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diff --git a/25291.txt b/25291.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7689c52 --- /dev/null +++ b/25291.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5818 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Theism or Atheism, by Chapman Cohen + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Theism or Atheism + The Great Alternative + +Author: Chapman Cohen + +Release Date: May 2, 2008 [EBook #25291] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEISM OR ATHEISM *** + + + + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Martin Pettit and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +THEISM OR ATHEISM + +THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE + +By CHAPMAN COHEN + +THE PIONEER PRESS, + +61, Farringdon Street, +----E.C.4---- + +1921. + + + + +Contents. + + +Part I. + +AN EXAMINATION OF THEISM. + PAGE + +Chapter I. What is God? 9 + +Chapter II. The Origin of the Idea of God 20 + +Chapter III. Have we a Religious Sense? 37 + +Chapter IV. The Argument from Existence 49 + +Chapter V. The Argument from Causation 59 + +Chapter VI. The Argument from Design 69 + +Chapter VII. The Disharmonies of Nature 85 + +Chapter VIII. God and Evolution 94 + +Chapter IX. The Problem of Pain 110 + + +Part II. + +SUBSTITUTES FOR ATHEISM. + +Chapter X. A Question of Prejudice 131 + +Chapter XI. What is Atheism? 138 + +Chapter XII. Spencer and the Unknowable 151 + +Chapter XIII. Agnosticism 169 + +Chapter XIV. Atheism and Morals 181 + +Chapter XV. Atheism Inevitable 194 + + + + +PREFACE. + + +Shrouded in the cloak of philosophy, the question of the existence of +God continues to attract attention, and, I may add, to command more +respect than it deserves. For it is only by a subterfuge that it assumes +the rank of philosophy. "God" enters into philosophy only when it is +beginning to lose caste in its proper home, and then in its new +environment it undergoes such a transformation as to contain very little +likeness to its former, and proper, self. It disowns its parentage and +claims another origin, and, like so many genealogists devising pedigrees +for the parvenu, certain philosophers attempt to map out for the +newcomer an ancestry to which he can establish no valid claim. Nothing +would, indeed, surprise the ancestor more than to be brought face to +face with his descendant. He would not be more astonished than would the +ancient Eohippus on meeting with a modern dray-horse. In anthropology or +history the idea of God may fairly claim a place, but it has no place in +philosophy on any sensible meaning of the word. + +The consequence of this transference of the idea of God to the sphere of +philosophy is the curious position that the God in which people believe +is not the God whose existence is made the product of an argument, and +the God of the argument is not the God of belief. The theory and the +fact have no more likeness to each other than a chestnut horse has to a +horse-chestnut. A fallacy is perpetuated by appealing to a fact, but the +fact immediately discredits the fallacy by disowning it in practice. The +grounds upon which the belief in God is supposed to rest, the reasoning +from which it springs, are seen to follow the belief instead of +preceding it. The roots are in the air, and on closer inspection are +seen to be artificial adornments, so many imitations that have been hung +there for the purpose of imposing on near-sighted or careless observers. + +The purpose of the following pages is to make clear the nature of this +alliance and to expose the real character of what we are asked to +worship. There are, of course, many on whose ears any amount of +reasoning will fall without effect. To that class this book will not +appeal; it may be questioned whether many will even read it. They will +go on professing the belief they have always professed, and taking pride +in the fact that they have an intellect which is superior to proof, and +which disdains evidence when it runs contrary to "my belief." Others +will, I expect, complain that the treatment of so solemn a subject is +not "reverent" enough. But why _any_ subject should be treated +reverently, as a condition of examination, is more than I have ever been +able to discover. It is asking the inquirer to commence his +investigation with a half-promise to find something good in what he is +about to examine. Whether a thing is worthy of reverence or not is a +conclusion that must follow investigation, not precede it. And one does +not observe any particular reverence shown by the religious person +towards those beliefs in which he does not happen to believe. + +But there are some who will read thoughtfully an examination of so old a +subject as Theism, and it is to those that these pages are addressed. +One cannot hope to say anything that is strikingly new on so well worn a +subject as the existence of God, but there are many who will read an old +subject when presented in a new work, and even then there is also the +possibility of presenting an old topic in a slightly new form. And I +think these will find the main lines of the defence set up by the +Goddite dealt with in a manner that should at least make the point at +issue clear. + +Finally, it is one aim of this book to press home the point that the +logical issue is between Theism and Atheism. That there is no logical +halting place between the two, and that any attempt to call a halt is +little more than a concession to a desire for mental or social +convenience, seems to me as clear as anything can well be. And there is +really nothing gained, ultimately, by the halt. Disinclination on the +part of the non-Theist to push the issue to its logical conclusion is +treated by the Theist as inability to do so, and is used as an argument +in support of his own belief. In matters of the intellect, compromise is +almost always a dangerous policy. It heartens one's enemies and +disheartens one's friends. And there is really no adequate reason why +those who have given up belief in deity should continue to treat this +master superstition of the ages as though it were one of our most +valuable inheritances, to be surrendered with lowered heads and sinking +hearts. We who know both sides know that in giving up the belief in +deity we have lost nothing of value, nothing that need cause us a single +regret. And on that point we certainly can speak with authority; for we +have been where the Theist is, he has not been where we are. Many of us +know quite well all that is meant by the fear and trembling with which +the believer looks upon a world without God. And we know how idle the +fear is--as idle as a child's fear of the dark. What the world is like +_with_ God, there is all the experience of history to inform us; and it +would indeed be strange if love and brotherhood, armed with the weapons +that science has given us, could not produce a better human society than +has ever existed under the dominion of the Gods. + + + + +Part I. + +AN EXAMINATION OF THEISM. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +WHAT IS GOD? + + +Soon after that famous Atheist, Charles Bradlaugh, entered the House of +Commons, it is said that a fellow member approached him with the remark, +"Good God, Bradlaugh, what does it matter whether there is a God or +not?" Bradlaugh's answer is not recorded, but one is impelled to open +the present examination of the belief in God, by putting the same +question in another form. Is the belief in God, as we are so often +assured, one of the most important questions that can engage the +attention of man? Under certain conditions one can conceive a rational +answer in the affirmative. Where the mental and social conditions are +such that men seriously believe the incidence of natural forces on +mankind to be determined by the direct action of "God," one can +appreciate right belief concerning him being treated as of first rate +importance. In such circumstances wrong ideas are the equivalent of +disaster. But we are not in that condition to-day. It is, indeed, common +ground with all educated men and women that natural happenings are +independent of divine control to at least the extent that natural forces +affect all alike, and without the least reference to religious beliefs. +Fire burns and water drowns, foods sustain and poisons kill, no matter +what our opinions on theology may be. In an earthquake or a war there is +no observable relation between casualties and religious opinions. We +are, in fact, told by theologians that it is folly to expect that there +should be. A particular providence is no longer in fashion; God, we are +told, works only through general laws, and that is only another way of +saying that our opinions about God have no direct or observable +influence on our well-being. It is a tacit admission that human welfare +depends upon our knowledge and manipulation of the forces by which we +are surrounded. There _may_ be a God behind these forces, but that +neither determines the extent of our knowledge of them or our power to +manipulate them. The belief in God becomes a matter of, at best, +secondary importance, and quite probably of no importance whatever. + +But if that be so why bother about the belief? Is that not a reason for +leaving it alone and turning our attention to other matters? The answer +to that is that the belief in God is not of so detached a character as +this advice assumes. In the course of ages the belief in God has +acquired associations that give it the character of a highly obstructive +force. It has become so entangled with inculcated notions of right and +wrong that it is everywhere used as a buttress for institutions which +have either outgrown their utility, or are in need of serious +modification in the interests of the race. The opposition encountered in +any attempt to deal with marriage, divorce, or education, are examples +of the way in which religious ideas are permitted to interfere with +subjects that should be treated solely from the standpoint of social +utility. The course of human development has been such that religion has +hitherto occupied a commanding position in relation to social laws and +customs, with the result that it is often found difficult to improve +either until the obstructive influence of religious beliefs has been +dealt with. + +It is not, then, because I believe the question of the existence of God +to be of intrinsic importance that an examination of its validity is +here undertaken. Its importance to-day is of a purely contingent +character. The valid ground for now discussing its truth is that it is +at present allowed to obstruct the practical conduct of life. And under +similar circumstances it would be important to investigate the +historical accuracy of Old Mother Hubbard or Jack and the Beanstalk. Any +belief, no matter what its nature, must be dealt with as a fact of some +social importance, so long as it is believed by large numbers to be +essential to the right ordering of life. Whether true or false, beliefs +are facts--mental and social facts, and the scheme of things which +leaves them out of account is making a blunder of the most serious kind. + +Certainly, conditions were never before so favourable for the delivery +of a considered judgment on the question of the belief in God. On the +one side we have from natural science an account of the universe which +rules the operations of deity out of court. And on the other side we +have a knowledge of the mode of origin of the belief which should leave +us in no doubt as to its real value. We hope to show later that the +question of origin is really decisive; that in reaching conclusions +concerning the origin of the god-idea we are passing judgment as to its +value. That the masters of this form of investigation have not usually, +and in so many words, pushed their researches to their logical +conclusions is no reason why we should refrain from doing so. Facts are +in themselves of no great value. It is the conclusions to which they +point that are the important things. + +If the conclusions to which we refer are sound, then the whole basis of +theism crumbles away. If we are to regard the god-idea as an evolution +which began in misunderstandings of nature that were rooted in the +ignorance of primitive man, it would seem clear that no matter how +refined or developed the idea may become, it can rest on no other or +sounder basis than that which is presented to us in the psychology of +primitive man. Each stage of theistic belief grows out of the preceding +stage, and if it can be shown that the beginning of this evolution arose +in a huge blunder I quite fail to see how any subsequent development can +convert this unmistakable blunder into a demonstrable truth. To take a +case in point. When it was shown that so far as witchcraft rested on +observed facts these could be explained on grounds other than those of +the malevolent activities of certain old women, the belief in witchcraft +was not "purified," neither did it advance to any so-called higher +stage; it was simply abandoned as a useless and mischievous explanation +of facts that could be otherwise accounted for. Are we logically +justified in dealing with the belief in God on any other principle? We +cannot logically discard the world of the savage and still retain his +interpretation of it. If the grounds upon which the savage constructed +his theory of the world, and from which grew all the ghosts and gods +with which he believed himself to be surrounded, if these grounds are +false, how can we still keep in substance to conclusions that are +admittedly based on false premises? We can say with tolerable certainty +that had primitive man known what we know about nature the gods would +never have been born. Civilised man does not discover gods, he discards +them. It was a profound remark of Feurbach's, that religion is +ultimately anthropology, and it is anthropology that gives to all forms +of theism the death blow. + +In our own time, at least, it is not difficult to see that the word God +retains its influence with many because of the indefinite manner in +which it is used. It is never easy to say what a person has in his mind +when he uses the word. In most cases one would be safe in saying that +nothing at all is meant. It is just one of those "blessed" words where +the comfort felt in their use is proportionate to the lack of definite +meaning that accompanies them. A frank confession of ignorance is +something that most people heartily dislike, and where problems are +persistent and difficult of solution what most people are in search of +is a narcotic. That "God" is one of the most popular of narcotics will +be denied by none who study the psychology of the average man or woman. + +When not used as a narcotic, "God" is brought into an argument as though +it stood for a term which carried a well defined and well understood +meaning. In work after work dealing with theism one looks in vain for +some definition of "God." All that one can do is to gather the author's +meaning from the course of his argument, and that is not always an easy +task. The truth is, of course, that instead of the word carrying with it +a generally understood meaning there is no word that is more loosely +used or which carries a greater variety of meanings. Its connotations +are endless, and range from the aggressively man-like deity of the +primitive savage up--or down--to the abstract force of the mathematical +physicist and the shadowy "Absolute" of the theologising metaphysician. +The consequence of this is to find commonly that while it is one kind of +a god that is being set up in argument, it is really another god that is +being defended and even believed in. When we find people talking of +entering into communion with God, or praying to God, it is quite certain +they do not conceive him as a mere mathematical abstraction, or as a +mere symbol of an unknown force. It is impossible to conceive any sane +man or woman extracting comfort from praying or talking to a god who +could not think, or feel, or hear. And if he possesses qualities that +the religious attitude implies, we endow him with all the attributes of +personality, and, be it noted, of human personality. Either one God is +believed in in fact while another is established in theory, or an +elaborate argument is presented which serves no other purpose than a +disguise for the fact that there is no genuine belief left. + +An example of the misleading way in which words are used is supplied by +Sir Oliver Lodge, who for a man of science shows an amazing capacity for +making use of unscientific language. In his "Man and the Universe," +discussing the attributes of deity, he says, "Let no worthy attribute be +denied to the deity. In anthropomorphism there are many errors, but +there is one truth. Whatever worthy attributes belong to man, be it +personality or any other, its existence in the universe is thereby +admitted; it belongs to the all." Putting on one side the fallacy +involved in speaking of attributes as though they were good or bad in +themselves, one wonders why Sir Oliver limits this inference to the +"worthy" attributes? Unworthy attributes are as real as worthy ones. If +honesty exists so does dishonesty. Kindness is as real as cruelty. And +if we must credit the deity with possessing all the good attributes, to +whom must we credit the bad ones? A little later Sir Oliver does admit +that we must credit the deity with the bad attributes also, but adds +that they are dying out. But as they are _part_ of the deity, their +decay must mean that the deity is also undergoing a process of change, +of education, and is as much subject to the law of growth as we are. +Surely that is not what people mean when they speak about God. A god who +is only a part of the cosmic process ceases to be a god in any +reasonable sense of the term. + +Professor Mellone, in his "God and the World," says that the word God +"becomes a name for the infinite system of law regarded as a whole" (p. +122). If that were really all that was meant by the word the matter +would not be worth discussing. "God" as a symbol of a generalisation is +a mere name, and as such is as good as any other name. But, again, it is +plain that people mean more than that when they speak about God. If God +is a name for universal law, let any really religious man try the plan +of substituting in his prayers and in his thoughts the phrase "Universal +Law" for "God," and then see how long he will retain his religion. As +Mr. Balfour points out ("Theism and Humanism," p. 20), the god of +religion and the god of philosophy represent two distinct beings, and it +is hard to see how the two can be fused into one. The plain truth is +that it is impossible to now make the existence of the god of religion +reasonable, and the plan adopted is that of arguing for the existence of +something about which there is often no dispute, and then introducing as +the product of the argument something that has never been argued for at +all. It is the philosophic analogue of the hat and omelette trick. + +In this connection some well considered words of Sir James Frazer are +well worth noting. He says:-- + + + By a god I understand a superhuman and supernatural being, of a + spiritual and personal nature, who controls the world or some part + of it on the whole for good, and who is endowed with intellectual + faculties, moral feelings, and active powers, which we can only + conceive on the analogy of human faculties, feelings, and + activities, though we are bound to suppose that in the divine + nature they exist in an infinitely higher degree, than the + corresponding faculties, feelings, and activities of man. In short, + by a God I mean a beneficent supernatural spirit, the ruler of the + world or of some part of it, who resembles man in nature though he + excels him in knowledge, goodness, and power. This is, I think, the + sense in which the ordinary man speaks of a God, and I believe that + he is right in so doing. I am aware that it has been not unusual, + especially of late years, to apply the name of God to very + different conceptions, to empty it of all implications of + personality, and to reduce it to signifying something very large + and very vague, such as the Infinite or the Absolute (whatever + these hard words may signify) the great First Cause, the Universal + Substance, the stream of tendency by which all things seek to + fulfil the law of their being, and so forth. Now, without + expressing opinion as to the truth or falsehood of the views + implied by such applications of the name of God, I cannot but + regard them as illegitimate extensions of the term, in short, an + abuse of language, and I venture to protest against it in the + interest, not only of verbal accuracy, but of clear thinking, + because it is apt to conceal from ourselves and others a real and + very important change of thought; in particular it may lead many to + imagine that the persons who use the name of God in one or other of + these extended senses retain theological opinions which they may in + fact have long abandoned. Thus the misuse of the name of God may + resemble the stratagem in war of putting up dummies to make an + enemy imagine that a fort is still held long after it has been + abandoned by the garrison. (_The Belief in Immortality_; pp. 9-10. + Vol. I.). + + +This expression of opinion from an authoritative quarter is very much +needed. The fear of public opinion displayed by many "advanced" thinkers +is in this country one of the greatest obstacles to rapid advance. It is +simply deplorable to observe the trouble taken by some to coin new +names, or the illegitimate use made of old ones, for no other +discoverable reason than that of disguising from the world the fact that +the orthodox beliefs are no longer held. The need of to-day is not so +much liberal thought as strong and courageous thought; and one would +cheerfully hand back to orthodoxy a fairly large parcel of a certain +type of heretical thinker in exchange for a single one who used plain +language to express clear convictions. + +What is it that the mass of believers have in their minds when they +speak of God? There can be no doubt but that what the plain man has +always understood by "God" is a person. Every book of religious devotion +implies this; every prayer that is offered takes it for granted that +_someone_ will listen, and probably grant the petition. God is personal, +God is just, God is beneficent, God is intelligent, these are +conceptions that are bound up with all the religions of the world, and +without which they would lack both significance and value. A very acute +theistic writer, Mr. W. H. Mallock, puts this quite plainly when he says +that the God of theism "is represented as revealing himself in the +universe, firstly, as the mind which animates and moves everything, +secondly, as a purposing mind which is infinitely wise and powerful, and +has created a perfect universe with a view to some perfect end; and +lastly, as an ethical mind which out of all the things created by it, +has selected men as the object of a preferential love. A personality +which thinks and wills and loves and hates. That is what mankind in the +mass have always meant by 'God.'" + +Indeed, any other kind of God is inconceivable. Whatever may be the +metaphysical subtleties employed, we come ultimately to that. It is +this, the older and the vital conception that is being fought for. The +arguments for any other kind of existence are mere subterfuges. The +pleas for an "Absolute" or an "Unconditioned" are only used to buttress +the older conception, and never till the older one has lost its force. +The unconditioned God is argued for only that it may serve as the basis +for the belief in a personal one. What is proved is not what is asked +for; what is asked for is not what is proved. No wonder that so eminent +a writer as Mr. F. H. Bradley feels constrained to give these +verbalistic thimble riggers a smart rap over the knuckles, as in the +following passage:-- + + + Most of those who insist on the "personality of God" are + intellectually dishonest. They desire one conclusion, and, to reach + it, they argue for another. But the second, if proved, is quite + different, and answers their purpose only because they obscure it + and confound it with the first.... The deity they want, is, of + course, finite, a person much like themselves, with thoughts and + feelings limited and mutable in the process of time.... And for + their purpose, what is not this is really nothing. (_Appearance and + Reality_; p. 532). + + +And it is really what people mean by God that is decisive. It is not at +all a question of what they might be made to mean, or what they ought to +mean. It is wholly a matter of what they _do_ mean. And to say that what +people intend to affirm in an expression of belief is not true, is to +say that the belief itself is false. If the God I believe in is a +delusion, then my God ceases to exist. True, I may if I think it worth +while acquire another one, but that will not revive the first. It is +what people believe that is the important question, not what some +ingenious speculator may succeed in making the belief stand for. + +Honestly to be of service to theism the God established must be a +person. To be intelligible, having regard to the historical developments +of religion, the God proved must be a person. The relation demanded by +religion between man and God must be of a personal character. No man can +love a pure abstraction; he might as reasonably fall in love with a +triangle or profess devotion to the equator. The God of religion must be +a person, and it is precisely that, as a controlling force of the +universe, in which modern thought finds it more and more difficult to +believe, and which modern science decisively rejects. And in rejecting +this the death blow is given to those religious ideas, which however +disguised find their origin in the fear-stricken ignorance of the +primitive savage. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF GOD. + + +The alleged universality of the belief in God is only inferentially an +argument for its truth. The inference is that if men have everywhere +developed a particular belief, this general agreement could only have +been reached as a consequence of a general experience. A universal +effect implies a universal cause. So put the argument seems impressive. +As a matter of fact the statement is one long tissue of fallacies and +unwarranted assumptions. + +In the first place, even admitting the universal pressure of certain +facts, it by no means follows that the theistic interpretation of those +facts is the only one admissible. There is no exception to the fact that +men have everywhere come to the conclusion that the earth was flat, and +yet a wider and truer knowledge proved that universal belief to be quite +false. The fact of a certain belief being universal only warrants the +assumption that the belief itself has a cause, but it tells us nothing +whatever concerning its truthfulness. The truth here is that the +argument from universality dates its origin from a stage of human +culture suitable to the god idea itself, a stage when very little was +known concerning the workings of the mind or the laws of mental +development. Otherwise it would have been seen that all the universality +of a belief really proves is the universality of the human mind--and +that means that, given an organism of a certain kind, it will react in +substantially an identical manner to the same stimuli. Thus it is not +surprising to find that as the human organism is everywhere +fundamentally alike, it has everywhere come to the same conclusions in +face of the same set of conditions. A man reacts to the universe in one +way, and a jelly fish in another way. And universality is as true of the +reactions of the latter as it is of those of the former. + +And this means that a delusion may be as widespread as truth, a false +inference may gain as general an acceptance as a true one. What belief +has been more general than the belief in witches, fairies, and the like? +But we see in the prevalence of these and similar beliefs, not a +presumption of their truth, but only the grounds for a search after the +conditions, social and psychological, which gave them birth. + +The truth is that the conditions which give rise to the belief in gods +are found in all ages, and no one would be more surprised than the +Atheist to find it otherwise. But here, precisely as in the case of good +and bad spirits, the vital question is not that people have everywhere +believed in the existence of supernatural beings,[1] but an +understanding of the conditions from which the beliefs themselves have +grown. That alone can determine whether in studying the god idea we are +studying the acquisition of a truth or the growth of a fallacy. + +Next, while it may be granted, at least provisionally, that the belief +in supernatural beings is universal, against that has to be set the fact +that the whole tendency of social development is to narrow the range of +the belief, to restrict the scope of its authority, and to so attenuate +it that it becomes of no value precisely where it is supposed to be of +most use. The belief in God is least questioned where civilisation is +lowest; it is called into the most serious question where civilisation +is most advanced. To-day the belief in God is only universal in the +sense that some representatives of it are to be found in all societies. +The majority may still profess to have it, but it has ceased to be +universal in the strict sense of the term. Nor will it be disputed that +the number of convinced disbelievers is everywhere on the increase. The +fact is everywhere lamented by the official exponents of religion. All +that we can say is that the belief in God is universal--with those who +believe in him. And even here universality of belief is only secured by +their refraining from discussing precisely what it is they mean by +"God," and what it is they believe in. There is agreement in obscurity, +each one dreading to see clearly the features of his assumed friend for +fear he should recognise the face of an enemy. + +Finally, the suspicious feature must be pointed out that the belief in +God owes its existence, not to the trained and educated observation of +civilised times, but to the uncritical reflection of the primitive mind. +It has its origin there, and it would indeed be remarkable if, while in +almost every other direction the primitive mind showed itself to be +hopelessly wrong, in its interpretation of the world in this particular +respect it has proved itself to be altogether right. As a matter of +fact, this primitive assumption is going the way of the others, the only +difference being that it is passing through more phases than some. But +the decay is plain to all save those who refuse to see. The process of +refinement cannot go on for ever. In other matters knowledge passes from +a nebulous and indefinite stage to a precise and definite one. In the +case of theism it pursues an opposite course. From the very definite +god, or gods, of primitive mankind we advance to the vague and +indefinite god of the modern theist--a God who, apparently, means +nothing and does nothing, and at most stands as a symbol for our +irremovable ignorance. Clearly this process cannot go on for ever. The +work of attenuation must stop at some point. And one may safely predict +that just as the advance of scientific knowledge has taken over one +department after another that was formerly regarded as within the +province of religion, so one day it will be borne in upon all that an +hypothesis such as that of theism, which does nothing and explains +nothing, may be profitably dispensed with. + +What really remains for discussion is a problem of socio-psychology. +That is, we have to determine the conditions of origin of so widespread +a belief, but which we believe to be false. The materials for answering +this question are now at our command, and whatever differences of +opinion there may be concerning the stages of development, there is +very little concerning their essential character. And it is not without +significance that this question of origin is one that the present-day +apologists of theism seem pretty unanimous in leaving severely alone. + +Let us commence with the fact that religion is something that is +acquired. Every work on the origin of religion assumes it, and all +investigation warrants the assumption. The question at issue is the mode +of acquisition. And here one word of caution is advisable. The wide +range of religious ideas and their existence at a very low culture +stage, precludes the assumption that religious ideas are generated in +the same conscious way as are scientific theories. Even with the modern +mind our conclusions concerning many of the affairs of life are formed +in a semi-conscious manner. Most frequently they are generated +subconsciously, and are only consciously formulated under pressure of +circumstances. And if we are to understand religion aright we must be on +our guard against attributing to primitive mankind a degree of +scientific curiosity and reflective power to which it can lay no claim. +We have to allow for what one writer well calls "physiological thought," +thought, that is, which rises subconsciously and has its origin in the +pressure of insistent experience. + +A comprehensive survey of religious beliefs show that there are only two +things that can be said to be common to them all. They differ in +teachings, in their conceptions of deity, and in modes of worship. But +all religions agree in believing in some kind of ghostly existence and +in a continued life beyond the grave. I use the expression, "ghostly +existence," because we can really trace the idea of God backward until +we lose the definite figure in a very general conception, much as +astronomers have taught us to lose a definite world in the primitive +fire-mist. So when we get beyond the culture stage at which we meet with +the definite man-like God, we encounter an indefinite thought stage at +which we can dimly mark the existence of a frame of mind that was to +give birth to the more concrete conception. + +The most general term for the belief in the various orders of gods thus +becomes the belief in invisible, super-material beings, like, and yet +superior to man. It is for this reason that Professor Tylor's definition +of religion as "the belief in spiritual beings--so long as we do not use +the term "spiritual" in its modern sense"--seems to me the moat +satisfactory definition yet offered. It is the one point on which all +religions agree, and for this reason may be regarded as their essential +feature. + +This taken for granted, our next point of enquiry is, What was there in +the conditions of primitive life that would give rise to a belief in +this super-material, or in modern language, spiritual existence? Now +there are at least two sets of experiences that seem adequate to the +required explanation. The one is normal, the other abnormal. The first +is connected directly with the universal experience of dreams. The +savage is, as Tylor says, a severely practical person. He believes what +he sees and, one may add, he sees what he believes. Knowing nothing of +the distinction we draw between a fact and an illusion, ignorant of the +functions, or even the existence of a nervous system, the dreams of a +savage are to him as real as his waking experiences. He does not say "I +dreamed I saw So-So," but like the Biblical characters he says, "I saw +So-So in a dream." The two forms of expression carry all the difference +between fact and fancy. One thing is therefore obvious to the savage +mind--something escapes from the body, travels about, and returns. Such +a conviction does not represent the conclusions of a genius speculating +upon the meaning of unexplained facts. It is a conviction steadily built +up by the pressure of unvarying experience, as steadily as is the +conviction that fire burns or that water is wet. The very universality +of the belief is proof that it had some such sub-conscious origin. + +A second class of experiences lead to the same conclusion. In temporary +loss of consciousness the savage again sees proof of the existence of a +double. With epilepsy or insanity there is offered decisive proof that +some spirit has taken possession of the individual's body. Even in +civilised countries this belief was widely held hardly more than a +century ago. And both these classes of experience are enforced by the +belief that the shadow of a man, an echo, a reflection seen in water, +etc., are all real things. The proofs that the belief in a "soul" does +originate in this way are now so plentiful that exact references are +needless. Examination of primitive religious beliefs all over the world +yield the one result, without there being any evidence to the contrary. + +Primitive philosophy does not stop here. Man dreams of things as well as +of persons, and a general extension of the belief in a ghost or double +is made until it covers almost everything. As Tylor says, "the doctrine +of souls is worked out with remarkable breadth and consistency. The +souls of animals are recognised by a natural extension from the theory +of human souls; the souls of trees and plants follow in some vague +partial way; and the souls of inanimate objects expand the category to +the extremest boundary." The reasoning of the primitive mind is thus, +given its limitations and unsound premises, uncompromisingly logical. +One can trace the processes of reasoning more easily than is the case +with modern man because it is less disturbed by cross-currents of +acquired knowledge and conflicting interests. + +I am giving but the barest outline of a vast subject because I am +desirous of keeping the attention of the reader on what I believe to be +the main issue. For that reason I am not discussing whether animism--the +vitalising of inanimate objects--has an independent origin, or whether +it is a mere extension of the ghost theory. Either theory does not +affect my main position, which is that the idea of God is derived from +the ignorance of primitive humanity, and has no other authority than a +misunderstanding of natural facts. On that point the agreement among all +schools of anthropologists is now very general. Personally, however, I +do not believe that men would ever have given a soul to trees or other +natural objects unless they had first given them to living beings, and +had thus familiarised themselves with the conception of a double. + +At present, though, we are on the track of the gods. The belief that +every human being, and nearly every object, possesses a soul, ends in +surrounding man with a cloud of spirits against which he has to be +always on his guard. The general situation is well put by Miss Kingsley, +who gives a picture of the West African that may well stand for the +savage world in general. + + + Everything happens by the action of spirits. The thing he does + himself is done by the spirit within acting on his body, the matter + with which that spirit is associated. Everything that is done by + other things is done by their spirit associated with their + particular mass of matter.... The native will point out to you a + lightning stricken tree and tell you its spirit has been killed. He + will tell you, when the earthen cooking pot is broken, it has lost + its spirit. If his weapon failed him, it is because he has stolen + or made its spirit sick by means of his influence on other spirits + of the same class.... In every action of his life he shows you how + he lives with a great, powerful spirit world around him. You see + him before running out to hunt or fight rubbing stuff in his weapon + to strengthen the spirit that is in it; telling it the while what + care he has taken of it; running through a list of what he had + given it before, though these things had been hard to give; and + begging it, in the hour of his dire necessity, not to fail him.... + You see him bending over the face of the river, talking to its + spirit with proper incantations, asking it when it meets an enemy + to upset his canoe and destroy him ... or, as I have myself seen in + Congo Francaise, to take down with it, away from his village, the + pestilence of the spotted death. (_West African Studies_; pp. + 394-5). + + +When Feurbach said that the "realm of memory was the world of souls," he +expressed a profound truth in a striking manner. It is dreams, swoons, +catalepsy, with their allied states which suggest the existence of a +double or ghost. Even in the absence of the mass of evidence from all +quarters in support of this, the fact of the ghost always being pictured +as identical in clothing and figure with the dead man would be almost +enough to demonstrate its dream origin. Into that aspect of the matter, +however, we do not now intend to enter. We are now only concerned with +the bearing of the ghost theory on the origin of God. Another step or +two and we shall have reached that point. Believing himself surrounded +on all sides by a world of ghosts the great concern of the savage is to +escape their ill-will or to secure their favour. Affection and +fear--fear that the ghost, if his wants are neglected, will wreak +vengeance through the agency of disease, famine, or accident--leads +insensibly to the ghosts of one's relations becoming objects of +veneration, propitiation, and petition. All ghosts receive some +attention for a certain time after death, but naturally special and +sustained honours are reserved for the heads of families,[2] and for +such as have been distinguished for various qualities during life. In +this way ancestor worship becomes one of the most general forms of +religious observances, and the gradual development of the great man or +the deceased ancestor into a deity follows by easy stages. The +principles of ancestor worship, to again cite the indispensible Tylor, +are not difficult to understand:-- + + + They plainly keep up the social relations of the living world. The + dead ancestor, now passed into a deity, simply goes on protecting: + his own family and receiving suit and service from them as of old; + the dead chief still watches over his own tribe, still holds his + authority by helping friends and harming enemies, still rewards the + right and sharply punishes the wrong. + + +That this deification of ancestors and of dead men actually takes place +is indisputable. The Mythologies of Greece and Rome offer numerous +examples, and the deification of the Roman Emperors became the regular +rule. Numerous examples to the same end are supplied from India by Mr. +W. Crookes and Sir A. C. Lyall. That this way of honouring the dead is +not limited to natives is shown by the famous case of General Nicholson, +who actually received the honour of deification during his lifetime. +Anyone who cares to consult those storehouses of information, Spencer's +"Principles of Sociology" (Vol. I.), Tylor's "Primitive Culture," and +Frazer's "Golden Bough" will find the whole god-making process set forth +with a wealth of illustration that can hardly fail to carry conviction. +Finally, in the case of Japan and China we have living examples of an +organised system of religion based upon the deification of ancestors.