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diff --git a/26430-h/26430-h.htm b/26430-h/26430-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2d316c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/26430-h/26430-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,13695 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" /> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of Essay on the Creative Imagination, by Th. Ribot. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + + p {margin-top: .75em; text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em;} + .transnote {margin: 2em 5% 1em 5%; font-size: 90%; + padding: 0.5em 1em 0.5em 1em; + border: solid 1px silver; margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%;} + .rightindent {text-align: right; margin-right: 30%;} + + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 {text-align: center; clear: both;} + + hr {width: 33%; margin-top: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 1.5em; + margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; clear: both;} + + img {border: 0;} + + table {margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;} + .hang {text-align: justify; text-indent: -1em; margin-left: 4em; + vertical-align: bottom;} + .nums {text-align: right; vertical-align: bottom;} + .firstp {text-align: left; vertical-align: top;} + .ready {text-align: justify; text-indent: -1em; margin-left: 1em; + vertical-align: top;} + + body {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .frontend {text-align: center; font-size: 90%} + + .pagenum {position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right;} + + .center {text-align: center;} + .right {text-align: right;} + .allin {font-weight: bold; font-size: 140%;} + .allin2 {font-variant: small-caps; font-size: 85%;} + + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + + .figcenter {margin: auto; text-align: center;} + + .figleft {float: left; clear: left; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-top: + 1em; margin-right: 1em; padding: 0; text-align: center;} + + .figright {float: right; clear: right; margin-left: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em; + margin-top: 1em; margin-right: 0; padding: 0; text-align: center;} + + .footnotes {border: dashed 1px;} + .footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + .footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + .fnanchor {vertical-align: super; font-size: .8em; text-decoration: none;} + + // --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +Project Gutenberg's Essay on the Creative Imagination, by Th. Ribot + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Essay on the Creative Imagination + +Author: Th. Ribot + +Translator: Albert H. N. Baron + +Release Date: August 25, 2008 [EBook #26430] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ESSAY ON THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION *** + + + + +Produced by Clare Boothby and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + + + + + + +<div class="transnote"> +<h3>Transcriber's Note:</h3> + +<p>Obvious typographical errors have been corrected in this text. For a +complete list, please see <a href="#transnote">the bottom of this document</a>.</p> + +<p>The children's letters on page <a href="#Page_108">108</a> have been reproduced in this text as illustrations.</p> +</div> + + + + + +<h1>ESSAY</h1> +<h3>ON THE</h3> +<h1>CREATIVE IMAGINATION</h1> + +<h3>BY</h3> + +<h2>TH. RIBOT</h2> + +<h3>TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH</h3> +<h3>BY</h3> +<h2>ALBERT H. N. BARON</h2> +<h4>FELLOW IN CLARK UNIVERSITY</h4> + +<p class='center'>LONDON<br /> +KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO., <span class="smcap">Ltd</span>.<br /> +1906</p> + +<p class='frontend'>COPYRIGHT BY<br /> +<span class="smcap">The Open Court Publishing Co</span>.<br /> +CHICAGO, U. S. A.<br /> +1906<br /> +<i>All rights reserved.</i></p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p class='center'><span class="smcap">To the Memory of My Teacher<br /> +and Friend</span>,</p> + +<p class='center'><span class='allin'>Arthur Allin, Ph. D.,</span><br /> +<span class='allin2'>professor of psychology and education,<br /> +university of colorado,</span></p> + +<p class='center'><span class='smcap'>who first interested me in the problems of psychology,<br /> +this book is dedicated, with reverence<br /> +and gratitude, by</span></p> + +<p class='rightindent'><span class="smcap">The Translator</span>.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[v]</a></span></p> +<h2>TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.</h2> + + +<p>The name of Th. Ribot has been for many years +well known in America, and his works have gained +wide popularity. The present translation of one +of his more recent works is an attempt to render +available in English what has been received as a +classic exposition of a subject that is often discussed, +but rarely with any attempt to understand +its true nature.</p> + +<p>It is quite generally recognized that psychology +has remained in the semi-mythological, semi-scholastic +period longer than most attempts at scientific +formulization. For a long time it has been +the "spook science" <i>per se</i>, and the imagination, now +analyzed by M. Ribot in such a masterly manner, +has been one of the most persistent, apparently real, +though very indefinite, of psychological spooks. +Whereas people have been accustomed to speak of +the imagination as an entity <i>sui generis</i>, as a lofty +something found only in long-haired, wild-eyed +"geniuses," constituting indeed the center of a cult, +our author, Prometheus-like, has brought it down +from the heavens, and has clearly shown that +<i>imagination is a function of mind common to all</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[vi]</a></span> +<i>men in some degree</i>, and that it is shown in as +highly developed form in commercial leaders and +practical inventors as in the most bizarre of romantic +idealists. The only difference is that the manifestation +is not the same.</p> + +<p>That this view is not entirely original with M. +Ribot is not to his discredit—indeed, he does not +claim any originality. We find the view clearly +expressed elsewhere, certainly as early as Aristotle, +that the greatest artist is he who actually embodies +his vision and will in permanent form, preferably +in social institutions. This idea is so clearly enunciated +in the present monograph, which the author +modestly styles an essay, that when the end of the +book is reached but little remains of the great +imagination-ghost, save the one great mystery underlying +all facts of mind.</p> + +<p>That the present rendering falls far below the +lucid French of the original, the translator is well +aware; he trusts, however, that the indulgent reader +will take into account the good intent as offsetting +in part, at least, the numerous shortcomings of this +version.</p> + +<p>I wish here to express my obligation to those +friends who encouraged me in the congenial task +of translation.</p> + +<p class='right'>A. H. N. B.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[vii]</a></span></p> +<h2>AUTHOR'S PREFACE</h2> + + +<p>Contemporary psychology has studied the purely +reproductive imagination with great eagerness and +success. The works on the different image-groups—visual, +auditory, tactile, motor—are known to +everyone, and form a collection of inquiries solidly +based on subjective and objective observation, on +pathological facts and laboratory experiments. The +study of the creative or constructive imagination, +on the other hand, has been almost entirely neglected. +It would be easy to show that the best, +most complete, and most recent treatises on psychology +devote to it scarcely a page or two; often, +indeed, do not even mention it. A few articles, a +few brief, scarce monographs, make up the sum of +the past twenty-five years' work on the subject. +The subject does not, however, at all deserve this +indifferent or contemptuous attitude. Its importance +is unquestionable, and even though the study +of the creative imagination has hitherto remained almost +inaccessible to experimentation strictly so-called, +there are yet other objective processes that +permit of our approaching it with some likelihood +of success, and of continuing the work of former<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[viii]</a></span> +psychologists, but with methods better adapted to +the requirements of contemporary thought.</p> + +<p>The present work is offered to the reader as an +essay or first attempt only. It is not our intention +here to undertake a complete monograph that would +require a thick volume, but only to seek the underlying +conditions of the creative imagination, showing +that it has its beginning and principal source in +the natural tendency of images to become objectified +(or, more simply, in the motor elements inherent +in the image), and then following it in its +development under its manifold forms, whatever +they may be. For I cannot but maintain that, at +present, the psychology of the imagination is concerned +almost wholly with its part in esthetic creation +and in the sciences. We scarcely get beyond +that; its other manifestations have been occasionally +mentioned—never investigated. Yet invention in +the fine arts and in the sciences is only a special +case, and possibly not the principal one. We hope +to show that in practical life, in mechanical, military, +industrial, and commercial inventions, in religious, +social, and political institutions, the human +mind has expended and made permanent as much +imagination as in all other fields.</p> + +<p>The constructive imagination is a faculty that in +the course of ages has undergone a reduction—or +at least, some profound changes. So, for reasons +indicated later on, the mythic activity has been +taken in this work as the central point of our topic, +as the primitive and typical form out of which the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[ix]</a></span> +greater number of the others have arisen. The creative +power is there shown entirely unconfined, +freed from all hindrance, careless of the possible +and the impossible; in a pure state, unadulterated +by the opposing influence of imitation, of ratiocination, +of the knowledge of natural laws and their +uniformity.</p> + +<p>In the first or analytical part, we shall try to resolve +the constructive imagination into its constitutive +factors, and study each of them singly.</p> + +<p>The second or genetic part will follow the imagination +in its development as a whole from the dimmest +to the most complex forms.</p> + +<p>Finally, the third or concrete part, will be no +longer devoted to the imagination, but to imaginative +beings, to the principal types of imagination +that observation shows us.</p> + +<p>May, 1900.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[x]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[xi]</a></span></p> +<h2>ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS.</h2> + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="toc"> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td class='nums'><span class='smcap'>page</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Translator's Preface</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_v">v</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Author's Preface</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_vii">vii</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>INTRODUCTION.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the motor nature of the constructive imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Transition from the reproductive to the creative imagination.—Do +all representations contain motor elements?—Unusual effects produced by images: vesication, +stigmata; their conditions; their meaning for our subject.—The +imagination is, on the intellectual side, +equivalent to will. Proof: Identity of development; +subjective, personal character of both; teleologic character; +analogy between the abortive forms of the +imagination and abulias.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>FIRST PART.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>analysis of the imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER I.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the intellectual factor.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Dissociation, preparatory work.—Dissociation in complete, +incomplete and schematic images.—Dissociation in +series. Its principal causes: internal or subjective, +external or objective.—Association: its rôle reduced +to a single question, the formation of new combinations.—The +principal intellectual factor is thinking by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[xii]</a></span> +analogy. Why it is an almost inexhaustible source of +creation. Its mechanism. Its processes reducible to +two, viz.: personification, transformation.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER II.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the emotional factor.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>The great importance of this element.—All forms of the +creative imagination imply affective elements. Proofs: +All affective conditions may influence the imagination. +Proofs: Association of ideas on an emotional basis; +new combinations under ordinary and extraordinary +forms.—Association by contrast.—The motor element +in tendencies.—There is no creative instinct; invention +has not <i>a</i> source, but <i>sources</i>, and always arises +from a need.—The work of the imagination reduced +to two great classes, themselves reducible to special +needs.—Reasons for the prejudice in favor of a creative +instinct.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_31">31</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER III.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the unconscious factor.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Various views of the "inspired state." Its essential characteristics; +suddenness, impersonality.—Its relations +to unconscious activity.—Resemblances to hypermnesia, +the initial state of alcoholic intoxication and +somnambulism on waking.—Disagreements concerning +the ultimate nature of unconsciousness: two hypotheses.—The +"inspired state" is not a cause, but an +index.—Associations in unconscious form.—Mediate or +latent association: recent experiments and discussions +on this subject.—"Constellation" the result of a +summation of predominant tendencies. Its mechanism.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_50">50</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER IV.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the organic conditions of the imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Anatomical conditions: various hypotheses. Obscurity of +the question. Flechsig's theory.—Physiological conditions:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[xiii]</a></span> +are they cause, effect, or accompaniment? +Chief factor: change in cerebral and local circulation.—Attempts +at experimentation.—The oddities of inventors +brought under two heads: the explicable and +inexplicable. They are helpers of inspiration.—Is +there any analogy between physical and psychic creation? +A philosophical hypothesis on the subject.—Limitation +of the question. Impossibility of an exact +answer.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_65">65</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER V.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the principle of unity.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Importance of the unifying principle. It is a fixed idea +or a fixed emotion.—Their equivalence.—Distinction +between the synthetic principle and the ideal, which +is the principle of unity in motion: the ideal is a construction +in images, merely outlined.—The principal +forms of the unifying principles: unstable, organic or +middle, extreme or semi-morbid.—Obsession of the inventor +and the sick: insufficiency of a purely psychological +criterion.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_79">79</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>SECOND PART.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the development of the imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER I.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>imagination in animals.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Difficulties of the subject.—The degree of imagination in +animals.—Does creative synthesis exist in them? +Affirmation and denials.—The special form of animal +imagination is motor, and shows itself through play: +its numerous varieties.—Why the animal imagination +must be above all motor: lack of intellectual development.—Comparison +with young children, in whom the +motor system predominates: the rôles of movements in +infantile insanity.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_93">93</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER II.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[xiv]</a></span><br /> +<span class='smcap'>imagination in the child.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Division of its development into four principal periods.—Transition +from passive to creative imagination: perception +and illusion.—Animating everything: analysis +of the elements constituting this moment: the rôle of +belief.—Creation in play: period of imitation, attempts +at invention.—Fanciful invention.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_103">103</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER III.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>primitive man and the creation of myths.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>The golden age of the creative imagination.—Myths: +hypotheses as to the origin: the myth is the psycho-physical +objectification of man in the phenomena that +he perceives. The rôle of imagination.—How myths +are formed. The moment of creation: two operations—animating +everything, qualifying everything. Romantic +invention lacking in peoples without imagination. +The rôle of analogy and of association through +"constellation."—The evolution of myths: ascension, +acme, decline.—The explanatory myths undergo a radical +transformation: the work of depersonification of +the myth. Survivals.—The non-explanatory myths +suffer a partial transformation: Literature is a fallen +and rationalized mythology.—Popular imagination +and legends: the legend is to the myth what illusion +is to hallucination.—Unconscious processes that the +imagination employs in order to create legends: +fusion, idealization.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_118">118</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER IV.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the higher forms of invention.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Is a psychology of great inventors possible? Pathological +and physiological theories of genius.—General characters +of great inventors. Precocity: chronological order +of the development of the creative power. Psychological<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[xv]</a></span> +reasons for this order. Why the creator commences +by imitating.—Necessity or fatalism of vocation.—The +representative character of great creators. +Discussion as to the origin of this character—is it in +the individual or in the environment?—Mechanism of +creation. Two principal processes—complete, abridged. +Their three phases; their resemblances and differences.—The +rôle of chance in invention: it supposes the +meeting of two factors—one internal, the other external.—Chance +is an occasion for, not an agent of, +creation.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_140">140</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER V.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>law of the development of the imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Is the creative imagination, in its evolution, subject to +any law?—It passes through two stages separated by +a critical phase.—Period of autonomy; critical period; +period of definite constitution. Two cases: decay or +transformation through logical form, through deviation.—Subsidiary +law of increasing complexity.—Historical +verification.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_167">167</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>THIRD PART.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the principal types of imagination.</span><br /> +<span class='smcap'>preliminary.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>The need of a concrete study.—The varieties of the creative +imagination, analogous to the varieties of character.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_179">179</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER I.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the plastic imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>It makes use of clear images, well determined in space, +and of associations of objective relations.—Its external +character.—Inferiority of the affective element.—Its +principal manifestations: in the arts dealing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[xvi]</a></span> +with form; in poetry (transformation of sonorous into +visual images); in myths with clear outline; in mechanical +invention.—The dry and rational imagination +its elements.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_184">184</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER II.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the diffluent imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>It makes use of vague images linked according to the +least rigorous modes of association. Emotional abstractions; +their nature.—Its characteristic of inwardness.—Its +principal manifestations: revery, the romantic +spirit, the chimerical spirit; myths and religious +conceptions, literature and the fine arts (the +symbolists), the class of the marvelous and fantastic.—Varieties +of the diffluent imagination: first, numerical +imagination; its nature; two principal forms, +cosmogonic and scientific conceptions; second, musical +imagination, the type of the affective imagination. +Its characteristics; it does not develop save after an +interval of time.—Natural transposition of events in +musicians.—Antagonism between true musical imagination +and plastic imagination. Inquiry and facts +on the subject.—Two great types of imagination.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_195">195</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER III.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>mystic imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Its elements; its special characteristics.—Thinking symbolically.—Nature +of this symbolism.—The mystic +changes concrete images into symbolic images.—Their +obscurity; whence it arises.—Extraordinary abuse of +analogy.—Mystic labor on letters, numbers, etc.—Nature +and extent of the belief accompanying this +form of imagination: it is unconditional and permanent.—The +mystic conception of the world a general +symbolism.—Mystic imagination in religion and in +metaphysics.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_221">221</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER IV.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[xvii]</a></span><br /> +<span class='smcap'>the scientific imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>It is distinguishable into genera and species.—The need +for monographs that have not yet appeared.—The +imagination in growing sciences—belief is at its +maximum; in the organized sciences—the negative +rôle of method.—The conjectural phase; proof of its +importance.—Abortive and dethroned hypotheses.—The +imagination in the processes of verification.—The +metaphysician's imagination arises from the same +need as the scientist's.—Metaphysics is a rationalized +myth.—Three moments.—Imaginative and rationalist.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_236">236</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER V.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the practical and mechanical imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Indetermination of this imaginative form.—Inferior +forms: the industrious, the unstable, the eccentric. +Why people of lively imagination are changeable.—Superstitious +beliefs. Origin of this form of imagination—its +mental mechanism and its elements.—The +higher form—mechanical imagination.—Man has expended +at least as much imagination there as in +esthetic creation.—Why the contrary view prevails.—Resemblances +between these two forms of imagination.—Identity +of development. Detail observation—four +phases.—General characters. This form, at its +best, supposes inspiration; periods of preparation, +of maturity, and of decline.—Special characters: +invention occurs in layers. Principal steps of its +development.—It depends strictly on physical conditions.—A +phase of pure imagination—mechanical +romances. Examples.—Identical nature of the imagination +of the mechanic and that of the artist.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_256">256</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER VI.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the commercial imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Its internal and external conditions.—Two classes of +creators—the cautious, the daring.—The initial moment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[xviii]</a></span> +of invention.—The importance of the intuitive +mind.—Hypotheses in regard to its psychologic +nature.—Its development: the creation of increasingly +more simple processes of substitution.—Characters in +common with the forms of creation already studied.—Characters +peculiar to it—the combining imagination +of the tactician; it is a form of war.—Creative +intoxication.—Exclusive use of schematic representations.—Remarks +on the various types of images.—The +creators of great financial systems.—Brief remarks +on the military imagination.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_281">281</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CHAPTER VII.<br /> +<span class='smcap'>the utopian imagination.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Successive appearances of ideal conceptions.—Creators in +ethics and in the social realm.—Chimerical forms. +Social novelists.—Ch. Fourrier, type of the great +imaginer.—Practical invention—the collective ideal.—Imaginative +regression.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_299">299</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>CONCLUSION.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>I. <i>The foundations of the creative imagination.</i></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>Why man is able to create: two principal conditions.—"Creative +spontaneity," which resolves itself into +needs, tendencies, desires.—Every imaginative creation +has a motor origin.—The spontaneous revival of +images.—The creative imagination reduced to three +forms: outlined, fixed, objectified. Their peculiar +characteristics.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_313">313</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>II. <i>The imaginative type.</i></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>A view of the imaginative life in all its stages.—Reduction +to a psychologic law.—Four stages characterized: +1, by the <i>quantity</i> of images; 2, by their <i>quantity +and intensity</i>; 3, by quantity, intensity and duration; +4, by the complete and permanent systematization +of the imaginary life.—Summary.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_320">320</a></td></tr> +<tr><td colspan='2'>APPENDICES.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[xix]</a></span><br /> +<span class='smcap'>observations and documents.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>A. The various forms of inspiration.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_335">335</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>B. On the nature of the unconscious factor. Two categories—static +unconscious, dynamic unconscious.—Theories +as to the nature of the unconscious.—Objections, +criticisms.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_338">338</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>C. Cosmic and human imagination.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_346">346</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>D. Evidence in regard to musical imagination.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_350">350</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='hang'>E. The imaginative type and association of ideas.</td><td class='nums'><a href="#Page_353">353</a></td></tr> +</table></div> + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[3]</a></span></p> +<h2>INTRODUCTION</h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Motor Nature of the Constructive Imagination</span></h3> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>It has been often repeated that one of the principal +conquests of contemporary psychology is the +fact that it has firmly established the place and +importance of movements; that it has especially +through observation and experiment shown the representation +of a movement to be a movement begun, +a movement in the nascent state. Yet those +who have most strenuously insisted on this proposition +have hardly gone beyond the realm of the +passive imagination; they have clung to facts of +pure reproduction. My aim is to extend their +formula, and to show that it explains, in large +measure at least, the origin of the creative imagination.</p> + +<p>Let us follow step by step the passage from reproduction +pure and simple to the creative stage, showing +therein the persistence and preponderance of the +motor element in proportion as we rise from mere +repetition to invention.</p> + +<p>First of all, do all representations include motor<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[4]</a></span> +elements? Yes, I say, because every perception +presupposes movements to some extent, and representations +are the remnants of past perceptions. +Certain it is that, without our examining the question +in detail, this statement holds good for the +great majority of cases. So far as visual and tactile +images are concerned there is no possible doubt as +to the importance of the motor elements that enter +into their composition. The eye is very poorly endowed +with movements for its office as a higher +sense-organ; but if we take into account its intimate +connection with the vocal organs, so rich in capacity +for motor combinations, we note a kind of compensation. +Smell and taste, secondary in human +psychology, rise to a very high rank indeed among +many animals, and the olfactory apparatus thus obtains +with them a complexity of movements proportionate +to its importance, and one that at times +approaches that of sight. There yet remains the +group of internal sensations that might cause discussion. +Setting aside the fact that the vague impressions +bound up with chemical changes within +the tissues are scarcely factors in representation, we +find that the sensations resulting from changes in +respiration, circulation, and digestion are not lacking +in motor elements. The mere fact that, in +some persons, vomiting, hiccoughs, micturition, etc., +can be caused by perceptions of sight or of hearing +proves that representations of this character have +a tendency to become translated into acts.</p> + +<p>Without emphasizing the matter we may, then,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span> +say that this thesis rests on a weighty mass of facts; +that the motor element of the image tends to cause +it to lose its purely "inner" character, to objectify +it, to externalize it, to project it outside of ourselves.</p> + +<p>It should, however, be noted that what has just +been said does not take us beyond the reproductive +imagination—beyond memory. All these revived +images are <i>repetitions</i>; but the creative imagination +requires something <i>new</i>—this is its peculiar and essential +mark. In order to grasp the transition from +reproduction to production, from repetition to creation, +it is necessary to consider other, more rare, +and more extraordinary facts, found only among +some favored beings. These facts, known for a +long time, surrounded with some mystery, and attributed +in a vague manner "to the power of the +imagination," have been studied in our own day +with much more system and exactness. For our +purpose we need to recall only a few of them.</p> + +<p>Many instances have been reported of tingling +or of pains that may appear in different parts of the +body solely through the effect of the imagination. +Certain people can increase or inhibit the beating of +their hearts at will, i.e., by means of an intense +and persistent representation. The renowned physiologist, +E. F. Weber, possessed this power, and has +described the mechanism of the phenomenon. Still +more remarkable are the cases of vesication produced +in hypnotized subjects by means of suggestion. +Finally, let us recall the persistent story of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span> +the stigmatized individuals, who, from the thirteenth +century down to our own day, have been quite +numerous and present some interesting varieties—some +having only the mark of the crucifix, others +of the scourging, or of the crown of thorns.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Let +us add the profound changes of the organism, results +of the suggestive therapeutics of contemporaries; +the wonderful effects of the "faith cure," i.e., +the miracles of all religions in all times and in all +places; and this brief list will suffice to recall certain +creative activities of the human imagination that we +have a tendency to forget.</p> + +<p>It is proper to add that the image acts not altogether +in a positive manner. Sometimes it has an +inhibitory power. A vivid representation of a +movement arrested is the beginning of the stoppage +of that movement; it may even end in complete +arrest of the movement. Such are the cases of +"paralysis by ideas" first described by Reynolds, +and later by Charcot and his school under the name +of "psychic paralysis." The patient's inward conviction +that he cannot move a limb renders him +powerless for any movement, and he recovers his +motor power only when the morbid representation +has disappeared.</p> + +<p>These and similar facts suggest a few remarks.</p> + +<p>First, that we have here creation in the strict +sense of the word, though it be limited to the organism. +What appears is <i>new</i>. Though one may<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span> +strictly maintain that from our own experience we +have a knowledge of formication, rapid and slow +beating of the heart, even though we may not be +able ordinarily to produce them at will, this position +is absolutely untenable when we consider cases of +vesication, stigmata, and other alleged miraculous +phenomena: <i>these are without precedent in the life +of the individual</i>.</p> + +<p>Second, in order that these unusual states may +occur, there are required additional elements in the +producing mechanism. At bottom this mechanism +is very obscure. To invoke "the power of the +imagination" is merely to substitute a word where +an explanation is needed. Fortunately, we do not +need to penetrate into the inmost part of this mystery. +It is enough for us to make sure of the +facts, to prove that they have a representation as +the starting point, and to show that the representation +by itself is not enough. What more then is +needed? Let us note first of all that these occurrences +are rare. It is not within the power of everybody +to acquire stigmata or to become cured of a +paralysis pronounced incurable. This happens only +to those having an ardent faith, a strong desire +<i>that it shall come to pass</i>. This is an indispensable +psychic condition. What is concerned in such a +case is not a single state, but a double one: an +image followed by a particular emotional state (desire, +aversion, etc.). In other words, there are two +conditions: In the first are concerned the motor +elements included in the image, the remains of previous +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span>perceptions; in the second, there are concerned +the foregoing, <i>plus</i> affective states, tendencies that +sum up the individual's energy. It is the latter fact +that explains their power.</p> + +<p>To conclude: This group of facts shows us the +existence, beyond images, of another factor, instinctive +or emotional in form, which we shall have +to study later and which will lead us to the ultimate +source of the creative imagination.</p> + +<p>I fear that the distance between the facts here +given and the creative imagination proper will seem +to the reader very great indeed. And why so? +First, because the creative activity here has as its +only material the organism, and is not separated +from the creator. Then, too, because these facts +are extremely simple, and the creative imagination, +in the ordinary sense, is extremely complex; here +there is one operating cause, a single representation +more or less complex, while in imaginative creation +we have several co-operating images with combinations, +coördination, arrangement, grouping. +But it must not be forgotten that our present aim +is simply to find <i>a transition stage</i><a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> between reproduction +and production; to show the common origin +of the two forms of imagination—the purely representative +faculty and the faculty of creating by +means of the intermediation of images;—and to +show at the same time the work of separation, of +severance between the two.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span></p> + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>Since the chief aim of this study is to prove that +the basis of invention must be sought in motor manifestations, +I shall not hesitate to dwell on it, and +I take the subject up again under another, clearer, +more precise, and more psychological form, in putting +the following question: Which one among the +various modes of mind-activity offers the closest +analogy to the creative imagination? I unhesitatingly +answer, <i>voluntary activity</i>: Imagination, in +the intellectual order, is the equivalent of will in the +realm of movements. Let us justify this comparison +by some proof.</p> + +<p>1. Likeness of development in the two instances. +Growth of voluntary control is progressive, slow, +crossed and checked. The individual has to become +master of his muscles and by their agency extend +his sway over other things. Reflexes, instinctive +movements, and movements expressive of emotion +constitute the primary material of voluntary movements. +The will has no movements of its own as +an inheritance: it must coördinate and associate, +since it separates in order to form new associations. +It reigns by right of conquest, not by right of birth. +In like manner, the creative imagination does not +rise completely armed. Its raw materials are +images, which here correspond to muscular movements. +It goes through a period of trial. It always +is, at the start (for reasons indicated later on), +an imitation; it attains its complex forms only +through a process of growth.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span></p> + +<p>2. But this first comparison does not go to the +bottom of the matter; there are yet deeper analogies. +First, the completely subjective character of both +instances. The imagination is subjective, personal, +anthropocentric; its movement is from within outwards +toward an objectification. The understanding, +i.e., the intellect in the restricted sense, has +opposite characteristics—it is objective, impersonal, +receives from outside. For the creative imagination +the inner world is the regulator; there is a preponderance +of the inner over the outer. For the +understanding, the outside world is the regulator; +there is a preponderance of the outer over the inner. +The world of my imagination is <i>my</i> world as opposed +to the world of my understanding, which is +the world of all my fellow creatures. On the other +hand, as regards the will, we might repeat exactly, +word for word, what we have just said of the +imagination. This is unnecessary. Back of both, +then, we have our true cause, whatever may be our +opinion concerning the ultimate nature of causation +and of will.</p> + +<p>3. Both imagination and will have a teleological +character, and act only with a view toward an end, +being thus the opposite of the understanding, which, +as such, limits itself to proof. We are always +wanting something, be it worthless or important. +We are always inventing for an end—whether in +the case of a Napoleon imagining a plan of campaign, +or a cook making up a new dish. In both +instances there is now a simple end attained by immediate +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span>means, now a complex and distant goal presupposing +subordinate ends which are means in relation +to the final end. In both cases there is a <i>vis a +tergo</i> designated by the vague term "spontaneity," +which we shall attempt to make clear later, and a +<i>vis a fronte</i>, an attracting movement.</p> + +<p>4. Added to this analogy as regards their nature, +there are other, secondary likenesses between the +abortive forms of the creative imagination and the +impotent forms of the will. In its normal and +complete form will culminates in an act; but with +wavering characters and sufferers from abulia deliberation +never ends, or the resolution remains inert, +incapable of realization, of asserting itself in +practice. The creative imagination also, in its complete +form, has a tendency to become objectified, to +assert itself in a work that shall exist not only for +the creator but for everybody. On the contrary, +with dreamers pure and simple, the imagination remains +a vaguely sketched inner affair; it is not embodied +in any esthetic or practical invention. Revery +is the equivalent of weak desires; dreamers are +the abulics of the creative imagination.</p> + +<p>It is unnecessary to add that the similarity established +here between the will and the imagination is +only partial and has as its aim only to bring to light +the rôle of the motor elements. Surely no one will +confuse two aspects of our psychic life that are so +distinct, and it would be foolish to delay in order +to enumerate the differences. The characteristic of +novelty should by itself suffice, since it is the special<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span> +and indispensable mark of invention, and for volition +is only accessory: The extraction of a tooth +requires of the patient as much effort the second +time as the first, although it is no longer a novelty.</p> + +<p>After these preliminary remarks we must go on +to the analysis of the creative imagination, in order +to understand its nature in so far as that is accessible +with our existing means. It is, indeed, a tertiary +formation in mental life, if we assume a primary +layer (sensations and simple emotions), and +a secondary (images and their associations, certain +elementary logical operations, etc.). Being composite, +it may be decomposed into its constituent elements, +which we shall study under these three headings, +viz., the intellectual factor, the affective or +emotional factor, and the unconscious factor. But +that is not enough; the analysis should be completed +by a synthesis. All imaginative creation, great or +small, is organic, requires a unifying principle: there +is then also a synthetic factor, which it will be necessary +to determine.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> A. Maury, in his book <i>L'Astronomie et la Magie</i>, enumerates +fifty cases.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> There are still others, as we shall see later on.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span></p> +<h2>PART ONE</h2> + +<h3>ANALYSIS OF THE IMAGINATION</h3><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<h3>THE INTELLECTUAL FACTOR.</h3> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>Considered under its intellectual aspect, that is, +in so far as it borrows its elements from the understanding, +the imagination presupposes two fundamental +operations—the one, negative and preparatory, +dissociation; the other, positive and constitutive, +association.</p> + +<p>Dissociation is the "abstraction" of the older psychologists, +who well understood its importance for +the subject with which we are now concerned. +Nevertheless, the term "dissociation" seems to me +preferable, because it is more comprehensive. It +designates a genus of which the other is a species. +It is a spontaneous operation and of a more radical +nature than the other. Abstraction, strictly so-called, +acts only on isolated states of consciousness; +dissociation acts, further, on series of states of consciousness, +which it sorts out, breaks up, dissolves, +and through this preparatory work makes suitable +for entering into new combinations.</p> + +<p>Perception is a synthetic process, but dissociation +(or abstraction) is already present in embryo in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span> +perception, just because the latter is a complex state. +Everyone perceives after an individual fashion, according +to his constitution and the impression of the +moment. A painter, a sportsman, a dealer, and an +uninterested spectator do not see a given horse in +the same manner: the qualities that interest one are +unnoticed by another.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> + +<p>The image being a simplification of sensory data, +and its nature dependent on that of previous perceptions, +it is inevitable that the work of dissociation +should go on in it. But this is far too mild +a statement. Observation and experiment show us +that in the majority of cases the process grows wonderfully. +In order to follow the progressive development +of this dissolution, we may roughly differentiate +images into three categories—complete, +incomplete, and schematic—and study them in +order.</p> + +<p>The group of images here termed <i>complete</i> comprises +first, objects repeatedly presented in daily +experience—my wife's face, my inkstand, the sound +of a church bell or of a neighboring clock, etc. In +this class are also included the images of things that +we have perceived but a few times, but which, for +additional reasons, have remained clean-cut in our +memory. Are these images complete, in the strict +sense of the word? They cannot be; and the contrary +belief is a delusion of consciousness that, however, +disappears when one confronts it with the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span> +reality. The mental image can contain all the qualities +of an object in even less degree than the perception; +the image is the result of selection, varying +with every case. The painter Fromentin, who +was proud that he found after two or three years +"an exact recollection" of things he had barely +noticed on a journey, makes elsewhere, however, +the following confession: "My memory of things, +although very faithful, has never the certainty admissible +as documentary evidence. The weaker it +grows, the more is it changed in becoming the property +of my memory and the more valuable is it for +the work that I intend for it. In proportion as the +exact form becomes altered, another form, partly +real, partly imaginary, which I believe preferable, +takes its place." Note that the person speaking thus +is a painter endowed with an unusual visual memory; +but recent investigations have shown that +among men generally the so-called complete and +exact images undergo change and warping. One +sees the truth of this statement when, after a lapse +of some time, one is placed in the presence of the +original object, so that comparison between the real +object and its image becomes possible.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Let us +note that in this group <i>the image always corresponds</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span> +<i>to certain individual objects</i>; it is not the same with +the other two groups.</p> + +<p>The group of <i>incomplete</i> images, according to +the testimony of consciousness itself, comes from +two distinct sources—first, from perceptions insufficiently +or ill-fixed; and again, from impressions of +like objects which, when too often repeated, end +by becoming confused. The latter case has been +well described by Taine. A man, says he, who, +having gone through an avenue of poplars wants +to picture a poplar; or, having looked into a poultry-yard, +wishes to call up a picture of a hen, experiences +a difficulty—his different memories rise up. +The experiment becomes a cause of effacement; the +images canceling one another decline to a state of +imperceptible tendencies which their likeness and +unlikeness prevent from predominating. Images +become blunted by their collision just as do bodies +by friction.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> + +<p>This group leads us to that of <i>schematic</i> images, +or those entirely without mark—the indefinite image +of a rosebush, of a pin, of a cigarette, etc. This is +the greatest degree of impoverishment; the image, +deprived little by little of its own characteristics, +is nothing more than a shadow. It has become that +transitional form between image and pure concept +that we now term "generic image," or one that at +least resembles the latter.</p> + +<p>The image, then, is subject to an unending process +of change, of suppression and addition, of dissociation +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span>and corrosion. This means that it is not a +dead thing; it is not at all like a photographic plate +with which one may reproduce copies indefinitely. +Being dependent on the state of the brain, the image +undergoes change like all living substance,—it is +subject to gains and losses, especially losses. But +each of the foregoing three classes has its use for +the inventor. They serve as material for different +kinds of imagination—in their concrete form, for +the mechanic and the artist; in their schematic form, +for the scientist and for others.</p> + +<p>Thus far we have seen only a part of the work of +dissociation and, taking it all in all, the smallest +part. We have, seemingly, considered images as +isolated facts, as psychic atoms; but that is a +purely theoretic position. Images are not solitary +in actual life; they form part of a chain, or rather +of a woof or net, since, by reason of their manifold +relations they may radiate in all directions, through +all the senses. Dissociation, then, works also upon +<i>series</i>, cuts them up, mangles them, breaks them, +and reduces them to ruins.</p> + +<p>The ideal law of the recurrence of images is that +known since Hamilton's time under the name of +"law of redintegration,"<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> which consists in the passing +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span>from a part to the whole, each element tending +to reproduce the complete state, each member of a +series the whole of that series. If this law existed +alone, invention would be forever forbidden to us; +we could not emerge from repetition; we should be +condemned to monotony. But there is an opposite +power that frees us—it is dissociation.</p> + +<p>It is very strange that, while psychologists have +for so long a time studied the laws of association, +no one has investigated whether the inverse process, +dissociation, also has not laws of its own. We +can not here attempt such a task, which would be +outside of our province; it will suffice to indicate in +passing two general conditions determining the association +of series.</p> + +<p>First, there are the internal or subjective causes. +The revived image of a face, a monument, a landscape, +an occurrence, is, most often, only partial. +It depends on various conditions that revive the +essential part and drop the minor details, and this +"essential" which survives dissociation depends on +subjective causes, the principal ones of which are +at first practical, utilitarian reasons. It is the tendency +already mentioned to ignore what is of no +value, to exclude that from consciousness. Helmholtz +has shown that in the act of seeing, various +details remain unnoticed because they are immaterial +in the concerns of life; and there are many +other like instances. Then, too, emotional reasons +governing the attention orientate it exclusively in +one direction—these will be studied in the course<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span> +of this work. Lastly, there are logical or intellectual +reasons, if we understand by this term the law +of mental inertia or the law of least resistance by +means of which the mind tends toward the simplification +and lightening of its labor.</p> + +<p>Secondly, there are external or objective causes +which are variations in experience. When two or +more qualities or events are given as constantly associated +in experience we do not dissociate them. +The uniformity of nature's laws is the great opponent +of dissociation. Many truths (for example, +the existence of the antipodes) are established with +difficulty, because it is necessary to break up closely +knit associations. The oriental king whom Sully +mentions, who had never seen ice, refused to credit +the existence of solid water. A total impression, +the elements of which had never been given us separately +in experience, would be unanalyzable. If +all cold objects were moist, and all moist objects +cold; if all liquids were transparent and all non-liquids +opaque, we should find it difficult to distinguish +cold from moisture and liquidity from +transparency. On his part, James adds further +that what has been associated sometimes with +one thing and sometimes with another tends to +become dissociated from both. This might be +called a law of association by concomitant variations.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> + +<p>In order to thoroughly comprehend the absolute +necessity for dissociation, let us note that total<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span> +redintegration is <i>per se</i> a hindrance to creation. Examples +are given of people who can easily remember +twenty or thirty pages of a book, but if they want +a particular passage they are unable to pick it out—they +must begin at the beginning and continue down +to the required place. Excessive ease of retention +thus becomes a serious inconvenience. Besides these +rare cases, we know that ignorant people, those intellectually +limited, give the same invariable story of +every occurrence, in which all the parts—the important +and the accessory, the useful and the useless—are +on a dead level. They omit no detail, they cannot +select. Minds of this kind are inapt at invention. In +short, we may say that there are two kinds of memory: +one is completely systematized, e.g., habits, +routine, poetry or prose learned by heart, faultless +musical rendering, etc. The acquisition forms a compact +whole and cannot enter into new combinations. +The other is not systematized; it is composed of +small, more or less coherent groups. This kind of +memory is plastic and capable of becoming combined +in new ways.</p> + +<p>We have enumerated the spontaneous, natural +causes of association, omitting the voluntary and +artificial causes, which are but their imitations. As +a result of these various causes, images are taken +to pieces, shattered, broken up, but made all the +readier as materials for the inventor. This is a +process analogous to that which, in geologic time, +produces new strata through the wearing away of +old rocks.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span></p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>Association is one of the big questions of psychology; +but as it does not especially concern our +subject, it will be discussed in strict proportion to +its use here. Nothing is easier than limiting ourselves. +Our task is reducible to a very clear and +very brief question: What are the forms of association +that give rise to new combinations and +under what influences do they arise? All other +forms of association, those that are only repetitions, +should be eliminated. Consequently, this subject +can not be treated in one single effort; it must be +studied, in turn, in its relations to our three factors—intellectual, +emotional, unconscious.</p> + +<p>It is generally admitted that the expression "association +of ideas" is faulty.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> It is not comprehensive +enough, association being active also in +psychic states other than ideas. It seems indicative +rather of mere juxtaposition, whereas associated +states modify one another by the very fact of their +being connected. But, as it has been confirmed by +long usage, it would be difficult to eliminate the +phrase.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, psychologists are not at all +agreed as regards the determination of the principal +laws or forms of association. Without taking sides +in the debate, I adopt the most generally accepted +classification, the one most suitable for our subject—the +one that reduces everything to the two fundamental +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span>laws of contiguity and resemblance. In +recent years various attempts have been made to +reduce these two laws to one, some reducing resemblance +to contiguity; others, contiguity to resemblance. +Putting aside the ground of this discussion, +which seems to me very useless, and which +perhaps is due to excessive zeal for unity, we must +nevertheless recognize that this discussion is not +without interest for the study of the creative imagination, +because it has well shown that each of the +two fundamental laws has a characteristic mechanism.</p> + +<p>Association by contiguity (or continuity), which +Wundt calls external, is simple and homogeneous. +It reproduces the order and connection of things; +it reduces itself to habits contracted by our nervous +system.</p> + +<p>Is association by resemblance, which Wundt calls +internal, strictly speaking, an elementary law? +Many doubt it. Without entering into the long +and frequently confused discussions to which this +subject has given rise, we may sum up their results +as follows: In so-called association by resemblance +it is necessary to distinguish three moments—(a) +That of the presentation; a state <i>A</i> is +given in perception or association-by-contiguity, and +forms the starting point. (b) That of the work of +assimilation; <i>A</i> is recognized as more or less like a +state <i>a</i> previously experienced. (c) As a consequence +of the coëxistence of <i>A</i> and <i>a</i> in consciousness, +they can later be recalled reciprocally, although<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span> +the two original occurrences <i>A</i> and <i>a</i> have previously +never existed together, and sometimes, indeed, +may not possibly have existed together. It +is evident that the crucial moment is the second, and +that it consists of an act of active assimilation. +Thus James maintains that "it is a relation that the +mind perceives after the fact, just as it may perceive +the relations of superiority, of distance, of +causality, of container and content, of substance and +accident, or of contrast between an object, and +some second object which the associative machinery +calls up."<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> + +<p>Association by resemblance presupposes a joint +labor of association and dissociation—it is an active +form. Consequently it is the principal source of +the material of the creative imagination, as the +sequel of this work will sufficiently show.</p> + +<p>After this rather long but necessary preface, we +come to the intellectual factor rightly so termed, +which we have been little by little approaching. +The essential, fundamental element of the creative +imagination in the intellectual sphere is the capacity +of thinking by analogy; that is, by partial and often +accidental resemblance. By analogy we mean an +imperfect kind of resemblance: like is a genus of +which analogue is a species.</p> + +<p>Let us examine in some detail the mechanism of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span> +this mode of thought in order that we may understand +how analogy is, by its very nature, an almost +inexhaustible instrument of creation.</p> + +<p>1. Analogy may be based solely on the <i>number of +attributes compared</i>. Let <i>a b c d e f</i> and <i>r s t u d v</i> +be two beings or objects, each letter representing +symbolically one of the constitutive attributes. It +is evident that the analogy between the two is very +weak, since there is only one common element, <i>d</i>. +If the number of the elements common to both increases, +the analogy will grow in the same proportion. +But the agreement represented above is not +infrequent among minds unused to a somewhat severe +discipline. A child sees in the moon and stars +a mother surrounded by her daughters. The aborigines +of Australia called a book "mussel," merely +because it opens and shuts like the valves of a shellfish.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> + +<p>2. Analogy may have for its basis the <i>quality</i> or +<i>value</i> of the compound attributes. It rests on a +variable element, which oscillates from the essential +to the accidental, from the reality to the appearance. +To the layman, the likeness between cetacians and +fishes are great; to the scientist, slight. Here, +again, numerous agreements are possible, provided +one take no account either of their solidity or their +frailty.</p> + +<p>3. Lastly, in minds without power, there occurs<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span> +a semi-unconscious operation that we may call a +transfer through the omission of the middle term. +There is analogy between <i>a b c d e</i> and <i>g h a i f</i> +through the common letter <i>a</i>; between <i>g h a i f</i> and +<i>x y f z q</i> through the common letter <i>f</i>; and finally an +analogy becomes established between <i>a b c d e</i> and +<i>x y f z q</i> for no other reason than that of their common +analogy with <i>g h a i f</i>. In the realm of the +affective states, transfers of this sort are not at all +rare.</p> + +<p>Analogy, an unstable process, undulating and +multiform, gives rise to the most unforeseen and +novel groupings. Through its pliability, which is +almost unlimited, it produces in equal measure absurd +comparisons and very original inventions.</p> + +<p>After these remarks on the mechanism of thinking +by analogy, let us glance at the processes it employs +in its creative work. The problem is, apparently, +inextricable. Analogies are so numerous, so +various, so arbitrary, that we may despair of finding +any regularity whatever in creative work. Despite +this it seems, however, reducible to two principal +types or processes, which are personification, and +transformation or metamorphosis.</p> + +<p>Personification is the earlier process. It is radical, +always identical with itself, but transitory. +It goes out from ourselves toward other things. +It consists in attributing life to everything, in supposing +in everything that shows signs of life—and +even in inanimate objects—desires, passions, and +acts of will analogous to ours, acting like ourselves<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span> +in view of definite ends. This state of mind is +incomprehensible to an adult civilized man; but it +must be admitted, since there are facts without number +that show its existence. We do not need to +cite them—they are too well known. They fill the +works of ethnologists, of travelers in savage lands, +of books of mythology. Besides, all of us, at the +commencement of our lives, during our earliest +childhood, have passed through this inevitable stage +of universal animism. Works on child-psychology +abound in observations that leave no possible room +for doubt on this point. The child endows everything +with life, and he does so the more in proportion +as he is more imaginative. But this stage, +which among civilized people lasts only a brief +period, remains in the primitive man a permanent +disposition and one that is always active. This +process of personification is the perennial fount +whence have gushed the greater number of myths, +an enormous mass of superstitions, and a large +number of esthetic productions. To sum up in a +word, all things that have been invented <i>ex analogia +hominis</i>.</p> + +<p>Transformation or metamorphosis is a general, +permanent process under many forms, proceeding +not from the thinking subject towards objects, but +from one object to another, from one thing to another. +It consists of a transfer through partial +resemblance. This operation rests on two fundamental +bases—depending at one time on vague resemblances +(a cloud becomes a mountain, or a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span> +mountain a fantastic animal; the sound of the wind +a plaintive cry, etc.), or again, on a resemblance +with a predominating emotional element: A perception +provokes a feeling, and becomes the mark, +sign, or plastic form thereof (the lion represents +courage; the cat, artifice; the cypress, sorrow; and +so on). All this, doubtless, is erroneous or arbitrary; +but the function of the imagination is to invent, +not to perceive. All know that this process +creates metaphors, allegories, symbols; it should +not, however, be believed on that account that it +remains restricted to the realm of art or of the development +of language. We meet it every moment +in practical life, in mechanical, industrial, commercial, +and scientific invention, and we shall, later, +give a large number of examples in support of this +statement.</p> + +<p>Let us note, briefly, that analogy, as an imperfect +form of resemblance—as was said above, if we assume +among the objects compared a totality of likenesses +and differences in varying proportions—necessarily +allows all degrees. At one end of the +scale, the comparison is made between valueless or +exaggerated likenesses. At the other end, analogy +is restricted to exact resemblance; it approaches +cognition, strictly so called; for example, in mechanical +and scientific invention. Hence it is not at all +surprising that the imagination is often a substitute +for, and as Goethe expressed it, "a forerunner of," +reason. Between the creative imagination and rational +investigation there is a community of nature<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span>—both +presuppose the ability of seizing upon likenesses. +On the other hand, the predominance of the +exact process establishes from the outset a difference +between "thinkers" and imaginative dreamers ("visionaries").<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Cf. the well-known aphorism, "<i>Apperception ist alles</i>." +(Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See especially J. Philippe, "La déformation et les transformations +des images" in <i>Revue Philosophique</i>, May and November, +1897. Although these investigations had in view only +visual representations, it is not at all doubtful that the results +hold good for others, especially those of hearing (voice, song, +harmony).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>On Intelligence</i>, Vol. I, Bk. ii, Chap. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> In his recent history of the theories of the imagination, +<i>La psicologia dell' immaginazione, nella storia filosofia</i> (Rome, +1898) Ambrosi shows that this law is found already formulated +in the <i>Psychologia Empirica</i> of Christian Wolff [d. 1754]: +"<i>Perceptio præterita integra recurrit cujus præsens continet +partem.</i>"</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Sully, <i>Human Mind</i>, I, p. 365; James, <i>Psychology</i>, I, p. 502.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> For a good criticism of the term, consult Titchener, <i>Outlines +of Psychology</i> (New York, 1896), p. 190.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> For the discussions on the reduction to a unity, a detailed +bibliography will be found in Jodl, <i>Lehrbuch der Psychologie</i> +(Stuttgart, 1896), p. 490. On the comparison of the two laws, +James, <i>op. cit.</i>, I, 590; Sully, <i>op. cit.</i>, I, 331 ff; Höffding, <i>Psychologie</i>, +213 ff. (Eng. ed. <i>Outlines of Psychology</i>, pp. 152 ff.).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Note here a characteristically naïve working of the primitive +intellect in explaining the unknown in terms of the known. +Cf. Part II, <a href="#Page_118">Chap. iii</a>, below. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> It is yet, and will probably long remain, an open question +whether we can draw any clear distinction between the two +kinds of mind here discussed. The author is careful to base +his distinction on the "predominance" of the "rational" or +of the "imaginative" process. So-called "thinkers," who <i>do</i> +nothing, can not, certainly, be ranked with the persons of great +intellectual attainment through whose efforts the progress of the +world is made; on the other hand, the author seeks to make +<i>results</i> or accomplishments the crucial test of true imagination +(see Introduction). +</p><p> +As regards the relative value or rank of the two bents of +mind there has ever been, and probably forever will be, great +difference of opinion. Even in this intensely "practical" age +there is an undercurrent of feeling that the narrowly "practical" +individual is not the final ideal, and the innermost conviction +of many is the same as that of the poet who declares +that "a dreamer lives forever, but a thinker dies in a day." +(Tr.)</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<h3>THE EMOTIONAL FACTOR.</h3> + + +<p>The influence of emotional states on the working +of the imagination is a matter of current observation. +But it has been studied chiefly by moralists, +who most often have criticised or condemned it as +an endless cause of mistakes. The point of view of +the psychologist is altogether different. He does +not need at all to investigate whether emotions and +passions give rise to mental phantoms—which is an +indisputable fact—but <i>why</i> and <i>how</i> they arise. +For, the emotional factor yields in importance to +no other; it is the ferment without which no creation +is possible. Let us study it in its principal +forms, although we may not be able at this moment +to exhaust the topic.</p> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>It is necessary to show at the outset that the influence +of the emotional life is unlimited, that it +penetrates the entire field of invention with no restriction +whatever; that this is not a gratuitous assertion, +but is, on the contrary, strictly justified<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span> +by facts, and that we are right in maintaining the +following two propositions:</p> + +<p>1. <i>All forms of the creative imagination imply +elements of feeling.</i></p> + +<p>This statement has been challenged by authoritative +psychologists, who hold that "emotion is +added to imagination in its esthetic aspect, not in +its mechanical and intellectual form." This is an +error of fact resulting from the confusion, or from +the imperfect analysis, of two distinct cases. In +the case of non-esthetic creation, the rôle of the emotional +life is simple; in esthetic creation, the rôle of +emotional element is double.</p> + +<p>Let us consider invention, first, in its most general +form. The emotional element is the primal, original +factor; for all invention presupposes a want, +a craving, a tendency, an unsatisfied impulse, often +even a state of gestation full of discomfort. Moreover, +it is concomitant, that is, under its form of +pleasure or of pain, of hope, of spite, of anger, etc., +it accompanies all the phases or turns of creation. +The creator may, haphazard, go through the most +diverse forms of exaltation and depression; may +feel in turn the dejection of repulse and the joy of +success; finally the satisfaction of being freed from +a heavy burden. I challenge anyone to produce +a solitary example of invention wrought out <i>in +abstracto</i>, and free from any factors of feeling. +Human nature does not allow such a miracle.</p> + +<p>Now, let us take up the special case of esthetic +creation, and of forms approaching thereto. Here<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span> +again we find the original emotional element as at +first motor, then attached to various aspects of +creation, as an accompaniment. But, <i>in addition, +affective states become material for the creative activity</i>. +It is a well-known fact, almost a rule, that +the poet, the novelist, the dramatist, and the musician—often, +indeed, even the sculptor and the +painter—experience the thoughts and feeling of their +characters, become identified with them. There are, +then, in this second instance, two currents of feeling—the +one, constituting emotion as material for art, +the other, drawing out creative activity and developing +along with it.</p> + +<p>The difference between the two cases that we +have distinguished consists in this and nothing more +than this. The existence of an emotion-content +belonging to esthetic production changes in no way +the psychologic mechanism of invention generally. +Its absence in other forms of imagination does not +at all prevent the necessary existence of affective +elements everywhere and always.</p> + +<p>2. <i>All emotional dispositions whatever may influence +the creative imagination.</i></p> + +<p>Here, again, I find opponents, notably Oelzelt-Newin, +in his short and substantial monograph on +the imagination.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Adopting the twofold division of +emotions as sthenic and asthenic, or exciting and +depressing, he attributes to the first the exclusive +privilege of influencing creative activity; but though +the author limits his study exclusively to the esthetic<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span> +imagination, his thesis, even understood thus, is +untenable. The facts contradict it completely, and +it is easy to demonstrate that all forms of emotion, +without exception, act as leaven for imagination.</p> + +<p>No one will deny that fear is the type of asthenic +manifestations. Yet is it not the mother of phantoms, +of numberless superstitions, of altogether irrational +and chimerical religious practices?</p> + +<p>Anger, in its exalted, violent form, is rather an +agent of destruction, which seems to contradict my +thesis; but let us pass over the storm, which is +always of short duration, and we find in its place +milder intellectualized forms, which are various +modifications of primitive fury, passing from the +acute to the chronic state: envy, jealousy, enmity, +premeditated vengeance, and so forth. Are not +these dispositions of the mind fertile in artifices, +stratagems, inventions of all kinds? To keep even +to esthetic creation, is it necessary to recall the saying +<i>facit indignatio versum</i>?</p> + +<p>It is not necessary to demonstrate the fecundity +of joy. As for love, everyone knows that its work +consists of creating an imaginary being, which is +substituted for the beloved object; then, when the +passion has vanished, the disenchanted lover finds +himself face to face with the bare reality.</p> + +<p>Sorrow rightly belongs in the category of depressing +emotions, and yet, it has as great influence on +invention as any other emotion. Do we not know +that melancholy and even profound sorrow has furnished +poets, musicians, painters, and sculptors with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span> +their most beautiful inspirations? Is there not an +art frankly and deliberately pessimistic? And this +influence is not at all limited to esthetic creation. +Dare we hold that hypochondria and insanity following +upon the delirium of persecution are devoid +of imagination? Their morbid character is, on the +contrary, the well whence strange inventions incessantly +bubble.</p> + +<p>Lastly, that complex emotion termed "self-feeling," +which reduces itself finally to the pleasure of +asserting our power and of feeling its expansion, or +to the pitiable feeling of our shackled, enfeebled +power, leads us directly to the motor elements that +are the fundamental conditions of invention. Above +all, in this personal feeling, there is the satisfaction +of being a causal factor, i.e., a creator, and every +creator has a consciousness of his superiority over +non-creators. However petty his invention, it confers +upon him a superiority over those who have +invented nothing. Although we have been surfeited +with the repeated statement that the characteristic +mark of esthetic creation is "being disinterested," it +must be recognized, as Groos has so truly remarked,<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> +that the artist does not create out of the simple +pleasure of creating, but in order that he may behold +a mastery over other minds.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Production is the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span> +natural extension of "self-feeling," and the accompanying +pleasure is the pleasure of conquest.</p> + +<p>Thus, on condition that we extend "imagination" +to its full sense, without limiting it unduly to +esthetics, there is, among the many forms of the +emotional life, not one that may not stimulate invention. +It remains to see this emotional factor +at work,—to note how it can give rise to new combinations; +and this brings us to the association of +ideas.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>We have said above that the ideal and theoretic +law of the recurrence of images is that of "total +redintegration," as e.g., recalling all the incidents +of a long voyage in chronological order, with +neither additions nor omissions. But this formula +expresses what ought to be, not what actually occurs. +It supposes man reduced to a state of pure +intelligence, and sheltered from all disturbing influences. +It suits the completely systematized forms +of memory, hardened into routine and habit; but, +outside of these cases, it remains an abstract concept.</p> + +<p>To this law of ideal value, there is opposed the +real and practical law that actually obtains in the +revival of images. It is rightly styled the "law of +interest" or the affective law, and may be stated thus: +In every past event the interesting parts alone revive, +or with more intensity than the others. "Interesting" +here means <i>what affects us in some way under</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span> +<i>a pleasing or painful form</i>. Let us note that the +importance of this fact has been pointed out not by +the associationists (a fact especially worth remembering) +but by less systematic writers, strangers to +that school,—Coleridge, Shadworth Hodgson, and +before them, Schopenhauer. William James calls +it the "ordinary or mixed association."<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> The "law +of interest" doubtless is less exact than the intellectual +laws of contiguity and resemblance. Nevertheless, +it seems to penetrate all the more in later +reasoning. If, indeed, in the problem of association +we distinguish these three things—facts, laws, +causes—the practical law brings us near to causes.</p> + +<p>Whatever the truth may be in this matter, the +emotional factor brings about new combinations by +several processes.