute. + +In short, in order that a creative act occur, there is required, first, +a need; then, that it arouse a combination of images; and lastly, that +it objectify and _realize_ itself in an appropriate form. + +We shall try later (in the Conclusion) to answer the question, _Why_ is +one imaginative? In passing, let us put the opposite question, Why is +one _not_ imaginative? One may possess in the mind an inexhaustible +treasure of facts and images and yet produce nothing: great travelers, +for example, who have seen and heard much, and who draw from their +experiences only a few colorless anecdotes; men who were partakers in +great political events or military movements, who leave behind only a +few dry and chilly memoirs; prodigies of reading, living encyclopedias, +who remain crushed under the load of their erudition. On the other hand, +there are people who easily move and act, but are limited, lacking +images and ideas. Their intellectual poverty condemns them to +unproductiveness; nevertheless, being nearer than the others to the +imaginative type, they bring forth childish or chimerical productions. +So that we may answer the question asked above: The non-imaginative +person is such from lack of materials or through the absence of +resourcefulness. + +Without contenting ourselves with these theoretical remarks, let us +rapidly show that it is thus that these things actually happen. All the +work of the creative imagination may be classed under two great +heads--esthetic inventions and practical inventions; on the one hand, +what man has brought to pass in the domain of art, and on the other +hand, all else. Though this division may appear strange, and +unjustifiable, it has reason for its being, as we shall see hereafter. + +Let us consider first the class of non-esthetic creations. Very +different in nature, all the products of this group coincide at one +point:--they are of practical utility, they are born of a vital need, of +one of the conditions of man's existence. There are first the inventions +"practical" in the narrow sense--all that pertains to food, clothing, +defense, housing, etc. Every one of these special needs has stimulated +inventions adapted to a special end. Inventions in the social and +political order answer to the conditions of collective existence; they +arise from the necessity of maintaining the coherence of the social +aggregate and of defending it against inimical groups. The work of the +imagination whence have arisen the myths, religious conceptions, and the +first attempts at a scientific explanation may seem at first +disinterested and foreign to practical life. This is an erroneous +supposition. Man, face to face with the higher powers of nature, the +mystery of which he does not penetrate, has a _need_ of acting upon it; +he tries to conciliate them, even to turn them to his service by magic +rites and operations. _His_ curiosity is not at all theoretic; he does +not aim to know for the sake of knowing, but in order to act upon the +outside world and to draw profit therefrom. To the numerous questions +that necessity puts to him his imagination alone responds, because his +reason is shifting and his scientific knowledge _nil_. Here, then, +invention again results from urgent needs. + +Indeed, in the course of the nineteenth century and on account of +growing civilization all these creations reach a second moment when +their origin is hidden. Most of our mechanical, industrial and +commercial inventions are not stimulated by the immediate necessity of +living, by an urgent need; it is not a question of existence but of +better existence. The same holds true of social and political inventions +which arise from the increasing complexity and the new requirements of +the aggregates forming great states. Lastly, it is certain that +primitive curiosity has partially lost its utilitarian character in +order to become, in some men at least, the taste for pure +research--theoretical, speculative, disinterested. But all this in no +way affects our thesis, for it is a well-known elementary psychological +law that upon primitive wants are grafted acquired wants fully as +imperative. The primitive need is modified, metamorphosed, adapted; +there remains of it, nonetheless, the fundamental activity toward +creation. + +Let us now consider the class of esthetic creations. According to the +generally accepted theory which is too well known for me to stop to +explain it, art has its beginning in a superfluous, bounding activity, +useless as regards the preservation of the individual, which is shown +first in the form of play. Then, through transformation and +complication, play becomes primitive art, dancing, music, and poetry at +the same time, closely united in an apparently indissoluble unity. +Although the theory of the absolute inutility of art has met some strong +criticism, let us accept it for the present. Aside from the true or +false character of inutility, the psychological mechanism remains the +same here as in the preceding cases; we shall only say that in place of +a vital need it is a need of _luxury_ acting, but it acts only because +it is in man. + +Nevertheless, the inutility of play is far from proven biologically. +Groos, in his two excellent works on the subject,[17] has maintained +with much power the opposite view. According to him the theory of +Schiller and Spencer, based on the expenditure of superfluous activity +and the opposite theory of Lazarus, who reduces play to a +relaxation--that is, a recuperation of strength--are but partial +explanations. Play has a positive use. In man there exist a great number +of instincts that are not yet developed at birth. An incomplete being, +he must have education of his capacities, and this is obtained through +play, _which is the exercise of the natural tendencies of human +activities_. In man and in the higher animals plays are a preparation, a +prelude to the active functions of life. _There is no instinct of play +in general, but there are special instincts that are manifested under +the forms of play._ If we admit this explanation, which does not lack +potency, the work of the esthetic imagination itself would be reduced +to a biological necessity, and there would be no reason for making a +separate category of it. Whichever view we may adopt, it still remains +established that any invention is reducible, directly or indirectly, to +a particular, determinate need, and that to allow man a special +instinct, the definite specific character of which should be stimulation +to creative activity, is a fantastic notion. + +Whence, then, comes this persistent and in some respects seductive idea +that creation is an instinctive result? Because a happy invention has +characteristics that evidently relate it to instinctive activity in the +strict sense of the word. First, precocity, of which we shall later give +numerous examples, and which resembles the innateness of instinct. +Again, orientation in a single direction: the inventor is, so to speak, +polarized; he is the slave of music, of mechanics, of mathematics; often +inapt at everything outside his own particular sphere. We know the +witticism of Madame du Deffant on Vaucanson, who was so awkward, so +insignificant when he ventured outside of mechanics. "One should say +that this man had manufactured himself." Finally, the ease with which +invention often (not always) manifests itself makes it resemble the work +of a pre-established mechanism. + +But these and similar characteristics may be lacking. They are necessary +for instinct, not for invention. There are great creators who have been +neither precocious nor confined in a narrow field, and who have given +birth to their inventions painfully, laboriously. Between the mechanism +of instinct and that of imaginative creation there are frequently great +analogies but not identity of nature. Every tendency of our +organization, useful or hurtful, may become the beginning of a creative +act. Every invention arises from a particular need of human nature, +acting within its own sphere and for its own special end. + +If now it should be asked why the creative imagination directs itself +preferably in one line rather than in another--toward poetry or physics, +trade or mechanics, geometry or painting, strategy or music, etc.--we +have nothing in answer. It is a result of the individual organization, +the secret of which we do not possess. In ordinary life we meet people +visibly borne along toward love or good cheer, toward ambition, riches +or good works; we say that they are "so built," that such is their +character. At bottom the two questions are identical, and current +psychology is not in a position to solve them. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[12] _Ueber Phantasievorstellungen_, Graz, 1889, p. 48. + +[13] _Die Spiele der Thiere_, Jena, 1896. The subject has been very +well treated by this author, pp. 294-301. + +[14] The "disinterested" view is found widely advocated or hinted at +in literature. Cf. Goethe's "Der Saenger" (Tr.). + +[15] _Psychology_, I, 571 ff. + +[16] Hoeffding, _Psychologie_, p. 219; _Eng. trans._, p. 161. + +[17] Groos, _Die Spiele der Thiere_, 1896, and _Die Spiele der +Menschen_, 1899 (Eng. trans., Appletons, New York, 1898, 1901). + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE UNCONSCIOUS FACTOR + +I + + +By this term I designate principally, not exclusively, what ordinary +speech calls "inspiration." In spite of its mysterious and +semi-mythological appearance, the term indicates a positive fact, one +that is ill-understood in a deep sense, like all that is near the roots +of creation. This concept has its history, and if it is permissible to +apply a very general formula to a particular case we may say that it has +developed according to the law of the three states assumed by the +positivists. + +In the beginning, inspiration is literally ascribed to the +gods--among the Greeks to Apollo and the Muses, and in like manner +under various polytheistic religions. Later, the gods become +supernatural spirits, angels, saints, etc. In one way or another it +is always regarded as external and superior to man. In the +beginnings of all inventions--agriculture, navigation, medicine, +commerce, legislation, fine arts--there is a belief in revelation; +the human mind considers itself incapable of having discovered all +that. Creation has arisen, we do not know how, in a total ignorance +of the processes. + +Later on these higher beings become empty formulas, mere survivals; +there remain only the poets to invoke their aid, through the force of +tradition, without believing in them. But side by side with these formal +survivals there remains a mysterious ground which is translated by vague +expressions and metaphors, such as "enthusiasm," "poetic frenzy," +"possession by a spirit," "being overcome," "having the devil inside +one," "the spirit whispers as it lists," etc. Here we have come out of +the supernatural without, however, attempting a positive (i.e., a +scientific) explanation. + +Lastly, in the third stage, we try to sound this unknown. Psychology +sees in it a special manifestation of the mind, a particular, +semi-conscious, semi-unconscious state which we must now study. + +At first sight, and considered in its negative aspect, inspiration +presents a very definite character. It does not depend on the individual +will. As in the case of sleep or digestion, we may try to call it forth, +encourage it, maintain it; but not always with success. Inventors, great +and small, never cease to complain over the periods of unproductiveness +which they undergo in spite of themselves. The wiser among them watch +for the moment; the others attempt to fight against their evil fate and +to create despite nature. + +Considered in its positive aspect, inspiration has two essential +marks--suddenness and impersonality. + +(a) It makes a sudden eruption into consciousness, but one presupposing +a latent, frequently long, labor. It has its analogues among other +well-known psychic states; for example, a passion that is forgotten, +which, after a long period of incubation, reveals itself through an act; +or, better, a sudden resolve after endless deliberation which did not +seem able to come to a head. Again, there may be absence of effort and +of appearance of preparation. Beethoven would strike haphazard the keys +of a piano or would listen to the songs of birds. "With Chopin," says +George Sand, "creation was spontaneous, miraculous; he wrought without +foreseeing. It would come complete, sudden, sublime." One might pile up +like facts in abundance. Sometimes, indeed, inspiration bursts forth in +deep sleep and awakens the sleeper, and lest we may suppose this +suddenness to be especially characteristic of artists we see it in all +forms of invention. "You feel a little electric shock striking you in +the head, seizing your heart at the same time--that is the moment of +genius" (Buffon). "In the course of my life I have had some happy +thoughts," says Du Bois Reymond, "and I have often noted that they would +come to me involuntarily, and when I was not thinking of the subject." +Claude Bernard has voiced the same thought more than once. + +(b) Impersonality is a deeper character than the preceding. It reveals a +power superior to the conscious individual, strange to him although +acting through him: a state which many inventors have expressed in the +words, "I counted for nothing in that." The best means of recognizing it +would be to write down some observations taken from the inspired +individuals themselves. We do not lack them, and some have the virtue of +good observation.[18] But that would lead us too far afield. Let us only +remark that this unconscious impulse acts variously according to the +individual. Some submit to it painfully, striving against it just like +the ancient pythoness at the time of giving her oracle. Others, +especially in religious inspiration, submit themselves entirely with +pleasure or else sustain it passively. Still others of a more analytic +turn have noted the concentration of all their faculties and capacities +on a single point. But whatever characteristics it takes on, remaining +impersonal at bottom and unable to appear in a fully conscious +individual, we must admit, unless we wish to give it a supernatural +origin, that inspiration is derived from the unconscious activity of the +mind. In order to make sure of its nature it would then be necessary to +make sure first of the nature of the unconscious, which is one of the +enigmas of psychology. + +I put aside all the discussions on the subject as tiresome and useless +for our present aim. Indeed, they reduce themselves to these two +principal propositions: for some the unconscious is a purely +physiological activity, a "cerebration"; for others it is a gradual +diminution of consciousness which exists without being bound to me--i.e., +to the principal consciousness. Both these are full of difficulties +and present almost insurmountable objections.[19] + +Let us take the "unconscious" as a fact and let us limit ourselves to +clearing it up, relating inspiration to mental states that have been +judged worthy of explaining it. + +1. Hypermnesia, or exaltation of memory, in spite of what has been said +about it, teaches us nothing in regard to the nature of inspiration or +of invention in general. It is produced in hypnotism, mania, the excited +period of "circular insanity," at the beginning of general paralysis, +and especially under the form known as "the gift of tongues" in +religious epidemics. We find, it is true, some observations (among +others one by Regis of an illiterate newspaper vender composing pieces +of poetry of his own), indicating that a heightened memory sometimes +accompanies a certain tendency toward invention. But hypermnesia, pure +and simple, consists of an extraordinary flood of memories totally +lacking that essential mark of creation--new combinations. It even +appears that in the two instances there is rather an antagonism since +heightened memory comes near to the ideal law of total redintegration, +which is, as we know, a hindrance to invention. They are alike only with +respect to the great mass of separable materials, but where the +principle of unity is wanting there can be no creation. + +2. Inspiration has often been likened to the state of excitement +preceding intoxication. It is a well-known fact that many inventors have +sought it in wine, alcoholic liquors, toxic substances like hashish, +opium, ether, etc. It is unnecessary to mention names. The abundance of +ideas, the rapidity of their flow, the eccentric spurts and caprices, +novel ideas, strengthening of the vital and emotional tone, that brief +state of bounding fancy of which novelists have given such good +descriptions, make evident to the least observing that under the +influence of intoxication the imagination works to a much greater extent +than ordinarily. Yet how pale that is compared to the action of the +intellectual poisons above mentioned, especially hashish. The +"artificial paradise" of DeQuincy, Moreau de Tours, Theophile Gautier, +Baudelaire and others have made known to all an enormous expansion of +the imagination launched into a giddy course without limits of time and +space. + +Strictly, these are facts representing only a stimulated, artificial, +temporary inspiration. They do not take us into its true nature; at the +most they may teach us concerning some of their physiological +conditions. It is not even an inspiration in the strict sense, but +rather a beginning, an embryo, an outline, analogous to the creations +produced in dreams which are found very incoherent when we awake. One of +the essential conditions of creation, a principal element--the directing +principle that organizes and unifies--is lacking. Under the influence +of alcoholic drinks and of poisonous intoxicants attention and will +always fall into exhaustion. + +3. With greater reason it has been sought to explain inspiration by +comparison with certain forms of somnambulism, and it has been said that +"it is only the lowest degree of the latter state, somnambulism in a +waking state. In inspiration it is as though a strange personality were +speaking to the author; in somnambulism it is the stranger himself who +talks or holds the pen, who speaks or writes--in a word, does the +work."[20] It would thus be the modified form of a state that is the +culmination of subconscious activity and a state of double personality. +As this last explanatory expression is wonderfully abused, and is called +upon to serve in all conditions, preciseness is indispensable. + +The inspired individual is like an awakened dreamer--he lives in his +dream. (Of this we might cite seemingly authentic examples: Shelly, +Alfieri, etc.) Psychologically, this means that there is in him a double +inversion of the normal state. + +To begin with, consciousness monopolized by the number and intensity of +its images is closed to the influences of the outside world, or else +receives them only to make them enter the web of its dream. The internal +life annihilates the external, which is just the opposite of ordinary +life. + +Further, the unconscious or subconscious activity passes to the first +plane, plays the first part, while preserving its impersonal character. + +This much allowed, if we would go further, we are thrown into increasing +difficulties. The existence of an unconscious working is beyond doubt; +facts in profusion could be given in support of this obscure elaboration +which enters consciousness only when all is done. But what is the nature +of this work? Is it purely physiological? Is it psychological? We come +to two opposing theses. Theoretically, we may say that everything goes +on in the realm of the unconscious just as in consciousness, _only +without a message to me_; that in clear consciousness the work may be +followed up step by step, while in unconsciousness it proceeds likewise, +but unknown to us. It is evident that all this is purely hypothetical. + +Inspiration resembles a cipher dispatch which the unconscious activity +transmits to the conscious process, which translates it. Must we admit +that in the deep levels of the unconscious there are formed only +fragmentary combinations and that they reach complete systematization +only in clear consciousness, or, rather, is the creative labor identical +in both cases? It is difficult to decide. It seems to be accepted that +genius, or at least richness, in invention depends on the subliminal +imagination,[21] not on the other, which is superficial in nature and +soon exhausted. The one is spontaneous, true; the other, artificial, +feigned. "Inspiration" signifies unconscious imagination, and is only a +special case of it. Conscious imagination is a kind of perfected state. + +To sum up, inspiration is the result of an underhand process existing in +men, in some to a very great degree. The nature of this work being +unknown, we can conclude nothing as to the ultimate nature of +inspiration. On the other hand, we may in a positive manner fix the +value of the phenomenon in invention, all the more as we are inclined to +over-value it. We should, indeed, note that inspiration is not a cause +but an effect--more exactly, a moment, a crisis, a critical stage; it is +an _index_. It marks either the end of an unconscious elaboration which +may have been very short or very long, or else the beginning of a +conscious elaboration which will be very short or very long (this is +seen especially in cases of creation suggested by chance). On the one +hand, it never has an absolute beginning; on the other hand, it never +delivers a finished work; the history of inventions sufficiently proves +this. Furthermore, one may pass beyond it; many creations long in +preparation seem without a crisis, strictly so called; such as Newton's +law of attraction, Leonardo da Vinci's "Last Supper," and the "Mona +Lisa." Finally, many have felt themselves really inspired without +producing anything of value.[22] + + +II + +What has been said up to this point does not exhaust the study of the +unconscious factor as a source of new combinations. Its role can be +studied under a simpler and more limited form. For this purpose we need +to return for the last time to association of ideas. The final reason +for association (outside of contiguity, in part at least) must be sought +in the temperament, character, individuality of the subject, often even +in the _moment_; that is, in a passing influence, hardly perceptible +because it is unconscious or subconscious. These momentary dispositions +in latent form can excite novel relations in two ways--through mediate +association and through a special mode of grouping which has recently +received the name "constellation." + +1. Mediate association has been well known since the time of Hamilton, +who was the first to determine its nature and to give a personal example +that has become classic. Loch Lomond recalled to him the Prussian system +of education because, when visiting the lake, he had met a Prussian +officer who conversed with him on the subject. His general formula is +this: _A_ recalls _C_, although there is between them neither contiguity +nor resemblance, but because a middle term, _B_, which does not enter +consciousness, serves as a transition between _A_ and _C_. This mode of +association seemed universally accepted when, latterly, it has been +attacked by Muensterberg and others. People have had recourse to +experimentation, which has given results only in slight agreement.[23] +For my own part, I count myself among those contemporaries who admit +mediate association, and they are the greater number. Scripture, who has +made a special study of the subject, and who has been able to note all +the intermediate conditions between almost clear consciousness and the +unconscious, considers the existence of mediate association as proven. +In order to pronounce as an illusion a fact that is met with so often in +daily experience, and one that has been studied by so many excellent +observers, there is required more than experimental investigations (the +conditions of which are often artificial and unnatural), some of which, +moreover, conclude for the affirmative. + +This form of association is produced, like the others, now by +contiguity, now by resemblance. The example given by Hamilton belongs to +the first type. In the experiments by Scripture are found some of the +second type--e.g., a red light recalled, through the vague memory of a +flash of strontium light, a scene of an opera. + +It is clear that by its very nature mediate association can give rise to +novel combinations. Contiguity itself, which is usually only repetition, +becomes the source of unforeseen relations, thanks to the elimination of +the middle term. Nothing, moreover, proves that there may not sometimes +be several latent intermediate terms. It is possible that _A_ should +call up _D_ through the medium of _b_ and _c_, which remain below the +threshold of consciousness. It seems even impossible not to admit this +in the hypothesis of the subconscious, where we see only the two end +links of the chain, without being able to allow a break of continuity +between them. + +2. In his determination of the regulating causes of association of +ideas, Ziehen designates one of these under the name of "constellation," +which has been adopted by some writers. This may be enunciated thus: The +recall of an image, or of a group of images, is in some cases the result +of a sum of predominant tendencies. + +An idea may become the starting point of a host of associations. The +word "Rome" can call up a hundred. Why is one called up rather than +another, and at such a moment rather than at another? There are some +associations based on contiguity and on resemblance which one may +foresee, but how about the rest? Here is an idea _A_; it is the center +of a network; it can radiate in all directions--_B, C, D, E, F, etc._ +Why does it call up now _B_, later _F_? + +It is because every image is comparable to a force, which may pass from +the latent to the active condition, and in this process may be +reinforced or checked by other images. There are simultaneous and +inhibitory tendencies. _B_ is in a state of tension and _C_ is not; or +it may be that _D_ exerts an arresting influence on _C_. Consequently +_C_ cannot prevail. But an hour later conditions have changed and +victory rests with _C_. This phenomenon rests on a physiological basis: +the existence of several currents diffusing themselves through the brain +and the possibility of receiving simultaneous excitations.[24] + +A few examples will make plainer this phenomenon of reinforcement, in +consequence of which an association prevails. Wahle reports that the +Gothic _Hotel de Ville_, near his house, had never suggested to him the +idea of the Doges' Palace at Venice, in spite of certain architectural +likenesses, until a certain day when this idea broke upon him with much +clearness. He then recalled that two hours before he had observed a lady +wearing a beautiful brooch in the form of a gondola. Sully rightly +remarks that it is much easier to recall the words of a foreign language +when we return from the country where it is spoken than when we have +lived a long time in our own, because the tendency toward recollection +is reinforced by the recent experience of the words heard, spoken, +read, and a whole array of latent dispositions that work in the same +direction. + +In my opinion we would find the finest examples of "constellation," +regarded as a creative element, in studying the formation and +development of myths. Everywhere and always man has had for material +scarcely anything save natural phenomena--the sky, land, water, stars, +storms, wind, seasons, life, death, etc. On each of these themes he +builds thousands of explanatory stories, which vary from the grandly +imposing to the laughably childish. Every myth is the work of a human +group which has worked according to the tendencies of its special genius +under the influence of various stages of intellectual culture. No +process is richer in resources, of freer turn, or more apt to give what +every inventor promises--the novel and unexpected. + +To sum up: The initial element, external or internal, excites +associations that one cannot always foresee, because of the numerous +orientations possible; an analogous case to that which occurs in the +realm of the will when there are present reasons for and against, acting +and not acting, one direction or another, now or later--when the final +resolution cannot be predicted, and often depends on imperceptible +causes. + +In conclusion, I anticipate a possible question: "Does the unconscious +factor differ in nature from the two others (intellectual and +emotional)?" The answer depends on the hypothesis that one holds as to +the nature of the unconscious itself. According to one view it would be +especially physiological, consequently different; according to another, +the difference can exist only _in the processes_: unconscious +elaboration is reducible to intellectual or emotional processes the +preparatory work of which is slighted, and which enters consciousness +ready made. Consequently, the unconscious factor would be a special form +of the other two rather than a distinct element in invention. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[18] Several of them will be found in Appendix A at the end of this +work. + +[19] On this subject see Appendix B. + +[20] Dr. Chabaneix, _Le subconscient sur les artistes, les savants, +et les ecrivains_, Paris, 1897, p. 87. + +[21] The recent case, studied with so much ability by M. Flournoy in +his book, "_Des Indes a la planete Mars_" (1900), is an example of +the subliminal creative imagination, and of the work it is capable +of doing by itself. + +[22] We shall return to this point in another part of this work. See +Part II, chapter iv. + +[23] Thus Howe (_American Journal of Psychology_, vi, 239 ff.), has +published some investigations in the negative. One series of 557 +experiments gave him eight apparently mediate associations; after +examination, he reduced them to a single one, which seemed to him +doubtful. Another series of 961 experiments gives 72 cases, for +which he offers an explanation other than mediate association. On +the other hand, Aschaffenburg admits them to the extent of four per +cent.; the association-time is longer than for average associations +(_Psychologische Arbeiten_, I and II). Consult especially Scripture, +_The New Psychology_, chapter xiii, with experiments in support of +his conclusion. + +[24] Ziehen, _Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie_, 4th +edition, 1898, pp. 164, 174. Also, Sully, _Human Mind_, I, 343. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE ORGANIC CONDITIONS OF THE IMAGINATION + + +Whatever opinion we may hold concerning the nature of the unconscious, +since that form of activity is related more than any other to the +physiological conditions of the mental life, the present time is +suitable for an exposition of the hypotheses that it is permissible to +express concerning the organic bases of the imagination. What we may +regard as positive, or even as probable, is very little. + + +I + +First, the anatomical conditions. Is there a "seat" of the imagination? +Such is the form of the question asked for the last twenty years. In +that period of extreme and closely bounded localization men strained +themselves to bind down every psychic manifestation to a strictly +determined point of the brain. Today the problem presents itself no +longer in this simple way. As at present we incline toward scattered +localization, functional rather than properly anatomical, and as we +often understand by "center" the synergic action of several centers +differently grouped according to the individual case, our question +becomes equivalent to: "Are there certain portions of the brain having +an exclusive or preponderating part in the working of the creative +imagination?" Even in this form the question is hardly acceptable. +Indeed, the imagination is not a primary and relatively simple function +like that of visual, auditory and other sensations. We have seen that it +is a state of tertiary formation and very complex. There is required, +then, (1) that the elements constituting imagination be determined in a +rigorous manner, but the foregoing analysis makes no pretense of being +definitive; (2) that each of these constitutive elements may be strictly +related to its anatomic conditions. It is evident that we are far from +possessing the secret of such a mechanism. + +An attempt has been made to put the question in a more precise and +limited form by studying the brains of men distinguished in different +lines. But this method, in avoiding the difficulty, answers our question +indirectly only. Most often great inventors possess qualities besides +imagination indispensable for success (Napoleon, James Watt, etc.). How +draw a dividing line so as to assign to the imagination only its +rightful share? In addition, the anatomical determination is beset with +difficulties. + +A method flourishing very greatly about the middle of the nineteenth +century consisted of weighing carefully a large number of brains and +drawing various conclusions as to intellectual superiority or +inferiority from a comparison of the weights. We find on this point +numerous documents in the special works published during the period +mentioned. But this method of weights has given rise to so many +surprises and difficulties in the way of explanation that it has been +quite necessary to give it up, since we see in it only another element +of the problem. + +Nowadays we attribute the greatest importance to the morphology of the +brain, to its histological structure, the marked development of certain +regions, the determination not only of centers but of connections and +associations between centers. On this last point contemporary anatomists +have given themselves up to eager researches, and, although the cerebral +architecture is not conceived by all in the same way, it is proper for +psychology to note that all with their "centers" or "associational +system" try to translate into their own language the complex conditions +of mental life. Since we must choose from among these various anatomical +views let us accept that of Flechsig, one of the most renowned and one +having also the advantage of putting directly the problem of the organic +conditions of the imagination. + +We know that Flechsig relies on the embryological method--that is, on +the development--in the order of time, of nerves and centers. For him +there exist on the one hand sensitive regions (sensory-motor), occupying +about a third of the cortical surface; on the other hand, +association-centers, occupying the remaining part. + +So far as the sensory centers are concerned, development occurs in the +following order: Organic sensations (middle of cerebral cortex), smell +(base of the brain and part of the frontal lobes), sight (occipital +lobe), hearing (first temporal). Whence it results that in a definite +part of the brain the body comes to proper consciousness of its +impulses, wants, appetites, pains, movements, etc., and that this part +develops first--"knowledge of the body precedes that of the outside +world." + +In what concerns the associational centers, Flechsig supposes three +regions: The great posterior center (parieto-occipito-temporal); +another, much smaller, anterior or frontal; and a middle center, the +smallest of all (the Island of Reil). Comparative anatomy proves that +the associational centers are more important than those of sensation. +Among the lower mammals they develop as we go up the scale: "That which +makes the psychic man may be said to be the centers of association that +he possesses." In the new-born child the sensitive centers are isolated, +and, in the absence of connections between them, the unity of the self +cannot be manifested; there is a plurality of consciousness. + +This much admitted, let us return to our special question, which +Flechsig asks in these words: "On what does genius rest? Is it based on +a special structure in the brain, or rather on special irritability? +that is, according to our present notions, on chemical factors? We may +hold the first opinion with all possible force. Genius is always united +to a special structure, to a particular organization of the brain." All +parts of this organ do not have the same value. It has been long +admitted that the frontal part may serve as a measure of intellectual +capacity; but we must allow, contrariwise, that there are other regions, +"principally a center located under the protuberance at the top of the +head, which is very much developed in all men of genius whose brains +have been studied down to our day. In Beethoven, and probably also in +Bach, the enormous development of this part of the brain is striking. In +great scientists like Gauss the centers of the posterior region of the +brain and those of the frontal region are strongly developed. The +scientific genius thus shows proportions of brain-structure other than +the artistic genius."[25] There would then be, according to our author, +a preponderance of the frontal and parietal regions--the former obtain +especially among artists; the latter among scientists. Already, twenty +years before Flechsig, Ruedinger had noted the extraordinary development +of the parietal convolutions in eminent men after a study of eighteen +brains. All the convolutions and fissures were so developed, said he, +that the parieto-occipital region had an altogether peculiar character. + +By way of summary we must bear in mind that, as regards anatomical +conditions, even when depending on the best of sources, we can at +present give only fragmentary, incomplete, hypothetical views. + +Let us now go on to the physiology. + + +II + +We might have rightly asked whether the physiological states existing +along with the working of the creative imagination are the cause, +effect, or merely the accompaniment of this activity. Probably all the +three conditions are met with. First, concomitance is an accomplished +fact, and we may consider it as an organic manifestation parallel to +that of the mind. Again, the employment of artificial means to excite +and maintain the effervescence of the imagination assigns a causal or +antecedent position to the physiologic conditions. Lastly, the psychic +activity may be initial and productive of changes in the organism, or, +if these already exist, may augment and prolong them. + +The most instructive instances are those indicated by very clear +manifestations and profound modifications of the bodily condition. Such +are the moments of inspiration or simply those of warmth from work which +arise in the form of sudden impulses. + +The general fact of most importance consists of changes in the blood +circulation. Increase of intellectual activity means an increase of work +in the cortical cells, dependent on a congested, sometimes a temporarily +anaemic state. Hyperaemia seems rather the rule, but we also know that +slight anaemia increases cortical excitability. "Weak, contracted pulse; +pale, chilly skin; overheated head; brilliant, sunken, roving eyes," +such is the classic, frequently quoted description of the physiological +state during creative labor. There are numerous inventors who, of their +own accord, have noted these changes--irregular pulse, in the case of +Lagrange; congestion of the head, in Beethoven, who made use of cold +douches to relieve it, etc. This elevation of the vital tone, this +nervous tension, translates itself also into motor form through +movements analogous to reflexes, without special end, mechanically +repeated and always the same in the same man--e.g., movement of the +feet, hands, fingers; whittling the table or the arms of a chair (as in +the case of Napoleon when he was elaborating a plan of campaign), etc. +It is a safety-valve for the excessive flow of nervous impulse, and it +is admitted that this method of expenditure is not useless for +preserving the understanding in all its clearness. In a word, increase +of the cerebral circulation is the formula covering the majority of +observations on this subject. + +Does experimentation, strictly so called, teach us anything on this +point? Numerous and well-known physiological researches, especially +those of Mosso, show that all intellectual, and, most of all, emotional, +work, produces cerebral congestion; that the brain-volume increases, and +the volume of the peripheral organs diminishes. But that tells us +nothing particularly about the imagination, which is but a special case +under the rule. Latterly, indeed, it has been proposed to study +inventors by an objective method through the examination of their +several circulatory, respiratory, digestive apparatus; their general +and special sensibility; the modes of their memory and forms of +association, their intellectual processes, etc. But up to this time no +conclusion has been drawn from these individual descriptions that would +allow any generalization. Besides, has an experiment, in the strict +sense of the word, ever been made at the "psychological moment"? I know +of none. Would it be possible? Let us admit that by some happy chance +the experimenter, using all his means of investigation, can have the +subject under his hand at the exact moment of inspiration--of the +sudden, fertile, brief creative impulse--would not the experiment itself +be a disturbing cause, so that the result would be _ipso facto_ +vitiated, or at least unconvincing? + +There still remains a mass of facts deserving summary notice--the +oddities of inventors. Were we to collect only those that may be +regarded as authentic we could make a thick volume. Despite their +anecdotal character these evidences do not seem to be unworthy of some +regard. + +It is impossible to enter here upon an enumeration that would be +endless. After having collected for my own information a large number of +these strange peculiarities, it seems to me that they are reducible to +two categories: + +(1) Those inexplicable freaks dependent on the individual constitution, +and more often probably also on experiences in life the memory of which +has been lost. Schiller, for example, kept rotten apples in his work +desk. + +(2) The others, more numerous, are easy to explain. They are +physiological means consciously or unconsciously chosen to aid creative +work; they are auxiliary helpers of the imagination. + +The most frequent method consists of artificially increasing the flow of +blood to the brain. Rousseau would think bare-headed in full sunshine; +Bossuet would work in a cold room with his head wrapped in furs; others +would immerse their feet in ice-cold water (Gretry, Schiller). Very +numerous are those who think "horizontally"--that is, lying stretched +out and often flattened under their blankets (Milton, Descartes, +Leibniz, Rossini, etc.) + +Some require motor excitation; they work only when walking,[26] or else +prepare for work by physical exercise (Mozart). For variety's sake, let +us note those who must have the noise of the streets, crowds, talk, +festivities, in order to invent. For others there must be external pomp +and a personal part in the scene (Machiavelli, Buffon). Guido Reni would +paint only when dressed in magnificent style, his pupils crowded about +him and attending to his wants in respectful silence. + +On the opposite side are those requiring retirement, silence, +contemplation, even shadowy darkness, like Lamennais. In this class we +find especially scientists and thinkers--Tycho-Brahe, who for twenty-one +years scarcely left his observatory; Leibniz, who could remain for +three days almost motionless in an armchair. + +But most methods are too artificial or too strong not to become quickly +noxious. Every one knows what they are--abuse of wine, alcoholic +liquors, narcotics, tobacco, coffee, etc., prolonged periods of +wakefulness, less for increasing the time for work than to cause a state +of hyperesthesia and a morbid sensibility (Goncourt). + +Summing up: The organic bases of the creative imagination, if there are +any specially its own, remain to be determined. For in all that has been +said we have been concerned only with some conditions of the general +working of the mind--assimilation as well as invention. The +eccentricities of inventors studied carefully and in a detailed manner +would finally, perhaps, be most instructive material, because it would +allow us to penetrate into their inmost individuality. Thus, the +physiology of the imagination quickly becomes pathology. I shall not +dwell on this, having purposely eliminated the morbid side of our +subject. It will, however, be necessary to return thereto, touching upon +it in another part of this essay. + + +III + +There remains a problem, so obscure and enigmatic that I scarcely +venture to approach it, in the analogy that most languages--the +spontaneous expression of a common thought--establish between +physiologic and psychic creation. Is it only a superficial likeness, a +hasty judgment, a metaphor, or does it rest on some positive basis? +Generally, the various manifestations of mental activity have as their +precursor an unconscious form from which they arise. The sensitiveness +belonging to living substance, known by the names heliotropism, +chemotropism, etc., is like a sketch of sensation and of the reactions +following it; organic memory is the basis and the obliterated form of +conscious memory. Reflexes introduce voluntary activity; appetitions and +hidden tendencies are the forerunners of effective psychology. Instinct, +on several sides, is like an unconscious and specific trial of reason. +Has the creative power of the human mind also analogous antecedents, a +physiological equivalent? + +One metaphysician, Froschammer, who has elevated the creative +imagination to the rank of primary world-principle, asserts this +positively. For him there is an objective or cosmic imagination working +in nature, producing the innumerable varieties of vegetable and animal +forms; transformed into subjective imagination it becomes in the human +brain the source of a new form of creation. "The very same principle +causes the living forms to appear--a sort of objective image--and the +subjective images, a kind of living form."[27] However ingenious and +attractive this philosophical theory may be, it is evidently of no +positive value for psychology. + +Let us stick to experience. Physiology teaches that generation is a +"prolonged nutrition," a surplus, as we see so plainly in the lower +forms of agamous generation (budding, division). The creative +imagination likewise presupposes a superabundance of psychic life that +might otherwise spend itself in another way. Generation in the physical +order is a spontaneous, natural tendency, although it may be stimulated, +successfully or otherwise, by artificial means. We can say as much of +the other. This list of resemblances it would be easy to prolong. But +all this is insufficient for the establishment of a thorough identity +between the two cases and the solution of the question. + +It is possible to limit it, to put it into more precise language. Is +there a connection between the development of the generative function +and that of the imagination? Even in this form the question scarcely +permits any but vague answers. In favor of a connection we may allege: + +(1) The well-known influence of puberty on the imagination of both +sexes, expressing itself in day-dreams, in aspirations toward an +unattainable ideal,[28] in the genius for invention that love bestows +upon the least favored. Let us recall also the mental troubles, the +psychoses designated by the name hebephrenia. With adolescence coincides +the first flowering of the fancy which, having emerged from its +swaddling-clothes of childhood, is not yet sophisticated and +rationalized. + +It is not a matter of indifference for the general thesis of the present +work to note that this development of the imagination depends wholly on +the first effervescence of the emotional life. That "influence of the +feelings on the imagination" and of "the imagination on the feelings" of +which the moralists and the older psychologists speak so often is a +vague formula for expressing this fact--that the motor element included +in the images is reinforced. + +(2) _Per contra_, the weakening of the generative power and of the +constructive imagination coincide in old age, which is, in a word, a +decay of nutrition, a progressive atrophy. It is proper not to omit the +influence of castration. According to the theory of Brown-Sequard, it +produces an abatement of the nutritive functions through the suppression +of an internal stimulus; and, although its relations to the imagination +have not been especially studied, it is not rash to admit that it is an +arresting cause. + +However, the foregoing merely establishes, between the functions +compared, a concomitance in the general course of their evolution and in +their critical periods; it is insufficient for a conclusion. There +would be needed clear, authentic and sufficiently numerous observations +proving that individuals bereft of imagination of the creative type have +acquired it suddenly through the sole fact of their sexual influences, +and, inversely, that brilliant imaginations have faded under the +contrary conditions. We find some of these evidences in Cabanis,[29] +Moreau de Tours and various alienists; they would seem to be in favor of +the affirmative, but some seem to me not sure enough, others not +explicit enough. Despite my investigations on this point, and inquiry of +competent persons, I do not venture to draw a definite conclusion. I +leave the question open; it will perhaps tempt another more fortunate +investigator. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[25] Flechsig, _Gehirn und Seele_, 1896. + +[26] Is it possible that this would explain the fact of Aristotle +lecturing to his pupils while walking about, thus giving the name +"peripatetic" to his school and system? (Tr.) + +[27] _Die Phantasie als Grundprincip der Weltprocesses_, Muenchen, +1877. For other details on the subject, see Appendix C. + +[28] A passage from Chateaubriand (cited by Paulhan, _Rev. Philos._, +March, 1898, p. 237) is a typical description of the situation: "The +warmth of my (adolescent) imagination, my shyness, and solitude, +caused me, instead of casting myself on something without, to fall +back upon myself. Wanting a real object, I evoked through the power +of my desires, a phantom, which thenceforth never left me; I made a +woman, composed of all the women that I had already seen. That +charming idea followed me everywhere, though invisible; I conversed +with her as with a real being; she would change according to my +frenzy. Pygmalion was less enamored of his statue." + +[29] Cabanis, _Rapports du Physique et du Moral_, edition Peisse, +pp. 248-249, an anecdote that he relates after Buffon. Analogous, +but less clear, facts may also be found in Moreau de Tours' +_Psychologie morbide_. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY + + +The psychological nature of the imagination would be very imperfectly +known were we limited to the foregoing analytical study. Indeed, all +creation whatever, great or small, shows an organic character; it +implies a unifying, synthetic principle. Every one of the three +factors--intellectual, emotional, unconscious--works not as an isolated +fact on its own account; they have no worth save through their union, +and no signification save through their common bearing. This principle +of unity, which all invention demands and requires, is at one time +intellectual in nature, i.e., as a fixed idea; at another time +emotional, i.e., as a fixed emotion or passion. These terms--fixed +idea, fixed emotion--are somewhat absolute and require restrictions and +reservations, which will be made in what follows. + +The distinction between the two is not at all absolute. Every fixed idea +is supported and maintained by a need, a tendency, a desire; i.e., by +an affective element. For it is idle fancy to believe in the +_persistence_ of an idea which, by hypothesis, would be a purely +intellectual state, cold and dry. The principle of unity in this form +naturally predominates in certain kinds of creation: in the practical +imagination wherein the end is clear, where images are direct +substitutes for things, where invention is subjected to strict +conditions under penalty of visible and palpable check; in the +scientific and metaphysical imagination, which works with concepts and +is subject to the laws of rational logic. + +Every fixed emotion should realize itself in an idea or image that gives +it body and systematizes it, without which it remains diffuse; and all +affective states can take on this permanent form which makes a unified +principle of them. The simple emotions (fear, love, joy, sorrow, etc.), +the complex or derived emotions (religious, esthetic, intellectual +ideas) may equally monopolize consciousness in their own interests. + +We thus see that these two terms--fixed idea, fixed emotion--are almost +equivalent, for they both imply inseparable elements, and serve only to +indicate the preponderance of one or the other element. + +This principle of unity, center of attraction and support of all the +working of the creative imagination--that is, a subjective principle +tending to become objectified--is the ideal. In the complete sense of +the word--not restrained merely to esthetic creation or made synonymous +with perfection as in ethics--the ideal is a construction in images that +should become a reality. If we liken imaginative creation to +physiological generation, the ideal is the ovum awaiting fertilization +in order to begin its development. + +We could, to be more exact, make a distinction between the synthetic +principle and the ideal conception which is a higher form of it. The +fixation of an end and the discovery of appropriate means are the +necessary and sufficient conditions for all invention. A creation, +whatever it be, that looks only to present success, can satisfy itself +with a unifying principle that renders it viable and organized, but we +can look higher than the merely necessary and sufficient. + +The ideal is the principle of unity in motion in its historic evolution; +like all development, it advances or recedes according to the times. +Nothing is less justified than the conception of a fixed archetype (an +undisguised survival of the Platonic Ideas), illuminating the inventor, +who reproduces it as best he can. The ideal is a nonentity; it arises in +the inventor and through him; its life is a _becoming_. + +Psychologically, it is a construction in images belonging to the merely +sketched or outlined type.[30] It results from a double activity, +negative and positive, or dissociation and association, the first cause +and origin of which is found in a _will that it shall be so_; it is the +motor tendency of images in the nascent state engendering the ideal. +The inventor cuts out, suppresses, sifts, according to his temperament, +character, taste, prejudices, sympathies and antipathies--in short, his +_interest_. In this separation, already studied, let us note one +important particular. "We know nothing of the complex psychic production +that may simply be the sum of component elements and in which they would +remain with their own characters, with no modification. The nature of +the components disappears in order to give birth to a novel phenomenon +that has its own and particular features. The construction of the ideal +is not a mere grouping of past experiences; in its totality it has its +own individual characteristics, among which we no more see the composing +lines than we see the components, oxygen and hydrogen, in water. In no +scientific or artistic production, says Wundt, does the whole appear as +made up of its parts, like a mosaic."