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+Project Gutenberg's The Approach to Philosophy, by Ralph Barton Perry
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Approach to Philosophy
+
+Author: Ralph Barton Perry
+
+Release Date: April 19, 2008 [EBook #25110]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: UTF-8
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Stephen Hope, Fox in the Stars, Lisa Reigel,
+and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's Notes: Some typographical errors have been corrected. A
+complete list follows the text. Greek words may not display properly--in
+that case, try another version. Transliterations of Greek words can be
+found in the ascii and html files. Words italicized in the original are
+surrounded by _underscores_.
+
+
+
+
+THE
+APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+BY PROF. RALPH BARTON PERRY
+
+  THE FREE MAN AND THE SOLDIER
+  THE MORAL ECONOMY
+  THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
+
+
+
+
+THE APPROACH TO
+PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+BY
+
+RALPH BARTON PERRY, PH.D.
+  ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
+
+
+CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
+  NEW YORK CHICAGO BOSTON
+
+
+COPYRIGHT, 1905, BY
+CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
+
+Printed in the United States of America
+F
+
+
+
+
+THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED TO
+
+MY FATHER
+
+AS A TOKEN OF MY LOVE AND ESTEEM
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+In an essay on "The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time,"
+Professor Edward Caird says that "philosophy is not a first venture into
+a new field of thought, but the rethinking of a secular and religious
+consciousness which has been developed, in the main, independently of
+philosophy."[vii:A] If there be any inspiration and originality in this
+book, they are due to my great desire that philosophy should appear in
+its vital relations to more familiar experiences. If philosophy is, as
+is commonly assumed, appropriate to a phase in the development of every
+individual, it should _grow out_ of interests to which he is already
+alive. And if the great philosophers are indeed never dead, this fact
+should manifest itself in their classic or historical representation of
+a perennial outlook upon the world. I am not seeking to attach to
+philosophy a fictitious liveliness, wherewith to insinuate it into the
+good graces of the student. I hope rather to be true to the meaning of
+philosophy. For there is that in its stand-point and its problem which
+makes it universally significant entirely apart from dialectic and
+erudition. These are derived interests, indispensable to the scholar,
+but quite separable from that modicum of philosophy which helps to make
+the man. The present book is written for the sake of elucidating the
+inevitable philosophy. It seeks to make the reader more solicitously
+aware of the philosophy that is in him, or to provoke him to philosophy
+in his own interests. To this end I have sacrificed all else to the task
+of mediating between the tradition and technicalities of the academic
+discipline and the more common terms of life.
+
+The purpose of the book will in part account for those shortcomings that
+immediately reveal themselves to the eye of the scholar. In Part I
+various great human interests have been selected as points of departure.
+I have sought to introduce the general stand-point and problem of
+philosophy through its implication in practical life, poetry, religion,
+and science. But in so doing it has been necessary for me to deal
+shortly with topics of great independent importance, and so risk the
+disfavor of those better skilled in these several matters. This is
+evidently true of the chapter which deals with natural science. But the
+problem which I there faced differed radically from those of the
+foregoing chapters, and the method of treatment is correspondingly
+different. In the case of natural science one has to deal with a body of
+knowledge which is frequently regarded as the only knowledge. To write a
+chapter about science from a philosophical stand-point is, in the
+present state of opinion, to undertake a polemic against exclusive
+naturalism, an attitude which is itself philosophical, and as such is
+well known in the history of philosophy as _positivism_ or
+_agnosticism_. I have avoided the polemical spirit and method so far as
+possible, but have, nevertheless, here taken sides against a definite
+philosophical position. This chapter, together with the Conclusion, is
+therefore an exception to the purely introductory and expository
+representation which I have, on the whole, sought to give. The
+relatively great space accorded to the discussion of religion is, in my
+own belief, fair to the general interest in this topic, and to the
+intrinsic significance of its relation to philosophy.
+
+I have in Part II undertaken to furnish the reader with a map of the
+country to which he has been led. To this end I have attempted a brief
+survey of the entire programme of philosophy. An accurate and full
+account of philosophical terms can be found in such books as Külpe's
+"Introduction to Philosophy" and Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy,"
+and an attempt to emulate their thoroughness would be superfluous, even
+if it were conformable to the general spirit of this book. The scope of
+Part II is due in part to a desire for brevity, but chiefly to the hope
+of furnishing an epitome that shall follow the course of the _natural
+and historical differentiation_ of the general philosophical problem.
+
+Finally, I have in Part III sought to present the tradition of
+philosophy in the form of general types. My purpose in undertaking so
+difficult a task is to acquaint the reader with philosophy in the
+concrete; to show how certain underlying principles may determine the
+whole circle of philosophical ideas, and give them unity and distinctive
+flavor. Part II offers a general classification of philosophical
+problems and conceptions independently of any special point of view. But
+I have in Part III sought to emphasize the point of view, or the
+internal consistency that makes a _system of philosophy_ out of certain
+answers to the special problems of philosophy. In such a division into
+types, lines are of necessity drawn too sharply. There will be many
+historical philosophies that refuse to fit, and many possibilities
+unprovided for. I must leave it to the individual reader to overcome
+this abstractness through his own reflection upon the intermediate and
+variant stand-points.
+
+Although the order is on the whole that of progressive complexity, I
+have sought to treat each chapter with independence enough to make it
+possible for it to be read separately; and I have provided a carefully
+selected bibliography in the hope that this book may serve as a stimulus
+and guide to the reading of other books.
+
+The earlier chapters have already appeared as articles: Chapter I in the
+_International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. XIII, No. 4; Chapter II in the
+_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, No. 6; Chapter III in the _Monist_,
+Vol. XIV, No. 5; Chapter IV in the _International Journal of Ethics_,
+Vol. XV, No. 1; and some paragraphs of Chapter V in the _Journal of
+Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol. I, No. 7. I am
+indebted to the editors of these periodicals for permission to reprint
+with minor changes.
+
+In the writing of this, my first book, I have been often reminded that
+a higher critic, skilled in the study of internal evidence, could
+probably trace all of its ideas to suggestions that have come to me from
+my teachers and colleagues of the Department of Philosophy in Harvard
+University. I have unscrupulously forgotten what of their definite ideas
+I have adapted to my own use, but not that I received from them the
+major portion of my original philosophical capital. I am especially
+indebted to Professor William James for the inspiration and resources
+which I have received from his instruction and personal friendship.
+
+                                              RALPH BARTON PERRY.
+
+CAMBRIDGE, March, 1905.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[vii:A] Edw. Caird: _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 207.
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+
+PART I
+
+APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY
+                                                                    PAGE
+
+CHAPTER I. THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER                       3
+
+  §   1. Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?                     3
+  §   2. Life as a Starting-point for Thought                          4
+  §   3. The Practical Knowledge of Means                              8
+  §   4. The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose                10
+  §   5. The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and the
+             Voluptuary                                               12
+  §   6. The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life          17
+
+CHAPTER II. POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY                                     24
+
+  §   7. Who is the Philosopher-Poet?                                 24
+  §   8. Poetry as Appreciation                                       25
+  §   9. Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman                                 27
+  §  10. Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare                30
+  §  11. Philosophy in Poetry. The World-view. Omar Khayyam           36
+  §  12. Wordsworth                                                   38
+  §  13. Dante                                                        42
+  §  14. The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy                 48
+
+CHAPTER III. THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE                                 53
+
+  §  15. The Possibility of Defining Religion                         53
+  §  16. The Profitableness of Defining Religion                      54
+  §  17. The True Method of Defining Religion                         56
+  §  18. Religion as Belief                                           59
+  §  19. Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude              62
+  §  20. Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual
+             Environment, or Universe                                 64
+  §  21. Examples of Religious Belief                                 66
+  §  22. Typical Religious Phenomena. Conversion                      69
+  §  23. Piety                                                        72
+  §  24. Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance    74
+  §  25. Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions            77
+  §  26. Buddhism                                                     78
+  §  27. Critical Religion                                            79
+
+CHAPTER IV. THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION                82
+
+  §  28. Résumé of Psychology of Religion                             82
+  §  29. Religion Means to be True                                    82
+  §  30. Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a Disposition
+             from which Consequences May Rationally be Expected       85
+  §  31. Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The
+             Religion of Baal                                         88
+  §  32. Greek Religion                                               89
+  §  33. Judaism and Christianity                                     92
+  §  34. The Cognitive Factor in Religion                             96
+  §  35. The Place of Imagination in Religion                         97
+  §  36. The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination          101
+  §  37. The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion      105
+  §  38. The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions         108
+
+CHAPTER V. NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY                            114
+
+  §  39. The True Relations of Philosophy and Science.
+             Misconceptions and Antagonisms                          114
+  §  40. The Spheres of Philosophy and Science                       117
+  §  41. The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science                    120
+  §  42. The Origin of the Scientific Interest                       123
+  §  43. Skill as Free                                               123
+  §  44. Skill as Social                                             126
+  §  45. Science for Accommodation and Construction                  127
+  §  46. Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. The
+             Descriptive Method                                      128
+  §  47. Space, Time, and Prediction                                 130
+  §  48. The Quantitative Method                                     132
+  §  49. The General Development of Science                          134
+  §  50. The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science          135
+  §  51. Natural Science is Abstract                                 136
+  §  52. The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth                        139
+  §  53. But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality                   142
+  §  54. Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy          143
+
+
+PART II
+
+THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+CHAPTER VI. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY                             149
+
+  §  55. The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem
+             of Philosophy                                           149
+  §  56. The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon
+             the Initial Interest                                    152
+  §  57. Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life                    152
+  §  58. Philosophy as the Extension of Science                      154
+  §  59. The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical
+             Problem                                                 155
+  §  60. Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception             157
+  §  61. Monism and Pluralism                                        159
+  §  62. Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process            159
+  §  63. Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies                     160
+  §  64. Dualism                                                     162
+  §  65. The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism                     163
+  §  66. Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of
+             Knowledge                                               164
+  §  67. Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism                      166
+  §  68. The Source and Criterion of Knowledge according to
+             Empiricism and Rationalism. Mysticism                   168
+  §  69. The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to
+             Realism, and the Representative Theory                  172
+  §  70. The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to
+             Idealism                                                175
+  §  71. Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism                176
+  §  72. Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism                     177
+
+CHAPTER VII. THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION     180
+
+  §  73. The Normative Sciences                                      180
+  §  74. The Affiliations of Logic                                   182
+  §  75. Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in
+             Belief                                                  183
+  §  76. The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence,
+             Inference, and Observation                              184
+  §  77. Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment                  187
+  §  78. Priority of Concepts                                        188
+  §  79. Æsthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of
+             Beauty. Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies       189
+  §  80. Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral
+             Goodness                                                191
+  §  81. Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism                           191
+  §  82. Rationalism                                                 193
+  §  83. Eudæmonism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism           194
+  §  84. Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics                    196
+  §  85. The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions                      198
+  §  86. The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of Faith    199
+  §  87. Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God             200
+  §  88. The Ontological Proof of God                                200
+  §  89. The Cosmological Proof of God                               203
+  §  90. The Teleological Proof of God                               204
+  §  91. God and the World. Theism and Pantheism                     205
+  §  92. Deism                                                       206
+  §  93. Metaphysics and Theology                                    207
+  §  94. Psychology is the Theory of the Soul                        208
+  §  95. Spiritual Substance                                         209
+  §  96. Intellectualism and Voluntarism                             210
+  §  97. Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, and
+             Indeterminism                                           211
+  §  98. Immortality. Survival and Eternalism                        212
+  §  99. The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and Method  213
+  § 100. Psychology and Philosophy                                   216
+  § 101. Transition from Classification by Problems to
+             Classification by Doctrines. Naturalism. Subjectivism.
+             Absolute Idealism. Absolute Realism                     217
+
+
+PART III
+
+SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+CHAPTER VIII. NATURALISM                                             223
+
+  § 102. The General Meaning of Materialism                          223
+  § 103. Corporeal Being                                             224
+  § 104. Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism                225
+  § 105. Materialism and Physical Science                            228
+  § 106. The Development of the Conceptions of Physical Science.
+             Space and Matter                                        228
+  § 107. Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the
+             Conception of Force                                     231
+  § 108. The Development and Extension of the Conception of Energy   236
+  § 109. The Claims of Naturalism                                    239
+  § 110. The Task of Naturalism                                      241
+  § 111. The Origin of the Cosmos                                    242
+  § 112. Life. Natural Selection                                     244
+  § 113. Mechanical Physiology                                       246
+  § 114. Mind. The Reduction to Sensation                            247
+  § 115. Automatism                                                  248
+  § 116. Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon               250
+  § 117. Knowledge. Positivism and Agnosticism                       252
+  § 118. Experimentalism                                             255
+  § 119. Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic                    256
+  § 120. General Ethical Stand-point                                 258
+  § 121. Cynicism and Cyrenaicism                                    259
+  § 122. Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception of
+             Social Relations                                        260
+  § 123. Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic                          262
+  § 124. Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion                      263
+  § 125. Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, Wonder,
+             and Renunciation                                        265
+
+CHAPTER IX. SUBJECTIVISM                                             267
+
+  § 126. Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and
+             Scepticism                                              267
+  § 127. Phenomenalism and Spiritualism                              271
+  § 128. Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem
+             Inherited from Descartes and Locke                      272
+  § 129. The Refutation of Material Substance                        275
+  § 130. The Application of the Epistemological Principle            277
+  § 131. The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World               278
+  § 132. The Transition to Spiritualism                              280
+  § 133. Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism                  281
+  § 134. Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the
+             Perceiver                                               284
+  § 135. Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate
+             Knowledge of the Will                                   285
+  § 136. Panpsychism                                                 287
+  § 137. The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for
+             Objective Knowledge                                     288
+  § 138. Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism.
+             Mysticism                                               290
+  § 139. Objective Spiritualism                                      292
+  § 140. Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness, and Order  293
+  § 141. The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself    297
+  § 142. Ethical Theories. Relativism                                298
+  § 143. Pessimism and Self-denial                                   299
+  § 144. The Ethics of Welfare                                       300
+  § 145. The Ethical Community                                       302
+  § 146. The Religion of Mysticism                                   303
+  § 147. The Religion of Individual Coöperation with God             304
+
+CHAPTER X. ABSOLUTE REALISM                                          306
+
+  § 148. The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, or
+             the Absolute                                            306
+  § 149. The Eleatic Conception of Being                             309
+  § 150. Spinoza's Conception of Substance                           311
+  § 151. Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The Modes
+             and the Attributes                                      312
+  § 152. The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God                    315
+  § 153. Spinoza's Provision for the Finite                          317
+  § 154. Transition to Teleological Conceptions                      317
+  § 155. Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical                  319
+  § 156. Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists        319
+  § 157. Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher          321
+  § 158. Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth               323
+  § 159. The Historical Preparation for Plato                        324
+  § 160. Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good            326
+  § 161. The Progression of Experience toward God                    329
+  § 162. Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to
+             Platonism                                               332
+  § 163. The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of
+             Platonism and Spinozism                                 335
+  § 164. Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development to
+             the Problem of Imperfection                             336
+  § 165. The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved                338
+  § 166. Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism               339
+  § 167. The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute Realism  340
+  § 168. The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity               342
+  § 169. The Platonic Ethics of Perfection                           344
+  § 170. The Religion of Fulfilment and the Religion of
+             Renunciation                                            346
+
+CHAPTER XI. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM                                        349
+
+  § 171. General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism         349
+  § 172. The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism                351
+  § 173. The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The Task
+             of the New Absolutism                                   352
+  § 174. The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis of
+             Experience                                              354
+  § 175. Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which they
+             Set in Order                                            356
+  § 176. The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the
+             Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant.
+             The Absolute Spirit                                     358
+  § 177. Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity       360
+  § 178. Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment            361
+  § 179. Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic            361
+  § 180. The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History               363
+  § 181. Résumé. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the Problem
+             of Evil                                                 365
+  § 182. The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is Based
+             upon the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge             368
+  § 183. The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason            371
+  § 184. Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian
+             Philosophy                                              372
+  § 185. Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the Thinking
+             Self                                                    374
+  § 186. Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers              376
+  § 187. To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind       377
+  § 188. The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general into an
+             Absolute Mind                                           380
+  § 189. The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite Mind to
+             the Infinite Mind                                       382
+  § 190. The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism                 385
+  § 191. The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics
+             of Absolute Idealism. Kant                              386
+  § 192. Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of
+             Universal and Objective Spirit                          388
+  § 193. The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute Idealism   390
+  § 194. The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality                      393
+
+CHAPTER XII. CONCLUSION                                              395
+
+  § 195. Liability of Philosophy to Revision Due to its Systematic
+             Character                                               395
+  § 196. The One Science and the Many Philosophies                   396
+  § 197. Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or Eclecticism
+             of the Present Age                                      398
+  § 198. Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism and
+             Absolutism                                              399
+  § 199. Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of
+             Nature. The Neo-Fichteans                               401
+  § 200. The Neo-Kantians                                            403
+  § 201. Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism            404
+  § 202. Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of
+             Fundamental Principles                                  405
+  § 203. Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism                         407
+  § 204. Summary and Transition to Epistemology                      408
+  § 205. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism.
+             Realistic Tendency in Empirical Idealism                409
+  § 206. Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception of
+             Experience                                              410
+  § 207. Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence Philosophy  412
+  § 208. The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New
+             Construction                                            413
+  § 209. The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of Attempt
+             to Reduce all Experience to it                          414
+  § 210. Truth of Psychical Relations but Impossibility of General
+             Reduction to them                                       415
+  § 211. Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of Ideal
+             of Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing the Whole
+             of Experience from it                                   415
+  § 212. Error and Evil cannot be Reduced to the Ideal               417
+  § 213. Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole             419
+  § 214. Moral Implications of Such Pluralistic Philosophy. Purity
+             of the Good                                             420
+  § 215. The Incentive to Goodness                                   422
+  § 216. The Justification of Faith                                  423
+  § 217. The Worship and Service of God                              425
+  § 218. The Philosopher and the Standards of the Market-Place       425
+  § 219. The Secularism of the Present Age                           427
+  § 220. The Value of Contemplation for Life                         428
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                         431
+
+INDEX                                                                441
+
+
+
+
+PART I
+
+APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF
+PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER
+
+
+[Sidenote: Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?]
+
+§ 1. Philosophy suffers the distinction of being regarded as essentially
+an academic pursuit. The term _philosophy_, to be sure, is used in
+common speech to denote a stoical manner of accepting the vicissitudes
+of life; but this conception sheds little or no light upon the meaning
+of philosophy as a branch of scholarship. The men who write the books on
+"Epistemology" or "Ontology," are regarded by the average man of
+affairs, even though he may have enjoyed a "higher education," with
+little sympathy and less intelligence. Not even philology seems less
+concerned with the real business of life. The pursuit of philosophy
+appears to be a phenomenon of extreme and somewhat effete culture, with
+its own peculiar traditions, problems, and aims, and with little or
+nothing to contribute to the real enterprises of society. It is easy to
+prove to the satisfaction of the philosopher that such a view is
+radically mistaken. But it is another and more serious matter to bridge
+over the very real gap that separates philosophy and common-sense. Such
+an aim is realized only when philosophy is seen to issue from some
+special interest that is humanly important; or when, after starting in
+thought at a point where one deals with ideas and interests common to
+all, one is led by the inevitableness of consistent thinking into the
+sphere of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Life as a Starting-point for Thought.]
+
+§ 2. There is but one starting-point for reflection when all men are
+invited to share in it. Though there be a great many special platforms
+where special groups of men may take their stand together, there is only
+one platform broad enough for all. This universal stand-point, or common
+platform, is _life_. It is our more definite thesis, then, that
+philosophy, even to its most abstruse technicality, is rooted in life;
+and that it is inseparably bound up with the satisfaction of practical
+needs, and the solution of practical problems.
+
+Every man knows what it is to live, and his immediate experience will
+verify those features of the adventure that stand out conspicuously. To
+begin with, life is our birthright. We did not ask for it, but when we
+grew old enough to be self-conscious we found ourselves in possession
+of it. Nor is it a gift to be neglected, even if we had the will. As is
+true of no other gift of nature, we must use it, or cease to be. There
+is a unique urgency about life. But we have already implied more, in so
+far as we have said that it must be _used_, and have thereby referred to
+some form of movement or activity as its inseparable attribute. To
+live is to find one's self compelled to do something. To do
+_something_--there is another implication of life: some outer
+expression, some medium in which to register the degree and form of its
+activity. Such we recognize as the environment of life, the real objects
+among which it is placed; which it may change, or from which it may
+suffer change. Not only do we find our lives as unsolicited active
+powers, but find, as well, an arena prescribed for their exercise. That
+we shall act, and in a certain time and place, and with reference to
+certain other realities, this is the general condition of things that is
+encountered when each one of us discovers life. In short, to live means
+to be compelled to do something under certain circumstances.
+
+There is another very common aspect of life that would not at first
+glance seem worthy of mention. Not only does life, as we have just
+described it, mean opportunity, but it means self-conscious opportunity.
+The facts are such as we have found them to be, and as each one of us
+has previously found them for himself. But when we discover life for
+ourselves, we who make the discovery, and we who live, are identical.
+From that moment we both live, and know that we live. Moreover, such is
+the essential unity of our natures that our living must now express our
+knowing, and our knowing guide and illuminate our living. Consider the
+allegory of the centipede. From the beginning of time he had manipulated
+his countless legs with exquisite precision. Men had regarded him with
+wonder and amazement. But he was innocent of his own art, being a
+contrivance of nature, perfectly constructed to do her bidding. One day
+the centipede discovered life. He discovered himself as one who walks,
+and the newly awakened intelligence, first observing, then foreseeing,
+at length began to direct the process. And from that moment the
+centipede, because he could not remember the proper order of his going,
+lost all his former skill, and became the poor clumsy victim of his own
+self-consciousness. This same self-consciousness is the inconvenience
+and the great glory of human life. We must stumble along as best we
+can, guided by the feeble light of our own little intelligence. If
+nature starts us on our way, she soon hands over the torch, and bids us
+find the trail for ourselves. Most men are brave enough to regard this
+as the best thing of all; some despair on account of it. In either case
+it is admittedly the true story of human life. We must live as separate
+selves, observing, foreseeing, and planning. There are two things that
+we can do about it. We can repudiate our natures, decline the
+responsibility, and degenerate to the level of those animals that never
+had our chance; or we can leap joyously to the helm, and with all the
+strength and wisdom in us guide our lives to their destination. But if
+we do the former, we shall be unable to forget what might have been, and
+shall be haunted by a sense of ignominy; and if we do the second, we
+shall experience the unique happiness of fulfilment and
+self-realization.
+
+Life, then, is a situation that appeals to intelligent activity. Humanly
+speaking, there is no such thing as a situation that is not at the same
+time a theory. As we live we are all theorists. Whoever has any
+misgivings as to the practical value of theory, let him remember that,
+speaking generally of human life, it is true to say that there is no
+practice that does not issue at length from reflection. That which is
+the commonest experience of mankind is the conjunction of these two, the
+thought and the deed. And as surely as we are all practical theorists,
+so surely is philosophy the outcome of the broadening and deepening of
+practical theory. But to understand how the practical man becomes the
+philosopher, we must inquire somewhat more carefully into the manner of
+his thought about life.
+
+[Sidenote: The Practical Knowledge of Means.]
+
+§ 3. Let anyone inspect the last moment in his life, and in all
+probability he will find that his mind was employed to discover the
+means to some end. He was already bent upon some definite achievement,
+and was thoughtful for the sake of selecting the economical and
+effectual way. His theory made his practice skilful. So through life his
+knowledge shows him how to work his will. Example, experience, and books
+have taught him the uses of nature and society, and in his thoughtful
+living he is enabled to reach the goal he has set for the next hour,
+day, or year of his activity. The long periods of human life are spent
+in elaborating the means to some unquestioned end. Here one meets the
+curious truth that we wake up in the middle of life, already making
+headway, and under the guidance of some invisible steersman. When first
+we take the business of life seriously, there is a considerable stock in
+trade in the shape of habits, and inclinations to all sorts of things
+that we never consciously elected to pursue. Since we do not begin at
+the beginning, our first problem is to accommodate ourselves to
+ourselves, and our first deliberate acts are in fulfilment of plans
+outlined by some predecessor that has already spoken for us. The same
+thing is true of the race of men. At a certain stage in their
+development men found themselves engaged in all manner of ritual and
+custom, and burdened with concerns that were not of their own choosing.
+They were burning incense, keeping festivals, and naming names, all of
+which they must now proceed to justify with myth and legend, in order to
+render intelligible to themselves the deliberate and self-conscious
+repetition of them. Even so much justification was left to the few, and
+the great majority continued to seek that good which social usage
+countenanced and individual predisposition confirmed. So every man of us
+acts from day to day for love's sake, or wealth's sake, or power's
+sake, or for the sake of some near and tangible object; reflecting only
+for the greater efficiency of his endeavor.
+
+[Sidenote: The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose.]
+
+§ 4. But if this be the common manner of thinking about life, it does
+not represent the whole of such thought. Nor does it follow that because
+it occupies us so much, it is therefore correspondingly fundamental.
+Like the myth makers of old, we all want more or less to know the
+_reason of our ends_. Here, then, we meet with a somewhat different type
+of reflection upon life, the reflection that underlies the adoption of a
+life purpose. It is obvious that most ends are selected for the sake of
+other ends, and so are virtually means. Thus one may struggle for years
+to secure a college education. This definite end has been adopted for
+the sake of a somewhat more indefinite end of self-advancement, and from
+it there issues a whole series of minor ends, which form a hierarchy of
+steps ascending to the highest goal of aspiration. Now upon the face of
+things we live very unsystematic lives, and yet were we to examine
+ourselves in this fashion, we should all find our lives to be marvels of
+organization. Their growth, as we have seen, began before we were
+conscious of it; and we are commonly so absorbed in some particular
+flower or fruit that we forget the roots, and the design of the whole.
+But a little reflection reveals a remarkable unitary adjustment of
+parts. The unity is due to the dominance of a group of central purposes.
+Judged from the stand-point of experience, it seems bitter irony to say
+that everyone gets from life just what he wishes. But a candid searching
+of our own hearts will incline us to admit that, after all, the way we
+go and the length we go is determined pretty much by the kind and the
+intensity of our secret longing. That for which in the time of choice we
+are willing to sacrifice all else, is the formula that defines the law
+of each individual life. All this is not intended to mean that we have
+each named a clear and definite ideal which is our chosen goal. On the
+contrary, such a conception may be almost meaningless to some of us. In
+general the higher the ideal the vaguer and less vivid is its
+presentation to our consciousness. But, named or unnamed, sharp or
+blurred, vivid or half-forgotten, there may be found in the heart of
+every man that which of all things he wants to be, that which of all
+deeds he wants to do. If he has had the normal youth of dreaming, he
+has seen it, and warmed to the picture of his imagination; if he has
+been somewhat more thoughtful than the ordinary, his reason has defined
+it, and adopted it for his vocation; if neither, it has been present as
+an undertone throughout the rendering of his more inevitable life. He
+will recognize it when it is named as the desire to do the will of God,
+or to have as good a time as possible, or to make other people as happy
+as possible, or to be equal to his responsibilities, or to fulfil the
+expectation of his mother, or to be distinguished, wealthy, or
+influential. This list of ideals is miscellaneous, and ethically
+reducible to more fundamental concepts, but these are the terms in which
+men are ordinarily conscious of their most intimate purposes. We must
+now inquire respecting the nature of the thought that determines the
+selection of such a purpose, or justifies it when it has been
+unconsciously accepted.
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and the
+Voluptuary.]
+
+§ 5. What is most worth while? So far as human action is concerned this
+obviously depends upon what is possible, upon what is expected of us by
+our own natures, and upon what interests and concerns are conserved by
+the trend of events in our environment. What I had best do, presupposes
+what I have the strength and the skill to do, what I feel called upon to
+do, and what are the great causes that are entitled to promotion at my
+hands. It seems that practically we cannot separate the ideal from the
+real. We may feel that the highest ideal is an immediate utterance of
+conscience, as mysterious in origin as it is authoritative in
+expression. We may be willing to defy the universe, and expatriate
+ourselves from our natural and social environment, for the sake of the
+holy law of duty. Such men as Count Tolstoi have little to say of the
+possible, or the expedient, or the actual, and are satisfied to stand
+almost alone against the brutal facts of usage and economy. We all have
+a secret sense of chivalry, that prompts, however ineffectually, to a
+like devotion. But that which in such moral purposes appears to indicate
+a severance of the ideal and the real, is, if we will but stop to
+consider, only a severance of the ideal and the apparent. The martyr is
+more sure of reality than the adventurer. He is convinced that though
+his contemporaries and his environment be against him; the fundamental
+or eventual order of things is for him. He believes in a spiritual world
+more abiding, albeit less obvious, than the material world. Though
+every temporal event contradict him, he lives in the certainty that
+eternity is his. Such an one may have found his ideal in the voice of
+God and His prophets, or he may have been led to God as the
+justification of his irresistible ideal; but in either case the
+selection of his ideal is reasonable to him in so far as it is
+harmonious with the ultimate nature of things, or stands for the promise
+of reality. In this wise, thought about life expands into some
+conception of the deeper forces of the world, and life itself, in
+respect of its fundamental attachment to an ideal, implies some belief
+concerning the fundamental nature of its environment.
+
+But lest in this account life be credited with too much gravity and
+import, or it seem to be assumed that life is all knight-errantry, let
+us turn to our less quixotic, and perhaps more effectual, man of
+affairs. He works for his daily bread, and for success in his vocation.
+He has selected his vocation for its promise of return in the form of
+wealth, comfort, fame, or influence. He likewise performs such
+additional service to his family and his community as is demanded of him
+by public opinion and his own sense of responsibility. He may have a
+certain contempt for the man who sees visions. This may be his manner of
+testifying to his own preference for the ideal of usefulness and
+immediate efficiency. But even so he would never for an instant admit
+that he was pursuing a merely conventional good. He may be largely
+imitative in his standards of value, recognizing such aims as are common
+to some time or race; nevertheless none would be more sure than he of
+the truth of his ideal. Question him, and he will maintain that his is
+the reasonable life under the conditions of human existence. He may
+maintain that if there be a God, he can best serve Him by promoting the
+tangible welfare of himself and those dependent upon him. He may
+maintain that, since there is no God, he must win such rewards as the
+world can give. If he have something of the heroic in him, he may tell
+you that, since there is no God, he will labor to the uttermost for his
+fellow-men. Where he has not solved the problem of life for himself, he
+may believe himself to be obeying the insight of some one wiser than
+himself, or of society as expressed in its customs and institutions. But
+no man ever admitted that his life was purely a matter of expediency, or
+that in his dominant ideal he was the victim of chance. In the
+background of the busiest and most preoccupied life of affairs, there
+dwells the conviction that such living is appropriate to the universe;
+that it is called for by the circumstances of its origin, opportunities,
+and destiny.
+
+Finally, the man who makes light of life has of all men the most
+transparent inner consciousness. In him may be clearly observed the
+relation between the ideal and the reflection that is assumed to justify
+it.
+
+     "A Moment's Halt--a momentary taste
+      Of Being from the Well amid the Waste--
+      And Lo!--the phantom Caravan has reach'd
+      The Nothing it set out from-- . . ."
+
+     "We are no other than a moving row
+      Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go
+      Round with the Sun-illumin'd Lantern held
+      In Midnight by the Master of the Show."
+
+Where the setting of life is construed in these terms, there is but one
+natural and appropriate manner of life. Once believing in the isolation
+and insignificance of life, one is sceptical of all worth save such as
+may be tasted in the moment of its purchase. If one's ideas and
+experiences are no concern of the world's, but incidents of a purely
+local and transient interest, they will realize most when they realize
+an immediate gratification. Where one does not believe that he is a
+member of the universe, and a contributor to its ends, he does well to
+minimize the friction that arises from its accidental propinquity, and
+to kindle some little fire of enjoyment in his own lonely heart. This is
+the life of abandonment to pleasure, accompanied by the conviction that
+the conditions of life warrant no more strenuous or heroic plan.
+
+[Sidenote: The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life.]
+
+§ 6. In such wise do we adopt the life purpose, or justify it when
+unconsciously adopted. The pursuit of an ideal implies a belief in its
+effectuality. Such a belief will invariably appear when the groundwork
+of the daily living is laid bare by a little reflection. And if our
+analysis has not been in error, there is something more definite to be
+obtained from it. We all believe in the practical wisdom of our
+fundamental ideals; but we believe, besides, that such wisdom involves
+the sanction of the universe as a whole. The momentousness of an
+individual's life will be satisfied with nothing less final than an
+absolutely wise disposition of it. For every individual, his life is all
+his power and riches, and is not to be spent save for the _greatest good
+that he can reasonably pursue_. But the solution of such a problem is
+not to be obtained short of a searching of entire reality. Every life
+will represent more or less of such wisdom and enlightenment; and in the
+end the best selection of ideal will denote the greatest wealth of
+experience. It is not always true that he who has seen more will live
+more wisely, for in an individual case instinct or authority may be
+better sources of aspiration than experience. But we trust instinct and
+authority because we believe them to represent a comprehensive
+experience on the part of the race as a whole, or on the part of God. He
+whose knowledge is broadest and truest would know best what is finally
+worth living for. On this account, most men can see no more reasonable
+plan of life than obedience to God's will, for God in the abundance of
+his wisdom, and since all eternity is plain before him, must see with
+certainty that which is supremely worthy.
+
+We mean, then, that the selection of our ideals shall be determined by
+the largest possible knowledge of the facts pertaining to life. We mean
+to select as one would select who knew all about the antecedents and
+surroundings and remote consequences of life. In our own weakness and
+finitude we may go but a little way in the direction of such an
+insight, and may prefer to accept the judgment of tradition or
+authority, but we recognize a distinct type of knowledge as alone worthy
+to justify an individual's adoption of an ideal. That type of knowledge
+is the knowledge that comprehends the universe in its totality. Such
+knowledge does not involve completeness of information respecting all
+parts of reality. This, humanly speaking, is both unattainable and
+inconceivable. It involves rather a conception of the _kind_ of reality
+that is fundamental. For a wise purpose it is unnecessary that we should
+know many matters of fact, or even specific laws, provided we are
+convinced of the inner and essential character of the universe. Some of
+the alternatives are matters of every-day thought and speech. One cannot
+tell the simplest story of human life without disclosing them. To live
+the human life means to pursue ideals, that is, to have a thing in mind,
+and then to try to accomplish it. Here is one kind of reality and power.
+The planetary system, on the other hand, does not pursue ideals, but
+moves unconscious of itself, with a mechanical precision that can be
+expressed in a mathematical formula; and is representative of another
+kind of reality and power. Hence a very common and a very practical
+question: Is there an underlying law, like the law of gravitation,
+fundamentally and permanently governing life, in spite of its apparent
+direction by ideal and aspiration? Or is there an underlying power, like
+purpose, fundamentally and permanently governing the planetary system
+and all celestial worlds, in spite of the apparent control of blind and
+irresistible forces? This is a practical question because nothing could
+be more pertinent to our choice of ideals. Nothing could make more
+difference to life than a belief in the life or lifelessness of its
+environment. The faiths that generate or confirm our ideals always refer
+to this great issue. And this is but one, albeit the most profound, of
+the many issues that arise from the desire to obtain some conviction of
+the inner and essential character of life. Though so intimately
+connected with practical concerns, these issues are primarily the
+business of thought. In grappling with them, thought is called upon for
+its greatest comprehensiveness, penetration, and self-consistency. By
+the necessity of concentration, thought is sometimes led to forget its
+origin and the source of its problems. But in naming itself philosophy,
+thought has only recognized the definiteness and earnestness of its
+largest task. Philosophy is still thought about life, representing but
+the deepening and broadening of the common practical thoughtfulness.
+
+We who began together at the starting-point of _life_, have now entered
+together the haven of _philosophy_. It is not a final haven, but only
+the point of departure for the field of philosophy proper. Nevertheless
+that field is now in the plain view of the man who occupies the
+practical stand-point. He must recognize in philosophy a kind of
+reflection that differs only in extent and persistence from the
+reflection that guides and justifies his life. He may not consciously
+identify himself with any one of the three general groups which have
+been characterized. But if he is neither an idealist, nor a philistine,
+nor a pleasure lover, surely he is compounded of such elements, and does
+not escape their implications. He desires something most of all, even
+though his highest ideal be only an inference from the gradation of his
+immediate purposes. This highest ideal represents what he conceives to
+be the greatest worth or value attainable in the universe, and its
+adoption is based upon the largest generalization that he can make or
+borrow. The complete justification of his ideal would involve a true
+knowledge of the essential character of the universe. For such knowledge
+he substitutes either authority or his own imperfect insight. But in
+either case his life is naturally and organically correlated with a
+_thought about the universe in its totality, or in its deepest and
+essential character_. Such thought, the activity and its results, is
+philosophy. Hence he who lives is, _ipso facto_, a philosopher. He is
+not only a potential philosopher, but a partial philosopher. He has
+already begun to be a philosopher. Between the fitful or prudential
+thinking of some little man of affairs, and the sustained thought of the
+devoted lover of truth, there is indeed a long journey, but it is a
+straight journey along the same road. Philosophy is neither accidental
+nor supernatural, but inevitable and normal. Philosophy is not properly
+a vocation, but the ground and inspiration of all vocations. In the
+hands of its devotees it grows technical and complex, as do all efforts
+of thought, and to pursue philosophy bravely and faithfully is to
+encounter obstacles and labyrinths innumerable. The general problem of
+philosophy is mother of a whole brood of problems, little and great. But
+whether we be numbered among its devotees, or their beneficiaries, an
+equal significance attaches to the truth that philosophy is continuous
+with life.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+[Sidenote: Who is the Philosopher-Poet?]
+
+§ 7. As the ultimate criticism of all human interests, philosophy may be
+approached by avenues as various as these interests. Only when
+philosophy is discovered as the implication of well-recognized special
+interests, is the significance of its function fully appreciated. For
+the sake of such a further understanding of philosophy, those who find
+either inspiration or entertainment in poetry are invited in the present
+chapter to consider certain of the relations between poetry and
+philosophy.
+
+We must at the very outset decline to accept unqualifiedly the poet's
+opinion in the matter, for he would not think it presumptuous to
+incorporate philosophy in poetry. "No man," said Coleridge, "was ever
+yet a great poet without being at the same time a great philosopher."
+This would seem to mean that a great poet is a great philosopher, and
+more too. We shall do better to begin with the prosaic and matter of
+fact minimum of truth: some poetry is philosophical. This will enable
+us to search for the portion of philosophy that is in some poetry,
+without finally defining their respective boundaries. It may be that all
+true poetry is philosophical, as it may be that all true philosophy is
+poetical; but it is much more certain that much actual poetry is far
+from philosophical, and that most actual philosophy was not conceived or
+written by a poet. The mere poet and the mere philosopher must be
+tolerated, if it be only for the purpose of shedding light upon the
+philosopher-poet and the poet-philosopher. And it is to the
+philosopher-poet that we turn, in the hope that under the genial spell
+of poetry we may be brought with understanding to the more forbidding
+land of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Poetry as Appreciation.]
+
+§ 8. Poetry is well characterized, though not defined, as an
+interpretation of life. The term "life" here signifies the human
+purposive consciousness, and active pursuit of ends. An interpretation
+of life is, then, a selection and account of such values in human
+experience as are actually sought or are worth the seeking. For the poet
+all things are good or bad, and never only matters of fact. He is
+neither an annalist nor a statistician, and is even an observer only
+for the sake of a higher design. He is one who appreciates, and
+expresses his appreciation so fittingly that it becomes a kind of truth,
+and a permanently communicable object. That "unbodied joy," the
+skylark's song and flight, is through the genius of Shelley so
+faithfully embodied, that it may enter as a definite joy into the lives
+of countless human beings. The sensuous or suggestive values of nature
+are caught by the poet's quick feeling for beauty, and fixed by his
+creative activity. Or with his ready sympathy he may perceive the value
+of some human ideal or mastering passion, and make it a reality for our
+common feeling. Where the poet has to do with the base and hateful, his
+attitude is still appreciative. The evil is apprehended as part of a
+dramatic whole having positive moral or æsthetic value. Moral ideas may
+appear in both poetry and life as the inspiration and justification of
+struggle. Where there is no conception of its moral significance, the
+repulsive possesses for the poet's consciousness the æsthetic value of
+diversity and contrast. Even where the evil and ugly is isolated, as in
+certain of Browning's dramatic monologues, it forms, both for the poet
+and the reader, but a part of some larger perception of life or
+character, which is sublime or beautiful or good. Poetry involves,
+then, the discovery and presentation of human experiences that are
+satisfying and appealing. It is a language for human pleasures and
+ideals. Poetry is without doubt a great deal more than this, and only
+after a careful analysis of its peculiar language could one distinguish
+it from kindred arts; but it will suffice for our purposes to
+characterize and not differentiate. Starting from this most general
+truth respecting poetry, we may now look for that aspect of it whereby
+it may be a witness of philosophical truth.
+
+[Sidenote: Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman.]
+
+§ 9. For the answer to our question, we must turn to an examination of
+the intellectual elements of poetry. In the first place, the common
+demand that the poet shall be accurate in his representations is
+suggestive of an indispensable intellectual factor in his genius. As we
+have seen, he is not to reproduce nature, but the human appreciative
+experience of nature. Nevertheless, he must even here be true to his
+object. His art involves his ability to express genuinely and sincerely
+what he himself experiences in the presence of nature, or what he can
+catch of the inner lives of others by virtue of his intelligent
+sympathy. No amount of emotion or even of imagination will profit a
+poet, unless he can render a true account of them. To be sure, he need
+not define, or even explain; for it is his function to transfer the
+immediate qualities of experience: but he must be able to speak the
+truth, and, in order to speak it, he must have known it. In all this,
+however, we have made no demand that the poet should see more than one
+thing at a time. Sincerity of expression does not require what is
+distinctly another mode of intelligence, _comprehensiveness of view_. It
+is easier, and accordingly more usual, to render an account of the
+moments and casual units of experience, than of its totality. There are
+poets, little and great, who possess the intellectual virtue of
+sincerity, without the intellectual power of synthesis and
+reconciliation. This distinction will enable us to separate the
+intelligence exhibited in all poetry, from that distinct form of
+intelligence exhibited in such poetry as is properly to be called
+philosophical.
+
+The "barbarian" in poetry has recently been defined as "the man who
+regards his passions as their own excuse for being; who does not
+domesticate them either by understanding their cause or by conceiving
+their ideal goal."[28:1] One will readily appreciate the application of
+this definition to Walt Whitman. What little unity there is in this
+poet's world, is the composition of a purely sensuous experience,
+
+     "The earth expending right hand and left hand,
+      The picture alive, every part in its best light,
+      The music falling in where it is wanted, and stopping where
+          it is not wanted."
+
+In many passages Whitman manifests a marvellous ability to discover and
+communicate a fresh gladness about the commonest experiences. We cannot
+but rejoice with him in all sights and sounds. But though we cannot deny
+him truth, his truth is honesty and not understanding. The experiences
+in which he discovers so much worth, are random and capricious, and do
+not constitute a universe. To the solution of ultimate questions he
+contributes a sense of mystery, and the conviction
+
+     "That you are here--that life exists and identity,
+      That the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse."
+
+His world is justly described by the writer just quoted as "a
+phantasmagoria of continuous visions, vivid, impressive, but monotonous
+and hard to distinguish in memory, like the waves of the sea or the
+decorations of some barbarous temple, sublime only by the infinite
+aggregation of parts."[30:2]
+
+As is Walt Whitman, so are many poets greater and less. Some who have
+seen the world-view, exhibit the same particularism in their lyric
+moods; although, generally speaking, a poet who once has comprehended
+the world, will see the parts of it in the light of that wisdom. But
+Walt Whitman is peculiarly representative of the poetry that can be
+true, without being wise in the manner that we shall come shortly to
+understand as the manner of philosophy. He is as desultory in his poet
+raptures as is the common man when he lives in his immediate
+experiences. The truth won by each is the clear vision of one thing, or
+of a limited collection of things, and not the broad inclusive vision of
+all things.
+
+[Sidenote: Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare.]
