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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws +of +the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; +margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Life and Matter +<br />A Criticism of Professor Haeckel's 'Riddle of the Universe'</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; +margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Oliver Lodge</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: August 15, 2008 +[eBook #26321]<br /> +[Most recently updated: June 7, 2022]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: +UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced +by: David Clarke and the Online Distributed Proofreading +Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images +generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian +Libraries)</div> + + +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE +PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LIFE AND MATTER ***</div> + + + +<p class="fs150 ctr"> +<b> +Life and Matter +</b> +</p> +<div class="box"> +<p class="ctr sp2"> +<b> +Recent Works by Sir Oliver Lodge +</b> +</p> +<hr class="tiny" /> +<p class="outdent"> +SCHOOL TEACHING AND SCHOOL REFORM. A Course of Four Lectures on School +Curricula and Methods delivered to Secondary Teachers and Teachers in +Training at Birmingham during February 1905. Crown 8vo, cloth, 3s. +</p> +<p class="ctr"> +WILLIAMS & NORGATE, +<span class="sc"> +London</span>. +</p> +<hr class="tiny" /> +<p class="outdent"> +EASY MATHEMATICS: +<span class="sc"> +Chiefly Arithmetic</span>. Being a Collection of Hints to Teachers, +Parents, self-taught Students, and Adults, and containing a Summary or +Indication of most things in Elementary Mathematics useful to be known. +By Sir +<span class="sc"> +Oliver Lodge</span>, F.R.S., D.Sc., Principal of the University of +Birmingham. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. +</p> +<p class="ctr"> +MACMILLAN & CO., +<span class="sc"> +Limited</span>, +<span class="sc"> +London</span>. +</p> +</div> + +<h1> +Life and Matter +</h1> +<p class="fs125 ctr"> +A Criticism of Professor Haeckel's +<br /> +"Riddle of the Universe" +</p> +<p class="fs80 ctr sp1"> +By +</p> +<p class="fs150 ctr"> +Sir Oliver Lodge +</p> +<p class="ctr sp1"> +The expansion of a Presidential Address +<br /> +to the Birmingham and Midland Institute +</p> +<p class="fs125 ctr"> +<i> +SECOND EDITION +</i> +</p> +<p class="ctr"> +London +<br /> +Williams & Norgate +<br /> +14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden +<br /> +1905 +</p> +<hr class="med" /> +<p class="dedication"> +TO +</p> +<p class="dedication"> +<big> +JOHN HENRY MUIRHEAD +</big> +</p> +<p class="dedication"> +AND +</p> +<p class="dedication"> +<big> +MARY TALBOT MUIRHEAD +</big> +</p> +<p class="dedication"> +THE FRIENDS OF MANY NEEDING HELP +</p> +<p class="dedication"> +NOT IN PHILOSOPHY ALONE +</p> +<p class="dedication"> +THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED +</p> +<p class="dedication"> +IN MEMORY OF CHANDOLIN AND ST LUC 1904 +</p> +<hr class="short" /> + +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="sp2"> +"Materialistic monism is nowadays the working hypothesis of every +scientific explorer in every department, whatever other beliefs or +denials he may, more or less explicitly and more or less consistently, +superadd. Materialistic monism only becomes false when put forward as a +complete philosophy of the universe, because it leaves out of sight the +conditions of human knowledge, which the special sciences may +conveniently disregard, but which a candid philosophy cannot +ignore." +</p> +<p> +"The legitimate materialism of the sciences simply means temporary +and convenient abstraction from the cognitive conditions under which +there are 'facts' or 'objects' for us at all; it is 'dogmatic +materialism' which is metaphysics of the bad sort." +</p> +<p class="sig"> +<span class="sc"> +D. G. Ritchie. +</span> +</p> + +<p class="sp1"> +"Our metaphysics is really like many other sciences—only on +the threshold of genuine knowledge: God knows if it will ever get +further. It is not hard to see its weakness in much that it undertakes. +Prejudice is often found to be the mainstay of its proofs. For this +nothing is to blame but the ruling passion of those who would fain +extend human knowledge. They are anxious to have a grand philosophy: +but the desirable thing is, that it should also be a sound one." +</p> +<p class="sig"> +<span class="sc"> +Kant. +</span> +</p> +</div> +<hr class="med" /> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2> +<span class="fs80">Preface</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p> +This small volume is in form controversial, but in substance it has a +more ambitious aim: it is intended to formulate, or perhaps rather to +reformulate, a certain doctrine concerning the nature of man and the +interaction between mind and matter. Incidentally it attempts to +confute two errors which are rather prevalent:— +</p> +<p class="outdent"> +1. The notion that because material energy is constant in quantity, +therefore its transformations and transferences—which admittedly +constitute terrestrial activity—are not susceptible of guidance +or directive control. +</p> +<p class="outdent"> +2. The idea that the specific guiding power which we call "life" +is one of the forms of material energy, so that directly it +relinquishes its connection with matter other equivalent forms of +energy must arise to replace it. +</p> +<p> +The book is specially intended to act as an antidote to the speculative +and destructive portions of Professor Haeckel's interesting and +widely-read work, but in other respects it may be regarded less as a +hostile attack than as a supplement—an extension of the more +scientific portions of that work into higher and more fruitful regions +of inquiry. +</p> +<p class="sig"> +OLIVER LODGE. +</p> +<p> +<span class="sc"> +University of Birmingham</span>, +<br /> +<i> +October 1905</i>. +</p> +<hr class="short" /> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2> +<span class="fs80">Contents</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<table summary="Contents" width="90%" cellpadding="1"> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +<small> +CHAP.</small> +</td> +<td class="txt"> + +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<small> +PAGE</small> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +I +</td> +<td class="txt"> +MONISM +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<a href="#I"> +1</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +II +</td> +<td class="txt"> +"THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE" +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<a href="#II"> +14</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +III +</td> +<td class="txt"> +THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<a href="#III"> +41</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +IV +</td> +<td class="txt"> +MEMORANDA FOR WOULD-BE MATERIALISTS +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<a href="#IV"> +60</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +V +</td> +<td class="txt"> +RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<a href="#V"> +71</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +VI +</td> +<td class="txt"> +MIND AND MATTER +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<a href="#VI"> +100</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +VII +</td> +<td class="txt"> +PROFESSOR HAECKEL'S CONJECTURAL PHILOSOPHY +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<a href="#VII"> +125</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +VIII +</td> +<td class="txt"> +HYPOTHESIS AND ANALOGIES CONCERNING LIFE +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<a href="#VIII"> +136</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +IX +</td> +<td class="txt"> +WILL AND GUIDANCE +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<a href="#IX"> +152</a> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="chpt"> +X +</td> +<td class="txt"> +FURTHER SPECULATION AS TO THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF LIFE +</td> +<td class="pg"> +<a href="#X"> +179</a> +</td> +</tr> +</table> +<hr class="long" /> + +<p class="fs150 sp2 ctr"> +LIFE AND MATTER +</p> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2> +<a id="I"></a>CHAPTER I +<br /> +<span class="fs80">MONISM</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p> +In his recent Presidential Address before the British Association, at +Cambridge, Mr Balfour rather emphasised the existence and even the +desirability of a barrier between Science and Philosophy which recent +advances have tended to minimise though never to obliterate. He +appeared to hint that it is best for scientific men not to attempt to +philosophise, but to restrict themselves to their own domain; +though, on the other hand, he did not appear to wish similarly to limit +philosophers, by recommending that they should keep themselves +unacquainted with scientific facts, and ignorant of the theories which +weld those facts together. Indeed, in his own person he is an example +of the opposite procedure, for he himself frequently takes pleasure in +overlooking the boundary and making a wide survey of the position on +its physical side—a thing which it is surely very desirable for +a philosopher to do. +</p> +<p> +But if that process be regarded as satisfactory, it is surely equally +permissible for a man of science occasionally to look over into the +philosophic region, and survey the territory on that side also, so far +as his means permit. +And if philosophers object to this procedure, it must be because they +have found by experience that men of science who have once transcended +or transgressed the boundary are apt to lose all sense of reasonable +constraint, and to disport themselves as if they had at length escaped +into a region free from scientific trammels—a region where +confident assertions might be freely made, where speculative hypothesis +might rank as theory, and where verification was both unnecessary and +impossible. +</p> +<p> +The most striking instance of a scientific man who on entering +philosophic territory has exhibited signs of exhilaration and +emancipation, is furnished by the case of Professor Haeckel of Jena. In +an eloquent and popular work, entitled +<i> +das Welt-Räthsel</i>, the World Problem, or "The Riddle of the +Universe," this eminent biologist has surveyed the whole range of +existence, from the foundations of physics to the comparison of +religions, from the facts of anatomy to the freedom of the will, from +the vitality of cells to the attributes of God; treating these subjects +with wide though by no means superhuman knowledge, and with +considerable critical and literary ability. This work, +through the medium of a really excellent translation by Mr M'Cabe, and +under the auspices of the Rationalist Press Association, has obtained a +wide circulation in this country, being purchasable for six-pence at +any bookstall; where one often finds it accompanied by another still +more popular and similarly-priced treatise by the same author, a digest +or summary of the religious aspect of his scientific philosophy, under +the title +<i> +The Confession of Faith of a Man of Science</i>. +</p> +<p> +Professor Haeckel's credentials, as a learned biologist who introduced +Darwinism into Germany, doubtless stand high; and it is a great tribute +to his literary ability that a fairly abstruse work on so comprehensive +a subject should have obtained a wide notoriety, and have been welcomed +by masses of thinking readers, especially by many among the skilled +artisans, in this country. +</p> +<p> +From several points of view this diffusion of interest is most +satisfactory, since the spread of thought on serious topics is greatly +to be welcomed. Moreover, there is a vast mass of information in these +writings which must be new to the bulk of the inhabitants of these +islands. +There is also a great deal of criticism which should arouse professors +of dogmatic theology, and exponents of practical religion, to a keener +sense of their opportunities and responsibility. A view of their +position from outside, by an able and unsparing critic, cannot but be +illuminating and helpful, however unpleasant. +</p> +<p> +Moreover, the comprehensive survey of existence which can be taken by a +modern man of science is almost sure to be interesting and instructive, +when properly interpreted with the necessary restrictions and +expansions; and if it be found that the helpful portions are unhappily +accompanied by over-confident negations and supercilious denials of +facts at present outside the range of orthodox science, +these natural blemishes must be discounted and estimated at their +proper worth; for it would be foolish to imagine that even a diligent +student of Nature has special access to the kind of truths which have +been hidden from the nominally "wise and prudent" of all time. +</p> +<p> +So far as Professor Haeckel's writings are read by the thoroughly +educated and well-informed, they can do nothing but good. They may not, +indeed, convey anything particularly new, but they furnish an +interesting study in scientific history and mental development. So far, +however, as they are read by unbalanced and uncultured persons, with no +sense of proportion and but little critical faculty, they may do harm, +unless accompanied by a suitable qualification or antidote, especially +an antidote against the bigotry of their somewhat hasty and scornful +destructive portions. +</p> +<p> +To the intelligent artisan or other hard-headed reader who considers +that Christian faith is undermined, and the whole religious edifice +upset, by the scientific philosophy advocated by Professor Haeckel +under the name "Monism," I would say, paraphrasing a sentence of Mr +Ruskin's in a preface to +<i> +Sesame and Lilies</i>:—Do not think it likely that you hold in +your hands a treatise in which the ultimate and final verity of the +universe is at length beautifully proclaimed, and in which pure truth +has been sifted from the errors of all preceding ages. Do not think it, +friend: it is not so. +</p> +<p> +For what is this same "Monism?" +</p> +<p> +Professor Haeckel writes almost as if it were a recent invention, but +in truth there have been many versions of it, and in one form or +another the idea is quite old, older than Plato, as old as Parmenides. +</p> +<p> +The name "Monism" should apply to any philosophic system which +assumes and attempts to formulate the essential simplicity and +<i> +oneness +</i> +of all the apparent diversity of sensual impression and consciousness, +any system which seeks to exhibit all the complexities of existence, +both material and mental—the whole of phenomena, both objective +and subjective—as modes of manifestation of one fundamental +reality. +</p> +<p> +According to the assumed nature of that reality, different brands of +monistic theory exist:— +</p> +<p> +1. There is the hypothesis that everything is an aspect of some unknown +absolute Reality, which itself, in its real nature, is far beyond our +apprehension or conception. And within the broad area thus suggested +may be grouped such utterly different universe-conceptions as that of +Herbert Spencer and that of Spinoza. +</p> +<p> +2. According to another system the fundamental reality is psychical, is +consciousness, let us say, or mind; and the material world has only the +reality appropriate to a consistent set of ideas. Here we find again +several varieties, ranging from Bishop Berkeley and presumably Hegel, +on the one hand, to William James—who, in so far as he is a +monist at all, may I suppose be called an empirical idealist—and +solipsists such as Mach and Karl Pearson, on the other. +</p> +<p> +3. A third system, or group of systems, has been in vogue among some +physicists of an earlier day, and among some biologists now; viz., that +mind, thought, consciousness are all by-products, phantasmagoria, +epiphenomena, developments and decorations, as it were, of the one +fundamental all-embracing reality, which some may call +"matter," some "energy," and some "substance." +In this category we find Tyndall—at any rate the Tyndall of +"the Belfast address"—and here consistently do we find +Haeckel, together with several other biologists. +</p> +<p> +This last system of Monism, though not now in favour with philosophers, +is the most militant variety of all; and accordingly it has in some +quarters managed to obtain, and it certainly seems anxious to obtain, a +monopoly of the name. +</p> +<p> +But the monopoly should not be granted. The name Materialism is quite +convenient for it, just as Idealism is for the opposing system; and if +either of these titles is objected to by the upholders of either +system, as apparently too thorough-going and exclusive, whereas only a +tendency in one or other direction is to be indicated, +then the longer but more descriptive titles of Idealistic-monism and +Materialistic-monism respectively should be employed. But neither of +these compromises seems necessary to connote the position of Professor +Haeckel. +</p> +<p> +The truth is that all philosophy aims at being monistic; it is bound to +aim at unification, however difficult of attainment; and a philosopher +who abandoned the quest, and contented himself with a permanent +antinomy—a universe compounded of two or more irreconcilable and +entirely disparate and disconnected agencies—would be held to be +throwing up his brief as a philosopher and taking refuge in a kind of +permanent Manichæism, which experience has shown to be an +untenable and ultimately unthinkable position. +</p> +<p> +An attempt at Monism is therefore common to all philosophers, whether +professional or amateur; and the only question at issue is what sort of +Monism are you aiming at, what sort of solution of the universe have +you to offer, what can you hold out to us as a simple satisfactory +comprehensive scheme of existence? +</p> +<p> +In order to estimate the value of Professor Haeckel's scheme of the +universe, it is not necessary to appeal to philosophers: it is +sufficient to meet him on scientific ground, and to show that in his +effort to simplify and unify he has under-estimated some classes of +fact and has stretched scientific theory into regions of guess-work and +hypothesis, where it loses touch with real science altogether. The +facts which he chooses gratuitously to deny, and the facts which he +chooses vigorously to emphasise, are arbitrarily selected by him +according as they will or will not fit into his philosophic scheme. +The scheme itself is no new one, and almost certainly contains elements +of truth. Some day far hence, when it is possible properly to formulate +it, a system of Monism may be devised which shall contain the whole +truth. At present the scheme formulated by Professor Haeckel must to +philosophers appear rudimentary and antiquated, while to men of science +it appears gratuitous, hypothetical, in some places erroneous, and +altogether unconvincing. +</p> +<p> +Before everything a philosopher should aim at being all-inclusive, +before everything a man of science should aim at being definite, clear, +and accurate. An attempt at combination is an ambitious attempt, which +may legitimately be made, but which it appears is hardly as yet given +to man to make successfully. +Attempts at an all-embracing scheme, which shall be both truly +philosophic and truly scientific, must for the present be mistrusted, +and the mistrust should extend especially to their negative side. +Positive contributions, either to fact or to system, may be real and +should be welcome; but negative or destructive criticism, the eschewing +and throwing away of any part of human experience, because it is +inconsistent with a premature and ill-considered monistic or any other +system, should be regarded with deep suspicion; and the promulgation of +any such negative and destructive scheme, especially in association +with free and easy dogmatism, should automatically excite mistrust and +repulsion. +</p> +<p> +There are things which cannot yet be fitted in as part of a coherent +scheme of scientific knowledge—at present they appear like +fragments of another order of things; and if they are to be forced into +the scientific framework, like portions of a "puzzle-map," +before their true place has been discovered, a quantity of substantial +fact must be disarranged, dislocated, and thrown away. A premature and +cheap Monism is therefore worse than none at all. +</p> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2><a id="II"></a>CHAPTER II +<br /> +<span class="fs80">"THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE"</span> +</h2> +</div> +<p> +I shall now endeavour to exhibit the way in which Professor Haeckel +proceeds to expound his views, and for that purpose shall extract +certain sentences from his work, +<i> +The Riddle of the Universe</i>; giving references to the sixpenny +translation, now so widely circulated in England, in order that they +may be referred to in their context with ease. To scientific men the +exaggeration of statement will in many cases be immediately obvious; +but in the present state of general education it will often be +necessary to append a few comments, indicating, as briefly as possible, +wherein the statement is in excess of ascertained fact, however +interesting as a guess or speculation; wherefore it must be considered +illegitimate as a weapon wherewith to attack other systems, so far as +they too are equally entitled to be considered reasonable guesses at +truth. +</p> +<p> +The central scientific doctrines upon which Professor Haeckel's +philosophy is founded appear to be two—one physical, the other +biological. The physical doctrine is what he calls "the Law of +Substance"—a kind of combination of the conservation of +matter and the conservation of energy: a law to which he attaches +extraordinary importance, and from which he draws momentous +conclusions. Ultimately he seems to regard this law as almost +axiomatic, in the sense that a philosopher who has properly grasped it +is unable to conceive the negative. A few extracts will suffice to show +the remarkable importance which he attaches to this law:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"All the particular advances of physics and chemistry yield in +theoretical importance to the discovery of the great law which brings +them to one common focus, the 'law of substance.' As this fundamental +cosmic law establishes the eternal persistence of matter and force, +their unvarying constancy throughout the entire universe, it has become +the pole-star that guides our monistic philosophy through the mighty +labyrinth to a solution of the world-problem" (p. 2). +</p> +<p> +"The uneducated member of a civilised community is surrounded with +countless enigmas at every step, just as truly as the savage. Their +number, however, decreases with every stride of civilisation and of +science; and the monistic philosophy is ultimately confronted with but +one simple and comprehensive enigma—the 'problem of +substance'" (p. 6). +</p> +<p> +"The supreme and all-pervading law of nature, the true and only +cosmological law, is, in my opinion, +<i> +the law of substance</i>; its discovery and establishment is the +greatest intellectual triumph of the nineteenth century, in the sense +that all other known laws of nature are subordinate to it.Under the +name of 'law of substance' we embrace two supreme laws of different +origin and age—the older is the chemical law of the +'conservation of matter,' and the younger is the physical law of the +'conservation of energy.' It will be self-evident to many readers, and +it is acknowledged by most of the scientific men of the day, that these +two great laws are essentially inseparable" (p. 75). +</p> +<p> +"The conviction that these two great cosmic theorems, the chemical +law of the persistence of matter and the physical law of the +persistence of force, are fundamentally one, is of the utmost +importance in our monistic system. The two theories are just as +intimately united as their objects—matter and force or energy. +Indeed, this fundamental unity of the two laws is self-evident to many +monistic scientists and philosophers, since they merely relate to two +different aspects of one and the same object, the +<i> +cosmos</i>" (p. 76). +</p> +<p> +"I proposed some time ago to call it the 'law of substance,' or the +'fundamental cosmic law'; it might also be called the 'universal law,' +or the 'law of constancy,' or the 'axiom of the constancy of the +universe.' In the ultimate analysis it is found to be a necessary +consequence of the principle of causality" (p. 76). +</p> +</div> +<p> +I criticise these utterances below, and I also quote extracts bearing +on the subject from Professor Huxley in Chapter IV.; but meanwhile +Professor Haeckel is as positive as any Positivist, and runs no risk of +being accused of Solipsism:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Our only real and valuable knowledge is a knowledge of nature +itself, and consists of presentations which correspond to external +things."... "These presentations we call +<i> +true</i>, and we are convinced that their content corresponds to the +knowable aspect of things. We +<i> +know +</i> +that these facts are not imaginary, but real" (p. 104). +</p> +</div> +<p> +He also tends to become sentimental about the ultimate reality as he +perceives it, and tries to construct from it a kind of religion:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"The astonishment with which we gaze upon the starry heavens and +the microscopic life in a drop of water, the awe with which we trace +the marvellous working of energy in the motion of matter, the reverence +with which we grasp the universal dominance of the law of substance +throughout the universe—all these are part of our emotional +life, falling under the heading of 'natural religion'" (p. 122). +</p> +<p> +"Pantheism teaches that God and the world are one. The idea of God +is identical with that of nature or substance.... In pantheism, God, as +an +<i> +intra-mundane +</i> +being, is everywhere identical with nature itself, and is operative +<i> +within +</i> +the world as 'force' or 'energy.' The latter view alone is compatible +with our supreme law—the law of substance. It follows +necessarily that pantheism is +<i> +the world-system of the modern scientist</i>" (p. 102). +</p> +<p> +"This 'godless world-system' substantially agrees with the monism or +pantheism of the modern scientist; it is only another expression for +it, emphasising its negative aspect, the non-existence of any +supernatural deity. In this sense Schopenhauer justly remarks: +</p> +<p> +"'Pantheism is only a polite form of atheism. The truth of pantheism +lies in its destruction of the dualist antithesis of God and the world, +in its recognition that the world exists in virtue of its own inherent +forces. The maxim of the pantheist, 'God and the world are one,' is +merely a polite way of giving the Lord God his +<i> +congé</i>'" (p. 103). +</p> +</div> +<p> +Thus we are led on, from what may be supposed to be a bare statement of +two recent generalisations of science,—first of all to regard +them as almost axiomatic or self-evident; next, to consider that they +solve the main problem of the universe; and, lastly, that they suffice +to replace the Deity Himself. +</p> +<p> +To curb these extravagant pretensions it is only necessary to consider +soberly what these physical laws really assert. +</p> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Conservation of Energy. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +Take first the conservation of energy. This generalisation asserts that +in every complete material system, subject to any kind of internal +activity, the total energy of the system does not change, but is +subject merely to transference and transformation, and can only be +increased or diminished by passing fresh energy in or out through the +walls of the system. So far from this being self-evident, it required +very careful measurement and experimental proof to demonstrate the +fact, for in common experience the energy of a system left to itself +continually to all appearance diminishes; yet it has been skilfully +proved that when the heat and every other kind of product is collected +and measured, the result can be so expressed as to show a total +constancy, appertaining to a certain specially devised function called +"energy," provided we know and are able to account for every +form into which the said energy can be transformed by the activity +going on. A very important generalisation truly, and one which has so +seized hold of the mind of the physicist that if in any actual example +a disappearance or a generation of energy were found, he would at once +conclude either that he had overlooked some known form and thereby +committed an error, or that some unknown form was present which he had +not allowed for: thereby getting a clue which, if followed up, he would +hope might result in a discovery. +</p> +<p> +But the term "energy" itself, as used in definite sense by the +physicist, rather involves a modern idea and is itself a +generalisation. Things as distinct from each other as light, heat, +sound, rotation, vibration, elastic strain, gravitative separation, +electric currents, and chemical affinity, have all to be generalised +under the same heading, in order to make the law true. Until +"heat" was included in the list of energies, the statement could +not be made; and, a short time ago, it was sometimes discussed whether +"life" should or should not be included in the category of +energy. I should give the answer decidedly No, but some might be +inclined to say Yes; and this is sufficient as an example to show that +the categories of energy are not necessarily exhausted; that new forms +may be discovered; and that if new forms exist, until they are +discovered, the law of conservation of energy as now stated may in some +cases be strictly untrue; just as it would be untrue, though partially +and usefully true, in the theory of machines, if heat were unknown or +ignored. To jump, therefore, from a generalisation such as this, and to +say, as Professor Haeckel does on page 5, that the following +cosmological theorems have already been "amply demonstrated," is +to leap across a considerable chasm:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"1. The universe, or the cosmos, is eternal, infinite, and +illimitable. +</p> +<p> +"2. Its substance, with its two attributes (matter and energy), +fills infinite space, and is in eternal motion. +</p> +<p> +"3. This motion runs on through infinite time as an unbroken +development, with a periodic change from life to death, from evolution +to devolution. +</p> +<p> +"4. The innumerable bodies which are scattered about the +space-filling ether all obey the same 'law of substance'; while the +rotating masses slowly move towards their destruction and dissolution +in one part of space, others are springing into new life and +development in other quarters of the universe." +</p> +</div> +<p> +Most of this, though in itself probable enough, must, when +scientifically regarded, be rated as guess-work, being an overpressing +of known fact into an exaggerated and over-comprehensive form of +statement. Let it be understood that I am not objecting to his +speculations, but only pointing out that they are speculations. +</p> +<p> +The conservation of energy is a legitimate enough generalisation: we do +not really doubt its conservation and constancy when we admit that we +are not yet sure of having fully and finally exhausted the whole +category of energy. What we do grant is, that it may hereafter be +possible to discover new forms; and when new forms are discovered, then +either the definition may have to be modified, or else the detailed +statement at present found sufficient will have to be overhauled. But +after all, this is not specially important: the +<i> +serious +</i> +mistake which people are apt to make concerning this law of energy is +to imagine that it denies the possibility of guidance, control, or +directing agency, whereas really it has nothing to say on these topics; +it relates to +<i> +amount +</i> +alone. Philosophers have been far too apt to jump to the conclusion +that because energy is constant, therefore no guidance is possible, so +that all psychological or other interference is precluded. Physicists, +however, know better; though unfortunately Tyndall, in some papers on +Miracles and Prayer, thoughtlessly adduced the conservation of energy +as decisive. This question of "guidance" is one of great +interest, and I emphasise the subject further on, especially in Chapter +IX. +</p> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Conservation of Matter. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +Take next the "conservation of matter"—which means that in +any operation, mechanical, physical, or chemical, to which matter can +be subjected, its amount, as measured by weight, remains unchanged; so +that the only way to increase or diminish the weight of substance +inside a given enclosure, or geometrically closed boundary, is to pass +matter in or out through the walls. +</p> +<p> +This law has been called the sheet-anchor of chemistry, but it is very +far from being self-evident; and its statement involves the finding of +a property of matter which experimentally shall remain unchanged, +although nearly every other property is modified. To superficial +observation nothing is easier than to destroy matter. When +liquid—when dew, for instance—evaporates, it seems to +disappear, and when a manuscript is burnt it is certainly destroyed: +but it turns out that there is something which may be called the vapour +of water, or the "matter" of the letter, which still persists, +though it has taken rarer form and become unrecognisable. Ultimately, +in order to express the persistence of the permanent abstraction called +"matter" clearly, it is necessary to speak of the "ultimate +atoms" of which it is composed, and to say that though these may +enter into various combinations, and thereby display many outward +forms, yet that they themselves are immutable and indestructible, +constant in number and quality and form, not subject to any law of +evolution; in other words, totally unaffected by time. +</p> +<p> +If we ask for the evidence on which this generalisation is founded, we +have to appeal to various delicate weighings, conducted chiefly by +chemists for practical purposes, and very few of them really directed +to ascertain whether the law is true or not. A few such direct +experiments are now, indeed, being conducted with the hope of finding +that the law is not completely true; in other words, with the hope of +finding that the weight of a body does depend slightly on its state of +aggregation or on some other physical property. The question has even +been raised whether the weight of a crystal is altogether independent +of its +<i> +aspect</i>: the direction of its plane of cleavage with reference to +the earth's radius; also, whether the +<i> +temperature +</i> +of bodies has any influence on their weight; but on these points it may +be truly said that if any difference were discovered it would not be +expressed by saying that the amount of matter was different, but simply +that "weight" was not so fundamental and inalienable a property +of matter as has been sometimes assumed; in which case it is clear that +there must be a more fundamental property to which appeal can be made +in favour of constancy or persistency or conservation. Now the most +fundamental property of matter known is undoubtedly 'inertia'; and the +law of conservation would therefore come to mean that the +<i> +inertia +</i> +of matter was constant, no matter what changes it underwent. But, then, +inertia is not an easy property to measure,—very difficult to +measure with great accuracy: it is in practice nearly always +<i> +inferred +</i> +from weight; and in terms of inertia the law of conservation of matter +cannot be considered really an experimental fact; it is, strictly +speaking, a reasonable hypothesis, an empirical law, which we have +never seen any reason to doubt, and in support of which all scientific +experience may be adduced in favour. +</p> +<p> +It is possible, however, to grant to Professor Haeckel—not +positively, but for the sake of argument, and giving him the benefit of +our present ignorance—that it is unlikely that matter in its +lowest denomination can by us be created or destroyed. For, although it +is now pretty well known that atoms of matter are not the +indestructible and immutable things they were once thought (seeing +that, although we do not know how to break them up, they are liable +every now and then themselves to break up or explode, and so resolve +themselves into simpler forms), yet it can be granted that these +simpler forms are likewise themselves atoms, in the same sense, and +that if they break up they will break up likewise into atoms: or +ultimately, it may be, into those corpuscles or electrons or electric +charges, of which one plausible theory conjectures that the atoms of +matter are really composed. +</p> +<p> +Supposing an atom thus broken up into electrons, its weight may +possibly have disappeared. We simply do not know whether weight is a +property of the grouping called an atom, or whether it belongs also to +the individual ingredients or corpuscles of that atom. There is at +present no evidence. But whether weight has disappeared or not, it is +quite certain, for definite though rather recondite theoretical +reasons, that the inertia would +<i> +not +</i> +have disappeared; and accordingly it may be held, and must be held in +our present state of knowledge, that the constancy of fundamental +material still holds good, even though the atoms are resolved into +electric charges—an amount of destruction never contemplated by +those chemists and physicists who promulgated the doctrine of the +conservation of matter. +</p> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Electrical Theory of Matter. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +But then, on the electrical theory of matter, even +<i> +inertia +</i> +is not the thoroughly constant property we once thought it. It is a +function of velocity for one thing, and when speeds become excessive +the inertia of matter rises perceptibly in value. The fact that it +would rise in value by a calculable amount, and that the rise would be +perceptible when the speed of motion approached in value to within, +say, a tenth of the velocity of light, was predicted mathematically;<a +href="#note1" id="noteref1"><sup>1</sup> +</a> +and now, strange to say, it has recently become possible to observe and +actually measure the increase of inertia experimentally, and thus to +confirm the electrical theory not only as qualitatively or +approximately true, but as completely and quantitatively accurate. A +remarkable achievement all this! of quite modern times, which has not +excited the attention it deserves—save among physicists. +</p> +<p> +But even this is not all that can be said as to the fluctuating +character of that fundamental material quality "inertia." It +appears possible, if electrons approach too near each other, so as to +encroach on each other's magnetic field as they move, that then their +inertia may fall in value during the time they are contiguous. No +experimental fact has yet suggested this at present: it is improbable +that even in the tightest combinations they ever really approach close +enough to each other to make the effect appreciable in the slightest +degree; still, strictly speaking, the inertia of matter is a known +mathematical function of the distance of electrons apart, compared with +their size, as well as of their absolute speed through the ether; and +hence it may be found to vary from either of two distinct reasons. +Nevertheless, even this variation would not be expressed as a failure +in the conservation of matter, though there is now no single material +property that can be specified as really and genuinely constant. So +long as the electric centres of strain, or whatever they are—so +long as the electric charges themselves—continue unaltered, we +should prefer to say that at least the +<i> +basis +</i> +of matter was fundamentally conserved. +</p> +<p> +Further than this, however, we cannot go; and to say, as Professor +Haeckel says, that the modern physicist has grown so accustomed to the +conservation of matter that he is unable to conceive the contrary, is +simply untrue. Whatever may be the case in real fact, there is no +question with respect to the possibility of conception. The electrons +themselves must be explained somehow; and the only surmise which at +present holds the field is that they are knots or twists or vortices, +or some sort of either static or kinetic modification, of the ether of +space—a small bit partitioned off from the rest and +individualised by reason of this identifying peculiarity. It may be +that these knots cannot be untied, these twists undone, these vortices +broken up; it may be that neither artificially nor spontaneously are +they ever in the slightest degree changed. It may be so, but we do not +know; and it is quite easy to conceive them broken up, the identity of +the electron lost, its substance resolved into the original ether, +without parts or individual properties. If this happened, within our +ken, we should have to confess that the properties of matter were gone, +and that hence everything that could by any stretch of language be +called "matter" was destroyed, since no identifying property +remained. The discovery of such an event may lie in the science of the +future; it would be an epoch-making event in the history of science, +but no physicist would be upset by it—perhaps not even +surprised; nor would any one have good reason to be astonished if the +correlative phenomenon occurred, and under certain conditions some +knots or strains were some day caused in the ether, which had not been +previously there; and so "matter," or the foundation of matter, +artificially produced. In other words, the destruction and the creation +of matter are well within the range of scientific conception, and may +be within the realm of experimental possibility. +</p> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Persistence of the Existent. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +Is there, then, no meaning in the conception which Professor Haeckel +and others have so enthusiastically formulated, and which certainly +commends itself to every one as representing in some sense a genuine +truth, whether it be called a "law of substance" or whatever it +be called? There does seem a certain plausibility in the idea, pure +guess or assumption though it be, that anything which really and +fundamentally exists, in a serious and untrivial and non-accidental +sense, can be trusted not suddenly to go out of existence and leave no +trace behind. In other words, there seems some reason to suppose that +anything which actually +<i> +exists +</i> +must be in some way or other perpetual; that real existence is not a +capricious and changing attribute: arbitrary collocations and +accidental relations may and must be temporary, but there may be in +each a fundamental substratum which, if it can be reached, will be +found to be eternal. I develop this idea further in the sequel. This +is, at any rate, what Professor Haeckel was evidently groping after, as +many others have groped before him, and the nature of this fundamental +persistent entity or entities (for we must not assume without proof +that there is only one: there may be several, and at any rate their +ultimate unification may be a still further advanced and more +transcendental problem) may with some appropriateness be called 'the +problem of the universe,' since it is clearly the problem of existence. +Professor Haeckel thinks he has solved the problem, grasped the +fundamental reality, and found it to be +<i> +matter and energy +</i> +and nothing else; though why he chooses to regard matter and energy as +one thing instead of two is not perfectly plain to me, nor, I venture +to say, is it really plain to him. +</p> +<p> +Making the assumption, then, that there is something, or that there are +several things, to be discovered, which may thus have the most +fundamental property, viz., persistent immutable existence, the +'problem' has resolved itself into the discovery of what these things +actually are. It will not do to jump at some object and assume that +that is it. +</p> +<p> +A multitude of things obviously perish, thereby showing themselves to +be trivial or accidental arrangements, according to our hypothesis. A +flame is extinguished and dies, a mountain is ultimately ground into +sand by the slow influence of denudation, a planet or a sun may lose +its identity by encounter with other bodies. All these are temporary +collocations of atoms; and it appears now that an atom may break up +into electric charges, and these again may some day be found capable of +resolving themselves into pristine ether. If so, then these also are +temporary, and in the material universe it is the ether only which +persists—the Ether with such states of motion or strain as it +eternally possesses—in which case the Ether will have proved +itself the material substratum and most fundamental known entity on +that side. +</p> +<p> +But are we to conclude, therefore, that nothing else exists? that the +existence of one thing disproves the existence of others? The +contention would be absurd. The category of +<i> +life +</i> +has not been touched in anything we have said so far; no relation has +been established between life and energy, or between life and ether. +The nature of life is unknown. Is life also a thing of which constancy +can be asserted? When it disappears from a material environment is it +knocked out of existence, or is it merely transferred to some other +surroundings, becoming as difficult to identify and recognise as are +the gases of a burnt manuscript or the vapour of a vanished cloud? Is +it a temporary trivial collocation associated with certain complex +groupings of the atoms of matter, and resolved into nothingness when +that grouping is interfered with? or is it something immaterial and +itself fundamental, something which uses these collocations of matter +in order to display itself amid material surroundings, but is otherwise +essentially independent of them? (This idea is expanded in Chapters VI. +to X., and see note at end of present chapter.) +</p> +<p> +Professor Haeckel would answer this question with a contemptuous +negative; and the treatment which he would thus give to life he would +also extend to mind and consciousness, to affection, to art, to poetry, +to religion, and all the other facts of experience to which in the +process of evolution humanity has risen: I say he would answer the +question, whether these had any real existence other than as a +necessary concomitant of a sufficiently complex material aggregate, +with a contemptuous negative; but I challenge him to say by what right +he gives that answer. His speculation is that all these properties are +nascent and latent in the material atoms themselves, that these have +the potentiality of life and choice and consciousness, which we +perceive in their developed combinations. As a speculation this is +legitimate; but the only answer that can by science legitimately be +given at the present time is the answer given by du Bois-Reymond, +<i> +ignoramus</i>, we do not know. +</p> +<p> +Scientifically we do not; and for a man of science to pretend, or to +assert in a popular treatise, that we do, is essentially and seriously +to mislead. (See Chapter VII. below.) It may even be a question whether +the assertion of entire ignorance at the present time is completely +appropriate, whether we have not some positive evidence +<i> +against +</i> +Professor Haeckel's contention. I believe that we have; and though I +may acquiesce in an assertion of present ignorance, I am not at all +willing to accept the next sentence of Professor du Bois-Reymond's +answer, and to say +<i> +ignorabimus</i>, we never shall know. +</p> +<p> +The matter seems to me within the legitimate lines of scientific +inquiry, and it is unwise to attempt prediction, especially negative +prediction, or to attempt to close the door to the future developments +of knowledge. +</p> +<p> +But I am content to say for the present that from the point of view of +strict science it is not yet possible to give any positive answer to +these questions; that they must await the progress of discovery. It +becomes a question of some interest, therefore, how it is possible for +Professor Haeckel and for others of his school to have arrived at the +idea not only that a scientific answer can be given, but that already +it has been given, and that they know distinctly what it is. +</p> +<hr class="short" /> +<p class="ctr"> +<span class="sc"> +Note on the Word "Life." +</span> +</p> +<p> +Until a term is accurately defined, and even afterwards for some +purposes, it is permissible to use a word of large significance in more +than one sense. Thus the word "light" may be considered a +psychological term, denoting a certain sensation, or a physiological +term, signifying the stimulus of certain specialised nerve-endings, or +a physical term, expressing briefly an electromagnetic wave-disturbance +in the ether. I am using the word "life" in a quite general +sense, as is obvious, for if it be limited to certain metabolic +processes in protoplasm—which is the narrowest of its legitimate +meanings—what I have said about its possible existence apart +from matter would be absurd. It may be convenient to employ the word +"vitality" for this limited sense; but so far as I know, there +is no general consensus of usage, and the context must suffice to show +a friendly reader the connotation intended. +</p> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2><a id="III"></a>CHAPTER III +<br /> +<span class="fs80">THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p> +This leads me to the second main thesis or central scientific doctrine +of Professor Haeckel's treatise, the biological one; and it is this +which I shall now proceed to illustrate by further quotations, viz., +the connection as he conceives it between life and matter. +</p> +<p> +His view is that life has arisen from inorganic matter without +antecedent life. The experimental facts of biogenesis he discards in +favour of a hypothetical and at present undiscovered kind of +spontaneous generation. He assumes that the chemico-physical properties +of carbon confer so peculiar a power on its albuminoid compounds that +they develop into living protoplasm. He says that he formulated this +view thirty-three years ago, and that no better monistic theory has +arisen to replace it, while to reject some form of spontaneous +generation is to admit a miracle:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"The hypothesis of spontaneous generation, and the allied +carbon-theory (viz., that 'carbon ... may be considered the chemical +basis of life,' p. 2) are of great importance in deciding the +long-standing conflict between the +<i> +teleological +</i> +(dualistic) and the +<i> +mechanical +</i> +(monistic) interpretation of phenomena" (p. 91). +</p> +</div> +<p> +But it can hardly be maintained that a "hypothesis" is able to +"decide" any dispute. (See, however, Chapter VI.) +</p> +<p> +An unscientific reader could hardly imagine that the apparently +detailed account given in the next sentence of the automatic origin of +life, as it may have arisen on other planes, and as it must have arisen +on this, is of the nature of hypothesis:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"First simple monera are formed by spontaneous generation, and from +these arise unicellular protists.... From these unicellular protists +arise, in the further course of evolution, first social +cell-communities, and subsequently tissue-forming plants and +animals" (p. 131). +</p> +</div> +<p> +In this hypothesis of automatic origin by the agency of matter and +energy alone, he could probably find many biologists to agree with him +speculatively; but he goes further than some of them, for he does not +limit the automatic or material development to animal and vegetable +life alone: he throws automatic consciousness in, too:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"The 'cellular theory' ... has given us the first true +interpretation of the physical, chemical, and even the psychological, +processes of life" (p. 1). +</p> +<p> +"Consciousness, thought, and speculation are functions of the +ganglionic cells of the cortex of the brain" (p. 6). +</p> +<p> +"The peculiar phenomenon of consciousness is not, as du Bois-Reymond +and the dualistic school would have us believe, a completely +'transcendental' problem: it is, as I showed thirty-three years ago, a +<i> +physiological +</i> +problem, and as such, must be reduced to the phenomena of physics and +chemistry" (p. 65). +</p> +</div> +<p> +Holding such a view concerning consciousness, in the teeth of the +general philosophic opinion of to-day, it is natural to find that of +orthodox psychology and psychologists he is contemptuous:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Most of our so-called 'psychologists' have little or no knowledge +of these indispensable foundations of anthropology—anatomy, +histology, ontogeny, and physiology.... Hence it is that most of the +psychological literature of the day is so much waste-paper" (p. 34). +</p> +<p> +"What we call the soul is, in my opinion, a natural phenomenon; I +therefore consider psychology to be a branch of natural +science—a section of physiology. Consequently, I must +emphatically assert from the commencement that we have no different +methods of research for that science than for any of the others" (p. +32). +</p> +</div> +<p> +In this difficult Science of Psychology he evidently feels himself +quite at home. He assumes easily and gratuitously that there is a +material substance at the root of all mental processes +whatever—called by Clifford 'mind-stuff,' (see, however, Chapter +IV. below,)—and he then proceeds to lay down the law concerning +ancient difficulties as follows:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"We shall give to this material basis of all psychic activity, +without which it is inconceivable, the provisional name of +'psychoplasm.' +</p> +<p> +"The psychic processes are subject to the supreme, all-ruling law of +substance; not even in this province is there a single exception to +this highest cosmological law. +</p> +<p> +"The dogma of 'free-will,' another essential element of the +dualistic psychology, is similarly irreconcilable with the universal +law of substance" (p. 32). +</p> +<p> +"The freedom of the will is not an object for critical scientific +inquiry at all, for it is a pure dogma, based on an illusion, and has +no real existence" (p. 6). +</p> +</div> +<p> +Nevertheless, he realises that its apparent existence has to be +accounted for somehow, and accordingly he adopts the view that has +several times occurred to thinkers, viz., that the nucleus of all the +faculties enjoyed by a complete organism must be attributed in germ or +nucleus to the cells and even to the atoms out of which the organism is +built up. +</p> +<p> +His speculation as to the formation of a conscious organism, and to the +real meaning of its apparent sense of right and wrong and its apparent +control over its own acts, runs as follows, the will being reduced to +attraction and repulsion between the atoms:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Vogt's pyknotic theory of substance is that minute parts of the +universal