</p> + +<p>There are the ordinary, simple cases, with a natural, +emotional foundation, depending on momentary +dispositions. They exist because of the fact +that representations that have been accompanied +by the same emotional state tend later to become +associated: the emotional resemblance reunites and +links disparate images. This differs from association +by contiguity, which is a repetition of experience, +and from association by resemblance in the +intellectual sense. The states of consciousness become +combined, not because they have been previously +given together, not because we perceive the +agreement of resemblance between them, but because +they have a common <i>emotional</i> note. Joy,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span> +sorrow, love, hatred, admiration, ennui, pride, +fatigue, etc., may become a center of attraction that +groups images or events having otherwise no rational +relations between them, but having the same +emotional stamp,—joyous, melancholy, erotic, etc. +This form of association is very frequent in dreams +and reveries, i.e., in a state of mind in which the +imagination enjoys complete freedom and works +haphazard. We easily see that this influence, active +or latent, of the emotional factor, must cause entirely +unexpected grouping to arise, and offers an almost +unlimited field for novel combinations, the number +of images having a common emotional factor being +very great.</p> + +<p>There are unusual and remarkable cases with an +exceptional emotional base. Of such is "colored +hearing." We know that several hypotheses have +been offered in regard to the origin of this phenomenon. +Embryologically, it would seem to be +the result of an incomplete separation between the +sense of sight and that of hearing, and the survival, +it is said, from a distant period of humanity, when +this state must have been the rule; anatomically, +the result of supposed anastamoses between the +cerebral centers for visual and auditory sensations; +physiologically, the result of nervous irradiation; +psychologically, the result of association. This latter +hypothesis seems to account for the greater +number of instances, if not for all; but, as Flournoy +has observed, it is a matter of "affective" imagination. +Two sensations absolutely unlike (for instance, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span>the color blue and the sound <i>i</i>) may resemble +one another through the equal retentive quality that +they possess in the organism of some favored individuals, +and this emotional factor becomes a bond +of association. Observe that this hypothesis explains +also the much more unusual cases of "colored" +smell, taste, and pain; that is, an abnormal +association between given colors and tastes, smells, +or pains.</p> + +<p>Although we meet them only as exceptional +cases, these modes of association are susceptible to +analysis, and seem clear, almost self-evident, if we +compare them with other, subtle, refined, barely perceptible +cases, the origin of which is a subject for +supposition, for guessing rather than for clear comprehension. +It is, moreover, a sort of imagination +belonging to very few people: certain artists and +some eccentric or unbalanced minds, scarcely ever +found outside the esthetic or practical life. I wish +to speak of the forms of invention that permit only +fantastic conceptions, of a strangeness pushed to the +extreme (Hoffman, Poe, Baudelaire, Goya, Wiertz, +etc.), or surprising, extraordinary thoughts, known +of no other men (the symbolists and decadents that +flourish at the present time in various countries of +Europe and America, who believe, rightly or +wrongly, that they are preparing the esthetics of the +future). It must be here admitted that there exists +an altogether special manner of <i>feeling</i>, dependent +on temperament at first, which many cultivate and +refine as though it were a precious rarity. There<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span> +lies the true source of their invention. Doubtless, +to assert this pertinently, it would be necessary to +establish the direct relations between their physical +and psychical constitution and that of their work; +to note even the particular states at the moment of +the creative act. To me at least, it seems evident +that the novelty, the strangeness of combinations, +through its deep subjective character, indicates an +emotional rather than an intellectual origin. Let +us merely add that these abnormal manifestations +of the creative imagination belong to the province +of pathology rather than to that of psychology.</p> + +<p>Association by contrast is, from its very nature, +vague, arbitrary, indeterminate. It rests, in truth, +on an essentially subjective and fleeting conception, +that of contrariety, which it is almost impossible to +delimit scientifically; for, most often, contraries exist +only by and for us. We know that this form of +association is not primary and irreducible. It is +brought down by some to contiguity, by most others +to resemblance. These two views do not seem to +me irreconcilable. In association by contrast we +may distinguish two layers,—the one, superficial, +consists of contiguity: all of us have in memory associated +couples, such as large-small, rich-poor, high-low, +right-left, etc., which result from repetition and +habit; the other, deep, is resemblance; <i>contrast exists +only where a common measure between two +terms is possible</i>. As Wundt remarks, a wedding +may be compared to a burial (the union and separation +of a couple), but not to a toothache. There is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span> +contrast between two colors, contrast between +sounds, but not between a sound and a color, at +least in that there may not be a common basis to +which we may relate them, as in the previously +given instances of "colored" sound. In association +by contrast, there are conscious elements opposed +to one another, and below, an unconscious +element, resemblance,—not clearly and logically +perceived, but felt—that evokes and relates the conscious +elements.</p> + +<p>Whether this explanation be right or not, let us +remark that association by contrast could not be +left out, because its mechanism, full of unforeseen +possibilities, lends itself easily to novel relations. +Otherwise, I do not at all claim that it is entirely +dependent upon the emotional factor. But, as +Höffding observes,<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> the special property of the emotional +life is moving among contraries; it is altogether +determined by the great opposition between +pleasure and pain. Thus, the effects of contrasts +are much stronger than in the realm of sensation. +This form of association predominates in esthetic +and mythic creation, that is to say, in creation of the +free fancy; it becomes dimmed in the precise forms +of practical, mechanical, and scientific invention.</p> + + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>Hitherto we have considered the emotional factor +under a single aspect only—the purely emotional—that +which is manifested in consciousness under an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span> +agreeable or disagreeable or mixed form. But +thoughts, feelings, and emotions include elements +that are deeper—motor, i.e., impulsive or inhibitory—which +we may neglect the less since it is in movements +that we seek the origin of the creative imagination. +This motor element is what current speech +and often even psychological treatises designate +under the terms "creative instinct," "inventive instinct;" +what we express in another form when we +say that creators are guided by instinct and "are +pushed like animals toward the accomplishment of +certain acts."</p> + +<p>If I mistake not, this indicates that the "creative +instinct" exists in all men to some extent—feeble in +some, perceptible in others, brilliant in the great +inventors.</p> + +<p>For I do not hesitate to maintain that the creative +instinct, taken in this strict meaning, compared to +animal instinct, is a mere figure of speech, an "entity" +regarded as a reality, an abstraction. There +are needs, appetites, tendencies, desires, common to +all men, which, in a given individual at a given +moment can result in a creative act; but there is no +special psychic manifestation that may be the "creative +instinct." What, indeed, could it be? Every +instinct has its own particular end:—hunger, thirst, +sex, the specific instincts of the bee, ant, beaver, +consist of a group of movements adapted for a determinate +end that is always the same. Now, what +would be a creative instinct <i>in general</i> which, by +hypothesis, could produce in turn an opera, a machine, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span>a metaphysical theory, a system of finance, +a plan of military campaign, and so forth? It is a +pure fancy. Inventive genius has not <i>a</i> source, but +<i>sources</i>.</p> + +<p>Let us consider from our present viewpoint the +human duality, the <i>homo duplex</i>:</p> + +<p>Suppose man reduced to a state of pure intelligence, +that is, capable of perceiving, remembering, +associating, dissociating, reasoning, and nothing +else. All creative activity is then impossible, because +there is nothing to solicit it.</p> + +<p>Suppose, again, man reduced to organic manifestations; +he is then no more than a bundle of +wants, appetites, instincts,—that is, of motor activities, +blind forces that, lacking a sufficient cerebral +organ, will produce nothing.</p> + +<p>The coöperation of both these factors is indispensable: +without the first, nothing begins; without +the second, nothing results. I hold that it is in needs +that we must seek for the primary cause of all inventions; +it is evident that the motor element alone +is insufficient. If the needs are strong, energetic, +they may determine a production, or, if the intellectual +factor is insufficient, may spoil it. Many +want to make discoveries but discover nothing. A +want so common as hunger or thirst suggests to +one some ingenious method of satisfying it; another +remains entirely destitute.</p> + +<p>In short, in order that a creative act occur, there +is required, first, a need; then, that it arouse a combination +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span>of images; and lastly, that it objectify and +<i>realize</i> itself in an appropriate form.</p> + +<p>We shall try later (in the Conclusion) to answer +the question, <i>Why</i> is one imaginative? In passing, +let us put the opposite question, Why is one <i>not</i> +imaginative? One may possess in the mind an inexhaustible +treasure of facts and images and yet +produce nothing: great travelers, for example, who +have seen and heard much, and who draw from their +experiences only a few colorless anecdotes; men +who were partakers in great political events or military +movements, who leave behind only a few dry +and chilly memoirs; prodigies of reading, living +encyclopedias, who remain crushed under the load +of their erudition. On the other hand, there are +people who easily move and act, but are limited, +lacking images and ideas. Their intellectual poverty +condemns them to unproductiveness; nevertheless, +being nearer than the others to the imaginative +type, they bring forth childish or chimerical +productions. So that we may answer the question +asked above: The non-imaginative person is such +from lack of materials or through the absence of resourcefulness.</p> + +<p>Without contenting ourselves with these theoretical +remarks, let us rapidly show that it is thus +that these things actually happen. All the work of +the creative imagination may be classed under two +great heads—esthetic inventions and practical inventions; +on the one hand, what man has brought +to pass in the domain of art, and on the other hand,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span> +all else. Though this division may appear strange, +and unjustifiable, it has reason for its being, as we +shall see hereafter.</p> + +<p>Let us consider first the class of non-esthetic creations. +Very different in nature, all the products +of this group coincide at one point:—they are of +practical utility, they are born of a vital need, of one +of the conditions of man's existence. There are +first the inventions "practical" in the narrow sense—all +that pertains to food, clothing, defense, housing, +etc. Every one of these special needs has stimulated +inventions adapted to a special end. Inventions +in the social and political order answer to the +conditions of collective existence; they arise from +the necessity of maintaining the coherence of the +social aggregate and of defending it against inimical +groups. The work of the imagination whence have +arisen the myths, religious conceptions, and the first +attempts at a scientific explanation may seem at first +disinterested and foreign to practical life. This is +an erroneous supposition. Man, face to face with +the higher powers of nature, the mystery of which +he does not penetrate, has a <i>need</i> of acting upon it; +he tries to conciliate them, even to turn them to his +service by magic rites and operations. <i>His</i> curiosity +is not at all theoretic; he does not aim to know for +the sake of knowing, but in order to act upon the +outside world and to draw profit therefrom. To the +numerous questions that necessity puts to him his +imagination alone responds, because his reason is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span> +shifting and his scientific knowledge <i>nil</i>. Here, +then, invention again results from urgent needs.</p> + +<p>Indeed, in the course of the nineteenth century +and on account of growing civilization all these +creations reach a second moment when their origin +is hidden. Most of our mechanical, industrial and +commercial inventions are not stimulated by the +immediate necessity of living, by an urgent need; it +is not a question of existence but of better existence. +The same holds true of social and political +inventions which arise from the increasing complexity +and the new requirements of the aggregates +forming great states. Lastly, it is certain that primitive +curiosity has partially lost its utilitarian character +in order to become, in some men at least, the +taste for pure research—theoretical, speculative, disinterested. +But all this in no way affects our thesis, +for it is a well-known elementary psychological law +that upon primitive wants are grafted acquired +wants fully as imperative. The primitive need is +modified, metamorphosed, adapted; there remains of +it, nonetheless, the fundamental activity toward +creation.</p> + +<p>Let us now consider the class of esthetic creations. +According to the generally accepted theory which is +too well known for me to stop to explain it, art has +its beginning in a superfluous, bounding activity, +useless as regards the preservation of the individual, +which is shown first in the form of play. Then, +through transformation and complication, play becomes +primitive art, dancing, music, and poetry at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span> +the same time, closely united in an apparently indissoluble +unity. Although the theory of the absolute +inutility of art has met some strong criticism, let us +accept it for the present. Aside from the true or +false character of inutility, the psychological +mechanism remains the same here as in the preceding +cases; we shall only say that in place of a vital +need it is a need of <i>luxury</i> acting, but it acts only +because it is in man.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the inutility of play is far from +proven biologically. Groos, in his two excellent +works on the subject,<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> has maintained with much +power the opposite view. According to him the +theory of Schiller and Spencer, based on the expenditure +of superfluous activity and the opposite +theory of Lazarus, who reduces play to a relaxation—that +is, a recuperation of strength—are but +partial explanations. Play has a positive use. In +man there exist a great number of instincts that +are not yet developed at birth. An incomplete being, +he must have education of his capacities, and +this is obtained through play, <i>which is the exercise +of the natural tendencies of human activities</i>. In +man and in the higher animals plays are a preparation, +a prelude to the active functions of life. +<i>There is no instinct of play in general, but there +are special instincts that are manifested under the +forms of play.</i> If we admit this explanation, which +does not lack potency, the work of the esthetic<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span> +imagination itself would be reduced to a biological +necessity, and there would be no reason for making +a separate category of it. Whichever view we may +adopt, it still remains established that any invention +is reducible, directly or indirectly, to a particular, +determinate need, and that to allow man a special +instinct, the definite specific character of which +should be stimulation to creative activity, is a fantastic +notion.</p> + +<p>Whence, then, comes this persistent and in some +respects seductive idea that creation is an instinctive +result? Because a happy invention has characteristics +that evidently relate it to instinctive activity +in the strict sense of the word. First, precocity, +of which we shall later give numerous examples, +and which resembles the innateness of instinct. +Again, orientation in a single direction: the +inventor is, so to speak, polarized; he is the slave of +music, of mechanics, of mathematics; often inapt at +everything outside his own particular sphere. We +know the witticism of Madame du Deffant on +Vaucanson, who was so awkward, so insignificant +when he ventured outside of mechanics. "One +should say that this man had manufactured himself." +Finally, the ease with which invention often +(not always) manifests itself makes it resemble +the work of a pre-established mechanism.</p> + +<p>But these and similar characteristics may be lacking. +They are necessary for instinct, not for invention. +There are great creators who have been +neither precocious nor confined in a narrow field,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span> +and who have given birth to their inventions painfully, +laboriously. Between the mechanism of instinct +and that of imaginative creation there are +frequently great analogies but not identity of nature. +Every tendency of our organization, useful +or hurtful, may become the beginning of a +creative act. Every invention arises from a particular +need of human nature, acting within its +own sphere and for its own special end.</p> + +<p>If now it should be asked why the creative +imagination directs itself preferably in one line +rather than in another—toward poetry or physics, +trade or mechanics, geometry or painting, strategy +or music, etc.—we have nothing in answer. It is a +result of the individual organization, the secret of +which we do not possess. In ordinary life we +meet people visibly borne along toward love or good +cheer, toward ambition, riches or good works; +we say that they are "so built," that such is their +character. At bottom the two questions are identical, +and current psychology is not in a position to +solve them.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Ueber Phantasievorstellungen</i>, Graz, 1889, p. 48.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Die Spiele der Thiere</i>, Jena, 1896. The subject has been +very well treated by this author, pp. 294-301.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> The "disinterested" view is found widely advocated or +hinted at in literature. Cf. Goethe's "Der Sänger" (Tr.).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Psychology</i>, I, 571 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Höffding, <i>Psychologie</i>, p. 219; <i>Eng. trans.</i>, p. 161.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Groos, <i>Die Spiele der Thiere</i>, 1896, and <i>Die Spiele der Menschen</i>, +1899 (Eng. trans., Appletons, New York, 1898, 1901).</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<h3>THE UNCONSCIOUS FACTOR</h3> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>By this term I designate principally, not exclusively, +what ordinary speech calls "inspiration." In +spite of its mysterious and semi-mythological appearance, +the term indicates a positive fact, one +that is ill-understood in a deep sense, like all that is +near the roots of creation. This concept has its +history, and if it is permissible to apply a very +general formula to a particular case we may say +that it has developed according to the law of the +three states assumed by the positivists.</p> + +<p>In the beginning, inspiration is literally ascribed +to the gods—among the Greeks to Apollo and the +Muses, and in like manner under various polytheistic +religions. Later, the gods become supernatural +spirits, angels, saints, etc. In one way or another +it is always regarded as external and superior +to man. In the beginnings of all inventions—agriculture, +navigation, medicine, commerce, legislation, +fine arts—there is a belief in revelation; the +human mind considers itself incapable of having +discovered all that. Creation has arisen, we do<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span> +not know how, in a total ignorance of the processes.</p> + +<p>Later on these higher beings become empty formulas, +mere survivals; there remain only the poets +to invoke their aid, through the force of tradition, +without believing in them. But side by side with +these formal survivals there remains a mysterious +ground which is translated by vague expressions +and metaphors, such as "enthusiasm," "poetic +frenzy," "possession by a spirit," "being overcome," +"having the devil inside one," "the spirit whispers +as it lists," etc. Here we have come out of the supernatural +without, however, attempting a positive +(i.e., a scientific) explanation.</p> + +<p>Lastly, in the third stage, we try to sound this +unknown. Psychology sees in it a special manifestation +of the mind, a particular, semi-conscious, +semi-unconscious state which we must now study.</p> + +<p>At first sight, and considered in its negative aspect, +inspiration presents a very definite character. +It does not depend on the individual will. As in the +case of sleep or digestion, we may try to call it +forth, encourage it, maintain it; but not always with +success. Inventors, great and small, never cease to +complain over the periods of unproductiveness which +they undergo in spite of themselves. The wiser +among them watch for the moment; the others +attempt to fight against their evil fate and to create +despite nature.</p> + +<p>Considered in its positive aspect, inspiration has +two essential marks—suddenness and impersonality.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span></p> + +<p>(a) It makes a sudden eruption into consciousness, +but one presupposing a latent, frequently long, +labor. It has its analogues among other well-known +psychic states; for example, a passion that is forgotten, +which, after a long period of incubation, +reveals itself through an act; or, better, a sudden +resolve after endless deliberation which did not +seem able to come to a head. Again, there may be +absence of effort and of appearance of preparation. +Beethoven would strike haphazard the keys of a +piano or would listen to the songs of birds. "With +Chopin," says George Sand, "creation was spontaneous, +miraculous; he wrought without foreseeing. +It would come complete, sudden, sublime." +One might pile up like facts in abundance. Sometimes, +indeed, inspiration bursts forth in deep sleep +and awakens the sleeper, and lest we may suppose +this suddenness to be especially characteristic of +artists we see it in all forms of invention. "You +feel a little electric shock striking you in the head, +seizing your heart at the same time—that is the moment +of genius" (Buffon). "In the course of my +life I have had some happy thoughts," says Du Bois +Reymond, "and I have often noted that they would +come to me involuntarily, and when I was not +thinking of the subject." Claude Bernard has +voiced the same thought more than once.</p> + +<p>(b) Impersonality is a deeper character than the +preceding. It reveals a power superior to the conscious +individual, strange to him although acting +through him: a state which many inventors have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span> +expressed in the words, "I counted for nothing in +that." The best means of recognizing it would be +to write down some observations taken from the +inspired individuals themselves. We do not lack +them, and some have the virtue of good observation.<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> +But that would lead us too far afield. Let +us only remark that this unconscious impulse acts +variously according to the individual. Some submit +to it painfully, striving against it just like the +ancient pythoness at the time of giving her oracle. +Others, especially in religious inspiration, submit +themselves entirely with pleasure or else sustain it +passively. Still others of a more analytic turn have +noted the concentration of all their faculties and +capacities on a single point. But whatever characteristics +it takes on, remaining impersonal at bottom +and unable to appear in a fully conscious individual, +we must admit, unless we wish to give it a +supernatural origin, that inspiration is derived from +the unconscious activity of the mind. In order to +make sure of its nature it would then be necessary +to make sure first of the nature of the unconscious, +which is one of the enigmas of psychology.</p> + +<p>I put aside all the discussions on the subject as +tiresome and useless for our present aim. Indeed, +they reduce themselves to these two principal propositions: +for some the unconscious is a purely +physiological activity, a "cerebration"; for others +it is a gradual diminution of consciousness which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span> +exists without being bound to me—i.e., to the principal +consciousness. Both these are full of difficulties +and present almost insurmountable objections.<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> + +<p>Let us take the "unconscious" as a fact and let us +limit ourselves to clearing it up, relating inspiration +to mental states that have been judged worthy of +explaining it.</p> + +<p>1. Hypermnesia, or exaltation of memory, in +spite of what has been said about it, teaches us +nothing in regard to the nature of inspiration or of +invention in general. It is produced in hypnotism, +mania, the excited period of "circular insanity," +at the beginning of general paralysis, and especially +under the form known as "the gift of tongues" in +religious epidemics. We find, it is true, some observations +(among others one by Regis of an illiterate +newspaper vender composing pieces of poetry of his +own), indicating that a heightened memory sometimes +accompanies a certain tendency toward invention. +But hypermnesia, pure and simple, consists +of an extraordinary flood of memories totally +lacking that essential mark of creation—new combinations. +It even appears that in the two instances +there is rather an antagonism since heightened memory +comes near to the ideal law of total redintegration, +which is, as we know, a hindrance to invention. +They are alike only with respect to the great mass +of separable materials, but where the principle of +unity is wanting there can be no creation.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span></p> + +<p>2. Inspiration has often been likened to the state +of excitement preceding intoxication. It is a well-known +fact that many inventors have sought it in +wine, alcoholic liquors, toxic substances like hashish, +opium, ether, etc. It is unnecessary to mention +names. The abundance of ideas, the rapidity of +their flow, the eccentric spurts and caprices, novel +ideas, strengthening of the vital and emotional tone, +that brief state of bounding fancy of which novelists +have given such good descriptions, make evident +to the least observing that under the influence of +intoxication the imagination works to a much +greater extent than ordinarily. Yet how pale that +is compared to the action of the intellectual poisons +above mentioned, especially hashish. The "artificial +paradise" of DeQuincy, Moreau de Tours, Théophile +Gautier, Baudelaire and others have made +known to all an enormous expansion of the imagination +launched into a giddy course without limits +of time and space.</p> + +<p>Strictly, these are facts representing only a stimulated, +artificial, temporary inspiration. They do +not take us into its true nature; at the most they +may teach us concerning some of their physiological +conditions. It is not even an inspiration in the +strict sense, but rather a beginning, an embryo, an +outline, analogous to the creations produced in +dreams which are found very incoherent when we +awake. One of the essential conditions of creation, +a principal element—the directing principle that organizes +and unifies—is lacking. Under the influence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span> +of alcoholic drinks and of poisonous intoxicants attention +and will always fall into exhaustion.</p> + +<p>3. With greater reason it has been sought to explain +inspiration by comparison with certain forms +of somnambulism, and it has been said that "it is +only the lowest degree of the latter state, somnambulism +in a waking state. In inspiration it is as +though a strange personality were speaking to the +author; in somnambulism it is the stranger himself +who talks or holds the pen, who speaks or writes—in +a word, does the work."<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> It would thus be the +modified form of a state that is the culmination of +subconscious activity and a state of double personality. +As this last explanatory expression is wonderfully +abused, and is called upon to serve in all +conditions, preciseness is indispensable.</p> + +<p>The inspired individual is like an awakened +dreamer—he lives in his dream. (Of this we might +cite seemingly authentic examples: Shelly, Alfieri, +etc.) Psychologically, this means that there is in +him a double inversion of the normal state.</p> + +<p>To begin with, consciousness monopolized by the +number and intensity of its images is closed to the +influences of the outside world, or else receives them +only to make them enter the web of its dream. The +internal life annihilates the external, which is just +the opposite of ordinary life.</p> + +<p>Further, the unconscious or subconscious activity<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span> +passes to the first plane, plays the first part, while +preserving its impersonal character.</p> + +<p>This much allowed, if we would go further, we +are thrown into increasing difficulties. The existence +of an unconscious working is beyond doubt; +facts in profusion could be given in support of this +obscure elaboration which enters consciousness only +when all is done. But what is the nature of this +work? Is it purely physiological? Is it psychological? +We come to two opposing theses. Theoretically, +we may say that everything goes on in the +realm of the unconscious just as in consciousness, +<i>only without a message to me</i>; that in clear consciousness +the work may be followed up step by +step, while in unconsciousness it proceeds likewise, +but unknown to us. It is evident that all this is +purely hypothetical.</p> + +<p>Inspiration resembles a cipher dispatch which the +unconscious activity transmits to the conscious +process, which translates it. Must we admit that +in the deep levels of the unconscious there are +formed only fragmentary combinations and that they +reach complete systematization only in clear consciousness, +or, rather, is the creative labor identical +in both cases? It is difficult to decide. It seems to +be accepted that genius, or at least richness, in invention +depends on the subliminal imagination,<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> not on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span> +the other, which is superficial in nature and soon +exhausted. The one is spontaneous, true; the other, +artificial, feigned. "Inspiration" signifies unconscious +imagination, and is only a special case of it. +Conscious imagination is a kind of perfected state.</p> + +<p>To sum up, inspiration is the result of an underhand +process existing in men, in some to a very great +degree. The nature of this work being unknown, +we can conclude nothing as to the ultimate nature +of inspiration. On the other hand, we may in a +positive manner fix the value of the phenomenon in +invention, all the more as we are inclined to over-value +it. We should, indeed, note that inspiration +is not a cause but an effect—more exactly, a moment, +a crisis, a critical stage; it is an <i>index</i>. It +marks either the end of an unconscious elaboration +which may have been very short or very long, or +else the beginning of a conscious elaboration which +will be very short or very long (this is seen especially +in cases of creation suggested by chance). +On the one hand, it never has an absolute beginning; +on the other hand, it never delivers a finished +work; the history of inventions sufficiently proves +this. Furthermore, one may pass beyond it; many +creations long in preparation seem without a crisis, +strictly so called; such as Newton's law of attraction, +Leonardo da Vinci's "Last Supper," and the +"Mona Lisa." Finally, many have felt themselves<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span> +really inspired without producing anything of +value.<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>What has been said up to this point does not exhaust +the study of the unconscious factor as a source +of new combinations. Its rôle can be studied under +a simpler and more limited form. For this purpose +we need to return for the last time to association +of ideas. The final reason for association (outside +of contiguity, in part at least) must be sought in the +temperament, character, individuality of the subject, +often even in the <i>moment</i>; that is, in a passing +influence, hardly perceptible because it is unconscious +or subconscious. These momentary dispositions +in latent form can excite novel relations in two +ways—through mediate association and through a +special mode of grouping which has recently received +the name "constellation."</p> + +<p>1. Mediate association has been well known since +the time of Hamilton, who was the first to determine +its nature and to give a personal example that has +become classic. Loch Lomond recalled to him the +Prussian system of education because, when visiting +the lake, he had met a Prussian officer who conversed +with him on the subject. His general formula +is this: <i>A</i> recalls <i>C</i>, although there is between them +neither contiguity nor resemblance, but because a +middle term, <i>B</i>, which does not enter consciousness, +serves as a transition between <i>A</i> and <i>C</i>. This mode +of association seemed universally accepted when, latterly, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span>it has been attacked by Münsterberg and +others. People have had recourse to experimentation, +which has given results only in slight agreement.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> +For my own part, I count myself among +those contemporaries who admit mediate association, +and they are the greater number. Scripture, who +has made a special study of the subject, and who +has been able to note all the intermediate conditions +between almost clear consciousness and the unconscious, +considers the existence of mediate association +as proven. In order to pronounce as an illusion +a fact that is met with so often in daily experience, +and one that has been studied by so many +excellent observers, there is required more than experimental +investigations (the conditions of which +are often artificial and unnatural), some of which, +moreover, conclude for the affirmative.</p> + +<p>This form of association is produced, like the +others, now by contiguity, now by resemblance. The +example given by Hamilton belongs to the first type. +In the experiments by Scripture are found some of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span> +the second type—e.g., a red light recalled, through +the vague memory of a flash of strontium light, a +scene of an opera.</p> + +<p>It is clear that by its very nature mediate association +can give rise to novel combinations. Contiguity +itself, which is usually only repetition, becomes +the source of unforeseen relations, thanks to +the elimination of the middle term. Nothing, moreover, +proves that there may not sometimes be several +latent intermediate terms. It is possible that <i>A</i> +should call up <i>D</i> through the medium of <i>b</i> and <i>c</i>, +which remain below the threshold of consciousness. +It seems even impossible not to admit this in the +hypothesis of the subconscious, where we see only +the two end links of the chain, without being able to +allow a break of continuity between them.</p> + +<p>2. In his determination of the regulating causes +of association of ideas, Ziehen designates one of +these under the name of "constellation," which has +been adopted by some writers. This may be enunciated +thus: The recall of an image, or of a group of +images, is in some cases the result of a sum of +predominant tendencies.</p> + +<p>An idea may become the starting point of a host +of associations. The word "Rome" can call up a +hundred. Why is one called up rather than another, +and at such a moment rather than at another? +There are some associations based on contiguity +and on resemblance which one may foresee, +but how about the rest? Here is an idea <i>A</i>; it is +the center of a network; it can radiate in all directions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span>—<i>B, +C, D, E, F, etc.</i> Why does it call up now +<i>B</i>, later <i>F</i>?</p> + +<p>It is because every image is comparable to a force, +which may pass from the latent to the active condition, +and in this process may be reinforced or +checked by other images. There are simultaneous +and inhibitory tendencies. <i>B</i> is in a state of tension +and <i>C</i> is not; or it may be that <i>D</i> exerts an arresting +influence on <i>C</i>. Consequently <i>C</i> cannot prevail. +But an hour later conditions have changed and victory +rests with <i>C</i>. This phenomenon rests on a +physiological basis: the existence of several currents +diffusing themselves through the brain and the possibility +of receiving simultaneous excitations.<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p> + +<p>A few examples will make plainer this phenomenon +of reinforcement, in consequence of which an +association prevails. Wahle reports that the Gothic +<i>Hôtel de Ville</i>, near his house, had never suggested +to him the idea of the Doges' Palace at Venice, in +spite of certain architectural likenesses, until a certain +day when this idea broke upon him with much +clearness. He then recalled that two hours before +he had observed a lady wearing a beautiful brooch +in the form of a gondola. Sully rightly remarks +that it is much easier to recall the words of a foreign +language when we return from the country +where it is spoken than when we have lived a long +time in our own, because the tendency toward recollection +is reinforced by the recent experience of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span> +words heard, spoken, read, and a whole array of +latent dispositions that work in the same direction.</p> + +<p>In my opinion we would find the finest examples +of "constellation," regarded as a creative element, +in studying the formation and development of +myths. Everywhere and always man has had for +material scarcely anything save natural phenomena—the +sky, land, water, stars, storms, wind, seasons, +life, death, etc. On each of these themes he builds +thousands of explanatory stories, which vary from +the grandly imposing to the laughably childish. +Every myth is the work of a human group which +has worked according to the tendencies of its special +genius under the influence of various stages of intellectual +culture. No process is richer in resources, +of freer turn, or more apt to give what every inventor +promises—the novel and unexpected.</p> + +<p>To sum up: The initial element, external or internal, +excites associations that one cannot always +foresee, because of the numerous orientations possible; +an analogous case to that which occurs in the +realm of the will when there are present reasons +for and against, acting and not acting, one direction +or another, now or later—when the final resolution +cannot be predicted, and often depends on +imperceptible causes.</p> + +<p>In conclusion, I anticipate a possible question: +"Does the unconscious factor differ in nature from +the two others (intellectual and emotional)?" The +answer depends on the hypothesis that one holds +as to the nature of the unconscious itself. According +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span>to one view it would be especially physiological, +consequently different; according to another, the difference +can exist only <i>in the processes</i>: unconscious +elaboration is reducible to intellectual or emotional +processes the preparatory work of which is slighted, +and which enters consciousness ready made. Consequently, +the unconscious factor would be a special +form of the other two rather than a distinct element +in invention.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Several of them will be found in <a href="#Page_335">Appendix A</a> at the end of +this work.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> On this subject see <a href="#Page_338">Appendix B</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Dr. Chabaneix, <i>Le subconscient sur les artistes, les savants, +et les écrivains</i>, Paris, 1897, p. 87.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> The recent case, studied with so much ability by M. Flournoy +in his book, "<i>Des Indes à la planète Mars</i>" (1900), is an +example of the subliminal creative imagination, and of the work +it is capable of doing by itself.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> We shall return to this point in another part of this work. +See Part II, <a href="#Page_140">chapter iv</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Thus Howe (<i>American Journal of Psychology</i>, vi, 239 ff.), +has published some investigations in the negative. One series +of 557 experiments gave him eight apparently mediate associations; +after examination, he reduced them to a single one, +which seemed to him doubtful. Another series of 961 experiments +gives 72 cases, for which he offers an explanation other +than mediate association. On the other hand, Aschaffenburg +admits them to the extent of four per cent.; the association-time +is longer than for average associations (<i>Psychologische +Arbeiten</i>, I and II). Consult especially Scripture, <i>The New +Psychology</i>, chapter xiii, with experiments in support of his +conclusion.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> Ziehen, <i>Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie</i>, 4th edition, +1898, pp. 164, 174. Also, Sully, <i>Human Mind</i>, I, 343.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<h3>THE ORGANIC CONDITIONS OF THE IMAGINATION</h3> + + +<p>Whatever opinion we may hold concerning the +nature of the unconscious, since that form of activity +is related more than any other to the physiological +conditions of the mental life, the present time is +suitable for an exposition of the hypotheses that it +is permissible to express concerning the organic +bases of the imagination. What we may regard as +positive, or even as probable, is very little.</p> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>First, the anatomical conditions. Is there a "seat" +of the imagination? Such is the form of the question +asked for the last twenty years. In that period +of extreme and closely bounded localization men +strained themselves to bind down every psychic +manifestation to a strictly determined point of the +brain. Today the problem presents itself no longer +in this simple way. As at present we incline +toward scattered localization, functional rather than +properly anatomical, and as we often understand +by "center" the synergic action of several centers<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span> +differently grouped according to the individual case, +our question becomes equivalent to: "Are there certain +portions of the brain having an exclusive or preponderating +part in the working of the creative +imagination?" Even in this form the question is +hardly acceptable. Indeed, the imagination is not +a primary and relatively simple function like that +of visual, auditory and other sensations. We have +seen that it is a state of tertiary formation and very +complex. There is required, then, (1) that the elements +constituting imagination be determined in a +rigorous manner, but the foregoing analysis makes +no pretense of being definitive; (2) that each of +these constitutive elements may be strictly related +to its anatomic conditions. It is evident that we +are far from possessing the secret of such a mechanism.</p> + +<p>An attempt has been made to put the question +in a more precise and limited form by studying the +brains of men distinguished in different lines. But +this method, in avoiding the difficulty, answers our +question indirectly only. Most often great inventors +possess qualities besides imagination indispensable +for success (Napoleon, James Watt, etc.). How +draw a dividing line so as to assign to the imagination +only its rightful share? In addition, the anatomical +determination is beset with difficulties.</p> + +<p>A method flourishing very greatly about the middle +of the nineteenth century consisted of weighing +carefully a large number of brains and drawing various +conclusions as to intellectual superiority or inferiority +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span>from a comparison of the weights. We +find on this point numerous documents in the special +works published during the period mentioned. But +this method of weights has given rise to so many +surprises and difficulties in the way of explanation +that it has been quite necessary to give it up, since +we see in it only another element of the problem.</p> + +<p>Nowadays we attribute the greatest importance to +the morphology of the brain, to its histological structure, +the marked development of certain regions, the +determination not only of centers but of connections +and associations between centers. On this last +point contemporary anatomists have given themselves +up to eager researches, and, although the +cerebral architecture is not conceived by all in the +same way, it is proper for psychology to note that +all with their "centers" or "associational system" +try to translate into their own language the complex +conditions of mental life. Since we must choose +from among these various anatomical views let us +accept that of Flechsig, one of the most renowned +and one having also the advantage of putting directly +the problem of the organic conditions of the +imagination.</p> + +<p>We know that Flechsig relies on the embryological +method—that is, on the development—in the +order of time, of nerves and centers. For him +there exist on the one hand sensitive regions (sensory-motor), +occupying about a third of the cortical +surface; on the other hand, association-centers, occupying +the remaining part.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span></p> + +<p>So far as the sensory centers are concerned, development +occurs in the following order: Organic +sensations (middle of cerebral cortex), smell (base +of the brain and part of the frontal lobes), sight +(occipital lobe), hearing (first temporal). Whence +it results that in a definite part of the brain the body +comes to proper consciousness of its impulses, wants, +appetites, pains, movements, etc., and that this part +develops first—"knowledge of the body precedes +that of the outside world."</p> + +<p>In what concerns the associational centers, Flechsig +supposes three regions: The great posterior center +(parieto-occipito-temporal); another, much +smaller, anterior or frontal; and a middle center, the +smallest of all (the Island of Reil). Comparative +anatomy proves that the associational centers are +more important than those of sensation. Among +the lower mammals they develop as we go up the +scale: "That which makes the psychic man may +be said to be the centers of association that he possesses." +In the new-born child the sensitive centers +are isolated, and, in the absence of connections between +them, the unity of the self cannot be manifested; +there is a plurality of consciousness.</p> + +<p>This much admitted, let us return to our special +question, which Flechsig asks in these words: "On +what does genius rest? Is it based on a special +structure in the brain, or rather on special irritability? +that is, according to our present notions, on +chemical factors? We may hold the first opinion +with all possible force. Genius is always united to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span> +a special structure, to a particular organization of +the brain." All parts of this organ do not have the +same value. It has been long admitted that the +frontal part may serve as a measure of intellectual +capacity; but we must allow, contrariwise, that there +are other regions, "principally a center located under +the protuberance at the top of the head, which is +very much developed in all men of genius whose +brains have been studied down to our day. In +Beethoven, and probably also in Bach, the enormous +development of this part of the brain is striking. In +great scientists like Gauss the centers of the posterior +region of the brain and those of the frontal region +are strongly developed. The scientific genius thus +shows proportions of brain-structure other than the +artistic genius."<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> There would then be, according +to our author, a preponderance of the frontal and +parietal regions—the former obtain especially among +artists; the latter among scientists. Already, twenty +years before Flechsig, Rüdinger had noted the extraordinary +development of the parietal convolutions +in eminent men after a study of eighteen brains. All +the convolutions and fissures were so developed, +said he, that the parieto-occipital region had an altogether +peculiar character.</p> + +<p>By way of summary we must bear in mind that, +as regards anatomical conditions, even when depending +on the best of sources, we can at present give +only fragmentary, incomplete, hypothetical views.</p> + +<p>Let us now go on to the physiology.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span></p> +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>We might have rightly asked whether the physiological +states existing along with the working of +the creative imagination are the cause, effect, or +merely the accompaniment of this activity. Probably +all the three conditions are met with. First, +concomitance is an accomplished fact, and we may +consider it as an organic manifestation parallel to +that of the mind. Again, the employment of artificial +means to excite and maintain the effervescence +of the imagination assigns a causal or antecedent +position to the physiologic conditions. Lastly, the +psychic activity may be initial and productive of +changes in the organism, or, if these already exist, +may augment and prolong them.</p> + +<p>The most instructive instances are those indicated +by very clear manifestations and profound modifications +of the bodily condition. Such are the moments +of inspiration or simply those of warmth from work +which arise in the form of sudden impulses.</p> + +<p>The general fact of most importance consists of +changes in the blood circulation. Increase of intellectual +activity means an increase of work in the +cortical cells, dependent on a congested, sometimes +a temporarily anæmic state. Hyperæmia seems +rather the rule, but we also know that slight anæmia +increases cortical excitability. "Weak, contracted +pulse; pale, chilly skin; overheated head; brilliant, +sunken, roving eyes," such is the classic, frequently +quoted description of the physiological state during<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span> +creative labor. There are numerous inventors who, +of their own accord, have noted these changes—irregular +pulse, in the case of Lagrange; congestion +of the head, in Beethoven, who made use of cold +douches to relieve it, etc. This elevation of the vital +tone, this nervous tension, translates itself also into +motor form through movements analogous to reflexes, +without special end, mechanically repeated +and always the same in the same man—e.g., movement +of the feet, hands, fingers; whittling the table +or the arms of a chair (as in the case of Napoleon +when he was elaborating a plan of campaign), etc. +It is a safety-valve for the excessive flow of nervous +impulse, and it is admitted that this method of expenditure +is not useless for preserving the understanding +in all its clearness. In a word, increase of +the cerebral circulation is the formula covering the +majority of observations on this subject.</p> + +<p>Does experimentation, strictly so called, teach us +anything on this point? Numerous and well-known +physiological researches, especially those of Mosso, +show that all intellectual, and, most of all, emotional, +work, produces cerebral congestion; that the brain-volume +increases, and the volume of the peripheral +organs diminishes. But that tells us nothing particularly +about the imagination, which is but a +special case under the rule. Latterly, indeed, it has +been proposed to study inventors by an objective +method through the examination of their several +circulatory, respiratory, digestive apparatus; their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span> +general and special sensibility; the modes of their +memory and forms of association, their intellectual +processes, etc. But up to this time no conclusion has +been drawn from these individual descriptions that +would allow any generalization. Besides, has an +experiment, in the strict sense of the word, ever +been made at the "psychological moment"? I know +of none. Would it be possible? Let us admit that +by some happy chance the experimenter, using all +his means of investigation, can have the subject +under his hand at the exact moment of inspiration—of +the sudden, fertile, brief creative impulse—would +not the experiment itself be a disturbing +cause, so that the result would be <i>ipso facto</i> vitiated, +or at least unconvincing?</p> + +<p>There still remains a mass of facts deserving +summary notice—the oddities of inventors. Were +we to collect only those that may be regarded as +authentic we could make a thick volume. Despite +their anecdotal character these evidences do not +seem to be unworthy of some regard.</p> + +<p>It is impossible to enter here upon an enumeration +that would be endless. After having collected for +my own information a large number of these strange +peculiarities, it seems to me that they are reducible +to two categories:</p> + +<p>(1) Those inexplicable freaks dependent on the +individual constitution, and more often probably +also on experiences in life the memory of which +has been lost. Schiller, for example, kept rotten +apples in his work desk.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span></p> + +<p>(2) The others, more numerous, are easy to explain. +They are physiological means consciously or +unconsciously chosen to aid creative work; they are +auxiliary helpers of the imagination.</p> + +<p>The most frequent method consists of artificially +increasing the flow of blood to the brain. Rousseau +would think bare-headed in full sunshine; Bossuet +would work in a cold room with his head wrapped +in furs; others would immerse their feet in ice-cold +water (Grétry, Schiller). Very numerous are those +who think "horizontally"—that is, lying stretched +out and often flattened under their blankets (Milton, +Descartes, Leibniz, Rossini, etc.)</p> + +<p>Some require motor excitation; they work only +when walking,<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> or else prepare for work by physical +exercise (Mozart). For variety's sake, let us note +those who must have the noise of the streets, crowds, +talk, festivities, in order to invent. For others +there must be external pomp and a personal part +in the scene (Machiavelli, Buffon). Guido Reni +would paint only when dressed in magnificent style, +his pupils crowded about him and attending to his +wants in respectful silence.</p> + +<p>On the opposite side are those requiring retirement, +silence, contemplation, even shadowy darkness, +like Lamennais. In this class we find especially +scientists and thinkers—Tycho-Brahé, who for +twenty-one years scarcely left his observatory; Leibniz, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span>who could remain for three days almost motionless +in an armchair.</p> + +<p>But most methods are too artificial or too strong +not to become quickly noxious. Every one knows +what they are—abuse of wine, alcoholic liquors, narcotics, +tobacco, coffee, etc., prolonged periods of +wakefulness, less for increasing the time for work +than to cause a state of hyperesthesia and a morbid +sensibility (Goncourt).</p> + +<p>Summing up: The organic bases of the creative +imagination, if there are any specially its own, remain +to be determined. For in all that has been said +we have been concerned only with some conditions +of the general working of the mind—assimilation +as well as invention. The eccentricities of inventors +studied carefully and in a detailed manner would +finally, perhaps, be most instructive material, because +it would allow us to penetrate into their inmost +individuality. Thus, the physiology of the +imagination quickly becomes pathology. I shall not +dwell on this, having purposely eliminated the morbid +side of our subject. It will, however, be necessary +to return thereto, touching upon it in another +part of this essay.</p> + + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>There remains a problem, so obscure and enigmatic +that I scarcely venture to approach it, in the +analogy that most languages—the spontaneous expression +of a common thought—establish between +physiologic and psychic creation. Is it only a superficial +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span>likeness, a hasty judgment, a metaphor, or does +it rest on some positive basis? Generally, the various +manifestations of mental activity have as their +precursor an unconscious form from which they +arise. The sensitiveness belonging to living substance, +known by the names heliotropism, chemotropism, +etc., is like a sketch of sensation and of the +reactions following it; organic memory is the basis +and the obliterated form of conscious memory. Reflexes +introduce voluntary activity; appetitions and +hidden tendencies are the forerunners of effective +psychology. Instinct, on several sides, is like an +unconscious and specific trial of reason. Has the +creative power of the human mind also analogous +antecedents, a physiological equivalent?</p> + +<p>One metaphysician, Froschammer, who has elevated +the creative imagination to the rank of primary +world-principle, asserts this positively. For him +there is an objective or cosmic imagination working +in nature, producing the innumerable varieties of +vegetable and animal forms; transformed into subjective +imagination it becomes in the human brain +the source of a new form of creation. "The very +same principle causes the living forms to appear—a +sort of objective image—and the subjective images, +a kind of living form."<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> However ingenious and +attractive this philosophical theory may be, it is +evidently of no positive value for psychology.</p> + +<p>Let us stick to experience. Physiology teaches<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span> +that generation is a "prolonged nutrition," a surplus, +as we see so plainly in the lower forms of +agamous generation (budding, division). The +creative imagination likewise presupposes a superabundance +of psychic life that might otherwise spend +itself in another way. Generation in the physical +order is a spontaneous, natural tendency, although +it may be stimulated, successfully or otherwise, by +artificial means. We can say as much of the other. +This list of resemblances it would be easy to prolong. +But all this is insufficient for the establishment +of a thorough identity between the two cases +and the solution of the question.</p> + +<p>It is possible to limit it, to put it into more precise +language. Is there a connection between the development +of the generative function and that of the +imagination? Even in this form the question scarcely +permits any but vague answers. In favor of a +connection we may allege:</p> + +<p>(1) The well-known influence of puberty on the +imagination of both sexes, expressing itself in day-dreams, +in aspirations toward an unattainable ideal,<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span> +in the genius for invention that love bestows upon +the least favored. Let us recall also the mental +troubles, the psychoses designated by the name +hebephrenia. With adolescence coincides the first +flowering of the fancy which, having emerged from +its swaddling-clothes of childhood, is not yet sophisticated +and rationalized.</p> + +<p>It is not a matter of indifference for the general +thesis of the present work to note that this development +of the imagination depends wholly on the +first effervescence of the emotional life. That "influence +of the feelings on the imagination" and of +"the imagination on the feelings" of which the +moralists and the older psychologists speak so often +is a vague formula for expressing this fact—that +the motor element included in the images is reinforced.</p> + +<p>(2) <i>Per contra</i>, the weakening of the generative +power and of the constructive imagination coincide +in old age, which is, in a word, a decay of nutrition, +a progressive atrophy. It is proper not to omit the +influence of castration. According to the theory of +Brown-Séquard, it produces an abatement of the +nutritive functions through the suppression of an +internal stimulus; and, although its relations to the +imagination have not been especially studied, it is +not rash to admit that it is an arresting cause.</p> + +<p>However, the foregoing merely establishes, between +the functions compared, a concomitance in +the general course of their evolution and in their +critical periods; it is insufficient for a conclusion.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span> +There would be needed clear, authentic and sufficiently +numerous observations proving that individuals +bereft of imagination of the creative type +have acquired it suddenly through the sole fact of +their sexual influences, and, inversely, that brilliant +imaginations have faded under the contrary conditions. +We find some of these evidences in Cabanis,<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> +Moreau de Tours and various alienists; they would +seem to be in favor of the affirmative, but some seem +to me not sure enough, others not explicit enough. +Despite my investigations on this point, and inquiry +of competent persons, I do not venture to draw a +definite conclusion. I leave the question open; it +will perhaps tempt another more fortunate investigator.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Flechsig, <i>Gehirn und Seele</i>, 1896.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Is it possible that this would explain the fact of Aristotle +lecturing to his pupils while walking about, thus giving the +name "peripatetic" to his school and system? (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Die Phantasie als Grundprincip der Weltprocesses</i>, München, +1877. For other details on the subject, see Appendix C.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> A passage from Chateaubriand (cited by Paulhan, <i>Rev. +Philos.</i>, March, 1898, p. 237) is a typical description of the +situation: "The warmth of my (adolescent) imagination, my +shyness, and solitude, caused me, instead of casting myself on +something without, to fall back upon myself. Wanting a real +object, I evoked through the power of my desires, a phantom, +which thenceforth never left me; I made a woman, composed +of all the women that I had already seen. That charming +idea followed me everywhere, though invisible; I conversed +with her as with a real being; she would change according to +my frenzy. Pygmalion was less enamored of his statue."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> Cabanis, <i>Rapports du Physique et du Moral</i>, édition Peisse, +pp. 248-249, an anecdote that he relates after Buffon. Analogous, +but less clear, facts may also be found in Moreau de +Tours' <i>Psychologie morbide</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<h3>THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY</h3> + + +<p>The psychological nature of the imagination +would be very imperfectly known were we limited +to the foregoing analytical study. Indeed, all creation +whatever, great or small, shows an organic +character; it implies a unifying, synthetic principle. +Every one of the three factors—intellectual, emotional, +unconscious—works not as an isolated fact +on its own account; they have no worth save +through their union, and no signification save +through their common bearing. This principle of +unity, which all invention demands and requires, is +at one time intellectual in nature, i.e., as a fixed +idea; at another time emotional, i.e., as a fixed emotion +or passion. These terms—fixed idea, fixed +emotion—are somewhat absolute and require restrictions +and reservations, which will be made in +what follows.</p> + +<p>The distinction between the two is not at all +absolute. Every fixed idea is supported and maintained +by a need, a tendency, a desire; i.e., by an +affective element. For it is idle fancy to believe in +the <i>persistence</i> of an idea which, by hypothesis,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span> +would be a purely intellectual state, cold and dry. +The principle of unity in this form naturally predominates +in certain kinds of creation: in the practical +imagination wherein the end is clear, where +images are direct substitutes for things, where invention +is subjected to strict conditions under penalty +of visible and palpable check; in the scientific +and metaphysical imagination, which works with +concepts and is subject to the laws of rational logic.</p> + +<p>Every fixed emotion should realize itself in an +idea or image that gives it body and systematizes it, +without which it remains diffuse; and all affective +states can take on this permanent form which makes +a unified principle of them. The simple emotions +(fear, love, joy, sorrow, etc.), the complex or derived +emotions (religious, esthetic, intellectual +ideas) may equally monopolize consciousness in their +own interests.</p> + +<p>We thus see that these two terms—fixed idea, +fixed emotion—are almost equivalent, for they both +imply inseparable elements, and serve only to indicate +the preponderance of one or the other element.</p> + +<p>This principle of unity, center of attraction and +support of all the working of the creative imagination—that +is, a subjective principle tending to become +objectified—is the ideal. In the complete +sense of the word—not restrained merely to esthetic +creation or made synonymous with perfection as in +ethics—the ideal is a construction in images that +should become a reality. If we liken imaginative +creation to physiological generation, the ideal is the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span> +ovum awaiting fertilization in order to begin its development.</p> + +<p>We could, to be more exact, make a distinction +between the synthetic principle and the ideal conception +which is a higher form of it. The fixation of +an end and the discovery of appropriate means are +the necessary and sufficient conditions for all invention. +A creation, whatever it be, that looks only +to present success, can satisfy itself with a unifying +principle that renders it viable and organized, +but we can look higher than the merely necessary +and sufficient.</p> + +<p>The ideal is the principle of unity in motion in +its historic evolution; like all development, it advances +or recedes according to the times. Nothing +is less justified than the conception of a fixed archetype +(an undisguised survival of the Platonic +Ideas), illuminating the inventor, who reproduces +it as best he can. The ideal is a nonentity; it arises +in the inventor and through him; its life is a +<i>becoming</i>.</p> + +<p>Psychologically, it is a construction in images belonging +to the merely sketched or outlined type.<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> +It results from a double activity, negative and positive, +or dissociation and association, the first cause +and origin of which is found in a <i>will that it shall +be so</i>; it is the motor tendency of images in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span> +nascent state engendering the ideal. The inventor +cuts out, suppresses, sifts, according to his temperament, +character, taste, prejudices, sympathies and +antipathies—in short, his <i>interest</i>. In this separation, +already studied, let us note one important particular. +"We know nothing of the complex psychic +production that may simply be the sum of component +elements and in which they would remain with their +own characters, with no modification. The nature +of the components disappears in order to give birth +to a novel phenomenon that has its own and particular +features. The construction of the ideal is +not a mere grouping of past experiences; in its totality +it has its own individual characteristics, among +which we no more see the composing lines than we +see the components, oxygen and hydrogen, in water. +In no scientific or artistic production, says Wundt, +does the whole appear as made up of its parts, like +a mosaic."<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> In other words, it is a case of mental +chemistry. The exactness of this expression, which +is due, I believe, to J. Stuart Mill, has been questioned. +Still it answers to positive facts; for example, +in perception, to the phenomena of contrast +and their analogues; juxtaposition or rapid succession +of two different colors, two different sounds, +of tactile, olfactory, gustatory impressions different +in quality, produces a particular state of consciousness, +similar to a combination. Harmony or +discord does not, indeed, exist in each separate<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span> +sound, but only in the relations and sequence of +sounds—it is a <i>tertium quid</i>. We have heretofore, +in the discussion of association of ideas, very frequently +represented the states of consciousness as +fixed elements that approach one another, cohere, +separate, come together anew, but always unalterable, +like atoms. It is not so at all. Consciousness, +says Titchener, resembles a fresco in which the transition +between colors is made through all kinds of +intermediate stages of light and shade.... The +idea of a pen or of an inkwell is not a stable thing +clearly pictured like the pen or inkwell itself. More +than any one else, William James has insisted on +this point in his theory of "fringes" of states of +consciousness. Outside of the given instances we +could find many others among the various manifestations +of the mental life. It is not, then, at all +chimerical to assume in psychology an equivalent of +chemical combination. In a complex state there is, +in addition to the component elements, the result +of their reciprocal influences, of their varying relations. +Too often we forget this resultant.</p> + +<p>At bottom the ideal is an individual concept. If +objection is offered that an ideal common to a large +mass of men is a fact of common experience (e.g., +idealists and realists in the fine arts, and even more +so religious, moral, social and political concepts, +etc.), the answer is easy: There are families of +minds. They have a common ideal because, in certain +matters, they have the same way of feeling and +thinking. It is not a transcendental idea that unites<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span> +them; but this result occurs because from their +common aspirations the collective ideal becomes disengaged; +it is, in scholastic terminology, a <i>universale +post rem</i>.</p> + +<p>The ideal conception is the first moment of the +creative act, which is not yet battling with the conditions +of the actual. It is only the internal vision +of an individual mind that has not yet been projected +externally with a form and body. We know how +the passage from the internal to the external life +has given rise among inventors to deceptions and +complaints. Such was the imaginative construction +that could not, unchanged, enter into its mould and +become a reality.</p> + +<p>Let us now examine the various forms of this +coagulating<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> principle in advancing from the lowest +to the highest, from the unity vaguely anticipated to +the absolute and tyrannical masterful unity. Following +a method that seems to me best adapted for +these ill-explained questions I shall single out only +the principal forms, which I have reduced to three—the +unstable, the organic or middle, and the extreme +or semi-morbid unity.</p> + +<p>(1) The unstable form has its starting point directly +and immediately in the reproductive imagination +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span>without creation. It assembles its elements +somewhat by chance and stitches together the bits +of our life; it ends only in beginnings, in attempts. +The unity-principle is a momentary disposition, vacillating +and changing without cessation according +to the external impressions or modifications of our +vital conditions and of our humor. By way of example +let us recall the state of the day-dreamer +building castles in the air; the delirious constructions +of the insane, the inventions of the child following +all the fluctuations of chance, of its caprice; +the half-coherent dreams that seem to the dreamer +to contain a creative germ. In consequence of the +extreme frailty of the synthetic principle the creative +imagination does not succeed in accomplishing its +task and remains in a condition intermediate between +simple association of ideas and creation proper.</p> + +<p>(2) The organic or middle form may be given as +the type of the unifying power. Ultimately it reduces +itself to attention and presupposes nothing +more, because, thanks to the process of "localization," +which is the essential mark of attention, it +makes itself a center of attraction, grouping about +the leading idea the images, associations, judgments, +tendencies and voluntary efforts. "Inspiration," the +poet Grillparzer used to say, "is a concentration of +all the forces and capacities upon a single point +which, for the time being, should represent the +world rather than enclose it. The reinforcement of +the state of the mind comes from the fact that its +several powers, instead of spreading themselves<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span> +over the whole world, are contained within the +bounds of a single object, touch one another, reciprocally +help and reinforce each other."<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> What the +poet here maintains as regards esthetics only is applicable +to all the <i>organic</i> forms of creation—that +is to those ruled by an immanent logic, and, like +them, resembling works of Nature.</p> + +<p>In order to leave no doubt as to the identity of +attention and imaginative synthesis, and in order +to show that it is normally the true unifying principle, +we offer the following remarks:</p> + +<p>Attention is at times spontaneous, natural, without +effort, simply dependent on the interest that a +thing excites in us—lasting as long as it holds us +in subjection, then ceasing entirely. Again, it is +voluntary, artificial, an imitation of the other, precarious +and intermittent, maintained with effort—in +a word, laborious. The same is true of the +imagination. The moment of inspiration is ruled +by a perfect and spontaneous unity; its impersonality +approaches that of the forces of Nature. Then +appears the personal moment, the detailed working +and long, painful, intermittent resumptions, the miserable +turns of which so many inventors have described. +The analogy between the two cases seems +to me incontestable.</p> + +<p>Next let us note that psychologists always adduce +the same examples when they wish to illustrate on +the one hand, the processes of the persistent, tenacious +attention, and, on the other hand, the developmental +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span>labor without which creative work does not +come to pass: "Genius is only long patience," the +saying of Newton; "always thinking of it," and like +expressions of d'Alembert, Helmholtz and others, +because in the one case as in the other the fundamental +condition is the existence of a fixed, ever-active +idea, notwithstanding its relaxations and its +incessant disappearances into the unconscious with +return to consciousness.</p> + +<p>(3) The extreme form, which from its nature +is semi-morbid, becomes in its highest degree plainly +pathological; the unifying principle changes to a +condition of obsession.</p> + +<p>The normal state of our mind is a plurality of +states of consciousness (polyideism). Through association +there is a radiation in every direction. In +this totality of coexisting images no one long occupies +first place; it is driven away by others, which +are displaced in turn by still others emerging from +the penumbra. On the contrary, in attention (relative +monoideism) a single image retains first place +for a long time and tends to have the same importance +again. Finally, in a condition of obsession +(absolute monoideism) the fixed idea defies all rivalry +and rules despotically. Many inventors have +suffered painfully this tyranny and have vainly +struggled to break it. The fixed idea, once settled, +does not permit anything to dislodge it save for the +moment and with much pain. Even then it is displaced +only apparently, for it persists in the unconscious +life where it has thrust its deep roots.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span></p> + +<p>At this stage the unifying principle, although it +can act as a stimulus for creation, is no longer normal. +Consequently, a natural question arises: +Wherein is there a difference between the obsession +of the inventor and the obsession of the insane, who +most generally destroys in place of creating?</p> + +<p>The nature of fixed ideas has greatly occupied +contemporary alienists. For other reasons and in +their own way they, too, have been led to divide +obsession into two classes, the intellectual and +emotional, according as the idea or the affective +state predominates. Then they have been led to +ask: Which of these two elements is the primitive +one? For some it is the idea. For others, and it +seems that these are the more numerous, the affective +state is in general the primary fact; the obsession +always rests on a basis of morbid emotion and +in a retention of impressions.<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></p> + +<p>But whatever opinion we may hold on this point, +the difficulty of establishing a dividing line between +the two forms of obsession above mentioned remains +the same. Are there characters peculiar to +each one?</p> + +<p>It has been said: "The physiologically fixed idea +is normally longed for, often sought, in all cases +accepted, and it does not break the unity of the +self." It does not impose itself fatally on consciousness; +the individual knows the value thereof, knows<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span> +where it leads him, and adapts his conduct to its +requirements. For example, Christopher Columbus.</p> + +<p>The pathological fixed idea is "parasitic," automatic, +discordant, irresistible. Obsession is only a +special case of psychic disintegration, a kind of +doubling of consciousness. The individual becomes +a person "possessed," whose self has been confiscated +for the sake of the fixed idea, and whose submission +to his situation is wrought with pain.