+
+§ 10. The transition from Whitman to Shakespeare may seem somewhat
+abrupt, but the very differences between these poets serve to mark out
+an interesting affinity. Neither has put any unitary construction upon
+human life and its environment. Neither, as poet, is the witness of any
+world-view; which will mean for us that neither is a philosopher-poet.
+As respects Shakespeare, this is a hard saying. We are accustomed to the
+critical judgment that finds in the Shakespearian dramas an apprehension
+of the universal in human life. But though this judgment is true, it is
+by no means conclusive as respects Shakespeare's relation to the
+philosophical type of thought. For there can be universality without
+philosophy. Thus, to know the groups and the marks of the vertebrates is
+to know a truth which possesses generality, in contradistinction to the
+particularism of Whitman's poetic consciousness. Even so to know well
+the groups and marks of human character, vertebrate and invertebrate, is
+to know that of which the average man, in his hand to hand struggle with
+life, is ignorant. Such a wisdom Shakespeare possessed to a unique
+degree, and it enabled him to reconstruct human life. He did not merely
+perceive human states and motives, but he understood human nature so
+well that he could create consistent men and women. Moreover,
+Shakespeare's knowledge was not only thus universal in being a knowledge
+of general groups and laws, but also in respect of its extensity. His
+understanding was as rich as it was acute. It is true, then, that
+Shakespeare read human life as an open book, knowing certainly the
+manner of human thinking and feeling, and the power and interplay of
+human motives. But it is equally true, on the other hand, that he
+possessed no unitary conception of the meaning and larger relations of
+human life. Such a conception might have been expressed either by means
+of the outlook of some dominating and persistent type of personality, or
+by a pervading suggestion of some constant world-setting for the
+variable enterprise of mankind. It could appear only provided the poet's
+appreciation of life in detail were determined by an interpretation of
+the meaning of life as a whole. Shakespeare apparently possessed no such
+interpretation. Even when Hamlet is groping after some larger truth that
+may bear upon the definite problems of life, he represents but one, and
+that a strange and unusual, type of human nature. And Hamlet's
+reflections, it should be noted, have no outcome. There is no
+Shakespearian answer to the riddles that Hamlet propounds. The poet's
+genius is not less amazing for this fact; indeed, his peculiar
+distinction can only be comprehended upon this basis. Shakespeare put no
+construction upon life, and by virtue of this very reserve accomplished
+an art of surpassing fidelity and vividness. The absence of philosophy
+in Shakespeare, and the presence of the most characteristic quality of
+his genius, may both be imputed by the one affirmation, that _there is
+no Shakespearian point of view_.
+
+This truth signifies both gain and loss. The philosophical criticism of
+life may vary from the ideal objectivity of absolute truth, to the
+subjectivity of a personal religion. Philosophy aims to correct the
+partiality of particular points of view by means of a point of view that
+shall comprehend their relations, and effect such reconciliations or
+transformations as shall enable them to constitute a universe.
+Philosophy always assumes the hypothetical view of omniscience. The
+necessity of such a final criticism is implicit in every scientific item
+of knowledge, and in every judgment that is passed upon life. Philosophy
+makes a distinct and peculiar contribution to human knowledge by its
+heroic effort to measure all knowledges and all ideals by the standard
+of totality. Nevertheless it is significant that no human individual can
+possibly possess the range of omniscience. The most adequate knowledge
+of which any generation of men is capable, will always be that which is
+conceived by the most synthetic and vigorously metaphysical minds; but
+every individual philosophy will nevertheless be a premature synthesis.
+The effort to complete knowledge is the indispensable test of the
+adequacy of prevailing conceptions, but the completed knowledge of any
+individual mind will shortly become an historical monument. It will
+belong primarily to the personal life of its creator, as the
+articulation of his personal covenant with the universe. There is a
+sound justification for such a conclusion of things in the case of the
+individual, for the conditions of human life make it inevitable; but it
+will always possess a felt unity, and many distinct features, that are
+private and subjective. Now such a projection of personality, with its
+coloring and its selection, Shakespeare has avoided; and very largely as
+a consequence, his dramas are a storehouse of genuine human nature.
+Ambition, mercy, hate, madness, guilelessness, conventionality, mirth,
+bravery, deceit, purity--these, and all human states and attributes save
+piety, are upon his pages as real, and as mysterious withal, as they are
+in the great historical society. For an ordinary reader, these states
+and attributes are more real in Hamlet or Lear than in his own direct
+experience, because in Hamlet and Lear he can see them with the eye and
+intelligence of genius. But Shakespeare is the world all over again,
+and there is loss as well as gain in such realism. Here is human life,
+no doubt, and a brilliant pageantry it is; but human life as varied and
+as problematic as it is in the living. Shakespeare's fundamental
+intellectual resource is the historical and psychological knowledge of
+such principles as govern the construction of human natures. The goods
+for which men undertake, and live or die, are any goods, justified only
+by the actual human striving for them. The virtues are the old winning
+virtues of the secular life, and the heroisms of the common conscience.
+Beyond its empirical generality, his knowledge is universal only in the
+sense that space and time are universal. His consciousness _contains_
+its representative creations, and expresses them unspoiled by any
+transforming thought. His poetic consciousness is like the very stage to
+which he likens all the world: men and women meet there, and things
+happen there. The stage itself creates no unity save the occasion and
+the place. Shakespeare's consciousness is universal because it is a fair
+field with no favors. But even so it is particular, because, though each
+may enter and depart in peace, when all enter together there is anarchy
+and a babel of voices. All Shakespeare is like all the world seen
+through the eyes of each of its inhabitants. Human experience in
+Shakespeare is human experience as everyone feels it, as comprehensive
+as the aggregate of innumerable lives. But human experience in
+philosophy is the experience of all as thought by a synthetic mind.
+Hence the wealth of life depicted by Shakespeare serves only to point
+out the philosopher's problem, and to challenge his powers. Here he will
+find material, and not results; much to philosophize about, but no
+philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Philosophy in Poetry. The World-View. Omar Khayyam.]
+
+§ 11. The discussion up to this point has attributed to poetry very
+definite intellectual factors that nevertheless do not constitute
+philosophy. Walt Whitman speaks his feeling with truth, but in general
+manifests no comprehensive insight. Shakespeare has not only sincerity
+of expression but an understanding mind. He has a knowledge not only of
+particular experiences, but of human nature; and a consciousness full
+and varied like society itself. But there is a kind of knowledge
+possessed by neither, the knowledge sought by coördinating all aspects
+of human experience, both particular and general. Not even Shakespeare
+is wise as one who, having seen the whole, can fundamentally interpret a
+part. But though the philosopher-poet may not yet be found, we cannot
+longer be ignorant of his nature. He will be, like all poets, one who
+appreciates experiences or finds things good, and he will faithfully
+reproduce the values which he discovers. But he must _justify himself in
+view of the fundamental nature of the universe_. The values which he
+apprehends must be harmonious, and so far above the plurality of goods
+as to transcend and unify them. The philosopher-poet will find reality
+as a whole to be something that accredits the order of values in his
+inner life. He will not only find certain things to be most worthy
+objects of action or contemplation, but he will see why they are worthy,
+because he will have construed the judgment of the universe in their
+favor.
+
+In this general sense, Omar Khayyam is a philosopher-poet. To be sure
+his universe is quite the opposite of that which most poets conceive,
+and is perhaps profoundly antagonistic to the very spirit of poetry; but
+it is none the less true that the joys to which Omar invites us are such
+as his universe prescribes for human life.
+
+     "Some for the Glories of This World; and some
+      Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come;
+      Ah, take the Cash, and let the Credit go,
+      Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum."
+
+Herein is both poetry and philosophy, albeit but a poor brand of each.
+We are invited to occupy ourselves only with spiritual cash, because the
+universe is spiritually insolvent. The immediately gratifying feelings
+are the only feelings that the world can guarantee. Omar Khayyam is a
+philosopher-poet, because his immediate delight in "youth's
+sweet-scented manuscript" is part of a consciousness that vaguely sees,
+though it cannot grasp, "this sorry scheme of things entire."
+
+     "Drink for you know not whence you come, nor why;
+      Drink for you know not why you go, nor where."
+
+[Sidenote: Wordsworth.]
+
+§ 12. But the poet in his world-view ordinarily sees other than
+darkness. The same innate spiritual enterprise that sustains religious
+faith leads the poet more often to find the universe positively
+congenial to his ideals, and to ideals in general. He interprets human
+experience in the light of the spirituality of all the world. It is to
+Wordsworth that we of the present age are chiefly indebted for such
+imagery, and it will profit us to consider somewhat carefully the
+philosophical quality of his poetry.
+
+Walter Pater, in introducing his appreciation of Wordsworth, writes that
+"an intimate consciousness of the expression of natural things, which
+weighs, listens, penetrates, where the earlier mind passed roughly by,
+is a large element in the complexion of modern poetry." We recognize at
+once the truth of this characterization as applied to Wordsworth. But
+there is something more distinguished about this poet's sensibility even
+than its extreme fineness and delicacy; a quality that is suggested,
+though not made explicit, by Shelley's allusion to Wordsworth's
+experience as "a sort of thought in sense." Nature possessed for him not
+merely enjoyable and describable characters of great variety and
+minuteness, but an immediately apprehended unity and meaning. It would
+be a great mistake to construe this meaning in sense as analogous to the
+crude symbolism of the educator Froebel, to whom, as he said, "the world
+of crystals proclaimed, in distinct and univocal terms, the laws of
+human life." Wordsworth did not attach ideas to sense, but regarded
+sense itself as a communication of truth. We readily call to mind his
+unique capacity for apprehending the characteristic flavor of a certain
+place in a certain moment of time, the individuality of a situation. Now
+in such moments he felt that he was receiving intelligences, none the
+less direct and significant for their inarticulate form. Like the boy
+on Windermere, whom he himself describes,
+
+                          "while he hung
+     Loitering, a gentle shock of mild surprise
+     Has carried far into his heart the voice
+     Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene
+     Would enter unawares into his mind,
+     With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,
+     Its woods, and that uncertain heaven received
+     Into the bosom of the steady lake."
+
+For our purpose it is essential that we should recognize in this
+appreciation of nature, expressed in almost every poem that Wordsworth
+wrote, a consciousness respecting the fundamental nature of the world.
+Conversation, as we know, denotes an interchange of commensurable
+meanings. Whatever the code may be, whether words or the most subtle
+form of suggestion, communication is impossible without community of
+nature. Hence, in believing himself to be holding converse with the
+so-called physical world, Wordsworth conceives that world as
+fundamentally like himself. He finds the most profound thing in all the
+world to be the universal spiritual life. In nature this life manifests
+itself most directly, clothed in its own proper dignity and peace. But
+it may be discovered in the humanity that is most close to nature, in
+the avocations of plain and simple people, and the unsophisticated
+delights of children; and, with the perspective of contemplation, even
+"among the multitudes of that huge city."
+
+So Wordsworth is rendering a true account of his own experience of
+reality when, as in "The Prelude," he says unequivocally:
+
+     "A gracious spirit o'er this earth presides,
+      And in the heart of man; invisibly
+      It comes to works of unreproved delight,
+      And tendency benign; directing those
+      Who care not, know not, think not, what they do."
+
+Wordsworth is not a philosopher-poet because by searching his pages we
+can find an explicit philosophical creed such as this, but because all
+the joys of which his poet-soul compels him to sing have their peculiar
+note, and compose their peculiar harmony, by virtue of such an
+indwelling consciousness. Here is one who is a philosopher in and
+through his poetry. He is a philosopher in so far as the detail of his
+appreciation finds fundamental justification in a world-view. From the
+immanence of "the universal heart" there follows, not through any
+mediate reasoning, but by the immediate experience of its propriety, a
+conception of that which is of supreme worth in life. The highest and
+best of which life is capable is contemplation, or the consciousness of
+the universal indwelling of God. Of those who fail to live thus
+fittingly in the midst of the divine life, Walter Pater speaks for
+Wordsworth as follows:
+
+     "To higher or lower ends they move too often with something of
+     a sad countenance, with hurried and ignoble gait, becoming,
+     unconsciously, something like thorns, in their anxiety to bear
+     grapes; it being possible for people, in the pursuit of even
+     great ends, to become themselves thin and impoverished in
+     spirit and temper, thus diminishing the sum of perfection in
+     the world at its very sources."[42:3]
+
+The quiet and worshipful spirit, won by the cultivation of the emotions
+appropriate to the presence of nature and society, is the mark of the
+completest life and the most acceptable service. Thus for Wordsworth the
+meaning of life is inseparable from the meaning of the universe. In
+apprehending that which is good and beautiful in human experience, he
+was attended by a vision of the totality of things. Herein he has had to
+do, if not with the form, at any rate with the very substance of
+philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Dante.]
+
+§ 13. Unquestionably the supreme philosopher-poet is Dante. He is not
+only philosophical in the temper of his mind, but his greatest poem is
+the incarnation of a definite system of philosophy, the most definite
+that the world has seen. That conception of the world which in the
+thirteenth century found argumentative and orderly expression in the
+"Summa Theologiæ" of Thomas of Aquino, and constituted the faith of the
+church, is visualized by Dante, and made the basis of an interpretation
+of life.
+
+The "Divina Commedia" deals with all the heavens to the Empyrean itself,
+and with all spiritual life to the very presence of God. It derives its
+imagery from the cosmology of the day, its dramatic motive from the
+Christian and Greek conceptions of God and his dealings with the world.
+Sin is punished because of the justice of God; knowledge, virtue, and
+faith lead, through God's grace and mercy manifested in Christ, to a
+perpetual union with Him. Hell, purgatory, and paradise give place and
+setting to the events of the drama. But the deeper meaning of the poem
+is allegorical. In a letter quoted by Lowell, Dante writes:
+
+     "The literal subject of the whole work is the state of the
+     soul after death, simply considered. But if the work be taken
+     allegorically the subject is man, as by merit or demerit,
+     through freedom of the will, he renders himself liable to the
+     reward or punishment of justice."[43:4]
+
+In other words, the inner and essential meaning of the poem has to do
+not with external retribution, but with character, and the laws which
+determine its own proper ruin or perfection. The punishments described
+in the "Inferno" are accounts of the state of guilt itself, implications
+of the will that has chosen the part of brutishness. Sin itself is
+damnable and deadening, but the knowledge that the soul that sinneth
+shall die is the first way of emancipation from sin. The guidance of
+Virgil through hell and purgatory signifies the knowledge of good and
+evil, or moral insight, as the guide of man through this life of
+struggle and progress. The earthly paradise, at the close of the
+"Purgatorio," represents the highest state to which human character can
+attain when choice is determined by ordinary experience, intelligence,
+and understanding. Here man stands alone, endowed with an enlightened
+conscience. Here are uttered the last words of Virgil to Dante, the
+explorer of the spiritual country:
+
+     "Expect no more or word or sign from me. Free, upright, and
+     sane is thine own free will, and it would be wrong not to act
+     according to its pleasure; wherefore thee over thyself I crown
+     and mitre."[44:5]
+
+But moral self-reliance is not the last word. As Beatrice, the image of
+tenderness and holiness, comes to Dante in the earthly paradise, and
+leads him from the summit of purgatory into the heaven of heavens, and
+even to the eternal light; so there is added to the mere human,
+intellectual, and moral resources of the soul, the sustaining power of
+the divine grace, the illuminating power of divine truth, and the
+transforming power of divine love. Through the aid of this higher
+wisdom, the journey of life becomes the way to God. Thus the allegorical
+truth of the "Divina Commedia" is not merely an analysis of the moral
+nature of man, but the revelation of a universal spiritual order,
+manifesting itself in the moral evolution of the individual, and above
+all in his ultimate community with the eternal goodness.
+
+     "Thou shouldst not, if I deem aright, wonder more at thy
+     ascent, than at a stream if from a high mountain it descends
+     to the base. A marvel it would be in thee, if, deprived of
+     hindrance, thou hadst sat below, even as quiet by living fire
+     in earth would be."[45:6]
+
+Such, in brief, is Dante's world-view, so suggestive of the freer
+idealistic conceptions of later thought as to justify a recent
+characterization of him as one who, "accepting without a shadow of a
+doubt or hesitation all the constitutive ideas of mediæval thought and
+life, grasped them so firmly and gave them such luminous expression that
+the spirit in them broke away from the form."[46:7]
+
+But it must be added, as in the case of Wordsworth, that Dante is a
+philosopher-poet not because St. Thomas Aquinas appears and speaks with
+authority in the Thirteenth Canto of the "Paradiso," nor even because a
+philosophical doctrine can be consistently formulated from his writings,
+but because his consciousness of life is informed with a sense of its
+universal bearings. There is a famous passage in the Twenty-second Canto
+of the "Paradiso," in which Dante describes himself as looking down upon
+the earth from the starry heaven.
+
+     "'Thou art so near the ultimate salvation,' began Beatrice,
+     'that thou oughtest to have thine eyes clear and sharp. And
+     therefore ere thou further enterest it, look back downward,
+     and see how great a world I have already set beneath thy feet,
+     in order that thy heart, so far as it is able, may present
+     itself joyous to the triumphant crowd which comes glad through
+     this round ether.' With my sight I returned through each and
+     all the seven spheres, and saw this globe such that I smiled
+     at its mean semblance; and that counsel I approve as the best
+     which holds it of least account; and he who thinks of other
+     things maybe called truly worthy."
+
+Dante's scale of values is that which appears from the starry heaven.
+His austere piety, his invincible courage, and his uncompromising hatred
+of wrong, are neither accidents of temperament nor blind reactions, but
+compose the proper character of one who has both seen the world from
+God, and returned to see God from the world. He was, as Lowell has said,
+"a man of genius who could hold heartbreak at bay for twenty years, and
+would not let himself die till he had done his task"; and his power was
+not obstinacy, but a vision of the ways of God. He knew a truth that
+justified him in his sacrifices, and made a great glory of his defeat
+and exile. Even so his poetry or appreciation of life is the expression
+of an inward contemplation of the world in its unity or essence. It is
+but an elaboration of the piety which he attributes to the lesser saints
+of paradise, when he has them say:
+
+     "Nay, it is essential to this blessed existence to hold
+     ourselves within the divine will, whereby our very wills are
+     made one. So that as we are from stage to stage throughout
+     this realm, to all the realm is pleasing, as to the King who
+     inwills us with His will. And His will is our peace; it is
+     that sea whereunto is moving all that which It creates and
+     which nature makes."[47:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy.]
+
+§ 14. There now remains the brief task of distinguishing the
+philosopher-poet from the philosopher himself. The philosopher-poet is
+one who, having made the philosophical point of view his own, expresses
+himself in the form of poetry. The philosophical point of view is that
+from which the universe is comprehended in its totality. The wisdom of
+the philosopher is the knowledge of each through the knowledge of all.
+Wherein, then, does the poet, when possessed of such wisdom, differ from
+the philosopher proper? To this question one can give readily enough the
+general answer, that the difference lies in the mode of utterance.
+Furthermore, we have already given some account of the peculiar manner
+of the poet. He invites us to experience with him the beautiful and
+moving in nature and life. That which the poet has to express, and that
+which he aims to arouse in others, is an appreciative experience. He
+requires what Wordsworth calls "an atmosphere of sensation in which to
+move his wings." Therefore if he is to be philosophical in intelligence,
+and yet essentially a poet, he must find his universal truth in
+immediate experience. He must be one who, in seeing the many, sees the
+one. The philosopher-poet is he who visualizes a fundamental
+interpretation of the world. "A poem," says one poet, "is the very image
+of life expressed in its eternal truth."
+
+The philosopher proper, on the other hand, has the sterner and less
+inviting task of rendering such an interpretation articulate to thought.
+That which the poet sees, the philosopher must define. That which the
+poet divines, the philosopher must calculate. The philosopher must dig
+for that which the poet sees shining through. As the poet transcends
+thought for the sake of experience, the philosopher must transcend
+experience for the sake of thought. As the poet sees all, and all in
+each, so the philosopher, knowing each, must think all consistently
+together, and then know each again. It is the part of philosophy to
+collect and criticise evidence, to formulate and coördinate conceptions,
+and finally to define in exact terms. The reanimation of the structure
+of thought is accomplished primarily in religion, which is a general
+conception of the world made the basis of daily living.
+
+For religion there is no subjective correlative less than life itself.
+Poetry is another and more circumscribed means of restoring thought to
+life. By the poet's imagination, and through the art of his expression,
+thought may be sensuously perceived. "If the time should ever come,"
+says Wordsworth, "when what is now called Science, thus familiarized to
+men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh, and blood,
+the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and
+will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of
+the household of man."[50:9] As respects truth, philosophy has an
+indubitable priority. The very sternness of the philosopher's task is
+due to his supreme dedication to truth. But if validity be the merit of
+philosophy, it can well be supplemented by immediacy, which is the merit
+of poetry. Presuppose in the poet conviction of a sound philosophy, and
+we may say with Shelley, of his handiwork, that "it is the perfect and
+consummate surface and bloom of all things; it is as the odor and the
+color of the rose to the texture of the elements which compose it, as
+the form and splendor of unfaded beauty to the secrets of anatomy and
+corruption." "Indeed," as he adds, "what were our consolations on this
+side of the grave--and our aspirations beyond it--if poetry did not
+ascend to bring light and fire from those eternal regions where the
+owl-winged faculty of calculation dare not ever soar?"[51:10]
+
+The unity in outlook, attended by differences of method and form, which
+may exist between poet and philosopher, is signally illustrated by the
+relation between Goethe and Spinoza. What Goethe saw and felt, Spinoza
+proved and defined. The universal and eternal substance was to Spinoza,
+as philosopher, a theorem, and to Goethe, as poet, a perception and an
+emotion. Goethe writes to Jacobi that when philosophy "lays itself out
+for division," he cannot get on with it, but when it "confirms our
+original feeling as though we were one with nature," it is welcome to
+him. In the same letter Goethe expresses his appreciation of Spinoza as
+the complement of his own nature:
+
+     "His all-reconciling peace contrasted with my all-agitating
+     endeavor; his intellectual method was the opposite counterpart
+     of my poetic way of feeling and expressing myself; and even
+     the inflexible regularity of his logical procedure, which
+     might be considered ill-adapted to moral subjects, made me his
+     most passionate scholar and his devoted adherent. Mind and
+     heart, understanding and sense, were drawn together with an
+     inevitable elective affinity, and this at the same time
+     produced an intimate union between individuals of the most
+     different types."[51:11]
+
+It appears, then, that some poets share with all philosophers that
+point of view from which the horizon line is the boundary of all the
+world. Poetry is not always or essentially philosophical, but may be so;
+and when the poetic imagination restores philosophy to immediacy, human
+experience reaches its most exalted state, excepting only religion
+itself, wherein God is both seen and also served. Nor is the part of
+philosophy in poetry and religion either ignoble or presumptuous, for,
+humanly speaking, "the owl-winged faculty of calculation" is the only
+safe and sure means of access to that place on high,
+
+     "Where the nightingale doth sing
+      Not a senseless, trancèd thing,
+      But a divine melodious truth;
+      Philosophic numbers smooth;
+      Tales and golden histories
+      Of heaven and its mysteries."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[28:1] George Santayana, in his _Poetry and Religion_, p. 176.
+
+[30:2] Santayana: _op. cit._, p. 180.
+
+[42:3] _Appreciations_, p. 59.
+
+[43:4] Letter to Can Grande. See Lowell's _Essay on Dante_, p. 34.
+
+[44:5] _Purgatorio_, Canto XXVII. Translation by Norton.
+
+[45:6] _Paradiso_, Canto I.
+
+[46:7] Edward Caird, in his _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 24.
+
+[47:8] _Paradiso_, Canto III.
+
+[50:9] Observations prefixed to the second edition of _Lyrical Ballads_.
+
+[51:10] _A Defence of Poetry._
+
+[51:11] Quoted by Caird in his _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p.
+60.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Possibility of Defining Religion.]
+
+§ 15. The least religious experience is so mysterious and so complex
+that a moderate degree of reflection upon it tends to a sense of
+intellectual impotence. "If I speak," says Emerson, "I define and
+confine, and am less." One would gladly set down religion among the
+unspeakable things and avoid the imputation of degrading it. It is
+certain that the enterprise of defining religion is at present in
+disrepute. It has been undertaken so often and so unsuccessfully that
+contemporary students for the most part prefer to supply a list of
+historical definitions of religion, and let their variety demonstrate
+their futility. Metaphysicians and psychologists agree that in view of
+the differences of creed, ritual, organization, conduct, and temperament
+that have been true of different religions in different times and
+places, one may as well abandon the idea that there is a constant
+element.
+
+But on the other hand we have the testimony afforded by the name
+religion; and the ordinary judgments of men to the effect that it
+signifies something to be religious, and to be more or less religious.
+There is an elementary logical principle to the effect that a group name
+implies certain common group characters. Impatience with abstract or
+euphemistic definitions should not blind us to the truth. Even the
+psychologist tends in his description of religious phenomena to single
+out and emphasize what he calls a _typical_ religious experience. And
+the same applies to the idealist's treatment of the matter.[54:1]
+Religion, he reasons, is essentially a development of which the true
+meaning can be seen only in the higher stages. The primitive religion is
+therefore only implicit religion. But lower stages cannot be regarded as
+belonging to a single development with higher stages, if there be not
+some actual promise of the later in the earlier, or some element which
+endures throughout. It is unavoidable, then, to assume that in dealing
+with religion we are dealing with a specific and definable experience.
+
+[Sidenote: The Profitableness of Defining Religion.]
+
+§ 16. The profitableness of undertaking such a definition is another
+matter. It may well be that in so human and practical an affair as
+religion, definition is peculiarly inappropriate. But is there not a
+human and practical value in the very defining of religion? Is there not
+a demand for it in the peculiar relation that exists between religion
+and the progress of enlightenment? Religion associates itself with the
+habits of society. The progress of enlightenment means that more or less
+all the time, and very profoundly at certain critical times, society
+must change its habits. The consequence is that religion is likely to be
+abandoned with the old habits. The need of a new religion is therefore a
+chronic one. The reformer in religion, or the man who wishes to be both
+enlightened and religious, is chiefly occupied with the problem of
+disentangling religion pure and undefiled from definite discredited
+practices and opinions. And the solution of the problem turns upon some
+apprehension of the essence of religion. There is a large amount of
+necessary and unnecessary tragedy due to the extrinsic connection
+between ideas and certain modes of their expression. There can be no
+more serious and urgent duty than that of expressing as directly, and so
+as truly as possible, the great permanent human concerns. The men to
+whom educational reform has been largely due have been the men who have
+remembered for their fellows what this whole business of education is
+after all for. Comenius and Pestalozzi served society by stripping
+educational activity of its historical and institutional accessories,
+and laying bare the genuine human need that these are designed to
+satisfy. There is a similar virtue in the insistent attempt to
+distinguish between the essential and the accessory in religion.
+
+[Sidenote: The True Method of Defining Religion.]
+
+§ 17. Although declining to be discouraged by the conspicuousness of
+past failures in this connection, one may well profit by them. The
+amazing complexity of religious phenomena must somehow be seen to be
+consistent with their common nature. The religious experience must not
+only be found, but must also be reconciled with "the varieties of
+religious experience." The inadequacy of the well-known definitions of
+religion may be attributed to several causes. The commonest fallacy is
+to define religion in terms of a religion. My definition of religion
+must include my brother's religion, even though he live on the other
+side of the globe, and my ancestor's religion, in spite of his
+prehistoric remoteness. Error may easily arise through the attempt to
+define religion in terms of my own religion, or what I conceive to be
+the true religion. Whatever the relation between ideal religion and
+actual religion, the field of religion contains by common consent cults
+that must on their own grounds condemn one another; religions that are
+bad religions, and yet religions.
+
+A more enlightened fallacy, and a more dangerous one, is due to the
+supposition that religion can be defined exclusively in terms of some
+department of human nature. There have been descriptions of religion in
+terms of feeling, intellect, and conduct respectively. But it is always
+easy to overthrow such a description, by raising the question of its
+application to evidently religious experiences that belong to some other
+aspect of life. Religion is not feeling, because there are many
+phlegmatic, God-fearing men whose religion consists in good works.
+Religion is not conduct, for there are many mystics whose very religion
+is withdrawal from the field of action. Religion is not intellection,
+for no one has ever been able to formulate a creed that is common to all
+religions. Yet without a doubt one must look for the essence of religion
+in human nature. The present psychological interest in religion has
+emphasized this truth. How, then, may we describe it in terms of
+certain constant conditions of human life, and yet escape the
+abstractness of the facultative method? Modern psychology suggests an
+answer in demonstrating the interdependence of knowledge, feeling, and
+volition.[58:2] The perfect case of this unity is _belief_. The
+believing experience is cognitive in intent, but practical and emotional
+as well in content. I believe what I take for granted; and the object of
+my belief is not merely known, but also felt and acted upon. _What I
+believe expresses itself in my total experience._
+
+There is some hope, then, of an adequate definition of the religious
+experience, if it be regarded as belonging to the psychological type of
+belief.[58:3] Belief, however, is a broader category than religion.
+There must be some _religious type_ of believing. An account of religion
+in terms of believing, and the particular type of it here in question,
+would, then, constitute the central stem of a psychology of religion,
+and affords the proper conceptions for a description of the religious
+experience. Even here the reservation must be made that belief is always
+more than the believing _state_, in that it means to be _true_.[59:4]
+Hence to complete an account of religion one should consider its object,
+or its cognitive implications. But this direct treatment of the relation
+between religion and philosophy must be deferred until in the present
+chapter we shall have come to appreciate the inwardness of the religious
+consciousness. To this end we must permit ourselves to be enlightened by
+the experience of religious people as viewed from within. It is not our
+opinion of a man's religion that is here in question, but the content
+and meaning which it has for him.
+
+     "I would have you," says Fielding, in his "Hearts of Men," "go
+     and kneel beside the Mahommedan as he prays at the sunset
+     hour, and put your heart to his and wait for the echo that
+     will surely come. . . . I would have you go to the hillman
+     smearing the stone with butter that his god may be pleased, to
+     the woman crying to the forest god for her sick child, to the
+     boy before his monks learning to be good. No matter where you
+     go, no matter what the faith is called, if you have the
+     hearing ear, if your heart is in unison with the heart of the
+     world, you will hear always the same song."[59:5]
+
+[Sidenote: Religion as Belief.]
+
+§ 18. The general identification of religion with belief is made without
+serious difficulty. The essential factor in belief, is, as we have seen,
+the reaction of the whole personality to a fixed object or accepted
+situation. A similar principle underlies common judgments about a man's
+religion. He is accounted most religious whose religion penetrates his
+life most intimately. In the man whose religion consists in the outer
+exercise of attendance upon church, we recognize the sham. He _appears_
+to be religious. He does one of the things which a religious man would
+do; but an object of religious faith is not the constant environment of
+his life. He may or may not feel sure of God from his pew, but God is
+not among the things that count in his daily life. God does not enter
+into his calculations or determine his scale of values. Again,
+discursive thinking is regarded as an interruption of religion. When I
+am at pains to justify my religion, I am already doubting; and for
+common opinion doubt is identical with irreligion. In so far as I am
+religious, my religion stands in no need of justification, even though I
+regard it as justifiable. In my religious experience I am taking
+something for granted; in other words I act about it and feel about it
+in a manner that is going to be determined by the special conditions of
+my mood and temperament. The mechanical and prosaic man acknowledges God
+in his mechanical and prosaic way. He believes in divine retribution as
+he believes in commercial or social retribution. He is as careful to
+prepare for the next world as he is to be respectable in this. The poet,
+on the other hand, believes in God after the manner of his genius.
+Though he worship God in spirit he may conduct his life in an irregular
+manner peculiar to himself. Difference of mood in the same individual
+may be judged by the same measure. When God is most real to him, brought
+home to him most vividly, or consciously obeyed, in these moments he is
+most religious. When, on the other hand, God is merely a name to him,
+and church a routine, or when both are forgotten in the daily
+occupations, he is least religious. His life on the whole is said to be
+religious in so far as periods of the second type are subordinated to
+periods of the first type. Further well-known elements of belief,
+corollaries of the above, are evidently present in religion. A certain
+_imagery remains constant_ throughout an individual's experience. He
+comes back to it as to a physical object in space. And although religion
+is sporadically an exclusive and isolated affair, it tends strongly to
+be social. The religious object, or God, is a social object, common to
+me and to my neighbor, and presupposed in our collective undertakings.
+This reduction of religion to the type of the believing state should
+thus provide us with an answer to that old and fundamental question
+concerning the relative priority of faith and works. The test of the
+faith is in the works, and the works are religious in so far as they are
+the expression of the faith. Religion is not the doing of anything nor
+the feeling of anything nor the thinking of anything, but the reacting
+as a whole, in terms of all possible activities of human life, to some
+accepted situation.
+
+[Sidenote: Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude.]
+
+§ 19. We may now face the more interesting but difficult question of the
+special character of religious belief. In spite of the fact that in
+these days the personality of God is often regarded as a transient
+feature of religion, that type of belief which throws most light upon
+the religious experience is the _belief in persons_. Our belief in
+persons consists in the practical recognition of a more or less
+persistent disposition toward ourselves. The outward behavior of our
+fellow-men is construed in terms of the practical bearing of the
+attitude which it implies. The extraordinary feature of such belief is
+the disproportion between its vividness and the direct evidence for it.
+Of this we are most aware in connection with those personalities which
+we regard as distinctly friendly or hostile to ourselves. We are always
+more or less clearly in the presence of our friends and enemies. Their
+well-wishing or their ill-wishing haunts the scene of our living. There
+is no more important constituent of what the psychologists call our
+"general feeling tone." There are times when we are entirely possessed
+by a state that is either exuberance in the presence of those who love
+us, or awkwardness and stupidity in the presence of those whom we
+believe to suspect and dislike us. The latter state may easily become
+chronic. Many men live permanently in the presence of an accusing
+audience. The inner life which expresses itself in the words, "Everybody
+hates me!" is perhaps the most common form of morbid self-consciousness.
+On the other hand, buoyancy of spirits springs largely from a constant
+faith in the good-will of one's fellows. In this case one is filled with
+a sense of security, and is conscious of a sympathetic reinforcement
+that adds to private joys and compensates for private sorrows. And this
+sense of attitude is wonderfully discriminating. We can feel the
+presence of a "great man," a "formidable person," a superior or
+inferior, one who is interested or indifferent to our talk, and all the
+subtlest degrees of approval and disapproval.
+
+A similar sensibility may quicken us even in situations where no direct
+individual attitude to ourselves is implied. We regard places and
+communities as congenial when we are in sympathy with the prevailing
+purposes or standards of value. We may feel ill at ease or thoroughly at
+home in cities where we know no single human soul. Indeed, in a
+misanthrope like Rousseau (and who has not his Rousseau moods!) the mere
+absence of social repression arouses a most intoxicating sense of
+tunefulness and security. Nature plays the part of an indulgent parent
+who permits all sorts of personal liberties.
+
+     "The view of a fine country, a succession of agreeable
+     prospects, a free air, a good appetite, and the health I gain
+     by walking; the freedom of inns, and the distance from
+     everything that can make me recollect the dependence of my
+     situation, conspire to free my soul, and give boldness to my
+     thoughts, throwing me, in a manner, into the immensity of
+     things, where I combine, choose, and appropriate them to my
+     fancy, without restraint or fear. I dispose of all nature as I
+     please."[64:6]
+
+[Sidenote: Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual
+Environment, or Universe.]
+
+§ 20. In such confidence or distrust, inspired originally by the social
+environment, and similarly suggested by other surroundings of life, we
+have the key to the religious consciousness. But it is now time to add
+that in the case of religion these attitudes are concerned with the
+universal or supernatural rather than with present and normal human
+relationships. Religious reactions are "total reactions."
+
+     "To get at them," says William James, "you must go behind the
+     foreground of existence and reach down to that curious _sense
+     of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence_,
+     intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious,
+     which in some degree everyone possesses. This _sense of the
+     world's presence_, appealing as it does to our peculiar
+     individual temperament, makes us either strenuous or careless,
+     devout or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant about life at large;
+     and our reaction, involuntary and inarticulate and often half
+     unconscious as it is, is the completest of all our answers to
+     the question, 'What is the character of this universe in which
+     we dwell?'"[65:7]
+
+This _residual environment_, or profounder realm of tradition and
+nature, may have any degree of unity from chaos to cosmos. For religion
+its significance lies in the idea of original and far-reaching power
+rather than in the idea of totality. But that which is at first only
+"beyond," is _practically_ the same object as that which comes in the
+development of thought to be conceived as the "world" or the "universe."
+We may therefore use these latter terms to indicate the object of
+religion, until the treatment of special instances shall define it more
+precisely. Religion is, then, _man's sense of the disposition of the
+universe to himself_. We shall expect to find, as in the social
+phenomena with which we have just dealt, that the manifestation of this
+sense consists in a general reaction appropriate to the disposition so
+attributed. He will be fundamentally ill at ease, profoundly confident,
+or will habitually take precautions to be safe. The ultimate nature of
+the world is here no speculative problem. The savage who could feel some
+joy at living in the universe would be more religious than the sublimest
+dialectician. It is in the vividness of the sense of this presence that
+the acuteness of religion consists. I am religious in so far as the
+whole tone and temper of my living reflects a belief as to what the
+universe thinks of such as me.
+
+[Sidenote: Examples of Religious Belief.]
+
+§ 21. The examples that follow are selected because their differences
+in personal flavor serve to throw into relief their common religious
+character. Theodore Parker, in describing his own boyhood, writes as
+follows:
+
+     "I can hardly think without a shudder of the terrible effect
+     the doctrine of eternal damnation had on me. How many, many
+     hours have I wept with terror as I lay on my bed, till,
+     between praying and weeping, sleep gave me repose. But before
+     I was nine years old this fear went away, and I saw clearer
+     light in the goodness of God. But for years, say from seven
+     till ten, I said my prayers with much devotion, I think, and
+     then continued to repeat, 'Lord, forgive my sins,' till sleep
+     came on me."[67:8]
+
+Compare with this Stevenson's Christmas letter to his mother, in which
+he says:
+
+     "The whole necessary morality is kindness; and it should
+     spring, of itself, from the one fundamental doctrine, Faith.
+     If you are sure that God, in the long run, means kindness by
+     you, you should be happy; and if happy, surely you should be
+     kind."[67:9]
+
+Here is destiny frowning and destiny smiling, but in each case so real,
+so present, as to be immediately responded to with helpless terror and
+with grateful warm-heartedness.
+
+The author of the "Imitatio Christi" speaks thus of the daily living of
+the Christian:
+
+     "The life of a Christian who has dedicated himself to the
+     service of God should abound with eminent virtues of all
+     kinds, that he may be really the same person which he is by
+     outward appearance and profession. Indeed, he ought not only
+     to be the same, but much more, in his inward disposition of
+     soul; because he professes to serve a God who sees the inward
+     parts, a searcher of the heart and reins, a God and Father of
+     spirits: and therefore, since we are always in His sight, we
+     should be exceedingly careful to avoid all impurity, all that
+     may give offence to Him whose eyes cannot behold iniquity. We
+     should, in a word, so far as mortal and frail nature can,
+     imitate the blessed angels in all manner of holiness, since
+     we, as well as they, are always in His presence. . . . And good
+     men have always this notion of the thing. For they depend upon
+     God for the success of all they do, even of their best and
+     wisest undertakings."[68:10]
+
+Such is to be the practical acknowledgment of God in the routine of
+life. The more direct response to this presence appears abundantly in
+St. Augustine's conversation and reminiscence with God.
+
+     "How evil have not my deeds been; or if not my deeds my words;
+     or if not my words my will? But Thou, O Lord, art good and
+     merciful, and Thy right hand had respect unto the profoundness
+     of my death, and removed from the bottom of my heart that
+     abyss of corruption. And this was the result, that I willed
+     not to do what I willed, and willed to do what thou
+     willedst. . . . How sweet did it suddenly become to me to be
+     without the delights of trifles! And what at one time I
+     feared to lose, it was now a joy to me to put away. For Thou
+     didst cast them away from me, Thou true and highest sweetness.
+     Thou didst cast them away, and instead of them didst enter in
+     Thyself--sweeter than all pleasure, though not to flesh and
+     blood; brighter than all light, but more veiled than all
+     mysteries; more exalted than all honor, but not to the exalted
+     in their own conceits. Now was my soul free from the gnawing
+     cares of seeking and getting. . . . And I babbled unto Thee my
+     brightness, my riches, and my health, the Lord my God."[69:11]
+
+In these two passages we meet with religious conduct and with the
+supreme religious experience, the direct worship of God. In each case
+the heart of the matter is an individual's indubitable conviction of the
+world's favorable concern for him. The deeper order of things
+constitutes the real and the profoundly congenial community in which he
+lives.
+
+[Sidenote: Typical Religious Phenomena: Conversion.]
+
+§ 22. Let us now apply this general account of the religious experience
+to certain typical religious phenomena: _conversion_; _piety_; and
+religious _instruments_, _symbolisms_, _and_ modes of _conveyance_.
+Although recent study of the phenomenon of _conversion_ has brought to
+light a considerable amount of interesting material, there is some
+danger of misconceiving its importance. The psychology of conversion is
+primarily the psychology of crisis or radical alteration, rather than
+the psychology of religion. For the majority of religious men and women
+conversion is an insignificant event, and in very many cases it never
+occurs at all. Religion is more purely present where it is normal and
+monotonous. But this phenomenon is nevertheless highly significant in
+that religion and irreligion are placed in close juxtaposition, and the
+contribution of religion at its inception thereby emphasized. In general
+it is found that conversion takes place during the period of
+adolescence. But this is the time of the most sudden expansion of the
+environment of life; a time when there is the awakening consciousness of
+many a new presence. This is sometimes expressed by saying that it is a
+period of acute self-consciousness. Life is conscious of itself as over
+against its inheritance; the whole setting of life sweeps into view.
+Some solution of the life problem, some coming to terms with the
+universe, is the normal issue of it. Religious conversion signifies,
+then, that in this fundamental adjustment a man defines and accepts for
+his life a certain attitude on the part of the universe. The examples
+cited by the psychologists, as well as the generalizations which they
+derive, bear out this interpretation.
+
+     "General Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, considers
+     that the first vital step in saving outcasts consists in
+     making them feel that some decent human being cares enough for
+     them to take an interest in the question whether they are to
+     rise or sink."[71:12]
+
+The new state is here one of courage and hope stimulated by the glow of
+friendly interest. The convert is no longer "out in the cold." He is
+told that the world wishes him well, and this is brought home to him
+through representations of the tenderness of Christ, and through the
+direct ministerings of those who mediate it. But somehow the convert
+must be persuaded to realize all this. He must _believe_ it before it
+can mean anything to him. He is therefore urged to pray--a proceeding
+that is at first ridiculous to him, since it involves taking for granted
+what he disbelieves. But therein lies the critical point. It is peculiar
+to the object in this case that it can exist only for one who already
+believes in it. The psychologists call this the element of
+"self-surrender." To be converted a man must somehow suffer his
+surroundings to put into him a new heart, which may thereupon confirm
+its object. Such belief is tremendously tenacious because it so largely
+creates its own evidence. Once believe that "God, in the long run, means
+kindness by you," and you are likely to stand by it to the end--the more
+so in this case because the external evidence either way is to the
+average man so insufficient. Such a belief as this is inspired in the
+convert, not by reasoning, but by all the powers of suggestion that
+personality and social contagion can afford.
+
+[Sidenote: Piety.]
+
+§ 23. The psychologists describe _piety_ as a sense of unity. One feels
+after reading their accounts that they are too abstract. For there are
+many kinds of unity, characteristic of widely varying moods and states.
+Any state of rapt attention is a state of unity, and this occurs in the
+most secular and humdrum moments of life. Nor does it help matters to
+say that in the case of religion this unity must have been preceded by a
+state of division; for we cannot properly characterize any state of mind
+in terms of another state unless the latter be retained in the former.
+And that which is characteristic of the religious sense of unity would
+seem to be just such an overcoming of difference. There is a recognition
+of two distinct attitudes, which may be more or less in sympathy with
+one another, but which are both present even in their fullest harmony.