substance, the centres of condensation, which might be called +<i> +pyknatoms</i>, correspond in general to the ultimate separate atoms of +the kinetic theory; they differ, however, very considerably in that +they are credited with sensation and inclination (or will-movement of +the simplest form), +<i> +with souls</i>, in a certain sense,—in harmony with the old +theory of Empedocles of the 'loves and hatreds of the elements.' +</p> +<p> +"Moreover, these 'atoms with souls' do not float in empty space, but +in the continuous, extremely attenuated, intermediate substance, which +represents the uncondensed portion of the primitive matter" (p. 77). +</p> +<p> +"'Attraction' and 'repulsion' seem to be the sources of +<i> +will</i>—that momentous element of the soul which determines the +character of the individual" (p. 45). +</p> +<p> +"The positive ponderable matter, the element with the feeling of +like or desire, is continually striving to complete the process of +condensation, and thus collecting an enormous amount of +<i> +potential +</i> +energy; the negative imponderable matter, on the other hand, offers a +perpetual and equal resistance to the further increase of its strain +and of the feeling of dislike connected therewith, and thus gathers the +utmost amount of +<i> +actual +</i> +energy. +</p> +<p> +"I think that this pyknotic theory of substance will prove more +acceptable to every biologist who is convinced of the unity of nature +than the kinetic theory which prevails in physics to-day" (p. 78). +</p> +</div> +<p> +In other words, he appeals to a presumed sentiment of biologists +against the knowledge of the physicist in his own sphere—a +strange attitude for a man of science. After this it is less surprising +to find him ignoring the elementary axiom that "action and reaction +are equal and opposite," +<i> +i.e. +</i> +that internal forces can have no motive power on a body as a whole, and +making the grotesque assertion that matter is moved, not by external +forces, but by internal likes and desires:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"I must lay down the following theses, which are involved in Vogt's +pyknotic theory, as indispensable for a truly monistic view of +substance, and one that covers the whole field of organic and inorganic +nature:— +</p> +<p> +"1. The two fundamental forms of substance, ponderable matter and +ether, are not dead and only moved by extrinsic force, but they are +endowed with sensation and will (though, naturally, of the lowest +grade); they experience an inclination for condensation, a dislike of +strain; they strive after the one and struggle against the other" +(p. 78). +</p> +</div> +<p> +My desire is to criticise politely, and hence I refrain from +characterising this sentence as a physicist should. +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Every shade of inclination, from complete indifference to the +fiercest passion, is exemplified in the chemical relation of the +various elements towards each other" (p. 79). +</p> +<p> +"On those phenomena we base our conviction that even the +<i> +atom +</i> +is not without a rudimentary form of sensation and will, or, as it is +better expressed, of feeling (<i>æsthesis</i>) and inclination +(<i>tropesis</i>)—that is, a universal 'soul' of the simplest +character" (p. 80). +</p> +<p> +"I gave the outlines of +<i> +cellular +</i> +psychology in 1866 in my paper on 'Cell-souls and Soul-cells'" (p. +63). +</p> +</div> +<p> +Thus, then, in order to explain life and mind and consciousness by +means of matter, all that is done is to assume that matter possesses +these unexplained attributes. +</p> +<p> +What the full meaning of that may be, and whether there be any +philosophic justification for any such idea, is a matter on which I +will not now express an opinion; but, at any rate, as it stands, it is +not science, and its formulation gives no sort of conception of what +life and will and consciousness really are. +</p> +<p> +Even if it were true, it contains nothing whatever in the nature of +explanation: it recognises the inexplicable, and relegates it to the +atoms, where it seems to hope that further quest may cease. Instead of +tackling the difficulty where it actually occurs; instead of +associating life, will, and consciousness with the organisms in which +they are actually in experience found, these ideas are foisted into the +atoms of matter; and then the properties which have been conferred on +the atoms are denied in all essential reality to the fully developed +organisms which those atoms help to compose! +</p> +<p> +I show later on (Chapters V. and X.) that there is no necessary +justification for assuming that a phenomenon exhibited by an aggregate +of particles must be possessed by the ingredients of which it is +composed; on the contrary, wholly new properties may make their +appearance simply by aggregation; though I admit that such a +proposition is by no means obvious, and that it may be a legitimate +subject for controversy. But into that question our author does not +enter; and even when he has conferred on the atoms these astounding +properties, he abstains from what would seem a natural development: for +his doctrine is that our power is actually less than that of the +atoms,—that instead of utilising the attractions and repulsions, +or "likes and dislikes," of our constituent particles, and +directing them by the aggregate of conscious will-power to some +preconceived end, we ourselves, on the contrary, are dominated and +controlled by +<i> +them</i>; so that freedom of the will is an illusion. +</p> +<p> +Freedom being thus disposed of, Immortality presents no difficulty; a +soul is the operation of a group of cells, and so the existence of man +clearly begins and ends with that of his terrestrial body:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"The most important moment in the life of every man, as in that of +all other complex animals, is the moment in which he begins his +individual existence [coalescence of sperm cell and ovum] ... the +existence of the personality, the independent individual, commences. +This ontogenetic fact is supremely important, for the most far-reaching +conclusions may be drawn from it. In the first place, we have a clear +perception that man, like all the other complex animals, inherits all +his personal characteristics, bodily and mental, from his parents; and +further, we come to the momentous conclusion that the new personality +which arises thus can lay no claim to 'immortality'" (p. 22). +</p> +</div> +<p> +Others beside Haeckel have held this kind of view at one time or +another; but, unlike him, most of them have recanted and seen the error +of their ways. He is, indeed, aware that several of his great German +contemporaries have been through this phase of thought and come out on +the other side, notably the physiologist-philosopher Wundt, and he +refers to them fairly and instructively thus:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"What seems to me of special importance and value in Wundt's work is +that he 'extends the law of the persistence of force for the first time +to the psychic world.' +</p> +<p> +"Thirty years afterwards, in a second edition, Wundt emancipated +himself from the fundamental errors of the first, and says that he +'learned many years ago to consider the work a sin of his youth'; it +'weighed on him as a kind of crime, from which he longed to free +himself as soon as possible.' In the first, psychology is treated as a +<i> +physical +</i> +science, on the same laws as the whole of physiology, of which it is +only a part; thirty years afterwards he finds psychology to be a +<i> +spiritual +</i> +science, with principles and objects entirely different from those of +physical science. +</p> +<p> +"I myself," says Haeckel, "naturally consider the 'youthful +sin' of the young physiologist Wundt to be a correct knowledge of +nature, and energetically defend it against the antagonistic view of +the old philosopher Wundt. This entire change of philosophical +principles, which we find in Wundt, as we found it in Kant, Virchow, du +Bois-Reymond, Carl Ernst Baer, and others, is very interesting" (p. +36). +</p> +</div> +<p> +So it is: very interesting! +</p> +<p> +Professor Haeckel is so imbued with biological science that he loses +his sense of proportion; and his enthusiasm for the work of Darwin +leads him to attribute to it an exaggerated scope, and enables him to +eliminate the third of the Kantian trilogy:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Darwin's theory of the natural origin of species at once gave us +the solution of the mystic 'problem of creation,' the great 'question +of all questions'—the problem of the true character and origin +of man himself" (p. 28) [<i>cf. +</i> +p. 19 above]. +</p> +</div> +<p> +It is a great deal more than that patient observer and deep thinker +Charles Darwin ever claimed, nor have his wiser disciples claimed it +for him. It is familiar that he explained how variations once arisen +would be clinched, if favourable in the struggle, by the action of +heredity and survival; but the source or origin of the variations +themselves he did not explain. +</p> +<p> +Do they arise by guidance or by chance? Is natural selection akin to +the verified and practical processes of artificial selection? or is it +wholly alien to them and influenced by chance alone? The latter view +can hardly be considered a complete explanation, though it is verbally +the one adopted by Professor Haeckel, and it is of interest to see what +he means by chance:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Since impartial study of the evolution of the world teaches us that +there is no definite aim and no special purpose to be traced in it, +there seems to be no alternative but to leave everything to 'blind +chance.' +</p> +<p> +"One group of philosophers affirms, in accordance with its +teleological conception, that the whole cosmos is an orderly system, in +which every phenomenon has its aim and purpose; there is no such thing +as chance. The other group, holding a mechanical theory, expresses +itself thus: The development of the universe is a monistic mechanical +process, in which we discover no aim or purpose whatever; what we call +design in the organic world is a special result of biological agencies; +neither in the evolution of the heavenly bodies nor in that of the +crust of our earth do we find any trace of a controlling +purpose—all is the result of chance. Each party is +right—according to its definition of chance. The general law of +causality, taken in conjunction with the law of substance, teaches us +that every phenomenon has a mechanical cause; in this sense there is no +such thing as chance. Yet it is not only lawful, but necessary, to +retain the term for the purpose of expressing the simultaneous +occurrence of two phenomena, which are not causally related to each +other, but of which each has its own mechanical cause, independent of +that of the other. +</p> +<p> +"Everybody knows that chance, in this monistic sense, plays an +important part in the life of man and in the universe at large. That, +however, does not prevent us from recognising in each 'chance' event, +as we do in the evolution of the entire cosmos, the universal +sovereignty of nature's supreme law, +<i> +the law of substance</i>" (p. 97). +</p> +</div> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Illegitimate Negations. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +With regard to the possibility of Revelation, or information derived +from super-human sources, naturally he ridicules the idea; but in +connection with the mode of origin and development of life on this +planet he makes the following sensible and noteworthy admission:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"It is very probable that these processes have gone on likewise on +other planets, and that other planets have produced other types of the +higher plants and animals, which are unknown on our earth; perhaps from +some higher animal stem, which is superior to the vertebrate in +formation, higher beings have arisen who far transcend us earthly men +in intelligence." +</p> +</div> +<p> +Exactly; it is quite probable. It is, in fact, improbable that man is +the highest type of existence. But if Professor Haeckel is ready to +grant that probability or even possibility, why does he so strenuously +exclude the idea of revelation, +<i> +i.e.</i>, the acquiring of imparted information from higher sources? +Savages can certainly have "revelation" from civilised men. +Why, then, should it be inconceivable that human beings should receive +information from beings in the universe higher than themselves? It may +or may not be the case that they do; but there is no scientific ground +for dogmatism on the subject, nor any reason for asserting the +inconceivability of such a thing. +</p> +<p> +Professor Haeckel would no doubt reply to some of the above criticism +that he is not only a man of science, but also a philosopher, that he +is looking ahead, beyond ascertained fact, and that it is his +philosophic views which are in question rather than his scientific +statements. To some extent it is both, as has been seen; but if even +the above be widely known—if it be generally understood that the +most controversial portions of his work are mainly speculative and +hypothetical, it can be left to its proper purpose of doing good rather +than harm. It can only do harm by misleading, it can do considerable +good by criticising and stimulating and informing; and it is an +interesting fact that a man so well acquainted with biology as +Professor Haeckel is should have been so strongly impressed with the +truth of some aspect of the philosophic system known as Monism. Many +men of science have likewise been impressed with the probability, or +possibility, of some such ultimate unification. +</p> +<p> +The problem to be solved—and an old-world problem indeed it +is—is the range, and especially the nature, of the connection +between mind and matter; or, let us say, between the material universe +on the one hand, and the vital, the mental, the conscious and spiritual +universe or universes, on the other. +</p> +<p> +It would be extremely surprising if any attempt yet made had already +been thoroughly successful, though the attack on the idealistic side +appears to many of us physicists to be by far the most hopeful line of +advance. An excessively wide knowledge of existence would seem to be +demanded for the success of any such most ambitious attempt; but, +though none of us may hope to achieve it, many may strive to make some +contribution towards the great end; and those who think they have such +a contribution to make, or such a revelation entrusted to them, are +bound to express it to the best of their ability, and leave it to their +contemporaries and successors to assimilate such portions of it as are +true, and to develop it further. From this point of view Professor +Haeckel is no doubt amply justified in his writings; but, +unfortunately, it appears to me that although he has been borne forward +on the advancing wave of monistic philosophy, he has, in its +specification, attempted such precision of materialistic detail, and +subjected it to so narrow and limited a view of the totality of +experience, that the progress of thought has left him, as well as his +great English exemplar, Herbert Spencer, somewhat high and dry, belated +and stranded by the tide of opinion which has now begun to flow in +another direction. He is, as it were, a surviving voice from the middle +of the nineteenth century; he represents, in clear and eloquent +fashion, opinions which then were prevalent among many leaders of +thought—opinions which they themselves in many cases, and their +successors still more, lived to outgrow; so that by this time Professor +Haeckel's voice is as the voice of one crying in the wilderness, not as +the pioneer or vanguard of an advancing army, but as the despairing +shout of a standard-bearer, still bold and unflinching, but abandoned +by the retreating ranks of his comrades as they march to new orders in +a fresh and more idealistic direction. +</p> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2><a id="IV"></a>CHAPTER IV +<br /> +<span class="fs80">MEMORANDA FOR WOULD-BE MATERIALISTS</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p> +The objection which it has been found necessary to express concerning +Materialism as a complete system is based not on its assertions, but on +its negations. In so far as it makes positive assertions, embodying the +results of scientific discovery and even of scientific speculation +based thereupon, there is no fault to find with it; but when, on the +strength of that, it sets up to be a philosophy of the +universe—all inclusive, therefore, and shutting out a number of +truths otherwise perceived, or which appeal to other faculties, or +which are equally true and are not really contradictory of legitimately +materialistic statements—then it is that its insufficiency and +narrowness have to be displayed. +</p> +<p> +It will be probably instructive, and it may be sufficient, if I show +that two great leaders in scientific thought (one the greatest of all +men of science who have yet lived), though well aware of much that +could be said positively on the materialistic side, and very willing to +admit or even to extend the province of science or exact knowledge to +the uttermost, yet were very far from being philosophic Materialists or +from imagining that other modes of regarding the universe were thereby +excluded. +</p> +<p> +Great leaders of thought, in fact, are not accustomed to take a narrow +view of existence, or to suppose that one mode of regarding it, or one +set of formulæ expressing it, can possibly be sufficient and +complete. Even a sheet of paper has two sides: a terrestrial globe +presents different aspects from different points of view; a crystal has +a variety of facets; and the totality of existence is not likely to be +more simple than any of these—is not likely to be readily +expressible in any form of words, or to be thoroughly conceivable by +any human mind. +</p> +<p> +It may be well to remember that Sir Isaac Newton was a Theist of the +most pronounced and thorough conviction, although he had a great deal +to do with the reduction of the major Cosmos to mechanics, +<i> +i.e. +</i> +with its explanation by the elaborated machinery of simple forces; and +he conceived it possible that, in the progress of science, this process +of reduction to mechanics would continue till it embraced nearly all +phenomena. (See extract below.) That, indeed, has been the effort of +science ever since, and therein lies the legitimate basis for +materialistic statements, though not for a materialistic philosophy. +</p> +<p> +The following sound remarks concerning Newton are taken from Huxley's +<i> +Hume</i>, p. 246:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Newton demonstrated all the host of heaven to be but the elements +of a vast mechanism, regulated by the same laws as those which express +the falling of a stone to the ground. There is a passage in the preface +to the first edition of the +<i> +Principia</i>, which shows that Newton was penetrated, as completely as +Descartes, with the belief that all the phenomena of nature are +expressible in terms of matter and motion:— +</p> +<p> +"'<span class="sc">Would that the rest of the phenomena of nature +could be deduced by a like kind of reasoning from mechanical +principles. For many circumstances lead me to suspect that all these +phenomena may depend upon certain forces, in virtue of which the +particles of bodies, by causes not yet known, are either mutually +impelled against one another, and cohere into regular figures, or repel +and recede from one another; which forces being unknown, philosophers +have as yet explored nature in vain. But I hope that, either by this +method of philosophising, or by some other and better, the principles +here laid down may throw some light upon the matter.</span>'" +</p> +</div> +<p> +Here is a full-blown anticipation of an intelligible exposition of the +Universe in terms of matter and force: the substantial basis of what +smaller men call materialism and develop into what they consider to be +a materialistic philosophy. But there is no necessity for anything of +the kind; a systematic expression of facts in terms of one of their +aspects does not exclude expression in terms of other and totally +different aspects also. Denial of all sides but one, is a poor kind of +unification. Denial of this sort is the weakness and delusion of the +people who call themselves 'Christian Scientists': they have hold of +one side of truth—and that should be granted them,—but +they hold it in so narrow and insecure a fashion that, in self-defence, +they think it safest strenuously to deny the existence of all other +sides. In this futile enterprise they are imitating the attitude of the +philosophic Materialists, on the other side of the controversy. +</p> +<p> +And then, again, Professor Huxley himself, who is commonly spoken of by +half-informed people as if he were a philosophic materialist, was +really nothing of the kind; for although, like Newton, fully imbued +with the mechanical doctrine, and, of course, far better informed +concerning the biological departments of Nature and the discoveries +which have in the last century been made, and though he rightly +regarded it as his mission to make the scientific point of view clear +to his benighted contemporaries, and was full of enthusiasm for the +facts on which materialists take their stand, he saw clearly that these +alone were insufficient for a philosophy. The following extracts from +the 'Hume' volume will show, first, that he entirely repudiated +materialism as a satisfactory or complete scheme of things; and, +secondly, that he profoundly disagreed with the position which now +appears to be occupied by Professor Haeckel. Especially is he severe on +gratuitous denials applied to provinces beyond our scope, +saying:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"that while it is the summit of human wisdom to learn the limit of +our faculties, it may be wise to recollect that we have no more right +to make denials, than to put forth affirmatives, about what lies beyond +that limit. Whether either mind or matter has a 'substance' or not is a +problem which we are incompetent to discuss; and it is just as likely +that the common notions upon the subject should be correct as any +others.... 'The same principles which, at first view, lead to +scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to common +sense'" (p. 282). +</p> +</div> +<p> +And on p. 286 he speaks concerning "substance"—that +substance which constitutes the foundation of Haeckel's +philosophy—almost as if he were purposely confuting that rather +fly-blown production:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Thus, if any man think he has reason to believe that the +'<i>substance</i>' of matter, to the existence of which no limit can be +set either in time or space, is the infinite and eternal substratum of +all actual and possible existences, which is the doctrine of +philosophical materialism, as I understand it, I have no objection to +his holding that doctrine; and I fail to comprehend how it can have the +slightest influence upon any ethical or religious views he may please +to hold.... +</p> +<p> +"Moreover, the ultimate forms of existence which we distinguish in +our little speck of the universe are, possibly, only two out of +infinite varieties of existence, not only analogous to matter and +analogous to mind, but of kinds which we are not competent so much as +to conceive—in the midst of which, indeed, we might be set down, +with no more notion of what was about us, than the worm in a +flower-pot, on a London balcony, has of the life of the great city. +</p> +<p> +"That which I do very strongly object to is the habit, which a +great many non-philosophical materialists unfortunately fall into, of +forgetting all these very obvious considerations. They talk as if the +proof that the 'substance of matter' was the 'substance' of all things +cleared up all the mysteries of existence. In point of fact, it leaves +them exactly where they were.... Your religious and ethical +difficulties are just as great as mine. The speculative game is +drawn—let us get to practical work" (p. 286). +</p> +</div> +<p> +And again on pp. 251 and 279:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"It is worth any amount of trouble to ... know by one's own +knowledge the great truth ... that the honest and rigorous following up +of the argument which leads us to 'materialism' inevitably carries us +beyond it" (p. 251). +</p> +<p> +"To sum up. If the materialist affirms that the universe and all its +phenomena are resolvable into matter and motion, Berkeley replies, +True; but what you call matter and motion are known to us only as forms +of consciousness; their being is to be conceived or known; and the +existence of a state of consciousness, apart from a thinking mind, is a +contradiction in terms. +</p> +<p> +"I conceive that this reasoning is irrefragable. And, therefore, if +I were obliged to choose between absolute materialism and absolute +idealism, I should feel compelled to accept the latter alternative" +(p. 279). +</p> +</div> +<p> +Let the jubilant but uninstructed and comparatively ignorant amateur +materialist therefore beware, and bethink himself twice or even thrice +before he conceives that he understands the universe and is competent +to pour scorn upon the intuitions and perceptions of great men in what +may be to him alien regions of thought and experience. +</p> +<p> +Let him explain, if he can, what he means by his own identity, or the +identity of any thinking or living being, which at different times +consists of a totally different set of material particles. Something +there clearly is which confers personal identity and constitutes an +individual: it is a property characteristic of every form of life, even +the humblest; but it is not yet explained or understood, and it is no +answer to assert gratuitously that there is some fundamental +"substance" or material basis on which that identity depends, +any more than it is an explanation to say that it depends upon a +"soul." These are all forms of words. As Hume says, quoted by +Huxley with approval in the work already cited, p. 194:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"It is impossible to attach any definite meaning to the word +'substance,' when employed for the hypothetical substratum of soul and +matter.... If it be said that our personal identity requires the +assumption of a substance which remains the same while the accidents of +perception shift and change, the question arises what is meant by +personal identity?... A plant or an animal, in the course of its +existence, from the condition of an egg or seed to the end of life, +remains the same neither in form, nor in structure, nor in the matter +of which it is composed: every attribute it possesses is constantly +changing, and yet we say that it is always one and the same +individual" (p. 194). +</p> +</div> +<p> +And in his own preface to the 'Hume' volume Huxley expresses himself +forcibly thus,—equally antagonistic as was his wont to both +ostensible friend and ostensible foe, as soon as they got off what he +considered the straight path:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"That which it may be well for us not to forget is, that the +first-recorded judicial murder of a scientific thinker [Socrates] was +compassed and effected, not by a despot, nor by priests, but was +brought about by eloquent demagogues.... Clear knowledge of what one +does not know just as important as knowing what one does know.... +</p> +<p> +"The development of exact natural knowledge in all its vast range, +from physics to history and criticism, is the consequence of the +working out, in this