</p> + +<p>In spite of this parallel the distinguishing criterion +between the two is very vague, because from the +sane to the delirious idea the transitions are very +numerous. We are obliged to recognize "that with +certain workers—who are rather taken up with the +elaboration of their work, and not masters directing +it, quitting it, and resuming it at their pleasure—an +artistic, scientific, or mechanical conception +succeeds in haunting the mind, imposing itself upon +it even to the extent of causing suffering." In reality, +pure psychology is unable to discover a positive +difference between obsession leading to creative +work and the other forms, because in both cases +the mental mechanism is, at bottom, the same. The +criterion must be sought elsewhere. For that we +must go out of the internal world and proceed +objectively. We must judge the fixed idea not in +itself but by its effects. What does it produce in +the practical, esthetic, scientific, moral, social, religious +field? It is of value according to its fruits. +If objection be made to this change of front we +may, in order to stick to a strictly psychological<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span> +point of view, state that it is certain that as soon +as it passes beyond a middle point, which it is +difficult to determine, the fixed idea profoundly +troubles the mechanism of the mind. In imaginative +persons this is not rare, which partly explains +why the pathological theory of genius (of which we +shall speak later) has been able to rally so many to +its support and to allege so many facts in its favor.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> For the distinction between this form of imagination and +the two others (fixed, objectified), I refer the reader to the +<a href="#Page_311">Conclusion</a> of this work, where the subject will be treated in +detail.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> Colozza, <i>L'immaginazione nella Scienza</i>, Rome, 1900, pp. +111 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> This unifying, organizing, creative principle is so active in +certain minds that, placed face to face with any work whatever—novel, +picture, monument, scientific or philosophic theory, +financial or political institution—while believing that they are +merely considering it, they spontaneously remake it. This +characteristic of their psychology distinguishes them from mere +critics.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Oelzelt-Newin, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 49.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Pitres et Régis, <i>Séméiologie des obsessions et des idées fixes</i>, +1878. Séglas, <i>Leçons cliniques sur les maladies mentales</i>, 1895. +Raymond et Janet, <i>Névroses et idées fixes</i>, 1898.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span></p> +<h2>SECOND PART</h2> + +<h3>THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMAGINATION.</h3> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span></p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<h3>IMAGINATION IN ANIMALS</h3> + + +<p>Up to this point the imagination has been treated +analytically only. This process alone would give +us but a very imperfect idea of its essentially concrete +and lively nature were we to stop here. So +this part continues the subject in another shape. I +shall attempt to follow the imagination in its ascending +development from the lowest to the most complex +forms, from the animal to the human infant, +to primitive man, thence to the highest modes of +invention. It will thus be exhibited in the inexhaustible +variety of its manifestations which the +abstract and simplifying process of analysis does +not permit us to suspect.</p> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>I shall not dwell at length on the imagination of +animals, not only because the question is much involved +but also because it is hardly liable to a positive +solution. Even eliminating mere anecdotes and +doubtful observations, there is no lack of verified +and authentic material, but it still remains to interpret +them. As soon as we begin to conjecture we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span> +know how difficult it is to divest ourselves of all +anthropomorphism.</p> + +<p>The question has been formulated, even if not +treated, with much system by Romanes in his +<i>Mental Evolution in Animals</i>.<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> Taking "imagination" +in its broadest sense, he recognizes four stages:</p> + +<p>1. Provoked revival of images. For example, +the sight of an orange reminds one of its taste. +This is a low form of memory, resting on association +by contiguity. It is met with very far down +in the animal scale, and the author furnishes abundant +proof of it.</p> + +<p>2. Spontaneous revival. An object present calls +up an absent object. This is a higher form of +memory, frequent in ants, bees, wasps, etc., which +fact explains the mistrustful sagacity of wild animals. +At night, the distant baying of a hound stops +the fox in his course, because all the dangers he +has undergone are represented in his mind.</p> + +<p>These two stages do not go beyond memory pure +and simple, i.e., reproductive imagination. The +other two constitute the higher imagination.</p> + +<p>3. The capacity of associating absent images, +without suggestion derived from without, through +an internal working of the mind. It is the lower +and primitive form of the creative imagination, +which may be called a passive synthesis. In order +to establish its existence, Romanes reminds us that +dreams have been proven in dogs, horses, and a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span> +large number of birds; that certain animals, especially +in anger, seem to be subject to delusions and +pursued by phantoms; and lastly, that in some +there is produced a condition resembling nostalgia, +expressing itself in a violent desire to return to +former haunts, or in a wasting away resulting from +the absence of accustomed persons and things. All +these facts, especially the latter, can hardly be +explained without a vivid recollection of the images +of previous life.</p> + +<p>4. The highest stage consists of intentionally +reuniting images in order to make novel combinations +from them. This may be called an active +synthesis, and is the true creative imagination. Is +this sometimes found in the animal kingdom? +Romanes very clearly replies, no; and not without +offering a plausible reason. For creation, says he, +there must first be capacity for abstraction, and, +without speech, abstraction is very weak. One of +the conditions for creative imagination is thus +wanting in the higher animals.</p> + +<p>We here come to one of those critical moments, +so frequent in animal psychology, when one asks, +Is this character exclusively human, or is it found +in embryo in lower forms? Thus it has been possible +to support a theory opposing that of Romanes. +Certain animals, says Oelzelt-Newin, fulfill all the +conditions necessary for creative imagination—subtle +senses, good memory, and appropriate emotional +states.<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> This assertion is perhaps true, but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span> +it is purely dialectic. It is equivalent to saying that +the thing is possible; it does not establish it as a +fact. Besides, is it very certain that all the conditions +for creative imagination are present here, +since we have just shown that there is lack of +abstraction? The author, who voluntarily limits +his study to birds and the construction of their +nests, maintains, against Wallace and others, that +nest-building requires "the mysterious synthesis of +representations." We might with equal reason +bring the instances of other building animals (bees, +wasps, white ants, the common ants, beavers, etc.). +It is not unreasonable to attribute to them an +anticipated representation of their architecture. +Shall we say that it is "instinctive," consequently +unconscious? At least, may we not group under +this head, changes and adaptations to new conditions +which these animals succeed in applying to +the typical plans of their construction? Observations +and even systematic experiments (like those +of Huber, Forel, <i>et al.</i>) show that, reduced to the +alternative of the impossibility of building or the +modification of their habits, certain animals modify +them. Judging from this, how refuse them invention +altogether? This contradicts in no way the +very just reservation of Romanes. It is sufficient +to remark that abstraction or dissociation has stages, +that the simplest are accessible to the animal intelligence. +If, in the absence of words, the logic of +concepts is forbidden it, there yet remains the logic<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span> +of images,<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> which is sufficient for slight innovations. +In a word, animals can invent according to +the extent that they can dissociate.</p> + +<p>In our opinion, if we may with any truthfulness +attribute a creative power to animals, we must seek +it elsewhere. Generally speaking, we attribute only +a mediocre importance to a manifestation that +might very well be the proper form of animal fancy. +It is purely motor, and expresses itself through the +various kinds of play.</p> + +<p>Although play may be as old as mankind, its +psychology dates only from the nineteenth century. +We have already seen that there are three theories +concerning its nature—it is "expenditure of superfluous +activity," "a mending, restoring of strength, +a recuperation," "an apprenticeship, a preliminary +exercise for the active functions of life and for the +development of our natural gifts."<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> The last position, +due to Groos, does not rule out the other two; +it holds the first valid for the young, the second for +adults; but it comprehends both in a more general +explanation.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span></p><p>Let us leave this doctrinal question in order to +call attention to the variety and richness of form +of play in the animal world. In this respect the +aforementioned book of Groos is a rich mine of +evidence to which I would refer the reader. I limit +myself to summing up his classification. He distinguishes +nine classes of play, viz.: (1) Those +that are at bottom experimental, consisting of trials +at hazard without immediate end, often giving the +animal a certain knowledge of the properties of the +external world. This is the introduction to an +experimental physics, optics, and mechanics for the +brood of animals. (2) Movements or changes of +place executed of their own accord—a very general +fact as is proven by the incessant movements of +butterflies, flies, birds, and even fishes, which often +appear to play in the water rather than to seek prey; +the mad running of horses, dogs, etc., in free space. +(3) Mimicry of hunting, i.e., playing with a living +or dead prey: the dog and cat following moving +objects, a ball, feather, etc. (4) Mimic battles, +teasing and fighting without anger. (5) Architectural +art, revealing itself especially in the building +of nests: certain birds ornament them with +shining objects (stones, bits of glass), by a kind +of anticipation of the esthetic feeling. (6) Doll-play +is universal in mankind, whether civilized or +savage. Groos believes he has found its equivalent +in certain animals. (7) Imitation through pleasure, +so familiar in monkeys (grimaces); singing-birds +which counterfeit the voices of a large number of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span> +beasts. (8) Curiosity, which is the only mental +play one meets in animals—the dog watching, from +a wall or window, what is going on in the street. +(9) Love-plays, "which differ from the others in +that they are not mere exercises, but have in view +a real object." They have been well-known since +Darwin's time, he attributing to them an esthetic +value which has been denied by Wallace, Tylor, +Lloyd Morgan, Wallaschek, and Groos.</p> + +<p>Let us recapitulate in thought the immense +quantity of motor expressions included in these nine +categories and let us note that they have the following +characters in common: They are grouped +in combinations that are often new and unforeseen; +they are not a repetition of daily life, acts necessary +for self-preservation. At one time the movements +are combined simultaneously (exhibition of beautiful +colors), again (and most often) successively +(amorous parades, fights, flight, dancing, emission +of noises, sounds or songs); but, under one form or +another, there is <i>creation</i>, <i>invention</i>. Here, the +imagination acts in its purely motor character; it +consists of a small number of images that become +translated into actions, and serve as a center for +their grouping; perhaps even the image itself is +hardly conscious, so that all is limited to a spontaneous +production and a collection of motor phenomena.</p> + +<p>It will doubtless be said that this form of imagination +belongs to a very shallow, poor psychology. +It cannot be otherwise. It is necessary that imaginative +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span>production be found reduced to its simplest +expression in animals, and the motor form must be +its special characteristic mark. It cannot have any +others for the following reasons: incapacity for +the work that necessarily precedes abstraction or +dissociation, breaking into bits the data of experience, +making them raw material for the future +construction; lack of images, and especially fewness +of possible combinations of images. This last point +is proven alike from the data of animal psychology +and of comparative anatomy. We know that the +nervous elements in the brain serving as connections +between sensory regions—whether one conceive of +them as centers (Flechsig), or as bundles of commisural +fibers (Meynert, Wernicke)—are hardly +outlined in the lower mammalia and attain only a +mediocre development in the higher forms.</p> + +<p>By way of corroboration of the foregoing, let us +compare the higher animals with young children: +this comparison is not based on a few far-fetched +analogies, but in a thorough resemblance in nature. +Man, during the first years of his life, has a brain +but slightly differentiated, especially as regards +connections, a very poor supply of images, a very +weak capacity for abstraction. His intellectual +development is much inferior to that of reflex, +instinctive, impulsive, and imitative movements. In +consequence of this predominance of the motor +system, the simple and imperfect images, in children +as in animals, tend to be immediately changed +into movements. Even most of their inventions in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span> +play are greatly inferior to those enumerated above +under nine distinct heads.</p> + +<p>A serious argument in favor of the prevalence +of imagination of the motor type in the child is +furnished by the principal part taken by movements +in infantile insanity: a remark made by many +alienists. The first stage of this madness, they say, +is found in the convulsions that are not merely a +physical ailment, but "a muscular delirium." The +disturbance of the automatic and instinctive functions +of the child is so often associated with muscular +disturbances that at this age the mental disorders +correspond to the motor ganglionic centers +situated below those parts that later assume the +labor of analysis and of imagination. The disturbances +are in the primary centers of organization and +according to the symptoms lack those analytic or +constructive qualities, those ideal forms, that we +find in adult insanity. If we descend to the lowest +stage of human life—to the baby—we see that +insanity consists almost entirely of the activity of +a muscular group acting on external objects. The +insane baby bites, kicks, and these symptoms are +the external measure of the degree of its madness.<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> +Has not chorea itself been called a muscular insanity?</p> + +<p>Doubtless, there likewise exists in the child a +sensorial madness (illusions, hallucinations); but +by reason of its feeble intellectual development the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span> +delirium causes a disorder of movements rather +than of images; its insane imagination is above all +a motor insanity.</p> + +<p>To hold that the creative imagination belonging +to animals consists of new combinations of movements +is certainly an hypothesis. Nevertheless, I +do not believe that it is merely a mental form without +foundation, if we take into account the foregoing +facts. I consider it rather as a point in favor +of the motor theory of invention. It is a singular +instance in which the original form of creation is +shown bare. If we wanted to discover it, it would +be necessary to seek it where it is reduced to the +greatest simplicity—in the animal world.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Chapter X.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, Appendix.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> For a more detailed study of this subject, the reader is +referred to the author's <i>Evolution of General Ideas</i> (English +trans., Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago), chapter I, section +I.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> A rather extended study of the subject by H. A. Carr will +be found in the <i>Investigations of the Department of Psychology +and Education of the University of Colorado</i>, vol. I, Number 2, +1902. The late Professor Arthur Allin devoted much time to +the investigation of play. See his brief article entitled +"Play" in the <i>University of Colorado Studies</i>, vol. I, 1902, +pp. 58-73. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Hack Tuke, "Insanity of Children," in <i>Dictionary of Psychological +Medicine</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<h3>THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION IN THE CHILD</h3> + + +<p>At what age, in what form, under what conditions +does the creative imagination make its appearance? +It is impossible to answer this question, +which, moreover, has no justification. For the +creative imagination develops little by little out of +pure reproduction by an evolutionary process, not +by sudden eruption. Nevertheless, its evolution is +very slow on account of causes both organic and +psychological.</p> + +<p>We could not dwell long on the organic causes +without falling into tiresome repetitions. The new-born +infant is a spinal being, with an unformed +diffluent brain, composed largely of water. Reflex +life itself is not complete in him, and the cortico-motor +system only hinted at; the sensory centers +are undifferentiated, the associational systems remain +isolated for a long time after birth. We have +given above Flechsig's observation on this point.</p> + +<p>The psychological causes reduce themselves to +the necessity for a consolidation of the primary and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span> +secondary operations of the mind, without which +the creative imagination cannot take form. To be +precise, we might distinguish, as does Baldwin, four +epochs in the mental development of the child: (1) +affective (rudimentary sensory processes, pleasures +and pains, simple motor adaptations); (2) and (3) +objective, in which the author establishes two +grades, (a) appearance of special senses, of memory, +instincts primarily defensive, and imitation; +(b) complex memory, complicated movements, +offensive activities, rudimentary will; (4) subjective +or final (conscious thought, constitutive will, +ideal emotions). If we accept this scheme as +approximately correct, the <i>moment</i> of imagination +must be assigned to the third period (the second +stage of the objective epoch) which fulfills all the +sufficient and necessary conditions for its origination +and for its rise above pure reproduction.</p> + +<p>Whatever the propitious age may be, the study +of the child-imagination is not without difficulties. +In order to enter into the child-mind, we must +become like a child; as it is, we are limited to an +interpretation of it in terms of the adult, with much +false interpretation possible, agreeing too much or +too little with the facts. Furthermore, the children +studied live and grow up in a civilized environment. +The result is that the development of their imagination +is rarely unhampered and complete; for as soon +as their fancy passes the middle level, the rationalizing +education of parents and teachers is eager to +master and control it. In truth it gives its full<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span> +measure and reveals itself in the fulness of growth +only among primitive peoples. With us it is +checked in its flight by an antagonistic power, +which treats it as a harbinger of insanity. Finally, +children are not equally well-suited for this study; +we must make a distinction between the imaginative +and non-imaginative, and the latter should be eliminated.</p> + +<p>When we have thus chosen suitable subjects, +observation shows from the start sufficiently distinct +varieties, different orientations of the imagination +depending on intellectual causes, such as the +predominance of visual or acoustic or tactile-motor +images making for mechanical invention; or dependent +on emotional causes, that is, of character, +according as the latter is timid, joyous, exuberant, +retired, healthy, sickly, etc.</p> + +<p>If we now attempt to follow the development of +the child-imagination, we may distinguish four +principal stages, without assigning them, otherwise, +a rigorous chronological order.</p> + +<p>1. The first stage consists of the passage from +passive to creative imagination. Its history would +be long were we to include all the hybrid forms that +are made up partly of memories, partly of new +groupings, being at the same time repetition and +construction. Even in the adult, they are very frequent. +I know a person who is always afraid of +being smothered, and for this reason urgently asks +that in his coffin his shirt be not tight at the neck: +this odd prepossession of the mind belongs neither<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span> +to memory nor to imagination. This particular +case illustrates in a very clear form the nature of +the first flights of the mind attempting to exercise +its imaginative powers. Without enumerating other +facts of this kind, it is more desirable to follow the +imagination's development, limiting ourselves to +two forms of the psychic life—perception and illusion. +The necessary presence of the image in these +two forms has been so often proven by contemporary +psychology that a few words to recall this +to mind will be sufficient.</p> + +<p>There seems to be a radical difference between +perception, which seizes reality, and imagination. +Nevertheless, it is generally admitted that in order +to rise above sensation to perception, there must be +a synthesis of images. To put it more simply, two +elements are required—one, coming from without, +the physiological stimulus acting on the nerves and +the sensory centers, which becomes translated in +consciousness through the vague state that goes by +the name "sensation"; the other, coming from within, +adds to the sensations present appropriate images, +remnants of former experiences. So that perception +requires an apprenticeship; we must feel, then imperfectly +perceive, in order to finally perceive well. +The sensory datum is only a fraction of the total +fact; and in the operation we call "perceiving," that +is, apprehending an object directly, a part only of +the object is represented.</p> + +<p>This, however, does not go beyond reproductive +imagination. The decisive step is taken in illusion.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span> +We know that illusion has as a basis and support a +modification of the external senses which are metamorphosed, +amplified by an immediate construction +of the mind: a branch of a tree becomes a serpent, +a distant noise seems the music of an orchestra. +Illusion has as broad a field as perception, since +there is no perception but may undergo this erroneous +transformation, and it is produced by the same +mechanism, but with interchange of the two terms. +In perception, the chief element is the sensory, and +the representative element is secondary; in illusion, +we have just the opposite condition: what one takes +as perceived is merely imagined—the imagination +assumes the principal rôle. Illusion is the type of +the transitional forms, of the mixed cases, that consist +of constructions made up of memories, without +being, in the strict sense, creations.</p> + +<p>2. The creative imagination asserts itself with +its peculiar characteristics only in the second stage, +in the form of animism or the attributing of life +to everything. This turn of the mind is already +known to us, though mentioned only incidentally. +As the state of the child's mind at that period +resembles that which in primitive man creates +myths, we shall return to it in the next chapter. +Works on psychology abound in facts demonstrating +that this primitive tendency to attribute life and +even personality to everything is a necessary phase +that the mind must undergo—long or short in duration, +rich or poor in inventions, according to the +level of the child's imagination. His attitude towards +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[108]</a></span>his dolls is the common example of this state, +and also the best example, because it is universal, +being found in all countries without exception, +among all races of men. It is needless to pile up +facts on an uncontroverted point.<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> Two will suffice; +I choose them on account of their extravagance, +which shows that at this particular moment +animism, in certain minds, can dare anything. "One +little fellow, aged one year eight months, conceived +a special fondness for the letter W, addressing it +thus: 'Dear old boy W.' Another little boy well +on in his fourth year, when tracing a letter L, happened +to slip, so that the horizontal limb formed +an angle, thus:</p> + +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 84px;"> +<img src="images/fig001.jpg" width="84" height="87" alt="" title="" /> +</div> + +<p>He instantly saw the resemblance +to the sedentary human form, and said: +'Oh, he's sitting down.' Similarly, when he made +an F turn the wrong way and then put the correct +form to the left, thus,</p> + +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 96px;"> +<img src="images/fig002.jpg" width="96" height="81" alt="" title="" /> +</div> + +<p>he exclaimed, 'They're +talking together!'" One of Sully's correspondents +says: "I had the habit of attributing intelligence +not only to all living creatures ... but even +to stones and manufactured articles. I used to feel +how dull it must be for the pebbles in the causeway +to lie still and only see what was round about. +When I walked out with a basket for putting +flowers in, I used sometimes to pick up a pebble or +two and carry them out to have a change."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[109]</a></span></p> + +<p>Let us stop a moment in order to try to determine +the nature of this strange mental state, all the more +as we shall meet it again in primitive man, and since +it presents the creative imagination at its beginning.</p> + +<p>a. The first element is a fixed idea, or rather, an +image, or group of images, that takes possession of +consciousness to the exclusion of everything else:—it +is the analogue of the state of suggestion in the +hypnotized subject, with this sole difference—that +the suggestion does not come from without, from +another, but from the child itself—it is auto-suggestion. +The stick that the child holds between his +legs becomes for him an imaginary steed. The +poverty of his mental development makes all the +easier this contraction of the field of his consciousness, +which assures the supremacy of the image.</p> + +<p>b. This has as its basis a reality that it includes. +This is an important detail to note, because this +reality, however tiny, gives objectivity to the imaginary +creation and incorporates it with the external +world. The mechanism is like that which produces +illusion, but with a stable character excluding correction. +The child transforms a bit of wood or +paper into another self, because he perceives only +the phantom he has created; that is, the images, not +the material exciting them, haunt his brain.</p> + +<p>c. Lastly, this creative power investing the image +with all its attributes of real existence is derived +from a fundamental fact—the state of belief, i.e., +adherence of the mind founded on purely subjective +conditions. It does not come within my province to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[110]</a></span> +treat incidentally such a large question. Neglected +by the older physiology, whose faculty-method inclined +it toward this omission, belief or faith has +recently become the object of numerous studies.<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> +I necessarily limit myself to remarking that but for +this psychic state, the nature of the imagination is +totally incomprehensible. The peculiarity of the +imagination is the production of a reality of human +origin, and it succeeds therein only because of the +faith accompanying the image.</p> + +<p>Representation and belief are not completely +separated; it is the nature of the image to appear +at first as a real object. This psychological truth, +though proven through observation, has made itself +acceptable only with great difficulty. It has had to +struggle on the one hand against the prejudices of +common-sense for which imagination is synonymous +with sham and vain appearance and opposed to the +real as non-being to being; on the other hand, +against a doctrine of the logicians who maintain +that the idea is at first merely conceived with no +affirmation of existence or non-existence (<i>apprehensio +simplex</i>). This position, legitimate in logic, +which is an abstract science, is altogether unacceptable +in psychology, a concrete science. The psychological +viewpoint giving the true nature of the +image has prevailed little by little. Spinoza already +asserts "that representations considered by themselves +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[111]</a></span>contain no errors," and he "denies that it is +possible to perceive [represent] without affirming." +More explicitly, Hume assigns belief to our subjective +dispositions: Belief does not depend on the +nature of the idea, but on the manner in which we +conceive it. Existence is not a quality added to it +by us; it is founded on habit and is irresistible. +The difference between fiction and belief consists of +a feeling added to the latter but not to the former. +Dugald Stewart treats the question purely as a +psychologist following the experimental method. +He enumerates very many facts whence he concludes +that imagination is always accompanied by +an act of belief, but for which fact the more vivid +the image, the less one would believe it; but just +the contrary happens—the strong representation +commands persuasion like sensation itself. Finally, +Taine treats the subject methodically, by studying +the nature of the image and its primitive character +of hallucination.<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> At present, I think, there is no +psychologist who does not regard as proven that +the image, when it enters consciousness, has two +moments. During the first, it is objective, appearing +as a full and complete reality; during the +second, which is definitive, it is deprived of its +objectivity, reduced to a completely internal event, +through the effect of other states of consciousness<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[112]</a></span> +which oppose and finally annihilate its objective +character. There is an affirmation, then negation; +impulse, then inhibition.</p> + +<p>Faith, being only a mode of existence, an attitude +of the mind, owes its creative and vivifying power +to general dispositions of our constitution. Besides +the intellectual element which is its content, its +material—the thing affirmed or denied—there are +tendencies and other affective factors (desire, fear, +love, etc.) giving the image its intensity, and assuring +it success in the struggle against other states +of consciousness. There are active faculties that +we sometimes designate by the name "will," understanding +by the term, as James says, not only deliberate +volition, but all the factors of belief (hope, +fear, passions, prejudices, sectarian feeling, and so +forth),<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> and this has justly given rise to the truthful +saying that the test of belief is action.<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> This +explains how in love, religion, in the moral life, in +politics, and elsewhere, belief can withstand the +logical assaults of the rationalizing intelligence—its +power is found everywhere. It lasts as long as +the mind waits and consents; but, as soon as these +affective and active dispositions disappear in life's +experience, faith falls with them, leaving in its place +a formless content, an empty and dead representation.</p> + +<p>After this, is it necessary to remark that belief<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[113]</a></span> +depends peculiarly on the motor elements of our +organization and not on the intellectual? As there +is no imagination without belief, nor belief without +imagination, we return by another route to the +thesis supported in the first part of this essay, that +creative activity depends on the motor nature of +images.</p> + +<p>Insofar as concerns the special case of the child, +the first of the two moments (the affirming) that +the image undergoes in consciousness is all in all +for him, the second (the rectifying) is nothing: +there is hypertrophy of one, atrophy of the other. +For the adult the contrary is true—in many cases, +indeed, in consequence of experience and habit, +the first moment, wherein the image should be +affirmed as a reality, is only virtual, is literally +atrophied. We must, however, remark that this +applies only partially to the ignorant and even less +to the savage.</p> + +<p>We might, nevertheless, ask ourselves if the +child's belief in his phantoms is complete, entire, +absolute, unreserved. Is the stick that he bestrides +perfectly identified with a horse? Was Sully's child, +that showed its doll a series of engravings to choose +from, completely deceived? It seems that we must +rather admit an intermittence, an alteration between +affirmation and negation. On the one hand, +the skeptical attitude of those who laugh at it displeases +the child, who is like a devout believer +whose faith is being broken down. On the other +hand, doubt must indeed arise in him from time to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[114]</a></span> +time, for without this, rectification could never +occur—one belief opposes the other or drives it +away. This second work proceeds little by little, +but then, under this form, imagination retreats.</p> + +<p>3. The third stage is that of play, which, in +chronological order, coincides with the one just +preceding. As a form of creation it is already +known to us, but in passing from animals to children, +it grows in complexity and becomes intellectualized. +It is no longer a simple combination of images.</p> + +<p>Play serves two ends—for experimenting: as +such it is an introduction to knowledge, gives certain +vague notions concerning the nature of things; +for creating: this is its principal function.</p> + +<p>The human child, like the animal, expends itself +in movements, forms associations new to it, simulates +defence, flight, attack; but the child soon +passes beyond this lower stage, in order to construct +by means of images (ideally). He begins by imitating: +this is a physiological necessity, reasons for +which we shall give later (see chapter iv. <i>infra</i>). +He constructs houses, boats, gives himself up to +large plans; but he imitates most in his own person +and acts, making himself in turn soldier, sailor, +robber, merchant, coachman, etc.</p> + +<p>To the period of imitation succeed more serious +attempts—he acts with a "spirit of mastery," he is +possessed by his idea which he tends to realize. +The personal character of creation is shown in that +he is really interested only in a work that emanates<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[115]</a></span> +from himself and of which he feels himself the +cause. B. Perez relates that he wanted to give a +lesson to his nephew, aged three and a half years, +whose inventions seemed to him very poor. Perez +scratched in the sand a trench resembling a river, +planted little branches on both banks, and had water +flow through it; put a bridge across, and launched +boats. At each new act the child would remain +cool, his admiration would always have to be waited +for. Out of patience, he remarked shortly that +"this isn't at all entertaining." The author adds: +"I believed it useless to persist, and I trampled +under foot, laughing at myself, my awkward attempt +at a childish construction."<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> "I had already +read it in many a book, but this time I had learned +from experience that the free initiative of children +is always superior to the imitations we pretend to +make for them. In addition, this experience and +others like it have taught me that their creative +force is much weaker than has been said."</p> + +<p>4. At the fourth stage appears romantic invention, +which requires a more refined culture, being +a purely internal, wholly imaginative (i.e., cast in +images) creation. It begins at about three or +four years of age. We know the taste of imaginative +children for stories and legends, which they +have repeated to them until surfeited: in this +respect they resemble semi-civilized people, who +listen greedily to rhapsodies for hours at a time, +experiencing all the emotions appropriate to the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[116]</a></span> +incidents of the tale. This is the prelude to creation, +a semi-passive, semi-active state, an apprentice +period, which will permit them to create in their +own turn. Thus the first attempts are made with +reminiscences, and imitated rather than created.</p> + +<p>Of this we find numerous examples in the special +works. A child of three and a half saw a lame man +going along a road, and exclaimed: "Look at that +poor ole man, mamma, he has dot [got] a bad leg." +Then the romance begins: He was on a high horse; +he fell on a rock, struck his poor leg; he will have +to get some powder to heal it, etc. Sometimes the +invention is less realistic. A child of three often +longed to live like a fish in the water, or like a star +in the sky. Another, aged five years nine months, +having found a hollow rock, invented a fairy story: +the hole was a beautiful hall inhabited by brilliant +mysterious personages, etc.<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></p> + +<p>This form of imagination is not as common as +the others. It belongs to those whom nature has +well endowed. It forecasts a development of mind +above the average. It may even be the sign of an +inborn vocation and indicate in what direction the +creative activity will be orientated.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[117]</a></span></p> + +<p>Let us briefly recall the creative rôle of the +imagination in language, through the intervening +of a factor already studied—thinking by analogy, +an abundant source of often picturesque metaphors. +A child called the cork of a bottle "door;" a small +coin was called by a little American a "baby dollar;" +another, seeing the dew on the grass, said, "The +grass is crying."</p> + +<p>The extension of the meaning of words has been +studied by Taine, Darwin, Preyer, and others. They +have shown that its psychological mechanism depends +sometimes on the perception of resemblance, +again on association by contiguity, processes that +appear and intermingle in an unforeseen manner. +Thus, a child applies the word "mambro" at first +to his nurse, then to a sewing machine that she uses, +then by analogy to an organ that he sees on the +street adorned with a monkey, then to his toys +representing animals.<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> We have elsewhere given +more similar cases, where we perceive the fundamental +difference between thought by imagery and +rational thought.</p> + +<p>To conclude: At this period the imagination is +the master-faculty and the highest form of intellectual +development. It works in two directions, +one principal—it creates plays, invents romances, +and extends language; the other secondary—it +contains a germ of thought and ventures a fanciful +explanation of the world which can not yet be conceived +according to abstract notions and laws.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> One will find a large number of examples in Sully's work, +<i>Studies of Childhood</i>, Chapter ii, entitled "The Age of Imagination." +Most of the observations given in the present chapter +have been borrowed from this author.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Apropos of this subject compare especially the recent +studies by William James, <i>Varieties of Religious Experience</i>. +(Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> Spinoza, <i>Ethics</i>, II, 49, <i>Scholium</i>; Hume, <i>Human Understanding</i>, +Part III, Section VII ff.; Dugald Stewart, <i>Elements +of the Philosophy of the Human Mind</i>, Vol. I, Ch. III; Taine, +<i>On Intelligence</i>, Part II.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> James, <i>The Will to Believe and Other Essays</i>, p. 10.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> Payot, <i>De la croyance</i>, 139 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> B. Perez, <i>Les trois premières années de l'enfant</i>, p. 323.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> Sully, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 59-61. Compayré, <i>L'évolution intellectuelle +et morale de l'enfant</i>, p. 145. +</p><p> +(Some time ago the writer was riding on a train, when the +engine, for some reason or other, began to slow up, jerking, +puffing, almost groaning, until it finally came to a full stop. +The groaning continued. A little girl of about three called to +her mother, "Too-too sick, too-too sick," and when finally the +train started on again, the child was overjoyed that "too-too" +was well again. (Tr.))</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> Sully, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 164.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[118]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<h3>PRIMITIVE MAN AND THE CREATION OF MYTHS</h3> + + +<p>We come now to a unique period in the history +of the development of the imagination—its golden +age. In primitive man, still confined in savagery +or just starting toward civilization, it reaches its +full bloom in the creation of myths; and we are +rightly astonished that psychologists, obstinately +attached to esthetics, have neglected such an important +form of activity, one so rich in information +concerning the creative imagination. Where, indeed, +find more favorable conditions for knowing it?</p> + +<p>Man, prior to civilization, is a purely imaginative +being; that is, the imagination marks the summit of +his intellectual development. He does not go +beyond this stage, but it is no longer an enigma as +in animals, nor a transitory phase as in the civilized +child who rapidly advances to the age of reason; +it is a fixed state, permanent and lasting throughout +life.<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> It is there revealed to us in its entire spontaneity: +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[119]</a></span>it has free rein; it can create without +imitation or tradition; it is not imprisoned in any +conventional form; it is sovereign. As primitive +man has knowledge neither of nature nor of its +laws, he does not hesitate to embody the most senseless +imaginings flitting through his brain. The +world is not, for him, a totality of phenomena +subject to laws, and nothing limits or hinders him.</p> + +<p>This working of the pure imagination, left to +itself and unadulterated by the intrusion and +tyranny of rational elements, becomes translated +into one form—the creation of myths; an anonymous, +unconscious work, which, as long as its rule +lasts, is sufficient in every way, comprehends everything—religion, +poetry, history, science, philosophy, +law.</p> + +<p>Myths have the advantage of being the incarnation +of pure imagination, and, moreover, they permit +psychologists to study them objectively. Thanks +to the labors of the nineteenth century, they offer +an almost inexhaustible content. While past ages +forgot, misunderstood, disfigured, and often despised +myths as aberrations of the human mind, as +unworthy of an hour's attention, it is no longer +necessary in our time to show their interest and +importance, even for psychology, which, however, +has not as yet drawn all the benefit possible from +them.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[120]</a></span></p> + +<p>But before commencing the psychological study +of the genesis and formation of myths considered +as an objective emanation of the creative imagination, +we must briefly summarize the hypotheses at +present offered for their origin. We find two principal +ones—the one, etymological, genealogical, or +linguistic; the other, ethno-psychological, or anthropological.<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a></p> + +<p>The first, whose principal though not sole champion +is Max Müller, holds that myths are the result +of a disease of language—words become things, +"nomina numina." This transformation is the +effect of two principal linguistic causes—(a) Polynomy; +several words for one thing. Thus the sun +is designated by more than twenty names in the +Vedas; Apollo, Phaethon, Hercules are three personifications +of the sun; <i>Varouna</i> (night) and +<i>Yama</i> (death) express at first the same conception, +and have become two distinct deities. In short, +every word tends to become an entity having its +attributes and its legends. (b) Homonomy, a +single word for several things. The same adjective, +"shining," refers to the sun, a fountain, spring, etc. +This is another source of confusion. Let us also +add metaphors taken literally, plays upon words, +wrong construction, etc.</p> + +<p>The opponents of this doctrine maintain that in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[121]</a></span> +the formation of myths, words represent scarcely +five per cent. Whatever may be the worth of this +assertion, the purely philological explanation remains +without value for psychology: it is neither +true nor false—it does not solve the question; it +merely avoids it. The word is only an occasion, a +vehicle; without the working of the mind exciting +it, nothing would change. Moreover, Max Müller +himself has recently recognized this.<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> + +<p>The anthropological theory, much more general +than the foregoing, penetrates further to psychological +origins—it leads us to the first advances of +the human mind. It regards the myth not as an +accident of primitive life, but as a natural function, +a mode of activity proper to man during a certain +period of his development. Later, the mythic creations +seem absurd, often immoral, because they are +survivals of a distant epoch, cherished and consecrated +through tradition, habits, and respect for +antiquity. According to the definition that seems +to me best adapted for psychology, the myth is +"the psychological objectification of man in all the +phenomena that he can perceive."<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> It is a humanization +of nature according to processes peculiar to +the imagination.</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[122]</a></span></p> +<p>Are these two views irreconcilable? It does not +seem so to me, provided we accept the first as only +a partial explanation. In any event, both schools +agree on one point important for us—that the +material for myths is furnished by the observation +of natural phenomena, including the great events +of human life: birth, sickness, death, etc. This is +the objective factor. The creation of myths has its +explanation in the nature of human imagination—this +is the subjective factor. We can not deny that +most works on mythology have a very decided +tendency to give the greater importance to the first +factor; in which respect they need a little psychology. +The periodic returns of the dawn, the sun, +the moon and stars, winds and storms, have their +effect also, we may suppose, on monkeys, elephants, +and other animals supposedly the most intelligent. +Have they inspired myths? Just the opposite: "the +surprising monotony of the ideas that the various +races have made final causes of phenomena, of the +origin and destiny of man, whence it results that +the numberless myths are reduced to a very small +number of types,"<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> shows that it is the human +imagination that takes the principal part and that +it is on the whole perhaps not so rich as we are +pleased to say—that it is even very poor, compared +to the fecundity of nature.</p> + +<p>Let us now study the psychology of this creative +activity, reducing it to these two questions: How<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[123]</a></span> +are myths formed? What line does their evolution +follow?</p> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>The psychology of the origin of the myth, of the +work that causes its rise, may theoretically, and for +the sake of facilitating analysis, be regarded as two +principal moments—that of creation proper, and +that of romantic invention.</p> + +<p>a. The moment of creation presupposes two +inseparable operations which, however, we have to +describe separately. The first consists of attributing +life to all things, the second of assigning qualities +to all things.</p> + +<p>Animating everything, that is attributing life +and action to everything, representing everything to +one's self as living and acting—even mountains, +rocks, and other objects (seemingly) incapable of +movement. Of this inborn and irresistible tendency +there are so many facts in proof that an enumeration +is needless: it is the rule. The evidence gathered +by ethnologists, mythologists, and travelers fills +large volumes. This state of mind does not particularly +belong to long-past ages. It is still in +existence, it is contemporary, and if we would see +it with our own eyes it is not at all necessary to +plunge into virgin countries, for there are frequent +reversions even in civilized lands. On the whole, +says Tylor, it must be regarded as conceded that to +the lower races of humanity the sun and stars, the +trees and rivers, the winds and clouds, become<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[124]</a></span> +animated creatures living like men and beasts, fulfilling +their special function in creation—or rather +that what the human eye can reach is only the +instrument or the matter of which some gigantic +being, like a man, hidden behind the visible things, +makes use. The grounds on which such ideas are +based cannot be regarded as less than a poetic fancy +or an ill-understood metaphor; they depend on a +vast philosophy of nature, certainly rude and primitive, +but coherent and serious.</p> + +<p>The second operation of the mind, inseparable, +as we have said, from the first, attributes to these +imaginary beings various qualities, but all important +to man. They are good or bad, useful or +hurtful, weak or powerful, kind or cruel. One +remains stupefied before the swarming of these +numberless genii whom no natural phenomenon, no +act of life, no form of sickness escapes, and these +beliefs remain unbroken even among the tribes that +are in contact with old civilizations.<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> Primitive +man lives and moves among the ceaseless phantoms +of his own imagination.<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[125]</a></span></p><p>Lastly, the psychological mechanism of the creative +moment is very simple. It depends on a single +factor previously studied—thinking by analogy. It +is a matter first of all—and this is important—of +conceiving beings analogous to ourselves, cast in +our mould, cut after our pattern; that is, feeling +and acting; then qualifying them and determining +them according to the attributes of our own nature. +But the logic of images, very different from that of +reason, concludes an objective resemblance; it regards +as alike, what seem alike; it attributes to an +internal linking of images, the validity of an objective +connection between things. Whence arises the +discord between the imagined world and the world +of reality. "Analogies that for us are only fancies +were for the man of past ages real" (Tylor).</p> + +<p>b. In the genesis of myths, the second moment +is that of fanciful invention. Entities take form; +they have a history and adventures: they become +the stuff for a romance. People of poor and dry +imagination do not reach the second period. Thus, +the religion of the Romans peopled the universe +with an innumerable quantity of genii. No object, +no act, no detail, but had its own presiding genius. +There was one for germinating grain, for sprouting +grain, for grain in flower, for blighted grain; for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[126]</a></span> +the door, its hinges, its lock, etc. There was a +myriad of misty, formless entities. This is animism +arrested at its first stage; abstraction has killed +imagination.</p> + +<p>Who created those legends and tales of adventure +constituting the subject-matter of mythology? +Probably inspired individuals, priests or prophets. +They came perhaps from dreams, hallucinations, +insane attacks—they are derived from several +sources. Whatever their origin, they are the work +of imaginative minds <i>par excellence</i> (we shall study +them later) who, confronted with any event whatever, +must, because of their nature, construct a +romance.</p> + +<p>Besides analogy, this imaginative creation has as +its principal source the associational form already +described under the name "constellation." We +know that it is based on the fact that, in certain +cases, the arousing of an image-group is the result +of a tendency prevailing at a given instant over +several that are possible. This operation has already +been expounded theoretically with individual +examples in support.<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> But in order to gauge its +importance, we must see it act in large masses. +Myths allow us to do this. Ordinarily they have +been studied in their historical development according +to their geographical distribution or ethnic character. +If we proceed otherwise, if we consider only +their content—i.e., the very few themes upon which +the human imagination has labored, such as celestial<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[127]</a></span> +phenomena, terrestrial disturbances, floods, the +origin of the universe, of man, etc.—we are surprised +at the wonderful richness of variety. What +diversity in the solar myths, or those of creation, +of fire, of water! These variations are due to +multiple causes, which have orientated the imagination +now in one direction, now in another. Let +us mention the principal ones: Racial characteristics—whether +the imagination is clear or mobile, +poor or exuberant; the manner of living—totally +savage, or on a level of civilization; the physical +environment—external nature cannot be reflected +in the brain of a Hindoo in the same way as in +that of a Scandinavian; and lastly, that assemblage +of considerable and unexpected causes grouped +under the term "chance."</p> + +<p>The variable combinations of these different +factors, with the predominance of one or the other, +explain the multiplicity of the imaginative conceptions +of the world, in contrast to the unity and +simplicity of scientific conceptions.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>The form of imagination now occupying our +attention by reason of its non-individual, anonymous, +collective character, attains a long development +that we may follow in its successive phases +of ascent, climax, and decline. To begin with, is it +necessarily inherent in the human mind? Are there +races or groups of men totally devoid of myths? +which is a slightly different question from that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[128]</a></span> +usually asked, "Are there tribes totally devoid of +religious thoughts?" Although it is very doubtful +that there are such now, it is probable that there +were in the beginning, when man had scarcely left +the brute level—at least if we agree with Vignoli<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> +that we already find in the higher animals embryonic +forms of animism.</p> + +<p>In any event, mythic creation appears early. We +can infer this from the signs of puerility of certain +legends. Savages who could not know themselves—the +Iroquois, the Australian aborigines, the natives +of the Andaman Islands—believed that the +earth was at first sterile and dry, all the water +having been swallowed by a gigantic frog or toad +which was compelled, by queer stratagems, to +regurgitate it. These are little children's imaginings. +Among the Hindoos the same myth takes +the form of an alluring epic—the dragon watching +over the celestial waters, of which he has taken +possession, is wounded by Indra after a heroic +battle, and restores them to the earth.</p> + +<p>Cosmogonies, Lang remarks, furnish a good +example of the development of myths; it is possible +to mark out stages and rounds according to the +degree of culture and intelligence. The natives of +Oceania believe that the world was created and +organized by spiders, grasshoppers, and various +birds. More advanced peoples regard powerful +animals as gods in disguise (such are certain Mexican +divinities). Later, all trace of animal worship<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[129]</a></span> +disappears, and the character of the myth is purely +anthropomorphic.<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> Kühn, in a special work, has +shown how the successive stages of social evolution +express themselves in the successive stages of mythology—myths +of cannibals, of hunters, of herders, +land-tillers, sailors. Speaking of pure savagery, +Max Müller<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> admits at least two periods—pan-Aryan +and Indo-Iranian—prior to the Vedic period. +In the course of this slow evolution the work of the +imagination passes little by little from infancy, +becomes more and more complex, subtle and refined.</p> + +<p>In the Aryan race, the Vedic epoch, despite its +sacerdotal ritualism, is considered as the period <i>par +excellence</i> of mythic efflorescence. "The myth," +says Taine, "is not here (in the Vedas) a disguise, +but an expression; no language is more true and +more supple: it permits a glimpse of, or rather +causes us to discern, the forms of mist, the movements +of the air, change of seasons, all the accidents +of sky, fire, storm: external nature has never found +a mode of thought so graceful and flexible for +reflecting itself thereby in all the inexhaustible +variety of her appearances. However changeable +nature may be, the imagination is equally so."<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> It +animates everything—not only fire in general, <i>Agni</i>, +but also the seven forms of flame, the wood that +lights it, the ten fingers of the sacrificing priest, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[130]</a></span> +prayer itself, and even the railing surrounding the +altar. This is one example among many others. +The partisans of the linguistic theory have been able +to maintain that at this moment every word is a +myth, because every word is a name designating a +quality or an act, transformed by the imagination +into substance. Max Müller has translated a page +of Hesiod, substituting the analytic, abstract, rational +language of our time for the image-making +names. Immediately, all the mythical material +vanishes. Thus, "Selene kisses the sleeping +Endymion" becomes the dry formula, "It is night." +The most skilled linguists often declare themselves +unable to change the pliant tongue of the imaginative +age into our algebraic idioms.<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> Thought by +imagery cannot remain itself and at the same time +take on a rational dress.</p> + +<p>The mental state that marks the zenith of the +free development of the imagination, is at present +met with only in mystics and in some poets. Language +has, however, preserved numerous vestiges +of it in current expressions, the mythic signification +of which has been lost—the sun rises, the sea is +treacherous, the wind is mad, the earth is thirsty, +etc.</p> + +<p>To this triumphant period there succeeds among +the races that have made progress in evolution, i.e., +that have been able to rise above the age of (pure)<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[131]</a></span> +imagination, the period of waning, of regression, of +decline. In order to understand it and perceive the +how and why of it, let us first note that myths are +reducible to two great categories:</p> + +<p>a. The explicative myths, arising from utility, +from the necessity of knowing. <i>These undergo a +radical transformation.</i></p> + +<p>b. The non-explicative myths, resulting from a +need of luxury, from a pure desire to create: these +undergo only a <i>partial</i> transformation.</p> + +<p>Let us follow them in the accomplishment of their +destinies.</p> + +<p>a. The myths of the first class, answering the +various needs of knowing in order afterwards to +act, are much the more numerous.... Is +primitive man by nature curious? The question +has been variously answered; thus, Tylor says yes; +Spencer, no.<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> The affirmative and negative answers +are not, perhaps, irreconcilable, if we take account +of the differences in races. Taking it generally, +it is hard to believe that he is not curious—he holds +his life at that price. He is in the presence of the +universe just as we are when confronted with an +unknown animal or fruit. Is it useful or hurtful? +He has all the more need for a conception of the +world since he feels himself dependent on everything. +While our subordination as regards nature +is limited by the knowledge of her laws, he is on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[132]</a></span> +account of his animism in a position similar to ours +before an assembly of persons whom we have to +approach or avoid, conciliate or yield to. It is +necessary that he be <i>practically</i> curious—that is +indispensable for his preservation. There has been +alleged the indifference of primitive man to the +complicated engines of civilization (a steamboat, a +watch, etc.). This shows, not lack of curiosity, but +absence of intelligence or interest for what he does +not consider immediately useful for his needs.</p> + +<p>His conception of the world is a product of the +imagination, because no other is possible for him. +The problem is imperatively set, he solves it as best +he can; the myth is a response to a host of theoretical +and practical needs. For him, the imaginative +explanation takes the place of the rational +explanation which is yet unborn, and which for +great reasons can not arise—first, because the +poverty of his experience, limited to a small circle, +engenders a multitude of erroneous associations, +which remain unbroken in the absence of other experiences +to contradict and shatter them; secondly, +because of the extreme weakness of his logic and +especially of his conception of causality, which most +often reduces itself to a <i>post hoc, ergo propter hoc</i>. +Whence we have the thorough subjectivity of his +interpretation of the world.<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> In short, primitive<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[133]</a></span> +man makes without exception or reserve, and in +terms of images, what science makes provisionally, +with reserves, and by means of concepts—namely, +hypotheses.</p> + +<p>Thus, the explicative myths are as we see, an +epitome of a practical philosophy, proportioned to +the requirements of the man of the earliest, or +slightly-cultured ages. Then comes the period of +critical transformation: a slow, progressive substitution +of a rational conception of the world for the +imaginative conception. It results from a work of +<i>depersonification</i> of the myth, which little by little +loses its subjective, anthropomorphic character in +order to become all the more objective, without ever +succeeding therein completely.</p> + +<p>This transformation occurs thanks to two principal +supports: methodical and prolonged observation +of phenomena, which suggests the objective +notion of stability and law, opposed to the caprices +of animism (example: the work of the ancient +astronomers of the Orient); the growing power of +reflection and of logical rigor, at least in well-endowed +races.</p> + +<p>It does not concern the subject in hand to trace +here the fortunes of the old battle whereby the +imagination, assailed by a rival power, loses little +by little its position and preponderance in the interpretation +of the world. A few remarks will suffice.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[134]</a></span></p> + +<p>To begin with, the myth is transformed into +philosophic speculation, but without total disappearance, +as is seen in the mystic speculations of the +Pythagoreans, in the cosmology of Empedocles, +ruled by two human-like antitheses, Love and Hate. +Even to Thales, an observing, positive spirit that +calculates eclipses, the world is full of <i>daemons</i>, +remains of primitive animism.<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> In Plato, even +leaving out his theory of Ideas, the employment of +myth is not merely a playful mannerism, but a real +survival.</p> + +<p>This work of elimination, begun by the philosophers, +is more firmly established in the first attempts +of pure science (the Alexandrian mathematicians; +naturalists like Aristotle; certain Greek physicians). +Nevertheless, we know how imaginary concepts +remained alive in physics, chemistry, biology, down +to the sixteenth century; we know the bitter +struggle that the two following centuries witnessed +against occult qualities and loose methods. Even +in our day, Stallo has been able to propose to write +a treatise "On Myth in Science." Without speaking +at this time of the hypotheses admitted as such and +on account of their usefulness, there yet remain in +the sciences many latent signs of primitive anthropomorphism. +At the beginning of the nineteenth<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[135]</a></span> +century people believed in several "properties of +matter" that we now regard as merely modes of +energy. But this latter notion, an expression of +permanence underneath the various manifestations +of nature, is for science only an abstract, symbolical +formula: if we attempt to embody it, to make +it concrete and representable, then, whether we will +or no, it resolves itself into the feeling of muscular +effort, that is, takes on a human character. To +produce no other examples, we see that so far as +concerns the last term of this slow regression, the +imagination is not yet completely annulled, although +it may have had to recede incessantly before a more +solid and better armed rival.</p> + +<p>b. In addition to the explanatory myths, there +are those having no claim to be in this class, +although they have perhaps been originally suggested +by some phenomenon of animate or inanimate +nature. They are much less numerous than +the others, since they do not answer multiple necessities +of life. Such are the epic or heroic stories, +popular tales, romances (which are found as early +as ancient Egypt): it is the first appearance of that +form of esthetic activity destined later to become +literature. Here, the mythic activity suffers only a +superficial metamorphosis—the essence is not +changed. Literature is mythology transformed and +adapted to the variable conditions of civilization. +If this statement appear doubtful or disrespectful, +we should note the following.</p> + +<p>Historically, from myths wherein there figure at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[136]</a></span> +first only divine personages, there arise the epics of +the Hindoos, Greeks, Scandinavians, etc., in which +the gods and heroes are confounded, live in the +same world, on a level. Little by little the divine +character is rubbed out; the myth approaches the +ordinary conditions of human life, until it becomes +the romantic novel, and finally the realistic story.</p> + +<p>Psychologically, the imaginative work that has +at first created the gods and superior beings before +whom man bows because he has unconsciously produced +them, becomes more and more humanized as +it becomes conscious; but it cannot cease being a +projection of the feelings, ideas, and nature of man +into the fictitious beings upon whom the belief of +their creator and of his hearers confers an illusory +and fleeting existence. The gods have become puppets +whose master man feels himself, and whom he +treats as he likes. Throughout the manifold techniques, +esthetics, documentary collections, reproductions +of the social life, the creative activity of the +earliest time remains at bottom unchanged. Literature +is a decadent and rationalized mythology.</p> + + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>Does the mythic activity of ancient times still +exist among civilized peoples, unmodified as in +literary creation, but in its pure form, as a non-individual, +collective, anonymous, unconscious, +work? Yes; as the popular imagination, when +creating legends. In passing from natural phenomena +to historic events and persons, the constructive +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[137]</a></span>imagination takes a slightly different position +which we may characterize thus: legend is to myth +what illusion is to hallucination.</p> + +<p>The psychological mechanism is the same in both +cases. Illusion and legend are partial imaginations, +hallucination and myth are total imaginations. Illusion +may vary in all shades between exact perception +and hallucination; legend can run all the way +from exact history to pure myth. The difference +between illusion and hallucination is sometimes +imperceptible; the same is sometimes true of legend +and myth. Sensory illusion is produced by an +addition of images changing perception; legend is +also produced by an addition of images changing +the historic personage or event. The only difference, +then, is in the material used; in one case, a +datum of sense, a natural phenomenon; in the other, +a fact of history, a human event.</p> + +<p>The psychological genesis of legends being thus +established in general, what, according to the facts, +are the unconscious processes that the imagination +employs for creating them? We may distinguish +two principal ones.</p> + +<p>The first process is a fusion or combination. The +myth precedes the fact; the historical personage or +event enters into the mould of a pre-existing myth. +"It is necessary that the mythic form be fashioned +before one may pour into it, in a more or less fluid +state, the historic metal." Imagination had created +a solar mythology long before it could be incarnated +by the Greeks in Hercules and his exploits. "There<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[138]</a></span> +was historically a Roland, perhaps even an Arthur, +but the greater part of the great deeds that the +poetry of the Middle Ages attributes to them had +been accomplished long before by mythological +heroes whose very names had been forgotten."<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> At +one time the man is completely hidden by the myth +and becomes absolutely legendary; again, he +assumes only an aureole that transfigures him. +This is exactly what occurs in the simpler phenomenon +of sensory illusion: now the real (the +perception) is swamped by the images, is transformed, +and the objective element reduced to almost +nothing; at another time, the objective element +remains master, but with numerous deformations.</p> + +<p>The second process is idealization, which can act +conjointly with the other. Popular imagination +incarnates in a real man its ideal of heroism, of +loyalty, of love, of piety, or of cowardice, cruelty, +wickedness, and other abnormalities. The process +is more complex. It presupposes in addition to +mythic creation a labor of abstraction, through +which a dominating characteristic of the historic +personage is chosen and everything else is suppressed, +cast into oblivion: the ideal becomes a +center of attraction about which is formed the +legend, the romantic tale. Compare the Alexander, +the Charlemagne, the Cid of the Middle Age traditions +to the character of history.</p> + +<p>Even much nearer to us, this process of extreme +simplification—which the law of mental inertia or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[139]</a></span> +of least effort is sufficient to explain—always persists: +Lucretia Borgia remains the type of debauchery, +Henry IV of good fellowship, etc. The protests +of historians and the documentary evidence +that they produce avail nothing: the work of the +imagination resists everything.</p> + +<p>To conclude: We have just passed over a period +of mental evolution wherein the creative imagination +reigns exclusively, explains everything, is sufficient +for everything. It has been said that the +imagination is "a temporary derangement." It +seems so to us, although it is often an effort toward +wisdom, i.e., toward the comprehension of things. +It would be more correct to say, with Tylor, that it +represents a state intermediate between that of a +man of our time, prosaic and well-to-do, and that +of a furious madman, or of a man in the delirium +of fever.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> Primitive man has been defined as "he for whom sensuous +data and images surpass in importance rational concepts." +From this standpoint, many contemporary poets, novelists, and +artists would be primitive. The mental state of the human +individual is not enough for such a determination; we must +also take account of the (comparative) simplicity of the social +environment.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> Let us mention the euhemeristic theory of Herbert Spencer, +taken up recently by Grant Allen (<i>The Evolution of the +Idea of God</i>, 1897), who brings down all religious and mythic +concepts from a single origin—the worship of the dead.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> "When I tried to briefly characterize mythology in its +inner nature, I called it a disease of language rather than a disease +of thought. The expression was strange but intentionally +so, meant to arouse attention and to provoke opposition. For +me, language and thought are inseparable." <i>Nouvelles études +de Mythologie</i>, p. 51.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> Vignoli, <i>Mito e Scienza</i>, p. 27.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> Marillier, Preface to the French translation of Andrew +Lang's <i>Myth, Ritual, and Religion</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> On this point consult a work very rich in information, +W. Crooke's book, <i>Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern +India</i>, 1897.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> "The Indian traversing the Montaña never feels himself +alone. Legions of beings accompany him. All of the nature +to whom he owes his soul speaks to him through the noise of +the wind, in the roaring of the waterfall. The insect like the +bird—everything, even to the bending twig wet with dew—for +him has language, distinct personality. The forest is alive in +its depths, has caprices, periods of anger; it avoids the thicket +under the tread of the huntsman, or again presses him more +closely, drags him into infected swamps, into closed bogs, where +miserable goblins exhaust all their witchcraft upon him, drink +his blood by attaching their lips to the wounds made by briers. +The Indian knows all that; he knows those dread genii by +name." Monnier, <i>Des Andes au Para</i>, p. 300.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> See Part I, <a href="#Page_65">Chapter IV</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, pp. 23-24.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> Lang, <i>op. cit.</i>, I, 162, and <i>passim</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> Max Müller, <i>op cit.</i>, p. 12.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> <i>Nouveaux Essais</i>, p. 320.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> See Lang, <i>Myth, Ritual and Religion</i>, I, p. 234, a passage +from the <i>Rig-Veda</i>, with four very different translations by +Max Müller, Wilson, Benfrey, and Langlois.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> On curiosity as the beginning of knowledge, compare the +position held by Plato. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> On this general subject consult the interesting though somewhat +general article by Professor John Dewey, "The Interpretation +of the Savage Mind," in the <i>Psychological Review</i>, May, +1903. The author justly criticises the current description of +savages in negative terms, and contends that there is general +misunderstanding of the true nature of the savage and of his +activities. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> It is now well accepted that Thales cannot be regarded as +propounding a materialistic theory when he declares that everything +is derived from water; for with him, "water" stands +not merely for the substance that we call chemically "H<sub>2</sub>O," +but for the "spirit that is in water" as well—the water-spirit +is the <i>Grundprincip</i>. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> Max Müller, <i>op. cit.</i>, 39, 47-48, 59-60.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[140]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<h3>THE HIGHER FORMS OF INVENTION</h3> + + +<p>We now pass from primitive to civilized man, +from collective to individual creation, the characters +of which it remains for us to study as we find +them in great inventors who exhibit them on a +large scale. Fortunately, we may dismiss the treatment +of the oft-discussed, never-solved problem of +the psychological nature of genius. As we have +already noted, there enter into its composition factors +other than the creative imagination, although +the latter is not the least among them. Besides, +great men being exceptions, anomalies, or as the +current expression has it, "spontaneous variations," +we may ask <i>in limine</i> whether their psychology is +explicable by means of simple formulæ, as with the +average man, or whether even monographs teach us +no more concerning their nature than general +theories that are never applicable to all cases. +Taking genius, then, as synonymous with great inventor, +accepting it <i>de facto</i> historically and psychologically, +our task is limited to the attempt to separate +characters that seem, from observation and +experiment, to belong to it as peculiarly its own.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[141]</a></span></p> + +<p>Putting aside vague dissertations and dithyrambics +in favor of theories with a scientific tendency +as to the nature of genius, we meet first the one +attributing to it a pathological origin. Hinted at +in antiquity (Aristotle, Seneca, etc.), suggested in +the oft-expressed comparison between inspiration +and insanity, it has reached, as we know—through +timid, reserved, and partial statements (Lélut)—its +complete expression in the famous formula of +Moreau de Tours, "Genius is a neurosis."