+Were I to be taken out of myself so completely as to forget myself, I
+should inevitably lose that sense of sympathy from which arises the
+peculiar exultation of religious faith, a heightened experience of the
+same type with the freedom and spontaneity that I experience in the
+presence of those with whom I feel most in accord. The further graces
+and powers of religion readily submit to a similar description. My sense
+of positive sympathy expresses itself in an attitude of well-wishing;
+living in an atmosphere of kindness I instinctively endeavor to
+propagate it. My buoyancy is distinctly of that quality which to a
+lesser degree is due to any sense of social security; my power is that
+of one who works in an environment that reënforces him. I experience the
+objective or even cosmical character of my enterprises. They have a
+momentum which makes me their instrument rather than their perpetrator.
+A paradoxical relation between religion and morality has always
+interested observers of custom and history. Religion is apparently as
+capable of the most fiendish malevolence as of the most saintly
+gentleness. Fielding writes that,
+
+     "When religion is brought out or into daily life and used as
+     a guide or a weapon in the world it has no effect either for
+     good or evil. Its effect is simply in strengthening the heart,
+     in blinding the eyes, in deafening the ears. It is an
+     intensive force, an intoxicant. It doubles or trebles a man's
+     powers. It is an impulsive force sending him headlong down the
+     path of emotion, whether that path lead to glory or to infamy.
+     It is a tremendous stimulant, that is all."[74:13]
+
+Religion does not originate life purposes or define their meaning, but
+stimulates them by the same means that works in all corporate and social
+activity. To work with the universe is the most tremendous incentive
+that can appeal to the individual will. Hence in highly ethical
+religions the power for good exceeds that of any other social and
+spiritual agency. Such religion makes present, actual, and real, that
+good on the whole which the individual otherwise tends to distinguish
+from that which is good for _him_. In daily life the morally valid and
+the practically urgent are commonly arrayed against one another; but the
+ethical religion makes the valid urgent.
+
+[Sidenote: Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance.]
+
+§ 24. The _instruments_ of religion are legion, and it is in order here
+only to mention certain prominent cases in which their selection would
+seem to have direct reference to the provocation and perpetuation of
+such a sense of attitude as we have been describing. This is true in a
+general way of all _symbolism_. There is no essential difference between
+the religious symbol and such symbols as serve to remind us of human
+relationships. In both cases the perceptual absence of will is
+compensated for by the presence of some object associated with that
+will. The function of this object is due to its power to revive and
+perpetuate a certain special social atmosphere. But the most important
+vehicle of religion has always been personality. It is, after all, to
+priests, prophets, and believers that religious cults have owed their
+long life. The traits that mark the prophet are both curious and
+sublime. He is most remarkable for the confidence with which he speaks
+for the universe. Whether it be due to lack of a sense of humor or to a
+profound conviction of truth, is indifferent to our purpose. The power
+of such men is undoubtedly in their suggestion of a force greater than
+they, whose designs they bring directly and socially to the attention of
+men. The prophet in his prophesying is indeed not altogether
+distinguished from God, and it is through the mediation of a directly
+perceptible human attitude that a divine attitude gets itself fixed in
+the imagination of the believer. What is true of the prophet is equally
+true of the preacher whose function it is not to represent God in his
+own person, but to depict him with his tongue. It is generally
+recognized that the preacher is neither a moralizer nor a theologian.
+But it is less perfectly understood that it is his function to suggest
+the presence of God. His proper language is that of the imagination, and
+the picture which he portrays is that of a reciprocal social
+relationship between man and the Supreme Master of the situation of
+life. He will not define God or prove God, but introduce Him and talk
+about Him. And at the same time the association of prayer and worship
+with his sermon, and the atmosphere created by the meeting together of a
+body of disciples, will act as the confirmation of his suggestions of
+such a living presence.
+
+The _conveyance_ of any single religious cult from generation to
+generation affords a signal illustration of the importance in religion
+of the recognition of attitude. Religions manage somehow to survive any
+amount of transformation of creed and ritual. It is not what is done, or
+what is thought, that identifies the faith of the first Christians with
+that of the last, but a certain reckoning with the disposition of God.
+The successive generations of Christians are introduced into the
+spiritual world of their fathers, with its furnishing of hopes and fears
+remaining substantially the same; and their Christianity consists in
+their continuing to live in it with only a slight and gradual
+renovation. To any given individual God is more or less completely
+represented by his elders in the faith in their exhortations and
+ministerings; and through them he fixes as the centre of his system an
+image of God his accuser or redeemer.
+
+[Sidenote: Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions.]
+
+§ 25. The complete verification of this interpretation of the religious
+experience would require the application of it to the different
+historical cults. In general the examination of such instances is
+entirely beyond the scope of this chapter; but a brief consideration may
+be given to those which seem to afford reasonable grounds for objection.
+
+First, it may be said that in _primitive religions_, notably in
+fetichism, tabooism, and totemism, there is no recognition of a cosmical
+unity. It is quite evident that there is no conception of a universe.
+But it is equally evident that the natural and historical environment in
+its generality has a very specific practical significance for the
+primitive believer. It is often said with truth that these earliest
+religions are more profoundly pantheistic than polytheistic. Man
+recognizes an all-pervading interest that is capable of being directed
+to himself. The selection of a deity is not due to any special
+qualification for deification possessed by the individual object itself,
+but to the tacit presumption that, as Thales said, "all things are full
+of gods." The disposition of residual reality manifests to the believer
+no consistency or unity, but it is nevertheless the most constant object
+of his will. He lives in the midst of a capriciousness which he must
+appease if he is to establish himself at all.
+
+[Sidenote: Buddhism.]
+
+§ 26. Secondly, in the case of _Buddhism_ we are said to meet with a
+religion that is essentially atheistic.
+
+     "Whether Buddhas arise, O priests, or whether Buddhas do not
+     arise, it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary
+     constitution of being, that all its constituents are
+     transitory."[78:14]
+
+The secret of life lies in the application of this truth:
+
+       "O builder! I've discovered thee!
+     This fabric thou shalt ne'er rebuild!
+     Thy rafters all are broken now,
+     And pointed roof demolished lies!
+     This mind has demolition reached,
+     And seen the last of all desire!"[78:15]
+
+The case of Buddha himself and of the exponents of his purely esoteric
+doctrine, belong to the reflective type which will presently be given
+special consideration. But with the ordinary believer, even where an
+extraneous but almost inevitable polytheism is least in evidence, the
+religious experience consists in substantially the same elements that
+appear in theistic religions. The individual is here living
+appropriately to the ultimate nature of things, with the ceaseless
+periods of time in full view. That which is brought home to him is the
+illusoriness and hollowness of things when taken in the spirit of active
+endeavor. The only profound and abiding good is nothingness. While
+nature and society conspire to mock him, Nirvana invites him to its
+peace. The religious course of his life consists in the use of such
+means as can win him this end. From the stand-point of the universe he
+has the sympathy only of that wisdom whose essence is self-destruction.
+And this truth is mediated by the imagination of divine sympathy, for
+the Blessed One remains as the perpetual incarnation of his own
+blessedness.
+
+[Sidenote: Critical Religion.]
+
+§ 27. Finally there remains the consideration of the bearing of this
+interpretation upon the more refined and disciplined religions. The
+religion of the critically enlightened man is less naive and credulous
+in its imagery. God tends to vanish into an ideal or a universal, into
+some object of theoretical definition. Here we are on that borderland
+where an assignment of individual cases can never be made with any
+certainty of correctness. We can generalize only by describing the
+conditions that such cases must fulfil if they are properly to be
+denominated religious. And there can be no question of the justice of
+deriving such a description from the reports of historical and
+institutional religions. An idealistic philosophy will, then, be a
+religion just in so far as it is rendered practically vivid by the
+imagination. Such imagination must create and sustain a social
+relationship. The question of the legitimacy of this imagination is
+another matter. It raises the issue concerning the judgment of truth
+implied in religion, and this is the topic of the next chapter. At any
+rate the religious experience _may be_ realized by virtue of the
+metaphorical or poetical representation of a situation as one of
+intercommunication between persons, where reflective definition at the
+same time denies it. The human worshipper may supply the personality of
+God from himself, viewing himself as from the divine stand-point. But
+whatever faculty supplies this indispensable social quality of religion,
+he who defines God as the ultimate goodness or the ultimate truth, has
+certainly not yet worshipped Him. He begins to be religious only when
+such an ideal determines the atmosphere of his daily living; when he
+regards the immanence of such an ideal in nature and history as the
+object of his will; and when he responds to its presence in the spirit
+of his conduct and his contemplation.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[54:1] Cf. Caird: _The Evolution of Religion_, Lectures II, III.
+
+[58:2] Cf. Leuba: _Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion_,
+_Monist_, Vol. XI, p. 195.
+
+[58:3] Cf. Leuba: _Ibid._
+
+[59:4] Cf. § 29.
+
+[59:5] P. 322.
+
+[64:6] Rousseau: _Confessions_, Book IV, p. 125.
+
+[65:7] William James: _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 35.
+The italics are mine. I am in the present chapter under constant
+obligation to this wonderfully sympathetic and stimulating book.
+
+[67:8] Chadwick: _Theodore Parker_, p. 18.
+
+[67:9] Stevenson: _Letters_, Vol. I, p. 229.
+
+[68:10] Thomas à Kempis: _Imitation of Christ_, Chap. XIX. Translation
+by Stanhope, p. 44.
+
+[69:11] St. Augustine: _Confessions_, Book I, Chap. I. Translation in
+Schaff: _Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, Vol. I, p. 129.
+
+[71:12] James: _Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 203.
+
+[74:13] Fielding: _op. cit._, p. 152.
+
+[78:14] Warren: _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 14.
+
+[78:15] _Ibid._, p. 83.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION
+
+
+[Sidenote: Résumé of Psychology of Religion.]
+
+§ 28. It has been maintained that religion is closely analogous to one's
+belief in the disposition toward one's self of men or communities. In
+the case of religion this disposition is attributed to the more or less
+vaguely conceived residual environment that is recognized as lying
+outside of the more familiar natural and social relations. After the
+rise of science this residual environment tends to be conceived as a
+unity which is ultimate or fundamental, but for the religious
+consciousness it is more commonly regarded as a general source of
+influence practically worthy of consideration. Such a belief, like all
+belief, is vitally manifested, with such emphasis upon action, feeling,
+or intellection as temperament and mood may determine.
+
+[Sidenote: Religion Means to be True.]
+
+§ 29. But if the psychology of belief is the proper starting-point for a
+description of the religious experience, it is none the less suggestive
+of the fact that religion, just because it _is_ belief, is not wholly a
+matter for psychology. For religion _means to be true_, and thus submits
+itself to valuation as a case of knowledge. The psychological study of
+religion is misleading when accepted as a substitute for philosophical
+criticism. The religious man takes his religion not as a narcotic, but
+as an enlightenment. Its subjective worth is due at any rate in part to
+the supposition of its objective worth. As in any case of insight, that
+which warms the heart must have satisfied the mind. The religious
+experience purports to be the part of wisdom, and to afford only such
+happiness as increasing wisdom would confirm. And the charm of truth
+cannot survive its truthfulness. Hence, though religion may be
+described, it cannot be justified, from the stand-point of therapeutics.
+Were such the case it would be the real problem of religious leaders to
+find a drug capable of giving a constantly pleasant tone to their
+patient's experience.[83:1] There would be no difference between priests
+and physicians who make a specialty of nervous diseases, except that the
+former would aim at a more fundamental and perpetual suggestion of
+serenity. Now no man wants to be even a blessed fool. He does not want
+to dwell constantly in a fictitious world, even if it be after his own
+heart. He may from the cynical point of view actually do so, but if he
+be religious he thinks it is reality, and is satisfied only in so far as
+he thinks so. He regards the man who has said in his heart that there is
+no God as the fool, and not because he may have to suffer for it, but
+because he is cognitively blind to the real nature of things. Piety, on
+the other hand, he regards as the standard experience, the most
+veracious life. Hence, it is not an accident that religion has had its
+creeds and its controversies, its wars with science and its appeals to
+philosophy. The history of these affairs shows that religion commonly
+fails to understand the scope of its own demand for truth; but they have
+issued from the deep conviction that one's religion is, implicitly, at
+least, in the field of truth; that there are theoretical judgments whose
+truth would justify or contradict it.
+
+This general fact being admitted, there remains the task to which the
+present discussion addresses itself, that of defining the kind of
+_theoretical judgment_ implied in religion, and the relation to this
+central cognitive stem of its efflorescences of myth, theology, and
+ritual. It is impossible to separate the stem and the efflorescence, or
+to determine the precise spot at which destruction of the tissue would
+prove fatal to the plant, but it is possible to obtain some idea of the
+relative vitality of the parts.
+
+[Sidenote: Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a Disposition
+from which Consequences May Rationally be Expected.]
+
+§ 30. The difficulty of reaching a definite statement in this matter is
+due to the fact that the truth in which any religious experience centres
+is a practical and not a scientific truth. A practical truth does not
+commit itself to any single scientific statement, and can often survive
+the overthrow of that scientific statement in which at any given time it
+has found expression. In other words, an indefinite number of scientific
+truths are compatible with a single practical truth. An instance of this
+is the consistency with my expectation of the alternation of day and
+night, of either the Ptolemaic or Copernican formulation of the solar
+system. Now expectation that the sun will rise to-morrow is an excellent
+analogue of my religious belief. Celestial mechanics is as relevant to
+the one as metaphysics to the other. Neither is overthrown until a
+central practical judgment is discredited, and either could remain true
+through a very considerable alteration of logical definition; but
+neither is on this account exempt from theoretical responsibility. In so
+far as religion deliberately enters the field of science, and defines
+its formularies with the historical or metaphysical method, this
+difficulty does not, of course, exist. Grant that the years of
+Methuselah's life, or the precise place and manner of the temptation of
+Jesus, or the definition of Christ in the terms of the Athanasian Creed,
+are constitutive of Christianity, and the survival of that religion will
+be determined by the solution of ordinary problems of historical or
+metaphysical research. But the Christian will very properly claim that
+his religion is only externally and accidentally related to such
+propositions, since they are never or very rarely intended in his
+experience. As religious he is occupied with Christ as his saviour or
+with God as his protector and judge. The history of Jesus or the
+metaphysics of God essentially concern him only in so far as they may or
+may not invalidate this relationship. He cares only for the power and
+disposition of the divine, and these are affected by history and
+metaphysics only in so far as he has definitely put them to such proof.
+
+For my religion is my sense of a practical situation, and only when
+that has been proved to be folly has my religion become untrue. My God
+is my practical faith, my plan of salvation. My religion is overthrown
+if I am convinced that I have misconceived the situation and mistaken
+what I should do to be saved. The conception of God is very simple
+practically, and very complex theoretically, a fact that confirms its
+practical genesis. My conception of God contains _an idea of my own
+interests_, _an idea of the disposition of the universe toward my
+interests_, and _some working plan for the reconciliation of these two
+terms_. These three elements form a practical unity, but each is capable
+of emphasis, and a religion may be transformed through the modification
+of any one of them. It appears, then, as has always been somewhat
+vaguely recognized, that the truth of religion is ethical as well as
+metaphysical or scientific. My religion will be altered by a change in
+my conception of what constitutes my real interest, a change in my
+conception of the fundamental causes of reality, or a change in my
+conception of the manner in which my will may or may not affect these
+causes. God is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always a relation of
+entity to ideal: _reality regarded from the stand-point of its
+favorableness or unfavorableness to human life, and prescribing for the
+latter the propriety of a certain attitude_.
+
+[Sidenote: Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The
+Religion of Baal.]
+
+§ 31. The range of historical examples is limitless, but certain of
+these are especially calculated to emphasize the application of a
+criterion to religion. Such is the case with Elijah's encounter with the
+prophets of Baal, as narrated in the Old Testament.
+
+     "And Elijah came near unto all the people, and said, How long
+     halt ye between two opinions? If Yahweh be God, follow him:
+     but if Baal, then follow him. . . . And call ye on the name of
+     your god, and I will call on the name of Yahweh: and the God
+     that answereth by fire, let him be God. . . . And Elijah said
+     unto the prophets of Baal, Choose you one bullock for
+     yourselves, and dress it first; for ye are many; and call on
+     the name of your god, but put no fire under. And they took the
+     bullock which was given them, and they dressed it, and called
+     on the name of Baal from morning even until noon, saying, O
+     Baal, hear us. But there was no voice, nor any that
+     answered. . . . And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah
+     mocked them, and said, Cry aloud: for he is a god; either he
+     is musing, or he is gone aside, or he is in a journey, or
+     peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked. And they cried
+     aloud, and cut themselves after their manner with knives and
+     lances, till the blood gushed out upon them. . . . But there
+     was neither voice, nor any to answer, nor any that
+     regarded."[88:2]
+
+The religion of the followers of Baal here consists in a belief in the
+practical virtue of a mode of address and form of ritual associated with
+the traditions and customs of a certain social group. The prophets of
+this cult agree to regard the experiment proposed by Elijah as a crucial
+test, and that which is disproved from its failure is a plan of action.
+These prophets relied upon the presence of a certain motivity, from
+which a definite response could be evoked by an appeal which they were
+peculiarly able to make; but though "they prophesied until the time of
+the offering of the evening oblation," there was none that regarded.
+
+[Sidenote: Greek Religion.]
+
+§ 32. An equally familiar and more instructive example is the refutation
+of the Greek national religion by Lucretius. The conception of life
+which Lucretius finds unwarranted is best depicted in Homer. There we
+hear of a society composed of gods and men. Though the gods, on the one
+hand, have their own history, their affairs are never sharply sundered
+from those of men, who, on the other hand, must constantly reckon with
+them, gauge their attitude, and seek their favor by paying tribute to
+their individual humors and preferences. In the Ninth Book of the
+"Iliad," Phoenix addresses himself to the recalcitrant Achilles as
+follows:
+
+                         "It fits not one that moves
+     The hearts of all, to live unmov'd, and succor hates for loves.
+     The Gods themselves are flexible; whose virtues, honors, pow'rs,
+     Are more than thine, yet they will bend their breasts as we bend
+         ours.
+     Perfumes, benign devotions, savors of offerings burn'd,
+     And holy rites, the engines are with which their hearts are turn'd,
+     By men that pray to them."[90:3]
+
+Here is a general recognition of that which makes sacrifice rational. It
+is because he conceives this presupposition to be mistaken, that
+Lucretius declares the practices and fears which are founded upon it to
+be folly. It is the same with all that is practically based upon the
+expectation of a life beyond the grave. The correction of the popular
+religion is due in his opinion to that true view of the world taught by
+Epicurus, whose memory Lucretius thus invokes at the opening of the
+Third Book of the "De Rerum Natura":
+
+     "Thee, who first wast able amid such thick darkness to raise
+     on high so bright a beacon and shed a light on the true
+     interests of life, thee I follow, glory of the Greek race,
+     and plant now my footsteps firmly fixed in thy imprinted
+     marks. . . . For soon as thy philosophy issuing from a
+     godlike intellect has begun with loud voice, to proclaim the
+     nature of things, the terrors of the mind are dispelled, the
+     walls of the world part asunder, I see things in operation
+     throughout the whole void: the divinity of the gods is
+     revealed and their tranquil abodes which neither winds do
+     shake nor clouds drench with rains nor snow congealed by sharp
+     frost harms with hoary fall: an ever cloudless ether
+     o'ercanopies them, and they laugh with light shed largely
+     round. Nature too supplies all their wants and nothing ever
+     impairs their peace of mind. But on the other hand the
+     Acherusian quarters[91:4] are nowhere to be seen, though earth
+     is no bar to all things being descried, which are in operation
+     underneath our feet throughout the void."[91:5]
+
+In another passage, after describing the Phrygian worship of Cybele, he
+comments as follows:
+
+     "All which, well and beautifully as it is set forth and told,
+     is yet widely removed from true reason. For the nature of gods
+     must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together
+     with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our
+     concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all
+     dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us,
+     it is neither gained by favors nor moved by anger. . . . The
+     earth however is at all time without feeling, and because it
+     receives into it the first-beginnings of many things, it
+     brings them forth in many ways into the light of the
+     sun."[91:6]
+
+If the teaching of Epicurus be true it is evident that those who
+offered hecatombs with the idea that they were thereby mitigating anger,
+or securing special dispensation, were playing the fool. They were
+appealing to a fictitious motivity, one not grounded in "the nature of
+things." To one for whom the walls of the world had parted asunder, such
+a procedure was no longer possible; though he might choose to "call the
+sea Neptune" and reverence the earth as "mother of the gods."[92:7]
+
+[Sidenote: Judaism and Christianity.]
+
+§ 33. The history of religion contains no more impressive and dramatic
+chapter than that which records the development of the religion of the
+Jews. Passing over its obscure beginnings in the primitive Semitic cult,
+we find this religion first clearly defined as tribal self-interest
+sanctioned by Yahweh.[92:8] God's interest in his chosen people
+determines the prosperity of him who practices the social virtues.
+
+     "The name of Yahweh is a strong tower: the righteous runneth
+     into it, and is safe."
+
+     "He that is steadfast in righteousness shall attain unto
+     life."
+
+     "To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to Yahweh than
+     sacrifice."[93:9]
+
+But in time it is evident to the believer that his experience does not
+bear out this expectation. Neither as a Jew nor as a righteous man does
+he prosper more than his neighbor. He comes, therefore, to distrust the
+virtue of his wisdom.
+
+     "Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light
+     excelleth darkness. The wise man's eyes are in his head, and
+     the fool walketh in darkness: and yet I perceived that one
+     event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, As it
+     happeneth to the fool, so will it happen even to me; and why
+     was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also
+     was vanity. For of the wise man, even as of the fool, there is
+     no remembrance forever; seeing that in the days to come all
+     will have been already forgotten. And how doth the wise man
+     die even as the fool! So I hated life; because the work that
+     is wrought under the sun was grievous unto me: for all is
+     vanity and a striving after wind."[93:10]
+
+It is evident that he who expects the favor of fortune in return for
+his observance of precept is mistaken. The "work that is wrought under
+the sun" makes no special provision for him during his lifetime. Unless
+the cry of vanity is to be the last word there must be a
+reinterpretation of the promise of God. This appears in the new ideal of
+patient submission, and the chastened faith that expects only the love
+of God. And those whom God loves He will not forsake. They will come to
+their own, if not here, then beyond, according to His inscrutable but
+unswerving plan.
+
+     "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a
+     contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."
+
+     "For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth
+     eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and holy
+     place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit,
+     to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of
+     the contrite ones."[94:11]
+
+In this faith Judaism merges into Christianity.[94:12] In the whole
+course of this evolution God is regarded as the friend of his people,
+but his people learn to find a new significance in his friendship. That
+which is altered is the conduct which that friendship requires and the
+expectation which it determines. The practical ideal which the
+relationship sanctions, changes gradually from that of prudence to that
+of goodness for its own sake. God, once an instrument relevant to human
+temporal welfare, has come to be an object of disinterested service.
+
+No such transformation as this was absolutely realized during the period
+covered by the writings of the Old Testament, nor has it even yet been
+realized in the development of Christianity. But the evolution of both
+Judaism and Christianity has taken this direction. The criterion of this
+evolution is manifestly both ethical and metaphysical. A Christian avows
+that he rates purity of character above worldly prosperity, so that the
+former cannot properly be prized for the sake of the latter.
+Furthermore, he shares more or less unconsciously such philosophical and
+scientific opinions as deny truth to the conception of special
+interferences and dispensations from a supernatural agency. Therefore he
+looks for no fire from heaven to consume his sacrifice. But his religion
+is nevertheless a practical expectation. He believes that God is good,
+and that God loves him and sustains him. He believes that there obtains
+between himself, in so far as good, and the universe _sub specie
+eternitatis_, a real sympathy and reciprocal reenforcement. He believes
+that he secures through the profoundly potent forces of the universe
+that which he regards as of most worth; and that somewhat is added to
+these forces by virtue of his consecration. The God of the Christians
+cannot be defined short of some such account as this, inclusive of an
+ideal, an attitude, and an expectation. In other words the God of the
+Christians is to be known only in terms of the Christlike outlook upon
+life, in which the disciple is taught to emulate the master. When moral
+and intellectual development shall have discredited either its scale of
+values, or its conviction that cosmical events are in the end determined
+in accordance with that scale of values, then Christianity must either
+be transformed, or be untenable for the wise man. If we have conceived
+the essence of Christianity too broadly or vaguely, it does not much
+matter for our present purposes. Its essence is, at any rate, some such
+inwardness of life resolving ideality and reality into one, and drawing
+upon objective truth only to the extent required for the confirming of
+that relation.
+
+[Sidenote: The Cognitive Factor in Religion.]
+
+§ 34. We conclude, then, our attempt to emphasize the cognitive factor
+in religion, with the thesis that every religion centres in a practical
+secret of the universe. _To be religious is to believe that a certain
+correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality operative, and
+that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a certain type of
+living. Whatever demonstrates the futility, vanity, or self-deception of
+this living, discredits the religion. And, per contra, except as they
+define or refute such practical truth, religion is not essentially
+concerned with theoretical judgments._
+
+[Sidenote: The Place of Imagination in Religion.]
+
+§ 35. But neither religion nor any other human interest consists in
+essentials. Such a practical conviction as that which has been defined
+inevitably flowers into a marvelous complexity, and taps for its
+nourishment every spontaneity of human nature. If it be said that only
+the practical conviction is essential, this is not the same as to say
+that all else is superfluous. There may be no single utterance that my
+religion could not have spared, and yet were I to be altogether dumb my
+religion would, indeed, be as nothing. For if I believe, I accept a
+presence in my world, which as I live will figure in my dreams, or in my
+thoughts, or in my habits. And each of these expressions of myself will
+have a truth if it do but bear out my practical acceptance of that
+presence. The language of religion, like that of daily life, is not the
+language of science except it take it upon itself to be so. There is
+scarcely a sentence which I utter in my daily intercourse with men which
+is not guilty of transgressions against the canons of accurate and
+definite thinking. Yet if I deceive neither myself nor another, I am
+held to be truthful, even though my language deal with chance and
+accident, material purposes and spiritual causes, and though I vow that
+the sun smiles or the moon lets down her hair into the sea. Science is a
+special interest in the discovery of unequivocal and fixed conceptions,
+and employs its terms with an unalterable connotation. But no such
+algebra of thought is indispensable to life or conversation, and its
+lack is no proof of error. Such is the case also with that eminently
+living affair, religion. I may if I choose, and I will if my reasoning
+powers be at all awakened, be a theologian. But theology, like science,
+is a special intellectual spontaneity. St. Thomas, the master
+theologian, did not glide unwittingly from prayer into the _quæstiones_
+of the "Summa Theologiæ," but turned to them as to a fresh adventure.
+Theology is inevitable, because humanly speaking adventure is
+inevitable. For man, with his intellectual spontaneity, every object is
+a problem; and did he not seek sooner or later to define salvation,
+there would be good reason to believe that he did not practically reckon
+with any. But this is _similarly_ and _independently_ true of the
+imagination, the most familiar means with which man clothes and vivifies
+his convictions, the exuberance with which he plays about them and
+delights to confess them. The imagination of religion, contributing what
+Matthew Arnold called its "poetry and eloquence," does not submit itself
+to such canons as are binding upon theology or science, but exists and
+flourishes in its own right.
+
+The indispensableness to religion of the imagination is due to that
+faculty's power of realizing what is not perceptually present. Religion
+is not interested in the apparent, but in the secret essence or the
+transcendent universal. And yet this interest is a practical one.
+Imagination may introduce one into the vivid presence of the secret or
+the transcendent. It is evident that the religious imagination here
+coincides with poetry. For it is at least one of the interests of poetry
+to cultivate and satisfy a sense for the universal; to obtain an
+immediate experience or appreciation that shall have the vividness
+without the particularism of ordinary perception. And where a poet
+elects so to view the world, we allow him as a poet the privilege, and
+judge him by the standards to which he submits himself. That upon which
+we pass judgment is the _fitness of his expression_. This expression is
+not, except in the case of the theoretical mystic, regarded as
+constituting the most valid form of the idea, but is appreciated
+expressly for its fulfilment of the condition of immediacy. The same
+sort of critical attitude is in order with the fruits of the religious
+imagination. These may or may not fulfil enough of the requirements of
+that art to be properly denominated poetry; but like poetry they are the
+translation of ideas into a specific language. They must not, therefore,
+be judged as though they claimed to excel in point of validity, but only
+in point of consistency with the context of that language. And _the
+language of religion is the language of the practical life_. Such
+translation is as essential to an idea that is to enter into the
+religious experience, as translation into terms of immediacy is
+essential to an idea that is to enter into the appreciative
+consciousness of the poet. No object can find a place in my religion
+until it is conjoined with my purposes and hopes; until it is taken for
+granted and acted upon, like the love of my friends, or the courses of
+the stars, or the stretches of the sea.
+
+[Sidenote: The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination.]
+
+§ 36. The religious imagination, then, is to be understood and justified
+as that which brings the objects of religion within the range of living.
+The central religious object, as has been seen, is an _attitude_ of the
+residuum or totality of things. To be religious one must have a sense
+for the _presence of an attitude_, like his sense for the presence of
+his human fellows, with all the added appreciation that is proper in the
+case of an object that is unique in its mystery or in its majesty. It
+follows that the religious imagination fulfils its function in so far as
+it provides the object of religion with properties similar to those
+which lend vividness and reality to the normal social relations.
+
+The presence of one's fellows is in part the perceptual experience of
+their bodies. To this there corresponds in religion some extraordinary
+or subtle appearance. The gods may in visions or dreams be met with in
+their own proper embodiments; or, as is more common, they may be
+regarded as present for practical purposes: in some inanimate object,
+as in the case of the fetish; in some animal species, as in the case of
+the totem; in some place, as in the case of the shrine; or even in some
+human being, as in the case of the inspired prophet and miracle worker.
+In more refined and highly developed religions the medium of God's
+presence is less specific. He is perceived with
+
+                         "--a sense sublime
+     Of something far more deeply interfused,
+     Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
+     And the round ocean and the living air,
+     And the blue sky, and in the mind of man."
+
+God is here found in an interpretation of the common and the natural,
+rather than in any individual and peculiar embodiment. And here the
+poet's appreciation, if not his art, is peculiarly indispensable.
+
+But, furthermore, his fellows are inmates of "the household of man" in
+that he knows their history. They belong to the temporal context of
+actions and events. Similarly, the gods must be historical. The sacred
+traditions or books of religion are largely occupied with this history.
+The more individual and anthropomorphic the gods, the more local and
+episodic will be the account of their affairs. In the higher religions
+the acts of God are few and momentous, such as creation or special
+providence; or they are identical with the events of nature and human
+history when these are _construed_ as divine. To find God in this latter
+way requires an interpretation of the course of events in terms of some
+moral consistency, a faith that sees some purpose in their evident
+destination.
+
+There is still another and a more significant way in which men recognize
+one another: the way of address and conversation. And men have
+invariably held a similar intercourse with their gods. To this category
+belong communion and prayer, with all their varieties of expression. I
+have no god until I address him. This will be the most direct evidence
+of what is at least from my point of view a social relation. There can
+be no general definition of the form which this address will take. There
+may be as many special languages, as many attitudes, and as much
+playfulness and subtlety of symbolism as in human intercourse. But, on
+the other hand, there are certain utterances that are peculiarly
+appropriate to religion. In so far as he regards his object as endowed
+with both power and goodness the worshipper will use the language of
+adoration; and the sense of his dependence will speak in terms of
+consecration and thanksgiving.
+
+     "O God, thou art my God; early will I seek thee:
+      My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee,
+      In a dry and weary land, where no water is.
+      So have I looked upon thee in the sanctuary,
+      To see thy power and thy glory.
+      For thy loving-kindness is better than life;
+      My lips shall praise thee."
+
+These are expressions of a hopeful faith; but, on the other hand, God
+may be addressed in terms of hatred and distrust.
+
+     "Who is most wretched in this dolorous place?
+      I think myself; yet I would rather be
+      My miserable self than He, than He
+      Who formed such creatures to his own disgrace.
+
+     "The vilest thing must be less vile than Thou
+      From whom it had its being, God and Lord!
+      Creator of all woe and sin! abhorred,
+      Malignant and implacable."[104:13]
+
+In either case there may be an indefinite degree of hyperbole. The
+language of love and hate, of confidence and despair, is not the
+language of description. In this train of the religious consciousness
+there is occasion for whatever eloquence man can feel, and whatever
+rhetorical luxuriance he can utter.
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion.]
+
+§ 37. Such considerations as these serve to account for the exercise and
+certain of the fruits of the religious imagination, and to designate the
+general criterion governing its propriety. But _how is one to determine
+the boundary between the imaginative and the cognitive_? It is commonly
+agreed that what religion says and does is not all intended literally.
+But when is expression of religion only poetry and eloquence, and when
+is it matter of conviction? If we revert again to the cognitive aspect
+of religion, it is evident that there is but one test to apply:
+_whatever either fortifies or misleads the will is literal conviction_.
+This test cannot be applied absolutely, because it can properly be
+applied only to the intention of an individual experience. However I may
+express my religion, that which I express, is, we have seen, an
+expectation. The degree to which I literally mean what I say is then the
+degree to which it determines my expectations. Whatever adds no item to
+these expectations, but only recognizes and vitalizes them, is pure
+imagination. But it follows that it is entirely impossible from direct
+inspection to define any given _expression_ of religious experience as
+myth, or to define the degree to which it is myth. It submits to such
+distinctions only when viewed from the stand-point of the concrete
+religious experience which it expresses. Any such given expression could
+easily be all imagination to one, and all conviction to another.
+Consider the passage which follows:
+
+     "And I saw the heaven opened; and behold, a white horse, and
+     he that sat thereon, called Faithful and True; and in
+     righteousness he doth judge and make war. And his eyes are a
+     flame of fire, and upon his head are many diadems; and he hath
+     a name written, which no one knoweth but he himself. And he is
+     arrayed in a garment sprinkled with blood: and his name is
+     called The Word of God."[106:14]
+
+Is this all rhapsody, or is it in part true report? There is evidently
+no answer to the question so conceived. But if it were to express my own
+religious feeling it would have some specific proportion of literal and
+metaphorical significance, according to the degree to which its detail
+contributes different practical values to me. It might then be my
+guide-book to the heavens, or only my testimony to the dignity and
+mystery of the function of Christ.
+
+The development of religion bears in a very important way upon this last
+problem. The factor of imagination has undoubtedly come to have a more
+clearly recognized role in religion. There can be no doubt that what we
+now call myths were once beliefs, and that what we now call poetry was
+once history. If we go back sufficiently far we come to a time when the
+literal and the metaphorical were scarcely distinguishable, and this
+because science had not emerged from the early animistic extension of
+social relations. Men _meant_ to address their gods as they addressed
+their fellows, and expected them to hear and respond, as they looked for
+such reactions within the narrower circle of ordinary intercourse. The
+advance of science has brought into vogue a description of nature that
+inhibits such expectations. The result has been that men, continuing to
+use the same terms, essentially expressive as they are of a practical
+relationship, have come to regard them as only a general expression of
+their attitude. The differences of content that are in excess of factors
+of expectation remain as poetry and myth. On the other hand, it is
+equally possible, if not equally common, for that which was once
+imagined to come to be believed. Such a transformation is, perhaps,
+normally the case when the inspired utterance passes from its author to
+the cult. The prophets and sweet singers are likely to possess an
+exuberance of imagination not appreciated by their followers; and for
+this reason almost certainly misunderstood. For these reasons it is
+manifestly absurd to fasten the name of myth or the name of creed upon
+any religious utterance whatsoever, unless it be so regarded from the
+stand-point of the personal religion which it originally expressed, or
+unless one means by so doing to define it as an expression of his own
+religion. He who defines "the myth of creation," or "the poetical story
+of Samson," as parts of the pre-Christian Judaic religion, exhibits a
+total loss of historical sense. The distinction between cognition and
+fancy does not exist among objects, but only in the _intending_
+experience; hence, for me to attach my own distinction to any individual
+case of belief, viewed apart from the believer, is an utterly confusing
+projection of my own personality into the field of my study.
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions.]
+
+§ 38. Only after such considerations as these are we qualified to attack
+that much-vexed question as to whether religion deals invariably with a
+personal god. It is often assumed in discussion of this question that
+"personal god," as well as "god," is a distinct and familiar kind of
+entity, like a dragon or centaur; its existence alone being
+problematical. This is doubly false to the religious employment of such
+an object. If it be true that in religion we mean by God a practical
+interpretation of the world, _whatsoever be its nature_, then the
+personality of God must be a derivative of the attitude, and not of the
+nature of the world. Given the practical outlook upon life, there is no
+definable world that cannot be construed under the form of God. My god
+is my world practically recognized in respect of its fundamental or
+ultimate attitude to my ideals. In the sense, then, conveyed by this
+term _attitude_ my god will invariably possess the characters of
+personality. But the degree to which these characters will coincide with
+the characters which I assign to human persons, or the terms of any
+logical conception of personality, cannot be absolutely defined.
+Anthropomorphisms may be imagination or they may be literal conviction.
+This will depend, as above maintained, upon the degree to which they
+determine my expectations. Suppose the world to be theoretically
+conceived as governed by laws that are indifferent to all human
+interests. The practical expression of this conception appears in the
+naturalism of Lucretius, or Diogenes, or Omar Khayyam. Living in the
+vivid presence of an indifferent world, I may picture my gods as leading
+their own lives in some remote realm which is inaccessible to my
+petitions, or as regarding me with sinister and contemptuous cruelty. In
+the latter case I may shrink and cower, or return them contempt for
+contempt. I mean this literally only if I look for consequences
+following directly from the emotional coloring which I have bestowed
+upon them. It may well be that I mean merely to regard myself _sub
+specie eternitatis_, in which case I am _personifying_ in the sense of
+free imagination. In the religion of enlightenment the divine attitude
+tends to belong to the poetry and eloquence of religion rather than to
+its cognitive intent. This is true even of optimistic and idealistic
+religion. The love and providence of God are less commonly supposed to
+warrant an expectation of special and arbitrary favors, and have come
+more and more to mean the play of my own feeling about the general
+central conviction of the favorableness of the cosmos to my deeper or
+moral concerns. But the factor of personality cannot possibly be
+entirely eliminated, for the religious consciousness _creates_ a social
+relationship between man and the universe. Such an interpretation of
+life is not a case of the pathetic fallacy, unless it incorrectly
+_reckons with_ the inner feeling which it attributes to the universe. It
+is an obvious practical truth that the total or residual environment is
+significant for life. Grant this and you make rational a recognition of
+that significance, or a more or less constant sense of coincidence or
+conflict with cosmical forces. Permit this consciousness to stand, and
+you make some expression of it inevitable. Such an expression may,
+furthermore, with perfect propriety and in fulfilment of human nature,
+set forth and transfigure this central belief until it may enter into
+the context of immediacy.
+
+Thus any conception of the universe whatsoever may afford a basis for
+religion. But there is no religion that does not virtually make a more
+definite claim upon the nature of things, and this entirely
+independently of its theology, or explicit attempt to define itself.
+Every religion, even in the very living of it, is naturalistic, or
+dualistic, or pluralistic, or optimistic, or idealistic, or pessimistic.
+And there is in the realm of truth that which justifies or refutes these
+definite practical ways of construing the universe. But no historical
+religion is ever so vague even as this in its philosophical
+implications. Indeed, we shall always be brought eventually to the
+inner meaning of some individual religious experience, where no general
+criticism can be certainly valid.
+
+There is, then, a place in religion for that which is not directly
+answerable to philosophical or scientific standards. But there is
+always, on the other hand, an element of hope which conceives the nature
+of the world, and means to be grounded in reality. In respect of that
+element, philosophy is indispensable to religion. The meaning of
+religion is, in fact, the central problem of philosophy. There is a
+virtue in religion like that which Emerson ascribes to poetry. "The poet
+is in the right attitude; he is believing; the philosopher, after some
+struggle, having only reasons for believing." But whatever may be said
+to the disparagement of its dialectic, philosophy is the justification
+of religion, and the criticism of religions. To it must be assigned the
+task of so refining positive religion as to contribute to the perpetual
+establishment of true religion. And to philosophy, with religion,
+belongs the task of holding fast to the idea of the universe. There is
+no religion except before you begin, or after you have rested from, your
+philosophical speculation. But in the universe these interests have a
+common object. As philosophy is the articulation and vindication of
+religion, so is religion the realization of philosophy. In philosophy
+thought is brought up to the elevation of life, and in religion
+philosophy, as the sum of wisdom, enters into life.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[83:1] As Plato interprets the scepticism of Protagoras to mean that one
+state of mind cannot be more _true_ than another, but only _better_ or
+worse. Cf. _Theætetus_, 167.
+
+[88:2] Quoted with some omissions from _I Kings_, 18:21-29. The Hebrew
+term _Yahweh_, the name of the national deity, has been substituted for
+the English translation, "the Lord."
+
+[90:3] _Iliad_, Book IX, lines 467 _sq._ Translation by Chapman.
+
+[91:4] The supposed abode of departed spirits.
+
+[91:5] Lucretius: _De Rerum Natura_, Book III, lines 1 _sq._ Translated
+by Munro.
+
+[91:6] _Ibid._, Book II, lines 644 _sq._
+
+[92:7] It would be interesting to compare the equally famous criticism
+of Greek religion in Plato's _Republic_, Book II, 377 _sq._
+
+[92:8] Cf. W. Robertson Smith's admirable account of the Semitic
+religions:
+
+"What is requisite to religion is a practical acquaintance with the
+rules on which the deity acts and on which he expects his worshippers to
+frame their conduct--what in II Kings, 17:26 is called the 'manner,' or
+rather the 'customary law' (_mishpat_), of the god of the land. This is
+true even of the religion of Israel. When the prophets speak of the
+knowledge of God, they always mean a practical knowledge of the laws and
+principles of His government in Israel, and a summary expression for
+religion as a whole is 'the knowledge and fear of Jehovah,' _i. e._, the
+knowledge of what Jehovah prescribes, combined with a reverent
+obedience." _The Religion of the Semites_, p. 23.
+
+[93:9] _Proverbs_, 18:10; 11:19; 21:3.
+
+[93:10] _Ecclesiastes_, 2:13 _sq._
+
+[94:11] _Psalms_, 51:17; _Isaiah_, 57:15.
+
+[94:12] In this discussion of Judaism I am much indebted to Matthew
+Arnold's _Literature and Dogma_, especially Chapters I and II.
+
+[104:13] James Thomson: _The City of Dreadful Night_. Quoted by James,
+in _The Will to Believe, etc._, p. 45.
+
+[106:14] _Revelation_, 19:11-13.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+[Sidenote: The True Relations of Philosophy and Science. Misconceptions
+and Antagonisms.]
+
+§ 39. In the case of natural science we meet not only with a special
+human interest, but with a theoretical discipline. We are confronted,
+therefore, with a new question: that of the relation within the body of
+human knowledge of two of its constituent members. Owing to the militant
+temper of the representatives of both science and philosophy, this has
+long since ceased to be an academic question, and has frequently been
+met in the spirit of rivalry and partisanship. But the true order of
+knowledge is only temporarily distorted by the brilliant success of a
+special type of investigation; and the conquests of science are now so
+old a story that critical thought shows a disposition to judge of the
+issue with sobriety and logical highmindedness.
+
+In the seventeenth century a newly emancipated and too sanguine reason
+proposed to know the whole of nature at once in terms of mathematics
+and mechanics. Thus the system of the Englishman Hobbes was science
+swelled to world-proportions, simple, compact, conclusive, and
+all-comprehensive. Philosophy proposed to do the work of science, but in
+its own grand manner. The last twenty years of Hobbes's life, spent in
+repeated discomfiture at the hands of Seth Ward, Wallis, Boyle, and
+other scientific experts of the new Royal Society, certified
+conclusively to the failure of this enterprise, and the experimental
+specialist thereupon took exclusive possession of the field of natural
+law. But the idealist, on the other hand, reconstructed nature to meet
+the demands of philosophical knowledge and religious faith. There
+issued, together with little mutual understanding and less sympathy, on
+the one hand _positivism_, or exclusive experimentalism, and on the
+other hand a rabid and unsympathetic transcendentalism. Hume, who
+consigned to the flames all thought save "abstract reasoning concerning
+quantity or number," and "experimental reasoning concerning matter of
+fact and existence"; Comte, who assigned metaphysics to an immature
+stage in the development of human intelligence; and Tyndall, who reduced
+the religious consciousness to an emotional experience of mystery, are
+typical of the one attitude. The other is well exhibited in Schelling's
+reference to "the blind and thoughtless mode of investigating nature
+which has become generally established since the corruption of
+philosophy by Bacon, and of physics by Boyle." Dogmatic experimentalism
+and dogmatic idealism signify more or less consistently the abstract
+isolation of the scientific and philosophical motives.