province, of the resolution to 'take nothing for +truth without clear knowledge that it is such'; to consider all beliefs +open to criticism; to regard the value of authority as neither greater +nor less, than as much as it can prove itself to be worth. The modern +spirit is not the spirit 'which always denies,' delighting only in +destruction; still less is it that which builds castles in the air +rather than not construct; it is that spirit which works and will work +'without haste and without rest,' gathering harvest after harvest of +truth into its barns, and devouring error with unquenchable fire" +(p. viii.). +</p> +</div> +<p> +The harvesting of truth is a safe enough enterprise, but the devouring +of error is a more dangerous pastime, since flames are liable to spread +beyond our control; and though, in a world overgrown with weeds and +refuse, the cleansing influence of fire is a necessity, it would be +cruel to apply the same agency again at a later stage, when a fresh +young crop is springing up in the cleared ground. +</p> + + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2><a id="V"></a>CHAPTER V +<br /> +<span class="fs80">RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p> +The aphorism sometimes encountered, that "whatever properties +appertain to a whole must essentially belong to the parts of which it +is composed," is a fallacy. A property can be possessed by an +aggregation of atoms which no atom possesses in the slightest degree. +Those who think otherwise are unacquainted with mathematical laws other +than simple proportion or some continuous or additive functions; they +are not aware of discontinuities; they are not experienced in critical +values, above which certain conditions obtain, while below them there +is suddenly nothing. To refute them an instance must suffice:— +</p> +<p> +A meteoric stone may seem to differ from a planet only in size, but the +difference in size involves also many other differences, notably the +fact that the larger body can attract and hold to itself an +atmosphere—a circumstance of the utmost importance to the +existence of life on its surface. In order, however, that a planet may +by gravitative attraction control the roving atoms of gas, and confine +their excursions to within a certain range of itself, it must have a +very considerable mass. +</p> +<p> +The earth is big enough to do it; the moon is not. By simply piling +atoms or stones together into a mighty mass there comes a critical +point at which an atmosphere becomes possible; and directly an +atmosphere exists, all manner of phenomena may spring into existence, +which without it were quite impossible. +</p> +<p> +So, also, it may be said that a sun differs from a dark planet only in +size; for it is just the fact of great size which enables its +gravitative-shrinkage and earthquake-subsidence to generate an immense +quantity of heat and to maintain the mass for æons at an +excessively high temperature, thereby fitting it to become the centre +of light and life to a number of worlds. The blaze of the sun is a +property which is the outcome of its great mass. A small permanent sun +is an impossibility. +</p> +<p> +Wherefore, properties can be possessed by an aggregate or assemblage of +particles which in the particles themselves did not in the slightest +degree exist. +</p> +<p> +If, however, we reverse the aphorism and say that whatever is in a part +must be in the whole, we are on much safer ground. I do not say that it +cannot be pressed into illegitimate extremes, but in one and that the +simplest sense it is little better than a platitude. The fact that an +apple has pips legitimises the assertion that an apple-tree has pips, +and that the peculiar property of pips represents a faculty enjoyed by +the vegetable kingdom as a whole; but it would be a childish +misunderstanding to expect to find actual pips in the trunk of a tree +or in all vegetables. +</p> +<p> +There is a tendency to call the argument or statement that whatever +faculty man possesses the Deity must have also; by the name +Anthropomorphism; but it seems to me a misnomer, and to convey quite +wrong ideas. The argument represented by "He that formed the eye, +shall he not see? he that planted the ear, shall he not hear?" need +not assume for a moment that God has sense organs akin to those of man, +or that He appreciates ethereal and aerial vibrations in the same sort +of way. It is not an assertion of similarity between God and man, but +merely a realisation that what belongs to a part +<i> +must +</i> +be contained in the whole. It is not even necessarily pantheistic: it +would hold equally well on a Theistic interpretation. Regarded +pantheistically it is obvious and requires no stating: regarded +Theistically, it is a perception that faculties and powers which have +come into existence, and are actually at work in the universe, cannot +have arisen without the knowledge and sympathy and full understanding +of the Sustainer and Comprehender of it all. Nor can functions be +expected in the creature which transcend the power of the Creator. +</p> +<p> +All our faculties, sensations, and emotions must therefore be +understood, and in a sense possessed, in some transcendental and to us +unimaginable form, by the Deity. +</p> +<p> +I know that it is possible to deny His existence, just as it is +possible to deny the existence of an external world or to maintain that +reality is limited to our sensations. If the Deity has a sense of +humour, as undoubtedly He has, He must be amused at the remarkable +philosophising faculty recently developed by the creature which on this +planet has become most vigorously self-conscious and is in the early +stages of progress towards higher things—a philosophising +faculty so acute as to lead him to mistrust and throw away information +conveyed to him by the very instruments which have enabled him to +become what he is; so that having become keenly alive to the truth that +all we are directly aware of is the fruit of our own sensations and +consciousness, he proceeds to the grotesque supposition that these +sensations and consciousness may be all that really exists, and that +the information which for ages our senses have conveyed to us +concerning external things may be illusory, not only in form and detail +and appearance, but in substantial fact. +</p> +<p> +He must be pleased, also, with the enterprise of those eager +philosophers who are so strenuously impressed with the truth of some +ultimate monistic unification, as to be unwilling to concede the +multifariousness of existence—who decline to speak of mind and +matter, or of body and spirit, or of God and the world, as in any sense +separate entities—who stigmatise as dualistic anything which +does not manifestly and consciously strain after an ultimate monistic +view—and who then, as a climax, on the strength of a few years' +superficial experience on a planet, by the aid of the sense organs +which they themselves perceive to be illusory whenever the actual +reality of things is in contemplation, proceed to develop the theory +that the whole has come into being without direct intelligence and +apart from spiritual guidance, that it is managed so well (or so ill) +that it is really not managed at all, that no Deity exists, and that it +is absurd to postulate the existence of a comprehensive and +all-inclusive guiding Mind. +</p> +<p> +To be able to perceive comprehensively and state fully not only what +is, but also what is not, is a wonderful achievement. I do not think +that such a power has yet been acquired by any of the sons of men; nor +will the semi-educated readers of this country be wise if they pin +their faith and build their hopes on the utterances of any man, however +eminent, who makes this superhuman claim. +</p> +<p> +Now, in all charity, it must be admitted that in some passages +Professor Haeckel puts himself under the ban implied by the above +paragraph, inasmuch as he conducts a sort of free and easy attack on +religion, especially on what he conceives to be the fundamental +doctrines of Christianity. But, after all, it can be perceived that his +attack, so far as it is really an attack on religion, is evidently +inspired by his mistrust and dislike, and to some extent fear, of +Ecclesiasticism, especially of the Ultramontane movement in Germany, +against which he says Prince Bismarck began a struggle in 1872. It is +this kind of semi-political religion that he is really attacking, more +than the pure essence of Christianity itself. He regards it as a +bigoted system hostile to knowledge—which, if true, would amply +justify an attack—and he says on page 118:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"The great struggle between modern science and orthodox Christianity +has become more threatening; it has grown more dangerous for science in +proportion as Christianity has found support in an increasing mental +and political reaction." +</p> +</div> +<p> +This may seem an exaggerated fear; but the following extract from a +Pastoral address by the Bishop of Newport, which accidentally I saw +reported in +<i> +The Tablet</i>, shows that the danger is not wholly imaginary, if +unwise opinions are pressed to their logical practical issue:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"If the formulas of modern science contradict the science of +Catholic dogma, it is the former that must be altered, not the +latter."<a href="#note2" name="noteref2"><sup>2</sup> +</a> +</p> +</div> +<p> +Professor Haeckel continues his criticism of Official Christianity in +the following vein:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"The so-called 'Peace between Church and State' is never more than +a suspension of hostilities. The modern Papacy, true to the despotic +principles it has followed for the last 1600 years, is determined to +wield sole dominion over the credulous souls of men; it must demand the +absolute submission of the cultured State, which, as such, defends the +rights of reason and science. True and enduring peace there cannot be +until one of the combatants lies powerless on the ground. Either the +Church wins, and then farewell to all 'free science and free +teaching'—then are our universities no better than gaols, and +our colleges become cloistral schools; or else the modern rational +State proves victorious—then, in the twentieth century, human +culture, freedom, and prosperity will continue their progressive +development until they far surpass even the height of the nineteenth +century. +</p> +<p> +"In order to compass these high aims, it is of the first importance +that modern science not only shatter the false structures of +superstition and sweep their ruins from the path, but that it also +erect a new abode for human emotion on the ground it has +cleared—a 'palace of reason,' in which, under the influence of +our new monistic views, we do reverence to the real trinity of the +nineteenth century—the trinity of 'the true, the good, and the +beautiful'" (p. 119). +</p> +</div> +<p> +These are the bases of religion, adopted from Goethe, which in +Haeckel's view should entirely replace what he calls the Trinity of +Kant, viz., God, Freedom, and Immortality—three ideas which he +regards as mere superstition or as so enveloped in superstition as to +be worthless. +</p> +<p> +Occasionally, however, he attacks not solely ecclesiastical +Christianity—in which enterprise he is entirely within his +rights,—but he goes further and abuses some of its more +primitive forms, and to some extent its practical fruits also. For +instance:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Primitive Christianity preached the worthlessness of earthly life, +regarding it merely as a preparation for an eternal life beyond. Hence +it immediately followed that all we find in the life of a man here +below, all that is beautiful in art and science, in public and in +private life, is of no real value. The true Christian must avert his +eyes from them; he must think only of a worthy preparation for the life +beyond. Contempt of nature, aversion from all its inexhaustible charms, +rejection of every kind of fine art, are Christian duties; and they are +carried out to perfection when a man separates himself from his +fellows, chastises his body, and spends all his time in prayers in the +cloister or the hermit's cell.... A Christian art is a contradiction in +terms" (p. 120). +</p> +</div> +<p> +I think it may without offence be said that if he means by +"Primitive Christianity" the teachings of Christ, he is +mistaken, and has something to learn as to what those teachings really +were. If he means the times of persecution under the Roman empire, he +could hardly expect much concentration on artistic pursuits or much +enjoyment of terrestrial existence when it was liable to be violently +extinguished at any moment: sufficient that the early Church survived +its struggle for existence. But if he is referring to mediæval +Christianity, of any other than a debased kind,—common knowledge +concerning mediæval art and architecture sufficiently rebuts the +indictment. So much so, that one may almost wonder if by chance he +happened to be thinking of "Mohammedanism" rather than of +Christianity. +</p> +<p> +But he continues, in a more practical and observant vein:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Christianity has no place for that well-known love of animals, +that sympathy with the nearly-related and friendly mammals (dogs, +horses, cattle, etc.) which is urged in the ethical teaching of many of +the older religions, especially Buddhism. (Unfortunately, Descartes +gave some support to the error in teaching that man only has a +sensitive soul, not the animal.) Whoever has spent much time in the +south of Europe must have often witnessed those frightful sufferings of +animals which fill us friends of animals with the deepest sympathy and +indignation. And when one expostulates with these brutal 'Christians' +on their cruelty, the only answer is, with a laugh: 'But the beasts are +not Christians'" (p. 126). +</p> +</div> +<p> +This, if true, and I have heard it from other sources, does constitute +rather a serious indictment against the form of practical Christianity +understood by the ignorant classes among the Latin races. +</p> +<p> +To return, however, to the concluding paragraph of the extract quoted +above (on page 81) from his page 119:— +</p> +<p> +No one can have any objection to raise against the dignity and +worthiness of the three great attributes which excite Professor +Haeckel's, as they excited Goethe's, worship and admiration, viz., the +three "goddesses," as he calls them: Truth, Goodness, and +Beauty; but there is no necessary competition or antagonism between +these and the other three great conceptions which aroused the +veneration of Kant: God, Freedom, and Immortality; nor does the +upholding of the one triad mean the overthrow of the other: they may be +all co-eternal together and co-equal. Nor are either of these triplets +inconsistent with some reasonable view of what may be meant by the +Christian Trinity. The total possibility of existence is so vast that +no simple formula, nor indeed any form of words, however complex, is +likely to be able to sum it up and express its essence to the exclusion +of all other modes of expression. It is a pity, therefore, that +Professor Haeckel should think it necessary to decry one set of ideas +in order to support another set. There is room for all in this large +universe—room for everything, except downright lies and +falseness. +</p> +<p> +Concerning Truth there is no need to speak: it cannot but be the breath +of the nostrils of every genuine scientific man; but his ideas of truth +should be large enough to take into account possibilities far beyond +anything of which he is at present sure, and he should be careful to be +undogmatic and docile in regions of which at present he has not the key. +</p> +<p> +The meaning of Goodness, the whole domain of ethics, and the higher +possibilities of sainthood of which the human spirit has shown itself +capable, are at present outside his domain; and if a man of science +seeks to dogmatise concerning the emotions and the will, and asserts +that he can reduce them to atomic forces and motions, because he has +learnt to recognise the undoubted truth that atomic forces and motions +must accompany them and constitute the machinery of their manifestation +here and now,—he is exhibiting the smallness of his conceptions +and gibbeting himself as a laughing-stock to future generations. +</p> +<p> +The atmosphere and full meaning of Beauty also he can only dimly grasp. +If he seeks to explain it in terms of sexual selection, or any other +small conception which he has recently been able to form in connection +with vital procedure on this planet, he is explaining nothing: he is +merely showing how the perception of beauty may operate in certain +cases; but the inner nature of beauty and the faculty by which it is +perceived are utterly beyond him. He cannot but feel that the +unconscious and unobtrusive beauty of field and hedgerow must have +originated in obedience to some primal instinct or in fulfilment of +some immanent desire, some lofty need quite other than anything he +recognises as human. +</p> +<p> +And if a poet witnessing the colours of a sunset, for instance, or the +profusion of beauty with which snow mountains seem to fling themselves +to the heavens in districts unpeopled and in epochs long before human +consciousness awoke upon the earth: if such a seer feels the revelation +weigh upon his spirit with an almost sickening pressure, and is +constrained to ascribe this wealth and prodigality of beauty to the joy +of the Eternal Being in His own existence, to an anticipation as it +were of the developments which lie before the universe in which He is +at work, and which He is slowly tending towards an unimaginable +perfection—it behooves the man of science to put his hand upon +his mouth, lest in his efforts to be true, in the absence of knowledge, +he find himself uttering, in his ignorance, words of lamentable folly +or blasphemy. +</p> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Man and Nature. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +Consider our own position—it is surely worth considering. We are +a part of this planet; on one side certainly and distinctly a part of +this material world, a part which has become self-conscious. At first +we were a part which had become alive; a tremendous step +that—introducing a number of powers and privileges which +previously had been impossible, but that step introduced no +responsibility; we were no longer, indeed, urged by mere pressure from +behind, we were guided by our instincts and appetites, but we still +obeyed the strongest external motive, almost like electro-magnetic +automata. Now, however, we have become conscious, able to look before +and after, to learn consciously from the past, to strive strenuously +towards the future; we have acquired a knowledge of good and evil, we +can choose the one and reject the other, and are thus burdened with a +sense of responsibility for our acts. We still obey the strongest +motive doubtless, but there is something in ourselves which makes it a +motive and regulates its strength. We +<i> +can +</i> +drift like other animals, and often do; but we can also obey our own +volition. +</p> +<p> +I would not deny the rudiments of self-consciousness, and some of what +it implies, to certain domestic animals, notably the dog; but +domestication itself is a result of humanity, and undoubtedly the +attributes we are discussing are chiefly and almost solely human, they +can hardly be detected in wild nature. No other animal can have a full +perception of its own individuality and personality as separate from +the rest of existence. Such ideas do not occur in the early periods of +even human infancy: they are a later growth. Self-consciousness must +have become prominent at a certain stage in the evolutionary process. +</p> +<p> +How it all arose is a legitimate problem for genetic psychology, but to +the plain man it is a puzzle; our ancestors invented legends to account +for it—legends of apples and serpents and the like; but the fact +is there, however it be accounted for. The truth embedded in that old +Genesis legend is deep; it is the legend of man's awakening from a +merely animal life to consciousness of good and evil, no longer obeying +his primal instincts in a state of thoughtlessness and +innocency—a state in which deliberate vice was impossible and +therefore higher and purposed goodness also impossible,—it was +the introduction of a new sense into the world, the sense of +conscience, the power of deliberate choice; the power also of conscious +guidance, the management of things and people external to himself, for +preconceived ends. Man was beginning to cease to be merely a passenger +on the planet, controlled by outside forces; it is as if the reins were +then for the first time being placed in his hands, as if he was allowed +to begin to steer, to govern his own fate and destiny, and to take over +some considerable part of the management of the world. +</p> +<p> +The process of handing over the reins to us is still going on. The +education of the human race is a long process, and we are not yet fit +to be fully trusted with the steering gear; but the words of the old +serpent were true enough: once open our eyes to the perception and +discrimination of good and evil, once become conscious of freedom of +choice, and sooner or later we must inevitably acquire some of the +power and responsibility of gods. A fall it might seem, just as a +vicious man sometimes seems degraded below the beasts, but in promise +and potency a rise it really was. +</p> +<p> +The oneness between ourselves and Nature is not a thing to be deplored; +it is a thing to rejoice at, when properly conceived. It awakens a kind +of religious enthusiasm even in Haeckel, who clearly perceives but a +limited aspect of it; yet the perception is vivid enough to cause him, +this so-called Atheist, to close his +<i> +Confession of Faith +</i> +with words such as these:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Now, at last, it is given to the mightily advancing human mind to +have its eyes opened; it is given to it to show that a true knowledge +of nature affords full satisfaction and inexhaustible nourishment not +only for its searching understanding, but also for its yearning spirit. +</p> +<p> +"Knowledge of the true, training for the good, pursuit of the +beautiful: these are the three great departments of our monism; by the +harmonious and consistent cultivation of these we effect at last the +truly beatific union of religion and science, so painfully longed after +by so many to-day. The True, the Beautiful, and the Good, these are the +three august Divine Ones before which we bow the knee in adoration.... +</p> +<p> +"In the hope that free research and free teaching may always +continue, I conclude my monistic +<i> +Confession of Faith +</i> +with the words: 'May God, the Spirit of the Good, the Beautiful, and +the True, be with us.'" +</p> +</div> +<p> +This is clearly the utterance of a man to whose type I unconsciously +referred in an article written two years ago (<i>Hibbert Journal</i>, +January 1903), from which I now make the following appropriate +extract:— +</p> +<p> +Looking at the loom of nature, the feeling not of despair, but of what +has been called atheism, one ingredient of atheism, has arisen: atheism +never fully realised, and wrongly so called—recently it has been +called severe Theism, indeed; for it is joyful sometimes, interested +and placid always, exultant at the strange splendour of the spectacle +which its intellect has laid bare to contemplation, satisfied with the +perfection of the mechanism, content to be a part of the self-generated +organism, and endeavouring to think that the feelings of duty, of +earnest effort, and of faithful service, which conspicuously persist in +spite of all discouragement, are on this view intelligible as well as +instinctive, and sure that nothing less than unrepining unfaltering +unswerving acquiescence is worthy of our dignity as man. +</p> +<p> +The above 'Confession of Faith,' then, is very well; for the man +himself very well indeed, but it is not enough for the race. Other +parts of Haeckel's writings show that it is not enough, and that his +conception of what he means by Godhead is narrow and limited to an +extent at which instinct, reason, and experience alike rebel. No one +can be satisfied with conceptions below the highest which to him are +possible: I doubt if it is given to man to think out a clear and +consistent system higher and nobler than the real truth. Our highest +thoughts are likely to be nearest to reality: they must be stages in +the direction of truth, else they could not have come to us and been +recognised as highest. So, also, with our longings and aspirations +towards ultimate perfection, those desires which we recognise as our +noblest and best: surely they must have some correspondence with the +facts of existence, else had they been unattainable by us. Reality is +not to be surpassed, except locally and temporarily, by the ideals of +knowledge and goodness invented by a fraction of itself; and if we +could grasp the entire scheme of things, so far from wishing to +</p> +<div class="poem"> +<div class="stanza"> +<p class="i8"> +"shatter it to bits and then +</p> +<p> +Remould it nearer to the heart's desire," +</p> +</div> +</div> +<p> +we should hail it as better and more satisfying than any of our random +imaginings. The universe is in no way limited to our conceptions: it +has a reality apart from them; nevertheless, they themselves constitute +a part of it, and can only take a clear and consistent character in so +far as they correspond with something true and real. Whatever we can +clearly and consistently conceive, that is +<i> +ipso facto +</i> +in a sense already existent in the universe as a whole; and that, or +something better, we shall find to be a dim foreshadowing of a higher +reality. +</p> +<hr class="short" /> +<p class="ctr"> +<span class="sc"> +Explanatory Note on Constructive Thought and Optimism. +</span> +</p> +<p class="ctr"> +(<i>Partly reprinted from "Mind."