</p> + +<p>Neuropathy was for him the exaggeration of vital +properties and consequently the most favorable condition +for the hatching of works of genius. Later, +Lombroso, in a book teeming with doubtful or +manifestly false evidence, finding his predecessor's +theory too vague, attempts to give it more precision +by substituting for neurosis in general a specific +neurosis—larvated epilepsy. Alienists, far from +eagerly accepting this view, have set themselves to +combat it and to maintain that Lombroso has compromised +everything in wanting to make the term +too precise. There are several possible hypotheses, +they say: either the neuropathic state is the direct, +immediate cause of which the higher faculties of +genius are effects; or, the intellectual superiority, +through the excessive labor and excitation it involves, +causes neuropathic disturbances; or, there +is no relation of cause and effect between genius and +neurosis, but mere coëxistence, since there are found +very mediocre neuropaths, and men above the average +without a neurotic blemish; or, the two states<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[142]</a></span>—the +one psychic, the other physiological—are both +effects, resulting from organic conditions that produce +according to circumstances genius, insanity, +and divers nervous troubles. Every one of these +hypotheses can allege facts in its favor. We must, +however, recognize that in most men of genius are +found so many peculiarities, physical eccentricities +and disorders of all kinds that the pathologic theory +retains much probability.</p> + +<p>There remain for consideration the sane geniuses +who, despite many efforts and subtleties, have not +yet been successfully brought under the foregoing +formula, and who have made possible the enunciation +of another theory. Recently, Nordau, rejecting +the theory of his master Lombroso, has maintained +that it is just as reasonable to say that +"genius is a neurosis" as that "athleticism is a +cardiopathy" because many athletes are affected +with heart disease. For him, "the essential elements +of genius are judgment and will." Following +this definition, he establishes the following +hierarchy of men of genius: At the highest rung +of the ladder are those in whom judgment and will +are equally powerful; men of action who make +world-history (Alexander, Cromwell, Napoleon)—these +are masters of men. On the second level are +found the geniuses of judgment, with no hyper-development +of will—these are masters of matter +(Pasteur, Helmholtz, Röntgen). On the third step +are geniuses of judgment without energetic will<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[143]</a></span>—thinkers +and philosophers. What then shall we do +with the emotional geniuses—the poets and artists? +Theirs is not genius in the strict sense, "because it +creates nothing new and exercises no influence on +phenomena." Without discussing the value of this +classification, without examining whether it is even +possible,—since there is no common measure between +Alexander, Pasteur, Shakespeare, and Spinoza,—and +whether, on the other hand, common +opinion is not right in putting on the same level +the great creators, whoever they be, solely because +they are far above the average, this remark is absolutely +necessary: In the definition above cited the +creative faculty <i>par excellence</i>—imagination—necessary +to all inventors, is entirely left out.</p> + +<p>We can, however, derive some benefit from this +arbitrary division. Although it is impossible to +admit that "emotional geniuses" create nothing new +and have no influence on society, they do form a +special group. Creative work requires of them a +nervous excitability and a predominance of affective +states that rapidly become morbid. In this way +they have provided the pathological theory with +most of its facts. It would perhaps be necessary to +recognize distinctions between the various forms of +invention. They require very different organic and +psychic conditions in order that some may profit +by morbid dispositions that are far from useful to +others. This point should deserve a special study +never made hitherto.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[144]</a></span></p> +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>We shall reduce to three the characters ordinarily +met in most great inventors. No one of them is +without exception.</p> + +<p>1. <i>Precocity</i>, which is reducible to innateness. +The natural bent becomes manifest as soon as circumstances +allow—it is the sign of the true vocation. +The story is the same in all cases: at one +moment the flash occurs; but this is not as frequent +as is supposed. False vocations abound. If we +deduct those attracted through imitation, environmental +influence, exhortations and advice, chance, +the attraction of immediate gain, aversion to a +career imposed from without which they shun and +adoption of an opposite one, will there remain many +natural and irresistible vocations?</p> + +<p>We have seen above that<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> the passage from reproductive +to constructive imagination takes place +toward the end of the third year. According to +some authors, this initial period should be followed +by a depression about the fifth year; thenceforward +the upward progress is continuous. But the +creative faculty, from its nature and content, develops +in a very clear, chronological order. Music, +plastic arts, poetry, mechanical invention, scientific +imagination—such is the usual order of appearance.</p> + +<p>In music, with the exception of a few child-prodigies, +we hardly find personal creation before the +age of twelve or thirteen. As examples of precocity<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[145]</a></span> +may be cited: Mozart, at the age of three; Mendelssohn, +five; Haydn, four; Handel, twelve; Weber, +twelve; Schubert, eleven; Cherubini, thirteen; +and many others. Those late in developing—Beethoven, +Wagner, etc.—are fewer by far.<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> + +<p>In the plastic arts, vocation and creative aptitude +are shown perceptibly later, on the average about +the fourteenth year: Giotto, at ten; Van Dyck, +ten; Raphael, eight; Guerchin, eight; Greuze, eight; +Michaelangelo, thirteen; Albrecht Dürer, fifteen; +Bernini, twelve; Rubens and Jordaens being also +precocious.</p> + +<p>In poetry we find no work having any individual +character before sixteen. Chatterton died at that +age, perhaps the only example of so young a poet +leaving any reputation. Schiller and Byron also +began at sixteen. Besides this, we know that the +talent for versification, at least as imitation, is very +early in developing.</p> + +<p>In mechanical arts children have early a remarkable +capacity for understanding and imitating. At +nine, Poncelet bought a watch that was out of +order in order to study it, then took it apart and +put it together correctly. Arago tells that at the +same age Fresnel was called by his comrades a +"man of genius," because he had determined by +correct experiments "the length and caliber of children's +elder-wood toy cannon giving the longest +range; also, which green or dry woods used in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[146]</a></span> +manufacture of bows have most strength and lasting +power." In general, the average of mechanical +invention is later, and scarcely comes earlier than +that of scientific discovery.</p> + +<p>The form of abstract imagination requisite for +invention in the sciences has no great personal +value before the twentieth year: there are a goodly +number, however, who have given proof of it before +that age—Pascal, Newton, Leibniz, Gauss, Auguste +Comte, etc. Almost all are mathematicians.</p> + +<p>These chronological variations result not from +chance, but from psychological conditions necessary +for the development of each form of imagination. +We know that the acquisition of musical sounds is +prior to speech: many children can repeat a scale +correctly before they are able to talk. On the other +hand, as dissolution follows evolution in inverse +order,<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> aphasic patients lacking the most common +words, can nevertheless sing. Sound-images are +thus organized before all others, and the creative +power when acting in this direction finds very early +material for its use. For the plastic arts a longer +apprenticeship is necessary for the education of the +senses and movements. To acquire manual dexterity +one must become skilled in observing form, +combinations of lines and colors, and apt at reproducing +them. Poetry and first attempts at novel-writing +presuppose some experience of the passions +of human life and a certain reflection of which the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[147]</a></span> +child is incapable. Invention in the mechanic arts, +as in the plastic arts, requires the education of the +senses and movements; and, further, calculation, rational +combination of means, rigorous adaptation to +practical necessities. Lastly, scientific imagination +is nothing without a high development of the +capacity for abstraction, which is a matter of slow +growth. Mathematicians are the most precocious +because their material is the most simple; they have +no need, as in the case of the experimental sciences, +of an extended knowledge of facts, which is +acquired only with time.</p> + +<p>At this period of its development the imagination +is in large part imitation. We must explain this +paradox. The creator begins by imitating: this is +such a well-known fact that it is needless to give +proof of it, and it is subject to few exceptions. +The most original mind is, at first, consciously or +unconsciously somebody's disciple. It is necessarily +so. Nature gives only one thing, "the creative instinct;" +that is, the need of producing in a determined +line. This internal factor alone is insufficient. +Aside from the fact that the imagination at +first has at its disposal only a very limited material, +it lacks technique, the processes indispensable for +realizing itself. As long as the creator has not +found the suitable form into which to cast his +creation he must indeed borrow it from another; +his ideas must suffer the necessity of a provisional +shelter. This explains how it is that later the +inventor, reaching full consciousness of himself,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[148]</a></span> +in order to complete mastery of his methods, often +breaks with his models, and burns what he at first +adorned.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>A second character consists of the necessity, the +fatality of creation. Great inventors feel that they +have a task to accomplish; they feel that they are +charged with a mission. On this point we have a +large number of testimonials and avowals. In the +darkest days of his life Beethoven, haunted by the +thought of suicide, wrote, "Art alone has kept me +back. It seemed to me that I could not leave the +world before producing all that I felt within me." +Ordinarily, inventors are apt in only one line; even +when they have a certain versatility, they remain +bound to their own peculiar manner—they have +their mark—like Michaelangelo; or, if they attempt +to change it, if they try to be unfaithful as respects +their vocation, they fall much below themselves.</p> + +<p>This characteristic of irresistible impulsion which +makes the genius create not because he wants to, but +because he must do it, has often been likened to +instinct. This very widespread view has been examined +before (Part I, <a href="#Page_31">Chapter ii</a>).</p> + +<p>We have seen that there is no creative instinct +in general, but <i>particular</i> tendencies, orientated in a +definite direction, which in most respects resemble +instinct. It is contrary to experience and logic to +admit that the creative genius follows any path +whatever at his choice—a proposition that Weismann, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[149]</a></span>in his horror of inheritance of acquired characters +(which are a kind of innateness) is not afraid +to support. That is true only of the man of talent, +a matter of education and circumstances. The distinction +between these two orders of creators—the +great and the ordinary—has been made too often +to need repetition, although it is proper to recognize +that it is not always easy in practice, that there are +names that cause us to hesitate, which we class +somewhat at hazard. Yet genius remains, as Schopenhauer +used to say, <i>monstrum per excessum</i>; excessive +development in one direction. Hypertrophy +of a special aptitude often makes genius fall, as far +as the others are concerned, below the average level. +Even those exceptional men who have given proof +of multiple aptitudes, such as Vinci, Michaelangelo, +Goethe, etc., always have a predominating tendency +which, in common opinion, sums them up.</p> + + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>A third characteristic is the clearly defined <i>individuality</i> +of the great creator. He is the man of +his work; he has done this or that: that is his +mark. He is "representative." There is no other +opinion as to this; what is a subject of discussion +is the <i>origin</i>, not the nature of this individuality. +The Darwinian theory as to the all-powerful action +of environment has led to the question whether the +representative character of great inventors comes +from themselves, and from them alone, or must<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[150]</a></span> +not rather be sought in the unconscious influence of +the race and epoch of which they are at a given +instant only brighter sparks. This debate goes beyond +the bounds of our subject. To decide whether +social changes are due mostly to the accumulated +influences of some individuals and their initiative, +or to the environment, to circumstances, to hereditary +transmission, is not a problem for psychology +to solve. We can not, however, totally avoid this +discussion, for it touches the very springs of creation.</p> + +<p>Is the inventive genius the highest degree of personality +or a synthesis of masses?—the result of +himself or of others?—the expression of an individual +activity or of a collective activity? In short, +should we look for his representative character +within him or without? Both these alternatives +have authoritative supporters.</p> + +<p>For Schopenhauer, Carlyle (<i>Hero-worship</i>), +Nietzsche, <i>et al.</i>, the great man is an autonomous +product, a being without a peer, a demigod, "<i>Uebermensch</i>." +He can be explained neither by heredity, +nor by environment.</p> + +<p>For others (Taine, Spencer, Grant, Allen, <i>et al.</i>), +the important factor is seen in the race and external +conditions. Goethe held that a whole family line is +summarized some day in a single one of its members, +and a whole people in one or several men. +For him, Louis XIV and Voltaire are respectively +the French king and writer <i>par excellence</i>. "The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[151]</a></span> +alleged great men," says Tolstoi, "are only the labels +of history, they give their names to events."<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a></p> + +<p>Each party explains the same facts according to +its own principle and in its own peculiar way. The +great historic epochs are rich in great men (the +Greek republics of the fourth century B. C., the +Roman Republic, the Renaissance, French Revolution, +etc.). Why? Because, say some, periods put +into ferment by the deep working of the masses +make this blossoming possible. Because, say the +others, this flowering modifies profoundly the social +and intellectual condition of the masses and raises +their level. For the former the ferment is deep +down; for the latter it is on top.</p> + +<p>Without presuming to solve this vexed question, +I lean toward the view of individualism pure and +simple. It seems to me very difficult to admit that +the great creator is only the result of his environment. +Since this influence acts on many others, +it is very necessary that, in great men, there should +be in addition a personal factor. Besides, in opposition +to the exclusively environmental theory we +may bring the well-known fact that most innovators +and inventors at first arouse opposition. We +know the invariable sentence on everything novel—it +is "false" or "bad;" then it is adopted with the +statement that it had been known for a long time.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[152]</a></span> +In the hypothesis of collective invention, it seems +that the mass of people should applaud inventors, +recognizing itself in them, seeing its confused +thought take form and body: but most often the +contrary happens. The misoneism of crowds seems +to me one of the strongest arguments in favor of +the individual character of invention.</p> + +<p>We can doubtless distinguish two cases—in the +first, the creator sums up and clearly translates the +aspirations of his <i>milieu</i>; in the second, he is in +opposition to it because he goes beyond it. How +many innovators have been disappointed because +they came before their time! But this distinction +does not reach to the bottom of the question, and is +not at all sufficient as an answer.</p> + +<p>Let us leave this problem, which, on account of +its complexity, we can hardly solve through peremptory +reasoning, and let us try to examine <i>objectively</i> +the relation between creation and environment in +order that we may see to what extent the creative +imagination, without losing its individual character—which +is impossible—depends on the intellectual +and social surrounding.</p> + +<p>If, with the American psychologists,<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> we term +the disposition for innovating a "spontaneous variation"—a +Darwinian term explaining nothing, but +convenient—we may enunciate the following law:</p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[153]</a></span></p> +<p><i>The tendency toward spontaneous variation (invention) +is always in inverse ratio to the simplicity +of the environment.</i></p> + +<p>The savage environment is in its nature very +simple, consequently homogeneous. The lower races +show a much smaller degree of differentiation than +the higher; in them, as Jastrow says, physical and +psychic maturity is more precocious, and as the +period just before the adult age is the plastic period +<i>per se</i>, this diminishes the chances of a departure +from the common type. Thus comparison between +whites and blacks, between primitive and civilized +peoples, shows that, for equal populations, there is +an enormous disproportion as to the number of +innovators.</p> + +<p>The barbarian environment is much more complex +and heterogeneous: it contains all the rudiments +of civilized life. Consequently, it favors +more individual variations and is richer in superior +men. But these variations are rarely produced outside +of a very restricted field—political, military, +religious. So it seems impossible to agree with +Joly<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> that neither primitive nor barbarian peoples +produce superior minds, "unless," as he says, "by +this name we mean those that simply surpass +their congeners." But is there a criterion other +than that? I see none. Greatness is altogether a +relative idea; and would not our great creators +seem, to beings better endowed than we, very small?</p> + +<p>The civilized environment, requiring division of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[154]</a></span> +labor and consequently a constantly growing complexity +of heterogeneous elements, is an open door +for all vocations. Doubtless, the social spirit always +retains something of that tendency toward stagnation +that is the rule in lower social orders; it is +more favorable to tradition than to innovation. But +the inevitable necessity of a warm competition between +individuals and peoples is a natural antidote +for that natural inertia; it favors useful variations. +Moreover, civilization means evolution; consequently +the conditions under which the imagination +is active change with the times. Let us suppose, +Weismann justly says, that in the Samoan +Islands there were born a child having the singular +and extraordinary genius of Mozart. What could +he accomplish? At the most, extend the gamut of +three or four tones to seven, and create a few more +complex melodies; but he would be as unable to +compose symphonies as Archimedes would have +been to invent an electric dynamo. How many +creators have been wrecked because the conditions +necessary for their inventions were lacking? Roger +Bacon foresaw several of our great discoveries; +Cardan, the differential calculus; Van Helmont, +chemistry; and it has been possible to write a book +on the forerunners of Darwin.<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> We talk so much +of the free flight of imagination, of the all-comprehensive +power of the creator, that we forget the +sociological conditions—not to mention others—on +which they are every moment dependent. In<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[155]</a></span> +this respect, no invention is personal in the strict +sense; there always remains in it a little of that +anonymous collaboration the highest expression of +which, as we have seen, is the mythic activity.</p> + +<p>By way of summary, and whatever be the causes, +we may say that there is a universal tendency in +all living matter toward variation, whether we consider +vegetables, animals, or the physical and mental +man. The need of innovating is only a special +case, rare in the lower races, frequent in the higher. +This tendency toward variation is fundamental or +superficial: As fundamental, it corresponds to +genius, and survives through processes analogous +to natural selection, i.e., by its own power. As +superficial, it corresponds to talent, survives and +prospers chiefly through the help of circumstances +and environment. Here, the orientation comes +from without, not from within. According as the +spirit of the time inclines rather to poetry or painting, +or music, or scientific research, or industry, or +military art, minds of the second order are dragged +into the current—showing that a goodly part of +their power is in the aptness, not for invention, but +for <i>imitation</i>.</p> + + +<h3>IV</h3> + +<p>The determination of the characters belonging to +the inventive genius has necessitated some seemingly +irrelevant remarks on the action of the environment. +Let us return to invention, strictly +so-called.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[156]</a></span></p> + +<p>For inventing there is always required a natural +aptitude, sometimes, a happy chance.</p> + +<p>The natural disposition should be accepted as a +fact. Why does a man create? Because he is +capable of forming new combinations of ideas. +However naïve this answer may be, there is no +other. The only thing possible, is the determination +of the conditions necessary and sufficient for producing +novel combinations: this has been done in +the first part of this book, and there is no occasion +for going over it again. But there is another +aspect in creative work to be considered—its psychological +<i>mechanism</i>, and the form of its development.</p> + +<p>Every normal person creates little or much. +He may, in his ignorance, invent what has been +already done a thousand times. Even if this is not +a creation as regards the species, it is none the less +such for the individual. It is wrong to say, as has +been said, that an invention "is a new and important +idea." <i>Novelty</i> only is essential—that is the +psychological mark: importance and utility are accessory, +merely social marks. Invention is thus +unduly limited when we attribute it to great inventors +only. At this moment, however, we are concerned +only with these, and in them the mechanism +of invention is easier to study.</p> + +<p>We have already seen how false is the theory +that holds that there is always a sudden stroke of +inspiration, followed by a period of rapid or slow +execution. On the contrary, observation reveals<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[157]</a></span> +many processes that apparently differ less in the +<i>content</i> of invention than according to individual +temperament. I distinguish two general processes +of which the rest are variations. In all creation, +great or small, there is a directing idea, an "ideal"—understanding +the word not in its transcendental +sense, but merely as synonymous with end or goal—or +more simply, a problem to solve. The <i>locus</i> of +the idea, of the given problem, is not the same in +the two processes. In the one I term "complete" +the ideal is at the beginning: in the "abridged" it is +in the middle. There are also other differences +which the following tables will make more clear:</p> + + + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="8" summary="first process"> +<tr><td colspan='3'><i>First Process</i> (<i>complete</i>).</td></tr> +<tr><td align='center'>1st phase</td><td align='center'>2nd phase</td><td align='center'>3d phase</td></tr> +<tr><td class='firstp'>IDEA (commencement)<br /> +Special incubation<br /> + of more or less<br /> + duration</td> +<td class='firstp'>INVENTION,<br /> + or<br /> +DISCOVERY<br /> + (end)</td> +<td class='firstp'>VERIFICATION,<br /> + or<br /> +APPLICATION</td></tr> +</table></div> + +<p>The idea excites attention and takes a fixed character. +The period of brooding begins. For Newton +it lasted seventeen years, and at the time of definitely +establishing his discovery by calculation he +was so overcome with emotion that he had to assign +to another the task of completing it. The mathematician +Hamilton tells us that his method of quaternians +burst upon him one day, completely finished, +while he was near a bridge in Dublin. "In +that moment I had the result of fifteen years' labor." +Darwin gathers material during his voyages, spends<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[158]</a></span> +a long time observing plants and animals, then +through the chance reading of Malthus' book, hits +upon and formulates his theory. In literary and +artistic creation similar examples are frequent.<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> + +<p>The second phase is only an instant, but essential—the +moment of discovery, when the creator +exclaims his "Eureka!"<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> With it, the work is virtually +or really ended.</p> + + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="8" summary="secondprocess"> +<tr><td colspan='3'><i>Second Process</i> (<i>abridged</i>).</td></tr> +<tr><td align='center'>1st phase</td><td align='center'>2nd phase</td><td align='center'>3rd phase</td></tr> +<tr><td class='firstp'>General preparation<br /> + (unconscious)</td> +<td class='firstp'>IDEA (commencement)<br /> +INSPIRATION<br /> +ERUPTION</td> +<td class='firstp'>CONSTRUCTIVE<br /> + and<br /> +DEVELOPING<br /> + period.</td></tr> +</table></div> + +<p>This is the process in intuitive minds. Such +seems to have been the case of Mozart, Poe, etc. +Without attempting what would be a tedious +enumeration of examples, we may say that this +form of creation comprises two classes—those +coming to maturity through an internal impulse, +a sudden stroke of inspiration, and those who are +suddenly illumined by chance. The two processes +differ superficially rather than essentially. Let us +briefly compare them.</p> + +<p>With some, the first phase is long and fully conscious; +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[159]</a></span>in others it seems negligible, equal to zero—there +is nothing of it because there exists a natural +or acquired tendency toward equilibrium. "For a +long time," says Schumann, "I had the habit of +racking my brain, and now I scarcely need to scratch +my forehead. Everything runs naturally."<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></p> + +<p>The second phase is almost the same in both +cases: it is only an instant, but it is essential—it +is the moment of imaginative synthesis.</p> + +<p>Lastly, the third phase is very short for some, +because the main labor is already done, and there +remains only the finishing touch or the verification. +It is long for others, because they must pass from +the perceived idea to complete realization, and because +the preparatory work is faulty; so that for +these the second creative process is shortened in +appearance only.</p> + +<p>Such seem to me the two principal forms of the +mechanism of creation. These are genera; they +include species and varieties that a patient and +minute study of the processes peculiar to various +inventors would reveal to us. We must bear in +mind that this work makes no claim of being a +monograph on invention, but merely a sketch.<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a></p> + +<p>The two processes above described seem to correspond +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[160]</a></span>on the whole to the oft-made distinction between +the intuitive or spontaneous, and the combining +or reflective imagination.</p> + +<p>The intuitive, essentially synthetic form, is found +principally in the purely imaginative types, children +and savages. The mind proceeds from the whole +to details. The generative idea resembles those concepts +which, in the sciences, are of wide range +because they condense a generalization rich in consequences. +The subject is at first comprehended as +a whole; development is organic, and we may compare +it to the embryological process that causes a +living being to arise from the fertilized ovum, +analogous to an immanent logic. As a type of this +creative form there has often been given a letter +wherein Mozart explains his mode of conception. +Recently (and that is why I do not reprint it here) +it has been suspected of being apocryphal. I regret +this—it was worthy of being authentic. According +to Goethe, Shakespeare's <i>Hamlet</i> could have been +created only through an intuitive process, etc.</p> + +<p>The combining, discursive imagination proceeds +from details to the vaguely-perceived unity. It +starts from a fragment that serves as a matrix, and +becomes completed little by little. An adventure, an +anecdote, a scene, a rapid glance, a detail, suggests +a literary or artistic creation; but the organic form +does not appear in a trice. In science, Kepler furnishes +a good example of this combining imagination. +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[161]</a></span>It is known that he devoted a part of his +life trying strange hypotheses, until the day when, +having discovered the elliptical orbit of Mars, all +his former work took shape and became an organized +system. Did we want to make use once more +of an embryological comparison, it would be necessary +to look for it in the strange conceptions of +ancient cosmogonies: they believed that from an +earthly slime arose parts of bodies and separate +organs which through a mysterious attraction and +happy chance ended by sticking together, and forming +living bodies.<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p> + +<p>It is an accepted view that of these two modes, +one, the abridged or intuitive process, is superior to +the other. I confess to having held this prejudice. +On examination, I find it doubtful, even false. +There is a <i>difference</i>, not any "higher" and "lower."</p> + +<p>First of all, both these forms of creation are +necessary. The intuitive process can suffice for an +invention of short duration: a rhyme, a story, a +profile, a <i>motif</i>, an ornamental stroke, a little +mechanical contrivance, etc. But as soon as the +work requires time and development the discursive +process becomes absolutely necessary: with many +inventors one easily perceives the change from one +form to the other. We have seen that in the case +of Chopin, "creation was spontaneous, miraculous," +coming complete and sudden. But George Sand +adds: "The crisis over, then commenced the most +heartrending labor at which I have ever been present," +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[162]</a></span>and she pictures him to us agonized, for days +and weeks, running after the bits of lost inspiration. +Goethe, likewise, in a letter to Humboldt regarding +his Faust, which occupied him for sixty years, full +of interruptions and gaps: "The difficulty has been +to get through strength of will what is really to be +gotten only by a spontaneous act of nature." Zola, +according to his biographer, Toulouse, "imagines a +novel, always starting out with a general idea that +dominates the work; then, from induction to induction, +he draws out of it the characters and all the +story."</p> + +<p>To sum up: Pure intuition and pure combination +are exceptional; ordinarily, it is a mixed process in +which one of the two elements prevails and permits +its qualification. If we note, in addition, that it +would be easy to group under these two headings +names of the first rank, we shall conclude that the +difference is altogether in the <i>mechanism</i>, not in the +<i>nature</i> of creation, and is consequently accessory; +and that this difference is reducible to natural dispositions, +which we may contrast as follows:</p> + + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="8" cellspacing="8" summary="ready"> +<tr><td class='ready'>Ready-witted minds,<br /> +excelling in conception,<br /> +making the whole almost<br /> +out of one piece.</td> +<td class='ready'>Logically-developing<br /> +minds, excelling in<br /> +elaboration.</td></tr> +<tr><td class='ready'>Work primarily unconscious.</td> +<td class='ready'>Patience the preponderating<br /> +rôle.</td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'></td><td class='ready'>Work primarily conscious.</td></tr> +<tr><td class='ready'>Actions quick.</td> +<td class='ready'>Actions slow.</td></tr> +</table></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[163]</a></span></p> + +<h3>V</h3> + +<p>"Were we to raise monuments to inventors in +the arts and sciences, there would be fewer statues +to men than to children, animals, and especially +<i>fortune</i>." In this wise expressed himself one of +the sage thinkers of the eighteenth century, Turgot. +The importance of the last factor has been much +exaggerated. Chance may be taken in two senses—one +general, the other narrow.</p> + +<p>(1) In its broad meaning, chance depends on +entirely internal, purely psychic circumstances. We +know that one of the best conditions for inventing +is abundance of material, accumulated experience, +knowledge—which augment the chances of original +association of ideas. It has even been possible to +maintain that the nature of memory implies the +capacity of creating in a special direction. The revelations +of inventors or of their biographers leave no +doubt as to the necessity of a large number of +sketches, trials, preliminary drawings, no matter +whether it is a matter of industry, commerce, a machine, +a poem, an opera, a picture, a building, a +plan of campaign, etc. "Genius for discovery," +says Jevons, depends on the number of notions and +chance thoughts coming to the inventor's mind. To +be fertile in hypotheses—that is the first requirement +for finding something new. The inventor's brain +must be full of forms, of melodies, of mechanical +agents, of commercial combinations, of figures, etc., +according to the nature of his work. "But it is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[164]</a></span> +very rare that the ideas we find are exactly those +we were seeking. In order to find, <i>we must think +along other lines</i>."<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> Nothing is more true.</p> + +<p>So much for chance within: it is indisputable, +whatever may have been said of it, but it depends +finally on individuality—from it arises the non-anticipated +synthesis of ideas. The abundance of +memory-ideas, we know, is not a sufficient condition +for creation; it is not even a necessary condition. +It has been remarked that a relative ignorance +is sometimes useful for invention: it favors assurance. +There are inventions, especially scientific and +industrial, that could not have been made had the +inventors been arrested by the ruling and presumably +invincible dogmas. The inventor was all the +more free the more he was unaware of them. Then, +as it was quite necessary to bow before the accomplished +fact, theory was broadened to include the +new discovery and explain it.</p> + +<p>(2) Chance, in the narrow sense, is a fortunate +occurrence stimulating invention: but to attribute to +it the greater part, is a partial, erroneous view. +Here, what we call chance, is the meeting and convergence +of <i>two</i> factors—one internal (individual +genius), the other, external (the fortuitous occurrence).</p> + +<p>It is impossible to determine all that invention +owes to chance in this sense. In primitive humanity +its influence must have been enormous: the use of +fire, the manufacture of weapons, of utensils, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[165]</a></span> +casting of metals: all that came about through accidents +as simple as, for example, a tree falling across +a stream suggesting the first idea of a bridge.</p> + +<p>In historic times—and to keep merely to the +modern period—the collection of authentic facts +would fill a large volume. Who does not know of +Newton's apple, Galileo's lamp, Galvani's frog? +Huygens declared that, were it not for an unforeseen +combination of circumstances, the invention of +the telescope would require "a superhuman genius;" +it is known that we owe it to children who were +playing with pieces of glass in an optician's shop. +Schönbein discovered ozone, thanks to the phosphorous +odor of air traversed by electric sparks. +The discoveries of Grimaldi and of Fresnel in regard +to interferences, those of Faraday, of Arago, +of Foucault, of Fraunhofer, of Kirchoff, and of +hundreds of others owed something to "fortune." +It is said that the sight of a crab suggested to Watt +the idea of an ingenious machine. To chance, also, +many poets, novelists, dramatists, and artists have +owed the best part of their inspirations: literature +and the arts abound in fictitious characters whose +real originals are known.</p> + +<p>So much for the external, fortuitous factor; its +rôle is clear. That of the internal factor is less so. +It is not at all apparent to the ordinary mind, escaping +the unreflecting. Yet it is extremely important. +The same fortuitous event passes by millions of +men without exciting anything. How many of +Pisa's inhabitants had seen the lamp of their cathedral +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[166]</a></span>before Galileo! He does not necessarily find +who wants to find. The happy chance comes only +to those worthy of it. In order to profit thereby, +one must first possess the spirit of observation, wide-awake +attention, that isolates and fixates the accident; +then, if it is a matter of scientific or practical +inventions, the penetration that seizes upon relations +and finds unforeseen resemblances; if it concerns +esthetic productions, the imagination that constructs, +organizes, gives life.</p> + +<p>Without repeating an evident truism, although it +is often misunderstood, we ought to end by remarking +that <i>chance is an occasion for, not an agent of, +creation</i>.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> See above, <a href="#Page_103">Chapter II</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> Some of these and the following figures are borrowed from +Oelzelt-Newin, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 70 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> Compare the well-known theory of Dr. Hughlings-Jackson. +(Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> For an elaborate and interesting discussion of this subject, +see Tolstoi's <i>Physiology of War</i>. As showing the later trend +of thought on this general theme, see the excellent summary by +Professor Seligman, <i>The Economic Interpretation of History</i>. +(Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> William James, <i>The Will to Believe and other Essays</i>, pp. +218 ff.; Jastrow, <i>Psych. Rev.</i>, May, 1898, p. 307; J. Royce, +<i>ibid.</i>, March, 1898; Baldwin, <i>Social and Ethical Interpretations</i>, +etc.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> Joly, <i>Psychologie des grands hommes</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> Osborn, <i>From the Greeks to Darwin</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> Such, according to Binet and Passy, seem to be the cases of +the Goncourts, Pailleron, etc. See "Psychologie des auteurs +dramatiques," in <i>L'année psychologique</i>, I, 96.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> Compare the striking instance of this moment as given by +Froebel, in his <i>Autobiography</i>, in connection with his idea of +the Kindergarten. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> Quoted by Arréat, <i>Mémoire et Imagination</i>, p. 118. (Paris, +F. Alcan.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> Paulhan ("De l'invention," <i>Rev. Philos.</i>, December, 1898, +pp. 590 ff.) distinguishes three kinds of development in invention: +(1) Spontaneous or reasoned—the directing idea persists +to the end; (2) transformation, which comprises several +contradictory evolutions succeeding and replacing one another +in consequence of impressions and feelings; (3) deviation, +which is a composite of the two preceding forms.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> Cf. the well-known doctrine of Empedocles. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> P. Souriau, <i>Théorie de l'invention</i>, pp. 6-7.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[167]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<h3>LAW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMAGINATION</h3> + + +<p>Is imagination, so often called "a capricious +faculty," subject to some law? The question thus +asked is too simple, and we must make it more +precise.</p> + +<p>As the direct cause of invention, great or small, +the imagination acts without assignable determination; +in this sense it is what is known as "spontaneity"—a +vague term, which we have attempted +to make clear. Its appearance is irreducible to any +law; it results from the often fortuitous convergence +of various factors previously studied.</p> + +<p>Leaving aside the moment of origin, does the +inventive power, considered in its individual and +specific development, seem to follow any law, or, if +this term appear too ambitious, does it present, in +the course of its evolution, any perceptible regularity? +Observation separates out an empirical law; +that is, extracts directly an abridged formula that +is only a condensation of facts. We may enunciate +it thus: The creative imagination in its complete +development passes through two periods separated<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[168]</a></span> +by a critical phase: a period of autonomy or efflorescence, +a critical moment, a period of definitive constitution +presenting several aspects.</p> + +<p>This formula, being only a summary of experience, +should be justified and explained by the latter. +For this purpose we can borrow facts from two distinct +sources: (a) individual development, which is +the safest, clearest, and easiest to observe; (b) the +development of the species, or historical development, +according to the accepted principle that phylogenesis +and ontogenesis follow the same general +line.</p> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p><i>First Period.</i> We are already acquainted with +it: it is the imaginative age. In normal man, it +begins at about the age of three, and embraces infancy, +adolescence, youth: sometimes a longer, +sometimes a shorter period. Play, romantic invention, +mythic and fantastic conceptions of the world +sum it up first; after that, in most, imagination is +dependent on the influence of the passions, and +especially sexual love. For a long time it remains +without any rational element.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, little by little, the latter wins a +place. Reflection—including under the term the +working of the intelligence—begins very late, grows +slowly, and the proportion as it asserts itself, gains +an influence over the imaginative activity and tends +to reduce it. This growing antagonism is represented +in the following figure.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[169]</a></span></p> + +<p>The curve IM is that of the imagination during +this first period. It rises at first very slowly, then +attains a rapid ascent and keeps at a height that +marks its greatest attainment in this earliest form. +The dotted line RX represents the rational development +that begins later, advances much more slowly, +but progressively, and reaches at X the level of the +imaginative curve. The two intellectual forms are +present like two rivals. The position MX on the +ordinate marks the beginning of the second period.</p> + +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> +<img src="images/fig003.jpg" width="400" height="181" alt="" title="" /> +</div> + +<p><i>Second Period.</i> This is a critical period of indeterminate +length, in any case, always much briefer +than the other two. This critical moment can be +characterized only by its causes and results. Its +causes are, in the physiological sphere, the formation +of an organism and a fully developed brain; in +the psychologic order, the antagonism between the +pure subjectivity of the imagination and the objectivity +of ratiocinative processes; in other words, +between mental instability and stability. As for +the results, they appear only in the third period, the +resultant of this obscure, metamorphic stage.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[170]</a></span></p> + +<p><i>Third Period.</i> It is definite: in some way or +another and in some degree the imagination has become +rationalized, but this change is not reducible +to a single formula.</p> + +<p>(1) The creative imagination falls, as is indicated +in the figure, where the imagination curve +MN´ descends rapidly toward the line of abcissas +without ever reaching it. This is the most general +case; only truly imaginative minds are exceptions. +One falls little by little into the prose of practical +life—such is the downfall of love which is treated +as a phantom, the burial of the dreams of youth, +etc. This is a regression, not an end; for the creative +imagination disappears completely in no man; +it only becomes accessory.</p> + +<p>(2) It keeps up but becomes transformed; it +adapts itself to the conditions of rational thought; +it is no longer pure imagination, but becomes a +mixed form—the fact is indicated in the diagram +by the union of the two lines, MN, the imagination, +and XO, the rational. This is the case with truly +imaginative beings, in whom inventive power long +remains young and fresh.</p> + +<p>This period of preservation, of definitive constitution +with rational transformation, presents several +varieties. First, and simplest, <i>transformation into +logical form</i>. The creative power manifested in +the first stage remains true to itself, and always follows +the same trend. Such are the precocious inventors, +those whose vocation appeared early and +never changed direction. Invention loses its childish<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[171]</a></span> +or juvenile character in becoming virile; there are +no other changes. Compare Schiller's <i>Robbers</i>, +written in his teens, with his <i>Wallenstein</i>, dating +from his fortieth year; or the vague sketches of +the adolescent James Watt with his inventions as a +man.</p> + +<p>Another case is the <i>metamorphosis</i> or <i>deviation</i> +of creative power. We know what numbers of men +who have left a great name in science, politics, mechanical +or industrial invention started out with +mediocre efforts in music, painting, and especially +poetry, the drama, and fiction. The imaginative +impulse did not discover its true direction at the outset; +it imitated while trying to invent. What has +been said above concerning the chronological development +of the imagination would be tiresome repetition. +The need of creating followed from the first +the line of least resistance, where it found certain +materials ready to hand. But in order to arrive +to full consciousness of itself it needed more time, +more knowledge, more accumulated experience.</p> + +<p>We might here ask whether the contrary case is +also met with; i.e., where the imagination, in this +third period, would return to the inclinations of the +first period. This regressive metamorphosis—for I +cannot style it otherwise—is rare but not without +examples. Ordinarily the creative imagination, +when it has passed its adult stage, becomes attenuated +by slow atrophy without undergoing serious +change of form. Nevertheless, I am able to cite the +case of a well-known scholar who began with a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[172]</a></span> +taste for art, especially plastic art, went over rapidly +to literature, devoted his life to biologic studies, +in which he gained a very deserved reputation; then, +in turn, became totally disgusted with scientific research, +came back to literature and finally to the +arts, which have entirely monopolized him.</p> + +<p>Finally—for there are very many forms—in some +the imagination, though strong, scarcely passes beyond +the first stage, always retains its youthful, almost +childish form, hardly modified by a minimum +of rationality. Let us note that it is not a question +here of the characteristic ingenuousness of some inventors, +which has caused them to be called "grown-up +children," but of the candor and inherent simplicity +of the imagination itself. This exceptional +form is hardly reconcilable except with esthetic creation. +Let us add the mystic imagination. It could +furnish examples, less in its religious conceptions, +which are without control, than in its reveries of a +scientific turn. Contemporary mystics have invented +adaptations of the world that take us back to the +mythology of early times. This prolonged childhood +of the imagination, which is, in a word, an +anomaly, produces curiosities rather than lasting +works.</p> + +<p>At this third period in the development of the +imagination appears a second, subsidiary law, that of +<i>increasing complexity</i>; it follows a progressive line +from the simple to the complex. Indeed, it is not, +strictly speaking, a law of the imagination but of +the rational development exerting an influence on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[173]</a></span> +it by a counter-action. It is a law of the mind that +<i>knows</i>, not of one that <i>imagines</i>.</p> + +<p>It is needless to show that theoretical and practical +intelligence develops as an increasing complex. But +from the time that the mind distinguishes clearly +between the possible and the impossible, between the +fancied and the real—which is a capacity wanting +in primitive man—as soon as man has formed rational +habits and has undergone experience the impress +of which is ineffaceable, the creative imagination +is subject, <i>nolens volens</i>, to new conditions; +it is no longer absolute mistress of itself, it has lost +the assurance of its infancy, and is under the rules +of logical thought, which draws it along in its train. +Aside from the exceptions given above—and even +they are partial exceptions only—creative power depends +on the ability to understand, which imposes +upon it its form and developmental law. In literature +and in the arts comparison between the simplicity +of primitive creations and the complexity of +advanced civilizations has become commonplace. In +the practical, technical, scientific and social worlds +the higher up we go the more we have to know in +order to create, and in default of this condition we +merely repeat when we think we are inventing.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>Historically considered, in the species, the development +of the imagination follows the same line of +progress as in the individual. We will not repeat +it; it would be mere reiteration in a vaguer form<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[174]</a></span> +of what we have just said. A few brief notes will +suffice.</p> + +<p>Vico—whose name deserves to be mentioned here +because he was the first to see the good that we can +get from myths for the study of the imagination—divided +the course of humanity into three successive +ages: divine or theocratic, heroic or fabulous, human +or historic, after which the cycle begins over +again. Although this too hypothetic conception is +now forgotten, it is sufficient for our purposes. +What, indeed, are those first two stages that have +everywhere and always been the harbingers and preparers +of civilization, if not the triumphant period +of the imagination? It has produced myths, religions, +legends, epics and martial narratives, and +imposing monuments erected in honor of gods and +heroes. Many nations whose evolution has been incomplete +have not gone beyond this stage.</p> + +<p>Let us now consider this question under a more +definite, more limited, better known form—the history +of intellectual development in Europe since the +fall of the Roman Empire. It shows very distinctly +our three periods.</p> + +<p>No one will question the preponderance of the +imagination during the middle Ages: intensity of +religious feeling, ceaselessly repeated epidemics of +superstition; the institution of chivalry, with all its +accessories; heroic poetry, chivalric romances; courts +of love, efflorescence of Gothic art, the beginning +of modern music, etc. On the other hand, the <i>quantity</i> +of imagination applied during this epoch to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[175]</a></span> +practical, industrial, commercial invention is very +small. Their scientific culture, buried in Latin +jargon, is made up partly of antique traditions, partly +of fancies; what the ten centuries added to positive +science is almost <i>nil</i>. Our figure, with its two +curves, one imaginative, the other rational, thus applies +just as well to historical development as to individual +development during this first period.</p> + +<p>No more will anyone question that the Renaissance +is a critical moment, a transition period, and a +transformation analogous to that which we have +noted in the individual, when there rises, opposed +to imagination, a rival power.</p> + +<p>Finally, it will be admitted without dissent that +during the modern period social imagination has become +partly decayed, partly rationalized, under the +influence of two principal factors—one scientific, the +other economic. On the one hand the development +of science, on the other hand the great maritime discoveries, +by stimulating industrial and commercial +inventions, have given the imagination a new field +of activity. There have arisen points of attraction +that have drawn it into other paths, have imposed +upon it other forms of creation that have often +been neglected or misunderstood and that we shall +study in the Third Part.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[176]</a></span></p> +<h2>THIRD PART</h2> + +<h3>THE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF IMAGINATION</h3> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[178]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[179]</a></span></p> +<h2>PRELIMINARY</h2> + + +<p>After having studied the creative imagination in +its constitutive elements and in its development we +purpose, in this last part, describing its principal +forms. This will be neither analytic nor genetic but +concrete. The reader need not fear wearisome repetition; +our subject is sufficiently complex to permit +a third treatment without reiteration.</p> + +<p>The expression "creative imagination," like all +general terms, is an abbreviation and an abstraction. +There is no "imagination in general," but only <i>men +who imagine</i>, and who do so in different ways; the +reality is in them. The diversities in creation, however +numerous, should be reducible to types that are +<i>varieties</i> of imagination, and the determination of +these varieties is analogous to that of character as related +to will. Indeed, when we have settled upon the +physiological and psychological conditions of voluntary +activity we have only done a work in <i>general</i> +psychology. Men being variously constituted, their +modes of action bear the stamp of their individuality; +in each one there is a personal factor that, whatever +its ultimate nature, puts its mark on the will +and makes it energetic or weak, rapid or slow, stable<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[180]</a></span> +or unstable, continuous or intermittent. The same +is true of the creative imagination. We cannot +know it completely without a study of its varieties, +without a special psychology, toward which the following +chapters are an attempt.</p> + +<p>How are we to determine these varieties? Many +will be inclined to think that the method is indicated +in advance. Have not psychologists distinguished, +according as one or another of image-groups preponderates, +visual, auditory, motor and mixed +types? Is not the way clear and is it not well +enough to go in this direction? However natural +this solution may appear, it is illusory and can lead +to naught. It rests on the equivocal use of the +word "imagination," which at one time means mere +reproduction of images, and at another time creative +activity, and which, consequently, keeps up the erroneous +notion that in the creative imagination +images, the raw materials, are the essential part. The +materials, no doubt, are not a negligible element, +but by themselves they cannot reveal to us the +species and varieties that have their origin in an +anterior and superior tendency of mind. We shall +see in the sequel that the very nature of constructive +imagination may express itself indifferently in +sounds, words, colors, lines, and even numbers. The +method that should allege to settle the various +orientations of creative activity according to the +nature of images would no more go to the bottom +of the matter than would a classification of architecture +according to the materials employed (as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[181]</a></span> +rock, brick, iron, wood, etc.) with no regard for +differences of style.</p> + +<p>This method aside, since the determination must +be made according to the individuality of the architect, +what method shall we follow? The matter is +even more perplexing than the study of character. +Although various authors have treated the latter +subject (we have attempted it elsewhere), no one +of the proposed classifications has been universally +accepted. Nevertheless, despite their differences, +they coincide in several points, because these have +the advantage of resting on a common basis—the +large manifestations of human nature, feeling, doing, +thinking. In our subject I find nothing like +this and I seek in vain for a point of support. Classifications +are made according to the essential dominating +attributes; but, as regards the varieties of the +creative imagination, what are they?</p> + +<p>We may, indeed, as was said above, distinguish +two great classes—the intuitive and the combining. +From another point of view we may distinguish +invention of free range (esthetic, religious, mystic) +from invention more or less restricted (mechanical, +scientific, commercial, military, political, social). +But these two divisions are too general, leading to +nothing. A true classification should be in touch +with facts, and this one soars too high.</p> + +<p>Leaving, then, to others, more skilled or more +fortunate, the task of a rational and systematic determination, +if it be possible, we shall try merely to +distinguish and describe the principal forms, such as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[182]</a></span> +experience gives them to us, emphasizing those that +have been neglected or misinterpreted. What follows +is thus neither a classification nor even a complete +enumeration.</p> + +<p>We shall study at first two general forms of the +creative imagination—the plastic and the diffluent—and +later, special forms, determined by their content +and subject.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>Wundt, in a little-noticed passage of his <i>Physiological +Psychology</i>, has undertaken to determine the +composition of the "principal forms of talent," +which he reduces to four:</p> + +<p>The first element is imagination. It may be intuitive, +"that is, conferring on representations a +clearness of sense-perception," or combining; "then +it operates on multiple combinations of images." A +very marked development in both directions at the +same time is uncommon; the author assigns reasons +for this.</p> + +<p>The second element is understanding (<i>Verstand</i>). +It may be inductive—i.e., inclining toward the collection +of facts in order to draw generalizations +from them—or deductive, taking general concepts +and laws to trace their consequences.</p> + +<p>If the intuitive imagination is joined to the inductive +spirit we have the talent for observation of +the naturalist, the psychologist, the pedagogue, the +man of affairs.</p> + +<p>If the intuitive imagination is combined with the +deductive spirit we have the analytical talent of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[183]</a></span> +systematic naturalist, of the geometrician. In Linnaeus +and Cuvier the intuitive element predominates; +in Gauss, the analytical element.</p> + +<p>The combining imagination joined to the inductive +spirit constitutes "the talent for invention strictly +so-called," in industry, in the technique of science; +it gives the artist and the poet the power of composing +their works.</p> + +<p>The combining imagination plus the deductive +spirit gives the speculative talent of the mathematician +and philosopher; deduction predominates in +the former, imagination in the latter.<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> Wundt, <i>Physiologische Psychologie</i>, 4th German edition, +Vol. II, pp. 490-95.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[184]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<h3>THE PLASTIC IMAGINATION</h3> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>By "plastic imagination" I understand that which +has for its special characters clearness and precision +of form; more explicitly those forms whose materials +are clear images (whatever be their nature), +approaching perception, giving the impression of +reality; in which, too, there predominate <i>associations +with objective relations</i>, determinable with precision. +The plastic mark, therefore, is in the images, and in +the modes of association of images. In somewhat +rough terms, requiring modifications which the +reader himself can make, it is the imagination that +materializes.</p> + +<p>Between perception—a very complex synthesis of +qualities, attributes and relations—and conception—which +is only the consciousness of a quality, quantity, +or relation, often of only a single word accompanied +by vague outlines and a latent, potential +knowledge; between concrete and abstract, the +image occupies an intermediate position and can run +from one pole to another, now full of reality, now<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[185]</a></span> +almost as poor and pale as a concept. The representation +here styled plastic descends towards its +point of origin; it is an external imagination, arising +from sensation rather than from feeling and needing +to become objective.</p> + +<p>Thus its general characters are easy of determination. +First and foremost, it makes use of visual +images; then of motor images; lastly, in practical +invention, of tactile images. In a word, the three +groups of images present to a great extent the +character of externality and objectivity. The clearness +of form of these three groups proceeds from +their origin, because they arise from sensation well +determined in space—sight, movement, touch. Plastic +imagination depends most on spatial conditions. +We shall see that its opposite, diffluent imagination, +is that which depends least upon that factor, or is +most free from it. Among these naturally objective +elements the plastic imagination chooses the most +objective, which fact gives its creations an air of +reality and life.</p> + +<p>The second characteristic is inferiority of the affective +element; it appears only intermittently and is +entirely blotted out before sensory impression. This +form of the creative imagination, coming especially +from sensation, aims especially at sensation. Thus +it is rather superficial, greatly devoid of that internal +mark that comes from feeling.</p> + +<p>But if it chance that both sensory and affective +elements are equal in power; if there is at the same +time intense vision adequate to reality, and profound<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[186]</a></span> +emotion, violent shock, then there arise extraordinary +imaginative personages, like Shakespeare, Carlyle, +Michelet. It is needless to describe this form +of imagination, excellent pen-pictures of which have +been given by the critics;<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> let us merely note that its +psychology reduces itself to an alternately ascending +and descending movement between the two limiting +points of perception and idea. The ascending process +assigns to inanimate objects life, desires and feelings. +Thus Michelet: "The great streams of the +Netherlands, <i>tired</i> with their very long course, <i>perish</i> +as though from <i>weariness</i> in the <i>unfeeling</i> +ocean."<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> Elsewhere, the great folio begets the octavo, +"which becomes the parent of the small volume, +of booklets, of ephemeral pamphlets, invisible +spirits flying in the night, creating under the very +eyes of tyrants the circulation of liberty." The descending +process materializes abstractions, gives +them body, makes them flesh and bone; the Middle<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[187]</a></span> +Ages become "a poor child, torn from the bowels +of Christianity, born amidst tears, grown up in +prayer and revery, in anguish of heart, dying without +achieving anything." In this dazzle of images +there is a momentary return to primitive animism.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>In order to more fully understand the plastic imagination, +let us take up its principal manifestations.</p> + +<p>1. First, the arts dealing with form, where its +necessity is evident. The sculptor, painter, architect, +must have visual and tactile-motor images; it +is the material in which their creations are wrapped +up. Even leaving out the striking acts requiring +such a sure and tenacious external vision (portraits +executed from memory, exact remembrance of faces +at the end of twenty years, as in the case of Gavarni, +etc.<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a>), and limiting ourselves merely to the +usual, the plastic arts demand an observant imagination. +For the majority of men the concrete image +of a face, a form, a color, usually remains vague and +fleeting; "red, blue, black, white, tree, animal, head, +mouth, arm, etc., are scarcely more than words, symbols +expressing a rough synthesis. For the painter, +on the other hand, images have a very high precision +of details, and what he sees beneath the words or +in real objects are analyzed facts, positive elements +of perception and movement."<a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[188]</a></span></p><p>The rôle of tactile-motor images is not insignificant. +There has often been cited the instance of +sculptors who, becoming blind, have nevertheless +been able to fashion busts of close resemblance to +the original. This is memory of touch and of the +muscular sense, entirely equivalent to the visual +memory of the portrait painters mentioned above. +Practical knowledge of design and modeling—i.e., +of contour and relief—though resulting from natural +or acquired disposition, depends on cerebral +conditions, the development of definite sensory-motor +regions and their connections; and on psychological +conditions—the acquisition and organization +of appropriate images. "We learn to paint and +carve," wrote a contemporary painter, "as we do +sewing, embroidery, sawing, filing and turning." +In short, like all manual labor requiring associated +and combined acts.</p> + +<p>2. Another form of plastic imagination uses +words as means for evoking vivid and clear impressions +of sight, touch, movement; it is the poetic or +literary form. Of it we find in Victor Hugo a finished +type. As all know, we need only open his +works at hazard to find a stream of glittering images. +But what is their nature? His recent biographers, +guided by contemporary psychology, have well +shown that they always paint scenes or movements. +It is unnecessary to give proofs. Some facts have +a broader range and throw light upon his psychology. +Thus we are told that "he never dictates or +rhymes from memory and composes only in writing, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[189]</a></span>for he believes that writing has its own features, +and he wants to <i>see the words</i>. Théophile Gautier, +who knows and understands him so well, says: 'I +also believe that in the sentence we need most of all +an <i>ocular</i> rhythm. A book is made to be read, not +to be spoken aloud.'" It is added that "Victor Hugo +never spoke his verses but wrote them out and +would often illustrate them on the margin, as if he +needed to fixate the image in order to find the appropriate +word."<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a></p> + +<p>After visual representations come those of movement: +the steeple <i>pierces</i> the horizon, the mountain +<i>rends</i> the cloud, the mountain <i>raises himself</i> and +looks about, "the cold caverns open their mouths +<i>drowsily</i>," the wind lashes the rock into tears with +the waterfall, the thorn is an enraged plant, and so +on indefinitely.</p> + +<p>A more curious fact is the transposition of sonorous +sensations or images of sound, and like them +without form or figure, into visual and motor +images: "The <i>ruffles</i> of sound that the fifer cuts out; +the flute <i>goes up</i> to alto like a frail capital on a column." +This thoroughly plastic imagination remains +identical with itself while reducing everything +spontaneously, unconsciously, to spatial terms.</p> + +<p>In literature this altogether foreign mode of creative +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[190]</a></span>activity has found its most complete expression +among the <i>Parnassiens</i> and their congeners, whose +creed is summed up in the formula, faultless form +and impassiveness. Théophile Gautier claims that "a +poet, no matter what may be said of him, is a <i>workman</i>; +it is not necessary that he have more intelligence +than a laborer and have knowledge of a state +other than his own, without which he does badly. +I regard as perfectly absurd the mania that people +have of hoisting them (the poets) up onto an ideal +pedestal; <i>nothing is less ideal than a poet</i>. For +him words have in themselves and outside the +meaning they express, their own beauty and value, +just like precious stones not yet cut and mounted in +bracelets, necklaces and rings; they charm the understanding +that looks at them and takes them from +the finger to the little pile where they are put aside +for future use." If this statement, whether sincere +or not, is taken literally, I see no longer any difference, +save as regards the materials employed, between +the imagination of poets and the imagination +active in the mechanical arts. For the usefulness +of the one and the "uselessness" of the other is a +characteristic foreign to invention itself.</p> + +<p>3. In the teeming mass of myths and religious +conceptions that the nineteenth century has gathered +with so much care we could establish various classifications—according +to race, content, intellectual +level; and, in a more artificial manner but one suitable +for our subject, according to the degree of +precision or fluidity.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[191]</a></span></p> + +<p>Neglecting intermediate forms, we may, indeed, +divide them into two groups; some are clear in outline, +are consistent, relatively logical, resembling +a definite historical relation; others are vague, multiform, +incoherent, contradictory; their characters +change into one another, the tales are mixed and are +imperceptible in the whole.</p> + +<p>The former types are the work of the plastic +imagination. Such are, if we eliminate oriental influences, +most of the myths belonging to Greece +when, on emerging from the earliest period, they +attained their definite constitution. It has been held +that the plastic character of these religious conceptions +is an effect of esthetic development: statues, +bas-reliefs, poetry, and even painting, have made +definite the attributes of the gods and their history. +Without denying this influence we must nevertheless +understand that it is only auxiliary. To those who +would challenge this opinion let us recall that the +Hindoos have had gigantic poems, have covered +their temples with numberless sculptures, and yet +their fluid mythology is the opposite of the Greek. +Among the peoples who have incarnated their divinities +in no statue, in no human or animal form, we +find the Germans and the Celts. But the mythology +of the former is clear, well kept within large lines; +that of the latter is fleeting and inconsistent—the +despair of scholars.<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a></p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[192]</a></span></p> +<p>It is, then, certain that myths of the plastic kind +are the fruits of an innate quality of mind, of a +mode of feeling and of translating, at a given moment +in its history, the preponderating characters +of a race; in short, of a form of imagination and +ultimately of a special cerebral structure.</p> + +<p>4. The most complete manifestation of the plastic +imagination is met with in mechanical invention +and what is allied thereto, in consequence of the need +of very exact representations of qualities and relations. +But this is a specialized form, and, as its importance +has been too often misunderstood, it deserves +a separate study. (See Chapter V, <i>infra</i>.)</p> + + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>Such are the principal traits of this type of imagination: +clearness of outline, both of the whole and +of the details. It is not identical with the form +called realistic—it is more comprehensive; it is a +genus of which "realism" is a species. Moreover, +the latter expression being reserved by custom for +esthetic creation, I purposely digress in order to +dwell on this point: that the esthetic imagination +has no essential character belonging exclusively to +it, and that it differs from other forms (scientific, +mechanical, etc.) only in its materials and in its +end, not in its primary nature.</p> + +<p>On the whole, the plastic imagination could be +summed up in the expression, <i>clearness in complexity</i>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[193]</a></span> +It always preserves the mark of its original +source—i.e., in the creator and those disposed to +enjoy and understand him it tends to approach the +clearness of perception.</p> + +<p>Would it be improper to consider as a variety of +the genus a mode of representation that could be +expressed as <i>clearness in simplicity</i>? It is the dry +and rational imagination. Without depreciating it +we may say that it is rather a condition of imaginative +poverty. We hold with Fouillée that the +average Frenchman furnishes a good example of it. +"The Frenchman," says he, "does not usually have +a very strong imagination. His internal vision has +neither the hallucinative intensity nor the exuberant +fancy of the German and Anglo-Saxon mind; it is an +intellectual and distant view rather than a sensitive +resurrection or an immediate contact with, and possession +of, the things themselves. Inclined to deduce +and construct, our intellect excels less in representing +to itself real things than in discovering +relations between possible or necessary things. In +other words, it is a logical and combining imagination +that takes pleasure in what has been termed +the abstract view of life. The Chateaubriands, +Hugos, Flauberts, Zolas, are exceptional with us. +We reason more than we imagine."<a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a></p> + +<p>Its psychological constitution is reducible to two +elements: slightly concrete images, <i>schemas</i> approaching +general ideas; for their association, relations +predominantly rational, more the products of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[194]</a></span> the logic of the intellect than of the logic of the +feelings. It lacks the sudden, violent shock of emotion +that gives brilliancy to images, making them +arise and grouping them in unforeseen combinations. +It is a form of invention and construction that is +more the work of reason than of imagination +proper.</p> + +<p>Consequently, is it not paradoxical to relate it to +plastic imagination, as species to genus? It would +be idle to enter upon a discussion of the subject +here without attempting a classification; let us +merely note the likenesses and differences. Both are +above all objective—the first, because it is sensory; +the other, because it is rational. Both make use of +analogous modes of association, dependent more on +the nature of things than on the personal impression +of the subject. Opposition exists only on one point: +the former is made up of vivid images that approach +perception; the latter is made up of internal images +bordering upon concepts. Rational imagination is +plastic imagination desiccated and simplified.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> Thus Taine says of Carlyle: "He cannot stick to simple +expression; at every step he drops into figures, gives body to +every idea, must touch forms. We see that he is possessed and +haunted by glittering or saddening visions; in him every +thought is an explosion; a flood of seething passion reaches +the boiling-point in his brain, which overflows, and the torrent +of images runs over the banks and rushes with all its mud and +all its splendor. He cannot reason, he must paint." Despite +the vigor of this sketch, the perusal of ten pages of <i>Sartor +Resartus</i> or of the <i>French Revolution</i> teaches more in regard +to the nature of this imagination than all the commentaries.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> For a point of view in criticism that has seemed correct to +many on this matter, compare the well-known chapter on the +"Pathetic Fallacy" by Ruskin, in his <i>Modern Painters</i>. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_81_81" id="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> Arréat (<i>Psychologie du peintre</i>, pp. 62 ff.) gives a large +number of examples of this.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_82_82" id="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 115.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83_83" id="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> For further details on this point, consult Mabilleau, <i>Victor +Hugo</i>, 2nd part, chaps. II, III, IV.—Renouvier, in the book +devoted to the poet, asserts that "on account of his aptitude +for representing to himself the details of a figure, order and +position in space, beyond any present sensation," Victor Hugo +could have become a mathematician of the highest order.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_84_84" id="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> As bearing out the position of the author, we may also call +attention to the fact that while the Hebrew race has had very +slight development in the plastic arts, yet its mythology has +always taken a very definite form, even when dealing with the +vaguest and most abstract subjects. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_85_85" id="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> Fouillée, <i>Psychologie du peuple français</i>, p. 185.