+
+There is already a touch of quaintness in both of these attitudes. We of
+the present are in the habit of acknowledging the autonomy of science,
+and the unimpeachable validity of the results of experimental research
+in so far as they are sanctioned by the consensus of experts. But at the
+same time we recognize the definiteness of the task of science, and the
+validity of such reservations as may be made from a higher critical
+point of view. Science is to be transcended in so far as it is
+understood as a whole. Philosophy is critically empirical; empirical,
+because it regards all _bona fide_ descriptions of experience as
+knowledge; critical, because attentive to the conditions of both general
+and special knowledge. And in terms of a critical empiricism so defined,
+it is one of the problems of philosophy _to define and appraise the
+generating problem of science_, and so to determine the value
+assignable to natural laws in the whole system of knowledge.
+
+[Sidenote: The Spheres of Philosophy and Science.]
+
+§ 40. If this be the true function of philosophy with reference to
+science, several current notions of the relations of the spheres of
+these disciplines may be disproved. In the first place, philosophy will
+not be all the sciences regarded as one science. Science tends to unify
+without any higher criticism. The various sciences already regard the
+one nature as their common object, and the one system of interdependent
+laws as their common achievement. The philosopher who tries to be all
+science at once fails ignominiously because he tries to replace the work
+of a specialist with the work of a dilettante; and if philosophy be
+identical with that body of truth accumulated and organized by the
+coöperative activity of scientific men, then philosophy is a name and
+there is no occasion for the existence of the philosopher as such.
+Secondly, philosophy will not be the assembling of the sciences; for
+such would be a merely clerical work, and the philosopher would much
+better be regarded as non-existent than as a book-keeper. Nor, thirdly,
+is philosophy an auxiliary discipline that may be called upon in
+emergencies for the solution of some baffling problem of science. A
+problem defined by science must be solved in the scientific manner.
+Science will accept no aid from the gods when engaged in her own
+campaign, but will fight it out according to her own principles of
+warfare. And as long as science moves in her own plane, she can
+acknowledge no permanent barriers. There is then no need of any
+superscientific research that shall replace, or piece together, or
+extend the work of science. But the savant is not on this account in
+possession of the entire field of knowledge. It is true that he is not
+infrequently moved to such a conviction when he takes us about to view
+his estates. Together we ascend up into heaven, or make our beds in
+sheol, or take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts
+of the sea--and look in vain for anything that is not work done, or work
+projected, by natural science. Persuade him, however, to _define_ his
+estates, and he has circumscribed them. In his definition he must employ
+conceptions more fundamental than the working conceptions that he
+employs within his field of study. Indeed, in viewing his task as
+definite and specific he has undertaken the solution of the problem of
+philosophy. The logical self-consciousness has been awakened, and there
+is no honorable way of putting it to sleep again. This is precisely
+what takes place in any account of the generating problem of science. To
+define science is to define at least one realm that is other than
+science, the realm of active intellectual endeavor with its own proper
+categories. One cannot reflect upon science and assign it an end, and a
+method proper to that end, without bringing into the field of knowledge
+a broader field of experience than the field proper to science, broader
+at any rate by the presence in it of the scientific activity itself.
+
+Here, then, is the field proper to philosophy. The scientist _qua_
+scientist is intent upon his own determinate enterprise. The philosopher
+comes into being as one who is interested in observing what it is that
+the scientist is so intently doing. In taking this interest he has
+accepted as a field for investigation that which he would designate as
+the totality of interests or the inclusive experience. He can carry out
+his intention of defining the scientific attitude only by standing
+outside it, and determining it by means of nothing less than an
+exhaustive searching out of all attitudes. Philosophy is, to be sure,
+itself a definite activity and an attitude, but an attitude required by
+definition to be conscious of itself, and, if you please, conscious of
+its own consciousness, until its attitude shall have embraced in its
+object the very principle of attitudes. Philosophy defines itself and
+all other human tasks and interests. None have furnished a clearer
+justification of philosophy than those men of scientific predilections
+who have claimed the title of agnostics. A good instance is furnished by
+a contemporary physicist, who has chosen to call his reflections
+"antimetaphysical."
+
+     "Physical science does not pretend to be a _complete_ view of
+     the world; it simply claims that it is working toward such a
+     complete view in the future. The highest philosophy of the
+     scientific investigator is precisely this _toleration_ of an
+     incomplete conception of the world and the preference for it,
+     rather than an apparently perfect, but inadequate
+     conception."[120:1]
+
+It is apparent that if one were to challenge such a statement, the issue
+raised would at once be philosophical and not scientific. The problem
+here stated and answered, requires for its solution the widest
+inclusiveness of view, and a peculiar interest in critical reflection
+and logical coördination.
+
+[Sidenote: The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science.]
+
+§ 41. One may be prepared for a knowledge of the economic and social
+significance of the railway even if one does not know a throttle from a
+piston-rod, provided one has broad and well-balanced knowledge of the
+interplay of human social interests. One's proficiency here requires one
+to stand off from society, and to obtain a perspective that shall be as
+little distorted as possible. The reflection of the philosopher of
+science requires a similar quality of perspective. All knowledges,
+together with the knowing of them, must be his object yonder, standing
+apart in its wholeness and symmetry. Philosophy is the least dogmatic,
+the most empirical, of all disciplines, since it is the only
+investigation that can permit itself to be forgetful of nothing.
+
+But the most comprehensive view may be the most distorted and false. The
+true order of knowledge is the difficult task of logical analysis,
+requiring as its chief essential some determination of the scope of the
+working conceptions of the different independent branches of knowledge.
+In the case of natural science this would mean an examination of the
+method and results characteristic of this field, for the sake of
+defining the kind of truth which attaches to the laws which are being
+gradually formulated. But one must immediately reach either the one or
+the other of two very general conclusions. If the laws of natural
+science cover all possible knowledge of reality, then there is left to
+philosophy only the logical function of justifying this statement. Logic
+and natural science will then constitute the sum of knowledge. If, on
+the other hand, it be found that the aim of natural science is such as
+to exclude certain aspects of reality, then philosophy will not be
+restricted to logical criticism, but will have a cognitive field of its
+own. The great majority of philosophers have assumed the latter of these
+alternatives to be true, while most aggressive scientists have intended
+the former in their somewhat blind attacks upon "metaphysics." Although
+the selection of either of these alternatives involves us in the defence
+of a specific answer to a philosophical question, the issue is
+inevitable in any introduction to philosophy because of its bearing upon
+the extent of the field of that study. Furthermore there can be no
+better exposition of the meaning of philosophy of science than an
+illustration of its exercise. The following, then, is to be regarded as
+on the one hand a tentative refutation of _positivism_, or the _claim of
+natural science to be coextensive with knowable reality_; and on the
+other hand a programme for the procedure of philosophy with reference
+to natural science.
+
+[Sidenote: The Origin of the Scientific Interest.]
+
+§ 42. Science issues through imperceptible stages from organic habits
+and instincts which signify the possession by living creatures of a
+power to meet the environment on its own terms. Every organism possesses
+such a working knowledge of nature, and among men the first science
+consists in those habitual adjustments common to men and infra-human
+organisms. Man is already practising science before he recognizes it. As
+_skill_ it distinguishes itself early in his history from lore, or
+untested tradition. Skill is familiarity with general kinds of events,
+together with ability to identify an individual with reference to a
+kind, and so be prepared for the outcome. Thus man is inwardly prepared
+for the alternation of day and night, and the periods of the seasons. He
+practically anticipates the procession of natural events in the
+countless emergencies of his daily life. But science in the stricter
+sense begins when skill becomes _free_ and _social_.
+
+[Sidenote: Skill as Free.]
+
+§ 43. Skill may be said to be _free_ when the essential terms of the
+action have been abstracted from the circumstances attending them in
+individual experiences, and are retained as ideal plans applicable to
+any practical occasion. The monkey who swings with a trapeze from his
+perch on the side of the cage, counts upon swinging back again without
+any further effort on his own part. His act and its successful issue
+signify his practical familiarity with the natural motions of bodies. We
+can conceive such a performance to be accompanied by an almost entire
+failure to grasp its essentials. It would then be necessary for nearly
+the whole situation to be repeated in order to induce in the monkey the
+same action and expectation. He would require a similar form, color, and
+distance. But he might, on the other hand, regard as practically
+identical all suspended and freely swinging bodies capable of affording
+him support, and quite independently of their shape, size, time, or
+place. In this latter case his skill would be applicable to the widest
+possible number of cases that could present themselves. Having a
+discerning eye for essentials, he would lose no chance of a swing
+through looking for more than the bare necessities. When the
+physicist describes the pendulum in terms of a formula such as
+t = 2pi[squareroot(l/g)] he exhibits a similar discernment. He has
+found that the time occupied by an oscillation of any pendulum may be
+calculated exclusively in terms of its length and the acceleration due
+to gravity. The monkey's higher proficiency and the formula alike
+represent a knowledge that is free in the sense that it is contained in
+terms that require no single fixed context in immediacy. The knowledge
+is valid wherever these essential terms are present; and calculations
+may be based upon these essential terms, while attendant circumstances
+vary _ad infinitum_. Such knowledge is said to be _general_ or
+_universal_.
+
+There is another element of freedom, however, which so far has not been
+attributed to the monkey's knowledge, but which is evidently present in
+that of the physicist. The former has a practical ability to deal with a
+pendulum when he sees it. The latter, on the other hand, knows about a
+pendulum whether one be present or not. His knowledge is so retained as
+always to be available, even though it be not always applicable. His
+knowledge is not merely skill in treating a situation, but the
+possession of resources which he may employ at whatever time, and in
+whatever manner, may suit his interests. Knowing what he does about the
+pendulum, he may act from the idea of such a contrivance, and with the
+aid of it construct some more complex mechanism. His formulas are his
+instruments, which he may use on any occasion. Suppose that a situation
+with factors _a_, _b_, and _c_ requires factor _d_ in order to become
+_M_, as desired. Such a situation might easily be hopeless for an
+organism reacting directly to the stimulus _abc_, and yet be easily met
+by a free knowledge of _d_. One who knows that _l_, _m_, and _n_ will
+produce _d_, may by these means provide the missing factor, complete the
+sum of required conditions, _abcd_, and so obtain the end _M_. Such
+indirection might be used to obtain any required factor of the end, or
+of any near or remote means to the end. There is, in fact, no limit to
+the complexity of action made possible upon this basis; for since it is
+available in idea, the whole range of such knowledge may be brought to
+bear upon any individual problem.
+
+[Sidenote: Skill as Social.]
+
+§ 44. But knowledge of this free type becomes at the same time _social_
+or _institutional_. It consists no longer in a skilful adaptation of the
+individual organism, but in a system of terms common to all
+intelligence, and preserved in those books and other monuments which
+serve as the articulate memory of the race. A knowledge that is social
+must be composed of unequivocal conceptions and fixed symbols. The
+mathematical laws of the exact sciences represent the most successful
+attainment of this end so far as form is concerned. Furthermore, the
+amount of knowledge may now be increased from generation to generation
+through the service of those who make a vocation of its pursuit. Natural
+science is thus a cumulative racial proficiency, which any individual
+may bring to bear upon any emergency of his life.
+
+[Sidenote: Science for Accommodation and Construction.]
+
+§ 45. Such proficiency as science affords is in every case the
+anticipation of experience. This has a twofold value for mankind, that
+of _accommodation_, and that of _construction_. Primitively, where mere
+survival is the function of the organism as a whole, the value of
+accommodation is relatively fundamental. The knowledge of what may be
+expected enables the organism to save itself by means of its own
+counter-arrangement of natural processes. Construction is here for the
+sake of accommodation. But with the growth of civilization construction
+becomes a positive interest, and man tends to save himself for definite
+ends. Accommodation comes to take place for the sake of construction.
+Science then supplies the individual with the ways and means wherewith
+to execute life purposes which themselves tend to assume an absolute
+value that cannot be justified merely on the ground of science.
+
+[Sidenote: Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. The
+Descriptive Method.]
+
+§ 46. If natural science be animated by any special cognitive interest,
+this motive should appear in the development of its method and
+fundamental conceptions. If that interest has been truly defined, it
+should now enable us to understand the progressive and permanent in
+scientific investigation as directly related to it. For the aim of any
+discipline exercises a gradual selection from among possible methods,
+and gives to its laws their determinate and final form.
+
+The _descriptive method_ is at the present day fully established. A
+leading moral of the history of science is the superior usefulness of an
+exact account of the workings of nature to an explanation in terms of
+some qualitative potency. Explanation has been postponed by enlightened
+science until after a more careful observation of actual processes shall
+have been made; and at length it has been admitted that there is no need
+of any explanation but perfect description. Now the practical use of
+science defined above, requires no knowledge beyond the actual order of
+events. For such a purpose sufficient reason signifies only sufficient
+conditions. All other considerations are irrelevant, and it is proper
+to ignore them. Such has actually been the fate of the so-called
+metaphysical solution of special problems of nature. The case of Kepler
+is the classic instance. This great scientist supplemented his laws of
+planetary motion with the following speculation concerning the agencies
+at work:
+
+     "We must suppose one of two things: either that the moving
+     spirits, in proportion as they are more removed from the sun,
+     are more feeble; or that there is one moving spirit in the
+     centre of all the orbits, namely, in the sun, which urges each
+     body the more vehemently in proportion as it is nearer; but in
+     more distant spaces languishes in consequence of the
+     remoteness and attenuation of its virtue."[129:2]
+
+The following passage from Hegel affords an interesting analogy:
+
+     "The moon is the waterless crystal which seeks to complete
+     itself by means of our sea, to quench the thirst of its arid
+     rigidity, and therefore produces ebb and flow."[129:3]
+
+No scientist has ever sought to refute either of these theories. They
+have merely been neglected.
+
+They were advanced in obedience to a demand for the ultimate
+explanation of the phenomena in question, and were obtained by applying
+such general conceptions as were most satisfying to the reasons of their
+respective authors. But they contributed nothing whatsoever to a
+practical familiarity with the natural course of events, in this case
+the times and places of the planets and the tides. Hence they have not
+been used in the building of science. In our own day investigators have
+become conscious of their motive, and do not wait for historical
+selection to exclude powers and reasons from their province. They
+deliberately seek to formulate exact descriptions. To this end they
+employ symbols that shall serve to identify the terms of nature, and
+formulas that shall define their systematic relationship. These systems
+must be exact, or deductions cannot be made from them. Hence they tend
+ultimately to assume a mathematical form of expression.
+
+[Sidenote: Space, Time, and Prediction.]
+
+§ 47. But science tends to employ for these systems only such
+conceptions as relate to _prediction_; and of these the most fundamental
+are _space_ and _time_. The first science to establish its method was
+the science of astronomy, where measurement and computation in terms of
+space and time were the most obvious means of description; and the
+general application of the method of astronomy by Galileo and Newton, or
+the development of mechanics, is the most important factor in the
+establishment of modern science upon a permanent working basis. The
+persistence of the term _cause_, testifies to the fact that science is
+primarily concerned with the determination of _events_. Its definitions
+of objects are means of identification, while its laws are dynamical,
+_i. e._, have reference to the conditions under which these objects
+arise. Thus the chemist may know less about the properties of water than
+the poet; but he is preëminently skilled in its production from
+elements, and understands similarly the compounds into which it may
+enter. Now the general conditions of all anticipation, whereby it
+becomes exact and verifiable, are spacial and temporal. A predictable
+event must be assigned to what is here now, or there now; or what is
+here then, or there then. An experimentally verifiable system must
+contain space-time variables, for which can be substituted the here and
+now of the experimenter's immediate experience. Hence science deals
+primarily with calculable places and moments. The mechanical theory of
+nature owes its success to a union of space and time through its
+conceptions of _matter_ and _motion_.[132:4] And the projected theory of
+energetics must satisfy the same conditions.
+
+[Sidenote: The Quantitative Method.]
+
+§ 48. But, furthermore, science has, as we have seen, an interest in
+freeing its descriptions from the peculiar angle and relativity of an
+individual's experience, for the sake of affording him knowledge of that
+with which he must meet. Science enlightens the will by acquainting it
+with that which takes place in spite of it, and for which it must hold
+itself in readiness. To this end the individual benefits himself in so
+far as he eliminates himself from the objects which he investigates. His
+knowledge is useful in so far as it is valid for his own indefinitely
+varying stand-points, and those of other wills recognized by him in his
+practical relations. But in attempting to describe objects in terms
+other than those of a specific experience, science is compelled to
+describe them in terms of one another. For this purpose _the
+quantitative method_ is peculiarly serviceable. With its aid objects
+permit themselves to be described as multiples of one another, and as
+occupying positions in relation to one another. When all objects are
+described strictly in terms of one another, they are expressed in terms
+of arbitrary units, and located in terms of arbitrary spacial or
+temporal axes of reference. Thus there arises the universe of the
+scientific imagination, a vast complexity of material displacements and
+transformations, without color, music, pleasure, or any of all that rich
+variety of qualities that the least of human experiences contains. It
+does not completely rationalize or even completely describe such
+experiences, but formulates their succession. To this end they are
+reduced to terms that correspond to no specific experience, and for this
+very reason may be translated again into all definable hypothetical
+experiences. The solar system for astronomy is not a bird's-eye view of
+elliptical orbits, with the planets and satellites in definite phases.
+Nor is it this group of objects from any such point of view, or from any
+number of such points of view; but a formulation of their motions that
+will serve as the key to an infinite number of their appearances. Or,
+consider the picture of the ichthysauria romping in the mesozoic sea,
+that commonly accompanies a text-book of geology. Any such picture, and
+all such pictures, with their coloring and their temporal and spacial
+perspective, are imaginary. No such special and exclusive manifolds can
+be defined as having been then and there realized. But we have a
+geological knowledge of this period, that fulfils the formal demands of
+natural science, in so far as we can construct this and countless other
+specific experiences with reference to it.
+
+[Sidenote: The General Development of Science.]
+
+§ 49. Science, then, is to be understood as springing from the practical
+necessity of anticipating the environment. This anticipation appears
+first as congenital or acquired reactions on the part of the organism.
+Such reactions imply a fixed coördination or system in the environment
+whereby a given circumstance determines other circumstances; and science
+proper arises as the formulation of such systems. The requirement that
+they shall apply to the phenomena that _confront_ the will, determines
+their spacial, temporal, and quantitative form. The progress of science
+is marked by the growth of these conceptions in the direction of
+comprehensiveness on the one hand, and of refinement and delicacy on the
+other. Man lives in an environment that is growing at the same time
+richer and more extended, but with a compensatory simplification in the
+ever closer systematization of scientific conceptions under the form of
+the order of nature.
+
+[Sidenote: The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science.]
+
+§ 50. At the opening of this chapter it was maintained that it is a
+function of philosophy to criticise science through its generating
+problem, or its self-imposed task viewed as determining its province and
+selecting its categories. The above account of the origin and method of
+science must suffice as a definition of its generating problem, and
+afford the basis of our answer to the question of its limits. Enough has
+been said to make it clear that philosophy is not in the field of
+science, and is therefore not entitled to contest its result in detail
+or even to take sides within the province of its special problems.
+Furthermore, philosophy should not aim to restrain science by the
+imposition of external barriers. Whatever may be said of the sufficiency
+of its categories in any region of the world, that body of truth of
+which mathematics, mechanics, and physics are the foundations, must be
+regarded as a whole that tends to be all-comprehensive in its own terms.
+There remains for philosophy, then, the critical examination of these
+terms, and the appraisal as a whole of the truth that they may express.
+
+[Sidenote: Natural Science is Abstract.]
+
+§ 51. The impossibility of embracing the whole of knowledge within
+natural science is due to the fact that the latter is _abstract_. This
+follows from the fact that natural science is governed by a selective
+interest. The formulation of definitions and laws in exclusively
+mechanical terms is not due to the exhaustive or even preëminent reality
+of these properties, but to their peculiar serviceableness in a
+verifiable description of events. Natural science does not affirm that
+reality is essentially constituted of matter, or essentially
+characterized by motion; but is _interested_ in the mechanical aspect of
+reality, and describes it quite regardless of other evident aspects and
+without meaning to prejudice them. It is unfortunately true that the
+scientist has rarely been clear in his own mind on this point. It is
+only recently that he has partially freed himself from the habit of
+construing his terms as final and exhaustive.[137:5] This he was able
+to do even to his own satisfaction, only by allowing loose rein to the
+imagination. Consider the example of the atomic theory. In order to
+describe such occurrences as chemical combination, or changes in volume
+and density, the scientist has employed as a unit the least particle,
+physically indivisible and qualitatively homogeneous. Look for the atom
+in the body of science, and you will find it in physical laws governing
+expansion and contraction, and in chemical formulas. There the real
+responsibility of science ends. But whether through the need of popular
+exposition, or the undisciplined imagination of the investigator
+himself, atoms have figured in the history of thought as round
+corpuscles of a grayish hue scurrying hither and thither, and armed with
+special appliances wherewith to lock in molecular embrace. Although this
+is nonsense, we need not on that account conclude that there are no
+atoms. There are atoms in precisely the sense intended by scientific
+law, in that the formulas computed with the aid of this concept are true
+of certain natural processes. The conception of ether furnishes a
+similar case. Science is not responsible for the notion of a quivering
+gelatinous substance pervading space, but only for certain laws that,
+_e. g._, describe the velocity of light in terms of the vibration. It is
+true that there is such a thing as ether, not as gratuitously rounded
+out by the imagination, with various attributes of immediate experience,
+but just in so far as this concept is employed in verified descriptions
+of radiation, magnetism, or electricity. Strictly speaking science
+asserts nothing about the existence of ether, but only about the
+behavior, _e. g._, of light. If true descriptions of this and other
+phenomena are reached by employing units of wave propagation in an
+elastic medium, then ether is proved to exist in precisely the same
+sense that linear feet are proved to exist, if it be admitted that there
+are 90,000,000 x 5,280 of them between the earth and the sun. And to
+imagine in the one case a jelly with all the qualities of texture,
+color, and the like, that an individual object of sense would possess,
+is much the same as in the other to imagine the heavens filled with
+foot-rules and tape-measures. There is but one safe procedure in dealing
+with scientific concepts: to regard them as true so far as they
+describe, and no whit further. To supplement the strict meaning which
+has been verified and is contained in the formularies of science, with
+such vague predicates as will suffice to make entities of them, is mere
+ineptness and confusion of thought. And it is only such a
+supplementation that obscures their abstractness. For a mechanical
+description of things, true as it doubtless is, is even more indubitably
+incomplete.
+
+[Sidenote: The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth.]
+
+§ 52. But though the abstractness involved in scientific description is
+open and deliberate, we must come to a more precise understanding of it,
+if we are to draw any conclusion as to what it involves. In his
+"Principles of Human Knowledge," the English philosopher Bishop Berkeley
+raises the question as to the universal validity of mathematical
+demonstrations. If we prove from the image or figure of an isosceles
+right triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles,
+how can we know that this proposition holds of all triangles?
+
+     "To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view
+     whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an
+     isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a
+     determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends
+     to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness
+     soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the
+     equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all
+     concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have
+     in view includes all these particulars; but then there is not
+     the least mention made of them in the proof of the
+     proposition."[140:6]
+
+Of the total conditions present in the concrete picture of a triangle,
+one may in one's calculations neglect as many as one sees fit, and work
+with the remainder. Then, if one has clearly distinguished the
+conditions used, one may confidently assert that whatever has been found
+true of them holds regardless of the neglected conditions. These may be
+missing or replaced by others, provided the selected or (for any given
+investigation) essential conditions are not affected. That which is true
+once is true always, provided time is not one of its conditions; that
+which is true in one place is true everywhere, provided location is not
+one of its conditions. But, given any concrete situation, the more
+numerous the conditions one ignores in one's calculations, the less
+adequate are one's calculations to that situation. The number of its
+inhabitants, and any mathematical operation made with that number, is
+true, but only very abstractly true of a nation. A similar though less
+radical abstractness appertains to natural science. Simple qualities of
+sound or color, and distinctions of beauty or moral worth, together with
+many other ingredients of actual experience attributed therein to the
+objects of nature, are ignored in the mechanical scheme. There is a
+substitution of certain mechanical arrangements in the case of the first
+group of properties, the simple qualities of sense, so that they may be
+assimilated to the general scheme of events, and their occurrence
+predicted. But their intrinsic qualitative character is not reckoned
+with, even in psychology, where the physiological method finally
+replaces them with brain states. Over and above these neglected
+properties of things there remain the purposive activities of thought.
+It is equally preposterous to deny them and to describe them in
+mechanical terms. It is plain, then, that natural science calculates
+upon the basis of only a fraction of the conditions that present
+themselves in actual experience. Its conclusions, therefore, though true
+so far as they go, and they may be abstractly true of everything, are
+completely true of nothing.
+
+[Sidenote: But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality.]
+
+§ 53. Such, in brief, is the general charge of inadequacy which may be
+urged against natural science, not in the spirit of detraction, but for
+the sake of a more sound belief concerning reality. The philosopher
+falls into error no less radical than that of the dogmatic scientist,
+when he charges the scientist with untruth, and attaches to his concepts
+the predicate of unreality. The fact that the concepts of science are
+selected, and only inadequately true of reality, should not be taken to
+mean that they are sportive or arbitrary. They are not "devices" or
+abbreviations, in any sense that does not attach to such symbolism as
+all thought involves. Nor are they merely "hypothetical," though like
+all thought they are subject to correction.[142:7] The scientist does
+not merely assert that the equation for energy is true if nature's
+capacity for work be measurable, but _that such is actually the case_.
+The statistician does not arrive at results contingent upon the
+supposition that men are numerable, but declares his sums and averages
+to be categorically true. Similarly scientific laws are true; only, to
+be sure, so far as they go, but with no condition save the condition
+that attaches to all knowledge, viz., that it shall not need correction.
+The philosophy of science, therefore, is not the adversary of science,
+but supervenes upon science in the interests of the ideal of final
+truth. No philosophy of science is sound which does not primarily seek
+by an analysis of scientific concepts to understand science on its own
+grounds. Philosophy may understand science better than science
+understands itself, but only by holding fast to the conviction of its
+truth, and including it within whatever account of reality it may be
+able to formulate.
+
+[Sidenote: Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy.]
+
+§ 54. Though philosophy be the most ancient and most exalted of human
+disciplines, it is not infrequently charged with being the most
+unprofitable. Science has amassed a fortune of information, which has
+facilitated life and advanced civilization. Is not philosophy, on the
+other hand, all programme and idle questioning? In the first place, no
+questioning is idle that is logically possible. It is true that
+philosophy shows her skill rather in the asking than in the answering of
+questions. But the formal pertinence of a question is of the greatest
+significance. No valid though unanswered question can have a purely
+negative value, and especially as respects the consistency or
+completeness of truth. But, in the second place, philosophy with all its
+limitations serves mankind as indispensably as science. If science
+supplies the individual with means of self-preservation, and the
+instruments of achievement, philosophy supplies the ideals, or the
+objects of deliberate construction. Such reflection as justifies the
+adoption of a fundamental life purpose is always philosophical. For
+every judgment respecting final worth is a judgment _sub specie
+eternitatis_. And the urgency of life requires the individual to pass
+such judgments. It is true that however persistently reflective he may
+be in the matter, his conclusion will be premature in consideration of
+the amount of evidence logically demanded for such a judgment. But he
+must be as wise as he can, or he will be as foolish as conventionality
+and blind impulse may impel him to be. Philosophy determines for society
+what every individual must practically determine upon for himself, the
+most reasonable plan of reality as a whole which the data and reflection
+of an epoch can afford. It is philosophy's service to mankind to
+compensate for the enthusiasm and concentration of the specialist, a
+service needed in every "present day." Apart from the philosopher,
+public opinion is the victim of sensationalism, and individual opinion
+is further warped by accidental propinquity. It is the function of
+philosophy to interpret knowledge for the sake of a sober and wise
+belief. The philosopher is the true prophet, appearing before men in
+behalf of that which is finally the truth. He is the spokesman of the
+most considerate and comprehensive reflection possible at any stage in
+the development of human thought. Owing to a radical misconception of
+function, the man of science has in these later days begun to regard
+himself as the wise man, and to teach the people. Popular materialism is
+the logical outcome of this determination of belief by natural science.
+It may be that this is due as much to the indifference of the
+philosopher as to the forwardness of the scientist, but in any case the
+result is worse than conservative loyalty to religious tradition. For
+religion is corrected surely though slowly by the whole order of
+advancing truth. Its very inflexibility makes it proof against an
+over-emphasis upon new truth. It has generally turned out in time that
+the obstinate man of religion was more nearly right than the adaptable
+intellectual man of fashion. But philosophy, as a critique of science
+for the sake of faith, should provide the individual religious believer
+with intellectual enlightenment and gentleness. The quality,
+orderliness, and inclusiveness of knowledge, finally determine its
+value; and the philosopher, premature as his synthesis may some day
+prove to be, is the wisest man of his own generation. From him the man
+of faith should obtain such discipline of judgment as shall enable him
+to be fearless of advancing knowledge, because acquainted with its
+scope, and so intellectually candid with all his visions and his
+inspirations.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[120:1] Ernst Mach: _Science of Mechanics_. Translation by McCormack, p.
+464. No one has made more important contributions than Professor Mach to
+a certain definite modern philosophical movement. Cf. § 207.
+
+[129:2] Whewell: _History of the Inductive Sciences_, Vol. I, p. 289.
+Quoted from Kepler: _Mysterium Cosmographicum_.
+
+[129:3] Quoted by Sidgwick in his _Philosophy, its Scope and Relations_,
+p. 89.
+
+[132:4] The reader is referred to Mr. Bertrand Russell's chapters on
+_matter_ and _motion_ in his _Principles of Mathematics_, Vol. I.
+Material particles he defines as "many-one relations of all times to
+some places, or of all terms of a continuous one-dimensional series _t_
+to some terms of a continuous three-dimensional series _s_." Similarly,
+"when different times, throughout any period however short, are
+correlated with different places, there is motion; when different times,
+throughout some period however short, are all correlated with the same
+place, there is rest." _Op. cit._, p. 473.
+
+[137:5] That the scientist still permits himself to teach the people a
+loose exoteric theory of reality, is proven by Professor Ward's citation
+of instances in his _Naturalism and Agnosticism_. So eminent a physicist
+as Lord Kelvin is quoted as follows: "You can imagine particles of
+something, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This thing we call
+the luminiferous ether. That is the only substance we are confident of
+in dynamics. One thing we are sure of, and that is the reality and
+substantiality of the luminiferous ether." Vol. I, p. 113.
+
+[140:6] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Introduction. Edition
+of Fraser, p. 248.
+
+[142:7] The reader who cares to pursue this topic further is referred to
+the writer's discussion of "_Professor Ward's Philosophy of Science_" in
+the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods_, Vol. I,
+No. 13.
+
+
+
+
+PART II
+
+THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF
+PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem of
+Philosophy.]
+
+§ 55. The stand-point and purpose of the philosopher define his task,
+but they do not necessarily prearrange the division of it. That the task
+is a complex one, embracing many subordinate problems which must be
+treated _seriatim_, is attested both by the breadth of its scope and the
+variety of the interests from which it may be approached. But this
+complexity is qualified by the peculiar importance which here attaches
+to unity. That which lends philosophical quality to any reflection is a
+steadfast adherence to the ideals of inclusiveness and consistency.
+Hence, though the philosopher must of necessity occupy himself with
+subordinate problems, these cannot be completely isolated from one
+another, and solved successively. Perspective is his most indispensable
+requisite, and he has solved no problem finally until he has provided
+for the solution of all. His own peculiar conceptions are those which
+_order_ experience, and reconcile such aspects of it as other interests
+have distinguished. Hence the compatibility of any idea with all other
+ideas is the prime test of its philosophical sufficiency. On these
+grounds it may confidently be asserted that the work of philosophy
+cannot be assigned by the piece to different specialists, and then
+assembled. There are no special philosophical problems which can be
+finally solved upon their own merits. Indeed, such problems could never
+even be named, for in their discreteness they would cease to be
+philosophical.
+
+The case of _metaphysics_ and _epistemology_ affords an excellent
+illustration. The former of these is commonly defined as the theory of
+reality or of first principles, the latter as the theory of knowledge.
+But the most distinctive philosophical movement of the nineteenth
+century issues from the idea that knowing and being are
+identical.[150:1] The prime reality is defined as a knowing mind, and
+the terms of reality are interpreted as terms of a cognitive process.
+Ideas and logical principles _constitute_ the world. It is evident that
+in this Hegelian philosophy epistemology embraces metaphysics. In
+defining the relations of knowledge to its object, one has already
+defined one's fundamental philosophical conception, while _logic_, as
+the science of the universal necessities of thought, will embrace the
+first principles of reality. Now, were one to divide and arrange the
+problems of philosophy upon this basis, it is evident that one would not
+have deduced the arrangement from the general problem of philosophy, but
+from a single attempted solution of that problem. It might serve as an
+exposition of Hegel, but not as a general philosophical programme.
+
+Another case in point is provided by the present-day interest in what is
+called "_pragmatism_."[151:2] This doctrine is historically connected
+with Kant's principle of the "primacy of the practical reason," in which
+he maintained that the consciousness of duty is a profounder though less
+scientific insight than the knowledge of objects. The current doctrine
+maintains that thought with its fruits is an expression of interest, and
+that the will which evinces and realizes such an interest is more
+original and significant than that which the thinking defines. Such a
+view attaches a peculiar importance to the springs of conduct, and in
+its more systematic development[152:3] has regarded _ethics_ as the
+true propædeutic and proof of philosophy. But to make ethics the
+key-stone of the arch, is to define a special philosophical system; for
+it is the very problem of philosophy to dispose the parts of knowledge
+with a view to systematic construction. The relation of the provinces of
+metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics cannot, then, be defined
+without entering these provinces and answering the questions proper to
+them.
+
+[Sidenote: The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon
+the Initial Interest.]
+
+§ 56. Since the above terms exist, however, there can be no doubt but
+that important divisions within the general aim of philosophy have
+actually been made. The inevitableness of it appears in the variety of
+the sources from which that aim may spring. The point of departure will
+always determine the emphasis and the application which the philosophy
+receives. If philosophy be needed to supplement more special interests,
+it will receive a particular character from whatever interest it so
+supplements. He who approaches it from a definite stand-point will find
+in it primarily an interpretation of that stand-point.
+
+[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life.]
+
+§ 57. There are two sources of the philosophical aim, which are
+perennial in their human significance. He, firstly, who begins with the
+demands of life and its ideals, looks to philosophy for a reconciliation
+of these with the orderly procedure of nature. His philosophy will
+receive its form from its illumination of life, and it will be an
+ethical or religious philosophy. Spinoza, the great seventeenth-century
+philosopher who justified mysticism after the manner of
+mathematics,[153:4] displays this temper in his philosophy:
+
+     "After experience had taught me that all the usual
+     surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that
+     none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves
+     anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is
+     affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there
+     might be some real good having power to communicate itself,
+     which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all
+     else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the
+     discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous,
+     supreme, and unending happiness."[153:5]
+
+In pursuance of this aim, though he deals with the problem of being in
+the rigorous logical fashion of his day, the final words of his great
+work are, "Of Human Freedom":
+
+     "Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
+     scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
+     himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
+     necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
+     acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed
+     out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may
+     nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is
+     so seldom found. How would it be possible if salvation were
+     ready to our hand, and could without great labor be found,
+     that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things
+     excellent are as difficult as they are rare."[154:6]
+
+[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Extension of Science.]
+
+§ 58. On the other hand, one who looks to philosophy for the extension
+and correction of scientific knowledge will be primarily interested in
+the philosophical definition of ultimate conceptions, and in the method
+wherewith such a definition is obtained. Thus the philosophy of the
+scientist will tend to be logical and metaphysical. Such is the case
+with Descartes and Leibniz, who are nevertheless intimately related to
+Spinoza in the historical development of philosophy.
+
+     "Several years have now elapsed," says the former, "since I
+     first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth,
+     many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I
+     afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and
+     from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking
+     once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had
+     adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the
+     foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding
+     superstructure in the sciences."[155:7]
+
+Leibniz's mind was more predominantly logical even than Descartes's. He
+sought in philosophy a supreme intellectual synthesis, a science of the
+universe.
+
+     "Although," he says retrospectively, "I am one of those who
+     have worked much at mathematics, I have none the less
+     meditated upon philosophy from my youth up; for it always
+     seemed to me that there was a possibility of establishing
+     something solid in philosophy by clear demonstrations. . . .
+     I perceived, after much meditation, that it is impossible to
+     find the _principles of a real unity_ in matter alone, or in
+     that which is only passive, since it is nothing but a
+     collection or aggregation of parts _ad infinitum_."[155:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical Problem.]
+
+§ 59. Though these types are peculiarly representative, they are by no
+means exhaustive. There are as many possibilities of emphasis as there
+are incentives to philosophical reflection. It is not possible to
+exhaust the aspects of experience which may serve as bases from which
+such thought may issue, and to which, after its synthetic insight, it
+may return. But it is evident that such divisions of philosophy
+represent in their order, and in the sharpness with which they are
+sundered, the intellectual autobiography of the individual philosopher.
+There is but one method by which that which is peculiar either to the
+individual, or to the special position which he adopts, may be
+eliminated. Though it is impossible to tabulate the empty programme of
+philosophy, we may name certain special problems that have appeared _in
+its history_. Since this history comprehends the activities of many
+individuals, a general validity attaches to it. There has been,
+moreover, a certain periodicity in the emergence of these problems, so
+that it may fairly be claimed for them that they indicate inevitable
+phases in the development of human reflection upon experience. They
+represent a normal differentiation of interest which the individual
+mind, in the course of its own thinking, tends to follow. It is true
+that it can never be said with assurance that any age is utterly blind
+to any aspect of experience. This is obviously the case with the
+practical and theoretical interests which have just been distinguished.
+There is no age that does not have some practical consciousness of the
+world as a whole, nor any which does not seek more or less earnestly to
+universalize its science. But though it compel us to deal abstractly
+with historical epochs, there is abundant compensation in the
+possibility which this method affords of finding the divisions of
+philosophy in the manifestation of the living philosophical spirit.
+
+[Sidenote: Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception.]
+
+§ 60. To Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, is commonly
+awarded the honor of being the founder of European philosophy. If he
+deserve this distinction, it is on account of the question which he
+raised, and not on account of the answer which he gave to it. Aristotle
+informs us that Thales held "water" to be "the material cause of all
+things."[157:9] This crude theory is evidently due to an interest in the
+totality of things, an interest which is therefore philosophical. But
+the interest of this first philosopher has a more definite character. It
+looks toward the definition in terms of some single conception, of _the
+constitution_ of the world. As a child might conceivably think the moon
+to be made of green cheese, so philosophy in its childhood thinks here
+of all things as made of water. Water was a well-known substance,
+possessing well-known predicates. To define all nature in terms of it,
+was to maintain that in spite of superficial differences, all things
+have these predicates in common. They are the predicates which qualify
+for reality, and compose a community of nature from which all the
+individual objects and events of nature arise. The successors of Thales
+were evidently dissatisfied with his fundamental conception, because of
+its lack of generality. They seized upon vaguer substances like air and
+fire, for the very definiteness of the nature of water forbids the
+identification of other substances with it. But what is so obviously
+true of water is scarcely less true of air and fire; and it appeared at
+length that only a substance possessing the most general characters of
+body, such as shape, size, and mobility, could be thought as truly
+primeval and universal. In this wise a conception like our modern
+physical conception of matter came at length into vogue. Now the problem
+of which these were all tentative solutions is, in general, the problem
+of _metaphysics_; although this term belongs to a later era, arising
+only from the accidental place of the discussion of first principles
+_after physics_ in the system of Aristotle. _The attempt to secure a
+most fundamental conception which attaches some definite meaning to the
+reality including and informing every particular thing, is metaphysics._
+
+[Sidenote: Monism and Pluralism.]
+
+§ 61. It must not be supposed that metaphysics is dogmatically committed
+to the reduction of all reality to a unity of nature. It is quite
+consistent with its purpose that the parts of reality should be found to
+compose a group, or an indefinite multitude of irreducibly different
+entities. But it is clear that even such an account of things deals with
+what is true of all reality, and even in acknowledging the variety of
+its constituents, attributes to them some kind of relationship. The
+degree to which such a relationship is regarded as intimate and
+essential, determines the degree to which any metaphysical system is
+_monistic_,[159:10] rather than _pluralistic_. But the significance of
+this difference will be better appreciated after a further
+differentiation of the metaphysical problem has been noted.
+
+[Sidenote: Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process.]
+
+§ 62. It has already been suggested that the test of Thales's conception
+lay in the possibility of deriving nature from it. A world principle
+must be fruitful. Now an abstract distinction has prevailed more or less
+persistently in metaphysics, between _the general definition of being_,
+called _ontology_, and the study of the processes wherewith being is
+divided into things and events. This latter study has to do primarily
+with the details of experience enumerated and systematized by the
+natural sciences. _To reconcile_ these, _or the course of nature, with
+the fundamental definition of being_, is the problem of _cosmology_.
+Cosmology is the construing of the _prima facie_ reality in terms of the
+essential reality. It is the proof and the explanation of ontology.
+Since the most familiar part of the _prima facie_ reality, the part
+almost exclusively noticed by the naive mind, is embraced within the
+field of the physical sciences, the term cosmology has come more
+definitely to signify the _philosophy of nature_. It embraces such an
+examination of space, time, matter, causality, etc., as seeks to answer
+the most general questions about them, and provide for them in the world
+thought of as most profoundly real. Such a study receives its
+philosophical character from its affiliation with ontology, as the
+latter would find its application in cosmology.
+
+[Sidenote: Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies.]
+
+§ 63. But in addition to the consideration of the various parts of
+nature, cosmology has commonly dealt with a radical and far-reaching
+alternative that appeared at the very dawn of metaphysics. Differences
+may arise within a world constituted of a single substance or a small
+group of ultimate substances, by changes in the relative position and
+grouping of the parts. Hence the virtue of the conception of motion. The
+theory which explains all differences by motions of the parts of a
+qualitatively simple world, is called _mechanism_. Another source of
+change familiar to naive experience is _will_, or the action of living
+creatures. According to the mechanical theory, _changes occur on account
+of the natural motions of the parts of matter_; according to the latter
+or _teleological_ conception, _changes are made by a formative agency
+directed to some end_. Among the early Greek philosophers, Leucippus was
+an exponent of mechanism.
+
+     "He says that the worlds arise when many bodies are collected
+     together into the mighty void from the surrounding space and
+     rush together. They come into collision, and those which are
+     of similar shape and like form become entangled, and from
+     their entanglement the heavenly bodies arise."[161:11]
+
+Anaxagoras, on the other hand, was famed for his doctrine of the Nous,
+or Intelligence, to whose direction he attributed the whole process of
+the world. The following is translated from extant fragments of his
+book, "πε�ὶ φύσεως":
+
+     "And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it
+     began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve
+     first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends
+     over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And
+     all the things that are mingled together and separated off and
+     distinguished are all known by the Nous. And Nous set in order
+     all things that were to be and that were, and all things that
+     are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now
+     revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and
+     the ether that are separated off."[162:12]
+
+[Sidenote: Dualism.]
+
+§ 64. It is clear, furthermore, that the doctrine of Anaxagoras not only
+names a distinct kind of cause, but also ascribes to it an independence
+and intrinsic importance that do not belong to motion. Whereas motion is
+a property of matter, intelligence is an originative power working out
+purposes of its own choosing. Hence we have here to do with a new
+ontology. If we construe ultimate being in terms of mind, we have a
+definite substitute for the physical theories outlined above. Such a
+theory is scarcely to be attributed to any Greek philosopher of the
+early period; it belongs to a more sophisticated stage in the
+development of thought, after the rise of the problem of epistemology.