[31] In other words, it is a case +of mental chemistry. The exactness of this expression, which is due, I +believe, to J. Stuart Mill, has been questioned. Still it answers to +positive facts; for example, in perception, to the phenomena of contrast +and their analogues; juxtaposition or rapid succession of two different +colors, two different sounds, of tactile, olfactory, gustatory +impressions different in quality, produces a particular state of +consciousness, similar to a combination. Harmony or discord does not, +indeed, exist in each separate sound, but only in the relations and +sequence of sounds--it is a _tertium quid_. We have heretofore, in the +discussion of association of ideas, very frequently represented the +states of consciousness as fixed elements that approach one another, +cohere, separate, come together anew, but always unalterable, like +atoms. It is not so at all. Consciousness, says Titchener, resembles a +fresco in which the transition between colors is made through all kinds +of intermediate stages of light and shade.... The idea of a pen or of an +inkwell is not a stable thing clearly pictured like the pen or inkwell +itself. More than any one else, William James has insisted on this point +in his theory of "fringes" of states of consciousness. Outside of the +given instances we could find many others among the various +manifestations of the mental life. It is not, then, at all chimerical to +assume in psychology an equivalent of chemical combination. In a complex +state there is, in addition to the component elements, the result of +their reciprocal influences, of their varying relations. Too often we +forget this resultant. + +At bottom the ideal is an individual concept. If objection is offered +that an ideal common to a large mass of men is a fact of common +experience (e.g., idealists and realists in the fine arts, and even +more so religious, moral, social and political concepts, etc.), the +answer is easy: There are families of minds. They have a common ideal +because, in certain matters, they have the same way of feeling and +thinking. It is not a transcendental idea that unites them; but this +result occurs because from their common aspirations the collective ideal +becomes disengaged; it is, in scholastic terminology, a _universale post +rem_. + +The ideal conception is the first moment of the creative act, which is +not yet battling with the conditions of the actual. It is only the +internal vision of an individual mind that has not yet been projected +externally with a form and body. We know how the passage from the +internal to the external life has given rise among inventors to +deceptions and complaints. Such was the imaginative construction that +could not, unchanged, enter into its mould and become a reality. + +Let us now examine the various forms of this coagulating[32] principle +in advancing from the lowest to the highest, from the unity vaguely +anticipated to the absolute and tyrannical masterful unity. Following a +method that seems to me best adapted for these ill-explained questions I +shall single out only the principal forms, which I have reduced to +three--the unstable, the organic or middle, and the extreme or +semi-morbid unity. + +(1) The unstable form has its starting point directly and immediately in +the reproductive imagination without creation. It assembles its +elements somewhat by chance and stitches together the bits of our life; +it ends only in beginnings, in attempts. The unity-principle is a +momentary disposition, vacillating and changing without cessation +according to the external impressions or modifications of our vital +conditions and of our humor. By way of example let us recall the state +of the day-dreamer building castles in the air; the delirious +constructions of the insane, the inventions of the child following all +the fluctuations of chance, of its caprice; the half-coherent dreams +that seem to the dreamer to contain a creative germ. In consequence of +the extreme frailty of the synthetic principle the creative imagination +does not succeed in accomplishing its task and remains in a condition +intermediate between simple association of ideas and creation proper. + +(2) The organic or middle form may be given as the type of the unifying +power. Ultimately it reduces itself to attention and presupposes nothing +more, because, thanks to the process of "localization," which is the +essential mark of attention, it makes itself a center of attraction, +grouping about the leading idea the images, associations, judgments, +tendencies and voluntary efforts. "Inspiration," the poet Grillparzer +used to say, "is a concentration of all the forces and capacities upon a +single point which, for the time being, should represent the world +rather than enclose it. The reinforcement of the state of the mind comes +from the fact that its several powers, instead of spreading themselves +over the whole world, are contained within the bounds of a single +object, touch one another, reciprocally help and reinforce each +other."[33] What the poet here maintains as regards esthetics only is +applicable to all the _organic_ forms of creation--that is to those +ruled by an immanent logic, and, like them, resembling works of Nature. + +In order to leave no doubt as to the identity of attention and +imaginative synthesis, and in order to show that it is normally the true +unifying principle, we offer the following remarks: + +Attention is at times spontaneous, natural, without effort, simply +dependent on the interest that a thing excites in us--lasting as long as +it holds us in subjection, then ceasing entirely. Again, it is +voluntary, artificial, an imitation of the other, precarious and +intermittent, maintained with effort--in a word, laborious. The same is +true of the imagination. The moment of inspiration is ruled by a perfect +and spontaneous unity; its impersonality approaches that of the forces +of Nature. Then appears the personal moment, the detailed working and +long, painful, intermittent resumptions, the miserable turns of which so +many inventors have described. The analogy between the two cases seems +to me incontestable. + +Next let us note that psychologists always adduce the same examples when +they wish to illustrate on the one hand, the processes of the +persistent, tenacious attention, and, on the other hand, the +developmental labor without which creative work does not come to pass: +"Genius is only long patience," the saying of Newton; "always thinking +of it," and like expressions of d'Alembert, Helmholtz and others, +because in the one case as in the other the fundamental condition is the +existence of a fixed, ever-active idea, notwithstanding its relaxations +and its incessant disappearances into the unconscious with return to +consciousness. + +(3) The extreme form, which from its nature is semi-morbid, becomes in +its highest degree plainly pathological; the unifying principle changes +to a condition of obsession. + +The normal state of our mind is a plurality of states of consciousness +(polyideism). Through association there is a radiation in every +direction. In this totality of coexisting images no one long occupies +first place; it is driven away by others, which are displaced in turn by +still others emerging from the penumbra. On the contrary, in attention +(relative monoideism) a single image retains first place for a long time +and tends to have the same importance again. Finally, in a condition of +obsession (absolute monoideism) the fixed idea defies all rivalry and +rules despotically. Many inventors have suffered painfully this tyranny +and have vainly struggled to break it. The fixed idea, once settled, +does not permit anything to dislodge it save for the moment and with +much pain. Even then it is displaced only apparently, for it persists in +the unconscious life where it has thrust its deep roots. + +At this stage the unifying principle, although it can act as a stimulus +for creation, is no longer normal. Consequently, a natural question +arises: Wherein is there a difference between the obsession of the +inventor and the obsession of the insane, who most generally destroys in +place of creating? + +The nature of fixed ideas has greatly occupied contemporary alienists. +For other reasons and in their own way they, too, have been led to +divide obsession into two classes, the intellectual and emotional, +according as the idea or the affective state predominates. Then they +have been led to ask: Which of these two elements is the primitive one? +For some it is the idea. For others, and it seems that these are the +more numerous, the affective state is in general the primary fact; the +obsession always rests on a basis of morbid emotion and in a retention +of impressions.[34] + +But whatever opinion we may hold on this point, the difficulty of +establishing a dividing line between the two forms of obsession above +mentioned remains the same. Are there characters peculiar to each one? + +It has been said: "The physiologically fixed idea is normally longed +for, often sought, in all cases accepted, and it does not break the +unity of the self." It does not impose itself fatally on consciousness; +the individual knows the value thereof, knows where it leads him, and +adapts his conduct to its requirements. For example, Christopher +Columbus. + +The pathological fixed idea is "parasitic," automatic, discordant, +irresistible. Obsession is only a special case of psychic +disintegration, a kind of doubling of consciousness. The individual +becomes a person "possessed," whose self has been confiscated for the +sake of the fixed idea, and whose submission to his situation is wrought +with pain. + +In spite of this parallel the distinguishing criterion between the two +is very vague, because from the sane to the delirious idea the +transitions are very numerous. We are obliged to recognize "that with +certain workers--who are rather taken up with the elaboration of their +work, and not masters directing it, quitting it, and resuming it at +their pleasure--an artistic, scientific, or mechanical conception +succeeds in haunting the mind, imposing itself upon it even to the +extent of causing suffering." In reality, pure psychology is unable to +discover a positive difference between obsession leading to creative +work and the other forms, because in both cases the mental mechanism is, +at bottom, the same. The criterion must be sought elsewhere. For that we +must go out of the internal world and proceed objectively. We must judge +the fixed idea not in itself but by its effects. What does it produce in +the practical, esthetic, scientific, moral, social, religious field? It +is of value according to its fruits. If objection be made to this change +of front we may, in order to stick to a strictly psychological point of +view, state that it is certain that as soon as it passes beyond a middle +point, which it is difficult to determine, the fixed idea profoundly +troubles the mechanism of the mind. In imaginative persons this is not +rare, which partly explains why the pathological theory of genius (of +which we shall speak later) has been able to rally so many to its +support and to allege so many facts in its favor. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[30] For the distinction between this form of imagination and the +two others (fixed, objectified), I refer the reader to the +Conclusion of this work, where the subject will be treated in +detail. + +[31] Colozza, _L'immaginazione nella Scienza_, Rome, 1900, pp. 111 +ff. + +[32] This unifying, organizing, creative principle is so active in +certain minds that, placed face to face with any work whatever--novel, +picture, monument, scientific or philosophic theory, financial or +political institution--while believing that they are merely +considering it, they spontaneously remake it. This characteristic of +their psychology distinguishes them from mere critics. + +[33] Oelzelt-Newin, _op. cit._, p. 49. + +[34] Pitres et Regis, _Semeiologie des obsessions et des idees +fixes_, 1878. Seglas, _Lecons cliniques sur les maladies mentales_, +1895. Raymond et Janet, _Nevroses et idees fixes_, 1898. + + + + +SECOND PART + +THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMAGINATION. + + + + +CHAPTER I + +IMAGINATION IN ANIMALS + + +Up to this point the imagination has been treated analytically only. +This process alone would give us but a very imperfect idea of its +essentially concrete and lively nature were we to stop here. So this +part continues the subject in another shape. I shall attempt to follow +the imagination in its ascending development from the lowest to the most +complex forms, from the animal to the human infant, to primitive man, +thence to the highest modes of invention. It will thus be exhibited in +the inexhaustible variety of its manifestations which the abstract and +simplifying process of analysis does not permit us to suspect. + + +I + +I shall not dwell at length on the imagination of animals, not only +because the question is much involved but also because it is hardly +liable to a positive solution. Even eliminating mere anecdotes and +doubtful observations, there is no lack of verified and authentic +material, but it still remains to interpret them. As soon as we begin to +conjecture we know how difficult it is to divest ourselves of all +anthropomorphism. + +The question has been formulated, even if not treated, with much system +by Romanes in his _Mental Evolution in Animals_.[35] Taking +"imagination" in its broadest sense, he recognizes four stages: + +1. Provoked revival of images. For example, the sight of an orange +reminds one of its taste. This is a low form of memory, resting on +association by contiguity. It is met with very far down in the animal +scale, and the author furnishes abundant proof of it. + +2. Spontaneous revival. An object present calls up an absent object. +This is a higher form of memory, frequent in ants, bees, wasps, etc., +which fact explains the mistrustful sagacity of wild animals. At night, +the distant baying of a hound stops the fox in his course, because all +the dangers he has undergone are represented in his mind. + +These two stages do not go beyond memory pure and simple, i.e., +reproductive imagination. The other two constitute the higher +imagination. + +3. The capacity of associating absent images, without suggestion derived +from without, through an internal working of the mind. It is the lower +and primitive form of the creative imagination, which may be called a +passive synthesis. In order to establish its existence, Romanes reminds +us that dreams have been proven in dogs, horses, and a large number of +birds; that certain animals, especially in anger, seem to be subject to +delusions and pursued by phantoms; and lastly, that in some there is +produced a condition resembling nostalgia, expressing itself in a +violent desire to return to former haunts, or in a wasting away +resulting from the absence of accustomed persons and things. All these +facts, especially the latter, can hardly be explained without a vivid +recollection of the images of previous life. + +4. The highest stage consists of intentionally reuniting images in order +to make novel combinations from them. This may be called an active +synthesis, and is the true creative imagination. Is this sometimes found +in the animal kingdom? Romanes very clearly replies, no; and not without +offering a plausible reason. For creation, says he, there must first be +capacity for abstraction, and, without speech, abstraction is very weak. +One of the conditions for creative imagination is thus wanting in the +higher animals. + +We here come to one of those critical moments, so frequent in animal +psychology, when one asks, Is this character exclusively human, or is it +found in embryo in lower forms? Thus it has been possible to support a +theory opposing that of Romanes. Certain animals, says Oelzelt-Newin, +fulfill all the conditions necessary for creative imagination--subtle +senses, good memory, and appropriate emotional states.[36] This +assertion is perhaps true, but it is purely dialectic. It is equivalent +to saying that the thing is possible; it does not establish it as a +fact. Besides, is it very certain that all the conditions for creative +imagination are present here, since we have just shown that there is +lack of abstraction? The author, who voluntarily limits his study to +birds and the construction of their nests, maintains, against Wallace +and others, that nest-building requires "the mysterious synthesis of +representations." We might with equal reason bring the instances of +other building animals (bees, wasps, white ants, the common ants, +beavers, etc.). It is not unreasonable to attribute to them an +anticipated representation of their architecture. Shall we say that it +is "instinctive," consequently unconscious? At least, may we not group +under this head, changes and adaptations to new conditions which these +animals succeed in applying to the typical plans of their construction? +Observations and even systematic experiments (like those of Huber, +Forel, _et al._) show that, reduced to the alternative of the +impossibility of building or the modification of their habits, certain +animals modify them. Judging from this, how refuse them invention +altogether? This contradicts in no way the very just reservation of +Romanes. It is sufficient to remark that abstraction or dissociation has +stages, that the simplest are accessible to the animal intelligence. If, +in the absence of words, the logic of concepts is forbidden it, there +yet remains the logic of images,[37] which is sufficient for slight +innovations. In a word, animals can invent according to the extent that +they can dissociate. + +In our opinion, if we may with any truthfulness attribute a creative +power to animals, we must seek it elsewhere. Generally speaking, we +attribute only a mediocre importance to a manifestation that might very +well be the proper form of animal fancy. It is purely motor, and +expresses itself through the various kinds of play. + +Although play may be as old as mankind, its psychology dates only from +the nineteenth century. We have already seen that there are three +theories concerning its nature--it is "expenditure of superfluous +activity," "a mending, restoring of strength, a recuperation," "an +apprenticeship, a preliminary exercise for the active functions of life +and for the development of our natural gifts."[38] The last position, +due to Groos, does not rule out the other two; it holds the first valid +for the young, the second for adults; but it comprehends both in a more +general explanation. + +Let us leave this doctrinal question in order to call attention to the +variety and richness of form of play in the animal world. In this +respect the aforementioned book of Groos is a rich mine of evidence to +which I would refer the reader. I limit myself to summing up his +classification. He distinguishes nine classes of play, viz.: (1) Those +that are at bottom experimental, consisting of trials at hazard without +immediate end, often giving the animal a certain knowledge of the +properties of the external world. This is the introduction to an +experimental physics, optics, and mechanics for the brood of animals. +(2) Movements or changes of place executed of their own accord--a very +general fact as is proven by the incessant movements of butterflies, +flies, birds, and even fishes, which often appear to play in the water +rather than to seek prey; the mad running of horses, dogs, etc., in free +space. (3) Mimicry of hunting, i.e., playing with a living or dead +prey: the dog and cat following moving objects, a ball, feather, etc. +(4) Mimic battles, teasing and fighting without anger. (5) Architectural +art, revealing itself especially in the building of nests: certain birds +ornament them with shining objects (stones, bits of glass), by a kind of +anticipation of the esthetic feeling. (6) Doll-play is universal in +mankind, whether civilized or savage. Groos believes he has found its +equivalent in certain animals. (7) Imitation through pleasure, so +familiar in monkeys (grimaces); singing-birds which counterfeit the +voices of a large number of beasts. (8) Curiosity, which is the only +mental play one meets in animals--the dog watching, from a wall or +window, what is going on in the street. (9) Love-plays, "which differ +from the others in that they are not mere exercises, but have in view a +real object." They have been well-known since Darwin's time, he +attributing to them an esthetic value which has been denied by Wallace, +Tylor, Lloyd Morgan, Wallaschek, and Groos. + +Let us recapitulate in thought the immense quantity of motor expressions +included in these nine categories and let us note that they have the +following characters in common: They are grouped in combinations that +are often new and unforeseen; they are not a repetition of daily life, +acts necessary for self-preservation. At one time the movements are +combined simultaneously (exhibition of beautiful colors), again (and +most often) successively (amorous parades, fights, flight, dancing, +emission of noises, sounds or songs); but, under one form or another, +there is _creation_, _invention_. Here, the imagination acts in its +purely motor character; it consists of a small number of images that +become translated into actions, and serve as a center for their +grouping; perhaps even the image itself is hardly conscious, so that all +is limited to a spontaneous production and a collection of motor +phenomena. + +It will doubtless be said that this form of imagination belongs to a +very shallow, poor psychology. It cannot be otherwise. It is necessary +that imaginative production be found reduced to its simplest expression +in animals, and the motor form must be its special characteristic mark. +It cannot have any others for the following reasons: incapacity for the +work that necessarily precedes abstraction or dissociation, breaking +into bits the data of experience, making them raw material for the +future construction; lack of images, and especially fewness of possible +combinations of images. This last point is proven alike from the data of +animal psychology and of comparative anatomy. We know that the nervous +elements in the brain serving as connections between sensory +regions--whether one conceive of them as centers (Flechsig), or as +bundles of commisural fibers (Meynert, Wernicke)--are hardly outlined in +the lower mammalia and attain only a mediocre development in the higher +forms. + +By way of corroboration of the foregoing, let us compare the higher +animals with young children: this comparison is not based on a few +far-fetched analogies, but in a thorough resemblance in nature. Man, +during the first years of his life, has a brain but slightly +differentiated, especially as regards connections, a very poor supply of +images, a very weak capacity for abstraction. His intellectual +development is much inferior to that of reflex, instinctive, impulsive, +and imitative movements. In consequence of this predominance of the +motor system, the simple and imperfect images, in children as in +animals, tend to be immediately changed into movements. Even most of +their inventions in play are greatly inferior to those enumerated above +under nine distinct heads. + +A serious argument in favor of the prevalence of imagination of the +motor type in the child is furnished by the principal part taken by +movements in infantile insanity: a remark made by many alienists. The +first stage of this madness, they say, is found in the convulsions that +are not merely a physical ailment, but "a muscular delirium." The +disturbance of the automatic and instinctive functions of the child is +so often associated with muscular disturbances that at this age the +mental disorders correspond to the motor ganglionic centers situated +below those parts that later assume the labor of analysis and of +imagination. The disturbances are in the primary centers of organization +and according to the symptoms lack those analytic or constructive +qualities, those ideal forms, that we find in adult insanity. If we +descend to the lowest stage of human life--to the baby--we see that +insanity consists almost entirely of the activity of a muscular group +acting on external objects. The insane baby bites, kicks, and these +symptoms are the external measure of the degree of its madness.[39] Has +not chorea itself been called a muscular insanity? + +Doubtless, there likewise exists in the child a sensorial madness +(illusions, hallucinations); but by reason of its feeble intellectual +development the delirium causes a disorder of movements rather than of +images; its insane imagination is above all a motor insanity. + +To hold that the creative imagination belonging to animals consists of +new combinations of movements is certainly an hypothesis. Nevertheless, +I do not believe that it is merely a mental form without foundation, if +we take into account the foregoing facts. I consider it rather as a +point in favor of the motor theory of invention. It is a singular +instance in which the original form of creation is shown bare. If we +wanted to discover it, it would be necessary to seek it where it is +reduced to the greatest simplicity--in the animal world. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[35] Chapter X. + +[36] _Op. cit._, Appendix. + +[37] For a more detailed study of this subject, the reader is +referred to the author's _Evolution of General Ideas_ (English +trans., Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago), chapter I, section I. + +[38] A rather extended study of the subject by H. A. Carr will be +found in the _Investigations of the Department of Psychology and +Education of the University of Colorado_, vol. I, Number 2, 1902. +The late Professor Arthur Allin devoted much time to the +investigation of play. See his brief article entitled "Play" in the +_University of Colorado Studies_, vol. I, 1902, pp. 58-73. (Tr.) + +[39] Hack Tuke, "Insanity of Children," in _Dictionary of +Psychological Medicine_. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION IN THE CHILD + + +At what age, in what form, under what conditions does the creative +imagination make its appearance? It is impossible to answer this +question, which, moreover, has no justification. For the creative +imagination develops little by little out of pure reproduction by an +evolutionary process, not by sudden eruption. Nevertheless, its +evolution is very slow on account of causes both organic and +psychological. + +We could not dwell long on the organic causes without falling into +tiresome repetitions. The new-born infant is a spinal being, with an +unformed diffluent brain, composed largely of water. Reflex life itself +is not complete in him, and the cortico-motor system only hinted at; the +sensory centers are undifferentiated, the associational systems remain +isolated for a long time after birth. We have given above Flechsig's +observation on this point. + +The psychological causes reduce themselves to the necessity for a +consolidation of the primary and secondary operations of the mind, +without which the creative imagination cannot take form. To be precise, +we might distinguish, as does Baldwin, four epochs in the mental +development of the child: (1) affective (rudimentary sensory processes, +pleasures and pains, simple motor adaptations); (2) and (3) objective, +in which the author establishes two grades, (a) appearance of special +senses, of memory, instincts primarily defensive, and imitation; (b) +complex memory, complicated movements, offensive activities, rudimentary +will; (4) subjective or final (conscious thought, constitutive will, +ideal emotions). If we accept this scheme as approximately correct, the +_moment_ of imagination must be assigned to the third period (the second +stage of the objective epoch) which fulfills all the sufficient and +necessary conditions for its origination and for its rise above pure +reproduction. + +Whatever the propitious age may be, the study of the child-imagination +is not without difficulties. In order to enter into the child-mind, we +must become like a child; as it is, we are limited to an interpretation +of it in terms of the adult, with much false interpretation possible, +agreeing too much or too little with the facts. Furthermore, the +children studied live and grow up in a civilized environment. The result +is that the development of their imagination is rarely unhampered and +complete; for as soon as their fancy passes the middle level, the +rationalizing education of parents and teachers is eager to master and +control it. In truth it gives its full measure and reveals itself in +the fulness of growth only among primitive peoples. With us it is +checked in its flight by an antagonistic power, which treats it as a +harbinger of insanity. Finally, children are not equally well-suited for +this study; we must make a distinction between the imaginative and +non-imaginative, and the latter should be eliminated. + +When we have thus chosen suitable subjects, observation shows from the +start sufficiently distinct varieties, different orientations of the +imagination depending on intellectual causes, such as the predominance +of visual or acoustic or tactile-motor images making for mechanical +invention; or dependent on emotional causes, that is, of character, +according as the latter is timid, joyous, exuberant, retired, healthy, +sickly, etc. + +If we now attempt to follow the development of the child-imagination, we +may distinguish four principal stages, without assigning them, +otherwise, a rigorous chronological order. + +1. The first stage consists of the passage from passive to creative +imagination. Its history would be long were we to include all the hybrid +forms that are made up partly of memories, partly of new groupings, +being at the same time repetition and construction. Even in the adult, +they are very frequent. I know a person who is always afraid of being +smothered, and for this reason urgently asks that in his coffin his +shirt be not tight at the neck: this odd prepossession of the mind +belongs neither to memory nor to imagination. This particular case +illustrates in a very clear form the nature of the first flights of the +mind attempting to exercise its imaginative powers. Without enumerating +other facts of this kind, it is more desirable to follow the +imagination's development, limiting ourselves to two forms of the +psychic life--perception and illusion. The necessary presence of the +image in these two forms has been so often proven by contemporary +psychology that a few words to recall this to mind will be sufficient. + +There seems to be a radical difference between perception, which seizes +reality, and imagination. Nevertheless, it is generally admitted that in +order to rise above sensation to perception, there must be a synthesis +of images. To put it more simply, two elements are required--one, coming +from without, the physiological stimulus acting on the nerves and the +sensory centers, which becomes translated in consciousness through the +vague state that goes by the name "sensation"; the other, coming from +within, adds to the sensations present appropriate images, remnants of +former experiences. So that perception requires an apprenticeship; we +must feel, then imperfectly perceive, in order to finally perceive well. +The sensory datum is only a fraction of the total fact; and in the +operation we call "perceiving," that is, apprehending an object +directly, a part only of the object is represented. + +This, however, does not go beyond reproductive imagination. The decisive +step is taken in illusion. We know that illusion has as a basis and +support a modification of the external senses which are metamorphosed, +amplified by an immediate construction of the mind: a branch of a tree +becomes a serpent, a distant noise seems the music of an orchestra. +Illusion has as broad a field as perception, since there is no +perception but may undergo this erroneous transformation, and it is +produced by the same mechanism, but with interchange of the two terms. +In perception, the chief element is the sensory, and the representative +element is secondary; in illusion, we have just the opposite condition: +what one takes as perceived is merely imagined--the imagination assumes +the principal role. Illusion is the type of the transitional forms, of +the mixed cases, that consist of constructions made up of memories, +without being, in the strict sense, creations. + +2. The creative imagination asserts itself with its peculiar +characteristics only in the second stage, in the form of animism or the +attributing of life to everything. This turn of the mind is already +known to us, though mentioned only incidentally. As the state of the +child's mind at that period resembles that which in primitive man +creates myths, we shall return to it in the next chapter. Works on +psychology abound in facts demonstrating that this primitive tendency to +attribute life and even personality to everything is a necessary phase +that the mind must undergo--long or short in duration, rich or poor in +inventions, according to the level of the child's imagination. His +attitude towards his dolls is the common example of this state, and +also the best example, because it is universal, being found in all +countries without exception, among all races of men. It is needless to +pile up facts on an uncontroverted point.[40] Two will suffice; I choose +them on account of their extravagance, which shows that at this +particular moment animism, in certain minds, can dare anything. "One +little fellow, aged one year eight months, conceived a special fondness +for the letter W, addressing it thus: 'Dear old boy W.' Another little +boy well on in his fourth year, when tracing a letter L, happened to +slip, so that the horizontal limb formed an angle, thus: + + | + | + +---+ + | + +He instantly saw the resemblance to the sedentary human form, and said: +'Oh, he's sitting down.' Similarly, when he made an F turn the wrong way +and then put the correct form to the left, thus, + + +--- ---+ + | | + +-- --+ + | | + +he exclaimed, 'They're talking together!'" One of Sully's correspondents +says: "I had the habit of attributing intelligence not only to all +living creatures ... but even to stones and manufactured articles. I +used to feel how dull it must be for the pebbles in the causeway to lie +still and only see what was round about. When I walked out with a basket +for putting flowers in, I used sometimes to pick up a pebble or two and +carry them out to have a change." + +Let us stop a moment in order to try to determine the nature of this +strange mental state, all the more as we shall meet it again in +primitive man, and since it presents the creative imagination at its +beginning. + +a. The first element is a fixed idea, or rather, an image, or group of +images, that takes possession of consciousness to the exclusion of +everything else:--it is the analogue of the state of suggestion in the +hypnotized subject, with this sole difference--that the suggestion does +not come from without, from another, but from the child itself--it is +auto-suggestion. The stick that the child holds between his legs becomes +for him an imaginary steed. The poverty of his mental development makes +all the easier this contraction of the field of his consciousness, which +assures the supremacy of the image. + +b. This has as its basis a reality that it includes. This is an +important detail to note, because this reality, however tiny, gives +objectivity to the imaginary creation and incorporates it with the +external world. The mechanism is like that which produces illusion, but +with a stable character excluding correction. The child transforms a bit +of wood or paper into another self, because he perceives only the +phantom he has created; that is, the images, not the material exciting +them, haunt his brain. + +c. Lastly, this creative power investing the image with all its +attributes of real existence is derived from a fundamental fact--the +state of belief, i.e., adherence of the mind founded on purely +subjective conditions. It does not come within my province to treat +incidentally such a large question. Neglected by the older physiology, +whose faculty-method inclined it toward this omission, belief or faith +has recently become the object of numerous studies.[41] I necessarily +limit myself to remarking that but for this psychic state, the nature of +the imagination is totally incomprehensible. The peculiarity of the +imagination is the production of a reality of human origin, and it +succeeds therein only because of the faith accompanying the image. + +Representation and belief are not completely separated; it is the nature +of the image to appear at first as a real object. This psychological +truth, though proven through observation, has made itself acceptable +only with great difficulty. It has had to struggle on the one hand +against the prejudices of common-sense for which imagination is +synonymous with sham and vain appearance and opposed to the real as +non-being to being; on the other hand, against a doctrine of the +logicians who maintain that the idea is at first merely conceived with +no affirmation of existence or non-existence (_apprehensio simplex_). +This position, legitimate in logic, which is an abstract science, is +altogether unacceptable in psychology, a concrete science. The +psychological viewpoint giving the true nature of the image has +prevailed little by little. Spinoza already asserts "that +representations considered by themselves contain no errors," and he +"denies that it is possible to perceive [represent] without affirming." +More explicitly, Hume assigns belief to our subjective dispositions: +Belief does not depend on the nature of the idea, but on the manner in +which we conceive it. Existence is not a quality added to it by us; it +is founded on habit and is irresistible. The difference between fiction +and belief consists of a feeling added to the latter but not to the +former. Dugald Stewart treats the question purely as a psychologist +following the experimental method. He enumerates very many facts whence +he concludes that imagination is always accompanied by an act of belief, +but for which fact the more vivid the image, the less one would believe +it; but just the contrary happens--the strong representation commands +persuasion like sensation itself. Finally, Taine treats the subject +methodically, by studying the nature of the image and its primitive +character of hallucination.[42] At present, I think, there is no +psychologist who does not regard as proven that the image, when it +enters consciousness, has two moments. During the first, it is +objective, appearing as a full and complete reality; during the second, +which is definitive, it is deprived of its objectivity, reduced to a +completely internal event, through the effect of other states of +consciousness which oppose and finally annihilate its objective +character. There is an affirmation, then negation; impulse, then +inhibition. + +Faith, being only a mode of existence, an attitude of the mind, owes its +creative and vivifying power to general dispositions of our +constitution. Besides the intellectual element which is its content, its +material--the thing affirmed or denied--there are tendencies and other +affective factors (desire, fear, love, etc.) giving the image its +intensity, and assuring it success in the struggle against other states +of consciousness. There are active faculties that we sometimes designate +by the name "will," understanding by the term, as James says, not only +deliberate volition, but all the factors of belief (hope, fear, +passions, prejudices, sectarian feeling, and so forth),[43] and this has +justly given rise to the truthful saying that the test of belief is +action.[44] This explains how in love, religion, in the moral life, in +politics, and elsewhere, belief can withstand the logical assaults of +the rationalizing intelligence--its power is found everywhere. It lasts +as long as the mind waits and consents; but, as soon as these affective +and active dispositions disappear in life's experience, faith falls with +them, leaving in its place a formless content, an empty and dead +representation. + +After this, is it necessary to remark that belief depends peculiarly on +the motor elements of our organization and not on the intellectual? As +there is no imagination without belief, nor belief without imagination, +we return by another route to the thesis supported in the first part of +this essay, that creative activity depends on the motor nature of +images. + +Insofar as concerns the special case of the child, the first of the two +moments (the affirming) that the image undergoes in consciousness is all +in all for him, the second (the rectifying) is nothing: there is +hypertrophy of one, atrophy of the other. For the adult the contrary is +true--in many cases, indeed, in consequence of experience and habit, the +first moment, wherein the image should be affirmed as a reality, is only +virtual, is literally atrophied. We must, however, remark that this +applies only partially to the ignorant and even less to the savage. + +We might, nevertheless, ask ourselves if the child's belief in his +phantoms is complete, entire, absolute, unreserved. Is the stick that he +bestrides perfectly identified with a horse? Was Sully's child, that +showed its doll a series of engravings to choose from, completely +deceived? It seems that we must rather admit an intermittence, an +alteration between affirmation and negation. On the one hand, the +skeptical attitude of those who laugh at it displeases the child, who is +like a devout believer whose faith is being broken down. On the other +hand, doubt must indeed arise in him from time to time, for without +this, rectification could never occur--one belief opposes the other or +drives it away. This second work proceeds little by little, but then, +under this form, imagination retreats. + +3. The third stage is that of play, which, in chronological order, +coincides with the one just preceding. As a form of creation it is +already known to us, but in passing from animals to children, it grows +in complexity and becomes intellectualized. It is no longer a simple +combination of images. + +Play serves two ends--for experimenting: as such it is an introduction +to knowledge, gives certain vague notions concerning the nature of +things; for creating: this is its principal function. + +The human child, like the animal, expends itself in movements, forms +associations new to it, simulates defence, flight, attack; but the child +soon passes beyond this lower stage, in order to construct by means of +images (ideally). He begins by imitating: this is a physiological +necessity, reasons for which we shall give later (see chapter iv. +_infra_). He constructs houses, boats, gives himself up to large plans; +but he imitates most in his own person and acts, making himself in turn +soldier, sailor, robber, merchant, coachman, etc. + +To the period of imitation succeed more serious attempts--he acts with a +"spirit of mastery," he is possessed by his idea which he tends to +realize. The personal character of creation is shown in that he is +really interested only in a work that emanates from himself and of +which he feels himself the cause. B. Perez relates that he wanted to +give a lesson to his nephew, aged three and a half years, whose +inventions seemed to him very poor. Perez scratched in the sand a trench +resembling a river, planted little branches on both banks, and had water +flow through it; put a bridge across, and launched boats. At each new +act the child would remain cool, his admiration would always have to be +waited for. Out of patience, he remarked shortly that "this isn't at all +entertaining." The author adds: "I believed it useless to persist, and I +trampled under foot, laughing at myself, my awkward attempt at a +childish construction."[45] "I had already read it in many a book, but +this time I had learned from experience that the free initiative of +children is always superior to the imitations we pretend to make for +them. In addition, this experience and others like it have taught me +that their creative force is much weaker than has been said." + +4. At the fourth stage appears romantic invention, which requires a more +refined culture, being a purely internal, wholly imaginative (i.e., +cast in images) creation. It begins at about three or four years of age. +We know the taste of imaginative children for stories and legends, which +they have repeated to them until surfeited: in this respect they +resemble semi-civilized people, who listen greedily to rhapsodies for +hours at a time, experiencing all the emotions appropriate to the +incidents of the tale. This is the prelude to creation, a semi-passive, +semi-active state, an apprentice period, which will permit them to +create in their own turn. Thus the first attempts are made with +reminiscences, and imitated rather than created. + +Of this we find numerous examples in the special works. A child of three +and a half saw a lame man going along a road, and exclaimed: "Look at +that poor ole man, mamma, he has dot [got] a bad leg." Then the romance +begins: He was on a high horse; he fell on a rock, struck his poor leg; +he will have to get some powder to heal it, etc. Sometimes the invention +is less realistic. A child of three often longed to live like a fish in +the water, or like a star in the sky. Another, aged five years nine +months, having found a hollow rock, invented a fairy story: the hole was +a beautiful hall inhabited by brilliant mysterious personages, etc.[46] + +This form of imagination is not as common as the others. It belongs to +those whom nature has well endowed. It forecasts a development of mind +above the average. It may even be the sign of an inborn vocation and +indicate in what direction the creative activity will be orientated. + +Let us briefly recall the creative role of the imagination in language, +through the intervening of a factor already studied--thinking by +analogy, an abundant source of often picturesque metaphors. A child +called the cork of a bottle "door;" a small coin was called by a little +American a "baby dollar;" another, seeing the dew on the grass, said, +"The grass is crying." + +The extension of the meaning of words has been studied by Taine, Darwin, +Preyer, and others. They have shown that its psychological mechanism +depends sometimes on the perception of resemblance, again on association +by contiguity, processes that appear and intermingle in an unforeseen +manner. Thus, a child applies the word "mambro" at first to his nurse, +then to a sewing machine that she uses, then by analogy to an organ that +he sees on the street adorned with a monkey, then to his toys +representing animals.[47] We have elsewhere given more similar cases, +where we perceive the fundamental difference between thought by imagery +and rational thought. + +To conclude: At this period the imagination is the master-faculty and +the highest form of intellectual development. It works in two +directions, one principal--it creates plays, invents romances, and +extends language; the other secondary--it contains a germ of thought and +ventures a fanciful explanation of the world which can not yet be +conceived according to abstract notions and laws. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[40] One will find a large number of examples in Sully's work, +_Studies of Childhood_, Chapter ii, entitled "The Age of +Imagination." Most of the observations given in the present chapter +have been borrowed from this author. + +[41] Apropos of this subject compare especially the recent studies +by William James, _Varieties of Religious Experience_. (Tr.) + +[42] Spinoza, _Ethics_, II, 49, _Scholium_; Hume, _Human +Understanding_, Part III, Section VII ff.; Dugald Stewart, _Elements +of the Philosophy of the Human Mind_, Vol. I, Ch. III; Taine, _On +Intelligence_, Part II. + +[43] James, _The Will to Believe and Other Essays_, p. 10. + +[44] Payot, _De la croyance_, 139 ff. + +[45] B. Perez, _Les trois premieres annees de l'enfant_, p. 323. + +[46] Sully, _op. cit._, pp. 59-61. Compayre, _L'evolution +intellectuelle et morale de l'enfant_, p. 145. + +(Some time ago the writer was riding on a train, when the engine, +for some reason or other, began to slow up, jerking, puffing, almost +groaning, until it finally came to a full stop. The groaning +continued. A little girl of about three called to her mother, +"Too-too sick, too-too sick," and when finally the train started on +again, the child was overjoyed that "too-too" was well again. (Tr.)) + +[47] Sully, _op. cit._, p. 164. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +PRIMITIVE MAN AND THE CREATION OF MYTHS + + +We come now to a unique period in the history of the development of the +imagination--its golden age. In primitive man, still confined in +savagery or just starting toward civilization, it reaches its full bloom +in the creation of myths; and we are rightly astonished that +psychologists, obstinately attached to esthetics, have neglected such an +important form of activity, one so rich in information concerning the +creative imagination. Where, indeed, find more favorable conditions for +knowing it? + +Man, prior to civilization, is a purely imaginative being; that is, the +imagination marks the summit of his intellectual development. He does +not go beyond this stage, but it is no longer an enigma as in animals, +nor a transitory phase as in the civilized child who rapidly advances to +the age of reason; it is a fixed state, permanent and lasting throughout +life.[48] It is there revealed to us in its entire spontaneity: it has +free rein; it can create without imitation or tradition; it is not +imprisoned in any conventional form; it is sovereign. As primitive man +has knowledge neither of nature nor of its laws, he does not hesitate to +embody the most senseless imaginings flitting through his brain. The +world is not, for him, a totality of phenomena subject to laws, and +nothing limits or hinders him. + +This working of the pure imagination, left to itself and unadulterated +by the intrusion and tyranny of rational elements, becomes translated +into one form--the creation of myths; an anonymous, unconscious work, +which, as long as its rule lasts, is sufficient in every way, +comprehends everything--religion, poetry, history, science, philosophy, +law. + +Myths have the advantage of being the incarnation of pure imagination, +and, moreover, they permit psychologists to study them objectively. +Thanks to the labors of the nineteenth century, they offer an almost +inexhaustible content. While past ages forgot, misunderstood, +disfigured, and often despised myths as aberrations of the human mind, +as unworthy of an hour's attention, it is no longer necessary in our +time to show their interest and importance, even for psychology, which, +however, has not as yet drawn all the benefit possible from them. + +But before commencing the psychological study of the genesis and +formation of myths considered as an objective emanation of the creative +imagination, we must briefly summarize the hypotheses at present offered +for their origin. We find two principal ones--the one, etymological, +genealogical, or linguistic; the other, ethno-psychological, or +anthropological.[49] + +The first, whose principal though not sole champion is Max Mueller, holds +that myths are the result of a disease of language--words become things, +"nomina numina." This transformation is the effect of two principal +linguistic causes--(a) Polynomy; several words for one thing. Thus the +sun is designated by more than twenty names in the Vedas; Apollo, +Phaethon, Hercules are three personifications of the sun; _Varouna_ +(night) and _Yama_ (death) express at first the same conception, and +have become two distinct deities. In short, every word tends to become +an entity having its attributes and its legends. (b) Homonomy, a single +word for several things. The same adjective, "shining," refers to the +sun, a fountain, spring, etc. This is another source of confusion. Let +us also add metaphors taken literally, plays upon words, wrong +construction, etc. + +The opponents of this doctrine maintain that in the formation of myths, +words represent scarcely five per cent. Whatever may be the worth of +this assertion, the purely philological explanation remains without +value for psychology: it is neither true nor false--it does not solve +the question; it merely avoids it. The word is only an occasion, a +vehicle; without the working of the mind exciting it, nothing would +change. Moreover, Max Mueller himself has recently recognized this.[50] + +The anthropological theory, much more general than the foregoing, +penetrates further to psychological origins--it leads us to the first +advances of the human mind. It regards the myth not as an accident of +primitive life, but as a natural function, a mode of activity proper to +man during a certain period of his development. Later, the mythic +creations seem absurd, often immoral, because they are survivals of a +distant epoch, cherished and consecrated through tradition, habits, and +respect for antiquity. According to the definition that seems to me best +adapted for psychology, the myth is "the psychological objectification +of man in all the phenomena that he can perceive."[51] It is a +humanization of nature according to processes peculiar to the +imagination. + +Are these two views irreconcilable? It does not seem so to me, provided +we accept the first as only a partial explanation. In any event, both +schools agree on one point important for us--that the material for myths +is furnished by the observation of natural phenomena, including the +great events of human life: birth, sickness, death, etc. This is the +objective factor. The creation of myths has its explanation in the +nature of human imagination--this is the subjective factor. We can not +deny that most works on mythology have a very decided tendency to give +the greater importance to the first factor; in which respect they need a +little psychology. The periodic returns of the dawn, the sun, the moon +and stars, winds and storms, have their effect also, we may suppose, on +monkeys, elephants, and other animals supposedly the most intelligent. +Have they inspired myths? Just the opposite: "the surprising monotony of +the ideas that the various races have made final causes of phenomena, of +the origin and destiny of man, whence it results that the numberless +myths are reduced to a very small number of types,"[52] shows that it is +the human imagination that takes the principal part and that it is on +the whole perhaps not so rich as we are pleased to say--that it is even +very poor, compared to the fecundity of nature. + +Let us now study the psychology of this creative activity, reducing it +to these two questions: How are myths formed? What line does their +evolution follow? + + +I + +The psychology of the origin of the myth, of the work that causes its +rise, may theoretically, and for the sake of facilitating analysis, be +regarded as two principal moments--that of creation proper, and that of +romantic invention. + +a. The moment of creation presupposes two inseparable operations which, +however, we have to describe separately. The first consists of +attributing life to all things, the second of assigning qualities to all +things. + +Animating everything, that is attributing life and action to everything, +representing everything to one's self as living and acting--even +mountains, rocks, and other objects (seemingly) incapable of movement. +Of this inborn and irresistible tendency there are so many facts in +proof that an enumeration is needless: it is the rule. The evidence +gathered by ethnologists, mythologists, and travelers fills large +volumes. This state of mind does not particularly belong to long-past +ages. It is still in existence, it is contemporary, and if we would see +it with our own eyes it is not at all necessary to plunge into virgin +countries, for there are frequent reversions even in civilized lands. On +the whole, says Tylor, it must be regarded as conceded that to the lower +races of humanity the sun and stars, the trees and rivers, the winds and +clouds, become animated creatures living like men and beasts, +fulfilling their special function in creation--or rather that what the +human eye can reach is only the instrument or the matter of which some +gigantic being, like a man, hidden behind the visible things, makes use. +The grounds on which such ideas are based cannot be regarded as less +than a poetic fancy or an ill-understood metaphor; they depend on a vast +philosophy of nature, certainly rude and primitive, but coherent and +serious. + +The second operation of the mind, inseparable, as we have said, from the +first, attributes to these imaginary beings various qualities, but all +important to man. They are good or bad, useful or hurtful, weak or +powerful, kind or cruel. One remains stupefied before the swarming of +these numberless genii whom no natural phenomenon, no act of life, no +form of sickness escapes, and these beliefs remain unbroken even among +the tribes that are in contact with old civilizations.[53] Primitive man +lives and moves among the ceaseless phantoms of his own imagination.[54] + +Lastly, the psychological mechanism of the creative moment is very +simple. It depends on a single factor previously studied--thinking by +analogy. It is a matter first of all--and this is important--of +conceiving beings analogous to ourselves, cast in our mould, cut after +our pattern; that is, feeling and acting; then qualifying them and +determining them according to the attributes of our own nature. But the +logic of images, very different from that of reason, concludes an +objective resemblance; it regards as alike, what seem alike; it +attributes to an internal linking of images, the validity of an +objective connection between things. Whence arises the discord between +the imagined world and the world of reality. "Analogies that for us are +only fancies were for the man of past ages real" (Tylor). + +b. In the genesis of myths, the second moment is that of fanciful +invention. Entities take form; they have a history and adventures: they +become the stuff for a romance. People of poor and dry imagination do +not reach the second period. Thus, the religion of the Romans peopled +the universe with an innumerable quantity of genii. No object, no act, +no detail, but had its own presiding genius. There was one for +germinating grain, for sprouting grain, for grain in flower, for +blighted grain; for the door, its hinges, its lock, etc. There was a +myriad of misty, formless entities. This is animism arrested at its +first stage; abstraction has killed imagination. + +Who created those legends and tales of adventure constituting the +subject-matter of mythology? Probably inspired individuals, priests or +prophets. They came perhaps from dreams, hallucinations, insane +attacks--they are derived from several sources. Whatever their origin, +they are the work of imaginative minds _par excellence_ (we shall study +them later) who, confronted with any event whatever, must, because of +their nature, construct a romance. + +Besides analogy, this imaginative creation has as its principal source +the associational form already described under the name "constellation." +We know that it is based on the fact that, in certain cases, the +arousing of an image-group is the result of a tendency prevailing at a +given instant over several that are possible. This operation has already +been expounded theoretically with individual examples in support.