</i>) +</p> +<p> +It may be worth while to explain how it is that, to a physicist +unsmitten with any taint of solipsism, a well-elaborated scheme which +is consistent with already known facts necessarily seems to correspond, +or have close affinity, with the truth. It is the result of experience +of a mathematical theorem concerning unique distributions. For +instance, it can be shown that in an electric field, however +complicated, any distribution of potential which satisfies boundary +conditions, and one or two other essential criteria, must be the actual +distribution; for it has been rigorously proved that there cannot be +two or more distributions which satisfy those conditions, hence if one +is arrived at theoretically, or intuitively, or by any means, it must +be the correct one; and no further proof is required. +</p> +<p> +So, also, in connection with analogies and working models: although +they must necessarily be imperfect, so long as they are only analogies, +yet the making or imagining of models (not necessarily or usually a +material model, but a conceptual model) is a recognised way of arriving +at an understanding of recondite and ultra-sensual processes, occurring +say in the ether or elsewhere. As an addition to evidence derived from +such experiments as have been found possible, and as a supplement to +the experience out of which, as out of a nucleus, every conception must +grow, the mind is set to design and invent a self-coherent scheme which +shall imitate as far as possible the results exhibited by nature. By +then using this as a working hypothesis, and pressing it into extremes, +it can be gradually amended until it shows no sign of discordance or +failure anywhere, and even serves as a guide to new and previously +unsuspected phenomena. When that stage is reached, it is provisionally +accepted and tentatively held as a step in the direction of the truth; +though the mind is always kept ready to improve and modify and enlarge +it, in accordance with the needs of more thorough investigation and +fresh discovery. It was so, for instance, with Maxwell's +electromagnetic theory of light; and there are a multitude of other +instances. +</p> +<p> +In the transcendental or ultra-mundane or supersensual region there is +the further difficulty to be encountered, that we are not acquainted +with anything like all the 'boundary conditions,' so to speak; we only +know our little bit of the boundary, and we may err egregiously in +inferring or attempting to infer the remainder. We may even make a +mistake as to the form of function adapted to the case. Nevertheless +there is no better clue, and the human mind is impelled to do the best +it can with the confessedly imperfect data which it finds at its +disposal. The result, therefore, in this region, is no system of +definite and certain truth, as in Physics, but is either suspense of +judgment altogether, or else a tentative scheme or working hypothesis, +to be held undogmatically, in an attitude of constant receptiveness for +further light, and in full readiness for modification in the direction +of the truth. +</p> +<p> +So far concerning the ascertainment of truth alone, in intangible +regions of inquiry. The further hypothesis that such truth when found +will be most satisfactory, or in other words higher and better than any +alternative plan,—the conviction that faith in the exceeding +grandeur of reality shall not be confounded,—requires further +justification; and its grounds are not so easy to formulate. Perhaps +the feeling is merely human and instinctive; but it is existent and +customary I believe among physicists, possibly among men of Science in +general, though I cannot speak for all; and it must be based upon +familiarity with a mass of experience in which, after long groping and +guess-work, the truth has ultimately been discovered, and been +recognised as 'very good.' It is illustrated, for instance, by the +words in which Tyndall closes the first edition of his book on Sound, +wherein, after explaining Helmholtz's brilliant theory of Corti's organ +and the musical mechanism of the ear,—a theory which, amid the +difficulties of actual observation, was necessarily at first saturated +with hypothesis, and is not even yet fully verified,—he +says:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Within the ears of men, and without their knowledge or +contrivance, this lute of 3000 strings has existed for ages, accepting +the music of the outer world, and rendering it fit for reception by the +brain.... I do not ask you to consider these views as established, but +only as probable. They present the phenomena in a connected and +intelligible form; and should they be doomed to displacement by a more +correct or comprehensive theory, it will assuredly be found that the +wonder is not diminished by the substitution of the truth." +</p> +</div> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2><a id="VI"></a>CHAPTER VI +<br /> +<span class="fs80">MIND AND MATTER</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p> +What, then, is the probable essence of truth in Professor Haeckel's +philosophy? for it is not to be supposed that the speculations of an +eminent man are baseless, or that he has been led to his view of what +he conceives to be the truth by some wholly erroneous path; his +intuitive convictions are to be respected, for they are based on a far +wider experience and knowledge of fact than is given to the average +man; and for the average man to consider it likely that there is no +foundation whatever for the life convictions of a great specialist is +as foolish as to suppose it probable that they are certain and +infallible, or that they are uncritically to be accepted even in +regions beyond those over which his jurisdiction extends. +</p> +<p> +First as to the "law of substance," by which he sets so much +store; the fact which he is really, though indistinctly, trying to +emphasise, is what I have preferred to formulate as "the persistence +of the really existent," see page 34; and, with that modification, +we can agree with Haeckel, or with what I take to be his inner meaning, +to some extent. We may all fairly agree, I think, that whatever really +and fundamentally +<i> +exists +</i> +must, so far as bare existence is concerned, be independent of time. It +may go through many changes, and thus have a history; that is to say, +must have definite time relations, so far as its changes are concerned; +but it can hardly be thought of as either going out of existence, or as +coming into existence, at any given period, though it may completely +change its form and accidents; everything basal must have a past and a +future of some kind or other, though any special concatenation or +arrangement may have a date of origin and of destruction. +</p> +<p> +A crowd, for instance, is of this fugitive character: it assembles and +it disperses, its existence as a crowd is over, but its constituent +elements persist; and the same can be said of a planet or a sun. Yet +for some "soul" or underlying reality even in these temporary +accretions there is permanence of a sort:—Tyndall's "streak +of morning cloud," though it may have "melted into infinite +azure," has not thereby become non-existent, although as a visible +object it has disappeared from our ken and become a memory only. It is +true that it was a mere aggregate or accidental agglomeration—it +had developed no self-consciousness, nothing that could be called +personality or identity characterised it,—and so no individual +persistence is to be expected for it; yet even it—low down in +the scale of being as it is—even it has rejoined the general +body of aqueous vapour whence, through the incarnating influence of +night, it arose. The thing that +<i> +is</i>, both +<i> +was +</i> +and +<i> +shall be</i>, and whatever does not satisfy this condition must be an +accidental or fugitive or essentially temporary conglomeration or +assemblage, and not one of the fundamental entities of the universe. It +is interesting to remember that this was one of the opinions strongly +held by the late Professor Tait, who considered that persistence or +conservation was the test or criterion of real existence. +</p> +<p> +The question, How many fundamental entities in this sense there are, +and what they are, is a difficult one. Many people, including such +opposite thinkers as Tait and Haeckel, would say "matter" and +"energy"; though Haeckel chooses, on his own account, to add +that these two are one. (Perhaps Professor Ostwald would agree with him +there; though to me the meaning is vague.) Physical science, pushed to +the last resort, would probably reply that, within its sphere of +knowledge at the present stage, the fundamental entities are +<i> +ether +</i> +and +<i> +motion</i>; and that of other things at present it knows next to +nothing. If physical science is interrogated as to the probable +persistence, +<i> +i.e.</i>, the fundamental existence, of "life" or of +"mind," it ought to reply that it does not know; if asked about +"personality," or "souls," or "God,"—about +all of which Professor Haeckel has fully-fledged opinions—it +would have to ask for a definition of the terms, and would speak either +not at all or with bated breath concerning them. +</p> +<p> +The possibility that "life" may be a real and basal form of +existence, and therefore persistent, is a possibility to be borne in +mind. It may at least serve as a clue to investigation, and some day +may bear fruit; at present it is no better than a working hypothesis. +It is one that on the whole commends itself to me; for I conceive that +though we only know of it as a function of terrestrial matter, yet that +it has another aspect too, and I say this because I see it arriving and +leaving—animating matter for a time and then quitting it, just +as I see dew appearing and disappearing on a plate. Apart from a solid +surface, dew cannot exist as such; and to a savage it might seem to +spring into and to go out of existence—to be an exudation from +the solid, and dependent wholly upon it; but we happen to know more +about it: we know that it has a permanent and continuous existence in +an imperceptible, intangible, supersensual form, though its visible +manifestation in the form of mist or dew is temporary and evanescent. +Perhaps it is permissible to trace in that elementary phenomenon some +superficial analogy to an incarnation. +</p> +<p> +The fact concerning life which lies at the root of Professor Haeckel's +doctrine about its origin, is that living beings have undoubtedly made +their appearance on this planet, where at one time they cannot be +suspected of having existed. Consequently that whatever life may be, it +is something which can begin to interact with the atoms of terrestrial +matter, at some period, or state of aggregation, or other condition of +elaboration,—a condition which may perhaps be rather definite, +if only we were aware of what it was. But that undoubted fact is quite +consistent with any view as to the nature of "life," and even +with any view as to the mode of its terrestrial commencement; there is +nothing in that to say that it is a function of matter alone, any more +than the wind is a function of the leaves which dance under its +influence; there is nothing even to contradict the notion that it +sprang into existence suddenly at a literal word of command. The +improbability or absurdity of such a conception as this last, except in +the symbolism of poetry, is extreme, and it is unthinkable by any +educated person; but its improbability depends upon other +considerations than biologic ones, and it is as repugnant to an +enlightened Theology as to any other science. +</p> +<p> +The mode in which biological speculation as to the probable development +of living out of dead matter, and the general relation of protoplasm to +physics and chemistry, can be surmised or provisionally granted, +without thereby concurring in any destructive criticism of other facts +and experiences, is explained in Chapter X. on "Life," further +on: and there I emphasise my agreement with parts of the speculative +contentions of Professor Haeckel on the positive side. +</p> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Soul and Body. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +Let us consider what are the facts scientifically known concerning the +interaction between mind and matter. Fundamentally they amount to this: +that a complex piece of matter, called the brain, is the organ or +instrument of mind and consciousness; that if it be stimulated mental +activity results; that if it be injured or destroyed no manifestation +of mental activity is possible. Moreover, it is assumed, and need not +be doubted, that a portion of brain substance is consumed, oxidised let +us say, in every act of mentation: using that term in the vaguest and +most general sense, and including in it unconscious as well as +conscious operations. +</p> +<p> +Suppose we grant all this, what then? We have granted that brain is the +means whereby mind is made manifest on this material plane, it is the +instrument through which alone we know it, but we have not granted that +mind is +<i> +limited +</i> +to its material manifestation; nor can we maintain that without matter +the things we call mind, intelligence, consciousness, have no sort of +existence. Mind may be incorporate or incarnate in matter, but it may +also transcend it; it is through the region of ideas and the +intervention of mind that we have become aware of the existence of +matter. It is injudicious to discard our primary and fundamental +<i> +awareness +</i> +for what is after all an instinctive inference or interpretation of +certain sensations. +</p> +<p> +The realities underlying those sensations are only known to us by +inference, but they have an independent existence: in their inmost +nature they may be quite other than what they seem, and are in no way +dependent upon our perception of them. So, also, our actual personality +may be something considerably unlike that conception of it which is +based on our present terrestrial consciousness—a form of +consciousness suited to, and developed by, our temporary existence +here, but not necessarily more than a fraction of our total self. +</p> +<p> +Take an analogy: the eye is the organ of vision; by it we perceive +light. Stimulate the retina in any way, and we are conscious of the +sensation of light; injure or destroy the eye, and vision becomes +imperfect or impossible. If eyes did not exist we should probably know +nothing about light, and we might be tempted to say that light did not +exist. In a sense, to a blind race, light would not exist—that +is to say, there would be no sensation of light, there would be no +sight; but the underlying physical cause of that sensation—the +ripples in the ether—would be there all the time. And it is +these ethereal ripples which a physicist understands by the term +"light." It is quite conceivable that a race of blind physicists +would be able to devise experimental means whereby they could make +experiments on what to us is luminous radiation, just as we now make +experiments on electric waves, for which we have no sense organ. It +would be absurd for a psychologist to inform them that light did not +exist because sight did not. The +<i> +term +</i> +might have to be reconsidered and redefined; indeed, most likely a +polysyllabic term would be employed, as is unfortunately usual when a +thing of which the race in general has no intimate knowledge requires +nomenclature. But the thing would be there, though its mode of +manifestation would be different; a term like "vision" might +still be employed, to signify our mode of perceiving and experiencing +the agency which now manifests itself to us through our eyes; and +plants might grow by the aid of that agency just as they do now. +</p> +<p> +So, also, brain is truly the organ of mind and consciousness, and to a +brainless race these terms, and all other terms, would be meaningless; +but no one is at liberty to assert, on the strength of that fact, that +the realities underlying our use of those terms have no existence apart +from terrestrial brains. Nor can we say with any security that the +stuff called "brain" is the only conceivable machinery which +they are able to utilise: though it is true that we know of no other. +Yet it would seem that such a proposition must be held by a +materialist, or by what can be implied by the term "monist," used in +its narrowest and most unphilosophic sense—a sense which would +be better expressed by the term materialistic-monist, with a limitation +of the term matter to the terrestrial chemical elements and their +combinations, +<i> +i.e.</i>, to that form of substance to which the human race has grown +accustomed—a sense which tends to exclude ethereal and other +generalisations and unknown possibilities such as would occur to a +philosophic monist of the widest kind. +</p> +<p> +For that it may ultimately be discovered that there is some intimate +and necessary connection between a generalised form of matter and some +lofty variety of mind is not to be denied; though also it cannot be +asserted. It has been surmised, for instance, that just as the +corpuscles and atoms of matter, in their intricate movements and +relations, combine to form the brain cell of a human being; so the +cosmic bodies, the planets and suns and other groupings of the ether, +may perhaps combine to form something corresponding as it were to the +brain cell of some transcendent Mind. The idea is to be found in +Newton. The thing is a mere guess, it is not an impossibility, and it +cannot be excluded from a philosophic system by any negative statement +based on scientific fact. In some such sense as that, matter and mind +may be, for all we know, eternally and necessarily connected; they can +be different aspects of some fundamental unity; and a lofty kind of +monism can be true, just as a lofty kind of pantheism can be true. But +the miserable degraded monism and lower pantheism, which limits the +term "god" to that part of existence of which we are now +aware—sometimes, indeed, to a fraction only of that—which +limits the term "mind" to that of which we are ourselves +conscious, and the term "matter" to the dust of the earth and +the other visible bodies, is a system of thought appropriate, perhaps, +to a fertile and energetic portion of the nineteenth century, but not +likely to survive as a system of perennial truth. +</p> +<p> +The term "organ" itself should have given pause to anyone +desirous of promulgating a scheme such as that. +</p> +<p> +"Organ" is a name popularly given to an instrument of music. +Without it, or some other instrument, no material manifestation or +display of music is possible; it is an instrument for the incarnation +of music—the means whereby it interacts with the material world +and throws the air and so our ears into vibration, it is the means +whereby we apprehend it. Injure the organ and the music is imperfect; +destroy it and it ceases to be possible. But is it to be asserted on +the strength of that fact that the term "music" has no significance +apart from its material manifestation? Have the ideas of Sir Edward +Elgar no reality apart from their record on paper and reproduction by +an orchestra? It is true that without suitable instruments and a +suitable sense organ we should know nothing of music, but it cannot be +supposed that its underlying essence would be therefore extinct or +non-existent and meaningless. Can there not be in the universe a +multitude of things which matter as we know it is incompetent to +express? Is it not the complaint of every genius that his material is +intractable, that it is difficult to coerce matter as he knows it into +the service of mind as he is conscious of it, and that his conceptions +transcend his powers of expression? +</p> +<p> +The connection between soul and body, or more generally between +spiritual and material, has been illustrated by the connection between +the meaning of a sentence and the written or spoken word conveying that +meaning. The writing or the speaking may be regarded as an incarnation +of the meaning, a mode of stating or exhibiting its essence. As +delivered, the sentence must have time relations; it has a beginning, +middle, and end; it may be repeated, and the same general meaning may +be expressed in other words; but the intrinsic meaning of the sentence +itself need have no time relations, it may be true +<i> +always</i>, it may exist as an eternal "now," though it may be +perceived and expressed by humanity with varying clearness from time to +time. +</p> +<p> +The soul of a thing is its underlying permanent reality—that +which gives it its meaning and confers upon it its attributes. The body +is an instrument or mechanism for the manifestation or sensible +presentation of what else would be imperceptible. It is useless to ask +whether a soul is immortal—a soul is always immortal "where a +soul can be discerned": the question to ask concerning any given +object is whether it has a soul or meaning or personal underlying +reality at all. +</p> +<p> +Those who think that reality is limited to its terrestrial +manifestation doubtless have a philosophy of their own, to which they +are entitled and to which at any rate they are welcome; but if they set +up to teach others that monism signifies a limitation of mind to the +potentialities of matter as at present known; if they teach a pantheism +which identifies God with nature in this narrow sense; if they hold +that mind and what they call matter are so intimately connected that no +<i> +transcendence +</i> +is possible; that, without the cerebral hemispheres, consciousness and +intelligence and emotion and love, and all the higher attributes +towards which humanity is slowly advancing, would cease to be; that the +term "soul" signifies "a sum of plasma-movements in the +ganglion cells"; and that the term "God" is limited to the +operation of a known evolutionary process, and can be represented as +"the infinite sum of all natural forces, the sum of all atomic +forces and all ether vibrations," to quote Professor Haeckel +(<i>Confession of Faith</i>, p. 78); then such philosophers must be +content with an audience of uneducated persons, or, if writing as men +of science, must hold themselves liable to be opposed by other men of +science, who are able, at any rate in their own judgment, to take a +wider survey of existence, and to perceive possibilities to which the +said narrow and over-definite philosophers were blind. +</p> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Life and Guidance. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +Matter possesses energy, in the form of persistent motion, and it is +propelled by force; but neither matter nor energy possesses the power +of automatic guidance and control. Energy has no directing power (this +has been elaborated by Croll and others: see, for instance, p. 24, and +a letter in +<i> +Nature</i>, vol. 43, p. 434, thirteen years ago, under the heading +"Force and Determinism"). Inorganic matter is impelled solely by +pressure from behind, it is not influenced by the future, nor does it +follow a preconceived course nor seek a predetermined end. +</p> +<p> +An organism animated by mind is in a totally different case. The +intangible influences of hunger, of a call, of perception of something +ahead, are then the dominant feature. An intelligent animal which is +being pushed is in an ignominious position and resents it; when led, or +when voluntarily obeying a call, it is in its rightful attitude. +</p> +<p> +The essence of mind is design and purpose. There are some who deny that +there is any design or purpose in the universe at all: but how can that +be maintained when humanity itself possesses these attributes? (<i>cf. +</i> +pp. 54, 74). Is it not more reasonable to say that just as we are +conscious of the power of guidance in ourselves, so guidance and +intelligent control may be an element running through the universe, and +may be incorporated even in material things? +</p> +<p> +A traveller who has lost his way in a mountain district, coming across +a path, may rejoice, saying, "This will guide me home." A +materialist, if he were consistent, should laugh such a traveller to +scorn, saying, "What guidance or purpose can there be in a material +object? there is no guidance or purpose in the universe; things +<i> +are +</i> +because they cannot be otherwise, not because of any intention +underlying them. How can a path, which is little better than the +absence of grass or the wearing down of stones, know where you live or +guide you to any desired destination? Moreover, whatever knowledge or +purpose the path exhibits must be +<i> +in the path</i>, must be a property of the atoms of which it is +composed. To them some fraction of will, of power, of knowledge, and of +feeling +<i> +may +</i> +perhaps be attributed, and from their aggregation something of the same +kind may perhaps be deduced. If the traveller can decipher that, he may +utilise the material object to his advantage; but if he conceives the +path to have been made with any teleological object or intelligent +purpose, he is abandoning himself to superstition, and is as likely to +be led by it to the edge of a precipice as to anywhere else. Let him +follow his superstition at his peril!" +</p> +<p> +This is not a quotation, of course: but it is a parable. +</p> +<p> +Matter is the instrument and vehicle of mind; incarnation is the mode +by which mind interacts with the present scheme of things, and thereby +the element of guidance is supplied; it can, in fact, be embodied in an +intelligent arrangement of inert inorganic matter. Even a mountain path +exhibits the property of guidance, and has direction: it is an +incorporation of intelligence, though itself inert. +</p> +<p> +Direction is not a function of energy. The energy of sound from an +organ is supplied by the blower of the bellows, which may be worked by +a mechanical engine; but the melody and harmony, the sequence and +co-existence of notes, are determined by the dominating mind of the +musician: not necessarily of the executant alone, for the composer's +mind may be evoked to some extent even by a pianola. The music may be +said to be incarnate in the roll of paper which is ready to be passed +through the instrument. So also can the conception of any artist +receive material embodiment in his work, and if a picture or a +beautiful building is destroyed it can be made to rise again from its +ashes provided the painter or the architect still lives: in other +words, his thought can receive a fresh incarnation; and a perception of +the beautiful form shall hereafter, in a kindred spirit, arouse similar +ideas. +</p> +<p> +There is thus a truth in materialism, but it is not a truth readily to +be apprehended and formulated. Matter may become imbued with life, and +full of vital association; something of the personality of a departed +owner seems to cling sometimes about an old garment, its curves and +folds can suggest him vividly to our recollection. I would not too +blatantly assert that even a doll on which much affection had been +lavished was wholly inert and material in the inorganic sense. The +tattered colours of a regiment are sometimes thought worthy to be hung +in a church. They are a symbol truly, but they may be something more. I +have reason to believe that a trace of individuality can cling about +terrestrial objects in a vague and almost imperceptible fashion, but to +a degree sufficient to enable those traces to be detected by persons +with suitable faculties. +</p> +<p> +There is a deep truth in materialism; and it is the foundation of the +material parts of worship—sacraments and the like. It is +possible to exaggerate their efficacy, but it is also possible to +ignore it too completely. The whole universe is metrical, everything is +a question of degree. A property like radio-activity or magnetism, +discovered conspicuously in one form of matter, turns out to be +possessed by matter of every kind, though to very varying extent. +</p> +<p> +So it would appear to be with the power possessed by matter to +incarnate and display mind. +</p> +<p> +There are grades of incarnation: the most thorough kind is that +illustrated by our bodies; in them we are incarnate, but probably not +even in that case is the incarnation complete. It is quite credible +that our whole and entire personality is never terrestrially manifest. +</p> +<p> +There are grades of incarnation. Some of the personality of an Old +Master is locked up in a painting: and whoever wilfully destroys a +great picture is guilty of something akin to murder, namely, the +premature and violent separation of soul and body. Some of the soul of +a musician can be occluded in a piece of manuscript, to be deciphered +thereafter by a perceptive mind. +</p> +<p> +Matter is the vehicle of mind, but it is dominated and transcended by +it. A painting is held together by cohesive forces among the atoms of +its pigments, and if those forces rebelled or turned repulsive the +picture would be disintegrated and destroyed; yet those forces did not +make the picture. A cathedral is held together by inorganic forces, and +it was built in obedience to them, but they do not explain it. It may +owe its existence and design to the thought of someone who never +touched a stone, or even of someone who was dead before it was begun. +In its symbolism it represents One who was executed many centuries ago. +Death and Time are far from dominant. +</p> +<p> +Are we so sure that when we truly attribute a sunset, or the moonlight +rippling on a lake, to the chemical and physical action of material +forces—to the vibrations of matter