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[195]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<h3>THE DIFFLUENT IMAGINATION</h3> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>The diffluent imagination is another general form, +but one that is completely opposed to the foregoing. +It consists of vaguely-outlined, indistinct images +that are evoked and joined according to the least +rigorous modes of association. It presents, then, +two things for our consideration—the nature of the +images and of their associations.</p> + +<p>(1) It employs neither the clear-cut, concrete, +reality-penetrated images of the plastic imagination, +nor the semi-schematic representations of the rational +imagination, but those midway in that ascending +and descending scale extending from perception +to conception. This determination, however, +is insufficient, and we can make it more precise. +Analysis, indeed, discovers a certain class of +ill-understood images, which I call emotional abstractions, +and which are the proper material for +the diffluent imagination. These images are reduced +to certain qualities or attributes of things, +taking the place of the whole, and chosen from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[196]</a></span> +among the others for various reasons, the origin of +which is affective. We shall comprehend their nature +better through the following comparison:</p> + +<p>Intellectual or rational abstraction results from +the choice of a fundamental, or at least principal, +character, which becomes the substitute for all the +rest that is omitted. Thus, extension, resistance, +or impenetrability, come to represent, through simplification +and abbreviation, what we call "matter."</p> + +<p>Emotional abstraction, on the other hand, results +from the permanent or temporary predominance of +an emotional state. Some aspect of a thing, essential +or not, comes into relief, solely because it is in +direct relation to the disposition of our sensibility, +with no other preoccupation; a quality, an attribute +is spontaneously, arbitrarily selected because it impresses +us at the given instant—in the final analysis, +because it somehow pleases or displeases us. The +images of this class have an "impressionist" mark. +They are abstractions in the strict sense—i.e., extracts +from and simplifications of the sensory data. +They act less through a direct influence than by +evoking, suggesting, whispering; they permit a +glance, a passing glimpse: we may justly call them +crepuscular or twilight ideas.</p> + +<p>(2) As for the forms of association, the relations +linking these images, they do not depend so much +on the order and connections of things as on the +changing dispositions of the mind. They have a +very marked subjective character. Some depend on +the intellectual factor; the most usual are based on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[197]</a></span> +chance, on distant and vacillating analogies—further +down, even on assonance and alliteration. +Others depend on the affective factor and are ruled +by the disposition of the moment: association by +contrast, especially those alike in emotional basis, +which have been previously studied. (First Part, +<a href="#Page_31">Chapter II</a>.)</p> + +<p>Thus the diffluent imagination is, trait for trait, +the opposite of the plastic imagination. It has a +general character of inwardness because it arises +less from sensation than from feeling, often from a +simple and fugitive impression. Its creations have +not the organic character of the other, lacking a +stable center of attraction; but they act by diffusion +and inclusion.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>By its very nature it is <i>de jure</i>, if not <i>de facto</i>, +excluded from certain territories—if it ventures +therein it produces only abortions. This is true of +the practical sphere, which permits neither vague +images nor approximate constructions; and of the +scientific world, where the imagination may be used +only to create a theory or invent processes of discovery +(experiments, schemes of reasoning). Even +with these exceptions there is still left for it a very +wide range.</p> + +<p>Let us rapidly pass over some very frequent, very +well-known manifestations of the diffluent imagination—those +obliterated forms in which it does not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[198]</a></span> +reach complete development and cannot give the +full measure of its power.</p> + +<p>(1) Revery and related states. This is perhaps +the purest specimen of the kind, but it remains +embryonic.</p> + +<p>(2) The romantic turn of mind. This is seen in +those who, confronted by any event whatever or an +unknown person, make up, spontaneously, involuntarily, +in spite of themselves, a story out of whole +cloth. I shall later give examples of it according +to the written testimony of several people.<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> In +whatever concerns themselves or others they create +an imagined world, which they substitute for the +real.</p> + +<p>(3) The fantastic mind. Here we come away +from the vague forms; the diffluent imagination becomes +substantial and asserts itself through its permanence. +At bottom this fantastic form is the romantic +spirit tending toward objectification. The +invention, which was at first only a thoroughly internal +construction and recognized as such, aspires +to become external, to become realized, and when +it ventures into a world other than its own, one requiring +the rigorous conditions of the practical +imagination, it is wrecked, or succeeds only through +chance, and that very rarely. To this class belong +those inventors, known to everyone, who are fertile +in methods of enriching themselves or their country +by means of agricultural, mining, industrial or commercial +enterprises; the makers of the utopias of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[199]</a></span> +finance, politics, society, etc. It is a form of imagination +unnaturally oriented toward the practical.<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a></p> + +<p>(4) The list increases with myths and religious +conceptions; the imagination in its diffuse form here +finds itself on its own ground.</p> + +<p>Depending on linguistics, it has recently been +maintained that, among the Aryans at least, the +imagination created at first only momentary gods +(<i>Augenblicksgötter</i>).<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> Every time that primitive +man, in the presence of a phenomenon, experienced +a perceptible emotion, he translated it by a name, +the manifestation of what was imagined the divine +part in the emotion felt. "Every religious emotion +gives rise to a new name—i.e., a new divinity. But +the religious imagination is never identical with itself; +though produced by the same phenomenon, it +translates itself, at two different moments, by two +different words." As a consequence, "during the +early periods of the human race, religious names +must have been applied not to <i>classes</i> of beings or +events but to <i>individual</i> beings or events. Before<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[200]</a></span> +worshipping the comet or the fig-tree, men must +have worshiped each one of the comets they beheld +crossing the sky, every one of the fig-trees that their +eyes saw." Later, with advancing capacity for generalization, +these "instantaneous" divinities would +be condensed into more consistent gods. If this +hypothesis, which has aroused many criticisms, +be sound—if this state were met with—it would be +the ideal type of imaginative instability in the religious +order.</p> + +<p>Nearer to us, authentic evidence shows that certain +peoples, at given stages of their history, have +created such vague, fluid myths, that we cannot +succeed in delimiting them. Every god can change +himself into another, different, or even opposite, +one. The Semitic religions might furnish examples +of this. There has been established the identity of +Istar, Astarte, Tanit, Baalath, Derketo, Mylitta, +Aschera, and still others. But it is in the early +religion of the Hindoos that we perceive best this +kaleidoscopic process applied to divine beings. In +the vedic hymns not only are the clouds now serpents, +now cows and later fortresses (the retreats of +dark Asuras), but we see Agni (fire) becoming +Kama (desire or love), and Indra becoming +Varuna, and so on. "We cannot imagine," says +Taine, "such a great clearness. The myth here is +not a disguise, but an expression; no language is +more true and more supple. It permits a glimpse +of, or rather, it causes us to discern the forms of +clouds, movements of the air, changes of seasons,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[201]</a></span> +all the happenings of sky, fire, storm: external +nature has never met a mind so impressionable and +pliant in which to mirror itself in all the inexhaustible +variety of its appearances. However changeable +nature may be, this imagination corresponds to +it. It has no fixed gods; they are changeable like +the things themselves; they blend one into another. +Everyone of them is in turn the supreme deity; no +one of them is a distinct personality; everyone is +only a moment of nature, able, according to the +apperception of the moment, to include its neighbor +or be included by it. In this fashion they swarm +and teem. Every moment of nature and every +apperceptive moment may furnish one of them."<a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> +Let us, indeed, note that, for the worshiper, the +god to whom he addresses himself and while he is +praying, is always the greatest and most powerful. +The assignment of attributes passes suddenly from +one to the other, regardless of contradiction. In +this versatility some writers believe they have discovered +a vague pantheistic conception. Nothing is +more questionable, fundamentally, than this interpretation. +It is more in harmony with the psychology +of these naïve minds to assume simply an +extreme state of "impressionism," explicable by the +logic of feeling.</p> + +<p>Thus, there is a complete antithesis between the +imagination that has created the clear-cut and +definite polytheism of the Greeks and that whence +have issued those fluctuating divinities that allow<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[202]</a></span> +the presentation of the future doctrine of <i>Mâya</i>, of +universal illusion—another more refined form of +the diffluent imagination. Finally, let us note that +the Hellenic imagination realized its gods through +anthropomorphism—they are the ideal forms of +human attributes<a name="FNanchor_90_90" id="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a>—majesty, beauty, power, wisdom, +etc. The Hindoo imagination proceeds +through symbolism: its divinities have several +heads, several arms, several legs, to symbolize +limitless intelligence, power, etc.; or better still, +animal forms, as e.g., Ganesa, the god of wisdom, +with the head of the elephant, reputed the wisest +of animals.</p> + +<p>(5) It would be easy to show by the history of +literature and the fine arts that the vague forms +have been preferred according to peoples, times, and +places. Let us limit ourselves to a single contemporary +example that is complete and systematically +created—the art of the "symbolists." It is not here +a question of criticism, of praise, or even of appreciation, +but merely of a consideration of it as a +psychological fact likely to instruct us in regard to +the nature of the diffluent imagination.</p> + +<p>This form of art despises the clear and exact +representation of the outer world: it replaces it by +a sort of music that aspires to express the changing +and fleeting inwardness of the human soul. It is +the school of the subject "who wants to know only +mental states." To that end, it makes use of a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[203]</a></span> +natural or artificial lack of precision: everything +floats in a dream, men as well as things, often without +mark in time and space. Something happens, +one knows not where or when; it belongs to no +country, is of no period in time: it is <i>the</i> forest, +<i>the</i> traveler, <i>the</i> city, <i>the</i> knight, <i>the</i> wood; less +frequently, even <i>He</i>, <i>She</i>, <i>It</i>. In short, all the +vague and unstable characters of the pure, content-less +affective state. This process of "suggestion" +sometimes succeeds, sometimes fails.</p> + +<p>The word is the sign <i>par excellence</i>. As, according +to the symbolists, it should give us emotions +rather than representations, it is necessary that it +lose, partially, its intellectual function and undergo +a new adaptation.</p> + +<p>A principal process consists of employing usual +words and changing their ordinary acceptation, or +rather, associating them in such a way that they +lose their precise meaning, and appear vague and +mysterious: these are the words "written in the +depths." The writers do not name—they leave it +for us to infer. "They banish commonplaces +through lack of precision, and leave to things only +the power of moving." A rose is not described by +the particular sensations that it causes, but by the +general condition that it excites.</p> + +<p>Another method is the employment of new words +or words that have fallen into disuse. Ordinary +words retain, in spite of everything, somewhat of +their customary meaning, associations and thoughts +condensed in them through long habit; words forgotten +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[204]</a></span>during four or five centuries escape this condition—they +are coins without fixed value.</p> + +<p>Lastly, a still more radical method is the attempt +to give to words an exclusively emotional valuation. +Unconsciously or as the result of reflection some +symbolists have come to this extreme trial, which +the logic of events imposed upon them. Ordinarily, +thought expresses itself in words; feeling, in gestures, +cries, interjections, change of tone: it finds +its complete and classic expression in music. The +symbolists want to transfer the rôle of sound to +words, to make of them the instrument for translating +and suggesting emotion through sound alone: +words have to act not as signs but as sounds: they +are "musical notes in the service of an impassioned +psychology."</p> + +<p>All this, indeed, concerns only imagination expressing +itself in words; but we know that the +symbolic school has applied itself to the plastic arts, +to treat them in its own way. The difference, however, +is in the vesture that the esthetic ideal assumes. +The pre-Raphaelites have attempted, by effacing +forms, outlines, semblances, colors, "to cause things +to appear as mere sources of emotion," in a word, to +<i>paint</i> emotions.</p> + +<p>To sum up—In this form of the diffluent imagination +the emotional factor exercises supreme +authority.</p> + +<p>May the type of imagination, the chief manifestations +of which we have just enumerated, be considered +as identical with the idealistic imagination?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[205]</a></span> +This question is similar to that asked in the preceding +chapter, and permits the same answer. In +idealistic art, doubtless, the material element furnished +in perception (form, color, touch, effort) is +minimized, subtilized, sublimated, refined, so as to +approach as nearly as possible to a purely internal +state. By the nature of its favorite images, by its +preference for vague associations and uncertain +relations, it presents all the characteristics of diffluent +imagination; but the latter covers a much +broader field: it is the genus of which the other is +a species. Thus, it would be erroneous to regard +the fantastic imagination as idealistic; it has no +claim to the term: on the contrary, it believes itself +adapted for practical work and acts in that direction.</p> + +<p>In addition, it must be recognized that were we +to make a complete review of all the forms of +esthetic creation, we should frequently be embarrassed +to classify them, because there are among +them, as in the case of characters, mixed or composite +forms. Here, for example, are two kinds +seemingly belonging to the diffluent imagination +which, however, do not permit it to completely +include them.</p> + +<p>(a) The "wonder" class (fairy-tales, the Thousand +and One Nights, romances of chivalry, +Ariosto's poem, etc.) is a survival of the mythic +epoch, when the imagination is given free play +without control or check; whereas, in the course of +centuries, art—and especially literary creation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[206]</a></span>—becomes, +as we have already said, a decadent and +rationalized mythology. This form of invention +consists neither of idealizing the external world, +nor reproducing it with the minuteness of realism, +but <i>remaking</i> the universe to suit oneself, without +taking into account natural laws, and despising the +impossible: it is a liberated realism. Often, in an +environment of pure fancy, where only caprice +reigns, the characters appear clear, well-fashioned, +living. The "wonder" class belongs, then, to the +vague as well as to the plastic imagination; more +or less to one or to the other, according to the +temperament of the creator.</p> + +<p>(b) The fantastic class develops under the same +conditions. Its chiefs (Hoffmann, Poe, <i>et al.</i>) are +classed by critics as realists. They are such by +virtue of their vision, intensified to hallucination, +the precision in details, the rigorous logic of characters +and events: they rationalize the improbable.<a name="FNanchor_91_91" id="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> +On the other hand, the environment is strange, +shrouded in mystery: men and things move in an +unreal atmosphere, where one feels rather than perceives. +It is thus proper to remark that this class +easily glides into the deeply sad, the horrible, terrifying, +nightmare-producing, "satanic literature;" +Goya's paintings of robbers and thieves being garroted; +Wiertz, a genius bizarre to the point of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[207]</a></span> +extravagance, who paints only suicides or the heads +of guillotined criminals.</p> + +<p>Religious conceptions could also furnish a fine lot +of examples: Dante's <i>Inferno</i>, the twenty-eight +hells of Buddhism, which are perhaps the masterpieces +of this class, etc. But all this belongs to +another division of our subject, one that I have +expressly eliminated from this essay—the pathology +of the creative imagination.</p> + + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>There yet remains for us to study two important +varieties that I connect with the diffluent imagination.</p> + +<p class='center'><span class="smcap">Numerical Imagination</span></p> + +<p>Under this head I designate the imagination that +takes pleasure in the unlimited—in infinity of time +and space—under the form of number. It seems +at first that these two terms—imagination and +number—must be mutually exclusive. Every number +is precise, rigorously determined, since we can +always reduce it to a relation with unity; it owes +nothing to fancy. But the <i>series</i> of numbers is +unlimited in two directions: starting from any term +in the series, we may go on ever increasingly or +ever decreasingly. The working of the mind gives +rise to a possible infinity that is limitless: it thus +traces a route for the movement of the imagination. +The number, or rather the series of numbers, is less +an object than a vehicle.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[208]</a></span></p> + +<p>This form of imagination is produced in two +principal ways—in religious conceptions and cosmogonies, +and in science.</p> + +<p>(1) Numerical imagination has nowhere been +more exuberant than among the peoples of the +Orient. They have played with number with magnificent +audacity and prodigality. Chaldean cosmogony +relates that <i>Oannes</i>, the Fish-god, devoted +259,200 years to the education of mankind, then +came a period of 432,000 years taken up with the +reigns of mythical personages, and at the end of +these 691,000 years, the deluge renewed the face +of the earth. The Egyptians, also, were liberal with +millions of years, and in the face of the brief and +limited chronology of the Greeks (another kind of +imagination) were wont to exclaim, "You, O +Greeks, you are only children!" But the Hindoos +have done better than all that. They have invented +enormous units to serve as basis and content for +their numerical fancies: the <i>Koti</i>, equivalent to ten +millions; the <i>Kalpa</i> (or the age of the world between +two destructions), 4,328,000,000 years. +Each <i>Kalpa</i> is merely one of 365 days of divine +life: I leave to the reader, if he is so inclined, the +work of calculating this appalling number. The +Djanas divide time into two periods, one ascending, +the other descending: each is of fabulous duration, +2,000,000,000,000,000 oceans of years; each ocean +being itself equivalent to 1,000,000,000,000,000 +years. "If there were a lofty rock, sixteen miles in +each dimension, and one touched it once in a hundred +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[209]</a></span>years with a bit of the finest Benares linen, it +would be reduced to the size of a wango-stone +before a fourth of one of these <i>Kalpas</i> had rolled +by." In the sacred books of Buddhism, poor, dry, +colorless, as they ordinarily are, imagination in its +numerical forms is triumphant. The <i>Lalitavistara</i> +is full of nomenclatures and enumerations of fatiguing +monotony: Buddha is seated on a rock shaded +by 100,000 parasols, surrounded by minor gods +forming an assemblage of 68,000 <i>Kotis</i> (i.e., 680,000,000 +persons), and—this surpasses all the rest—"he +had experienced many vicissitudes during +10,100,000,000 <i>Kalpas</i>." This makes one dizzy.</p> + +<p>(2) Numerical imagination in the sciences does +not take on these delirious forms; it has the advantage +of resting on an objective basis: it is the +substitute of an unrepresentable reality. Scientific +culture, which people often accuse of stifling imagination, +on the contrary opens to it a field much +vaster than esthetics. Astronomy delights in infinitudes +of time and space: it sees worlds arise, burn +at first with the feeble light of a nebular mass, glow +like suns, become chilled, covered with spots, and +then become condensed. Geology follows the development +of our earth through upheavals and cataclysms: +it foresees a distant future when our globe, +deprived of the atmospheric vapors that protect it, +will perish of cold. The hypotheses of physics and +chemistry in regard to atoms and molecules are not +less reckless than the speculations of the Hindoo +imagination. "Physicists have determined the volume +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[210]</a></span>of a molecule, and referring to the numbers +that they give, we find that a cube, a millimeter +each way (scarcely the volume of a silkworm's +egg), would contain a number of molecules at least +equal to the cube of 10,000,000—i.e., unity followed +by twenty-one zeros. One scientist has calculated +that if one had to count them and could +separate in thought a million per second, it would +take more than 250,000,000 years: the being who +commenced the task at the time that our solar +system could have been no more than a formless +nebula, would not yet have reached the end."<a name="FNanchor_92_92" id="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> +Biology, with its protoplasmic elements, its plastids, +gemmules, hypotheses on hereditary transmission +by means of infinitesimal subdivisions; the theory +of evolution, which speaks off-hand of periods of a +hundred thousand years; and many other scientific +theses that I omit, offer fine material for the numerical +imagination.</p> + +<p>More than one scientist has even made use of this +form of imagination for the pleasure of developing +a purely fanciful notion. Thus Von Baer, supposing +that we might perceive the portions of duration +in another way, imagines the changes that would +result therefrom in our outlook on nature: "Suppose +we were able, within the length of a second, to +note 10,000 events distinctly, instead of barely 10, +as now; if our life were then destined to hold the +same number of impressions, it might be 1,000 times<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[211]</a></span> +as short. We should live less than a month, and +personally know nothing of the change of seasons. +If born in winter, we should believe in summer as +we now believe in the heats of the Carboniferous +era. The motions of organic beings would be so +slow to our senses as to be inferred, not seen. The +sun would stand still in the sky, the moon be almost +free from change, and so on. But now reverse the +hypothesis and suppose a being to get only one +1,000th part of the sensations that we get in a given +time, and consequently to live 1,000 times as long. +Winters and summers will be to him like quarters +of an hour. Mushrooms and the swifter-growing +plants will shoot into being so rapidly as to appear +instantaneous creations; annual shrubs will rise and +fall from the earth like restlessly boiling water +springs; the motions of animals will be as invisible +as are to us the movements of bullets and cannonballs; +the sun will scour through the sky like a +meteor, leaving a fiery trail behind him, etc."<a name="FNanchor_93_93" id="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p> + +<p>The psychologic conditions of this variety of the +creative imagination are, then, these: Absence of +limitation in time and space, whence the possibility +of an endless movement in all directions, and the +possibility of filling either with a myriad of dimly-perceived +events. These events not being susceptible +of clear representation as to their nature and +quantity, escaping even a schematic representation, +the imagination makes its constructions with substitutes +that are, in this case, numbers.</p> + + +<h3>IV</h3><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[212]</a></span></p> + +<p class='center'><span class="smcap">Musical Imagination</span></p> + +<p>Musical imagination deserves a separate monograph. +As the task requires, in addition to psychological +capacity, a profound knowledge of musical +history and technique, it cannot be undertaken here. +I purpose only one thing, namely, to show that it +has its own individual mark—that it is the type of +affective imagination.</p> + +<p>I have elsewhere<a name="FNanchor_94_94" id="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> attempted to prove that, contrary +to the general opinion of psychologists, there +exists, in many men at least, an affective memory; +that is, a memory of emotions strictly so called, and +not merely of the intellectual conditions that caused +and accompanied them. I hold that there exists +also a form of the creative imagination that is +purely emotional—the contents of which are wholly +made up of states of mind, dispositions, wants, aspirations, +feelings, and emotions of all kinds, and that +it is the characteristic of the composer of genius, of +the born musician.</p> + +<p>The musician sees in the world what concerns +him. "He carries in his head a coherent system of +tone-images, in which every element has its place +and value; he perceives delicate differences of sound, +of <i>timbre</i>; he succeeds, through exercise, in penetrating +into their most varied combinations, and the +knowledge of harmonious relations is for him what +design and the knowledge of color are for the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[213]</a></span> +painter: intervals and harmony, rhythm and tone-qualities +are, as it were, standards to which he +relates his present perceptions and which he causes +to enter into the marvelous constructions of his +fancy."<a name="FNanchor_95_95" id="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p> + +<p>These sound-elements and their combinations are +the words of a special language that is very clear +for some, impenetrable for others. People have +spoken to a tiresome extent of the vagueness of +musical expression; some have been pleased to hold +that every one may interpret it in his own way. We +must surely recognize that emotional language does +not possess the precision of intellectual language; +but in music it is the same as in any other idiom: +there are those who do not understand at all; those +who half understand and consequently always give +wrong renderings; and those who understand well—and +in this last category there are grades as varying +as the aptitude for perceiving the delicate and subtle +shades of speech.<a name="FNanchor_96_96" id="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[214]</a></span></p> +<p>The materials necessary for this form of imaginative +construction are gathered slowly. Many +centuries passed between the early ages when man's +voice and the simple instruments imitating it translated +simple emotions, to the period when the efforts +of antiquity and of the middle ages finally furnished +the musical imagination with the means of expressing +itself completely, and allowed complex and difficult +constructions in sound. The development of +music—slow and belated as compared to the other +arts—has perhaps been due, in part at least, to the +fact that the affective imagination, its chief province +(imitative, descriptive, picturesque music being only +an episode and accessory), being made up, contrary +to sensorial imagination, of tenuous, subtle, fugitive +states, has been long in seeking its methods of +analysis and of expression. However it be, Bach +and the contrapuntists, by their treatment in an +independent manner of the different voices constituting +harmony, have opened a new path. Henceforth +melody will be able to develop and give rise +to the richest combinations. We shall be able to +associate various melodies, sing them at the same +time, or in alternation, assign them to various instruments, +vary indefinitely the pitch of singing and +concerted voices. The boundless realm of musical +combinations is open; it has been worth while to +take the trouble to invent. Modern polyphony with +its power of expressing at the same time different, +even opposing, feelings is a marvelous instrument<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[215]</a></span> +for a form of imagination which, alien to the forms +clear-cut in space, moves only in time.</p> + +<p>What furnishes us the best entrance into the +psychology of this form of imagination is the natural +transposition operative in musicians. It consists +in this: An external or internal impression, +any occurrence whatever, even a metaphysical idea, +undergoes change of a certain kind, which the following +examples will make better understood than +any amount of commentary.</p> + +<p>Beethoven said of Klopstock's <i>Messiah</i>, "always +<i>maestoso</i>, written in <i>D flat major</i>." In his fourth +symphony he expressed musically the destiny of +Napoleon; in the ninth symphony he tries to give +a proof of the existence of God. By the side of a +dead friend, in a room draped in black, he improvises +the <i>adagio</i> of the sonata in <i>C sharp minor</i>. +The biographers of Mendelssohn relate analogous +instances of transposition under musical form. +During a storm that almost engulfed George Sand, +Chopin, alone in the house, under the influence of +his agony, and half unconsciously, composed one of +his <i>Préludes</i>. The case of Schumann is perhaps +the most curious of all: "From the age of eight, +he would amuse himself with sketching what might +be called musical portraits, drawing by means of +various turns of song and varied rhythms the shades +of character, and even the physical peculiarities, of +his young comrades. He sometimes succeeded in +making such striking resemblances that all would<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[216]</a></span> +recognize, with no further designation, the figure +indicated by the skillful fingers that genius was +already guiding." He said later: "I feel myself +affected by all that goes on in the world—men, +politics, literature; I reflect on all that in my own +way and it issues outwards in the form of music. +That is why many of my compositions are so hard +to understand: they relate to events of distant +interest, though important; but everything remarkable +that is furnished me by the period I must +express musically." Let us recall again that Weber +interpreted in one of the finest scenes of his <i>Freyschütz</i> +(the bullet-casting scene) "a landscape that +he had seen near the falls of Geroldsau, at the hour +when the moon's rays cause the basin in which the +water rushes and boils to glisten like silver."<a name="FNanchor_97_97" id="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> In +short, the events go into the composer's brain, mix +there, and come out changed into a musical structure.</p> + +<p>The plastic imagination furnishes us a counter-proof: +it transposes inversely. The musical impression +traverses the brain, sets it in turmoil, but +comes out transformed into visual images. We +have already cited examples from Victor Hugo (<a href="#Page_184">ch. +I</a>); Goethe, we know, had poor musical gifts. After +having the young Mendelssohn render an overture +from Bach, he exclaimed, "How pompous and grand +that is! It seems to me like a procession of grand<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[217]</a></span> +personages, in gala attire, descending the steps of +a gigantic staircase."</p> + +<p>We might generalize the question and ask +whether or no there exists a natural antagonism +between true musical imagination and plastic imagination. +An answer in the affirmative seems scarcely +liable to be challenged. I had undertaken an investigation +which, at the outset, made for a different +goal. It happens that it answered clearly enough +the question propounded above: the conclusion has +arisen of itself, unsought; which fact saves me from +any charge of a preconceived opinion.</p> + +<p>The question asked orally of a large number of +people was this: "Does hearing or even remembering +a bit of <i>symphonic</i> music excite visual images +in you and of what kind are they?" For self evident +reasons dramatic music was expressly excluded: +the appearance of the theater, stage, and +scenery impose on the observer visual perceptions +that have a tendency to be repeated later in the +form of memories.</p> + +<p>The result of observation and of the collected +answers are summed up as follows:</p> + +<p>Those who possess great musical culture and—this +is by far more important—taste or passion for +music, generally have no visual images. If these +arise, it is only momentarily, and by chance. I give +a few of the answers: "I see absolutely nothing; I +am occupied altogether with the pleasure of the +music: I live entirely in a world of sound. In +accordance with my knowledge of harmony, I<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[218]</a></span> +analyze the harmonies but not for long. I follow +the development of the phrasing." "I see nothing: +I am given up wholly to my impressions. I believe +that the chief effect of music is to heighten in everyone +the predominating feelings."</p> + +<p>Those who possess little musical culture, and +especially those having little taste for music, have +very clear visual representations. It must nevertheless +be admitted that it is very hard to investigate +these people. Because of their anti-musical natures, +they avoid concerts, or at the most, resign themselves +to sit through an opera. However, since the +nature and quality of the music does not matter +here, we may quote: "Hearing a Barbary organ in +the street, I picture the instrument to myself. I see +the man turning the crank. If military music sounds +from afar, I <i>see</i> a regiment marching." An excellent +pianist plays for a friend Beethoven's sonata in +C sharp minor, putting into its execution all the +pathos of which he is capable. The other sees in it +"the tumult and excitement of a fair." Here the +musical rendering is misinterpreted through misapprehension. +I have several times noted this—in +people familiar with design or painting, music calls +up pictures and various scenes; one of these persons +says that he is "besieged by visual images." Here +the hearing of music evidently acts as excitant.<a name="FNanchor_98_98" id="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a></p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[219]</a></span></p> +<p>In a word, insofar as it is permissible in psychology +to make use of general formulas—and with the +proviso that they apply to most, not to all cases—we +may say that during the working of the musical +imagination the appearance of visual images is the +exception; that when this form of imagination is +weak, the appearance of images is the rule.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, this result of observation is altogether +in accord with logic. There is an irreducible +antithesis between affective imagination, the characteristic +of which is interiority, and visual imagination, +basically objective. Intellectual language<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[220]</a></span>—speech—is +an arrangement of words that stand for +objects, qualities, relations, extracts of things: in +order to be understood they must call up in consciousness +the corresponding images. Emotional +language—music—is an appropriate ordering of +successive or simultaneous sounds, of melodies and +harmonies that are signs of affective states: in order +to be understood, they must call up in consciousness +the corresponding affective modifications. But, in +the non-musically inclined, the evocative power is +small—sonorous combinations excite only superficial +and unstable internal states. The exterior excitation, +that of the sounds, follows the line of least +resistance, and acting according to the psychic nature +of the individual, tends to arouse objective +images, pictures, visual representations, well or ill +adapted.</p> + +<p>To sum up: In contrast to sensorial imagination, +which has its origin without, affective imagination +begins within. The <i>stuff</i> of its creation is found in +the mental states enumerated above, and in their +innumerable combinations, which it expresses and +fixes in language peculiar to itself, of which it has +been able to make wonderful use. Taking it altogether, +the only great division possible between the +different types of imagination is perhaps reducible +to this: To speak more exactly, there are exterior +and interior imaginations. These two chapters have +given a sketch of them. There now remains for us +to study the less general forms of the creative +power.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_86_86" id="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> See <a href="#Page_353">Appendix E</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_87_87" id="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> Let us cite merely the case of Balzac who, says one of his +biographers, "was always odd." He buys a property, in +order to start a dairy there with "the best cows in the world," +from which he expects to receive a net income of 3,000 francs. +In addition, high-grade vegetable gardens, same income; vineyard, +with Malaga plants, which should bring about 2,000 fr. +He has the commune of Sèvres deed over to him a walnut tree, +worth annually 2,000 francs to him, because all the townspeople +dump their rubbish there. And so on, until at the end of four +years he sees himself obliged to sell his domain for 3,000 +francs, after spending on it thrice that sum.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88_88" id="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> Usener, <i>Götternamen</i>, 1896.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_89_89" id="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> <i>Nouveaux Essais de critique</i>, p. 320.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_90_90" id="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> Or, as it has been expressed, "human qualities raised to +their highest power." (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91_91" id="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> The same statement holds good as regards the "Temptations +of Saint Anthony" and other analogous subjects that have +often attracted painters.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92_92" id="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> R. Dubois, <i>Leçons de physiologie générale et comparée</i>, p. +286.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93_93" id="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> Von Baer, in James, <i>Psychology</i>, I, 639.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94_94" id="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> <i>Psychology of the Emotions</i>, Part I, Chapter IX.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_95_95" id="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> Arréat, <i>Mémoire et Imagination</i>, p. 118.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_96_96" id="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> Mendelssohn wrote to an author who composed verses for +his <i>Lieder</i>: "Music is more definite than speech, and to want +to explain it by means of words is to make the meaning +obscure. I do not think that words suffice for that end, and +were I persuaded to the contrary, I would not compose music. +There are people who accuse music of being ambiguous, who +allege that words are always understood: for me it is just the +other way; words seem to me vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, +if we compare them to the true music that fills the soul with +a thousand things better than words. What the music that +I like expresses to me seems to me too <i>definite</i>, rather than too +indefinite, for anyone to be able to match words to it."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_97_97" id="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> Oelzelt-Newin, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 22-23. For analogous facts +from contemporary musicians, see Paulhan, <i>Rev. Phil.</i>, 1898, +pp. 234-35.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_98_98" id="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> For the sake of brevity and clearness I do not give here the +observations and evidence. They will be found at the end of +this work, as <a href="#Page_350">Appendix D</a>. +</p><p> +Under the title "An experimental test of musical expressiveness," +Gilman, in <i>American Journal of Psychology</i>, vol. IV, +No. 4, and vol. V, No. 1 (1892-3), has studied from another +point of view the effect of music on various listeners. Eleven +selections were given; I note that three or four at the most +excited visual images—ten (perhaps eleven), emotional states. +More recently, the <i>Psychological Review</i> (September, 1898, pp. +463 ff.) has published a personal observation of Macdougal in +which sight-images accompany the hearing of music only exceptionally +and under special conditions. The author characterizes +himself as a "poor visualizer;" he declares that music arouses +in him only very rarely visual representations; "even then +they are fragmentary, consisting of simple forms without bond +between them, appearing on a dark background, remaining +visible for a moment or two, and soon disappearing." But, +having gone to the concert fatigued and jaded, he sees nothing +during the first number: the visions begin during the <i>andante</i> +of the second, and accompany "in profusion" the rendering +of the third. (See Appendix D.) May we not assume that the +state of fatigue, by lowering the vital tone, which is the basis +of the emotional life, likewise diminishes the tendency of affective +dispositions to arise again under the form of memory? +On the other hand, sensory images remain without opposition +and come to the front; at least, unless they are reënforced by +a state of semi-morbid excitation.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[221]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER III.</h2> + +<h3>THE MYSTIC IMAGINATION</h3> + + +<p>Mystic imagination deserves a place of honor, as +it is the most complete and most daring of purely +theoretic invention. Related to diffluent imagination, +especially in the latter's affective form, it has +its own special characters, which we shall try to +separate out.</p> + +<p>Mysticism rests essentially on two modes of +mental life—feeling, which we need not study; and +imagination, which, in the present instance, represents +the intellectual factor. Whether the part of +consciousness that this state of mind requires and +permits be imaginative in nature and nothing else +it is easy to find out. Indeed, the mystic considers +the data of sense as vain appearances, or at the most +as signs revealing and frequently laying bare the +world of reality. He therefore finds no solid support +in perception. On the other hand, he scorns +reasoned thought, looking upon it as a cripple, halting +half-way. He makes neither deductions nor +inductions, and does not draw conclusions after the +method of scientific hypotheses. The conclusion,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[222]</a></span> +then, is that he imagines, i.e., that he realizes a +construction in images that is for him knowledge +of the world; and he never proceeds, and does not +proceed here, save <i>ex analogia hominis</i>.</p> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>The root of the mystic imagination consists of a +tendency to incarnate the ideal in the sensible, to +discover a hidden "idea" in every material phenomenon +or occurrence, to suppose in things a supranatural +principle that reveals itself to whoever may +penetrate to it. Its fundamental character, from +which the others are derived, is thus a way of thinking +<i>symbolically</i>; but the algebraist also thinks by +means of symbols, yet is not on that account a +mystic. The nature of this symbolism must, then, +be determined.</p> + +<p>In doing so, let us note first of all that our images—understanding +the word "image" in its broadest +sense—may be divided into two distinct groups:</p> + +<p>(1) <i>Concrete</i> images, earliest to be received, being +representations of greatest power, residues of our +perceptions, with which they have a direct and immediate +relation.</p> + +<p>(2) <i>Symbolic</i> images, or signs, of secondary acquirement, +being representations of lesser power, +having only indirect and mediate relations with +things.</p> + +<p>Let us make the differences between the two clear +by a few simple examples.</p> + +<p>Concrete images are: In the visual sphere, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[223]</a></span> +recollection of faces, monuments, landscapes, etc.; +in the auditory sphere, the remembrance of the +sounds of the sea, wind, the human voice, a melody, +etc.; in the motor sphere, the tossings one feels when +resting after having been at sea, the illusions of +those who have had limbs amputated, etc.</p> + +<p>Symbolic images are: In the visual order, written +words, ideographic signs, etc.; in the auditory +order, spoken words or verbal images; in the motor +order, significant gestures, and even better, the +finger-language of deaf-mutes.</p> + +<p>Psychologically, these two groups are not identical +in nature. Concrete images result from a persistence +of perceptions and draw from the latter all +their validity; symbolic images result from a mental +synthesis, from an association of perception and +image, or of image and image. If they have not +the same origin, no more do they disappear in the +same way, as is proven by very numerous examples +of aphasia.</p> + +<p>The originality of mystic imagination is found in +this fact: It transforms concrete images into symbolic +images, and uses them as such. It extends +this process even to perceptions, so that all manifestations +of nature or of human art take on a value +as signs or symbols. We shall later find numerous +examples of this. Its mode of expression is necessarily +synthetic. In itself, and because of the materials +that it makes use of, it differs from the affective +imagination previously described; it also differs<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[224]</a></span> +from sensuous imagination, which makes use of +forms, movements, colors, as having a value of their +own; and from the imagination developing in the +functions of words, through an analytic process. It +has thus a rather special mark.</p> + +<p>Other characters are related to this one of symbolism, +or else are derived from it, viz.:</p> + +<p>(1) An external character: the manner of writing +and of speaking, the mode of expression, whatever +it is. "The dominant style among mystics," says +von Hartmann, "is metaphorical in the extreme—now +flat and ordinary, more often turgid and emphatic. +Excess of imagination betrays itself there, +ordinarily, in the thought and in the form in which +that is rendered.... A sign of mysticism +which it has been believed may often be taken as an +essential sign, is obscurity and unintelligibility of +language. We find it in almost all those who have +written."<a name="FNanchor_99_99" id="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> We might add that even in the plastic +arts, symbolists and "<i>décadents</i>" have attempted, as +far as possible, methods that merely indicate and +suggest or hint instead of giving real, definite objects: +which fact makes them inaccessible to the +greater number of people.</p> + +<p>This characteristic of obscurity is due to two +causes. First, mystical imagination is guided by +the logic of feeling, which is purely subjective, full +of leaps, jerks, and gaps. Again, it makes use of +the language of images, especially visual images—a +language whose ideal is vagueness, just as the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[225]</a></span> +ideal of verbal language is precision. All this can +be summed up in a phrase—the subjective character +inherent in the symbol. While seeming to speak +like everyone else, the mystic uses a personal idiom: +things becoming symbols at the pleasure of his +fancy, he does not use signs that have a fixed and +universally admitted value. It is not surprising if +we do not understand him.</p> + +<p>(2) An extraordinary abuse of analogy and comparison +in their various forms (allegory, parable, +etc.)—a natural consequence of a mode of thinking +that proceeds by means of symbols, not concepts. +It has been said, and rightly, that "the only force +that makes the vast field of mysticism fruitful is +analogy."<a name="FNanchor_100_100" id="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> Bossuet, a great opponent of mystics, +had already remarked: "One of the characteristics +of these authors is the pushing of allegories to the +extreme limit." With warm imagination, having at +their disposal overexcited senses, they are lavish of +changes of expressions and figures, hoping thereby +to explain the world's mysteries. We know to what +inventive labors the Vedas, the Bible, the Koran, +and other sacred books have given rise. The distinction +between literal and figurative sense, which +is boundlessly arbitrary, has given commentators a +freedom to imagine equal to that of the myth-creators.</p> + +<p>All this is yet very reasonable; but the imagination +left to itself stops at no extravagance. After<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[226]</a></span> +having strained the meaning of expressions, the +imaginative mind exercises itself on words and +letters. Thus, the cabalists would take the first or +the last letters of the words composing a verse, and +would form with them a new word which was to +reveal the hidden meaning. Again, they would +substitute for the letters composing words the numbers +that these letters represent in the Hebrew +numerical system and form the strangest combinations +with them. In the <i>Zohar</i>, all the letters of the +alphabet come before God, each one begging to be +chosen as the creative element of the universe.</p> + +<p>Let us also bring to mind numerical mysticism, +different from numerical imagination heretofore +studied. Here, number is no longer the means that +mind employs in order to soar in time and space; it +becomes a symbol and material for fanciful construction. +Hence arise those "sacred numbers" +teeming in the old oriental religions:—3, symbol of +the trinity; 4, symbol of the cosmic elements; 7, +representing the moon and the planets, etc.<a name="FNanchor_101_101" id="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> Besides +these fantastic meanings, there are more complicated +inventions—calculating, from the letters of +one's name, the years of life of a sick person, the +auspices of a marriage, etc. The Pythagorean +philosophy, as Zeller has shown, is the systematic +form of this mathematical mysticism, for which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[227]</a></span> +numbers are not symbols of quantitative relations, +but the very essence of things.</p> + +<p>This exaggerated symbolism, which makes the +works of mystics so fragile, and which permits the +mind to feed only on glimpses, has nevertheless an +undeniable source of energy in its enchanting capacity +to suggest. Without doubt suggestion exists +also in art, but much more weakly, for reasons that +we shall indicate.</p> + +<p>(3) Another characteristic of mystic imagination +is the nature and the great degree of belief accompanying +it. We already know<a name="FNanchor_102_102" id="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> that when an image +enters consciousness, even in the form of a recollection, +of a purely passive reproduction, it appears +at first, and for a moment, just as real as a percept. +Much more so, in the case of imaginative constructions. +But this illusion has degrees, and with +mystics it attains its maximum.</p> + +<p>In the scientific and practical world, the work of +the imagination is accompanied by only a conditional +and provisional belief. The construction in +images must justify its existence, in the case of the +scientist, by explaining; and in the case of the man +of affairs, by being embodied in an invention that is +useful and answers its purpose.</p> + +<p>In the esthetic field, creation is accompanied by +a momentary belief. Fancy, remarks Groos, is +necessarily joined to appearance. Its special character +does not consist merely in freedom in images; +what distinguishes it from association and from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[228]</a></span> +memory is this—that what is merely representative +is taken for the reality. The creative artist has a +conscious illusion (<i>bewusste Selbsttäuschung</i>): <i>the +esthetic pleasure is an oscillation between the appearance +and the reality</i>.<a name="FNanchor_103_103" id="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p> + +<p>Mystic imagination presupposes an unconditioned +and permanent belief. Mystics are believers in the +true sense—they have faith. This character is +peculiar to them, and has its origin in the intensity +of the affective state that excites and supports this +form of invention. Intuition becomes an object of +knowledge only when clothed in images. There has +been much dispute as to the objective value of those +symbolic forms that are the working material of the +mystic imagination. This contest does not concern +us here; but we may make the positive statement +that the constructive imagination has never obtained +such a frequently hallucinatory form as in the +mystics. Visions, touch-illusions, external voices, +inner and "wordless" voices, which we now regard +as psycho-motor hallucinations—all that we meet +every moment in their works, until they become +commonplace. But as to the nature of these psychic +states there are only two solutions possible—one, +naturalistic, that we shall indicate; the other, supernatural, +which most theologians hold, and which +regards these phenomena as valid and true revelation. +In either case, the mystic imagination seems +to us naturally tending toward objectification. It +tends outwardly, by a spontaneous movement that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[229]</a></span> +places it on the same level as reality. Whichever +conclusion we adopt, no imaginative type has the +same great gift of energy and permanence in belief.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>Mystic imagination, working along the lines peculiar +to it, produces cosmological, religious, and +metaphysical constructions, a summary exposition +of which will help us understand its true nature.</p> + +<p>(1) The all-embracing cosmological form is the +conception of the world by a purely imaginative +being. It is rare, abnormal, and is nowadays met +with only in a few artists, dreamers, or morbidly +esthetic persons, as a kind of survival and temporary +form. Thus, Victor Hugo sees in each letter +of the alphabet the pictured imitation of one of the +objects essential to human knowledge: "<i>A</i> is the +head, the gable, the cross-beam, the arch, <i>arx</i>; <i>D</i> +is the back, <i>dos</i>; <i>E</i> is the basement, the console, etc., +so that man's house and its architecture, man's body +and its structure, and then justice, music, the +church, war, harvesting, geometry, mountains, etc.—all +that is comprised in the alphabet through the +mystic virtue of form."<a name="FNanchor_104_104" id="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> Even more radical is +Gérard de Nerval (who, moreover, was frequently +subject to hallucinations): "At certain times everything +takes on for me a new aspect—secret voices +come out of plant, tree, animals, from the humblest +insects, to caution and encourage me. Formless and +lifeless objects have mysterious turns the meaning<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[230]</a></span> +of which I understand." To others, contemporaries, +"the real world is a fairy land."</p> + +<p>The middle ages—a period of lively imagination +and slight rational culture—overflowed in this direction. +"Many thought that on this earth everything +is a sign, a figure, and that the visible is worth +nothing except insofar as it covers up the invisible." +Plants, animals—there is nothing that does not +become subject for interpretation; all the members +of the body are emblems; the head is Christ, the +hairs are the saints, the legs are the apostles, the +eye is contemplation, etc. There are extant special +books in which all that is seriously explained. Who +does not know the symbolism of the cathedrals, and +the vagaries to which it has given rise? The towers +are prayer, the columns the apostles, the stones and +the mortar the assembly of the faithful; the windows +are the organs of sense, the buttresses and abutments +are the divine assistance; and so on to the +minutest detail.</p> + +<p>In our day of intense intellectual development, it +is not given to many to return sincerely to a mental +condition that recalls that of the earliest times. Even +if we come near it, we still find a difference. Primitive +man puts life, consciousness, activity, into +everything; symbolism does likewise, but it does not +believe in an autonomous, distinct, particular soul +inherent in each thing. The absence of abstraction +and generalization, characteristic of humanity in its +early beginnings, when it peoples the world with +myriads of animate beings, has disappeared. Every<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[231]</a></span> +source of activity revealed by symbols appears as a +fragmentary manifestation; it descends from a +single primary, personal or impersonal, spring. At +the root of this imaginative construction there is +always either theism or pantheism.</p> + +<p>(2) Mystical imagination has often and erroneously +been identified with religious imagination. +Although it may be held that every religion, no +matter how dull and poor, presupposes a latent +mysticism, because it supposes an Unknown beyond +the reach of sense, there are religions very slightly +mystical in fact—those of savages, strictly utilitarian; +among barbarians, the martial cults of the +Germans and the Aztecs; among civilized races, +Rome and Greece.<a name="FNanchor_105_105" id="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> However, even though the +mystic imagination is not confined to the bounds of +religious thought, history shows us that there it +attains its completest expansion.</p> + +<p>To be brief, and to keep strictly within our subject, +let us note that in the completely developed +great religions there has arisen opposition between +the rationalists and the imaginative expounders, +between the dogmatists and the mystics. The former, +rational architects, build by means of abstract +ideas, logical relations and methods, by deduction +and induction; the others, imaginative builders, care<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[232]</a></span> +little for this learned magnificence—they excel in +vivid creations because the moving energy with +them is in their feelings, "in their hearts;" because +they speak a language made up of concrete images, +and consequently their wholly symbolic speech is at +the same time an original construction. The mystic +imagination is a transformation of the mythic +imagination, the myth changing into symbols. It +cannot escape the necessity of this. On the other +hand, the affective states cannot longer remain +vague, diffuse, purely internal; they must become +fixed in time and space, and condensed into images +forming a personality, legend, event, or rite. Thus, +Buddha represents the tendencies towards pity and +resignation, summing up the aspirations for final +rest. On the other hand, abstract ideas, pure concepts, +being repugnant to the mystic's nature, it is +also necessary that they take on images through +which they may be seen—e.g., the relations between +God and man, in the various forms of communion; +the idea of divine protection in incarnations, mediators, +etc. But the images made use of are not dry +and colorless like words that by long use have lost +all direct representative value and are merely marks +or tags. Being symbolic, i.e., concrete, they are, as +we have seen, direct substitutes for reality, and they +differ as much from words as sketching and drawing +differ from our alphabetical signs, which are, however, +their derivatives or abbreviations.</p> + +<p>It must, however, be noted that if "the mystic +fact is a naïve effort to apprehend the absolute, a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[233]</a></span> +mode of symbolic, not dialectic, thinking, that lives +on symbols and finds in them the only fitting expression,"<a name="FNanchor_106_106" id="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a> +it seems that this imaginative phase has been +to some minds only an internal form, for they have +attempted to go beyond it through ecstacy, aspiring +to grasp the ultimate principle as a pure unity, without +image and without form,<a name="FNanchor_107_107" id="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> which metaphysical +realism hopes to attain by other methods and by a +different route. However interesting they may be +for psychology, these attempts, luring one on further +and further, by their seeming or real elimination of +every symbolic element, become foreign to our subject, +and we cannot consider them at greater length +here.</p> + +<p>(3) "History shows that philosophy has done +nothing but transform ideas of mystic production, +substituting for the form of images and undemonstrated +statements the form of assertions of a +rational system."<a name="FNanchor_108_108" id="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> This declaration of a metaphysician +saves us from dwelling on the subject long.</p> + +<p>When we seek the difference between religious +and metaphysical or philosophical symbolism, we +find it in the nature of the constitutive elements. +Turned in the direction of religion, mystic symbolism +presupposes two principal elements—imagination +and feeling; turned in a metaphysical direction, it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[234]</a></span> +presupposes imagination and a very small rational +element. This substitution involves appreciable deviation +from the primitive type. The construction is +of greater logical regularity. Besides, and this is +the important characteristic, the subject-matter—though +still resembling symbolic images—tends to +become concepts: such are vivified abstractions, +allegorical beings, hereditary entities of spirits and +of gods. In short, metaphysical mysticism is a +transition-form towards metaphysical rationalism, +although these two tendencies have always been +inimical in the history of philosophy, just as in the +history of religion.</p> + +<p>In this imaginative plan of the world we may +recognize stages according to the increasing weakness +of the systems, depending on the number and +quality of the hypotheses. For example, the progression +is apparent between Plotinus and the frenzied +creations of the Gnostics and the Cabalists. +With the latter, we come into a world of unbridled +fancy which, in place of human romances, invents +cosmic romances. Here appear the allegorical +beings mentioned above, half concept, half symbol; +the ten Sephiros of the Cabala, immutable forms of +being; the <i>syzygies</i> or couples of Gnosticism—soul +and reflection, depth and silence, reason and life, +inspiration and truth, etc.; the absolute manifesting +itself by the unfolding of fifty-two attributes, each +unfolding comprising seven <i>eons</i>, corresponding to +the 364 days of the year, etc. It would be wearisome +to follow these extravagant thoughts, which,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[235]</a></span> +though the learned may treat them with some +respect, have for the psychologist only the interest +of pathologic evidence. Moreover, this form of +mystic imagination presents too little that is new +for us to speak of it without repeating ourselves.</p> + +<p>To conclude: The mystic imagination, in its +alluring freedom, its variety, and its richness, is +second to no form, not even to esthetic invention, +which, according to common prejudice, is the type +<i>par excellence</i>. Following the most venturesome +methods of analogy, it has constructed conceptions +of the world made up almost wholly of feelings and +images—symbolic architectures.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_99_99" id="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, I, part 2, ch. IX.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_100_100" id="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> J. Darmesteter, in Récéjac, <i>Essai sur les fondements de la +connaissance mystique</i>, p. 124.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_101_101" id="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> In such notions may perhaps be best found the genesis of +the present superstitions in regard to "lucky" and "unlucky" +numbers, like the number 13, which have such persistence. +(Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_102_102" id="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> See Part Two, <a href="#Page_103">chapter II</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_103_103" id="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> Groos, <i>Die Spiele der Thiere</i>, pp. 308-312.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_104_104" id="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> Mabilleau, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 132.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_105_105" id="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> If we leave out oriental influences and the Mysteries, which, +according to Aristotle, were not dogmatic teaching, but a +show, an assemblage of symbols, acting by evocation, or suggestion, +following the special mode of mystic imagination that +we already know.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_106_106" id="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> Récéjac, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 139 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_107_107" id="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> One at once calls to mind Plotinus, whose highest philosophy +is a kind of indescribable ecstacy. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_108_108" id="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> Hartmann, <i>op. cit.</i>, vol. I, part 2, chapter IX.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[236]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<h3>THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION</h3> + + +<p>It is quite generally recognized that imagination +is indispensable in all sciences; that without it we +could only copy, repeat, imitate; that it is a stimulus +driving us onward and launching us into the unknown. +If there does exist a very widespread prejudice +to the contrary—if many hold that scientific +culture throttles imagination—we must look for the +explanation of this view first, in the equivocation, +pointed out several times, that makes the essence of +the creative imagination consist of images, which +are here most often replaced by abstractions or +extracts of things—whence it results that the created +work does not have the living forms of religion, of +art, or even of mechanical invention; and then, in +the rational requirements regulating the development +of the creative faculty—it may not wander at +will. In either case its end is determined, and in +order to exist, i.e., in order to be accepted, the +invention must become subject to preëstablished +rules.</p> + +<p>This variety of imagination being, after the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[237]</a></span> +esthetic form, the one that psychologists have best +described, we may therefore be brief. A complete +study of the subject, however, remains yet to be +made. Indeed, we may remark that there is no +"scientific imagination" in general, that its form +must vary according to the nature of the science, +and that, consequently, it really resolves itself into +a certain number of genera and even of species. +Whence arises the need of monographs, each one of +which should be the work of a competent man.</p> + +<p>No one will question that mathematicians have a +way of thinking all their own; but even this is too +general. The arithmetician, the algebraist, and +more generally the analyst, in whom invention obtains +in the most abstract form of discontinuous +functions—symbols and their relations—cannot +imagine like the geometrician. One may well speak +of the ideal figures of geometry—the empirical +origin of which is no longer anywhere contested—but +we cannot escape from representing them as +somehow in space. Does anyone think that Monge, +the creator of descriptive geometry, who by his +work has aided builders, architects, mechanics, stone +cutters in their labors, could have the same type of +imagination as the mathematician who has been +given up all his life to the theory of number? Here, +then, are at least two well-marked varieties, to say +nothing of mixed forms. The physicist's imagination +is necessarily more concrete; since he is incessantly +obliged to refer to the data of sense or to +that totality of visual, tactile, motor, acoustic,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[238]</a></span> +thermic, etc., representations that we term the +"properties of matter." Our eye, says Tyndall, +cannot see sound waves contract and dilate, but we +construct them in thought—i.e., by means of +visual images. The same remarks are true of chemists. +The founders of the atomic theory certainly +<i>saw</i> atoms, and pictured them in the mind's eye, and +their arrangement in compound bodies. The complexity +of the imagination increases still more in the +geologist, the botanist, the zoologist; it approaches +more and more, with its increasing details, to the +level of perception. The physician, in whom science +becomes also an art, has need of visual representations +of the exterior and interior, microscopic and +macroscopic, of the various forms of diseased conditions; +auditory representations (auscultation); tactile +representations (touch, reverberation, etc.); and +let us also add that we are not speaking merely of +diagnosis of diseases, which is a matter of reproductive +imagination, but of the discovery of a new +pathologic "entity," proven and made certain from +the symptoms. Lastly, if we do not hesitate to give +a very broad extension to the term "scientific," and +apply it also to invention in social matters, we shall +see that the latter is still more exacting, for one must +represent to oneself not only the elements of the +past and of the present, but in addition construct a +picture of the future according to probable inductions +and deductions.</p> + +<p>It might be objected that the foregoing enumeration +proves a great variety in the <i>content</i> of creative<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[239]</a></span> +imagination but not in the imagination itself, and +that nothing has proven that, under all these various +aspects, there does not exist a so-called scientific +imagination, that always remains identical. This +position is untenable. For we have seen above<a name="FNanchor_109_109" id="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> that +there exists no creative instinct in general, no one +mere indeterminate "creative power," but only wants +that, in certain cases, excite novel combinations of +images. The nature of the separable materials, then, +is a factor of the first importance; it is determining, +and indicates to the mind the direction in which it +is turned, and all treason in this regard is paid for +by aborted construction, by painful labor for some +petty result. Invention, separated from what gives +it body and soul, is nothing but a pure abstraction.</p> + +<p>The monographs called for above would, then, be +a not unneeded work. It is only from them collectively +that the rôle of the imagination in the +sciences could be completely shown, and we might +by abstraction separate out the characters common +to all varieties—the essential marks of this imaginative +type.</p> + +<p>Mathematics aside, all the sciences dealing with +facts—from astronomy to sociology—suppose three +moments, namely, observation, conjecture, verification. +The first depends on external and internal +sense, the second on the creative imagination, the +third on rational operations, although the imagination +is not entirely barred from it. In order to +study its influence on scientific development, we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[240]</a></span> +shall study it (a) in the sciences in process of +formation; (b) in the established sciences; (c) in +the processes of verification.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>It has often been said that the perfection of a +science is measured by the amount of mathematics +it requires; we might say, conversely, that its lack +of completeness is measured by the amount of +imagination that it includes. It is a psychological +necessity. Where the human mind cannot explain +or prove, there it invents; preferring a semblance +of knowledge to its total absence.<a name="FNanchor_110_110" id="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> Imagination +fulfills the function of a substitute; it furnishes a +subjective, conjectural solution in place of an objective, +rational explanation. This substitution has +degrees:</p> + +<p>(1) The sway of the imagination is almost complete +in the pseudo-sciences (alchemy, astrology, +magic, occultism, etc.), which it would be more +proper to call embryonic sciences, for they were the +beginnings of more exact disciplines and their fancies +have not been without use. In the history of +science, this is the golden age of the creative imagination, +corresponding to the myth-making period +already studied.</p> + +<p>(2) The semi-sciences, incompletely proved (certain +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[241]</a></span>portions of biology, psychology, sociology, +etc.), although they show a regression of imaginative +explanation repulsed by the hitherto absent or +insufficient experimentation, nevertheless abound in +hypotheses, that succeed, contradict, destroy one +another. It is a commonplace truism that does not +need to be dwelt on—they furnish <i>ad libitum</i> +examples of what has been rightly termed scientific +mythology.</p> + +<p>Aside from the quantity of imagination expended, +often without great profit, there is another character +to be noted—the nature of the belief that accompanies +imaginative creation. We have already seen +repeatedly that the intensity of the imaginary conception +is in direct ratio to the accompanying belief, +or rather, that the two phenomena are really one—merely +the two aspects of one and the same state of +consciousness. But faith—i.e., the adherence of +the mind to an undemonstrated assertion—is here at +its maximum.</p> + +<p>There are in the sciences hypotheses that are not +believed in, that are preserved for their didactic +usefulness, because they furnish a simple and convenient +method of explanation. Thus the "properties +of matter" (heat, electricity, magnetism, etc.), +regarded by physicists as distinct qualities even in +the first half of the last century; the "two electric +fluids;" cohesion, affinity, etc., in chemistry—these +are some of the convenient and admitted expressions +to which, however, we attach no explanatory value.</p> + +<p>There is also to be mentioned the hypothesis held<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[242]</a></span> +as an approximation of reality—this is the truly +scientific position. It is accompanied by a provisional +and ever-revocable belief. This is admitted, +in principle at least, by all scientists, and has been +put into practice by many of them.</p> + +<p>Lastly, there is the hypothesis regarded as the +truth itself—one that is accompanied by a complete, +absolute, belief. But daily observation and history +show us that in the realm of embryonic and ill-proven +sciences this disposition is more flourishing +than anywhere else. <i>The less proof there is, the +more we believe.</i> This attitude, however wrong +from the standpoint of the logician, seems to the +psychologist natural. The mind clings tenaciously +to the hypothesis because the latter is its own creation, +or, because in adopting it, it seems to the mind +that it should have itself discovered the hypothesis, +so much does the latter harmonize with its inner +states. Let us take the hypothesis of evolution, for +example: we need not mention its high philosophical +bearing, and the immense influence that it exerts on +almost all forms of human thought. Nevertheless, +it still remains an hypothesis; but for many it is an +indisputable and inviolable dogma, raised far above +all controversy. They accept it with the uncompromising +fervor of believers: a new proof of the +underlying connection between imagination and +belief—they increase and decrease <i>pari passu</i>.</p> + + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>Should we assign as belonging solely to the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[243]</a></span> +imagination every invention or discovery—in a +word, whatever is new—in the well-organized +sciences that form a body of solid, constantly-broadening +doctrine? It is a hard question. That +which raises scientific knowledge above popular +knowledge is the use of an experimental method and +rigorous reasoning processes; but, is not induction +and deduction going from the known to the unknown? +Without desiring to depreciate the method +and its value, it must nevertheless be admitted that +it is preventive, not inventive. It resembles, says +Condillac, the parapets of a bridge, which do not +help the traveler to walk, but keep him from falling +over. It is of value especially as a habit of mind. +People have wisely discoursed on the "methods" of +invention. There are none; but for which fact we +could manufacture inventors just as we make +mechanics and watchmakers. It is the imagination +that invents, that provides the rational faculties with +their materials, with the position, and even the solution +of their problems. Reasoning is only a means +for control and proof; it transforms the work of the +imagination into acceptable, logical results. If one +has not imagined beforehand, the logical method is +aimless and useless, for we cannot reason concerning +the completely unknown. Even when a problem +seems to advance towards solution wholly through +the reason, the imagination ceaselessly intervenes in +the form of a succession of groupings, trials, +guesses, and possibilities that it proposes. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[244]</a></span> +function of method is to determine its value, to +accept or reject it.<a name="FNanchor_111_111" id="FNanchor_111_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a></p> + +<p>Let us show by a few examples that conjecture, +the work of the combining imagination, is at the +root of the most diverse scientific inventions.<a name="FNanchor_112_112" id="FNanchor_112_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a></p> + +<p>Every mathematical invention is at first only an +hypothesis that must be demonstrated, i.e., must +be brought under previously established general +principles: prior to the decisive moment of rational +verification it is only a thing imagined. "In a +conversation concerning the place of imagination in +scientific work," says Liebig, "a great French +mathematician expressed the opinion to me that the +greater part of mathematical truth is acquired not +through deduction, but through the imagination. +He might have said 'all the mathematical truths,' +without being wrong." We know that Pascal discovered +the thirty-second proposition of Euclid all +by himself. It is true that it has been concluded,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[245]</a></span> +wrongly perhaps, that he had also discovered all +the earlier ones, the order followed by the Greek +geometrician not being necessary, and not excluding +other arrangements. However it be, reasoning alone +was not enough for that discovery. "Many people," +says Naville, "of whom I am one, might have +thought hard all their lives without finding out the +thirty-two propositions of Euclid." This fact alone +shows clearly the difference between invention and +demonstration, imagination and reason.</p> + +<p>In the sciences dealing with facts, all the best-established +experimental truths have passed through +a conjectural stage. History permits no doubt on +this point. What makes it appear otherwise is the +fact that for centuries there has gradually come to +be formed a body of solid belief, making a whole, +stored away in classic treatises from which we learn +from childhood, and in which they seem to be arranged +of themselves. We are not told of the series +of checks and failures through which<a name="FNanchor_113_113" id="FNanchor_113_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> they have +passed. Innumerable are the inventions that remained +for a long time in a state of conjecture, +matters of pure imagination, because various circumstances +did not permit them to take shape, to +be demonstrated and verified. Thus, in the thirteenth +century, Roger Bacon had a very clear idea<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[246]</a></span> +of a construction on rails similar to our railroads; +of optical instruments that would permit, as does +the telescope, to see very far, and to discover the +invisible. It is even claimed that he must have +foreseen the phenomena of interferences, the demonstration +of which had to be awaited ten centuries.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, there are guesses that have +met success without much delay, but in which the +imaginative phase—that of the invention preceding +all demonstration—is easy to locate. We know that +Tycho-Brahé, lacking inventive genius but rich in +capacity for exact observation, met Kepler, an +adventurous spirit: together, the two made a complete +scientist. We have seen how Kepler, guided +by a preconceived notion of the "harmony of the +spheres," after many trials and corrections, ended +by discovering his laws. Copernicus recognized +expressly that his theory was suggested to him by +an hypothesis of Pythagoras—that of a revolution +of the earth about a central fire, assumed to be in +a fixed position. Newton imagined his hypothesis +of gravitation from the year 1666 on, then abandoned +it, the result of his calculations disagreeing +with observation; finally he took it up again after a +lapse of a few years, having obtained from Paris +the new measure of the terrestrial meridian that +permitted him to prove his guess. In relating his +discoveries, Lavoisier is lavish in expressions that +leave no doubt as to their originally conjectural +character. "He <i>suspects</i> that the air of the atmosphere +is not a simple thing, but is composed of two<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[247]</a></span> +very different substances." "He <i>presumes</i> that the +permanent alkalies (potash, soda) and the earths +(lime, magnesia) should not be considered simple +substances." And he adds: "What I present here +is at the most no more than a mere <i>conjecture</i>." +We have mentioned above the case of Darwin. Besides, +the history of scientific discoveries is full of +facts of this sort.</p> + +<p>The passage from the imaginative to the rational +phase may be slow or sudden. "For eight months," +says Kepler, "I have seen a first glimmer; for three +months, daylight; for the last week I see the sunlight +of the most wonderful contemplation." On +the other hand, Haüy drops a bit of crystallized calcium +spar, and, looking at one of the broken prisms, +cries out, "All is found!" and immediately verifies +his quick intuition in regard to the true nature of +crystallization. We have already indicated<a name="FNanchor_114_114" id="FNanchor_114_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> the psychological +reasons for these differences.</p> + +<p>Underneath all the reasoning, inductions, deductions, +calculations, demonstrations, methods, and +logical apparatus of every sort, there is something +animating them that is not understood, that is the +work of that complex operation—the constructive +imagination.</p> + +<p>To conclude: The hypothesis is a creation of the +mind, invested with a provisional reality that may, +after verification, become permanent. False hypotheses +are characterized as imaginary, by which +designation is meant that they have not become freed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[248]</a></span> +from the first state. But for psychology they are +different neither in their origin nor in their nature +from those scientific hypotheses that, subjected to +the power of reason or of experiment, have come out +victorious. Besides, in addition to abortive +hypotheses, there are dethroned ones. What theory +was more clinging, more fascinating in its applications, +than that of phlogiston? Kant<a name="FNanchor_115_115" id="FNanchor_115_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> praised it as +one of the greatest discoveries of the eighteenth century. +The development of the sciences is replete +with these downfalls. They are psychological regressions: +the invention, considered for a time as +adequate to reality, decays, returns to the imaginative +phase whence it seems to have emerged, and +remains pure imagination.</p> + + +<h3>IV</h3> + +<p>Imagination is not absent from the third stage of +scientific research, in demonstration and experimentation, +but here we must be brief, (1) because it +passes to a minor place, yielding its rank to other +modes of investigation, and (2) because this study +would have to become doubly employed with the +practical and mechanical imagination, which will +occupy our attention later. The imagination is here +only an auxiliary, a useful instrument, serving:</p> + +<p>(1) In the sciences of reasoning, to discover ingenious +methods of demonstration, stratagems for +avoiding or overcoming difficulties.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[249]</a></span></p> + +<p>(2) In the experimental sciences for inventing +methods of research or of control—whence its analogy, +above mentioned, to the practical imagination. +Furthermore, the reciprocal influence of these two +forms of imagination is a matter of common observation: +a scientific discovery permits the invention +of new instruments; the invention of new instruments +makes possible experiments that are increasingly +more complicated and delicate.</p> + +<p>One remark further: This constructive imagination +at the third stage is the only one met with in +many scientists. They lack genius for invention, +but discover details, additions, corrections, improvements. +A recent author distinguishes (a) those +who have created the hypothesis, prepared the experiments, +and imagined the appropriate apparatus; +(b) those who have imagined the hypothesis and the +experiment, but use means already invented; and +(c) those who, having found the hypothesis made +and demonstrated, have thought out a new method +of verification.<a name="FNanchor_116_116" id="FNanchor_116_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> The scientific imagination becomes +poorer as we follow it down this scale, which, however, +bears no relation to exactness of reasoning and +firmness of method.</p> + +<p>Neglecting species and varieties, we may reduce +the fundamental characters of the scientific imagination +to the following:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[250]</a></span></p> + +<p>For its material, it has concepts, the degree of +abstraction of which varies with the nature of the +science.</p> + +<p>It employs only those associational forms that +have an objective basis, although its mission is to +form new combinations, "the discoveries consisting +of the relation of ideas, capable of being united, +which hitherto have been isolated."<a name="FNanchor_117_117" id="FNanchor_117_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> (Laplace.) +All association with an affective basis is strictly excluded.</p> + +<p>It aims toward objectivity: in its conjectural construction +it attempts to reproduce the order and connection +of things. Whence its natural affinity for +realistic art, which is midway between fiction and +reality.</p> + +<p>It is unifying, and so just the opposite of the +esthetic imagination, which is rather developmental. +It puts forward the master idea (Claude Bernard's +<i>idée directrice</i>), a center of attraction and impulse +that enlivens the entire work. The principle of +unity, without which no creation succeeds, is nowhere +more visible than in the scientific imagination.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[251]</a></span> +Even when illusory, it is useful. Pasteur, scrupulous +scientist that he was, did not hesitate to say: +"The experimenter's illusions are a part of his +power: they are the preconceived ideas serving as +guides for him."</p> + + +<h3>V</h3> + +<p>It does not seem to me wrong to regard the +imagination of the metaphysician as a variety of +the scientific imagination. Both arise from one and +the same requirement. Several times before this +we have emphasized this point—that the various +forms of imagination are not the work of an alleged +"creative instinct," but that each particular one has +arisen from a special need. The scientific imagination +has for its prime motive the need of <i>partial</i> +knowledge or explanation; the metaphysical imagination +has for its prime motive the need of a <i>total</i> +or complete explanation. The latter is no longer an +endeavor on a restricted group of phenomena, but +a conjecture as to the totality of things, as aspiration +toward completely unified knowledge, a need +of final explanation that, for certain minds, is just +as imperious as any other need.</p> + +<p>This necessity is expressed by the creation of a +cosmic or human hypothesis constructed after the +type and methods of scientific hypotheses, but radically +subjective in its origin—only apparently objective. +<i>It is a rationalized myth.</i></p> + +<p>The three moments requisite for the constitution +of a science are found here, but in a modified form:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[252]</a></span> +reflection replaces observation, the choice of the +hypothesis becomes all-important, and its application +to everything corresponds to scientific proof.</p> + +<p>(1) The first moment or preparatory stage, does +not belong to our subject. It requires, however, a +word in passing. In all science, whether well or ill +established, firm or weak, we start from facts derived +from observation or experiment. Here, facts +are replaced by general ideas. The terminus of +every science is, then, the starting-point of philosophical +speculation:—metaphysics begins where +each separate science ends; and the limits of the latter +are theories, hypotheses. These hypotheses become +working material for metaphysics which, consequently, +is an hypothesis built on hypotheses, a +conjecture grafted on conjecture, a work of imagination +superimposed on works of imagination. Its +principal source, then, is imagination, to which reflection +applies itself.</p> + +<p>Metaphysicians, indeed, hold that the object of +their researches, far from being symbolic and abstract, +as in science, or fictitious and imaginary, +as in art, is the very essence of things,—absolute +reality. Unfortunately, they have never proven that +it suffices to seek in order to find, and to wish in +order to get.</p> + +<p>(2) The second stage is critical. It is concerned +with finding the principle that rules and explains +everything. In the invention of his theory the metaphysician +gives his measure, and permits us to value +his imaginative power. But the hypothesis, which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[253]</a></span> +in science is always provisional and revocable, is +here the supreme reality, the fixed position, the <i>inconcussum +quid</i>.</p> + +<p>The choice of the principle depends on several +causes: The chief of these is the creator's individuality. +Every metaphysician has a point of view, +a personal way of contemplating and interpreting the +totality of things, a belief that tends to recruit adherents.</p> + +<p>Secondary causes are: the influence of earlier systems, +the sum of acquired knowledge, the social +<i>milieu</i>, the variable predominance of religions, +sciences, morality, esthetic culture.</p> + +<p>Without troubling ourselves with classifications, +otherwise very numerous, into which we may group +systems (idealism, materialism, monism, etc.) we +shall, for our purpose, divide metaphysicians into +the imaginative and rational, according as the +imagination is superior to the reason or the reason +rules the imagination. The differences between +these two types of mind, already clearly shown in the +choice of the hypothesis, are proven in its development.</p> + +<p>(3) The fundamental principle, indeed, must +come out of its state of involution and justify its +universal validity by explaining everything. This +is the third moment, when the scientific process of +verification is replaced by a process of construction.</p> + +<p>All imaginative metaphysics have a dynamic basis, +e.g., the Platonic <i>Ideas</i>, Leibniz' <i>Monadology</i>, the +<i>Nature-philosophy</i> of Schelling, Schopenhauer's<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[254]</a></span> +<i>Will</i>, and Hartmann's <i>Unconscious</i>, the mystics, the +systems that assume a world-soul, etc. Semi-abstract, +semi-poetic constructions, they are permeated +with imagination not only in the general conception, +but also in the numberless details of its application. +Such are the "fulgurations" of Leibniz, those very +rich digressions of Schopenhauer, etc. They have +the fascination of a work of art as much as that of +science, and this is no longer questioned by metaphysicians +themselves;<a name="FNanchor_118_118" id="FNanchor_118_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> they are living things.</p> + +<p>Rational metaphysics, on the other hand, have a +chilly aspect, which brings them nearer the abstract +sciences. Such are most of the mechanical conceptions, +the Hegelian <i>Dialectic</i>, Spinoza's construction +<i>more geometrico</i>, the <i>Summa</i> of the Middle +Ages. These are buildings of concepts solidly cemented +together with logical relations. But art is +not wholly absent; it is seen in the systematic concatenation, +in the beautiful ordering, in the symmetry +of division, in the skill with which the generative +principle is constantly brought in, in showing +it ever-present, explaining everything. It has been +possible to compare these systems with the architecture +of the Gothic cathedrals, in which the dominant +idea is incessantly repeated in the numberless +details of the construction, and in the branching +multiplicity of ornamentation.</p> + +<p>Further, whatever view we adopt as to its ultimate +value, it must be recognized that the imagination +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[255]</a></span>of the great metaphysicians, by the originality +and fearlessness of its conceptions, by its skill in +perfecting all parts of its work, is inferior to no +other form. It is equal to the highest, if it does not +indeed surpass them.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_109_109" id="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> See Part I, <a href="#Page_31">chapter II</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_110_110" id="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> Cf. the Preface to Kant's <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>. "Our +reason ... is always troubled with questions which cannot +be ignored, because they spring from the very nature of +reason, and which cannot be answered, because they transcend +the powers of human reason." (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_111_111" id="Footnote_111_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> In the rare <i>Notes</i> that he has left, James Watt writes that +one afternoon he had gone out for a stroll on the Green at +Glasgow, and his thoughts were absorbed with the experiments +in which he was busied, trying to prevent the cooling of the +cylinder. The thought then came to him that steam, being an +elastic fluid, should expand and be precipitated in a space formerly +void; and having made a vacuum in a separate vessel +and opened communication between the steam of the cylinder +and the vacant space, we see what should follow. Thus, having +imagined the masterpiece of his discovery, he enumerates the +processes that, employed in turn, allowed him to perfect it.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_112_112" id="Footnote_112_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> For further information we refer to the <i>Logique de l'hypothèse</i>, +by E. Naville, from which are borrowed most of the +facts here given.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_113_113" id="Footnote_113_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> This much-criticised defect has been only partially overcome +in our methods of education through "object" lessons, +and, if we may call them so, evolutionary methods, showing to +the child "wie es eigentlich gewesen." Cf. J. Dewey, "<i>The +School and Society</i>." (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_114_114" id="Footnote_114_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> See above, Part Two, <a href="#Page_140">chapter IV</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_115_115" id="Footnote_115_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> Preface to the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_116_116" id="Footnote_116_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> Colozza, <i>L'immaginazione nella Scienza</i> (Paravia, 1900), +pp. 89 ff. In this author will be found abundant details respecting +famous discoveries or experiments—those of Galileo, +Franklin, Grimaldi, etc.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_117_117" id="Footnote_117_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> Here is an example in confirmation, taken from Duclaux's +book on Pasteur: Herschel established a relation between the +crystalline structure of quartz and the rotatory power of the +substance; later on, Biot established it for sugar, tartaric +acid, etc.—i.e., for substances in solution, whence he concluded +that the rotatory power is due to the form of the molecule +itself, not to the arrangement of the molecules in relation to +one another. Pasteur discovered a relation between molecular +dyssymmetry and hemiedry, and the study of hemiedry in crystals +led him logically to that of fermentation and spontaneous generation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_118_118" id="Footnote_118_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> On this point cf. Fouillée, <i>L'Avenir de la Metaphysique</i>, +pp. 79 ff.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[256]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<h3>THE PRACTICAL AND MECHANICAL IMAGINATION</h3> + + +<p>The study of the practical imagination is not +without difficulties. First of all, it has not hitherto +attracted psychologists, so that we enter the field +at random, and wander unguided in an unexplored +region. But the principal obstacle is in the lack of +determination of this form of imagination, and in +the absence of boundary lines. Where does it begin, +and where does it end? Penetrating all our +life even in its least details, it is likely to lead us +astray through the diversity, often insignificant, of +its manifestations. To convince ourselves of this +fact, let us take a man regarded as least imaginative:—subtract +the moments when his consciousness +is busied with perceptions, memories, +emotions, logical thought and action—all the rest +of his mental life must be put down to the credit +of the imagination. Even thus limited, this function +is not a negligible quantity:—it includes the +plans and constructions for the future, and all the +dreams of escaping from the present; and there is +no man but makes such. This had to be mentioned<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[257]</a></span> +on account of its very triteness, because it is often +forgotten, and consequently the field of the creative +imagination is unduly restricted, being limited little +by little to exceptional cases.</p> + +<p>It must, however, be recognized that these small +facts teach us little. Consequently, following our +adopted procedure, dwelling longest on the clearer +and more evident cases in which the work of creating +appears distinctly, we shall rapidly pass over +the lower forms of the practical imagination, in order +to dwell on the higher form—technical or mechanical +imagination.</p> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>If we take an ordinary imaginative person,—understanding +by this expression, one whom his nature +singles out for no special invention—we see that +he excels in the small inventions, adapted for a +moment, for a detail, for the petty needs constantly +arising in human life. It is a fruitful, ingenious, industrious +mind, one that knows how to "take hold +of things." The active, enterprising American, capable +of passing from one occupation to another according +to circumstances, opportunity, or imagined +profits, furnishes a good example.</p> + +<p>If we descend from this form of sane imagination +toward the morbid forms, we meet first the +unstable—knights of industry, hunters of adventure, +inventors frequently of questionable means, +people hungry for change, always imagining what +they haven't, trying in turn all professions, becoming +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[258]</a></span>workmen, soldiers, sailors, merchants, etc., not +from expediency, but from natural instability.</p> + +<p>Further down are found the acknowledged +"freaks" at the brink of insanity, who are but the +extreme form of the unstable, and who, after having +wasted haphazard much useless imagination, end +in an insane asylum or worse still.</p> + +<p>Let us consider these three groups together. Let +us eliminate the intellectual and moral qualities +characteristic of each group, which establish notable +differences between them, and let us consider only +their inventive capacity as applied to practical life. +One character common to all is mobility—the tendency +to change. It is a matter of current observation +that men of lively imagination are changeable. +Common opinion, which is also the opinion of moralists +and of most psychologists, attributes this mobility, +this instability, to the imagination. This, in +my opinion, is just upside down. <i>It is not because +they have an active imagination that they are +changeable, but it is because they are changeable that +their imagination is active.</i> We thus return to the +<i>motor</i> basis of all creative work. Each new or +merely modified disposition becomes a center of attraction +and pull. Doubtless the inner push is a +necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. If +there were not within them a sufficient number of +concrete, abstract, or semi-abstract representations, +susceptible of various combinations, nothing would +happen; but the origin of invention and of its frequent +or constant changes of direction lies in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[259]</a></span> +emotional and motor constitution, not in the quantity +or quality of representations. I shall not dwell +longer on a subject already treated,<a name="FNanchor_119_119" id="FNanchor_119_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> but it was +proper to show, in passing, that common opinion +starts from an erroneous conception of the primary +conditions of invention—whether great or small, +speculative or practical.</p> + +<p>In the immense empire of the practical imagination, +superstitious beliefs form a goodly province.</p> + +<p>What is superstition? By what positive signs +do we recognize it? An exact definition and a sure +criterion are impossible. It is a flitting notion that +depends on the times, places, and nature of minds. +Has it not often been said that the religion of one +is superstition to another, and <i>vice versâ</i>? This, +too, is only a single instance from among many +others; for the common opinion that restricts superstition +within the bounds of religious faith is an incomplete +view. There are peculiar beliefs, foreign +to every dogma and every religious feeling, from +which the most radical freethinker is not exempt; +for example, the superstitions of gamblers. Indeed, +at the bottom of all such beliefs, we always find the +vague, semi-conscious notion of a mysterious power—destiny, +fate, chance.</p> + +<p>Without taking the trouble to set arbitrary limits, +let us take the facts as they are, without possible +question, i.e., imaginary creations, subjective fancies, +having reality only for those admitting them. +Even a summary collection of past and present superstitions +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[260]</a></span>would fill a library. Aside from those +having a frankly religious mark, others almost as +numerous surround civil life, birth, marriage, death, +appearance and healing of diseases, <i>dies fasti atque +nefasti</i>, propitious or fateful words, auguries drawn +from the meeting or acts of certain animals. The +list would be endless.<a name="FNanchor_120_120" id="FNanchor_120_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a></p> + +<p>All that can be attempted here is a determination +of the principal condition of that state of mind, +the psychology of which is in the last analysis very +simple. We shall thus answer in an indirect and +incomplete manner the question of criterion.</p> + +<p>First, since we hold that the origin of all imaginative +creation is a need, a desire, a tendency, where +then is the origin of that inexhaustible fount of +fancies? <i>In the instinct for individual preservation</i>, +orientated in the direction of the future. Man +seeks to divine future events, and by various means +to act on the order of things to modify it for his +own advantage or to appease his evil fate.</p> + +<p>As for the mental mechanism that, set in motion +by this desire, produces the vain images of the +superstitious, it implies:</p> + +<p>(1) A deep idea of causality, reduced to a <i>post +hoc, ergo propter hoc</i>. Herodotus says of the Egyptian +priests: "They have discovered more prodigies +and presages than any other people, because, when +some extraordinary thing appears, they note it as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[261]</a></span> +well as all the events following it, so that if a similar +prodigy appears anew, they expect to see the +same events reproduced." It is the hypothesis of an +indissoluble association between two or more events, +assumed without verification, without criticism. This +manner of thinking depends on the weakness of the +logical faculties or on the excessive influence of the +feelings.</p> + +<p>(2) The abuse of reasoning by analogy. This +great artisan of the imagination is satisfied with +likenesses so vague and agreements so strange, that +it dares everything. Resemblance is no longer a +quality of things imposed on the mind, but an hypothesis +of the mind imposed on things. Astrology +groups into "constellations" stars that are billions of +miles apart, believes that it discovers there an animal +shape, human or any other, and deduces therefrom +alleged "influences." This star is reddish +(Mars), sign of blood; this other is of a pure, brilliant +silvery light (Venus) or livid (Saturn), and +acts in a different way. We know what clever +structures of conjectures and prognoses have been +built on these foundations. Need we mention the +Middle Age practice of charms, which even in our +day still has adherents among cultured people? +The physicians of the time of Charles II, says Lang, +gave their patients "mummy powder" (pulverized +mummies) because the mummies, having lasted a +long time, must prolong life.<a name="FNanchor_121_121" id="FNanchor_121_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_121_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> Gold in solution has<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[262]</a></span> +been esteemed as a medicine—gold, being a perfect +substance, should produce perfect health. In +order to get rid of a disease nothing is more frequent +among primitive men than to picture the sick +person on wood or on the ground, and to strike +the injured part with an arrow or knife, in order +to annihilate the sickening principle.</p> + +<p>(3) Finally, there is the magic influence ascribed +to certain words. It is the triumph of the theory +of <i>nomina numina</i>; we need not return to it. But +the working of the mind on words, erecting them +into entities, conferring life and power on them—in +a word, the activity that creates myths and is +the final basis of all constructive imagination—appears +also here.<a name="FNanchor_122_122" id="FNanchor_122_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a></p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>Up to this point we have considered the practical +imagination only in its somewhat petty aspect in +small inventions or as semi-morbid in superstitious<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[263]</a></span> +fancies. We now come to its higher form, mechanical +invention.</p> + +<p>This subject has not been studied by psychologists. +Not that they have misunderstood its rôle, which +is, after all, very evident; but they limit themselves +to speak of it cursorily, without emphasizing it.</p> + +<p>In order to appreciate its importance, I see no +other way than to put ourselves face to face with +the works that it has produced, to question the history +of discovery and useful arts, to profit by the +disclosures of inventors and their biographers.</p> + +<p>Of a work of this kind, which would be very long +because the materials are scattered, we can give here +only a rough sketch, merely to take therefrom what +is of interest for psychology and what teaches us +in regard to the characters peculiar to this type of +imagination.</p> + +<p>The erroneous view that opposes imagination to +the useful, and claims that they are mutually exclusive, +is so widespread and so persistent, that we +shall seem to many to be expressing a paradox when +we say that if we could strike the balance of the +imagination that man has spent and made permanent +in esthetic life on the one hand, and in technical +and mechanical invention on the other, the +balance would be in favor of the latter. This assertion, +however, will not seem paradoxical to those +who have considered the question. Why, then, the +view above mentioned? Why are people inclined +to believe that our present subject, if not entirely +foreign to the imagination, is only an impoverished<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[264]</a></span> +form of it? I account for it by the following reasons:</p> + +<p>Esthetic imagination, when fully complete, is +simply <i>fixed</i>, i.e., remains a fictitious matter recognized +as such. It has a frankly subjective, personal +character, arbitrary in its choice of means. A work +of art—a poem, a novel, a drama, an opera, a picture, +a statue—might have been otherwise than it +is. It is possible to modify the general plan, to +add or reduce an episode, to change an ending. +The novelist who in the course of his work changes +his characters; the dramatic author who, in deference +to public sentiment, substitutes a happy <i>denoûement</i> +in place of a catastrophe, furnish naïve +testimony of this freedom of imagination. Moreover, +artistic creation, expressing itself in words, +sounds, lines, forms, colors, is cast in a mould that +allows it only a feeble "material" reality.</p> + +<p>The mechanical imagination is objective—it must +be embodied, take on a form that gives it a place +side by side with products of nature. It is arbitrary +neither in its choice nor in its means; it is not a free +creature having its end in itself. In order to succeed, +it is subjected to rigorous physical conditions, +to a determinism. It is at this cost that it becomes +a reality, and as we instinctively establish an antithesis +between the imaginary and the real, it seems +that mechanical invention is outside the realm of the +imagination. Moreover, it requires the constant +intervention of calculation, of reasoning, and lastly, +of a manual operation of supreme importance. We<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[265]</a></span> +may say without exaggerating that the success of +many mechanical creations depends on the skillful +manipulation of materials. But this last moment, +because it is decisive, should not make us forget its +antecedents, especially the initial moment, which is, +for psychology, similar to all other instances of invention, +when the idea arises, tending to become +objective.</p> + +<p>Otherwise, the differences here pointed out between +the two forms of imagination—esthetic and +mechanical—are but relative. The former is not +independent of technical apprenticeship, often of +long duration (e.g., in music, sculpture, painting). +As for the latter, we should not exaggerate its determinism. +Often the same end can be reached by +different inventions—by means differently imagined, +through different mental constructions; and it follows +that, after all allowances are made, these differently +realized imaginations are equally useful.</p> + +<p>The difference between the two types is found in +the nature of the need or desire stimulating the invention, +and secondly in the nature of the materials +employed. Others have confounded two distinct +things—liberty of imagination, which belongs rather +to esthetic creation, and quality and power of imagination, +which may be identical in both cases.</p> + +<p>I have questioned certain inventors very skillful in +mechanics, addressing myself to those, preferably, +whom I knew to be strangers to any preconceived +psychological theory. Their replies agree, and +prove that the birth and development of mechanical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[266]</a></span> +invention are very strictly like those found in other +forms of constructive imagination. As an example, +I cite the following statement of an engineer, which +I render literally:</p> + +<p>"The so-called creative imagination surely proceeds +in very different ways, according to temperament, +aptitudes, and, in the same individual, following +the mental disposition, the <i>milieu</i>.</p> + +<p>"We may, however, as far as regards mechanical +inventions, distinguish four sufficiently clear phases—the +germ, incubation, flowering, and completion.</p> + +<p>"By germ I mean the first idea coming to the +mind to furnish a solution for a problem that the +whole of one's observations, studies, and researches +has put before one, or that, put by another, has +struck one.</p> + +<p>"Then comes incubation, often very long and +painful, or, again, even unconscious. Instinctively +as well as voluntarily one brings to the solution of +the problem all the materials that the eyes and ears +can gather.</p> + +<p>"When this latent work is sufficiently complete, +the idea suddenly bursts forth, it may be at the end +of a voluntary tension of mind, or on the occasion of +a chance remark, tearing the veil that hides the surmised +image.</p> + +<p>"But this image always appears simple and clear. +In order to get the ideal solution into practice, there +is required a struggle against matter, and the bringing +to an issue is the most thankless part of the inventor's +work.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[267]</a></span></p> + +<p>"In order to give consistence and body to the idea +caught sight of enthusiastically in an aureole, one +must have patience, a perseverance through all trials. +One must view on all sides the mechanical agencies +that should serve to set the image together, until the +latter has attained the simplicity that alone makes +invention viable. In this work of bringing to a +head, the same spirit of invention and imagination +must be constantly drawn upon for the solution of +all the details, and it is against this arduous requirement +that the great majority of inventors rebel again +and again.</p> + +<p>"This is then, I believe, how one may in a general +way understand the genesis of an invention. It follows +from this that here, as almost everywhere, the +imagination acts through association of ideas.</p> + +<p>"Thanks to a profound acquaintance with known +mechanical methods, the inventor succeeds, through +association of ideas, in getting novel combinations +producing new effects, towards the realization of +which his mind has in advance been bent."</p> + +<p>But for a slightly explored subject, the foregoing +remarks are not enough. It is necessary to determine +more precisely the general and special characters +of this form of imagination.</p> + + +<h3><i>1. General Characters</i></h3> + +<p>I term general characters those that the mechanical +imagination possesses in common with the best +known, least questioned forms of the constructive +imagination. In order to be convinced that, so far<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[268]</a></span> +as concerns these characters it does not differ from +the rest, let us take, for the sake of comparison, +esthetic imagination, since it is agreed, rightly or +wrongly, that this is the model <i>par excellence</i>. We +shall see that the essential psychological conditions +coincide in the two instances.</p> + +<p>The mechanical imagination thus has like the other +its ideal, i.e., a perfection conceived and put +forward as capable, little by little, of being realized. +The idea is at first hidden; it is, to use our correspondent's +phrase, "the germ," the principle of unity, +center of attraction, that suggests, excites, and +groups appropriate associations of images, in which +it is enwrapped and organized into a structure, an +<i>ensemble</i> of means converging toward a common +end. It thus presupposes a dissociation of experience. +The inventor undoes, decomposes, breaks +up in thought, or makes of experience a tool, an +instrument, a machine, an agency for building anew +with the débris.</p> + +<p>The practical imagination is no more foreign to +inspiration than the esthetic imagination. The history +of useful inventions is full of men who suffered +privations, persecution, ruin; who fought to +the bitter end against relatives and friends—drawn +by the need of creating, fascinated not by the hope +of future gain but by the idea of an imposed mission, +of a destiny they had to fulfill. What more +have poets and artists done? The fixed and irresistible +idea has led more than one to a foreseen +death, as in the discovery of explosives, the first<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[269]</a></span> +attempts at lightning conductors, aeronautics, and +many others. Thus, from a true intuition, primitive +civilizations have put on a level great poets +and great inventors, erected into divinities or demi-gods +historical or legendary personages in whom the +genius of discovery is personified:—among the Hindoos, +Vicavakarma; among the Greeks, Hephaestos, +Prometheus, Triptolemus, Daedalus and Icarus. The +Chinese, despite their dry imagination, have done +the same; and we find the same condition in Egypt, +Assyria, and everywhere. Moreover, the practical +and mechanical arts have passed through a first +period of no-change, during which the artisan, subjected +to fixed rules and an undisputed tradition, +considers himself an instrument of divine revelation.<a name="FNanchor_123_123" id="FNanchor_123_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> +Little by little he has emerged from that +theological age, to enter the humanistic age, when, +being fully conscious of being the author of his +work, he labors freely, changes and modifies according +to his own inspiration.</p> + +<p>Mechanical and industrial imagination, like esthetic +imagination, has its preparatory period, its +zenith and decline: the periods of the precursors, of +the great inventors, and of mere perfectors. At +first a venture is made, effort is wasted with small +result,—the man has come too early or lacks clear +vision; then a great imaginative mind arises, blossoms; +after him the work passes into the hands of +<i>dii minores</i>, pupils or imitators, who add, abridge,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[270]</a></span> +modify: such is the order. The many-times written +history of the application of steam, from the +time of the eolipile of Hero of Alexandria to the +heroic period of Newcomen and Watt, and the improvements +made since their time, is one proof of +the statement. Another example:—the machine for +measuring duration is at first a simple clepsydra; +then there are added marks indicating the subdivisions +of time, then a water gauge causes a hand to +move around a dial, then two hands for the hours +and minutes; then comes a great moment—by the +use of weights the clepsydra becomes a clock, at +first massive and cumbersome, later lightened, becoming +capable, with Tycho-Brahé, of marking seconds; +and then another moment—Huyghens invents +the spiral spring to replace the weights, and the +clock, simplified and lightened, becomes the watch.</p> + + +<h3><i>2. Special Characters</i></h3> + +<p>The special characteristics of the mechanical +imagination being the marks belonging to this type, +we shall study them at greater length.</p> + +<p>(I) There is first of all, at least in great inventors, +an inborn quality,—that is, a natural disposition,—that +does not originate in experience and +owes the latter only its development. This quality +is a bent in a practical, useful direction; a tendency +to act, not in the realm of dreams or human feeling, +not on individuals or social groups, not toward the +attainment of theoretical knowledge of nature, but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[271]</a></span> +to become master over natural forces, to transform +them and adapt them toward an end.</p> + +<p>Every mechanical invention arises from a need: +from the strict necessity for individual preservation +in the case of primitive man who wages war against +the powers of nature; from the desire for well-being +and the necessity for luxury in growing civilization; +from the need of creating little engines, imitating +instruments and machines, in the child. In a word, +<i>every particular invention, great or small, arises +from a particular need</i>; for, we repeat again, there +is no creative instinct in general. A man distinguished +for various inventions along practical lines, +writes: "As far as my memory allows, I can state +that in my case conception always results from a +material or mental need.<a name="FNanchor_124_124" id="FNanchor_124_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_124_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> It springs up suddenly. +Thus, in 1887, a speech of Bismarck made me so +angry that I immediately thought of arming my<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[272]</a></span> +country with a repeating rifle. I had already made +various applications to the ministry of war, when +I learned that the Lebel system had just been +adopted. My patriotism was fully satisfied, but I +still have the design of the gun that I invented." +This communication mentions two or three other inventions +that arose under analogous circumstances, +but have had a chance of being adopted.</p> + +<p>Among the requisite qualities I mention the natural +and necessary preëminence of certain groups of +sensations or images (visual, tactile, motor) that +may be decisive in determining the direction of the +inventor.</p> + +<p>(II) Mechanical invention grows by successive +stratifications and additions, as in the sciences, but +more completely. It is a fine verification of the +"subsidiary law of growing complexity" previously +discussed.<a name="FNanchor_125_125" id="FNanchor_125_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> If we measure the distance traversed +since the distant ages when man was naked and +unarmed before nature to the present time of the +reign of machinery, we are astonished at the amount +of imagination produced and expended, often uselessly +lavished, and we ask ourselves how such a +work could have been misunderstood or so lightly +appreciated. It does not pertain to our subject to +make even a summary table of this long development. +The reader can consult the special works +which, unfortunately, are most often fragmentary +and lack a general view. So we should feel grateful +to a historian of the useful arts, L. Bourdeau, for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[273]</a></span> +having attempted to separate out the philosophy of +the subject, and for having fastened it down in the +following formulas:<a name="FNanchor_126_126" id="FNanchor_126_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a></p> + +<p>(a) The exploitation of the powers of nature is +made according to their degree of power.</p> + +<p>(b) The extension of working instruments has +followed a logical evolution in the direction of growing +complexity and perfection.</p> + +<p>Man, according to the observations of M. Bourdeau, +has applied his creative activity to natural +forces and has set them to work according to a regular +order, viz.:</p> + +<p>(1) Human forces, the only ones available during +the "state of nature" and the savage state. Before +all else, man created weapons: the most circumscribed +primitive races have invented engines +for attack and defense—of wood, bone, stone, as +they were able. Then the weapon became a tool +by special adaptation:—the battle-club serves as a +lever, the tomahawk as a hammer, the flint ax as a +hatchet, etc. In this manner there is gradually +formed an arsenal of instruments. "Inferior to +most animals as regards certain work that would +have to be done with the aid of our organic resources +alone, we are superior to all as soon as we set our +tools at work. If the rodents with their sharp teeth +cut wood better than we can, we do it still better +with the ax, the chisel, the saw. Some birds, with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[274]</a></span> +the help of a strong beak, by repeated blows, penetrate +the trunk of a tree: but the auger, the gimlet, +the wimble do the same work better and more +quickly. The knife is superior to the carnivore's +teeth for tearing meat; the hoe better than the mole's +paw for digging earth, the trowel than the beaver's +tail for beating and spreading mortar. The oar permits +us to rival the fish's fin; the sail, the wing of +the bird. The distaff and spindle allow our imitating +the industry of insect spinners; etc. Man +thus reproduces and sums up in his technical contrivances +the scattered perfections of the animal +world. He even succeeds in surpassing them, because, +in the form of tools, he uses substances and +combinations of effects that cannot figure as part of +an organism."<a name="FNanchor_127_127" id="FNanchor_127_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> It is scarcely likely that most of +these inventions arose from a voluntary imitation of +animals: but even supposing such an origin, there +would still remain a fine place for personal creative +work. Man has produced by conscious effort what +life realizes by methods that escape us; so that the +creative imagination in man is a <i>succedaneum</i> of the +generative powers of nature.</p> + +<p>(2) During the pastoral stage man brought animals +under subjection and discipline. An animal +is a machine, ready-made, that needs only to be +trained to obedience; but this training has required +and stimulated all sorts of inventions, from the harness +with which to equip it, to the chariots, wagons, +and roads with which and on which it moves.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[275]</a></span></p> + +<p>(3) Later, the natural motors—air and water—have +furnished new material for human ingenuity, +e.g., in navigation; wind- and water-mills, used at +first to grind grain, then for a multitude of uses—sawing, +milling, lifting hammers; etc.</p> + +<p>(4) Lastly, much later, come products of an already +mature civilization, artificial motors, explosives,—powder +and all its derivatives and substitutes—steam, +which has made such great +progress.</p> + +<p>If the reader please to represent to himself well +the immense number of facts that we have just indicated +in a few lines; if he please to note that +every invention, great or small, before becoming a +fixed and realized thing, was at first an imagination, +a mere contrivance of the brain, an assembly of new +combinations or new relations, he will be forced to +admit that nowhere—not excepting even esthetic +production—has man imagined to such a great extent.</p> + +<p>One of the reasons—though not the only one—that +supports the contrary opinion is, that by the +very law of their growing complexity, inventions +are grafted one on another. In all the useful arts +improvements have been so slow, and so gradually +wrought, that each one of them passed unperceived, +without leaving its author the credit for its discovery. +The immense majority of inventions are +anonymous—some great names alone survive. But, +whether individual or collective, imagination remains +imagination. In order that the plow, at first<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[276]</a></span> +a simple piece of wood hardened by the fire and +pushed along with the human hand, should become +what it is to-day, through a long series of modifications +described in the special works, who knows +how many imaginations have labored! In the same +way, the uncertain flame of a resinous branch guiding +vaguely in the night leads us, through a long +series of inventions, to gas and electric lighting. +All objects, even the most ordinary and most common +that now serve us in our everyday-life, are <i>condensed +imagination</i>.</p> + +<p>(III) More than any other form, mechanical +imagination depends strictly on physical conditions. +It cannot rest content with combining images, it +postulates material factors that impose themselves +unyieldingly. Compared to it, the scientific imagination +has much more freedom in the building of +its hypotheses. In general, every great invention +has been preceded by a period of abortive attempts. +History shows that the so-called "initial moment" +of a mechanical discovery, followed by its improvements, +is the moment ending a series of unsuccessful +trials: we thus skip a phase of pure imagination, +of imaginative construction that has not been able +to enter into the mold of an appropriate determinism. +There must have existed innumerable inventions +that we might term mechanical romances, +which, however, we cannot refer to because they +have left us no trace, not being born viable. Others +are known as curiosities because they have +blazed the path. We know that Otto de Guericke<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[277]</a></span> +made four fruitless attempts before discovering his +air-pump. The brothers Montgolfier were possessed +with the desire to make "imitation clouds," like +those they saw moving over the Alps. "In order +to imitate nature," they at first enclosed water-vapor +in a light, stout case, which fell on cooling. +Then they tried hydrogen; then the production of a +gas with electrical properties; and so on. Thus, +after a succession of hypotheses and failures, they +finally succeeded. From the end of the sixteenth +century there was offered the possibility of communicating +at a distance by means of electricity. +"In a work published in 1624 the Jesuit, Father +Leurechon, described an imaginary apparatus (by +means of which, he said, people could converse at a +distance) for the aid of lovers who, by the connection +of their movements, would cause a needle to +move about a dial on which would be written the +letters of the alphabet; and the drawing accompanying +the text is almost a picture of Breguet's telegraph." +But the author considered it impossible +"in the absence of lovers having such ability."<a name="FNanchor_128_128" id="FNanchor_128_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p> + +<p>Mechanical inventions that fail correspond to +erroneous or unverified scientific hypotheses. They +do not emerge from the stage of pure imagination,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[278]</a></span> +but they are instructive to the psychologist because +they give in bare form the initial work of the constructive +imagination in the technical field.</p> + +<p>There still remain the requirements of reasoning, +of calculation, of adaptation to the properties of +matter. But, we repeat, this determinism has several +possible forms—one can reach the same goal +through different means. Besides, these determining +conditions are not lacking in any type of imagination; +there is only a difference as between lesser +and greater. Every imaginative construction from +the moment that it is little more than a group of +fancies, a spectral image haunting a dreamer's brain, +must take on a body, submit to external conditions +on which it depends, and which materialize it somewhat. +In this respect, architecture is an excellent +example. It is classed among the fine arts; but it +is subject to so many limitations that its process +of invention strongly resembles technical and mechanical +creations. Thus it has been possible to say +that "Architecture is the least personal of all the +arts." "Before being an art it is an industry in the +sense that it has nearly always a useful end that is +imposed on it and rules its manifestations. Whatever +it builds—a temple, a theater, a palace—it must +before all else subordinate its work to the end assigned +to it in advance. This is not all:—it must +take account of materials, climate, soil, location, +habits—of all things that may require much skill, +tact, calculation, which, however, do not interest<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[279]</a></span> +art as such, and do not permit architecture to manifest +its purely esthetic qualities."<a name="FNanchor_129_129" id="FNanchor_129_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a></p> + +<p>Thus, at bottom, there is an identity of nature +between the constructive imagination of the mechanic +and that of the artist: the difference is only +in the end, the means, and the conditions. The +formula, <i>Ars homo additus naturae</i>, has been too +often restricted to esthetics—it should comprehend +everything artificial. Esthetes, doubtless, hold that +their imagination has for them a loftier quality—a +disputed question that psychology need not discuss; +for it, the essential mechanism is the same in +the two cases: a great mechanic is a poet in his own +way, because he makes instruments imitating life. +"Those constructions that at other times are the +marvel of the ignorant crowd deserve the admiration +of the reflecting:—Something of the power that +has organized matter seems to have passed into combinations +in which nature is imitated or surpassed. +Our machines, so varied in form and in function, +are the representatives of a new kingdom intermediate +between senseless and animate forms, having +the passivity of the former and the activity of the +latter, and exploiting everything for our sake. They +are counterfeits of animate beings, capable of giving +inert substances a regular functioning. Their +skeleton of iron, organs of steel, muscles of leather, +soul of fire, panting or smoking breath, rhythm of +movement—sometimes even the shrill or plaintive<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[280]</a></span> +cries expressing effort or simulating pain:—all that +contributes to give them a fantastic likeness to life—a +specter and dream of inorganic life."<a name="FNanchor_130_130" id="FNanchor_130_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_119_119" id="Footnote_119_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> See above, Part One, <a href="#Page_31">chapter II</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_120_120" id="Footnote_120_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> For a complete and recent study of the question, see A. Lehmann, +<i>Aberglaube und Zauberei von den ältesten Zeiten bis in +die Gegenwart</i>, 1898.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_121_121" id="Footnote_121_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_121_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> Lang, <i>op. cit.</i>, I, 96. There will be found many other facts +of this kind.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_122_122" id="Footnote_122_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_122_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> If this book were not merely an essay, we should have had +to study language as an instrument of the practical life in its +relations to the creative imagination, especially the function of +analogy, in the extension and transformation of the meanings +of words. Works on linguistics are full of evidence on this +point. One could do better still by attending exclusively to the +vernacular, to slang, which shows us creative force in action. +"Slang," says one philologist, "has the property of figuring, +expressing, and picturing language.... With it, however +low its origin, one could reconstruct a people or a society." +Its principal, not only, means, are metaphor and allegory. It +lends itself equally to methods that degrade or ennoble existing +words, but with a very marked preference for the worse or +degrading meanings.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_123_123" id="Footnote_123_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_123_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> Ample information on this point will be found in the work +of Espinas, <i>Les Origines de la Technologie</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_124_124" id="Footnote_124_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_124_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> The same correspondent, without my having asked him in +regard to this, gives me the following details: "When about +seven years old I saw a locomotive, its fire and smoke. My +father's stove also made fire and smoke, but lacked wheels. If, +then, I told my father, we put wheels under the stove, it would +move like a locomotive. Later, when about thirteen, the sight of +a steam threshing-machine suggested to me the idea of making +a horseless wagon. I began a childish construction of one, +which my father made me give up," etc. The tendency toward +mechanical invention shows itself very early in some children—we +gave examples of it before. Our inventor adds: "My +imagination was strongest at about the age of 25 to 35 (I am +now 45 years old). After that time it seems to me that the +remainder of life is good only for producing less important +conceptions, forming a natural consequence of the principal conceptions +born of the period of youth."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_125_125" id="Footnote_125_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_125_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> See above, Part Two, <a href="#Page_167">chapter V</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_126_126" id="Footnote_126_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_126_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> L. Bourdeau, <i>Les Forces de l'Industrie</i>, Paris, 1884. This +very substantial work, abounding in facts, conceived after a +systematic plan, has aided us much in this study.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_127_127" id="Footnote_127_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_127_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, pp. 45-46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_128_128" id="Footnote_128_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_128_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> Quoted by L. Bourdeau (<i>op. cit.</i>, p. 354), who also mentions +many other attempts: an anonymous Scot in 1753, Lesage of +Geneva, 1780, Lhomond (France, 1787), Battencourt (Spain, +1787), Reiser, a German (1794), Salva (Madrid, 1796). The +insufficient study of dynamic electricity did not permit them +to succeed.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_129_129" id="Footnote_129_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> E. Veron, <i>L'Esthétique</i>, p. 315.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_130_130" id="Footnote_130_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_130_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> L. Bourdeau, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 233.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[281]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<h3>THE COMMERCIAL IMAGINATION</h3> + + +<p>Taking the word "commercial" in its broadest +signification, I understand by this expression all +those forms of the constructive imagination that +have for their chief aim the production and distribution +of wealth, all inventions making for individual +or collective enrichment. Even less studied +than the form preceding, this imaginative manifestation +reveals as much ingenuity as any other. The +human mind is largely busied in that way. There +are inventors of all kinds—the great among these +equal those whom general opinion ranks as highest. +Here, as elsewhere, the great body invent nothing, +live according to tradition, in routine and imitation.</p> + +<p>Invention in the commercial or financial field is +subject to various conditions with which we are not +concerned:</p> + +<p>(1) External conditions:—Geographical, political, +economic, social, etc., varying according to +time, place, and people. Such is its external determinism—human +and social here in place of cosmic, +physical, as in mechanical invention.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[282]</a></span></p> + +<p>(2) Internal, psychological conditions, most of +which are foreign to the primary and essential inventive +act:—on one hand, foresight, calculation, +strength of reasoning;—in a word, capacity for reflection; +on the other hand, assurance, recklessness, +soaring into the unknown—in a word, strong capacity +for action. Whence arise, if we leave out the +mixed forms, two principal types—the calculating, +the venturesome. In the former the rational element +is first. They are cautious, calculating, selfish +exploiters, with no great moral or social preoccupations. +In the latter, the active and emotional element +predominates. They have a broader sweep. +Of this sort were the merchant-sailors of Tyre, +Carthage, and Greece; the merchant-travelers of the +Middle Ages, the mercantile and gain-hungry explorers +of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth +centuries; later, in a changed form, the organizers of +great companies, the inventors of monopolies, +American "trusts," etc. These are the great imaginative +minds.</p> + +<p>Eliminating, then, from our subject, what is not +the purely imaginative element in order to study +it alone, I see only two points for us to treat, if we +would avoid repetition—at the initial moment of invention, +the intuitive act that is its germ; during +the period of development and organization, the +necessary and exclusive rôle of schematic images.</p> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>By "intuition" we generally understand a practical, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[283]</a></span>immediate judgment that goes straight to the +goal. Tact, wisdom, scent, divination, are synonymous +or equivalent expressions. First let us note +that intuition does not belong exclusively to this +part of our subject, for it is found <i>in parvo</i> throughout; +but in commercial invention it is preponderating +on account of the necessity of perceiving quickly +and surely, and of grasping chances. "Genius for +business," someone has said, "consists in making +exact hypotheses regarding the fluctuations of +values." To characterize the mental state is easy, +if it is a matter merely of giving examples; very +difficult, if one attempts to discover its mechanism.</p> + +<p>The physician who in a trice diagnoses a disease, +who, on a higher level, groups symptoms in order +to deduce a new disease from them, like Duchenne +de Boulogne; the politician who knows human nature, +the merchant who scents a good venture, etc., +furnish examples of intuition. It does not depend +on the degree of culture;—not to mention women, +whose insight into practical matters is well known, +there are ignorant people—peasants, even savages—who, +in their limited sphere, are the equals of fine +diplomats.</p> + +<p>But all these facts teach us nothing concerning its +psychological nature. Intuition presupposes acquired +experience of a special nature that gives the +judgment its validity and turns it in a particular +direction. Nevertheless, this accumulated knowledge +of itself gives no evidence as to the future. +Now, every intuition is an anticipation of the future,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[284]</a></span> +resulting from only two processes:—inductive or deductive +reasoning, e.g., the chemist foreseeing a +reaction; imagination, i.e., a representative construction. +Which is the chief process here? Evidently +the former, because it is not a matter of fancied +hypothesis, but of adaptation of former experience +to a new case. Intuition resembles logical +operations much more than it does imaginative combinations. +We may liken it to unconscious reasoning, +if we are not afraid of the seeming contradiction +of this expression which supposes a logical +operation without consciousness of the middle term. +Although questionable, it is perhaps to be preferred +to other proposed explanations—such as automatism, +habit, "instinct," "nervous connections." Carpenter, +who as promoter of "unconscious cerebration," +deserves to be consulted, likens this state to +reflection. In ending, he reprints a letter that +John Stuart Mill wrote to him on the subject, in +which he says in substance that this capacity is found +in persons who have experience and lean toward +practical things, but attach little importance to +theory.<a name="FNanchor_131_131" id="FNanchor_131_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a></p> + +<p>Every intuition, then, becomes concrete as a judgment, +equivalent to a conclusion. But what seems +obscure and even mysterious in it is the fact that, +from among many possible solutions, it finds at the +first shot the proper one. In my opinion this difficulty +arises largely from a partial comprehension +of the problem. By "intuition" people mean only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[285]</a></span> +cases in which the divination is correct; they forget +the other, far more numerous, cases that are failures. +The act by which one reaches a conclusion is a special +case of it. What constitutes the originality of +the operation is not its accuracy, but its <i>rapidity</i>—the +latter is the essential character, the former accessory.</p> + +<p>Further, it must be acknowledged that the gift of +seeing correctly is an inborn quality, vouchsafed to +one, denied to another:—people are born with it, +just as they are born right-or left-handed: experience +does not give it—only permits it to be put to +use. As for knowing why the intuitive act now succeeds +and at another time fails, that is a question +that comes down to the natural distinction between +accurate and erroneous minds, which we do not need +to examine here.</p> + +<p>Without dwelling longer on this initial stage, let +us return to the commercial imagination, and follow +it in its development.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>The human race passed through a pre-commercial +age. The Australians, Fuegians, and their class +seem to have had no idea whatever of exchange. +This primitive period, which was long, corresponds +to the age of the horde or large clan. Commercial +invention, arising like the other forms from needs,—simple +and indispensable at first, artificial and superfluous +later,—could not arise in that dim period +when the groups had almost their sole relations with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[286]</a></span> +one another as war. Nothing called it to arise. But +at a higher stage the rudimentary form of commerce, +exchange in kind or truck, appeared early +and almost everywhere. Then this long, cumbersome, +inconvenient method gave place to a more +ingenious invention—the employment of "standard +values," beings or material objects serving as a +common measure for all the rest:—their choice varied +with the time, place, and people—e.g., certain +shells, salt, cocoa-seeds, cloth, straw-matting, cattle, +slaves, etc.; but this innovation held all the remainder +in the germ, for it was the first attempt at substitution. +But during the earliest period of commercial +evolution the chief effort at invention consisted +of finding increasingly more simple methods +in the mechanism of exchange. Thus, there succeeded +to these disparate values, the precious metals, +in the form of powder and ingots, subject to theft +and the inconveniences of weighing. Then, money +of fixed denomination, struck under the authority of +a chief or of a social group. Finally, gold and silver +are replaced by the letter of credit, the bank check, +and the numerous forms of fiduciary money.<a name="FNanchor_132_132" id="FNanchor_132_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_132_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a></p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[287]</a></span></p> +<p>Every one of these forward steps is due to inventors. +I say inventors, in the plural, because it +is proven that every change in the means of exchange +has been imagined several times, in several +ages—though in the same way—on the surface of +our earth.</p> + +<p>Summing up—the inventive labor of this period +is reduced to creating increasingly more simple and +more rapid methods of <i>substitution</i> in the commercial +mechanism.</p> + +<p>The appearance of commerce on a large scale has +depended on the state of agriculture, industry, ways +of communication, social and economic conditions +and political extension. It came into being toward +the end of the Roman Republic. After the interruption +of the Middle Ages the activity is taken up +again by the Italian cities, the Hanseatic League, +etc.; in the fifteenth century with the great maritime +discoveries; in the sixteenth century by the <i>Conquistadores</i>, +hungering for adventure and wealth; +later on, by the mixed expeditions, whose expenses +are defrayed by merchants in common, and which +are often accompanied by armed bands that fight +for them; lastly comes the incorporation of great +companies that have been wittily dubbed "<i>Conquistadores</i> +of the counting-house."</p> + +<p>We now come to the moment when commercial +invention attains its complex form and must move +great masses. Taken as a whole, its psychological +mechanism is the same as that of any other creative +work. In the first instance, the idea arises, from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[288]</a></span> +inspiration, from reflection, or by chance. Then +comes a period of fermenting during which the inventor +sketches his construction in images, represents +to himself the material to be worked upon, the +grouping of stockholders, the making up of a capital, +the mechanism of buying and selling, etc. All +this differs from the genesis of an esthetic or mechanical +work only in the end, or in the nature of the +images. In the second phase it is necessary to proceed +to execution—a castle in the air must be made +a solid structure. Then appear a thousand obstructions +in the details that must be overcome. As +everywhere else, minor inventions become grafted +on the principal invention; the author lets us see the +poverty or richness in resource of his mind. Finally, +the work is triumphant, fails, or is only half-successful.</p> + +<p>Did it keep only to these general traits, commercial +imagination would be merely the reiteration, +with slight changes, of forms already studied; but +it has characteristics all its own that must be distinguished.</p> + +<p>(1) It is a combining or tactical imagination. +Heretofore, we have met nothing like it. This special +mark is derived from the very nature of its +determinism, which is very different from that limiting +the scientific or mechanical imagination. Every +commercial project, in order to emerge from the internal, +purely imaginative phase, and become a +reality, requires "coming to a head," very exact +calculation of frequently numerous, divergent, even<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[289]</a></span> +contrary elements. The American dealer speculating +in grain is under the absolute necessity of being +quickly and surely informed regarding the agricultural +situation in all countries of the world that +are rich in grain, that export or import; in regard +to the probable chances of rain or drouth; the tariff +duties of the various countries, etc. Lacking that, +he buys and sells haphazard. Moreover, as he deals +in enormous quantities, the least error means great +losses, the smallest profit on a unit is of account, +and is multiplied and increased into a noticeable +gain.</p> + +<p>Besides that initial intuition that shows opportune +business and moments, commercial imagination presupposes +a well-studied, detailed campaign for attack +and defense, a rapid and reliable glance at +every moment of execution in order to incessantly +modify this plan—it is a kind of war. All this +totality of special conditions results from a general +condition,—namely, competition, strife. We shall +come back to this point at the end of the chapter.</p> + +<p>Let us follow to the end the working of this +creative imagination. Like the other forms, this +kind of invention arises from a need, a desire—that +of the spreading of "self-feeling," of the expansion +of the individual under the form of enrichment. +But this tendency, and with it the resulting imaginative +creation, can undergo changes.</p> + +<p>It is a well-known law of the emotional life that +what is at first sought as a means may become an +end and be desired for itself. A very sensual passion +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[290]</a></span>may at length undergo a sort of idealization; +people study a science at first because it is useful, and +later because of its fascination; and we may desire +money in order to spend it, and later in order to +hoard it. Here it is the same: the financial inventor +is often possessed with a kind of intoxication—he +no longer labors for lucre, but for art; he becomes, +in his own way, an author of romance. His imagination, +set at the beginning toward gain, now seeks +only its complete expansion, the assertion and eruption +of its creative power, the pleasure of inventing +for invention's sake,<a name="FNanchor_133_133" id="FNanchor_133_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> daring the extraordinary, +the unheard-of—it is the victory of pure construction. +The natural equilibrium between the three +necessary elements of creation—mobility, combination +of images, calculation—is destroyed. The rational +element gives way, is obliterated, and the +speculator is launched into adventure with the possibility +of a dazzling success or astounding catastrophe. +But let us note well that the primary and sole +cause of this change is in the affective and motor +element, in an hypertrophy of the lust for power, in +an unmeasured and morbid want of expansion of +self. Here, as everywhere, the source of invention +is the emotional nature of the inventor.</p> + +<p>(2) A second special character of commercial +imagination is the exclusive employment of schematic +representations. Although this process is also +met with in the sciences and especially in social<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[291]</a></span> +inventions, the imaginative type that we are now +considering has the privilege of using them without +exception. This, then, is the proper moment +for a description.</p> + +<p>By "schematic images" I mean those that are, by +their very nature, intermediate between the concrete +image and the pure concept, but approach more +nearly the concept. We have already pointed out +very different kinds of representations—concrete +images, material pertaining to plastic and mechanical +imagination; the emotional abstractions of the diffluent +imagination; affective images, the type of +which is found in musicians; symbolic images, familiar +in mystics. It may seem improper to add +another class to this list, but it is not a meaningless +subtlety. Indeed, there are no images in general +that, according to the ordinary conception, would +be copies of reality. Even their separation into +visual, auditory, motor, etc., is not sufficient, because +it distinguishes them only with regard to their +<i>origin</i>. There are other differences. We have seen +that the image, like everything living, undergoes +corrosions, damages, twisting, and transformation: +whence it comes about that this remainder of former +impressions varies according to its composition, i.e., +in simplicity, complexity, grouping of its constitutive +elements, etc., and takes on many aspects. On +the other hand, as the difference between the chief +types of creative imagination depends in part on the +materials employed—on the nature of the images +that serve in mental building—a precise determination +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[292]</a></span>of the nature of the images belonging to each +type is not an idle operation.</p> + +<p>In order to clearly explain what we mean by +schematic images, let us represent by a line, <i>PC</i>, the +scale of images according to the degree of complexity, +from the percept, <i>P</i>, to the concept, <i>C</i>.</p> + +<p class='center'> +P——————X——G——S——C<br /> +</p> + +<p>As far as I am aware, this determination of all +the degrees has never been made. The work would +be delicate; I do not regard it as impossible. I +have no intention to undertake it, even as I do not +pretend that I have given above the complete list +of the various forms of images.