[55] +But in order to gauge its importance, we must see it act in large +masses. Myths allow us to do this. Ordinarily they have been studied in +their historical development according to their geographical +distribution or ethnic character. If we proceed otherwise, if we +consider only their content--i.e., the very few themes upon which the +human imagination has labored, such as celestial phenomena, terrestrial +disturbances, floods, the origin of the universe, of man, etc.--we are +surprised at the wonderful richness of variety. What diversity in the +solar myths, or those of creation, of fire, of water! These variations +are due to multiple causes, which have orientated the imagination now in +one direction, now in another. Let us mention the principal ones: Racial +characteristics--whether the imagination is clear or mobile, poor or +exuberant; the manner of living--totally savage, or on a level of +civilization; the physical environment--external nature cannot be +reflected in the brain of a Hindoo in the same way as in that of a +Scandinavian; and lastly, that assemblage of considerable and unexpected +causes grouped under the term "chance." + +The variable combinations of these different factors, with the +predominance of one or the other, explain the multiplicity of the +imaginative conceptions of the world, in contrast to the unity and +simplicity of scientific conceptions. + + +II + +The form of imagination now occupying our attention by reason of its +non-individual, anonymous, collective character, attains a long +development that we may follow in its successive phases of ascent, +climax, and decline. To begin with, is it necessarily inherent in the +human mind? Are there races or groups of men totally devoid of myths? +which is a slightly different question from that usually asked, "Are +there tribes totally devoid of religious thoughts?" Although it is very +doubtful that there are such now, it is probable that there were in the +beginning, when man had scarcely left the brute level--at least if we +agree with Vignoli[56] that we already find in the higher animals +embryonic forms of animism. + +In any event, mythic creation appears early. We can infer this from the +signs of puerility of certain legends. Savages who could not know +themselves--the Iroquois, the Australian aborigines, the natives of the +Andaman Islands--believed that the earth was at first sterile and dry, +all the water having been swallowed by a gigantic frog or toad which was +compelled, by queer stratagems, to regurgitate it. These are little +children's imaginings. Among the Hindoos the same myth takes the form of +an alluring epic--the dragon watching over the celestial waters, of +which he has taken possession, is wounded by Indra after a heroic +battle, and restores them to the earth. + +Cosmogonies, Lang remarks, furnish a good example of the development of +myths; it is possible to mark out stages and rounds according to the +degree of culture and intelligence. The natives of Oceania believe that +the world was created and organized by spiders, grasshoppers, and various +birds. More advanced peoples regard powerful animals as gods in disguise +(such are certain Mexican divinities). Later, all trace of animal worship +disappears, and the character of the myth is purely anthropomorphic.[57] +Kuehn, in a special work, has shown how the successive stages of social +evolution express themselves in the successive stages of mythology--myths +of cannibals, of hunters, of herders, land-tillers, sailors. Speaking of +pure savagery, Max Mueller[58] admits at least two periods--pan-Aryan and +Indo-Iranian--prior to the Vedic period. In the course of this slow +evolution the work of the imagination passes little by little from +infancy, becomes more and more complex, subtle and refined. + +In the Aryan race, the Vedic epoch, despite its sacerdotal ritualism, is +considered as the period _par excellence_ of mythic efflorescence. "The +myth," says Taine, "is not here (in the Vedas) a disguise, but an +expression; no language is more true and more supple: it permits a +glimpse of, or rather causes us to discern, the forms of mist, the +movements of the air, change of seasons, all the accidents of sky, fire, +storm: external nature has never found a mode of thought so graceful and +flexible for reflecting itself thereby in all the inexhaustible variety +of her appearances. However changeable nature may be, the imagination is +equally so."[59] It animates everything--not only fire in general, +_Agni_, but also the seven forms of flame, the wood that lights it, the +ten fingers of the sacrificing priest, the prayer itself, and even the +railing surrounding the altar. This is one example among many others. +The partisans of the linguistic theory have been able to maintain that +at this moment every word is a myth, because every word is a name +designating a quality or an act, transformed by the imagination into +substance. Max Mueller has translated a page of Hesiod, substituting the +analytic, abstract, rational language of our time for the image-making +names. Immediately, all the mythical material vanishes. Thus, "Selene +kisses the sleeping Endymion" becomes the dry formula, "It is night." +The most skilled linguists often declare themselves unable to change the +pliant tongue of the imaginative age into our algebraic idioms.[60] +Thought by imagery cannot remain itself and at the same time take on a +rational dress. + +The mental state that marks the zenith of the free development of the +imagination, is at present met with only in mystics and in some poets. +Language has, however, preserved numerous vestiges of it in current +expressions, the mythic signification of which has been lost--the sun +rises, the sea is treacherous, the wind is mad, the earth is thirsty, +etc. + +To this triumphant period there succeeds among the races that have made +progress in evolution, i.e., that have been able to rise above the age +of (pure) imagination, the period of waning, of regression, of decline. +In order to understand it and perceive the how and why of it, let us +first note that myths are reducible to two great categories: + +a. The explicative myths, arising from utility, from the necessity of +knowing. _These undergo a radical transformation._ + +b. The non-explicative myths, resulting from a need of luxury, from a +pure desire to create: these undergo only a _partial_ transformation. + +Let us follow them in the accomplishment of their destinies. + +a. The myths of the first class, answering the various needs of knowing +in order afterwards to act, are much the more numerous.... Is primitive +man by nature curious? The question has been variously answered; thus, +Tylor says yes; Spencer, no.[61] The affirmative and negative answers +are not, perhaps, irreconcilable, if we take account of the differences +in races. Taking it generally, it is hard to believe that he is not +curious--he holds his life at that price. He is in the presence of the +universe just as we are when confronted with an unknown animal or fruit. +Is it useful or hurtful? He has all the more need for a conception of +the world since he feels himself dependent on everything. While our +subordination as regards nature is limited by the knowledge of her laws, +he is on account of his animism in a position similar to ours before an +assembly of persons whom we have to approach or avoid, conciliate or +yield to. It is necessary that he be _practically_ curious--that is +indispensable for his preservation. There has been alleged the +indifference of primitive man to the complicated engines of civilization +(a steamboat, a watch, etc.). This shows, not lack of curiosity, but +absence of intelligence or interest for what he does not consider +immediately useful for his needs. + +His conception of the world is a product of the imagination, because no +other is possible for him. The problem is imperatively set, he solves it +as best he can; the myth is a response to a host of theoretical and +practical needs. For him, the imaginative explanation takes the place of +the rational explanation which is yet unborn, and which for great +reasons can not arise--first, because the poverty of his experience, +limited to a small circle, engenders a multitude of erroneous +associations, which remain unbroken in the absence of other experiences +to contradict and shatter them; secondly, because of the extreme +weakness of his logic and especially of his conception of causality, +which most often reduces itself to a _post hoc, ergo propter hoc_. +Whence we have the thorough subjectivity of his interpretation of the +world.[62] In short, primitive man makes without exception or reserve, +and in terms of images, what science makes provisionally, with reserves, +and by means of concepts--namely, hypotheses. + +Thus, the explicative myths are as we see, an epitome of a practical +philosophy, proportioned to the requirements of the man of the earliest, +or slightly-cultured ages. Then comes the period of critical +transformation: a slow, progressive substitution of a rational +conception of the world for the imaginative conception. It results from +a work of _depersonification_ of the myth, which little by little loses +its subjective, anthropomorphic character in order to become all the +more objective, without ever succeeding therein completely. + +This transformation occurs thanks to two principal supports: methodical +and prolonged observation of phenomena, which suggests the objective +notion of stability and law, opposed to the caprices of animism +(example: the work of the ancient astronomers of the Orient); the +growing power of reflection and of logical rigor, at least in +well-endowed races. + +It does not concern the subject in hand to trace here the fortunes of +the old battle whereby the imagination, assailed by a rival power, loses +little by little its position and preponderance in the interpretation of +the world. A few remarks will suffice. + +To begin with, the myth is transformed into philosophic speculation, but +without total disappearance, as is seen in the mystic speculations of +the Pythagoreans, in the cosmology of Empedocles, ruled by two +human-like antitheses, Love and Hate. Even to Thales, an observing, +positive spirit that calculates eclipses, the world is full of +_daemons_, remains of primitive animism.[63] In Plato, even leaving out +his theory of Ideas, the employment of myth is not merely a playful +mannerism, but a real survival. + +This work of elimination, begun by the philosophers, is more firmly +established in the first attempts of pure science (the Alexandrian +mathematicians; naturalists like Aristotle; certain Greek physicians). +Nevertheless, we know how imaginary concepts remained alive in physics, +chemistry, biology, down to the sixteenth century; we know the bitter +struggle that the two following centuries witnessed against occult +qualities and loose methods. Even in our day, Stallo has been able to +propose to write a treatise "On Myth in Science." Without speaking at +this time of the hypotheses admitted as such and on account of their +usefulness, there yet remain in the sciences many latent signs of +primitive anthropomorphism. At the beginning of the nineteenth century +people believed in several "properties of matter" that we now regard as +merely modes of energy. But this latter notion, an expression of +permanence underneath the various manifestations of nature, is for +science only an abstract, symbolical formula: if we attempt to embody +it, to make it concrete and representable, then, whether we will or no, +it resolves itself into the feeling of muscular effort, that is, takes +on a human character. To produce no other examples, we see that so far +as concerns the last term of this slow regression, the imagination is +not yet completely annulled, although it may have had to recede +incessantly before a more solid and better armed rival. + +b. In addition to the explanatory myths, there are those having no claim +to be in this class, although they have perhaps been originally +suggested by some phenomenon of animate or inanimate nature. They are +much less numerous than the others, since they do not answer multiple +necessities of life. Such are the epic or heroic stories, popular tales, +romances (which are found as early as ancient Egypt): it is the first +appearance of that form of esthetic activity destined later to become +literature. Here, the mythic activity suffers only a superficial +metamorphosis--the essence is not changed. Literature is mythology +transformed and adapted to the variable conditions of civilization. If +this statement appear doubtful or disrespectful, we should note the +following. + +Historically, from myths wherein there figure at first only divine +personages, there arise the epics of the Hindoos, Greeks, Scandinavians, +etc., in which the gods and heroes are confounded, live in the same +world, on a level. Little by little the divine character is rubbed out; +the myth approaches the ordinary conditions of human life, until it +becomes the romantic novel, and finally the realistic story. + +Psychologically, the imaginative work that has at first created the gods +and superior beings before whom man bows because he has unconsciously +produced them, becomes more and more humanized as it becomes conscious; +but it cannot cease being a projection of the feelings, ideas, and +nature of man into the fictitious beings upon whom the belief of their +creator and of his hearers confers an illusory and fleeting existence. +The gods have become puppets whose master man feels himself, and whom he +treats as he likes. Throughout the manifold techniques, esthetics, +documentary collections, reproductions of the social life, the creative +activity of the earliest time remains at bottom unchanged. Literature is +a decadent and rationalized mythology. + + +III + +Does the mythic activity of ancient times still exist among civilized +peoples, unmodified as in literary creation, but in its pure form, as a +non-individual, collective, anonymous, unconscious, work? Yes; as the +popular imagination, when creating legends. In passing from natural +phenomena to historic events and persons, the constructive imagination +takes a slightly different position which we may characterize thus: +legend is to myth what illusion is to hallucination. + +The psychological mechanism is the same in both cases. Illusion and +legend are partial imaginations, hallucination and myth are total +imaginations. Illusion may vary in all shades between exact perception +and hallucination; legend can run all the way from exact history to pure +myth. The difference between illusion and hallucination is sometimes +imperceptible; the same is sometimes true of legend and myth. Sensory +illusion is produced by an addition of images changing perception; +legend is also produced by an addition of images changing the historic +personage or event. The only difference, then, is in the material used; +in one case, a datum of sense, a natural phenomenon; in the other, a +fact of history, a human event. + +The psychological genesis of legends being thus established in general, +what, according to the facts, are the unconscious processes that the +imagination employs for creating them? We may distinguish two principal +ones. + +The first process is a fusion or combination. The myth precedes the +fact; the historical personage or event enters into the mould of a +pre-existing myth. "It is necessary that the mythic form be fashioned +before one may pour into it, in a more or less fluid state, the historic +metal." Imagination had created a solar mythology long before it could +be incarnated by the Greeks in Hercules and his exploits. "There was +historically a Roland, perhaps even an Arthur, but the greater part of +the great deeds that the poetry of the Middle Ages attributes to them +had been accomplished long before by mythological heroes whose very +names had been forgotten."[64] At one time the man is completely hidden +by the myth and becomes absolutely legendary; again, he assumes only an +aureole that transfigures him. This is exactly what occurs in the +simpler phenomenon of sensory illusion: now the real (the perception) is +swamped by the images, is transformed, and the objective element reduced +to almost nothing; at another time, the objective element remains +master, but with numerous deformations. + +The second process is idealization, which can act conjointly with the +other. Popular imagination incarnates in a real man its ideal of +heroism, of loyalty, of love, of piety, or of cowardice, cruelty, +wickedness, and other abnormalities. The process is more complex. It +presupposes in addition to mythic creation a labor of abstraction, +through which a dominating characteristic of the historic personage is +chosen and everything else is suppressed, cast into oblivion: the ideal +becomes a center of attraction about which is formed the legend, the +romantic tale. Compare the Alexander, the Charlemagne, the Cid of the +Middle Age traditions to the character of history. + +Even much nearer to us, this process of extreme simplification--which +the law of mental inertia or of least effort is sufficient to +explain--always persists: Lucretia Borgia remains the type of +debauchery, Henry IV of good fellowship, etc. The protests of historians +and the documentary evidence that they produce avail nothing: the work +of the imagination resists everything. + +To conclude: We have just passed over a period of mental evolution +wherein the creative imagination reigns exclusively, explains +everything, is sufficient for everything. It has been said that the +imagination is "a temporary derangement." It seems so to us, although it +is often an effort toward wisdom, i.e., toward the comprehension of +things. It would be more correct to say, with Tylor, that it represents +a state intermediate between that of a man of our time, prosaic and +well-to-do, and that of a furious madman, or of a man in the delirium of +fever. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[48] Primitive man has been defined as "he for whom sensuous data +and images surpass in importance rational concepts." From this +standpoint, many contemporary poets, novelists, and artists would be +primitive. The mental state of the human individual is not enough +for such a determination; we must also take account of the +(comparative) simplicity of the social environment. + +[49] Let us mention the euhemeristic theory of Herbert Spencer, +taken up recently by Grant Allen (_The Evolution of the Idea of +God_, 1897), who brings down all religious and mythic concepts from +a single origin--the worship of the dead. + +[50] "When I tried to briefly characterize mythology in its inner +nature, I called it a disease of language rather than a disease of +thought. The expression was strange but intentionally so, meant to +arouse attention and to provoke opposition. For me, language and +thought are inseparable." _Nouvelles etudes de Mythologie_, p. 51. + +[51] Vignoli, _Mito e Scienza_, p. 27. + +[52] Marillier, Preface to the French translation of Andrew Lang's +_Myth, Ritual, and Religion_. + +[53] On this point consult a work very rich in information, W. +Crooke's book, _Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India_, +1897. + +[54] "The Indian traversing the Montana never feels himself alone. +Legions of beings accompany him. All of the nature to whom he owes +his soul speaks to him through the noise of the wind, in the roaring +of the waterfall. The insect like the bird--everything, even to the +bending twig wet with dew--for him has language, distinct +personality. The forest is alive in its depths, has caprices, +periods of anger; it avoids the thicket under the tread of the +huntsman, or again presses him more closely, drags him into infected +swamps, into closed bogs, where miserable goblins exhaust all their +witchcraft upon him, drink his blood by attaching their lips to the +wounds made by briers. The Indian knows all that; he knows those +dread genii by name." Monnier, _Des Andes au Para_, p. 300. + +[55] See Part I, Chapter IV. + +[56] _Op. cit._, pp. 23-24. + +[57] Lang, _op. cit._, I, 162, and _passim_. + +[58] Max Mueller, _op cit._, p. 12. + +[59] _Nouveaux Essais_, p. 320. + +[60] See Lang, _Myth, Ritual and Religion_, I, p. 234, a passage +from the _Rig-Veda_, with four very different translations by Max +Mueller, Wilson, Benfrey, and Langlois. + +[61] On curiosity as the beginning of knowledge, compare the +position held by Plato. (Tr.) + +[62] On this general subject consult the interesting though somewhat +general article by Professor John Dewey, "The Interpretation of the +Savage Mind," in the _Psychological Review_, May, 1903. The author +justly criticises the current description of savages in negative +terms, and contends that there is general misunderstanding of the +true nature of the savage and of his activities. (Tr.) + +[63] It is now well accepted that Thales cannot be regarded as +propounding a materialistic theory when he declares that everything +is derived from water; for with him, "water" stands not merely for +the substance that we call chemically "H2O," but for the "spirit +that is in water" as well--the water-spirit is the _Grundprincip_. +(Tr.) + +[64] Max Mueller, _op. cit._, 39, 47-48, 59-60. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE HIGHER FORMS OF INVENTION + + +We now pass from primitive to civilized man, from collective to +individual creation, the characters of which it remains for us to study +as we find them in great inventors who exhibit them on a large scale. +Fortunately, we may dismiss the treatment of the oft-discussed, +never-solved problem of the psychological nature of genius. As we have +already noted, there enter into its composition factors other than the +creative imagination, although the latter is not the least among them. +Besides, great men being exceptions, anomalies, or as the current +expression has it, "spontaneous variations," we may ask _in limine_ +whether their psychology is explicable by means of simple formulae, as +with the average man, or whether even monographs teach us no more +concerning their nature than general theories that are never applicable +to all cases. Taking genius, then, as synonymous with great inventor, +accepting it _de facto_ historically and psychologically, our task is +limited to the attempt to separate characters that seem, from +observation and experiment, to belong to it as peculiarly its own. + +Putting aside vague dissertations and dithyrambics in favor of theories +with a scientific tendency as to the nature of genius, we meet first the +one attributing to it a pathological origin. Hinted at in antiquity +(Aristotle, Seneca, etc.), suggested in the oft-expressed comparison +between inspiration and insanity, it has reached, as we know--through +timid, reserved, and partial statements (Lelut)--its complete expression +in the famous formula of Moreau de Tours, "Genius is a neurosis." + +Neuropathy was for him the exaggeration of vital properties and +consequently the most favorable condition for the hatching of works of +genius. Later, Lombroso, in a book teeming with doubtful or manifestly +false evidence, finding his predecessor's theory too vague, attempts to +give it more precision by substituting for neurosis in general a +specific neurosis--larvated epilepsy. Alienists, far from eagerly +accepting this view, have set themselves to combat it and to maintain +that Lombroso has compromised everything in wanting to make the term too +precise. There are several possible hypotheses, they say: either the +neuropathic state is the direct, immediate cause of which the higher +faculties of genius are effects; or, the intellectual superiority, +through the excessive labor and excitation it involves, causes +neuropathic disturbances; or, there is no relation of cause and effect +between genius and neurosis, but mere coexistence, since there are found +very mediocre neuropaths, and men above the average without a neurotic +blemish; or, the two states--the one psychic, the other +physiological--are both effects, resulting from organic conditions that +produce according to circumstances genius, insanity, and divers nervous +troubles. Every one of these hypotheses can allege facts in its favor. +We must, however, recognize that in most men of genius are found so many +peculiarities, physical eccentricities and disorders of all kinds that +the pathologic theory retains much probability. + +There remain for consideration the sane geniuses who, despite many +efforts and subtleties, have not yet been successfully brought under the +foregoing formula, and who have made possible the enunciation of another +theory. Recently, Nordau, rejecting the theory of his master Lombroso, +has maintained that it is just as reasonable to say that "genius is a +neurosis" as that "athleticism is a cardiopathy" because many athletes +are affected with heart disease. For him, "the essential elements of +genius are judgment and will." Following this definition, he establishes +the following hierarchy of men of genius: At the highest rung of the +ladder are those in whom judgment and will are equally powerful; men of +action who make world-history (Alexander, Cromwell, Napoleon)--these are +masters of men. On the second level are found the geniuses of judgment, +with no hyper-development of will--these are masters of matter (Pasteur, +Helmholtz, Roentgen). On the third step are geniuses of judgment without +energetic will--thinkers and philosophers. What then shall we do with +the emotional geniuses--the poets and artists? Theirs is not genius in +the strict sense, "because it creates nothing new and exercises no +influence on phenomena." Without discussing the value of this +classification, without examining whether it is even possible,--since +there is no common measure between Alexander, Pasteur, Shakespeare, and +Spinoza,--and whether, on the other hand, common opinion is not right in +putting on the same level the great creators, whoever they be, solely +because they are far above the average, this remark is absolutely +necessary: In the definition above cited the creative faculty _par +excellence_--imagination--necessary to all inventors, is entirely left +out. + +We can, however, derive some benefit from this arbitrary division. +Although it is impossible to admit that "emotional geniuses" create +nothing new and have no influence on society, they do form a special +group. Creative work requires of them a nervous excitability and a +predominance of affective states that rapidly become morbid. In this way +they have provided the pathological theory with most of its facts. It +would perhaps be necessary to recognize distinctions between the various +forms of invention. They require very different organic and psychic +conditions in order that some may profit by morbid dispositions that are +far from useful to others. This point should deserve a special study +never made hitherto. + + +I + +We shall reduce to three the characters ordinarily met in most great +inventors. No one of them is without exception. + +1. _Precocity_, which is reducible to innateness. The natural bent +becomes manifest as soon as circumstances allow--it is the sign of the +true vocation. The story is the same in all cases: at one moment the +flash occurs; but this is not as frequent as is supposed. False +vocations abound. If we deduct those attracted through imitation, +environmental influence, exhortations and advice, chance, the attraction +of immediate gain, aversion to a career imposed from without which they +shun and adoption of an opposite one, will there remain many natural and +irresistible vocations? + +We have seen above that[65] the passage from reproductive to +constructive imagination takes place toward the end of the third year. +According to some authors, this initial period should be followed by a +depression about the fifth year; thenceforward the upward progress is +continuous. But the creative faculty, from its nature and content, +develops in a very clear, chronological order. Music, plastic arts, +poetry, mechanical invention, scientific imagination--such is the usual +order of appearance. + +In music, with the exception of a few child-prodigies, we hardly find +personal creation before the age of twelve or thirteen. As examples of +precocity may be cited: Mozart, at the age of three; Mendelssohn, five; +Haydn, four; Handel, twelve; Weber, twelve; Schubert, eleven; Cherubini, +thirteen; and many others. Those late in developing--Beethoven, Wagner, +etc.--are fewer by far.[66] + +In the plastic arts, vocation and creative aptitude are shown +perceptibly later, on the average about the fourteenth year: Giotto, at +ten; Van Dyck, ten; Raphael, eight; Guerchin, eight; Greuze, eight; +Michaelangelo, thirteen; Albrecht Duerer, fifteen; Bernini, twelve; +Rubens and Jordaens being also precocious. + +In poetry we find no work having any individual character before +sixteen. Chatterton died at that age, perhaps the only example of so +young a poet leaving any reputation. Schiller and Byron also began at +sixteen. Besides this, we know that the talent for versification, at +least as imitation, is very early in developing. + +In mechanical arts children have early a remarkable capacity for +understanding and imitating. At nine, Poncelet bought a watch that was +out of order in order to study it, then took it apart and put it +together correctly. Arago tells that at the same age Fresnel was called +by his comrades a "man of genius," because he had determined by correct +experiments "the length and caliber of children's elder-wood toy cannon +giving the longest range; also, which green or dry woods used in the +manufacture of bows have most strength and lasting power." In general, +the average of mechanical invention is later, and scarcely comes earlier +than that of scientific discovery. + +The form of abstract imagination requisite for invention in the sciences +has no great personal value before the twentieth year: there are a +goodly number, however, who have given proof of it before that +age--Pascal, Newton, Leibniz, Gauss, Auguste Comte, etc. Almost all are +mathematicians. + +These chronological variations result not from chance, but from +psychological conditions necessary for the development of each form of +imagination. We know that the acquisition of musical sounds is prior to +speech: many children can repeat a scale correctly before they are able +to talk. On the other hand, as dissolution follows evolution in inverse +order,[67] aphasic patients lacking the most common words, can +nevertheless sing. Sound-images are thus organized before all others, +and the creative power when acting in this direction finds very early +material for its use. For the plastic arts a longer apprenticeship is +necessary for the education of the senses and movements. To acquire +manual dexterity one must become skilled in observing form, combinations +of lines and colors, and apt at reproducing them. Poetry and first +attempts at novel-writing presuppose some experience of the passions of +human life and a certain reflection of which the child is incapable. +Invention in the mechanic arts, as in the plastic arts, requires the +education of the senses and movements; and, further, calculation, +rational combination of means, rigorous adaptation to practical +necessities. Lastly, scientific imagination is nothing without a high +development of the capacity for abstraction, which is a matter of slow +growth. Mathematicians are the most precocious because their material is +the most simple; they have no need, as in the case of the experimental +sciences, of an extended knowledge of facts, which is acquired only with +time. + +At this period of its development the imagination is in large part +imitation. We must explain this paradox. The creator begins by +imitating: this is such a well-known fact that it is needless to give +proof of it, and it is subject to few exceptions. The most original mind +is, at first, consciously or unconsciously somebody's disciple. It is +necessarily so. Nature gives only one thing, "the creative instinct;" +that is, the need of producing in a determined line. This internal +factor alone is insufficient. Aside from the fact that the imagination +at first has at its disposal only a very limited material, it lacks +technique, the processes indispensable for realizing itself. As long as +the creator has not found the suitable form into which to cast his +creation he must indeed borrow it from another; his ideas must suffer +the necessity of a provisional shelter. This explains how it is that +later the inventor, reaching full consciousness of himself, in order to +complete mastery of his methods, often breaks with his models, and burns +what he at first adorned. + + +II + +A second character consists of the necessity, the fatality of creation. +Great inventors feel that they have a task to accomplish; they feel that +they are charged with a mission. On this point we have a large number of +testimonials and avowals. In the darkest days of his life Beethoven, +haunted by the thought of suicide, wrote, "Art alone has kept me back. +It seemed to me that I could not leave the world before producing all +that I felt within me." Ordinarily, inventors are apt in only one line; +even when they have a certain versatility, they remain bound to their +own peculiar manner--they have their mark--like Michaelangelo; or, if +they attempt to change it, if they try to be unfaithful as respects +their vocation, they fall much below themselves. + +This characteristic of irresistible impulsion which makes the genius +create not because he wants to, but because he must do it, has often +been likened to instinct. This very widespread view has been examined +before (Part I, Chapter ii). + +We have seen that there is no creative instinct in general, but +_particular_ tendencies, orientated in a definite direction, which in +most respects resemble instinct. It is contrary to experience and logic +to admit that the creative genius follows any path whatever at his +choice--a proposition that Weismann, in his horror of inheritance of +acquired characters (which are a kind of innateness) is not afraid to +support. That is true only of the man of talent, a matter of education +and circumstances. The distinction between these two orders of +creators--the great and the ordinary--has been made too often to need +repetition, although it is proper to recognize that it is not always +easy in practice, that there are names that cause us to hesitate, which +we class somewhat at hazard. Yet genius remains, as Schopenhauer used to +say, _monstrum per excessum_; excessive development in one direction. +Hypertrophy of a special aptitude often makes genius fall, as far as the +others are concerned, below the average level. Even those exceptional +men who have given proof of multiple aptitudes, such as Vinci, +Michaelangelo, Goethe, etc., always have a predominating tendency which, +in common opinion, sums them up. + + +III + +A third characteristic is the clearly defined _individuality_ of the +great creator. He is the man of his work; he has done this or that: that +is his mark. He is "representative." There is no other opinion as to +this; what is a subject of discussion is the _origin_, not the nature of +this individuality. The Darwinian theory as to the all-powerful action +of environment has led to the question whether the representative +character of great inventors comes from themselves, and from them alone, +or must not rather be sought in the unconscious influence of the race +and epoch of which they are at a given instant only brighter sparks. +This debate goes beyond the bounds of our subject. To decide whether +social changes are due mostly to the accumulated influences of some +individuals and their initiative, or to the environment, to +circumstances, to hereditary transmission, is not a problem for +psychology to solve. We can not, however, totally avoid this discussion, +for it touches the very springs of creation. + +Is the inventive genius the highest degree of personality or a synthesis +of masses?--the result of himself or of others?--the expression of an +individual activity or of a collective activity? In short, should we +look for his representative character within him or without? Both these +alternatives have authoritative supporters. + +For Schopenhauer, Carlyle (_Hero-worship_), Nietzsche, _et al._, the +great man is an autonomous product, a being without a peer, a demigod, +"_Uebermensch_." He can be explained neither by heredity, nor by +environment. + +For others (Taine, Spencer, Grant, Allen, _et al._), the important +factor is seen in the race and external conditions. Goethe held that a +whole family line is summarized some day in a single one of its members, +and a whole people in one or several men. For him, Louis XIV and +Voltaire are respectively the French king and writer _par excellence_. +"The alleged great men," says Tolstoi, "are only the labels of history, +they give their names to events."[68] + +Each party explains the same facts according to its own principle and in +its own peculiar way. The great historic epochs are rich in great men +(the Greek republics of the fourth century B. C., the Roman Republic, +the Renaissance, French Revolution, etc.). Why? Because, say some, +periods put into ferment by the deep working of the masses make this +blossoming possible. Because, say the others, this flowering modifies +profoundly the social and intellectual condition of the masses and +raises their level. For the former the ferment is deep down; for the +latter it is on top. + +Without presuming to solve this vexed question, I lean toward the view +of individualism pure and simple. It seems to me very difficult to admit +that the great creator is only the result of his environment. Since this +influence acts on many others, it is very necessary that, in great men, +there should be in addition a personal factor. Besides, in opposition to +the exclusively environmental theory we may bring the well-known fact +that most innovators and inventors at first arouse opposition. We know +the invariable sentence on everything novel--it is "false" or "bad;" +then it is adopted with the statement that it had been known for a long +time. In the hypothesis of collective invention, it seems that the mass +of people should applaud inventors, recognizing itself in them, seeing +its confused thought take form and body: but most often the contrary +happens. The misoneism of crowds seems to me one of the strongest +arguments in favor of the individual character of invention. + +We can doubtless distinguish two cases--in the first, the creator sums +up and clearly translates the aspirations of his _milieu_; in the +second, he is in opposition to it because he goes beyond it. How many +innovators have been disappointed because they came before their time! +But this distinction does not reach to the bottom of the question, and +is not at all sufficient as an answer. + +Let us leave this problem, which, on account of its complexity, we can +hardly solve through peremptory reasoning, and let us try to examine +_objectively_ the relation between creation and environment in order +that we may see to what extent the creative imagination, without losing +its individual character--which is impossible--depends on the +intellectual and social surrounding. + +If, with the American psychologists,[69] we term the disposition for +innovating a "spontaneous variation"--a Darwinian term explaining +nothing, but convenient--we may enunciate the following law: + +_The tendency toward spontaneous variation (invention) is always in +inverse ratio to the simplicity of the environment._ + +The savage environment is in its nature very simple, consequently +homogeneous. The lower races show a much smaller degree of +differentiation than the higher; in them, as Jastrow says, physical and +psychic maturity is more precocious, and as the period just before the +adult age is the plastic period _per se_, this diminishes the chances of +a departure from the common type. Thus comparison between whites and +blacks, between primitive and civilized peoples, shows that, for equal +populations, there is an enormous disproportion as to the number of +innovators. + +The barbarian environment is much more complex and heterogeneous: it +contains all the rudiments of civilized life. Consequently, it favors +more individual variations and is richer in superior men. But these +variations are rarely produced outside of a very restricted +field--political, military, religious. So it seems impossible to agree +with Joly[70] that neither primitive nor barbarian peoples produce +superior minds, "unless," as he says, "by this name we mean those that +simply surpass their congeners." But is there a criterion other than +that? I see none. Greatness is altogether a relative idea; and would not +our great creators seem, to beings better endowed than we, very small? + +The civilized environment, requiring division of labor and consequently +a constantly growing complexity of heterogeneous elements, is an open +door for all vocations. Doubtless, the social spirit always retains +something of that tendency toward stagnation that is the rule in lower +social orders; it is more favorable to tradition than to innovation. But +the inevitable necessity of a warm competition between individuals and +peoples is a natural antidote for that natural inertia; it favors useful +variations. Moreover, civilization means evolution; consequently the +conditions under which the imagination is active change with the times. +Let us suppose, Weismann justly says, that in the Samoan Islands there +were born a child having the singular and extraordinary genius of +Mozart. What could he accomplish? At the most, extend the gamut of three +or four tones to seven, and create a few more complex melodies; but he +would be as unable to compose symphonies as Archimedes would have been +to invent an electric dynamo. How many creators have been wrecked +because the conditions necessary for their inventions were lacking? +Roger Bacon foresaw several of our great discoveries; Cardan, the +differential calculus; Van Helmont, chemistry; and it has been possible +to write a book on the forerunners of Darwin.[71] We talk so much of the +free flight of imagination, of the all-comprehensive power of the +creator, that we forget the sociological conditions--not to mention +others--on which they are every moment dependent. In this respect, no +invention is personal in the strict sense; there always remains in it a +little of that anonymous collaboration the highest expression of which, +as we have seen, is the mythic activity. + +By way of summary, and whatever be the causes, we may say that there is +a universal tendency in all living matter toward variation, whether we +consider vegetables, animals, or the physical and mental man. The need +of innovating is only a special case, rare in the lower races, frequent +in the higher. This tendency toward variation is fundamental or +superficial: As fundamental, it corresponds to genius, and survives +through processes analogous to natural selection, i.e., by its own +power. As superficial, it corresponds to talent, survives and prospers +chiefly through the help of circumstances and environment. Here, the +orientation comes from without, not from within. According as the spirit +of the time inclines rather to poetry or painting, or music, or +scientific research, or industry, or military art, minds of the second +order are dragged into the current--showing that a goodly part of their +power is in the aptness, not for invention, but for _imitation_. + + +IV + +The determination of the characters belonging to the inventive genius +has necessitated some seemingly irrelevant remarks on the action of the +environment. Let us return to invention, strictly so-called. + +For inventing there is always required a natural aptitude, sometimes, a +happy chance. + +The natural disposition should be accepted as a fact. Why does a man +create? Because he is capable of forming new combinations of ideas. +However naive this answer may be, there is no other. The only thing +possible, is the determination of the conditions necessary and +sufficient for producing novel combinations: this has been done in the +first part of this book, and there is no occasion for going over it +again. But there is another aspect in creative work to be +considered--its psychological _mechanism_, and the form of its +development. + +Every normal person creates little or much. He may, in his ignorance, +invent what has been already done a thousand times. Even if this is not +a creation as regards the species, it is none the less such for the +individual. It is wrong to say, as has been said, that an invention "is +a new and important idea." _Novelty_ only is essential--that is the +psychological mark: importance and utility are accessory, merely social +marks. Invention is thus unduly limited when we attribute it to great +inventors only. At this moment, however, we are concerned only with +these, and in them the mechanism of invention is easier to study. + +We have already seen how false is the theory that holds that there is +always a sudden stroke of inspiration, followed by a period of rapid or +slow execution. On the contrary, observation reveals many processes +that apparently differ less in the _content_ of invention than according +to individual temperament. I distinguish two general processes of which +the rest are variations. In all creation, great or small, there is a +directing idea, an "ideal"--understanding the word not in its +transcendental sense, but merely as synonymous with end or goal--or more +simply, a problem to solve. The _locus_ of the idea, of the given +problem, is not the same in the two processes. In the one I term +"complete" the ideal is at the beginning: in the "abridged" it is in the +middle. There are also other differences which the following tables will +make more clear: + + _First Process_ (_complete_). + + 1st phase 2nd phase 3d phase + IDEA INVENTION, VERIFICATION, + (commencement) or or + Special incubation DISCOVERY APPLICATION + of more or less (end) + duration + +The idea excites attention and takes a fixed character. The period of +brooding begins. For Newton it lasted seventeen years, and at the time +of definitely establishing his discovery by calculation he was so +overcome with emotion that he had to assign to another the task of +completing it. The mathematician Hamilton tells us that his method of +quaternians burst upon him one day, completely finished, while he was +near a bridge in Dublin. "In that moment I had the result of fifteen +years' labor." Darwin gathers material during his voyages, spends a +long time observing plants and animals, then through the chance reading +of Malthus' book, hits upon and formulates his theory. In literary and +artistic creation similar examples are frequent.[72] + +The second phase is only an instant, but essential--the moment of +discovery, when the creator exclaims his "Eureka!"[73] With it, the work +is virtually or really ended. + + _Second Process_ (_abridged_). + + 1st phase 2nd phase 3rd phase + General preparation IDEA (commencement) CONSTRUCTIVE + (unconscious) INSPIRATION and + ERUPTION DEVELOPING + period. + +This is the process in intuitive minds. Such seems to have been the case +of Mozart, Poe, etc. Without attempting what would be a tedious +enumeration of examples, we may say that this form of creation comprises +two classes--those coming to maturity through an internal impulse, a +sudden stroke of inspiration, and those who are suddenly illumined by +chance. The two processes differ superficially rather than essentially. +Let us briefly compare them. + +With some, the first phase is long and fully conscious; in others it +seems negligible, equal to zero--there is nothing of it because there +exists a natural or acquired tendency toward equilibrium. "For a long +time," says Schumann, "I had the habit of racking my brain, and now I +scarcely need to scratch my forehead. Everything runs naturally."[74] + +The second phase is almost the same in both cases: it is only an +instant, but it is essential--it is the moment of imaginative synthesis. + +Lastly, the third phase is very short for some, because the main labor +is already done, and there remains only the finishing touch or the +verification. It is long for others, because they must pass from the +perceived idea to complete realization, and because the preparatory work +is faulty; so that for these the second creative process is shortened in +appearance only. + +Such seem to me the two principal forms of the mechanism of creation. +These are genera; they include species and varieties that a patient and +minute study of the processes peculiar to various inventors would reveal +to us. We must bear in mind that this work makes no claim of being a +monograph on invention, but merely a sketch.[75] + +The two processes above described seem to correspond on the whole to +the oft-made distinction between the intuitive or spontaneous, and the +combining or reflective imagination. + +The intuitive, essentially synthetic form, is found principally in the +purely imaginative types, children and savages. The mind proceeds from +the whole to details. The generative idea resembles those concepts +which, in the sciences, are of wide range because they condense a +generalization rich in consequences. The subject is at first +comprehended as a whole; development is organic, and we may compare it +to the embryological process that causes a living being to arise from +the fertilized ovum, analogous to an immanent logic. As a type of this +creative form there has often been given a letter wherein Mozart +explains his mode of conception. Recently (and that is why I do not +reprint it here) it has been suspected of being apocryphal. I regret +this--it was worthy of being authentic. According to Goethe, +Shakespeare's _Hamlet_ could have been created only through an intuitive +process, etc. + +The combining, discursive imagination proceeds from details to the +vaguely-perceived unity. It starts from a fragment that serves as a +matrix, and becomes completed little by little. An adventure, an +anecdote, a scene, a rapid glance, a detail, suggests a literary or +artistic creation; but the organic form does not appear in a trice. In +science, Kepler furnishes a good example of this combining imagination. +It is known that he devoted a part of his life trying strange +hypotheses, until the day when, having discovered the elliptical orbit +of Mars, all his former work took shape and became an organized system. +Did we want to make use once more of an embryological comparison, it +would be necessary to look for it in the strange conceptions of ancient +cosmogonies: they believed that from an earthly slime arose parts of +bodies and separate organs which through a mysterious attraction and +happy chance ended by sticking together, and forming living bodies.[76] + +It is an accepted view that of these two modes, one, the abridged or +intuitive process, is superior to the other. I confess to having held +this prejudice. On examination, I find it doubtful, even false. There is +a _difference_, not any "higher" and "lower." + +First of all, both these forms of creation are necessary. The intuitive +process can suffice for an invention of short duration: a rhyme, a +story, a profile, a _motif_, an ornamental stroke, a little mechanical +contrivance, etc. But as soon as the work requires time and development +the discursive process becomes absolutely necessary: with many inventors +one easily perceives the change from one form to the other. We have seen +that in the case of Chopin, "creation was spontaneous, miraculous," +coming complete and sudden. But George Sand adds: "The crisis over, then +commenced the most heartrending labor at which I have ever been +present," and she pictures him to us agonized, for days and weeks, +running after the bits of lost inspiration. Goethe, likewise, in a +letter to Humboldt regarding his Faust, which occupied him for sixty +years, full of interruptions and gaps: "The difficulty has been to get +through strength of will what is really to be gotten only by a +spontaneous act of nature." Zola, according to his biographer, Toulouse, +"imagines a novel, always starting out with a general idea that +dominates the work; then, from induction to induction, he draws out of +it the characters and all the story." + +To sum up: Pure intuition and pure combination are exceptional; +ordinarily, it is a mixed process in which one of the two elements +prevails and permits its qualification. If we note, in addition, that it +would be easy to group under these two headings names of the first rank, +we shall conclude that the difference is altogether in the _mechanism_, +not in the _nature_ of creation, and is consequently accessory; and that +this difference is reducible to natural dispositions, which we may +contrast as follows: + +Ready-witted minds, Logically-developing + excelling in conception, minds, excelling in + making the whole almost elaboration. + out of one piece. + +Work primarily unconscious. Patience the preponderating + role. + + Work primarily conscious. + +Actions quick. Actions slow. + + +V + +"Were we to raise monuments to inventors in the arts and sciences, there +would be fewer statues to men than to children, animals, and especially +_fortune_." In this wise expressed himself one of the sage thinkers of +the eighteenth century, Turgot. The importance of the last factor has +been much exaggerated. Chance may be taken in two senses--one general, +the other narrow. + +(1) In its broad meaning, chance depends on entirely internal, purely +psychic circumstances. We know that one of the best conditions for +inventing is abundance of material, accumulated experience, +knowledge--which augment the chances of original association of ideas. +It has even been possible to maintain that the nature of memory implies +the capacity of creating in a special direction. The revelations of +inventors or of their biographers leave no doubt as to the necessity of +a large number of sketches, trials, preliminary drawings, no matter +whether it is a matter of industry, commerce, a machine, a poem, an +opera, a picture, a building, a plan of campaign, etc. "Genius for +discovery," says Jevons, depends on the number of notions and chance +thoughts coming to the inventor's mind. To be fertile in +hypotheses--that is the first requirement for finding something new. The +inventor's brain must be full of forms, of melodies, of mechanical +agents, of commercial combinations, of figures, etc., according to the +nature of his work. "But it is very rare that the ideas we find are +exactly those we were seeking. In order to find, _we must think along +other lines_."[77] Nothing is more true. + +So much for chance within: it is indisputable, whatever may have been +said of it, but it depends finally on individuality--from it arises the +non-anticipated synthesis of ideas. The abundance of memory-ideas, we +know, is not a sufficient condition for creation; it is not even a +necessary condition. It has been remarked that a relative ignorance is +sometimes useful for invention: it favors assurance. There are +inventions, especially scientific and industrial, that could not have +been made had the inventors been arrested by the ruling and presumably +invincible dogmas. The inventor was all the more free the more he was +unaware of them. Then, as it was quite necessary to bow before the +accomplished fact, theory was broadened to include the new discovery and +explain it. + +(2) Chance, in the narrow sense, is a fortunate occurrence stimulating +invention: but to attribute to it the greater part, is a partial, +erroneous view. Here, what we call chance, is the meeting and +convergence of _two_ factors--one internal (individual genius), the +other, external (the fortuitous occurrence). + +It is impossible to determine all that invention owes to chance in this +sense. In primitive humanity its influence must have been enormous: the +use of fire, the manufacture of weapons, of utensils, the casting of +metals: all that came about through accidents as simple as, for example, +a tree falling across a stream suggesting the first idea of a bridge. + +In historic times--and to keep merely to the modern period--the +collection of authentic facts would fill a large volume. Who does not +know of Newton's apple, Galileo's lamp, Galvani's frog? Huygens declared +that, were it not for an unforeseen combination of circumstances, the +invention of the telescope would require "a superhuman genius;" it is +known that we owe it to children who were playing with pieces of glass +in an optician's shop. Schoenbein discovered ozone, thanks to the +phosphorous odor of air traversed by electric sparks. The discoveries of +Grimaldi and of Fresnel in regard to interferences, those of Faraday, of +Arago, of Foucault, of Fraunhofer, of Kirchoff, and of hundreds of +others owed something to "fortune." It is said that the sight of a crab +suggested to Watt the idea of an ingenious machine. To chance, also, +many poets, novelists, dramatists, and artists have owed the best part +of their inspirations: literature and the arts abound in fictitious +characters whose real originals are known. + +So much for the external, fortuitous factor; its role is clear. That of +the internal factor is less so. It is not at all apparent to the +ordinary mind, escaping the unreflecting. Yet it is extremely important. +The same fortuitous event passes by millions of men without exciting +anything. How many of Pisa's inhabitants had seen the lamp of their +cathedral before Galileo! He does not necessarily find who wants to +find. The happy chance comes only to those worthy of it. In order to +profit thereby, one must first possess the spirit of observation, +wide-awake attention, that isolates and fixates the accident; then, if +it is a matter of scientific or practical inventions, the penetration +that seizes upon relations and finds unforeseen resemblances; if it +concerns esthetic productions, the imagination that constructs, +organizes, gives life. + +Without repeating an evident truism, although it is often misunderstood, +we ought to end by remarking that _chance is an occasion for, not an +agent of, creation_. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[65] See above, Chapter II. + +[66] Some of these and the following figures are borrowed from +Oelzelt-Newin, _op. cit._, pp. 70 ff. + +[67] Compare the well-known theory of Dr. Hughlings-Jackson. (Tr.) + +[68] For an elaborate and interesting discussion of this subject, +see Tolstoi's _Physiology of War_. As showing the later trend of +thought on this general theme, see the excellent summary by +Professor Seligman, _The Economic Interpretation of History_. (Tr.) + +[69] William James, _The Will to Believe and other Essays_, pp. 218 +ff.; Jastrow, _Psych. Rev._, May, 1898, p. 307; J. Royce, _ibid._, +March, 1898; Baldwin, _Social and Ethical Interpretations_, etc. + +[70] Joly, _Psychologie des grands hommes_. + +[71] Osborn, _From the Greeks to Darwin_. + +[72] Such, according to Binet and Passy, seem to be the cases of the +Goncourts, Pailleron, etc. See "Psychologie des auteurs +dramatiques," in _L'annee psychologique_, I, 96. + +[73] Compare the striking instance of this moment as given by +Froebel, in his _Autobiography_, in connection with his idea of the +Kindergarten. (Tr.) + +[74] Quoted by Arreat, _Memoire et Imagination_, p. 118. (Paris, F. +Alcan.) + +[75] Paulhan ("De l'invention," _Rev. Philos._, December, 1898, pp. +590 ff.) distinguishes three kinds of development in invention: (1) +Spontaneous or reasoned--the directing idea persists to the end; (2) +transformation, which comprises several contradictory evolutions +succeeding and replacing one another in consequence of impressions +and feelings; (3) deviation, which is a composite of the two +preceding forms. + +[76] Cf. the well-known doctrine of Empedocles. (Tr.) + +[77] P. Souriau, _Theorie de l'invention_, pp. 6-7. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +LAW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMAGINATION + + +Is imagination, so often called "a capricious faculty," subject to some +law? The question thus asked is too simple, and we must make it more +precise. + +As the direct cause of invention, great or small, the imagination acts +without assignable determination; in this sense it is what is known as +"spontaneity"--a vague term, which we have attempted to make clear. Its +appearance is irreducible to any law; it results from the often +fortuitous convergence of various factors previously studied. + +Leaving aside the moment of origin, does the inventive power, considered +in its individual and specific development, seem to follow any law, or, +if this term appear too ambitious, does it present, in the course of its +evolution, any perceptible regularity? Observation separates out an +empirical law; that is, extracts directly an abridged formula that is +only a condensation of facts. We may enunciate it thus: The creative +imagination in its complete development passes through two periods +separated by a critical phase: a period of autonomy or efflorescence, a +critical moment, a period of definitive constitution presenting several +aspects. + +This formula, being only a summary of experience, should be justified +and explained by the latter. For this purpose we can borrow facts from +two distinct sources: (a) individual development, which is the safest, +clearest, and easiest to observe; (b) the development of the species, or +historical development, according to the accepted principle that +phylogenesis and ontogenesis follow the same general line. + + +I + +_First Period._ We are already acquainted with it: it is the imaginative +age. In normal man, it begins at about the age of three, and embraces +infancy, adolescence, youth: sometimes a longer, sometimes a shorter +period. Play, romantic invention, mythic and fantastic conceptions of +the world sum it up first; after that, in most, imagination is dependent +on the influence of the passions, and especially sexual love. For a long +time it remains without any rational element. + +Nevertheless, little by little, the latter wins a place. +Reflection--including under the term the working of the +intelligence--begins very late, grows slowly, and the proportion as it +asserts itself, gains an influence over the imaginative activity and +tends to reduce it. This growing antagonism is represented in the +following figure. + +The curve IM is that of the imagination during this first period. It +rises at first very slowly, then attains a rapid ascent and keeps at a +height that marks its greatest attainment in this earliest form. The +dotted line RX represents the rational development that begins later, +advances much more slowly, but progressively, and reaches at X the level +of the imaginative curve. The two intellectual forms are present like +two rivals. The position MX on the ordinate marks the beginning of the +second period. + +[Illustration] + +_Second Period._ This is a critical period of indeterminate length, in +any case, always much briefer than the other two. This critical moment +can be characterized only by its causes and results. Its causes are, in +the physiological sphere, the formation of an organism and a fully +developed brain; in the psychologic order, the antagonism between the +pure subjectivity of the imagination and the objectivity of +ratiocinative processes; in other words, between mental instability and +stability. As for the results, they appear only in the third period, the +resultant of this obscure, metamorphic stage. + +_Third Period._ It is definite: in some way or another and in some +degree the imagination has become rationalized, but this change is not +reducible to a single formula. + +(1) The creative imagination falls, as is indicated in the figure, where +the imagination curve MN' descends rapidly toward the line of abcissas +without ever reaching it. This is the most general case; only truly +imaginative minds are exceptions. One falls little by little into the +prose of practical life--such is the downfall of love which is treated +as a phantom, the burial of the dreams of youth, etc. This is a +regression, not an end; for the creative imagination disappears +completely in no man; it only becomes accessory. + +(2) It keeps up but becomes transformed; it adapts itself to the +conditions of rational thought; it is no longer pure imagination, but +becomes a mixed form--the fact is indicated in the diagram by the union +of the two lines, MN, the imagination, and XO, the rational. This is the +case with truly imaginative beings, in whom inventive power long remains +young and fresh. + +This period of preservation, of definitive constitution with rational +transformation, presents several varieties. First, and simplest, +_transformation into logical form_. The creative power manifested in the +first stage remains true to itself, and always follows the same trend. +Such are the precocious inventors, those whose vocation appeared early +and never changed direction. Invention loses its childish or juvenile +character in becoming virile; there are no other changes. Compare +Schiller's _Robbers_, written in his teens, with his _Wallenstein_, +dating from his fortieth year; or the vague sketches of the adolescent +James Watt with his inventions as a man. + +Another case is the _metamorphosis_ or _deviation_ of creative power. We +know what numbers of men who have left a great name in science, +politics, mechanical or industrial invention started out with mediocre +efforts in music, painting, and especially poetry, the drama, and +fiction. The imaginative impulse did not discover its true direction at +the outset; it imitated while trying to invent. What has been said above +concerning the chronological development of the imagination would be +tiresome repetition. The need of creating followed from the first the +line of least resistance, where it found certain materials ready to +hand. But in order to arrive to full consciousness of itself it needed +more time, more knowledge, more accumulated experience. + +We might here ask whether the contrary case is also met with; i.e., +where the imagination, in this third period, would return to the +inclinations of the first period. This regressive metamorphosis--for I +cannot style it otherwise--is rare but not without examples. Ordinarily +the creative imagination, when it has passed its adult stage, becomes +attenuated by slow atrophy without undergoing serious change of form. +Nevertheless, I am able to cite the case of a well-known scholar who +began with a taste for art, especially plastic art, went over rapidly +to literature, devoted his life to biologic studies, in which he gained +a very deserved reputation; then, in turn, became totally disgusted with +scientific research, came back to literature and finally to the arts, +which have entirely monopolized him. + +Finally--for there are very many forms--in some the imagination, though +strong, scarcely passes beyond the first stage, always retains its +youthful, almost childish form, hardly modified by a minimum of +rationality. Let us note that it is not a question here of the +characteristic ingenuousness of some inventors, which has caused them to +be called "grown-up children," but of the candor and inherent simplicity +of the imagination itself. This exceptional form is hardly reconcilable +except with esthetic creation. Let us add the mystic imagination. It +could furnish examples, less in its religious conceptions, which are +without control, than in its reveries of a scientific turn. Contemporary +mystics have invented adaptations of the world that take us back to the +mythology of early times. This prolonged childhood of the imagination, +which is, in a word, an anomaly, produces curiosities rather than +lasting works. + +At this third period in the development of the imagination appears a +second, subsidiary law, that of _increasing complexity_; it follows a +progressive line from the simple to the complex. Indeed, it is not, +strictly speaking, a law of the imagination but of the rational +development exerting an influence on it by a counter-action. It is a +law of the mind that _knows_, not of one that _imagines_. + +It is needless to show that theoretical and practical intelligence +develops as an increasing complex. But from the time that the mind +distinguishes clearly between the possible and the impossible, between +the fancied and the real--which is a capacity wanting in primitive +man--as soon as man has formed rational habits and has undergone +experience the impress of which is ineffaceable, the creative +imagination is subject, _nolens volens_, to new conditions; it is no +longer absolute mistress of itself, it has lost the assurance of its +infancy, and is under the rules of logical thought, which draws it along +in its train. Aside from the exceptions given above--and even they are +partial exceptions only--creative power depends on the ability to +understand, which imposes upon it its form and developmental law. In +literature and in the arts comparison between the simplicity of +primitive creations and the complexity of advanced civilizations has +become commonplace. In the practical, technical, scientific and social +worlds the higher up we go the more we have to know in order to create, +and in default of this condition we merely repeat when we think we are +inventing. + + +II + +Historically considered, in the species, the development of the +imagination follows the same line of progress as in the individual. We +will not repeat it; it would be mere reiteration in a vaguer form of +what we have just said. A few brief notes will suffice. + +Vico--whose name deserves to be mentioned here because he was the first +to see the good that we can get from myths for the study of the +imagination--divided the course of humanity into three successive ages: +divine or theocratic, heroic or fabulous, human or historic, after which +the cycle begins over again. Although this too hypothetic conception is +now forgotten, it is sufficient for our purposes. What, indeed, are +those first two stages that have everywhere and always been the +harbingers and preparers of civilization, if not the triumphant period +of the imagination? It has produced myths, religions, legends, epics and +martial narratives, and imposing monuments erected in honor of gods and +heroes. Many nations whose evolution has been incomplete have not gone +beyond this stage. + +Let us now consider this question under a more definite, more limited, +better known form--the history of intellectual development in Europe +since the fall of the Roman Empire. It shows very distinctly our three +periods. + +No one will question the preponderance of the imagination during the +middle Ages: intensity of religious feeling, ceaselessly repeated +epidemics of superstition; the institution of chivalry, with all its +accessories; heroic poetry, chivalric romances; courts of love, +efflorescence of Gothic art, the beginning of modern music, etc. On the +other hand, the _quantity_ of imagination applied during this epoch to +practical, industrial, commercial invention is very small. Their +scientific culture, buried in Latin jargon, is made up partly of antique +traditions, partly of fancies; what the ten centuries added to positive +science is almost _nil_. Our figure, with its two curves, one +imaginative, the other rational, thus applies just as well to historical +development as to individual development during this first period. + +No more will anyone question that the Renaissance is a critical moment, +a transition period, and a transformation analogous to that which we +have noted in the individual, when there rises, opposed to imagination, +a rival power. + +Finally, it will be admitted without dissent that during the modern +period social imagination has become partly decayed, partly +rationalized, under the influence of two principal factors--one +scientific, the other economic. On the one hand the development of +science, on the other hand the great maritime discoveries, by +stimulating industrial and commercial inventions, have given the +imagination a new field of activity. There have arisen points of +attraction that have drawn it into other paths, have imposed upon it +other forms of creation that have often been neglected or misunderstood +and that we shall study in the Third Part. + + + + +THIRD PART + +THE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF IMAGINATION + + + + +PRELIMINARY + + +After having studied the creative imagination in its constitutive +elements and in its development we purpose, in this last part, +describing its principal forms. This will be neither analytic nor +genetic but concrete. The reader need not fear wearisome repetition; our +subject is sufficiently complex to permit a third treatment without +reiteration. + +The expression "creative imagination," like all general terms, is an +abbreviation and an abstraction. There is no "imagination in general," +but only _men who imagine_, and who do so in different ways; the reality +is in them. The diversities in creation, however numerous, should be +reducible to types that are _varieties_ of imagination, and the +determination of these varieties is analogous to that of character as +related to will. Indeed, when we have settled upon the physiological and +psychological conditions of voluntary activity we have only done a work +in _general_ psychology. Men being variously constituted, their modes of +action bear the stamp of their individuality; in each one there is a +personal factor that, whatever its ultimate nature, puts its mark on the +will and makes it energetic or weak, rapid or slow, stable or unstable, +continuous or intermittent. The same is true of the creative +imagination. We cannot know it completely without a study of its +varieties, without a special psychology, toward which the following +chapters are an attempt. + +How are we to determine these varieties? Many will be inclined to think +that the method is indicated in advance. Have not psychologists +distinguished, according as one or another of image-groups +preponderates, visual, auditory, motor and mixed types? Is not the way +clear and is it not well enough to go in this direction? However natural +this solution may appear, it is illusory and can lead to naught. It +rests on the equivocal use of the word "imagination," which at one time +means mere reproduction of images, and at another time creative +activity, and which, consequently, keeps up the erroneous notion that in +the creative imagination images, the raw materials, are the essential +part. The materials, no doubt, are not a negligible element, but by +themselves they cannot reveal to us the species and varieties that have +their origin in an anterior and superior tendency of mind. We shall see +in the sequel that the very nature of constructive imagination may +express itself indifferently in sounds, words, colors, lines, and even +numbers. The method that should allege to settle the various +orientations of creative activity according to the nature of images +would no more go to the bottom of the matter than would a classification +of architecture according to the materials employed (as rock, brick, +iron, wood, etc.) with no regard for differences of style. + +This method aside, since the determination must be made according to the +individuality of the architect, what method shall we follow? The matter +is even more perplexing than the study of character. Although various +authors have treated the latter subject (we have attempted it +elsewhere), no one of the proposed classifications has been universally +accepted. Nevertheless, despite their differences, they coincide in +several points, because these have the advantage of resting on a common +basis--the large manifestations of human nature, feeling, doing, +thinking. In our subject I find nothing like this and I seek in vain for +a point of support. Classifications are made according to the essential +dominating attributes; but, as regards the varieties of the creative +imagination, what are they? + +We may, indeed, as was said above, distinguish two great classes--the +intuitive and the combining. From another point of view we may +distinguish invention of free range (esthetic, religious, mystic) from +invention more or less restricted (mechanical, scientific, commercial, +military, political, social). But these two divisions are too general, +leading to nothing. A true classification should be in touch with facts, +and this one soars too high. + +Leaving, then, to others, more skilled or more fortunate, the task of a +rational and systematic determination, if it be possible, we shall try +merely to distinguish and describe the principal forms, such as +experience gives them to us, emphasizing those that have been neglected +or misinterpreted. What follows is thus neither a classification nor +even a complete enumeration. + +We shall study at first two general forms of the creative +imagination--the plastic and the diffluent--and later, special forms, +determined by their content and subject. + + * * * * * + +Wundt, in a little-noticed passage of his _Physiological Psychology_, +has undertaken to determine the composition of the "principal forms of +talent," which he reduces to four: + +The first element is imagination. It may be intuitive, "that is, +conferring on representations a clearness of sense-perception," or +combining; "then it operates on multiple combinations of images." A very +marked development in both directions at the same time is uncommon; the +author assigns reasons for this. + +The second element is understanding (_Verstand_). It may be +inductive--i.e., inclining toward the collection of facts in order to +draw generalizations from them--or deductive, taking general concepts +and laws to trace their consequences. + +If the intuitive imagination is joined to the inductive spirit we have +the talent for observation of the naturalist, the psychologist, the +pedagogue, the man of affairs. + +If the intuitive imagination is combined with the deductive spirit we +have the analytical talent of the systematic naturalist, of the +geometrician. In Linnaeus and Cuvier the intuitive element predominates; +in Gauss, the analytical element. + +The combining imagination joined to the inductive spirit constitutes +"the talent for invention strictly so-called," in industry, in the +technique of science; it gives the artist and the poet the power of +composing their works. + +The combining imagination plus the deductive spirit gives the +speculative talent of the mathematician and philosopher; deduction +predominates in the former, imagination in the latter.[78] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[78] Wundt, _Physiologische Psychologie_, 4th German edition, Vol. +II, pp. 490-95. + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE PLASTIC IMAGINATION + +I + + +By "plastic imagination" I understand that which has for its special +characters clearness and precision of form; more explicitly those forms +whose materials are clear images (whatever be their nature), approaching +perception, giving the impression of reality; in which, too, there +predominate _associations with objective relations_, determinable with +precision. The plastic mark, therefore, is in the images, and in the +modes of association of images. In somewhat rough terms, requiring +modifications which the reader himself can make, it is the imagination +that materializes. + +Between perception--a very complex synthesis of qualities, attributes +and relations--and conception--which is only the consciousness of a +quality, quantity, or relation, often of only a single word accompanied +by vague outlines and a latent, potential knowledge; between concrete +and abstract, the image occupies an intermediate position and can run +from one pole to another, now full of reality, now almost as poor and +pale as a concept. The representation here styled plastic descends +towards its point of origin; it is an external imagination, arising from +sensation rather than from feeling and needing to become objective. + +Thus its general characters are easy of determination. First and +foremost, it makes use of visual images; then of motor images; lastly, +in practical invention, of tactile images. In a word, the three groups +of images present to a great extent the character of externality and +objectivity. The clearness of form of these three groups proceeds from +their origin, because they arise from sensation well determined in +space--sight, movement, touch. Plastic imagination depends most on +spatial conditions. We shall see that its opposite, diffluent +imagination, is that which depends least upon that factor, or is most +free from it. Among these naturally objective elements the plastic +imagination chooses the most objective, which fact gives its creations +an air of reality and life. + +The second characteristic is inferiority of the affective element; it +appears only intermittently and is entirely blotted out before sensory +impression. This form of the creative imagination, coming especially +from sensation, aims especially at sensation. Thus it is rather +superficial, greatly devoid of that internal mark that comes from +feeling. + +But if it chance that both sensory and affective elements are equal in +power; if there is at the same time intense vision adequate to reality, +and profound emotion, violent shock, then there arise extraordinary +imaginative personages, like Shakespeare, Carlyle, Michelet. It is +needless to describe this form of imagination, excellent pen-pictures of +which have been given by the critics;[79] let us merely note that its +psychology reduces itself to an alternately ascending and descending +movement between the two limiting points of perception and idea. The +ascending process assigns to inanimate objects life, desires and +feelings. Thus Michelet: "The great streams of the Netherlands, _tired_ +with their very long course, _perish_ as though from _weariness_ in the +_unfeeling_ ocean."[80] Elsewhere, the great folio begets the octavo, +"which becomes the parent of the small volume, of booklets, of ephemeral +pamphlets, invisible spirits flying in the night, creating under the +very eyes of tyrants the circulation of liberty." The descending process +materializes abstractions, gives them body, makes them flesh and bone; +the Middle Ages become "a poor child, torn from the bowels of +Christianity, born amidst tears, grown up in prayer and revery, in +anguish of heart, dying without achieving anything." In this dazzle of +images there is a momentary return to primitive animism. + + +II + +In order to more fully understand the plastic imagination, let us take +up its principal manifestations. + +1. First, the arts dealing with form, where its necessity is evident. +The sculptor, painter, architect, must have visual and tactile-motor +images; it is the material in which their creations are wrapped up. Even +leaving out the striking acts requiring such a sure and tenacious +external vision (portraits executed from memory, exact remembrance of +faces at the end of twenty years, as in the case of Gavarni, etc.[81]), +and limiting ourselves merely to the usual, the plastic arts demand an +observant imagination. For the majority of men the concrete image of a +face, a form, a color, usually remains vague and fleeting; "red, blue, +black, white, tree, animal, head, mouth, arm, etc., are scarcely more +than words, symbols expressing a rough synthesis. For the painter, on +the other hand, images have a very high precision of details, and what +he sees beneath the words or in real objects are analyzed facts, +positive elements of perception and movement."[82] + +The role of tactile-motor images is not insignificant. There has often +been cited the instance of sculptors who, becoming blind, have +nevertheless been able to fashion busts of close resemblance to the +original. This is memory of touch and of the muscular sense, entirely +equivalent to the visual memory of the portrait painters mentioned +above. Practical knowledge of design and modeling--i.e., of contour and +relief--though resulting from natural or acquired disposition, depends +on cerebral conditions, the development of definite sensory-motor +regions and their connections; and on psychological conditions--the +acquisition and organization of appropriate images. "We learn to paint +and carve," wrote a contemporary painter, "as we do sewing, embroidery, +sawing, filing and turning." In short, like all manual labor requiring +associated and combined acts. + +2. Another form of plastic imagination uses words as means for evoking +vivid and clear impressions of sight, touch, movement; it is the poetic +or literary form. Of it we find in Victor Hugo a finished type. As all +know, we need only open his works at hazard to find a stream of +glittering images. But what is their nature? His recent biographers, +guided by contemporary psychology, have well shown that they always +paint scenes or movements. It is unnecessary to give proofs. Some facts +have a broader range and throw light upon his psychology. Thus we are +told that "he never dictates or rhymes from memory and composes only in +writing, for he believes that writing has its own features, and he +wants to _see the words_. Theophile Gautier, who knows and understands +him so well, says: 'I also believe that in the sentence we need most of +all an _ocular_ rhythm. A book is made to be read, not to be spoken +aloud.'" It is added that "Victor Hugo never spoke his verses but wrote +them out and would often illustrate them on the margin, as if he needed +to fixate the image in order to find the appropriate word."[83] + +After visual representations come those of movement: the steeple +_pierces_ the horizon, the mountain _rends_ the cloud, the mountain +_raises himself_ and looks about, "the cold caverns open their mouths +_drowsily_," the wind lashes the rock into tears with the waterfall, the +thorn is an enraged plant, and so on indefinitely. + +A more curious fact is the transposition of sonorous sensations or +images of sound, and like them without form or figure, into visual and +motor images: "The _ruffles_ of sound that the fifer cuts out; the flute +_goes up_ to alto like a frail capital on a column." This thoroughly +plastic imagination remains identical with itself while reducing +everything spontaneously, unconsciously, to spatial terms. + +In literature this altogether foreign mode of creative activity has +found its most complete expression among the _Parnassiens_ and their +congeners, whose creed is summed up in the formula, faultless form and +impassiveness. Theophile Gautier claims that "a poet, no matter what may +be said of him, is a _workman_; it is not necessary that he have more +intelligence than a laborer and have knowledge of a state other than his +own, without which he does badly. I regard as perfectly absurd the mania +that people have of hoisting them (the poets) up onto an ideal pedestal; +_nothing is less ideal than a poet_. For him words have in themselves +and outside the meaning they express, their own beauty and value, just +like precious stones not yet cut and mounted in bracelets, necklaces and +rings; they charm the understanding that looks at them and takes them +from the finger to the little pile where they are put aside for future +use." If this statement, whether sincere or not, is taken literally, I +see no longer any difference, save as regards the materials employed, +between the imagination of poets and the imagination active in the +mechanical arts. For the usefulness of the one and the "uselessness" of +the other is a characteristic foreign to invention itself. + +3. In the teeming mass of myths and religious conceptions that the +nineteenth century has gathered with so much care we could establish +various classifications--according to race, content, intellectual level; +and, in a more artificial manner but one suitable for our subject, +according to the degree of precision or fluidity. + +Neglecting intermediate forms, we may, indeed, divide them into two +groups; some are clear in outline, are consistent, relatively logical, +resembling a definite historical relation; others are vague, multiform, +incoherent, contradictory; their characters change into one another, the +tales are mixed and are imperceptible in the whole. + +The former types are the work of the plastic imagination. Such are, if +we eliminate oriental influences, most of the myths belonging to Greece +when, on emerging from the earliest period, they attained their definite +constitution. It has been held that the plastic character of these +religious conceptions is an effect of esthetic development: statues, +bas-reliefs, poetry, and even painting, have made definite the +attributes of the gods and their history. Without denying this influence +we must nevertheless understand that it is only auxiliary. To those who +would challenge this opinion let us recall that the Hindoos have had +gigantic poems, have covered their temples with numberless sculptures, +and yet their fluid mythology is the opposite of the Greek. Among the +peoples who have incarnated their divinities in no statue, in no human +or animal form, we find the Germans and the Celts. But the mythology of +the former is clear, well kept within large lines; that of the latter is +fleeting and inconsistent--the despair of scholars.[84] + +It is, then, certain that myths of the plastic kind are the fruits of an +innate quality of mind, of a mode of feeling and of translating, at a +given moment in its history, the preponderating characters of a race; in +short, of a form of imagination and ultimately of a special cerebral +structure. + +4. The most complete manifestation of the plastic imagination is met +with in mechanical invention and what is allied thereto, in consequence +of the need of very exact representations of qualities and relations. +But this is a specialized form, and, as its importance has been too +often misunderstood, it deserves a separate study. (See Chapter V, +_infra_.) + + +III + +Such are the principal traits of this type of imagination: clearness of +outline, both of the whole and of the details. It is not identical with +the form called realistic--it is more comprehensive; it is a genus of +which "realism" is a species. Moreover, the latter expression being +reserved by custom for esthetic creation, I purposely digress in order +to dwell on this point: that the esthetic imagination has no essential +character belonging exclusively to it, and that it differs from other +forms (scientific, mechanical, etc.) only in its materials and in its +end, not in its primary nature. + +On the whole, the plastic imagination could be summed up in the +expression, _clearness in complexity_. It always preserves the mark of +its original source--i.e., in the creator and those disposed to enjoy +and understand him it tends to approach the clearness of perception. + +Would it be improper to consider as a variety of the genus a mode of +representation that could be expressed as _clearness in simplicity_? It +is the dry and rational imagination. Without depreciating it we may say +that it is rather a condition of imaginative poverty. We hold with +Fouillee that the average Frenchman furnishes a good example of it. "The +Frenchman," says he, "does not usually have a very strong imagination. +His internal vision has neither the hallucinative intensity nor the +exuberant fancy of the German and Anglo-Saxon mind; it is an +intellectual and distant view rather than a sensitive resurrection or an +immediate contact with, and possession of, the things themselves. +Inclined to deduce and construct, our intellect excels less in +representing to itself real things than in discovering relations between +possible or necessary things. In other words, it is a logical and +combining imagination that takes pleasure in what has been termed the +abstract view of life. The Chateaubriands, Hugos, Flauberts, Zolas, are +exceptional with us. We reason more than we imagine."[85] + +Its psychological constitution is reducible to two elements: slightly +concrete images, _schemas_ approaching general ideas; for their +association, relations predominantly rational, more the products of the +logic of the intellect than of the logic of the feelings. It lacks the +sudden, violent shock of emotion that gives brilliancy to images, making +them arise and grouping them in unforeseen combinations. It is a form of +invention and construction that is more the work of reason than of +imagination proper. + +Consequently, is it not paradoxical to relate it to plastic imagination, +as species to genus? It would be idle to enter upon a discussion of the +subject here without attempting a classification; let us merely note the +likenesses and differences. Both are above all objective--the first, +because it is sensory; the other, because it is rational. Both make use +of analogous modes of association, dependent more on the nature of +things than on the personal impression of the subject. Opposition exists +only on one point: the former is made up of vivid images that approach +perception; the latter is made up of internal images bordering upon +concepts. Rational imagination is plastic imagination desiccated and +simplified. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[79] Thus Taine says of Carlyle: "He cannot stick to simple +expression; at every step he drops into figures, gives body to every +idea, must touch forms. We see that he is possessed and haunted by +glittering or saddening visions; in him every thought is an +explosion; a flood of seething passion reaches the boiling-point in +his brain, which overflows, and the torrent of images runs over the +banks and rushes with all its mud and all its splendor. He cannot +reason, he must paint." Despite the vigor of this sketch, the +perusal of ten pages of _Sartor Resartus_ or of the _French +Revolution_ teaches more in regard to the nature of this imagination +than all the commentaries. + +[80] For a point of view in criticism that has seemed correct to +many on this matter, compare the well-known chapter on the "Pathetic +Fallacy" by Ruskin, in his _Modern Painters_. (Tr.) + +[81] Arreat (_Psychologie du peintre_, pp. 62 ff.) gives a large +number of examples of this. + +[82] _Ibid._, p. 115. + +[83] For further details on this point, consult Mabilleau, _Victor +Hugo_, 2nd part, chaps. II, III, IV.--Renouvier, in the book devoted +to the poet, asserts that "on account of his aptitude for +representing to himself the details of a figure, order and position +in space, beyond any present sensation," Victor Hugo could have +become a mathematician of the highest order. + +[84] As bearing out the position of the author, we may also call +attention to the fact that while the Hebrew race has had very slight +development in the plastic arts, yet its mythology has always taken +a very definite form, even when dealing with the vaguest and most +abstract subjects. (Tr.) + +[85] Fouillee, _Psychologie du peuple francais_, p. 185. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE DIFFLUENT IMAGINATION + +I + + +The diffluent imagination is another general form, but one that is +completely opposed to the foregoing. It consists of vaguely-outlined, +indistinct images that are evoked and joined according to the least +rigorous modes of association. It presents, then, two things for our +consideration--the nature of the images and of their associations. + +(1) It employs neither the clear-cut, concrete, reality-penetrated +images of the plastic imagination, nor the semi-schematic +representations of the rational imagination, but those midway in that +ascending and descending scale extending from perception to conception. +This determination, however, is insufficient, and we can make it more +precise. Analysis, indeed, discovers a certain class of ill-understood +images, which I call emotional abstractions, and which are the proper +material for the diffluent imagination. These images are reduced to +certain qualities or attributes of things, taking the place of the +whole, and chosen from among the others for various reasons, the origin +of which is affective. We shall comprehend their nature better through +the following comparison: + +Intellectual or rational abstraction results from the choice of a +fundamental, or at least principal, character, which becomes the +substitute for all the rest that is omitted. Thus, extension, +resistance, or impenetrability, come to represent, through +simplification and abbreviation, what we call "matter." + +Emotional abstraction, on the other hand, results from the permanent or +temporary predominance of an emotional state. Some aspect of a thing, +essential or not, comes into relief, solely because it is in direct +relation to the disposition of our sensibility, with no other +preoccupation; a quality, an attribute is spontaneously, arbitrarily +selected because it impresses us at the given instant--in the final +analysis, because it somehow pleases or displeases us. The images of +this class have an "impressionist" mark. They are abstractions in the +strict sense--i.e., extracts from and simplifications of the sensory +data. They act less through a direct influence than by evoking, +suggesting, whispering; they permit a glance, a passing glimpse: we may +justly call them crepuscular or twilight ideas. + +(2) As for the forms of association, the relations linking these images, +they do not depend so much on the order and connections of things as on +the changing dispositions of the mind. They have a very marked subjective +character. Some depend on the intellectual factor; the most usual are +based on chance, on distant and vacillating analogies--further down, even +on assonance and alliteration. Others depend on the affective factor and +are ruled by the disposition of the moment: association by contrast, +especially those alike in emotional basis, which have been previously +studied. (First Part, Chapter II.) + +Thus the diffluent imagination is, trait for trait, the opposite of the +plastic imagination. It has a general character of inwardness because it +arises less from sensation than from feeling, often from a simple and +fugitive impression. Its creations have not the organic character of the +other, lacking a stable center of attraction; but they act by diffusion +and inclusion. + + +II + +By its very nature it is _de jure_, if not _de facto_, excluded from +certain territories--if it ventures therein it produces only abortions. +This is true of the practical sphere, which permits neither vague images +nor approximate constructions; and of the scientific world, where the +imagination may be used only to create a theory or invent processes of +discovery (experiments, schemes of reasoning). Even with these +exceptions there is still left for it a very wide range. + +Let us rapidly pass over some very frequent, very well-known +manifestations of the diffluent imagination--those obliterated forms in +which it does not reach complete development and cannot give the full +measure of its power. + +(1) Revery and related states. This is perhaps the purest specimen of +the kind, but it remains embryonic. + +(2) The romantic turn of mind. This is seen in those who, confronted by +any event whatever or an unknown person, make up, spontaneously, +involuntarily, in spite of themselves, a story out of whole cloth. I +shall later give examples of it according to the written testimony of +several people.[86] In whatever concerns themselves or others they +create an imagined world, which they substitute for the real. + +(3) The fantastic mind. Here we come away from the vague forms; the +diffluent imagination becomes substantial and asserts itself through its +permanence. At bottom this fantastic form is the romantic spirit tending +toward objectification. The invention, which was at first only a +thoroughly internal construction and recognized as such, aspires to +become external, to become realized, and when it ventures into a world +other than its own, one requiring the rigorous conditions of the +practical imagination, it is wrecked, or succeeds only through chance, +and that very rarely. To this class belong those inventors, known to +everyone, who are fertile in methods of enriching themselves or their +country by means of agricultural, mining, industrial or commercial +enterprises; the makers of the utopias of finance, politics, society, +etc. It is a form of imagination unnaturally oriented toward the +practical.[87] + +(4) The list increases with myths and religious conceptions; the +imagination in its diffuse form here finds itself on its own ground. + +Depending on linguistics, it has recently been maintained that, among +the Aryans at least, the imagination created at first only momentary +gods (_Augenblicksgoetter_).[88] Every time that primitive man, in the +presence of a phenomenon, experienced a perceptible emotion, he +translated it by a name, the manifestation of what was imagined the +divine part in the emotion felt. "Every religious emotion gives rise to +a new name--i.e., a new divinity. But the religious imagination is +never identical with itself; though produced by the same phenomenon, it +translates itself, at two different moments, by two different words." As +a consequence, "during the early periods of the human race, religious +names must have been applied not to _classes_ of beings or events but to +_individual_ beings or events. Before worshipping the comet or the +fig-tree, men must have worshiped each one of the comets they beheld +crossing the sky, every one of the fig-trees that their eyes saw." +Later, with advancing capacity for generalization, these "instantaneous" +divinities would be condensed into more consistent gods. If this +hypothesis, which has aroused many criticisms, be sound--if this state +were met with--it would be the ideal type of imaginative instability in +the religious order. + +Nearer to us, authentic evidence shows that certain peoples, at given +stages of their history, have created such vague, fluid myths, that we +cannot succeed in delimiting them. Every god can change himself into +another, different, or even opposite, one. The Semitic religions might +furnish examples of this. There has been established the identity of +Istar, Astarte, Tanit, Baalath, Derketo, Mylitta, Aschera, and still +others. But it is in the early religion of the Hindoos that we perceive +best this kaleidoscopic process applied to divine beings. In the vedic +hymns not only are the clouds now serpents, now cows and later +fortresses (the retreats of dark Asuras), but we see Agni (fire) +becoming Kama (desire or love), and Indra becoming Varuna, and so on. +"We cannot imagine," says Taine, "such a great clearness. The myth here +is not a disguise, but an expression; no language is more true and more +supple. It permits a glimpse of, or rather, it causes us to discern the +forms of clouds, movements of the air, changes of seasons, all the +happenings of sky, fire, storm: external nature has never met a mind so +impressionable and pliant in which to mirror itself in all the +inexhaustible variety of its appearances. However changeable nature may +be, this imagination corresponds to it. It has no fixed gods; they are +changeable like the things themselves; they blend one into another. +Everyone of them is in turn the supreme deity; no one of them is a +distinct personality; everyone is only a moment of nature, able, +according to the apperception of the moment, to include its neighbor or +be included by it. In this fashion they swarm and teem. Every moment of +nature and every apperceptive moment may furnish one of them."[89] Let +us, indeed, note that, for the worshiper, the god to whom he addresses +himself and while he is praying, is always the greatest and most +powerful. The assignment of attributes passes suddenly from one to the +other, regardless of contradiction. In this versatility some writers +believe they have discovered a vague pantheistic conception. Nothing is +more questionable, fundamentally, than this interpretation. It is more +in harmony with the psychology of these naive minds to assume simply an +extreme state of "impressionism," explicable by the logic of feeling. + +Thus, there is a complete antithesis between the imagination that has +created the clear-cut and definite polytheism of the Greeks and that +whence have issued those fluctuating divinities that allow the +presentation of the future doctrine of _Maya_, of universal +illusion--another more refined form of the diffluent imagination. +Finally, let us note that the Hellenic imagination realized its gods +through anthropomorphism--they are the ideal forms of human +attributes[90]--majesty, beauty, power, wisdom, etc. The Hindoo +imagination proceeds through symbolism: its divinities have several +heads, several arms, several legs, to symbolize limitless intelligence, +power, etc.; or better still, animal forms, as e.g., Ganesa, the god of +wisdom, with the head of the elephant, reputed the wisest of animals. + +(5) It would be easy to show by the history of literature and the fine +arts that the vague forms have been preferred according to peoples, +times, and places. Let us limit ourselves to a single contemporary +example that is complete and systematically created--the art of the +"symbolists." It is not here a question of criticism, of praise, or even +of appreciation, but merely of a consideration of it as a psychological +fact likely to instruct us in regard to the nature of the diffluent +imagination. + +This form of art despises the clear and exact representation of the +outer world: it replaces it by a sort of music that aspires to express +the changing and fleeting inwardness of the human soul. It is the school +of the subject "who wants to know only mental states." To that end, it +makes use of a natural or artificial lack of precision: everything +floats in a dream, men as well as things, often without mark in time and +space. Something happens, one knows not where or when; it belongs to no +country, is of no period in time: it is _the_ forest, _the_ traveler, +_the_ city, _the_ knight, _the_ wood; less frequently, even _He_, _She_, +_It_. In short, all the vague and unstable characters of the pure, +content-less affective state. This process of "suggestion" sometimes +succeeds, sometimes fails. + +The word is the sign _par excellence_. As, according to the symbolists, +it should give us emotions rather than representations, it is necessary +that it lose, partially, its intellectual function and undergo a new +adaptation. + +A principal process consists of employing usual words and changing their +ordinary acceptation, or rather, associating them in such a way that +they lose their precise meaning, and appear vague and mysterious: these +are the words "written in the depths." The writers do not name--they +leave it for us to infer. "They banish commonplaces through lack of +precision, and leave to things only the power of moving." A rose is not +described by the particular sensations that it causes, but by the +general condition that it excites. + +Another method is the employment of new words or words that have fallen +into disuse. Ordinary words retain, in spite of everything, somewhat of +their customary meaning, associations and thoughts condensed in them +through long habit; words forgotten during four or five centuries +escape this condition--they are coins without fixed value. + +Lastly, a still more radical method is the attempt to give to words an +exclusively emotional valuation. Unconsciously or as the result of +reflection some symbolists have come to this extreme trial, which the +logic of events imposed upon them. Ordinarily, thought expresses itself +in words; feeling, in gestures, cries, interjections, change of tone: it +finds its complete and classic expression in music. The symbolists want +to transfer the role of sound to words, to make of them the instrument +for translating and suggesting emotion through sound alone: words have +to act not as signs but as sounds: they are "musical notes in the +service of an impassioned psychology." + +All this, indeed, concerns only imagination expressing itself in words; +but we know that the symbolic school has applied itself to the plastic +arts, to treat them in its own way. The difference, however, is in the +vesture that the esthetic ideal assumes. The pre-Raphaelites have +attempted, by effacing forms, outlines, semblances, colors, "to cause +things to appear as mere sources of emotion," in a word, to _paint_ +emotions. + +To sum up--In this form of the diffluent imagination the emotional +factor exercises supreme authority. + +May the type of imagination, the chief manifestations of which we have +just enumerated, be considered as identical with the idealistic +imagination? This question is similar to that asked in the preceding +chapter, and permits the same answer. In idealistic art, doubtless, the +material element furnished in perception (form, color, touch, effort) is +minimized, subtilized, sublimated, refined, so as to approach as nearly +as possible to a purely internal state. By the nature of its favorite +images, by its preference for vague associations and uncertain +relations, it presents all the characteristics of diffluent imagination; +but the latter covers a much broader field: it is the genus of which the +other is a species. Thus, it would be erroneous to regard the fantastic +imagination as idealistic; it has no claim to the term: on the contrary, +it believes itself adapted for practical work and acts in that +direction. + +In addition, it must be recognized that were we to make a complete +review of all the forms of esthetic creation, we should frequently be +embarrassed to classify them, because there are among them, as in the +case of characters, mixed or composite forms. Here, for example, are two +kinds seemingly belonging to the diffluent imagination which, however, +do not permit it to completely include them. + +(a) The "wonder" class (fairy-tales, the Thousand and One Nights, +romances of chivalry, Ariosto's poem, etc.) is a survival of the mythic +epoch, when the imagination is given free play without control or check; +whereas, in the course of centuries, art--and especially literary +creation--becomes, as we have already said, a decadent and rationalized +mythology. This form of invention consists neither of idealizing the +external world, nor reproducing it with the minuteness of realism, but +_remaking_ the universe to suit oneself, without taking into account +natural laws, and despising the impossible: it is a liberated realism. +Often, in an environment of pure fancy, where only caprice reigns, the +characters appear clear, well-fashioned, living. The "wonder" class +belongs, then, to the vague as well as to the plastic imagination; more +or less to one or to the other, according to the temperament of the +creator. + +(b) The fantastic class develops under the same conditions. Its chiefs +(Hoffmann, Poe, _et al._) are classed by critics as realists. They are +such by virtue of their vision, intensified to hallucination, the +precision in details, the rigorous logic of characters and events: they +rationalize the improbable.[91] On the other hand, the environment is +strange, shrouded in mystery: men and things move in an unreal +atmosphere, where one feels rather than perceives. It is thus proper to +remark that this class easily glides into the deeply sad, the horrible, +terrifying, nightmare-producing, "satanic literature;" Goya's paintings +of robbers and thieves being garroted; Wiertz, a genius bizarre to the +point of extravagance, who paints only suicides or the heads of +guillotined criminals. + +Religious conceptions could also furnish a fine lot of examples: Dante's +_Inferno_, the twenty-eight hells of Buddhism, which are perhaps the +masterpieces of this class, etc. But all this belongs to another +division of our subject, one that I have expressly eliminated from this +essay--the pathology of the creative imagination. + + +III + +There yet remains for us to study two important varieties that I connect +with the diffluent imagination. + +NUMERICAL IMAGINATION + +Under this head I designate the imagination that takes pleasure in the +unlimited--in infinity of time and space--under the form of number. It +seems at first that these two terms--imagination and number--must be +mutually exclusive. Every number is precise, rigorously determined, +since we can always reduce it to a relation with unity; it owes nothing +to fancy. But the _series_ of numbers is unlimited in two directions: +starting from any term in the series, we may go on ever increasingly or +ever decreasingly. The working of the mind gives rise to a possible +infinity that is limitless: it thus traces a route for the movement of +the imagination. The number, or rather the series of numbers, is less an +object than a vehicle. + +This form of imagination is produced in two principal ways--in religious +conceptions and cosmogonies, and in science. + +(1) Numerical imagination has nowhere been more exuberant than among the +peoples of the Orient. They have played with number with magnificent +audacity and prodigality. Chaldean cosmogony relates that _Oannes_, the +Fish-god, devoted 259,200 years to the education of mankind, then came a +period of 432,000 years taken up with the reigns of mythical personages, +and at the end of these 691,000 years, the deluge renewed the face of the +earth. The Egyptians, also, were liberal with millions of years, and in +the face of the brief and limited chronology of the Greeks (another kind +of imagination) were wont to exclaim, "You, O Greeks, you are only +children!" But the Hindoos have done better than all that. They have +invented enormous units to serve as basis and content for their numerical +fancies: the _Koti_, equivalent to ten millions; the _Kalpa_ (or the age +of the world between two destructions), 4,328,000,000 years. Each _Kalpa_ +is merely one of 365 days of divine life: I leave to the reader, if he is +so inclined, the work of calculating this appalling number. The Djanas +divide time into two periods, one ascending, the other descending: each is +of fabulous duration, 2,000,000,000,000,000 oceans of years; each ocean +being itself equivalent to 1,000,000,000,000,000 years. "If there were a +lofty rock, sixteen miles in each dimension, and one touched it once in a +hundred years with a bit of the finest Benares linen, it would be reduced +to the size of a wango-stone before a fourth of one of these _Kalpas_ had +rolled by." In the sacred books of Buddhism, poor, dry, colorless, as they +ordinarily are, imagination in its numerical forms is triumphant. The +_Lalitavistara_ is full of nomenclatures and enumerations of fatiguing +monotony: Buddha is seated on a rock shaded by 100,000 parasols, +surrounded by minor gods forming an assemblage of 68,000 _Kotis_ (i.e., +680,000,000 persons), and--this surpasses all the rest--"he had +experienced many vicissitudes during 10,100,000,000 _Kalpas_." This makes +one dizzy. + +(2) Numerical imagination in the sciences does not take on these +delirious forms; it has the advantage of resting on an objective basis: +it is the substitute of an unrepresentable reality. Scientific culture, +which people often accuse of stifling imagination, on the contrary opens +to it a field much vaster than esthetics. Astronomy delights in +infinitudes of time and space: it sees worlds arise, burn at first with +the feeble light of a nebular mass, glow like suns, become chilled, +covered with spots, and then become condensed. Geology follows the +development of our earth through upheavals and cataclysms: it foresees a +distant future when our globe, deprived of the atmospheric vapors that +protect it, will perish of cold. The hypotheses of physics and chemistry +in regard to atoms and molecules are not less reckless than the +speculations of the Hindoo imagination. "Physicists have determined the +volume of a molecule, and referring to the numbers that they give, we +find that a cube, a millimeter each way (scarcely the volume of a +silkworm's egg), would contain a number of molecules at least equal to +the cube of 10,000,000--i.e., unity followed by twenty-one zeros. One +scientist has calculated that if one had to count them and could +separate in thought a million per second, it would take more than +250,000,000 years: the being who commenced the task at the time that our +solar system could have been no more than a formless nebula, would not +yet have reached the end."