[3] + +It will make it easier to understand the evolution of the god from the +ghost if we bear in mind that with primitive man the gods are conceived +neither as independent existences nor as creators. Even immortality is +not asserted of them. The modern notions of deity, largely due to the +attempt to accommodate the idea of god to certain metaphysical and +philosophical conceptions, are so intermingled with the primitive idea, +that there is always the danger of reading into the primitive +intelligence more than was ever there. The consequence is that by +confusing the two senses of the word many find it difficult to realise +how one has grown out of the other. Such ideas as those of creation and +independence are quite foreign to the primitive mind. Savages are like +children in this respect; their interest in things is primarily of a +practical character. A child does not begin by asking how a thing came +to be; it asks what it is for or what it does. So the prime concern of +the savage is, what are certain things for? what will they do? are they +injurious or beneficial? It is because of this practical turn of mind +that so much attention is paid to the ghost, having once accepted its +existence as a fact. The superiority of the gods do not consist in their +substantial difference from himself, but in the greater power for good +or evil conferred upon them by their invisible existence. Creation is a +conception that does not arise until the capacity for philosophical +speculation has developed. Then reflection sets to work; the nature of +the god undergoes modification, and the long process of accommodating +primitive religious beliefs to later knowledge commences, the end of +which we have not yet seen. + +The process of reading modern speculations into the religion of the +savage leads to some curious results, one of which we cannot forbear +mentioning. In his little work on "Animism" Mr. Edward Clodd, after +tracing the fundamental ideas of religion to primitive delusion, says:-- + + + Herein (_i.e._, in dream and visions) are to be found the sufficing + materials for a belief in an entity in the body, but not of it, + which can depart and return at will, and which man everywhere has + more or less vaguely envisaged as his "double" or "other self."... + The distinction between soul and body, which explained to man his + own actions, was the key to the actions of animate and inanimate + things. A personal life and will controlled them. This was + obviously brought home to him more forcibly in the actions of + living things, since these so closely resembled his own that he saw + no difference between themselves and him. _Not in this matter alone + have the intuitions of the savage found their confirmation in the + discoveries of modern science_.... Ignorant of the reflection of + sound, how else could he account for the echoes flung back from the + hillside? Ignorant of the law of the interruption of light, how + else could he explain the advancing and retreating shadows? _In + some sense they must be alive; an inference supported by modern + science._ + + +The italics in the above passages are mine, and they serve to illustrate +how certain writers manage to introduce quite misleading conceptions to +their readers. It almost causes one to cease wondering at the +persistence of religion when one finds a writer accepting the results of +anthropological research, and at the same time claiming that savage +"intuitions" are confirmed by modern science. If that be true, then all +that Mr. Clodd has previously written must be dismissed as untrue. The +statement is, however, quite inaccurate. The inference drawn by the +savage is not supported by modern science. Neither on the existence of a +soul nor on the existence of a god, nor on the nature of disease, nor on +the causes of physical or psychical states has science confirmed the +"intuitions" (whatever that conveniently cloudy word may mean) of the +primitive savage. The acquisition of correct views would indeed be an +easy thing if they could be gained by the "intuitions" of an untaught +savage. + +The assertion that "in some sense" natural forces must be alive (as +though there can be any real sense in a term except the right sense), +and that this inference is "supported by modern physics," is an +illustration of that playing with words which is fatal to exact thought. +The only sense in which the expression is used in physics is that of +"active," and both "active" and "alive" owe their vogue to the necessity +for controverting the older view that natural forces are "inert" or +"dead" and need some external force to produce anything. It is a mere +figure of speech; the evil is when it is taken and used as an exact +expression of scientific fact. Let a reader of Mr. Clodd ask himself +whether the life he thinks of when he speaks of forces being alive is +animal life, and he will at once see the absurdity of the statement. And +if he does not mean animal life, what life does he mean? + +Putting on one side all such attempts at accommodation, we may safely +say that given the origin of religion in the manner indicated, one may +trace--at least in outline--the development of religion from the +primitive ghost worship up to the rituals and beliefs of current creeds. +I do not mean by this that _all_ religious beliefs and practices spring +directly from ghost worship. Once religion is established, and the +myth-making capacity let loose, additions are made that are due to all +sorts of causes. The Romans and Greeks, for example, seem to have +created a number of deities out of pure abstractions--gods of peace, of +war, of fortune, and so forth. Why particular deities were invented, and +how they became attached to particular groups of phenomena, are +questions that it is often impossible to answer with any great degree of +certainty, but why there should be any gods at all is a question that +can be answered, I think, on the lines above indicated. + +The way in which the primitive ghost worship probably paved the way for +some of the doctrines of the "higher" religions may be seen on taking a +story such as the death and resurrection of the Gospel Jesus. In his +treatise on "The Attis" Mr. Grant Allen made the ingenious suggestion +that the greater fertility of the ground on and near the grave, owing to +the food placed there to feed the ghost, would produce in the savage +mind the conviction that this increased fertility was due to the +beneficent activity of the double of the dead man. Reasoning from this +basis, it would be a simple conclusion that the production, or lack, of +crops was everywhere due to the action of good or evil spirits. In the +next place, it must be remembered that it is the act of dying which +raises the human being to the level of a guardian spirit or god; and +from this to the production of a god by ceremonial killing would be a +natural and an easy step. In this last respect, at least, we are upon +the firm ground of fact, and not on that of mere theory. If a reader +will take the trouble to peruse the numerous examples collected by Tylor +in the first chapter of his "Primitive Culture," and those provided by +Frazer in the "Golden Bough," he will find the evidence for this +overwhelming. Examples of the practice of killing a human being and +burying his body under the foundations of a castle or a bridge are very +common, and the modern custom of burying coins under a foundation-stone +is a harmless and interesting survival of this custom. In some parts of +Africa a boy and girl are buried where a village is to be established. +In Polynesia the central pillar of a temple was placed on the body of a +human victim. In Scotland there is the legend that St. Columba buried +the body of St. Oran under his monastery to make the building secure. +Any country will supply stories of a similar kind. Finally, we have the +amusing story of the manner in which Sir Richard Burton narrowly escaped +deification. Exploring in Afghanistan in the disguise of a Mohammedan +fakir, he received a friendly hint that he would do well to get off +without delay. He expressed surprise, as the people seemed very fond of +him. That, it was explained, was the cause of the trouble. They thought +so much of him they intended to kill him, and thus retain so excellent a +man with them for ever. + +When Tylor wrote, the prevalent impression was that this killing of +human beings was due to a desire to appease the spirits of the place. +Later investigation showed that instead of a sacrifice it was a +creation. The purpose was to create a local god who would watch over the +building or settlement. God-making was thus shown to be a universal +practice. + +Our next step must be taken in the company of Sir James Frazer. On +all-fours with the practice of creating a guardian deity for a building +is that of making a similar guardian for crops and vegetation. The +details of this practice are interesting, but they need not now detain +us. It is enough that the practice existed, and, as Frazer shows, was an +annual practice. Year by year the god was killed in order that the seed +might ripen and the harvest be secured. In some cases the body was cut +up and pieces buried in the fields; in other cases it was burned and the +ashes scattered over the ground. Gradually the ritual becomes more +elaborate, but the central idea remains intact that of a human being +converted into a god by being killed, a man sacrificed for the benefit +of the tribe. In the light of these researches the New Testament story +becomes only a more recent version of a widespread savage superstition. +The time of the sacrifice, the symbolism, the practices all prove this. +The crucified Saviour, in honour of whom all the Christian cathedrals +and churches of the world are built, is only another late survival of +the god-making practice of primitive savagery. + +The gods are, then, ultimately deified ghosts. They are born of +misinterpreted subjective and objective experiences. This is among the +surest and most firmly established results of modern investigation. It +matters not what modifications later knowledge may demand; it will only +mean a change of form, not of substance. On any scientific theory we are +bound to explain the origin of the gods in terms of human error. And no +subsequent development can alter its character. We may trace the various +stages of a universal delusion, but nothing can convert a delusion into +a reality. It is now universally recognised that the primitive notions +of gods represent false conclusions from misunderstood facts. No one now +believes that the visions seen during sleep are proofs of a wandering +double. No one believes that it is necessary to supply the ghost of the +dead with food, or with weapons, or with wives. We do not believe that +the wind, the stars, the waters are alive or are capable of being +influenced by our petitions. All the phenomena upon which the god idea +was originally built are now known to be susceptible to a radically +different explanation. And if this is so, what other foundations have we +on which to build a belief in God? There is none. There is only one +plausible reason for the belief in God, and that is the reason advanced +by the savage. When we get beyond that we are not dealing with reasons +for holding the belief, but only with excuses for retaining it. +Unfortunately, thousands are familiar with the excuses, and only a few +with the reasons. Were it otherwise a great deal of what follows need +never have been written. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Both the words "supernatural" and "God" are here used somewhat +loosely. In fact the conception of the supernatural arises gradually, +and as a consequence of developing knowledge which, so to speak, splits +the universe into two. So also with the belief in God. There is clearly +an earlier form in which there exists a kind of mental plasma from which +the more definite conception of God is subsequently formed. On this +topic the reader may consult "The Threshold of Religion," by R. R. +Marett, 1914. + +[2] For the importance of this in the history of religion see Fustel de +Coulanges' "The Ancient City." + +[3] The perpetuation of this earlier stage of religion in China and +Japan appears to make the transition to Free-thought easier than in +countries where religion has under-gone a more advanced evolution. In +both the countries named, the better minds find it quite easy to treat +their religion as merely the respect paid to ancestors, and thus divest +it of the supernatural element. In Christian countries there is also the +attempt to restate beliefs in terms of current morality and sociology, +but the transition is more difficult. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +HAVE WE A RELIGIOUS SENSE? + + +In all discussions of theism there is one point that is usually +overlooked. This is that theism is in the nature of a hypothesis. And, +like every hypothesis, its value is proportionate to the extent to which +it offers a satisfactory explanation of the facts with which it +professes to deal. If it can offer no explanation its value is nil. If +its explanation is only partial, its value will be determined by the +degree to which it can claim superiority over any other hypothesis that +is before us. But every hypothesis implies two things. There is a group +of things to be explained, and there is the hypothesis itself that is +offered in explanation. In the harmony of the two, and in the +possibility of verification, lies the only proof of truth that can be +offered. + +If this be granted it at once disposes of the plea that a conviction of +the existence of God springs from some special quality of the mind which +enables man to arrive at a conclusion in a manner different from the way +in which conclusions concerning other subjects are reached. Intuition as +a method of discovering truth is pure delusion. All that can be +rationally meant by such a word as intuition is summarised experience. +When we speak of knowing a thing "intuitively," all that we can mean is +that, experience having furnished us with a sufficient guidance, we are +able to reach a conclusion so rapidly that we cannot follow the steps of +the mental process involved. That this is so is seen in the fact that +our intuitions always follow the line of our experience. A stockbroker +may "intuitively" foresee a rise or fall of the market, but his +intuition will fail him when considering the possibilities of a chemical +composition. To say that a man knows a thing by intuition is only one +way of saying that he does not know how he knows it--that is, he is +unable to trace the stages of his own mental operations. And in this +sense intuition is universal. It belongs as much to the cooking of a +dumpling as it does to the belief in deity. + +But it is evident that when the theist talks of intuition, what he has +in mind is something very different from this. He is thinking of some +special quality of mind that operates independently of experience, +either racial or individual. And this simply does not exist. In religion +man is never putting into operation qualities of mind different from +those he employs in other directions. Whether we call a state of mind +religious or not is determined, not by the mental processes involved, +but by the object to which it is directed. Hatred and love, anger, +pleasure, awe, curiosity, reverence, even worship, are exactly the same +whether directed towards "God" or towards anything else. Human qualities +are fundamentally identical, and may be expressed in relation to all +sorts of objects. + +The attempt to mark religion off from the rest of life, to be approached +by special methods and in a special frame of mind, takes many forms, and +it may be illustrated by the manner in which it is dealt with by +Professor Arthur Thomson. In a little work entitled "An Introduction to +Science," and specially intended for general consumption, he remarks, +as a piece of advice to his readers:-- + + + We would remind ourselves and our readers that the whole subject + should be treated with reverence and sympathy, for it is hardly + possible to exaggerate the august role of religion in human life. + Whatever be our views, we must recognise that just as the great + mathematicians and metaphysicians represent the aristocracy of the + human intellect, so the great religious geniuses represent the + aristocracy of human emotion. And in this connection it is probably + useful to bear in mind that in all discussions about religious + ideas or feelings we should ourselves be in an exalted mood, and + yet "with a compelling sense of our own limitations," and of the + vastness and mysteriousness of the world. + + +If Professor Thomson had been writing on "Frames of Mind Fatal to +Scientific Investigation" he could hardly have chosen a better +illustration of his thesis. One may safely say that anyone who started +an examination of religion in this spirit, and maintained it throughout +his examination, would perform something little short of a miracle did +he reach a sound conclusion. A feeling of sympathy may pass, but why +"reverence"? Reverence is a very complex state, but it certainly +includes respect and a certain measure of affection. And how is one to +rationally have respect or affection for anything _before_ one has +ascertained that they are deserving of either? Is anyone who happens to +believe that religion is _not_ worthy of reverence to be ruled out as +being unfit to express an opinion? Clearly, on this rule, either we +compel a man to sacrifice his sense of self-respect before we will allow +him to be heard, or we pack the jury with persons who confess to have +reached a decision before they have heard the evidence. It would almost +seem from the expression that while examining religion we should be in +an "exalted mood" that Professor Thomson has in view the last +contingency. For by an exalted mood we can only understand a religious +mood--that is, we must believe in religion before we examine it, +otherwise our examination is profanity. Well, that is just the cry of +the priest in all ages. And while it is sound religion, there is no +question of its being shocking science. Even the mere feeling of +exaltation is not to be encouraged during a scientific investigation. +One can understand Kepler when he had discovered the true laws of +planetary motion, or Newton when he embraced in one magnificent +generalisation the fall of a stone and the revolution of a planet, +experiencing a feeling of exaltation; but exaltation must follow, not +precede, the conclusion. At any rate, there are few scientific teachers +who would encourage such a feeling during investigation. + +Leaving for a moment the question of religious geniuses being the +aristocrats of human emotion, we may take the same writer's view of the +limitations of science, thus providing an opening for the intrusion of +religion. This is given in the form of a criticism of the following +well-known passage from Huxley:-- + + + If the fundamental proposition of evolution is true, namely, that + the entire world, animate and inanimate, is the result of the + mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of forces possessed + by the molecules which made up the primitive nebulosity of the + universe; then it is no less certain that the present actual world + reposed potentially in the cosmic vapour, and that an intelligence, + if great enough, could from his knowledge of the properties of the + molecules of that vapour have predicted the state of the fauna in + Great Britain in 1888 with as much certitude as we say what will + happen to the vapour of our breath on a cold day in winter. + + +Now, if the principle of evolution be accepted, the truth of Huxley's +statement appears to be self-evident. It may be that no intelligence +capable of making such a calculation will ever exist, but the abstract +possibility remains. Professor Thomson calls it "a very strong and +confident statement," which illustrates the need for philosophical +criticism. His criticism of Huxley's statement is based on two grounds. +These are: (1) "No complete physico-chemical description has ever been +given of any distinctively vital activity; and (2) the physical +description of things cannot cover biological phenomena, nor can the +biological description cover mental and moral phenomena." There is, he +says, + + + The physical order of nature--the inorganic world--where mechanism + reigns supreme. (2) There is the vital order of nature--the world + of organisms--where mechanism proves insufficient. (3) There is the + physical order of nature--the world of mind--where mechanism is + irrelevant. Thus there are three fundamental sciences--Physics, + Biology, and Psychology--each with characteristic questions, + categories and formulae. + + +Now, however earnestly Huxley's statement calls for criticism, it is +clear to us that nothing useful in that direction is offered by Prof. +Thomson. It is quite plain that the abstract possibility of such a +calculation as that named by Huxley can never be ruled out by science, +since such a conception lies at the root of all scientific thinking. +After all, want of knowledge only proves--want of knowledge; and Sir +Oliver Lodge would warn Prof. Thomson of the extreme danger of resting +an argument on the ignorance of science at any particular time.[4] + +I note this statement of Professor Thomson's chiefly because it +illustrates a very common method of dealing with the mechanistic or +non-theistic view of the universe. In this matter Professor Thomson may +claim the companionship of Sir Oliver Lodge, who says, "Materialism is +appropriate to the material world, not as a philosophy, but as a working +creed, as a proximate, an immediate formula for guiding research. +Everything beyond that belongs to another region, and must be reached by +other methods. To explain the psychical in terms of physics and +chemistry is simply impossible.... The extreme school of biologists ... +ought to say, if they were consistent, there is nothing but physics and +chemistry at work anywhere." With both these writers there is the common +assumption that the mechanist assumes there is a physical and chemical +explanation of all phenomena. And the assumption is false. There is a +story of a well-known lecturer on physiology who commenced an address on +the stomach by remarking that that organ had been called this, that, and +the other, but the one thing he wished his students to bear in mind was +that it was a stomach. So the mechanist, while firmly believing that +there is an ascending unity in all natural phenomena, is never silly +enough to deny that living things are alive, or that thinking beings +think. + +But unless Professor Thomson does impute this to the mechanist, we quite +fail to see the relevance his assertion that there are three +departments, physics, biology, and psychology, each with its +characteristic questions, categories, and formulae. Of course, there are, +and equally, of course, physical laws will not cover biological facts; +nor will biological laws cover psychological ones. This is not due to +any occult cause, but to the simple fact that as each group of phenomena +has its characteristic features, each set of laws are framed to cover +the phenomena presented by that group. Otherwise there would be no need +of these special laws. It is astonishing how paralysing is the effect of +the theistic obsession on the minds of even scientific men, since it +leads them to ignore what is really a basic consideration in scientific +method. + +Perhaps a word or two more on this topic is advisable. If it is +permissible to arrange natural phenomena in a serial order, we may place +them in succession as physical, chemical, biological, and psychological. +But these names represent no more than descriptions of certain features +that are to the group common, otherwise the grouping would be useless +and impossible. And it is part of the business of science to frame +"laws"--descriptions--of phenomena such as will enable us to express +their characteristic features in a brief formula. It is, therefore, +quite true to say that you cannot express vital phenomena in terms of +physics or chemistry. And no materialist who took the trouble to +understand materialism, instead of taking a statement of what it is from +an anti-materialist, ever thought otherwise. _Each specific group of +phenomena can only be covered by laws that belong to that group, and +which were framed for that express purpose._ A psychological fact can no +more be expressed in terms of chemistry than a physical fact can be +expressed in terms of biology. These truths are as plain to the +mechanist as they are to the vitalist. Mental life, the scientific +categories, are real to all; the only question at issue is that of their +origin. + +To explain is to make intelligible, and in that sense all scientific +explanation consists in the establishing of equivalents. When we say +that A, B, C are the factors of D, we have asserted D is the equivalent +of A, B, C--plus, of course, all that results from the combination of +the factors. When we say that we have explained the formation of water +by showing it to be the product of H.2.O. we have shown that whether we +say "water" or use the chemical formula we are making identical +statements. If we are working out a problem in dynamics we meet with +exactly the same principle. We must prove that the resultant accounts +for all the forces in operation at the time. Now, all that the mechanist +claims is that it is extremely probable that one day the scientist will +be able to work out the exact physico-chemical conditions that are the +equivalents of biological phenomena, and, in turn, the +physico-chemical-biological conditions that are the equivalents of +psychological phenomena. Very considerable progress has already been +made in this direction, and, as Sir Oliver Lodge says, there are +probably very few scientific men who would deny the likelihood of this +being done. + +But this does not deny the existence of differences between these groups +of phenomena; neither does it assert that we can describe the +characteristic features of one group in terms that belong to another +group. Once a group of phenomena, biological, or chemical is there, we +must have special formulae to describe them, otherwise there would be no +need for these divisions. It is admitted that the earth was at one time +destitute of life; it is also admitted that there are forms of life +destitute of those features which we call mind. And, whatever be their +mode of origin, once introduced they must be dealt with in special +terms. Psychological facts must be expressed in terms of psychology, +biological facts in terms of biology, and chemical facts in terms of +chemistry. You may give the chemical and physical equivalent of a +sunset. That is one aspect. You may also give the psychological +explanation of the emotion of man on beholding it. That is another +aspect. But you cannot express the psychological fact in terms of +chemistry because it belongs to quite another category. A psychological +fact, as such, is ultimate. So is a chemical or a biological fact. If by +analysis you reduce the psychological fact to its chemical and +biological equivalents, its character as a psychological fact is +destroyed. That is the product of the synthesis, and to seek in analysis +for what only exists in synthesis, is surely to altogether misunderstand +the spirit of scientific method. The curious thing is that a mere layman +should have to correct men of science on this matter. + +We can now return to Prof. Thomson's attempt to claim for religion a +special place in the sphere of emotion. He claims, in the passage +already cited, that "as the great mathematicians and metaphysicians +represent the aristocracy of human intellect so the great religious +geniuses represent the aristocracy of human emotion." There is nothing +new in this claim, neither is there any evidence of its truth. +Coleridge's dictum that the proper antithesis to religion is poetry is +open to serious objection, but there is more to be said for it than may +be said for the antithesis set up by Prof. Thomson. As a matter of fact, +religious geniuses have often pursued their work with as much attention +to scientific precision as was possible, and have prided themselves that +they made no appeal to mere emotion. Justification by emotion has only +been attempted when other means of securing conviction has failed. And +the appeal to emotion has become popular for very obvious reasons. It +enables the ordinary theologian to feel a comfortable superiority over a +Spencer or a Darwin. It enables mediocrities to enjoy the feeling of +being wise without the trouble of acquiring wisdom. It enables inherited +prejudices to rank as reasoned convictions. And, in addition, there is +nothing that cannot be conveniently proved or disproved by such a +method. + +In whatever form the distinction is met with it harbours a fallacy. +Intellectual activity is not and cannot be divorced from emotion. There +are states of mind in which feeling predominates, and there are others +in which reason predominates. But all intellectual states involve a +feeling element. The often-made remark that feeling and intellect are +in conflict is true only in the sense that ultimately certain +intellectual states, _plus_ their associated feelings, are in conflict +with other intellectual states plus _their_ associated feelings. To +realise this one need only consider the sheer pleasure that results from +the rapid sweep of the mind through a lengthy chain of reasoning, and +the positive pain that ensues when the terms of a proposition baffles +comprehension. The force of this is admitted by Prof. Thomson in the +remark that man at the limit of his endeavour has fallen back on +religion. Quite so; that is the painful feelings evoked by an +intellectual failure have thrown a certain type of mind back on +religion. In this they have acted like one who flies to a drug for +relief from a pain he lacks the courage to bear. They take a narcotic +when, often enough, the real need is for a stimulant. + +In sober truth religion is no more necessarily connected with the +emotions than are other subjects of investigation. Those who have made +the pursuit of "cold scientific truth" their life's work have shown +every whit as much ardour and passion as those who have given their life +to religion. The picture of man sacrificing himself in the cause of +religion is easily matched by a Vesalius haunting the charnel houses of +Europe, and risking the most loathsome diseases in the interests of +scientific research. The abiding passion for truth in a character such +as that of Roger Bacon or Bruno easily matches the enthusiasm of the +missionary monk. The passion and the enthusiasm for science is less +advertised than the passion and the enthusiasm for religion, but it is +quite as real, and certainly not less valuable. The state of mind of +Kepler on discovering the laws of planetary motion was hardly less +ecstatic than that of a religious visionary describing his sense of +"spiritual" communion. Only in the case of the scientist, it is emotion +guided by reason, not reason checked and partly throttled by emotion. + +When, therefore, Matthew Arnold defined religion as morality touched +with emotion, he substituted a fallacy for a definition. Primarily +religion is as much a conviction as is the Copernican system of +astronomy. It exists first as an idea; it only exists as an emotion at a +later stage. There is really no such thing as a religious emotion, there +are only emotions connected with religion. Originally all religion is in +the nature of an inference from observed or experienced facts. This +inference may not be of the elaborate kind that we associate with modern +scientific work, but it is there. The inference is an illogical one, but +under the conditions inevitable. And being an inference religion is not +primarily an emotion but a conviction, and it must stand or fall by its +intellectual trustworthiness. It seems, indeed, little less than a +truism to say that unless men first of all _believed_ something about +religion they could never have emotions concerning it. Hope and fear may +colour our convictions, they may prevent the formation of correct +opinions, but they originate in connection with a belief in every case. +And an emotion, if it be a healthful one, must be ultimately capable of +intellectual justification. When this cannot be done, when we have mere +emotion pleaded as a ground for rejecting rational examination, we have +irrationalism driven to its last ditch. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[4] "The present powerlessness of science to explain or originate life +is a convenient weapon wherewith to fell a pseudo-scientific antagonist +who is dogmatising too loudly out of bounds; but it is not perfectly +secure as a permanent support.... Life in its ultimate elements and on +its material side is such a simple thing, it is but a slight extension +of known chemical and physical forces.... I apprehend that there is not +a biologist but believes (perhaps quite erroneously) that sooner or +later the discovery will be made, and that a cell discharging all the +essential functions of life will be constructed out of inorganic +material." ("Man and the Universe," Chap. I.). + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM EXISTENCE. + + +What, now, are the facts upon which the modern believer in deity +professes to base his belief and what are the arguments used to defend +the position taken up? + +Premising that the reasons advanced for the belief in deity are more in +the nature of excuses than aught else, we may take first of all the +argument derived from the mere existence of the universe, with the +alleged impossibility of conceiving it as self-existent. Along with that +there may also be taken as a variant of the argument from existence, the +alleged impossibility of a natural "order" that should result from the +inherent properties of natural forces. Now it is at least plain that +whatever difficulty there is in thinking of the universe as either +self-existing or self-adjusting is in no degree lessened by assuming a +God as the originator and sustainer of the whole. The most that it does +is to move the difficulty back a step, and while with many "out of sight +out of mind" is as true of their attitude towards mental problems as it +is towards the more ordinary things of life, the policy can hardly be +commended in serious intellectual discussions. It is not a bit easier to +think of self-existence or self-direction in connection with a god than +it is in connection with the universe. And if we must rest ultimately +with an insoluble difficulty, it is surely better to stop with the +existence we know rather than to introduce a second existence which for +all we know may be quite mythical. + +It is no reply to say that the idea of God involves self-existence. It +does nothing of the kind, or at least it can do so only by our making +yet another assumption that is as unjustifiable as the previous one. If +God is a personality, we have no conception of a personality that is +self-existent. The only personality that we know is the human +personality, and that is certainly derived. Our whole knowledge of human +personality is that of something which is derived from pre-existing +personalities, each of which is a centre of derived influences. Of +personality as either the cause or the commencement of a series we have +not the slightest conception. And the man who says he has can never have +carefully examined the contents of his own mind. + +The truth is that the fact of the existence of the universe provides no +ground for argument in favour of either Atheism or Theism. Existence is +a common datum for all. Some existence must be assumed in all argument +since all argument implies something that is to be discussed and +explained. And for that very reason we can offer no explanation of +existence itself, since all explanation means the merging of one class +of facts in a larger class. The largest class of facts we have is that +which is included in the term "universe," and we cannot explain that by +assuming another existence--God--about which we know nothing. To explain +the unknown by the known is an intelligible procedure. To explain the +known by the unknown is to forsake all intellectual sanity. Thus every +difficulty that surrounds the conception of the universe as an ultimate +fact, surrounds the existence of God as an ultimate fact. You cannot get +rid of a difficulty by giving it another name. And whether we call +ultimate existence "God," or "matter," or "substance," is of no vital +importance to anyone who keeps his mind on the real issue that has to be +decided. If the question, What is the cause of existence? be a +legitimate one, it applies no less to the existence of God than it does +to the existence of matter, or force, or substance. All that we gain is +another problem which we add to the problems we already possess. We +increase our burden without enlarging our comprehension. If, on the +other hand, it is said that we need an all embracing formula that will +make our conception of the universe coherent, it may be replied that we +have that in such a conception as the persistence of force. And it is +surely better to keep to a formula that does at least work, than to +devise one that is altogether useless. + +The inherent weakness of the theistic conception will be best seen by +taking an orthodox presentation of the argument under consideration. In +his well-known work on "Theism," Professor Flint says "that granting all +the atoms of matter to be eternal, grant that all the properties and +forces, which with the smallest degree of plausibility can be claimed +for them to be eternal and indestructible, and it is still beyond +expression improbable that these atoms, with these forces, if +unarranged, uncombined, unutilised by a presiding mind, would give rise +to anything entitled to be called a universe. It is millions to one that +they would never produce the simplest of the regular arrangements which +we comprehend under the designation of course of nature." (_Theism_; pp. +107-8.) + +Now this is an admirably clear and terse statement of an argument which +is often presented in so verbose a manner that its real nature is, to a +considerable extent, disguised. But in this case, clearness of statement +makes for ease of refutation, as will be seen. + +For, instead of the statement being, as the writer seems to think, +almost self-evidently true, it is almost obtrusively false. Instead of +its being millions to one, given matter and force with all their present +properties, against the present arrangement of things occurring, it is +inconceivable, assuming that nothing but the atoms and their properties +exist, that any other arrangement than the present one should have +resulted. For the present natural order is not something that is, so to +speak, separable from our conception of natural forces, it is something +that has grown out of and is the expression of the idea of nature. Thus, +given a proper understanding of the principle of gravitation, and it is +impossible to conceive an unsupported stone _not_ falling to the ground. +Given a proper conception of the properties of the constituents of a +chemical compound, and