+But Anaxagoras's sharp distinction between the material of the world on
+the one hand, and the author of its order and evolution on the other, is
+in itself worthy of notice. It contains the germ of a recurrent
+philosophical _dualism_, which differs from pluralism in that it finds
+two and only two fundamental divisions of being, the physical, material,
+or potential on the one hand, and the mental, formal, or ideal on the
+other.
+
+[Sidenote: The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism.]
+
+§ 65. Finally, the alternative possibilities which these cosmological
+considerations introduce, bear directly upon the general question of the
+interdependence of the parts of the world, a question which has already
+appeared as pertinent in ontology. Monism and pluralism now obtain a new
+meaning. Where the world process is informed with some singleness of
+plan, as teleology proposes, the parts are reciprocally necessary, and
+inseparable from the unity. Where, on the other hand, the processes are
+random and reciprocally fortuitous, as Leucippus proposes, the world as
+a whole is an aggregate rather than a unity. In this way uniformity in
+kind of being may prevail in a world the relations of whose parts are
+due to chance, while diversity in kind of being may prevail in a world
+knit together by some thorough-going plan of organization. Thus monism
+and pluralism are conceptions as proper to cosmology as to ontology.
+
+But enough has been said to demonstrate the interdependence of ontology
+and cosmology, of the theory of being and the theory of differentiation
+and process. Such problems can be only abstractly sundered, and the
+distinctive character of any metaphysical system will usually consist in
+some theory determining their relation. Philosophy returns to these
+metaphysical problems with its thought enriched and its method
+complicated, after becoming thoroughly alive to the problems of
+epistemology, logic, and ethics.
+
+[Sidenote: Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of
+Knowledge.]
+
+§ 66. _Epistemology is the theory of the possibility of knowledge_, and
+issues from criticism and scepticism. If we revert again to the history
+of Greek philosophy, we find a first period of enterprising speculation
+giving place to a second period of hesitancy and doubt. This phase of
+thought occurs simultaneously with the brilliantly humanistic age of
+Pericles, and it is undoubtedly true that energy is withdrawn from
+speculation largely for the sake of expending it in the more lively and
+engaging pursuits of politics and art. But there are patent reasons
+within the sphere of philosophy itself for entailment of activity and
+taking of stock. For three centuries men have taken their philosophical
+powers for granted, and used them without questioning them. Repeated
+attacks upon the problem of reality have resulted in no consensus of
+opinion, but only in a disagreement among the wise men themselves. A
+great variety of mere theories has been substituted for the old
+unanimity of religious tradition and practical life. It is natural under
+these circumstances to infer that in philosophy man has overreached
+himself. He would more profitably busy himself with affairs that belong
+to his own sphere, and find a basis for life in his immediate relations
+with his fellows. The sophists, learned in tradition, and skilled in
+disputation, but for the most part entirely lacking in originality, are
+the new prophets. As teachers of rhetoric and morals, they represent the
+practical and secular spirit of their age; while in their avoidance of
+speculation, and their critical justification of that course, they
+express its sceptical philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism.]
+
+§ 67. In their self-justification certain of the sophists attached
+themselves to a definite doctrine maintained by those of their
+predecessors and contemporaries who were atomists, or followers of that
+same Leucippus whom we have quoted. This doctrine was the result of an
+attempt to construe perception in terms of the motion of atoms. Outer
+objects were said to give off fine particles which, through the
+mediation of the sense organs, impinged upon the soul-atom. But it was
+evident even to the early exponents of this theory that according to
+such an account, each perceiver is relegated to a world peculiar to his
+own stand-point. His perception informs him concerning his own states as
+affected by things, rather than concerning the things themselves. Upon
+this ground the great sophist Protagoras is said to have based his
+dictum: Πάντων χ�ημάτων μέτ�ον ἄνθ�ωπος,--"Man is the measure of all
+things." This is the classic statement of the doctrine of relativity.
+But we have now entered into the province of epistemology, and various
+alternatives confront us. Reduce thought to perception, define
+perception as relative to each individual, and you arrive at
+_scepticism_, or _the denial of the possibility of valid knowledge_.
+Plato expounds this consequence in the well-known discussion of
+Protagoras that occurs in the "Theætetus."
+
+     "I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each
+     one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with
+     a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other
+     yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of
+     all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt
+     for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that
+     while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom, he
+     was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his
+     fellow-men--would not this have produced an overpowering
+     effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern
+     another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right
+     to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each,
+     as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole
+     judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why,
+     my friend, should Protagoras be preferred to the place of
+     wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we
+     poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure
+     of his own wisdom? . . . The attempt to supervise or refute
+     the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and
+     enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and
+     this must be the case if Protagoras's Truth is the real truth,
+     and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving
+     oracles out of the shrine of his book."[167:13]
+
+This is the full swing of the pendulum from _dogmatism_, or the
+uncritical conviction of truth. A modified form of scepticism has been
+developed in these later days under the influence of natural science,
+and is called _agnosticism_ or _positivism_. It accepts the Protagorean
+doctrine only in the sense of attributing to human knowledge as a whole
+an incapacity for exceeding the range of perception. Beyond this realm
+of natural science, where theories can be sensibly verified, lies the
+unknowable realm, more real, but forever inaccessible.
+
+[Sidenote: The Source and Criterion of Knowledge According to Empiricism
+and Rationalism. Mysticism.]
+
+§ 68. It is important to note that both scepticism and agnosticism agree
+in regarding _perception as the essential factor in knowledge_. So far
+at any rate as our knowledge is concerned, the certification of being
+consists in perceivability. Knowledge is coextensive with actual and
+possible human experience. This account of the source and criterion of
+knowledge is called _empiricism_, in distinction from the counter-theory
+of _rationalism_.
+
+The rationalistic motive was a quickening influence in Greek philosophy
+long before it became deliberate and conspicuous in Socrates and Plato.
+Parmenides, founder of the Eleatic School, has left behind him a poem
+divided into two parts: "The Way of Truth" and "The Way of
+Opinion."[168:14] In the first of these he expounds his esoteric
+philosophy, which is a definition of being established by dialectical
+reasoning. He finds that being must be single, eternal, and changeless,
+because otherwise it cannot be thought and defined without
+contradiction. The method which Parmenides here employs presupposes that
+knowledge consists in understanding rather than perception. Indeed, he
+regards the fact that the world of the senses is manifold and mutable as
+of little consequence to the wise man. The world of sense is the
+province of vulgar opinion, while that of reason is the absolute truth
+revealed only to the philosopher. The truth has no concern with
+appearance, but is answerable only to the test of rationality. _That
+world is real which one is able by thinking to make intelligible._ The
+world is what a world must be in order to be possible at all, and the
+philosopher can deduce it directly from the very conditions of thought
+which it must satisfy. He who would know reality may disregard what
+seems to be, provided he can by reflective analysis discover certain
+general necessities to which being must conform. This is rationalism in
+its extreme form.
+
+The rationalism of Socrates was more moderate, as it was more fruitful
+than that of Parmenides. As is well known, Socrates composed no
+philosophical books, but sought to inculcate wisdom in his teaching and
+conversation. His method of inculcating wisdom was to evoke it in his
+interlocutor by making him considerate of the meaning of his speech.
+Through his own questions he sought to arouse the questioning spirit,
+which should weigh the import of words, and be satisfied with nothing
+short of a definite and consistent judgment. In the Platonic dialogues
+the Socratic method obtains a place in literature. In the "Theætetus,"
+which is, perhaps, the greatest of all epistemological treatises,
+Socrates is represented as likening his vocation to that of the midwife.
+
+     "Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs,
+     but differs in that I attend men, and not women, and I look
+     after their souls when they are in labor, and not after their
+     bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining
+     whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings
+     forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And, like the
+     midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made
+     against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the
+     wit to answer them myself, is very just; the reason is that
+     the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to
+     bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor
+     have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my
+     own soul, but those who converse with me profit. . . . It is
+     quite clear that they never learned anything from me; the
+     many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own
+     making."[171:15]
+
+The principle underlying this method is the insistence that a
+proposition, to be true of reality, must at least bespeak a mind that is
+true to itself, internally luminous, and free from contradiction. That
+which is to me nothing that I can express in form that will convey
+precise meaning and bear analysis, is so far nothing at all. Being is
+not, as the empiricist would have it, ready at hand, ours for the
+looking, but is the fruit of critical reflection. Only reason,
+overcoming the relativity of perception, and the chaos of popular
+opinion, can lay hold on the universal truth.
+
+A very interesting tendency to clothe the articulations of thought with
+the immediacy of perception is exhibited in _mysticism_, which
+attributes the highest cognitive power to an experience that transcends
+thought, an ineffable insight that is the occasional reward of thought
+and virtuous living. This theory would seem to owe its great vigor to
+the fact that it promises to unite the universality of the rational
+object with the vivid presence of the empirical object, though it
+sacrifices the definite content of both. The mystic, empiricist, and
+rationalist are in these several ways led to revise their metaphysics
+upon the basis of their epistemology, or to define reality in terms
+dictated by the means of knowing it.
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to Realism,
+and the Representative Theory.]
+
+§ 69. But within the general field of epistemology there has arisen
+another issue of even greater significance in its bearing upon
+metaphysics. The first issue, as we have seen, has reference to the
+criterion of knowledge, to the possibility of arriving at certainty
+about reality, and the choice of means to that end. A second question
+arises, concerning _the relation between the knowledge and its object or
+that which is known_. This problem does not at first appear as an
+epistemological difficulty, but is due to the emphasis which the moral
+and religious interests of men give to the conception of the self. My
+knowing is a part of me, a function of that soul whose welfare and
+eternal happiness I am seeking to secure. Indeed, my knowing is, so the
+wise men have always taught, the greatest of my prerogatives. Wisdom
+appertains to the philosopher, as folly to the fool. But though my
+knowledge be a part of me, and in me, the same cannot, lightly at any
+rate, be said of what I know. It would seem that I must distinguish
+between the knowledge, which is my act or state, an event in my life,
+and the known, which is object, and belongs to the context of the outer
+world. _The object of knowledge_ would then be quite _independent of the
+circumstance that I know it_. This theory has acquired the name of
+_realism_,[173:16] and is evidently as close to common sense as any
+epistemological doctrine can be said to be. If the knowledge consists in
+some sign or symbol which in my mind stands for the object, but is
+quite other than the object, realism is given the form known as the
+_representative theory_. This theory is due to a radical distinction
+between the inner world of consciousness and the outer world of things,
+whereby in knowledge the outer object requires a substitute that is
+qualified to belong to the inner world. Where, on the other hand, no
+specific and exclusive nature is attributed to the inner world, realism
+may flourish without the representative theory. In such a case the
+object would be regarded as itself capable of entering into any number
+of individual experiences or of remaining outside them all, and without
+on either account forfeiting its identity. This view was taken for
+granted by Plato, but is elaborately defended in our own day. During the
+intervening period epistemology has been largely occupied with
+difficulties inherent in the representative theory, and from that
+discussion there has emerged the theory of _idealism_,[175:17] the great
+rival theory to that of realism.
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to
+Idealism.]
+
+§ 70. The representative theory contains at least one obvious
+difficulty. If the thinker be confined to his ideas, and if the reality
+be at the same time beyond these ideas, how can he ever verify their
+report? Indeed, what can it mean that an idea should be true of that
+which belongs to a wholly different category? How under such
+circumstances can that which is a part of the idea be attributed with
+any certainty to the object? Once grant that you know only your ideas,
+and the object reduces to an unknown _x_, which you retain to account
+for the outward pointing or reference of the ideas, but which is not
+missed if neglected. The obvious though radical theory of idealism is
+almost inevitably the next step. Why assume that there is any object
+other than the state of mind, since all positive content belongs to that
+realm? The eighteenth century English philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, was
+accused by his contemporaries of wilful eccentricity, and even madness,
+for his boldness in accepting this argument and drawing this conclusion:
+
+     "The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel
+     it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed;
+     meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it,
+     or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was
+     an odor--that is, it was smelt; there was a sound--that is, it
+     was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or
+     touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like
+     expressions. For as to what is said of the _absolute_
+     existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their
+     being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their
+     _esse_ is _percipi_; nor is it possible that they should have
+     any existence out of the minds or thinking thing which
+     perceives them."[176:18]
+
+[Sidenote: Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism.]
+
+§ 71. In this paragraph Berkeley maintains that it is essential to
+things, or at any rate to their qualities, that they _be perceived_.
+This principle when expressed as an epistemological or metaphysical
+generalization, is called _phenomenalism_. But in another phase of his
+thought Berkeley emphasizes the _perceiver_, or _spirit_. The theory
+which maintains that the only real substances are these active selves,
+with their powers and their states, has been called somewhat vaguely by
+the name of _spiritualism_.[176:19] Philosophically it shows a strong
+tendency to develop into either _panpsychism_ or _transcendentalism_.
+The former is radically empirical. Its classic representative is the
+German pessimist Schopenhauer, who defined reality in terms of will
+because that term signified to him most eloquently _the directly felt
+nature of the self_. This immediate revelation of the true inwardness of
+being serves as the key to an "intuitive interpretation" of the
+gradations of nature, and will finally awaken a sense of the presence of
+the universal Will.
+
+[Sidenote: Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism.]
+
+§ 72. _Transcendentalism_, or _absolute idealism_, on the other hand,
+emphasizes the _rational activity_, rather than the bare subjectivity,
+_of the self_. The term "transcendental" has become associated with this
+type of idealism through Kant, whose favorite form of argument, the
+"transcendental deduction," was an analysis of experience with a view to
+discovering the categories, or formal principles of thought, implied in
+its meaning. From the Kantian method arose the conception of a standard
+or _absolute mind_ for the standard experience. This mind is
+transcendental not in the sense of being alien, but in the sense of
+exceeding the human mind in the direction of what this means and strives
+to be. It is the ideal or normal mind, in which the true reality is
+contained, with all the chaos of finite experience compounded and
+redeemed. There is no being but the absolute, the one all-inclusive
+spiritual life, in whom all things are inherent, and whose perfection is
+the virtual implication of all purposive activities.
+
+     "God's life . . . sees the one plan fulfilled through all the
+     manifold lives, the single consciousness winning its purpose
+     by virtue of all the ideas, of all the individual selves, and
+     of all the lives. No finite view is wholly illusory. Every
+     finite intent taken precisely in its wholeness is fulfilled in
+     the Absolute. The least life is not neglected, the most
+     fleeting act is a recognized part of the world's meaning. You
+     are for the divine view all that you know yourself at this
+     instant to be. But you are also infinitely more. The
+     preciousness of your present purposes to yourself is only a
+     hint of that preciousness which in the end links their meaning
+     to the entire realm of Being."[178:20]
+
+The fruitfulness of the philosopher's reflective doubt concerning his
+own powers is now evident. Problems are raised which are not merely
+urgent in themselves, but which present wholly new alternatives to the
+metaphysician. Rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, are
+doctrines which, though springing from the epistemological query
+concerning the possibility of knowledge, may determine an entire
+philosophical system. They bear upon every question of metaphysics,
+whether the fundamental conception of being, or the problems of the
+world's unity, origin, and significance for human life.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[150:1] The post-Kantian movement in Germany--especially in so far as
+influenced by Hegel. See Chap. XII.
+
+[151:2] Cf. § 203.
+
+[152:3] _E. g._, the system of Fichte. Cf. § 177.
+
+[153:4] See Chap. XI.
+
+[153:5] Spinoza: _On the Improvement of the Understanding_. Translation
+by Elwes, p. 3.
+
+[154:6] Spinoza: _Ethics_, Part V, Proposition XLII. Translation by
+Elwes, p. 270.
+
+[155:7] Descartes: _Meditations_, I. Translation by Veitch, p. 97.
+
+[155:8] Leibniz: _New System of the Nature of Substances_. Translation
+by Latta, pp. 299, 300.
+
+[157:9] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 42.
+
+[159:10] No little ambiguity attaches to the term "monism" in current
+usage, because of its appropriation by those who maintain that the
+universe is unitary and homogeneous in _physical terms_ (cf. § 108). It
+should properly be used to emphasize the unity of the world in any
+terms.
+
+[161:11] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 358.
+
+[162:12] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 284.
+
+[167:13] Plato: _Theætetus_, 161. Translation by Jowett. References to
+Plato are to the marginal paging.
+
+[168:14] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, pp. 184, 187.
+
+[171:15] Plato: _Theætetus_, 150 B. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[173:16] Much ambiguity attaches to the terms "realism" and "idealism"
+in current usage. The first had at one time in the history of philosophy
+a much narrower meaning than that which it now possesses. It was used to
+apply to those who, after Plato, believed in the independent reality of
+ideas, universals, or general natures. _Realists_ in this sense were
+opposed to _nominalists_ and _conceptualists_. Nominalism maintained the
+exclusive reality of individual substances, and reduced ideas to
+particular signs having, like the _name_, a purely symbolical or
+descriptive value. Conceptualism sought to unite realism and nominalism
+through the conception of mind, or an individual substance whose
+meanings may possess universal validity. Though this dispute was of
+fundamental importance throughout the mediæval period, the issues
+involved have now been restated. Realism in the old sense will, if held,
+come within the scope of the broader epistemological realism defined
+above. Nominalism is covered by empirical tendencies, and conceptualism
+by modern idealism.
+
+The term _idealism_ is sometimes applied to Plato on account of his
+designation of ideas as the ultimate realities. This would be a natural
+use of the term, but in our own day it has become inseparably associated
+with the doctrine which attributes to being a dependence upon the
+activity of mind. It is of the utmost importance to keep these two
+meanings clear. In the preferred sense Plato is a realist, and so
+opposed to idealism.
+
+The term _idealism_ is further confused on account of its employment in
+literature and common speech to denote the control of ideals. Although
+this is a kindred meaning, the student of philosophy will gain little or
+no help from it, and will avoid confusion if he distinguishes the term
+in its technical use and permits it in that capacity to acquire an
+independent meaning.
+
+[175:17] See _note_, p. 173.
+
+[176:18] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Part I, Fraser's
+edition, p. 259.
+
+[176:19] To be distinguished from the religious sect which bears the
+same name.
+
+[178:20] Quoted from Professor Josiah Royce's _The World and the
+Individual, First Series_, pp. 426-427.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Normative Sciences.]
+
+§ 73. There are three sets of problems whose general philosophical
+importance depends upon the place which metaphysics assigns to the
+_human critical faculties_. Man passes judgment upon that which claims
+to be _true_, _beautiful_, or _good_, thus referring to ideals and
+standards that define these values. Attempts to make these ideals
+explicit, and to formulate principles which regulate their attainment,
+have resulted in the development of the three so-called _normative
+sciences_: _logic_, _æsthetics_, and _ethics_. These sciences are said
+to owe their origin to the Socratic method, and it is indeed certain
+that their problem is closely related to the general rationalistic
+attitude.[180:1] In Plato's dialogue, "Protagoras," one may observe the
+manner of the inception of both ethics and logic. The question at issue
+between Socrates and the master sophist Protagoras, is concerning the
+possibility of teaching virtue. Protagoras conducts his side of the
+discussion with the customary rhetorical flourish, expounding in set
+speeches the tradition and usage in which such a possibility is
+accepted. Socrates, on the other hand, conceives the issue quite
+differently. One can neither affirm nor deny anything of virtue unless
+one knows _what is meant by it_. Even the possession of such a meaning
+was scarcely recognized by Protagoras, who was led by Socrates's
+questions to attribute to the various virtues an external grouping
+analogous to that of the parts of the face. But Socrates shows that
+since justice, temperance, courage, and the like, are admittedly similar
+in that they are all virtues, they must have in common some essence,
+which is virtue in general. This he seeks to define in the terms,
+_virtue is knowledge_. The interest which Socrates here shows in the
+reduction of the ordinary moral judgments to a system centering in some
+single fundamental principle, is the ethical interest. But this is at
+the same time a particular application of the general rationalistic
+method of definition, and of the general rationalistic postulate that
+one knows nothing until one can form unitary and determinate
+conceptions. The recognition which Socrates thus gives to criteria of
+knowledge is an expression of the logical interest. In a certain sense,
+indeed, the whole labor of Socrates was in the cause of the logical
+interest. For he sought to demonstrate that belief is not necessarily
+knowledge; that belief may or may not be true. In order that it shall be
+true, and constitute knowledge, it must be well-grounded, and
+accompanied by an understanding of its object. Socrates thus set the
+problem of logic, the discovery, namely, of those characters by virtue
+of the possession of which belief is knowledge.
+
+[Sidenote: The Affiliations of Logic.]
+
+§ 74. Logic deals with the ground of belief, and thus distinguishes
+itself from the psychological account of the elements of the believing
+state.[182:2] But it is not possible sharply to sunder psychology and
+logic. This is due to the fact that the general principles which make
+belief true, may be regarded quite independently of this fact. They then
+become the _most general truth_, belonging to the absolute, archetypal
+realm, or to the mind of God.[182:3] When the general principles of
+certainty are so regarded, logic can be distinguished from metaphysics
+only by adding to the study of the general principles themselves, the
+study of the special conditions (mainly psychological) under which they
+may be realized among men. In the history of human thought the name of
+logic belongs to the study of this _attainment_ of truth, as the terms
+æsthetics and ethics belong to the studies of the attainment of beauty
+and goodness.[183:4] It is evident that logic will have a peculiar
+importance for the rationalist. For the empiricist, proposing to report
+upon things as they are given, will tend on the whole to maintain that
+knowledge has no properties save those which are given to it by its
+special subject-matter. One cannot, in short, define any absolute
+relationship between the normative sciences and the other branches of
+philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in
+Belief.]
+
+§ 75. _Logic is the formulation, as independently as possible of special
+subject-matter, of that which conditions truth in belief._ Since logic
+is concerned with truth only in so far as it is predicated of belief,
+and since belief in so far as true is knowledge, logic can be defined as
+the formulation of the most general principles of knowledge. The
+principles so formulated would be those virtually used to _justify_
+belief or to disprove the imputation of error.
+
+[Sidenote: The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence,
+Inference, and Observation.]
+
+§ 76. What is called _formal logic_ is animated with the hope of
+extracting these formulations directly from an analysis of the procedure
+of thought. The most general logical principles which have appeared in
+the historical development of formal logic are _definition_,
+_self-evidence_, _inference_, and _observation_. Each of these has been
+given special study, and each has given rise to special issues.
+
+_Definition_ has to do with the _formation of concepts_, or determinate
+and unequivocal meanings. The universality of such concepts, and their
+consequent relation to particular things, was, as we have seen,
+investigated at a very early date, and gave rise to the great
+realistic-nominalistic controversy.[184:5] A large part of the logical
+discussion in the Platonic dialogues is an outgrowth of the earlier
+"eristic," a form of disputation in favor with the sophists, and
+consisting in the adroit use of ambiguity.[184:6] It is natural that in
+its first conscious self-criticism thought should discover the need of
+definite terms. The perpetual importance of definition has been largely
+due to the great prestige in modern philosophy of the method of
+geometry, which was regarded by Descartes and Spinoza as the model for
+systems of necessary truth.
+
+_Self-evidence_ is the principle according to which _conviction of truth
+follows directly from an understanding of meaning_. In the practice of
+his intellectual midwifery, Socrates presupposed that thought is capable
+of bringing forth its own certainties. And rationalism has at all times
+regarded truth as ultimately accredited by internal marks recognizable
+by reason. Such truth arrived at antecedent to acquaintance with
+instances is called _a priori_, as distinguished from _a posteriori_
+knowledge, or observation after the fact. There can be no principles of
+self-evidence, but logicians have always been more or less concerned
+with the enumeration of alleged self-evident principles, notably those
+of _contradiction_ and _identity_. A philosophical interest in the
+mathematical method has led to a logical study of axioms, but with a
+view rather to their fruitfulness than their intrinsic truth. Indeed,
+the interest in self-evident truth has always been subordinate to the
+interest in systematic truth, and the discovery of first principles most
+commonly serves to determine the relative priority of definite
+concepts, or the correct point of departure for a series of inferences.
+
+The greater part of the famous Aristotelian logic consists in a study of
+_inference_, or _the derivation of new knowledge from old knowledge_.
+Aristotle sought to set down and classify every method of advancing from
+premises. The most important form of inference which he defined was the
+_syllogism_, a scheme of reasoning to a conclusion by means of two
+premises having one term in common. From the premises "all men are
+mortal" and "Socrates is a man," one may conclude that "Socrates is
+mortal." This is an instance not only of the syllogism in general, but
+of its most important "mood," the subsumption of a particular case under
+a general rule. Since the decline of Aristotle's influence in philosophy
+there has been a notable decrease of interest in the different forms of
+inference; though its fundamental importance as the very bone and sinew
+of _reasoning_ or _deductive thinking_ has never been challenged. Its
+loss of preëminence is in part due to the growth of empiricism,
+stimulated by the writings of Lord Bacon in the seventeenth century, and
+fostered by the subsequent development of experimental science.
+
+_Observation_ is the fundamental logical principle of empiricism. For a
+radical empiricism, knowledge would consist of descriptive
+generalizations based upon the summation of instances. That branch of
+logic which deals with _the advance from individual instances to general
+principles_, is called _inductive logic_. It has resulted in the
+announcement of canons of accuracy and freedom from preconception, and
+in the methodological study of hypothesis, experiment, and verification.
+Rules for observation directed to the end of discovering causes,
+constitute the most famous part of the epoch-making logic of J. S.
+Mills.[187:7]
+
+[Sidenote: Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment.]
+
+§ 77. There are two significant tendencies in contemporary logic.
+_Theories of the judgment_ have arisen in the course of an attempt to
+define the least complexity that must be present in order that thought
+shall come within the range of truth and error. It is evident that no
+one either knows or is in error until he takes some attitude which lays
+claim to knowledge. Denoting by the term _judgment_ this minimum of
+complexity in knowledge, an important question arises as to the sense in
+which the judgment involves the subject, predicate, and copula that are
+commonly present in its propositional form.
+
+[Sidenote: Priority of Concepts.]
+
+§ 78. But a more important logical development has been due to the
+recent analysis of definite accredited systems of knowledge. The study
+of the fundamental conceptions of mathematics and mechanics, together
+with an examination of the systematic structure of these sciences,
+furnishes the most notable cases. There are two senses in which such
+studies may be regarded as logical. In the first place, in so far as
+they bring to light the inner coherence of any body of truth, the kind
+of evidence upon which it rests, and the type of formal perfection which
+it seeks, they differ from formal logic only in that they derive their
+criteria from cases, rather than from the direct analysis of the
+procedure of thought. And since formal logic must itself make
+experiments, this difference is not a radical one. The study of cases
+tends chiefly to enrich _methodology_, or the knowledge of the special
+criteria of special sciences. In the second place, such studies serve to
+define the relatively few simple truths which are common to the
+relatively many complex truths. A study of the foundations of arithmetic
+reveals more elementary conceptions, such as _class_ and _order_, that
+must be employed in the very definition of number itself, and so are
+implied in every numerical calculation. It appears similarly that the
+axioms of geometry are special axioms which involve the acceptance of
+more general axioms or indefinables.[189:8] Logic in this sense, then,
+is the enumeration of conceptions and principles in the order of their
+indispensableness to knowledge. And while it must be observed that the
+most general conceptions and principles of knowledge are not necessarily
+those most significant for the existent world, nevertheless the careful
+analysis which such an enumeration involves is scarcely less fruitful
+for metaphysics than for logic.
+
+[Sidenote: Æsthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Beauty.
+Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies.]
+
+§ 79. _Æsthetics is the formulation, as independently as possible of
+special subject-matter, of that which conditions beauty._ As logic
+commonly refers to a judgment of truth, so æsthetics at any rate
+_refers_ to a judgment implied in appreciation. But while it is
+generally admitted that truth itself is by no means limited to the form
+of the judgment, the contrary is frequently maintained with reference
+to beauty. The aphorism, _De gustibus non est disputandum_, expresses a
+common opinion to the effect that beauty is not a property belonging to
+the object of which it is predicated, but a property generated by the
+appreciative consciousness. According to this opinion there can be no
+beauty except in the case of an object's presence in an individual
+experience. Investigators must of necessity refuse to leave individual
+caprice in complete possession of the field, but they have in many cases
+occupied themselves entirely with the _state of æsthetic enjoyment_ in
+the hope of discovering its constant factors. The opposing tendency
+defines certain _formal characters which the beautiful object must
+possess_. Evidently the latter school will attribute a more profound
+philosophical importance to the conception of beauty, since for them it
+is a principle that obtains in the world of being. This was the first
+notable contention, that of Plato. But even with the emphasis laid upon
+the subjective aspect of the æsthetic experience, great metaphysical
+importance may be attached to it, where, as in the case of the German
+Romanticists, reality is deliberately construed as a spiritual life
+which is to be appreciated rather than understood.
+
+As in the case of logic, a strong impulse has manifested itself in
+æsthetics to deal with groups of objects that lie within its province,
+rather than directly with its concepts and principles. The first special
+treatise on æsthetics, the "Poetics" of Aristotle, belongs to this type
+of inquiry, as does all criticism of art in so far as it aims at the
+formulation of general principles.
+
+[Sidenote: Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral
+Goodness.]
+
+§ 80. _Ethics_, the oldest and most popular of the normative sciences,
+_is the formulation, as independently as possible of special
+subject-matter, of that which conditions goodness of conduct_. Ethics is
+commonly concerned with goodness only in so far as it is predicated of
+conduct, or of character, which is a more or less permanent disposition
+to conduct. Since conduct, in so far as good, is said to constitute
+moral goodness, ethics may be defined as the formulation of the general
+principles of _morality_. The principles so formulated would be those
+virtually employed to _justify_ conduct, or to disprove the imputation
+of immorality.
+
+[Sidenote: Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism.]
+
+§ 81. The student of this science is confronted with a very considerable
+diversity of method and differentiation of problems. The earliest and
+most profound opposition of doctrine in ethics arose from the
+differences of interpretation of which the teaching of Socrates is
+capable. His doctrine is, as we have seen, verbally expressed in the
+proposition, _virtue is knowledge_. Socrates was primarily concerned to
+show that there is no real living without an understanding of the
+significance of life. To live well is to know the end of life, the good
+of it all, and to govern action with reference to that end. Virtue is
+therefore the practical wisdom that enables one to live consistently
+with his real intention. But what is the real intention, the end or good
+of life? In the "Protagoras," where Plato represents Socrates as
+expounding his position, virtue is interpreted to mean prudence, or
+foresight of pleasurable and painful consequences. He who knows,
+possesses all virtue in that he is qualified to adapt himself to the
+real situation and to gain the end of pleasure. All men, indeed, seek
+pleasure, but only virtuous men seek it wisely and well.
+
+     "And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some
+     pleasant things evil and some painful things good?--for I am
+     rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they
+     are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort,
+     and in as far as they are painful they are bad."[192:9]
+
+According to this view painful things are good only when they lead
+eventually to pleasure, and pleasant things evil only when their painful
+consequences outweigh their pleasantness. Hence moral differences reduce
+to differences of skill in the universal quest for pleasure, and
+_sensible gratification is the ultimate standard of moral value_. This
+ancient doctrine, known as _hedonism_, expressing as it does a part of
+life that will not suffer itself for long to be denied, is one of the
+great perennial tendencies of ethical thought. In the course of many
+centuries it has passed through a number of phases, varying its
+conception of pleasure from the tranquillity of the wise man to the
+sensuous titillations of the sybarite, and from the individualism of the
+latter to the universalism of the humanitarian. But in every case it
+shows a respect for the natural man, praising morality for its
+disciplinary and instrumental value in the service of such human wants
+as are the outgrowth of the animal instinct of self-preservation.
+
+[Sidenote: Rationalism.]
+
+§ 82. But if a man's life be regarded as a truer representation of his
+ideals than is his spoken theory, there is little to identify Socrates
+with the hedonists. At the conclusion of the defence of his own life,
+which Plato puts into his mouth in the well-known "Apology," he speaks
+thus:
+
+     "When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to
+     punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have
+     troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything,
+     more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something
+     when they are really nothing,--then reprove them, as I have
+     reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought
+     to care, and thinking that they are something when they are
+     really nothing."[194:10]
+
+It is plain that the man Socrates cared little for the pleasurable or
+painful consequences of his acts, provided they were worthy of the high
+calling of human nature. A man's virtue would now seem to possess an
+intrinsic nobility. If knowledge be virtue, then on this basis it must
+be because knowledge is itself excellent. Virtue as knowledge
+contributes to the good by constituting it. We meet here with the
+_rationalistic_ strain in ethics. It praises conduct for the _inherent
+worth which it may possess if it express that reason_ which the Stoics
+called "_the ruling part_." The riches of wisdom consist for the
+hedonist in their purchase of pleasure. For the rationalist, on the
+other hand, wisdom is not coin, but itself the very substance of value.
+
+[Sidenote: Eudæmonism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism.]
+
+§ 83. Rationalism has undergone modifications even more significant
+than those of hedonism, and involving at least one radically new group
+of conceptions. Among the Greeks rationalism and hedonism alike are
+_eudæmonistic_. They aim to portray _the fulness of life_ that makes
+"the happy man." In the ethics of Aristotle, whose synthetic mind weaves
+together these different strands, the Greek ideal finds its most
+complete expression as "the high-minded man," with all his powers and
+trappings. But the great spiritual transformation which accompanied the
+decline of Greek culture and the rise of Christianity, brought with it a
+new moral sensibility, which finds in man no virtue of himself, but only
+through the grace of God.
+
+     "And the virtues themselves," says St. Augustine, "if they
+     bear no relation to God, are in truth vices rather than
+     virtues; for although they are regarded by many as truly moral
+     when they are desired as ends in themselves and not for the
+     sake of something else, they are, nevertheless, inflated and
+     arrogant, and therefore not to be viewed as virtues but as
+     vices."[195:11]
+
+The new ideal is that of renunciation, obedience, and resignation.
+Ethically this expresses itself in _pietism_. Virtue is good neither in
+itself nor on account of its consequences, but because it is
+conformable to the will of God. The extreme inwardness of this ideal is
+characteristic of an age that despaired of attainment, whether of
+pleasure or knowledge. To all, even the persecuted, it is permitted to
+obey, and so gain entrance into the kingdom of the children of God. But
+as every special study tends to rely upon its own conceptions, pietism,
+involving as it does a relation to God, is replaced by _rigorism_ and
+_intuitionism_. The former doctrine defines virtue in terms of the inner
+attitude which it expresses. It must be done in the spirit of
+dutifulness, _because one ought_, and through sheer respect for the law
+which one's moral nature affirms. _Intuitionism_ has attempted to deal
+with the source of the moral law by defining conscience as a _special
+faculty_ or sense, qualified to pass directly upon moral questions, and
+deserving of implicit obediences. It is characteristic of this whole
+tendency to look for the spring of virtuous living, not in a good which
+such living obtains, but in a law to which it owes obedience.
+
+[Sidenote: Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics.]
+
+§ 84. This third general ethical tendency has thus been of the greatest
+importance in emphasizing the _consciousness of duty_, and has brought
+both hedonism and rationalism to a recognition of its fundamental
+importance. Ethics must deal not only with the moral ideal, but also
+with the ground of its appeal to the individual, and his obligation to
+pursue it. In connection with this recognition of moral responsibility,
+the problem of human _freedom_ has come to be regarded in the light of
+an inevitable point of contact between ethics and metaphysics. That
+which is absolutely binding upon the human will can be determined only
+in view of some theory of its ultimate nature. On this account the
+rationalistic and hedonistic motives are no longer abstractly sundered,
+as in the days of the Stoics and Epicureans, but tend to be absorbed in
+broader philosophical tendencies. Hedonism appears as the sequel to
+naturalism; or, more rarely, as part of a theistic system whose morality
+is divine legislation enforced by an appeal to motives of pleasure and
+pain. Rationalism, on the other hand, tends to be absorbed in
+rationalistic or idealistic philosophies, where man's rational nature is
+construed as his bond of kinship with the universe.
+
+Ethics has exhibited from the beginning a tendency to universalize its
+conceptions and take the central place in metaphysics. Thus with Plato
+good conduct was but a special case of goodness, the good being the most
+general principle of reality.[198:12] In modern times Fichte and his
+school have founded an ethical metaphysics upon the conception of
+duty.[198:13] In these cases ethics can be distinguished from
+metaphysics only by adding to the study of the good or of duty, a study
+of the special physical, psychological, and social conditions under
+which goodness and dutifulness may obtain in human life. It is possible
+to attach the name of ethics, and we have seen the same to be true of
+logic, either to a realm of ideal truth or to that realm wherein the
+ideal is realized in humanity.
+
+[Sidenote: The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions.]
+
+§ 85. A systematic study of ethics requires that the _virtues_, or types
+of moral practice, shall be interpreted in the light of the central
+conception of good, or of conscience. _Justice_, _temperance_, _wisdom_,
+and _courage_ were praised by the Greeks. Christianity added
+_self-sacrifice_, _humility_, _purity_, and _benevolence_. These and
+other virtues have been defined, justified, and co-ordinated with the
+aid of a standard of moral value or a canon of duty.
+
+There is in modern ethics a pronounced tendency, parallel to those
+already noted in logic and æsthetics, to study such phenomena belonging
+to its field as have become historically established. A very
+considerable investigation of _custom_, _institutions_, and other social
+forces has led to a contact of ethics with anthropology and sociology
+scarcely less significant than that with metaphysics.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+[Sidenote: The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of Faith.]
+
+§ 86. In that part of his philosophy in which he deals with faith, the
+great German philosopher Kant mentions God, Freedom, and Immortality as
+the three pre-eminent religious interests. Religion, as we have seen,
+sets up a social relationship between man and that massive drift of
+things which determines his destiny. Of the two terms of this relation,
+God signifies the latter, while freedom and immortality are prerogatives
+which religion bestows upon the former. Man, viewed from the stand-point
+of religion as an object of special interest to the universe, is said to
+have a soul; and by virtue of this soul he is said to be free and
+immortal, when thought of as having a life in certain senses independent
+of its immediate natural environment. The attempt to make this faith
+theoretically intelligible has led to the philosophical disciplines
+known as _theology_ and _psychology_.[199:14]
+
+[Sidenote: Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God.]
+
+§ 87. _Theology_, as a branch of philosophy, deals with _the proof and
+the nature of God_. Since "God" is not primarily a theoretical
+conception, the proof of God is not properly a philosophical problem.
+Historically, this task has been assumed as a legacy from Christian
+apologetics; and it has involved, at any rate so far as European
+philosophy is concerned, the definition of ultimate being in such
+spiritual terms as make possible the relation with man postulated in
+Christianity. For this it has been regarded as sufficient to ascribe to
+the world an underlying unity capable of bearing the predicates of
+perfection, omnipotence, and omniscience. Each proof of God has defined
+him pre-eminently in terms of some one of these his attributes.
+
+[Sidenote: The Ontological Proof of God.]
+
+§ 88. The _ontological_ proof of God held the foremost place in
+philosophy's contribution to Christianity up to the eighteenth century.
+This proof _infers the existence from the ideal_ of God, and so
+approaches the nature of God through the attribute of perfection. It
+owes the form in which it was accepted in the Middle Ages and
+Renaissance to St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury at the close of the
+eleventh century. He argued from the idea of a most perfect being to its
+existence, on the ground that non-existence, or existence only in idea,
+would contradict its perfection. It is evident that the force of this
+argument depends upon the necessity of the idea of God. The argument was
+accepted in Scholastic Philosophy[201:15] largely because of the virtual
+acceptance of this necessity. Mediæval thought was under the dominance
+of the philosophical ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and through them
+rationalism had come to be the unquestioned starting-point for all
+thought. For Plato reality and rationality meant one and the same thing,
+so that the ultimate reality was the highest principle of rationality,
+which he conceived to be the idea of the good. In the case of Aristotle
+the ideal of rationality was conceived to determine the course of the
+cosmical evolution as its immanent final cause. But in itself it was
+beyond the world, or transcendent. For Plato perfection itself is
+reality, whereas for Aristotle perfection determines the hierarchical
+order of natural substances. The latter theory, more suitable to the
+uses of Christianity, because it distinguished between God and the
+world, was incorporated into the great school systems. But both theories
+contain the essence of the ontological proof of God. In thought one
+seeks the perfect truth, and posits it as at once the culmination of
+insight and the meaning of life. The ideal of God is therefore a
+necessary idea, because implied in all the effort of thought as the
+object capable of finally satisfying it. St. Anselm adds little to the
+force of this argument, and does much to obscure its real significance.
+
+In stating the ontological argument the term perfection has been
+expressly emphasized, because it may be taken to embrace both truth and
+goodness. Owing to a habit of thought, due in the main to Plato, it was
+long customary to regard degrees of truth and goodness as
+interchangeable, and as equivalent to degrees of reality. The _ens
+realissimum_ was in its completeness the highest object both of the
+faculty of cognition and of the moral will. But even in the scholastic
+period these two different aspects of the ideal were clearly recognized,
+and led to sharply divergent tendencies. More recently they have been
+divided and embodied in separate arguments. _The epistemological_
+argument _defines God in terms of that absolute truth which is referred
+to in every judgment_. Under the influence of idealism this absolute
+truth has taken the form of a universal mind, or all-embracing standard
+experience, called more briefly the absolute. The _ethical_ argument, on
+the other hand, conceives God as _the perfect goodness implied in the
+moral struggle, or the power through which goodness is made to triumph
+in the universe_ to the justification of moral faith. While the former
+of these arguments identifies God with being, the latter defines God in
+terms of the intent or outcome of being. Thus, while the epistemological
+argument does not distinguish God and the world, the latter does so,
+assuming that independent reality can be attributed to the stages of a
+process and to the purpose that dominates it.
+
+[Sidenote: The Cosmological Proof of God.]
+
+§ 89. The _cosmological_ proof of God approaches him through the
+attribute of creative omnipotence. The common principle of causal
+explanation refers the origin of natural events to similar antecedent
+events. But there must be some _first cause_ from which the whole series
+is derived, a cause which is ultimate, sufficient to itself, and the
+responsible author of the world. Because God's function as creator was a
+part of the Christian teaching, and because explanation by causes is
+habitual with common sense, this argument has had great vogue. But in
+philosophy it has declined in importance, chiefly because it has been
+absorbed in arguments which deal with the _kind_ of causality proper to
+a first cause or world-ground. The argument that follows is a case in
+point.
+
+[Sidenote: The Teleological Proof of God.]
+
+§ 90. The _teleological_ proof argues that the world can owe its origin
+only to an _intelligent first cause_. The evidence for this is furnished
+by the cunning contrivances and beneficent adaptations of nature. These
+could not have come about through chance or the working of mechanical
+forces, but only through the foresight of a rational will. This argument
+originally infers God from the character of nature and history; and the
+extension of mechanical principles to organic and social phenomena,
+especially as stimulated by Darwin's principle of natural selection, has
+tended greatly to diminish its importance. When, on the other hand, for
+nature and history there are substituted the intellectual and moral
+activities themselves, and the inference is made to the ideal which they
+imply, the teleological argument merges into the ontological. But the
+old-fashioned statement of it remains in the form of religious faith,
+and in this capacity it has had the approval even of Hume and Kant, the
+philosophers who have contributed most forcibly to its overthrow as a
+demonstration of God. They agree that the _acknowledgment_ of God in
+nature and history is the sequel to a theistic belief, and an inevitable
+attitude on the part of the religious consciousness.
+
+[Sidenote: God and the World. Theism and Pantheism.]
+
+§ 91. Another group of ideas belonging to philosophical theology
+consists of three generalizations respecting God's relation to the
+world, known as _theism_, _pantheism_, and _deism_. Although,
+theoretically, these are corollaries of the different arguments for God,
+two of them, theism and pantheism, owe their importance to their rivalry
+as religious tendencies. _Theism_ emphasizes that attitude to God which
+recognizes in him an historical personage, in some sense distinct from
+both the world and man, which are his works and yet stand in an external
+relationship to him. It expresses the spirit of ethical and monotheistic
+religion, and is therefore the natural belief of the Christian.