[92] Biology, with its protoplasmic elements, +its plastids, gemmules, hypotheses on hereditary transmission by means +of infinitesimal subdivisions; the theory of evolution, which speaks +off-hand of periods of a hundred thousand years; and many other +scientific theses that I omit, offer fine material for the numerical +imagination. + +More than one scientist has even made use of this form of imagination +for the pleasure of developing a purely fanciful notion. Thus Von Baer, +supposing that we might perceive the portions of duration in another +way, imagines the changes that would result therefrom in our outlook on +nature: "Suppose we were able, within the length of a second, to note +10,000 events distinctly, instead of barely 10, as now; if our life were +then destined to hold the same number of impressions, it might be 1,000 +times as short. We should live less than a month, and personally know +nothing of the change of seasons. If born in winter, we should believe +in summer as we now believe in the heats of the Carboniferous era. The +motions of organic beings would be so slow to our senses as to be +inferred, not seen. The sun would stand still in the sky, the moon be +almost free from change, and so on. But now reverse the hypothesis and +suppose a being to get only one 1,000th part of the sensations that we +get in a given time, and consequently to live 1,000 times as long. +Winters and summers will be to him like quarters of an hour. Mushrooms +and the swifter-growing plants will shoot into being so rapidly as to +appear instantaneous creations; annual shrubs will rise and fall from +the earth like restlessly boiling water springs; the motions of animals +will be as invisible as are to us the movements of bullets and +cannonballs; the sun will scour through the sky like a meteor, leaving a +fiery trail behind him, etc."[93] + +The psychologic conditions of this variety of the creative imagination +are, then, these: Absence of limitation in time and space, whence the +possibility of an endless movement in all directions, and the +possibility of filling either with a myriad of dimly-perceived events. +These events not being susceptible of clear representation as to their +nature and quantity, escaping even a schematic representation, the +imagination makes its constructions with substitutes that are, in this +case, numbers. + + +IV + +MUSICAL IMAGINATION + +Musical imagination deserves a separate monograph. As the task requires, +in addition to psychological capacity, a profound knowledge of musical +history and technique, it cannot be undertaken here. I purpose only one +thing, namely, to show that it has its own individual mark--that it is +the type of affective imagination. + +I have elsewhere[94] attempted to prove that, contrary to the general +opinion of psychologists, there exists, in many men at least, an +affective memory; that is, a memory of emotions strictly so called, and +not merely of the intellectual conditions that caused and accompanied +them. I hold that there exists also a form of the creative imagination +that is purely emotional--the contents of which are wholly made up of +states of mind, dispositions, wants, aspirations, feelings, and emotions +of all kinds, and that it is the characteristic of the composer of +genius, of the born musician. + +The musician sees in the world what concerns him. "He carries in his +head a coherent system of tone-images, in which every element has its +place and value; he perceives delicate differences of sound, of +_timbre_; he succeeds, through exercise, in penetrating into their most +varied combinations, and the knowledge of harmonious relations is for +him what design and the knowledge of color are for the painter: +intervals and harmony, rhythm and tone-qualities are, as it were, +standards to which he relates his present perceptions and which he +causes to enter into the marvelous constructions of his fancy."[95] + +These sound-elements and their combinations are the words of a special +language that is very clear for some, impenetrable for others. People +have spoken to a tiresome extent of the vagueness of musical expression; +some have been pleased to hold that every one may interpret it in his +own way. We must surely recognize that emotional language does not +possess the precision of intellectual language; but in music it is the +same as in any other idiom: there are those who do not understand at +all; those who half understand and consequently always give wrong +renderings; and those who understand well--and in this last category +there are grades as varying as the aptitude for perceiving the delicate +and subtle shades of speech.[96] + +The materials necessary for this form of imaginative construction are +gathered slowly. Many centuries passed between the early ages when man's +voice and the simple instruments imitating it translated simple +emotions, to the period when the efforts of antiquity and of the middle +ages finally furnished the musical imagination with the means of +expressing itself completely, and allowed complex and difficult +constructions in sound. The development of music--slow and belated as +compared to the other arts--has perhaps been due, in part at least, to +the fact that the affective imagination, its chief province (imitative, +descriptive, picturesque music being only an episode and accessory), +being made up, contrary to sensorial imagination, of tenuous, subtle, +fugitive states, has been long in seeking its methods of analysis and of +expression. However it be, Bach and the contrapuntists, by their +treatment in an independent manner of the different voices constituting +harmony, have opened a new path. Henceforth melody will be able to +develop and give rise to the richest combinations. We shall be able to +associate various melodies, sing them at the same time, or in +alternation, assign them to various instruments, vary indefinitely the +pitch of singing and concerted voices. The boundless realm of musical +combinations is open; it has been worth while to take the trouble to +invent. Modern polyphony with its power of expressing at the same time +different, even opposing, feelings is a marvelous instrument for a form +of imagination which, alien to the forms clear-cut in space, moves only +in time. + +What furnishes us the best entrance into the psychology of this form of +imagination is the natural transposition operative in musicians. It +consists in this: An external or internal impression, any occurrence +whatever, even a metaphysical idea, undergoes change of a certain kind, +which the following examples will make better understood than any amount +of commentary. + +Beethoven said of Klopstock's _Messiah_, "always _maestoso_, written in +_D flat major_." In his fourth symphony he expressed musically the +destiny of Napoleon; in the ninth symphony he tries to give a proof of +the existence of God. By the side of a dead friend, in a room draped in +black, he improvises the _adagio_ of the sonata in _C sharp minor_. The +biographers of Mendelssohn relate analogous instances of transposition +under musical form. During a storm that almost engulfed George Sand, +Chopin, alone in the house, under the influence of his agony, and half +unconsciously, composed one of his _Preludes_. The case of Schumann is +perhaps the most curious of all: "From the age of eight, he would amuse +himself with sketching what might be called musical portraits, drawing +by means of various turns of song and varied rhythms the shades of +character, and even the physical peculiarities, of his young comrades. +He sometimes succeeded in making such striking resemblances that all +would recognize, with no further designation, the figure indicated by +the skillful fingers that genius was already guiding." He said later: "I +feel myself affected by all that goes on in the world--men, politics, +literature; I reflect on all that in my own way and it issues outwards +in the form of music. That is why many of my compositions are so hard to +understand: they relate to events of distant interest, though important; +but everything remarkable that is furnished me by the period I must +express musically." Let us recall again that Weber interpreted in one of +the finest scenes of his _Freyschuetz_ (the bullet-casting scene) "a +landscape that he had seen near the falls of Geroldsau, at the hour when +the moon's rays cause the basin in which the water rushes and boils to +glisten like silver."[97] In short, the events go into the composer's +brain, mix there, and come out changed into a musical structure. + +The plastic imagination furnishes us a counter-proof: it transposes +inversely. The musical impression traverses the brain, sets it in +turmoil, but comes out transformed into visual images. We have already +cited examples from Victor Hugo (ch. I); Goethe, we know, had poor +musical gifts. After having the young Mendelssohn render an overture +from Bach, he exclaimed, "How pompous and grand that is! It seems to me +like a procession of grand personages, in gala attire, descending the +steps of a gigantic staircase." + +We might generalize the question and ask whether or no there exists a +natural antagonism between true musical imagination and plastic +imagination. An answer in the affirmative seems scarcely liable to be +challenged. I had undertaken an investigation which, at the outset, made +for a different goal. It happens that it answered clearly enough the +question propounded above: the conclusion has arisen of itself, +unsought; which fact saves me from any charge of a preconceived opinion. + +The question asked orally of a large number of people was this: "Does +hearing or even remembering a bit of _symphonic_ music excite visual +images in you and of what kind are they?" For self evident reasons +dramatic music was expressly excluded: the appearance of the theater, +stage, and scenery impose on the observer visual perceptions that have a +tendency to be repeated later in the form of memories. + +The result of observation and of the collected answers are summed up as +follows: + +Those who possess great musical culture and--this is by far more +important--taste or passion for music, generally have no visual images. +If these arise, it is only momentarily, and by chance. I give a few of +the answers: "I see absolutely nothing; I am occupied altogether with +the pleasure of the music: I live entirely in a world of sound. In +accordance with my knowledge of harmony, I analyze the harmonies but +not for long. I follow the development of the phrasing." "I see nothing: +I am given up wholly to my impressions. I believe that the chief effect +of music is to heighten in everyone the predominating feelings." + +Those who possess little musical culture, and especially those having +little taste for music, have very clear visual representations. It must +nevertheless be admitted that it is very hard to investigate these +people. Because of their anti-musical natures, they avoid concerts, or +at the most, resign themselves to sit through an opera. However, since +the nature and quality of the music does not matter here, we may quote: +"Hearing a Barbary organ in the street, I picture the instrument to +myself. I see the man turning the crank. If military music sounds from +afar, I _see_ a regiment marching." An excellent pianist plays for a +friend Beethoven's sonata in C sharp minor, putting into its execution +all the pathos of which he is capable. The other sees in it "the tumult +and excitement of a fair." Here the musical rendering is misinterpreted +through misapprehension. I have several times noted this--in people +familiar with design or painting, music calls up pictures and various +scenes; one of these persons says that he is "besieged by visual +images." Here the hearing of music evidently acts as excitant.[98] + +In a word, insofar as it is permissible in psychology to make use of +general formulas--and with the proviso that they apply to most, not to +all cases--we may say that during the working of the musical imagination +the appearance of visual images is the exception; that when this form of +imagination is weak, the appearance of images is the rule. + +Furthermore, this result of observation is altogether in accord with +logic. There is an irreducible antithesis between affective imagination, +the characteristic of which is interiority, and visual imagination, +basically objective. Intellectual language--speech--is an arrangement +of words that stand for objects, qualities, relations, extracts of +things: in order to be understood they must call up in consciousness the +corresponding images. Emotional language--music--is an appropriate +ordering of successive or simultaneous sounds, of melodies and harmonies +that are signs of affective states: in order to be understood, they must +call up in consciousness the corresponding affective modifications. But, +in the non-musically inclined, the evocative power is small--sonorous +combinations excite only superficial and unstable internal states. The +exterior excitation, that of the sounds, follows the line of least +resistance, and acting according to the psychic nature of the +individual, tends to arouse objective images, pictures, visual +representations, well or ill adapted. + +To sum up: In contrast to sensorial imagination, which has its origin +without, affective imagination begins within. The _stuff_ of its +creation is found in the mental states enumerated above, and in their +innumerable combinations, which it expresses and fixes in language +peculiar to itself, of which it has been able to make wonderful use. +Taking it altogether, the only great division possible between the +different types of imagination is perhaps reducible to this: To speak +more exactly, there are exterior and interior imaginations. These two +chapters have given a sketch of them. There now remains for us to study +the less general forms of the creative power. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[86] See Appendix E. + +[87] Let us cite merely the case of Balzac who, says one of his +biographers, "was always odd." He buys a property, in order to start +a dairy there with "the best cows in the world," from which he +expects to receive a net income of 3,000 francs. In addition, +high-grade vegetable gardens, same income; vineyard, with Malaga +plants, which should bring about 2,000 fr. He has the commune of +Sevres deed over to him a walnut tree, worth annually 2,000 francs +to him, because all the townspeople dump their rubbish there. And so +on, until at the end of four years he sees himself obliged to sell +his domain for 3,000 francs, after spending on it thrice that sum. + +[88] Usener, _Goetternamen_, 1896. + +[89] _Nouveaux Essais de critique_, p. 320. + +[90] Or, as it has been expressed, "human qualities raised to their +highest power." (Tr.) + +[91] The same statement holds good as regards the "Temptations of +Saint Anthony" and other analogous subjects that have often +attracted painters. + +[92] R. Dubois, _Lecons de physiologie generale et comparee_, p. +286. + +[93] Von Baer, in James, _Psychology_, I, 639. + +[94] _Psychology of the Emotions_, Part I, Chapter IX. + +[95] Arreat, _Memoire et Imagination_, p. 118. + +[96] Mendelssohn wrote to an author who composed verses for his +_Lieder_: "Music is more definite than speech, and to want to +explain it by means of words is to make the meaning obscure. I do +not think that words suffice for that end, and were I persuaded to +the contrary, I would not compose music. There are people who accuse +music of being ambiguous, who allege that words are always +understood: for me it is just the other way; words seem to me vague, +ambiguous, unintelligible, if we compare them to the true music that +fills the soul with a thousand things better than words. What the +music that I like expresses to me seems to me too _definite_, rather +than too indefinite, for anyone to be able to match words to it." + +[97] Oelzelt-Newin, _op. cit._, pp. 22-23. For analogous facts from +contemporary musicians, see Paulhan, _Rev. Phil._, 1898, pp. 234-35. + +[98] For the sake of brevity and clearness I do not give here the +observations and evidence. They will be found at the end of this +work, as Appendix D. + +Under the title "An experimental test of musical expressiveness," +Gilman, in _American Journal of Psychology_, vol. IV, No. 4, and vol. +V, No. 1 (1892-3), has studied from another point of view the effect +of music on various listeners. Eleven selections were given; I note +that three or four at the most excited visual images--ten (perhaps +eleven), emotional states. More recently, the _Psychological Review_ +(September, 1898, pp. 463 ff.) has published a personal observation of +Macdougal in which sight-images accompany the hearing of music only +exceptionally and under special conditions. The author characterizes +himself as a "poor visualizer;" he declares that music arouses in him +only very rarely visual representations; "even then they are +fragmentary, consisting of simple forms without bond between them, +appearing on a dark background, remaining visible for a moment or two, +and soon disappearing." But, having gone to the concert fatigued and +jaded, he sees nothing during the first number: the visions begin +during the _andante_ of the second, and accompany "in profusion" the +rendering of the third. (See Appendix D.) May we not assume that the +state of fatigue, by lowering the vital tone, which is the basis of +the emotional life, likewise diminishes the tendency of affective +dispositions to arise again under the form of memory? On the other +hand, sensory images remain without opposition and come to the front; +at least, unless they are reenforced by a state of semi-morbid +excitation. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE MYSTIC IMAGINATION + + +Mystic imagination deserves a place of honor, as it is the most complete +and most daring of purely theoretic invention. Related to diffluent +imagination, especially in the latter's affective form, it has its own +special characters, which we shall try to separate out. + +Mysticism rests essentially on two modes of mental life--feeling, which +we need not study; and imagination, which, in the present instance, +represents the intellectual factor. Whether the part of consciousness +that this state of mind requires and permits be imaginative in nature +and nothing else it is easy to find out. Indeed, the mystic considers +the data of sense as vain appearances, or at the most as signs revealing +and frequently laying bare the world of reality. He therefore finds no +solid support in perception. On the other hand, he scorns reasoned +thought, looking upon it as a cripple, halting half-way. He makes +neither deductions nor inductions, and does not draw conclusions after +the method of scientific hypotheses. The conclusion, then, is that he +imagines, i.e., that he realizes a construction in images that is for +him knowledge of the world; and he never proceeds, and does not proceed +here, save _ex analogia hominis_. + + +I + +The root of the mystic imagination consists of a tendency to incarnate +the ideal in the sensible, to discover a hidden "idea" in every material +phenomenon or occurrence, to suppose in things a supranatural principle +that reveals itself to whoever may penetrate to it. Its fundamental +character, from which the others are derived, is thus a way of thinking +_symbolically_; but the algebraist also thinks by means of symbols, yet +is not on that account a mystic. The nature of this symbolism must, +then, be determined. + +In doing so, let us note first of all that our images--understanding the +word "image" in its broadest sense--may be divided into two distinct +groups: + +(1) _Concrete_ images, earliest to be received, being representations of +greatest power, residues of our perceptions, with which they have a +direct and immediate relation. + +(2) _Symbolic_ images, or signs, of secondary acquirement, being +representations of lesser power, having only indirect and mediate +relations with things. + +Let us make the differences between the two clear by a few simple +examples. + +Concrete images are: In the visual sphere, the recollection of faces, +monuments, landscapes, etc.; in the auditory sphere, the remembrance of +the sounds of the sea, wind, the human voice, a melody, etc.; in the +motor sphere, the tossings one feels when resting after having been at +sea, the illusions of those who have had limbs amputated, etc. + +Symbolic images are: In the visual order, written words, ideographic +signs, etc.; in the auditory order, spoken words or verbal images; in +the motor order, significant gestures, and even better, the +finger-language of deaf-mutes. + +Psychologically, these two groups are not identical in nature. Concrete +images result from a persistence of perceptions and draw from the latter +all their validity; symbolic images result from a mental synthesis, from +an association of perception and image, or of image and image. If they +have not the same origin, no more do they disappear in the same way, as +is proven by very numerous examples of aphasia. + +The originality of mystic imagination is found in this fact: It +transforms concrete images into symbolic images, and uses them as such. +It extends this process even to perceptions, so that all manifestations +of nature or of human art take on a value as signs or symbols. We shall +later find numerous examples of this. Its mode of expression is +necessarily synthetic. In itself, and because of the materials that it +makes use of, it differs from the affective imagination previously +described; it also differs from sensuous imagination, which makes use +of forms, movements, colors, as having a value of their own; and from +the imagination developing in the functions of words, through an +analytic process. It has thus a rather special mark. + +Other characters are related to this one of symbolism, or else are +derived from it, viz.: + +(1) An external character: the manner of writing and of speaking, the +mode of expression, whatever it is. "The dominant style among mystics," +says von Hartmann, "is metaphorical in the extreme--now flat and +ordinary, more often turgid and emphatic. Excess of imagination betrays +itself there, ordinarily, in the thought and in the form in which that +is rendered.... A sign of mysticism which it has been believed may often +be taken as an essential sign, is obscurity and unintelligibility of +language. We find it in almost all those who have written."[99] We might +add that even in the plastic arts, symbolists and "_decadents_" have +attempted, as far as possible, methods that merely indicate and suggest +or hint instead of giving real, definite objects: which fact makes them +inaccessible to the greater number of people. + +This characteristic of obscurity is due to two causes. First, mystical +imagination is guided by the logic of feeling, which is purely +subjective, full of leaps, jerks, and gaps. Again, it makes use of the +language of images, especially visual images--a language whose ideal is +vagueness, just as the ideal of verbal language is precision. All this +can be summed up in a phrase--the subjective character inherent in the +symbol. While seeming to speak like everyone else, the mystic uses a +personal idiom: things becoming symbols at the pleasure of his fancy, he +does not use signs that have a fixed and universally admitted value. It +is not surprising if we do not understand him. + +(2) An extraordinary abuse of analogy and comparison in their various +forms (allegory, parable, etc.)--a natural consequence of a mode of +thinking that proceeds by means of symbols, not concepts. It has been +said, and rightly, that "the only force that makes the vast field of +mysticism fruitful is analogy."[100] Bossuet, a great opponent of +mystics, had already remarked: "One of the characteristics of these +authors is the pushing of allegories to the extreme limit." With warm +imagination, having at their disposal overexcited senses, they are +lavish of changes of expressions and figures, hoping thereby to explain +the world's mysteries. We know to what inventive labors the Vedas, the +Bible, the Koran, and other sacred books have given rise. The +distinction between literal and figurative sense, which is boundlessly +arbitrary, has given commentators a freedom to imagine equal to that of +the myth-creators. + +All this is yet very reasonable; but the imagination left to itself +stops at no extravagance. After having strained the meaning of +expressions, the imaginative mind exercises itself on words and letters. +Thus, the cabalists would take the first or the last letters of the +words composing a verse, and would form with them a new word which was +to reveal the hidden meaning. Again, they would substitute for the +letters composing words the numbers that these letters represent in the +Hebrew numerical system and form the strangest combinations with them. +In the _Zohar_, all the letters of the alphabet come before God, each +one begging to be chosen as the creative element of the universe. + +Let us also bring to mind numerical mysticism, different from numerical +imagination heretofore studied. Here, number is no longer the means that +mind employs in order to soar in time and space; it becomes a symbol and +material for fanciful construction. Hence arise those "sacred numbers" +teeming in the old oriental religions:--3, symbol of the trinity; 4, +symbol of the cosmic elements; 7, representing the moon and the planets, +etc.[101] Besides these fantastic meanings, there are more complicated +inventions--calculating, from the letters of one's name, the years of +life of a sick person, the auspices of a marriage, etc. The Pythagorean +philosophy, as Zeller has shown, is the systematic form of this +mathematical mysticism, for which numbers are not symbols of +quantitative relations, but the very essence of things. + +This exaggerated symbolism, which makes the works of mystics so fragile, +and which permits the mind to feed only on glimpses, has nevertheless an +undeniable source of energy in its enchanting capacity to suggest. +Without doubt suggestion exists also in art, but much more weakly, for +reasons that we shall indicate. + +(3) Another characteristic of mystic imagination is the nature and the +great degree of belief accompanying it. We already know[102] that when +an image enters consciousness, even in the form of a recollection, of a +purely passive reproduction, it appears at first, and for a moment, just +as real as a percept. Much more so, in the case of imaginative +constructions. But this illusion has degrees, and with mystics it +attains its maximum. + +In the scientific and practical world, the work of the imagination is +accompanied by only a conditional and provisional belief. The +construction in images must justify its existence, in the case of the +scientist, by explaining; and in the case of the man of affairs, by +being embodied in an invention that is useful and answers its purpose. + +In the esthetic field, creation is accompanied by a momentary belief. +Fancy, remarks Groos, is necessarily joined to appearance. Its special +character does not consist merely in freedom in images; what +distinguishes it from association and from memory is this--that what is +merely representative is taken for the reality. The creative artist has +a conscious illusion (_bewusste Selbsttaeuschung_): _the esthetic +pleasure is an oscillation between the appearance and the reality_.[103] + +Mystic imagination presupposes an unconditioned and permanent belief. +Mystics are believers in the true sense--they have faith. This character +is peculiar to them, and has its origin in the intensity of the +affective state that excites and supports this form of invention. +Intuition becomes an object of knowledge only when clothed in images. +There has been much dispute as to the objective value of those symbolic +forms that are the working material of the mystic imagination. This +contest does not concern us here; but we may make the positive statement +that the constructive imagination has never obtained such a frequently +hallucinatory form as in the mystics. Visions, touch-illusions, external +voices, inner and "wordless" voices, which we now regard as psycho-motor +hallucinations--all that we meet every moment in their works, until they +become commonplace. But as to the nature of these psychic states there +are only two solutions possible--one, naturalistic, that we shall +indicate; the other, supernatural, which most theologians hold, and +which regards these phenomena as valid and true revelation. In either +case, the mystic imagination seems to us naturally tending toward +objectification. It tends outwardly, by a spontaneous movement that +places it on the same level as reality. Whichever conclusion we adopt, +no imaginative type has the same great gift of energy and permanence in +belief. + + +II + +Mystic imagination, working along the lines peculiar to it, produces +cosmological, religious, and metaphysical constructions, a summary +exposition of which will help us understand its true nature. + +(1) The all-embracing cosmological form is the conception of the world +by a purely imaginative being. It is rare, abnormal, and is nowadays met +with only in a few artists, dreamers, or morbidly esthetic persons, as a +kind of survival and temporary form. Thus, Victor Hugo sees in each +letter of the alphabet the pictured imitation of one of the objects +essential to human knowledge: "_A_ is the head, the gable, the +cross-beam, the arch, _arx_; _D_ is the back, _dos_; _E_ is the +basement, the console, etc., so that man's house and its architecture, +man's body and its structure, and then justice, music, the church, war, +harvesting, geometry, mountains, etc.--all that is comprised in the +alphabet through the mystic virtue of form."[104] Even more radical is +Gerard de Nerval (who, moreover, was frequently subject to +hallucinations): "At certain times everything takes on for me a new +aspect--secret voices come out of plant, tree, animals, from the +humblest insects, to caution and encourage me. Formless and lifeless +objects have mysterious turns the meaning of which I understand." To +others, contemporaries, "the real world is a fairy land." + +The middle ages--a period of lively imagination and slight rational +culture--overflowed in this direction. "Many thought that on this earth +everything is a sign, a figure, and that the visible is worth nothing +except insofar as it covers up the invisible." Plants, animals--there is +nothing that does not become subject for interpretation; all the members +of the body are emblems; the head is Christ, the hairs are the saints, +the legs are the apostles, the eye is contemplation, etc. There are +extant special books in which all that is seriously explained. Who does +not know the symbolism of the cathedrals, and the vagaries to which it +has given rise? The towers are prayer, the columns the apostles, the +stones and the mortar the assembly of the faithful; the windows are the +organs of sense, the buttresses and abutments are the divine assistance; +and so on to the minutest detail. + +In our day of intense intellectual development, it is not given to many +to return sincerely to a mental condition that recalls that of the +earliest times. Even if we come near it, we still find a difference. +Primitive man puts life, consciousness, activity, into everything; +symbolism does likewise, but it does not believe in an autonomous, +distinct, particular soul inherent in each thing. The absence of +abstraction and generalization, characteristic of humanity in its early +beginnings, when it peoples the world with myriads of animate beings, +has disappeared. Every source of activity revealed by symbols appears +as a fragmentary manifestation; it descends from a single primary, +personal or impersonal, spring. At the root of this imaginative +construction there is always either theism or pantheism. + +(2) Mystical imagination has often and erroneously been identified with +religious imagination. Although it may be held that every religion, no +matter how dull and poor, presupposes a latent mysticism, because it +supposes an Unknown beyond the reach of sense, there are religions very +slightly mystical in fact--those of savages, strictly utilitarian; among +barbarians, the martial cults of the Germans and the Aztecs; among +civilized races, Rome and Greece.[105] However, even though the mystic +imagination is not confined to the bounds of religious thought, history +shows us that there it attains its completest expansion. + +To be brief, and to keep strictly within our subject, let us note that +in the completely developed great religions there has arisen opposition +between the rationalists and the imaginative expounders, between the +dogmatists and the mystics. The former, rational architects, build by +means of abstract ideas, logical relations and methods, by deduction and +induction; the others, imaginative builders, care little for this +learned magnificence--they excel in vivid creations because the moving +energy with them is in their feelings, "in their hearts;" because they +speak a language made up of concrete images, and consequently their +wholly symbolic speech is at the same time an original construction. The +mystic imagination is a transformation of the mythic imagination, the +myth changing into symbols. It cannot escape the necessity of this. On +the other hand, the affective states cannot longer remain vague, +diffuse, purely internal; they must become fixed in time and space, and +condensed into images forming a personality, legend, event, or rite. +Thus, Buddha represents the tendencies towards pity and resignation, +summing up the aspirations for final rest. On the other hand, abstract +ideas, pure concepts, being repugnant to the mystic's nature, it is also +necessary that they take on images through which they may be seen--e.g., +the relations between God and man, in the various forms of +communion; the idea of divine protection in incarnations, mediators, +etc. But the images made use of are not dry and colorless like words +that by long use have lost all direct representative value and are +merely marks or tags. Being symbolic, i.e., concrete, they are, as we +have seen, direct substitutes for reality, and they differ as much from +words as sketching and drawing differ from our alphabetical signs, which +are, however, their derivatives or abbreviations. + +It must, however, be noted that if "the mystic fact is a naive effort to +apprehend the absolute, a mode of symbolic, not dialectic, thinking, +that lives on symbols and finds in them the only fitting +expression,"[106] it seems that this imaginative phase has been to some +minds only an internal form, for they have attempted to go beyond it +through ecstacy, aspiring to grasp the ultimate principle as a pure +unity, without image and without form,[107] which metaphysical realism +hopes to attain by other methods and by a different route. However +interesting they may be for psychology, these attempts, luring one on +further and further, by their seeming or real elimination of every +symbolic element, become foreign to our subject, and we cannot consider +them at greater length here. + +(3) "History shows that philosophy has done nothing but transform ideas +of mystic production, substituting for the form of images and +undemonstrated statements the form of assertions of a rational +system."[108] This declaration of a metaphysician saves us from dwelling +on the subject long. + +When we seek the difference between religious and metaphysical or +philosophical symbolism, we find it in the nature of the constitutive +elements. Turned in the direction of religion, mystic symbolism +presupposes two principal elements--imagination and feeling; turned in +a metaphysical direction, it presupposes imagination and a very small +rational element. This substitution involves appreciable deviation +from the primitive type. The construction is of greater logical +regularity. Besides, and this is the important characteristic, the +subject-matter--though still resembling symbolic images--tends to +become concepts: such are vivified abstractions, allegorical beings, +hereditary entities of spirits and of gods. In short, metaphysical +mysticism is a transition-form towards metaphysical rationalism, +although these two tendencies have always been inimical in the history +of philosophy, just as in the history of religion. + +In this imaginative plan of the world we may recognize stages according +to the increasing weakness of the systems, depending on the number and +quality of the hypotheses. For example, the progression is apparent +between Plotinus and the frenzied creations of the Gnostics and the +Cabalists. With the latter, we come into a world of unbridled fancy +which, in place of human romances, invents cosmic romances. Here appear +the allegorical beings mentioned above, half concept, half symbol; the +ten Sephiros of the Cabala, immutable forms of being; the _syzygies_ or +couples of Gnosticism--soul and reflection, depth and silence, reason +and life, inspiration and truth, etc.; the absolute manifesting itself +by the unfolding of fifty-two attributes, each unfolding comprising +seven _eons_, corresponding to the 364 days of the year, etc. It would +be wearisome to follow these extravagant thoughts, which, though the +learned may treat them with some respect, have for the psychologist only +the interest of pathologic evidence. Moreover, this form of mystic +imagination presents too little that is new for us to speak of it +without repeating ourselves. + +To conclude: The mystic imagination, in its alluring freedom, its +variety, and its richness, is second to no form, not even to esthetic +invention, which, according to common prejudice, is the type _par +excellence_. Following the most venturesome methods of analogy, it has +constructed conceptions of the world made up almost wholly of feelings +and images--symbolic architectures. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[99] _Philosophy of the Unconscious_, I, part 2, ch. IX. + +[100] J. Darmesteter, in Recejac, _Essai sur les fondements de la +connaissance mystique_, p. 124. + +[101] In such notions may perhaps be best found the genesis of the +present superstitions in regard to "lucky" and "unlucky" numbers, +like the number 13, which have such persistence. (Tr.) + +[102] See Part Two, chapter II. + +[103] Groos, _Die Spiele der Thiere_, pp. 308-312. + +[104] Mabilleau, _op. cit._, p. 132. + +[105] If we leave out oriental influences and the Mysteries, which, +according to Aristotle, were not dogmatic teaching, but a show, an +assemblage of symbols, acting by evocation, or suggestion, following +the special mode of mystic imagination that we already know. + +[106] Recejac, _op. cit._, pp. 139 ff. + +[107] One at once calls to mind Plotinus, whose highest philosophy +is a kind of indescribable ecstacy. (Tr.) + +[108] Hartmann, _op. cit._, vol. I, part 2, chapter IX. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION + + +It is quite generally recognized that imagination is indispensable in +all sciences; that without it we could only copy, repeat, imitate; that +it is a stimulus driving us onward and launching us into the unknown. If +there does exist a very widespread prejudice to the contrary--if many +hold that scientific culture throttles imagination--we must look for the +explanation of this view first, in the equivocation, pointed out several +times, that makes the essence of the creative imagination consist of +images, which are here most often replaced by abstractions or extracts +of things--whence it results that the created work does not have the +living forms of religion, of art, or even of mechanical invention; and +then, in the rational requirements regulating the development of the +creative faculty--it may not wander at will. In either case its end is +determined, and in order to exist, i.e., in order to be accepted, the +invention must become subject to preestablished rules. + +This variety of imagination being, after the esthetic form, the one +that psychologists have best described, we may therefore be brief. A +complete study of the subject, however, remains yet to be made. Indeed, +we may remark that there is no "scientific imagination" in general, that +its form must vary according to the nature of the science, and that, +consequently, it really resolves itself into a certain number of genera +and even of species. Whence arises the need of monographs, each one of +which should be the work of a competent man. + +No one will question that mathematicians have a way of thinking all +their own; but even this is too general. The arithmetician, the +algebraist, and more generally the analyst, in whom invention obtains in +the most abstract form of discontinuous functions--symbols and their +relations--cannot imagine like the geometrician. One may well speak of +the ideal figures of geometry--the empirical origin of which is no +longer anywhere contested--but we cannot escape from representing them +as somehow in space. Does anyone think that Monge, the creator of +descriptive geometry, who by his work has aided builders, architects, +mechanics, stone cutters in their labors, could have the same type of +imagination as the mathematician who has been given up all his life to +the theory of number? Here, then, are at least two well-marked +varieties, to say nothing of mixed forms. The physicist's imagination is +necessarily more concrete; since he is incessantly obliged to refer to +the data of sense or to that totality of visual, tactile, motor, +acoustic, thermic, etc., representations that we term the "properties +of matter." Our eye, says Tyndall, cannot see sound waves contract and +dilate, but we construct them in thought--i.e., by means of visual +images. The same remarks are true of chemists. The founders of the +atomic theory certainly _saw_ atoms, and pictured them in the mind's +eye, and their arrangement in compound bodies. The complexity of the +imagination increases still more in the geologist, the botanist, the +zoologist; it approaches more and more, with its increasing details, to +the level of perception. The physician, in whom science becomes also an +art, has need of visual representations of the exterior and interior, +microscopic and macroscopic, of the various forms of diseased +conditions; auditory representations (auscultation); tactile +representations (touch, reverberation, etc.); and let us also add that +we are not speaking merely of diagnosis of diseases, which is a matter +of reproductive imagination, but of the discovery of a new pathologic +"entity," proven and made certain from the symptoms. Lastly, if we do +not hesitate to give a very broad extension to the term "scientific," +and apply it also to invention in social matters, we shall see that the +latter is still more exacting, for one must represent to oneself not +only the elements of the past and of the present, but in addition +construct a picture of the future according to probable inductions and +deductions. + +It might be objected that the foregoing enumeration proves a great +variety in the _content_ of creative imagination but not in the +imagination itself, and that nothing has proven that, under all these +various aspects, there does not exist a so-called scientific +imagination, that always remains identical. This position is untenable. +For we have seen above[109] that there exists no creative instinct in +general, no one mere indeterminate "creative power," but only wants +that, in certain cases, excite novel combinations of images. The nature +of the separable materials, then, is a factor of the first importance; +it is determining, and indicates to the mind the direction in which it +is turned, and all treason in this regard is paid for by aborted +construction, by painful labor for some petty result. Invention, +separated from what gives it body and soul, is nothing but a pure +abstraction. + +The monographs called for above would, then, be a not unneeded work. It +is only from them collectively that the role of the imagination in the +sciences could be completely shown, and we might by abstraction separate +out the characters common to all varieties--the essential marks of this +imaginative type. + +Mathematics aside, all the sciences dealing with facts--from astronomy +to sociology--suppose three moments, namely, observation, conjecture, +verification. The first depends on external and internal sense, the +second on the creative imagination, the third on rational operations, +although the imagination is not entirely barred from it. In order to +study its influence on scientific development, we shall study it (a) in +the sciences in process of formation; (b) in the established sciences; +(c) in the processes of verification. + + +II + +It has often been said that the perfection of a science is measured by +the amount of mathematics it requires; we might say, conversely, that +its lack of completeness is measured by the amount of imagination that +it includes. It is a psychological necessity. Where the human mind +cannot explain or prove, there it invents; preferring a semblance of +knowledge to its total absence.[110] Imagination fulfills the function +of a substitute; it furnishes a subjective, conjectural solution in +place of an objective, rational explanation. This substitution has +degrees: + +(1) The sway of the imagination is almost complete in the +pseudo-sciences (alchemy, astrology, magic, occultism, etc.), which it +would be more proper to call embryonic sciences, for they were the +beginnings of more exact disciplines and their fancies have not been +without use. In the history of science, this is the golden age of the +creative imagination, corresponding to the myth-making period already +studied. + +(2) The semi-sciences, incompletely proved (certain portions of +biology, psychology, sociology, etc.), although they show a regression +of imaginative explanation repulsed by the hitherto absent or +insufficient experimentation, nevertheless abound in hypotheses, that +succeed, contradict, destroy one another. It is a commonplace truism +that does not need to be dwelt on--they furnish _ad libitum_ examples of +what has been rightly termed scientific mythology. + +Aside from the quantity of imagination expended, often without great +profit, there is another character to be noted--the nature of the belief +that accompanies imaginative creation. We have already seen repeatedly +that the intensity of the imaginary conception is in direct ratio to the +accompanying belief, or rather, that the two phenomena are really +one--merely the two aspects of one and the same state of consciousness. +But faith--i.e., the adherence of the mind to an undemonstrated +assertion--is here at its maximum. + +There are in the sciences hypotheses that are not believed in, that are +preserved for their didactic usefulness, because they furnish a simple +and convenient method of explanation. Thus the "properties of matter" +(heat, electricity, magnetism, etc.), regarded by physicists as distinct +qualities even in the first half of the last century; the "two electric +fluids;" cohesion, affinity, etc., in chemistry--these are some of the +convenient and admitted expressions to which, however, we attach no +explanatory value. + +There is also to be mentioned the hypothesis held as an approximation +of reality--this is the truly scientific position. It is accompanied by +a provisional and ever-revocable belief. This is admitted, in principle +at least, by all scientists, and has been put into practice by many of +them. + +Lastly, there is the hypothesis regarded as the truth itself--one that +is accompanied by a complete, absolute, belief. But daily observation +and history show us that in the realm of embryonic and ill-proven +sciences this disposition is more flourishing than anywhere else. _The +less proof there is, the more we believe._ This attitude, however wrong +from the standpoint of the logician, seems to the psychologist natural. +The mind clings tenaciously to the hypothesis because the latter is its +own creation, or, because in adopting it, it seems to the mind that it +should have itself discovered the hypothesis, so much does the latter +harmonize with its inner states. Let us take the hypothesis of +evolution, for example: we need not mention its high philosophical +bearing, and the immense influence that it exerts on almost all forms of +human thought. Nevertheless, it still remains an hypothesis; but for +many it is an indisputable and inviolable dogma, raised far above all +controversy. They accept it with the uncompromising fervor of believers: +a new proof of the underlying connection between imagination and +belief--they increase and decrease _pari passu_. + + +III + +Should we assign as belonging solely to the imagination every invention +or discovery--in a word, whatever is new--in the well-organized sciences +that form a body of solid, constantly-broadening doctrine? It is a hard +question. That which raises scientific knowledge above popular knowledge +is the use of an experimental method and rigorous reasoning processes; +but, is not induction and deduction going from the known to the unknown? +Without desiring to depreciate the method and its value, it must +nevertheless be admitted that it is preventive, not inventive. It +resembles, says Condillac, the parapets of a bridge, which do not help +the traveler to walk, but keep him from falling over. It is of value +especially as a habit of mind. People have wisely discoursed on the +"methods" of invention. There are none; but for which fact we could +manufacture inventors just as we make mechanics and watchmakers. It is +the imagination that invents, that provides the rational faculties with +their materials, with the position, and even the solution of their +problems. Reasoning is only a means for control and proof; it transforms +the work of the imagination into acceptable, logical results. If one has +not imagined beforehand, the logical method is aimless and useless, for +we cannot reason concerning the completely unknown. Even when a problem +seems to advance towards solution wholly through the reason, the +imagination ceaselessly intervenes in the form of a succession of +groupings, trials, guesses, and possibilities that it proposes. The +function of method is to determine its value, to accept or reject +it.[111] + +Let us show by a few examples that conjecture, the work of the combining +imagination, is at the root of the most diverse scientific +inventions.[112] + +Every mathematical invention is at first only an hypothesis that must be +demonstrated, i.e., must be brought under previously established +general principles: prior to the decisive moment of rational +verification it is only a thing imagined. "In a conversation concerning +the place of imagination in scientific work," says Liebig, "a great +French mathematician expressed the opinion to me that the greater part +of mathematical truth is acquired not through deduction, but through the +imagination. He might have said 'all the mathematical truths,' without +being wrong." We know that Pascal discovered the thirty-second +proposition of Euclid all by himself. It is true that it has been +concluded, wrongly perhaps, that he had also discovered all the earlier +ones, the order followed by the Greek geometrician not being necessary, +and not excluding other arrangements. However it be, reasoning alone was +not enough for that discovery. "Many people," says Naville, "of whom I +am one, might have thought hard all their lives without finding out the +thirty-two propositions of Euclid." This fact alone shows clearly the +difference between invention and demonstration, imagination and reason. + +In the sciences dealing with facts, all the best-established +experimental truths have passed through a conjectural stage. History +permits no doubt on this point. What makes it appear otherwise is the +fact that for centuries there has gradually come to be formed a body of +solid belief, making a whole, stored away in classic treatises from +which we learn from childhood, and in which they seem to be arranged of +themselves. We are not told of the series of checks and failures through +which[113] they have passed. Innumerable are the inventions that +remained for a long time in a state of conjecture, matters of pure +imagination, because various circumstances did not permit them to take +shape, to be demonstrated and verified. Thus, in the thirteenth century, +Roger Bacon had a very clear idea of a construction on rails similar to +our railroads; of optical instruments that would permit, as does the +telescope, to see very far, and to discover the invisible. It is even +claimed that he must have foreseen the phenomena of interferences, the +demonstration of which had to be awaited ten centuries. + +On the other hand, there are guesses that have met success without much +delay, but in which the imaginative phase--that of the invention +preceding all demonstration--is easy to locate. We know that +Tycho-Brahe, lacking inventive genius but rich in capacity for exact +observation, met Kepler, an adventurous spirit: together, the two made a +complete scientist. We have seen how Kepler, guided by a preconceived +notion of the "harmony of the spheres," after many trials and +corrections, ended by discovering his laws. Copernicus recognized +expressly that his theory was suggested to him by an hypothesis of +Pythagoras--that of a revolution of the earth about a central fire, +assumed to be in a fixed position. Newton imagined his hypothesis of +gravitation from the year 1666 on, then abandoned it, the result of his +calculations disagreeing with observation; finally he took it up again +after a lapse of a few years, having obtained from Paris the new measure +of the terrestrial meridian that permitted him to prove his guess. In +relating his discoveries, Lavoisier is lavish in expressions that leave +no doubt as to their originally conjectural character. "He _suspects_ +that the air of the atmosphere is not a simple thing, but is composed of +two very different substances." "He _presumes_ that the permanent +alkalies (potash, soda) and the earths (lime, magnesia) should not be +considered simple substances." And he adds: "What I present here is at +the most no more than a mere _conjecture_." We have mentioned above the +case of Darwin. Besides, the history of scientific discoveries is full +of facts of this sort. + +The passage from the imaginative to the rational phase may be slow or +sudden. "For eight months," says Kepler, "I have seen a first glimmer; +for three months, daylight; for the last week I see the sunlight of the +most wonderful contemplation." On the other hand, Hauey drops a bit of +crystallized calcium spar, and, looking at one of the broken prisms, +cries out, "All is found!" and immediately verifies his quick intuition +in regard to the true nature of crystallization. We have already +indicated[114] the psychological reasons for these differences. + +Underneath all the reasoning, inductions, deductions, calculations, +demonstrations, methods, and logical apparatus of every sort, there is +something animating them that is not understood, that is the work of +that complex operation--the constructive imagination. + +To conclude: The hypothesis is a creation of the mind, invested with a +provisional reality that may, after verification, become permanent. +False hypotheses are characterized as imaginary, by which designation is +meant that they have not become freed from the first state. But for +psychology they are different neither in their origin nor in their +nature from those scientific hypotheses that, subjected to the power of +reason or of experiment, have come out victorious. Besides, in addition +to abortive hypotheses, there are dethroned ones. What theory was more +clinging, more fascinating in its applications, than that of phlogiston? +Kant[115] praised it as one of the greatest discoveries of the +eighteenth century. The development of the sciences is replete with +these downfalls. They are psychological regressions: the invention, +considered for a time as adequate to reality, decays, returns to the +imaginative phase whence it seems to have emerged, and remains pure +imagination. + + +IV + +Imagination is not absent from the third stage of scientific research, +in demonstration and experimentation, but here we must be brief, (1) +because it passes to a minor place, yielding its rank to other modes of +investigation, and (2) because this study would have to become doubly +employed with the practical and mechanical imagination, which will +occupy our attention later. The imagination is here only an auxiliary, a +useful instrument, serving: + +(1) In the sciences of reasoning, to discover ingenious methods of +demonstration, stratagems for avoiding or overcoming difficulties. + +(2) In the experimental sciences for inventing methods of research or of +control--whence its analogy, above mentioned, to the practical +imagination. Furthermore, the reciprocal influence of these two forms of +imagination is a matter of common observation: a scientific discovery +permits the invention of new instruments; the invention of new +instruments makes possible experiments that are increasingly more +complicated and delicate. + +One remark further: This constructive imagination at the third stage is +the only one met with in many scientists. They lack genius for +invention, but discover details, additions, corrections, improvements. A +recent author distinguishes (a) those who have created the hypothesis, +prepared the experiments, and imagined the appropriate apparatus; (b) +those who have imagined the hypothesis and the experiment, but use means +already invented; and (c) those who, having found the hypothesis made +and demonstrated, have thought out a new method of verification.