and ether as we know them, +that we have exhausted the whole truth of things? Many a thinker, +brooding over the phenomena of Nature, has felt that they represent the +thoughts of a dominating unknown Mind partially incarnate in it all. +</p> + + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2><a id="VII"></a>CHAPTER VII +<br /> +<span class="fs80">PROFESSOR HAECKEL'S CONJECTURAL PHILOSOPHY</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p class="subhead"> +<i> +A reply to Mr M'Cabe. +</i> +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +Part of the preceding, so far as it is a criticism of Haeckel, was +given by me in the first instance as a Presidential Address to the +Members of the Birmingham and Midland Institute; and the greater +portion of this Address was printed in the +<i> +Hibbert Journal +</i> +for January 1905. Mr M'Cabe, the translator of Haeckel, thereupon took +up the cudgels on behalf of his Chief, and wrote an article in the +following July issue; to the pages of which references will be given +when quoting. A few observations of mine in reply to this article +emphasise one or two points which perhaps previously were not quite +clear; and so this reply, from the October number of the +<i> +Hibbert Journal</i>, may be conveniently here reproduced. +</p> +</div> +<p> +I have no fault to find with the tone of Mr M'Cabe's criticism of my +criticism of Haeckel, and it is satisfactory that one who has proved +himself an enthusiastic disciple, as well as a most industrious and +competent translator, should stand up for the honour and credit of a +foreign Master when he is attacked. +</p> +<p> +But in admitting the appropriateness and the conciliatory tone of his +article, I must not be supposed to agree with its contentions; for +although he seeks to show that after all there is but little difference +between myself and Haeckel—and although in a sense that is true +as regards the fundamental facts of science, distinguishing the facts +themselves from any hypothetical and interpretative gloss—yet +with Haeckel's interpretations and speculative deductions from the +facts, especially with the mode of presentation, and the crude and +unbalanced attacks on other fields of human activity, my feeling of +divergence occasionally becomes intense. +</p> +<p> +And it is just these superficial, and as Mr M'Cabe now admits +hypothetical, and as they seem to me rather rash, excursions into side +issues, which have attracted the attention of the average man, and have +succeeded in misleading the ignorant. +</p> +<p> +If it could be universally recognised that +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"it is expressly as a hypothesis that Haeckel formulates his +conjecture as to manner of the origin of life" (p. 744), +</p> +</div> +<p> +and if it could be further generally admitted that his authority +outside biology is so weak that +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"it is mere pettiness to carp at incidental statements on matters on +which Haeckel is known to have or to exercise no peculiar authority, or +to labour in determining the precise degree of evidence for the monism +of the inorganic or the organic world" (p. 748), +</p> +</div> +<p> +I should be quite content, and hope that I may never find it necessary +to carp at these things again. Also I entirely agree with Mr M'Cabe, +though I have some doubt whether Professor Haeckel would equally agree +with him, that +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"there remain the great questions whether this mechanical evolution +of the universe needed intelligent control, and whether the mind of man +stands out as imperishable amidst the wreck of worlds. These constitute +the serious controversy of our time in the region of cosmic philosophy +or science. These are the rocks that will divide the stream of higher +scientific thought for long years to come. To many of us it seems that +a concentration on these issues is as much to be desired as sympathy +and mutual appreciation" (p. 748). +</p> +</div> +<p> +This is excellent; but then it is surely true that Professor Haeckel +has taken great pains to state forcibly and clearly that these great +questions cannot by him be regarded as open; in fact Mr M'Cabe himself +says— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Haeckel's position, if expressed at times with some harshness, and +not always with perfect consistency, is well enough known. He rejects +the idea of intelligent and benevolent guidance, chiefly on the ground +of the facts of dysteleology, and he fails to see any evidence for +exempting the human mind from the general law of dissolution" (p. +748). +</p> +</div> +<p> +Ultimately, however, he appears to have been driven to a singularly +unphilosophic view, of which Mr M'Cabe says— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"It is interesting to note that in his latest work Haeckel regards +sensation (or unconscious sentience) as an ultimate and irreducible +attribute of substance, like matter (or extension) and force (or +spirit)" (p. 752). +</p> +</div> +<p> +I call this unphilosophical because—omitting any reference here +to the singular parenthetical explanations or paraphrases, for which I +suppose Haeckel is not to be held responsible—this is simply +abandoning all attempt at explanation; it even closes the door to +inquiry, and is equivalent to an attitude proper to any man in the +street, for it virtually says: "Here the thing is anyhow, I cannot +explain it." However legitimate and necessary such an attitude may +be as an expression of our ignorance, we ought not to use the phrase +"ultimate and irreducible," as if no one could ever explain it. +</p> +<p> +Moreover, if it be true that— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"Haeckel does not teach—never did teach—that the +spiritual universe is an aspect of the material universe, as his critic +makes him say, it is his fundamental and most distinctive idea that +both are attributes or aspects of a deeper reality" (p. 745)— +</p> +</div> +<p> +in that case there is, indeed, but little difference between us. But no +reader of Haeckel's +<i> +Riddle +</i> +would have anticipated that such a contention could be made by any +devout disciple; and I wonder whether Mr M'Cabe can adduce any passage +adequate to support so estimable a position. Surely it is difficult to +sustain in face of quotations such as these:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"The peculiar phenomenon of consciousness is ... a physiological +problem, and as such must be reduced to the phenomena of physics and +chemistry" (p. 65). +</p> +<p> +"I therefore consider Psychology a branch of natural science—a +section of physiology.... We shall give to the material basis of all +psychic activity, without which it is inconceivable, the provisional +name of psychoplasm" (p. 32). +</p> +</div> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Life and Energy. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +The one and only point on which I think it worth while to express +decided dissidence is to be found in the paragraph where Mr M'Cabe +makes a statement concerning what he calls "vital force,"—a +term I do not remember to have ever used in my life. He claims for +Haeckel what is represented by the following extracts from his article +(pp. 745, 6, 7):— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"He does not say that life is 'knocked out of existence' when the +material organism decays. He says that the vital energy no longer exists +<i> +as such</i>, but is resolved into the inorganic energies associated +with the gases and relics of the decaying body. Thus the matter looks a +little different when Sir Oliver comes to 'challenge him to say by what +right he gives that answer.' He gives it on this plain right, that +<i> +science always finds these inorganic energies to reappear on the +dissolution of life</i>, and has never in a single instance found the +slightest reason to suspect (if we make an exception for the moment of +psychical research) that the vital force as such has continued to +exist." +</p> +</div> +<p> +The italics are mine. A little further on he continues:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +"There is no serious scientific demur to Haeckel's assumption of a +monism of the physical world, and his identification of vital force +with ordinary physical and chemical forces. +</p> +<p> +"Sir Oliver seems to admit, indeed, that the vital force is not in +its nature distinct from physical force, but holds that it needs +'guidance.'" +</p> +<p> +"On all sides we hear the echo of Professor Le Conte's words: 'Vital +force may now be regarded as so much force withdrawn from the general +fund of chemical and physical forces.'" +</p> +</div> +<p> +Very well then, here is no conflict on a matter of opinion or +philosophic speculation, but divergence on a downright question of +scientific fact (let it be noted that I do not wish to hold Professor +Haeckel responsible for these utterances of his disciple: he must +surely know better), and I wish to oppose the fallacy in the strongest +terms. +</p> +<p> +If it were true that vital energy turned into or was anyhow convertible +into inorganic energy, if it were true that a dead body had more +inorganic energy than a live one, if it were true that "these +inorganic energies" always or ever "reappear on the dissolution +of life," then undoubtedly +<i> +cadit quæstio</i>; life would immediately be proved to be a form +of energy, and would enter into the scheme of physics. But inasmuch as +all this is untrue—the direct contrary of the truth—I +maintain that life is +<i> +not +</i> +a form of energy, that it is +<i> +not +</i> +included in our present physical categories, that its explanation is +still to seek. And I have further stated—though there I do not +dogmatise—that it appears to me to belong to a separate order of +existence, which interacts with this material frame of things, and, +while there, exerts guidance and control on the energy which already +here exists (<i>cf. +</i> +p. 24); for, though they alter the quantity of energy no whit, and +though they merely utilise available energy like any other machine, +live things are able to direct inorganic terrestrial energy along new +and special paths, so as to achieve results which without such living +agency could not have occurred—<i>e.g. +</i> +forests, ant-hills, birds' nests, Forth bridge, sonatas, cathedrals. +</p> +<p> +I have never taught, nor for a moment thought, that "vital force is +akin to physical force, but that it needs guidance" (p. 747); the +phrase sounds to me nonsense. I perceive, not as a theory, but as a +fact, that life is +<i> +itself +</i> +a guiding principle, a controlling agency, +<i> +i.e. +</i> +that a live animal or plant can and does guide or influence the +elements of inorganic nature. The fact of an organism possessing life +enables it to build up material particles into many notable +forms—oak, eagle, man,—which material aggregates last +until they are abandoned by the guiding principle, when they more or +less speedily fall into decay, or become resolved into their elements, +until utilised by a fresh incarnation; and hence I say that whatever +life is or is not, it is certainly this: it is a guiding and +controlling entity which interacts with our world according to laws so +partially known that we have to say they are practically unknown, and +therefore appear in some respects mysterious. If it be thought that I +mean by this something superstitious, and for ever inexplicable or +unintelligible, I have no such meaning. I believe in the ultimate +intelligibility of the universe, though our present brains may require +considerable improvement before we can grasp the deepest things by +their aid; but this matter of "vitality" is probably not hopelessly +beyond us; and it does not follow, because we have no theory of life or +death now, that we shall be equally ignorant a century hence. +</p> +<p> +My chief objection to Professor Haeckel's literary work is that he is +dogmatic on such points as these, and would have people believe, what +doubtless he believes himself, that he already knows the answer to a +number of questions in the realms of physical nature and of philosophy. +He writes in so forcible and positive and determined a fashion, from +the vantage ground of scientific knowledge, that he exerts an undue +influence on the uncultured among his readers, and causes them to fancy +that only benighted fools or credulous dupes can really disagree with +the historical criticisms, the speculative opinions, and philosophical, +or perhaps unphilosophical, conjectures, thus powerfully set forth. +</p> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2><a id="VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII +<br /> +<span class="fs80">HYPOTHESIS AND ANALOGIES CONCERNING LIFE</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p> +The view concerning Life which I have endeavoured to express is that it +is neither matter nor energy, nor even a function of matter or of +energy, but is something belonging to a different category; that by +some means at present unknown it is able to interact with the material +world for a time, but that it can also exist in some sense +independently; although in that condition of existence it is by no +means apprehensible by our senses. It is dependent on matter for its +phenomenal appearance—for its manifestation to us here and now, +and for all its terrestrial activities; but otherwise, I conceive that +it is independent, that its essential existence is continuous and +permanent, though its interactions with matter are discontinuous and +temporary; and I conjecture that it is subject to a law of +evolution—that a linear advance is open to it—whether it +be in its phenomenal or in its occult state. +</p> +<p> +It may be well to indicate what I mean by conceiving of the possibility +that life has an existence apart from its material manifestations as we +know them at present. (Remember note on p. 40.) It is easy to imagine +that such a view is a mere surmise, having no intelligible meaning, and +that it is merely an attempt to clutch at human immortality in an +emotional and unscientific spirit. To this, however, I in no way plead +guilty. My ideas about life may be quite wrong, but they are as +cold-blooded and free from bias as possible; moreover, they apply not +to human life alone, but to all life—to that of all animals, and +even of plants; and they are held by me as a working hypothesis, the +only one which enables me to fit the known facts of ordinary vitality +into a thinkable scheme. Without it, I should be met by all the usual +puzzles:—(1) as to the stage at which existence begins, if it +can be thought of as "beginning" at all;<a href="#note3" +name="noteref3"><sup>3</sup> +</a> +(2) as to the nature of individuality, in the midst of diversity of +particles, and the determination of form irrespective of variety of +food; (3) the extraordinary rapidity of development, which results in +the production of a fully endowed individual in the course of some +fraction of a century. +</p> +<p> +With it, I cannot pretend that all these things are thoroughly +intelligible, but the lines on which an explanation may be forthcoming +seem to be laid down:—the notion being that what we see is a +temporary apparition or incarnation of a permanent entity or idea. +</p> +<p> +It is easiest to explain my meaning by aid of analogues,—by the +construction, as it were, of "models," just as is the custom in +Physics whenever a recondite idea has to be grasped before it can be +properly formulated and before a theory is complete. +</p> +<p> +I will take two analogies: one from Magnetism and one from Politics. +</p> +<p> +"Parliament," or "the Army," is a body which consists of +individual members constantly changing, and its existence is not +dependent on their existence: it pre-existed any particular set of +them, and it can survive a dissolution. Even after a complete +slaughter, the idea of the Army would survive, and another would come +into being, to carry on the permanent traditions and life. +</p> +<p> +Except as an idea in some sentient mind, it could not be said to exist +at all. The mere individuals composing it do not make it: without the +idea they would be only a disorganised mob. Abstractions like the +British Constitution, and other such things, can hardly be said to have +any incarnate existence. These exist +<i> +only +</i> +as ideas. +</p> +<p> +Parliament exists fundamentally as an idea, and it can be called into +existence or re-incarnated again. Whether it is the same Parliament or +not after a general election is a question that may be differently +answered. It is not identical, it may have different characteristics, +but there is certainly a sort of continuity; it is still a British +Parliament, for instance, it has not changed its character to that of +the French Assembly or the American Congress. It is a permanent entity +even when disembodied; it has a past and it has a future; it has a +fundamentally continuous existence though there are breaks or +dislocations in its conspicuous activity, and though each incarnation +has a separate identity or personality of its own. It is larger and +more comprehensive than any individual representation of it; it may be +said to have a "subliminal self," of which any septennial period +sees but a meagre epitome. +</p> +<p> +Some of those epitomes are more, some less, worthy; sometimes there +appears only a poor deformity or a feeble-minded attempt, sometimes a +strong and vigorous embodiment of the root idea. +</p> +<p> +As to its technical continuity of existence and actual mode of +reproduction, I suppose it would be merely fanciful to liken the +"Crown" to those germ-cells or nuclei, whose existence continues +without break, which serve the purpose of collecting and composing the +somatic cells in due season. +</p> +<p> +Other illustrations of the temporary incarnation of a permanent idea +are readily furnished from the domain of Art; but, after all, the best +analogy to life that I can at present think of is to be found in the +subject of Magnetism. +</p> +<p> +At one time it was possible to say that magnetism could not be produced +except by antecedent magnetism; that there was no known way of +generating it spontaneously; yet that, since it undoubtedly occurs in +certain rocks of the earth, it must have come into existence somehow, +at date unknown. It could also be said, and it can be said still, that, +given an initial magnet, any number of others can be made, without loss +to the generating magnet. By influence or induction exerted by +proximity on other pieces of steel, the properties of one magnet can be +excited in any number of such pieces,—the amount of magnetism +thus producible being infinite; that is, being strictly without limit, +and not dependent at all on the very finite strength of the original +magnet, which indeed continues unabated. It is just as if magnetism +were not really manufactured at all, but were a thing called out of +some infinite reservoir: as if something were brought into active and +prominent existence from a previously dormant state. +</p> +<p> +And that indeed is the fact. The process of magnetisation, as conducted +with a steel magnet on other pieces of previously inert steel, in no +case really generates new lines of magnetic force, though it appears to +generate them. We now know that the lines which thus spring into +corporeal existence, as it were, are essentially closed curves or +loops, which cannot be generated; they can be expanded or enlarged to +cover a wide field, and they can be contracted or shrunk up into +insignificance, but they cannot be created, they must be pre-existent; +they were in the non-magnetised steel all the time, though they were so +small and ill-arranged that they had no perceptible effect whatever; +they constituted a potentiality for magnetism; they existed as +molecular closed curves or loops, which, by the operation called +magnetisation, could, some of them, be opened out into loops of finite +area and spread out into space, where they are called "lines of +force." They then constitute the region called a magnetic field, +which remains a seat of so-called "permanent" magnetic activity, +until by lapse of time, excessive heat, or other circumstance, they +close up again; and so the magnet, as a magnet, dies. The magnetism +itself, however, has not really died, it has a perpetual existence; and +a fresh act of magnetisation can recall it, or something +indistinguishable from it, into manifest activity again; so that it, or +its equivalent, can once more interact with the rest of material +energies, and be dealt with by physicists, or subserve the uses of +humanity. Until that time of re-appearance its existence can only be +inferred by the thought of the mathematician: it is indeed a matter of +theory, not necessarily recognised as true by the practical man. +</p> +<p> +Our present view is that the act of magnetisation consists in a +re-arrangement and co-ordination of previously existing magnetic +elements, lying dormant, so to speak, in iron and other magnetic +materials; only a very small fraction of the whole number being usually +brought into activity at any one time, and not necessarily always the +same actual set. Only a small and indiscriminate selection is made from +all the molecular loops; and it can be a different group each time, or +some elements may be different and some the same, whenever a fresh +individual or magnet is brought into being. +</p> +<p> +All this can be said concerning the old process of +magnetisation—the process as it was doubtless familiar to the +unknown discoverer of the lodestone, to the ancient users of the +mariner's compass, and to Dr Gilbert of Colchester, the discoverer of +the magnetised condition of the Earth. +</p> +<p> +But within the nineteenth century a fresh process of magnetisation has +been discovered, and this new or electrical process is no longer +obviously dependent on the existence of antecedent magnetism, but seems +at first sight to be a property freshly or spontaneously generated, as +it were. The process was discovered as the result of setting +electricity into motion. So long as electricity was studied in its +condition at rest on charged conductors, as in the old science of +electrostatics or frictional electricity, it possessed no magnetic +properties whatever, nor did it encroach on the magnetic domain: only +vague similarities in the phenomena of attraction and repulsion aroused +attention. But directly electricity was set in motion, constituting +what is called an electric current, magnetic lines of force instantly +sprang into being, without the presence of any steel or iron; and in +twenty years they were recognised. These electrically generated lines +of force are similar to those previously known, but they need no matter +to sustain them. They need matter to display them, but they themselves +exist equally well in perfect vacuum. +</p> +<p> +How did they manage to spring into being? Can it be said that they too +had existed previously in some dormant condition in the ether of space? +That they too were closed loops opened out, and their existence thus +displayed, by the electric current? +</p> +<p> +That is an assertion which might reasonably be made: it is not the only +way of regarding the matter, however, and the mode in which a magnetic +field originates round the path of a moving charge—being +generated during the acceleration-period by a pulse of radiation which +travels with the speed of light, being maintained during the +steady-motion period by a sort of inertia as if in accordance with the +first law of motion, and being destroyed only by a return pulse of +re-radiation during a retardation-period when the moving charge is +stopped or diverted or reversed—all this can hardly be fully +explained until the intimate nature of an electric charge has been more +fully worked out; and the subject now trenches too nearly on the more +advanced parts of Physics to be useful any longer as an analogue for +general readers. +</p> +<p> +Indeed it must be recollected that no analogy will bear pressing too +far. All that we are concerned to show is that known magnetic behaviour +exhibits a very fair analogy to some aspects of that still more +mysterious entity which we call "life"; and if anyone should +assert that all magnetism was pre-existent in some ethereal condition, +that it would never go out of essential existence, but that it could be +brought into relation with the world of matter by certain +acts,—that while there it could operate in a certain way, +controlling the motion of bodies, interacting with forms of energy, +producing sundry effects for a time, and then disappearing from our ken +to the immaterial region whence it came,—he would be saying what +no physicist would think it worth while to object to, what many indeed +might agree with. +</p> +<p> +Well, that is the kind of assertion which I want to make, as a working +hypothesis, concerning life. +</p> +<p> +An acorn has in itself the potentiality not of one oak-tree alone, but +of a forest of oak-trees, to the thousandth generation, and indeed of +oak-trees without end. There is no sort of law of +"conservation" here. It is not as if something were passed on +from one thing to another. It is not analogous to energy at all, it is +analogous to the magnetism which can be excited by any given magnet: +the required energy, in both cases, being extraneously supplied, and +only transmuted into the appropriate form by the guiding principle +which controls the operation. +</p> +<p> +We do not know how to generate life without the action of antecedent +life at present, though that may be a discovery lying ready for us in +the future; but even if we did, it would still be true (as I think) +that the life was in some sense pre-existent, that it was not really +created +<i> +de novo</i>, that it was brought into actual practical every-day +existence doubtless, but that it had pre-existed in some sense too: +being called out, as it were, from some great reservoir or storehouse +of vitality, to which, when its earthly career is ended, it will return. +</p> +<p> +Indeed, it cannot in any proper sense be said ever to have left that +storehouse, though it has been made to interact with the world for a +time; and, if we might so express it, it may be thought of as carrying +back with it, into the general reservoir, any individuality, and any +experience and training or development, which it can be thought of as +having acquired here. Such a statement as this last cannot be made of +magnetism, to which no known law of evolution and progress can be +supposed to apply; but of life, of anything subject to continuous +evolution or linear progress embodied in the race, of any condition not +cyclically determinate and returning into itself, but progressing and +advancing—acquiring fresh potentialities, fresh powers, fresh +beauties, new characteristics such as perhaps may never in the whole +universe have been displayed before—of everything which +possesses such powers as these, a statement akin to the above may +certainly be made. To all such things, when they reach a high enough +stage, the ideas of continued personality, of memory, of persistent +individual existence, not only may, but I think must, apply; +notwithstanding the admitted return of the individual after each +incarnation to the central store from which it was differentiated and +individualised. +</p> +<p> +Even so a villager, picked out as a recruit and sent to the seat of +war, may serve his country, may gain experience, acquire a soul and a +width of horizon such as he had not dreamt of; and when he returns, +after the war is over, may be merged as before in his native village. +But the village is the richer for his presence, and his individuality +or personality is not really lost; though to the eye of the world, +which has no further need for it, it has practically ceased to be. +</p> + + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2><a id="IX"></a>CHAPTER IX +<br /> +<span class="fs80">WILL AND GUIDANCE</span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p class="subhead"> +(<i>Partially read to the Synthetic Society in February 1903.