we can only conceive one result as possible. In +all cases our conception of what _must_ occur follows from the nature of +the forces themselves. This is necessarily the case since the conception +of the ultimate properties of matter has been built up by the +observation of the actual results. And one simply cannot conceive an +alteration in these results without thinking of some alteration or +modification of the causes of which they are the expression. What is +true of the part is true of the whole. The present structure of the +world stands as the inevitable outcome of the play of natural forces. +This is both the expression of an actual fact and a condition of +coherent thought. Uniformity of results from uniformity of conditions is +a pre-requisite to sane thinking. + +In reality, the expression "millions to one" is no more than an appeal +to man's awe in facing a stupendous mechanism, and his feeling of +impotence when dealing with so complex a subject as the evolution of a +world. It can only mean that to a certain state of knowledge it _seems_ +millions to one against the present order resulting. But to a certain +state of knowledge it would seem millions to one against so fluid a +thing as water ever becoming solid. To others it is a commonplace thing +and a necessary consequence of the properties of water itself. To a +savage it would be millions to one against a cloud of "fire mist" ever +becoming a world with a highly diversified fauna and flora. To a +scientist there is nothing more in it than antecedent and consequent. +Such expressions as its being "millions to one" against certain things +happening is never really more than an appeal to ignorance; it means +only that our knowledge is not great enough to permit our tracing the +successive stages of the evolution before us. Once the scientific +conception of the universe is grasped, the marvel is not that the +present order exists, the marvel would be that any other "order" should +be, or that any radical alteration in it should occur. + +And there really is no need to throw the whole universe at the head of +the sceptic. That is an attempt to overcome him with sheer weight. +Intrinsically there is nothing more marvellous in the evolution of a +habitable globe from the primitive nebula, than there is in the fact +that an unsupported stone always falls to the ground. It is only our +familiarity with the one experience and our lack of knowledge concerning +the other that gives us the condition of wonder in the one case and lack +of it in the other. In the light of modern knowledge "order" is, as W. +H. Mallock says, "a physical platitude, not a divine paradox." + +Moreover, if the odds are a million to one against the existence of the +present arrangement existing, the odds would be equally great against +the existence of any other arrangement. And as the odds are equally +great against all--seeing that _some_ arrangement must exist--there can +be no logical value in using the argument against one arrangement in +particular. The same question, "Why this arrangement and none other?" +might arise in any case. + +Finally, the absurdity of arguing that the "order" of nature compels a +belief in deity may be seen by realising the fact that our conception of +order is itself the product of the experienced sequence which +constitutes the order in question. Our ideas of order are not +independent of the world, they are its product--an expression of the +relation between organism and environment. Given a different organism, +with different sense organs, and the world would appear different. On +the other hand the whole structure of man is the result of the existing +conditions. Assume the order to be changed, and the human +organism--presuming it still to exist, will undergo corresponding +modifications. It would not find less order or less beauty, the order +and the beauty would simply be found in another direction. And, +presumably, the theist would still point to the existence of _that_ +order as clear proof of a designing intelligence. + +Something needs to be said here on a more recent form of the argument +from the "order" of nature than the one we have been discussing. There +is no vital distinction between the old and the new form, but a +variation in terms seems to produce on some minds a conviction of +newness--itself a proof that the nature of the old form had never been +fully realised. + +This new form is that based upon what is called "Directivity." +Recognising that it is no longer possible to successfully dispute the +scientific proposition that the state of the universe at any one moment +must be taken as the result of all the conditions then prevailing, and, +therefore, it is to the operation of the ultimate properties of matter, +force, ether,--or whatever name we choose to give to the substance of +the universe--it is argued that we nevertheless require some directing +force which will set, and keep the universe on its present track. + +But there is really nothing in this beyond the now familiar appeal to +human impotence. "We do not know," "We cannot see," are quite excellent +reasons for saying nothing at all, but the very worst ground on which to +make positive statements, or on which to base positive beliefs. The +only condition that would justify our making human ignorance a ground +on which to make statements of the kind named would be that we had +demonstrably exhausted the possibilities of natural forces, and no +further developments were possible in this direction. Far from this +being the case there is not a single man of science who would dissent +from the statement that we are only upon the threshold of a knowledge of +their possibilities. + +And this assumption of "direction" is unconvincing, if not suicidal in +character. Assuming that direction may have occurred, the fact of +direction adds nothing to the qualities or possibilities of existence, +any more than the "directivity" of a chemist adds to the possibilities +of certain elements when he brings them into combination. Unless the +possibilities of the compound were already in the elements guidance +would be useless. And, in the same way, unless the capacity for +producing the universe we see already existed in the atoms themselves, +no amount of "direction" could have produced it. God simply takes the +place of the chemist bringing certain chemical elements in, of the +engineer guiding certain forces along a particular channel. But no new +capacity is created, and all that is done by either the chemist or the +engineer _might_ occur without their interference. Otherwise it could +not occur at all. + +Now there is no denying that natural forces _do_ produce the phenomena +around us. That is undeniable. And whether there be a god or not this +fact remains quite unaffected. All that God can do is to set up certain +combinations. But this does not exclude the possibility of this +combination taking place without the operation of deity. In fact, it +implies it. Either, then, natural forces possess the capacity to produce +the universe as we see it, or they do not. If they do not, then it is +impossible for us to conceive in what way even deity could produce it. +If, on the other hand, they have this capacity, the argument for the +existence of deity loses its force, and the theist is bound to admit +that all that he claims as due to the action of deity might have +happened without him. The theists own argument, if logically pursued +ends in divesting it of all coercive value. + +It is curious that the theist should fail to see that a much stronger +argument for the operation of deity would have been of a negative +character, to have proved that in some way God manifested an inhibitive +influence and thus prevented certain things occurring which would have +transpired but for his interference. Regularity, or "order" is, as we +have seen, the necessary consequence of the persistence of force. And so +long as natural forces continue to express themselves in the way in +which experience has led us to expect there is no need for us to think +of anything beyond. The principle of inertia is with us here, for if it +be true that force will persist in a given direction unless deflected +from its course by some other force, it must be equally true that _all_ +forces will work out a given consequence unless they are deflected from +their course by the operation of some superior force. + +Now if it were possible for the theist to show that in certain cases the +normal consequences of known forces did not transpire, and that the +aberration could not be accounted for by the operation of any other +conceivable force, it might be argued with some degree of plausibility +that there exists a controlling power beyond which answers to God. That +might afford a plausible case for "directivity." But to insist upon the +prevalence of "natural order" will not help the case for theism. It will +rather embarrass it. It may, of course, impress all those whose +conception of scientific method is poor--and sometimes one thinks that +this is all that is deliberately aimed at--but it will not affect anyone +else. To the informed mind it will appear that the Goddite is weakening +his case with every step he takes in the direction of what he apparently +believes to be a demonstration of its logical invulnerability. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. + + +The argument from causation may logically follow that from existence, of +which it may be regarded as a part. It is presented under various forms, +and when stated in a persuasive manner, is next to the argument from +design, probably as popular as any. The principal reason for this is, I +think, that very few people are concerned with thinking out exactly what +is meant by causation, and the proposition that every event must have a +cause, wins a ready assent, and when followed by the assertion that +therefore the universe must have had a cause, which is God, the +reasoning, or rather the parody of reasoning, appeals to many. There is +a show of reason and logic, but little more. + +Quite unquestionably a great deals depends upon what is meant by +causation, and still more upon the use made of the law of causation by +theists. Thus we have seen it urged against Materialists that neural +activity cannot be the equivalent of thought because they do not +resemble each other. And in another direction we meet with the same idea +in the assertion that the cause must be equal to the effect, by which it +is apparently meant that the cause must be _similar_ to the effect, and +that unless we can discern in the cause the same qualities manifested by +the effect, we have not established the fact of causation at all. + +The complete and perfect answer to this last view is that the qualities +manifest in an effect never are manifest in the cause, were it so it +would be impossible to distinguish one from the other. The theist is, +as is often the case, saying one thing and meaning another. What he says +is that the cause must be adequate to the effect. There is no dispute +here. But what he proceeds to argue is that the effect must be +discernible in the cause, which is a different statement altogether. +When he says that an effect cannot be greater than its cause, what he +means is that an effect cannot be different from its cause, which is +downright nonsense. He asks, How can that which has not life produce +life? as though the question were on all fours with the necessity for a +man to possess twenty shillings before he can give change for a +sovereign. + +Of course, the reply to all this is that the factors which when combined +produce an effect always "give" something of which when uncombined they +show no trace. There is no trace; of sweetness in the constituents of +sugar of lead, or of blueness in the constituents of blue vitriol. In +not a single case, if we are to follow the logic of the theist, is there +a cause adequate to produce an effect, if we are to follow the reasoning +of some theists; in each case we should have to assume some occult agent +as responsible for the result. In reality and in strict scientific +truth, it is of the very essence of causation that there shall be +present in the effect some quality or qualities that are not present in +the cause. And all the confusion may be eliminated if there is borne in +mind the simple and single consideration that in studying an effect it +is the qualities of a combination with which we are properly concerned. +And to expect to find in analysis that which is the product of synthesis +is in the highest degree absurd. + +Sir Oliver Lodge in his little work on "Life and Matter" properly +corrects the fallacy with which I have been dealing, and points out that +"properties can be possessed by an aggregate or an assemblage of +particles, which in the particles themselves did not in the slightest +degree exist." But in his desire to find a basis for his theism +immediately falls into an error in an opposite direction. We are on safe +ground, he says, in asserting that "whatever is in a part must be in the +whole." This is true if it is meant that as the whole contains the part, +the part is in the whole. But in that sense the statement was hardly +worth the making. What his argument demands is the meaning that as man +is possessed of mind, and as man is part of nature, therefore nature, as +a whole, manifests mind. And that is not true. Mind may be a special +manifestation of a special arrangement of forces, and only occurring +under special conditions. What Sir Oliver says, then, is that the +properties of a part are in the whole, because the part is included in +whole. What he implies, and without this implication his argument is +meaningless, is that the properties of a part belong to all parts of the +whole. And that is a statement so grotesquely untrue that I suspect Sir +Oliver would be the first to disown the plain implications of his own +argument. + +And here is Sir Oliver's illustration of his argument:-- + + + "the fact an apple has pips legitimises the assertion that an apple + tree has pips ... but it would be a childish misunderstanding to + expect to find actual pips in the trunk of a tree." + + +Now, why should the fact that an apple has pips legitimise the +statement that an apple tree has pips, any more than it legitimises the +statement that the soil from which it springs has pips? And if the tree +has not actual pips, in what sense does it possess them? If the reply is +that it possesses them potentially, one may meet that with the rejoinder +that potentially pips, and everything else, including Sir Oliver Lodge, +were contained in the primitive nebulae. As a matter of fact the apple +tree does not contain pips either actually or potentially. In his +championship of theism our scientist forgets his science. What the apple +tree possesses is the capacity for building up a fruit with pips _with +the aid of material extracted from the soil beneath and from the air +around_. These pips are no more in the tree than they are in the air or +the soil--not even as a figure of speech. One might, from any point of +view, as reasonably look for the colour and shape and smell of an apple +in the tree as to look for the pips. The properties of the tree is +really one of the factors in the production of a result. Sir Oliver +makes the mistake of writing as though the tree was the only factor in +the problem. + +This is not the place in which to enter on an exhaustive inquiry as to +the nature of causation. It is enough to point out that the whole +theistic fallacy rests here on the assumption that we are dealing with +two things, when as a matter of fact we are dealing with only one. Cause +and effect are not two separate things, they are the same thing viewed +under two different aspects. When, for example, I ask for the cause of +gunpowder and am told that it is sulphur, charcoal, and nitre, or for a +cause of sulphuric acid and am given sulphide of iron and oxygen, it is +clear that considered separately these ingredients are not causes at +all. Whether charcoal and sulphur will become part of the cause of +gunpowder or not will depend upon the presence of the third agent; +whether sulphide of iron will rank as part of the cause of sulphuric +acid will depend upon the presence of oxygen. In every case it is the +assemblage of appropriate factors that constitute a real cause. But +given the factors, gunpowder does not follow their assemblage, it is +their assemblage that is expressed by the result. There is no succession +in time, the result is instantaneous with the assemblage of the factors. +The effect is the registration, so to speak, of the combination of the +factors. + +Now if what has been said be admitted as correct the argument for the +existence of God as based upon the fact of causation breaks down +completely. If cause and effect are the expressions of a relation, and +if they are not two things, but only one, under two aspects, "cause" +being the name for the related powers of the factors, and "effect" the +name for their assemblage, to talk, as does the theist, of working back +along the chain of causes until we reach God, is nonsense. Even if we +could achieve this feat of regression, we could not reach by this means +a God distinct from the universe. For, as discovering the cause of any +effect means no more than analysing an effect into its factors, the +problem would ultimately be that of dealing with the question of how +something already existing transformed itself into the existing +universe. A form of a very doubtful Pantheism might be reached in this +way, but not theism. + +But here a fresh difficulty presents itself to the theist. A cause, as +I have pointed out, must consist of at least two factors or two forces. +This is absolutely indispensable. But assuming that we have got back to +a point prior to the existence of the universe, we have on the theistic +theory, not two factors, but only one. The essential condition for an +act of causation is lacking. A single factor could only repeat itself. +By this method the theist might reach "God." But having got there, there +he would remain. He is left with God and nothing else, and with no +possibility of reaching anything else. + +We land in the same dilemma if we pursue another road. Philosophers of +certain schools place existence in two categories. There is the world of +appearance (phenomena), and there is the world of reality or substance +(noumena). We know phenomena and their laws, they say, but no more. We +do not know, and cannot know, Substance in itself; and the theist +promptly adds that this unknown substance is but another name for God. +The philosopher also warns us against applying the laws of the +phenomenal world to noumena, reminding us that what we call "laws of +nature" have been devised to explain the world as it presents itself to +our consciousness. And to this we have the theological analogue in the +warning not to measure the infinite by the finite or to judge God by +human standards. + +Now granting all this, let us see how the argument stands. The laws of +phenomena belong exclusively to the phenomenal world. Their application +and their validity are restricted to the world of phenomena. When we +leave this region we are in a sphere to which they are quite +inapplicable. What, then, can be meant by speaking of God as a "First +Cause"? Cause is a phenomenal term, it expresses the relations between +phenomena, and it has no meaning when applied to this assumed and +unknown reality. We are in the position of one who is trying to use a +colour scale in a world where vision does not exist. The theist is +trying, in a similar way, to use the conception of "cause," which is +created to express the relations between phenomena, in a world where +phenomena have no existence. Thus, when the theist, to use his own +words, has traced back an effect to a cause, and this to a prior cause, +and so on, till he has reached a "First Cause," what happens? Simply +this. At the end of the chain of phenomena the theist makes a mighty +jump and gains the noumenon. But between this and the phenomenon he can +establish no relation whatever. It cannot be a cause of phenomena +because on his own showing causation is a phenomenal thing. He has +worked back along the chain of causation, discarding link after link on +his journey. Finally, he reaches God and discards the lot. And here he +is left clinging with _no intelligible way of getting back again_. If on +the other hand, he relates God to phenomena he has failed to get what he +requires. He has merely added one more link to his chain of phenomena, +and the "first cause" remains as far off as ever. For if God is not +related to phenomena he ceases to be a cause of phenomena in the only +sense in which he is of use to the theistic hypothesis. + +Further, one may ask, Why travel back along the chain of causation to +discover God? What is gained by travelling along an infinite series, +and saying suddenly, "At this point I espy God." Confessedly we may +trace back phenomena as far as we will without finding ourselves a step +nearer a commencement. All we get is a transformation of pre-existing +material into new forms. Consequently all the evidence that exists at +the moment we cease our journey existed when we began it. In short, if +God can be shown to be the efficient cause of phenomena anywhere, he can +be shown to be the cause everywhere, and the proof may be produced +through phenomena immediately at hand as well as from those removed from +us by an indefinite number of stages. The evidence becomes neither +stronger nor more relevant by being put farther back. Proof is not like +wine, its quality does not improve with age. To say that we must pause +somewhere may be true, but that is only reminding us that both human +time and human energy are limited. But it is certainly foolish to first +of all induce mental exhaustion, and then use it as the equivalent of a +positive and valuable discovery. + +And even though by some undiscovered method we had reached that +metaphysical nightmare a cause of all phenomena, and in defiance of all +intelligibility had christened it a "First Cause," how would that +satisfy the "causal craving"? Professor Campbell Fraser very properly +says that "the old form of each new phenomenon as much needs explanation +as the new form itself did, and this need is certainly neither satisfied +nor destroyed by referring one form of existence to another." If A. is +explained by B. we are driven to explain B. by C., and so on +indefinitely. Or if we can stop with A. or B. then the causal craving +is not so persistent as was supposed, and man can rest content within +the limit of recognised limitations. For what Professor Fraser calls an +"absolutely originating cause" is only such so long as we have not +reached it. We are satisfied with an imaginary B. as an explanation of +the actual A. so long as B. does not come within our grasp. So soon as +it has become the originating cause of the phenomenon in hand we are off +on a further search. "First" has no other intelligible sense or meaning +than this. "First" in relation to a given cluster of phenomenon we may +grant; "First" in the sense of calling for no further explanation is +downright theological lunacy. + +An eternal "First cause" could only be such in relation to an eternal +effect. And in that case it could not be _prior_ to the effect since the +effect is only the existing factors combined. Causation cannot carry us +_beyond_ phenomena since it has no meaning apart from phenomena. The +notion that because every phenomenon has a cause therefore there must be +a cause for phenomena as a whole--meaning by this for the sum total of +phenomena--is wholly absurd. It is not sound science, it is not good +philosophy, it is not even commonsense. It is simply nonsense which is +given an air of dignity because it is clothed in philosophic language. +You cannot rise from phenomena to the theist's God; first, because, as I +have said, cause and effect are names for the relation that is seen to +exist between one phenomenon and another, and the theist is seeking +after something that is above all relations. To postulate something that +is not phenomena as the cause of phenomena, is like discussing the +possibility of a bird's flight and dismissing the possibility of an +atmosphere. Secondly, causation can give no clue to a God because the +search for causes is a search for the conditions under which phenomena +occur. And when we have described these conditions we have fulfilled all +the conditions required to establish an act of causation. The theist, in +short, commences with a wrong conception of causation. He proceeds by +applying to one sphere language and principles from another, and to +which they can have no possible application, and where they have no +intelligibility. And having completely confused the issue, he ends with +a conclusion which, even on his own showing, has no logical relation to +the premises laid down. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. + + +Kant called the argument from design "the oldest, the clearest, and the +most adapted to the ordinary human reason," of all the arguments +advanced on behalf of the belief in God. Kant's dictum, it will be +observed, omits all opinion as to its quality, and his own criticism of +it left it a sorry wreck. John Stuart Mill treated it far more +respectfully, and commenced his examination of it with the flattering +introduction, "We now at last reach an argument of a really scientific +character," and, although he did not find the argument convincing, gave +it a most respectful dismissal. The purpose of the present chapter is to +show that the argument from design in nature is in the last degree +unscientific, that the analogy it seeks to establish is a false one, +that it is completely and hopelessly irrelevant to the point at issue, +and that one might grant nearly all it asks for, and even then show that +it does not prove what it sets out to prove. That such an argument +should have, and for so long, exerted so much influence over the human +mind, gives one anything but a flattering impression of the power of +reason in human affairs. + +True it is that of late years the argument from design has felt the +influence of the growth of the idea of evolution, and the champions of +theism have used it with much greater caution, and under an obvious +sense that it no longer wielded its old authority. The fact that this +is so forms a commentary on the statement so often made that man's +craving for an ultimate cause leads to the belief in God. The truth +being that man--the average man--only seeks for an explanation of +immediate happenings. Once the immediate thing before him is explained +his curiosity is allayed. The average man lives mentally from hand to +mouth, and troubles as little about ultimate explanations as he does +about the exhaustion of the coal supply. + +It is a point of some significance that the perception of design in +nature, as with the belief in deity, is, if one may use the expression, +pre-scientific in point of origin. What I mean by that is that it +originates at a time when no other explanation of the origin of natural +adaptations existed. It did not establish itself as one of several rival +explanations and in virtue of its own strength. It was established +simply because no other explanation was at the time conceivable. And so +soon as another explanation, such as that of natural selection, was +placed before the world, the origin of adaptations as a product of an +extra-natural designing intelligence became to most educated minds +simply impossible. The perception of design in nature was, as a matter +of fact, no more than a special illustration of the animistic frame of +mind which reads vitality into all natural happenings. It is impossible +to find in the statement that particular adaptations in nature are +designed anything more scientific than one can find in the belief that +rain is the product of a heavenly rain-cow, or that flashes of lightning +are spears thrown by competing heavenly warriors. It is the language +only that differs in the two cases. The frame of mind indicated in the +two cases are identical. + +The attractiveness of the argument from design lies in its nearness to +hand and in its appeal to facts, combined with the impossibility of +verification. That nature is full of strange and curious examples of +adaptation is clear to all, although the significance of these +adaptations are by no means so clear. Moreover, a very casual study of +these cases show that they are better calculated to dazzle than to +convince. The presentation of a number of more or less elaborate facts +of adaptation, followed with the remark that we are unable to see how +such cases could have been brought about in the absence of a designing +intelligence, is, at best, an appeal to human weakness and ignorance. +The reverse of such a position is that if we had complete knowledge of +the causes at work, the assumption of design might be found to be quite +unnecessary. "We cannot see" is only the equivalent of we do not know, +and that is a shockingly bad basis on which to build an argument. + +When, therefore, an eminent electrician like Professor Fleming says, "We +have overwhelming proof that in the manufacture of the infinite number +of substances made in Nature's laboratory there must be at all stages +some directivity," this can only mean that Professor Fleming cannot see +the way in which these substances are made. It does not mean that he +sees _how_ they are made. And in saying this he is in no better position +than was Kepler, who after describing the true laws of planetary motion, +when he came to the question of _why_ the planets should describe these +motions fell back on the theory of "Angelic intelligences" as the +cause. The true explanation came with the physics of Galileo and Newton, +and with that, farewell to the angelic "directivity." The only reason +for Kepler's angels was his ignorance of the causes of planetary motion. +The only reason why Professor Fleming says that the atoms "have to be +guided into certain positions to build up the complex molecules" is that +he is unable to isolate this assumed directive force and to show it in +operation; he is like a modern Kepler faced with something the cause of +which he doesn't know, and lugging in "God" to save further trouble. It +is an assumption of knowledge where no knowledge exists. "God" is always +what Spinoza called it, the asylum of ignorance. When causes are unknown +"God" is brought forward. When causes are known "God" retires into the +background. "God" is not an explanation, it is a narcotic. + +The argument from design rests upon the existence in nature of +adaptations either general or special. And quite obviously the value of +evidence derived from adaptations will be determined by the existence of +non-adaptations. If, that is, it can be shown that a certain assemblage +of forces produce adaptation, while in another instance they fail to +produce it, it would then be logical to argue that the difference was +due to the directive power being withdrawn in the latter case. But that +as we know is never the case. What we see is always the same conditions +producing the same effects. We are never able to say, "Here are natural +forces working _minus_ a directing intelligence, and here is an +assemblage of the same forces working _plus_ the addition of a +directing intelligence." If we could do that we should be able to +attribute the difference to the new factor. But this we are never able +to do. And it is an elementary principle of scientific method that +before we can assert the existence of a distinct force or factor, the +possibility of isolation must be shown. Adaptation can, then, only be +demonstrated by non-adaptation. And _non-adaptation in nature simply +does not exist, except in relation to an ideal end created by +ourselves_. + +Surprising as this may appear to some, examination shows it to be no +more than a truism, and that granted, the whole strength of the argument +from adaptation, whether in the inorganic or the organic world, +disappears. + +To see the matter the more clearly, let us drop for a time the word +"adaptation" and substitute the word "process." For that after all is +what nature presents us with. We see processes and we see results. It is +because we create an _end_ for these processes that we class them as +well or ill adapted to achieve it. We make a gun, and say it is ill or +well made as it shoots well or ill. But whether it carries straight or +not the relation of the shooting to the construction of the gun remains +the same. Judging the gun merely from its construction, the product +answers completely to the combination of its parts. Constructed in one +way the gun cannot but shoot straight. Constructed in another way the +gun cannot but shoot crookedly. And the only reason we have for calling +one good and the other bad is that _we_ desire a particular result. But +the goodness or badness has nothing to do with the thing itself. Its +adaptation to the end produced is as perfect in the one case as in the +other. It could produce no other result than the one that actually +emerges without an alteration in the means employed. A thing is what it +is because it is the combination of all the forces that produce it. And +to ask us to marvel at the result of a process, when the one is the +product of the other is like asking us to express our surprise that +twice two equal four. Twice two equal four because four is the sum of +the factors, and no one dreams of praising God because they don't +sometimes make four and a half. The argument from adaptations in nature +is, when examined, just about as impressive as the reasoning of the +curate who saw the hand of Providence in the fact that death came at the +end of life instead of in the middle of it. + +Adaptation is not, then, a singular fact in nature, but a universal one. +It is everywhere, in the case of death as in that of life. It is the +same in the case of a child born a marvel of health and beauty as in +that of one born deformed and diseased. There is nothing else but +adaptations of means to ends in nature, however displeasing some of them +may be to us. The "harmony" which the theist perceives in nature is not +the expression of "plan," it is the inevitable outcome of the properties +of existence. Given matter and force, and it requires no "directive +intelligence" to produce the existing order, it would indeed require a +God to prevent its occurrence. + +It is the same if we take the case of animal life alone. To say that +animal life is adapted to its environment, and to say that animal life +exists, is to say the same thing in two ways. Whether animal forms are +fashioned by "divine intelligence" or not, the fact of adaptation +remains; for adaptation is the essential condition of existence. And as +adaptation is the condition of existence, it follows that an animal's +feelings, structure, and functions will be developed in accordance with +the nature of the environment. If the conditions of existence were +different from what they are animal life would show corresponding +modifications. But all the same we should observe the same +correspondence between animal life and its surroundings. Here, again, we +have a fact transformed, without the slightest warranty, into a purpose. + +Now, if the theist could prove that out of a number of equally possible +lines of development living beings show one fixed form, and that against +the compulsion of environmental forces, he would do something to prove +the probability of some sort of guidance. But that we know cannot be +done. The forms of life are infinite in number. They vary within all +possible limits; and always in terms of environmental conditions. In +brief, what is said to occur with God, can be shown to be inevitable +without him. "God" in nature is a wholly gratuitous hypothesis. + +Later it will be seen that the whole basis of the argument from design +is fallacious; that it proceeds along altogether wrong lines, and that +the final objection to it is that it is completely irrelevant to the +point at issue. For the moment, however, we proceed with a criticism of +the argument as usually stated. + +It must be borne in mind that what the theist desires to reach is a +_Creator_, but it is obvious that this plea can never give us more than +a mere designer working on materials that already exist. Of necessity +design implies two things, difficulties to be overcome, and skill or +wisdom in overcoming them. Design is an understandable thing in +connection with man, because man is always occupied in overcoming the +resistance of forces that exist quite independently of him, and which +operate without reference to his needs or desires. But it would be +absurd to assume design on the part of one for whom difficulties had no +existence, or on the part of one who himself created the forces that had +to be overcome, and endowed them with all the properties which made the +work of design necessary. Granting the relevance of the data upon which +the belief in design rests, one could only assume, with Mill, that "the +author of the Cosmos worked under limitations; that he was obliged to +adapt himself to conditions independent of his will, and to attain his +ends by such arrangements as these conditions admitted of." + +In the next place, the argument for design is an argument from analogy, +and an analogy can by its very nature never give a complete +demonstration. It can never offer more than a probability, more or less +convincing as the analogy is more of less complete. But in the case +under consideration the analogy is considerably less rather than more. +Paley's classical illustration--taken almost verbatim from Malebranche, +but as old otherwise as the days of Greek philosophy, where a statute +took its place--was that of a watch. And the conclusion was drawn that +as the parts of a watch bear obvious marks of having been made with a +view to a particular end, so the animal structure and the universe as a +whole bear similar marks of having been designed. It is true that of +late years the Paleyan form of the argument has been disavowed by most +scholarly advocates of theism, but as they immediately proceed to make +use of arguments that are substantially identical with it, the +repudiation does not seem of great consequence. It reminds one of a +government that is compelled by the force of public opinion to openly +repudiate one of its officials, and having removed him from the office +in which the misdemeanour was committed, immediately appoints him to one +of an increased dignity and with a larger salary. + +Thus, we have Professor Fiske saying that "Paley's simile of a watch is +no longer applicable to such a world as this" ("Idea of God"; p. 131), +and Prof. Sorley telling us that "the age of Paley and of the +Bridgewater Treatises is past" (Moral Values and the Idea of God; p. +327), and Mr. Balfour repudiating Paley as having been ruled out of +court by Darwinism ("Humanism and Theism," chapter II.). But as Fiske +puts the flower in the place of the watch, Sorley, the moral nature of +man, and Balfour, the conditions of animal life, it is not quite clear +why if the Paleyan argument is invalid, the new form is any more +intellectually respectable. The essence of the Paleyan argument was the +assertion of a mind behind phenomena, the workings of which could be +seen in the forms of animal life. And whether we find that proof in the +growth of a flower, or in the moral sense of man, or in the creation of +natural conditions that impel the development of life along a certain +road, the distinction is not vital. We are still finding proofs of God +in the structure of the world (where otherwise, indeed, are we to find +it?) and we are still depending on the supposed likeness between the +works of human intelligence and natural products. + +And that analogy is wholly false. The argument from design aims at +proving that _all_ things are made by a creative intelligence. It is not +merely animals that are designed; they are selected as no more than +striking individual examples of a general truth. Everything, if theism +be true, must be ultimately due to manufacture. But the whole +significance of the Paleyan argument from design is that behind the +manufactured article which we recognise as such, there are other +articles or other things that are not manufactured. The traveller, says +Paley, who comes across a watch recognises in the relation of its parts +evidences of workmanship. But he does not see in the breaking of a wave +on the shore, or in the piling up of sand in the desert, or in a pebble +on the beach, the same tokens of workmanship. In the very act of +attempting to prove that _some_ things _are_ made, the theist is +compelled to assume that _all_ things are not made. He can only gain a +victory at the price of confessing a defeat. + +But is there any real analogy between the works of man and the universe +at large? Let us take a familiar example. It is, we are told in a very +familiar illustration, as absurd to imagine that the world as it exists +is the work of unguided natural forces, as it would be to believe that +the rows of letters in a compositor's "stick" had of their own +contained force arranged themselves in intelligible sentences. The +absurdity