+_Pantheism_ appears in primitive religion as an animistic or
+polytheistic sense of the presence of a divine principle diffused
+throughout nature. But it figures most notably in the history of
+religions, in the highly reflective Brahmanism of India. In sharp
+opposition to Christianity, this religion preaches the indivisible unity
+of the world and the illusoriness of the individual's sense of his own
+independent reality. In spite of the fact that such a doctrine is alien
+to the spirit of Christianity, it enters into Christian theology through
+the influence of philosophy. The theoretical idea of God tends, as we
+have seen, to the identification of him with the world as its most real
+principle. Or it bestows upon him a nature so logical and formal, and so
+far removed from the characters of humanity, as to forbid his entering
+into personal or social relations. Such reflections concerning God find
+their religious expression in a mystical sense of unity, which has in
+many cases either entirely replaced or profoundly modified the theistic
+strain in Christianity. In current philosophy pantheism appears in the
+epistemological argument which identifies God with being; while the
+chief bulwark of theism is the ethical argument, with its provision for
+a distinction between the actual world and ideal principle of evolution.
+
+[Sidenote: Deism.]
+
+§ 92. While theism and pantheism appear to be permanent phases in the
+philosophy of religion, _deism_ is the peculiar product of the
+eighteenth century. It is based upon a repudiation of supernaturalism
+and "enthusiasm," on the one hand, and a literal acceptance of the
+cosmological and teleological proofs on the other. Religions, like all
+else, were required, in this epoch of clear thinking, to submit to the
+canons of experimental observation and practical common sense. These
+authorize only a _natural religion_, the acknowledgment in pious living
+of a God who, having contrived this natural world, has given it over to
+the rule, not of priests and prophets, but of natural law. The
+artificiality of its conception of God, and the calculating spirit of
+its piety, make deism a much less genuine expression of the religious
+experience than either the moral chivalry of theism or the intellectual
+and mystical exaltation of pantheism.
+
+[Sidenote: Metaphysics and Theology.]
+
+§ 93. The systematic development of philosophy leads to the inclusion of
+conceptions of God within the problem of metaphysics, and the
+subordination of the proof of God to the determination of the
+fundamental principle of reality. There will always remain, however, an
+outstanding theological discipline, whose function it is to interpret
+worship, or the living religious attitude, in terms of the theoretical
+principles of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Psychology is the Theory of the Soul.]
+
+§ 94. _Psychology is the theory of the soul._ As we have already seen,
+the rise of scepticism directs attention from the object of thought to
+the thinker, and so emphasizes the self as a field for theoretical
+investigation. But the original and the dominating interest in the self
+is a practical one. The precept, γνῶθι σεαυτόν, has its deepest
+justification in the concern for the salvation of one's soul. In
+primitive and half-instinctive belief the self is recognized in
+practical relations. In its animistic phase this belief admitted of such
+relations with all living creatures, and extended the conception of life
+very generally to natural processes. Thus in the beginning the self was
+doubtless indistinguishable from the vital principle. In the first
+treatise on psychology, the "πε�ὶ Ψυχῆς" of Aristotle, this
+interpretation finds a place in theoretical philosophy. For Aristotle
+the soul is the _entelechy_ of the body--that function or activity which
+makes a man of it. He recognized, furthermore, three stages in this
+activity: the nutritive, sensitive, and rational souls, or the
+vegetable, animal, and distinctively human natures, respectively. The
+rational soul, in its own proper activity, is man's highest
+prerogative, the soul to be saved. By virtue of it man rises above
+bodily conditions, and lays hold on the divine and eternal. But Plato,
+who, as we have seen, was ever ready to grant reality to the ideal apart
+from the circumstances of its particular embodiment, had already
+undertaken to demonstrate the immortality of the soul on the ground of
+its distinctive nature.[209:16] According to his way of thinking, the
+soul's essentially moral nature made it incapable of destruction through
+the operation of natural causes. It is evident, then, that there were
+already ideas in vogue capable of interpreting the Christian teaching
+concerning the existence of a soul, or of an inner essence of man
+capable of being made an object of divine interest.
+
+[Sidenote: Spiritual Substance]
+
+§ 95. The immediate effect of Christianity was to introduce into
+philosophy as one of its cardinal doctrines the theory of a spiritual
+being, constituting the true self of the individual, and separable from
+the body. The difference recognized in Plato and Aristotle between the
+divine spark and the appetitive and perceptual parts of human nature was
+now emphasized. The former (frequently called the "spirit," to
+distinguish it from the lower soul) was defined as a _substance_ having
+the attributes of thought and will. The fundamental argument for its
+existence was the immediate appeal to self-consciousness; and it was
+further defined as indestructible on the ground of its being utterly
+discontinuous and incommensurable with its material environment. This
+theory survives at the present day in the conception of pure activity,
+but on the whole the attributes of the soul have superseded its
+substance.
+
+[Sidenote: Intellectualism and Voluntarism.]
+
+§ 96. _Intellectualism and voluntarism_ are the two rival possibilities
+of emphasis when the soul is defined in terms of its known activities.
+Wherever the essence of personality is in question, as also occurs in
+the case of theology, thought and will present their respective claims
+to the place of first importance. _Intellectualism would make will
+merely the concluding phase of thought, while voluntarism would reduce
+thought to one of the interests of a general appetency._ It is evident
+that idealistic theories will be much concerned with this question of
+priority. It is also true, though less evident, that intellectualism,
+since it emphasizes the general and objective features of the mind,
+tends to subordinate the individual to the universal; while voluntarism,
+emphasizing desire and action, is relatively individualistic, and so,
+since there are many individuals, also pluralistic.[211:17]
+
+[Sidenote: Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, and
+Indeterminism.]
+
+§ 97. The question of the _freedom of the will_ furnishes a favorite
+controversial topic in philosophy. For the interest at stake is no less
+than the individual's responsibility before man and God for his good or
+bad works. It bears alike upon science, religion, and philosophy, and is
+at the same time a question of most fundamental practical importance.
+But this diffusion of the problem has led to so considerable a
+complication of it that it becomes necessary in outlining it to define
+two issues. In the first place, the concept of freedom is designed to
+express generally the distinction between man and the rest of nature. To
+make man in all respects _the product and creature of his natural
+environment_ would be to deny freedom and accept the radically
+_necessitarian_ doctrine. The question still remains, however, as to the
+causes which dominate man. He may be free from nature, and yet be ruled
+by God, or by distinctively spiritual causes, such as ideas or
+character. Where in general the will is regarded as submitting only to a
+_spiritual causation_ proper to its own realm, the conception is best
+named _determinism_; though in the tradition of philosophy it is held to
+be a doctrine of freedom, because contrasted with the necessitarianism
+above defined. There remains _indeterminism_, which attributes to the
+will a spontaneity that makes possible the _direct presence to it of
+genuine alternatives_. The issue may here coincide with that between
+intellectualism and voluntarism. If, _e.g._, in God's act of creation,
+his ideals and standards are prior to his fiat, his conduct is
+determined; whereas it is free in the radical or indeterministic sense
+if his ideals themselves are due to his sheer will. This theory involves
+at a certain point in action the absence of cause. On this account the
+free will is often identified with _chance_, in which case it loses its
+distinction from nature, and we have swung round the circle.
+
+[Sidenote: Immortality. Survival and Eternalism.]
+
+§ 98. There is similar complexity in the problem concerning
+_immortality_. Were the extreme claims of naturalism to be established,
+there would be no ground whatsoever upon which to maintain the
+immortality of man, mere dust returning unto dust. The philosophical
+concept of immortality is due to the supposition that the quintessence
+of the individual's nature is divine.[213:18] But several possibilities
+are at this point open to us. The first would maintain the survival
+after death of a recognizable and discrete personality. Another would
+suppose a preservation after death, through being taken up into the life
+of God. Still another, the theory commonly maintained on the ground of
+rationalistic and idealistic metaphysics, would deny that immortality
+has to do with life after death, and affirm that it signifies the
+perpetual membership of the human individual in a realm of eternity
+through the truth or virtue that is in him. But this interpretation
+evidently leaves open the question of the immortality of that which is
+distinctive and personal in human nature.
+
+[Sidenote: The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and Method.]
+
+§ 99. So far we have followed the fortunes only of the "spirit" of man.
+What of that lower soul through which he is identified with the fortunes
+of his body? When philosophy gradually ceased, in the sixteenth and
+seventeenth centuries, to be "the handmaid of religion," there arose a
+renewed interest in that part of human nature lying between the strictly
+physiological functions, on the one hand, and thought and will on the
+other. Descartes and Spinoza analyzed what they called the "passions,"
+meaning such states of mind as are conditioned by a concern for the
+interests of the body. At a later period, certain English philosophers,
+following Locke, traced the dependence of ideas upon the senses. Their
+method was that of _introspection_, or the direct examination by the
+individual of his own ideas, and for the sake of noting their origin and
+composition from simple factors. The lineal descendants of these same
+English philosophers defined more carefully the process of
+_association_, whereby the complexity and sequence of ideas are brought
+about, and made certain conjectures as to its dependence upon properties
+and transactions in the physical brain. These are the three main
+philosophical sources of what has now grown to be the separate _natural
+science of psychology_. It will be noted that there are two
+characteristics which all of these studies have in common. They deal
+with the experience of the individual as composing his own private
+history, and tend to attribute the specific course which this private
+history takes to bodily conditions. It is only recently that these
+investigations have acquired sufficient unity and exclusiveness of aim
+to warrant their being regarded as a special science. But such is now so
+far the case that the psychologist of this type pursues his way quite
+independently of philosophy. It is true his research has advanced
+considerably beyond his understanding of its province. But it is
+generally recognized that he must examine those very _factors of
+subjectivity_ which the natural scientist otherwise seeks to evade, and,
+furthermore, that he must seek to _provide for them in nature_. He
+treats the inner life in what Locke called "the plain historical
+method," that is to say, instead of interpreting and defining its ideas,
+he analyzes and reports upon its content. He would not seek to justify a
+moral judgment, as would ethics, or to criticise the cogency of thought,
+as would logic; but only to describe the actual state as he found it. In
+order to make his data commensurable with the phenomena of nature, he
+discovers or defines bodily conditions for the subjective content which
+he analyzes. His fundamental principle of method is the postulate of
+_psycho-physical parallelism_, according to which he assumes a _state of
+brain or nervous system for every state of mind_. But in adopting a
+province and a method the psychologist foregoes finality of truth after
+the manner of all natural science. He deals admittedly with an aspect of
+experience, and his conclusions are no more adequate to the nature of
+the self than they are to the nature of outer objects. An admirable
+reference to this abstract division of experience occurs in Külpe's
+"Introduction to Philosophy":
+
+     "For the developed consciousness, as for the naive, every
+     experience is an unitary whole; and it is only the habit of
+     abstract reflection upon experience that makes the objective
+     and subjective worlds seem to fall apart as originally
+     different forms of existence. Just as a plane curve can be
+     represented in analytical geometry as the function of two
+     variables, the abscissæ and the ordinates, without prejudice
+     to the unitary course of the curve itself, so the world of
+     human experience may be reduced to a subjective and an
+     objective factor, without prejudice to its real
+     coherence."[215:19]
+
+[Sidenote: Psychology and Philosophy.]
+
+§ 100. The problems of psychology, like those of theology, tend to
+disappear as independent philosophical topics. The ultimate nature of
+the self will continue to interest philosophers--more deeply, perhaps,
+than any aspect of experience--but their conception of it will be a
+corollary of their metaphysics and epistemology. The remainder of the
+field of the old philosophical psychology, the introspective and
+experimental analysis of special states of mind, is already the
+province of a natural science which is becoming more and more free from
+the stand-point and method of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Transition from Classification by Problems to Classification
+by Doctrines. Naturalism. Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute
+Realism.]
+
+§ 101. Reminding ourselves anew that philosophical problems cannot be
+treated in isolation from one another, we shall hereinafter seek to
+become acquainted with general stand-points that give systematic unity
+to the issues which have been enumerated. Such stand-points are not
+clearly defined by those who occupy them, and they afford no clear-cut
+classification of all historical philosophical philosophies. But
+system-making in philosophy is commonly due to the moving in an
+individual mind of some most significant idea; and certain of these
+ideas have reappeared so frequently as to define more or less clearly
+marked tendencies, or continuous strands, out of which the history of
+thought is forever weaving itself. Such is clearly the case with
+_naturalism_. From the beginning until now there have been men whose
+philosophy is a summation of the natural sciences, whose entire thought
+is based upon an acceptance of the methods and the fundamental
+conceptions of these disciplines. This tendency stands in the history
+of thought for the conviction that the visible and tangible world which
+interacts with the body is veritable reality. This philosophy is
+realistic and empirical to an extent entirely determined by its belief
+concerning being. But while naturalism is only secondarily
+epistemological, _subjectivism_ and _absolute idealism_ have their very
+source in the self-examination and the self-criticism of thought.
+Subjectivism signifies the conviction that the knower cannot escape
+himself. If reality is to be kept within the range of possible
+knowledge, it must be defined in terms of the processes or states of
+selves. _Absolute idealism_ arises from a union of this epistemological
+motive with a recognition of what are regarded as the logical
+necessities to which reality must submit. Reality must be both knowledge
+and rational knowledge; the object, in short, of an absolute mind, which
+shall be at once all-containing and systematic. This rationalistic
+motive was, however, not originally associated with an idealistic
+epistemology, but with the common-sense principle that being is
+discovered and not constituted by thought. Such an _absolute realism_
+is, like naturalism, primarily metaphysical rather than
+epistemological; but, unlike naturalism, it seeks to define reality as
+a logical or ethical necessity.
+
+Under these several divisions, then, we shall meet once more with the
+special problems of philosophy, but this time they will be ranged in an
+order that is determined by some central doctrine. They will appear as
+parts not of the general problem of philosophy, but of some definite
+system of philosophy.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[180:1] Cf. § 68.
+
+[182:2] The Socratic distinction between the logical and the
+psychological treatment of belief finds its best expression in Plato's
+_Gorgias_, especially, 454, 455. Cf. also § 29.
+
+[182:3] Thus, e. g. Hegel. See § 179. Cf. also §§ 199, 200.
+
+[183:4] Cf. § 84.
+
+[184:5] See § 69, _note_.
+
+[184:6] The reader will find a good illustration of eristic in Plato's
+_Euthydemus_, 275.
+
+[187:7] The reader can find these rules, and the detail of the
+traditional formal logic, in any elementary text-book, such as, e. g.,
+Jevons: _Elements of Logic_.
+
+[189:8] What is called "the algebra of logic" seeks to obtain an
+unequivocal symbolic expression for these truths.
+
+[192:9] Plato: _Protagoras_, 351. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[194:10] Plato: _Apology_, 41. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[195:11] Quoted by Paulsen in his _System of Ethics_. Translation by
+Thilly, p. 69.
+
+[198:12] Cf. § 160.
+
+[198:13] Cf. § 177.
+
+[199:14] Concerning the duty of philosophy to religion in these matters,
+cf. Descartes: _Meditations_, _Dedication_. Translation by Veitch, p.
+81.
+
+[201:15] The school-philosophy that flourished from the eleventh to the
+fifteenth century, under the authority of the church.
+
+[209:16] Especially in the _Phædo_.
+
+[211:17] Schopenhauer is a notable exception. Cf. §§ 135, 138.
+
+[213:18] It is interesting, however, to observe that current
+spiritualistic theories maintain a naturalistic theory of immortality,
+verifiable, it is alleged, in certain extraordinary empirical
+observations.
+
+[215:19] Translation by Pillsbury and Titchener, p. 59.
+
+
+
+
+PART III
+
+SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+NATURALISM[223:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: The General Meaning of Materialism.]
+
+§ 102. The meaning conveyed by any philosophical term consists largely
+of the distinctions which it suggests. Its peculiar quality, like the
+physiognomy of the battle-scarred veteran, is a composite of the
+controversies which it has survived. There is, therefore, an almost
+unavoidable confusion attendant upon the denomination of any early phase
+of philosophy as _materialism_. But in the historical beginnings of
+thought, as also in the common-sense of all ages, there is at any rate
+present a very essential strand of this theory. The naive habit of mind
+which, in the sixth century before Christ, prompted successive Greek
+thinkers to define reality in terms of water, air, and fire, is in this
+respect one with that exhibited in Dr. Samuel Johnson's smiting the
+ground with his stick in curt refutation of Bishop Berkeley's
+idea-philosophy. There is a theoretical instinct, not accidental or
+perverse, but springing from the very life-preserving equipment of the
+organism, which attributes reality to _tangible space-filling things
+encountered by the body_. For obvious reasons of self-interest the
+organism is first of all endowed with a sense of contact, and the more
+delicate senses enter into its practical economy as means of
+anticipating or avoiding contact. From such practical expectations
+concerning the proximity of that which may press upon, injure, or
+displace the body, arise the first crude judgments of reality. And these
+are at the same time the nucleus of naive philosophy and the germinal
+phase of materialism.
+
+[Sidenote: Corporeal Being.]
+
+§ 103. The first philosophical movement among the Greeks was a series of
+attempts to reduce the tangible world to unity, and of these the
+conception offered by Anaximander is of marked interest in its bearing
+upon the development of materialism. This philosopher is remarkable for
+having _defined_ his first principle, instead of having chosen it from
+among the different elements already distinguished by common-sense. He
+thought the unity of nature to consist in its periodic evolution from
+and return into one infinite sum of material (τὸ ἄπει�ον), which, much
+in the manner of the "nebula" of modern science, is conceived as both
+indeterminate in its actual state and infinitely rich in its
+potentiality. The conception of matter, the most familiar commonplace of
+science, begins to be recognizable. It has here reached the point of
+signifying a common substance for all tangible things, a substance that
+in its own general and omnipresent nature is without the special marks
+that distinguish these tangible things from one another. And in so far
+the philosophy of Anaximander is materialistic.
+
+[Sidenote: Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism.]
+
+§ 104. But the earliest thinkers are said to be _hylozoists_, rather
+than strict materialists, because of their failure to make certain
+distinctions in connection with the _processes_ of matter. The term
+hylozoism unites with the conception of the formless material of the
+world (ὕλη), that of an animating power to which its formations and
+transformations are due. Hylozoism itself was not a deliberate synthesis
+of these two conceptions, but a primitive practical tendency to
+universalize the conception, of life. Such "animism" instinctively
+associates with an object's bulk and hardness a capacity for locomotion
+and general initiative. And the material principles defined by the
+philosophers retain this vague and comprehensive attribute as a matter
+of course, until it is distinguished and separated through attempts to
+understand it.
+
+That aspect of natural process which was most impressive to Greek minds
+of the reflective type was the alternation of "generation and decay." In
+full accord with his more ancient master, Epicurus, the Latin poet
+Lucretius writes:
+
+     "Thus neither can death-dealing motions keep the mastery
+     always, nor entomb existence forevermore; nor, on the other
+     hand, can the birth and increase giving motions of things
+     preserve them always after they are born. Thus the war of
+     first beginnings waged from eternity is carried on with
+     dubious issue: now here, now there, the life-bringing elements
+     of things get the mastery and are o'ermastered in turn: with
+     the funeral wail blends the cry which babies raise when they
+     enter the borders of light; and no night ever followed day,
+     nor morning night, that heard not, mingling with the sickly
+     infant's cries, wailings of the attendants on death and black
+     funeral."[226:2]
+
+In a similar vein, the earliest conceptions of natural evolution
+attributed it to the coworking of two principles, that of Love or union
+and that of Hate or dissolution. The process is here distinguished from
+the material of nature, but is still described in the language of
+practical life. A distinction between two aspects of vital phenomena is
+the next step. These may be regarded in respect either of the motion and
+change which attend them, or the rationality which informs them. Life is
+both effective and significant. Although neither of these ideas ever
+wholly ceases to be animistic, they may nevertheless be applied quite
+independently of one another. The one reduces the primitive animistic
+world to the lower end of its scale, the other construes it in terms of
+a purposive utility commensurable with that of human action. Now it is
+with _mechanism_, the former of these diverging ways, that the
+development of materialism is identified. For this philosophy a thing
+need have no value to justify its existence, nor any acting intelligence
+to which it may owe its origin. Its bulk and position are sufficient for
+its being, and the operation of forces capable of integrating, dividing,
+or moving it is sufficient for its derivation and history. In short,
+there is no rhyme or reason at the heart of things, but only actual
+matter distributed by sheer force. With this elimination of the element
+of purposiveness from the hylozoistic world, the content and process of
+nature are fitted to one another. Matter is that which is moved by
+force, and force is the determining principle of the motions of matter.
+Materialism is now definitely equipped with its fundamental conceptions.
+
+[Sidenote: Materialism and Physical Science.]
+
+§ 105. The central conceptions of materialism as a philosophical theory
+differ from those employed in the physical sciences only in what is
+demanded of them. The scientist reports upon physical phenomena without
+accepting any further responsibility, while those who like Lucretius
+maintain a physical metaphysics, must, like him, prove that "the minute
+bodies of matter from everlasting continually uphold the sum of things."
+But, though they employ them in their own way, materialists and all
+other exponents of naturalism derive their central conceptions from the
+physical sciences, and so reflect the historical development through
+which these sciences have passed. To certain historical phases of
+physical science, in so far as these bear directly upon the meaning of
+naturalism, we now turn.
+
+[Sidenote: The Development of the Conceptions of Physical Science. Space
+and Matter.]
+
+§ 106. From the earliest times down to the present day the groundwork of
+materialism has most commonly been cast in the form of an _atomic
+theory_. Democritus, the first system-builder of this school, adopted
+the conception of indivisible particles (ἄτομοι), impenetrable in
+their occupancy of space, and varying among themselves only in form,
+order, and position. To provide for the motion that distributes them he
+conceived them as separated from one another by empty space. From this
+it follows that the void is as real as matter, or, as Democritus himself
+is reputed to have said, "thing is not more real than no-thing."
+
+But atomism has not been by any means universally regarded as the most
+satisfactory conception of the relation between space and matter. Not
+only does it require two kinds of being, with the different attributes
+of extension and hardness, respectively,[229:3] but it would also seem
+to be experimentally inadequate in the case of the more subtle physical
+processes, such as light. The former of these is a speculative
+consideration, and as such had no little weight with the French
+philosopher Descartes, whose divisions and definitions so profoundly
+affected the course of thought in these matters after the sixteenth
+century. Holding also "that a vacuum or space in which there is
+absolutely no body is repugnant to reason," and that an indivisible
+space-filling particle is self-contradictory, he was led to _identify
+space and matter_; that is, to make matter as indispensable to space as
+space to matter. There is, then, but one kind of corporeal being, whose
+attribute is extension, and whose modes are motion and rest. The most
+famous application of the mechanical conceptions which he bases upon
+this first principle, is his theory of the planets, which are conceived
+to be embedded in a transparent medium, and to move with it, vortex
+fashion, about the sun.[230:4]
+
+But the conception of the space-filling continuity of material substance
+owes its prominence at the present time to the experimental hypothesis
+of _ether_. This substance, originally conceived to occupy the
+intermolecular spaces and to serve as a medium for the propagation of
+undulations, is now regarded by many physicists as replacing matter. "It
+is the great hope of science at the present day," says a contemporary
+exponent of naturalism, "that hard and heavy matter will be shown to be
+ether in motion."[231:5] Such a theory would reduce bodies to the
+relative displacements of parts of a continuous substance, which would
+be first of all defined as spacial, and would possess such further
+properties as special scientific hypotheses might require.
+
+Two broadly contrasting theories thus appear: that which defines matter
+as a continuous substance coextensive with space; and that which defines
+it as a discrete substance divided by empty space. But both theories are
+seriously affected by the peculiarly significant development of the
+conception of force.
+
+[Sidenote: Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the
+Conception of Force.]
+
+§ 107. In the Cartesian system the cause of motion was pressure within a
+plenum. But in the seventeenth century this notion encountered the
+system of Newton, a system which seemed to involve action at a distance.
+In the year 1728 Voltaire wrote from London:
+
+     "When a Frenchman arrives in London, he finds a very great
+     change, in philosophy as well as in most other things. In
+     Paris he left the world all full of matter; here he finds
+     absolute vacua. At Paris the universe is seen filled up with
+     ethereal vortices, while here the same space is occupied with
+     the play of the invisible forces of gravitation. In Paris the
+     earth is painted for us longish like an egg, and in London it
+     is oblate like a melon. At Paris the pressure of the moon
+     causes the ebb and flow of tides; in England, on the other
+     hand, the sea gravitates toward the moon, so that at the same
+     time when the Parisians demand high water of the moon, the
+     gentlemen of London require an ebb."[232:6]
+
+But these differences are not matters of taste, nor even rival
+hypotheses upon an equal footing. The Newtonian system of mechanics, the
+consummation of a development initiated by Galileo, differed from the
+vortex theory of Descartes as exact science differs from speculation and
+unverified conjecture. And this difference of method carried with it
+eventually certain profound differences of content, distinguishing the
+Newtonian theory even from that of Democritus, with which it had so much
+in common. Although Democritus had sought to avoid the element of
+purposiveness in the older hylozoism by referring the motions of bodies
+as far as possible to the impact of other bodies, he nevertheless
+attributed these motions ultimately to _weight_, signifying thereby a
+certain _downward disposition_. Now it is true that in his general
+belief Newton himself is not free from hylozoism. He thought of the
+motions of the planets themselves as initiated and quickened by a power
+emanating ultimately from God. They are "impressed by an intelligent
+Agent," and
+
+     "can be the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and skill
+     of a powerful ever-living Agent who, being in all places, is
+     more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless
+     uniform _sensorium_, and thereby to form and reform the parts
+     of the universe, than we are by our will to move the parts of
+     our own bodies."[233:7]
+
+But by the side of these statements must be set his famous disclaimer,
+"_hypotheses non fingo_." In his capacity of natural philosopher he did
+not seek to explain motions, but only to describe them. Disbelieving as
+he did in action at a distance, he saw no possibility of explanation
+short of a reference of them to God; but such "hypotheses" he thought to
+be no proper concern of science. As a consequence, the mathematical
+formulation of motions came, through him, to be regarded as the entire
+content of mechanics. The notion of an efficient cause of motion is
+still suggested by the term _force_, but even this term within the
+system of mechanics refers always to a definite amount of motion, or
+measurement of relative motion. And the same is true of _attraction_,
+_action_, _reaction_, and the like. The further explanation of motion,
+the definition of a virtue or potency that produces it, first a
+neglected problem, then an irrelevant problem, is finally, for a
+naturalistic philosophy in which this progression is completed, an
+insoluble problem. For the sequel to this purely descriptive procedure
+on the part of science is the disavowal of "metaphysics" by those who
+will have no philosophy but science. Thus the scientific conservatism of
+Newton has led to the positivistic and agnostic phase of naturalism. But
+a further treatment of this development must be reserved until the issue
+of epistemology shall have been definitely raised.
+
+A different emphasis within the general mechanical scheme, attaching
+especial importance to the conceptions of force and energy, has led to a
+rival tendency in science and a contrasting type of naturalism. The
+mechanical hypotheses hitherto described are all of a simple and readily
+depicted type. They suggest an imagery quite in accord with common-sense
+and with observation of the motions of great masses like the planets.
+Material particles are conceived to move within a containing space; the
+motions of corpuscles, atoms, or the minute parts of ether, differing
+only in degree from those of visible bodies. The whole physical
+universe may be represented in the imagination as an aggregate of bodies
+participating in motions of extraordinary complexity, but of one type.
+But now let the emphasis be placed upon the determining causes rather
+than upon the moving bodies themselves. In other words, let the bodies
+be regarded as attributive and the forces as substantive. The result is
+a radical alteration of the mechanical scheme and the transcendence of
+common-sense imagery. This was one direction of outgrowth from the work
+of Newton. His force of gravitation prevailed between bodies separated
+by spaces of great magnitude. Certain of the followers of Newton,
+notably Cotes, accepting the formulas of the master but neglecting his
+allusions to the agency of God, accepted the principle of action at a
+distance. _Force_, in short, _was conceived to pervade space of itself_.
+But if force be granted this substantial and self-dependent character,
+what further need is there of matter as a separate form of entity? For
+does not the presence of matter consist essentially in resistance,
+itself a case of force? Such reflections as these led Boscovich and
+others to the radical departure of defining material particles _as
+centres of force_.
+
+[Sidenote: The Development and Extension of the Conception of Energy.]
+
+§ 108. But a more fruitful hypothesis of the same general order is due
+to the attention directed to the conception of _energy_, or capacity for
+work, by experimental discoveries of the possibility of reciprocal
+transformations without loss, of motion, heat, electricity, and other
+processes. The principle of the conservation of energy affirms the
+quantitative constancy of that which is so transformed, measured, for
+example, in terms of capacity to move units of mass against gravity. The
+exponents of what is called "energetics" have in many cases come to
+regard that the quantity of which is so conserved, as a substantial
+reality whose forms and distributions compose nature. A contemporary
+scientist, whose synthetic and dogmatic habit of mind has made him
+eminent in the ranks of popular philosophy, writes as follows:
+
+     "Mechanical and chemical energy, sound and heat, light and
+     electricity, are mutually convertible; they seem to be but
+     different modes of one and the same fundamental force or
+     _energy_. Thence follows the important thesis of the unity of
+     all natural forces, or, as it may also be expressed, the
+     'monism of energy.'"[236:8]
+
+The conception of energy seems, indeed, to afford an exceptional
+opportunity to naturalism. We have seen that the matter-motion theory
+was satisfied to ignore, or regard as insoluble, problems concerning the
+ultimate causes of things. Furthermore, as we shall presently see to
+better advantage, the more strictly materialistic type of naturalism
+must regard thought as an anomaly, and has no little difficulty with
+life. But the conception of energy is more adaptable, and hence better
+qualified to serve as a common denominator for various aspects of
+experience. The very readiness with which we can picture the corpuscular
+scheme is a source of embarrassment to the seeker after unity. That
+which is so distinct is bristling with incompatibilities. The most
+aggressive materialist hesitates to describe thought as a motion of
+bodies in space. Energy, on the other hand, exacts little if anything
+beyond the character of measurable power. Thought is at any rate in some
+sense a power, and to some degree measurable. Recent discoveries of the
+dependence of capacity for mental exertion upon physical vitality and
+measurements of chemical energy received into the system as food, and
+somehow exhausted by the activities of thought, have lent plausibility
+to the hypothesis of a universal energy of which physical and
+"psychical" processes are alike manifestations. And the conception of
+energy seems capable not only of unifying nature, but also of satisfying
+the metaphysical demand for an efficient and moving cause. This term,
+like "force" and "power," is endowed with such a significance by common
+sense. Indeed, naturalism would seem here to have swung round toward its
+hylozoistic starting-point. The exponent of energetics, like the naive
+animistic thinker, attributes to nature a power like that which he feels
+welling up within himself. When he acts upon the environment, like meets
+like. Energetics, it is true, may obtain a definite meaning for its
+central conception from the measurable behavior of external bodies, and
+a meaning that may be quite free from vitalism or teleology. But in his
+extension of the conception the author of a philosophical energetics
+abandons this strict meaning, and blends his thought even with a phase
+of subjectivism, known as _panpsychism_.[238:9] This theory regards the
+inward life of all nature as homogeneous with an immediately felt
+activity or appetency, as energetics finds the inner life to be
+homogeneous with the forces of nature. Both owe their philosophical
+appeal to their apparent success in unifying the world upon a direct
+empirical basis, and to their provision for the practical sense of
+reality.
+
+Such, in brief, are the main alternatives available for a naturalistic
+theory of being, in consequence of the historical development of the
+fundamental conceptions of natural science.
+
+[Sidenote: The Claims of Naturalism.]
+
+§ 109. We turn now to an examination of the manner in which naturalism,
+equipped with working principles, seeks to meet the special requirements
+of philosophy. The conception of the unity of nature is directly in the
+line of a purely scientific development, but naturalism takes the bold
+and radical step of regarding nature so unified as coextensive with the
+real, or at any rate knowable, universe. It will be remembered that
+among the early Greeks Anaxagoras had referred the creative and
+formative processes of nature to a non-natural or rational agency, which
+he called the _Nous_. The adventitious character of this principle, the
+external and almost purely nominal part which it played in the actual
+cosmology of Anaxagoras, betrayed it into the hands of the atomists,
+with their more consistently naturalistic creed. Better, these maintain,
+the somewhat dogmatic extension of conceptions proved to be successful
+in the description of nature, than a vague dualism which can serve only
+to distract the scientific attention and people the world with
+obscurities. There is a remarkable passage in Lucretius in which atomism
+is thus written large and inspired with cosmical eloquence:
+
+     "For verily not by design did the first-beginnings of things
+     station themselves each in its right place guided by keen
+     intelligence, nor did they bargain sooth to say what motions
+     each should assume, but because many in number and shifting
+     about in many ways throughout the universe, they are driven
+     and tormented by blows during infinite time past, after trying
+     motions and unions of every kind at length they fall into
+     arrangements such as those out of which our sum of things has
+     been formed, and by which too it is preserved through many
+     great years, when once it has been thrown into the appropriate
+     motions, and causes the streams to replenish the greedy sea
+     with copious river waters, and the earth, fostered by the heat
+     of the sun, to renew its produce, and the race of living
+     things to come up and flourish, and the gliding fires of ether
+     to live: all which these several things could in no wise bring
+     to pass, unless a store of matter could rise up from infinite
+     space, out of which store they are wont to make up in due
+     season whatever has been lost."[240:10]
+
+The prophecy of La Place, the great French mathematician, voices the
+similar faith of the eighteenth century in a mechanical understanding
+of the universe:
+
+     "The human mind, in the perfection it has been able to give to
+     astronomy, affords a feeble outline of such an intelligence.
+     Its discoveries in mechanics and in geometry, joined to that
+     of universal gravitation, have brought it within reach of
+     comprehending in the same analytical expressions the past and
+     future states of the system of the world."[241:11]
+
+As for God, the creative and presiding intelligence, La Place had "no
+need of any such hypothesis."
+
+[Sidenote: The Task of Naturalism.]
+
+§ 110. But these are the boasts of Homeric heroes before going into
+battle. The moment such a general position is assumed there arise sundry
+difficulties in the application of naturalistic principles to special
+interests and groups of facts. It is one thing to project a mechanical
+scheme in the large, but quite another to make explicit provision within
+it for the origin of nature, for life, for the human self with its
+ideals, and for society with its institutions. The naturalistic method
+of meeting these problems involves a reduction all along the line in the
+direction of such categories as are derived from the infra-organic
+world. That which is not like the planetary system must be construed as
+mechanical by indirection and subtlety.
+
+[Sidenote: The Origin of the Cosmos.]
+
+§ 111. The origin of the present known natural world was the first
+philosophical question to be definitely met by science. The general form
+of solution which naturalism offers is anticipated in the most ancient
+theories of nature. These already suppose that the observed mechanical
+processes of the circular or periodic type, like the revolutions and
+rotations of the stars, are incidents in a historical mechanical process
+of a larger scale. Prior to the present fixed motions of the celestial
+bodies, the whole mass of cosmic matter participated in irregular
+motions analogous to present terrestrial redistributions. Such motions
+may be understood to have resulted in the integration of separate
+bodies, to which they at the same time imparted a rotary motion. It is
+such a hypothesis that Lucretius paints in his bold, impressionistic
+colors.
+
+But the development of mechanics paved the way for a definite scientific
+theory, the so-called "nebular hypothesis," announced by La Place in
+1796, and by the philosopher Kant at a still earlier date. Largely
+through the Newtonian principle of the parallelogram of forces, the
+present masses, orbits, and velocities were analyzed into a more
+primitive process of concentration within a nebulous or highly diffused
+aggregate of matter. And with the aid of the principle of the
+conservation of energy this theory appears to make possible the
+derivation of heat, light, and other apparently non-mechanical processes
+from the same original energy of motion.
+
+But a persistently philosophical mind at once raises the question of the
+origin of this primeval nebula itself, with a definite organization and
+a vast potential energy that must, after all, be regarded as a part of
+nature rather than its source. Several courses are here open to
+naturalism. It may maintain that the question of ultimate origin is
+unanswerable; it may regard such a process of concentration as extending
+back through an infinitely long past;[243:12] or, and this is the
+favorite alternative for more constructive minds, the historical
+cosmical process may be included within a still higher type of periodic
+process, which is regarded as eternal. This last course has been
+followed in the well-known synthetic naturalism of Herbert Spencer.
+"Evolution," he says, "is the progressive integration of matter and
+dissipation of motion." But such a process eventually runs down, and may
+be conceived as giving place to a counter-process of devolution which
+scatters the parts of matter and gathers another store of potential
+motion. The two processes in alternation will then constitute a cosmical
+system without beginning or end.
+
+In such wise a sweeping survey of the physical universe may be thought
+in the terms of natural science. The uniformitarian method in geology,
+resolving the history of the crust of the earth into known processes,
+such as erosion and igneous fusion;[244:13] and spectral analysis, with
+its discoveries concerning the chemical constituents of distant bodies
+through the study of their light, have powerfully reënforced this effort
+of thought, and apparently completed an outline sketch of the universe
+in terms of infra-organic processes.
+
+[Sidenote: Life. Natural Selection.]
+
+§ 112. But the cosmos must be made internally homogeneous in these same
+terms. There awaits solution, in the first place, the serious problem of
+the genesis and maintenance of life within a nature that is originally
+and ultimately inorganic. The assimilation of the field of biology and
+physiology to the mechanical cosmos had made little real progress prior
+to the nineteenth century. Mechanical theories had, indeed, been
+projected in the earliest age of philosophy, and proposed anew in the
+seventeenth century.[245:14] Nevertheless, the structural and functional
+teleology of the organism remained as apparently irrefutable testimony
+to the inworking of some principle other than that of mechanical
+necessity. Indeed, the only fruitful method applicable to organic
+phenomena was that which explained them in terms of purposive
+adaptation. And it was its provision for a mechanical interpretation of
+this very principle that gave to the Darwinian _law of natural
+selection_, promulgated in 1859 in the "Origin of Species," so profound
+a significance for naturalism. It threatened to reduce the last
+stronghold of teleology, and completely to dispense with the intelligent
+Author of nature.
+
+Darwin's hypothesis sought to explain the origin of animal species by
+survival under competitive conditions of existence through the
+possession of a structure suited to the environment. Only the most
+elementary organism need be presupposed, together with slight variations
+in the course of subsequent generations, and both may be conceived to
+arise mechanically. There will then result in surviving organisms a
+gradual accumulation of such variations as promote survival under the
+special conditions of the environment. Such a principle had been
+suggested as early as the time of Empedocles, but it remained for Darwin
+to establish it with an unanswerable array of observation and
+experimentation. If any organism whatsoever endowed with the power of
+generation be allowed to have somehow come to be, naturalism now
+promises to account for the whole subsequent history of organic
+phenomena and the origin of any known species.
+
+[Sidenote: Mechanical Physiology.]
+
+§ 113. But what of life itself? The question of the derivation of
+organic from inorganic matter has proved insoluble by direct means, and
+the case of naturalism must here rest upon such facts as the chemical
+homogeneity of these two kinds of matter, and the conformity of
+physiological processes to more general physical laws. Organic matter
+differs from inorganic only through the presence of proteid, a peculiar
+product of known elements, which cannot be artificially produced, but
+which is by natural means perpetually dissolved into these elements
+without any discoverable residuum. Respiration may be studied as a case
+of aerodynamics, the circulation of the blood as a case of
+hydrodynamics, and the heat given off in the course of work done by the
+body as a case of thermodynamics. And although vitalistic theories still
+retain a place in physiology, as do teleological theories in biology, on
+the whole the naturalistic programme of a reduction of organic processes
+to the type of the inorganic tends to prevail.
+
+[Sidenote: Mind. The Reduction to Sensation.]
+
+§ 114. The history of naturalism shows that, as in the case of life, so
+also in the case of _mind_, its hypotheses were projected by the Greeks,
+but precisely formulated and verified only in the modern period of
+science. In the philosophy of Democritus the soul was itself an atom,
+finer, rounder, and smoother than the ordinary, but thoroughly a part of
+the mechanism of nature. The processes of the soul are construed as
+interactions between the soul and surrounding objects. In sensation, the
+thing perceived produces images by means of effluxes which impinge upon
+the soul-atom. These images are not true reports of the outer world, but
+must be revised by thought before its real atomic structure emerges.
+For this higher critical exercise of thought Democritus devised no
+special atomic genesis. The result may be expressed either as the
+invalidity of such operations of mind as he could provide for in his
+universe, or the irreducibility to his chosen first principles of the
+very thought which defined them. Later naturalism has generally
+sacrificed epistemology to cosmology, and reduced thought to sensation.
+Similarly, will has been regarded as a highly developed case of
+instinct. Knowledge and will, construed as sensation and instinct, may
+thus be interpreted in the naturalistic manner within the field of
+biology.
+
+[Sidenote: Automatism.]
+
+§ 115. But the actual content of sensation, and the actual feelings
+which attend upon the promptings of instinct, still stubbornly testify
+to the presence in the universe of something belonging to a wholly
+different category from matter and motion. The attitude of naturalism in
+this crucial issue has never been fixed and unwavering, but there has
+gradually come to predominate a method of denying to the inner life all
+efficacy and real significance in the cosmos, while admitting its
+presence on the scene. It is a strange fact of history that Descartes,
+the French philosopher who prided himself on having rid the soul of all
+dependence on nature, should have greatly contributed to this method.
+But it is perhaps not so strange when we consider that every dualism is,
+after all, symmetrical, and that consequently whatever rids the soul of
+nature at the same time rids nature of the soul. It was Descartes who
+first conceived the body and soul to be utterly distinct substances. The
+corollary to this doctrine was his _automatism_, applied in his own
+system to animals other than man, but which those less concerned with
+religious tradition and less firmly convinced of the soul's originating
+activity were not slow to apply universally. This theory conceived the
+vital processes to take place quite regardless of any inner
+consciousness, or even without its attendance. To this radical theory
+the French materialists of the eighteenth century were especially
+attracted. With them the active soul of Descartes, the distinct
+spiritual entity, disappeared. This latter author had himself admitted a
+department of the self, which he called the "passions," in which the
+course and content of mind is determined by bodily conditions. Extending
+this conception to the whole province of mind, they employed it to
+demonstrate the thorough-going subordination of mind to body. La
+Mettrie, a physician and the author of a book entitled "L'Homme
+Machine," was first interested in this thesis by a fever delirium, and
+afterward adduced anatomical and pathological data in support of it. The
+angle from which he views human life is well illustrated in the
+following:
+
+     "What would have sufficed in the case of Julius Cæsar, of
+     Seneca, of Petronius, to turn their fearlessness into timidity
+     or braggartry? An obstruction in the spleen, the liver, or the
+     _vena portae_. For the imagination is intimately connected
+     with these viscera, and from them arise all the curious
+     phenomena of hypochondria and hysteria. . . . 'A mere nothing,
+     a little fibre, some trifling thing that the most subtle
+     anatomy cannot discover, would have made two idiots out of
+     Erasmus and Fontenelle.'"[250:15]
+
+[Sidenote: Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon.]
+
+§ 116. The extreme claim that the soul is a physical organ of the body,
+identical with the brain, marked the culmination of this militant
+materialism, so good an instance of that over-simplification and
+whole-hearted conviction characteristic of the doctrinaire propagandism
+of France. Locke, the Englishman, had admitted that possibly the
+substance which thinks is corporeal. In the letters of Voltaire this
+thought has already found a more positive expression:
+
+     "I am body, and I think; more I do not know. Shall I then
+     attribute to an unknown cause what I can so easily attribute
+     to the only fruitful cause I am acquainted with? In fact,
+     where is the man who, without an absurd godlessness, dare
+     assert that it is impossible for the Creator to endow matter
+     with thought and feeling?"[251:16]
+
+Finally, Holbach, the great systematizer of this movement, takes the
+affair out of the hands of the Creator and definitively announces that
+"a sensitive soul is nothing but a human brain so constituted that it
+easily receives the motions communicated to it."[251:17]
+
+This theory has been considerably tempered since the age of Holbach.