</i>) +</p> +<p> +The influence of the divine on the human, and on the material world, +has been variously conceived in different ages, and various forms of +difficulty have been at different times felt and suggested; but always +some sort of analogy between human action and divine action has had +perforce to be drawn, in order to make the latter in the least +intelligible to our conception. The latest form of difficulty is +peculiarly deep-seated, and is a natural outcome of an age of physical +science. It consists in denying the possibility of any guidance or +control,—not only on the part of a Deity, but on the part of +every one of his creatures. It consists in pressing the laws of physics +to what may seem their logical and ultimate conclusion, in applying the +conservation of energy without ruth or hesitation, and so excluding, as +some have fancied, the possibility of free-will action, of guidance, of +the self-determined action of mind or living things upon matter, +altogether. The appearance of control has accordingly been considered +illusory, and has been replaced by a doctrine of pure mechanism, +enveloping living things as well as inorganic nature. +</p> +<p> +And those who for any reason have felt disinclined or unable to +acquiesce in this exclusion of non-mechanical agencies, whether it be +by reason of faith and instinct or by reason of direct experience and +sensation to the contrary, have thought it necessary of late years to +seek to undermine the foundation of Physics, and to show that its +much-vaunted laws rest upon a hollow basis, that their exactitude is +illusory,—that the conservation of energy, for instance, has +been too rapid an induction, that there may be ways of eluding many +physical laws and of avoiding submission to their sovereign sway. +</p> +<p> +By this sacrifice it has been thought that the eliminated guidance and +control can philosophically be reintroduced. +</p> +<p> +This, I gather, may have been the chief motive of a critical +examination of the foundations of Physics by an American author, J. B. +Stallo, in a little book called the +<i> +Concepts of Physics</i>. But the worst of that book was that Judge +Stallo was not fully familiar with the teachings of the great +physicists; he appears to have collected his information from popular +writings, where the doctrines were very imperfectly laid down; so that +some of his book is occupied in demolishing constructions of straw, +unrecognisable by professed physicists except as caricatures at which +they also might be willing to heave an occasional missile. +</p> +<p> +The armoury pressed into the service of Professor James Ward's not +wholly dissimilar attack on Physics is of heavy calibre, and his +criticism cannot in general be ignored as based upon inadequate +acquaintance with the principles under discussion; but still his +Gifford lectures raise an antithesis or antagonism between the +fundamental laws of mechanics and the possibility of any intervention +whether human or divine. +</p> +<p> +If this antagonism is substantial it is serious; for Natural +Philosophers will not be willing to concede fundamental inaccuracy or +uncertainty about their recognised and long-established laws of motion, +when applied to ordinary matter; nor will they be prepared to tolerate +any the least departure from the law of the conservation of energy, +when all forms of energy are taken into account. Hence, if guidance and +control can be admitted into the scheme by no means short of +undermining and refuting those laws, there may be every expectation +that the attitude of scientific men will be perennially hostile to the +idea of guidance or control, and so to the efficacy of prayer, and to +many another practical outcome of religious belief. It becomes +therefore an important question to consider whether it is true that +life or mind is incompetent to disarrange or interfere with matter at +all, except as itself an automatic part of the machine,—whether +in fact it is merely an ornamental appendage or phantasmal accessory of +the working parts. +</p> +<p> +Now experience—the same kind of experience as gave us our scheme +of mechanics—shows us that to all appearance live animals +certainly can direct and control mechanical energies to bring about +desired and preconceived results; and that man can definitely will that +those results shall occur. The way the energy is provided is +understood, and its mode of application is fairly understood; what is +not understood is the way its activity is +<i> +determined</i>. Undoubtedly our body is material and can act on other +matter; and the energy of its operations is derived from food, like any +other self-propelled and fuel-fed mechanism; but mechanism is usually +controlled by an attendant. The question is whether our will or mind or +life can direct our body's energy along certain channels to attain +desired ends, or whether—as in a motor-car with an automaton +driver—the end and aim of all activity is wholly determined by +mechanical causes. And a further question concerns the mode whereby +vital control, if any, is achieved. +</p> +<p> +Answers that might be hazarded are: +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +(<i>a</i>) That life is itself a latent store of energy, and achieves +its results by imparting to matter energy that would not otherwise be +in evidence: in which case life would be a part of the machine, and as +truly mechanical as all the rest. +</p> +</div> +<p> +Experiment lends no support to this view of the relation between life +and energy, and I hold that it is false; because the essential property +of energy is that it can transform itself into other forms, remaining +constant in quantity, whereas life does not add to the stock of any +known form of energy, nor does death affect the sum of energy in any +known way. +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +(<i>b</i>) That life is something outside the scheme of +mechanics—outside the categories of matter and energy; though it +can nevertheless control or direct material forces—timing them +and determining their place of application,—subject always to +the laws of energy and all other mechanical laws; supplementing or +accompanying these laws, therefore, but contradicting or traversing +them no whit. +</p> +</div> +<p> +This second answer I hold to be true; but in order to admit its truth +we must recognise that force can be exerted and energy directed, by +suitable adjustment of existing energy, without any introduction of +energy from without; in other words, that the energy of operations +automatically going on in any active region of the universe—any +region where transformation and transference of energy are continuously +occurring whether life be present or not—can be guided along +paths that it would not automatically have taken, and can be directed +so as to produce effects that would not otherwise have occurred; and +this without any breakage or suspension of the laws of dynamics, and in +full correspondence with both the conservation of energy and the +conservation of momentum. +</p> +<p> +That is where I part company with Professor James Ward in the second +volume of +<i> +Naturalism and Agnosticism</i>; with whom nevertheless on many broad +issues I find myself in fair agreement. Those who find a real antinomy +between "mechanism and morals" must either throw overboard the +possibility of interference or guidance or willed action altogether, +which is one alternative, or must assume that the laws of Physics are +only approximate and untrustworthy, which is the other +alternative—the alternative apparently favoured by Professor +James Ward. I wish to argue that neither of these alternatives is +necessary, and that there is a third or middle course of proverbial +safety: all that is necessary is to realise and admit that the laws of +Physical Science are +<i> +incomplete</i>, when regarded as a formulation and philosophical +summary of the universe in general. No Laplacian calculator can be +supplied with all the data. +</p> +<p> +On a stagnant and inactive world life would admittedly be powerless: it +could only make dry bones stir in such a world if itself were a form of +energy; I do not suppose for a moment that it could be incarnated on +such a world; it is only potent where inorganic energy is mechanically +"available"—to use Lord Kelvin's term,—that is to +say, is either potentially or actually in process of transfer and +transformation. In other words, life can generate no trace of energy, +it can only guide its transmutations. +</p> +<p> +It has gradually dawned upon me that the reason why Philosophers who +are well acquainted with Physical or Dynamical Science are apt to fall +into the error of supposing that mental and vital interference with the +material world is impossible, in spite of their clamorous experience to +the contrary (or else, on the strength of that experience, to conceive +that there is something the matter with the formulation of physical and +dynamical laws), is because all such interference is naturally and +necessarily excluded from scientific methods and treatises. +</p> +<p> +In pure Mechanics, "force" is treated as a function of +configuration and momentum: the positions, the velocities, and the +accelerations of a conservative system depend solely on each other, on +initial conditions, and on mass; or, if we choose so to express it, the +co-ordinates, the momenta, and the kinetic energies, of the parts of +any dynamical system whatever, are all functions of time and of each +other, and of nothing else. In other words, we have to deal, in this +mode of regarding things, with a definite and completely determinate +world, to which prediction may confidently be applied. +</p> +<p> +But this determinateness is got by refusing to contemplate anything +outside a certain scheme: it is an internal truth within the assigned +boundaries, and is quite consistent with psychical interference and +indeterminateness, as soon as those boundaries are ignored; +determinateness is not part of the +<i> +essence +</i> +of dynamical doctrine, it is arrived at by the tacit assumption that no +undynamical or hyperdynamical agencies exist: in short, by that process +of abstraction which is invariably necessary for simplicity, and indeed +for possibility, of methodical human treatment. Everyone engaged in +scientific research is aware that if exuberant charwomen, or +intelligent but mischievous students (who for the moment may be taken +to represent life and mind respectively) are admitted into a laboratory +and given full scope for their activities, the subsequent scientific +results—though still, no doubt, in some strained sense, +concordant with law and order—are apt to be too complicated for +investigation; wherefore there is usually an endeavour to exclude these +incalculable influences, and to make a tacit assumption that they have +not been let in. +</p> +<p> +There is a similar tacit assumption in treatises on Physics and +Chemistry; viz., that the laws of automatic nature shall be allowed +unrestricted and unaided play, that nothing shall intervene in any +operation from start to finish save mechanical sequent and +antecedent,—that it is permissible in fact to exercise +abstraction, as usual, to the exclusion of agents not necessarily +connected with the problem, and not contemplated by the equations. +</p> +<p> +In text-books of Dynamics and in treatises of Natural Philosophy that +is a perfectly legitimate procedure;<a href="#note4" +name="noteref4"><sup>4</sup> +</a> +but when later on we come to philosophise, and to deal with the +universe as a whole, we must forgo the ingrained habit of abstraction, +and must remember that for a +<i> +complete +</i> +treatment +<i> +nothing +</i> +must permanently be ignored. So if life and mind and will, and +curiosity and mischief and folly, and greed and fraud and malice, and a +whole catalogue of attributes and things not contemplated in Natural +Philosophy—if these are known to have any real existence in the +larger world of total experience, and if there is any reason to believe +that any one of them may have had some influence in determining an +observed result, then it is foolish to exclude these things from +philosophic consideration, on the ground that they are out of place in +the realm of Natural Philosophy, that they are not allowed for in its +scheme, and therefore cannot possibly be supposed capable of exerting +any effective interference, any real guidance or control. +</p> +<p> +My contention then is—and in this contention I am practically +speaking for my brother physicists—that whereas life or mind can +neither generate energy nor directly exert force, yet it can cause +matter to exert force on matter, and so can exercise guidance and +control: it can so prepare any scene of activity, by arranging the +position of existing material, and timing the liberation of existing +energy, as to produce results concordant with an idea or scheme or +intention: it can, in short, "aim" and "fire." +</p> +<p> +Guidance of +<i> +matter +</i> +can be affected by a passive exertion of force without doing work; as a +quiescent rail can guide a train to its destination, provided an active +engine propels it. But the analogy of the rail must not be pressed: the +rail "guides" by exerting force perpendicular to the direction +of motion, it does no work but it sustains an equal opposite +reaction.<a href="#note5" name="noteref5"><sup>5</sup> +</a> +The guidance exercised by life or mind is managed in an unknown but +certainly different fashion: "determination" can sustain no +reaction—if it could it would be a straightforward mechanical +agent—but it can utilise the mechanical properties both of rail +and of engine; it arranged for the rail to be placed in position so +that the lateral force thereby exerted should guide all future trains +to a desired destination, and it further took steps to design and +compose locomotives of sufficient power, and to start them at a +prearranged time. It "employs" mechanical stress, as a capitalist +employs a labourer, not doing anything itself, but directing the +operations. It is impossible to explain all this fully by the laws of +mechanics alone, that is to say, no mechanical analysis can be complete +and all-embracing, though the whole procedure is fully subject to those +laws. +</p> +<p> +To every force there is an equal opposite force or reaction, and a +reaction may be against a live body, but it is never suspected of being +against the abstraction life or mind—that would indeed be +enlarging the scope of mechanics!—the reaction is always against +some other body. All stresses as a matter of fact occur in the ether; +and they all have a material terminus at each end (or in exceptional +cases a wave-front or some other recondite ethereal equivalent), that +is to say something possessing inertia; but the timed or +<i> +opportune +</i> +existence of a particular stress may be the result of organisation and +control. Mechanical operations can be thus dominated by intelligence +and purpose. When a stone is rolling over a cliff, it is all the same +to "energy" whether it fall on point A or point B of the beach. +But at A it shall merely dent the sand, whereas at B it shall strike a +detonator and explode a mine. Scribbling on a piece of paper results in +a certain distribution of fluid and production of a modicum of heat: so +far as energy is concerned it is the same whether we sign Andrew +Carnegie or Alexander Coppersmith, yet the one effort may land us in +twelve months' imprisonment or may build a library, according to +circumstances, while the other achieves no result at all. John Stuart +Mill used to say that our sole power over Nature was to +<i> +move +</i> +things; but strictly speaking we cannot do even that: we can only +arrange that things shall move each other, and can determine by +suitably preconceived plans the kind and direction of the motion that +shall ensue at a given time and place. Provided always that we include +in this category of "things" our undoubtedly material bodies, muscles +and nerves. +</p> +<p> +But here is just the puzzle: at what point does will or determination +enter into the scheme? Contemplate a brain cell, whence originates a +certain nerve-process whereby energy is liberated with some resultant +effect; what pulled the detent in that cell which started the impulse? +No doubt some chemical process: combination or dissociation, something +atomic, occurred; but what made it occur just then and in that way? +</p> +<p> +I answer, not anything that we as yet understand, but apparently the +same sort of pre-arrangement that determined whether the stone from the +cliff should fall on point A or point B—the same sort of process +that guided the pen to make legible and effective writing instead of +illegible and ineffective scrawls—the same kind of control that +determines when and where a trigger shall be pulled so as to secure the +anticipated slaughter of a bird. So far as energy is concerned, the +explosion and the trigger-pulling are the same identical operations +whether the aim be exact or random. It is intelligence which directs; +it is physical energy which is directed and controlled and produces the +result in time and space. +</p> +<p> +It will be said +<i> +some +</i> +energy is needed to pull a hair-trigger, to open the throttle-valve of +an engine, to press the button which shall shatter a rock. Granted: but +the work-concomitants of that energy are all familiar, and equally +present whether it be arranged so as to produce any predetermined +effect or not. The opening of the throttle-valve for instance demands +just the same exertion, and results in just the same imperceptible +transformation of fully-accounted-for energy, whether it be used to +start a train in accordance with a time-table and the guard's whistle, +or whether it be pushed over, as if by the wind, at random. The +shouting of an order to a troop demands vocal energy and produces its +due equivalent of sound; but the intelligibility of the order is +something superadded, and its result may be to make not sound or heat +alone, but History. +</p> +<p> +Energy must be +<i> +available +</i> +for the performance of any physical operation, but the energy is +independent of the determination or arrangement. Guidance and control +are not forms of energy, nor need they be themselves phantom modes of +force: their superposition upon the scheme of Physics need perturb +physical and mechanical +<i> +laws +</i> +no whit, and yet it may profoundly affect the consequences resulting +from those same laws. The whole effort of civilisation would be futile +if we could not guide the powers of nature. The powers are there, else +we should be helpless; but life and mind are outside those powers, and, +by pre-arranging their field of action, can direct them along an +organised course. +</p> +<hr class="short" /> +<p> +And this same life or mind, as we know it, is accessible to petition, +to affection, to pity, to a multitude of non-physical influences; and +hence, indirectly, the little plot of physical universe which is now +our temporary home has become amenable to truly spiritual control. +</p> +<p> +I lay stress upon a study of the nature and mode of human action of the +interfering or guiding kind, because by that study we must be led if we +are to form any intelligent conception of divine action. True, it might +be feasible to admit divine agency and yet to deny the possibility of +any human power of the same kind,—though that would be a +nebulous and at least inconclusive procedure; but if once we are +constrained to admit the existence and reality of human guidance and +control, superposed upon the physical scheme, we cannot deny the +possibility of such power and action to any higher being, nor even to +any totality of Mind of which ours is a part. +</p> +<p> +I do not see how the function claimed can be resented, except by those +who deny "life" to be anything at all. If it exists, if it is +not mere illusion, it appears to me to be something whose full +significance lies in another scheme of things, but which touches and +interacts with this material universe in a certain way, building its +particles into notable configurations for a time—without +confounding any physical laws,—and then evaporating whence it +came. This language is vague and figurative undoubtedly, but, I +contend, appropriately so, for we have not yet a theory of +life—we have not even a theory of the essential nature of +gravitation; discoveries are waiting to be made in this region, and it +is absurd to suppose that we are already in possession of all the data. +We can wait; but meanwhile we need not pretend that because we do not +understand them, therefore life and will can accomplish nothing; we +need not imagine that "life"—with its higher developments and +still latent powers—is an impotent nonentity. The philosophic +attitude, surely, is to observe and recognise its effects, both what it +can and what it cannot achieve, and to realise that our present +knowledge of it is extremely partial and incomplete. +</p> +<hr class="short" /> +<h3> +<span class="sc"> +Note on Free Will and Foreknowledge. +</span> +</h3> +<p> +In the above chapter I must not be understood as pretending to settle +the thorny question of a reconciliation between freedom of choice and +pre-determination or prevision. All I there contend for is that no +mechanical or scientific determinism, subject to special conditions in +a limited region, can be used to contradict freedom of the will, under +generalised conditions, in the Universe as a whole. +</p> +<p> +Nevertheless there are things which may perhaps be usefully said, even +on the larger and much-worn topic of the present note. If we still +endeavour to learn as much as possible from human analogies, examples +are easy:— +</p> +<p> +An architect can draw in detail a building that is to be; the dwellers +in a valley can be warned to evacuate their homesteads because a city +has determined that a lake shall exist where none existed before. +Doubtless the city is free to change its mind, but it is not expected +to; and all predictions are understood to be made subject to the +absence of disturbing, +<i> +i.e. +</i> +unforeseen, causes. Even the prediction of an eclipse is not free from +a remote uncertainty, and in the case of the return of meteoric showers +and comets the element of contingency is not even remote. +</p> +<p> +But it will be said that to higher and superhuman knowledge all +possible contingencies would be known and recognised as part of the +data. That is quite possibly, though not quite certainly, true: and +there comes the real difficulty of reconciling absolute prediction of +events with real freedom of the actors in the drama. I anticipate that +a complete solution of the problem must involve a treatment of the +subject of +<i> +time</i>, and a recognition that "time," as it appears to us, +is really part of our human limitations. We all realise that "the +past" is in some sense not non-existent but only past; we may +readily surmise that "the future" is similarly in some sense +existent, only that we have not yet arrived at it; and our links with +the future are less understood. That a seer in a moment of clairvoyance +may catch a glimpse of futurity—some partial picture of what +perhaps exists even now in the forethought of some higher +mind—is not inconceivable. It may be after all only an +unconscious and inspired inference from the present, on an enlarged and +exceptional scale; and it is a matter for straightforward investigation +whether such prevision ever occurs. +</p> +<p> +The following article, on the general subject of "Free Will and +Determinism," reprinted from the +<i> +Contemporary Review +</i> +for March 1904, may conveniently be here reproduced:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p> +The conflict between Free Will and Determinism depends on a question of +boundaries. We occasionally ignore the fact that there must be a +subjective partition in the Universe separating the region of which we +have some inkling of knowledge from the region of which we have +absolutely none; we are apt to regard the portion on our side as if it +were the whole, and to debate whether it must or must not be regarded +as self-determined. As a matter of fact any partitioned-off region is +in general not completely self-determined, since it is liable to be +acted upon by influences from the other side of the partition. If the +far side of the boundary is ignored, then an observer on the near side +will conclude that things really initiate their own motion and act +without stimulation or motive, in some cases, whereas the fact is that +no act is performed without stimulus or motive; even irrational acts +are caused by something, and so also are rational acts. Madness and +delirium are natural phenomena amenable to law. +</p> +<p> +But in actual life we are living on one side of a boundary, and are +aware of things on one side only; the things on this side appear to us +to constitute the whole universe, since they are all of which we have +any knowledge, either through our senses or in other ways. Hence we are +subject to certain illusions, and feel certain difficulties,—the +illusion of unstimulated and unmotived freedom of action, and the +difficulty of reconciling this with the felt necessity for general +determinism and causation. +</p> +<p> +If we speak in terms of the part of the universe that we know and have +to do with, we find free agencies rampant among organic life; so that +"freedom of action" is a definite and real experience, and for +practical convenience is so expressed. But if we could seize the +entirety of things and perceive what was occurring beyond the range of +our limited conceptions we should realise that the whole was welded +together, and that influences were coming through which produced the +effects that we observe. +</p> +<p> +Those philosophers, if there are any, who assert that we are wholly +chained bound and controlled by the circumstances of that part of the +Universe of which we are directly aware—that we are the slaves +of our environment and must act as we are compelled by forces emanating +from things on our side of the boundary alone,—those +philosophers err. +</p> +<p> +This kind of determinism is false; and the reaction against it has led +other philosophers to assert that we are +<i> +lawlessly +</i> +free, and able to initiate any action without motive or +cause,—that each individual is a capricious and chaotic entity, +not part of a Cosmos at all! +</p> +<p> +It may be doubted whether anyone has clearly and actually maintained +either of these theses in all its crudity; but there are many who +vigorously and cheaply deny one or other of them, and in so denying the +one conceive that they are maintaining the other. Both the above theses +are false; yet Free Will and Determinism are both true, and in a +completely known universe would cease to be contradictories. +</p> +<p> +The reconciliation between opposing views lies in realising that the +Universe of which we have a kind of knowledge is but a portion or an +aspect of the whole. +</p> +<p> +We are free, and we are controlled. We are free, in so far as our +sensible surroundings and immediate environment are concerned; that is, +we are free for all practical purposes, and can choose between +alternatives as they present themselves. We are controlled, as being +intrinsic parts of an entire cosmos suffused with law and order. +</p> +<p> +No scheme of science based on knowledge of our environment can +confidently predict our actions, nor the actions of any sufficiently +intelligent live creature. For "mind" and "will" have +their roots on the other side of the partition, and that which we +perceive of them is but a fraction of the whole. Nevertheless, the more +developed and consistent and harmonious our character becomes, the less +liable is it to random outbreaks, and the more certainly can we be +depended on. We thus, even now, can exhibit some approximation to the +highest state—that conscious unison with the entire scheme of +existence which is identical with perfect freedom. +</p> +<p> +If we could grasp the totality of things we should realise that +everything was ordered and definite, linked up with everything else in +a chain of causation, and that nothing was capricious and uncertain and +uncontrolled. The totality of things is, however, and must remain, +beyond our grasp; hence the actual working of the process, the nature +of the links, the causes which create our determinations, are +frequently unknown. And since it is necessary for practical purposes to +treat what is utterly beyond our ken as if it were non-existent, it +becomes easily possible to fall into the erroneous habit of conceiving +the transcendental region to be completely inoperative. +</p> +</div> + + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2><a id="X"></a>CHAPTER X +<br /> +<span class="fs80">FURTHER SPECULATION AS TO THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF +LIFE<a href="#note6" name="noteref6"><sup>6</sup></a></span> +</h2> +</div> + +<p class="subhead"> +<i> +Preliminary Remarks on Recent Views in Chemistry. +</i> +</p> +<p> +It is a fact extremely familiar to chemists that the groupings possible +to atoms of carbon are exceptionally numerous and complicated, each +carbon atom having the power of linking itself with others to an +extraordinary extent, so that it is no exceptional thing to find a +substance which contains twenty or thirty atoms of carbon as well as +other elements linked together in its molecule in a perfectly definite +way, the molecule being still classifiable as that of a definite +chemical compound. But there are also some non-elementary bodies which, +although they are chemically complete and satisfied, retain a +considerable vestige of power to link their molecules together so as to +make a complex and massive compound molecule; and these are able not +only to link similar molecules into a more or less indefinite chain, +but to unite and include the saturated molecules of many other +substances also into the unwieldy aggregate. +</p> +<p> +Of the non-elementary bodies possessing this property, +<i> +water +</i> +appears to be one of the chief; for there is evidence to show that the +ordinary H<sub>2</sub>O molecule of water, although it may be properly +spoken of as a saturated or satisfied compound, seldom exists in the +simple isolated shape depicted by this formula, but rather that a great +number of such simple molecules attach themselves to each other by what +is called their residual or outstanding affinity, and build themselves +up into a complex aggregate. +</p> +<p> +The doctrine of residual affinity has been long advocated by Armstrong; +and the present writer has recently shown that it is a necessary +consequence of the electrical theory of chemical affinity,<a +href="#note7" name="noteref7"><sup>7</sup></a> and that the structure +of the resulting groupings, or compound aggregates, may be partially +studied by means of floating magnets, somewhat after the manner of +Alfred Mayer.