of the last supposition is admitted, but why is that so? +Obviously because we have the previous knowledge that the type itself is +a manufactured thing, and that its arrangement in orderly sentences is +the work of intelligent men. Thus, what occurs when we come across a +particular example of type setting is that we compare our present +experience with other experiences and recognise it as belonging to a +particular class. So with the watch. The only reason we have for +believing that a watch is made is that of our previous knowledge that +such things are made. The present judgment is based upon past +experience. But the case of animal forms, and still more the universe at +large, offers no such analogy. We know nothing of world makers nor of +animal makers. We have no previous experience to go upon, nor have we +any things of a similar kind, known to be made, with which we can +compare them. Instead of the points of resemblance between the two +things being so numerous as to compel belief, they agree in one +particular only, that of existence. At most all we are left with is the +palpably absurd position that because man selects and adjusts means to a +given end, therefore any combination of forces in nature which produce a +certain result must also be the expression of conscious intention. + +Some apparent force even to this flimsy conclusion might be given if +nature could be said to be working towards a given end. But we do not +find this. What we see is a multitude of forces at work, the action of +each of which often results in the negation of the other. Put on one +side the larger, but not the least pregnant fact that animal life is +only maintained in the face of numerous agencies, inorganic and organic, +that are apparently bent upon its destruction; put on one side also the +fact that multitudes of parasites--as much the result of design as any +other form of life--are constantly preying upon and destroying forms of +life higher than themselves, and there still remain myriads of facts +altogether inconsistent and completely irreconcilable with the +hypothesis of a creative intelligence shaping the course of affairs to a +given end. To take only one illustration of this. What is to be said of +the myriads of animals that are born into the world only to perish +before reaching an age at which they can play their part in the +perpetuation of the species? Are we to believe that the same deity who +fashioned these forms of life created at the same time a number of +forces that were certain to destroy them? Clearly we are bound to +assume, either that this hypothetical Being pursues a number of mutually +destructive plans, or that there are a number of designers at work and +at war with each other, or that none at all exist. + +If we are to judge nature from the standpoint of human intelligence, +then we must logically decide that it is full of waste, full of +bungling, full of plans that come to nothing, of ends that are never +realised, of pain and misery that might have been avoided by the +exercise of almost ordinary intelligence. There are few animals +concerning which a competent anatomist or physiologist could not suggest +some improvement in their construction by which their functions might be +more efficiently performed. Nor does it seem quite impossible to have +so adjusted natural forces that the development of life might have been +accomplished without the present enormous waste of material. It is +almost stupid to ask, as did the late Dr. Martineau, what right have we +to judge the world from "a purely humanistic point of view." The whole +argument from design is based upon a humanistic point of view. The +Atheist is only calling the attention of the theist to the consequences +of his own argument. + +I leave for a later chapter, the moral aspect of the design argument. I +am at present concerned with its purely logical presentation. And the +crowning charge here is not that it is inconclusive, not that it falls +short, as Mill thought, of a complete analogy, the decisive rejection of +it is based upon the fact that it is absolutely irrelevant. The argument +has no bearing on the issue; the evidence has no relation to the case. +What is the essence of the argument from design? It is based upon +certain adaptations that are observed to exist. But adaptation is, as we +have shown, a universal quality of existence. It exists in every case, +and no more in one case than in another. And when the theist says that +because certain things work together therefore god arranged it, an apt +query is, How do you know? One may even say, Granting there is a God, +how do you know that what is was actually designed by him? It is no use +replying that the way things work together prove design, for things +always work together. They cannot do otherwise. Any group of forces work +together to produce a given result. That is part of the universal fact +of adaptation which the theist holds up as though it were a divine +miracle instead of, as Mallock says, a physical platitude. + +Let us take an illustration from everyday life. A man tries his hand at +building a bicycle. When it is finished the wheels are not true, the +frame is unsteady, the whole thing is ready to fall to pieces and is +absolutely unrideable. Is any one warranted in declaring that because +the parts have all been brought together by me therefore the resulting +machine was an act of design? Clearly not. What I designed was a machine +perfect after its kind. What appeared was the miserable structure that +is before us. On the other hand that machine with all its imperfections +might have been designed by me. I might, for some purpose deliberately +have intended to make a machine that would not carry a rider. And when +would anyone be logically justified in saying which of the two kinds of +machines express my design? Clearly, only when he had a knowledge of my +intention. Apart from a knowledge of an intention preceding an act the +inference of design is unwarrantable. + +Now, assuming the existence of a God, and who stands in the same +relation to the world that I do to the machine, how can anyone know that +the world as it is expresses design any more than did my home-made +bicycle? In this case, as in the former, what is needed to justify the +assumption of design is a knowledge of intention. One must know what the +assumed maker intended and then see how far the actual result realises +it. + +Design, in short, although it may be expressed in a physical form is not +a physical thing, but a psychic fact. You cannot by examining physical +processes and results reach design. You cannot start with a material +fact and reach intention. You must begin with intention and compare it +with the physical result. Things may be as they are whether design is +involved or not. It is only by a knowledge of intention, and a +comparison of that with the fact before us that we can be certain of +design. Proof of design is not found in the capacity of certain clusters +of circumstances or forces to realise a particular result, but in a +knowledge that they correspond with an intention which we know to have +existed before the result occurs. + +To warrant a logical belief in design in nature three things are +essential. First, one must assume that a God exists. Second, one must +take it for granted that one has a knowledge of the intention in the +mind of the deity before the alleged designed thing is brought into +existence. Finally, one must be able to compare the result with the +intention and demonstrate their agreement. But the impossibility of +knowing the first two things is apparent. And without the first two the +third is of no value whatever. For we have no means of reaching the +first except through the third. And until we get to the first we cannot +make use of the third. We are thus in a hopeless impasse. No examination +of nature can lead back to God because we lack the necessary starting +point. All the volumes that have been written, and all the sermons that +have been preached depicting the wisdom of organic structures are so +much waste of paper and breath. They prove nothing, and can prove +nothing. They assume at the beginning all they require at the end. Their +God is not something reached by way of inference, it is something +assumed at the very outset. + +What the theist does at every step of his reasoning is to read his own +feelings and desires into nature. The design he talks so glibly about is +in him, not outside of him. As well might a maggot in a cheese argue +that the world was designed for him because the agreement between his +structure and it are so harmonious. In relation to their surroundings +man and the maggot are in the same position. And in the economy of +nature man is of no more consequence than the maggot. There is a more +complex synthesis of forces here than there, a more subtle exhibition of +nature's infinite capacity for evolving fresh forms of life, and that is +all. It is man himself who paints a distorted picture of himself on the +surface of things, who reads his own passions and desires into nature, +and then admires a marvel created by himself. To he who correctly +visualises the process of the evolution of deity, the existence of God +is hardly to-day a question for discussion. There is a discussion only +of the history of the belief, and in that is found its strongest +condemnation. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +THE DISHARMONIES OF NATURE. + + +It has already been indicated that it is not really necessary, in order +to prove design, to establish the fact that the design is perfect or +that it exhibits complete goodness. It is enough that there be design. +Its moral quality or value is quite another question. Nevertheless, it +will be as well to deal with this latter aspect of the subject, and to +see what kind of "plan" it is that nature does exhibit, even assuming +the existence of some design. + +Now it is evident that if there be design in nature, and if the design +is the expression of a single supreme mind one quality of that plan +should be unity. The products should, so to speak, dovetail into each +other in such a way that they work together, and even harmonise with +each other. But this is, notoriously, not the case. If from one point of +view there is a certain harmony throughout the world of living beings in +virtue of which life is preserved, it is at least equally true that from +another point of view the harmony is one of destruction. And in the end +death wins. Sooner or later death overtakes all forms of life, while in +the grand total of living beings born into the world, a far larger +number perish than can reach maturity. Wasted effort is the mildest +judgment that can be passed upon these abortive attempts. And not only +does death eventually win in the case of each individual, and against +which may be set the consideration that in the economy of nature death +plays a part in the development of life, but eventually death will, if +we are to trust science, reap a sweeping and universal triumph by the +consummation of terrestrial conditions that will render the maintenance +of life impossible. + +Or, again, the relations of species are clearly not what we have a right +to expect in the working out of a reasonably wise and benevolent plan. +It is a general truth that, with the exception of a few instances, +chiefly connected with the relations existing between insects and +flowers, the development of one species in relation to another is not +that of mutual helpfulness. The general rule here is that of mutual +injury. The carnivora prey on the herbivora and upon each other; and the +herbivora crush each other by methods that are as effective as the +method of direct attack. Any variation is "good" provided it be of +advantage to its possessor. And the "good" of the one kind may mean the +destruction of another order. All the exquisite design shown in the +development of the finer feelings of man, and upon which theistic +sentimentalists love to dwell, may be seen in the structure of those +parasites which destroy man and bring his finer feelings to naught. The +late Theodore Roosevelt says of the Brazilian forests:-- + + + In these forests the multitude of insects that bite, sting, devour, + and prey on other creatures, often with accompaniments of atrocious + suffering, passes belief. The very pathetic myths of beneficent + nature could not deceive even the least wise being if he once saw + the iron cruelty of life in the tropics. Of course, "nature"--in + common parlance a wholly inaccurate term, by the way, especially + when used to express a single entity--is entirely ruthless, no less + so as regards types than as regards individuals, and entirely + indifferent to good or evil, and works out her ends or no ends + with utter disregard of pain and woe (Cited by E. D. Fawcett in + _The World as Imagination_; pp. 571-2). + + +And Mr. Carveth Reade expresses the same thing in a more elaborate +summing up:-- + + + The merciless character of organic evolution appears to us, first, + in reckless propagation and the consequent destruction. Every + species is as prolific as it can be compatibly with the development + of its individuals; and the deaths that ensue from inanition, + disease, violence, present a stupefying scene. The best one can say + for it is that, as life rises in the organic scale, the death rate + declines. Yet even man still suffers outrageously by violence, + disease, inanition; the notion that "Malthus's Law" no longer holds + of civilised man is a foolish delusion. But more sinister than the + direct destruction of life is the spectacle of innumerable species + profiting by a life, parasitic or predatory, at the expense of + others. The parasites refute the vulgar prejudice that evolution is + by the measure of man, progressive; adaptation is indifferent to + better or worse, except as to each species, that its offspring + shall survive by atrophy and degradation. The predatory species + flourish as if in derision of moral maxims; we see that though + human morality is natural to man, it is far from expressing the + whole of Nature. Animals, at first indistinguishable vegetables, + devour them and enjoy a far richer life. Animals that eat other + animals are nearly always superior not only in strength, grace and + agility but in intelligence. There are exceptions to this rule; + some snakes eat monkeys (thanking Providence), and the elephant is + content with foliage; but compare cats and wolves with the + ungulates that make a first concoction of herbs for their sake. It + is true that our monkey kin are chiefly frugivorous; for it may be + plausibly argued that man was first differentiated by becoming + definitely carnivorous, a sociable hunter, as it were, a wolf-ape. + Hence the advantage of longer legs, the use of weapons, the upright + gait and defter hands to use and make weapons, more strategic + brains, tribal organisation, and hence liberation from the tropical + forest, and citizenship of the world. The greater part of his + subsequent history is equally unedifying: having made the world his + prey, he says that God made the world to that end, and those who + have preyed upon their fellows, and enslaved them, and flourished + upon it, have declared that to have been the intention of nature. + (_The Metaphysics of Nature_; pp. 344-5). + + +A perpetual pulling down and building up, and the building altogether +dependent upon the demolition. The tiger built with tastes and +capacities for catching the gazelle: the gazelle built with capacities +that enable it to escape the tiger. There is no evidence here of the +existence of a single mind working out an intelligent plan. At most we +have either the proof for a number of warring powers, each one striving +to destroy what the other is striving to create, or a single mind that +has deliberately fashioned things so that each part may work for the +destruction of the other part, the whole to presently end in a grand +catastrophe. + +But that is not all. If we limit our attention to man, can it be said +that we find in the human structure what we might reasonably expect to +find if man be indeed the crown of the divine plan, the event to which, +for untold ages, all things were designedly tending? What we actually do +find is that the structure of man, physically and mentally, is such as +to altogether negative the notion of complete or harmonious adjustment +to environment. That the human has within it a large number of vestigial +structures--some scientists place it as high as one hundred and +seventy--is now well known, and forms at the same time one of the +evidences of evolution and an impeachment of the theistic theory. There +is only need to instance now the vermiform appendage, which forms the +seat of appendicitis, the "wisdom" teeth, of very little use, and one of +the most fruitful of causes of disease of the teeth, the hair which +covers the human body, now of no use whatever, except to form a lodgment +for microbes, and so makes the acquisition of disease the more certain. +In addition to the number of rudimentary organs that actually encourage +disease--Metchnikoff counts among these the larger intestine--the body +is full of rudimentary muscles and structures that when not positively +harmful, impose a tax on the organism for which no corresponding service +is performed. + +The meaning and significance of these structures are, however, so well +recognised that one need not dwell upon their existence. Not so well +known is the complementary fact that just as in his physical structure +man bears evidence of his emergence from lower forms of life, which +result in a certain degree of disharmony between him and an ideal +environment, so in his psychic life his instincts and feelings are often +such as to prevent that ideal adaptation which so many desire. The +earlier conception of optimistic evolutionists that the instincts of man +were, through the operation of natural selection, converted into +beneficent guides is quite faulty. In itself this was probably a +survival of the theism which tried to prove that this was the best of +all possible worlds, and which led evolutionists to try and prove that +their theory was also ethically desirable. At any rate, the theory of +the wholly beneficent nature of human instincts is not tenable. Our +instincts are inherited from our animal ancestors; they were brought to +fruition under conditions different in form from those which obtain with +human beings, with the result that whether an instinct is helpful or the +contrary depends largely upon the educational quality of the +environment, and even then inherited tendencies may be so strong as to +make them a source of danger to the community rather than of benefit. + +It is noted, for example, that a deal of what may be called crime, or at +least lawlessness, is the result of an individual being born with +tendencies developed in a way that fits him for an environment of +centuries ago, rather than an environment of to-day. Very many of our +national heroes of a few centuries ago would rank as criminals to-day, +just as many of our criminals to-day would, had they been born a few +centuries since, have been handed down to us as examples of chivalry or +of national heroism. Instead of what one may call the natural endowments +of man pointing towards a more civilised form of life, they point to a +less civilised form, while it is the artificially or socially induced +feelings and ideas that point to a better future. + +Thus, if we take the primitive or brute feeling of retaliation we find +it assuming the form of war. And without discussing the value of war in +the past, or even its admissibility in special circumstances in the +present, I do not think it will be seriously disputed that the great +need of the present is to transfer that feeling from the lower level of +brute force to the higher one of adventure in the interests of science +and human betterment. Here it is not the existence of a lofty +"god-given" endowment that puts man out of harmony with his environment; +it is, on the contrary, the operation of an earlier form of feeling +manifestation which retards the coming of a better day. + +There is, in fact, not a single quality of human nature that can be +said to act with inerrancy. The baby seizes objects indiscriminately and +puts them in its mouth. The man falling into the water does the very +thing he should not do--throws up his arms. Intense cold lulls to +somnolency, instead of rousing to activity. The love of children, on +which the preservation of the race depends, is absent with many; while +with others the sexual instinct undergoes strange and morbid +manifestations. A complete list of these disharmonies would fill a +volume--indeed, Metchnikoff, in his "Nature of Man," has filled half a +volume with describing some of the instances of physiological +disharmony, and then has not exhausted the list. + +It would indeed seem as if nature, with its method of never creating a +new organ or structure, but only transforming and utilising an old one, +had attached a penalty to every successful attempt to rise above a +certain level. If man will walk upright she sees to it that his doing so +shall involve a great liability to hernia. If he will live in cities, +she has ready the ravage of consumption. If he will use clothing she +makes him carry round a coating of useless hair as a method of trapping +disease microbes. So soon as one disease is conquered another is +discovered. Pleasures have their reverse side in pains, and to some +pains the pleasures bear a small relation, being chiefly of the +character of the pains being absent. As a social animal man is only +imperfectly adapted to the state, there going on a constant warfare +between his egoistic and altruistic impulses. In fact, it would +certainly be an arguable proposition, if we allow intention in nature, +to say that man was intended to remain at the animal level, and that, +having so far defeated nature's intention, he is dogged by a +disappointed creator, and made to pay the fullest price that can be +exacted for every step of progress achieved. + +Of course, of proof of design in nature there is positively none. +Design, as I have said, is not a natural fact, but a purely human +construction. But, if admitted, it is a two edged weapon. For, if +assumed anywhere, it must be assumed to exist everywhere. And designing +intelligence must be made responsible for the whole scheme. But this the +most extravagant piety refuses to do. Either we have the primitive +theory of a devil who divides with God the responsibility for the state +of the world, or we have the plea that evil may be only good disguised, +or good in the making, or it is argued that we have to contemplate the +"plan" as a whole, and must wait for some future state to pass judgment. +And whichever view we take, there is the implied admission that the plan +of creation as we know it cannot be harmonised with the theory of God +that modern theism places before us. And instead of man being the +miracle of perfection that an earlier generation saw in his structure, +we know that the human structure is such that, given the power to +create, science could really fashion, in the light of its present +knowledge, a better organism. + +Finally, disharmony is implied in and necessitated by the very fact of +progress. Progress means a better adjustment, and the discomfort of +maladjustment is the spur to improvement. A perfect equilibrium is as +impossible as perpetual motion, and it is only with a perfect +equilibrium that change, which is the condition of progress, would +cease. The ceaseless desire for something better is, therefore, in +itself an impeachment of things as they are. It is an indication of +there being something wanting, of the existence of a want of complete +harmony between man and his surroundings. Nor is the case of the theist +bettered if he retorts that without the sense of imperfection or of +dissatisfaction there would be no such thing as a conscious striving +after improvement. That may be admitted, but that is only proving that +perfection can never be achieved, and that even in this last resort +"God" has so designed things as to make a mock of man at the end. The +want of complete harmony that is seen in the physical structure of man +is carried over into his mental life. If theism be true man is mocked by +a mirage. And the knowledge is made the more depressing by the belief +that the plan is not accidental, it is not a product of the working of +non-conscious forces, it is the preordained outcome of a plan that was +deliberately resolved on by a being with full power to devise some thing +wiser and better. At the side of that, any theory of things is, by +comparison, hopeful and inspiring. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +GOD AND EVOLUTION. + + +There is no logical connection between what is called the "Moral +government of the universe" and the belief in God, but it must be +confessed that the criticism of the belief from the point of view of +moral feeling is of considerable importance. This is in itself a +striking illustration of the reaction of social developments on +religious beliefs. For there is originally no connection between +morality and the belief in God. Man does not believe in the gods because +they are moral, but because they are there. If they are, to his mind, +good, that is so much the better. But whether they are good or bad they +have to be faced as facts. The gods, in short belong to the region of +belief, while morality belongs to that of practice. It is in the nature +of morality that it should be implicit in practice long before it is +explicit in theory. Morality belongs to the group and is rooted in +certain impulses that are a product of the essential conditions of group +life. It is as reflection awakens that men are led to speculate upon the +nature and origin of the moral feelings. Morality, whether in practice +or in theory, is thus based upon what is. On the other hand, religion, +whether it be true or false, is in the nature of a discovery. However +crude or uninformed the thinking, the belief in God must be regarded as +the product of reflection. The situation is not unfairly described by +Dr. Jastrow:-- + + + The various rites practiced by primitive society in order to ward + off evils, or to secure the protection of dreaded powers or + spirits, are based primarily on logical considerations. If a + certain stone is regarded as sacred, it is probably because it is + associated with some misfortune, or some unusual piece of good + luck. Someone sitting on the stone may have died; or on sleeping on + it may have seen a remarkable vision, which was followed by a + signal victory over a dangerous foe.... In all this, however, + ethical considerations are remarkable for their absence.... Taking + again so common a belief among all peoples as the influence for + good or evil exerted by the dead upon the living and the numerous + practices to which it gives rise ... it will be difficult to + discover in these beliefs the faintest suggestion of any ethical + influence. It is not the good but the powerful spirits that are + invoked; an appeal to them is not made by showing them examples of + kindness, justice, or noble deeds, but by bribes, flatteries, and + threats. (_The Study of Religion_; Ch. VI.). + + +So we have Tylor also endorsing this opinion by remarking that, "The +popular idea that the moral government of the universe is an essential +tenet of natural religion simply falls to the ground. Savage animism is +almost devoid of that ethical element which, to the educated, modern +mind, is the very mainspring of religion." And Hoffding says that, "In +the lowest forms of it with which we are acquainted religion cannot be +said to have any ethical significance. The gods appear as powers on +which man is dependent, but not as patterns of conduct or administrators +of an ethical world order.... Not till men have discovered ethical +problems in practical life and have developed an ethical feeling ... can +the figures of the gods assume an ethical character." ("Philosophy of +Religion"; pp. 323-4). + +It is quite unnecessary to multiply evidence, the truth of the matter +would seem obvious. One cannot conceive man actually ascribing ethical +qualities to his gods before he becomes sufficiently developed to +formulate moral rules for his own guidance, and to create moral laws for +his fellow man. The moralisation of the gods will then follow as a +matter of course. And thereafter we can plainly observe the operation of +the moral sense on the belief in god, and upon the recognition of crude +power. Man really modifies his gods in terms of the ideal human being. +Paul's picture of a god who uses man as the potter uses his clay could +never flourish in a society which believed in the "rights of man." And +so soon as that conception developes so soon does man begin to revise +his conception of god. So with almost every great change in the form of +government or in the notions of right and wrong. In a slave state, God +favours slavery. When slavery gives place to another form of labour the +gods are equally vigorous in its condemnation. The history of the belief +in witch burning, heresy hunting, eternal damnation, etc., all +illustrate the same point--religious teachings are all modified and +moralised in accordance with the changing moral conceptions of mankind. +It is not the gods who moralise man, it is man who moralises the gods. + +The gods have their beginnings as mere powers. They are feared because +they are, not for the moral value of what they are. Social development +does all the rest. But with that development the feeling of +helplessness, of weakness, decays and there arises the demand that if +god is to be worshipped he must prove worthy of it. The conviction +arises very gradually, but it is there, and it becomes a powerful +solvent of religious ideas. Merely to govern is not enough, God must +govern well, and in terms of what we have come to understand by the word +"Justice." And to the minds of millions of moderns, when tried by that +test the idea of god breaks down. That there is a god who rules the +universe is one question; that he rules it well and in accord with what +is understood when we talk of morality, is quite another. The two +questions are quite distinct since the first might be true and the +second false. We have already seen how slender are the grounds for +believing in the first; we have now to show that the reasons for +believing in the second are quite as unsatisfactory. + +Theism has been defined as consisting in the belief in a God who is +wise, powerful, and loving, and who has selected man as the object of +his preferential care, and to this may be added the statement that most +modern theists would extend that care to the whole of sentient life. +"God's care" must be "over all his creatures," and although this care +may be subservient to some wide and far-seeing plan, there must be +nothing that looks like obvious carelessness or criminal neglect. + +To what conclusion do the facts point when they are examined in the +light of modern knowledge? Does the world supply us with the kind of +picture that one would expect to see if it were really presided over by +divine love under the guidance of divine wisdom, and backed by divine +power? The proof that it does not is shown in the almost endless +attempts made to harmonise the world as it is with the world as theory +would have it be. And a theory that needs so much defending, explaining, +and qualifying must have something radically weak about it. That there +is evil in the world all admit, that it offers _prima facie_ objection +to the theistic hypothesis is confessed by the many attempts made to fit +in this evil with the existence of God, to prove that it works in some +mysterious way for some larger good, or that its presence cannot be +dispensed with profitably. The question of why the world is as it is +with a god such as we are told exists, is, as Canon Green says, "the +really vital question, for it touches the very heart of religion." ("The +Problem of Evil"; p. 46.) How, then, does the Theist deal with it? + +Broadly, two methods are adopted. In the one case we are presented with +the order of the world, or the course of evolution, as indicative of a +beneficent scheme. This claims to freely adopt all that science has to +say concerning the development of life and to prove that this is in +harmony with the legitimate demands of the moral sense. The second is +the more orthodox way, and taking the world as it is, claims that pain +and suffering play a disciplinary and educational part in the life of +the individual. We will take these in the order named. + +When dealing with the argument from design little was said concerning +the evolutionary explanation of the special adaptations that meet us in +the animal world. It was thought better to fix attention on the purely +logical value of the argument presented. It is now necessary to look a +little closer at the ethical implications of the evolutionary process. + +It has been pointed out that all life involves a special degree of +adaptation between an organism and its environment. Destroy that +adjustment and life ceases to exist. How is that adjustment secured? The +answer of the pre-Darwinian was that it represented a deliberate design +on the part of God. Against this Darwinism propounds a theory of +automatic or mechanical adjustment which makes the calling in of deity +altogether gratuitous. And it remains gratuitous, no matter how far the +scope of the theory of natural selection may be modified. But given the +continuous variations which we know to exist with all kinds of life, +given any sort of competition between animals as to which shall live, +given even a degree of adaptation below which an animal cannot fall and +live, and it is at once plain that the better adaptations will live and +the poorer adapted will be eliminated. This process is analogous to that +by which man has managed to breed so many varieties of domesticated +animals and plants, some of the varieties presenting so marked a +difference from the original type that if found in a state of nature +they would often be classed as a distinct species. Man _selects_ the +variation that pleases him, eliminates or segregates the type that does +not, and by following up the process eventually produces a distinct and +fixed variation. It was because of the likeness of what goes on in the +case of the breeder to what we see actually going on in nature that +Darwin used the phrase "Natural Selection" as descriptive of the +process. It was not an exact phrase, and it was not meant to be exact. +For one thing--a very important thing, while a breeder selects, nature +eliminates. Man's action, in relation to the type preserved, is +positive. Nature's attitude in relation to the type preserved is +negative. This is a very important distinction; and it is one that is +fatal to the claims of theism. For if it points to a plan in nature it +points to one that aims at killing off all that can be killed, and only +sparing those who are able to protect themselves against its attack. And +one is left wondering at the type of mind which can see goodness and +wisdom in a plan that goes, on generation, after generation +manufacturing an inferior or defective type in enormous numbers in order +that a few superior specimens may be found, these in their turn to +become inferior by the arrival of some other specimens a little more +fortunate in their endowment. One hardly knows at which to marvel the +most--at the clumsiness of the plan, or at the brutality of the design. + +It was soon realised that the old argument from design was no longer +possible. But if one can only get far enough away from the possibility +of proof or disproof there is always a chance for the Goddite. So it was +argued that inasmuch as natural selection meant the emergence of a +"higher" type, and as there was no room for design within the process, +might not the process itself be an expression of design? There might +still be room for what Huxley, with one of those foolish concessions to +established opinion which is the bane of English thought, called the +"wider teleology." This was a teleology which placed a designing mind at +the back of the evolutionary process, and arranging it with a view to a +preconceived end. The process then becomes, to use Spencer's phrase, a +"beneficent" one, since it eliminates the poorer specimens and leaves +the better ones to perpetuate the species. We are thus asked to imagine +a divine wisdom selecting the better and destroying the inferior much as +an omniscient Eugenist might destroy at birth all human beings of an +undesirable type. + +The weakness of the thesis lies primarily in the fact that in the case +of the breeder he has to take the animal as he finds it, subject to the +play of forces, the characteristics of which are determined for him. He +has to make the best of the situation. In the case of the deity he +creates the animals with which he is assumed to be experimenting, he +creates the forces with all their qualities, and thus determines the +nature of the situation. Quite certainly no breeder would waste his time +in breeding over a number of generations if he could secure the desired +type at once. The whole of the argument of the advocate of the wider +teleology is that God wanted the higher type. But if that is so why did +he not produce it at once? What useful purpose could be served by +producing at the end of a lengthy and murderous process what might just +as well have been secured at the beginning? It is not wisdom but +unadulterated stupidity to take thousands of years securing what might +have been as well done in the twinkling of an eye. + +There is, in short, no justification in the creation of a process so +long as the end at which the process is aiming can be reached by a less +tortuous method. As Mr. F. C. S. Schiller says:-- + + + So long as we are dealing with finite factors, the function of pain + and the nature of evil can be more or less understood, but as soon + as it is supposed to display the working of an infinite power + everything becomes wholly unintelligible. We can no longer console + ourselves with the hope that "good becomes the final goal of ill," + we can no longer fancy that imperfection serves any secondary + purpose in the economy of the universe. A process by which evil + _becomes_ good is unintelligible as the action of a truly infinite + power which can attain its end without a process; it is absurd to + ascribe imperfection as a secondary result to a power which can + attain all its aims _without_ evil. Hence the world process, and + the intelligent purpose we fancy we detect in it must be + illusory.... God can have no purpose, and the world cannot be in + process.... If the world is the product of an infinite power it is + utterly unknowable, because its process and its nature would be + alike unnecessary and unaccountable. (_Riddles of the Sphinx_; pp. + 318-19). + + +Besides, as I have already pointed out, in the process as it meets us in +nature there is not a selection for preservation, but a selection for +killing. With the breeder preservation is primary. It is of no value to +him to kill, it is the preservation of a desired type that is all +important. In nature, so far as we can see, the whole aim is to destroy. +It is not the fittest that are preserved so much as it is the unfittest +that are killed. The fittest are left alive for no other apparent reason +than that nature is unable to kill them. The truth of this is seen in +the fact that where there is no death there is no evolution of a +"higher" type. In the case of diseases that kill there is a gradual +development of an immune type--which introduces the paradox that the +healthiest diseases from which a race may suffer are those that are most +deadly. Where a disease does not kill there is no development against +it. It is the winnowing fan of death that makes for the development of +animal life. And the correct picture of nature--if we must picture an +intelligence behind it--would be that of an intelligence aiming at +killing all, and only failing in its purpose because the natural +endowment of some placed them beyond its power. + +And, without examining the question begging word "higher," it may be +said that natural selection does not make for the uniform covering of +the earth with representatives of higher types. If in some parts of the +world the higher have replaced the lower types, elsewhere the lower have +replaced the higher. Natural selection, in fact, works without reference +to whether the form which survives is "higher" or "lower." All that +matters is adaptation. The germ of malaria renders whole tracts of the +earth uninhabitable to those whom we consider representative of the +higher culture. In other parts an alteration of the rainfall may crush +out a civilisation, and leave a handful of nomadic tribes as the sole +denizens of lands where once a lofty civilisation flourished. Throughout +the whole of nature there is never the slightest indication that forces +operate with the slightest reference to what we are accustomed to +consider the higher interests of the race. + +Moreover, from the standpoint of an apologetic theism, we are entitled +to ask precisely