[116] +The scientific imagination becomes poorer as we follow it down this +scale, which, however, bears no relation to exactness of reasoning and +firmness of method. + +Neglecting species and varieties, we may reduce the fundamental +characters of the scientific imagination to the following: + +For its material, it has concepts, the degree of abstraction of which +varies with the nature of the science. + +It employs only those associational forms that have an objective basis, +although its mission is to form new combinations, "the discoveries +consisting of the relation of ideas, capable of being united, which +hitherto have been isolated."[117] (Laplace.) All association with an +affective basis is strictly excluded. + +It aims toward objectivity: in its conjectural construction it attempts +to reproduce the order and connection of things. Whence its natural +affinity for realistic art, which is midway between fiction and reality. + +It is unifying, and so just the opposite of the esthetic imagination, +which is rather developmental. It puts forward the master idea (Claude +Bernard's _idee directrice_), a center of attraction and impulse that +enlivens the entire work. The principle of unity, without which no +creation succeeds, is nowhere more visible than in the scientific +imagination. Even when illusory, it is useful. Pasteur, scrupulous +scientist that he was, did not hesitate to say: "The experimenter's +illusions are a part of his power: they are the preconceived ideas +serving as guides for him." + + +V + +It does not seem to me wrong to regard the imagination of the +metaphysician as a variety of the scientific imagination. Both arise +from one and the same requirement. Several times before this we have +emphasized this point--that the various forms of imagination are not the +work of an alleged "creative instinct," but that each particular one has +arisen from a special need. The scientific imagination has for its prime +motive the need of _partial_ knowledge or explanation; the metaphysical +imagination has for its prime motive the need of a _total_ or complete +explanation. The latter is no longer an endeavor on a restricted group +of phenomena, but a conjecture as to the totality of things, as +aspiration toward completely unified knowledge, a need of final +explanation that, for certain minds, is just as imperious as any other +need. + +This necessity is expressed by the creation of a cosmic or human +hypothesis constructed after the type and methods of scientific +hypotheses, but radically subjective in its origin--only apparently +objective. _It is a rationalized myth._ + +The three moments requisite for the constitution of a science are found +here, but in a modified form: reflection replaces observation, the +choice of the hypothesis becomes all-important, and its application to +everything corresponds to scientific proof. + +(1) The first moment or preparatory stage, does not belong to our +subject. It requires, however, a word in passing. In all science, +whether well or ill established, firm or weak, we start from facts +derived from observation or experiment. Here, facts are replaced by +general ideas. The terminus of every science is, then, the +starting-point of philosophical speculation:--metaphysics begins where +each separate science ends; and the limits of the latter are theories, +hypotheses. These hypotheses become working material for metaphysics +which, consequently, is an hypothesis built on hypotheses, a conjecture +grafted on conjecture, a work of imagination superimposed on works of +imagination. Its principal source, then, is imagination, to which +reflection applies itself. + +Metaphysicians, indeed, hold that the object of their researches, far +from being symbolic and abstract, as in science, or fictitious and +imaginary, as in art, is the very essence of things,--absolute reality. +Unfortunately, they have never proven that it suffices to seek in order +to find, and to wish in order to get. + +(2) The second stage is critical. It is concerned with finding the +principle that rules and explains everything. In the invention of his +theory the metaphysician gives his measure, and permits us to value his +imaginative power. But the hypothesis, which in science is always +provisional and revocable, is here the supreme reality, the fixed +position, the _inconcussum quid_. + +The choice of the principle depends on several causes: The chief of +these is the creator's individuality. Every metaphysician has a point of +view, a personal way of contemplating and interpreting the totality of +things, a belief that tends to recruit adherents. + +Secondary causes are: the influence of earlier systems, the sum of +acquired knowledge, the social _milieu_, the variable predominance of +religions, sciences, morality, esthetic culture. + +Without troubling ourselves with classifications, otherwise very +numerous, into which we may group systems (idealism, materialism, +monism, etc.) we shall, for our purpose, divide metaphysicians into the +imaginative and rational, according as the imagination is superior to +the reason or the reason rules the imagination. The differences between +these two types of mind, already clearly shown in the choice of the +hypothesis, are proven in its development. + +(3) The fundamental principle, indeed, must come out of its state of +involution and justify its universal validity by explaining everything. +This is the third moment, when the scientific process of verification is +replaced by a process of construction. + +All imaginative metaphysics have a dynamic basis, e.g., the Platonic +_Ideas_, Leibniz' _Monadology_, the _Nature-philosophy_ of Schelling, +Schopenhauer's _Will_, and Hartmann's _Unconscious_, the mystics, the +systems that assume a world-soul, etc. Semi-abstract, semi-poetic +constructions, they are permeated with imagination not only in the +general conception, but also in the numberless details of its +application. Such are the "fulgurations" of Leibniz, those very rich +digressions of Schopenhauer, etc. They have the fascination of a work of +art as much as that of science, and this is no longer questioned by +metaphysicians themselves;[118] they are living things. + +Rational metaphysics, on the other hand, have a chilly aspect, which +brings them nearer the abstract sciences. Such are most of the +mechanical conceptions, the Hegelian _Dialectic_, Spinoza's construction +_more geometrico_, the _Summa_ of the Middle Ages. These are buildings +of concepts solidly cemented together with logical relations. But art is +not wholly absent; it is seen in the systematic concatenation, in the +beautiful ordering, in the symmetry of division, in the skill with which +the generative principle is constantly brought in, in showing it +ever-present, explaining everything. It has been possible to compare +these systems with the architecture of the Gothic cathedrals, in which +the dominant idea is incessantly repeated in the numberless details of +the construction, and in the branching multiplicity of ornamentation. + +Further, whatever view we adopt as to its ultimate value, it must be +recognized that the imagination of the great metaphysicians, by the +originality and fearlessness of its conceptions, by its skill in +perfecting all parts of its work, is inferior to no other form. It is +equal to the highest, if it does not indeed surpass them. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[109] See Part I, chapter II. + +[110] Cf. the Preface to Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_. "Our +reason ... is always troubled with questions which cannot be +ignored, because they spring from the very nature of reason, and +which cannot be answered, because they transcend the powers of human +reason." (Tr.) + +[111] In the rare _Notes_ that he has left, James Watt writes that +one afternoon he had gone out for a stroll on the Green at Glasgow, +and his thoughts were absorbed with the experiments in which he was +busied, trying to prevent the cooling of the cylinder. The thought +then came to him that steam, being an elastic fluid, should expand +and be precipitated in a space formerly void; and having made a +vacuum in a separate vessel and opened communication between the +steam of the cylinder and the vacant space, we see what should +follow. Thus, having imagined the masterpiece of his discovery, he +enumerates the processes that, employed in turn, allowed him to +perfect it. + +[112] For further information we refer to the _Logique de +l'hypothese_, by E. Naville, from which are borrowed most of the +facts here given. + +[113] This much-criticised defect has been only partially overcome +in our methods of education through "object" lessons, and, if we may +call them so, evolutionary methods, showing to the child "wie es +eigentlich gewesen." Cf. J. Dewey, "_The School and Society_." (Tr.) + +[114] See above, Part Two, chapter IV. + +[115] Preface to the _Critique of Pure Reason_. + +[116] Colozza, _L'immaginazione nella Scienza_ (Paravia, 1900), pp. +89 ff. In this author will be found abundant details respecting +famous discoveries or experiments--those of Galileo, Franklin, +Grimaldi, etc. + +[117] Here is an example in confirmation, taken from Duclaux's book +on Pasteur: Herschel established a relation between the crystalline +structure of quartz and the rotatory power of the substance; later +on, Biot established it for sugar, tartaric acid, etc.--i.e., for +substances in solution, whence he concluded that the rotatory power +is due to the form of the molecule itself, not to the arrangement of +the molecules in relation to one another. Pasteur discovered a +relation between molecular dyssymmetry and hemiedry, and the study +of hemiedry in crystals led him logically to that of fermentation +and spontaneous generation. + +[118] On this point cf. Fouillee, _L'Avenir de la Metaphysique_, pp. +79 ff. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE PRACTICAL AND MECHANICAL IMAGINATION + + +The study of the practical imagination is not without difficulties. +First of all, it has not hitherto attracted psychologists, so that we +enter the field at random, and wander unguided in an unexplored region. +But the principal obstacle is in the lack of determination of this form +of imagination, and in the absence of boundary lines. Where does it +begin, and where does it end? Penetrating all our life even in its least +details, it is likely to lead us astray through the diversity, often +insignificant, of its manifestations. To convince ourselves of this +fact, let us take a man regarded as least imaginative:--subtract the +moments when his consciousness is busied with perceptions, memories, +emotions, logical thought and action--all the rest of his mental life +must be put down to the credit of the imagination. Even thus limited, +this function is not a negligible quantity:--it includes the plans and +constructions for the future, and all the dreams of escaping from the +present; and there is no man but makes such. This had to be mentioned +on account of its very triteness, because it is often forgotten, and +consequently the field of the creative imagination is unduly restricted, +being limited little by little to exceptional cases. + +It must, however, be recognized that these small facts teach us little. +Consequently, following our adopted procedure, dwelling longest on the +clearer and more evident cases in which the work of creating appears +distinctly, we shall rapidly pass over the lower forms of the practical +imagination, in order to dwell on the higher form--technical or +mechanical imagination. + + +I + +If we take an ordinary imaginative person,--understanding by this +expression, one whom his nature singles out for no special invention--we +see that he excels in the small inventions, adapted for a moment, for a +detail, for the petty needs constantly arising in human life. It is a +fruitful, ingenious, industrious mind, one that knows how to "take hold +of things." The active, enterprising American, capable of passing from +one occupation to another according to circumstances, opportunity, or +imagined profits, furnishes a good example. + +If we descend from this form of sane imagination toward the morbid +forms, we meet first the unstable--knights of industry, hunters of +adventure, inventors frequently of questionable means, people hungry for +change, always imagining what they haven't, trying in turn all +professions, becoming workmen, soldiers, sailors, merchants, etc., not +from expediency, but from natural instability. + +Further down are found the acknowledged "freaks" at the brink of +insanity, who are but the extreme form of the unstable, and who, after +having wasted haphazard much useless imagination, end in an insane +asylum or worse still. + +Let us consider these three groups together. Let us eliminate the +intellectual and moral qualities characteristic of each group, which +establish notable differences between them, and let us consider only +their inventive capacity as applied to practical life. One character +common to all is mobility--the tendency to change. It is a matter of +current observation that men of lively imagination are changeable. +Common opinion, which is also the opinion of moralists and of most +psychologists, attributes this mobility, this instability, to the +imagination. This, in my opinion, is just upside down. _It is not +because they have an active imagination that they are changeable, but it +is because they are changeable that their imagination is active._ We +thus return to the _motor_ basis of all creative work. Each new or +merely modified disposition becomes a center of attraction and pull. +Doubtless the inner push is a necessary condition, but it is not +sufficient. If there were not within them a sufficient number of +concrete, abstract, or semi-abstract representations, susceptible of +various combinations, nothing would happen; but the origin of invention +and of its frequent or constant changes of direction lies in the +emotional and motor constitution, not in the quantity or quality of +representations. I shall not dwell longer on a subject already +treated,[119] but it was proper to show, in passing, that common opinion +starts from an erroneous conception of the primary conditions of +invention--whether great or small, speculative or practical. + +In the immense empire of the practical imagination, superstitious +beliefs form a goodly province. + +What is superstition? By what positive signs do we recognize it? An +exact definition and a sure criterion are impossible. It is a flitting +notion that depends on the times, places, and nature of minds. Has it +not often been said that the religion of one is superstition to another, +and _vice versa_? This, too, is only a single instance from among many +others; for the common opinion that restricts superstition within the +bounds of religious faith is an incomplete view. There are peculiar +beliefs, foreign to every dogma and every religious feeling, from which +the most radical freethinker is not exempt; for example, the +superstitions of gamblers. Indeed, at the bottom of all such beliefs, we +always find the vague, semi-conscious notion of a mysterious +power--destiny, fate, chance. + +Without taking the trouble to set arbitrary limits, let us take the +facts as they are, without possible question, i.e., imaginary +creations, subjective fancies, having reality only for those admitting +them. Even a summary collection of past and present superstitions would +fill a library. Aside from those having a frankly religious mark, others +almost as numerous surround civil life, birth, marriage, death, +appearance and healing of diseases, _dies fasti atque nefasti_, +propitious or fateful words, auguries drawn from the meeting or acts of +certain animals. The list would be endless.[120] + +All that can be attempted here is a determination of the principal +condition of that state of mind, the psychology of which is in the last +analysis very simple. We shall thus answer in an indirect and incomplete +manner the question of criterion. + +First, since we hold that the origin of all imaginative creation is a +need, a desire, a tendency, where then is the origin of that +inexhaustible fount of fancies? _In the instinct for individual +preservation_, orientated in the direction of the future. Man seeks to +divine future events, and by various means to act on the order of things +to modify it for his own advantage or to appease his evil fate. + +As for the mental mechanism that, set in motion by this desire, produces +the vain images of the superstitious, it implies: + +(1) A deep idea of causality, reduced to a _post hoc, ergo propter hoc_. +Herodotus says of the Egyptian priests: "They have discovered more +prodigies and presages than any other people, because, when some +extraordinary thing appears, they note it as well as all the events +following it, so that if a similar prodigy appears anew, they expect to +see the same events reproduced." It is the hypothesis of an indissoluble +association between two or more events, assumed without verification, +without criticism. This manner of thinking depends on the weakness of +the logical faculties or on the excessive influence of the feelings. + +(2) The abuse of reasoning by analogy. This great artisan of the +imagination is satisfied with likenesses so vague and agreements so +strange, that it dares everything. Resemblance is no longer a quality of +things imposed on the mind, but an hypothesis of the mind imposed on +things. Astrology groups into "constellations" stars that are billions +of miles apart, believes that it discovers there an animal shape, human +or any other, and deduces therefrom alleged "influences." This star is +reddish (Mars), sign of blood; this other is of a pure, brilliant +silvery light (Venus) or livid (Saturn), and acts in a different way. We +know what clever structures of conjectures and prognoses have been built +on these foundations. Need we mention the Middle Age practice of charms, +which even in our day still has adherents among cultured people? The +physicians of the time of Charles II, says Lang, gave their patients +"mummy powder" (pulverized mummies) because the mummies, having lasted a +long time, must prolong life.[121] Gold in solution has been esteemed +as a medicine--gold, being a perfect substance, should produce perfect +health. In order to get rid of a disease nothing is more frequent among +primitive men than to picture the sick person on wood or on the ground, +and to strike the injured part with an arrow or knife, in order to +annihilate the sickening principle. + +(3) Finally, there is the magic influence ascribed to certain words. It +is the triumph of the theory of _nomina numina_; we need not return to +it. But the working of the mind on words, erecting them into entities, +conferring life and power on them--in a word, the activity that creates +myths and is the final basis of all constructive imagination--appears +also here.[122] + + +II + +Up to this point we have considered the practical imagination only in +its somewhat petty aspect in small inventions or as semi-morbid in +superstitious fancies. We now come to its higher form, mechanical +invention. + +This subject has not been studied by psychologists. Not that they have +misunderstood its role, which is, after all, very evident; but they +limit themselves to speak of it cursorily, without emphasizing it. + +In order to appreciate its importance, I see no other way than to put +ourselves face to face with the works that it has produced, to question +the history of discovery and useful arts, to profit by the disclosures +of inventors and their biographers. + +Of a work of this kind, which would be very long because the materials +are scattered, we can give here only a rough sketch, merely to take +therefrom what is of interest for psychology and what teaches us in +regard to the characters peculiar to this type of imagination. + +The erroneous view that opposes imagination to the useful, and claims +that they are mutually exclusive, is so widespread and so persistent, +that we shall seem to many to be expressing a paradox when we say that +if we could strike the balance of the imagination that man has spent and +made permanent in esthetic life on the one hand, and in technical and +mechanical invention on the other, the balance would be in favor of the +latter. This assertion, however, will not seem paradoxical to those who +have considered the question. Why, then, the view above mentioned? Why +are people inclined to believe that our present subject, if not entirely +foreign to the imagination, is only an impoverished form of it? I +account for it by the following reasons: + +Esthetic imagination, when fully complete, is simply _fixed_, i.e., +remains a fictitious matter recognized as such. It has a frankly +subjective, personal character, arbitrary in its choice of means. A work +of art--a poem, a novel, a drama, an opera, a picture, a statue--might +have been otherwise than it is. It is possible to modify the general +plan, to add or reduce an episode, to change an ending. The novelist who +in the course of his work changes his characters; the dramatic author +who, in deference to public sentiment, substitutes a happy _denouement_ +in place of a catastrophe, furnish naive testimony of this freedom of +imagination. Moreover, artistic creation, expressing itself in words, +sounds, lines, forms, colors, is cast in a mould that allows it only a +feeble "material" reality. + +The mechanical imagination is objective--it must be embodied, take on a +form that gives it a place side by side with products of nature. It is +arbitrary neither in its choice nor in its means; it is not a free +creature having its end in itself. In order to succeed, it is subjected +to rigorous physical conditions, to a determinism. It is at this cost +that it becomes a reality, and as we instinctively establish an +antithesis between the imaginary and the real, it seems that mechanical +invention is outside the realm of the imagination. Moreover, it requires +the constant intervention of calculation, of reasoning, and lastly, of a +manual operation of supreme importance. We may say without exaggerating +that the success of many mechanical creations depends on the skillful +manipulation of materials. But this last moment, because it is decisive, +should not make us forget its antecedents, especially the initial +moment, which is, for psychology, similar to all other instances of +invention, when the idea arises, tending to become objective. + +Otherwise, the differences here pointed out between the two forms of +imagination--esthetic and mechanical--are but relative. The former is +not independent of technical apprenticeship, often of long duration (e.g., +in music, sculpture, painting). As for the latter, we should not +exaggerate its determinism. Often the same end can be reached by +different inventions--by means differently imagined, through different +mental constructions; and it follows that, after all allowances are +made, these differently realized imaginations are equally useful. + +The difference between the two types is found in the nature of the need +or desire stimulating the invention, and secondly in the nature of the +materials employed. Others have confounded two distinct things--liberty +of imagination, which belongs rather to esthetic creation, and quality +and power of imagination, which may be identical in both cases. + +I have questioned certain inventors very skillful in mechanics, +addressing myself to those, preferably, whom I knew to be strangers to +any preconceived psychological theory. Their replies agree, and prove +that the birth and development of mechanical invention are very +strictly like those found in other forms of constructive imagination. As +an example, I cite the following statement of an engineer, which I +render literally: + +"The so-called creative imagination surely proceeds in very different +ways, according to temperament, aptitudes, and, in the same individual, +following the mental disposition, the _milieu_. + +"We may, however, as far as regards mechanical inventions, distinguish +four sufficiently clear phases--the germ, incubation, flowering, and +completion. + +"By germ I mean the first idea coming to the mind to furnish a solution +for a problem that the whole of one's observations, studies, and +researches has put before one, or that, put by another, has struck one. + +"Then comes incubation, often very long and painful, or, again, even +unconscious. Instinctively as well as voluntarily one brings to the +solution of the problem all the materials that the eyes and ears can +gather. + +"When this latent work is sufficiently complete, the idea suddenly +bursts forth, it may be at the end of a voluntary tension of mind, or on +the occasion of a chance remark, tearing the veil that hides the +surmised image. + +"But this image always appears simple and clear. In order to get the +ideal solution into practice, there is required a struggle against +matter, and the bringing to an issue is the most thankless part of the +inventor's work. + +"In order to give consistence and body to the idea caught sight of +enthusiastically in an aureole, one must have patience, a perseverance +through all trials. One must view on all sides the mechanical agencies +that should serve to set the image together, until the latter has +attained the simplicity that alone makes invention viable. In this work +of bringing to a head, the same spirit of invention and imagination must +be constantly drawn upon for the solution of all the details, and it is +against this arduous requirement that the great majority of inventors +rebel again and again. + +"This is then, I believe, how one may in a general way understand the +genesis of an invention. It follows from this that here, as almost +everywhere, the imagination acts through association of ideas. + +"Thanks to a profound acquaintance with known mechanical methods, the +inventor succeeds, through association of ideas, in getting novel +combinations producing new effects, towards the realization of which his +mind has in advance been bent." + +But for a slightly explored subject, the foregoing remarks are not +enough. It is necessary to determine more precisely the general and +special characters of this form of imagination. + + +_1. General Characters_ + +I term general characters those that the mechanical imagination +possesses in common with the best known, least questioned forms of the +constructive imagination. In order to be convinced that, so far as +concerns these characters it does not differ from the rest, let us take, +for the sake of comparison, esthetic imagination, since it is agreed, +rightly or wrongly, that this is the model _par excellence_. We shall +see that the essential psychological conditions coincide in the two +instances. + +The mechanical imagination thus has like the other its ideal, i.e., a +perfection conceived and put forward as capable, little by little, of +being realized. The idea is at first hidden; it is, to use our +correspondent's phrase, "the germ," the principle of unity, center of +attraction, that suggests, excites, and groups appropriate associations +of images, in which it is enwrapped and organized into a structure, an +_ensemble_ of means converging toward a common end. It thus presupposes +a dissociation of experience. The inventor undoes, decomposes, breaks up +in thought, or makes of experience a tool, an instrument, a machine, an +agency for building anew with the debris. + +The practical imagination is no more foreign to inspiration than the +esthetic imagination. The history of useful inventions is full of men +who suffered privations, persecution, ruin; who fought to the bitter end +against relatives and friends--drawn by the need of creating, fascinated +not by the hope of future gain but by the idea of an imposed mission, of +a destiny they had to fulfill. What more have poets and artists done? +The fixed and irresistible idea has led more than one to a foreseen +death, as in the discovery of explosives, the first attempts at +lightning conductors, aeronautics, and many others. Thus, from a true +intuition, primitive civilizations have put on a level great poets and +great inventors, erected into divinities or demi-gods historical or +legendary personages in whom the genius of discovery is +personified:--among the Hindoos, Vicavakarma; among the Greeks, +Hephaestos, Prometheus, Triptolemus, Daedalus and Icarus. The Chinese, +despite their dry imagination, have done the same; and we find the same +condition in Egypt, Assyria, and everywhere. Moreover, the practical and +mechanical arts have passed through a first period of no-change, during +which the artisan, subjected to fixed rules and an undisputed tradition, +considers himself an instrument of divine revelation.[123] Little by +little he has emerged from that theological age, to enter the humanistic +age, when, being fully conscious of being the author of his work, he +labors freely, changes and modifies according to his own inspiration. + +Mechanical and industrial imagination, like esthetic imagination, has +its preparatory period, its zenith and decline: the periods of the +precursors, of the great inventors, and of mere perfectors. At first a +venture is made, effort is wasted with small result,--the man has come +too early or lacks clear vision; then a great imaginative mind arises, +blossoms; after him the work passes into the hands of _dii minores_, +pupils or imitators, who add, abridge, modify: such is the order. The +many-times written history of the application of steam, from the time of +the eolipile of Hero of Alexandria to the heroic period of Newcomen and +Watt, and the improvements made since their time, is one proof of the +statement. Another example:--the machine for measuring duration is at +first a simple clepsydra; then there are added marks indicating the +subdivisions of time, then a water gauge causes a hand to move around a +dial, then two hands for the hours and minutes; then comes a great +moment--by the use of weights the clepsydra becomes a clock, at first +massive and cumbersome, later lightened, becoming capable, with +Tycho-Brahe, of marking seconds; and then another moment--Huyghens +invents the spiral spring to replace the weights, and the clock, +simplified and lightened, becomes the watch. + + +_2. Special Characters_ + +The special characteristics of the mechanical imagination being the +marks belonging to this type, we shall study them at greater length. + +(I) There is first of all, at least in great inventors, an inborn +quality,--that is, a natural disposition,--that does not originate in +experience and owes the latter only its development. This quality is a +bent in a practical, useful direction; a tendency to act, not in the +realm of dreams or human feeling, not on individuals or social groups, +not toward the attainment of theoretical knowledge of nature, but to +become master over natural forces, to transform them and adapt them +toward an end. + +Every mechanical invention arises from a need: from the strict necessity +for individual preservation in the case of primitive man who wages war +against the powers of nature; from the desire for well-being and the +necessity for luxury in growing civilization; from the need of creating +little engines, imitating instruments and machines, in the child. In a +word, _every particular invention, great or small, arises from a +particular need_; for, we repeat again, there is no creative instinct in +general. A man distinguished for various inventions along practical +lines, writes: "As far as my memory allows, I can state that in my case +conception always results from a material or mental need.[124] It +springs up suddenly. Thus, in 1887, a speech of Bismarck made me so +angry that I immediately thought of arming my country with a repeating +rifle. I had already made various applications to the ministry of war, +when I learned that the Lebel system had just been adopted. My +patriotism was fully satisfied, but I still have the design of the gun +that I invented." This communication mentions two or three other +inventions that arose under analogous circumstances, but have had a +chance of being adopted. + +Among the requisite qualities I mention the natural and necessary +preeminence of certain groups of sensations or images (visual, tactile, +motor) that may be decisive in determining the direction of the +inventor. + +(II) Mechanical invention grows by successive stratifications and +additions, as in the sciences, but more completely. It is a fine +verification of the "subsidiary law of growing complexity" previously +discussed.[125] If we measure the distance traversed since the distant +ages when man was naked and unarmed before nature to the present time of +the reign of machinery, we are astonished at the amount of imagination +produced and expended, often uselessly lavished, and we ask ourselves +how such a work could have been misunderstood or so lightly appreciated. +It does not pertain to our subject to make even a summary table of this +long development. The reader can consult the special works which, +unfortunately, are most often fragmentary and lack a general view. So we +should feel grateful to a historian of the useful arts, L. Bourdeau, +for having attempted to separate out the philosophy of the subject, and +for having fastened it down in the following formulas:[126] + +(a) The exploitation of the powers of nature is made according to their +degree of power. + +(b) The extension of working instruments has followed a logical +evolution in the direction of growing complexity and perfection. + +Man, according to the observations of M. Bourdeau, has applied his +creative activity to natural forces and has set them to work according +to a regular order, viz.: + +(1) Human forces, the only ones available during the "state of nature" +and the savage state. Before all else, man created weapons: the most +circumscribed primitive races have invented engines for attack and +defense--of wood, bone, stone, as they were able. Then the weapon became +a tool by special adaptation:--the battle-club serves as a lever, the +tomahawk as a hammer, the flint ax as a hatchet, etc. In this manner +there is gradually formed an arsenal of instruments. "Inferior to most +animals as regards certain work that would have to be done with the aid +of our organic resources alone, we are superior to all as soon as we set +our tools at work. If the rodents with their sharp teeth cut wood better +than we can, we do it still better with the ax, the chisel, the saw. +Some birds, with the help of a strong beak, by repeated blows, +penetrate the trunk of a tree: but the auger, the gimlet, the wimble do +the same work better and more quickly. The knife is superior to the +carnivore's teeth for tearing meat; the hoe better than the mole's paw +for digging earth, the trowel than the beaver's tail for beating and +spreading mortar. The oar permits us to rival the fish's fin; the sail, +the wing of the bird. The distaff and spindle allow our imitating the +industry of insect spinners; etc. Man thus reproduces and sums up in his +technical contrivances the scattered perfections of the animal world. He +even succeeds in surpassing them, because, in the form of tools, he uses +substances and combinations of effects that cannot figure as part of an +organism."[127] It is scarcely likely that most of these inventions +arose from a voluntary imitation of animals: but even supposing such an +origin, there would still remain a fine place for personal creative +work. Man has produced by conscious effort what life realizes by methods +that escape us; so that the creative imagination in man is a +_succedaneum_ of the generative powers of nature. + +(2) During the pastoral stage man brought animals under subjection and +discipline. An animal is a machine, ready-made, that needs only to be +trained to obedience; but this training has required and stimulated all +sorts of inventions, from the harness with which to equip it, to the +chariots, wagons, and roads with which and on which it moves. + +(3) Later, the natural motors--air and water--have furnished new +material for human ingenuity, e.g., in navigation; wind- and +water-mills, used at first to grind grain, then for a multitude of +uses--sawing, milling, lifting hammers; etc. + +(4) Lastly, much later, come products of an already mature civilization, +artificial motors, explosives,--powder and all its derivatives and +substitutes--steam, which has made such great progress. + +If the reader please to represent to himself well the immense number of +facts that we have just indicated in a few lines; if he please to note +that every invention, great or small, before becoming a fixed and +realized thing, was at first an imagination, a mere contrivance of the +brain, an assembly of new combinations or new relations, he will be +forced to admit that nowhere--not excepting even esthetic +production--has man imagined to such a great extent. + +One of the reasons--though not the only one--that supports the contrary +opinion is, that by the very law of their growing complexity, inventions +are grafted one on another. In all the useful arts improvements have +been so slow, and so gradually wrought, that each one of them passed +unperceived, without leaving its author the credit for its discovery. +The immense majority of inventions are anonymous--some great names alone +survive. But, whether individual or collective, imagination remains +imagination. In order that the plow, at first a simple piece of wood +hardened by the fire and pushed along with the human hand, should become +what it is to-day, through a long series of modifications described in +the special works, who knows how many imaginations have labored! In the +same way, the uncertain flame of a resinous branch guiding vaguely in +the night leads us, through a long series of inventions, to gas and +electric lighting. All objects, even the most ordinary and most common +that now serve us in our everyday-life, are _condensed imagination_. + +(III) More than any other form, mechanical imagination depends strictly +on physical conditions. It cannot rest content with combining images, it +postulates material factors that impose themselves unyieldingly. +Compared to it, the scientific imagination has much more freedom in the +building of its hypotheses. In general, every great invention has been +preceded by a period of abortive attempts. History shows that the +so-called "initial moment" of a mechanical discovery, followed by its +improvements, is the moment ending a series of unsuccessful trials: we +thus skip a phase of pure imagination, of imaginative construction that +has not been able to enter into the mold of an appropriate determinism. +There must have existed innumerable inventions that we might term +mechanical romances, which, however, we cannot refer to because they +have left us no trace, not being born viable. Others are known as +curiosities because they have blazed the path. We know that Otto de +Guericke made four fruitless attempts before discovering his air-pump. +The brothers Montgolfier were possessed with the desire to make +"imitation clouds," like those they saw moving over the Alps. "In order +to imitate nature," they at first enclosed water-vapor in a light, stout +case, which fell on cooling. Then they tried hydrogen; then the +production of a gas with electrical properties; and so on. Thus, after a +succession of hypotheses and failures, they finally succeeded. From the +end of the sixteenth century there was offered the possibility of +communicating at a distance by means of electricity. "In a work +published in 1624 the Jesuit, Father Leurechon, described an imaginary +apparatus (by means of which, he said, people could converse at a +distance) for the aid of lovers who, by the connection of their +movements, would cause a needle to move about a dial on which would be +written the letters of the alphabet; and the drawing accompanying the +text is almost a picture of Breguet's telegraph." But the author +considered it impossible "in the absence of lovers having such +ability."[128] + +Mechanical inventions that fail correspond to erroneous or unverified +scientific hypotheses. They do not emerge from the stage of pure +imagination, but they are instructive to the psychologist because they +give in bare form the initial work of the constructive imagination in +the technical field. + +There still remain the requirements of reasoning, of calculation, of +adaptation to the properties of matter. But, we repeat, this determinism +has several possible forms--one can reach the same goal through +different means. Besides, these determining conditions are not lacking +in any type of imagination; there is only a difference as between lesser +and greater. Every imaginative construction from the moment that it is +little more than a group of fancies, a spectral image haunting a +dreamer's brain, must take on a body, submit to external conditions on +which it depends, and which materialize it somewhat. In this respect, +architecture is an excellent example. It is classed among the fine arts; +but it is subject to so many limitations that its process of invention +strongly resembles technical and mechanical creations. Thus it has been +possible to say that "Architecture is the least personal of all the +arts." "Before being an art it is an industry in the sense that it has +nearly always a useful end that is imposed on it and rules its +manifestations. Whatever it builds--a temple, a theater, a palace--it +must before all else subordinate its work to the end assigned to it in +advance. This is not all:--it must take account of materials, climate, +soil, location, habits--of all things that may require much skill, tact, +calculation, which, however, do not interest art as such, and do not +permit architecture to manifest its purely esthetic qualities."[129] + +Thus, at bottom, there is an identity of nature between the constructive +imagination of the mechanic and that of the artist: the difference is +only in the end, the means, and the conditions. The formula, _Ars homo +additus naturae_, has been too often restricted to esthetics--it should +comprehend everything artificial. Esthetes, doubtless, hold that their +imagination has for them a loftier quality--a disputed question that +psychology need not discuss; for it, the essential mechanism is the same +in the two cases: a great mechanic is a poet in his own way, because he +makes instruments imitating life. "Those constructions that at other +times are the marvel of the ignorant crowd deserve the admiration of the +reflecting:--Something of the power that has organized matter seems to +have passed into combinations in which nature is imitated or surpassed. +Our machines, so varied in form and in function, are the representatives +of a new kingdom intermediate between senseless and animate forms, +having the passivity of the former and the activity of the latter, and +exploiting everything for our sake. They are counterfeits of animate +beings, capable of giving inert substances a regular functioning. Their +skeleton of iron, organs of steel, muscles of leather, soul of fire, +panting or smoking breath, rhythm of movement--sometimes even the shrill +or plaintive cries expressing effort or simulating pain:--all that +contributes to give them a fantastic likeness to life--a specter and +dream of inorganic life."[130] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[119] See above, Part One, chapter II. + +[120] For a complete and recent study of the question, see A. +Lehmann, _Aberglaube und Zauberei von den aeltesten Zeiten bis in die +Gegenwart_, 1898. + +[121] Lang, _op. cit._, I, 96. There will be found many other facts +of this kind. + +[122] If this book were not merely an essay, we should have had to +study language as an instrument of the practical life in its +relations to the creative imagination, especially the function of +analogy, in the extension and transformation of the meanings of +words. Works on linguistics are full of evidence on this point. One +could do better still by attending exclusively to the vernacular, to +slang, which shows us creative force in action. "Slang," says one +philologist, "has the property of figuring, expressing, and +picturing language.... With it, however low its origin, one could +reconstruct a people or a society." Its principal, not only, means, +are metaphor and allegory. It lends itself equally to methods that +degrade or ennoble existing words, but with a very marked preference +for the worse or degrading meanings. + +[123] Ample information on this point will be found in the work of +Espinas, _Les Origines de la Technologie_. + +[124] The same correspondent, without my having asked him in regard +to this, gives me the following details: "When about seven years old +I saw a locomotive, its fire and smoke. My father's stove also made +fire and smoke, but lacked wheels. If, then, I told my father, we +put wheels under the stove, it would move like a locomotive. Later, +when about thirteen, the sight of a steam threshing-machine +suggested to me the idea of making a horseless wagon. I began a +childish construction of one, which my father made me give up," etc. +The tendency toward mechanical invention shows itself very early in +some children--we gave examples of it before. Our inventor adds: "My +imagination was strongest at about the age of 25 to 35 (I am now 45 +years old). After that time it seems to me that the remainder of +life is good only for producing less important conceptions, forming +a natural consequence of the principal conceptions born of the +period of youth." + +[125] See above, Part Two, chapter V. + +[126] L. Bourdeau, _Les Forces de l'Industrie_, Paris, 1884. This +very substantial work, abounding in facts, conceived after a +systematic plan, has aided us much in this study. + +[127] _Op. cit._, pp. 45-46. + +[128] Quoted by L. Bourdeau (_op. cit._, p. 354), who also mentions +many other attempts: an anonymous Scot in 1753, Lesage of Geneva, +1780, Lhomond (France, 1787), Battencourt (Spain, 1787), Reiser, a +German (1794), Salva (Madrid, 1796). The insufficient study of +dynamic electricity did not permit them to succeed. + +[129] E. Veron, _L'Esthetique_, p. 315. + +[130] L. Bourdeau, _op. cit._, p. 233. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE COMMERCIAL IMAGINATION + + +Taking the word "commercial" in its broadest signification, I understand +by this expression all those forms of the constructive imagination that +have for their chief aim the production and distribution of wealth, all +inventions making for individual or collective enrichment. Even less +studied than the form preceding, this imaginative manifestation reveals +as much ingenuity as any other. The human mind is largely busied in that +way. There are inventors of all kinds--the great among these equal those +whom general opinion ranks as highest. Here, as elsewhere, the great +body invent nothing, live according to tradition, in routine and +imitation. + +Invention in the commercial or financial field is subject to various +conditions with which we are not concerned: + +(1) External conditions:--Geographical, political, economic, social, +etc., varying according to time, place, and people. Such is its external +determinism--human and social here in place of cosmic, physical, as in +mechanical invention. + +(2) Internal, psychological conditions, most of which are foreign to the +primary and essential inventive act:--on one hand, foresight, +calculation, strength of reasoning;--in a word, capacity for reflection; +on the other hand, assurance, recklessness, soaring into the unknown--in +a word, strong capacity for action. Whence arise, if we leave out the +mixed forms, two principal types--the calculating, the venturesome. In +the former the rational element is first. They are cautious, +calculating, selfish exploiters, with no great moral or social +preoccupations. In the latter, the active and emotional element +predominates. They have a broader sweep. Of this sort were the +merchant-sailors of Tyre, Carthage, and Greece; the merchant-travelers +of the Middle Ages, the mercantile and gain-hungry explorers of the +fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries; later, in a changed +form, the organizers of great companies, the inventors of monopolies, +American "trusts," etc. These are the great imaginative minds. + +Eliminating, then, from our subject, what is not the purely imaginative +element in order to study it alone, I see only two points for us to +treat, if we would avoid repetition--at the initial moment of invention, +the intuitive act that is its germ; during the period of development and +organization, the necessary and exclusive role of schematic images. + + +I + +By "intuition" we generally understand a practical, immediate judgment +that goes straight to the goal. Tact, wisdom, scent, divination, are +synonymous or equivalent expressions. First let us note that intuition +does not belong exclusively to this part of our subject, for it is found +_in parvo_ throughout; but in commercial invention it is preponderating +on account of the necessity of perceiving quickly and surely, and of +grasping chances. "Genius for business," someone has said, "consists in +making exact hypotheses regarding the fluctuations of values." To +characterize the mental state is easy, if it is a matter merely of +giving examples; very difficult, if one attempts to discover its +mechanism. + +The physician who in a trice diagnoses a disease, who, on a higher +level, groups symptoms in order to deduce a new disease from them, like +Duchenne de Boulogne; the politician who knows human nature, the +merchant who scents a good venture, etc., furnish examples of intuition. +It does not depend on the degree of culture;--not to mention women, +whose insight into practical matters is well known, there are ignorant +people--peasants, even savages--who, in their limited sphere, are the +equals of fine diplomats. + +But all these facts teach us nothing concerning its psychological +nature. Intuition presupposes acquired experience of a special nature +that gives the judgment its validity and turns it in a particular +direction. Nevertheless, this accumulated knowledge of itself gives no +evidence as to the future. Now, every intuition is an anticipation of +the future, resulting from only two processes:--inductive or deductive +reasoning, e.g., the chemist foreseeing a reaction; imagination, i.e., +a representative construction. Which is the chief process here? +Evidently the former, because it is not a matter of fancied hypothesis, +but of adaptation of former experience to a new case. Intuition +resembles logical operations much more than it does imaginative +combinations. We may liken it to unconscious reasoning, if we are not +afraid of the seeming contradiction of this expression which supposes a +logical operation without consciousness of the middle term. Although +questionable, it is perhaps to be preferred to other proposed +explanations--such as automatism, habit, "instinct," "nervous +connections." Carpenter, who as promoter of "unconscious cerebration," +deserves to be consulted, likens this state to reflection. In ending, he +reprints a letter that John Stuart Mill wrote to him on the subject, in +which he says in substance that this capacity is found in persons who +have experience and lean toward practical things, but attach little +importance to theory.[131] + +Every intuition, then, becomes concrete as a judgment, equivalent to a +conclusion. But what seems obscure and even mysterious in it is the fact +that, from among many possible solutions, it finds at the first shot the +proper one. In my opinion this difficulty arises largely from a partial +comprehension of the problem. By "intuition" people mean only cases in +which the divination is correct; they forget the other, far more +numerous, cases that are failures. The act by which one reaches a +conclusion is a special case of it. What constitutes the originality of +the operation is not its accuracy, but its _rapidity_--the latter is the +essential character, the former accessory. + +Further, it must be acknowledged that the gift of seeing correctly is an +inborn quality, vouchsafed to one, denied to another:--people are born +with it, just as they are born right-or left-handed: experience does not +give it--only permits it to be put to use. As for knowing why the +intuitive act now succeeds and at another time fails, that is a question +that comes down to the natural distinction between accurate and +erroneous minds, which we do not need to examine here. + +Without dwelling longer on this initial stage, let us return to the +commercial imagination, and follow it in its development. + + +II + +The human race passed through a pre-commercial age. The Australians, +Fuegians, and their class seem to have had no idea whatever of exchange. +This primitive period, which was long, corresponds to the age of the +horde or large clan. Commercial invention, arising like the other forms +from needs,--simple and indispensable at first, artificial and +superfluous later,--could not arise in that dim period when the groups +had almost their sole relations with one another as war. Nothing called +it to arise. But at a higher stage the rudimentary form of commerce, +exchange in kind or truck, appeared early and almost everywhere. Then +this long, cumbersome, inconvenient method gave place to a more +ingenious invention--the employment of "standard values," beings or +material objects serving as a common measure for all the rest:--their +choice varied with the time, place, and people--e.g., certain shells, +salt, cocoa-seeds, cloth, straw-matting, cattle, slaves, etc.; but this +innovation held all the remainder in the germ, for it was the first +attempt at substitution. But during the earliest period of commercial +evolution the chief effort at invention consisted of finding +increasingly more simple methods in the mechanism of exchange. Thus, +there succeeded to these disparate values, the precious metals, in the +form of powder and ingots, subject to theft and the inconveniences of +weighing. Then, money of fixed denomination, struck under the authority +of a chief or of a social group. Finally, gold and silver are replaced +by the letter of credit, the bank check, and the numerous forms of +fiduciary money.