+Naturalism has latterly been less interested in identifying the soul
+with the body, and more interested in demonstrating its dependence upon
+specific bodily conditions, after the manner of La Mettrie. The
+so-called higher faculties, such as thought and will, have been related
+to central or _cortical_ processes of the nervous system, processes of
+connection and complication which within the brain itself supplement the
+impulses and sensations congenitally and externally stimulated. The
+term "epiphenomenon" has been adopted to express the distinctness but
+entire dependence of the mind. Man is "a conscious automaton." The real
+course of nature passes through his nervous system, while consciousness
+attends upon its functions like a shadow, present but not
+efficient.[252:18]
+
+[Sidenote: Knowledge, Positivism and Agnosticism.]
+
+§ 117. Holbach's "Système de la Nature," published in 1770, marks the
+culmination of the unequivocally materialistic form of naturalism. Its
+epistemological difficulties, always more or less in evidence, have
+since that day sufficed to discredit materialism, and to foster the
+growth of a critical and apologetic form of naturalism known as
+_positivism_ or _agnosticism_. The modesty of this doctrine does not, it
+is true, strike very deep. For, although it disclaims knowledge of
+ultimate reality, it also forbids anyone else to have any. Knowledge, it
+affirms, can be of but one type, that which comprises the verifiable
+laws governing nature. All questions concerning first causes are
+futile, a stimulus only to excursions of fancy popularly mistaken for
+knowledge. The superior certainty and stability which attaches to
+natural science is to be permanently secured by the savant's steadfast
+refusal to be led away after the false gods of metaphysics.
+
+But though this is sufficient ground for an agnostic policy, it does
+prove an agnostic theory. The latter has sprung from a closer analysis
+of knowledge, though it fails to make a very brave showing for
+thoroughness and consistency. The crucial point has already been brought
+within our view. The general principles of naturalism require that
+knowledge shall be reduced to sensations, or impressions of the
+environment upon the organism. But the environment and the sensations do
+not correspond. The environment is matter and motion, force and energy;
+the sensations are of motions, to be sure, but much more conspicuously
+of colors, sounds, odors, pleasures, and pains. Critically, this may be
+expressed by saying that since the larger part of sense-perception is so
+unmistakably subjective, and since all knowledge alike must be derived
+from this source, knowledge as a whole must be regarded as dealing only
+with appearances. There are at least three agnostic methods progressing
+from this point. All agree that the inner or essential reality is
+unfathomable. But, in the first place, those most close to the tradition
+of materialism maintain that the most significant appearances, the
+primary qualities, are those which compose a purely quantitative and
+corporeal world. The inner essence of things may at any rate be
+_approached_ by a monism of matter or of energy. This theory is
+epistemological only to the extent of moderating its claims in the hope
+of lessening its responsibility. Another agnosticism places all sense
+qualities on a par, but would regard physics and psychology as
+complementary reports upon the two distinct series of phenomena in which
+the underlying reality expresses itself. This theory is epistemological
+to the extent of granting knowledge, viewed as perception, as good a
+standing in the universe as that which is accorded to its object. But
+such a dualism tends almost irresistibly to relapse into materialistic
+monism, because of the fundamental place of physical conceptions in the
+system of the sciences. Finally, in another and a more radical phase of
+agnosticism, we find an attempt to make full provision for the
+legitimate problems of epistemology. The only datum, the only existent
+accessible to knowledge, is said to be the sensation, or state of
+consciousness. In the words of Huxley:
+
+     "What, after all, do we know of this terrible 'matter' except
+     as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of
+     our own consciousness? And what do we know of that 'spirit'
+     over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation
+     is arising, . . . except that it is also a name for an unknown
+     and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of
+     consciousness?"[255:19]
+
+The physical world is now to be regarded as a construction which does
+not assimilate to itself the content of sensations, but enables one to
+anticipate them. The sensation signifies a contact to which science can
+provide a key for practical guidance.
+
+[Sidenote: Experimentalism.]
+
+§ 118. This last phase of naturalism is an attempt to state a pure and
+consistent experimentalism, a workable theory of the routine of
+sensations. But it commonly falls into the error of the vicious circle.
+The hypothetical cause of sensations is said to be matter. From this
+point of view the sensation is a complex, comprising elaborate physical
+and physiological processes. But these processes themselves, on the
+other hand, are said to be analyzable into sensations. Now two such
+methods of analysis cannot be equally ultimate. If all of reality is
+finally reducible to sensations, then the term sensation must be used
+in a new sense to connote a self-subsistent being, and can no longer
+refer merely to a function of certain physiological processes. The issue
+of this would be some form of idealism or of the experience-philosophy
+that is now coming so rapidly to the front.[256:20] But while it is true
+that idealism has sometimes been intended, and that a radically new
+philosophy of experience has sometimes been closely approached, those,
+nevertheless, who have developed experimentalism from the naturalistic
+stand-point have in reality achieved only a thinly disguised
+materialism. For _the very ground of their agnosticism is
+materialistic_.[256:21] Knowledge of reality itself is said to be
+unattainable, because knowledge, in order to come within the order of
+nature, must be regarded as reducible to sensation; and because
+sensation itself, when regarded as a part of nature, is only a
+physiological process, a special phenomenon, in no way qualified to be
+knowledge that is true of reality.
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic.]
+
+§ 119. Perhaps, after all, it would be as fair to the spirit of
+naturalism to relieve it of responsibility for an epistemology. It has
+never thoroughly reckoned with this problem. It has deliberately
+selected from among the elements of experience, and been so highly
+constructive in its method as to forfeit its claim to pure empiricism;
+and, on the other hand, has, in this same selection of categories and in
+its insistence upon the test of experiment, fallen short of a
+thorough-going rationalism. While, on the one hand, it defines and
+constructs, it does so, on the other hand, within the field of
+perception and with constant reference to the test of perception. The
+explanation and justification of this procedure is to be found in the
+aim of natural science rather than in that of philosophy. It is this
+special interest, rather than the general problem of being, that
+determines the order of its categories. Naturalism as an account of
+reality is acceptable only so far as its success in satisfying specific
+demands obtains for it a certain logical immunity. These demands are
+unquestionably valid and fundamental, but they are not coextensive with
+the demand for truth. They coincide rather with the immediate practical
+need of a formulation of the spacial and temporal changes that confront
+the will. Hence naturalism is acceptable to common-sense as an account
+of what the every-day attitude to the environment treats as its object.
+Naturalism is common-sense about the "outer world," revised and brought
+up to date with the aid of the results of science. Its deepest spring is
+the organic instinct for the reality of the tangible, the vital
+recognition of the significance of that which is on the plane of
+interaction with the body.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+[Sidenote: General Ethical Stand-point.]
+
+§ 120. Oddly enough, although common-sense is ready to intrust to
+naturalism the description of the situation of life, it prefers to deal
+otherwise with its ideals. Indeed, common-sense is not without a certain
+suspicion that naturalism is the advocate of moral reversion. It is
+recognized as the prophecy of the brute majority of life, of those
+considerations of expediency and pleasure that are the warrant for its
+secular moods rather than for its sustaining ideals. And that strand of
+life is indeed its special province. For the naturalistic method of
+reduction must find the key to human action among those practical
+conditions that are common to man and his inferiors in the scale of
+being. In short, human life, like all life, must be construed as the
+adjustment of the organism to its natural environment for the sake of
+preservation and economic advancement.
+
+[Sidenote: Cynicism and Cyrenaicism.]
+
+§ 121. Early in Greek philosophy this general idea of life was
+picturesquely interpreted in two contrasting ways, those of the Cynic
+and the Cyrenaic. Both of these wise men postulated the spiritual
+indifference of the universe at large, and looked only to the _contact_
+of life with its immediate environment. But while the one hoped only to
+hedge himself about, the other sought confidently the gratification of
+his sensibilities. The figure of the Cynic is the more familiar.
+Diogenes of the tub practised self-mortification until his dermal and
+spiritual callousness were alike impervious. From behind his protective
+sheath he could without affectation despise both nature and society. He
+could reckon himself more blessed than Alexander, because, with demand
+reduced to the minimum, he could be sure of a surplus of supply. Having
+renounced all goods save the bare necessities of life, he could neglect
+both promises and threats and be played upon by no one. He was securely
+intrenched within himself, an unfurnished habitation, but the citadel of
+a king. The Cyrenaic, on the other hand, did not seek to make impervious
+the surface of contact with nature and society, but sought to heighten
+its sensibility, that it might become a medium of pleasurable feeling.
+For the inspiration with which it may be pursued this ideal has nowhere
+been more eloquently set forth than in the pages of Walter Pater, who
+styles himself "the new Cyrenaic."
+
+     "Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the
+     end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a
+     variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is
+     to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass
+     most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the
+     focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their
+     purest energy?
+
+     To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this
+     ecstacy, is success in life. . . . While all melts under our
+     feet, we may well catch at any exquisite passion, or any
+     contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to
+     set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the
+     senses, strange dyes, strange colors, and curious odors, or
+     work of the artist's hands, or the face of one's friend. Not
+     to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those
+     about us, and in the brilliancy of their gifts some tragic
+     dividing of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of
+     frost and sun, to sleep before evening."[261:22]
+
+[Sidenote: Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception of
+Social Relations.]
+
+§ 122. In the course of modern philosophy the ethics of naturalism has
+undergone a transformation and development that equip it much more
+formidably for its competition with rival theories. If the Cynic and
+Cyrenaic philosophies of life seem too egoistic and narrow in outlook,
+this inadequacy has been largely overcome through the modern conception
+of the relation of the individual to society. Man is regarded as so
+dependent upon social relations that it is both natural and rational for
+him to govern his actions with a concern for the community. There was a
+time when this relation of dependence was viewed as external, a barter
+of goods between the individual and society, sanctioned by an implied
+contract. Thomas Hobbes, whose unblushing materialism and egoism
+stimulated by opposition the whole development of English ethics,
+conceived morality to consist in rules of action which condition the
+stability of the state, and so secure for the individual that "peace"
+which self-interest teaches him is essential to his welfare.
+
+     "And therefore so long a man is in the condition of mere
+     nature, which is a condition of war, as private appetite is
+     the measure of good and evil: and consequently all men agree
+     on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the ways or
+     means of peace, which, as I have showed before, are 'justice,'
+     'gratitude,' 'modesty,' 'equity,' 'mercy,' and the rest of
+     the laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, 'moral virtues';
+     and their contrary 'vices,' evil."[262:23]
+
+Jeremy Bentham, the apostle of utilitarianism in the eighteenth century,
+defined political and social sanctions through which the individual
+could purchase security and good repute with action conducive to the
+common welfare. But the nineteenth century has understood the matter
+better--and the idea of an evolution under conditions that select and
+reject, is here again the illuminating thought. No individual,
+evolutionary naturalism maintains, has survived the perils of life
+without possessing as an inalienable part of his nature, congenital like
+his egoism, certain impulses and instinctive desires in the interest of
+the community as a whole. The latest generation of a race whose
+perpetuation has been conditioned by a capacity to sustain social
+relations and make common cause against a more external environment,
+_is_ moral, and does not adopt morality in the course of a calculating
+egoism. Conscience is the racial instinct of self-preservation uttering
+itself in the individual member, who draws his very life-blood from the
+greater organism.
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic.]
+
+§ 123. This latest word of naturalistic ethics has not won acceptance
+as the last word in ethics, and this in spite of its indubitable truth
+within its scope. For the deeper ethical interest seeks not so much to
+account for the moral nature as to construe and justify its promptings.
+The evolutionary theory reveals the genesis of conscience, and
+demonstrates its continuity with nature, but this falls as far short of
+realizing the purpose of ethical study as a history of the natural
+genesis of thought would fall short of logic. Indeed, naturalism shows
+here, as in the realm of epistemology, a persistent failure to
+appreciate the central problem. Its acceptance as a philosophy, we are
+again reminded, can be accounted for only on the score of its genuinely
+rudimentary character. As a rudimentary phase of thought it is both
+indispensable and inadequate. It is the philosophy of instinct, which
+should in normal development precede a philosophy of reason, in which it
+is eventually assimilated and supplemented.
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion.]
+
+§ 124. There is, finally, an inspiration for life which this philosophy
+of naturalism may convey--atheism, its detractors would call it, but
+none the less a faith and a spiritual exaltation that spring from its
+summing up of truth. It is well first to realize that which is
+dispiriting in it, its failure to provide for the freedom, immortality,
+and moral providence of the more sanguine faith.
+
+     "For what is man looked at from this point of view? . . . Man,
+     so far as natural science by itself is able to teach us, is no
+     longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaven-descended
+     heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his
+     story a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the
+     meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which
+     first converted a dead organic compound into the living
+     progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows
+     nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine,
+     disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords
+     of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a
+     race with conscience enough to feel that it is vile, and
+     intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant. . . . We
+     sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared
+     with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the
+     divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of
+     our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed,
+     and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the
+     race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will
+     go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The
+     uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a
+     brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will
+     be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. 'Imperishable
+     monuments' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself, and love
+     stronger than death, will be as though they had never been.
+     Nor will anything that _is_ be better or be worse for all that
+     the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have
+     striven through countless generations to effect."[265:24]
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, Wonder,
+and Renunciation.]
+
+§ 125. But though our philosopher must accept the truth of this terrible
+picture, he is not left without spiritual resources. The abstract
+religion provided for the agnostic faithful by Herbert Spencer does not,
+it is true, afford any nourishment to the religious nature. He would
+have men look for a deep spring of life in the negative idea of mystery,
+the apotheosis of ignorance, while religious faith to live at all must
+lay hold upon reality. But there does spring from naturalism a positive
+religion, whose fundamental motives are those of service, wonder, and
+renunciation: service of humanity in the present, wonder at the natural
+truth, and renunciation of a universe keyed to vibrate with human
+ideals.
+
+     "Have you," writes Charles Ferguson, "had dreams of Nirvana
+     and sickly visions and raptures? Have you imagined that the
+     end of your life is to be absorbed back into the life of God,
+     and to flee the earth and forget all? Or do you want to walk
+     on air, or fly on wings, or build a heavenly city in the
+     clouds? Come, let us take our kit on our shoulders, and go out
+     and build the city _here_."[265:25]
+
+For Haeckel "natural religion" is such as
+
+     "the astonishment with which we gaze upon the starry heavens
+     and the microscopic life in a drop of water, the awe with
+     which we trace the marvellous working of energy in the motion
+     of matter, the reverence with which we grasp the universal
+     dominance of the law of substance throughout the
+     universe."[266:26]
+
+There is a deeper and a sincerer note in the stout, forlorn humanism of
+Huxley:
+
+     "That which lies before the human race is a constant struggle
+     to maintain and improve, in opposition to the State of Nature,
+     the State of Art of an organized polity; in which, and by
+     which, man may develop a worthy civilization, capable of
+     maintaining and constantly improving itself, until the
+     evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its
+     downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway; and,
+     once more, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of
+     our planet."[266:27]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[223:1] PRELIMINARY NOTE.--By _naturalism_ is meant that system of
+philosophy which defines the universe in the terms of _natural science_.
+In its dogmatic phase, wherein it maintains that _being is corporeal_,
+it is called _materialism_. In its critical phase, wherein it makes the
+general assertion that the natural sciences constitute the only
+_possible knowledge_, whatever be the nature of reality itself, it is
+called _positivism_, _agnosticism_, or simply _naturalism_.
+
+[226:2] Lucretius: _De Rerum Natura_, Bk. II, lines 569-580. Translation
+by Munro.
+
+[229:3] The reader will find an interesting account of these opposing
+views in Locke's chapter on _Space_, in his _Essay Concerning Human
+Understanding_.
+
+[230:4] Descartes distinguished his theory from that of Democritus in
+the _Principles of Philosophy_, Part IV, § ccii.
+
+[231:5] Pearson: _Grammar of Science_, pp. 259-260. Cf. _ibid._, Chap.
+VII, entire.
+
+[232:6] Quoted in Ueberweg: _History of Philosophy_, II, p. 124.
+
+[233:7] Quoted from the _Opticks_ of Newton by James Ward, in his
+_Naturalism and Agnosticism_, I, p. 43.
+
+[236:8] Haeckel: _Riddle of the Universe_. Translation by McCabe, p.
+254.
+
+The best systematic presentation of "energetics" is to be found in
+Ostwald's _Vorlesungen über Natur-Philosophie_. Herbert Spencer, in his
+well-known _First Principles_, makes philosophical use of both "force"
+and "energy."
+
+[238:9] Cf. Chap. IX.
+
+[240:10] Lucretius: _Op. cit._, Bk. I, lines 1021-1237.
+
+[241:11] Quoted from La Place's essay on _Probability_ by Ward: _Op.
+cit._, I, p. 41.
+
+[243:12] An interesting account and criticism of such a theory
+(Clifford's) is to be found in Royce's _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_,
+Lecture X.
+
+[244:13] This method replaced the old theory of "catastrophes" through
+the efforts of the English geologists, Hutton (1726-1797) and Lyell
+(1767-1849).
+
+[245:14] Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, published
+in 1628, was regarded as a step in this direction.
+
+[250:15] From the account of La Mettrie in Lange: _History of
+Materialism_. Translation by Thomas, II, pp. 67-68.
+
+[251:16] Quoted from Voltaire's London _Letter on the English_, by
+Lange: _Op. cit._, II, p. 18.
+
+[251:17] Quoted by Lange: _Op. cit._, II, p. 113.
+
+[252:18] The phrase "psycho-physical parallelism," current in
+psychology, may mean automatism of the kind expounded above, and may
+also mean dualism. It is used commonly as a methodological principle to
+signify that no causal relationship between mind and body, but one of
+_correspondence_, is to be looked for in empirical psychology. Cf. § 99.
+
+[255:19] Quoted by Ward: _Op. cit._, I, p. 18.
+
+[256:20] There are times when Huxley, _e. g._, would seem to be on the
+verge of the Berkeleyan idealism. Cf. Chap. IX.
+
+[256:21] For the case of Karl Pearson, read his _Grammar of Science_,
+Chap. II.
+
+[261:22] Pater: _The Renaissance_, pp. 249-250.
+
+[262:23] Hobbes: _Leviathan,_ Chap. XV.
+
+[265:24] Quoted from Balfour: _Foundations of Belief_, pp. 29-31.
+
+[265:25] Ferguson: _Religion of Democracy_, p. 10.
+
+[266:26] Haeckel: _Op. cit._, p. 344.
+
+[266:27] Huxley: _Evolution and Ethics_, p. 45. _Collected Essays_, Vol.
+IX.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+SUBJECTIVISM[267:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and
+Scepticism.]
+
+§ 126. When, in the year 1710, Bishop Berkeley maintained the thesis of
+empirical idealism, having rediscovered it and announced it with a
+justifiable sense of originality, he provoked a kind of critical
+judgment that was keenly annoying if not entirely surprising to him. In
+refuting the conception of material substance and demonstrating the
+dependence of being upon mind, he at once sought, as he did repeatedly
+in later years, to establish the world of practical belief, and so to
+reconcile metaphysics and common-sense. Yet he found himself hailed as a
+fool and a sceptic. In answer to an inquiry concerning the reception of
+his book in London, his friend Sir John Percival wrote as follows:
+
+     "I did but name the subject matter of your book of
+     _Principles_ to some ingenious friends of mine and they
+     immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time
+     refusing to read it, which I have not yet got one to do. A
+     physician of my acquaintance undertook to discover your
+     person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought
+     to take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire of
+     starting something new should put you upon such an
+     undertaking. Another told me that you are not gone so far as
+     another gentleman in town, who asserts not only that there is
+     no such thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no being
+     at all."[268:2]
+
+There can be no doubt but that the idea of the dependence of real things
+upon their appearance to the individual is a paradox to common-sense. It
+is a paradox because it seems to reverse the theoretical instinct
+itself, and to define the real in those very terms which disciplined
+thought learns to neglect. In the early history of thought the nature of
+the thinker himself is recognized as that which is likely to distort
+truth rather than that which conditions it. When the wise man, the
+devotee of truth, first makes his appearance, his authority is
+acknowledged because he has renounced himself. As witness of the
+universal being he purges himself of whatever is peculiar to his own
+individuality, or even to his human nature. In the aloofness of his
+meditation he escapes the cloud of opinion and prejudice that obscures
+the vision of the common man. In short, the element of belief dependent
+upon the thinker himself is the dross which must be refined away in
+order to obtain the pure truth. When, then, in the critical epoch of the
+Greek sophists, Protagoras declares that there is no belief that is not
+of this character, his philosophy is promptly recognized as scepticism.
+Protagoras argues that sense qualities are clearly dependent upon the
+actual operations of the senses, and that all knowledge reduces
+ultimately to these terms.
+
+     "The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling;
+     there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire,
+     fear, and many more which are named, as well as innumerable
+     others which have no name; _with each of them there is born an
+     object of sense_,--all sorts of colors born with all sorts of
+     sight and sounds in like manner with hearing, and other
+     objects with the other senses."[269:3]
+
+If the objects are "born with" the senses, it follows that they are born
+with and appertain to the individual perceiver.
+
+     "Either show, if you can, that our sensations are not
+     relative and individual, or, if you admit that they are
+     individual, prove that this does not involve the consequence
+     that the appearance becomes, or, if you like to say, is to the
+     individual only."[270:4]
+
+The same motif is thus rendered by Walter Pater in the Conclusion of his
+"Renaissance":
+
+     "At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of
+     external objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and
+     importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand
+     forms of action. But when reflexion begins to act upon those
+     objects they are dissipated under its influence; the cohesive
+     force seems suspended like a trick of magic; each object is
+     loosed into a group of impressions--color, odor, texture--in
+     the mind of the observer. . . . Experience, already reduced to
+     a swarm of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by
+     that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has
+     ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can
+     only conjecture to be without. Every one of these impressions
+     is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each
+     mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world."
+
+The Protagorean generalization is due to the reflection that all
+experience is some individual experience, that no subject of discourse
+escapes the imputation of belonging to some individual's private
+history. The individual must start with his own experiences and ideas,
+and he can never get beyond them, for he cannot see outside his own
+vision, or even think outside his own mind. The scepticism of this
+theory is explicit, and the formulas of Protagoras--the famous "_Man is
+the measure of all things_," and the more exact formula, "_The truth is
+what appears to each man at each time_"[271:5]--have been the articles
+of scepticism throughout the history of thought.
+
+[Sidenote: Phenomenalism and Spiritualism.]
+
+§ 127. There is, therefore, nothing really surprising in the reception
+accorded the "new philosophy" of Bishop Berkeley. A sceptical relativism
+is the earliest phase of subjectivism, and its avoidance at once becomes
+the most urgent problem of any philosophy which proposes to proceed
+forth from this principle. And this problem Berkeley meets with great
+adroitness and a wise recognition of difficulties. But his sanguine
+temperament and speculative interest impel him to what he regards as the
+extension of his first principle, the reintroduction of the conception
+of substance under the form of spirit, and of the objective order of
+nature under the form of the mind of God. In short, there are two
+motives at work in him, side by side: the epistemological motive,
+restricting reality to perceptions and thoughts, and the
+metaphysical-religious motive, leading him eventually to the definition
+of reality in terms of perceiving and thinking spirits. And from the
+time of Berkeley these two principles, _phenomenalism_ and
+_spiritualism_, have remained as distinct and alternating phases of
+subjectivism. The former is its critical and dialectical conception, the
+latter its constructive and practical conception.
+
+[Sidenote: Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem
+Inherited from Descartes and Locke.]
+
+§ 128. As _phenomenalism_ has its classic statement and proof in the
+writings of Berkeley, we shall do well to return to these. The fact that
+this philosopher wished to be regarded as the prophet of common-sense
+has already been mentioned. This purpose reveals itself explicitly in
+the series of "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." The form in which
+Berkeley here advances his thesis is further determined by the manner in
+which the lines were drawn in his day of thought. The world of
+enlightened public opinion was then threefold, consisting of God,
+physical nature, and the soul. In the early years of the seventeenth
+century Descartes had sharply distinguished between the two
+substances--mind, with its attribute of thought; and body, with its
+attribute of extension--and divided the finite world between them. God
+was regarded as the infinite and sustaining cause of both. Stated in the
+terms of epistemology, the object of clear thinking is the physical
+cosmos, the subject of clear thinking the immortal soul. The realm of
+perception, wherein the mind is subjected to the body, embarrasses the
+Cartesian system, and has no clear title to any place in it. And without
+attaching cognitive importance to this realm, the system is utterly
+dogmatic in its epistemology.[273:6] For what one substance thinks, must
+be assumed to be somehow true of another quite independent substance
+without any medium of communication. Now between Descartes and Berkeley
+appeared the sober and questioning "Essay Concerning Human
+Understanding," by John Locke. This is an interesting combination (they
+cannot be said to blend) of traditional metaphysics and revolutionary
+epistemology. The universe still consists of God, the immortal thinking
+soul, and a corporeal nature, the object of its thought. But, except for
+certain proofs of God and self, knowledge is entirely reduced to the
+perceptual type, to sensations, or ideas directly imparted to the mind
+by the objects themselves. To escape dogmatism it is maintained that
+the real is what is _observed to be present_. But Locke thinks the
+qualities so discovered belong in part to the perceiver and in part to
+the substance outside the mind. Color is a case of the former, a
+"secondary quality"; and extension a case of the latter, a "primary
+quality." And evidently the above empirical test of knowledge is not
+equally well met in these two cases. When I see a red object I know that
+red exists, for it is observed to be present, and I make no claim for it
+beyond the present. But when I note that the red object is square, I am
+supposed to know a property that will continue to exist in the object
+after I have closed my eyes or turned to something else. Here my claim
+exceeds my observation, and the empirical principle adopted at the
+outset would seem to be violated. Berkeley develops his philosophy from
+this criticism. His refutation of material substance is intended as a
+full acceptance of the implications of the new empirical epistemology.
+Knowledge is to be all of the perceptual type, where what is known is
+directly presented; and, in conformity with this principle, being is to
+be restricted to the content of the living pulses of experience.
+
+[Sidenote: The Refutation of Material Substance.]
+
+§ 129. Berkeley, then, beginning with the threefold world of Descartes
+and of common-sense, proposes to apply Locke's theory of knowledge to
+the discomfiture of corporeal nature. It was a radical doctrine, because
+it meant for him and for his contemporaries the denial of all finite
+objects outside the mind. But at the same time it meant a restoration of
+the homogeneity of experience, the reëstablishment of the qualitative
+world of every-day living, and so had its basis of appeal to
+common-sense. The encounter between Hylas, the advocate of the
+traditional philosophy, and Philonous, who represents the author
+himself, begins with an exchange of the charge of innovation.
+
+     _Hyl._ I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I
+     heard of you.
+
+     _Phil._ Pray, what were those?
+
+     _Hyl._ You were represented, in last night's conversation, as
+     one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever
+     entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such
+     thing as _material substance_ in the world.
+
+     _Phil._ That there is no such thing as what _philosophers_
+     call _material substance_, I am seriously persuaded: but if I
+     were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I
+     should then have the same reason to renounce this that I
+     imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.
+
+     _Hyl._ What! can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant
+     to Common-Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than
+     to believe there is no such thing as _matter_?
+
+     _Phil._ Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you,
+     who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater
+     sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to
+     Common-Sense, than I who believe no such thing?[276:7]
+
+Philonous now proceeds with his case. Beginning by obtaining from Hylas
+the admission that pleasure and pain are essentially relative and
+subjective, he argues that sensations such as heat, since they are
+inseparable from these feelings, must be similarly regarded. And he is
+about to annex other qualities in turn to this core of subjectivity,
+when Hylas enters a general demurrer:
+
+     "Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this
+     time. You asked me whether heat and cold, sweetness and
+     bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to
+     which I answered simply that they were. Whereas I should have
+     thus distinguished:--those qualities as perceived by us, are
+     pleasures or pains; but not as existing in the external
+     objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there
+     is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only
+     that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the
+     fire or sugar."[276:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Application of the Epistemological Principle.]
+
+§ 130. Here the argument touches upon profound issues. Philonous now
+assumes the extreme empirical contention _that knowledge applies only to
+its own psychological moment, that its object in no way extends beyond
+that individual situation which we call the state of knowing_. The full
+import of such an epistemology Berkeley never recognized, but he is
+clearly employing it here, and the overthrow of Hylas is inevitable so
+long as he does not challenge it or turn it against his opponent. This,
+however, as a protagonist of Berkeley's own making, he fails to do, and
+he plays into Philonous's hands by admitting that what is known only in
+perception must for that reason _consist_ in perception. He frankly owns
+"that it is vain to stand out any longer," that "colors, sounds, tastes,
+in a word, all those termed _secondary qualities_, have certainly no
+existence without the mind."[277:9]
+
+Hylas has now arrived at the distinction between primary and secondary
+qualities. "Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest" are
+the attributes of an external substance which is the cause of
+sensations. But the same epistemological principle readily reduces these
+also to dependence on mind, for, like the secondary qualities, their
+content is given only in perception. Hylas is then driven to defend a
+general material substratum, which is the cause of ideas, but to which
+none of the definite content of these ideas can be attributed. In short,
+he has put all the content of knowledge on the one side, and admitted
+its inseparability from the perceiving spirit, and left the being of
+things standing empty and forlorn on the other. This amounts, as
+Philonous reminds him, to the denial of the reality of the known world.
+
+     "You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the
+     _reality_ of sensible things; since you made it to consist in
+     an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say,
+     you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which
+     was to show your principles led to Scepticism."[278:10]
+
+[Sidenote: The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World.]
+
+§ 131. Having advanced the direct empiricist argument for phenomenalism,
+Berkeley now gives the rationalistic motive an opportunity to express
+itself in the queries of Hylas as to whether there be not an "absolute
+extension," somehow abstracted by thought from the relativities of
+perception. Is there not at least a _conceivable_ world independent of
+perception?
+
+The answers of Philonous throw much light upon the Berkeleyan position.
+He admits that thought is capable of separating the primary from the
+secondary qualities in certain _operations_, but at the same time denies
+that this is forming an idea of them as separate.
+
+     "I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general
+     propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without
+     mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat
+     of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I
+     can pronounce the word _motion_ by itself, I can form the idea
+     of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may
+     be made of extension and figures, without any mention of
+     _great_ or _small_, or any other sensible mode or quality,
+     that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of
+     extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible
+     quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the
+     mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what
+     other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being
+     altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when
+     laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I
+     believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas
+     of extension."[279:11]
+
+Berkeley denies that we have ideas of pure extension or motion, because,
+although we do actually _deal_ with these and find them intelligible, we
+can never obtain a state of mind in which they appear as the content. He
+applies this psychological test because of his adherence to the general
+empirical postulate that knowledge is limited to the individual content
+of its own individual states. "It is a universally received maxim," he
+says, "that _everything which exists is particular_." Now the truth of
+mathematical reckoning is not particular, but is valid wherever the
+conditions to which it refers are fulfilled. Mathematical reckoning, if
+it is to be particular, must be regarded as a particular act or state of
+some thinker. Its truth must then be construed as relative to the
+interests of the thinker, as a symbolism which has an instrumental
+rather than a purely cognitive value. This conclusion cannot be disputed
+short of a radical stand against the general epistemological principle
+to which Berkeley is so far true, the principle that the reality which
+is known in any state of thinking or perceiving is the state itself.
+
+[Sidenote: The Transition to Spiritualism.]
+
+§ 132. This concludes the purely phenomenalistic strain of Berkeley's
+thought. He has taken the immediate apprehension of sensible objects in
+a state of mind centring about the pleasure and pain of an individual,
+to be the norm of knowledge. He has further maintained that knowledge
+cannot escape the particularity of its own states. The result is that
+the universe is composed of private perceptions and ideas. Strictly on
+the basis of what has preceded, Hylas is justified in regarding this
+conclusion as no less sceptical than that to which his own position had
+been reduced; for while he had been compelled to admit that the real is
+unknowable, Philonous has apparently defined the knowable as relative to
+the individual. But the supplementary metaphysics which had hitherto
+been kept in the background is now revealed. It is maintained that
+though perceptions know no external world, they do nevertheless reveal a
+spiritual substance of which they are the states. Although it has
+hitherto been argued that the _esse_ of things is in their _percipi_,
+this is now replaced by the more fundamental principle that the _esse_
+of things is in their _percipere_ or _velle_. The real world consists
+not in perceptions, but in perceivers.
+
+[Sidenote: Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism.]
+
+§ 133. Now it is at once evident that the epistemological theory which
+has been Berkeley's dialectical weapon in the foregoing argument is no
+longer available. And those who have cared more for this theory than for
+metaphysical speculation have attempted to stop at this point, and so to
+construe phenomenalism as to make it self-sufficient on its own
+grounds. Such attempts are so instructive as to make it worth our while
+to review them before proceeding with the development of the
+spiritualistic motive in subjectivism.
+
+The world is to be regarded as made up of sense-perceptions, ideas, or
+phenomena. What is to be accepted as the fundamental category which
+gives to all of these terms their subjectivistic significance? So far
+there seems to be nothing in view save the principle of relativity. The
+type to which these were reduced was that of the peculiar or unsharable
+experience best represented by an individual's pleasure and pain. But
+relativity will not work as a general principle of being. It consigns
+the individual to his private mind, and cannot provide for the validity
+of knowledge enough even to maintain itself. Some other course, then,
+must be followed. Perception may be given a psycho-physical definition,
+which employs physical terms as fundamental;[282:12] but this flagrantly
+contradicts the phenomenalistic first principle. Or, reality may be
+regarded as so stamped with its marks as to insure the proprietorship of
+thought. But this definition of certain objective entities of mind, of
+beings attributed to intelligence because of their intrinsic
+intelligibility, is inconsistent with empiricism, if indeed it does not
+lead eventually to a realism of the Platonic type.[283:13] Finally, and
+most commonly, the terms of phenomenalism have been retained after their
+original meaning has been suffered to lapse. The "impressions" of Hume,
+_e. g._, are the remnant of the Berkeleyan world with the spirit
+stricken out. There is no longer any point in calling them impressions,
+for they now mean only elements or qualities. As a consequence this
+outgrowth of the Berkeleyanism epistemology is at present merging into a
+realistic philosophy of experience.[283:14] Any one, then, of these
+three may be the last state of one who undertakes to remain exclusively
+faithful to the phenomenalistic aspect of Berkeleyanism, embodied in the
+principle _esse est percipi_.
+
+[Sidenote: Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the
+Perceiver.]
+
+§ 134. Let us now follow the fortunes of the other phase of
+subjectivism--that which develops the conception of the perceiver rather
+than the perceived. When Berkeley holds that
+
+     "all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in a
+     word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the
+     world, have not any subsistence without a Mind,"
+
+his thought has transcended the epistemology with which he overthrew the
+conception of material substance, in two directions. For neither mind of
+the finite type nor mind of the divine type is perceived. But the first
+of these may yet be regarded as a direct empirical datum, even though
+sharply distinguished from an object of perception. In the third
+dialogue, Philonous thus expounds this new kind of knowledge:
+
+     "I own I have properly no _idea_, either of God or any other
+     spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by
+     things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless
+     know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as
+     certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I
+     mean by the terms _I_ and _myself_; and I know this
+     immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I
+     perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound."[284:15]
+
+The knowledge here provided for may be regarded as empirical because
+the reality in question is an individual present in the moment of the
+knowledge. Particular acts of perception are said directly to reveal not
+only perceptual objects, but perceiving subjects. And the conception of
+spiritual substance, once accredited, may then be extended to account
+for social relations and to fill in the nature of God. The latter
+extension, in so far as it attributes such further predicates as
+universality and infinity, implies still a third epistemology, and
+threatens to pass over into rationalism. But the knowledge of one's
+fellow-men may, it is claimed, be regarded as immediate, like the
+knowledge of one's self. Perceptual and volitional activity has a sense
+for itself and also a sense for other like activity. The self is both
+self-conscious and socially conscious in an immediate experience of the
+same type.
+
+[Sidenote: Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate
+Knowledge of the Will.]
+
+§ 135. But this general spiritualistic conception is developed with less
+singleness of purpose in Berkeley than among the _voluntarists_ and
+_panpsychists_ who spring from Schopenhauer, the orientalist, pessimist,
+and mystic among the German Kantians of the early nineteenth century.
+His great book, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," opens with the
+phenomenalistic contention that "the world is my idea." It soon appears,
+however, that the "my" is more profoundly significant than the "idea."
+Nature is my creation, due to the working within me of certain fixed
+principles of thought, such as space, time, and causality. But nature,
+just because it is my creation, is less than me: is but a manifestation
+of the true being for which I must look _within_ myself. But this inner
+self cannot be made an object of thought, for that would be only to
+create another term of nature. The will itself, from which such creation
+springs, is "that which is most immediate" in one's consciousness, and
+"makes itself known in a direct manner in its particular acts." The term
+_will_ is used by Schopenhauer as a general term covering the whole
+dynamics of life, instinct and desire, as well as volition. It is that
+sense of life-preserving and life-enhancing appetency which is the
+conscious accompaniment of struggle. With its aid the inwardness of the
+whole world may now be apprehended.
+
+     "Whoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge
+     _in abstracto_, and therefore clear and certain, of what
+     everyone knows directly _in concreto_, _i. e._, as feeling, a
+     knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his
+     phenomenal being, . . . and that his will is that which is
+     most immediate in his consciousness, . . . will find that of
+     itself it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost
+     being of the whole of nature; for he now transfers it to all
+     those phenomena which are not given to him, like his own
+     phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge,
+     but only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as _idea_
+     alone."[287:16]
+
+The heart of reality is thus known by an "intuitive interpretation,"
+which begins at home in the individual's own heart.
+
+[Sidenote: Panpsychism.]
+
+§ 136. The panpsychist follows the same course of reflection. There is
+an outwardness and an inwardness of nature, corresponding to the
+knower's body on the one hand, and his feeling or will on the other.
+With this principle in hand one may pass down the whole scale of being
+and discover no breach of continuity. Such an interpretation of nature
+has been well set forth by a contemporary writer, who quotes the
+following from the botanist, C. v. Naegeli:
+
+     "Sensation is clearly connected with the reflex actions of
+     higher animals. We are obliged to concede it to the other
+     animals also, and we have no grounds for denying it to plants
+     and inorganic bodies. The sensation arouses in us a condition
+     of comfort and discomfort. In general, the feeling of
+     pleasure arises when the natural impulses are satisfied, the
+     feeling of pain when they are not satisfied. Since all
+     material processes are composed of movements of molecules and
+     elementary atoms, pleasure and pain must have their seat in
+     these particles. . . . Thus the same mental thread runs
+     through all material phenomena. The human mind is nothing but
+     the highest development on our earth of the mental processes
+     which universally animate and move nature."[288:17]
+
+According to panpsychism, then, physical nature is the manifestation of
+an _appetency or bare consciousness generalized from the thinker's
+awareness of his most intimate self_. Such appetency or bare
+consciousness is the essential or substantial state of that which
+appears as physical nature.
+
+[Sidenote: The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for
+Objective Knowledge.]
+
+§ 137. We must now turn to the efforts which this doctrine has made to
+maintain itself against the sceptical trend of its own epistemology. For
+precisely as in the case of phenomenalism its dialectical principle
+threatens to be self-destructive. Immediate presence is still the test
+of knowledge. But does not immediate presence connote relativity and
+inadequacy, at best; an initial phase of knowledge that must be
+supplemented and corrected before objective reality and valid truth are
+apprehended? Does not the individuality of the individual thinker
+connote the very maximum of error? Indeed, spiritualism would seem to
+have exceeded even Protagoreanism itself, and to have passed from
+scepticism to deliberate nihilism. The object of knowledge is no longer
+even, as with the phenomenalist, the thinker's thought, but only his
+_thinking_. And if the thinker's thought is relative to him, then the
+thinker's act of thinking is the very vanishing-point of relativity, the
+negative term of a negating relation. How is a real, a self-subsistent
+world to be composed of such? Impelled by a half-conscious realization
+of the hopelessness of this situation, the exponent of spiritualism has
+sought to universalize his conception; to define an _absolute or
+ultimate spirit_ other than the individual thinker, though known in and
+through him. But it is clear that this development of spiritualism, like
+all of the speculative procedure of subjectivism, threatens to exceed
+the scope of the original principle of knowledge. There is a strong
+presumption against the possibility of introducing a knowledge of God by
+the way of the particular presentations of an individual consciousness.
+
+[Sidenote: Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism.
+Mysticism.]
+
+§ 138. Schopenhauer must be credited with a genuine effort to accept the
+metaphysical consequences of his epistemology. His epistemology, as we
+have seen, defined knowledge as centripetal. The object of real
+knowledge is identical with the subject of knowledge. If I am to know
+the universal will, therefore, I must in knowing become that will. And
+this Schopenhauer maintains. The innermost heart of the individual into
+which he may retreat, even from his private will, is--the universal. But
+there is another way of arriving at the same knowledge. In contemplation
+I may become absorbed in principles and laws, rather than be diverted by
+the particular spacial and temporal objects, until (and this is
+peculiarly true of the æsthetic experience) my interest no longer
+distinguishes itself, but coincides with truth. In other words, abstract
+thinking and pure willing are not opposite extremes, but adjacent points
+on the deeper or transcendent circle of experience. One may reach this
+part of the circle by moving in either of two directions that at the
+start are directly opposite: by turning in upon the subject or by
+utterly giving one's self up to the object. Reality obtains no
+definition by this means. Philosophy, for Schopenhauer, is rather a
+programme for realizing the state in which I will the universal and know
+the universal will. The final theory of knowledge, then, is mysticism,
+reality directly apprehended in a supreme and incommunicable experience,
+direct and vivid, like perception, and at the same time universal, like
+thought. But the empiricism with which Schopenhauer began, the appeal to
+a familiar experience of self as will, has meanwhile been forgotten. The
+idea as object of my perception, and the will as its subject were in the
+beginning regarded as common and verifiable items of experience. But
+who, save the occasional philosopher, knows a universal will? Nor have
+attempts to avoid mysticism, while retaining Schopenhauer's first
+principle, been successful. Certain voluntarists and panpsychists have
+attempted to do without the universal will, and define the world solely
+in terms of the many individual wills. But, as Schopenhauer himself
+pointed out, individual wills cannot be distinguished except in terms of
+something other than will, such as space and time. The same is true if
+for will there be substituted inner feeling or consciousness. Within
+this category individuals can be distinguished only as points of view,
+which to be comparable at all must contain common objects, or be
+defined in terms of a system of relations like that of the physical
+world or that of an ethical community. The conception of pure will or
+pure feeling inevitably attaches to itself that of an undivided unity,
+if for no other reason because there is no ground for distinction. And
+such a unity, a will or consciousness that is no particular act or idea,
+can be known only in the unique experience which mysticism provides.
+
+[Sidenote: Objective Spiritualism.]
+
+§ 139. The way of Schopenhauer is the way of one who adheres to the
+belief that what the thinker knows must always be a part of himself, his
+state or his activity. From this point of view the important element of
+being, its very essence or substance, is not any definable nature but an
+immediate relation to the knower. The consequence is that the universe
+in the last analysis can only be defined as a supreme state or activity
+into which the individual's consciousness may develop. Spiritualism has,
+however, other interests, interests which may be quite independent of
+epistemology. It is speculatively interested in a kind of being which it
+defines as spiritual, and in terms of which it proposes to define the
+universe. Such procedure is radically different from the
+epistemological criticism which led Berkeley to maintain that the
+_esse_ of objects is in their _percipi_, or Schopenhauer to maintain
+that "the world is my idea," or that led both of these philosophers to
+find a deeper reality in immediately intuited self-activity. For now it
+is proposed to _understand_ spirit, discover its properties, and to
+acknowledge it only where these properties appear. I may now know spirit
+as an object; which in its properties, to be sure, is quite different
+from matter, but which like matter is capable of subsisting quite
+independently of my knowledge. This is a metaphysical spiritualism quite
+distinct from epistemological spiritualism, and by no means easily made
+consistent therewith. Indeed, it exhibits an almost irrepressible
+tendency to overstep the bounds both of empiricism and subjectivism, an
+historical connection with which alone justifies its introduction in the
+present chapter.
+
+[Sidenote: Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness and Order.]
+
+§ 140. To return again to the instructive example of Bishop Berkeley, we
+find him proving God from the evidence of him in experience, or the need
+of him to support the claims of experience.