<a href="#note8" name="noteref8"><sup>8</sup> +</a> +</p> +<p> +It may be well here to explain to students that one of the lines of +argument which lead to the conclusion that the water molecule, as it +ordinarily exists, is really complex and massive, is based upon +measurements of the Faraday dielectric constant for water; for this +constant, or "specific inductive capacity," is found to be very +large, something like 50 times that of air or free ether; whereas for +glass it is only 5 or 6 times that of free space. The dielectric +constant of a substance generally increases with the density or +massiveness of its molecule,—indeed, the value of this constant +is one of the methods whereby matter displays its interaction with and +loading of the free ether of space,—and any such density as the +conventional nine times that of hydrogen for the molecule of water +would be wholly unable to explain its immense dielectric constant. +</p> +<p> +The influence of the massiveness of a water molecule is also displayed +in its power of tearing asunder or dissociating any salts or other +simple chemical substance introduced into it; common salt, for +instance, is found always to have a certain percentage of its molecules +knocked or torn asunder directly it is dissolved in water, so that, in +addition to a number of salt molecules in solution, there are a few +positively charged sodium atoms and a few negatively charged chlorine +atoms, existing in a state of loose attraction to the water aggregate, +and amenable to the smallest electric force; which, when applied, urges +the chlorine one way and the sodium the other way, so that they can be +removed at an electrode and their place supplied by freshly dissociated +molecules of salt, thus bringing about its permanent electro-chemical +decomposition, and enabling the water to behave as an electrolytic +conductor directly a little salt or acid is dissolved in it. +</p> +<p> +The power of the water molecule to associate itself with molecules of +other substances is illustrated by the well-known fact that water is an +almost universal solvent. It is its residual affinity which enables it +to enter into weak chemical combination with a large number of other +substances, and thus to dissolve those substances. The dissolving power +usually increases when the temperature is raised, possibly because the +self-contained or self-sufficient groupings of the water molecules are +then to some extent broken up and the fragments enabled to cling on to +the foreign or introduced matter instead of only to each other. The +foreign substance is apt to be extruded again when the liquid cools, +and when the affinity of the water-aggregates for each other resumes +its sway. Very hot water can dissolve not only the substances +familiarly known to be soluble in water, but it can dissolve things +like glass also; so that glass vessels are unable to retain water kept +under high pressure at a very high temperature, approaching a red heat. +</p> +<p> +Another material which also seems to have the power of combining with a +number of other bodies, under the influence of the loose mode of +chemical combination spoken of as residual affinity, is carbon; so that +a block of charcoal can absorb hundreds of times its own bulk of +certain gases. +</p> +<p> +Indeed, Sir James Dewar has recently employed this absorbing power of +very cold carbon to produce a perfect kind of vacuum, which may, +perhaps, be the nearest approach to absolute vacuum that has yet been +attained: probably higher than can be attained by any kind of +mechanical or mercury pump. +</p> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Unexpected Influence of Size. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +Suppose now a substance contains a great number of carbon molecules and +a great number of water molecules, each of which has this residual +affinity or power of clinging together well developed, what may be +expected to be the result? Surely, the formation of a molecule +consisting of thousands or hundreds of thousands of atoms, constituting +substances more complex even than those already known to or analysable +by organic chemistry; and if these complex molecules likewise possess +the adhesive faculty, a grouping of millions or even billions of atoms +may ultimately be formed. (A billion, that is a million millions, of +atoms is truly an immense number, but the resulting aggregate is still +excessively minute. A portion of substance consisting of a billion +atoms is only barely visible with the highest power of a microscope; +and a speck or granule, in order to be visible to the naked eye, like a +grain of lycopodium-dust, must be a million times bigger still.) Such a +grouping is likely to have properties differing not only in degree but +in kind from the properties of simple substances. +</p> +<p> +For it must not be thought that aggregation only produces quantitative +change and leaves quality unaltered. Fresh qualities altogether are +liable to be introduced or to make their appearance at certain +stages—certain critical stages—in the building up of a +complex mass (<i>cf. +</i> +p. 71). +</p> +<p> +The habitability of a house, for instance, depends on its possessing a +cavity of a certain size; there is a critical size of brick-aggregate +which enables it to serve as a dwelling. Nothing much smaller than this +would do at all. The aggregate retains this property, thus conferred +upon it by size, however big it may be made after that; until it +becomes a palace or a cathedral, when it may perhaps reach an upper +limit of size at which it would be crushed by its own weight, or at +which the span of roof is too great to be supported. But the +difference, as regards habitability, between a palace and a hovel is +far less than that between a hovel and one of the air-holes in a brick +or loaf, or any other cavity too small to act as a human habitation. +The difference as regards habitability is then an infinite difference. +</p> +<p> +To take a less trivial instance; a planet which is large enough to +retain an atmosphere by its gravitative attraction differs utterly, in +potentiality and importance, from the numerous lumps of matter +scattered throughout space, which, though they may be as large as a +haystack or a mountain or as the British Isles, or even Europe, are yet +too small to hold any trace of air to their surface, and therefore +cannot in any intelligible sense of the word be regarded as habitable. +One of the lumps of matter in space can become a habitable planet only +when it has attained a certain size, which conceivably it might do by +falling together with others into a complex aggregate under the +influence of gravitative attraction. The asteroids have not succeeded +in doing this, but the planets have; and, accordingly, one of them, at +any rate, has become a habitable world. +</p> +<p> +But observe that the great size and the consequent retention of an +atmosphere did not generate the inhabitants; it satisfied one of the +conditions necessary for their existence. How they arose is another +matter. All that we have seen so far is that an aggregate of bodies may +possess properties and powers which the separate bodies themselves +possess in no kind or sort of way. It is not a question of degree, but +of kind. +</p> +<p> +So also, further, if the aggregate is large enough, very much larger +than any planet, as large as a million earths aggregated together, it +acquires the property of conspicuous radio-activity, it becomes a +self-heating and self-luminous body, able to keep the ether violently +agitated in all space round it, and thus to supply the radiation +necessary for protecting the habitable worlds from the cold of space to +which they are exposed, for maintaining them at a temperature +appropriate to organic existence, and likewise for supplying and +generating the energy for their myriad activities. It has become in +fact a central sun, and source of heat, solely because of its enormous +size combined with the fact of the mutual gravitative attraction of its +own constituent particles. No body of moderate size could perform this +function, nor act as a perennial furnace to the rest. +</p> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Application to Protoplasm. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +Very well then, return now to our complex molecular aggregate, and ask +what new property, beyond the province of ordinary chemistry and +physics, is to be expected of a compound which contains millions or +billions of atoms attached to each other in no rigid, stable, frigid +manner, but by loose unstable links, enabling them constantly to +re-arrange themselves and to be the theatre of perpetual +change, aggregating and reaggregating in various ways and manifesting +ceaseless activities. Such unstable aggregates of matter may, like the +water of a pond or a heap of organic refuse, serve as the vehicle for +influences wholly novel and unexpected. +</p> +<p> +Too much agitation—that is, too high a temperature—will +split them up and destroy the new-found potentiality of such +aggregates; too little agitation—that is, too low a +temperature—will permit them to begin to cohere and settle down +into frozen rigid masses insusceptible of manifold activities. But take +them just at the right temperature, when sufficiently complex and +sufficiently mobile; take care of them, so to speak, for the structure +may easily be killed; and what shall we find? We could not infer or +guess what would be the result, but we can observe the result as it is. +</p> +<p> +The result is that the complexes group themselves into minute masses +visible in the microscope, each mass being called by us a +"cell"; that these cells possess the power of uniting with or +assimilating other cells, or fragments of cells, as they drift by and +come into contact with them; and that they absorb into their own +substance such portions as may be suitable, while the insufficiently +elaborated portions—the grains of inorganic or over-simple +material—are presently extruded. They thus begin the act of +"feeding." +</p> +<p> +Another remarkable property also can be observed; for a cell which thus +grows by feeding need not remain as one individual, but may split into +two, or into more than two, which may cohere for a time, but will +ultimately separate and continue existence on their own account. Thus +begins the act of "reproduction." +</p> +<p> +But a still more remarkable property can be observed in some of the +cells, though not in all; they can not only assimilate a fragment of +matter which comes into contact with them, but they can sense it, +apparently, while not yet in contact, and can protrude portions of +their substance or move their whole bodies towards the fragment, thus +beginning the act of "hunting"; and the incipient locomotory +power can be extended till light and air and moisture and many other +things can be sought and moved towards, until locomotion becomes so +free that it sometimes seems apparently objectless—mere +restlessness, change for the sake of change, like that of human beings. +</p> +<p> +The power of locomotion is liable, however, to introduce the cell to +new dangers, and to conditions hostile to its continued aggregate +existence. So, in addition to the sense of food and other desirable +things ahead, it seems to acquire, at any rate when still further +aggregated and more developed, a sense of shrinking from and avoidance +of the hostile and the dangerous,—a sense as it were of "pain." +</p> +<p> +And so it enters on its long career of progress, always liable to +disintegration or "death"; it begins to differentiate portions +of itself for the feeding process, other portions for the reproductive +process, other portions again for sensory processes, but retaining the +protective sense of pain almost everywhere; until the spots sensitive +to ethereal and aerial vibrations—which, arriving as they do +from a distance, carry with them so much valuable information, and when +duly appreciated render possible perception and prediction as to what +is ahead—until these sensitive spots have become developed into +the special organs which we now know as the "eye" and the +"ear." Then, presently, the power of communication is slowly +elaborated, speech and education begin, and the knowledge of the +individual is no longer limited to his own experience, but expands till +it embraces the past history and the condensed acquisition of the race. +And thus gradually arises a developed self-consciousness, a +discrimination between the self and the external world, and a +realisation of the power of choice and freedom,—a stage beyond +which we have not travelled as yet, but a stage at which almost all +things seem possible. +</p> +<p> +The first two properties, assimilation and reproduction, overshadowed +by the possibility of +<i> +death</i>, are properties of life of every kind, plant life as of all +other. The power of locomotion and special senses, overshadowed by the +sense of +<i> +pain</i>, are the sign of a still further development into what we call +"animal life." The further development, of mind, consciousness, +and sense of freedom, overshadowed by the possibility of wilful error or +<i> +sin</i>, is the conspicuous attribute of life which is distinctively +human. +</p> +<p> +Thus, our complex molecular aggregate has shown itself capable of +extraordinary and most interesting processes, has proved capable of +constituting the material vehicle of life, the natural basis of living +organisms, and even of mind; very much as a planet of certain size +proved capable of possessing an atmosphere. +</p> +<p> +But is it to be supposed that the complex aggregate +<i> +generated +</i> +the life and mind, as the planet generated its atmosphere? That is the +so-called materialistic view, but to the writer it seems an erroneous +one, and it is certainly one that is not proven. It is not even certain +that every planet generated all the gases of its own atmosphere: some +of them it may have swept up in its excursion through space. What is +certain is that it possesses the power of retaining an atmosphere; it +is by no means so certain how all the constituents of that atmosphere +arrived. +</p> +<h3 class="section"> +<i> +Questions concerning the Origin and Nature of Life. +</i> +</h3> +<p> +All that we have actually experienced and verified is that a complex +molecular aggregate is capable of being the vehicle or material basis +of life; but to the question +<i> +what life is +</i> +we have as yet no answer. Many have been the attempts to generate life +<i> +de novo</i>, by packing together suitable materials and keeping them +pleasantly warm for a long time; but, if all germs of pre-existing life +are rigorously excluded, the attempt hitherto has been a failure: so +far, no life has made its appearance under observation, except from +antecedent life. +</p> +<p> +But, to exclude all trace of antecedent life, it is necessary not only +to shut out floating germs, but to kill all germs previously existing +in the material we are dealing with. This killing of previous life is +usually accomplished by heat; but it has been argued that strong heat +will destroy not only the life but the potentiality for life, will +break up the complex aggregate on which life depends, will deprive the +incubating solution not only of life but of livelihood. There is some +force in the objection, and it is an illustration of the difficulty +surrounding the subject. But Tyndall showed that antecedent life could +be destroyed, without any very high temperature, by gentle heat +periodically applied: heat insufficient to kill the germs, but +sufficient to kill the hatched or developed organisms. Periodic heating +enables the germs of successive ages to hatch, so to speak, and the +product to be slain; and, although some each time may have reproduced +germs before slaughter—eggs capable of standing the +warmth—yet a succession of such warmings would ultimately be +fatal to all, and that without necessarily breaking up the protoplasmic +complex aggregates on the existence of which the whole vital +potentiality depends. +</p> +<p> +So far, however, all effort at spontaneous generation has been a +failure; possibly because some essential ingredient or condition was +omitted, possibly because great lapse of time was necessary. But +suppose it was successful; what then? We should then be reproducing in +the laboratory a process that must at some past age have occurred on +the earth; for at one time the earth was certainly hot and molten and +inorganic, whereas now it swarms with life. +</p> +<p> +Does that show that the earth generated the life? By no means; no more +than it need necessarily have generated all the gases of its +atmosphere, or the meteoric dust which lies upon its snows. +</p> +<p> +Life may be something not only ultra-terrestrial, but even immaterial, +something outside our present categories of matter and energy; as real +as they are, but different, and utilising them for its own purpose. +What is certain is that life possesses the power of vitalising the +complex material aggregates which exist on this planet, and of +utilising their energies for a time to display itself amid terrestrial +surroundings; and then it seems to disappear or evaporate whence it +came. It is perpetually arriving and perpetually disappearing. While it +is here, if it is at a sufficiently high level, the animated material +body moves about and strives after many objects, some worthy, some +unworthy; it acquires thereby a certain individuality, a certain +character. It may realise +<i> +itself</i>, moreover, becoming conscious of its own mental and +spiritual existence; and it then begins to explore the Mind which, like +its own, it conceives must underlie the material fabric—half +displayed, half concealed, by the environment, and intelligible only to +a kindred spirit. Thus the scheme of law and order dimly dawns upon the +nascent soul, and it begins to form clear conceptions of truth, +goodness, and beauty; it may achieve something of permanent value, as a +work of art or of literature; it may enter regions of emotion and may +evolve ideas of the loftiest kind; it may degrade itself below the +beasts, or it may soar till it is almost divine. +</p> +<p> +Is it the material molecular aggregate that has of its own unaided +latent power generated this individuality, acquired this character, +felt these emotions, evolved these ideas? There are some who try to +think that it is. There are others who recognise in this extraordinary +development a contact between this material frame of things and a +universe higher and other than anything known to our senses;a universe +not dominated by Physics and Chemistry, but utilising the interactions +of matter for its own purposes; a universe where the human spirit is +more at home than it is among these temporary collocations of atoms; a +universe capable of infinite development, of noble contemplation, and +of lofty joy, long after this planet—nay, the whole solar +system—shall have fulfilled its present spire of destiny, and +retired cold and lifeless upon its endless way. +</p> +<hr class="short" /> +<p class="ctr"> +PRINTED BY NEILL AND CO., LTD., EDINBURGH. +</p> + +<hr class="long" /> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2> +<span class="fs80">Footnotes</span></h2> +</div> + + +<p class="foot"><a id="note1"></a> +<a href="#noteref1"> +<sup> +1</sup> +</a> +By Mr Oliver Heaviside and Professor J. J. Thomson. +</p> + +<p class="foot"><a id="note2"></a> +<a href="#noteref2"> +<sup> +2</sup> +</a> +In case it is unfair to wrench a sentence like this from its context, I +quote the larger portion of that instructive report in this +note:— +</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="centerfoot"> +<i> +Extract from "The Tablet," Aug. 27th, 1904</i>—<i>An +Address by the Bishop of Newport. +</i> +</p> +<p class="foot"> +"If the Abbé Loisy has followers within the Church, as we are +informed he has, it cannot be doubted that the danger for Catholics is +by no means imaginary. For Loisy teaches that the dogmatic definitions +of the Church [on the Incarnation], although the best that could be +given at the time and under the circumstances, are only a most +inadequate expression of the real truth, which they represent merely +relatively and imperfectly. These definitions, he says, should now be +stated afresh, because the traditional formula no longer corresponds to +the way in which the mystery is regarded by contemporary thought. In +his view, our present knowledge of the universe should suggest to the +Church a new examination of the dogma of Creation;our knowledge of +history should make her revise her ideas of revelation; and our +progress in psychology and moral philosophy should suggest to her to +re-state her theology of the Incarnation. Every one can see that there +is a grain of truth in this kind of talk. But it is, on the whole, a +pestilent and dangerous heresy. If the formulas of modern science +contradict the science of Catholic dogma, it is the former that must be +altered, not the latter. If modern metaphysics are incompatible with +the metaphysical terms and expressions adopted by councils and +explained by the Catholic schools, then modern metaphysics must be +rejected as erroneous. The Church does not change her Christian +philosophy to suit the world's speculations; she teaches the world, by +her theological definitions, what true and sound philosophy is. Whilst +every effort should be made by Catholic apologists to smooth the way +for a genuine understanding of the Church's dogmatic terminology, two +things must never be lost sight of, first, that this terminology +expresses real objective truth (however inadequate the expression may +be to the full meaning, as God sees it, of any given mystery); and, +secondly, that such truth is expressed in terms of sound philosophy +which will not be given up, and which may be called the Christian +philosophy." +</p> +</div> + +<p class="foot"><a id="note3"></a> +<a href="#noteref3"> +<sup> +3</sup> +</a> +I doubt whether +<i> +existence +</i> +can be "begun" at all, save as the result of a juxtaposition of +elements, or of a conveyance of motion. We can put things together, and +we can set things in motion,—statics and kinetics,—can we +do more? Ether can be strained, matter can be moved: I doubt whether we +see more than this happening in the whole material universe. This +dictum is elaborated elsewhere. +</p> + +<p class="foot"><a id="note4"></a> +<a href="#noteref4"> +<sup> +4</sup> +</a> +It is on a similar basis that there is a science of rigid dynamics, +with elasticity and fluidity excluded; and thus also can there be a +hydrodynamics in which the consequences of viscosity are ignored. +</p> + +<p class="foot"><a id="note5"></a> +<a href="#noteref5"> +<sup> +5</sup> +</a> +It is well to bear in mind the distinction between "force" and +"energy." These terms have been so popularly confused that it +may be difficult always to discriminate them, but in Physics they are +absolutely discriminated. We have a direct sense of "force," in +our muscles, whether they be moving or at rest. A force in motion is a +"power," it "does work" and transfers energy from one +body to another, which is commonly though incorrectly spoken of as +"generating" energy. But a force at rest—a mere statical +stress, like that exerted by a pillar or a watershed—does no +work, and "generates" or transfers no energy; yet the one sustains a +roof which would otherwise fall, thereby screening a portion of ground +from vegetation; while the other deflects a rain-drop into the Danube +or the Rhine. This latter is the kind of force which constrains a stone +to revolve in a circle instead of a straight line; a force like that of +a groove or slot or channel or "guide." +</p> + +<p class="foot"><a id="note6"></a> +<a href="#noteref6"> +<sup> +6</sup> +</a> +An article reprinted from the +<i> +North American Review +</i> +for May 1905. +</p> + +<p class="foot"><a id="note7"></a> +<a href="#noteref7"> +<sup> +7</sup> +</a> +See +<i> +Nature</i>, vol. 70, p. 176, June 23, 1904. +</p> + +<p class="foot"><a id="note8"></a> +<a href="#noteref8"> +<sup> +8</sup> +</a> +See an article on "Modern Views of Chemical Affinity" by the +present writer in a magazine called +<i> +Technics</i>, for September 1904. +</p> + + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT +GUTENBERG EBOOK LIFE AND MATTER ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions +will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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