[132] + +Every one of these forward steps is due to inventors. I say inventors, +in the plural, because it is proven that every change in the means of +exchange has been imagined several times, in several ages--though in the +same way--on the surface of our earth. + +Summing up--the inventive labor of this period is reduced to creating +increasingly more simple and more rapid methods of _substitution_ in the +commercial mechanism. + +The appearance of commerce on a large scale has depended on the state of +agriculture, industry, ways of communication, social and economic +conditions and political extension. It came into being toward the end of +the Roman Republic. After the interruption of the Middle Ages the +activity is taken up again by the Italian cities, the Hanseatic League, +etc.; in the fifteenth century with the great maritime discoveries; in +the sixteenth century by the _Conquistadores_, hungering for adventure +and wealth; later on, by the mixed expeditions, whose expenses are +defrayed by merchants in common, and which are often accompanied by +armed bands that fight for them; lastly comes the incorporation of great +companies that have been wittily dubbed "_Conquistadores_ of the +counting-house." + +We now come to the moment when commercial invention attains its complex +form and must move great masses. Taken as a whole, its psychological +mechanism is the same as that of any other creative work. In the first +instance, the idea arises, from inspiration, from reflection, or by +chance. Then comes a period of fermenting during which the inventor +sketches his construction in images, represents to himself the material +to be worked upon, the grouping of stockholders, the making up of a +capital, the mechanism of buying and selling, etc. All this differs from +the genesis of an esthetic or mechanical work only in the end, or in the +nature of the images. In the second phase it is necessary to proceed to +execution--a castle in the air must be made a solid structure. Then +appear a thousand obstructions in the details that must be overcome. As +everywhere else, minor inventions become grafted on the principal +invention; the author lets us see the poverty or richness in resource of +his mind. Finally, the work is triumphant, fails, or is only +half-successful. + +Did it keep only to these general traits, commercial imagination would +be merely the reiteration, with slight changes, of forms already +studied; but it has characteristics all its own that must be +distinguished. + +(1) It is a combining or tactical imagination. Heretofore, we have met +nothing like it. This special mark is derived from the very nature of +its determinism, which is very different from that limiting the +scientific or mechanical imagination. Every commercial project, in order +to emerge from the internal, purely imaginative phase, and become a +reality, requires "coming to a head," very exact calculation of +frequently numerous, divergent, even contrary elements. The American +dealer speculating in grain is under the absolute necessity of being +quickly and surely informed regarding the agricultural situation in all +countries of the world that are rich in grain, that export or import; in +regard to the probable chances of rain or drouth; the tariff duties of +the various countries, etc. Lacking that, he buys and sells haphazard. +Moreover, as he deals in enormous quantities, the least error means +great losses, the smallest profit on a unit is of account, and is +multiplied and increased into a noticeable gain. + +Besides that initial intuition that shows opportune business and +moments, commercial imagination presupposes a well-studied, detailed +campaign for attack and defense, a rapid and reliable glance at every +moment of execution in order to incessantly modify this plan--it is a +kind of war. All this totality of special conditions results from a +general condition,--namely, competition, strife. We shall come back to +this point at the end of the chapter. + +Let us follow to the end the working of this creative imagination. Like +the other forms, this kind of invention arises from a need, a +desire--that of the spreading of "self-feeling," of the expansion of the +individual under the form of enrichment. But this tendency, and with it +the resulting imaginative creation, can undergo changes. + +It is a well-known law of the emotional life that what is at first +sought as a means may become an end and be desired for itself. A very +sensual passion may at length undergo a sort of idealization; people +study a science at first because it is useful, and later because of its +fascination; and we may desire money in order to spend it, and later in +order to hoard it. Here it is the same: the financial inventor is often +possessed with a kind of intoxication--he no longer labors for lucre, +but for art; he becomes, in his own way, an author of romance. His +imagination, set at the beginning toward gain, now seeks only its +complete expansion, the assertion and eruption of its creative power, +the pleasure of inventing for invention's sake,[133] daring the +extraordinary, the unheard-of--it is the victory of pure construction. +The natural equilibrium between the three necessary elements of +creation--mobility, combination of images, calculation--is destroyed. +The rational element gives way, is obliterated, and the speculator is +launched into adventure with the possibility of a dazzling success or +astounding catastrophe. But let us note well that the primary and sole +cause of this change is in the affective and motor element, in an +hypertrophy of the lust for power, in an unmeasured and morbid want of +expansion of self. Here, as everywhere, the source of invention is the +emotional nature of the inventor. + +(2) A second special character of commercial imagination is the +exclusive employment of schematic representations. Although this process +is also met with in the sciences and especially in social inventions, +the imaginative type that we are now considering has the privilege of +using them without exception. This, then, is the proper moment for a +description. + +By "schematic images" I mean those that are, by their very nature, +intermediate between the concrete image and the pure concept, but +approach more nearly the concept. We have already pointed out very +different kinds of representations--concrete images, material pertaining +to plastic and mechanical imagination; the emotional abstractions of the +diffluent imagination; affective images, the type of which is found in +musicians; symbolic images, familiar in mystics. It may seem improper to +add another class to this list, but it is not a meaningless subtlety. +Indeed, there are no images in general that, according to the ordinary +conception, would be copies of reality. Even their separation into +visual, auditory, motor, etc., is not sufficient, because it +distinguishes them only with regard to their _origin_. There are other +differences. We have seen that the image, like everything living, +undergoes corrosions, damages, twisting, and transformation: whence it +comes about that this remainder of former impressions varies according +to its composition, i.e., in simplicity, complexity, grouping of its +constitutive elements, etc., and takes on many aspects. On the other +hand, as the difference between the chief types of creative imagination +depends in part on the materials employed--on the nature of the images +that serve in mental building--a precise determination of the nature of +the images belonging to each type is not an idle operation. + +In order to clearly explain what we mean by schematic images, let us +represent by a line, _PC_, the scale of images according to the degree +of complexity, from the percept, _P_, to the concept, _C_. + + P------------X----G----S----C + +As far as I am aware, this determination of all the degrees has never +been made. The work would be delicate; I do not regard it as impossible. +I have no intention to undertake it, even as I do not pretend that I +have given above the complete list of the various forms of images. + +If, then, we consider the foregoing figure merely as a means of +representing the gradation to the eye, the image in moving, by +hypothesis, from the moment of perception, _P_, is less and less in +contact with reality, becomes simplified, impoverished, and loses some +of its constitutive elements. At _X_ it crosses the middle threshold to +approach nearer and nearer to the concept. At _G_ let us locate generic +images, primitive forms of generalization, whose nature and process of +becoming are well-known;[134] we should place farther along, at _S_, +schematic images, which require a higher function of mind. Indeed, the +generic image results from a spontaneous fusion of like or very +analogous images--such as the vague representation of the oak, the +horse, the negro, etc.; it belongs to only one class of objects. The +schematic image results from a voluntary act; it is not limited to exact +resemblances--it rises into abstraction; so it is scarcely accompanied +by a fleeting representation of concrete objects--it is almost reduced +to the word. At a higher level, it is freed from all sensuous elements +or pictures, and is reduced, in the present instance, to the mere notion +of value--it is not different from a pure concept. While the artist and +the mechanic build with concrete images, the commercial imagination can +act directly neither on things nor on their immediate representations, +because from the time that it goes beyond the primitive age it requires +a substitution of increasing generality; materials become values that +are in turn reducible to symbols. Consequently, it proceeds as in the +stating and solving of abstract problems in which, after having +substituted for things and their relations figures and letters, +calculation works with signs, and indirectly with things. + +Aside from the first moment of invention, the finding of the idea--an +invariable psychological state--it must be recognized that in its +development and detailed construction the commercial imagination is made +up chiefly of calculations and combinations that hardly permit concrete +images. If we admit, then,--and this is unquestionable--that these are +the materials _par excellence_ of the creative imagination, we shall be +disposed to hold that the imaginative type we are now studying is a kind +of involution, a case of impoverishment--an unacceptable thesis as +regards the invention itself, but strictly acceptable as regards the +conditions that necessity imposes upon it. + +In closing, let us note that financial imagination does not always have +as its goal the enriching of an individual or of a closely limited group +of associates: it can aim higher, act on greater masses, address itself +strenuously to a problem as complex as the reformation of the finances +of a powerful state. All the civilized nations count in their history +men who imagined a financial system and succeeded, with various +fortunes, in making it prevail. The word "system," consecrated by usage, +makes unnecessary any comment, and relates this form of imagination to +that of scientists and philosophers. Every system rests on a +master-conception, on an ideal, a center about which there is assembled +the mental construction made up of imagination and calculation which, if +circumstances permit, must take shape, must show that it can live. + +Let us call to mind the author of the first, or at least, of the most +notorious of these "systems." Law claimed that he was applying "the +methods of philosophy, the principles of Descartes, to social economy, +abandoned hitherto to chance and empiricism." His ideal was the +institution of _credit_ by the state. Commerce, said he, was during its +first stage the exchange of merchandise in kind; in a second stage, +exchange by means of another, more manageable, commodity or universal +value, security equivalent to the object it represented; it must enter +a third stage when exchange will be made by a purely conventional sign +having no value of its own. Paper represents money, just as the latter +represents goods, "with the difference that the paper is not security, +but a simple promise, constituting credit." The state must do +systematically what individuals have done instinctively; but it must +also do what individuals cannot do--create currency by printing on the +paper of exchange the seal of public authority. We know the history of +the downfall of this system, the eulogies and criticisms it has +received:--but because of the originality and boldness of his views, the +inexhaustible fecundity of his lesser inventions, Law holds an +undisputed place among the great imaginative minds. + + +III + +We said above that commerce, in its higher manifestations, is a kind of +war.[135] Here, then, would be the place to study the military +imagination. The subject cannot be treated save by a man of the +profession, so I shall limit myself to a few brief remarks based on +personal information, or gleaned from authorities. + +Between the various types of imagination hitherto studied we have shown +great differences as regards their external conditions. While the +so-called forms of pure imagination, whence esthetic, mythic, religious, +mystic creations arise, can realize themselves by submitting to material +conditions that are simple and not very exacting, the others can become +embodied only when they satisfy an _ensemble_ of numerous, inevitable, +rigorously determined conditions; the goal is fixed, the materials are +rigid, there is little choice of the appropriate means. If there be +added to the inflexible laws of nature unforeseen human passions and +determinations, as in political or social invention, or the offensive +combination of opponents, as in commerce and war; then the imaginative +construction is confronted with problems of constantly growing +complexity. The most ingenious inventor cannot invent an object as a +whole, letting his work develop through an immanent logic:--the early +plan must be continually modified and readapted; and the difficulty +arises not merely from the multiple elements of the problem to be +solved, but from ceaseless changes in their positions. So one can +advance only step by step, and go forward by calculations and strict +examination of possibilities. Hence it results that underneath this +thick covering of material and intellectual conditions (calculation, +reasoning), spontaneity (the aptness for finding new combinations, "that +art of inventing without which we hardly advance"[136]) reveals itself +to few clear-sighted persons; but, in spite of everything, this creative +power is everywhere, flowing like subterranean streams, a vivifying +agency. + +These general remarks, although not applicable exclusively to the +military imagination, find their justification in it, because of its +extreme complexity. Let us rapidly enumerate, proceeding from without +inwards, the enormous mass of representations that it has to move and +combine in order to make its construction adequate to reality, able at a +precise moment to cease being a dream:--(1) Arms, engines, instruments +of destruction and supply, varying according to time, place, richness of +the country, etc. (2) The equally variable human element--mercenaries, a +national army; strong, tried troops or weak and new. (3) The general +principles of war, acquired by the study of the masters. (4) More +personal is the power of reflection, the habitual solving of tactical +and strategic problems. "Battles," said Napoleon, "are thought out at +length, and in order to be successful it is necessary that we think +several times in regard to what may happen." All the foregoing should be +headed "science." Advancing more and more within the secret psychology +of the individual, we come to art, the characteristic work of pure +imagination. (5) Let us note the exact, rapid intuition at the +commencement of the opportune moments. (6) Lastly, the creative element, +the conception, a natural gift bearing the hall-mark of each inventor. +Thus "the Napoleonic esthetics was always derived from a single concept, +based on a principle that may be summed up thus:--Strict economy +wherever it can be done; expenditure without limit on the decisive +point. This principle inspires the strategy of the master; it directs +everything, especially his battle-tactics, in which it is synthetized +and summed up."[137] + +Such, in analytical terms, appears the hidden spring that makes +everything move, and it is to be attributed neither to experience nor to +reasoning, nor to wise combinations, for it arises from the innermost +depths of the inventor. "The principle exists in him in a latent state, +i.e., in the depths of the unconscious, and unconsciously it is that he +applies it, when the shock of the circumstances, of goal and means, +causes to flash from his brain the spark stimulating the artistic +solution _par excellence_, one that reaches the limits of human +perfection."[138] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[131] Carpenter, _Mental Physiology_, chapter XI (end). + +[132] Historically, the evolution has not always proceeded strictly +in this order, which, however, seems the most logical one. +Negotiable drafts were known to the Assyrians and Carthaginians. For +thousands of years Egypt used ingots, not real money, but it was +acquainted with fiduciary money. In the new world, the Peruvians +made use of the scale, the Aztecs were ignorant of its use, etc. For +details, see Letourneau, _L'Evolution du commerce dans les diverses +races humaines_, Paris, 1897, especially pp. 264, 330, 354, 384, +etc. + +[133] This condition has been well-described by various novelists, +among them Zola, in _Money_. + +[134] For further details on this point, we refer the reader to our +_Evolution of General Ideas_ (chapter I). + +[135] A general, a former professor in the War College, told me that +when he heard a great merchant tell of the quick and sure service of +his commercial information, the conception of the whole, and the +care in all the details of his operations, he could not keep from +exclaiming, "Why, that is war!" + +[136] Leibniz. + +[137] General Bonnal, _Les Maitres de la Guerre_, 1899, p. 137. "In +him (Napoleon)," says the writer, "there was something of the poet, +and one could explain all his acts by means of this singular +complex, a medley of imagination, passion, and calculation. The +dreams of an Ossian with the positive cast of mind of a +mathematician and the passions of a Corsican--such were the +heterogeneous elements that clashed in that powerful organization" +(p. 151). + +[138] _Op. cit._, p. 6. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE UTOPIAN IMAGINATION[139] + + +When the human mind creates, it can use only two classes of ideas as +materials to embody its idea, viz.: + +(1) Natural phenomena, the forces of the organic and inorganic worlds. +In its scientific form, seeking to explain, to know, it ends in the +hypothesis, a disinterested creation. In its industrial aspect, aiming +towards application and utilization, it ends in practical, interested +inventions. + +(2) Human, i.e., psychic elements--instincts, passions, feelings, +ideas, and actions. Esthetic creation is the disinterested form, social +invention is the utilitarian form. + +Consequently, we may say that invention in science resembles invention +in the fine arts, both being speculative; and that mechanical and +industrial invention approaches social invention through a common +tendency toward the practical. I shall not insist on this distinction, +which, to be definite, rests only on partial characters; I merely wish +to mention that invention, whose role in social, political and moral +evolution is large, must, in order to be a success, adopt certain +processes while neglecting others. This the Utopians do not do. + +The development of human societies depends on a multitude of factors, +such as race, geographic and economic conditions, war, etc., which we +need neither enumerate nor study. One only belongs to our topic--the +successive appearance of idealistic conceptions that, like all other +creations of mind, tend to realize themselves, the moral ideal +consisting of new combinations arising from the predominance of one +feeling, or from an unconscious elaboration (inspiration), or from +analogy. + +At the beginning of civilizations we meet semi-historic, semi-legendary +persons--Manu, Zoroaster, Moses, Confucius, etc., who were inventors or +reformers in the social and moral spheres. That a part of the inventions +attributed to them must be credited to predecessors or successors is +probable; but the invention, no matter who is its author, remains none +the less invention. We have said elsewhere, and may repeat, that the +expression _inventor_ in morals may seem strange to some, because we are +imbued with the notion of a knowledge of good and evil that is innate, +universal, bestowed on all men and in all times. If we admit, on the +other hand, as observation compels us to do, not a ready-made morality, +but a morality in the making, it must be, indeed, the _creation_ of an +individual or of a group. Everybody recognizes inventors in geometry, +in music, in the plastic and mechanic arts; but there have also been men +who, in their moral dispositions, were very superior to their +contemporaries, and were promoters, initiators.[140] For reasons of +which we are ignorant, analogous to those that produce a great poet or a +great painter, there arise moral geniuses who feel strongly what others +do not feel at all, just as does a great poet, in comparison with the +crowd. But it is not enough that they feel: they must create, they must +realize their ideal in a belief and in rules of conduct accepted by +other men. All the founders of great religions were inventors of this +kind. Whether the invention comes from themselves alone, or from a +collectivity of which they are the sum and incarnation, matters little. +In them moral invention has found its complete form; like all invention, +it is organic. The legend relates that Buddha, possessed with the desire +of finding the perfect road of salvation for himself and all other men, +gives himself up, at first, to an extravagant asceticism. He perceives +the uselessness of this and renounces it. For seven years he meditates, +then he beholds the light. He comes into possession of knowledge of the +means that give freedom from _Karma_ (the chain of causes and effects), +and from the necessity of being born again. Soon he renounces the life +of contemplation, and during fifty years of ceaseless wanderings +preaches, makes converts, organizes his followers. Whether true or +false historically, this tale is psychologically exact. A fixed and +besetting idea, trial followed by failure, the decisive moment of +_Eureka!_ then the inner revelation manifests itself outwardly, and +through the labors of the master and his disciples becomes complete, +imposes itself on millions of men. In what respect does this mode of +creation differ from others, at least in the practical order? + +Thus, from the viewpoint of our present study, we may divide ethics into +living and dead. Living ethics arise from needs and desires, stimulate +an imaginative construction that becomes fixed in actions, habits and +laws; they offer to men a concrete, positive ideal which, under various +and often contrary aspects, is always happiness. The lifeless ethics, +from which invention has withdrawn, arise from reflection upon, and the +rational codification of, living ethics. Stored away in the writings of +philosophers, they remain theoretical, speculative, without appreciable +influence on the masses, mere material for dissertation and commentary. + +In proportion as we recede from distant origins the light grows, and +invention in the social and moral order becomes manifest as the work of +two principal categories of minds--the fantastic, the positive. The +former, purely imaginative beings, visionaries, utopians, are closely +related to poets and artists. The latter, practical creators or +reformers, capable of organizing, belong to the family of inventors in +the industrial-commercial-mechanical order. + + +I + +The chimerical form of imagination, applied to the social sciences, is +the one that, taking account neither of the external determinism nor of +practical requirements, spreads out freely. Such are the creators of +ideal republics, seeking for a lost or to-be-discovered-in-the-future +golden age, constructing, as their fancy pleases, human societies in +their large outlines and in their details. They are social novelists, +who bear the same relation to sociologists that poets do to critics. +Their dreams, subjected merely to the conditions of an inner logic, have +lived only within themselves, an ideal life, without ever passing +through the test of application. It is the creative imagination in its +unconscious form, restrained to its first phase. + +Nothing is better known than their names and their works: The _Republic_ +of Plato, Thomas More's _Utopia_, Campanella's _City of the Sun_, +Harrington's _Oceana_, Fenelon's _Salente_, etc.[141] However idealistic +they may be, one could easily show that all the materials of their ideal +are taken from the surrounding reality, they bear the stamp of the +_milieu_, be it Greek, English, Christian, etc., in which they lived, +and it should not be forgotten that in the Utopians everything is not +chimerical--some have been revealers, others have acted as stimuli or +ferments. True to its mission, which is to make innovations, the +constructive imagination is a spur that arouses; it hinders social +routine and prevents stagnation. + +Among the creators of ideal societies there is one, almost contemporary, +who would deserve a study of individual psychology--Ch. Fourier. If it +is a question merely of fertility in pure construction, I doubt whether +we could find one superior to him--he is equal to the highest, with the +special characteristic of being at the same time exuberant to delirium +and exact in details to the least minutiae. He is such a fine type of the +imaginative intellect that he deserves that we stop a moment. + +His cosmogony seems the work of an omnipotent demiurge fashioning the +universe at will. His conception of the future world with its +"counter-cast" creations, where the present ugliness and troubles of +animal reign become changed into their opposites, where there will be +"anti-lions," "anti-crocodiles," "anti-whales," etc., is one example of +hundreds showing his inexhaustible richness in fantastic visions: the +work of an imagination that is hot and overflowing, with no rational +preoccupation. + +On the other hand, his psychogony, based on the idea of metempsychosis +borrowed from the Orient, gives itself up to numerical vagaries. +Assuming for every soul a periodical rebirth, he assigns it first a +period of "ascending subversion," the first phase of which lasts five +thousand years, the second thirty-six thousand; then comes a period of +completion, 9,000 years; and then a period of "descending subversion," +whose first stage is 27,000 years, and the second 4,000 years--a total +of 81,000 years. This form of imagination is already known to us.[142] + +The principal part of his psychology, the theory of the emotions, +questionable in many respects, is relatively rational. But in the +construction of human society, the duality of his imagination--powerful +and minute--reappears. We know his methodical organization: the _group_, +composed of seven to nine persons; the _series_, comprising twenty-four +to thirty-two groups; a _phalanx_ that includes eighteen groups, +constituting the phalanstery; the small city, a general center of +phalanges; the provincial city, the imperial capital, the universal +metropolis. He has a passion for classification and ordering; "his +phalanstery works like a clock." + +This rare imaginative type well deserved a few remarks, because of its +mixture of apparent exactness and a natural, unconscious utopianism and +extravagance. For, beneath all these pulsating inventions of precise, +petty details, the foundation is none the less a purely speculative +construction of the mind. Let us add an incredible abuse of analogy, +that chief intellectual instrument of invention, of which only the +reading of his books can give an idea.[143] Heinrich Heine said of +Michelet, "He has a Hindoo imagination." The term would apply still +better to Fourier, in whom coexist unchecked profusion of images and the +taste for numerical accumulations. People have tried to explain this +abundance of figures and calculation as a professional habit--he was for +a long time a bookkeeper or cashier, always an excellent accountant. But +this is taking the effect for cause. This dualism existed in the very +nature of his mind, and he took advantage of it in his calling. The +study of the numerical imagination[144] has shown how it is frequently +met with among orientals, whose imaginative development is unquestioned, +and we have seen why the idealistic imagination agrees so well with the +indefinite series of numbers and makes use of it as a vehicle. + + +II + +With practical inventors and reformers the ideal falls--not that they +sacrifice it for their personal interests, but because they have a +comprehension of possibilities. The imaginative construction must be +corrected, narrowed, mutilated, if it is to enter into the narrow frame +of the conditions of existence, until it becomes adapted and determined. +This process has been described several times, and it is needless to +repeat it here in other terms. Nevertheless, the ideal--understanding by +this term the unifying principle that excites creative work and supports +it in its development--undergoes metamorphosis and must be not only +individual but collective; the creation does not realize itself save +through a "communion of minds," by a co-operation of feelings and of +wills; the work of one conscious individual must become the work of a +social consciousness. + +That form of imagination, creating and organizing social groups, +manifests itself in various degrees according to the tendency and power +of creators. + +There are the founders of small societies, religious in form--the +Essenes, the earliest Christian communities, the monastic orders of the +Orient and Occident, the great Catholic or Mohammedan congregations, the +semi-lay, semi-religious sects like the Moravian Brotherhood, the +Shakers, Mormons, etc. Less complete because it does not cover the +individual altogether in all the acts of life is the creation of secret +associations, professional unions, learned societies, etc. The founder +conceives an ideal of complete living or one limited to a given end, and +puts it into practice, having for material men grouped of their free +choice, or by cooptation. + +There is invention operating on great masses--social or political +invention strictly so called--ordinarily not proposed but imposed, +which, however, despite its coercive power, is subject to requirements +even more numerous than mechanical, industrial, or commercial invention. +It has to struggle against natural forces, but most of all against human +forces--inherited habits, customs, traditions. It must make terms with +dominant passions and ideas, finding its justification, like all other +creation, only in success. + +Without entering into the details of this inevitable determination, +which would require useless repetition, we may sum up the role of the +constructive imagination in social matters by saying that it has +undergone a regression--i.e., that its area of development has been +little by little narrowed; not that inventive genius, reduced to pure +construction in images, has suffered an eclipse, but on its part it has +had to make increasingly greater room for experiment, rational elements, +calculation, inductions and deductions that permit foresight--for +practical necessities. + +If we omit the spontaneous, instinctive, semi-conscious invention of the +earliest ages, that was sufficient for primitive societies, and keep to +creations that were the result of reflection and of great pretension, we +can roughly distinguish three successive periods: + +(1) A very long idealistic phase (Antiquity, Renaissance) when triumphed +the pure imagination, and the play of the free fancy that spends itself +in social novels. Between the creation of the mind and the life of +contemporary society there was no relation; they were worlds apart, +strangers to one another. The true Utopians scarcely troubled themselves +to make applications. Plato and More--would they have wished to realize +their dreams? + +(2) An intermediate phase, when an attempt is made to pass from the +ideal to the practical, from pure speculation to social facts. Already, +in the eighteenth century, some philosophers (Locke, Rousseau) drew up +constitutions, at the request of interested persons. During this period, +when the work of the imagination, instead of merely becoming fixed in +books, tends to become objectified in acts, we find many failures and +some successes. Let us recall the fruitless attempts of the +"phalansteries" in France, in Algeria, Brazil, and in the United States. +Robert Owen was more fortunate;[145] in four years he reformed New +Larnak, after his ideal, and with varying fortune founded short-lived +colonies. Saint-Simonism has not entirely died out; the primitive +civilization after his ideal rapidly disappeared, but some of his +theories have filtered into or have become incorporated with other +doctrines. + +(3) A phase in which imaginative creation becomes subordinated to +practical life: The conception of society ceases to be purely idealistic +or constructed _a priori_ by deduction from a single principle; it +recognizes the conditions of its environment, adapts itself to the +necessities of its development. It is the passage from the absolutely +autonomous state of the imagination to a period when it submits to the +laws of a rational imperative. In other words, the transition from the +esthetic to the scientific, and especially the practical, form. +Socialism is a well-known and excellent example of this. Compare its +former utopias, down to about the middle of the last century, with its +contemporary forms, and without difficulty we can appreciate the amount +of imaginative elements lost in favor of an at least equivalent quantity +of rational elements and positive calculations. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[139] This title, as will be seen later, corresponds only in part to +the contents of this chapter. + +[140] For facts in support, see the _Psychology of the Emotions_, +Second Part, chapter VIII. + +[141] Our author does not mention Bacon's _New Atlantis_, one of the +best specimens of its kind. "Wisest Verulam," active and +distinguished in so many fields, is not amenable to rules, and is +here found among "idealists," as elsewhere among the foremost +empiricists and iconoclasts. (Tr.) + +[142] See above, Part III, chapter III. + +[143] We recommend to the reader the "Epilogue sur l'Analogie," in +_Le Monde Industriel_, pp. 244 ff., where he will learn that the +"goldfinch depicts the child born of poor parents; the pheasant +represents the jealous husband; the cock is the symbol of the man of +the world; the cabbage is the emblem of mysterious love," etc. There +are several pages in this tone, with alleged reasons in support of +the statements. + +[144] See above, chapter II. + +[145] For an excellent account of the principles of these movements, +see Rae, _Contemporary Socialism_; for Owen's ideals, his +_Autobiography_; and for an account of some of the trials, Bushee's +"Communistic Societies in the United States," _Political Science +Quarterly_, vol. XX, pp. 625 ff. (Tr.) + + + + +CONCLUSION. + + + + +CONCLUSION + +I + +THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION + + +Why is the human mind able to create? In a certain sense this question +may seem idle, childish, and even worse. We might just as well ask why +does man have eyes and not an electric apparatus like the torpedo? Why +does he perceive directly sounds but not the ultra-red and ultra-violet +rays? Why does he perceive changes of odors but not magnetic changes? +And so on _ad infinitum_. We will put the question in a very different +manner: Being given the physical and mental constitution of man such as +it is at present, how is the creative imagination a natural product of +this constitution? + +Man is able to create for two principal reasons. The first, motor in +nature, is found in the action of his needs, appetites, tendencies, +desires. The second is the possibility of a spontaneous revival of +images that become grouped in new combination. + +1. We have already shown in detail[146] that the hypothesis of a +"creative instinct," if the expression is used not as an abbreviated or +metaphorical formula but in the strict sense, is a pure chimera, an +empty entity. In studying the various types of imagination we have +always been careful to note that every mode of creation may be reduced, +as regards its beginnings, to a tendency, a want, a special, determinate +desire. Let us recall for the last time these initial conditions of all +invention--these desires, conscious or not, that excite it. + +The wants, tendencies, desires--it matters not which term we adopt--the +whole of which constitutes the instinct of individual preservation, have +been the generators of all inventions dealing with food-getting, +housing, making of weapons, instruments, and machines. + +The need for individual and social expansion or extension has given rise +to military, commercial, and industrial invention, and in its +disinterested form, esthetic creation. + +As for the sexual instinct, its psychic fertility is in no way less than +the physical--it is an inexhaustible source of imagination in everyday +life as well as in art. + +The wants of man in contact with his fellows have engendered, through +instinctive or reflective action, the numerous social and practical +creations regulating human groups, and they are rough or complex, stable +or unstable, just or unjust, kindly or harsh. + +The need of knowing and of explaining, well or ill, has created myths, +religions, philosophical systems, scientific hypotheses. + +Every want, tendency or desire may, then, become creative, by itself or +associated with others, and into these final elements it is that +analysis must resolve "creative spontaneity." This vague expression +corresponds to a _sum_, not to a special property.[147] Every invention, +then, has a _motor_ origin; _the ultimate basis of the constructive +imagination is motor_. + +2. But needs and desires by themselves cannot create--they are only a +stimulus and a spring. Whence arises the need of a second condition--the +spontaneous revival of images. + +In many animals that are endowed only with memory the return of images +is always provoked. Sensation from without or from within bring them +into consciousness under the form, pure and simple, of former +experience; whence we have reproduction, repetition without new +associations. People of slight imagination and used to routine approach +this mental condition. But, as a matter of fact, man from his second +year on, and some higher animals, go beyond this stage--they are capable +of spontaneous revival. By this term I mean that revival that comes +about abruptly, without _apparent_ antecedents. We know that these act +in a latent form, and consist of thinking by analogy, affective +dispositions, unconscious elaboration. This sudden appearance excites +other states which, grouped into new associations, contain the first +elements of the creative act. + +Taken altogether, and however numerous its manifestations, the +constructive imagination seems to me reducible to three forms, which I +shall call _sketched_, _fixed_, _objectified_, according as it remains +an internal fancy, or takes on a material but contingent and unstable +form, or is subjected to the conditions of a rigorous internal or +external determinism. + +(a) The _sketched_ form is primordial, original, the simplest of all; it +is a nascent moment or first attempt. It appears first of all in +dreaming--an embryonic, unstable and uncoordinated manifestation of the +creative imagination--a transition-stage between passive reproduction +and organized construction. A step higher is revery, whose flitting +images, associated by chance, without personal intervention, are +nevertheless vivid enough to exclude from consciousness every impression +of the external world--so much so that the day-dreamer re-enters it only +with a shock of surprise. More coherent are the imaginary constructions +known as "castles in Spain"--the works of a wish considered +unrealizable, fancies of love, ambition, power and wealth, the goal of +which seems to be forever beyond our reach. Lastly, still higher, come +all the plans for the future conceived vaguely and as barely +possible--foreseeing the end of a sickness, of a business enterprise, of +a political event, etc. + +This vague and "outline" imagination, penetrating our entire life, has +its peculiar characters--the unifying principle is _nil_ or ephemeral, +which fact always reduces it to the dream as a type; it does not +externalize itself, does not change into acts, a consequence of its +basically chimerical nature or of weakness of will, which reduces it to +a strictly internal and individual existence. It is needless to say that +this kind of imagination is a permanent and definite form with the +dreamers living in a world of ceaselessly reappearing images, having no +power to organize them, to change them into a work of art, a theory, or +a useful invention. + +The "sketched" form is or remains an elementary, primitive, automatic +form. Conformably to the general law ruling the development of +mind--passage from indefinite to definite, from the incoherent to the +coherent, from spontaneity to reflection, from the reflex to the +voluntary period--the imagination comes out of its swaddling-clothes, +is changed--through the intervention of a teleological act that assigns +it an end; through the union of rational elements that subdue it for an +adaptation. Then appear the other two forms. + +(b) The _fixed_ form comprises mythic and esthetic creations, +philosophical and scientific hypotheses. While the "outline" imagination +remains an internal phenomenon, existing only in and for a single +individual, the fixed form is projected outwards, made something else. +The former has no reality other than the momentary belief accompanying +it; the latter exists by itself, for its creator and for others; the +work is accepted, rejected, examined, criticised. Fiction rests on the +same level as reality. Do not people discuss seriously the objective +value of certain myths, and of metaphysical theories? the action of a +novel or drama as though it were a matter of real events? the character +of the _dramatis personae_ as though they were living flesh and blood? + +The fixed imagination moves in an elastic frame. The material elements +circumscribing it and composing it have a certain fluidity; they are +language, writing, musical sounds, colors, forms, lines. Furthermore, we +know that its creations, in spite of the spontaneous adherence of the +mind accepting them, are the work of a free will; they could have been +otherwise--they preserve an indelible imprint of contingency and +subjectivity. + +(c) This last mark is rubbed out without disappearing (for a thing +imagined is always a personal thing) in the objectified form that +comprises successful practical inventions--whether mechanical, +industrial, commercial, military, social, or political. These have no +longer an arbitrary, borrowed reality; they have their place in the +totality of physical and social phenomena. They resemble creations of +nature, subject like them to fixed conditions of existence and to a +limited determinism. We shall not dwell longer on this last character, +so often pointed out. + +In order the better to comprehend the distinction between the three +forms of imagination let us borrow for a moment the terminology of +spiritualism or of the common dualism--merely as a means of explaining +the matter clearly. The "outline" imagination is a soul without a body, +a pure spirit, without determination in space. The "fixed" imagination +is a soul or spirit surrounded by an almost immaterial sheath, like +angels or demons, genii, shadows, the "double" of savages, the +_peresprit_ of spiritualists, etc. The _objectified_ imagination is soul +and body, a complete organization after the pattern of living people; +the ideal is incarnated, but it must undergo transformation, reductions +and adaptations, in order that it may become practical--just as the +soul, according to spiritualism, must bend to the necessities of the +body, to be at the same time the servant of, and served by, the bodily +organs. + +According to general opinion the great imaginers are found only in the +first two classes, which is, in the strict sense of the word, true; in +the full sense of the word false. As long as it remains "outline," or +even "fixed," the constructive imagination can reign as supreme +mistress. Objectified, it still rules, but shares its power with +competitors; it avails nought without them, they can do nothing without +it. What deceives us is the fact that we see it no longer in the open. +Here the imaginative stroke resembles those powerful streams of water +that must be imprisoned in a complicated network of canals and +ramifications varying in shape and in diameter before bursting forth in +multiple jets and in liquid architecture.[148] + + +II + +THE IMAGINATIVE TYPE. + +Let us try now, by way of conclusion, to present to the reader a picture +of the whole of the imaginative life in all its degrees. + +If we consider the human mind principally under its intellectual +aspect--i.e., insofar as it knows and thinks, deducting its emotions +and voluntary activity--the observation of individuals distinguishes +some very clear varieties of mentality. + +First, those of a "positive" or realistic turn of mind, living chiefly +on the external world, on what is perceived and what is immediately +deducible therefrom--alien or inimical to vain fancy; some of them flat, +limited, of the earth earthy; others, men of action, energetic but +limited by real things. + +Second, abstract minds, "quintessence abstractors," with whom the +internal life is dominant in the form of combinations of concepts. They +have a schematic representation of the world, reduced to a hierarchy of +general ideas, noted by symbols. Such are the pure mathematicians, the +pure metaphysicians. If these two tendencies exist together, or, as +happens, are grafted one on the other, without anything to +counterbalance them, the abstract spirit attains its perfect form. + +Midway between these two groups are the imaginers in whom the internal +life predominates in the form of combinations of images, which fact +distinguishes them clearly from the abstractors. The former alone +interest us, and we shall try to trace this imaginative type in its +development from the normal or average stage to the moment when +ever-growing exuberance leads us into pathology. + +The explanation of the various phases of this development is reducible +to a well-known psychologic law--the natural antagonism between +sensation and image, between phenomena of peripheral origin and +phenomena of central origin; or, in a more general form, between the +outer and inner life. I shall not dwell long on this point, which Taine +has so admirably treated.[149] He has shown in detail how the image is +a spontaneously arising sensation, one that is, however, aborted by the +opposing shock of real sensation, which is its reducer, producing on it +an arresting action and maintaining it in the condition of an internal, +subjective fact. Thus, during the waking hours, the frequency and +intensity of impressions from without press the images back to the +second level; but during sleep, when the external world is as it were +suppressed, their hallucinatory tendency is no longer kept in check, and +the world of dreams is momentarily the reality. + +The psychology of the imaginer reduces itself to a progressively +increasing interchange of roles. Images become stronger and stronger +states; perceptions, more and more feeble. In this movement opposite to +nature I note four steps, each of which corresponds to particular +conditions: (1) The quantity of images; (2) quantity and intensity; (3) +quantity, intensity and duration; (4) complete systematization. + +(1) In the first place the predominance of imagination is marked only by +the quantity of representations invading consciousness; they teem, break +apart, become associated, combine easily and in various ways. All the +imaginative persons who have given us their experiences either orally or +in writing agree in regard to the extreme ease of the formation of +associations, not in repeating past expedience, but in sketching little +romances.[150] From among many examples I choose one. One of my +correspondents writes that if at church, theatre, on a street, or in a +railway station, his attention is attracted to a person--man or +woman--he immediately makes up, from the appearance, carriage and +attractiveness his or her present or past, manner of life, +occupation--representing to himself the part of the city he or she must +dwell in, the apartments, furniture, etc.--a construction most often +erroneous; I have many proofs of it. Surely this disposition is normal; +it departs from the average only by an excess of imagination that is +replaced in others by an excessive tendency to observe, to analyze, or +to criticise, reason, find fault. In order to take the decisive step and +become abnormal one condition more is necessary--intensity of the +representations. + +2. Next, the interchange of place, indicated above, occurs. Weak states +(images) become strong; strong states (perceptions) become weak. The +impressions from without are powerless to fulfill their regular function +of inhibition. We find the simplest example of this state in the +exceptional persistence of certain dreams. Ordinarily, our nocturnal +imaginings vanish as empty phantasmagorias at the inrush of the +perceptions and habits of daily life--they seem like faraway phantoms, +without objective value. But, in the struggle occurring, on waking, +between images and perceptions, the latter are not always victorious. +There are dreams--i.e., imaginary creations--that remain firm in face +of reality, and for some time go along parallel with it. Taine was +perhaps the first to see the importance of this fact. He reports that +his relative, Dr. Baillarger, having dreamt that one of his friends had +been appointed editor of a journal, announced the news seriously to +several persons, and doubt arose in his mind only toward the end of the +afternoon. Since then contemporary psychologists have gathered various +observations of this kind.[151] The emotional persistence of certain +dreams is known. So-and-so, one of our neighbors, plays in a dream an +odious role; we may have a feeling of repulsion or spite toward him +persisting throughout the day. But this triumph of the image, accidental +and ephemeral in normal man, is frequent and stable in the imaginers of +the second class. Many among them have asserted that this internal world +is the only reality. Gerard de Nerval "had very early the conviction +that the majority is mistaken, that the material universe in which it +believes, because its eyes see it and its hands touch it, is nothing but +phantoms and appearances. For him the invisible world, on the contrary, +was the only one not chimerical." Likewise, Edgar Allan Poe: "The real +things of the world would affect me like visions, and only so; while the +wild ideas of the land of dreams became in turn not only the feeding +ground of my daily existence but positively the sole and entire +existence itself." Others describe their life as "a permanent dream." +We could multiply examples. Aside from the poets and artists, the +mystics would furnish copious examples. Let us take an exaggerated +instance: This permanent dream is, indeed, only a part of their +existence; it is above all active through its intensity; but, while it +lasts, it absorbs them so completely that they enter the external world +only with a sudden, violent and painful shock. + +(3) If the changing of images into strong states preponderating in +consciousness is no longer an episode but a lasting disposition, then +the imaginative life undergoes a partial systematization that approaches +insanity. Everyone may be "absorbed" for a moment; the above-mentioned +authors are so frequently. On a higher level this invading supremacy of +the internal life becomes a habit. This third degree is but the second +carried to excess. + +Some cases of double personality (those of Azam, Reynolds) are known in +which the second state is at first embryonic and of short duration; then +its appearances are repeated, its sphere becomes extended. Little by +little it engrosses the greater part of life; it may even entirely +supplant the earlier self. The growing working of the imagination is +similar to this. Thanks to two causes acting in unison, temperament and +habit, the imaginative and internal life tends to become systematized +and to encroach more and more on the real, external life. In an account +by Fere[152] one may follow step by step this work of systematization +which we abridge here to its chief characteristics. + +The subject, M......, a man thirty-seven years old, had from childhood a +decided taste for solitude. Seated in an out-of-the-way corner of the +house or out of doors, "he commenced from that time on to build castles +in Spain that little by little took on a considerable importance in his +life. His constructions were at first ephemeral, replaced every day by +new ones. They became progressively more consistent.... When he had well +entered into his imaginary role, he often succeeded in continuing his +musing in the presence of other people. At college, whole hours would be +spent in this way; often he would see and hear nothing." Married, the +head of a prosperous business house, he had some respite; then he +returned to his former constructions. "They commenced by being, as +before, not very durable or absorbing; but gradually they acquired more +intensity and duration, and lastly became fixed in a definite form." + +"To sum up, here is what this ideal life, lasting almost from his fourth +year, meant: M...... had built at Chaville, on the outskirts of the +forest, an imaginary summer residence surrounded by a garden. By +successive additions the pavilion became a chateau; the garden, a park; +servants, horses, water-fixtures came to ornament the domain. The +furnishings of the inside had been modified at the same time. A wife had +come to give life to the picture; two children had been born. Nothing +was wanting to this household, only the being true.... One day he was +in his imaginary salon at Chaville, occupied in watching an upholsterer +who was changing the arrangement of the tapestry. He was so absorbed in +the matter that he did not notice a man coming toward him, and at the +question, 'M......, if you please--?' he answered, without thinking, 'He +is at Chaville.' This reply, given in public, aroused in him a real +terror. 'I believe that I was foolish,' he said. Coming to himself, he +declared that he was ready to do anything to get rid of his ideas." + +Here the imaginative type is at its maximum, at the brink of insanity +without being over it. Associations and combinations of images form the +entire content of consciousness, which remains impervious to impressions +from without. Its world becomes _the_ world. The parasitic life +undermines and corrodes the other in order to become established in its +place--it grows, its parts adhere more closely, it forms a compact +mass--the imaginary systematization is complete. + +(4) The fourth stage is an exaggeration of the foregoing. The +_completely_ systematized and permanent imaginative life excludes the +other. This is the extreme form, the beginning of insanity, which is +outside our subject, from which pathology has been excluded. + +Imagination in the insane would deserve a special study, that would be +lengthy, because there is no form of imagination that insanity has not +adopted. In no period have insane creations been lacking in the +practical, religious, or mystic life, in poetry, the fine arts, and in +the sciences; in industrial, commercial, mechanical, military projects, +and in plans for social and political reform. We should, then, be +abundantly supplied with facts.[153] + +It would be difficult, for, if in ordinary life we are often perplexed +to decide whether a man is sane or not, how much more then, when it is a +question of an inventor, of an act of the creative faculty, i.e., of a +venture into the unknown! How many innovators have been regarded as +insane, or as at least unbalanced, visionary! We cannot even invoke +success as a criterion. Many non-viable or abortive inventions have been +fathered by very sane minds, and people regarded as insane have +vindicated their imaginative constructions through success. + +Let us leave these difficulties of a subject that is not our own, in +order to determine merely the psychological criterion belonging to the +fourth stage. + +How may we rightly assert that a form of imaginative life is clearly +pathologic? In my opinion, the answer must be sought in the nature and +degree of belief accompanying the labor of creating. It is an axiom +unchallenged by anyone--whether idealist or realist of any shade of +belief--that nothing has existence for us save through the consciousness +we have of it; but for realism--and experimental psychology is of +necessity realistic--there are two distinct forms of existence. + +One, subjective, having no reality except in consciousness, for the one +experiencing it, its reality being due only to belief, to that first +affirmation of the mind so often described. + +The other, objective, existing in consciousness and outside of it, being +real not only for me but for all those whose constitution is similar or +analogous to mine. + +This much borne in mind, let us compare the last two degrees of the +development of the imaginative life. + +For the imaginer of the third stage, the two forms of existence are not +confounded. He distinguishes _two_ worlds, preferring one and making +the best of the other, but believing in both. He is conscious of passing +from one to the other. There is an alternation. The observation of Fere, +although extreme, is a proof of this. + +At the fourth stage, in the insane, imaginative labor--the only kind +with which we are concerned--is so systematized that the distinction +between the two kinds of existence has disappeared. All the phantoms of +his brain are invested with objective reality. Occurrences without, even +the most extraordinary, do not reach one in this stage, or else are +interpreted in accordance with the diseased fancy. There is no longer +any alternation.[154] + +By way of summary we may say: The creative imagination consists of the +property that images have of gathering in new combinations, through the +effect of a spontaneity whose nature we have attempted to describe. It +always tends to realize itself in degrees that vary from mere momentary +belief to complete objectivity. Throughout its multiple manifestations, +it remains identical with itself in its basic nature, in its +constitutive elements. The diversity of its deeds depends on the end +desired, the conditions required for its attainment, materials employed +which, as we have seen, under the collective name "representations" are +very unlike one another, not only as regards their sensuous origin +(visual, auditory, tactile, etc.) but also as regards their psychologic +nature (concrete, symbolic, affective, emotional-abstract images; +generic and schematic images, concepts--each group itself having shades +or degrees). + +This constructive activity, applying itself to everything and radiating +in all directions, is in its early, typical form a mythic creation. It +is an invincible need of man to reflect and reproduce his own nature in +the world surrounding him. The first application of his mind is thinking +by analogy, which vivifies everything after the human model and attempts +to know everything according to arbitrary resemblances. Myth-making +activity, which we have studied in the child and in primitive man, is +the embryonic form whence arise by a slow evolution religious +creations--gross or refined; esthetic development, which is a fallen, +impoverished mythology; the fantastic conceptions of the world that may +little by little become scientific conceptions, with, however, an +irreducible residuum of hypotheses. Alongside of these creations, all +bordering upon what we have called the fixed form, there are practical, +objective creations. As for the latter, we could not trace them to the +same mythic source except by dialectic subtleties which we renounce. The +former arise from an internal efflorescence; the latter from urgent +life-needs; they appear later and are a bifurcation of the early trunk: +but the same sap flows in both branches. + +The constructive imagination penetrates every part of our life, whether +individual or collective, speculative and practical, in all its +forms--IT IS EVERYWHERE. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[146] See above, Part I, chapter II. + +[147] It is a postulate of contemporary physiology that all the +neurones taken together cannot spontaneously, that is, of +themselves, give rise to any movement--they receive from without, +and expend their energy outwards. Nevertheless, between the two +moments that, in reflex and instinctive actions, seem continuous, a +third interposes, which, for the higher psychic acts, may be of long +duration. Thus, reasonings in logical form and reflection regarding +a decision to be made have a feeble tendency to become changed into +acts; their motor effects are indirect, and at a long range. But +this intermediate moment is _par excellence_ the moment for +psychology. It is also the moment of the personal equation: every +man receives, transforms, and restores outwards according to his own +organization, temperament, idiosyncrasies, character--in a word, +according to his personality, of which needs, tendencies, desires, +are the direct and immediate expression. So we come back, by another +route, to the same definition of spontaneity. + +[148] Besides these three principal forms, there are intermediate +forms, transitions from one category to another, that are hard to +classify: certain mythic creations are half-sketched, half-fixed; +and we find religious and social and political conceptions, partly +theoretic or fixed, partly practical or objective. + +[149] Taine, _On Intelligence_, Part I, Book II, ch. I. + +[150] See Appendix E. + +[151] Sante de Santis, _I Sogni_, chapter X; Dr. Tissie, _Les +Reves_, esp. p. 165, the case of a merchant who dreams of having +paid a certain debt, and several weeks afterward meets his creditor, +and maintains that they are even, giving way only to proof. + +[152] For the complete account, see his _Pathologie des emotions_, +pp. 345-49. (Paris, F. Alcan.) + +[153] Dr. Max Simon, in an article on "Imagination in Insanity" +(_Annales medico-psychologiques_, December, 1876), holds that every +kind of mental disease has its own form of imagination that +expresses itself in stories, compositions, sketches, decorations, +dress, and symbolic attributes. The maniac invents complicated and +improbable designs; the persecuted, symbolic designs, strange +writings, bordering on the horrible; megalomaniacs look for the +effect of everything they say and do; the general paralytic lives in +grandeur and attributes capital importance to everything; lunatics +love the naive and childishly wonderful. + +There are also great imaginers who, having passed through a period +of insanity, have strongly regretted it "as a state in which the +soul, more exalted and more refined, perceives invisible relations +and enjoys spectacles that escape the material eyes." Such was +Gerard de Nerval. As for Charles Lamb, he would assert that he +should be envied the days spent in an insane asylum. "Sometimes," he +said in a letter to Coleridge, "I cast a longing glance backwards to +the condition in which I found myself; for while it lasted I had +many hours of pure happiness. Do not believe, Coleridge, that you +have tasted the grandeur and all the transport of fancy if you have +not been insane. Everything seems to me now insipid in comparison." +Quoted by A. Barine, _Nevroses_, p. 326. + +[154] There has often been cited the instance of certain maniacs at +Charenton, who, during the Franco-Prussian War, despite the stories +that were told them, the papers that they read, and the shells +bursting under the walls of the asylum, maintained that the war was +only imagined, and that all was only a contrivance of their +persecutors. + + + + +APPENDICES + + + + +APPENDIX A + +THE VARIOUS FORMS OF INSPIRATION[155] + + +Among the descriptions of the inspired state found in various authors, I +select only three, which are brief and have each a special character. + +I. Mystic inspiration, in a passive form, in Jacob Boehme (_Aurora_): "I +declare before God that I do not myself know how the thing arises within +me, without the participation of my will. I do not even know that which +I must write. If I write, it is because the Spirit moves me and +communicates to me a great, wonderful knowledge. Often I do not even +know whether I dwell in spirit in this present world and whether it is I +myself that have the fortune to possess a certain and solid knowledge." + +II. Feverish and painful inspiration in Alfred de Musset: "Invention +annoys me and makes me tremble. Execution, always too slow for my wish, +makes my heart beat awfully, and weeping, and keeping myself from crying +aloud, I am delivered of an idea that is intoxicating me, but of which +I am mortally ashamed and disgusted next morning. If I change it, it is +worse, it deserts me--it is much better to forget it and wait for +another; but this other comes to me so confused and misshapen that my +poor being cannot contain it. It presses and tortures me, until it has +taken realizable proportions, when comes the other pain, of bringing +forth, a truly physical suffering that I cannot define. And that is how +my life is spent when I let myself be dominated by this artistic monster +in me. It is much better, then, that I should live as I have imagined +living, that I go to all kinds of excess, and that I kill this +never-dying worm that people like me modestly term their inspiration, +but which I call, plainly, my weakness."[156] + +III. The poet Grillparzer[157] analyzes the condition, thus: + +"Inspiration, properly so called, is the concentration of all the +faculties and aptitudes on a single point which, for the moment, should +include the rest of the world less than represent it. The strengthening +of the state of the soul comes from the fact that its various faculties, +instead of being disseminated over the whole world, find themselves +contained within the limits of a single object, touch one another, +reciprocally upholding, reenforcing, completing themselves. Thanks to +this isolation, the object emerges out of the average level of its +_milieu_, is illumined all around and put in relief--it takes body, +moves, lives. But to attain this is necessary the concentration of all +the faculties. It is only when the art-work has been a world for the +artist that it is also a world for others." + +FOOTNOTES: + +[155] See Part One, chapter III. + +[156] George Sand, _Elle et Lui_, I. + +[157] In Oelzelt-Newin, _op. cit._, p. 49. + + + + +APPENDIX B + +ON THE NATURE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS FACTOR + + +We have seen that in the question of the unconscious there +must be recognized a positive part--facts, and an hypothetical +part--theories.[158] + +Insofar as the facts are concerned, it would be well, I think, to +establish two categories--(1) static unconscious, comprising habits, +memory, and, in general, all that is organized knowledge. It is a state +of preservation, of rest; very relatively, since representations suffer +incessant corrosion and change. (2) Dynamic unconscious, which is a +state of latent activity, of elaboration and incubation. We might give a +multitude of proofs of this unconscious rumination. The well-known fact +that an intellectual work gains by being interrupted; that in resuming +it one often finds it cleared up, changed, even accomplished, was +explained by some psychologists prior to Carpenter by "the resting of +the mind." It would be just as valid to say that a traveler covers +leagues by lying abed. The author just mentioned[159] has brought +together many observations in which the solution of a mathematical, +mechanical, commercial problem appeared suddenly after hours and days of +vague, undefinable uneasiness, the cause of which is unknown, which, +however, is only the result of an underlying cerebral working; for the +trouble, sometimes rising to anguish, ceases as soon as the unawaited +conclusion has entered consciousness. The men who think the most are not +those who have the clearest and "most conscious" ideas, but those having +at their disposal a rich fund of unconscious elaboration. On the other +hand, shallow minds have a naturally poor unconscious fund, capable of +but slight development; they give out immediately and rapidly all that +they are able to give; they have no reserve. It is useless to allow them +time for reflection or invention. They will not do better; they may do +worse. + +As to the nature of the unconscious working, we find disagreement and +darkness. One may doubtless maintain, theoretically, that in the +inventor everything goes on in subconsciousness and in unconsciousness, +just as in consciousness itself, with the exception that a message does +not arrive as far as the self; that the labor that may be followed, in +clear consciousness, in its progress and retreats, remains the same when +it continues unknown to us. This is possible. Yet it must at least be +recognized that consciousness is rigorously subject to the condition of +time, the unconscious is not. This difference, not to mention others, is +not negligible, and could well arouse other problems. + +The contemporary theories regarding the nature of the unconscious seem +to me reducible to two principal positions--one psychological, the other +physiological. + +1. The physiological theory is simple and scarcely permits any +variations. According to it, unconscious activity is simply cerebral; it +is an "unconscious cerebration." The psychic factor, which ordinarily +accompanies the activity of the nervous centers, is absent. Although I +incline toward this hypothesis, I confess that it is full of +difficulties. + +It has been proven through numerous experiments (Fere, Binet, Mosso, +Janet, Newbold, etc.) that "unconscious sensations"[160] act, since they +produce the same reactions as conscious sensations, and Mosso has been +able to maintain that "the testimony of consciousness is less certain +than that of the sphygmograph." But the particular instance of invention +is very different; for it does not merely suppose the adaptation to an +end which the physiological factor would suffice to explain; it implies +a series of adaptations, corrections, rational operations, of which +nervous activity alone furnishes us no example.[161] + +2. The psychological theory is based on an equivocal use of the word +consciousness. Consciousness has one definite mark--it is an internal +event existing, not by itself, but for me and insofar as it is known by +me. But the psychological theory of the unconscious assumes that if we +descend from clear consciousness progressively to obscure consciousness, +to the subconscious, to the unconscious that manifests itself only +through its motor reactions, the first state thus successively +impoverished, still remains, down to its final term, identical in its +basis with consciousness. It is an hypothesis that nothing justifies. + +No difficulty arises when we bear in mind the legitimate distinction +between consciousness of self and consciousness in general, the former +entirely subjective, the latter in a way objective (the consciousness of +a man captivated by an attractive scene; better yet, the fluid form of +revery or of the awaking from syncope). We may admit that this +evanescent consciousness, affective in nature, felt rather than +perceived, is due to a lack of synthesis, of relations among the +internal states, which remain isolated, unable to unite into a whole. + +The difficulty commences when we descend into the region of the +subconscious, which allows stages whose obscurity increases in +proportion as we move away from clear consciousness, "like a lake in +which the action of light is always nearing extinction" (in double +coexisting personalities, automatic writing, mediums, etc.). Here some +postulate two currents of consciousness existing at the same time in one +person without reciprocal connection. Others suppose a "field of +consciousness" with a brilliant center and extending indefinitely toward +the dim distance. Still others liken the phenomenon to the movement of +waves, whose summit alone is lighted up. Indeed, the authors declare +that with these comparisons and metaphors they make no pretense of +explaining; but certainly they all reduce unconsciousness to +consciousness, as a special to a general case, and what is that if not +explaining? + +I do not intend to enumerate all the varieties of the psychological +theory. The most systematic, that of Myers, accepted by Delboef and +others, is full of a biological mysticism all its own. Here it is in +substance: In every one of us there is a conscious self adapted to the +needs of life, and potential selves constituting the subliminal +consciousness. The latter, much broader in scope than personal +consciousness, has dependent on it the entire vegetative +life--circulation, trophic actions, etc. Ordinarily the conscious self +is on the highest level, the subliminal consciousness on the second; but +in certain extraordinary states (hypnosis, hysteria, divided +consciousness, etc.) it is just the reverse. Here is the bold part of +the hypothesis: Its authors suppose that the supremacy of the subliminal +consciousness is a reversion, a return to the ancestral. In the higher +animals and in primitive man, according to them, all trophic actions +entered consciousness and were regulated by it. In the course of +evolution this became organized; the higher consciousness has delegated +to the subliminal consciousness the care of silently governing the +vegetative life. But in case of mental disintegration there occurs a +return to the primitive state. In this manner they explain burns through +suggestion, stigmata, trophic changes of a miraculous appearance, etc. +It is needless to dwell on this conception of the unconscious. It has +been vehemently criticised, notably by Bramwell, who remarks that if +certain faculties could little by little fall into the domain of +subliminal consciousness because they were no longer necessary for the +struggle for life, there are nevertheless faculties so essential to the +well-being of the individual that we ask ourselves how they have been +able to escape from the control of the will. If, for example, some lower +type had the power of arresting pain, how could it lose it? + +At the foundation of the psychological theory in all its forms is the +unexpressed hypothesis that consciousness may be likened to a quantity +that forever decreases without reaching zero. This is a postulate that +nothing justifies. The experiments of psychophysicists, without solving +the question, would support rather the opposite view. We know that the +"threshold of consciousness" or minimum perceptible quantity, appears +and disappears suddenly; the excitation is not felt under a determinate +limit. Likewise in regard to the "summit of perception" or maximum +perceptible, any increase of excitation is no longer felt if above a +determinate limit. Moreover, in order that an increase or diminution be +felt between these two extreme limits, it is necessary that both have a +constant relation--differential threshold--as is expressed in Weber's +law. All these facts, and others that I omit, are not favorable to the +thesis of growing or diminishing continuity of consciousness. It has +even been maintained that consciousness "has an aversion for +continuity." + +To sum up: The two rival theories are equally unable to penetrate into +the inner nature of the unconscious factor. We have thus had to limit +ourselves to taking it as a fact of experience and to assign it its +place in the complex function that produces invention. + +The observations of Flournoy (in his book, mentioned above, Part I, +chapter III) have a particular interest in relation to our subject. His +medium, Helene S......--very unlike others, who are satisfied with +forecasts of the future, disclosures of unknown past events, counsel, +prognosis, evocation, etc., without creating anything, in the proper +sense--is the author of three or four novels, one of which, at least, is +invented out of whole cloth--revelations in regard to the planet Mars, +its countries, inhabitants, dwellings, etc. Although the descriptions +and pictures of Helene S. are found on comparison to be borrowed from +our terrestrial globe, and transposed and changed, as Flournoy has well +shown, it is certain that in this "Martian novel," to say nothing of the +others, there is a richness of invention that is rare among mediums: the +creative imagination in its subliminal (unconscious) form encloses the +other in its eclat. We know how much the cases of mediums teach us in +regard to the unconscious life of the mind. Here we are permitted, as an +exceptional case, to penetrate into the dark laboratory of romantic +invention, and we can appreciate the importance of the labor that is +going on there. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[158] See Part I, Chapter III. + +[159] _Mental Physiology_, Book II, chapter 13. + +[160] This expression is put in quotation marks because in American +and English usage "sensation" is defined in terms of consciousness, +and such an expression as "unconscious sensation" is paradoxical, +and would lead to futile discussion. (Tr.) + +[161] For the detailed criticism of unconscious cerebration, see +Boris Sidis, _The Psychology of Suggestion: A research into the +subconscious nature of Man and Society_, New York, Appletons, 1898, +pp. 121-127. The author, who assumes the coexistence of two +selves--one waking, the other subwaking, and who attributes to the +latter all weakness and vice (according to him the unconscious is +incapable of rising above mere association by contiguity; it is +"stupid," "uncritical," "credulous," "brutal," etc.) would be +greatly puzzled to explain its role in creative activity. + + + + +APPENDIX C + +COSMIC AND HUMAN IMAGINATION[162] + + +For Froschammer, _Fancy_ is the original principle of things. In his +philosophical theory it plays the same part as Hegel's _Idea_, +Schopenhauer's _Will_, Hartmann's _Unconscious_, etc. It is, at first, +objective--in the beginning the universal creative power is immanent in +things, just as there is contained in the kernel the principle that +shall give the plant its form and construct its organism; it spreads out +into the myriads of vegetable and animal existences that have been +succeeded or that still live on the surface of the Cosmos. The first +organized beings must have been very simple; but little by little the +objective imagination increases its energy by exercising it; it invents +and realizes increasingly more complex images that attest the progress +of its artistic genius. So Darwin was right in asserting that a slow +evolution raises up organized beings towards fulness of life and beauty +of form. + +Step by step, it succeeds in becoming conscious of itself in the mind of +man--it becomes subjective. Generative power, at first diffused +throughout the organism, becomes localized in the generative organs, and +becomes established in sex. "The brain, in living beings, may form a +pole opposed to the reproductive organs, especially when these beings +are very high in the organic scale." Thus changed, the generative power +has become capable of perceiving new relations, of bringing forth +internal worlds. In nature and in man it is the same principle that +causes living forms to appear--objective images in a way, and subjective +images, a kind of living forms that arise and die in the mind.[163] + +This metaphysical theory, one of the many varieties of _mens agitat +molem_, being, like every other, a personal conception, it is +superfluous to discuss or criticise its evident anthropomorphism. But, +since we are dealing with hypotheses, I venture to risk a comparison +between embryological development in physiology, instinct in +psychophysiology, and the creative imagination in psychology. These +three phenomena are creations, i.e., a disposition of certain materials +following a determinate type. + +In the first case, the ovum after fertilization is subject to a +rigorously determined evolution whence arises such and such an +individual with its specific and personal characters, its hereditary +influences, etc. Every disturbing factor in this evolution produces +deviations, monstrosities, and the creation does not attain the normal. +Embryology can follow these changes step by step. There remains one +obscure point in any event, and that is, the nature of what the ancients +called the _nisus formativus_. + +In the case of instinct, the initial moment is an external or internal +sensation, or rather, a representation--the image of a nest to be built, +in the case of the bird; of a tunnel to be dug, for the ant; of a comb +to be made, for the bee and the wasp; of a web to be spun, for the +spider, etc. This initial state puts into action a mechanism determined +by the nature of each species, and ends in creations of special kinds. +However, variations of instinct, its adaptation to various conditions, +show that the conditions of the determinism are less simple, that the +creative activity is endowed with a certain plasticity. + +In the third case, creative imagination, the ideal, a sketched +construction, is the equivalent of the ovum; but it is evident that the +plasticity of the creative imagination is much greater than that of +instinct. The imagination may radiate in several very different ways, +and the plan of the invention, as we have seen,[164] may arise as a +whole and develop regularly in an embryological manner, or else present +itself in a fragmentary, partial form that becomes complete after a +series of attractions. + +Perhaps an identical process, forming three stages--a lower, middle, +and higher--is at the root of all three cases. But this is only a +speculative hypothesis, foreign to psychology proper. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[162] See above, Part One, Chapter IV. + +[163] Those who, not having the courage to read the 575 pages of +Froschammer's book, want more details, may profitably consult the +excellent analysis that Seailles has given (_Rev. Philos._, March, +1878, pp. 198-220). See also Ambrosi, _Psicologia dell' +immaginazione nella storia della filosofia_, pp. 472-498. + +[164] See above, Part II, chapter IV. + + + + +APPENDIX D + +EVIDENCE IN REGARD TO MUSICAL IMAGINATION[165] + + +The question asked above,[166] Does the experiencing of purely musical +sounds evoke images, universally, and of what nature and under what +conditions? seemed to me to enter a more general field--the affective +imagination--which I intend to study elsewhere in a special work. For +the time being I limit myself to observations and information that I +have gathered, picking from them several that I give here for the sake +of shedding light on the question. I give first the replies of +musicians; then, those of non-musicians. + +1. M. Lionel Dauriac writes me: "The question that you ask me is +complex. I am not a 'visualizer;' I have infrequent hypnagogic +hallucinations, and they are all of the auditory type. + +"... Symphonic music aroused in me no image of the visual type while I +remained the amateur that you knew from 1876 to 1898. When that amateur +began to reflect methodically on the art of his taste, he recognized in +music a power of suggesting: + +"1. Sonorous, non-musical images--thunder, clock. Example, the overture +of _William Tell_. + +"2. Psychic images--suggestion of a mental state--anger, love, religious +feeling. + +"3. Visual images, whether following upon the psychic image or through +the intermediation of a programme. + +"Under what condition, in a symphonic work, is the visual image, +introduced by the psychic image, produced? In the event of a break in +the melodic web (see my _Psychologie dans l'Opera_, pp. 119-120). Here +are given, without orderly arrangement, some of the ideas that have come +to me: + +"Beethoven's _symphony in C major_ appears to me purely musical--it is +of a sonorous design. The _symphony in D major_ (the second) suggests to +me visual-motor images--I set a ballet to the first part and keep track +altogether of the ballet that I picture. The _Heroic Symphony_ (aside +from the funeral march, the meaning of which is indicated in the title) +suggests to me images of a military character, ever since the time that +I noticed that the fundamental theme of the first portion is based on +notes of perfect harmony--trumpet-notes and, by association, military. +The _finale_ of this symphony, which I consider superior to other parts, +does not cause me to see anything. _Symphony in B flat major_--I see +nothing there--this may be said without qualification. _Symphony in C +minor_--it is dramatic, although the melodic web is never broken. The +first part suggests the image, not of Fate knocking at the gate, as +Beethoven said, but of a soul overcome with the crises of revolt, +accompanied by a hope of victory. Visual images do not come except as +brought by psychic images." + +F. G., a musician, always sees--that is the rule, notably in the +_Pastoral_, and in the _Heroic Symphony_. In Bach's _Passion_ he beholds +the scene of the mystic lamb. + +A composer writes me: "When I compose or play music of my own +composition I behold dancing figures; I see an orchestra, an audience, +etc. When I listen to or play music by another composer I do not see +anything." This communication also mentions three other musicians who +see nothing. + +2. D......, so little of a musician that I had some trouble to make him +understand the term "symphonic music," never goes to concerts. However, +he went once, fifteen years ago, and there remains in his memory very +clearly the principal phrase of a minuet (he hums it)--he cannot recall +it without seeing people dancing a minuet. + +M. O. L...... has been kind enough to question in my behalf sixteen +non-musical persons. Here are the results of his inquiry: + +Eight see curved lines. + +Three see images, figures springing in the air, fantastic designs. + +Two see the waves of the ocean. + +Three do not see anything. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[165] See Part Three, Chapter II. + +[166] _Ibid._, IV. + + + + +APPENDIX E + +THE IMAGINATIVE TYPE AND ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS[167] + + +I have questioned a very great number of imaginative persons, well known +to me as such, and have chosen preferably those who, not making a +profession of creating, let their fancy wander as it wills, without +professional care. In all the mechanism is the same, differing scarcely +more than temperament and degree of culture. Here are two examples. + +B......, forty-six years of age, is acquainted with a large part of +Europe, North America, Oceania, Hindoostan, Indo-China, and North +Africa, and has not passed through these countries on the run, but, +because of his duties, resided there some time. It is worthy of remark, +as will be seen from the following observation, that the remembrance of +such various countries does not have first place in this brilliant, +fanciful personage--which fact is an argument in favor of the very +personal character of the creative imagination. + +"In a general way, imagination, very lively in me, functions by +association of ideas. Memory or the outer world furnishes me some data. +On this data there is not always, though there should be, imaginative +work proper, and then things remain as they are, without end. + +"But when I meet a construction--it matters little whether ancient or in +the course of erection--the formula, 'That ought to be fixed,' is one +that rises mechanically to my mind in such a case; often it happens that +I think aloud and say it, although alone. When going away from the +architectural subject[168] under consideration, I make up infinite +variations upon it, one after another. Sometimes the things start from a +reflex...." + +After having noted his preference for the architecture of the Middle +Ages, B...... adds (here he touches on the unconscious factor): + +"Were I to explain or attempt to explain how the Middle Ages have such +an attraction for my mind, I should see therein an atavistic +accumulation of religious feeling fixed in my family, on the female side +no doubt, and of religiousness in ecclesiastical architecture--these +touch. + +"Another example illustrating the role of association of ideas in the +same matter. One Sunday night I left Noumea in the carriage of Dr. +F...... who was going to visit a nunnery five leagues from there. At the +moment of our arrival the doctor asked what time it was. 'Half-past +two,' I said, looking at my watch. As we stopped in the convent court +in front of the chapel I _heard_ the lusty conclusion of a psalm. 'They +are singing vespers,' I remarked to the doctor. He commenced to laugh. +'What time are vespers sung in your town?' 'At half-past two,' I +answered. I opened the chapel door in order to show the doctor that +vespers had just been held: the chapel was vacant. As I stood there, +somewhat non-plussed, the doctor remarked, 'Cerebral automatism.' + +"I may add here, _by association_ of ideas. The doctor had seen through +me, and had with fine insight perceived _why_ I had _heard_ the end of +the psalm. The incident made a great impression on me, all the more as +ever since the age of eight my memory testifies to a like hallucination, +but of sight in place of hearing. It was at L...... that on Good Friday +they rang at the cathedral with all their might. It was the very moment +before the bells remain silent for three days, and it is known that this +silence, ordained in the liturgy, is explained to children by telling +them that during these two days the bells have flown to Rome. Naturally +I was treated to this little tale, and as they finished telling it, I +_saw_ a bell flying at an angle that I could still describe. + +"But this transforming power of my imagination is not present in me to +the same extent as regards all things. It is much more operative in +relation to Romano-Gothic architecture, mystic literature, and +sociological knowledge than in relation, for instance, to my memories of +travels. When I see again, in the mind's eye, the Isle of Bourbon, +Niagara, Tahiti, Calcutta, Melbourne, the Pyramids and the Sphinx, the +graphic representation is intellectually perfect. The objects live again +in all their external surroundings. I feel the _Khamsinn_, the desert +wind that scorched me at the foot of Pompey's Column; I hear the sea +breaking into foam on the barrier reef of Tahiti. But the image does not +lead to evocation of related or parallel ideas. + +"When, on the other hand, I take a walk over the Comburg moor, the +castle weighs upon me in all its massiveness; the recollections of the +_Memoires d'Outre-tombe_ besiege me like living pictures. I see, like +Chateaubriand himself, the family of great famished lords in their +feudal castle. With Chateaubriand I return in the twinkling of an eye to +the Niagara that we have both seen. In the fall of the waters I find the +deep and melancholy note that he himself found; and after that I think +of that dark cathedral of Dol that evidently suggested to the author his +_Genie du Christianisme_. + +"In literature, things are very unequally suggestive to me. Classic +literature has only few paths outwards for me--Tacitus, Lucretius, +Juvenal, Homer, and Saint-Simon excepted. I read the other authors of +this class partly for themselves, without making a comparison. On the +other hand, the reading of Dante, Shakespeare, St. Jerome's compact +verses on the Hebrew, and Middle Age prose excites within me a whole +world of ideas, like Wagner's music, _canto-fermo_, and Beethoven. +Certain things form a link for me from one order of ideas to another. +For example, Michaelangelo and the Bible, Rembrandt and Balzac, Puvis de +Chavannes and the Merovingian narratives. + +"To sum up: There are in me certain _milieux_ especially favorable to +imagination. When any circumstance brings me into one of them, it is +rare that an imaginative network does not occur; and, if one is +produced, association of ideas will perform the work. When I give myself +up to serious work, I have to mistrust myself: and in this connection I +shall surprise people when I say that in the class of ideas above +indicated the subject exciting the most ideas in me is sociology." + +M......, sixty years of age, artistic temperament. Because of the +necessities of life, he has followed a profession entirely opposite to +his bent. He has given me his "confession" in the form of fragmentary +notes made day by day. Many are _moral_ remarks on the subject of his +imagination--I leave them out. I note especially the unconquerable +tendency to make up little romances and some details in regard to visual +representation, and a dislike for numbers. + +"It happens that I experience sharp regret when I see the photograph of +a monument, e.g., the Pantheon, the proportions of which I have +constructed according to the descriptions of the monument and the idea +that I had of the life of the Greeks. The photograph mars my dream. + +"From the seen to the unknown. In the S. G. library. A slender young +woman, smartly dressed--spotless black gloves--between her fingers a +small pencil and a tiny note-book. What business has this affectation +this morning in a classic and dull building, in a common environment of +poor workmen? She is not a servant-maid, and not a teacher. Now for the +solution of the unknown. I follow the woman to her family, into her +home, and it is quite a task. + +"In the same library. I want to get an address from the _Almanach +Bottin_. A young man, perhaps a student, has borrowed the ridiculous +volume. Bent over it, his hands in his hair, he turns the leaves with +the sage leisure of a scholar looking for a commentary. From the empty +dictionary he often draws out a letter. He must have received this +letter this morning from the country. His family advises him to apply to +so-and-so. It is a question of money and employment. He must locate the +people who, provincial ignorance said, are near him. And so goes the +wandering imagination. + +"When I feel myself drawn to anyone, I prefer seeing images or portraits +rather than the reality. That is how I avoid making unforeseen +discoveries that would spoil my model. + +"If I make numerical calculations, in the absence of concrete factors, +the imagination goes afield, and the figures group themselves +mechanically, harkening to an inner voice that arranges them in order to +get the sense. + +"There may be an imagination devoted to arithmetical +calculations--forms, beings intrude, even the outline of the figure 3, +for example; and then the addition or any other calculation is ruined. + +"I revert to the impossibility of making an addition without a swerve of +imagination, because plastic figures are always ready before the +calculator. The man of imagination is always constructing by means of +plastic images.[169] Life possesses him, intoxicates him, so he never +gets tired." + +THE END + +FOOTNOTES: + +[167] See Conclusion, II, above. + +[168] B...... is not an architect. + +[169] We see that the speaker is a visualizer. + + + + +INDEX. + + +Absent images, Association of, 94. + +Abstraction, 15; + Late appearance of, 146. + +Abulics, 11. + +Activity, normal end of imagination, 11. + +Adaptation of means to end, 264. + +Advance plans in commerce, 288. + +Adventure, Eras of, 287. + +Affective states, Role of, 8. + +Alcoholic liquors, 74. + +Alembert, d', 87. + +Alexander, 138, 142, 143. + +Alfieri, 56. + +Allen, 150. + +Americans, change occupations, 257. + +Analogy, 299; + Abuse of, 305; + based on qualitative resemblance, 26; + essential to creative imagination, 25; + not trustworthy in science, 27; + Role of, in primitive life, 125; + Thinking by, 117. + +Anatomical conditions, 65. + +Anger, 34. + +Animal fancy, 97. + +Animals, Association fibers or centers, lacking in, 100; + Discoveries of, 98; + Imagination in, 93, 94; + Usefulness of, to man, 274. + +Animism, 107, 189; + of primitives, 123. + +Anticipations of later inventions, 277. + +Apollo, 50. + +Apperception, Importance of, 16. + +_Apprehensio simplex_, a logical figment, 110. + +Arago, 145. + +Aristotle, vi, 134, 141. + +Art, Indefiniteness of modern, 203; + Realistic, 250; + Various theories of, 46. + +Artificial motors, Use of, a late development, 275. + +Aryan race, 129. + +Association, 22, 23; + Forms of, 196; + Laws of, 23; + of ideas, 59, 353; + of ideas, Criticism of the term, 23; + of ideas, Discovery depends on, 250; + suggests cause, 261. + +Associational systems, 67. + +Astral influences, 261. + +Asyllogistic deduction, 283. + +Attention, 86. + +Australians, 285. + +Automatisms, 71. + +Azam, 325. + + +Bach, 69, 214, 216. + +Bacon, Roger, 245, 303 n. + +Baillarger, Dr., 324. + +Baldwin, 104. + +Barter, 286. + +Baudelaire, 39, 55. + +Beethoven, 52, 71, 148, 218. + +Bernard, Claude, 52; + _idee directrice_ of, 250. + +Binet, 340. + +Bipartite division of the brain, 67. + +Bismarck, 271. + +Blood circulation, Importance of, 70. + +Boehme, Jacob, 335. + +Bonnal, 298 n. + +Borgia, Lucretia, 139. + +Bossuet, 225. + +Boulogne, De, 283. + +Bourdeau, L., 272. + +Brain- development and abstraction, 100; + regions, Development of, 67; + weights, 66. + +Bramwell, 343. + +Breguet, 277. + +Brown-Sequard, 77. + +Buddha, Life of, 301. + +Buffon, 52, 73. + +Byron, 145. + + +Cabalists, 234. + +Cabalistic mysticism, 226. + +Cabanis, 78. + +Campanella, 303. + +Carlyle, 150, 186. + +Carpenter, 284, 339. + +Carthage, 282. + +Categories of images, 16. + +Causality, Search for, 260. + +Charcot, 6. + +Charlemagne, 138. + +Chateaubriand, 76. + +Chatterton, 145. + +Cherubini, 145. + +Child, Adult misinterpretation of, 104; + Creative imagination in the, 103 ff.; + Exaggeration of his intelligence, 115; + Oscillation of belief and doubt in the, 113; + Stages of development, 105. + +Child-study, Difficulties of, 104. + +Chopin, 52, 215. + +Chorea, 101. + +Cid, The, 140. + +Classes of discoverers, 249. + +Classification, 181. + +Coleridge, 37. + +Colored hearing, 38. + +Columbus, Christopher, 89. + +Commerce, Combative element in, 295. + +Commercial imagination, Conditions of, 281; + development due to increasing substitution, 287; + development, Stages of, 285. + +Common factor in comparison, 40. + +Complementary scientists, 246. + +Complete images impossible, 16. + +Comte, 146. + +Condillac, 243. + +Confucius, 300. + +Confusion of impressions, 18. + +Conjecture, beginning of science, 245. + +Conscious imagination, a special case, 58. + +Constellation, 59, 126. + +Constitutions by philosophers, 309. + +Contiguity and resemblance, 24. + +Contrapuntists, 214. + +Contrast, Association by, 40. + +Cooperation, 309; + of intellect and feeling, 43. + +Copernicus, 246. + +Counter-world, 304. + +Creation hindered by complete redintegration, 22; + in physiological inhibition, 6; + Motor basis of, 258; + Physiological and imaginative, 76; + versus repetition, 5. + +Creative imagination, a growth, 9; + Composite character of, 12; + conditioned by knowledge, 173; + either esthetic or practical, 44; + implies feeling, 32; + Neglect of, by writers on psychology, vii; + Reasons for, 313. + +Creative instinct, non-existent, 42. + +Crisis, not essential, 58. + +Critical stage of investigation, 252. + +Cromwell, 144. + +Cumulative inventions, 272. + +Curiosity, 99; + of primitive man, 45, 131. + +Cuvier, 183. + + +Daedalus, 269. + +Dante, 205. + +Darwin, 117, 346. + +Dauriac, 350. + +Deduction, Process of, 283. + +Deffant, Madame du, 48. + +Deities, Coalescence of, 200; + Momentary, 199; + Multiplicity of Roman, 125. + +Delboef, 342. + +DeQuincy, 55. + +Descartes, 73, 294. + +Determinism, Neglect of, by idealists, 303; + of art, 278; + of invention, 264. + +Dewey, John, 132 n. + +_Dialectic_, Hegelian, 254. + +Diffluent imagination, 196 ff. + +_Dii minores_, 269. + +Disinterestedness of the artist, 35. + +Dissociation, 15, 268; + by concomitant variations, 21; + of series, 19. + +Double personality, 325. + +Dreams, 38; + Emotional persistence of, 324. + +Drugs, Effect of, 55; + Use of, as excitants, 70. + +Dualism of Fourier, 306. + +Duerer, 145. + + +Egypt, 135. + +Egyptian conception of causality, 260. + +Emotion, and sensation, 38; + material for imagination, 33; + presupposes unsatisfied needs, 32; + Realization of, 80. + +Emotional abstraction, 196; + factor, 31 ff. + +Empedocles, 136. + +Epic, Rise of the, 138. + +Essenes, 307. + +Esthetic imagination, + contrasted to mechanical, 264; + Fixity of, 264. + +Ethics, Living and dead, 302. + +Euclid, 244, 245. + +Eureka, Moment of, 247, 302. + +Evolution of commerce, Law's statement of, 294. + +Exact knowledge requisite in commerce, 289. + +Expansion of self, 314. + +Experience requisite for literary invention, 146. + +External factors, 21. + + +Facts and general ideas, 252. + +Faith, 112; + -cure, 6; + highest in semi-science, 241; + Role of, 7. + +Fancy, 346; + in animals, 97; + Source of, 260. + +Fear, 34. + +Fenelon, 303. + +Fere, 325, 340. + +Fiduciary money, 286. + +Fixed ideas, 88, 89. + +Flechsig, 67, 68, 100, 103. + +Flournoy, 38, 344. + +Forel, 96. + +Fouillee, 193. + +Fourier, 304. + +French, not strong in imagination, 193; + Revolution, 151. + +Fresnel, 145. + +Fromentin, 17. + +Froschammer, 75, 346. + +Fuegians, 285. + + +Gauss, 69, 183. + +Gautier, Theophile, 55, 189, 190. + +Gavarni, 187. + +Generic image, 18. + +Genius, and brain structure, 68; + depends on subliminal imagination, 57; + exceptional, 149; + No common measure of, 143. + +Geniuses, of judgment, 142; + of mastery over men, and matter, 142. + +Gilman, 219 n. + +Gnostics, 234. + +Goethe, 29, 149, 150, 216. + +Gold, Curative powers of, 261. + +Goncourt, 74. + +Goya, 39, 206. + +Greece, 282. + +Greek republics, 151. + +Gretry, 73. + +Grillparzer, 85, 336. + +Groos, 35, 47, 99, 227. + +Guericke, Otto de, 276. + + +Habits, 22. + +Hamilton, 19, 58, 60. + +Handel, 145. + +Hanseatic League, 287. + +Harrington, 303. + +Hartmann, 254, 346. + +Hauey, 247. + +Haydn, 145. + +Hegel, 254, 346. + +Heine, 306. + +Hellenic imagination, anthropomorphic, 202. + +Helmholtz, 20, 87, 142. + +Henry IV, 139. + +Hephaestos, 269. + +Hercules, 137. + +Hero, 270. + +Herodotus, 260. + +Hesiod, 130. + +Hindoo imagination, symbolic, 202. + +Hindoos, 128. + +Hodgson, 35. + +Hoeffding, 41. + +Hoffman, 39, 206. + +_Homo duplex_, 43. + +Homonomy, 120. + +Howe, 60 n. + +Huber, 96. + +Hugo, Victor, 188, 189, 216, 229; + Animism in, 189. + +Human force, beginning of invention, 273. + +Hume, 111. + +Huyghens, 270. + +Hyperaemia, 70. + +Hyperesthesia, Temporary, 74. + +Hypermnesia, 54. + +Hypothesis, 251; + Progressive, 244. + + +Icarus, 269. + +Idea and emotion, Equivalence of, 80. + +Ideal modified in practice, 306. + +Idealistic conceptions, 300. + +Idealization, Process of, 38. + +Illusion, 107; + and legend, 137; + Conscious, of mystic, 228. + +Illusions, valuable to scientist, 251. + +Image, Modification of, 18, 291. + +Images, 80; + abbreviations of reality, 232; + Categories of, 16; + Concrete, 222; + provoked, 188; + sketched type, 81; + Symbolic, 222; + Visual, provoked by music, 217. + +Imagination, and abulia, 11; + and foresight, 284; + anthropocentric, 10; + basis of the cosmic process, 75; + Commercial, 281; + complete in animals, 95; + condensed in common objects, 276; + Conditions of, 44; + Development of, 167 ff.; + Diffluent, 196 ff.; + Esthetic, 264; + fixed form, 318; + in animals, 93; + in experimentation, 248; + in primitive man, 118; + Mechanical and technical, 257; + Motives of different sorts of, 251; + Musical, 212 ff., 350; + Mystic, 221 ff.; + Mystical, different from religious, 231; + not opposed to the useful, 263; + Numerical, 207 ff.; + Periods of development of, 144; + Plastic, 184 ff.; + Poetical, 267; + Practical, 256 ff.; + present in all activities, viii; + Quality of, same in many lives, 265; + Scientific, 236 ff.; + sketched form, 316; + substitute for reason, 29; + Varieties of, 180. + +Imaginative type, 320. + +Imitation, through pleasure, 98. + +Imitative music, 214. + +Impersonality, 52, 86. + +Incomplete images, 18. + +Incubation, Periods of, 278. + +Individual variations, 179. + +Individuality of genius, 149. + +Inductive reasoning, 132. + +Infantile insanity, 101. + +Inhibition by representation, 6. + +Initial moment of discovery, 276. + +Inspiration, 50, 85; + and intoxication, 55; + Characteristic of, 57; + characterized by suddenness and impersonality, 51; + resembles somnambulism, 56; + Subjective feeling of, untrustworthy, 59. + +Instinct, 75; + answer to specific needs, 42; + Creative, 313; + Resemblance of invention to, 48. + +Intellectual factor, 15. + +Intuition, 282, 285. + +Introspectors, 321. + +Intentional combination of images, 95. + +Interest, a factor in creation, 82. + +Interesting, defined, 36. + +Invention arises to satisfy a need, 271; + Higher forms of, 140 ff.; + in morals, 300; + in successive parts, 296; + of monopolies, 282; + Pain of, 51; + Spontaneity of, 51; + subjected to tradition, 269. + +Inventions, Amplifiers of, 270; + largely anonymous, 275; + Mechanical, neglected by psychologists, 263; + Stratification of, 272. + +Inventors deified, 269; + Oddities of, 72. + + +James, William, 21, 25, 37, 83, 112. + +Janet, 340. + +Jealousy, stimulates imagination, 34. + +Jordaens, 145. + +Joy, 34. + + +Kant, 248. + +Kepler, 246, 247. + +Klopstock, 215. + +Kuehn, 129. + + +Lagrange, 71. + +Lamennais, 73. + +Lang, 128, 261. + +Language, Origin of, 120. + +Laplace, 250. + +Larvated epilepsy, 141. + +Lavoisier, 246. + +Law, 294. + +Lazarus, 47. + +Leibniz, 73, 74, 146, 253, 296 n. + +Lelut, 141. + +Leurechon, 277. + +Liebig, 244. + +Linnaeus, 183. + +Literal mysticism, 226. + +Localization, 65. + +Loch Lomond, 58. + +Locke, 309. + +Lombroso, 141, 142. + +Louis XIV, 150. + +Love, 34; + and hate, 134. + +Love-plays, 99. + + +Machiavelli, 73. + +Machines, counterfeits of human beings, 279. + +Man and animals, Specific quality of, 273. + +Manu, 300. + +Mastery, Spirit of, 114. + +Materials of imagination, 299. + +Maury, A., 6 n. + +Mechanic and poet, 279. + +Mechanical aptitude, 145. + +Mechanical imagination, Ideal of, 268. + +Mediate association, 59. + +Memory, Predominant tendencies in, 61; + untrustworthy, 17. + +Men, Great, as makers of history, 150. + +Mendelssohn, 145, 213 n., 215, 216. + +Mental chemistry, 82. + +Merchant sailors, 282. + +Metamorphosis, 28; + of deities, 129; + Regressive, 171. + +Metaphysical speculation, 251; + thought, Stages of, 252. + +Metaphysics, 252 ff. + +Methods of invention, 243. + +Meynert, 100. + +Michaelangelo, 145, 148, 149. + +Michelet, 186, 306. + +Middle Ages, predominantly imaginative, 174. + +Military invention, 295; + Conditions of, 297. + +Mill, John Stuart, 82, 284. + +Milton, 73. + +Mimicry, 98. + +Mind, Varieties of, 320. + +Mission, Consciousness of, 148. + +Misunderstanding of the new, 151. + +Mobility of inventors, 258. + +Monadology, 253. + +Money, Invention of, 286; + sought as an end, 289. + +Monge, 237. + +Moses, 300. + +More, 303, 309. + +Morgan, Lloyd, 99. + +Mormons, 307. + +Monoideism, 87. + +Montgolfier, 277. + +Moral geniuses, 301. + +Moravian brotherhood, 307. + +Mosso, 71, 340. + +Motor elements in all representation, 4; + elements, Role of, 7; + manifestation basis of creation, 9. + +Movements, Importance of, in imagination, 3. + +Mozart, 73, 145. + +Mueller, Max, 120, 129, 130. + +Mummy powder, 261. + +Muensterberg, 60. + +Muses, 50. + +Music an emotional language, 220; + Precocity in, 144. + +Musical imagination, 212, 350. + +Musset, Alfred de, 335. + +Myers, 342. + +Mystic imagination, 221 ff., 335. + +Mystics, Abuse of allegory, by, 225; + Belief of, 227; + Metaphorical style of, 224. + +Mysticism by suggestion, 229. + +Myth, defined, 123; + Depersonification of, 133; + in Plato, 134; + in science, 134; + Subjective and objective factors in, 122. + +Myths, Significance of, 119; + Variations in, 127. + +Myth-making activity, viii, 331. + + +Napoleon, 10, 66, 71, 142; + his war practice, 298. + +Natural, and human phenomena, 299; + law, Uniformity of, opposed to dissociation, 21; + motors, Use of, 275. + +Naville, 245. + +Need of knowing, 314. + +Neglect of details in sensation, 20. + +Nerval, Gerard de, 229, 324. + +Nervous overflow, 71. + +New Larnak, 309. + +Newbold, 340. + +Newcomen, 270. + +Newton, 58, 87, 146. + +Nietzsche, 150. + +_Nomina Numina_, 120, 262. + +Nordau, 142. + +Numerical imagination, 207 ff.; + mysticism, 226; + series unlimited, 207. + + +Objective study of inventors, 71. + +Oddities of inventors, 72. + +Oelzelt-Newin, 33, 95. + +Old age, Effect of, on imagination, 77. + +Organic conditions, 65. + +Orientation conditioned by individual organization, 48; + Personal, 270. + +Owen, Robert, 309. + + +Paradox of belief, 242. + +Paralysis by ideas, 6. + +Pascal, 146, 244. + +Pasteur, 142, 143, 251. + +Pathological view of genius, 141. + +Pathology and physiology, 74. + +Perception, 15; + and conception, 184; + and imagination, 106. + +Perez, B., 115. + +Persistence of ideas due to feeling, 79. + +Personification, 186; + characteristic of aborigines and children, 27; + source of myth, 28. + +Phalanges, Organization of society into, 305. + +Philippe, J., 17 n. + +Philosophy, a transformation of mystic ideas, 233. + +Phlogiston, 248. + +Physiological states, 70. + +Physiology and pathology, 74. + +Plastic art and mythology, 191; + imagination, 184 f. + +Plato, 134, 303, 309. + +Platonic ideas, 81, 253. + +Play, 47, 97; + Uses of, for man, 114. + +Plotinus, 234. + +Poe, 39, 206, 324. + +Poet, a workman, 190. + +Poetical imagination, general characters, 267; + Inspiration in, 268; + special characters, 270. + +Poetical invention, Stages of, 266. + +Polyideism, 87. + +Polynomy, 120. + +Poncelet, 143. + +Positive minds, 318. + +Powers of nature, Exploitation of 271. + +Practical imagination, Ubiquity of, 254. + +Practice, essential in motor creation, 186. + +Precocity, 144; + in poetry, 145; + of mathematicians, 147. + +Pre-Raphaelites, 204. + +Preyer, 117. + +Primitive man, 45; + and myth, 118 ff. + +Principle of unity, 250. + +Progressive stages of imagination, 84. + +Prometheus, 269. + +Provoked revival, 94. + +Pseudo-science, 240. + +Psychic atoms, 19; + paralysis, 6. + +Psychological regressions, 248. + +Puberty, Influence of, on imagination, 76. + +Pythagoras, 226, 246. + +Pythagoreans, 134. + + +Qualities, Attribution of, to objects, 124. + + +Raphael, 145. + +Rational Metaphysics, 234. + +Reason, Objectivity of, 10. + +Reciprocal working of scientific and practical discoveries, 249. + +Recuperative theory of play, 97. + +Redintegration, Law of, 19; + Total, 36. + +Regis, 54. + +Religion, Universality of, 128. + +Renaissance, 151, 175. + +Reni, Guido, 73. + +Repetition versus creation, 5, 23. + +Representation and belief inseparable, 110. + +Representations, Interchange of, 323; + Number of, 322. + +Revery, 38, 198, 316. + +Reymond, Du Bois, 52. + +Reynolds, 6, 325. + +Roland, 138. + +Roman Republic, 151. + +Romans, 125. + +Romanes, 94, 95, 96. + +Romantic invention, 115. + +Roentgen, 142. + +Rossini, 73. + +Rousseau, 309. + +Rubens, 145. + +Ruedinger, 69. + + +Saint-Simonism, 309. + +Sand, George, 52, 215. + +Satanic literature, 206. + +Schelling, 253. + +Schematic images, 18, 291. + +Schiller, 47, 72, 73, 145. + +Schopenhauer, 37, 149, 150, 253, 346. + +Schubert, 145. + +Schumann, 215. + +Science, 45; + Conjecture beginning of, 245; + prescribes conditions and limits to imagination, 236; + Three movements in growth of, 239. + +Scientific imagination, 236 ff. + +Scripture, 60. + +Self-feeling, 35. + +Semi-science, 240. + +Seneca, 141. + +Sensation changed in memory, 17. + +Sensorial insanity, 101. + +Sexual instinct, 314. + +Shakers, 307. + +Shakespeare, 143, 186. + +Shelly, 56. + +Social aims in finance, 294; + invention, limited by the past, 308; + wants, 314. + +Socialism, Utopian and scientific, 310. + +Societies for special ends, 307. + +Sorrow, 34. + +Special modes of scientific imagining, 237. + +Specific, not general imagination, 179. + +Spencer, 47, 131, 150. + +Spinoza, 110, 143, 254. + +Spirits, Belief in, 51. + +Spontaneity, 296. + +Spontaneous revival, 94, 315. + +Spontaneous variations, 140. + +Stages of passage from percept to concept, 292. + +Stallo, 134. + +State credit, Law's system of, 294. + +Stewart, Dugald, 111. + +Stigmata, etc., unprecedented in individual's experience, 7. + +Stigmatized individuals, 6. + +Subjective factors, 20. + +Subliminal imagination, 57. + +Sully, 21. + +_Summa_, 254. + +Summary, 330. + +Superstition and religion, 259. + +Symbolism of Hindoos, 202. + + +Taine, 18, 111, 117, 129, 150, 200. + +Teleological character of will and imagination, 10. + +Thales, 134. + +Titchener, 83. + +Tolstoi, 151. + +Tools, 274. + +Tours, Moreau de, 55, 78, 141. + +Triptolemus, 269. + +Tropisms, 75. + +Tycho-Brahe, 73, 246, 270. + +Tylor, 99, 123, 125, 131, 139. + +Tyndall, 238. + +Tyre, 282. + + +Unconscious, Nature of the, 339; + physiological theory, 340, 341. + +Unconscious cerebration, 53; + factor, 50 ff.; + factor, not a distinct element in invention, 64. + +Units of exchange, 286. + +Unity, Principle of, 79. + +_Universale post rem_, 84. + +Utopias, based on author's _milieu_, 303. + +Utopian imagination, 299. + +Utopians, indifferent to realization, 309. + + +Van Dyck, 145. + +Vaucanson, 48. + +Vedic epoch, 129. + +Vesication, 5, 7. + +Vicavakarma, 269. + +Vico, 174. + +Vignoli, 128. + +Vinci, Leonardo da, 58, 149. + +_Vis a fronte_ and _a tergo_, 11. + +Vocation, Change of, 172; + Choice of, 144. + +Voltaire, 150. + +Voluntary activity analogous to creative imagination, 9. + +Von Baer, 210. + +Von Hartmann, 224. + + +Wagner, 145. + +Wahle, 62. + +Wallace, 96, 99. + +Wallaschek, 99. + +Watch, Evolution of the, 270. + +Watt, James, 66, 244, 270. + +Wealth, desired from artistic motives, 290. + +Weber, E. F., 5, 145, 216. + +Weismann, 148. + +Wernicke, 100. + +Wiertz, 39, 206. + +Will, The broad meaning of, 112; + a coordinating function, 9; + Effect of, on physiological functioning, 5. + +Words, Role of, 96. + +Wundt, 24, 40, 182. + + +Zeller, 226. + +Ziehen, 61, 62. + +Zoroaster, 300. + + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Notes: | + | | + | Page 23: Fn. 8: Phychology amended to Psychology | + | Page 25: Missing footnote marker in original. Added | + | footnote marker after James quote. | + | Page 35: casual amended to causal | + | Page 38: haphazard amended to haphazardly; grouping amended | + | to groupings | + | Page 39: subejct amended to subject | + | Page 54: vender _sic_ | + | Page 56: "Under the influence of alcoholic drinks and of | + | poisonous intoxicants attention and will always fall into | + | exhaustion." _sic_ Possibly the word "does" or similar | + | is missing before "and," or "and" is superfluous. | + | Page 55: subtances amended to substances | + | Page 75: images amended to image | + | Page 84: unisersale amended to universale | + | Page 85: The following lines transposed: "which, for the | + | time being, should represent the" and "all the forces and | + | capacities upon a single point" | + | Page 123: fill amended to fills | + | Page 151: duplicate "the" removed ("the the deep working of | + | the masses") | + | Page 155: Section II amended to IV | + | Page 163: Section III amended to V | + | Page 193: Saxin amended to Saxon | + | Page 200: everyone amended to every one | + | Page 208: apalling amended to appalling | + | Page 213: Missing footnote marker in original. Added | + | footnotemarker after last paragraph on page. | + | Page 226: caballists amended to cabalists | + | Page 229: plant and tree amended to plants and trees | + | Page 236: In Chapter IV, "The Scientific Imagination," there | + | are sections II, III, IV and V, but no section I. | + | Page 250: dyssymetry amended to dyssymmetry | + | Page 280: Missing footnote marker in original. Added | + | footnote marker after "... inorganic life." | + | Page 286: Fn. 132: Evolution amended to Evolution | + | Page 292: acording amended to according | + | Page 294: managable amended to manageable | + | Page 297: opoprtune amended to opportune | + | Page 319: or amended to of ("the double of savages") | + | Page 321: quintescence amended to quintessence | + | Page 338: Footnote marker and number added to note on page. | + | Footnote marker added at end of first paragraph. | + | Page 348: quivalent amended to equivalent | + | Page 351: l'Opera amended to l'Opera | + | Page 365: Lammennais amended to Lamennais | + | Page 365: Michelangelo amended to Michaelangelo | + | | + | Part II, Chapter II: The chapter heading in the table of | + | contents differs from that shown on page 102. Left as is. | + | | + | Accented letters, italicisation and the punctuation of | + | abbreviations have been standardised. | + | | + | Where a word is spelt differently and there is an equal | + | number of instances, the variant spellings have been left as | + | is: Hephaestos/Hephaestos; Jordaens/Jordaens; | + | Linnaeus/Linnaeus. | + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Essay on the Creative Imagination, by Th. 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