what is meant by this justification of the evolutionary +process in terms of the production of a higher type. The justification +of a painful or a costly experience by an individual is two-fold. First, +it is the only way, perhaps, in which certain things may be learned or +accomplished, and, second, it is the individual who passes through the +experience who benefits thereby. But suppose a person entered on a +course of training with the absolute certainty that he would never +survive it. Should we be justified in forcing the course on him? +Clearly not. The whole would be regarded as a wasted effort and as an +exhibition of gratuitous cruelty. + +Now when we look closely at this evolutionary process, who is it that +benefits thereby? In a vague way we speak of the race benefiting. But +the race is made up of individuals, and while it may be said the +individual benefits from the experience through which the race has +passed, it cannot be truthfully said that he is the better because he +has gained from experience. He does not pass through the discipline, he +simply registers, so to speak, the result. And, therefore, so far as he +is concerned, he is exactly in the position that the first man would +have been had he possessed the endowment, social, and individual, which +the present man has. There is no greater fallacy than that contained in +the common saying that man learns through experience. Individually, so +far as civilisation is concerned, that is not true. Were it true, +civilisation would be impossible. If each man had to start where our +primitive ancestors started, and learn from experience, we should end +where the first generation of socialised human beings ended, and the +generations of men would represent an endless series of first steps to +which there would be no second ones. What the individual learns from +experience is very little and would never serve to lift him from out the +ranks of savagery. What he learns from the experience of the race is +much, and gives the whole distinction between the civilised man and the +savage. It is the discipline of the race, that experience which meets +each of us in the form of traditions, counsels, institutions, etc., +from which we get the really vital lessons of life. But if that is so +the attempted justification of natural processes on the ground that God +designed them as they are so that man might learn from experience breaks +down. The individual does not so learn, but is presented with the +products of the experience of others, and which he accepts in the vast +majority of cases without even putting it to the test. And, therefore, +the method by which man learns was open from the start. Had there been +some _man_ who could have told us generations ago all that has been +slowly discovered since, we should all have been the better for it, and +we should have learned then exactly as we have learned since. And if God +was really anxious to teach us, what possible objection could there be +to his teaching us in some such way? In other words, how can we justify +the process if the result is possible by any other method? + +The standpoint of the theist is that God develops the species in order +to benefit the individual. But the order is that the individual is +sacrificed to benefit the species--so far as any benefit can be traced. +For it must be noted that it is not the individual who has passed +through all the suffering, who has lived through the years of +semi-animal life, or through the years of tyranny, that finally emerges +strengthened and triumphant. It is a different individual altogether. +The greatest benefit is secured by those who come latest, and who have +done the least to secure it. The reward bears no relation to the +personal desert. And at the end what happens? If we are to be guided by +the lessons of science, we must believe that one day the human race +will cease to exist, just as certainly as one day it began to exist. +And what are we to think of the almighty wisdom and goodness which is +responsible for all? An almighty intelligence designs a process to +produce a perfect animal through the sufferings of myriads of other +animals. It takes thousands and thousands of generations to complete the +process, and meantime every year is bringing the whole plan nearer to +extinction. Divine wisdom! Anything nearer complete stupidity and +futility it would be difficult to conceive. + +I know that at this point it will be said that I am leaving out of +account the future life, and that the story of human growth is to be +continued elsewhere. But that will certainly not meet all that has been +said above. And it is a curious manner of meeting an objection based +upon the only phase of existence that we know with assurance to tell us +that our indictment will receive a complete refutation in another state +of existence of which we know nothing at all. The reply is in itself an +admission of the truth of the charges. If life admitted of a moral +justification here there would be no need to appeal to some other life +in which these blemishes are made good. If some other life is needed to +correct the moral abnormalities of this one, then the indictment of the +Atheist is justified. And one is left again wondering why, if almighty +intelligence could make all things straight in the next world, why the +same intelligence could not have made the necessary corrections in this +one. + +The truth is that the God of the evolutionary process is as much a myth +as is the god of special creation. He has all the blemishes of the other +one--one step removed. The Paleyan God had at least the merit of coming +to close grips with his work. The evolutionary one shields himself +behind the fact that the work is done by his agents, and then it is +found that he created the agents for this special work and all that they +do is the product of the qualities with which he endowed them. If +anything the evolutionary deity is more objectionable than the older +one. And if theists will examine nature candidly and with an open mind, +they will see that it is so. I do not know that anyone has drawn a more +truthful picture of natural processes as they appear from the point of +view of being the product of a divine intelligence than has Mr. W. H. +Mallock, and his picture is the more deadly as coming from a champion of +theism. If, he says, theists will look the facts of the universe +steadily in the face: + + + What they will see will astonish them. They will see that if there + is anything at the back of this vast process, with a consciousness + and a purpose in any way resembling our own--a being who knows what + he wants and is doing his best to get it--he is instead of a holy + and all-wise God, a scatter-brained, semi-powerful, semi-impotent + monster. They will recognise as clearly as they ever did the old + familiar facts which seemed to them evidences of God's wisdom, + love, and goodness; but they will find that these facts, when taken + in connection with the others, only supply us with a standard in + the nature of this Being himself by which most of his acts are + exhibited to us as those of a criminal madman. If he had been + blind, he had not sin; but if we maintain that he can see, then his + sin remains. Habitually a bungler as he is, and callous when not + actively cruel, we are forced to regard him, when he seems to + exhibit benevolence, as not divinely benevolent, but merely weak + and capricious, like a boy who fondles a kitten and the next moment + sets a dog at it, and not only does his moral character fall from + him bit by bit but his dignity disappears also. The orderly + processes of the stars and the larger phenomena of nature are + suggestive of nothing so much as a wearisome Court ceremonial + surrounding a king who is unable to understand or to break away + from it; whilst the thunder and whirlwind, which have from time + immemorial been accepted as special revelations of his awful power + and majesty, suggest, if they suggest anything of a personal + character at all, merely some blackguardly larrikin kicking his + heels in the clouds, not perhaps bent on mischief, but indifferent + to the fact that he is causing it.... + + The truth is, if we consider the universe as a whole, it fails to + suggest a conscious and purposive God at all; and it fails to do so + not because the processes of evolution as such preclude the idea + that a God might have made use of them for a definite purpose, but + because when we come to consider these processes in detail, and + view them in the light of the only purposes they suggest, we find + them to be such that a God who could deliberately have been guilty + of them would be a God too absurd, too monstrous, too mad to be + credible. (_Religion as a Credible Doctrine_; pp. 176-8). + + +As we have already seen, the attempt to find a plan in the processes of +evolution breaks down hopelessly. On analysis, the supposed plan turns +out to be nothing more than a perception of some sort of regularity, and +as regularity is an inescapable condition of existence, all that it +proves _is_ existence. On that point there is no dispute. And the moral +justification of the cosmic process while intellectually indefensible, +adds an element of moral repulsion. That the process as we know it is +morally repugnant is shown by the appeal to the future, the request to +suspend judgment till such time as the plan is completed, when it is +hoped that the end will justify the means. God, it is trusted, will +justify himself in the future. But in his anxiety to impress upon us +the fact that God has a moral future the theist forgets that he has had +a past, and that past is a black one. The uncounted generations of +suffering in the past is not to be compensated by a probable happiness +in the future. The myriads of organisms that have lived incomplete +lives, and ended them in deaths of suffering are not cancelled by the +probability that at some time, still in the future, a comparatively +small number will lead lives of happiness. The record is there, "there +is blood upon the hand," and not all the apologies of a self-convicted +animism can ever wipe it clean. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +THE PROBLEM OF PAIN. + + +The problem of how to harmonise the existence of a God as believers +picture him to be with a world such as experience discloses, is as old +as theology. And the problem will disappear only when theology is given +up as an aggregate of question begging words and gratuitous hypotheses +based upon a foundation of primitive ignorance and inherited delusion. +For the majority of those questions that are properly called theological +are not of the necessary order. Questions such as those connected with +the mutations of matter, the development of life, the growth of society, +or the nature and clash of human passions cannot be evaded. They are +present in the facts themselves. But the problems of theology are +self-created; they arise out of certain beliefs, and have no existence +apart from those beliefs. They are the joint product of beliefs which +are wholly useless, in conflict with facts with which they cannot be +squared. + +What is known as "The Problem of Evil" is an apt illustration of the +truth of what has been said. Here there is created a problem which is +not alone quite gratuitous, but it succeeds in inverting the real +question at issue. For unless we accept the world as the product of a +good and wise God, there is no problem of evil for us to explain. The +problem of evil is, given such a deity, how to account for the existence +of evil, or, if it exists, how account for its continuance. The problem +is created by the theory. Dismiss the theory and no problem is left. +And it is in line with what is done in other directions, that, having +created the difficulty, the theist should present it to the non-theist +as one of the questions that he must answer. + +In reality there is no problem of evil in connection with ethics. The +ethical problem is not the existence of evil, but the emergence of good; +not, that is, why do men do wrong, but why do they do right. That life +should cease to be is not at all wonderful, but that with so many +potential dangers around the organism, the actions of living beings +should become so automatically adapted to their surroundings as to shun +the actions which destroy life, and perform such actions as maintain +it--at least, to such an extent as secures the preservation of the +species--may well arouse surprise and give birth to enquiry. So with the +question of evil and suffering in the world. That these exist is +undeniable, but the enquiry they suggest is only on all fours with the +enquiry suggested by any other natural fact, while the ethical problem +centres, not around the existence of wrong action, but around the +emergence of right conduct. It is the evolution of happiness that forms +the kernel of the ethical problem, not the evolution of pain. + +The earlier form of the Christian apologetic took the form of a +dualistic theory of the world. There were two powers, God and the devil, +and between them they shared the responsibility for all good and evil. +So far, good. But this was clearly saving the goodness of God at the +expense of his omnipotence. Moreover, if God was to be thought of as the +creator of the universe, the theory, as Mill said, paid him the +doubtful compliment of making him the creator of Satan, and, therefore, +the creator of evil once removed. Or, if not, God and the devil were +left as rival monarchs quarrelling over a territory that appeared to +exist apart from and independent of either. + +But nowadays the devil has gone out of fashion. Very few of the clergy +ever mention him, and although an attempt was made to reinstate him some +years ago by the author of "Evil and Evolution," the endeavour was a +failure. And bereft of the convenient scapegoat, the devil, the present +day theist is compelled to attempt an apology for evil that will appeal +to natural and verifiable facts for confirmation, or which must, at +least, not be in conflict with them. If theism is to stand, a place and +a meaning must be found for the evil in the world, and found in such a +way that it either relieves God of the responsibility for its existence +or its being can be shown to harmonise with his assumed character. It is +no longer possible to fall back on Paul's position that the potter is at +liberty to doom one pot to honour and the other to dishonour. The moral +responsibility for the kind of pots he turns out cannot be so easily +evaded. As Professor Sorley says, "If ethical theism is to stand, the +evil in the world cannot be referred to God in the same way as the good +is referred to him." Somehow, he must be relieved of the responsibility +for its existence, or a purpose for it must be found. + +Now, curiously enough, modern theists hover between the two positions. +Professor Sorley, representing one position, says that the only way to +avoid referring evil to God is by "the postulate of human freedom." +("Moral Values and the Idea of God," p. 469.) This is also the way out +adopted by Canon Green in "The Problem of Evil," and it turns upon a +mere play on words. Thus, Canon Green says that there is one thing God +could not do. "He could not force him to be good, i.e., to choose virtue +freely, for the idea of forcing a free being to choose involves a +contradiction." And Professor Sorley says more elaborately that "things +occur in the universe which are not due to God's will, although they +must have happened with his permission ... a higher range of power and +perfection is shown in the creation of free beings than in the creation +of beings whose every thought and action are pre-determined by their +Creator," and while he admits there is limitations to man's power of +choice, he holds that there is one form of choice that is always there, +and that is the choice of good and evil. ("Moral Values and the Idea of +God," pp. 469-70.) + +In all this one can see little more than verbal confusion. To commence +with Canon Green, which will also cover much that Prof. Sorley says on +the same point. When we are told man must choose virtue freely in order +that what he does shall partake of the character of morality, it is +plain that he is using the word "forced" in two senses. In the one sense +force may mean no more than a determinant. Thus we may say that our +sympathies _force_ us to act in such and such a way. Or the religious +man may say that the love of God forces him to act in such and such a +manner. Force here means any consideration that will lead to action, and +no one can object to its use in this sense. + +A second meaning of force is that of compulsion from without, as when a +strong man gets hold of a weak one and by exertion of physical strength +compels him to do something that he is disinclined to do, or when one +forces another by threat of punishment. In this latter sense no one +dreams of harmonising force with moral action. Neither law nor common +sense does so. But compulsion in the sense of one's actions being forced +by a mental or moral disposition no one outside an asylum would dispute. +And what Canon Green does is to ask us to reject the idea of a moral +action being forced, in the sense of external compulsion, and then uses +it in the sense of an absence of dispositions that will lead to certain +courses of conduct. + +It is probable that the Canon would reject this interpretation of his +statement, but if it does not mean this, then his argument is +unintelligible. For if it is admitted that what man does is the product +of his mental or moral dispositions, in other words, of his nature, and +if, as is undeniable, the nature with which he fronts the world is the +product of heredity and environment, he would no more be "forced" to do +good had God given him impulses strong enough to overcome all tendency +to evil than he is now when his impulses come to him from his ancestors +and his general social heredity. + +All that is implied in a moral act is free choice. But choice is free, +not when it is independent of organic promptings; that is absurd; but +when those organic promptings are allowed to find expression. There is +no other rational meaning to "choice" than this. Choice does not tell us +how it is determined, on that point it can say nothing, any more than a +child can say why it chooses sugar in preference to cayenne pepper. Its +choice, we say, is determined by its taste. And its taste is determined +by--? To answer that question we must call in the chemist and the +physiologist, and they probably will tell us why our choice moves in one +direction rather than in another. + +When men like Canon Green talk of the morality of an action being +dependent upon our _choice_ between right and wrong, what they probably +have in their minds is the perception of right and wrong. For we may +perceive the possibility of one course while we are performing another. +But the power of choice is clearly limited. A man cannot choose to be a +mathematician, however much he may see the desirability of becoming one. +And many a man may in the moral sphere see the advisability of his being +different in character from what he is, but may altogether lack the +capacity of becoming such. And the power of choice differs not only with +each individual, but with the same individual at different times. +Finally, the more fixed the character of the individual the less +conscious he is of choice, or of a sense of freedom to do differently +from what he actually does, and as this applies with equal force to +character, whether it be good or bad, we reach, finally, the suicidal +position that the more fundamentally moral a man becomes, the less moral +he is.[5] + +Now seeing that all our educational processes aim at making the good +character, so to speak, automatic, that is, to quite fill the mind with +worthy motives and wise power of choice, and seeing also that a +character is good so far as this is done, will some one explain in what +way moral character would have suffered had God so made man that he +would have had intelligence enough to always choose the good and reject +the bad? For, be it noted, the apology put forward for the present state +of affairs is that man is in a state of probation, he is passing through +a course of moral discipline, and it is essential that he should +experience the possibility to do wrong, and even to occasionally do the +wrong. And the end of the process of tuition is, what? The production of +a perfect being in whom there shall not be a proneness to do wrong, to +whose purified moral nature wrong doing shall be quite foreign. That is +to say that we are to reach as a result of this long roundabout process, +with all its waste and bungling, just what might have been established +at the beginning. For either the perfect moral being is without the +quality which we have just been assured is essential to morality, or the +whole argument is reduced to nonsense. + +For it is impossible to assume that the bad man chooses to be bad with a +full perception of the consequences of his actions, and at the same time +with the power to do otherwise. We all agree that the _right_ choice is +ultimately a _wise_ choice, and that if we could all trace out the +consequences of all we do, we should realise that it was to our real +interest to act rightly. And if that is admitted, it follows that the +"choice" to do evil is the product of short-sightedness, or of some +defect of temperament which prevents our standing up against the +temptations of the moment. And our ethical education is mainly directed +to making good this defect in our make up. But suppose that amount of +wisdom or strength had been an endowment of our nature from the outset, +is there any conceivable way in which we should have been the worse for +it? For even as it is there are some people who do make a fairly wise +and right choice, and whose high-water mark of excellence is not reached +through the crime and folly of the revival meeting convert. Are they the +worse because they have never yielded to evil? Is the naturally good man +really a less worthy character than the one whose comparative goodness +is only reached through and after a lengthy course of evil living? And +if not, in what way would the race have been worsened had we all been as +fortunately circumstanced? If it was really God's purpose to have a race +of men and women who should be both good and wise, it remains for the +theist to show in what way the plan would not have been as well served +by making them at once with a sufficiency of intelligence to act in the +real interests of themselves and of all around them. + +Coming closer to earth the theist attempts to find a justification for +the existing order of things by finding a use for pain and suffering in +their educational influence on human nature, and in the impossibility of +altering for the better the consequences of natural law. + +The real question at issue, says one of the most eloquent of modern +theists, the late Dr. Martineau, is "whether the laws of which complaint +is made work such harm that they ought never to have been enacted; or +whether, in spite of occasional disasters in their path, the sentient +existence of which they are the conditions has in its history a vast +excess of blessing." (Study of Religion II., p. 91.) And Canon Green, +who uses some of Dr. Martineau's ideas without the latter's eloquence or +power of reasoning, asks, "If God were to say, 'You condemn me for this +suffering! Well, take my creative power and re-create the world to +please yourself and to suit your own sense of justice and mercy'" could +we think out a world that should be better than this one? (Problem of +Evil, p. 48.) + +Now both these methods of raising the question--and they are +representative of a whole group--serve but to confuse the issue. For no +one denies that some benefit may result from the present cosmical +structure. But that does not touch the complaint that the structure is +not such as fits in with the existence of a presiding intelligence such +as theism asks us to accept. And the question of Canon Green's whether +we could turn out a better universe than the one that actually exists, +is wide of the mark also. If I purchase a motor car as the work of a +genius in car-building, and find when I get my purchase home that it +cannot be made to run, it does not destroy the justice of my complaint +to ask whether I could build a better one or not. The important thing is +that the car is not what it should be, and judging by the product the +builder is not what he is represented to be either. Dr. Martineau was +far too keen a controversialist to adopt Canon Green's foolish retort, +but he does seek to parry the force of the atheist criticism by saying +that God "if once he commits his will to any determinate method, and for +the realisation of his ends selects and institutes a scheme of +instrumental rules, he thereby shuts the door on a thousand things that +might have been done before." (_Study_, p. 85). To that one may reply, +so much the worse for his judgment; while if the fact of his having once +adopted a "determinate method" caused him to resolve to stick to it, in +spite of its consequences in practice, and irrespective of the +beneficial results that might have followed its modification, we can +only regret that the deity was not acquainted with Emerson's opinion +that "a foolish consistency is the bugbear of little minds." Even what +is said to be the greatest mind of all might easily have benefited from +the warning. + +Canon Green tries another line of reply, which is not in the least more +convincing. He pictures to us a father who, by misappropriating trust +funds, brings disgrace to the whole of his family. The mother is driven +to despair and drink. The sister dies for want of food, the brother +finds his career ruined. The disaster is complete, and Canon Green says +it is inevitable because we cannot have a world in which the relations +of parents and children exist without having them suffer from each +other's faults. So far as the present world goes that is true. But it is +certainly a strange reply to the complaint that an arrangement is unjust +to say that as the injustice results from the arrangement, therefore, we +have no cause for complaint. And that _we_ are unable to make a better +world is beside the mark. Between the perception of an injustice, and +the ability to remove it there is a world of difference, and although we +may be unable to remedy the defect the defect remains. + +But, indeed, human nature does try to produce a world in which such +happenings as those depicted shall either not occur or their +consequences shall be reduced to a minimum. We do not hang a son for +his parents' crime, nor do humane people blame children for the +shortcomings of their parents. To some extent we try to correct the +consequences that follow, and even though the endeavour be futile, that +is in itself an indictment of the existing order. Man does at least try +to correct the injustices his God is said to have created. + +It is overlooked also that the evils which follow from wrong actions are +not confined to those immediately connected, and who may conceivably +have their resentment to some extent dulled, if not lessened, by that +fact. People in no way connected, and who can have no perception of the +cause of their suffering, who are unconscious of everything, save the +one fact that they are suffering, feel its consequences. When a great +war spreads devastation all over the world, can it be said that any +useful purpose is served by the sufferings of millions who are not in +the slightest degree aware of the cause of their agony? When a shady +financial operation brings an innocent man to ruin, and effects all the +consequences which Canon Green imagines resulting from the defaulting +parent, how can it be said that the catastrophe admits of ethical +justification? In many cases the thought of the injury experienced acts +itself as a fresh cause of degradation. It creates a rankling and a +bitterness which depresses and inhibits the power to struggle, unless it +be the desire to struggle for revenge against a condition of things of +which the evil results are only too apparent. People are not merely +punished for the evil they do; they are punished for the evil that +others do, and the punishment, so far as we can see, bears no observable +relation to the wrong done. There is no _ethical_ relation between +actions and consequences. Not alone is the incidence of an action +dependent upon personal qualities--some will suffer more from having +accidentally told an untruth than others will suffer from having +committed gross and deliberate fraud--but nature is absolutely careless +of whether what I do is motived by good or bad intentions. If I get a +wetting through going out to help some one in distress, the consequences +will be exactly the same as though I had got wet going out to commit a +burglary or a murder. And when Dr. Martineau talks of the "natural +penalties for guilt," and adds that "sin being there, it would be simply +monstrous that there should be no suffering and would fully justify the +despair which now raises its sickly cry of complaint against the +retributory wretchedness of human transgression" (_Study_ II., p. 106), +the reply is that there are no such things as "_natural_ penalties for +guilt." There are only consequences of actions, and they are the same +whatever be the moral quality of the actions performed. In the same way +that nature may in the course of an earthquake destroy the homes of a +dozen worthy families and leave a gambling hell untouched, so it will in +other directions punish where a man, from good intentions, places +himself in the path of punishment, and refrain from afflicting one whose +selfishness or greed has guarded him against attack. There are natural +consequences of actions, there are no natural penalties for guilt, and +there are no natural rewards for innocence. Rewards and penalties are +the creation of man, and it is only in the form of a figure of speech +that we can apply them to nature. + +It is equally idle to speak of pain as a form of discipline. Professor +Sorley says that if the pain in the world can be turned to the increase +of goodness, then its existence offers no insuperable objection to "the +ethical view of reality." So Dr. Martineau says that suffering is "the +moral discipline" through which our nature arrives at its "true +elevation." It is needless to multiply quotations; such statements are +the commonplaces of theistic controversy, and almost any book that one +cares to pick up will supply further illustrations, if they be required. +None can reject them, because no theist can afford to candidly admit +that the world we know offers no justification for his belief. The +belief in the goodness of God, as Canon Green says, is a belief that is +"absolutely fundamental to all religion," and if the facts as we see +them do not support the belief, some apology must be found that will +marry the theory to the fact. + +Nevertheless, the belief in the disciplinary power of pain or suffering +is, if not quite illusory, so nearly so that it is useless for the +purpose for which it is brought forward. In the first place, it does not +require very profound study to see that whatever are the lessons taught +by suffering they are seldom proportionate to the conduct which cause +them, nor do those who suffer reap the alleged disciplinary benefit of +their suffering. Let us take a common case. A mother goes out and leaves +a child near an unguarded fire. The mother returns to find the child +burned to death. Where is the discipline here? Certainly the child +cannot have gained any. But there is, of course, the mother. The mother +has learned such a lesson that she will never forget it, and will never +again commit the same blunder. There we have it. A child is allowed to +die by a hideously cruel death in order that a mother may learn a lesson +in carefulness. It is good to learn from other sources that God's ways +are not our ways. A man who tried to imitate them, and who burned one of +his children in order to teach its mother how to look after the rest, +would soon find himself in the criminal court, or in an asylum. But what +would be insanity or criminal cruelty in the case of man, becomes, in +the alembic of religious apologetic, goodness and wisdom in God. + +The theory that it is the function of pain to elevate and to discipline +is simply not true. One has only to look to see that in countless cases +the effect of pain is disaster. The world's best work is not born of +pain but of pleasure. There is no pain and no suffering, there is hardly +even toil, in the work of a genius. In all the higher walks of music, of +art, of literature, the work is perfect in proportion as the worker +finds himself in agreeable and pleasant surroundings. And what is true +of the higher aspect of art is true also of life in general. Life may be +lived in spite of pain, as good work may be done in spite of +discouraging circumstances, but one might as well talk of a plant +flourishing because of poor soil, or sharp frosts, as to speak of life +becoming better because of pain. + +The normal function of pain is to depress, that of pleasure is to +heighten. As Spencer said, every pain lowers the tide of life; every +pleasure raises the tide of life. It is one of the commonest of sights +to see those suffering from illness becoming more self-centred, less +careful of others, and to see the disintegrating consequences of +disease on character. Here and there one may find a character that has +had its rough edges smoothed down by suffering, but for every case of +that kind one may find a score of an opposite order. It is not the +underfed, badly clothed, neglected child that is likely to make the best +citizen, but the one that has the best chance of developing itself in +healthy surroundings. And it is a curious commentary, if it were true, +to argue that a good and wise God so arranged things that pain and +suffering, even undeserved suffering, should be the main way for the +development of character. + +A strange but not uncommon argument is used by Canon Green in dealing +with the suffering incidental to the various disasters that overtake +mankind from time to time. Suffering, he says, has a certain element of +martyrdom about it. Even evils due to human greed and carelessness bring +some benefit in their train. Thus, apropos of the _Titanic_ disaster:-- + + + Every such disaster tends to produce some improvement for future + generations. Shipowners are forced to supply more boats, wireless + instalment is required on all ships; the idle rich are led to think + less of saving useless time and more of saving lives, their own and + those of men in the stokeholds. In a sense those who perish may be + said to be unwilling martyrs who by their deaths purchase some + advantage for others. It will be said that it is a great price to + pay for a small advantage, and one which might have been cheaply + gained in some other ways. That is so. But so too the ways of + nature are cruel. So many seeds must be sown, so many young animals + or birds or fishes born, so many must be trampled out of existence, + that only the best may survive. (_Problem of Evil_; pp. 163-4). + + +That certainly puts all the owners of slum property, all the grasping +shipowners, all those who batten and fatten on other people's welfare in +a most favourable light. We have been thinking them almost criminals +when they were in reality public benefactors. They lead to many +improvements, and even though the improvements come too late to benefit +those who suffer from the evils, yet they do come--sometimes. Certainly +it might give some comfort if the sufferers knew what it was they were +being sacrificed for, and that others would be benefited by their death. +But they do not, and we are therefore bound to conclude that whatever +satisfaction is felt is by those who survive. When a _Titanic_ sinks it +must be the people on shore who see the element of goodness in it since +it makes travelling easier for _them_. And the kindness developed in one +who can excuse the brutalities of nature because it brings some benefit +to himself is of a rather startling nature. + +The fundamental fault in all reasoning of this order lies in the +assumption that pain ceases to be pain if it can be shown to bring good +to _some_ one. But that it not so. Pleasure and pain are not +quantitative things, increments of which can be carried on from +generation to generation and a balance struck at the end, much as one +strikes a balance between the profits and losses of a year's trading. +All suffering and all enjoyment are of necessity personal. Suffering is +not increased by extending it over a million instances. There was not +more pain because a larger number happened to be be killed in the +European war than are killed in a borderland skirmish. There were a +larger _number_ of people involved in the one case than in the other, +but that is all. Multiplying the number of cases makes a greater appeal +to a sluggish imagination, but it adds nothing substantial to the fact. +Feeling, whether it be pleasant or painful, is a matter of individual +experience, and that being so it is not the number of people who suffer +through no fault of their own, and, so far as one can see, without any +benefit proportionate to the suffering experienced, but the fact of +there being this suffering at all. That is the point the theist must +face; it is the one point he systematically avoids. + +Another form of the same argument meets us in the familiar plea that +bodily pain "sounds the alarm bell of disease in time for its removal." +In some sense it may be admitted that a painful feeling, in certain +circumstances, does act as a warning that persistence will lead to +disaster. But it is not universally true in the sense and in the degree +that is needed to justify the argument, and it is a "warning" out of all +proportion to the danger faced. In the first place, pain cannot be a +warning against disease, it can only be an indication of its presence. +It does not warn us against the dangers of a contemplated course of +conduct, nor can it tell us what conduct has led to the pain +experienced. And in the case of contagious diseases, what amount of +warning is there given? In some case the victim is stricken and is dead +in so short a time as not to know with what it is he has been afflicted, +and certainly without any chance of being warned. What warning is there +in the case of a violent poison? Or what relation is there between pains +felt and dangers run? The most dangerous diseases may have painless +beginnings, and be well rooted in the system before the victim is +driven by discomfort to seek medical advice. On the other hand, a corn +or a toothache, neither of them very deadly ailments, create pain out of +all proportion to their gravity. And if we take the case of excessive +cold we have here an instance where instead of pain acting as a warning, +the danger just acts as an anaesthetic. The victim is oppressed by +drowsiness, sinks into insensibility, finally death. Here it is not the +approach of death that is painful, but the return to life, the pain of +restoring circulation being very severe indeed. + +Fear, which may be classed as a species of pain, appears to act, in the +majority of instances, as an enemy, rather than as a friend to the +animal experiencing it. Thus Professor Mosso points out that in the +animal organism there exists a number of harmful reactions that increase +in number the graver the peril becomes. We have all read of the +"fascination" of the bird by the serpent, and there are other animals +that in the presence of an enemy become so palsied with fear as to +become incapable of defence, even that of flight. And with man it is not +as the danger becomes most acute that his nerves become steadier and his +courage firmer. The opposite is probably more often the case. In all +these cases it is as though nature had lured the animal or man into a +position of grave danger, and then does its best to divest him of +adequate means of defence against it. + +Common sense revolts against the doctrine that pain is a good thing, and +the fact of this is everywhere seen in the attempt of man to get rid of +it. No one trusts it as a sure warning against disease, no one turns to +it as a means of purifying character. All these pleas are the mere +platitudes of a religious apologetic trying to harmonise a primitive +theory of things with a larger knowledge and a more developed moral +sense. Pain and suffering in the world remain facts whether we believe +in the existence of a God or not, but we are at least freed from the +paralysing horror of the belief that all the suffering and pain in +nature is part of a plan. If man realised all that that belief involved +it might indeed rob his mind of all strength to struggle against the +forces that make for his destruction. Fortunately no race of people +could act upon the logical implications of the theistic theory and +maintain its existence. In practice, as well as in theory, theism has +had to come to terms with facts. And now the series of adjustments have +almost reached their end. The belief in God has been traced to its +origin, and we know it to have issued in an altogether discredited view +of the world and of man. We know that man does not discover God, he +invents him, and an invention is properly discarded when a better +instrument is forthcoming. To-day the hypothesis of God stands in just +the same relation to the better life of to-day as the fire drill of the +savage does to the modern method of obtaining a light. The belief in God +may continue awhile in virtue of the lack of intelligence of some, of +the carelessness of others, and of the conservative character of the +mass. But no amount of apologising can make up for the absence of +genuine knowledge, nor can the flow of the finest eloquence do aught but +clothe in regal raiment the body of a corpse. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[5] I have discussed this question at length in my "Determinism or Free +Will." + + + + +Part II. + +SUBSTITUTES FOR ATHEISM. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +A QUESTION OF PREJUDICE. + + +It affords some ground for surprise that there should be so great a +resentment shown against religious disbelief in general and against +Atheism in particular. We have here more than the mere rejection of a +theory or view of life. There is a certain emotional resentment, a +shrinking from the one who is guilty of disbelief, such as is not +explainable on ordinary grounds. The attitude is ridiculous, so +ridiculous that many who adopt it are ashamed to openly acknowledge it, +but it is there, and its existence calls for explanation. + +We believe this is to be found in the peculiar history of the god-idea +combined with primitive theories of social life. Like many frames of +mind that persist in civilised society, this attitude towards disbelief +has its roots in a conception of the world that has been generally +discarded and in social conditions that have ceased to exist among +civilised people. To begin with, we have the fact that religion +dominates the life of primitive man to a degree that is almost +inconceivable to the modern mind. The anger of the tribal gods has to be +always reckoned with. What they desire must be done, what they do not +desire must be avoided. In the next place there exists a very strong +sense of collective responsibility. What one member of a tribe does the +whole of the tribe is responsible for, both to the members of other +tribes and to the gods. We see a survival of this in the reversion to a +more primitive state of things that takes place during a war. In some +circumstances hatred of the whole of a people with whom a nation is at +war becomes a duty, and all are responsible for the offences of each. So +in primitive times an offence against the gods became an act of treason +against the tribe. It might expose the whole of the tribe to disaster. + +It is not, it must be noted, that primitive man is fond of the gods, or +jealous of their honour; he is not any more fond of them than is the +modern citizen of the tax-collector. And no one will ever really +understand the question of religion until he rids himself of the notion +that primitive man spends his time _looking_ for gods or that he is +happy in their company. He is simply afraid that a single unruly member +may get the whole tribe into a serious difficulty. The savage is +severely practical; his conduct rests upon grounds of, to him, the most +obvious utility, and his treatment of the heretic leaves little to be +desired on the score of effectiveness. The unbeliever is a dangerous +person, and he is promptly suppressed. The first heretic died a martyr +to the tribe; the last heretic will die a martyr to the race. + +Primitive conditions die out, but primitive feelings linger, and +although in theory we have reached the stage of believing that each +person must bear the consequences of his own religious opinions, the +deeply rooted dislike to the man who rejects the rule of the gods +remains. + +Historically we have also to reckon with the operations of an interested +priesthood, but leaving that on one side as a secondary development it +would seem that one must trace to some such cause as the one above +indicated the deep and widespread dislike to such a term as atheism, +even by many who to all intents and purposes are atheist in their +opinion. Certainly in this country, where compromise is more fashionable +than in many other places, the dislike to the word is partly due to its +uncompromising character. It is clear cut and definite. Its connotations +cannot be misunderstood by any one who takes the word in its literal +meaning. The Theist is one who believes in a personal God. The Atheist +is one who is without belief in a personal God. The meaning is clear, +and the implied mental attitude is plain. It is opposed to theism, and +has no significance apart from Theism. And, as will be seen, when +non-theists quarrel with it, it is only because it is mis-stated or +misunderstood. + +But most people dislike clear cut terms. They prefer to exist in an +atmosphere of mental ambiguity and intellectual fog which blurs outlines +and obscures differences. Unbeliever is preferable to some, +sceptic--presumably because of its age and philosophical associations, +is a greater favourite, and Agnostic is more beloved than either--the +latter has indeed been pressed into the service of a more or less +nebulous "religion." As it is said, "We are all Socialists nowadays," so +it is said that we are unbelievers or Agnostics nowadays. But no one +says we are all Atheists nowadays. Timidity can find no use for a word +of that character. Of course, if a man believes that some word other +than Atheism best describes his state of mind, he has a perfect right to +select the one that seems fittest. But when one finds non-theists +repudiating the name of Atheist with as much moral indignation as though +they had been accused of shoplifting, one cannot help the suspicion +that the heat displayed is not unconnected with some lurking fear of the +"respectabilities." It does seem that while many may have outgrown all +fear of the God of orthodoxy, the fear of the god of social pressure +remains. + +So far as the Theist is concerned it is quite understandable that his +objection to Atheism should involve a certain moral element. That would +result from what has already been said concerning the cause of the fear +of heresy. Still one would have thought that in these days it would +require a person of almost abnormal stupidity to assume that disbelief +in God has its roots in a defective moral character. The facts would +warrant a quite opposite conclusion. In the first place, the rejection +of any well-established belief argues a degree of independence of mind +that is, unfortunately, not common. The ordinary mind follows the common +route. It is the extraordinary mind that strikes out from the beaten +path. The heretic, whether in politics or in religion, may be wrong, but +there is always with him the guarantee of a certain measure of mental +strength that is not, on the face of the matter, present with one who +follows the orthodox path. And that in itself represents a type of mind +of no little social value. Moreover, I for one, am quite ready to assert +that, class for class, the Freethinker does represent a type of mind +considerably above the average. That this is not more generally +recognised is due to the policy of the religious advocate in contrasting +the uneducated Freethinker with the educated believer. + +Secondly, it strikes one as almost insane to assume that in a Christian +country Atheism should be professed as a cloak or as an excuse for +misconduct. They who talk in this strain greatly undervalue the +accommodating power of religion. Is there a single form of rascality +known to man for which religion has not been able to provide a sanction? +If there is I have failed to come across it. The use of religion made by +tyranny in all ages and in all countries is proof of how accommodating +it is to man's passions and interests. The picture of the dying murderer +meeting his end, filled with the consolation of religion, and certain of +his speedy salvation, contains a lesson that all may read if they will. + +Error there may be in any case where opinion is concerned, but +profession of an opinion that paves the way for suspicion and +persecution provides a _prima facie_ guarantee of honesty that cannot be +furnished by the advocacy of one that stands high in the public favour. +For aught I know to the contrary, every one of England's Bishops may be +quite honest men. But there can be no certainty about it so long as the +profession carries with it all it does. The dice are loaded in favour of +conviction. But the man who faces social ostracism, and even loss of +liberty in defence of an opinion, is giving a hostage to truth such as +none other can give. + +This association of heresy with a defective moral character is a very +old game. It has been played by all religions, and, it must be admitted, +with considerable success. Writing in the second century Lucian shows us +the same policy at work in his day. In one of his dialogues, when the +Atheist has refuted one after another the theistic arguments of his +opponent, the defender of the gods turns on his opponent with-- + + + You god robbing, shabby, villainous, infamous, halter-sick + vagabond! Does not everybody know that your father was a + tatterdemalion, and your mother no better than she should be? that + you murdered your brother and are guilty of other execrable crimes? + You lewd, lying, rascally, abominable varlet. + + +That type of disputant is still with us, and is still supporting his +beliefs with the same tactics. And it is successful with some. There is +a certain snobbishness in human nature that makes it seek the +association of well-known names and shun all of those with an +unfashionable reputation. To observe the way in which some people will +introduce into their conversation, speeches, or writings, the names of +well-known men, is a revelation of this mental snobbery. And the moral +equivalent of this is the fear of being found in the company of an +opinion that has been branded as immoral. Such people have all the fear +of an unpopular opinion that a savage has of a tribal taboo--it is, in +fact, a survival of the same spirit that gave the tribal taboo its +force. It is, thus, not a very difficult matter to warn people off an +undesirable opinion. Samuel Taylor Coleridge relates how the clergy +raised the cry of Atheism against him, although he had never advanced +further than Deism. And it is to his credit that in referring to this +charge he said:-- + + + Little do these men know what Atheism is. Not one man in a thousand + has either strength of mind or goodness of heart to be an Atheist. + I repeat it. Not one man in a thousand has either strength of mind + or goodness of heart to be an Atheist. + + +And we have also the oft-quoted testimony of the late Professor +Tyndall:-- + + + It is my comfort to know that there are amongst us many whom the + gladiators of pulpit would call Atheists and Materialists, whose + lives, nevertheless, as tested by any accessible standard of + morality would contrast more than favourably with the lives of + those who seek to stamp them with this offensive brand. When I say + "offensive," I refer merely to the intention of those who use such + terms, and not because Atheism or Materialism, when compared with + many of the notions ventilated in the columns of religious + newspapers has any particular offensiveness to me. If I wish to + find men who are scrupulous in their adherence to engagements, + whose words are their bond, and to whom moral shiftiness of any + kind is subjectively unknown, if I wanted a loving father, a + faithful husband, an honourable neighbour, and a just citizen, I + would seek him among the band of Atheists to which I refer. I have + known some of the most pronounced amongst them, not only in life, + but in death--seeing them approaching with open eyes the inexorable + goal, with no dread of a "hangman's whip," with no hope of a + heavenly crown, and still as mindful of their duties, as if their + eternal future depended upon their latest deeds. + + +Still the moral cry is too useful with the crowd to lead to the +conviction that anything one could say would lead to its disuse. In the +dialogue of Lucian's to which we have referred, and after the theist has +been refuted by the Atheist, Hermes consoles the chief deity, Zeus, by +telling him that even though a few may have been won over by the +arguments of the Atheist, the vast majority, "the whole mass of +uneducated Greeks and the Barbarians everywhere," still remain firm in +their faith. And although Zeus replies that he would prefer one sensible +man to a thousand fools, when a case depends upon the adherence of the +relatively foolish, numbers will always bring some consolation to the +champions of an intellectually distressed creed. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +WHAT IS ATHEISM? + + +Between Atheism and Theism there is no logical halting place. But there +are, unfortunately, many illogical ones. Few possess the capacity for +pushing their ideas to a logical conclusion, and some position is +finally discovered which has the weakness of both extremes with the +strength of neither. With many there is vague talk of a "Power" +manifested in the universe, and by giving this the dignity of capital +letters it is evidently hoped that ether people will recognise it as an +equivalent for God. But power, with or without capitals, is not God. It +is not the existence of a "Power" that forms the kernel of the dispute +between the Theist and the Atheist, but what that power is like. The +issue arises on the point of whether it is personal or not. That it is, +is what the religious man believes. As Mr. Balfour says, when the plain +man speaks of God he means "a God whom men can love, to whom men can +pray, who takes sides, who has purposes and preferences, whose +attributes, however conceived, leaves the possibility of a personal +relation between Himself and those whom he has created." ("Theism and +Humanism," p. 21.) What the genuine believer has in view is not the +worthless abstraction of a rationalised metaphysic, but the personal +being of historic theology. + +It is now my purpose to take a few of these substitutes for Atheism by +the aid of which some persons seek to mark themselves off from a +declared and reasoned unbelief. As outstanding examples of this one may +take two men of no less eminence than Herbert Spencer and Professor +Huxley. Both of these men have rendered great service to advanced +thought, but both have only succeeded in repudiating Atheism by +misstating and misrepresenting it. In addition to the service that +Spencer unwittingly rendered the current religion by his use of the +"Unknowable" (with which we deal fully later), a further help was given +by his destruction of an Atheism that had no existence. This remarkable +performance will be found in the first part of his "First Principles." +Respecting the origin of the universe, he tells us, there are three +intelligible propositions--although neither of these, on his own +showing, is intelligible. We may assert that it is self-existent, that +it is self-created, or that it is created by an external agency. All +three propositions, he proceeds to show, are equally inconceivable. The +noticeable thing about the performance is that Atheism is identified +with the proposition that the universe is self-existent. A very slight +acquaintance with the writings of representative Atheists would have +shown Mr. Spencer that "the origin of the universe" is one of those +questions on which Atheism has wisely been silent, and it has also +insisted that all attempts to deal with such a question can only result +in a meaningless string of words. To the Atheist, "the universe"--the +sum of existence--is a fact that no amount of reasoning can get behind +or beyond. To think of the universe as a whole is an impossibility; +while to talk of its origin is to assume, first, that it did originate, +and, second, that we have some means by which we can transcend all the +known limits of the human mind. The Atheist can say, and has said, with +Mr. Spencer himself--whose final statement of Agnosticism differs in no +material respect from Atheism, that in discussing the "origin of the +universe," we can only succeed in multiplying impossibilities of thought +"by every attempt we make to explain its existence." No one has pointed +out more clearly than Mr. Spencer that "infinity" is not a conception, +but the negation of one. The pity is that he did not realise that in +taking up this position he was on exactly the same level of criticism +that Atheists have pursued. For them the universe is an ultimate fact; +all that we can do is to mark the ceaseless changes always going on +around us, and to develope our capacity for modifying their action in +the interests of human welfare. Farther than this our knowledge does not +and cannot go; and it may be added that even though our knowledge could +go beyond the world of phenomena, such knowledge would not be of the +slightest possible value. + +It may also be pointed out that, just as it is not true that Atheism +attempts to explain the origin of the universe, so it is unfair to tie +the Atheist down to any particular theory of cosmic evolution. As a +mental attitude Atheism is quite independent of any theory of cosmic +working, so long as that theory does not involve an appeal to deity. As +we shall see, Atheism, from the point of view both of history and +etymology, stands for the negation of theism, and its final +justification must be found in the untenability of the theistic +position. + +Rightly enough it may be argued that the acceptance of Atheism implies a +certain general mental attitude towards both cosmic and social +questions, but the Atheist, as such, is no more committed to a special +scientific theory than he is committed to a special theory of +government. Of course, it is convenient for the Theist to first of all +saddle his opponent with a set of social or scientific beliefs, and then +to assume that in attacking those beliefs he is demolishing Atheism, but +it is none the less fighting on a false issue. All that Atheism +necessarily involves is that all forms of Theism are logically +untenable, and consequently the only effective method of destroying +Atheism is to establish its opposite. + +Professor Huxley's treatment of Atheism proceeds on similar lines to +that already dealt with, but is more elaborate in character. Discussing +the nature of his own opinions he repudiates all sympathy with Atheism, +because: + + + "the problem of the ultimate cause of existence is one which seems + to me to be hopelessly out of reach of my poor powers. Of all the + senseless babble I have ever had occasion to read, the + demonstrations of those philosophers who undertake to tell us about + the nature of God would be the worst, if they were not surpassed by + the still greater absurdities of the philosophers who try to prove + there is no God." (_On the Hypothesis the Animals are Automata._) + + +And on another occasion, replying to a correspondent, he expresses the +opinion that "Atheism is, on philosophical grounds, untenable, that +there is no evidence of the god of the theologians is true enough, but +strictly scientific reasoning can take us no further. When we know +nothing we can neither affirm nor deny with propriety." (_Life and +Letters_, p. 162.) + +Here, again, we have the common error that Atheism seeks in some way to +explain the ultimate cause of existence. And this in spite of continuous +disclaimers that all search for a "first cause," or for a "cause of +existence" is midsummer madness. The fault here, we suspect, is that +both writers took their statement of Atheism, not from Atheistic writers +but from their opponents. But it is none the less surprising that it was +not recognised that both "a first cause" and an "ultimate cause of +existence," are, strictly speaking, theistic questions. I do not mean +that these questions may not suggest themselves to non-theists, but that +when they are raised clearly and definitely they are seen to belong to a +class of questions to which no rational answer is possible. To the +Theist, however, the questions arise from his primary assumptions. His +theory is one of final causes; his deity is postulated as the cause of +existence, and he cannot give up the questions as hopeless without +admitting his position to be indefensible. It is quite usual for the +theist to propound problems which only arise on his own assumptions, and +then call upon his opponents for answers to them, but there is no +justification whatever for non-theists playing the same game. Atheism +has nothing to do with final causes, and therefore is not concerned with +defending its illogicalities. Theism is a doctrine of final causes, and +in arguing that it is absurd to express an opinion upon the subject +Professor Huxley was adding a good reason in support of the position he +believed himself to be destroying. + +Huxley's other objection to Atheism is that it perpetuates the absurdity +of trying to prove there is no God. How far is that true? Or in what +sense is it true? The danger in all discussion on this point lies in our +taking it for granted that "God" conveys a definite and identical +meaning to all people. But this is very far from being the case. What +anyone means by "God" it is impossible to say until some further +description has been given. When this has been done, and not until then, +"God" may become the subject of affirmation or denial. Until then we are +playing with empty words. By itself "God" means nothing. It offers the +possibility of neither negation nor affirmation. + +Now Professor Huxley would have readily admitted that the truth of a +proposition may be denied whenever its terms involve a contradiction. +And the ground of this is the sheer impossibility of bringing the terms +together in thought. That a circle may be square, or that parallel lines +may enclose a space, are propositions the truth of which may be denied +offhand. The ground of this is that the conception of squareness and +circularity, of straight lines and an enclosed space are mutually +destructive, they cancel each other. And so far as Atheism may be said +to involve the denial of particular gods that denial is based upon +precisely similar grounds. When defined it is seen that the attributes +of this defined god cancel each other as effectually as squareness rules +out the idea of a circle; either this or they are simply unthinkable. +You cannot have an infinite personality any more than you can have a +six-sided octagon, nor can you posit an infinite personality without +divesting the terms of all meaning. + +It may also be noted in passing that both the theist and the Agnostic +actually do deny the existence of particular gods without the least +hesitation. No rational Agnostic would hesitate to deny the existence of +Jupiter, Javeh, Allah, or Brahma. No Christian would hesitate to deny +the existence of the gods of a tribe of savages. Even believers in the +current theology have evolved beyond the stage of the primitive +Christians, who accepted the existence of the Pagan deities with the +proviso that they were demons. And it is a mere verbal quibble to say +that these people merely deny each other's conception of deity. Each +man's conception of god _is_ his god, and to say that no being answering +to that conception exists is to say that his god does not exist, and in +relation to the god denied the denier is in exactly the position in +which he places the Atheist. + +So far then the Atheism of each is just a question of degree or of +relation. So far as Atheism involves the denial of deity the follower of +one religion is an Atheist in relation to the followers of every other +religion. Each religion--among civilised people--is atheistic from the +standpoint of the followers of other gods. The affirmation of one god +involves the denial of other gods. This would really seem to be the +historical significance of the term. The early Christians were called +atheists by the Pagans, and some of them accepted it without demur. At a +later date Spinoza, Voltaire, Paine, and others were called atheists, +and the epithet has lost its force to-day only because the evolution of +thought has broken down many religious barriers, and is rapidly dividing +people into two groups--those who believe in some god and who believe +in none at all. Now all that Atheism--conscious and reflective +Atheism--does is to carry a step further the restricted denial of the +ordinary religionist. The Christian theist denies every god but his own. +The Atheist, seeing no more evidence for the existence of the Christian +deity than for the existence of any of the deities discarded by the +Christian, seeing, further, that there are exactly the same +contradictions involved in assuming the existence of any one of the +world's deities, places the Christian deity on the list as among those +gods in whose existence he does not believe, and whose existence, so far +as it is defined, may be logically denied. + +The really distinguishing feature of philosophic Atheism is its +comprehensiveness, the ranking of all known deities, big and little, +ancient and modern, savage and civilised, gross and subtle, upon the +same level. Historically, we see them all originating in the same +conditions, passing through substantially the same phases of +development, finally to meet with the same fate as civilisation +developes. In this respect Atheism has to be considered in its historic +developments. It begins, as we have seen in the rejection of a +particular god, in favour of some other deity. It is only at a very much +later stage that the whole idea of god is subjected to examination and +analysis in such a way as to lead to the rejection of the conception of +god as a whole. But with that aspect of the subject we shall be +concerned later. + +But does Atheism deny the existence of any possible god? This question +might admit of a simple answer if one only knew precisely what it meant. +It is easy enough to understand what is meant by God so long as we keep +to any or all of the gods of the world's religions. But what is meant by +god standing alone and undefined? Historically "God" means a deity +believed in by some people, some where, at some time. And if we put on +one side these particular gods we have nothing left that can be either +affirmed or denied. God in the abstract is not a real existence any more +than tree in the abstract is a real existence. There is a pine tree, a +pear tree, an apple tree, etc., but there is and can be no "tree" apart +from some particular tree. So with "god." There are particular gods, but +if we do away with these, we have no god left as a separate existence. +"God" then becomes a mere word conveying no meaning whatever. Atheism +does not deny the existence of _a_ god for the same reason that it does +not deny the existence of Abracadabra--both terms mean as much, or as +little. And it is more than absurd for people who have rejected theism +to continue using the word "god" as though it had a quite definite +meaning apart from the gods of the various theologies. We have Professor +Huxley admitting that "there is no evidence of the existence of the god +of the theologians," and we imagine that he would have met the +affirmation of their existence with a flat contradiction. At any rate he +would have been quite justified in doing so. But when he asserts, with a +show of logical precision, but in reality with great looseness, that "it +is preposterous to assert that there is no god because he cannot be such +as we think him to be," he is using language for which no precise +meaning can be found. To be intelligible, the sentence implies that we +have some conception answering to the terms used, and this, as we have +pointed out with almost wearisome insistence, is not the case. It is not +a case of saying to the theist, "I fully understand your hypothesis, but +as at present I do not see enough evidence to convince me of its truth +or to demonstrate its error I must suspend judgment." We do _not_ +understand it. And when we seek to we discover that the terms of the +proposition we are asked to accept refuse to be brought together within +the compass of a single conception. Suspended judgment where the subject +under discussion is understandable is right and proper, but it is quite +out of place, and indeed cannot exist, where the proposition before us +is void of meaning. In such circumstances suspended judgment is absurd, +and it may be added that the affirmation or negation of such a +proposition is absurd likewise. + +Only one other word need be said on this point. It may be urged that +educated believers mean by "God" not the anthropomorphic deity of the +theologies, but a personal intelligence controlling things. But this is +really not less anthropomorphic than the form in which the god idea +meets us in the popular theologies. Its anthropomorphism is only, to +unobservant minds, less apparent. The conception of an intelligent, +personal being controlling nature is not fundamentally less +objectionable than the frankly man-like being of the early theologies. +Intelligence, as we know it (and to talk of an intelligence that is +unlike the intelligence we know is absurd) is as much a characteristic +of human, or animal, organisation, as arms and legs are. Mind, after +all, is only known to us as a function of an organism. That it is more +than this, or other than this, is a pure assumption. And to divest "God" +of all physical parts, while retaining his functions, is sheer nonsense. +There is the personal intelligence of Smith, or Brown, or Robinson, but +it is absurd to wipe out all the particular Smiths, and Browns, and +Robinsons, and then talk as though their qualities continue in +existence. So with God. If we reject all the gods of the theologies one +after another, what god have we left to talk about? All we have left is +the memory of a delusion. + +It is equally fallacious to talk of "God" as an equivalent of force in +the abstract, or as the equivalent of some non-intelligent force. This +is not what people ever meant, or mean, by god. What religious folk +believe in, what they pray to, is a person who can hear them, and who +can do things. A god only dimly apprehended may be tolerated, but for +how long will faith continue to worship an existence that can neither do +nor hear nor sympathise? There is a limit to even religious folly. And +even a savage only worships "sticks and stones" _after_ he endows them +with life and intelligence. + +Finally, if there is one thing clear to the modern mind it is that +science has no room in its theory of things for an over-ruling +intelligence. Sir Oliver Lodge well sums up the attitude of science in +the following sentences:--"Orthodox science shows us a self-contained +and self-sufficient universe, not in touch with anything above or beyond +itself--the general trend and outline of it known--nothing supernatural +or miraculous, no intervention of beings other than ourselves, being +conceived possible." (_Man and the Universe_, p. 14, Popular ed.) +Personally, we question whether there are any scientists of repute who +really believe in the existence of a personal intelligence above or +beyond nature. Some may make professions to the contrary, but it will +usually be found that the qualifications introduced rob their +professions of all value. Certainly their teaching is destitute of any +such conception. Modern scientific thought leaves no room for the +operations of deity. The miraculous is generally discarded. Response to +prayer is whittled down to a species of self-delusion, to be valued on +account of its subjective influence only. The scientific theory of +things, incomplete as it may be in many of its details, leaves no room +for the operations of a god. Not alone does it leave no room for a god, +but if the scientific conception of the world is to stand, then it would +be necessary to repeat Bakunine's _mot_, and to say, "If there were a +god it would be necessary to destroy him." You simply cannot have at one +and the same time a universe in which all that occurs is the consequence +of calculable and indestructible forces, the operations of which can be +foreseen and relied upon, and a universe controlled by a +self-determining deity, capable of modifying the action of these same +forces. You may have one or the other, but it is sheer lunacy to imagine +that you can have both. Either uniformity with invariable causation, or +a world in which every scientific calculation must be prefaced with the +"D.V." of a prayer meeting. And the Atheist, who accepts the principles +of modern science, says, not merely that he is without a belief in god, +but that he fails to see any necessity for his existence, or anything +for him to do if he did exist. He passes the gods of the world in review +and categorically dismisses each one as a myth. In doing this he has the +concurrence of all theists in discarding every god save one--his own. +The Atheist simply applies the same rule to each, and metes out the same +judgment to all. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +SPENCER AND THE UNKNOWABLE. + + +We have already referred to the use made by religionists of Spencer's +"Unknowable." This theory was not without its forerunners, and in +England was already in the field in the teachings of Hamilton and +Mansel. Spencer gave it a still greater vogue. As he presented it, it +came before the world with all the prestige attaching to its association +with one of the most comprehensive of modern thinkers, and one of the +most influential in the schools of evolutionary philosophy. It was also +connected with a world theory that claimed to be strictly scientific in +its character. It became not only a fashion in certain circles, it +founded a school, and gained numerous followers in the religious world. +Its author propounded it as a basis on which to reconcile religion and +science, and many were ready to accept it as such. Printed in all the +glory of capital letters, appearing sometimes as "The Ultimate Reality," +sometimes as the "Unconditioned," sometimes as an "Infinite and Eternal +Energy," it was equally impressive under all its forms. It provided just +that solemn kind of formula that the religious mind is accustomed to +hear, and if it was as meaningless as the Athanasian Creed, is was, for +that reason, quite as satisfying. It gave all the comfort of a religious +confession of faith, and it has been the parent of a whole host of more +recent apologies for God. + +In itself the "Unknowable" was harmless enough. Its philosophic value +is not great, its scientific utility is nil. To say that everything +proceeds from an "Ultimate Reality" is not very helpful, and to follow +on with the declaration that we know nothing about it, and that it would +be of no use to us if we did, does not sound very encouraging. It +reminds one of the description of the horse that had only two +faults--one that it was hard to catch, and the other that it was no good +when it was caught. We repeat with all solemnity the formula that all +things proceed from an infinite and eternal energy, and that this is the +Ultimate Reality, and then find that in relation to any and every +question we are precisely where we were. Its acceptance in certain +religious circles, and its use later, may be taken as evidence of the +fact that what the pious mind longs for is not sense but satisfaction. + +Still there remains cause for wonder that this "Unknowable" should ever +have been taken as affording foundation for the belief in deity. The +most extreme materialist or Atheist need not be in the slightest degree +disconcerted on being told things proceed from an "Infinite and Eternal +Energy." It is only what the Atheist has said, minus the capital +letters. He has affirmed his conviction, that all phenomena result from +the permutations of matter and force, which are eternal because no time +limit can be placed to their operations. And you do not add anything +material to the statement by printing it in capital letters. That the +Spencerian abstraction should have been taken as a substitute for deity +proves how desperate the situation is. Drowning men clutch at straws, +and a disintegrating deity hopes to renew his strength by the lavish +use of capital letters. + +For, after all, what the theist needs is, not an eternal energy, but a +personality. An inscrutable existence will not do. There is no dispute +that something exists. There is no quarrel over mere existence. It is +with the nature of what exists and the mode of its operation that the +issue arises. The theist needs a special kind of energy, a special form +of existence, a special kind of "reality" if his case is to be +established. It will not do for Mr. Spencer to assure him that this +"Ultimate Reality" is higher than personal. How Mr. Spencer knows that +something, the nature of which is unknown, is higher than something +else, is more than one can tell. But that does not matter. Higher or +lower, it is all the same. Either way it is different from personal, and +if it is different it is not the same, it is not personal. Whatever +other qualities this "Ultimate Reality" has or lacks, it must have that +one if it is to be of use to the theist. And to say that it is higher +than personal is to say that it is not personal at all, and to repeat in +a roundabout manner what the Atheist has been saying all the time. + +What now is Spencer's theory of an ultimate reality that must for ever +remain unknowable? Following a line of thought that had been steadily +gaining ground since Hume--although much older than Hume--Spencer holds +that in final analysis all our knowledge is a knowledge of mental states +and their relations. Beyond this we _know_ nothing, and can never know +anything. Nevertheless, while we cannot know anything beyond +consciousness, the conditions of thinking oblige us to assume that +something exists as the cause of our states of mind. Just as black +implies something that is not black, hard something that is not hard, so +we must conceive, as against the conditioned, relative existence of our +conscious states, an unconditioned, absolute existence as their cause. +It is this assumed, but completely unknown cause of our conscious +states, and of all else, that Spencer distinguishes as the Unknowable, +the Unconditioned, the Absolute, etc., and which appears to have brought +so much consolation to hard-pressed theists. + +I have no intention of discussing here the philosophic value of the +"Unknowable." But one may say, in passing, that even from that point of +view Spencer is untrue to his own Agnosticism in speaking of the +Unconditioned as the _cause_ of phenomena. For causation is a category +of the conditioned, it belongs to the world we know. It is not something +that exists beyond consciousness, it is something that is supplied by +consciousness and which possesses validity only within the world of +phenomena. On Spencer's own theory of relativity a cause only exists in +relation to an effect. Destroy the one and you destroy the other. Thus, +if the Unknowable is a cause of phenomena it ceases to be the +unconditioned and becomes part of the phenomenal order. If, on the other +hand, it is not part of the phenomenal sequence, it cannot stand to +phenomena in a genuine casual relation. It is, however, only fair to +point out that between the Unknowable and the evolutionary philosophy of +Spencer the only connection between them is that they are both in the +same work. In all probability it is an unconscious survival of +Spencer's earlier theism, which was active at the time the Synthetic +Philosophy was originally planned, but which became more and more +attenuated as Spencer grew older, and disappears entirely from the more +important volumes of the series. And but for the help it has been +supposed to give the belief in god, the "Unknowable" would only have +ranked as a harmless speculation of no value to anyone or to anything. +This is substantially admitted in a postscript to the 1899 edition of +"First Principles." At the conclusion of the section entitled "The +Unknowable," he says:-- + + + The reader is not called on to judge respecting any of the + arguments or conclusions contained in the foregoing five chapters + and in the above paragraphs. The subjects on which we are about to + enter are independent of the subjects thus far discussed; and he + may reject any or all of that which has gone before while leaving + himself free to accept any or all of that which is now to come. + + +In other words, the "Unknowable" is a pure abstraction, having no +organic connection with the Synthetic Philosophy, or indeed with any +philosophy of value. Mr. Spencer's warning to his readers seems to quite +justify Mr. Bradley's rather caustic comment, "I do not wish to be +irreverent, but Mr. Spencer's attitude towards his Unknowable strikes me +as a pleasantry, the point of which lies in its unconsciousness. It +seems a proposal to take something for God simply and solely because we +do not know what the devil it can be." (Note to p. 128 of _Appearance +and Reality_.) + +The curious thing is that Mr. Spencer really offers his readers two +theories of