</p> + +<p>If, then, we consider the foregoing figure merely +as a means of representing the gradation to the eye, +the image in moving, by hypothesis, from the moment +of perception, <i>P</i>, is less and less in contact +with reality, becomes simplified, impoverished, and +loses some of its constitutive elements. At <i>X</i> it +crosses the middle threshold to approach nearer and +nearer to the concept. At <i>G</i> let us locate generic +images, primitive forms of generalization, whose +nature and process of becoming are well-known;<a name="FNanchor_134_134" id="FNanchor_134_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_134_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> +we should place farther along, at <i>S</i>, schematic +images, which require a higher function of mind. +Indeed, the generic image results from a spontaneous +fusion of like or very analogous images—such +as the vague representation of the oak, the horse,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[293]</a></span> +the negro, etc.; it belongs to only one class of objects. +The schematic image results from a voluntary +act; it is not limited to exact resemblances—it +rises into abstraction; so it is scarcely accompanied +by a fleeting representation of concrete objects—it +is almost reduced to the word. At a higher level, +it is freed from all sensuous elements or pictures, +and is reduced, in the present instance, to the mere +notion of value—it is not different from a pure concept. +While the artist and the mechanic build with +concrete images, the commercial imagination can +act directly neither on things nor on their immediate +representations, because from the time that it +goes beyond the primitive age it requires a substitution +of increasing generality; materials become +values that are in turn reducible to symbols. Consequently, +it proceeds as in the stating and solving +of abstract problems in which, after having substituted +for things and their relations figures and +letters, calculation works with signs, and indirectly +with things.</p> + +<p>Aside from the first moment of invention, the +finding of the idea—an invariable psychological +state—it must be recognized that in its development +and detailed construction the commercial imagination +is made up chiefly of calculations and combinations +that hardly permit concrete images. If we +admit, then,—and this is unquestionable—that these +are the materials <i>par excellence</i> of the creative imagination, +we shall be disposed to hold that the imaginative +type we are now studying is a kind of involution, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[294]</a></span>a case of impoverishment—an unacceptable +thesis as regards the invention itself, but strictly +acceptable as regards the conditions that necessity +imposes upon it.</p> + +<p>In closing, let us note that financial imagination +does not always have as its goal the enriching of an +individual or of a closely limited group of associates: +it can aim higher, act on greater masses, address +itself strenuously to a problem as complex as +the reformation of the finances of a powerful state. +All the civilized nations count in their history men +who imagined a financial system and succeeded, +with various fortunes, in making it prevail. The +word "system," consecrated by usage, makes unnecessary +any comment, and relates this form of +imagination to that of scientists and philosophers. +Every system rests on a master-conception, on an +ideal, a center about which there is assembled the +mental construction made up of imagination and +calculation which, if circumstances permit, must +take shape, must show that it can live.</p> + +<p>Let us call to mind the author of the first, or at +least, of the most notorious of these "systems." +Law claimed that he was applying "the methods of +philosophy, the principles of Descartes, to social +economy, abandoned hitherto to chance and empiricism." +His ideal was the institution of <i>credit</i> +by the state. Commerce, said he, was during its +first stage the exchange of merchandise in kind; +in a second stage, exchange by means of another, +more manageable, commodity or universal value, security +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[295]</a></span>equivalent to the object it represented; it +must enter a third stage when exchange will be +made by a purely conventional sign having no value +of its own. Paper represents money, just as the +latter represents goods, "with the difference that +the paper is not security, but a simple promise, constituting +credit." The state must do systematically +what individuals have done instinctively; but it +must also do what individuals cannot do—create +currency by printing on the paper of exchange the +seal of public authority. We know the history of +the downfall of this system, the eulogies and criticisms +it has received:—but because of the originality +and boldness of his views, the inexhaustible fecundity +of his lesser inventions, Law holds an undisputed +place among the great imaginative minds.</p> + + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>We said above that commerce, in its higher manifestations, +is a kind of war.<a name="FNanchor_135_135" id="FNanchor_135_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> Here, then, would +be the place to study the military imagination. The +subject cannot be treated save by a man of the profession, +so I shall limit myself to a few brief remarks +based on personal information, or gleaned +from authorities.</p> + +<p>Between the various types of imagination hitherto +studied we have shown great differences as regards<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[296]</a></span> +their external conditions. While the so-called forms +of pure imagination, whence esthetic, mythic, religious, +mystic creations arise, can realize themselves +by submitting to material conditions that are simple +and not very exacting, the others can become embodied +only when they satisfy an <i>ensemble</i> of numerous, +inevitable, rigorously determined conditions; +the goal is fixed, the materials are rigid, there is +little choice of the appropriate means. If there be +added to the inflexible laws of nature unforeseen +human passions and determinations, as in political +or social invention, or the offensive combination of +opponents, as in commerce and war; then the imaginative +construction is confronted with problems of +constantly growing complexity. The most ingenious +inventor cannot invent an object as a whole, +letting his work develop through an immanent +logic:—the early plan must be continually modified +and readapted; and the difficulty arises not merely +from the multiple elements of the problem to be +solved, but from ceaseless changes in their positions. +So one can advance only step by step, and go forward +by calculations and strict examination of possibilities. +Hence it results that underneath this +thick covering of material and intellectual conditions +(calculation, reasoning), spontaneity (the aptness +for finding new combinations, "that art of inventing +without which we hardly advance"<a name="FNanchor_136_136" id="FNanchor_136_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a>) reveals +itself to few clear-sighted persons; but, in spite +of everything, this creative power is everywhere,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[297]</a></span> +flowing like subterranean streams, a vivifying +agency.</p> + +<p>These general remarks, although not applicable +exclusively to the military imagination, find their +justification in it, because of its extreme complexity. +Let us rapidly enumerate, proceeding from without +inwards, the enormous mass of representations that +it has to move and combine in order to make its +construction adequate to reality, able at a precise +moment to cease being a dream:—(1) Arms, engines, +instruments of destruction and supply, varying +according to time, place, richness of the country, +etc. (2) The equally variable human element—mercenaries, +a national army; strong, tried troops +or weak and new. (3) The general principles of +war, acquired by the study of the masters. (4) More +personal is the power of reflection, the habitual +solving of tactical and strategic problems. "Battles," +said Napoleon, "are thought out at length, and in +order to be successful it is necessary that we think +several times in regard to what may happen." All +the foregoing should be headed "science." Advancing +more and more within the secret psychology +of the individual, we come to art, the characteristic +work of pure imagination. (5) Let us note the +exact, rapid intuition at the commencement of the +opportune moments. (6) Lastly, the creative element, +the conception, a natural gift bearing the hall-mark +of each inventor. Thus "the Napoleonic esthetics +was always derived from a single concept, +based on a principle that may be summed up thus:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[298]</a></span>—Strict +economy wherever it can be done; expenditure +without limit on the decisive point. This principle +inspires the strategy of the master; it directs +everything, especially his battle-tactics, in which it +is synthetized and summed up."<a name="FNanchor_137_137" id="FNanchor_137_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a></p> + +<p>Such, in analytical terms, appears the hidden +spring that makes everything move, and it is to be +attributed neither to experience nor to reasoning, +nor to wise combinations, for it arises from the innermost +depths of the inventor. "The principle +exists in him in a latent state, i.e., in the depths of +the unconscious, and unconsciously it is that he +applies it, when the shock of the circumstances, of +goal and means, causes to flash from his brain the +spark stimulating the artistic solution <i>par excellence</i>, +one that reaches the limits of human perfection."<a name="FNanchor_138_138" id="FNanchor_138_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_131_131" id="Footnote_131_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_131_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> Carpenter, <i>Mental Physiology</i>, chapter XI (end).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_132_132" id="Footnote_132_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> Historically, the evolution has not always proceeded strictly +in this order, which, however, seems the most logical one. +Negotiable drafts were known to the Assyrians and Carthaginians. +For thousands of years Egypt used ingots, not real +money, but it was acquainted with fiduciary money. In the +new world, the Peruvians made use of the scale, the Aztecs +were ignorant of its use, etc. For details, see Letourneau, +<i>L'Évolution du commerce dans les diverses races humaines</i>, +Paris, 1897, especially pp. 264, 330, 354, 384, etc.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_133_133" id="Footnote_133_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_133_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> This condition has been well-described by various novelists, +among them Zola, in <i>Money</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_134_134" id="Footnote_134_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_134_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> For further details on this point, we refer the reader to +our <i>Evolution of General Ideas</i> (chapter I).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_135_135" id="Footnote_135_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_135_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> A general, a former professor in the War College, told me +that when he heard a great merchant tell of the quick and sure +service of his commercial information, the conception of the +whole, and the care in all the details of his operations, he could +not keep from exclaiming, "Why, that is war!"</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_136_136" id="Footnote_136_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_136_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> Leibniz.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_137_137" id="Footnote_137_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> General Bonnal, <i>Les Maîtres de la Guerre</i>, 1899, p. 137. +"In him (Napoleon)," says the writer, "there was something +of the poet, and one could explain all his acts by means of +this singular complex, a medley of imagination, passion, and +calculation. The dreams of an Ossian with the positive cast +of mind of a mathematician and the passions of a Corsican—such +were the heterogeneous elements that clashed in that +powerful organization" (p. 151).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_138_138" id="Footnote_138_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_138_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 6.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[299]</a></span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<h3>THE UTOPIAN IMAGINATION<a name="FNanchor_139_139" id="FNanchor_139_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a></h3> + + +<p>When the human mind creates, it can use only +two classes of ideas as materials to embody its idea, +viz.:</p> + +<p>(1) Natural phenomena, the forces of the organic +and inorganic worlds. In its scientific form, +seeking to explain, to know, it ends in the hypothesis, +a disinterested creation. In its industrial aspect, +aiming towards application and utilization, it ends +in practical, interested inventions.</p> + +<p>(2) Human, i.e., psychic elements—instincts, +passions, feelings, ideas, and actions. Esthetic creation +is the disinterested form, social invention is the +utilitarian form.</p> + +<p>Consequently, we may say that invention in +science resembles invention in the fine arts, both +being speculative; and that mechanical and industrial +invention approaches social invention through +a common tendency toward the practical. I shall +not insist on this distinction, which, to be definite,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[300]</a></span> +rests only on partial characters; I merely wish to +mention that invention, whose rôle in social, political +and moral evolution is large, must, in order +to be a success, adopt certain processes while neglecting +others. This the Utopians do not do.</p> + +<p>The development of human societies depends on +a multitude of factors, such as race, geographic and +economic conditions, war, etc., which we need +neither enumerate nor study. One only belongs to +our topic—the successive appearance of idealistic +conceptions that, like all other creations of mind, +tend to realize themselves, the moral ideal consisting +of new combinations arising from the predominance +of one feeling, or from an unconscious elaboration +(inspiration), or from analogy.</p> + +<p>At the beginning of civilizations we meet semi-historic, +semi-legendary persons—Manu, Zoroaster, +Moses, Confucius, etc., who were inventors or reformers +in the social and moral spheres. That a +part of the inventions attributed to them must be +credited to predecessors or successors is probable; +but the invention, no matter who is its author, remains +none the less invention. We have said elsewhere, +and may repeat, that the expression <i>inventor</i> +in morals may seem strange to some, because we are +imbued with the notion of a knowledge of good and +evil that is innate, universal, bestowed on all men +and in all times. If we admit, on the other hand, +as observation compels us to do, not a ready-made +morality, but a morality in the making, it must be, +indeed, the <i>creation</i> of an individual or of a group.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[301]</a></span> +Everybody recognizes inventors in geometry, in +music, in the plastic and mechanic arts; but there +have also been men who, in their moral dispositions, +were very superior to their contemporaries, and +were promoters, initiators.<a name="FNanchor_140_140" id="FNanchor_140_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> For reasons of which +we are ignorant, analogous to those that produce a +great poet or a great painter, there arise moral +geniuses who feel strongly what others do not feel +at all, just as does a great poet, in comparison with +the crowd. But it is not enough that they feel: they +must create, they must realize their ideal in a belief +and in rules of conduct accepted by other men. All +the founders of great religions were inventors of +this kind. Whether the invention comes from +themselves alone, or from a collectivity of which +they are the sum and incarnation, matters little. In +them moral invention has found its complete form; +like all invention, it is organic. The legend relates +that Buddha, possessed with the desire of finding +the perfect road of salvation for himself and all other +men, gives himself up, at first, to an extravagant +asceticism. He perceives the uselessness of this +and renounces it. For seven years he meditates, +then he beholds the light. He comes into possession +of knowledge of the means that give freedom +from <i>Karma</i> (the chain of causes and effects), and +from the necessity of being born again. Soon he +renounces the life of contemplation, and during fifty +years of ceaseless wanderings preaches, makes converts, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[302]</a></span>organizes his followers. Whether true or +false historically, this tale is psychologically exact. +A fixed and besetting idea, trial followed by failure, +the decisive moment of <i>Eureka!</i> then the inner revelation +manifests itself outwardly, and through the +labors of the master and his disciples becomes complete, +imposes itself on millions of men. In what +respect does this mode of creation differ from others, +at least in the practical order?</p> + +<p>Thus, from the viewpoint of our present study, +we may divide ethics into living and dead. Living +ethics arise from needs and desires, stimulate an +imaginative construction that becomes fixed in actions, +habits and laws; they offer to men a concrete, +positive ideal which, under various and often contrary +aspects, is always happiness. The lifeless +ethics, from which invention has withdrawn, arise +from reflection upon, and the rational codification of, +living ethics. Stored away in the writings of philosophers, +they remain theoretical, speculative, without +appreciable influence on the masses, mere material +for dissertation and commentary.</p> + +<p>In proportion as we recede from distant origins +the light grows, and invention in the social and +moral order becomes manifest as the work of two +principal categories of minds—the fantastic, the +positive. The former, purely imaginative beings, +visionaries, utopians, are closely related to poets and +artists. The latter, practical creators or reformers, +capable of organizing, belong to the family of inventors +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[303]</a></span>in the industrial-commercial-mechanical order.</p> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>The chimerical form of imagination, applied to +the social sciences, is the one that, taking account +neither of the external determinism nor of practical +requirements, spreads out freely. Such are the creators +of ideal republics, seeking for a lost or to-be-discovered-in-the-future +golden age, constructing, as +their fancy pleases, human societies in their large +outlines and in their details. They are social novelists, +who bear the same relation to sociologists that +poets do to critics. Their dreams, subjected merely +to the conditions of an inner logic, have lived only +within themselves, an ideal life, without ever passing +through the test of application. It is the +creative imagination in its unconscious form, restrained +to its first phase.</p> + +<p>Nothing is better known than their names and +their works: The <i>Republic</i> of Plato, Thomas More's +<i>Utopia</i>, Campanella's <i>City of the Sun</i>, Harrington's +<i>Oceana</i>, Fenelon's <i>Salente</i>, etc.<a name="FNanchor_141_141" id="FNanchor_141_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> However idealistic +they may be, one could easily show that all the +materials of their ideal are taken from the surrounding +reality, they bear the stamp of the <i>milieu</i>, be it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[304]</a></span> +Greek, English, Christian, etc., in which they lived, +and it should not be forgotten that in the Utopians +everything is not chimerical—some have been revealers, +others have acted as stimuli or ferments. +True to its mission, which is to make innovations, +the constructive imagination is a spur that arouses; +it hinders social routine and prevents stagnation.</p> + +<p>Among the creators of ideal societies there is one, +almost contemporary, who would deserve a study +of individual psychology—Ch. Fourier. If it is a +question merely of fertility in pure construction, I +doubt whether we could find one superior to him—he +is equal to the highest, with the special characteristic +of being at the same time exuberant to delirium +and exact in details to the least minutiæ. He +is such a fine type of the imaginative intellect that he +deserves that we stop a moment.</p> + +<p>His cosmogony seems the work of an omnipotent +demiurge fashioning the universe at will. His conception +of the future world with its "counter-cast" +creations, where the present ugliness and troubles +of animal reign become changed into their opposites, +where there will be "anti-lions," "anti-crocodiles," +"anti-whales," etc., is one example of hundreds +showing his inexhaustible richness in fantastic visions: +the work of an imagination that is hot and +overflowing, with no rational preoccupation.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, his psychogony, based on the +idea of metempsychosis borrowed from the Orient, +gives itself up to numerical vagaries. Assuming for +every soul a periodical rebirth, he assigns it first a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[305]</a></span> +period of "ascending subversion," the first phase +of which lasts five thousand years, the second thirty-six +thousand; then comes a period of completion, +9,000 years; and then a period of "descending subversion," +whose first stage is 27,000 years, and the +second 4,000 years—a total of 81,000 years. This +form of imagination is already known to us.<a name="FNanchor_142_142" id="FNanchor_142_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p> + +<p>The principal part of his psychology, the theory +of the emotions, questionable in many respects, is +relatively rational. But in the construction of human +society, the duality of his imagination—powerful +and minute—reappears. We know his methodical +organization: the <i>group</i>, composed of seven to +nine persons; the <i>series</i>, comprising twenty-four to +thirty-two groups; a <i>phalanx</i> that includes eighteen +groups, constituting the phalanstery; the small city, +a general center of phalanges; the provincial city, +the imperial capital, the universal metropolis. He +has a passion for classification and ordering; "his +phalanstery works like a clock."</p> + +<p>This rare imaginative type well deserved a few +remarks, because of its mixture of apparent exactness +and a natural, unconscious utopianism and extravagance. +For, beneath all these pulsating inventions +of precise, petty details, the foundation is none +the less a purely speculative construction of the +mind. Let us add an incredible abuse of analogy, +that chief intellectual instrument of invention, of +which only the reading of his books can give an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[306]</a></span> +idea.<a name="FNanchor_143_143" id="FNanchor_143_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> Heinrich Heine said of Michelet, "He has a +Hindoo imagination." The term would apply still +better to Fourier, in whom coexist unchecked profusion +of images and the taste for numerical accumulations. +People have tried to explain this abundance +of figures and calculation as a professional +habit—he was for a long time a bookkeeper or +cashier, always an excellent accountant. But this +is taking the effect for cause. This dualism existed +in the very nature of his mind, and he took advantage +of it in his calling. The study of the +numerical imagination<a name="FNanchor_144_144" id="FNanchor_144_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a> has shown how it is frequently +met with among orientals, whose imaginative +development is unquestioned, and we have seen +why the idealistic imagination agrees so well with +the indefinite series of numbers and makes use of it +as a vehicle.</p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>With practical inventors and reformers the ideal +falls—not that they sacrifice it for their personal +interests, but because they have a comprehension of +possibilities. The imaginative construction must be +corrected, narrowed, mutilated, if it is to enter into<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[307]</a></span> +the narrow frame of the conditions of existence, until +it becomes adapted and determined. This process +has been described several times, and it is needless +to repeat it here in other terms. Nevertheless, the +ideal—understanding by this term the unifying +principle that excites creative work and supports it +in its development—undergoes metamorphosis and +must be not only individual but collective; the creation +does not realize itself save through a "communion +of minds," by a co-operation of feelings and +of wills; the work of one conscious individual must +become the work of a social consciousness.</p> + +<p>That form of imagination, creating and organizing +social groups, manifests itself in various degrees +according to the tendency and power of creators.</p> + +<p>There are the founders of small societies, religious +in form—the Essenes, the earliest Christian +communities, the monastic orders of the Orient and +Occident, the great Catholic or Mohammedan congregations, +the semi-lay, semi-religious sects like +the Moravian Brotherhood, the Shakers, Mormons, +etc. Less complete because it does not cover the +individual altogether in all the acts of life is the +creation of secret associations, professional unions, +learned societies, etc. The founder conceives an +ideal of complete living or one limited to a given +end, and puts it into practice, having for material +men grouped of their free choice, or by coöptation.</p> + +<p>There is invention operating on great masses—social +or political invention strictly so called—ordinarily +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[308]</a></span>not proposed but imposed, which, however, +despite its coercive power, is subject to requirements +even more numerous than mechanical, industrial, or +commercial invention. It has to struggle against +natural forces, but most of all against human forces—inherited +habits, customs, traditions. It must +make terms with dominant passions and ideas, finding +its justification, like all other creation, only in +success.</p> + +<p>Without entering into the details of this inevitable +determination, which would require useless repetition, +we may sum up the rôle of the constructive +imagination in social matters by saying that it has +undergone a regression—i.e., that its area of development +has been little by little narrowed; not that +inventive genius, reduced to pure construction in +images, has suffered an eclipse, but on its part it +has had to make increasingly greater room for experiment, +rational elements, calculation, inductions +and deductions that permit foresight—for practical +necessities.</p> + +<p>If we omit the spontaneous, instinctive, semi-conscious +invention of the earliest ages, that was +sufficient for primitive societies, and keep to creations +that were the result of reflection and of great +pretension, we can roughly distinguish three successive +periods:</p> + +<p>(1) A very long idealistic phase (Antiquity, Renaissance) +when triumphed the pure imagination, +and the play of the free fancy that spends itself in +social novels. Between the creation of the mind<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[309]</a></span> +and the life of contemporary society there was no +relation; they were worlds apart, strangers to one +another. The true Utopians scarcely troubled themselves +to make applications. Plato and More—would +they have wished to realize their dreams?</p> + +<p>(2) An intermediate phase, when an attempt is +made to pass from the ideal to the practical, from +pure speculation to social facts. Already, in the +eighteenth century, some philosophers (Locke, +Rousseau) drew up constitutions, at the request of +interested persons. During this period, when the +work of the imagination, instead of merely becoming +fixed in books, tends to become objectified in +acts, we find many failures and some successes. Let +us recall the fruitless attempts of the "phalansteries" +in France, in Algeria, Brazil, and in the +United States. Robert Owen was more fortunate;<a name="FNanchor_145_145" id="FNanchor_145_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_145_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> +in four years he reformed New Larnak, after his +ideal, and with varying fortune founded short-lived +colonies. Saint-Simonism has not entirely died out; +the primitive civilization after his ideal rapidly disappeared, +but some of his theories have filtered into +or have become incorporated with other doctrines.</p> + +<p>(3) A phase in which imaginative creation becomes +subordinated to practical life: The conception +of society ceases to be purely idealistic or constructed +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[310]</a></span><i>a priori</i> by deduction from a single principle; +it recognizes the conditions of its environment, +adapts itself to the necessities of its development. +It is the passage from the absolutely autonomous +state of the imagination to a period when it submits +to the laws of a rational imperative. In other +words, the transition from the esthetic to the scientific, +and especially the practical, form. Socialism +is a well-known and excellent example of this. +Compare its former utopias, down to about the middle +of the last century, with its contemporary forms, +and without difficulty we can appreciate the amount +of imaginative elements lost in favor of an at least +equivalent quantity of rational elements and positive +calculations.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_139_139" id="Footnote_139_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_139_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> This title, as will be seen later, corresponds only in part +to the contents of this chapter.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_140_140" id="Footnote_140_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> For facts in support, see the <i>Psychology of the Emotions</i>, +Second Part, chapter VIII.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_141_141" id="Footnote_141_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_141_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> Our author does not mention Bacon's <i>New Atlantis</i>, one of +the best specimens of its kind. "Wisest Verulam," active +and distinguished in so many fields, is not amenable to rules, +and is here found among "idealists," as elsewhere among the +foremost empiricists and iconoclasts. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_142_142" id="Footnote_142_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> See above, Part III, <a href="#Page_221">chapter III</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_143_143" id="Footnote_143_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_143_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> We recommend to the reader the "Epilogue sur l'Analogie," +in <i>Le Monde Industriel</i>, pp. 244 ff., where he will learn +that the "goldfinch depicts the child born of poor parents; +the pheasant represents the jealous husband; the cock is the +symbol of the man of the world; the cabbage is the emblem of +mysterious love," etc. There are several pages in this tone, +with alleged reasons in support of the statements.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_144_144" id="Footnote_144_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_144_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> See above, <a href="#Page_195">chapter II</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_145_145" id="Footnote_145_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_145_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> For an excellent account of the principles of these movements, +see Rae, <i>Contemporary Socialism</i>; for Owen's ideals, +his <i>Autobiography</i>; and for an account of some of the trials, +Bushee's "Communistic Societies in the United States," +<i>Political Science Quarterly</i>, vol. XX, pp. 625 ff. (Tr.)</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[311]</a></span></p> +<h2>CONCLUSION.</h2><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[312]</a></span></p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[313]</a></span></p> +<h2>CONCLUSION</h2> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Foundations of the Creative Imagination</span></h3> + +<p>Why is the human mind able to create? In a +certain sense this question may seem idle, childish, +and even worse. We might just as well ask why +does man have eyes and not an electric apparatus +like the torpedo? Why does he perceive directly +sounds but not the ultra-red and ultra-violet rays? +Why does he perceive changes of odors but not magnetic +changes? And so on <i>ad infinitum</i>. We will +put the question in a very different manner: Being +given the physical and mental constitution of man +such as it is at present, how is the creative imagination +a natural product of this constitution?</p> + +<p>Man is able to create for two principal reasons. +The first, motor in nature, is found in the action +of his needs, appetites, tendencies, desires. The +second is the possibility of a spontaneous revival of +images that become grouped in new combination.</p> + +<p>1. We have already shown in detail<a name="FNanchor_146_146" id="FNanchor_146_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> that the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[314]</a></span> +hypothesis of a "creative instinct," if the expression +is used not as an abbreviated or metaphorical formula +but in the strict sense, is a pure chimera, an +empty entity. In studying the various types of imagination +we have always been careful to note that +every mode of creation may be reduced, as regards +its beginnings, to a tendency, a want, a special, determinate +desire. Let us recall for the last time these +initial conditions of all invention—these desires, conscious +or not, that excite it.</p> + +<p>The wants, tendencies, desires—it matters not +which term we adopt—the whole of which constitutes +the instinct of individual preservation, have +been the generators of all inventions dealing with +food-getting, housing, making of weapons, instruments, +and machines.</p> + +<p>The need for individual and social expansion or +extension has given rise to military, commercial, +and industrial invention, and in its disinterested +form, esthetic creation.</p> + +<p>As for the sexual instinct, its psychic fertility is +in no way less than the physical—it is an inexhaustible +source of imagination in everyday life as well as +in art.</p> + +<p>The wants of man in contact with his fellows +have engendered, through instinctive or reflective +action, the numerous social and practical creations +regulating human groups, and they are rough or +complex, stable or unstable, just or unjust, kindly +or harsh.</p> + +<p>The need of knowing and of explaining, well or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[315]</a></span> +ill, has created myths, religions, philosophical systems, +scientific hypotheses.</p> + +<p>Every want, tendency or desire may, then, become +creative, by itself or associated with others, +and into these final elements it is that analysis +must resolve "creative spontaneity." This vague expression +corresponds to a <i>sum</i>, not to a special property.<a name="FNanchor_147_147" id="FNanchor_147_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> +Every invention, then, has a <i>motor</i> origin; +<i>the ultimate basis of the constructive imagination is +motor</i>.</p> + +<p>2. But needs and desires by themselves cannot +create—they are only a stimulus and a spring. +Whence arises the need of a second condition—the +spontaneous revival of images.</p> + +<p>In many animals that are endowed only with +memory the return of images is always provoked. +Sensation from without or from within bring them<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[316]</a></span> +into consciousness under the form, pure and simple, +of former experience; whence we have reproduction, +repetition without new associations. People +of slight imagination and used to routine approach +this mental condition. But, as a matter of +fact, man from his second year on, and some higher +animals, go beyond this stage—they are capable of +spontaneous revival. By this term I mean that revival +that comes about abruptly, without <i>apparent</i> +antecedents. We know that these act in a latent +form, and consist of thinking by analogy, affective +dispositions, unconscious elaboration. This sudden +appearance excites other states which, grouped into +new associations, contain the first elements of the +creative act.</p> + +<p>Taken altogether, and however numerous its +manifestations, the constructive imagination seems +to me reducible to three forms, which I shall call +<i>sketched</i>, <i>fixed</i>, <i>objectified</i>, according as it remains +an internal fancy, or takes on a material but contingent +and unstable form, or is subjected to the +conditions of a rigorous internal or external determinism.</p> + +<p>(a) The <i>sketched</i> form is primordial, original, +the simplest of all; it is a nascent moment or first +attempt. It appears first of all in dreaming—an +embryonic, unstable and uncoördinated manifestation +of the creative imagination—a transition-stage +between passive reproduction and organized construction. +A step higher is revery, whose flitting +images, associated by chance, without personal intervention, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[317]</a></span>are nevertheless vivid enough to exclude +from consciousness every impression of the external +world—so much so that the day-dreamer re-enters +it only with a shock of surprise. More coherent are +the imaginary constructions known as "castles in +Spain"—the works of a wish considered unrealizable, +fancies of love, ambition, power and wealth, +the goal of which seems to be forever beyond our +reach. Lastly, still higher, come all the plans for +the future conceived vaguely and as barely possible—foreseeing +the end of a sickness, of a business +enterprise, of a political event, etc.</p> + +<p>This vague and "outline" imagination, penetrating +our entire life, has its peculiar characters—the +unifying principle is <i>nil</i> or ephemeral, which fact always +reduces it to the dream as a type; it does not +externalize itself, does not change into acts, a consequence +of its basically chimerical nature or of +weakness of will, which reduces it to a strictly internal +and individual existence. It is needless to say +that this kind of imagination is a permanent and +definite form with the dreamers living in a world of +ceaselessly reappearing images, having no power to +organize them, to change them into a work of art, +a theory, or a useful invention.</p> + +<p>The "sketched" form is or remains an elementary, +primitive, automatic form. Conformably to the general +law ruling the development of mind—passage +from indefinite to definite, from the incoherent to +the coherent, from spontaneity to reflection, from +the reflex to the voluntary period—the imagination<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[318]</a></span> +comes out of its swaddling-clothes, is changed—through +the intervention of a teleological act that +assigns it an end; through the union of rational elements +that subdue it for an adaptation. Then appear +the other two forms.</p> + +<p>(b) The <i>fixed</i> form comprises mythic and esthetic +creations, philosophical and scientific hypotheses. +While the "outline" imagination remains an internal +phenomenon, existing only in and for a single individual, +the fixed form is projected outwards, made +something else. The former has no reality other +than the momentary belief accompanying it; the latter +exists by itself, for its creator and for others; +the work is accepted, rejected, examined, criticised. +Fiction rests on the same level as reality. Do not +people discuss seriously the objective value of certain +myths, and of metaphysical theories? the action of a +novel or drama as though it were a matter of real +events? the character of the <i>dramatis personae</i> as +though they were living flesh and blood?</p> + +<p>The fixed imagination moves in an elastic frame. +The material elements circumscribing it and composing +it have a certain fluidity; they are language, +writing, musical sounds, colors, forms, lines. Furthermore, +we know that its creations, in spite of the +spontaneous adherence of the mind accepting them, +are the work of a free will; they could have been +otherwise—they preserve an indelible imprint of +contingency and subjectivity.</p> + +<p>(c) This last mark is rubbed out without disappearing +(for a thing imagined is always a personal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[319]</a></span> +thing) in the objectified form that comprises successful +practical inventions—whether mechanical, industrial, +commercial, military, social, or political. +These have no longer an arbitrary, borrowed reality; +they have their place in the totality of physical +and social phenomena. They resemble creations of +nature, subject like them to fixed conditions of +existence and to a limited determinism. We shall +not dwell longer on this last character, so often +pointed out.</p> + +<p>In order the better to comprehend the distinction +between the three forms of imagination let us +borrow for a moment the terminology of spiritualism +or of the common dualism—merely as a means +of explaining the matter clearly. The "outline" +imagination is a soul without a body, a pure +spirit, without determination in space. The "fixed" +imagination is a soul or spirit surrounded by an +almost immaterial sheath, like angels or demons, +genii, shadows, the "double" of savages, the <i>peresprit</i> +of spiritualists, etc. The <i>objectified</i> imagination +is soul and body, a complete organization after +the pattern of living people; the ideal is incarnated, +but it must undergo transformation, reductions and +adaptations, in order that it may become practical—just +as the soul, according to spiritualism, must bend +to the necessities of the body, to be at the same time +the servant of, and served by, the bodily organs.</p> + +<p>According to general opinion the great imaginers +are found only in the first two classes, which is, +in the strict sense of the word, true; in the full<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[320]</a></span> +sense of the word false. As long as it remains "outline," +or even "fixed," the constructive imagination +can reign as supreme mistress. Objectified, it still +rules, but shares its power with competitors; it +avails nought without them, they can do nothing +without it. What deceives us is the fact that we see +it no longer in the open. Here the imaginative +stroke resembles those powerful streams of water +that must be imprisoned in a complicated network +of canals and ramifications varying in shape and +in diameter before bursting forth in multiple jets +and in liquid architecture.<a name="FNanchor_148_148" id="FNanchor_148_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_148_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a></p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Imaginative Type.</span></h3> + +<p>Let us try now, by way of conclusion, to present +to the reader a picture of the whole of the imaginative +life in all its degrees.</p> + +<p>If we consider the human mind principally under +its intellectual aspect—i.e., insofar as it knows and +thinks, deducting its emotions and voluntary activity—the +observation of individuals distinguishes +some very clear varieties of mentality.</p> + +<p>First, those of a "positive" or realistic turn of +mind, living chiefly on the external world, on what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[321]</a></span> +is perceived and what is immediately deducible +therefrom—alien or inimical to vain fancy; some of +them flat, limited, of the earth earthy; others, men +of action, energetic but limited by real things.</p> + +<p>Second, abstract minds, "quintessence abstractors," +with whom the internal life is dominant in the form +of combinations of concepts. They have a schematic +representation of the world, reduced to a hierarchy +of general ideas, noted by symbols. Such are the +pure mathematicians, the pure metaphysicians. If +these two tendencies exist together, or, as happens, +are grafted one on the other, without anything to +counterbalance them, the abstract spirit attains its +perfect form.</p> + +<p>Midway between these two groups are the imaginers +in whom the internal life predominates in the +form of combinations of images, which fact distinguishes +them clearly from the abstractors. The +former alone interest us, and we shall try to trace +this imaginative type in its development from the +normal or average stage to the moment when ever-growing +exuberance leads us into pathology.</p> + +<p>The explanation of the various phases of this development +is reducible to a well-known psychologic +law—the natural antagonism between sensation and +image, between phenomena of peripheral origin and +phenomena of central origin; or, in a more general +form, between the outer and inner life. I shall not +dwell long on this point, which Taine has so admirably +treated.<a name="FNanchor_149_149" id="FNanchor_149_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a> He has shown in detail how the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[322]</a></span> +image is a spontaneously arising sensation, one that +is, however, aborted by the opposing shock of real +sensation, which is its reducer, producing on it an +arresting action and maintaining it in the condition +of an internal, subjective fact. Thus, during the +waking hours, the frequency and intensity of impressions +from without press the images back to the +second level; but during sleep, when the external +world is as it were suppressed, their hallucinatory +tendency is no longer kept in check, and the world +of dreams is momentarily the reality.</p> + +<p>The psychology of the imaginer reduces itself to +a progressively increasing interchange of rôles. +Images become stronger and stronger states; perceptions, +more and more feeble. In this movement +opposite to nature I note four steps, each of which +corresponds to particular conditions: (1) The quantity +of images; (2) quantity and intensity; (3) +quantity, intensity and duration; (4) complete systematization.</p> + +<p>(1) In the first place the predominance of imagination +is marked only by the quantity of representations +invading consciousness; they teem, break +apart, become associated, combine easily and in various +ways. All the imaginative persons who have +given us their experiences either orally or in writing +agree in regard to the extreme ease of the formation +of associations, not in repeating past expedience, +but in sketching little romances.<a name="FNanchor_150_150" id="FNanchor_150_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a> From +among many examples I choose one. One of my<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[323]</a></span> +correspondents writes that if at church, theatre, on +a street, or in a railway station, his attention is attracted +to a person—man or woman—he immediately +makes up, from the appearance, carriage and attractiveness +his or her present or past, manner of +life, occupation—representing to himself the part of +the city he or she must dwell in, the apartments, +furniture, etc.—a construction most often erroneous; +I have many proofs of it. Surely this disposition +is normal; it departs from the average only by an +excess of imagination that is replaced in others by +an excessive tendency to observe, to analyze, or to +criticise, reason, find fault. In order to take the +decisive step and become abnormal one condition +more is necessary—intensity of the representations.</p> + +<p>2. Next, the interchange of place, indicated +above, occurs. Weak states (images) become +strong; strong states (perceptions) become weak. +The impressions from without are powerless to fulfill +their regular function of inhibition. We find +the simplest example of this state in the exceptional +persistence of certain dreams. Ordinarily, our nocturnal +imaginings vanish as empty phantasmagorias +at the inrush of the perceptions and habits of daily +life—they seem like faraway phantoms, without objective +value. But, in the struggle occurring, on +waking, between images and perceptions, the latter +are not always victorious. There are dreams—i.e., +imaginary creations—that remain firm in face of +reality, and for some time go along parallel with it. +Taine was perhaps the first to see the importance<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[324]</a></span> +of this fact. He reports that his relative, Dr. Baillarger, +having dreamt that one of his friends had +been appointed editor of a journal, announced the +news seriously to several persons, and doubt arose +in his mind only toward the end of the afternoon. +Since then contemporary psychologists have gathered +various observations of this kind.<a name="FNanchor_151_151" id="FNanchor_151_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a> The emotional +persistence of certain dreams is known. So-and-so, +one of our neighbors, plays in a dream an +odious rôle; we may have a feeling of repulsion or +spite toward him persisting throughout the day. +But this triumph of the image, accidental and +ephemeral in normal man, is frequent and stable +in the imaginers of the second class. Many among +them have asserted that this internal world is the +only reality. Gérard de Nerval "had very early the +conviction that the majority is mistaken, that the +material universe in which it believes, because its +eyes see it and its hands touch it, is nothing but +phantoms and appearances. For him the invisible +world, on the contrary, was the only one not chimerical." +Likewise, Edgar Allan Poe: "The real +things of the world would affect me like visions, and +only so; while the wild ideas of the land of dreams +became in turn not only the feeding ground of my +daily existence but positively the sole and entire +existence itself." Others describe their life as "a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[325]</a></span> +permanent dream." We could multiply examples. +Aside from the poets and artists, the mystics would +furnish copious examples. Let us take an exaggerated +instance: This permanent dream is, indeed, +only a part of their existence; it is above all active +through its intensity; but, while it lasts, it absorbs +them so completely that they enter the external +world only with a sudden, violent and painful shock.</p> + +<p>(3) If the changing of images into strong states +preponderating in consciousness is no longer an +episode but a lasting disposition, then the imaginative +life undergoes a partial systematization that +approaches insanity. Everyone may be "absorbed" +for a moment; the above-mentioned authors are so +frequently. On a higher level this invading supremacy +of the internal life becomes a habit. This third +degree is but the second carried to excess.</p> + +<p>Some cases of double personality (those of Azam, +Reynolds) are known in which the second state is at +first embryonic and of short duration; then its +appearances are repeated, its sphere becomes extended. +Little by little it engrosses the greater part +of life; it may even entirely supplant the earlier self. +The growing working of the imagination is similar +to this. Thanks to two causes acting in unison, +temperament and habit, the imaginative and internal +life tends to become systematized and to encroach +more and more on the real, external life. In an +account by Féré<a name="FNanchor_152_152" id="FNanchor_152_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> one may follow step by step this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[326]</a></span> +work of systematization which we abridge here to +its chief characteristics.</p> + +<p>The subject, M......, a man thirty-seven years +old, had from childhood a decided taste for solitude. +Seated in an out-of-the-way corner of the house or +out of doors, "he commenced from that time on to +build castles in Spain that little by little took on a +considerable importance in his life. His constructions +were at first ephemeral, replaced every day by +new ones. They became progressively more consistent.... +When he had well entered into +his imaginary rôle, he often succeeded in continuing +his musing in the presence of other people. At +college, whole hours would be spent in this way; +often he would see and hear nothing." Married, the +head of a prosperous business house, he had some +respite; then he returned to his former constructions. +"They commenced by being, as before, not +very durable or absorbing; but gradually they +acquired more intensity and duration, and lastly +became fixed in a definite form."</p> + +<p>"To sum up, here is what this ideal life, lasting +almost from his fourth year, meant: M...... had +built at Chaville, on the outskirts of the forest, an +imaginary summer residence surrounded by a garden. +By successive additions the pavilion became +a château; the garden, a park; servants, horses, +water-fixtures came to ornament the domain. The +furnishings of the inside had been modified at the +same time. A wife had come to give life to the +picture; two children had been born. Nothing was<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[327]</a></span> +wanting to this household, only the being true.... +One day he was in his imaginary salon at +Chaville, occupied in watching an upholsterer who +was changing the arrangement of the tapestry. He +was so absorbed in the matter that he did not notice +a man coming toward him, and at the question, +'M......, if you please—?' he answered, without +thinking, 'He is at Chaville.' This reply, given in +public, aroused in him a real terror. 'I believe that +I was foolish,' he said. Coming to himself, he +declared that he was ready to do anything to get rid +of his ideas."</p> + +<p>Here the imaginative type is at its maximum, at +the brink of insanity without being over it. Associations +and combinations of images form the entire +content of consciousness, which remains impervious +to impressions from without. Its world becomes +<i>the</i> world. The parasitic life undermines and corrodes +the other in order to become established in its +place—it grows, its parts adhere more closely, it +forms a compact mass—the imaginary systematization +is complete.</p> + +<p>(4) The fourth stage is an exaggeration of the +foregoing. The <i>completely</i> systematized and permanent +imaginative life excludes the other. This is +the extreme form, the beginning of insanity, which +is outside our subject, from which pathology has +been excluded.</p> + +<p>Imagination in the insane would deserve a special +study, that would be lengthy, because there is no +form of imagination that insanity has not adopted.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[328]</a></span> +In no period have insane creations been lacking in +the practical, religious, or mystic life, in poetry, the +fine arts, and in the sciences; in industrial, commercial, +mechanical, military projects, and in plans +for social and political reform. We should, then, +be abundantly supplied with facts.<a name="FNanchor_153_153" id="FNanchor_153_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a></p> + +<p>It would be difficult, for, if in ordinary life we +are often perplexed to decide whether a man is sane +or not, how much more then, when it is a question +of an inventor, of an act of the creative faculty, +i.e., of a venture into the unknown! How many +innovators have been regarded as insane, or as at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[329]</a></span> +least unbalanced, visionary! We cannot even invoke +success as a criterion. Many non-viable or abortive +inventions have been fathered by very sane minds, +and people regarded as insane have vindicated their +imaginative constructions through success.</p> + +<p>Let us leave these difficulties of a subject that is +not our own, in order to determine merely the +psychological criterion belonging to the fourth stage.</p> + +<p>How may we rightly assert that a form of +imaginative life is clearly pathologic? In my opinion, +the answer must be sought in the nature and +degree of belief accompanying the labor of creating. +It is an axiom unchallenged by anyone—whether +idealist or realist of any shade of belief—that nothing +has existence for us save through the consciousness +we have of it; but for realism—and experimental +psychology is of necessity realistic—there are +two distinct forms of existence.</p> + +<p>One, subjective, having no reality except in consciousness, +for the one experiencing it, its reality +being due only to belief, to that first affirmation of +the mind so often described.</p> + +<p>The other, objective, existing in consciousness +and outside of it, being real not only for me but +for all those whose constitution is similar or analogous +to mine.</p> + +<p>This much borne in mind, let us compare the last +two degrees of the development of the imaginative +life.</p> + +<p>For the imaginer of the third stage, the two forms +of existence are not confounded. He distinguishes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[330]</a></span> +<i>two</i> worlds, preferring one and making the best of +the other, but believing in both. He is conscious +of passing from one to the other. There is an +alternation. The observation of Féré, although +extreme, is a proof of this.</p> + +<p>At the fourth stage, in the insane, imaginative +labor—the only kind with which we are concerned—is +so systematized that the distinction between +the two kinds of existence has disappeared. All the +phantoms of his brain are invested with objective +reality. Occurrences without, even the most extraordinary, +do not reach one in this stage, or else are +interpreted in accordance with the diseased fancy. +There is no longer any alternation.<a name="FNanchor_154_154" id="FNanchor_154_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a></p> + +<p>By way of summary we may say: The creative +imagination consists of the property that images +have of gathering in new combinations, through the +effect of a spontaneity whose nature we have attempted +to describe. It always tends to realize itself +in degrees that vary from mere momentary belief +to complete objectivity. Throughout its multiple +manifestations, it remains identical with itself in its +basic nature, in its constitutive elements. The +diversity of its deeds depends on the end desired, +the conditions required for its attainment, materials +employed which, as we have seen, under the collective +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[331]</a></span>name "representations" are very unlike one +another, not only as regards their sensuous origin +(visual, auditory, tactile, etc.) but also as regards +their psychologic nature (concrete, symbolic, affective, +emotional-abstract images; generic and schematic +images, concepts—each group itself having +shades or degrees).</p> + +<p>This constructive activity, applying itself to everything +and radiating in all directions, is in its early, +typical form a mythic creation. It is an invincible +need of man to reflect and reproduce his own nature +in the world surrounding him. The first application +of his mind is thinking by analogy, which vivifies +everything after the human model and attempts to +know everything according to arbitrary resemblances. +Myth-making activity, which we have +studied in the child and in primitive man, is the +embryonic form whence arise by a slow evolution +religious creations—gross or refined; esthetic development, +which is a fallen, impoverished mythology; +the fantastic conceptions of the world that may +little by little become scientific conceptions, with, +however, an irreducible residuum of hypotheses. +Alongside of these creations, all bordering upon +what we have called the fixed form, there are practical, +objective creations. As for the latter, we +could not trace them to the same mythic source +except by dialectic subtleties which we renounce. +The former arise from an internal efflorescence; the +latter from urgent life-needs; they appear later and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[332]</a></span> +are a bifurcation of the early trunk: but the same +sap flows in both branches.</p> + +<p>The constructive imagination penetrates every +part of our life, whether individual or collective, +speculative and practical, in all its forms—<span class="smcap">it is +everywhere</span>.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_146_146" id="Footnote_146_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_146_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> See above, Part I, <a href="#Page_31">chapter II</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_147_147" id="Footnote_147_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_147_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> It is a postulate of contemporary physiology that all the +neurones taken together cannot spontaneously, that is, of themselves, +give rise to any movement—they receive from without, +and expend their energy outwards. Nevertheless, between the +two moments that, in reflex and instinctive actions, seem continuous, +a third interposes, which, for the higher psychic acts, +may be of long duration. Thus, reasonings in logical form and +reflection regarding a decision to be made have a feeble tendency +to become changed into acts; their motor effects are +indirect, and at a long range. But this intermediate moment +is <i>par excellence</i> the moment for psychology. It is also the +moment of the personal equation: every man receives, transforms, +and restores outwards according to his own organization, +temperament, idiosyncrasies, character—in a word, according +to his personality, of which needs, tendencies, desires, +are the direct and immediate expression. So we come back, by +another route, to the same definition of spontaneity.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_148_148" id="Footnote_148_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_148_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> Besides these three principal forms, there are intermediate +forms, transitions from one category to another, that are hard +to classify: certain mythic creations are half-sketched, half-fixed; +and we find religious and social and political conceptions, +partly theoretic or fixed, partly practical or objective.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_149_149" id="Footnote_149_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_149_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> Taine, <i>On Intelligence</i>, Part I, Book II, ch. I.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_150_150" id="Footnote_150_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> See <a href="#Page_353">Appendix E</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_151_151" id="Footnote_151_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> Sante de Santis, <i>I Sogni</i>, chapter X; Dr. Tissié, <i>Les Rêves</i>, +esp. p. 165, the case of a merchant who dreams of having paid +a certain debt, and several weeks afterward meets his creditor, +and maintains that they are even, giving way only to proof.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_152_152" id="Footnote_152_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> For the complete account, see his <i>Pathologie des émotions</i>, +pp. 345-49. (Paris, F. Alcan.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_153_153" id="Footnote_153_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> Dr. Max Simon, in an article on "Imagination in Insanity" +(<i>Annales médico-psychologiques</i>, December, 1876), holds +that every kind of mental disease has its own form of imagination +that expresses itself in stories, compositions, sketches, +decorations, dress, and symbolic attributes. The maniac invents +complicated and improbable designs; the persecuted, +symbolic designs, strange writings, bordering on the horrible; +megalomaniacs look for the effect of everything they say and +do; the general paralytic lives in grandeur and attributes +capital importance to everything; lunatics love the naïve and +childishly wonderful. +</p><p> +There are also great imaginers who, having passed through +a period of insanity, have strongly regretted it "as a state +in which the soul, more exalted and more refined, perceives +invisible relations and enjoys spectacles that escape the material +eyes." Such was Gérard de Nerval. As for Charles Lamb, he +would assert that he should be envied the days spent in an +insane asylum. "Sometimes," he said in a letter to Coleridge, +"I cast a longing glance backwards to the condition in which +I found myself; for while it lasted I had many hours of pure +happiness. Do not believe, Coleridge, that you have tasted the +grandeur and all the transport of fancy if you have not been +insane. Everything seems to me now insipid in comparison." +Quoted by A. Barine, <i>Névrosés</i>, p. 326.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_154_154" id="Footnote_154_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154_154"><span class="label">[154]</span></a> There has often been cited the instance of certain maniacs +at Charenton, who, during the Franco-Prussian War, despite +the stories that were told them, the papers that they read, and +the shells bursting under the walls of the asylum, maintained +that the war was only imagined, and that all was only a contrivance +of their persecutors.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[333]</a></span></p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[334]</a></span></p> +<h2>APPENDICES</h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[335]</a></span></p> +<h2>APPENDIX A</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Various Forms of Inspiration</span><a name="FNanchor_155_155" id="FNanchor_155_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_155_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a></h3> + + +<p>Among the descriptions of the inspired state +found in various authors, I select only three, which +are brief and have each a special character.</p> + +<p>I. Mystic inspiration, in a passive form, in +Jacob Boehme (<i>Aurora</i>): "I declare before God +that I do not myself know how the thing arises +within me, without the participation of my will. I +do not even know that which I must write. If I +write, it is because the Spirit moves me and communicates +to me a great, wonderful knowledge. +Often I do not even know whether I dwell in spirit +in this present world and whether it is I myself that +have the fortune to possess a certain and solid +knowledge."</p> + +<p>II. Feverish and painful inspiration in Alfred +de Musset: "Invention annoys me and makes me +tremble. Execution, always too slow for my wish, +makes my heart beat awfully, and weeping, and +keeping myself from crying aloud, I am delivered +of an idea that is intoxicating me, but of which I<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[336]</a></span> +am mortally ashamed and disgusted next morning. +If I change it, it is worse, it deserts me—it is much +better to forget it and wait for another; but this +other comes to me so confused and misshapen that +my poor being cannot contain it. It presses and +tortures me, until it has taken realizable proportions, +when comes the other pain, of bringing forth, +a truly physical suffering that I cannot define. And +that is how my life is spent when I let myself be +dominated by this artistic monster in me. It is +much better, then, that I should live as I have +imagined living, that I go to all kinds of excess, and +that I kill this never-dying worm that people like +me modestly term their inspiration, but which I +call, plainly, my weakness."<a name="FNanchor_156_156" id="FNanchor_156_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p> + +<p>III. The poet Grillparzer<a name="FNanchor_157_157" id="FNanchor_157_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> analyzes the condition, +thus:</p> + +<p>"Inspiration, properly so called, is the concentration +of all the faculties and aptitudes on a single +point which, for the moment, should include the +rest of the world less than represent it. The +strengthening of the state of the soul comes from +the fact that its various faculties, instead of being +disseminated over the whole world, find themselves +contained within the limits of a single object, touch +one another, reciprocally upholding, reënforcing, +completing themselves. Thanks to this isolation, +the object emerges out of the average level of its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[337]</a></span> +<i>milieu</i>, is illumined all around and put in relief—it +takes body, moves, lives. But to attain this is necessary +the concentration of all the faculties. It is only +when the art-work has been a world for the artist +that it is also a world for others."</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_155_155" id="Footnote_155_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155_155"><span class="label">[155]</span></a> See Part One, <a href="#Page_50">chapter III</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_156_156" id="Footnote_156_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_156_156"><span class="label">[156]</span></a> George Sand, <i>Elle et Lui</i>, I.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_157_157" id="Footnote_157_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157_157"><span class="label">[157]</span></a> In Oelzelt-Newin, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 49.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[338]</a></span></p> +<h2>APPENDIX B</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">On the Nature of the Unconscious Factor</span></h3> + + +<p>We have seen that in the question of the unconscious +there must be recognized a positive part—facts, +and an hypothetical part—theories.<a name="FNanchor_158_158" id="FNanchor_158_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_158_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a></p> + +<p>Insofar as the facts are concerned, it would be +well, I think, to establish two categories—(1) static +unconscious, comprising habits, memory, and, in +general, all that is organized knowledge. It is a +state of preservation, of rest; very relatively, since +representations suffer incessant corrosion and +change. (2) Dynamic unconscious, which is a +state of latent activity, of elaboration and incubation. +We might give a multitude of proofs of this +unconscious rumination. The well-known fact that +an intellectual work gains by being interrupted; +that in resuming it one often finds it cleared up, +changed, even accomplished, was explained by some +psychologists prior to Carpenter by "the resting of +the mind." It would be just as valid to say that a +traveler covers leagues by lying abed. The author<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[339]</a></span> +just mentioned<a name="FNanchor_159_159" id="FNanchor_159_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> has brought together many observations +in which the solution of a mathematical, +mechanical, commercial problem appeared suddenly +after hours and days of vague, undefinable uneasiness, +the cause of which is unknown, which, however, +is only the result of an underlying cerebral +working; for the trouble, sometimes rising to +anguish, ceases as soon as the unawaited conclusion +has entered consciousness. The men who think the +most are not those who have the clearest and "most +conscious" ideas, but those having at their disposal +a rich fund of unconscious elaboration. On the +other hand, shallow minds have a naturally poor +unconscious fund, capable of but slight development; +they give out immediately and rapidly all that they +are able to give; they have no reserve. It is useless +to allow them time for reflection or invention. They +will not do better; they may do worse.</p> + +<p>As to the nature of the unconscious working, we +find disagreement and darkness. One may doubtless +maintain, theoretically, that in the inventor everything +goes on in subconsciousness and in unconsciousness, +just as in consciousness itself, with the +exception that a message does not arrive as far as +the self; that the labor that may be followed, in +clear consciousness, in its progress and retreats, +remains the same when it continues unknown to us. +This is possible. Yet it must at least be recognized +that consciousness is rigorously subject to the condition +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[340]</a></span>of time, the unconscious is not. This difference, +not to mention others, is not negligible, and +could well arouse other problems.</p> + +<p>The contemporary theories regarding the nature +of the unconscious seem to me reducible to two +principal positions—one psychological, the other +physiological.</p> + +<p>1. The physiological theory is simple and +scarcely permits any variations. According to it, +unconscious activity is simply cerebral; it is an +"unconscious cerebration." The psychic factor, +which ordinarily accompanies the activity of the +nervous centers, is absent. Although I incline +toward this hypothesis, I confess that it is full of +difficulties.</p> + +<p>It has been proven through numerous experiments +(Féré, Binet, Mosso, Janet, Newbold, etc.) that +"unconscious sensations"<a name="FNanchor_160_160" id="FNanchor_160_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_160_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> act, since they produce +the same reactions as conscious sensations, and +Mosso has been able to maintain that "the testimony +of consciousness is less certain than that of the +sphygmograph." But the particular instance of +invention is very different; for it does not merely +suppose the adaptation to an end which the physiological +factor would suffice to explain; it implies a +series of adaptations, corrections, rational operations, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[341]</a></span>of which nervous activity alone furnishes us +no example.<a name="FNanchor_161_161" id="FNanchor_161_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_161_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a></p> + +<p>2. The psychological theory is based on an +equivocal use of the word consciousness. Consciousness +has one definite mark—it is an internal +event existing, not by itself, but for me and insofar +as it is known by me. But the psychological theory +of the unconscious assumes that if we descend from +clear consciousness progressively to obscure consciousness, +to the subconscious, to the unconscious +that manifests itself only through its motor reactions, +the first state thus successively impoverished, +still remains, down to its final term, identical in its +basis with consciousness. It is an hypothesis that +nothing justifies.</p> + +<p>No difficulty arises when we bear in mind the +legitimate distinction between consciousness of self +and consciousness in general, the former entirely +subjective, the latter in a way objective (the consciousness +of a man captivated by an attractive +scene; better yet, the fluid form of revery or of the +awaking from syncope). We may admit that this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[342]</a></span> +evanescent consciousness, affective in nature, felt +rather than perceived, is due to a lack of synthesis, +of relations among the internal states, which remain +isolated, unable to unite into a whole.</p> + +<p>The difficulty commences when we descend into +the region of the subconscious, which allows stages +whose obscurity increases in proportion as we move +away from clear consciousness, "like a lake in which +the action of light is always nearing extinction" (in +double coexisting personalities, automatic writing, +mediums, etc.). Here some postulate two currents +of consciousness existing at the same time in one +person without reciprocal connection. Others suppose +a "field of consciousness" with a brilliant center +and extending indefinitely toward the dim distance. +Still others liken the phenomenon to the movement +of waves, whose summit alone is lighted up. Indeed, +the authors declare that with these comparisons +and metaphors they make no pretense of +explaining; but certainly they all reduce unconsciousness +to consciousness, as a special to a general +case, and what is that if not explaining?</p> + +<p>I do not intend to enumerate all the varieties of +the psychological theory. The most systematic, that +of Myers, accepted by Delboef and others, is full of +a biological mysticism all its own. Here it is in +substance: In every one of us there is a conscious +self adapted to the needs of life, and potential selves +constituting the subliminal consciousness. The latter, +much broader in scope than personal consciousness, +has dependent on it the entire vegetative life<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[343]</a></span>—circulation, +trophic actions, etc. Ordinarily the conscious +self is on the highest level, the subliminal +consciousness on the second; but in certain extraordinary +states (hypnosis, hysteria, divided consciousness, +etc.) it is just the reverse. Here is the +bold part of the hypothesis: Its authors suppose +that the supremacy of the subliminal consciousness +is a reversion, a return to the ancestral. In the +higher animals and in primitive man, according to +them, all trophic actions entered consciousness and +were regulated by it. In the course of evolution this +became organized; the higher consciousness has +delegated to the subliminal consciousness the care +of silently governing the vegetative life. But in +case of mental disintegration there occurs a return +to the primitive state. In this manner they explain +burns through suggestion, stigmata, trophic changes +of a miraculous appearance, etc. It is needless to +dwell on this conception of the unconscious. It has +been vehemently criticised, notably by Bramwell, +who remarks that if certain faculties could little by +little fall into the domain of subliminal consciousness +because they were no longer necessary for the +struggle for life, there are nevertheless faculties so +essential to the well-being of the individual that we +ask ourselves how they have been able to escape +from the control of the will. If, for example, some +lower type had the power of arresting pain, how +could it lose it?</p> + +<p>At the foundation of the psychological theory in +all its forms is the unexpressed hypothesis that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[344]</a></span> +consciousness may be likened to a quantity that +forever decreases without reaching zero. This is a +postulate that nothing justifies. The experiments +of psychophysicists, without solving the question, +would support rather the opposite view. We know +that the "threshold of consciousness" or minimum +perceptible quantity, appears and disappears suddenly; +the excitation is not felt under a determinate +limit. Likewise in regard to the "summit of perception" +or maximum perceptible, any increase of +excitation is no longer felt if above a determinate +limit. Moreover, in order that an increase or +diminution be felt between these two extreme limits, +it is necessary that both have a constant relation—differential +threshold—as is expressed in Weber's +law. All these facts, and others that I omit, are not +favorable to the thesis of growing or diminishing +continuity of consciousness. It has even been maintained +that consciousness "has an aversion for continuity."