the nature of religion. One is contained in his "Principles +of Sociology," and so far as it traces all religious ideas to the +delusions and illusions of the primitive savage is substantially that +held by all modern anthropologists. The other is contained in his "First +Principles," and the two theories, like parallel lines, never meet. +Though born in the same brain they are quite distinct, and even +contradictory. + +The substance of this second theory may be summarised as follows:-- + +1. The conditions of human thought compel the recognition of an +unknowable reality of which all phenomena are the expression. + +2. The function of religion, from the earliest time, has been the +assertion of the existence of an unknowable reality, and to keep alive a +consciousness of the insoluble mystery surrounding it. + +3. The function of science is to deal with the known and the knowable, +with all that is presented in experience, with the world of phenomena +exclusively. + +4. Religion having for its subject matter the unknown and unknowable, +while science has for its subject matter the known and the knowable, +religion and science are not antagonistic, but complementary. Conflicts +only arise when one trespasses on the other's department, and a +recognition of the true line of demarcation effectually reconciles these +hitherto hostile forces. + +A very obvious criticism of number one is in affirming a consciousness +of an "Unknowable," its quality of unknowableness is annihilated. +Existence can only be predicated of that which affects consciousness in +some manner; and so far as I have the slightest apprehension or +consciousness of anything existing, to that extent it ceases to be the +unknowable. Our knowledge of it may be imperfect or altogether +erroneous; we may feel it impossible that we should ever rightly +understand it; but so far as we think about it we are bound to +assimilate it to the best of our knowledge, even though it be only under +the category of force. In brief, "unknowableness" is not a property or +quality by which a thing may be apprehended; it is a name for complete +mental vacuity. It does not refer to the thing itself, it refers only to +us. It is a pure negation which Spencer, by sheer verbal play converts +into a quasi-positive conception. A consciousness of things unknown can +never be more than a consciousness of ignorance. There is only one way +to prove the existence of an unknowable, and that is to know nothing +about it--not even to know that there is something about which we know +nothing. + +But, says Spencer, "to say that we cannot know the absolute is, by +implication, to affirm that there is an absolute." Certainly, if we take +an infirmity of language to be the equivalent of a necessity of +existence, not otherwise. When I say that we cannot know a four-sided +triangle I do not affirm by implication that a four-sided triangle +exists. I am asserting that the phrase, a four-sided triangle, involves +conceptions that cannot be brought together in consciousness, and so +dismiss it as being without meaning. + +The truth is that every one of Spencer's attempts to prove the existence +of an unknowable turns out on examination to be no more than a proof of +the existence of an unknown, and this is not disputed at any time or by +anyone. Thus, after being told that a known cannot be thought of apart +from an unknown, we are informed:-- + + + Positive knowledge does not, and never can, fill the whole region + of possible thought. At the utmost reach of discovery there arises, + and must ever arise, the question, What lies beyond? As it is + impossible to think of a limit to space so as to exclude the idea + of space lying outside that limit, so we cannot conceive of any + explanation profound enough to exclude the question, What is the + explanation of the explanation? + + +With this we can all agree, but it does not bring us any nearer an +"unknowable." It is perfectly true that thought can never be +comprehensive enough to exhaust the possibilities of existence, since it +is of the essence of thinking to limit and define. But it is a sheer +impossibility to think of what lies beyond the boundary of our knowledge +as unknowable, so far as we think of it at all, we must conceive it as +the unknown but possibly knowable. The unknown can only be thought of +thus because it is only as it is, by assumption, brought into line with +what is already known that it can be thought about at all. We are +compelled to think of what lies beyond the limits of our actual +knowledge in the same way as a traveller thinks of the fauna and flora +of an untravelled country. The new region may present many new features, +but until actual observation has taken place, these new features will +only be thought of as more or less unusual combinations of known animal +and vegetable life. They are substantially identical with what is +already known. + +No stranger notion ever occurred to a great thinker than that religion +and science represent parallel and distinct lines of development, each +having its own sphere of operation. It is all the more remarkable when +we remember that with Spencer "religion" means all religion, past and +present, civilised and savage. And no one is more precise in pointing +out how all religious ideas find their beginnings in the conditions of +primitive life. And that being the case, one wonders whether we are to +picture primitive man as a profound metaphysical philosopher, +speculating on that which lies behind phenomena, contemplating an +"insoluble Mystery," and paying homage to an "Ultimate Reality"? Nothing +could be more absurd. Thinking begins in concrete images, not in +abstractions. We have only to note the development of intelligence in +children to realise this. And primitive man, not being a mystic nor a +metaphysician, bases his religion, not upon a reality that transcends +experience, but upon a presumed fact, and what is to him the best known +of all facts. And even with modern men it may safely be said that they +worship God for what they believe they know about him, not because they +believe him to be unknown and unknowable. + +Spencer himself may be cited in support of this. In his "Principles of +Sociology," where the Unknowable plays no part whatever, he concludes +after an elaborate survey of the facts, that the imagination of +primitive man is reminiscent, not constructive; his power of thought is +feeble, he is without the quick curiosity of civilised man, there is an +absence of the conception of causation, he accepts things as they +appear, without any vivid desire to inquire into their real nature or +their connection with other events, and is without abstract ideas. +Clearly, here is not a very promising subject from which to derive even +the germ of the idea of a "Reality transcending experience." Spencer +also, and quite properly, insists that religious ideas are, under the +condition of their origin, national ideas; that we must accept the truth +that the laws of thought are everywhere the same, and that, given the +data as known to primitive man, the inference drawn by him is a +reasonable inference. + +With this we agree, but it gives the death blow to the previous +statement as to the essential nature of religion, and its essential +differentiation from science. For given the constitution of the +primitive mind, its ignorance of causation and general lack of +knowledge, religion commences not in some search after an eternal +reality, but in a natural misunderstanding of observed facts. Primitive +religion is just a reasoned misunderstanding of phenomena that in later, +and better informed ages, are given an altogether different explanation. + +That this is so, Spencer himself makes plain. For he shows, step by +step, how the experience of dreams, echoes, shadows, etc., combine to +produce the belief in unseen agencies differing in no essential from man +save that of possessing greater power and in being invisible. From +dreams and other subjective experiences he derives the idea of a double, +from death that of a ghost. Hence the ceremonies round the grave, and +the attention paid to the double of the dead man, which subsequently +developes into ancestor worship. The same train of thought gives a +double to objects other than human beings. Hence Animism, Totemism, and +their numerous subsidiary developments. Spencer insists, not only that +"all religions have a natural genesis," but also that "behind +supernatural beings of all orders" there has been in every case a human +personality--in other words, every god is developed from a ghost, +"ancestor worship is the root of every religion." To this he will admit +no exception, and referring to the Jewish religion, he asks +contemptuously:-- + + + Must we recognise a single exception to the general truth thus far + verified everywhere? While among all races in all regions, from the + earliest times down to the present, the conceptions of deities have + been naturally evolved in the way shown, must we conclude that a + small clan of the Semitic race had given to it supernaturally a + conception which, though superficially like the rest, was in + substance absolutely unlike them. + + +And in about half a dozen pages he shows conclusively that the Biblical +God had exactly a similar origin to other gods. + +Now if this account of religious origins means anything at all (and in +spite of differences between anthropologists it is in substance the +account of the origin of religion given by all) it means that instead of +religion and science moving along parallel lines, religion is simply +primitive science. Religion and science, as a very able theistic writer +says, "touch and oppose each other as rival methods of explaining, not +solely or mainly the life and nature of man, but the universe taken as a +whole, man forming a part of it." (W. H. Mallock, _Religion as a +Credible Doctrine_, p. ii.) Both are concerned with the same facts, and +their respective claims to consideration depend entirely on their +ability to explain the facts. For the reasons given by Spencer, man's +earliest interpretation of things is inevitably vitalistic. Ghosts--the +primitive protoplasm from which the gods are made--are assumed, and once +assumed dominate the savage intelligence. Fear combines with ignorance +to resist any conception that will wrest power from the hands of these +extra-natural agents, "Nature's haughty lords," rule all, and their +dynasty is the hardest of all to overthrow. + +In spite, however, of all opposition the mechanical theory of things +develops, and in developing establishes a clear division between the two +conceptions of nature. But the line of demarcation is not that stated by +Spencer. Religion no more asserts the existence of an "Unknown Verity," +than it asserts a fourth dimension of space. Nor is science concerned +with denying the existence of something of which we know nothing, and +can never know anything. The essential feature of religion is that it +offers a vitalistic explanation of the world as against the mechanical +explanation offered by science. And in this religion stands for the +earlier as against the later expression of human knowledge. It is the +eternal champion of savage thought against civilised intelligence. Its +whole significance lies in the persistence of animistic modes of +thinking under civilised conditions. + +This conclusion, be it observed, is one that is quite borne out by +Spencer's own explanation of the nature of religion. Nor do we know of a +more remarkable instance of a front rank thinker propounding in one +part of his work a theory bearing no relation whatever to the remaining +portion, and in addition disproving his own theory at every point. + +Spencer's reconciliation of science and religion, which in one form or +another is continually in evidence, is only one degree less remarkable +than the fact of its being accepted by so many religionists as +satisfactory. Following the line of his untenable theory that religion +and science pursue parallel lines, he points out that "the agent which +has effected the purification (of religion) has been science." That is, +the growth of the mechanical theory has driven back the vitalistic one. +This is purification only in the sense that a defaulting cashier +purifies the firm he robs. "As fact or experience proves that certain +familiar changes always happen in the same sequence, there begins to +fade from the mind the conception of a special personality to whose +variable will they were before ascribed." This process of annexation is, +says Spencer, science teaching religion its true function. As a matter +of fact, science has given religion no instruction, it has merely issued +prohibitions. It has warned religion that there are certain things it +must not meddle with, certain departments on which it must not encroach. +In this way religion has been forced farther and farther back, until it +is left with what? Not with anything that can be known, or is known; it +is left supreme in the kingdom of nowhere, ruling over an empire of +nothing at all. And so long as religion strives for a more tangible +possession so long must there be a conflict between science and +religion. But--"as the limits of possible cognition are established, the +causes of possible conflict will diminish. And a permanent peace will be +reached when science becomes fully convinced that its explanations are +proximate and relative; while religion becomes fully convinced that the +mystery it contemplates is ultimate and absolute." So, when science has +monopolised the entire field of human knowledge, actual and possible, +and when religion is satisfied that it knows nothing, and never can know +anything of the object of its worship, that it can offer nothing in the +shape of counsel or advice, but that its function is to sit in owl-like +solemnity, contemplating nothing, meanwhile offering man an eternal +conundrum that he must everlastingly give up, then, and not till then, +there will be peace between science and religion. And this is called a +reconciliation. Mr. Spencer finds two combatants engaged in deadly +conflict, he murders one and offers the other the corpse, with the hope +that now they will live peacefully together. The scientist is asked to +be content with all there is. The religious man is asked to find comfort +in the reflection that science must eventually monopolise the entire +field of knowledge, but that, in return, religion will be left free to +work in an unknowable region, to occupy itself with an unknowable +object, and to eternally cry "all is mystery" in an amended philosophic +version of the Athanasian Creed. + +As a piece of humour this is superb. So also is the following: "Science +has been obliged to abandon the attempt to include within the boundaries +of knowledge that which cannot be known, and so has yielded up to +religion that which of right belonged to it." Capital! Science gives up +to religion that which cannot be known, and as it does not know what it +is, that cannot be known, it surrenders to religion absolute vacuity as +the proper sphere for its operations. And even this is accompanied with +the proviso that if it happens to have made a mistake, the ceded +territory will be at once reclaimed. Science would certainly be +vindictive if after having murdered religion it declined to live +peaceably with its corpse. + +The distinction between science and religion is, in truth, neither +fundamental nor original. It is one that arises gradually in the history +of mental development. And, therefore, when a man such as Professor +Arthur Thomson describes religion as being concerned with the +recognition of the existence of an independent "spiritual reality," the +reply is that religion commences as just an explanation of nature in +terms of the then existing knowledge and culture. Religion is just a +crude form of science. The separation of the world into a religious and +a scientific sphere arises when the religious interpretation of natural +happenings gets discredited by advancing knowledge. If one takes such an +illustration as that of witchcraft the nature of the process is clear. +First we have the interpretation of certain forms of dementia and +delusion in terms of religion. Later we have the same facts interpreted +in terms of positive knowledge and the religious explanation is +rejected. And that, in a sentence is the whole history of religion, once +we have cleared away the verbiage with which the subject is surrounded. + +The truth of what has just been said is often obscured by +unintelligible talk of growth in religion. It is claimed that we acquire +truer views of deity, and a process of growth is asserted analogous to +that which meets us in knowledge in general. Let us see what truth there +is in this. + +In ordinary instances when we speak of growth we imply one of three +things. Either there is increase in size, or there is an enlargement of +function, or there is an increase in knowledge. So long as we keep to +these plain meanings of "growth" there can be no confusion. But none of +these meanings fit the case of religion. Certainly there has been no +increase in the size of religion--it does not, that is, cover a larger +area. On the contrary it is continually being warned off more and more +territory. It becomes more and more a negligible quantity. One need not +go back to primitive times to prove this, any country will supply +instances. The displacement of religious by other considerations is +observable on all sides. + +There has certainly been no growth in the functions exercised by +religion. Its function as law-giver in the physical world is now +definitely abandoned, and all it asks is that science will let it alone. +In ethics and sociology it still maintains a precarious kind of an +existence, but it no longer claims supreme power. It is content to urge +its utility as a source of inspiration, to rank as one among a number of +other forces that are frankly secular in nature. Finally there has been +no growth in the shape of an extension of knowledge of the object of +religious belief. Of the nature of deity we know no more than did our +earliest ancestors. In earlier generations the nature of God, his aims +and intentions, were discussed with the same degree of confidence that +one now sees displayed in discussing schemes of sanitation. The modern +believer is now more anxious to impress upon the world how little he +knows about God, or how little it is possible for him to know. This is +not surprising except in the fact that it is called religious growth. +And if this be a sign of growth one wonders what would be considered +indications of decay. Historically religious life presents us, not with +a process of growth, but one of shrinkage. To reduce the gods from many +to few, and from a few to one is not growth. To limit the functions of +deity from those of a direct, particular, and universal character, to an +indirect, general form is not growth. To refine the idea of a personal +deity until it becomes that of a mere abstract force, is not growth. All +these are so many modifications of the religious idea under pressure of +advancing knowledge--so many attempts to state religion in such a way +that it can conflict with nothing we know to be true because it answers +to nothing of which we are certain. + +The idea of God, the idea of religion, does not begin in a mystery or in +some abstract conception, but in an assumed knowledge of certain +concrete facts of experience. Man believes in the gods because of what +he thinks he knows about them, not because of what he does not know. The +talk of a mystery is the jargon of a priesthood which finds it +profitable to keep the lay mind at a distance. Increased emphasis is +placed on mystery because religious teachers are alive to the danger of +basing their beliefs upon matters that can be brought to the test of +experience. Mystery mongering is not the beginning of religion, but a +sign of its approaching demise. Mysticism, too, is no more than a cover +for a sanctuary that has been emptied of all worthy of respect. But if +religion is to really live, it must have some knowledge, no matter how +little or how imperfect, of the subject with which it professes to deal. +A religion that does not possess this, but is compelled to hand over the +whole of life to secular science, signs its own death warrant. It +commits suicide to save itself from execution. And as people realise +this they turn to clear-eyed science for guidance, leaving religion to +such representatives of primitive animism as still survive in a +civilised community. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +AGNOSTICISM. + + +The primary difficulty in dealing with Agnosticism is its elusive +character. It is a word of various and vague meanings, and many of those +who use it seem to have no great anxiety to fix its meaning with any +degree of precision. It is used now in a philosophic and now in a +religious sense, and its use in the one connection is justified by its +use in another. It has become, in the half century of its existence, as +indefinite as "religion," and about as enlightening. On the one side it +appears as a counsel of mental integrity with which everyone will agree, +and on the other, the religious side, it will vary from a form that is +identical, with that much-dreaded "Atheism," to a religious or +"reverent" Agnosticism that reminds one--mentally and morally--of +Methodism minus its creed. Indeed, to say that a man is an Agnostic +nowadays tells one no more than calling a man religious indicates to +which one of the world's sects he gives his adherence. + +The only aspect of Agnosticism that we are here vitally concerned with +is its relation to religion, or specifically with the god-idea. But it +will be necessary to say a word, in passing, on at least one other +phase. + +And first as to the origin of the term. The credit for the first use of +the term has always been given to the late Professor Huxley. Mr. R. H. +Hutton says that Huxley first suggested the word at a meeting of friends +in the house of Mr. James Knowles in 1869. Professor Huxley says that he +deliberately adopted it because, "When I reached intellectual maturity +and began to ask myself whether I was an atheist, a theist, or a +pantheist; a materialist, or an idealist, a Christian, or a freethinker, +I found that the more I learned and reflected the less ready was the +answer, until at last I came to the conclusion that I had neither art +nor part with any of these denominations except the last.... So I took +thought and invented what I conceived to be the appropriate title of +'agnostic.'" And he goes on to explain that the term was used as +antithetical to the "gnostic" of Church history who knew all about +things of which Huxley felt himself in ignorance. To all of which one +may say that Huxley appears to have given himself a lot of needless +trouble. In philosophy there was the term "Sceptic," and in relation to +religion the term "Atheist" was ready to hand. The latter term certainly +covered all that Huxley meant by Agnosticism as applied to the god-idea. +The plain, and perhaps brutal truth, is that Huxley was just +illustrating the fatal tendency of English public men to seek for a +label that will mark them off from an unfashionable heresy even more +clearly than it separates them from a crumbling orthodoxy. It is +certainly suggestive to find, in this connection, a French writer of +distinction, M. Emile Boutmy, pointing out that in France, Spencer, +Mill, and Huxley would all have been professed atheists. (_The English +People_, p. 44.) But France is France, and has always possessed the +courage to follow ideas to their logical conclusion. + +When it comes to a definition of Agnosticism Professor Huxley's position +becomes still more difficult of understanding. Agnosticism, he says, is +a method the essence of which may be expressed in a single principle. +"Positively the principle may be expressed; in matters of the intellect +follow your reason so far as it will take you without regard to any +other consideration. And negatively; in matters of the intellect, do not +pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or +demonstrable." So far as this goes we have here perfectly sound advice. +But why call it Agnosticism? It is no more than the perfectly sound +advice that we must be honest in our investigations, and make no claim +to certainty where the conditions of certainty do not exist. But we have +no more right to call this Agnosticism than we have to give the +multiplication table a sectarian or party label. + +Nor do we believe for a moment that what Huxley had in view, or what +other agnostics have in view, is no more than a counsel of intellectual +perfection. What is really at issue here is one's attitude of mind in +relation to the belief in God. It is in pretending to know about God +that the theist finds himself at issue with the Agnostic, and it is to +mark himself off from the theist that the Agnostic gives himself a +special label. And the trouble of the Agnostic is that so soon as he +begins to justify his position, either he states the atheistic case or +he fails altogether to make his case good. + +There is, perhaps, one other topic on which agnosticism may be +professed, and that is in connection with the question of what is known +as the problem of existence. We may profess our belief in the reality of +an external world, but deny that any _knowledge_ of it is possible. Here +we assert that what "substance," or "reality," or "thing in itself," is +we do not know and cannot know. But while many attempts are made under +the name of "the Absolute," etc., to identify this with "God," it is +really nothing of the kind. The belief or disbelief in an external +"reality" is a problem in philosophy, it has no genuine connection with +theology. To identify the two is a mere dialectical subterfuge. Mere +existence is an ultimate fact that must be accepted by all. It is only +on the question of its nature that controversy can arise. + +Whatever may be claimed on behalf of Agnosticism, it certainly cannot be +claimed that it carries a clear and a definite meaning. As we have seen, +Professor Huxley used the word to indicate the fact that he was without +knowledge of certain things. But what things? To answer that we have to +go beyond the word itself--that is, we have to define the definition. As +it stands we may profess agnosticism in relation to anything from the +prospects of a general election within a given period to the question of +whether Mars is inhabited or not. If, then, it is said that what is +implied is that the Agnostic is without a knowledge of God, or without a +belief in God, the reply is that is exactly the position of the Atheist. +And there was no need whatever to coin a new word, if all that was +wanted was to express the atheistic position. Still less justifiable was +it to proceed to misinterpret Atheism in order to justify a departure +that need never have been made. + +One cannot at this point forbear a word on Mr.--afterwards Sir--Leslie +Stephen's curious justification of his choice of the word Agnosticism. +After the enlightening remark that the word "Atheist" carries with it an +unpleasant connotation, he says:-- + + + Dogmatic Atheism--the doctrine that there is no God, whatever may + be meant by God--is to say the least of it a rare phase of opinion. + The word Agnosticism, on the other hand, seems to imply a fairly + accurate appreciation of a form of creed already common and daily + spreading. The Agnostic is one who asserts--what no one + denies--that there are limits to human intelligence. (_An + Agnostic's Apology_; p. 1). + + +And he then goes on to assert that the subject matter of theology lies +beyond these limits. + +Now putting on one side this perversion of the meaning of Atheism, was +it really worth while to coin a new word to affirm what no one denies? +Theists do not deny the limitations of knowledge, on the contrary, they +are always affirming it. Neither do all theists deny that "God" is +unknowable. That has been affirmed by them over and over again. What +they have claimed is that "God" is apprehended rather than known, and +they affirm his existence on much the same grounds that others assert +the real existence of an external world. Professor Flint's comments on +Stephen's performance are quite to the point, and the more noteworthy as +coming from a clergyman. He says: + + + The word Atheist is a thoroughly honest, unambiguous term. It means + one who does not believe in God, and it means neither more nor + less. It implies neither blame nor approval, neither desert of + punishment nor of reward. If a purely dogmatic Atheism be a rare + phase of opinion critical Atheism is a very common one, and there + is also a form of Atheism which is professedly sceptical or + agnostic, but often in reality dogmatic or gnostic. (_Agnosticism_; + p. 69). + + +The more carefully one examines the reasons given for the preference for +the word Agnosticism, the clearer it becomes that the real motive is not +the wish to obtain mental clarity, but the desire to avoid association +with a term that carries, religiously, disagreeable associations. The +care taken by so many who call themselves Agnostics to explain to the +religious world that they are not atheists, is almost enough to prove +this. Indeed, the position is well summed up by Mr. John M. Robertson:-- + + + The best argument for the use of the name Agnostic is simply that + the word Atheist has been so long covered with all manner of + ignorant calumny that it is expedient to use a new term which + though in some respects faulty, has a fair start, and will in time + have a recognised meaning. The case, so stated, is reasonable; but + there is the _per contra_ that whatever the motive with which the + name is used, it is now tacked to half a dozen conflicting forms of + doctrine, varying loosely between Theism and Pantheism. The name of + Atheist escapes that drawback. Its unpopularity has saved it from + half-hearted and half-minded patronage. + + +So that, on the best showing, we are to take "Agnostic" on the professed +ground that it is more exact than "Atheism," but on the real ground that +it is less unpopular, waiting meanwhile for the time when it shall have +become more exact than it is by becoming accepted in the same sense as +the Atheism that has previously been rejected. Courage and +straightforwardness saves a lot of trouble. + +Mr. Bailey Saunders (_Quest of Faith_, p. 7) calls agnosticism "a plea +on behalf of suspended judgment," and this is a favourite expression. +It gives one an air of impartiality, with the comforting reflection that +it will please the socially stronger side. But suspended judgment on +what? To hold one's judgment in suspense implies that we have at least a +workable comprehension of the subject in dispute, and that judgment is +suspended because the evidence produced is not adequate to command +decision. But is that the case here? Does the Agnostic claim that the +evidence produced by the theist is merely inadequate, or that it is +irrelevant? Surely he holds the latter position. And if that is the +case, then he does not suspend judgment, for the simple reason that +there is no case made out concerning which judgment is to be suspended. +There is simply no case before the court. For the Agnostic, no more than +the Atheist, can attach no intelligible meaning to "God." He must have +it defined to understand it, and when it is defined he rejects it +without ceremony. And it is quite obvious that when an Agnostic says, "I +know nothing about God," he means more than that; otherwise it would not +be worth the saying. He really means that no one else knows either. He +asserts that a knowledge of god is impossible to anyone, because it does +not present the possibility of being known. "God," standing alone is a +meaningless word, and how can one suspend judgment concerning the truth +of an unintelligible proposition? + +For here are the plain facts of the situation. If we ask the Agnostic +whether he suspends judgment concerning the existence of the gods of any +savage peoples, the reply is in the negative. If we put the same +question concerning the god of the Bible, or of the Mohammedan, or of +any other of the world's theologies we receive the same answer. There is +nothing here to suspend judgment about, the characters and qualities of +the gods being such that there admits of no doubt as to their imaginary +character. Or if it is said that the Agnostic, while dismissing the gods +of the various theologies, savage and civilised, as being impossible, +suspends judgment as to the existence of a "supreme mind," or of a +"creative intelligence," the reply is that one cannot suspend judgment +as to the possible existence of an inconceivability. For "mind" must be +mind, as we know it. And it is a downright absurdity to speak of the +possible existence of a "mind" while divesting it of all the qualities +that characterise mind as we know it. Really between the statement that +A. does not exist, and the affirmation that A. does exist, but differs +in every conceivable particular from all known A.'s there is no +difference whatever. We are denying its existence in the very act of +affirming it. + +Further, we quite agree with Mr. F. C. S. Schiller (_Riddles of the +Sphinx_, pp. 17-19) that in practice such suspense of judgment is +impossible. We suspend our judgment as to whether we shall die to-morrow +or at some indefinite future date, and for that reason we make our +arrangements in view of either contingency. We suspend judgment as to +the honesty of an employee, and our attitude towards him is governed by +that fact. And so with the question of a god. In one way or another we +are bound to indicate our judgment on the subject. We must act either as +though we believe in the possibility or in the impossibility of "divine" +interference. If the mental hesitancy of the respectable Agnostic were +accompanied by a corresponding timidity in action life would be +impossible. + +A less common plea on behalf of Agnosticism, but one on which a word +must be said, is that the agnostic attitude is more "reverential" than +that of atheism. But why in the name of all that is reasonable should +one profess reverence towards something of which one knows nothing? +Reverence, to be intelligible, must be directed towards an intelligent +object, and we must have grounds for believing it to be worthy of +reverence. Reverence towards our fellow creatures is a reasonable enough +sentiment, but what is there reasonable in an expression of reverence +towards something that can only be thought of--and even this is +unwarranted--as a force? The truth is that this expression of reverence +is no more than the flickering survival of religion. Numbers have +reached the stage at which they can perceive the unreasonable nature of +religious beliefs, but they have not yet managed to achieve liberation +from the traditional emotional attitude towards these beliefs. In other +words, the development of the emotional and the intellectual sides of +their nature have been unequal, and for these the "Unknowable" has +simply served as a peg on which to hang religious feelings that have +been robbed of all intellectual support. The semi-religious Agnostic +thus represents a transition form, interesting enough to all who observe +how curiously decaying types strive to perpetuate themselves, but which +is bound to disappear in the process of intellectual evolution. + +Finally, one would like from the Agnostic some authoritative +announcement as to his position in relation to what is known concerning +the origin of the god-idea. So far as professed theists are concerned +one expects this to be ignored. On the part of non-theists one expects a +more logical attitude. In this case it is common ground with the Atheist +and the Agnostic that the idea of god owes its beginnings to the +ignorance of primitive man. We know the facts on which this idea was +based, and we know that all these are now differently explained. The +belief that there is a god governing nature is just one of those +blunders made by primitive man, and is on all fours with the numerous +other blunders he makes concerning himself and the world around him. +Knowing this, and accepting this, believing that "god" springs from the +same set of conditions that gave rise to fairies and spirits of various +kinds, one would like to know on what ground the Agnostic definitely +rejects the grounds on which the idea of god is based, while professing +a state of suspended judgment about the existence of the object created +by this primitive blunder. It is certainly surprising to find those who +accept the natural origin of the god-idea, when they come to deal with +current religion talk as though it were merely a question of the +inconclusiveness of religious arguments. It is nothing of the kind. The +final reply to the arguments set forth on behalf of Theism is, not that +they are inconclusive, but that they are absolutely irrelevant to the +question at issue. We cannot remain undecided because there is nothing +to remain undecided about. We know that the idea of god is pure myth, +and was never anything but myth. A belief that began in error, and which +has no other basis than error, cannot by any possible argument be +converted into a truth. The old question was, "Can man by searching find +out God?" The modern answer is an emphatic affirmative. Substantially we +have by searching found out God. We know the origin and history of one +of the greatest delusions that ever possessed the human mind. God has +been found out. Analytically and synthetically we understand the +god-idea as previous generations could not understand it. It has been +explained; and the logical consequence of the explanation is--Atheism. + +Ultimately, then, we come to this: (1) The Agnosticism that concerns +itself with a confession of ignorance concerning the nature of +"existence," has no necessary connection with religion, and is only made +to have such by a confusion of two distinct things. (2) The plea of a +suspended judgment is invalid, since there is nothing about which one +can suspend a decision. (3) The Agnosticism that professes a +semi-religious feeling of reverence towards the "Unknowable" is +fundamentally upon all fours with the religious feelings of the ordinary +believer. Worshipping the Unknowable is more ridiculous than worshipping +Huxley's "wilderness of apes." The apes _might_ take some intelligent +interest in the antics of their devotees; but to print our hypostatised +ignorance in capital letters and then profess a feeling of veneration +for it is as ridiculous a proceeding as the world has seen. After all, +an absurdity is never quite so grotesque as when it is tricked out in +scientific phrases and paraded as the outcome of profound philosophic +thinking. (4) The only Agnosticism that seems capable of justifying +itself is an Agnosticism that is indistinguishable from Atheism. To +again cite Professor Flint, Atheist "means one who does not believe in +God, and it means neither more nor less." The Agnostic is also one who +is without belief in a god, every argument he uses to justify his +position is and has been used as a justification of Atheism. Atheist is +really "a thoroughly honest, unambiguous term," it admits of no +paltering and of no evasion, and the need of the world, now as ever, is +for clear-cut issues and unambiguous speech. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +ATHEISM AND MORALS. + + +Looking at the world as it is one cannot forbear a mild wonder at the +fears expressed at the probable consequences to morals of a general +acceptance of Atheism. One would have thought that the world would not +run a very great danger of becoming worse on that account, and that, +seeing the way in which all forms of rascality have flourished, and +still maintain themselves, without in the least disturbing people's +religious convictions, one might even feel inclined to risk a change in +the hopes of improvement. Mainly, indeed, one might say that those who +are affected by religious belief are such as can very well do without +it, while those who stand in urgent need of moral improvement seldom +show that their religious belief has any very beneficial effect on their +conduct. + +Yet nothing is more common than to find the theist, when driven off all +other grounds of defence, protesting against a deliberate propaganda of +Atheism on the ground of its probable harmful consequences to morals. +This, not because those who have publicly professed Atheism are open to +the charge of loose living, but on account of those who at present +believe in religion, and whose loss of belief would possibly upset their +moral equilibrium. It is a curious position for a theist to take up, +since it implies that while the Atheist as we know him shows no +deterioration of character in consequence of his loss of belief, we +cannot be so certain of the present believers in deity. They are formed +of poorer clay, and once convinced that there is no God with whom they +have to reckon, there is no telling what will happen. So we are urged to +let well alone, and leave believers with their illusions lest their loss +should present us with a very unpleasant reality. + +This fear is expressed in various ways, but in one way or another it is +tolerably common. The following which reached me from a well known man +of letters probably puts the argument as fairly and as temperately as it +can be put, and therefore in dealing with that I cannot be accused of +taking the theist at an unfair advantage. His conclusions are summarised +in the following paragraphs. (The summary is the author's, not mine.) + +(1) The decentish code of morals which prevails in this twentieth +century is the outcome of all the human ages. From the very first, +everywhere and all the time, it has, and continues to be, inextricably +intertwined and influenced by Theistic beliefs, even when and where such +beliefs have been the crudest and most debased form of polytheism. + +(2) The ethical atmosphere in which we now live, after having had such +an origin and history, remains strongly and frankly pervaded by religion +of a Theistic type. Atheist, Agnostic, and Theist alike have to live in +this atmosphere, and consciously or unconsciously, are subject to its +influence. + +(3) Even if we could set up a wholly secular code of morals, derived +entirely from the exigencies of, tribal, communal, and national life, I +take it that such a code would be inadequate to form the type of +individual character we most admire, and which acts under a sense of +"ought" rather than of "must." The latter is often the mere demand of +gregarious or individual comfort and convenience; the former may be +quite opposed to the inclinations of the individual, and yet bring into +play irksome but ennobling springs of action which a purely secular code +cannot touch. + +Now these statements put the case for the theist as moderately and as +well as it can be put, and I think that they are worthy of a little +careful examination. It may be observed that there is no insinuation +that Atheists are actually worse than other people, only the fear that +in the absence of some form of theism the higher ethical motive cannot +be roused, and that therefore character will suffer. Well, we are none +of us free from the contagion of our environment, and the most powerful +influences are often enough those that it would be difficult to specify +in any given instance. It is not only that the influence of the higher +members of society affect the lower. The lower is not without its +influence on the higher. But the question here is not really whether we +are all exposed to the general influence of the group to which we +belong, that, I think, is undeniable, the real question at issue is +whether the determining influence on conduct is theistic or not. And I +think it will be found that while the one thing is asserted it is the +other that is proven. + +So far as the first proposition is concerned it may be taken for granted +that our present state is the product of all past evolution, and that in +the course of that evolution theistic beliefs have been closely--not +inextricably--connected with morals. But this is not alone true of +morality, it is true of every branch of human thought and of every +aspect of human life. Art, science, literature, have all been closely +connected with religious beliefs. Necessarily so. Early human history is +spent under the shadow of superstition, and its dominating influence +affects the form of every aspect of life. But as the course of +development has been to separate the essential from the non-essential +and to place most of each department of life on a self-supporting basis, +it would not seem an unreasonable conclusion that ethics will follow the +same lines. In fact, it is following the same lines. There are few +educated people nowadays who would claim that morality cannot exist +apart from religion, they are content to say, as my correspondent does, +that in the absence of religion belief the higher aspects of morality +will suffer. + +Our morality, we are told, is the outcome of all the human ages. I go +further than that and assert that it is the outcome of all the human and +of all the animal ages. There is no break in nature, and to the +evolutionist the development of the human from the animal is plain. And +it should scarcely need pointing out nowadays that nearly every one of +the fundamental qualities of man can be seen in germ in the animal +world. I only emphasise the point here because it is so often forgotten +that morality is fundamentally the expression of those conditions under +which associated life is found possible and profitable, and that so far +as any quality is declared to be moral its justification and meaning +must be found in that direction. The question of incentive we will come +to later; for the moment it is enough to insist upon the fact that +morality is fashioned, in its fundamentals, with reference to facts, not +with reference to speculative beliefs. Beliefs may influence morality +for awhile, but the persistent operation of social selection secures a +general conformity between conduct and the conditions upon which life +depends. That is the fundamental fact to be remembered in all +discussions of morality, although it is the fact that is most often +ignored. Ultimately life determines moral teaching, it is not moral +teaching that determines life. + +Life not alone determines morality, but it determines religion as well. +What else is the meaning of all those discarded forms of religious +belief, those bodies of dead gods, that meet the student of history as +the remains of extinct animals meet the geologist in his unravelment of +the story of the earth's vicissitudes? They are the result of a lack of +adaptation to new conditions to which they could not accommodate +themselves. Once the gods lorded it over man as the gigantic dinosaur +lorded it in his day over lesser animals. And in the one case, as in the +other, a change in the environment brought about their doom. Natural +selection determines the survival of religions as of animal forms, and a +religion to survive must become increasingly utilitarian in character, +certainly there is a point beyond which the opposite tendency cannot be +carried. + +Assume, for example, that a religion existed of a grossly anti-social +character, one that teaches doctrines that are subversive of the general +social well-being. One of two things must result. If the religion is +strong enough to enforce its teaching the society it dominates will +disappear, and the religion will die out with it. If, on the other hand, +it cannot enforce its teaching, or can get it accepted only in a +modified form, then either the religion disappears in its original form, +or it is modified to get itself established. To live, religion must +establish some sort of harmony between its teachings and the conditions +of life. It may retard the development of life, but it must not retard +to the point of destruction. This is all that is really involved in what +is called the purification of religious teaching. In reality there is no +such thing. The purification is a modification, and it is modified in +order that it may become acceptable to the society in which it is +existing. The ascetic epidemic, the various disgusting sects that have +sprung into existence from time to time during the course of Christian +history, have all died out from this cause. As with the individual, so +with society, the forces of which we are conscious generally move upon +the surface. Of the underlying ones we are mostly unaware. + +The truth is, then, that behind all our consciously elaborated theories +of life there are operative the unconscious or sub-conscious forces of +evolution. There is, of course, a certain area of conduct in which +speculative opinions play their part, and where actions may be +arbitrarily classed as good or bad. But this area is, of necessity, +limited, and for the reasons that have been given above. Properly +understood morality is not something very abstract, but something that +is very concrete. The underlying reason for morality is always the same, +and we are compelled to hark back to it for justification. And no +rejection of religion can alter the basis upon which morality rests. + +The proposition that Atheist, Agnostic, and Theist breathe the same +atmosphere and are affected by the same influences is, therefore, one +that is two-edged. If our intellectual atmosphere is saturated with +religious influences, it is also saturated with social influences of a +much more fundamental character, and which have been perpetually +correcting religious extravagances. And it is at least open to the +Atheist to retort that we have to thank this circumstance that religious +beliefs have not been more injurious than has been actually the case. +If, for example, the ascetic epidemic of the early Christian centuries +had increased in force and had continued operative, European society +would have disappeared. That this was not the case was due to the +strength of the sexual and social instincts, against which religion was +unable to maintain its hold. In the change of opinion over the better +way to spend Sunday, or in the decay of the doctrine of eternal +damnation, we have the same point illustrated. Right through history it +has been the social instincts that have acted as a corrective to +religious extravagance. And it is worth noting that with the exception +of a little gain from the practice of casuistry, religions have +contributed nothing towards the building up of a science of ethics. On +the contrary it has been a very potent cause of confusion and +obstruction. Fictitious vices and virtues have been created and the real +moral problem lost sight of. It gave the world the morality of the +prison cell, instead of the tonic of the rational life. And it was +indeed fortunate for the race that conduct was not ultimately dependent +upon a mass of teachings that had their origin in the brains of savages, +and were brought to maturity during the darkest period of European +civilisation. + +In dealing with the two first propositions I have, by implication, +answered the third--namely, that a wholly secular authentic code of +morals would be inadequate to form the highest type of character; it +might supply a "must," but it could not supply an "ought." + +The first and obvious reply to an objection of this kind is that our +working code of morals is secular already. In life, if we observe +without prejudice, it is not difficult to see that one's neighbours, +friends, social class, etc., have far more force in shaping conduct than +speculative theories. In its widest sense natural selection determines +what actions shall be declared to be moral. Of this we may take the +universal feeling against homicide. This is but an expression of the +truth that social life would be impossible were it otherwise. And when +we pass from the general to the special we meet with much the same +principle operating in society. The average burglar pursues his calling +with no special sense of its wrongness, although he may have a keen +sense of its dangers. But while burgling with a fairly easy conscience, +he does flinch at breaking the code of honour set up by his +fellow-burglars. And at the other extreme we have the "gentleman" with +his code of honour which forbids him not to pay a gambling debt, but +takes no count of keeping a poor tradesman out of his money. In each of +these cases the determining factor is not theory but fact, and the fact +here is association with our fellow countrymen or with a special social +class. Morality, in short, is social or nothing. Moral laws are +meaningless apart from social life. Every moral command implies the +existence of a social medium, and it is no more than a study in history +to see how this social medium has been continuously shaping and +reshaping human nature. The determination here is not conscious, but it +is real, however much disguised it may be by various forms or theories. +And when we realise this, it is no more than a truism to say that a +change in religious belief can no more destroy morality than a change in +government can destroy society. + +But in saying that the essence of morality is unreasoning I do not mean +that it is unreasonable. All I mean is that it can receive a reasonable +justification, and that no matter how lofty the development it has its +basis in the fundamental conditions of associated animal and human life. +We may surround the subject with a vague and attractive idealistic +verbalism, but we come back to this as a starting point. The love of +family, with all its attendant values, rests upon the fact of crude +sexual desire, refined, of course, during the passing of many +generations, but dependent upon it all the same. Remove the sexual +desire and the family feelings are inexplicable. Thus, the _reason_ for +the existence of the sexual instinct is race preservation, but the end +has been achieved in a quite unreasoning manner. In the animal world at +large there is certainly no conscious desire for the production of +offspring, nor is there with the mass of human beings. There is the +desire to gratify an impulse, and very little more. And for the +strengthening of an instinct there need not be, nor is there, any +consciousness of its social value. All that is necessary is that it +shall be useful. Natural selection attends to the rest. + +This will, I think, supply an answer to the contention that secular +ethics can supply a "must," but not an "ought"; that is, it may show +that an individual should act in accordance with his inclinations, but +in cases where these clash with the social well being, it can supply no +reason why the former should give way to the latter. + +The argument rests upon a dual confusion. First, the moral "ought" is no +more than an organised and conscious form of "must," and not something +distinct from it. One may test the matter by taking a case. A man says, +I ought so to work as to promote the general welfare of society. If we +seek to find the source of this feeling we come ultimately upon the +feeling of tribal solidarity in virtue of which certain tribes survive +in the struggle for existence. It is gregariousness struggling into +consciousness. The moral "ought" is an idealised form of the primitive +tribal "must." And the "must" of primitive life is encouraged and +developed because it is one of the conditions of survival. + +The second point of confusion is based upon a supposed opposition +between individual inclinations and an ideal conception of duty. That +the two are often, as a matter of fact, in conflict, must be admitted. +And the cause is that while our inclinations represent a heritage from +the past, our ideals are a projection into the future. But the +contention is based upon their supposed permanent hostility, and that +need not be taken for granted. For the whole course of social evolution +tends to bring about a substantial identification of personal and social +well-being. More and more as the race develops it is being recognised +that there is no real individual life apart from social life, of which +it is the creation and the expression. Such antagonism as exists is the +inevitable result of a conflict between an organism and its adaptation +to a changing environment. And from this point of view the whole growth +of man is in the nature of an expansion of his sympathies and sense of +duty over an ever-widening area. The primitive egoism of the tribal +individual is extended to the nation, that of the nation to the empire, +and thence to the whole of humanity. There is no destruction or denial +of self in such cases, it is a development of the sense of self over an +enlarging area. + +Finally, if a secular code of morals will not suffice, it is sheer +rhetoric to say that religion is powerful enough to operate where +naturalism fails. On the contrary, in a civilised community religious +appeals tend to become secular appeals in disguise. On the admission of +Christian advocates the two most powerful appeals that can be made are +on the one hand, in the name of the fatherhood of god, and on the other, +the conception of the Mother and the Child. And what are these but +appeals to the secular and social feelings of man in the name of +religion? It may be granted that Atheism in its appeals to mankind often +fails, but in this respect is it any worse off than religion? Why, one +of the standing complaints of religious preachers in all ages is that +their message falls so frequently on deaf ears. There is no more +certainty that the religious appeal will meet with success, than there +is that any other appeal will be successful. And there is the +unquestionable fact that morality has become stronger as the power of +religion has weakened. The higher qualities have asserted themselves +during a period of religious disintegration, and the student of morals +sees in this a promise of a further development in the future. + +And to all prophecies as to the effects of Atheism on the morality of +the future there is the apt reply that they are prophecies and nothing +else. And in this respect it is dangerous for the Christian theist to +appeal to history. For while the consequences of Atheism can be no more +than a forecast, which may or may not be justified, the record of +Christianity is before the world. And we know that the period during +which the influence of Christian theism was strongest, was the period +when the intellectual life of civilised man was at its lowest, morality +at its weakest, and the general outlook most hopeless. Religious control +gave us heresy hunts, and Jew hunts, burnings for witchcraft, and magic +in the place of medicine. It gave us the Inquisition and the _auto da +fe_, the fires of Smithfield and the night of St. Bartholomew. It gave +us the war of sects and it helped powerfully to establish the sect of +war. It gave us life without happiness, and death cloaked with terror. +The Christian record is before us, and it is such that every Church +blames the others for its existence. Quite as certainly we cannot point +to a society that has been dominated by Freethinking ideas, but we can +point to their existence in all ages, and can show that all progress is +due to their presence. We can show that progressive ideas have +originated with the least, and have been opposed by the most religious +sections of society. What religion has done for the world we know; what +freethought will do we can only guess. But we are confident that as +honesty is possible without the falsity of religion, as duty may be done +with no other incentive than its visible consequences on the people +around us, so life may be lived in honour and closed in peace with no +other inspiration than comes from the contemplation of the human stream +from which we emerge and into which we finally go. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +ATHEISM INEVITABLE. + + +Between Theism and Atheism the logical mind may halt, but it cannot rest +for long, and in the end the logic of fact works its way. Compromise, +while it may delay the end without preventing its inevitability, is +quite out of place in matters of the intellect. In the world of practice +compromise is often unavoidable, but in that of ideas the sole concern +should be for truth. When Whately said that the man who commenced by +loving Christianity more than truth would continue by loving his own +sect more than any other, and end by loving himself more than all, he +placed his finger on the great moral danger of compromise where opinion +is concerned. It begins, ostensibly, by considering the respect due to +an opponent's case, it continues by sacrificing the respect that is due +one's own, and it ends by giving a new sense of value to the very +opinion it aims at destroying. "No quarter" is the only sound rule in +intellectual warfare, where to take prisoners is only one degree less +dishonouring than to be taken captive oneself. And the value of an +opinion is never wholly in the opinion itself. No small part of its +worth is derived from the way in which it is held, and the importance +which is placed upon it. + +When Professor Tylor said that the deepest of all divisions in the +history of human thought was that which divided Animism from +Materialism, he was saying what I have been endeavouring to say, in +another manner, in the foregoing pages. Atheism and supernaturalism are +fundamental divisions in human thought, and divisions that connote an +irreconcilable antagonism. The terms not only mark a division, they are +the badges of a movement, the indication of a pilgrimage. Dr. Tylor's +own work and the work of his fellow labourers tell the story in detail, +and although no one is in a position to write "finis" to it, there is no +doubt as to what its end will be. And the manner of the pilgrimage is +quite plain. The starting point is the creation by the befogged +ignorance of primitive man of that welter of ghosts and gods which make +so much of early existence a veritable nightmare. The journey commences +in a world in which the "supernatural" is omnipresent, in which man's +chief endeavours is given to win the good will or avert the anger of the +ghosts and gods to whom he has himself given being. And the end, the +last stage of the pilgrimage, is a world in which mechanical operations +take the place of disembodied intelligences, or of supernatural powers. +From a world in which the gods are everything and do everything to a +world in which the gods are nothing and do nothing. The story of that +transition is the record of one of the greatest revolutions that has +happened in the history of mankind. Its real greatness and far-reaching +significance is not always adequately recognised, even by those who +welcome it gladly. Indeed, the narrower interests that suffer from this +revolution are more keenly alive to its importance than are those who +benefit from its consummation. That is, perhaps, what one ought to +expect from the known course of human history. For history would not be +what it is, nor would reforms be so difficult of accomplishment were it +not possible to persuade the slave that his servitude guards him from +the very evils it perpetuates. + +Incidentally the nature of that revolution has been indicated in the +preceding pages. But a more connected view will form a fitting close to +this work. Nothing more than the barest of outlines can be attempted, +but such as it is it may serve to illustrate the truth that Atheism is +more than the speculative philosophy of a few, that it is in sober truth +the logical outcome of mental growth. So far as any phase of human life +can be called inevitable Atheism may lay claim to being inescapable. All +mental growth can be seen leading to it, just as we can see one stage of +social development giving a logical starting point for another stage, +and which could have been foretold had our knowledge of all the forces +in operation been precise enough. Atheism is, so to speak, implicit in +the growth of knowledge; its complete expression is the consummation of +a process that began with the first questionings of religion. And the +completion of the process means the death of supernaturalism in all its +forms. + +Religion, it has already been said, is something that is acquired, and +although that sounds little better than a commonplace, yet reflection +proves it to contain an important truth. For it is in the nature of the +acquisition that its significance lies. Whatever be the earliest stages +of religion it is at all events clear that its earliest form is in the +nature of a hypothesis, even though only of the semi-conscious kind that +exists when man is brought into touch with some new and overpowering +experience. Religious ideas are put forth in explanation of something. +But all explanation whether by savage or civilised man, must be in terms +of existing knowledge. No other method is possible. We must explain the +unknown in terms of the known, and our explanation will be the more +elaborate and the nearer the truth as our knowledge of the nature of the +forces are the more exact and extensive. A knowledge of the laws of +condensation and evaporation enables a modern to give an explanation of +the meaning of a shower of rain that is simply impossible to man in an +earlier stage of culture. In every case the facts are the same, and in +each case the explanation given depends upon the knowledge acquired. + +Now one radical distinction between an early and a modern explanation of +the world is that whereas the former moves from within outward, the +latter moves from without inward. Uncivilised man explains the world by +himself; civilised man explains himself by the world. The savage +describes the world in terms of his own feelings and passions, the +scientist regards human qualities as resulting from the relation which +man holds to the forces around him. The process, while presenting a +radical difference in form, is yet fundamentally one in essence. +Ignorant of all that we connote by such an expression as "natural +forces," whatever explanation is offered by the savage is necessarily in +terms of the only force with which he is acquainted. But it happens that +the only forces which he then fancies he understands are those +represented by his own organisation. What he is conscious of doing is +prompted by his own will and intelligence. He hurts when he is angry, he +rewards when he is pleased, and he makes the same assumption regarding +the things around him. So far as he explains nature he vitalises it. +Vital force becomes the symbol of all force. And this result expresses a +mental law that is universally operative. The civilised mind differs +from the savage mind not because the brain functions differently in the +two cases, but solely in consequence of the wider and truer knowledge of +the causes of natural phenomena which civilised man possesses. We arrive +at different conclusions because we start from different premises. +Inevitably, therefore, the first attempt of man to deal with nature +takes the form of assuming the operation of a number of personal +intelligences. Natural objects are alive, and everything that happens to +man, from the cradle to the grave, is thought of as being either alive +or controlled by living beings. The world is filled with a crowd of +ghostly beings exercising more or less discordant functions. Against +this riot of gods the conception of natural law developes but slowly. +Quite apart from the natural inertia of the human mind, the fact of +questioning the power of these assumed beings involves to the primitive +mind an element of grave danger. All sorts of things may happen if the +gods are offended, and in self-defence the tribe feels bound to suppress +the critic of religion and of religious ideas. But once the step is +taken, the area over which the gods rule is to that extent restricted, +and with that step Atheism may be said to be born. + +What Lange said in the opening sentences of his classic "History of +Materialism," that "Materialism is as old as philosophy, but not older," +may be said with equal truth of Atheism. That, too, is as old as +philosophy, since it begins with man's attempts to break away from that +primitive interpretation of nature which sees in all phenomena the +action of personal intelligences. It is of no importance in which branch +of knowledge the departure was made, whichever department one takes the +process can be seen at work. Astronomy appears to have been the branch +of knowledge in which the powers of the gods were earliest restricted, +although it was not until the discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, +Newton, and Laplace were given to the world that "God" vanished +altogether from that region. Geology follows with the teaching that +chemical, thermal, and other known forces leave nothing for the gods to +accomplish. Biology and sociology, dealing with more complex forces, are +much later in the field, but they tread the same path. They provide a +refuge for "God" for awhile, but it is evident that their complete +dispossession is no more than a question of time. And even though the +very complex character of the forces working in these latter departments +should prevent us ever acquiring the same degree of prevision that +exists in other classes, no difference will be made to the general +result. The principle will be fairly established and our ignorance of +details will no longer be made the ground for assertions which, if made +at all, should rest upon the most exact knowledge. "God" will be left +with nothing to do, and man will not for ever go on worshipping a God +whose sole recommendation is that he exists, nor will the common sense +of civilised people hold on to a hypothesis when there is nothing left +for that hypothesis to explain. + +The single and outstanding characteristic of the conception of god at +all times and under all conditions is that it is the equivalent of +ignorance. In primitive times it is ignorance of the character of +natural forces that leads to the assumption of the existence of gods, +and in this respect the god-idea has remained true to itself throughout. +Even to-day whenever the principle of "God" is invoked a very slight +examination is enough to show that the only reason for this being done +is our ignorance of the subject before us. Why does anyone assume that +we must believe in God in order to explain the beginnings of life? Why +is "God" assumed to be responsible for the order of nature? Why must we +assume "God" to explain mind? The answer to these and to all similar +questions is that we do not know, in the sense that we know the cause of +planetary motions, how these things came to be. It is not what we know +about them that leads to the assumption of god, but what we do not know. +And the converse of that is that so soon as knowledge replaces ignorance +"God" will be dispensed with. It is never a case of believing in God +because of the actual knowledge we possess, but always the appeal to +weakness and ignorance. From this point of view the colloquial "God only +knows!" expresses the appeal to ignorance even more clearly than the +elaborate argument of the sophisticated apologist. + +This aspect of the matter was well put by Spinoza. Believers in the +argument from design, he says, have a method of argument that is a +reduction, not to the impossible, but to ignorance. Thus, + + + If a stone falls from a roof on to someone's head and kills him, + they will demonstrate by their new method that the stone fell to + kill the man; for if it had not by God's will fallen with that + object, how could so many circumstances (and there are often many + concurrent circumstances) have all happened together by chance. + Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that the + wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. "But why," they + will insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the wind at that + very time blowing that way?" If you again answer, that the wind had + then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day + before, the weather having been previously calm, and that the man + had been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was + the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?" So + they will pursue their question from cause to cause, till at last + you take refuge in the will of God--in other words, the sanctuary + of ignorance. (Appendix to _Ethics_; pt. 1) + + +The sanctuary of ignorance "God" has always been, and the sanctuary of +ignorance it will remain to the end. It has no other function in life. A +consciousness of this is shown by the upholders of Theism in the +eagerness with which they welcome every supposed demonstration of the +impotence of science, and of the resistance everywhere offered to the +development of scientific advance. + +So far, then, as the progress of life makes for the growth of knowledge, +so far may we safely claim that the development of thought makes for +Atheism, as we have just said, and to do the religious world justice it +has always been quick to realise this, and every great scientific +generalisation--as well as many smaller ones, has been resisted on the +ground that they were atheistic in character and tended to take the +control of the world out of God's hands. Present-day theists are apt to +condemn this attitude of their predecessors, but it can hardly be denied +that the logic lies with the earlier representatives. A God who does +nothing might, for all practical purposes, as well be non-existent. And +a God who is merely in the background of things, who may be responsible +for their origin, but having originated them surrenders all control over +their operations, is hardly more serviceable. The modern theist saves +his God only by leaving him a negligible quantity in a universe he is +supposed to sustain and govern. + +And it cannot be too often emphasised that the whole basis of exact or +positive science is atheistic--that is, it is compelled to ignore even +the possibility of the existence of God. Every scientific generalisation +rests upon the constancy of natural forces. On no other basis is it +possible to give a scientific interpretation to what has gone before or +to anticipate what is to happen in the future. Every scientific +calculation assumes that in the world with which it deals causation is +invariable and universal. But if we are to assume the operations of a +"God" at any time or point every scientific calculation would have to be +accompanied with the D.V. of a prayer meeting. To argue from the past to +the future would be futile. God might have operated then, no one could +be certain he will operate now. Or he might have operated in the far +past, but he might not in the future. In either case the assumption of a +God would be fatal to exact scientific calculations. Thus in sheer self +defence, in order to preserve its character as science, science is +compelled to discard even the possibility of the existence of a +controlling intelligence. As one eminent theistic advocate admits, +"Science has no need, and indeed, can make no use, in any particular +instance of the theistic hypothesis."[6] It is only when supernaturalism +is partly excluded from human thought that science can be said to really +commence its existence; and in proportion as our conception of the +universe becomes that of an aggregate of non-conscious forces--or of a +single force with many forms producing given results under given +conditions, only then does our view of the universe reach completion. + +A study of the nature and tendency of human development does, therefore, +provide a very strong presumption in favour of atheism. All growth here +is in favour of atheism and away from theism. In the beginning we have +the gods everywhere and dominating everything. They do everything and +control everything. "God" is the one universal primitive hypothesis. And +all subsequent development is to its discrediting. There is no growth in +the idea of god, there is only an attenuation. The gods grow fewer as +the race approaches maturity. Their activities cease as man becomes +aware of the character of the forces around him. And it may be further +noted that this decline of the belief in deity is brought about as much +by sheer pressure of experience as by pure reason. The majority of +people do not reason themselves out of the belief in god, they outgrow +it. People cease to believe in the gods because they experience no +compulsion to believe in them. The logic of fact is ultimately more +powerful than the logic of theory, and as environmental forces brought +the gods into existence, so environmental forces carry them out again. + +Now Atheism does but make explicit in words what has long been implicit +in practice. It takes the god-idea, examines it, and explains it out of +existence. It admits the reality of gods as it admits the reality of +ghosts and fairies and witches. They are subjective, not objective, +realities. Atheism takes the god-idea, explains its origin, describes +its subsequent development, and in so doing indicates its ultimate fate. +In this sense Atheism is, as I have said, no more than the final stage +of a long historical process. The theistic phase of thought is an +inevitable one in human evolution, but it is no more a permanent one +than is the belief in hobgoblins. One might here paraphrase Bacon and +say, "A little philosophy inclineth a man to belief in the gods, but +depth in philosophy leads to their rejection as a false and useless +hypothesis." It is true that thinking brought the gods into the world; +it is also true that adequate thinking carries them out again. + +The cardinal truth is, of course, that the hypothesis of mind in nature +does not owe its existence to an exact knowledge of things but to its +absence. Its origin must be sought in a pre-scientific age and its +persistence in a number of extraneous circumstances which have +perpetuated a belief that would otherwise have inevitably disappeared. +And it would indeed be a matter for surprise if this belief--said by +theists to be of all beliefs the most profound--should be the one +speculation on which savage thought has justified itself. On no other +question did the primitive mind reach truth. Universally its +speculations concerning the world were discovered to be wrong. On this +one topic we are asked to believe that the savage was absolutely right. + +From the age of fetichism--rightly called by Comte the creative age in +theology--the history of the god-idea has been a history of a series of +modifications and rejections. Scarce an invention that has not slain a +god, scarce a discovery has not marked the burying-place of a discarded +deity. Criticism reduced the gods in number and limited them in power. +Advancing knowledge pushed them back till nature, "rid of her haughty +lords," is conceived as a huge mechanism, self-acting, self-adjusting, +and self-repairing. Even in the mouths of religionists "God" to-day +stands for little more than a force. We must not describe him as +personal, as intelligent, or as conscious, and between this and the +existence assumed by atheistic science it is impossible to detect any +vital difference. Atheism, then, takes its stand upon the observed trend +of human history, upon a scrutiny of the facts of nature, and upon an +examination of the origin and contents of the god-idea. And upon these +grounds it may fairly claim to be irrefutable and inevitable. +Circumstances may obstruct its universal acceptance as a reasoned mental +attitude, but that merely delays, it does not destroy the certainty of +its final triumph. + +With the supposed direful consequences that would follow the triumph of +Atheism I have not dealt with at length. These are the bugbears which +the designing normally employ in order to frighten the timid and +credulous. Mental uprightness and moral integrity are certainly not the +property of one religion, nor can it be said with truth that they belong +to any. And examining the histories of religion it is a fair assumption +that in whatever direction the world may suffer from the disappearance +of religion there will be no moral catastrophe. Looking at the whole +course of human history, and noting how the vilest and most ruinous +practices have been ever associated with religion, and have ever relied +upon religion for support, the cause for speculation is, not what will +happen to the world when religion dies out, but how human society has +managed to flourish while the belief in the gods ruled. + +Fortunately for human society nature has not left the operation of the +fundamental virtues dependent upon the acceptance of this or that theory +of the world. The social and family instincts, which are inseparable +from our nature as men and women, and which operate in ways of which we +are largely unconscious, are the grounds of all the higher and finer +virtues, and while a change in opinion may affect their operation here +and there, it can never alter their fundamental character. Conduct, in +short, comes from life, it is not the creation of a theory to be +dismissed by resolution or refashioned by a vote. + +What Atheism would mean in practice would be an enormous concentration +of energy upon purely human affairs, and a judgment of conduct in terms +of human happiness and prosperity. And that certainly furnishes no cause +for alarm. It is, indeed, our greatest need. We need an awakening to the +untapped power and possibilities of human nature. If the gods die, man +their creator still lives; and the creative energy which once covered +the face of nature with innumerable gods, which spent itself in the +attempt to win their favour, and which called forth a heaven in the +endeavour to redress the wrongs of earth, may, if properly applied, yet +cover the earth with homes in which men and women, rendered purer by +love and stronger by knowledge, will rise superior to the fabled gods +before whom they once bowed in blind adoration. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[6] Prof. Ward "Naturalism and Agnosticism" Vol. I., p. 23. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Theism or Atheism, by Chapman Cohen + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEISM OR ATHEISM *** + +***** This file should be named 25291.txt or 25291.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/5/2/9/25291/ + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Martin Pettit and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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