</p> + +<p>To sum up: The two rival theories are equally +unable to penetrate into the inner nature of the +unconscious factor. We have thus had to limit +ourselves to taking it as a fact of experience and to +assign it its place in the complex function that +produces invention.</p> + +<p>The observations of Flournoy (in his book, mentioned +above, Part I, <a href="#Page_50">chapter III</a>) have a particular +interest in relation to our subject. His medium, +Helène S......—very unlike others, who are satisfied +with forecasts of the future, disclosures of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[345]</a></span> +unknown past events, counsel, prognosis, evocation, +etc., without creating anything, in the proper sense—is +the author of three or four novels, one of +which, at least, is invented out of whole cloth—revelations +in regard to the planet Mars, its countries, +inhabitants, dwellings, etc. Although the +descriptions and pictures of Helène S. are found +on comparison to be borrowed from our terrestrial +globe, and transposed and changed, as Flournoy has +well shown, it is certain that in this "Martian +novel," to say nothing of the others, there is a +richness of invention that is rare among mediums: +the creative imagination in its subliminal (unconscious) +form encloses the other in its éclat. We +know how much the cases of mediums teach us in +regard to the unconscious life of the mind. Here +we are permitted, as an exceptional case, to penetrate +into the dark laboratory of romantic invention, +and we can appreciate the importance of the labor +that is going on there.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_158_158" id="Footnote_158_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_158_158"><span class="label">[158]</span></a> See Part I, <a href="#Page_50">Chapter III</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_159_159" id="Footnote_159_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159_159"><span class="label">[159]</span></a> <i>Mental Physiology</i>, Book II, chapter 13.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_160_160" id="Footnote_160_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_160_160"><span class="label">[160]</span></a> This expression is put in quotation marks because in American +and English usage "sensation" is defined in terms of +consciousness, and such an expression as "unconscious sensation" +is paradoxical, and would lead to futile discussion. (Tr.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_161_161" id="Footnote_161_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161_161"><span class="label">[161]</span></a> For the detailed criticism of unconscious cerebration, see +Boris Sidis, <i>The Psychology of Suggestion: A research into +the subconscious nature of Man and Society</i>, New York, Appletons, +1898, pp. 121-127. The author, who assumes the coëxistence +of two selves—one waking, the other subwaking, and who +attributes to the latter all weakness and vice (according to him +the unconscious is incapable of rising above mere association +by contiguity; it is "stupid," "uncritical," "credulous," +"brutal," etc.) would be greatly puzzled to explain its rôle in +creative activity.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[346]</a></span></p> +<h2>APPENDIX C</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Cosmic and Human Imagination</span><a name="FNanchor_162_162" id="FNanchor_162_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a></h3> + + +<p>For Froschammer, <i>Fancy</i> is the original principle +of things. In his philosophical theory it plays +the same part as Hegel's <i>Idea</i>, Schopenhauer's <i>Will</i>, +Hartmann's <i>Unconscious</i>, etc. It is, at first, objective—in +the beginning the universal creative power +is immanent in things, just as there is contained in +the kernel the principle that shall give the plant its +form and construct its organism; it spreads out into +the myriads of vegetable and animal existences that +have been succeeded or that still live on the surface +of the Cosmos. The first organized beings must +have been very simple; but little by little the objective +imagination increases its energy by exercising +it; it invents and realizes increasingly more complex +images that attest the progress of its artistic genius. +So Darwin was right in asserting that a slow evolution +raises up organized beings towards fulness of +life and beauty of form.</p> + +<p>Step by step, it succeeds in becoming conscious +of itself in the mind of man—it becomes subjective.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[347]</a></span> +Generative power, at first diffused throughout the +organism, becomes localized in the generative +organs, and becomes established in sex. "The brain, +in living beings, may form a pole opposed to the +reproductive organs, especially when these beings +are very high in the organic scale." Thus changed, +the generative power has become capable of perceiving +new relations, of bringing forth internal worlds. +In nature and in man it is the same principle that +causes living forms to appear—objective images in a +way, and subjective images, a kind of living forms +that arise and die in the mind.<a name="FNanchor_163_163" id="FNanchor_163_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a></p> + +<p>This metaphysical theory, one of the many varieties +of <i>mens agitat molem</i>, being, like every other, a +personal conception, it is superfluous to discuss or +criticise its evident anthropomorphism. But, since +we are dealing with hypotheses, I venture to risk a +comparison between embryological development in +physiology, instinct in psychophysiology, and the +creative imagination in psychology. These three +phenomena are creations, i.e., a disposition of certain +materials following a determinate type.</p> + +<p>In the first case, the ovum after fertilization is +subject to a rigorously determined evolution whence +arises such and such an individual with its specific +and personal characters, its hereditary influences,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[348]</a></span> +etc. Every disturbing factor in this evolution produces +deviations, monstrosities, and the creation +does not attain the normal. Embryology can follow +these changes step by step. There remains one +obscure point in any event, and that is, the nature +of what the ancients called the <i>nisus formativus</i>.</p> + +<p>In the case of instinct, the initial moment is an +external or internal sensation, or rather, a representation—the +image of a nest to be built, in the case +of the bird; of a tunnel to be dug, for the ant; of a +comb to be made, for the bee and the wasp; of a +web to be spun, for the spider, etc. This initial +state puts into action a mechanism determined by the +nature of each species, and ends in creations of +special kinds. However, variations of instinct, its +adaptation to various conditions, show that the conditions +of the determinism are less simple, that the +creative activity is endowed with a certain plasticity.</p> + +<p>In the third case, creative imagination, the ideal, +a sketched construction, is the equivalent of the +ovum; but it is evident that the plasticity of the +creative imagination is much greater than that of +instinct. The imagination may radiate in several +very different ways, and the plan of the invention, +as we have seen,<a name="FNanchor_164_164" id="FNanchor_164_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> may arise as a whole and develop +regularly in an embryological manner, or else present +itself in a fragmentary, partial form that becomes +complete after a series of attractions.</p> + +<p>Perhaps an identical process, forming three<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[349]</a></span> +stages—a lower, middle, and higher—is at the root +of all three cases. But this is only a speculative +hypothesis, foreign to psychology proper.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_162_162" id="Footnote_162_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162_162"><span class="label">[162]</span></a> See above, Part One, <a href="#Page_65">Chapter IV</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_163_163" id="Footnote_163_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_163_163"><span class="label">[163]</span></a> Those who, not having the courage to read the 575 pages +of Froschammer's book, want more details, may profitably consult +the excellent analysis that Séailles has given (<i>Rev. Philos.</i>, +March, 1878, pp. 198-220). See also Ambrosi, <i>Psicologia dell' +immaginazione nella storia della filosofia</i>, pp. 472-498.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_164_164" id="Footnote_164_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_164_164"><span class="label">[164]</span></a> See above, Part II, <a href="#Page_140">chapter IV</a>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[350]</a></span></p> +<h2>APPENDIX D</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Evidence in Regard to Musical Imagination</span><a name="FNanchor_165_165" id="FNanchor_165_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_165_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a></h3> + + +<p>The question asked above,<a name="FNanchor_166_166" id="FNanchor_166_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> Does the experiencing +of purely musical sounds evoke images, universally, +and of what nature and under what conditions? +seemed to me to enter a more general field—the +affective imagination—which I intend to study elsewhere +in a special work. For the time being I limit +myself to observations and information that I have +gathered, picking from them several that I give here +for the sake of shedding light on the question. I +give first the replies of musicians; then, those of +non-musicians.</p> + +<p>1. M. Lionel Dauriac writes me: "The question +that you ask me is complex. I am not a 'visualizer;' +I have infrequent hypnagogic hallucinations, +and they are all of the auditory type.</p> + +<p>"... Symphonic music aroused in me no +image of the visual type while I remained the +amateur that you knew from 1876 to 1898. When +that amateur began to reflect methodically on the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[351]</a></span> +art of his taste, he recognized in music a power of +suggesting:</p> + +<p>"1. Sonorous, non-musical images—thunder, +clock. Example, the overture of <i>William Tell</i>.</p> + +<p>"2. Psychic images—suggestion of a mental +state—anger, love, religious feeling.</p> + +<p>"3. Visual images, whether following upon the +psychic image or through the intermediation of a +programme.</p> + +<p>"Under what condition, in a symphonic work, is +the visual image, introduced by the psychic image, +produced? In the event of a break in the melodic +web (see my <i>Psychologie dans l'Opéra</i>, pp. 119-120). +Here are given, without orderly arrangement, +some of the ideas that have come to me:</p> + +<p>"Beethoven's <i>symphony in C major</i> appears to me +purely musical—it is of a sonorous design. The +<i>symphony in D major</i> (the second) suggests to me +visual-motor images—I set a ballet to the first part +and keep track altogether of the ballet that I picture. +The <i>Heroic Symphony</i> (aside from the funeral +march, the meaning of which is indicated in the +title) suggests to me images of a military character, +ever since the time that I noticed that the fundamental +theme of the first portion is based on notes +of perfect harmony—trumpet-notes and, by association, +military. The <i>finale</i> of this symphony, which +I consider superior to other parts, does not cause me +to see anything. <i>Symphony in B flat major</i>—I see +nothing there—this may be said without qualification. +<i>Symphony in C minor</i>—it is dramatic, although +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[352]</a></span>the melodic web is never broken. The first +part suggests the image, not of Fate knocking at +the gate, as Beethoven said, but of a soul overcome +with the crises of revolt, accompanied by a hope of +victory. Visual images do not come except as +brought by psychic images."</p> + +<p>F. G., a musician, always sees—that is the rule, +notably in the <i>Pastoral</i>, and in the <i>Heroic Symphony</i>. +In Bach's <i>Passion</i> he beholds the scene of +the mystic lamb.</p> + +<p>A composer writes me: "When I compose or +play music of my own composition I behold dancing +figures; I see an orchestra, an audience, etc. When +I listen to or play music by another composer I do +not see anything." This communication also mentions +three other musicians who see nothing.</p> + +<p>2. D......, so little of a musician that I had +some trouble to make him understand the term +"symphonic music," never goes to concerts. However, +he went once, fifteen years ago, and there remains +in his memory very clearly the principal +phrase of a minuet (he hums it)—he cannot recall +it without seeing people dancing a minuet.</p> + +<p>M. O. L...... has been kind enough to question +in my behalf sixteen non-musical persons. Here +are the results of his inquiry:</p> + +<p>Eight see curved lines.</p> + +<p>Three see images, figures springing in the air, +fantastic designs.</p> + +<p>Two see the waves of the ocean.</p> + +<p>Three do not see anything.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_165_165" id="Footnote_165_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_165_165"><span class="label">[165]</span></a> See Part Three, <a href="#Page_195">Chapter II</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_166_166" id="Footnote_166_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_166_166"><span class="label">[166]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, <a href="#Page_236">IV</a>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[353]</a></span></p> +<h2>APPENDIX E</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Imaginative Type and Association of Ideas</span><a name="FNanchor_167_167" id="FNanchor_167_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a></h3> + + +<p>I have questioned a very great number of imaginative +persons, well known to me as such, and have +chosen preferably those who, not making a profession +of creating, let their fancy wander as it wills, +without professional care. In all the mechanism is +the same, differing scarcely more than temperament +and degree of culture. Here are two examples.</p> + +<p>B......, forty-six years of age, is acquainted +with a large part of Europe, North America, +Oceania, Hindoostan, Indo-China, and North +Africa, and has not passed through these countries +on the run, but, because of his duties, resided there +some time. It is worthy of remark, as will be seen +from the following observation, that the remembrance +of such various countries does not have first +place in this brilliant, fanciful personage—which +fact is an argument in favor of the very personal +character of the creative imagination.</p> + +<p>"In a general way, imagination, very lively in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[354]</a></span> +me, functions by association of ideas. Memory or +the outer world furnishes me some data. On this +data there is not always, though there should be, +imaginative work proper, and then things remain +as they are, without end.</p> + +<p>"But when I meet a construction—it matters little +whether ancient or in the course of erection—the +formula, 'That ought to be fixed,' is one that rises +mechanically to my mind in such a case; often it +happens that I think aloud and say it, although +alone. When going away from the architectural +subject<a name="FNanchor_168_168" id="FNanchor_168_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> under consideration, I make up infinite +variations upon it, one after another. Sometimes +the things start from a reflex...."</p> + +<p>After having noted his preference for the architecture +of the Middle Ages, B...... adds (here he +touches on the unconscious factor):</p> + +<p>"Were I to explain or attempt to explain how the +Middle Ages have such an attraction for my mind, +I should see therein an atavistic accumulation of +religious feeling fixed in my family, on the female +side no doubt, and of religiousness in ecclesiastical +architecture—these touch.</p> + +<p>"Another example illustrating the rôle of association +of ideas in the same matter. One Sunday +night I left Noumea in the carriage of Dr. F...... +who was going to visit a nunnery five leagues from +there. At the moment of our arrival the doctor +asked what time it was. 'Half-past two,' I said, +looking at my watch. As we stopped in the convent<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[355]</a></span> court +in front of the chapel I <i>heard</i> the lusty conclusion +of a psalm. 'They are singing vespers,' I +remarked to the doctor. He commenced to laugh. +'What time are vespers sung in your town?' 'At +half-past two,' I answered. I opened the chapel +door in order to show the doctor that vespers had +just been held: the chapel was vacant. As I stood +there, somewhat non-plussed, the doctor remarked, +'Cerebral automatism.'</p> + +<p>"I may add here, <i>by association</i> of ideas. The +doctor had seen through me, and had with fine +insight perceived <i>why</i> I had <i>heard</i> the end of the +psalm. The incident made a great impression on +me, all the more as ever since the age of eight my +memory testifies to a like hallucination, but of sight +in place of hearing. It was at L...... that on +Good Friday they rang at the cathedral with all +their might. It was the very moment before the +bells remain silent for three days, and it is known +that this silence, ordained in the liturgy, is explained +to children by telling them that during these +two days the bells have flown to Rome. Naturally +I was treated to this little tale, and as they finished +telling it, I <i>saw</i> a bell flying at an angle that I +could still describe.</p> + +<p>"But this transforming power of my imagination +is not present in me to the same extent as regards +all things. It is much more operative in relation to +Romano-Gothic architecture, mystic literature, and +sociological knowledge than in relation, for instance, +to my memories of travels. When I see<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[356]</a></span> +again, in the mind's eye, the Isle of Bourbon, +Niagara, Tahiti, Calcutta, Melbourne, the Pyramids +and the Sphinx, the graphic representation is intellectually +perfect. The objects live again in all their +external surroundings. I feel the <i>Khamsinn</i>, the +desert wind that scorched me at the foot of Pompey's +Column; I hear the sea breaking into foam on +the barrier reef of Tahiti. But the image does not +lead to evocation of related or parallel ideas.</p> + +<p>"When, on the other hand, I take a walk over +the Comburg moor, the castle weighs upon me in all +its massiveness; the recollections of the <i>Mémoires +d'Outre-tombe</i> besiege me like living pictures. I +see, like Chateaubriand himself, the family of great +famished lords in their feudal castle. With Chateaubriand +I return in the twinkling of an eye to the +Niagara that we have both seen. In the fall of the +waters I find the deep and melancholy note that he +himself found; and after that I think of that dark +cathedral of Dol that evidently suggested to the +author his <i>Génie du Christianisme</i>.</p> + +<p>"In literature, things are very unequally suggestive +to me. Classic literature has only few paths +outwards for me—Tacitus, Lucretius, Juvenal, +Homer, and Saint-Simon excepted. I read the +other authors of this class partly for themselves, +without making a comparison. On the other hand, +the reading of Dante, Shakespeare, St. Jerome's +compact verses on the Hebrew, and Middle Age +prose excites within me a whole world of ideas, like +Wagner's music, <i>canto-fermo</i>, and Beethoven. Certain +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[357]</a></span>things form a link for me from one order of +ideas to another. For example, Michaelangelo and +the Bible, Rembrandt and Balzac, Puvis de Chavannes +and the Merovingian narratives.</p> + +<p>"To sum up: There are in me certain <i>milieux</i> +especially favorable to imagination. When any circumstance +brings me into one of them, it is rare that +an imaginative network does not occur; and, if one +is produced, association of ideas will perform the +work. When I give myself up to serious work, I +have to mistrust myself: and in this connection I +shall surprise people when I say that in the class of +ideas above indicated the subject exciting the most +ideas in me is sociology."</p> + +<p>M......, sixty years of age, artistic temperament. +Because of the necessities of life, he has +followed a profession entirely opposite to his bent. +He has given me his "confession" in the form of +fragmentary notes made day by day. Many are +<i>moral</i> remarks on the subject of his imagination—I +leave them out. I note especially the unconquerable +tendency to make up little romances and some +details in regard to visual representation, and a +dislike for numbers.</p> + +<p>"It happens that I experience sharp regret when I +see the photograph of a monument, e.g., the Pantheon, +the proportions of which I have constructed +according to the descriptions of the monument and +the idea that I had of the life of the Greeks. The +photograph mars my dream.</p> + +<p>"From the seen to the unknown. In the S. G.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[358]</a></span> +library. A slender young woman, smartly dressed—spotless +black gloves—between her fingers a small +pencil and a tiny note-book. What business has this +affectation this morning in a classic and dull building, +in a common environment of poor workmen? +She is not a servant-maid, and not a teacher. Now +for the solution of the unknown. I follow the +woman to her family, into her home, and it is quite +a task.</p> + +<p>"In the same library. I want to get an address +from the <i>Almanach Bottin</i>. A young man, perhaps +a student, has borrowed the ridiculous volume. +Bent over it, his hands in his hair, he turns the +leaves with the sage leisure of a scholar looking for +a commentary. From the empty dictionary he often +draws out a letter. He must have received this +letter this morning from the country. His family +advises him to apply to so-and-so. It is a question +of money and employment. He must locate the +people who, provincial ignorance said, are near him. +And so goes the wandering imagination.</p> + +<p>"When I feel myself drawn to anyone, I prefer +seeing images or portraits rather than the reality. +That is how I avoid making unforeseen discoveries +that would spoil my model.</p> + +<p>"If I make numerical calculations, in the absence +of concrete factors, the imagination goes afield, and +the figures group themselves mechanically, harkening +to an inner voice that arranges them in order to +get the sense.</p> + +<p>"There may be an imagination devoted to arithmetical +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[359]</a></span>calculations—forms, beings intrude, even +the outline of the figure 3, for example; and then +the addition or any other calculation is ruined.</p> + +<p>"I revert to the impossibility of making an addition +without a swerve of imagination, because +plastic figures are always ready before the calculator. +The man of imagination is always constructing +by means of plastic images.<a name="FNanchor_169_169" id="FNanchor_169_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> Life possesses +him, intoxicates him, so he never gets tired."</p> + +<p class='center'>THE END</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_167_167" id="Footnote_167_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167_167"><span class="label">[167]</span></a> See Conclusion, <a href="#Page_320">II</a>, above.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_168_168" id="Footnote_168_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168_168"><span class="label">[168]</span></a> B...... is not an architect.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_169_169" id="Footnote_169_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_169_169"><span class="label">[169]</span></a> We see that the speaker is a visualizer.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[360]</a></span></p> + +<h2>INDEX.</h2> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[361]</a></span> +Absent images, Association of, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Abstraction, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Late appearance of, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Abulics, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Activity, normal end of imagination, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Adaptation of means to end, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Advance plans in commerce, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Adventure, Eras of, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Affective states, Rôle of, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Alcoholic liquors, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Alembert, d', <a href="#Page_87">87</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Alexander, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Alfieri, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Allen, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Americans, change occupations, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Analogy, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Abuse of, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">based on qualitative resemblance, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">essential to creative imagination, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not trustworthy in science, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Rôle of, in primitive life, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thinking by, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Anatomical conditions, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Anger, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Animal fancy, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Animals, Association fibers or centers, lacking in, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Discoveries of, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Imagination in, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Usefulness of, to man, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Animism, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of primitives, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Anticipations of later inventions, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Apollo, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Apperception, Importance of, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<i>Apprehensio simplex</i>, a logical figment, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Arago, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Aristotle, vi, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Art, Indefiniteness of modern, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Realistic, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Various theories of, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Artificial motors, Use of, a late development, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Aryan race, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Association, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Forms of, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Laws of, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of ideas, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of ideas, Criticism of the term, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of ideas, Discovery depends on, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">suggests cause, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Associational systems, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Astral influences, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Asyllogistic deduction, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Attention, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Australians, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Automatisms, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Azam, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Bach, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Bacon, Roger, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a> <a href="#Footnote_141_141">n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Baillarger, Dr., <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Baldwin, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Barter, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Baudelaire, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Beethoven, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Bernard, Claude, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>idée directrice</i> of, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Binet, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Bipartite division of the brain, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Bismarck, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Blood circulation, Importance of, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[362]</a></span>Boehme, Jacob, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Bonnal, <a href="#Page_298">298</a> <a href="#Footnote_137_137">n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Borgia, Lucretia, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Bossuet, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Boulogne, De, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Bourdeau, L., <a href="#Page_272">272</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Brain- development and abstraction, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regions, Development of, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">weights, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Bramwell, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Breguet, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Brown-Séquard, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Buddha, Life of, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Buffon, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Byron, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Cabalists, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Cabalistic mysticism, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Cabanis, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Campanella, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Carlyle, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Carpenter, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Carthage, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Categories of images, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Causality, Search for, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Charcot, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Charlemagne, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Chateaubriand, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Chatterton, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Cherubini, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Child, Adult misinterpretation of, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Creative imagination in the, <a href="#Page_103">103</a> ff.;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Exaggeration of his intelligence, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Oscillation of belief and doubt in the, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Stages of development, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Child-study, Difficulties of, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Chopin, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Chorea, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Cid, The, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Classes of discoverers, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Classification, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Coleridge, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Colored hearing, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Columbus, Christopher, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Commerce, Combative element in, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Commercial imagination, Conditions of, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">development due to increasing substitution, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">development, Stages of, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Common factor in comparison, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Complementary scientists, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Complete images impossible, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Comte, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Condillac, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Confucius, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Confusion of impressions, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Conjecture, beginning of science, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Conscious imagination, a special case, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Constellation, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Constitutions by philosophers, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Contiguity and resemblance, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Contrapuntists, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Contrast, Association by, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Cooperation, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of intellect and feeling, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Copernicus, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Counter-world, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Creation hindered by complete redintegration, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in physiological inhibition, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Motor basis of, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Physiological and imaginative, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">versus repetition, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Creative imagination, a growth, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Composite character of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conditioned by knowledge, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">either esthetic or practical, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">implies feeling, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Neglect of, by writers on psychology, <a href="#Page_vii">vii</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Reasons for, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Creative instinct, non-existent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Crisis, not essential, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Critical stage of investigation, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Cromwell, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Cumulative inventions, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Curiosity, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of primitive man, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Cuvier, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Daedalus, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Dante, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Darwin, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Dauriac, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Deduction, Process of, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Deffant, Madame du, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Deities, Coalescence of, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Momentary, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>;</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[363]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Multiplicity of Roman, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Delboef, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>.<br /> +<br /> +DeQuincy, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Descartes, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Determinism, Neglect of, by idealists, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of art, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of invention, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Dewey, John, <a href="#Page_132">132</a> <a href="#Footnote_62_62">n.</a><br /> +<br /> +<i>Dialectic</i>, Hegelian, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Diffluent imagination, <a href="#Page_196">196</a> ff.<br /> +<br /> +<i>Dii minores</i>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Disinterestedness of the artist, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Dissociation, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">by concomitant variations, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of series, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Double personality, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Dreams, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Emotional persistence of, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Drugs, Effect of, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Use of, as excitants, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Dualism of Fourier, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Dürer, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Egypt, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Egyptian conception of causality, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Emotion, and sensation, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">material for imagination, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">presupposes unsatisfied needs, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Realization of, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Emotional abstraction, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">factor, <a href="#Page_31">31</a> ff.</span><br /> +<br /> +Empedocles, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Epic, Rise of the, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Essenes, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Esthetic imagination,<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">contrasted to mechanical, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Fixity of, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Ethics, Living and dead, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Euclid, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Eureka, Moment of, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Evolution of commerce, Law's statement of, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Exact knowledge requisite in commerce, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Expansion of self, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Experience requisite for literary invention, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>.<br /> +<br /> +External factors, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Facts and general ideas, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Faith, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">-cure, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">highest in semi-science, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Rôle of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Fancy, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in animals, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Source of, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Fear, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Fenelon, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Féré, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Fiduciary money, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Fixed ideas, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Flechsig, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Flournoy, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Forel, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Fouillée, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Fourier, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>.<br /> +<br /> +French, not strong in imagination, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Revolution, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Fresnel, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Fromentin, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Froschammer, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Fuegians, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Gauss, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Gautier, Théophile, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Gavarni, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Generic image, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Genius, and brain structure, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">depends on subliminal imagination, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">exceptional, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">No common measure of, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Geniuses, of judgment, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of mastery over men, and matter, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Gilman, <a href="#Page_219">219</a> <a href="#Footnote_98_98">n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Gnostics, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Goethe, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Gold, Curative powers of, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Goncourt, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Goya, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Greece, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Greek republics, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Grétry, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Grillparzer, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Groos, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Guericke, Otto de, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Habits, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hamilton, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Handel, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hanseatic League, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Harrington, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hartmann, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Haüy, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[364]</a></span>Haydn, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hegel, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Heine, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hellenic imagination, anthropomorphic, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Helmholtz, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Henry IV, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hephæstos, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hercules, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hero, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Herodotus, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hesiod, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hindoo imagination, symbolic, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hindoos, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hodgson, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Höffding, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hoffman, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<i>Homo duplex</i>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Homonomy, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Howe, <a href="#Page_60">60</a> <a href="#Footnote_23_23">n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Huber, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hugo, Victor, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Animism in, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Human force, beginning of invention, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hume, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Huyghens, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hyperæmia, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hyperesthesia, Temporary, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hypermnesia, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Hypothesis, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Progressive, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Icarus, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Idea and emotion, Equivalence of, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Ideal modified in practice, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Idealistic conceptions, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Idealization, Process of, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Illusion, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and legend, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Conscious, of mystic, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Illusions, valuable to scientist, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Image, Modification of, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Images, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">abbreviations of reality, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Categories of, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Concrete, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">provoked, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sketched type, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Symbolic, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Visual, provoked by music, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Imagination, and abulia, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and foresight, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">anthropocentric, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">basis of the cosmic process, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Commercial, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">complete in animals, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">condensed in common objects, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Conditions of, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Development of, <a href="#Page_167">167</a> ff.;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Diffluent, <a href="#Page_196">196</a> ff.;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Esthetic, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">fixed form, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in animals, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in experimentation, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in primitive man, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mechanical and technical, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Motives of different sorts of, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Musical, <a href="#Page_212">212</a> ff., <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mystic, <a href="#Page_221">221</a> ff.;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mystical, different from religious, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not opposed to the useful, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Numerical, <a href="#Page_207">207</a> ff.;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Periods of development of, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Plastic, <a href="#Page_184">184</a> ff.;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Poetical, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Practical, <a href="#Page_256">256</a> ff.;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">present in all activities, <a href="#Page_viii">viii</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Quality of, same in many lives, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Scientific, <a href="#Page_236">236</a> ff.;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sketched form, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">substitute for reason, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Varieties of, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Imaginative type, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Imitation, through pleasure, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Imitative music, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Impersonality, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Incomplete images, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Incubation, Periods of, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Individual variations, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Individuality of genius, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Inductive reasoning, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Infantile insanity, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Inhibition by representation, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Initial moment of discovery, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Inspiration, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and intoxication, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Characteristic of, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">characterized by suddenness and impersonality, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">resembles somnambulism, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Subjective feeling of, untrustworthy, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Instinct, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">answer to specific needs, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Creative, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Resemblance of invention to, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Intellectual factor, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Intuition, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Introspectors, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Intentional combination of images, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Interest, a factor in creation, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[365]</a></span>Interesting, defined, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Invention arises to satisfy a need, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Higher forms of, <a href="#Page_140">140</a> ff.;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in morals, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in successive parts, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of monopolies, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Pain of, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Spontaneity of, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">subjected to tradition, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Inventions, Amplifiers of, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">largely anonymous, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mechanical, neglected by psychologists, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Stratification of, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Inventors deified, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Oddities of, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +James, William, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Janet, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Jealousy, stimulates imagination, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Jordæns, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Joy, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Kant, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Kepler, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Klopstock, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Kühn, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Lagrange, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Lamennais, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Lang, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Language, Origin of, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Laplace, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Larvated epilepsy, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Lavoisier, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Law, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Lazarus, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Leibniz, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a> <a href="#Footnote_136_136">n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Lélut, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Leurechon, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Liebig, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Linnæus, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Literal mysticism, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Localization, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Loch Lomond, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Locke, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Lombroso, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Louis XIV, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Love, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and hate, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Love-plays, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Machiavelli, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Machines, counterfeits of human beings, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Man and animals, Specific quality of, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Manu, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mastery, Spirit of, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Materials of imagination, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Maury, A., <a href="#Page_6">6</a> <a href="#Footnote_1_1">n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Mechanic and poet, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mechanical aptitude, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mechanical imagination, Ideal of, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mediate association, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Memory, Predominant tendencies in, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">untrustworthy, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Men, Great, as makers of history, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mendelssohn, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a> <a href="#Footnote_96_96">n.</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mental chemistry, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Merchant sailors, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Metamorphosis, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of deities, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Regressive, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Metaphysical speculation, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">thought, Stages of, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Metaphysics, <a href="#Page_252">252</a> ff.<br /> +<br /> +Methods of invention, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Meynert, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Michaelangelo, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Michelet, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Middle Ages, predominantly imaginative, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Military invention, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Conditions of, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Mill, John Stuart, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Milton, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mimicry, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mind, Varieties of, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mission, Consciousness of, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Misunderstanding of the new, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mobility of inventors, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Monadology, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Money, Invention of, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sought as an end, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Monge, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Moses, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>.<br /> +<br /> +More, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Morgan, Lloyd, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mormons, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Monoideism, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Montgolfier, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Moral geniuses, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[366]</a></span>Moravian brotherhood, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mosso, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Motor elements in all representation, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">elements, Rôle of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">manifestation basis of creation, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Movements, Importance of, in imagination, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mozart, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Müller, Max, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mummy powder, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Münsterberg, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Muses, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Music an emotional language, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Precocity in, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Musical imagination, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Musset, Alfred de, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Myers, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mystic imagination, <a href="#Page_221">221</a> ff., <a href="#Page_335">335</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Mystics, Abuse of allegory, by, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Belief of, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Metaphorical style of, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Mysticism by suggestion, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Myth, defined, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Depersonification of, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Plato, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in science, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Subjective and objective factors in, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Myths, Significance of, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Variations in, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Myth-making activity, <a href="#Page_viii">viii</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Napoleon, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his war practice, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Natural, and human phenomena, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">law, Uniformity of, opposed to dissociation, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">motors, Use of, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Naville, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Need of knowing, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Neglect of details in sensation, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Nerval, Gérard de, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Nervous overflow, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.<br /> +<br /> +New Larnak, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Newbold, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Newcomen, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Newton, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Nietzsche, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<i>Nomina Numina</i>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Nordau, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Numerical imagination, <a href="#Page_207">207</a> ff.;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mysticism, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">series unlimited, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Objective study of inventors, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Oddities of inventors, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Oelzelt-Newin, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Old age, Effect of, on imagination, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Organic conditions, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Orientation conditioned by individual organization, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Personal, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Owen, Robert, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Paradox of belief, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Paralysis by ideas, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Pascal, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Pasteur, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Pathological view of genius, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Pathology and physiology, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Perception, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and conception, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and imagination, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Perez, B., <a href="#Page_115">115</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Persistence of ideas due to feeling, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Personification, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">characteristic of aborigines and children, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">source of myth, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Phalanges, Organization of society into, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Philippe, J., <a href="#Page_17">17</a> <a href="#Footnote_4_4">n.</a><br /> +<br /> +Philosophy, a transformation of mystic ideas, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Phlogiston, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Physiological states, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Physiology and pathology, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Plastic art and mythology, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">imagination, <a href="#Page_184">184</a> f.</span><br /> +<br /> +Plato, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Platonic ideas, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Play, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Uses of, for man, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Plotinus, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Poe, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Poet, a workman, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Poetical imagination, general characters, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Inspiration in, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">special characters, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Poetical invention, Stages of, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Polyideism, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[367]</a></span>Polynomy, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Poncelet, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Positive minds, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Powers of nature, Exploitation of <a href="#Page_271">271</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Practical imagination, Ubiquity of, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Practice, essential in motor creation, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Precocity, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in poetry, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of mathematicians, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Pre-Raphaelites, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Preyer, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Primitive man, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and myth, <a href="#Page_118">118</a> ff.</span><br /> +<br /> +Principle of unity, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Progressive stages of imagination, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Prometheus, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Provoked revival, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Pseudo-science, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Psychic atoms, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">paralysis, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Psychological regressions, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Puberty, Influence of, on imagination, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Pythagoras, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Pythagoreans, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Qualities, Attribution of, to objects, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Raphael, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Rational Metaphysics, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Reason, Objectivity of, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Reciprocal working of scientific and practical discoveries, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Recuperative theory of play, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Redintegration, Law of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Total, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Regis, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Religion, Universality of, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Renaissance, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Reni, Guido, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Repetition versus creation, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Representation and belief inseparable, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Representations, Interchange of, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Number of, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Revery, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Reymond, Du Bois, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Reynolds, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Roland, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Roman Republic, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Romans, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Romanes, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Romantic invention, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Röntgen, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Rossini, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Rousseau, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Rubens, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Rüdinger, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Saint-Simonism, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Sand, George, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Satanic literature, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Schelling, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Schematic images, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Schiller, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Schubert, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Schumann, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Science, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Conjecture beginning of, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">prescribes conditions and limits to imagination, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Three movements in growth of, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Scientific imagination, <a href="#Page_236">236</a> ff.<br /> +<br /> +Scripture, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Self-feeling, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Semi-science, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Seneca, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Sensation changed in memory, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Sensorial insanity, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Sexual instinct, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Shakers, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Shakespeare, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Shelly, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Social aims in finance, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">invention, limited by the past, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">wants, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Socialism, Utopian and scientific, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Societies for special ends, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Sorrow, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Special modes of scientific imagining, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Specific, not general imagination, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Spencer, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Spinoza, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Spirits, Belief in, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[368]</a></span>Spontaneity, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Spontaneous revival, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Spontaneous variations, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Stages of passage from percept to concept, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Stallo, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>.<br /> +<br /> +State credit, Law's system of, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Stewart, Dugald, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Stigmata, etc., unprecedented in individual's experience, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Stigmatized individuals, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Subjective factors, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Subliminal imagination, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Sully, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<i>Summa</i>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Summary, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Superstition and religion, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Symbolism of Hindoos, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Taine, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Teleological character of will and imagination, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Thales, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Titchener, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Tolstoi, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Tools, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Tours, Moreau de, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Triptolemus, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Tropisms, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Tycho-Brahé, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Tylor, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Tyndall, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Tyre, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Unconscious, Nature of the, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">physiological theory, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Unconscious cerebration, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">factor, <a href="#Page_50">50</a> ff.;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">factor, not a distinct element in invention, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Units of exchange, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Unity, Principle of, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<i>Universale post rem</i>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Utopias, based on author's <i>milieu</i>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Utopian imagination, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Utopians, indifferent to realization, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Van Dyck, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Vaucanson, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Vedic epoch, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Vesication, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Vicavakarma, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Vico, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Vignoli, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Vinci, Leonardo da, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<i>Vis a fronte</i> and <i>a tergo</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Vocation, Change of, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Choice of, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Voltaire, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Voluntary activity analogous to creative imagination, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Von Baer, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Von Hartmann, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Wagner, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Wahle, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Wallace, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Wallaschek, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Watch, Evolution of the, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Watt, James, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Wealth, desired from artistic motives, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Weber, E. F., <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Weismann, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Wernicke, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Wiertz, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Will, The broad meaning of, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">a coordinating function, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Effect of, on physiological functioning, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</span><br /> +<br /> +Words, Rôle of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Wundt, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +Zeller, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Ziehen, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.<br /> +<br /> +Zoroaster, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>.<br /> +</p> + + + +<div class='transnote'> +<a name="transnote" id="transnote"></a><h3>Transcriber's Notes:</h3> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_23">23</a>: <a href="#Footnote_8_8">Fn. 8</a>: Phychology amended to Psychology</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_25">25</a>: Missing footnote marker in original. Added footnote marker after James quote.</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_35">35</a>: casual amended to causal</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_38">38</a>: haphazard amended to haphazardly; grouping amended to groupings</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_39">39</a>: subejct amended to subject</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_54">54</a>: vender <i>sic</i></p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_56">56</a>: "Under the influence of alcoholic drinks and of +poisonous intoxicants attention and will always fall into +exhaustion." <i>sic</i> Possibly the word "does" or similar +is missing before "and," or "and" is superfluous.</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_55">55</a>: subtances amended to substances</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_75">75</a>: images amended to image</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_84">84</a>: unisersale amended to universale</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_85">85</a>: The following lines transposed: "which, for the +time being, should represent the" and "all the forces and +capacities upon a single point"</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_123">123</a>: fill amended to fills</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_151">151</a>: duplicate "the" removed ("the the deep working of +the masses")</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_155">155</a>: Section II amended to IV</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_163">163</a>: Section III amended to V</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_193">193</a>: Saxin amended to Saxon</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_200">200</a>: everyone amended to every one</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_208">208</a>: apalling amended to appalling</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_213">213</a>: Missing footnote marker in original. Added +footnote marker after last paragraph on page.</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_226">226</a>: caballists amended to cabalists</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_229">229</a>: plant and tree amended to plants and trees</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_236">236</a>: In Chapter IV, "The Scientific Imagination," there +are sections II, III, IV and V, but no section I.</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_250">250</a>: dyssymetry amended to dyssymmetry</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_280">280</a>: Missing footnote marker in original. Added +footnote marker after "... inorganic life."</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_286">286</a>: <a href="#Footnote_132_132">Fn. 132</a>: Evolution amended to Évolution</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_292">292</a>: acording amended to according</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_294">294</a>: managable amended to manageable</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_297">297</a>: opoprtune amended to opportune</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_319">319</a>: or amended to of ("the double of savages")</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_321">321</a>: quintescence amended to quintessence</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_338">338</a>: Footnote marker and number added to note on page. +Footnote marker added at end of first paragraph.</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_348">348</a>: quivalent amended to equivalent</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_351">351</a>: l'Opera amended to l'Opéra</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_365">365</a>: Lammennais amended to Lamennais</p> +<p>Page <a href="#Page_365">365</a>: Michelangelo amended to Michaelangelo</p> +<p>Part II, Chapter II: The chapter heading in the <a href="#Page_xiv">table of +contents</a> differs from that shown on page <a href="#Page_102">102</a>. Left as is.</p> + +<p>Accented letters, italicisation and the punctuation of +abbreviations have been standardised.</p> + +<p>Where a word is spelt differently and there is an equal +number of instances, the variant spellings have been left as +is: Hephaestos/Hephæstos; Jordaens/Jordæns; +Linnaeus/Linnæus.</p> +</div> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Essay on the Creative Imagination, by Th. 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