+
+     "But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find
+     the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like
+     dependence on _my_ will. When in broad daylight I open my
+     eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or
+     no, or to determine what particular objects shall present
+     themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and
+     other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of
+     _my_ will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that
+     produces them.
+
+     The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than
+     those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness,
+     order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those
+     which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a
+     regular train or series--the admirable connection whereof
+     sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its
+     Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the
+     Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called
+     _the laws of nature_."[294:18]
+
+Of the attributes of experience here in question, independence or
+"steadiness" is not regarded as _prima facie_ evidence of spirit, but
+rather as an aspect of experience for which some cause is necessary. But
+it is assumed that the power to "produce," with which such a cause must
+be endowed, is the peculiar prerogative of spirit, and that this cause
+gives further evidence of its spiritual nature, of its eminently
+spiritual nature, in the orderliness and the goodness of its effects.
+
+     "The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the
+     goodness that perfects all things is the Supreme
+     Being."[294:19]
+
+That spirit is possessed of causal efficacy, Berkeley has in an earlier
+passage proved by a direct appeal to the individual's sense of power.
+
+     "I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary
+     and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than
+     _willing_, and straightway this or that idea arises in my
+     fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way
+     for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very
+     properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and
+     grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents,
+     or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse
+     ourselves with words."[295:20]
+
+Although Berkeley is here in general agreement with a very considerable
+variety of philosophical views, it will be readily observed that this
+doctrine tends to lapse into mysticism whenever it is retained in its
+purity. Berkeley himself admitted that there was no "idea" of such
+power. And philosophers will as a rule either obtain an idea
+corresponding to a term or amend the term--always excepting the mystical
+appeal to an inarticulate and indefinable experience. Hence pure power
+revealed in an ineffable immediate experience tends to give place to
+kinds of power to which some definite meaning may be attached. The
+energy of physics, defined by measurable quantitative equivalence, is a
+case in point. The idealistic trend is in another direction, power
+coming to signify ethical or logical connection. Similarly, in the later
+philosophy of Berkeley himself, God is known by the nature of his
+activity rather than by the fact of his activity; and we are said "to
+account for a thing, when we show that it is so best." God's power, in
+short, becomes indistinguishable from his universality attended with the
+attributes of goodness and orderliness. But this means that the analogy
+of the human spirit, conscious of its own activity, is no longer the
+basis of the argument. By the divine will is now meant ethical
+principles, rather than the "here am I willing" of the empirical
+consciousness. Similarly the divine mind is defined in terms of logical
+principles, such as coherence and order, rather than in terms of the
+"here am I thinking" of the finite knower himself. But enough has been
+said to make it plain that this is no longer the stand-point of
+empirio-idealism. Indeed, in his last philosophical writing, the
+"Siris," Berkeley is so far removed from the principles of knowledge
+which made him at once the disciple and the critic of Locke, as to
+pronounce himself the devotee of Platonism and the prophet of
+transcendentalism. The former strain appears in his conclusion that
+"the _principles_ of science are neither objects of sense nor
+imagination; and that intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to
+truth."[297:21] His transcendentalism appears in his belief that such
+principles, participating in the vital unity of the Individual Purpose,
+constitute the meaning and so the substantial essence of the universe.
+
+[Sidenote: The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself.]
+
+§ 141. Such then are the various paths which lead from subjectivism to
+other types of philosophy, demonstrating the peculiar aptitude of the
+former for departing from its first principle. Beginning with the
+relativity of all knowable reality to the individual knower, it
+undertakes to conceive reality in one or the other of the terms of this
+relation, as particular state of knowledge or as individual subject of
+knowledge. But these terms develop an intrinsic nature of their own, and
+become respectively _empirical datum_, and _logical_ or _ethical
+principle_. In either case the subjectivistic principle of knowledge has
+been abandoned. Those whose speculative interest in a definable
+objective world has been less strong than their attachment to this
+principle, have either accepted the imputation of scepticism, or had
+recourse to the radical epistemological doctrine of mysticism.
+
+[Sidenote: Ethical Theories. Relativism.]
+
+§ 142. Since the essence of subjectivism is epistemological rather than
+metaphysical, its practical and religious implications are various. The
+ethical theories which are corollary to the tendencies expounded above,
+range from extreme egoism to a mystical universalism. The close
+connection between the former and relativism is evident, and the form of
+egoism most consistent with epistemological relativism is to be found
+among those same Sophists who first maintained this latter doctrine. If
+we may believe Plato, the Sophists sought to create for their individual
+pupils an _appearance_ of good. In the "Theaetetus," Socrates is
+represented as speaking thus on behalf of Protagoras:
+
+     "And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no
+     existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the
+     evils which are and appear to a man, into goods which are and
+     appear to him. . . . I say that they (the wise men) are the
+     physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of
+     plants--for the husbandmen also take away the evil and
+     disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and
+     healthy sensations as well as true ones; and the wise and good
+     rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil seem just to
+     states; for whatever appears to be just and fair to a state,
+     while sanctioned by a state, is just and fair to it; but the
+     teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the
+     evil, both in appearance and in reality."[299:22]
+
+As truth is indistinguishable from the appearance of truth to the
+individual, so good is indistinguishable from a particular seeming good.
+The supreme moral value according to this plan of life is the agreeable
+feeling tone of that dream world to which the individual is forever
+consigned. The possible perfection of an experience which is "reduced to
+a swarm of impressions," and "ringed round" for each one of us by a
+"thick wall of personality" has been brilliantly depicted in the passage
+already quoted from Walter Pater, in whom the naturalistic and
+subjectivistic motives unite.[299:23] If all my experience is strictly
+my own, then my good must likewise be my own. And if all of my
+experience is valid only in its instants of immediacy, then my best good
+must likewise consist in some "exquisite passion," or stirring of the
+senses.
+
+[Sidenote: Pessimism and Self-denial.]
+
+§ 143. But for Schopenhauer the internal world opens out into the
+boundless and unfathomable sea of the universal will. If I retire from
+the world upon my own private feelings, I am still short of the true
+life, for I am asserting myself against the world. I should seek a sense
+of unison with a world whose deeper heart-beats I may learn to feel and
+adopt as the rhythm of my own. The folly of willing for one's private
+self is the ground of Schopenhauer's pessimism.
+
+     "All _willing_ arises from want, therefore from deficiency,
+     and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends
+     it; yet for one wish that is satisfied there remain at least
+     ten which are denied. Further, the desire lasts long, the
+     demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily
+     measured out. But even the final satisfaction is itself only
+     apparent; every satisfied wish at once makes room for a new
+     one, both are illusions; the one is known to be so, the other
+     not yet. No attained object of desire can give lasting
+     satisfaction, but merely a fleeting gratification; it is like
+     the alms thrown to the beggar, that keeps him alive to-day
+     that his misery may be prolonged till the morrow. . . . The
+     subject of willing is thus constantly stretched on the
+     revolving wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the
+     Danaids, is the ever-longing Tantalus."[300:24]
+
+The escape from this torture and self-deception is possible through the
+same mystical experience, the same blending with the universe that
+conditions knowledge.
+
+[Sidenote: The Ethics of Welfare.]
+
+§ 144. But though pleasant dreaming be the most consistent practical
+sequel to a subjectivistic epistemology, its _individualism_ presents
+another basis for life with quite different possibilities of emphasis.
+It may develop into an aggressive egoism of the type represented by the
+sophist Thrasymachus, in his proclamation that "might is right, justice
+the interest of the stronger."[301:25] But more commonly it is tempered
+by a conception of social interest, and serves as the champion of action
+against contemplation. The gospel of action is always individualistic.
+It requires of the individual a sense of his independence, and of the
+real virtue of his initiative. Hence those voluntarists who emphasize
+the many individual wills and decline to reduce them, after the manner
+of Schopenhauer, to a universal, may be said to afford a direct
+justification of it. It is true that this practical realism threatens
+the tenability of an epistemological idealism, but the two have been
+united, and because of their common emphasis upon the individual such
+procedure is not entirely inconsequential. Friedrich Paulsen, whose
+panpsychism has already been cited, is an excellent case in point. The
+only good, he maintains, is "welfare," the fulfilment of those natural
+desires which both distinguish the individual and signify his
+continuity with all grades of being.
+
+     "The goal at which the will aims does not consist in a maximum
+     of pleasurable feelings, but in the normal exercise of the
+     vital functions for which the species is predisposed. In the
+     case of man the mode of life is on the whole determined by the
+     nature of the historical unity from which the individual
+     evolves as a member. Here the objective content of life, after
+     which the will strives, also enters into consciousness with
+     the progressive evolution of presentation; the type of life
+     becomes a conscious ideal of life."[302:26]
+
+Here, contrary to the teaching of Schopenhauer, the good consists in
+individual attainment, the extension and fulfilment of the _distinct_
+interests that arise from the common fund of nature. To be and to do to
+the uttermost, to realize the maximum from nature's investment in one's
+special capacities and powers--this is indeed the first principle of a
+morality of action.
+
+[Sidenote: The Ethical Community.]
+
+§ 145. But a type of ethics still further removed from the initial
+relativism has been adopted and more or less successfully assimilated by
+subjectivistic philosophies. Accepting Berkeley's spirits, with their
+indefinite capacities, and likewise the stability of the ideal
+principles that underlie a God-administered world, and morality becomes
+the obedience which the individual renders to the law. The individual,
+free to act in his own right, coöperates with the purposes of the
+general spiritual community, whose laws are worthy of obedience though
+not coercive. The recognition of such a spiritual citizenship, entailing
+opportunities, duties, and obligations, rather than thraldom, partakes
+of the truth as well as the inadequacy of common-sense.
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Mysticism.]
+
+§ 146. As for religion, at least two distinct practical appreciations of
+the universe have been historically associated with this chapter in
+philosophy. The one of these is the mysticism of Schopenhauer, the
+religious sequel to a universalistic voluntarism. Schopenhauer's ethics,
+his very philosophy, is religion. For the good and the true are alike
+attainable only through identification with the Absolute Will. This
+consummation of life, transcending practical and theoretical
+differences, engulfing and effacing all qualities and all values, is
+like the Nirvâna of the Orient--a positive ideal only for one who has
+appraised the apparent world at its real value.
+
+     "Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the
+     entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full
+     of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom
+     the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world,
+     which is so real, with all it's suns and milky-ways--is
+     nothing."[304:27]
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Individual Coöperation with God.]
+
+§ 147. From the union of the two motives of voluntarism and
+individualism springs another and a more familiar type of religion, that
+of coöperative spiritual endeavor. In the religion of Schopenhauer the
+soul must utterly lose itself for the sake of peace; here the soul must
+persist in its own being and activity for the sake of the progressive
+goodness of the world. For Schopenhauer God is the universal solution,
+in which all motions cease and all differences disappear; here God is
+the General of moral forces. The deeper and more significant universe is
+
+     "a society of rational agents, acting under the eye of
+     Providence, concurring in one design to promote the common
+     benefit of the whole, and conforming their actions to the
+     established laws and order of the Divine parental wisdom:
+     wherein each particular agent shall not consider himself
+     apart, but as the member of a great City, whose author and
+     founder is God: in which the civil laws are no other than the
+     rules of virtue and the duties of religion: and where
+     everyone's true interest is combined with his duty."[304:28]
+
+But so uncompromising an optimism is not essential to this religion.
+Its distinction lies rather in its acceptance of the manifest plurality
+of souls, and its appeal to the faith that is engendered by
+service.[305:29] As William James has said:
+
+     "Even God's being is sacred from ours. To coöperate with his
+     creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants
+     of us. In such coöperation with his purposes, not in any
+     chimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretical
+     drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our
+     destiny."[305:30]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[267:1] PRELIMINARY NOTE. By _Subjectivism_ is meant that system of
+philosophy which construes the universe in accordance with the
+epistemological principle that _all knowledge is of its own states or
+activities_. In so far as subjectivism reduces reality to _states of
+knowledge_, such as _perceptions_ or _ideas_, it is _phenomenalism_. In
+so far as it reduces reality to a more _internal active principle_ such
+as _spirit_ or _will_, it is _spiritualism_.
+
+[268:2] Berkeley: _Complete Works_, Vol. I, p. 352. Fraser's edition.
+
+[269:3] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 156. Translation by Jowett. The italics are
+mine.
+
+[270:4] Plato: _Op. cit._, 166.
+
+[271:5] ἀληθὲς ὃ ἑκάστῳ ἑκάστοτε δοκεῖ.
+
+[273:6] For another issue out of this situation, cf. §§ 185-187.
+
+[276:7] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 380-381.
+
+[276:8] _Ibid._, p. 389.
+
+[277:9] _Ibid._, p. 397.
+
+[278:10] _Ibid._, p. 418.
+
+[279:11] _Ibid._, pp. 403-404.
+
+[282:12] Cf. Pearson: _Grammar of Science_, Chap. II. See above, § 118.
+
+[283:13] See Chap. XI. Cf. also § 140.
+
+[283:14] The same may be said of the "permanent possibilities of
+sensation," proposed by J. S. Mill. Such possibilities outside of actual
+perception are either nothing or things such as they are known to be
+_in_ perception. In either case they are not perceptions.
+
+In Ernst Mach's _Analysis of Sensations_, the reader will find an
+interesting transition from sensationalism to realism through the
+substitution of the term _Bestandtheil_ for _Empfindung_. (See
+Translation by Williams, pp. 18-20.) See below, § 207.
+
+[284:15] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, p. 447.
+
+[287:16] Schopenhauer: _The World as Will and Idea_. Translation by
+Haldane and Kemp, Vol. I, p. 141.
+
+[288:17] Quoted from Naegeli: _Die Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der
+Abstammungslehre_, by Friedrich Paulsen, in his _Introduction to
+Philosophy_. Translation by Thilly, p. 103.
+
+[294:18] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, p. 273.
+
+[294:19] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 272-273.
+
+[295:20] _Op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 278.
+
+[297:21] _Op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 249.
+
+[299:22] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 167. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[299:23] See § 121.
+
+[300:24] Schopenhauer: _Op. cit._ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, Vol.
+I, pp. 253-254.
+
+[301:25] See Plato: _Republic_, Bk. I, 338.
+
+[302:26] Paulsen: _Op. cit._, p. 423.
+
+[304:27] Schopenhauer: _Op. cit._ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, p.
+532.
+
+[304:28] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 138.
+
+[305:29] For an interesting characterization of this type of religion,
+cf. Royce: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, p. 46.
+
+[305:30] James: _The Will to Believe_, p. 141.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+ABSOLUTE REALISM[306:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, or the
+Absolute.]
+
+§ 148. No one has understood better than the philosopher himself that he
+cannot hope to be popular with men of practical common-sense. Indeed, it
+has commonly been a matter of pride with him. The classic representation
+of the philosopher's faith in himself is to be found in Plato's
+"Republic." The philosopher is there portrayed in the famous cave simile
+as one who having seen the light itself can no longer distinguish the
+shadows which are apparent to those who sit perpetually in the twilight.
+Within the cave of shadows he is indeed less at his ease than those who
+have never seen the sun. But since he knows the source of the shadows,
+his knowledge surrounds that of the shadow connoisseurs. And his
+equanimity need not suffer from the contempt of those whom he
+understands better than they understand themselves. The history of
+philosophy is due to the dogged persistence with which the philosopher
+has taken himself seriously and endured the poor opinion of the world.
+But the pride of the philosopher has done more than perpetuate the
+philosophical outlook and problem; it has led to the formulation of a
+definite philosophical conception, and of two great philosophical
+doctrines. The conception is that of the _absolute_; and the doctrines
+are that of the _absolute being_, and that of the _absolute self_ or
+_mind_. The former of these doctrines is the topic of the present
+chapter.
+
+Among the early Greeks the rôle of the philosopher was one of
+superlative dignity. In point of knowledge he was less easily satisfied
+than other men. He thought beyond immediate practical problems, devoting
+himself to a profounder reflection, that could not but induce in him a
+sense of superior intellectual worth. The familiar was not binding upon
+him, for his thought was emancipated from routine and superficiality.
+Furthermore his intellectual courage and resolution did not permit him
+to indulge in triviality, doubt, or paradox. He sought his own with a
+faith that could not be denied. Even Heraclitus the Dark, who was also
+called "the Weeping Philosopher," because he found at the very heart of
+nature that transiency which the philosophical mind seeks to escape,
+felt himself to be exalted as well as isolated by that insight. But this
+sentiment of personal aloofness led at once to a division of experience.
+He who knows truly belongs to another and more abiding world. As there
+is a philosophical way of thought, there is a philosophical way of life,
+and _a philosophical object_. Since the philosopher and the common man
+do not see alike, the terms of their experience are incommensurable. In
+Parmenides the Eleatic this motive is most strikingly exhibited. There
+is a _Way of Truth_ which diverges from the _Way of Opinion_. The
+philosopher walks the former way alone. And there is an object of truth,
+accessible only to one who takes this way of truth. Parmenides finds
+this object to be the content of pure affirmation.
+
+     "One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that _It
+     is_. In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and
+     indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end.
+     Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now _it is_, all at once,
+     a continuous one."[308:2]
+
+The philosophy of Parmenides, commonly called the Eleatic Philosophy,
+is notable for this emergence of the pure concept of _absolute being_ as
+the final object of knowledge. The philosopher aims to discover that
+which is, and so turns away from that which is not or that which ceases
+to be. The negative and transient aspects of experience only hinder him
+in his search for the eternal. It was the great Eleatic insight to
+realize that the outcome of thought is thus predetermined; that the
+answer to philosophy is contained in the question of philosophy. The
+philosopher, in that he resolutely avoids all partiality, relativity,
+and superficiality, must affirm a complete, universal, and ultimate
+being as the very object of that perfect knowledge which he means to
+possess. This object is known in the history of these philosophies as
+the _infinite_ or _absolute_.[309:3]
+
+[Sidenote: The Eleatic Conception of Being.]
+
+§ 149. The Eleatic reasons somewhat as follows. The philosopher seeks to
+know what is. The object of his knowledge will then contain as its
+primary and essential predicate, that of being. It is a step further to
+_define_ being in terms of this essential predicate.
+
+Parmenides thinks of being as a power or strength, a positive
+self-maintenance to which all affirmations refer. The remainder of the
+Eleatic philosophy is the analysis of this concept and the proof of its
+implications. Being must persist through all change, and span all
+chasms. Before being there can be only nothing, which is the same as to
+say that so far as being is concerned there is no before. Similarly
+there can be no after or beyond. There can be no motion, change, or
+division of being, because being will be in all parts of every division,
+and in all stages of every process. Hence being is "uncreated and
+indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end."
+
+The argument turns upon the application to being as a whole of the
+meaning and the implications of _only being_. Being is the affirmative
+or positive. From that _alone_, one can derive only such properties as
+eternity or unity. For generation and decay and plurality may belong to
+that which is _also_ affirmative and positive, but not to that which is
+affirmative and positive _only_. The Eleatic philosophy is due, then, to
+the determination to derive the whole of reality from the bare necessity
+of being, to cut down reality to what flows entirely from the assertion
+of its only known necessary aspect, that of being. We meet here in its
+simplest form a persistent rationalistic motive, the attempt to derive
+the universe from the isolation and analysis of its most universal
+character. As in the case of every well-defined philosophy, this motive
+is always attended by a "besetting" problem. Here it is the accounting
+for what, empirically at least, is alien to that universal character.
+And this difficulty is emphasized rather than resolved by Parmenides in
+his designation of a limbo of opinion, "in which is no true belief at
+all," to which the manifold of common experience with all its
+irrelevancies can be relegated.
+
+[Sidenote: Spinoza's Conception of Substance.]
+
+§ 150. The Eleatic philosophy, enriched and supplemented, appears many
+centuries later in the rigorous rationalism of Spinoza.[311:4] With
+Spinoza philosophy is a demonstration of necessities after the manner of
+geometry. Reality is to be set forth in theorems derived from
+fundamental axioms and definitions. As in the case of Parmenides, these
+necessities are the implications of the very problem of being. The
+philosopher's problem is made to solve itself. But for Spinoza that
+problem is more definite and more pregnant. The problematic being must
+not only be, but must be _sufficient to itself_. What the philosopher
+seeks to know is primarily an intrinsic entity. Its nature must be
+independent of other natures, and my knowledge of it independent of my
+knowledge of anything else. Reality is something which need not be
+sought further. So construed, being is in Spinoza's philosophy termed
+_substance_. It will be seen that to define substance is to affirm the
+existence of it, for substance is so defined as to embody the very
+qualification for existence. Whatever exists exists under the form of
+substance, as that "which is in itself, and is conceived through itself:
+in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently
+of any other conception."[312:5]
+
+[Sidenote: Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The Modes and
+the Attributes.]
+
+§ 151. There remains but one further fundamental thesis for the
+establishment of the Spinozistic philosophy, the thesis which maintains
+the exclusive existence of the one "absolutely infinite being," or God.
+The exclusive existence of God follows from his existence, because of
+the exhaustiveness of his nature. His is the nature "consisting in
+infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite
+essentiality." He will contain all meaning, and all possible meaning,
+within his fixed and necessary constitution. It is evident that if such
+a God exist, nothing can fall outside of him. One such substance must be
+the only substance. But upon what grounds are we to assert God's
+existence?
+
+To proceed further with Spinoza's philosophy we must introduce two terms
+which are scarcely less fundamental in his system than that of
+substance. The one of these is "attribute," by which he means _kind_ or
+general property; the other is "mode," by which he means _case_ or
+individual thing. Spinoza's proof of God consists in showing that no
+single mode, single attribute, or finite group of modes or attributes,
+can be a substance; but only an infinite system of all modes of all
+attributes. Translated into common speech this means that neither kinds
+nor cases, nor special groups of either, can stand alone and be of
+themselves, but only the unity of all possible cases of all possible
+kinds.
+
+The argument concerning the possible substantiality of the case or
+individual thing is relatively simple. Suppose an attribute or kind,
+_A_, of which there are cases _am_{1}, _am_{2}, _am_{3}, etc. The
+number of cases is never involved in the nature of the kind, as is seen
+for example in the fact that the definition of triangle prescribes no
+special number of individual triangles. Hence _am_{1}, _am_{2},
+_am_{3}, etc., must be explained by something outside of their nature.
+Their being cases of _A_ does not account for their existing severally.
+This is Spinoza's statement of the argument that individual events, such
+as motions or sensations, are not self-dependent, but belong to a
+context of like events which are mutually dependent.
+
+The question of the attribute is more difficult. Why may not an
+attribute as a complete domain of interdependent events, itself be
+independent or substantial? Spinoza's predecessor, Descartes, had
+maintained precisely that thesis in behalf of the domain of thought and
+the domain of space. Spinoza's answer rests upon the famous ontological
+argument, inherited from scholasticism and generally accepted in the
+first period of modern philosophy. The evidence of existence, he
+declares, is clear and distinct conceivability.
+
+     "For a person to say that he has a clear and distinct--that
+     is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is not sure
+     whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said
+     that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was
+     false."[314:6]
+
+Now we can form a clear and distinct idea of an absolutely infinite
+being that shall have all possible attributes. This idea is a
+well-recognized standard and object of reference for thought. But it is
+a conception which is highly qualified, not only through its clearness
+and distinctness, but also through its abundance of content. It affirms
+itself therefore with a certainty that surpasses any other certainty,
+because it is supported by each and every other certainty, and even by
+the residuum of possibility. If any intelligible meaning be permitted to
+affirm itself, so much the more irresistible is the claim of this
+infinitely rich meaning. Since every attribute contributes to its
+validity, the being with infinite attributes is infinitely or absolutely
+valid. The conclusion of the argument is now obvious. If the being
+constituted by the infinite attributes exists, it swallows up all
+possibilities and exists exclusively.
+
+[Sidenote: The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God.]
+
+§ 152. The vulnerable point in Spinoza's argument can thus be expressed:
+that which is important is questionable, and that which is
+unquestionable is of doubtful importance. Have I indeed a clear and
+distinct idea of an absolutely infinite being? The answer turns upon the
+meaning of the phrase "idea of." It is true I can add to such meaning
+as I apprehend the thought of possible other meaning, and suppose the
+whole to have a definiteness and systematic unity like that of the
+triangle. But such an idea is problematic. I am compelled to use the
+term "possible," and so to confess the failure of definite content to
+measure up to my idea. My idea of an absolutely infinite being is like
+my idea of a universal language: I can think _of_ it, but I cannot
+_think it out_, for lack of data or because of the conflicting testimony
+of other data. If I mean the infinity of my being to be a term of
+inclusiveness, and to insist that the all must be, and that there can be
+nothing not included in the all, I can scarcely be denied. But it is
+reasonable to doubt the importance of such a truth. If, on the other
+hand, I mean that my infinite being shall have the compactness and
+organic unity of a triangle, I must admit that such a being is indeed
+problematic. The degree to which the meaning of the part is dependent
+upon the meaning of the whole, or the degree to which the geometrical
+analogy is to be preferred to the analogy of aggregates, like the events
+within a year, is a problem that falls quite outside Spinoza's
+fundamental arguments.
+
+[Sidenote: Spinoza's Provision for the Finite.]
+
+§ 153. But the advance of Spinoza over the Eleatics must not be lost
+sight of. The modern philosopher has so conceived being as to provide
+for parts within an individual unity. The geometrical analogy is a most
+illuminating one, for it enables us to understand how manyness may be
+indispensable to a being that is essentially unitary. The triangle as
+triangle is one. But it could not be such without sides and angles. The
+unity is equally necessary to the parts, for sides and angles of a
+triangle could not be such without an arrangement governed by the nature
+triangle. The whole of nature may be similarly conceived: as the
+reciprocal necessity of _natura naturans_, or nature defined in respect
+of its unity, and _natura naturata_, or nature specified in detail.
+There is some promise here of a reconciliation of the _Way of Opinion_
+with the _Way of Truth_. Opinion would be a gathering of detail, truth a
+comprehension of the intelligible unity. Both would be provided for
+through the consideration that whatever is complete and necessary must
+be made up of incompletenesses that are necessary to it.
+
+[Sidenote: Transition to Teleological Conceptions.]
+
+§ 154. This consideration, however, does not receive its most effective
+formulation in Spinoza. The isolation of the parts, the actual
+severalty and irrelevance of the modes, still presents a grave problem.
+Is there a kind of whole to which not only parts but fragments, or parts
+in their very incompleteness, are indispensable? This would seem to be
+true of a _progression_ or _development_, since that would require both
+perfection as its end, and degrees of imperfection as its stages.
+Spinoza was prevented from making much of this idea by his rejection of
+the principle of _teleology_. He regarded appreciation or valuation as a
+projection of personal bias. "Nature has no particular goal in view,"
+and "final causes are mere human figments." "The perfection of things is
+to be reckoned only from their own nature and power."[318:7] The
+philosophical method which Spinoza here repudiates, the interpretation
+of the world in moral terms, is _Platonism_, an independent and
+profoundly important movement, belonging to the same general realistic
+type with Eleaticism and Spinozism. Absolute being is again the
+fundamental conception. Here, however, it is conceived that being is
+primarily not affirmation or self-sufficiency, but the _good_ or
+_ideal_. There are few great metaphysical systems that have not been
+deeply influenced by Platonism; hence the importance of understanding it
+in its purity. To this end we must return again to the early Greek
+conception of the philosopher; for Platonism, like Eleaticism, is a
+sequel to the philosopher's self-consciousness.
+
+[Sidenote: Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical.]
+
+§ 155. Although the first Greek philosophers, such men as Thales,
+Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, were clearly aware of their
+distinction and high calling, it by no means follows that they were good
+judges of themselves. Their sense of intellectual power was
+unsuspecting; and they praised philosophy without definitely raising the
+question of its meaning. They were like unskilled players who try all
+the stops and scales of an organ, and know that somehow they can make a
+music that exceeds the noises, monotones or simple melodies of those who
+play upon lesser instruments. They knew their power rather than their
+instrument or their art. The first philosophers, in short, were
+self-conscious but not self-critical.
+
+[Sidenote: Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists.]
+
+§ 156. The immediately succeeding phase in the history of Greek
+philosophy was a curtailment, but only in the most superficial sense a
+criticism, of the activity of the philosopher. In the Periclean Age
+philosophy suffered more from inattention than from refutation. The
+scepticism of the sophists, who were the knowing men of this age, was
+not so much conviction as indisposition. They failed to recognize the
+old philosophical problem; it did not _appeal_ to them as a genuine
+problem. The sophists were the intellectual men of an age of _humanism_,
+_individualism_, and _secularism_. These were years in which the circle
+of human society, the state with its institutions, citizenship with its
+manifold activities and interests, bounded the horizon of thought. What
+need to look beyond? Life was not a problem, but an abundant opportunity
+and a sense of capacity. The world was not a mystery, but a place of
+entertainment and a sphere of action. Of this the sophists were faithful
+witnesses. In their love of novelty, irreverence, impressionism,
+elegance of speech, and above all in their praise of individual
+efficiency, they preached and pandered to their age. Their public,
+though it loved to abuse them, was the greatest sophist of them
+all--brilliant and capricious, incomparably rich in all but wisdom. The
+majority belonged to what Plato called "the sight-loving, art-loving,
+busy class." This is an age, then, when the man of practical
+common-sense is preëminent, and the philosopher with his dark sayings
+has passed away. The pride of wisdom has given way to the pride of power
+and the pride of cleverness. The many men pursue the many goods of life,
+and there is no spirit among them all who, sitting apart in
+contemplation, wonders at the meaning of the whole.
+
+[Sidenote: Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher.]
+
+§ 157. But in their midst there moved a strange prophet, whom they
+mistook for one of themselves. Socrates was not one who prayed in the
+wilderness, but a man of the streets and the market-place, who talked
+rather more incessantly than the rest, and apparently with less right.
+He did not testify to the truth, but pleaded ignorance in extenuation of
+an exasperating habit of asking questions. There was, however, a humor
+and a method in his innocence that arrested attention. He was a
+formidable adversary in discussion from his very irresponsibility; and
+he was especially successful with the more rhetorical sophists because
+he chose his own weapons, and substituted critical analysis, question
+and answer, for the long speeches to which these teachers were
+habituated by their profession. He appeared to be governed by an
+insatiable inquisitiveness, and a somewhat malicious desire to discredit
+those who spoke with authority.
+
+But to those who knew him better, and especially to Plato, who knew him
+best, Socrates was at once the sweetest and most compelling spirit of
+his age. There was a kind of truth in the quality of his character. He
+was perhaps _the first of all reverent men_. In the presence of conceit
+his self-depreciation was ironical, but in another presence it was most
+genuine, and his deepest spring of thought and action. This other
+presence was his own ideal. Socrates was sincerely humble because,
+expecting so much of philosophy, he saw his own deficiency. Unlike the
+unskilled player, he did not seek to _make_ music; but he loved music,
+and knew that such music as is indeed music was beyond his power. On the
+other hand he was well aware of his superiority to those in whom
+self-satisfaction was possible because they had no conception of the
+ideal. Of such he could say in truth that they did not know enough even
+to realize the extent of their ignorance. The world has long been
+familiar with the vivid portrayal of the Socratic consciousness which is
+contained in Plato's "Apology." Socrates had set out in life with the
+opinion that his was an age of exceptional enlightenment. But as he
+came to know men he found that after all no one of them really knew what
+he was about. Each "sight-loving, art-loving, busy" man was quite blind
+to the meaning of life. While he was capable of practical achievement,
+his judgments concerning the real virtue of his achievements were
+conventional and ungrounded, a mere reflection of tradition and opinion.
+When asked concerning the meaning of life, or the ground of his
+opinions, he was thrown into confusion or aggravated to meaningless
+reiteration. Such men, Socrates reflected, were both unwise and
+confirmed in their folly through being unconscious of it. Because he
+knew that vanity is vanity, that opinion is indeed mere opinion,
+Socrates felt himself to be the wisest man in a generation of dogged
+unwisdom.
+
+[Sidenote: Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth.]
+
+§ 158. It is scarcely necessary to point out that this insight, however
+negatively it be used, is a revelation of positive knowledge. Heraclitus
+and Parmenides claimed to know; Socrates disclaimed knowledge _for
+reasons_. Like all real criticism this is at once a confounding of error
+and a prophecy of truth. The truth so discovered is indeed not ordinary
+truth concerning historical or physical things, but not on that account
+less significant and necessary. This truth, it will also be admitted, is
+virtually rather than actually set forth by Socrates himself. He knew
+that life has some meaning which those who live with conviction desire
+at heart to realize, and that knowledge has principles with which those
+who speak with conviction intend to be consistent. There is, in short, a
+rational life and a rational discourse. Furthermore, a rational life
+will be a life wisely directed to the end of the good; and a rational
+discourse one constructed with reference to the real natures of things,
+and the necessities which flow from these natures. But Socrates did not
+conclusively define either the meaning of life or the form of perfect
+knowledge. He testified to the necessity of some such truths, and his
+testimony demonstrated both the blindness of his contemporaries and also
+his own deficiency.
+
+[Sidenote: The Historical Preparation for Plato.]
+
+§ 159. The character and method of Socrates have their best foil in the
+sophists, but their bearing on the earlier philosophers is for our
+purposes even more instructive. Unlike Socrates these philosophers had
+not made a study of the task of the philosopher. They _were_
+philosophers--"spectators of all time and all existence"; but they were
+precritical or dogmatic philosophers, to whom it had not occurred to
+define the requirements of philosophy. They knew no perfect knowledge
+other than their own actual knowledge. They defined being and
+interpreted life without reflecting upon the quality of the knowledge
+whose object is being, or the quality of insight that would indeed be
+practical wisdom. But when through Socrates the whole philosophical
+prospect is again revealed after the period of humanistic concentration,
+it is as an ideal whose possibilities, whose necessities, are conceived
+before they are realized. Socrates celebrates the rôle of the
+philosopher without assigning it to himself. The new philosophical
+object is the philosopher himself; and the new insight a knowledge of
+knowledge itself. These three types of intellectual procedure, dogmatic
+speculation concerning being, humanistic interest in life, and the
+self-criticism of thought, form the historical preparation for Plato,
+the philosopher who defined being as the ideal of thought, and upon this
+ground interpreted life.
+
+There is no more striking case in history of the subtle continuity of
+thought than the relation between Plato and his master Socrates. The
+wonder of it is due to the absence of any formulation of doctrine on
+the part of Socrates himself. He only lived and talked; and yet Plato
+created a system of philosophy in which he is faithfully embodied. The
+form of embodiment is the dialogue, in which the talking of Socrates is
+perpetuated and conducted to profounder issues, and in which his life is
+both rendered and interpreted. But as the vehicle of Plato's thought
+preserves and makes perfect the Socratic method, so the thought itself
+begins with the Socratic motive and remains to the end an expression of
+it. The presentiment of perfect knowledge which distinguished Socrates
+from his contemporaries becomes in Plato the clear vision of a realm of
+ideal truth.
+
+[Sidenote: Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good.]
+
+§ 160. Plato begins his philosophy with the philosopher and the
+philosopher's interest. The philosopher is a lover, who like all lovers
+longs for the beautiful. But he is the supreme lover, for he loves not
+the individual beautiful object but the Absolute Beauty itself. He is a
+lover too in that he does not possess, but somehow apprehends his object
+from afar. Though imperfect, he seeks perfection; though standing like
+all his fellows in the twilight of half-reality, he faces toward the
+sun. Now it is the fundamental proposition of the Platonic philosophy
+that reality is the sun itself, or the perfection whose possession every
+wise thinker covets, whose presence would satisfy every longing of
+experience. The real is that beloved object which is "truly beautiful,
+delicate, perfect, and blessed." There is both a serious ground for such
+an affirmation and an important truth in its meaning. The ground is the
+evident incompleteness of every special judgment concerning experience.
+We understand only in part, and we know that we understand only in part.
+What we discover is real enough for practical purposes, but even
+common-sense questions the true reality of its objects. Special
+judgments seem to terminate our thought abruptly and arbitrarily. We
+give "the best answer we can," but such answers do not come as the
+completion of our thinking. Our thought is in some sense surely a
+seeking, and it would appear that we are not permitted to rest and be
+satisfied at any stage of it. If we do so we are like the
+sophists--blind to our own ignorance. But it is equally true that our
+thought is straightforward and progressive. We are not permitted to
+return to earlier stages, but must push on to that which is not less,
+but more, than what we have as yet found. There is good hope, then, of
+understanding what the ideal may be from our knowledge of the direction
+which it impels us to follow.
+
+But to understand Plato's conception of the progression of experience we
+must again catch up the Socratic strain which he weaves into every
+theme. For Socrates, student of life and mankind, all objects were
+objects of interest, and all interests practical interests. One is
+ignorant when one does not know the good of things; opinionative when
+one rates things by conventional standards; wise when one knows their
+real good. In Platonism this practical interpretation of experience
+appears in the principle that the object of perfect knowledge is _the
+good_. The nature of things which one seeks to know better is the good
+of things, the absolute being which is the goal of all thinking is the
+very good itself. Plato does not use the term good in any merely
+utilitarian sense. Indeed it is very significant that for Plato there is
+no cleavage between theoretical and practical interests. To be morally
+good is to know the good, to set one's heart on the true object of
+affection; and to be theoretically sound is to understand perfection.
+The good itself is the end of every aim, that in which all interests
+converge. Hence it cannot be defined, as might a special good, in terms
+of the fulfilment of a set of concrete conditions, but only in terms of
+the sense or direction of all purposes. The following passage occurs in
+the "Symposium":
+
+     "The true order of going or being led by others to the things
+     of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which
+     he mounts upward for the sake of that other beauty, going from
+     one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair
+     forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions,
+     until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute
+     beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty
+     is."[329:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Progression of Experience toward God.]
+
+§ 161. There is, then, a "true order of going," and an order that leads
+from one to many, from thence to forms, from thence to morality, and
+from thence to the general objects of thought or _the ideas_. In the
+"Republic," where the proper education of the philosopher is in
+question, it is proposed that he shall study arithmetic, geometry,
+astronomy, and dialectic. Thus in each case mathematics is the first
+advance in knowledge, and dialectic the nearest to perfection. Most of
+Plato's examples are drawn from mathematics. This science replaces the
+variety and vagueness of the forms of experience with _clear_,
+_unitary_, _definite_, and _eternal_ natures, such as the number and
+the geometrical figure. Thus certain individual things are approximately
+triangular, but subject to alteration, and indefinitely many. On the
+other hand the triangle as defined by geometry is the fixed and
+unequivocal nature or idea which such experiences suggest; and the
+philosophical mind will at once pass to it from these. But the
+mathematical objects are themselves not thoroughly understood when
+understood only in mathematical terms, for the foundations of
+mathematics are arbitrary. And the same is true of all the so-called
+special sciences. Even the scientists themselves, says Plato,
+
+     "only dream about being, but never can behold the waking
+     reality so long as they leave the hypotheses they use
+     unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For
+     when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the
+     conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of
+     he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a conventional
+     statement will ever become science?"[330:9]
+
+Within the science of dialectics we are to understand the connections
+and sequences of ideas themselves, in the hope of eliminating every
+arbitrariness and conventionality within a system of truth that is pure
+and self-luminous rationality. To this science, which is the great
+interest of his later years, Plato contributes only incomplete studies
+and experiments. We must be satisfied with the playful answer with
+which, in the "Republic," he replies to Glaucon's entreaty that "he
+proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain, and
+describe that in like manner": "Dear Glaucon, you will not be able to
+follow me here, though I would do my best."
+
+But a philosophical system has been projected. The real is that perfect
+significance or meaning which thought and every interest suggests, and
+toward which there is in experience an appreciable movement. It is this
+significance which makes things what they really are, and which
+constitutes our understanding of them. In itself it transcends the steps
+which lead to it; "for God," says Plato, "mingles not with men." But it
+is nevertheless the meaning of human life. And this we can readily
+conceive. The last word may transform the sentence from nonsense into
+sense, and it would be true to say that its sense mingles not with
+nonsense. Similarly the last touch of the brush may transform an
+inchoate mass of color into a picture, disarray into an object of
+beauty; and its beauty mingles not with ugliness. So life, when it
+finally realizes itself, obtains a new and incommensurable quality of
+perfection in which humanity is transformed into deity. There is frankly
+no provision for imperfection in such a world. In his later writings
+Plato sounds his characteristic note less frequently, and permits the
+ideal to create a cosmos through the admixture of matter. But in his
+moment of inspiration, the Platonist will have no sense for the
+imperfect. It is the darkness behind his back, or the twilight through
+which he passes on his way to the light. He will use even the beauties
+of earth only "as steps along which he mounts upward for the sake of
+that other beauty."
+
+[Sidenote: Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to
+Platonism.]
+
+§ 162. We have met, then, with two distinct philosophical doctrines
+which arise from the conception of the _absolute_, or the philosopher's
+peculiar object: the doctrine of the _absolute being_ or _substance_,
+and that of the _absolute ideal_ or _good_. Both doctrines are realistic
+in that they assume reality to be demonstrated or revealed, rather than
+created, by knowledge. Both are rationalistic in that they develop a
+system of philosophy from the problem of philosophy, or deduce a
+definition of reality from the conception, of reality. There remains a
+third doctrine of the same type--the philosophy of Aristotle, the most
+elaborately constructed system of Greek antiquity, and the most potent
+influence exerted upon the Scholastic Philosophy of the long mediæval
+period. This philosophy was rehabilitated in the eighteenth century by
+Leibniz, the brilliant librarian of the court of Hanover. The
+extraordinary comprehensiveness of Aristotle's philosophy makes it quite
+impossible to render here even a general account of it. There is
+scarcely any human discipline that does not to some extent draw upon it.
+We are concerned only with the central principles of the metaphysics.
+
+Upon the common ground of rationalism and realism, Plato and Aristotle
+are complementary in temper, method, and principle. Plato's is the
+genius of inspiration and fertility, Aristotle's the genius of
+erudition, mastery, and synthesis. In form, Plato's is the gift of
+expression, Aristotle's the gift of arrangement. Plato was born and bred
+an aristocrat, and became the lover of the best--the uncompromising
+purist; Aristotle is middle-class, and limitlessly wide, hospitable, and
+patient in his interests. Thus while both are speculative and acute,
+Plato's mind is intensive and profound, Aristotle's extensive and
+orderly. It was inevitable, then, that Aristotle should find Plato
+one-sided. The philosophy of the ideal is not worldly enough to be true.
+It is a religion rather than a theory of reality. Aristotle, however,
+would not renounce it, but construe it that it may better provide for
+nature and history. This is the significance of his new terminology.
+Matter, to which Plato reluctantly concedes some room as a principle of
+degradation in the universe, is now admitted to good standing. _Matter_
+or material is indispensable to being as its potentiality or that out of
+which it is constituted. The ideal, on the other hand, loses its
+exclusive title to the predicate of reality, and becomes the _form_, or
+the determinate nature which exists only in its particular embodiments.
+The being or _substance_ is the concrete individual, of which these are
+the abstracted aspects. Aristotle's "form," like Plato's "idea," is a
+teleological principle. The essential nature of the object is its
+perfection. It is furthermore essential to the object that it should
+strive after a higher perfection. With Aristotle, however, the reality
+is not the consummation of the process, the highest perfection in and
+for itself, but the very hierarchy of objects that ascends toward it.
+The highest perfection, or God, is not itself coextensive with being,
+but the final cause of being--that on account of which the whole
+progression of events takes place. Reality is the development with all
+of its ascending stages from the maximum of potentiality, or matter, to
+the maximum of actuality, or God the pure form.
+
+[Sidenote: The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of Platonism
+and Spinozism.]
+
+§ 163. To understand the virtue of this philosophy as a basis for the
+reconciliation of different interests, we must recall the relation
+between Plato and Spinoza. Their characteristic difference appears to
+the best advantage in connection with mathematical truth. Both regarded
+geometry as the best model for philosophical thinking, but for different
+reasons. Spinoza prized geometry for its necessity, and proposed to
+extend it. His philosophy is the attempt to formulate a geometry of
+being, which shall set forth the inevitable certainties of the universe.
+Plato, on the other hand, prized geometry rather for its definition of
+types, for its knowledge of pure or perfect natures such as the circle
+and triangle, which in immediate experience are only approximated. His
+philosophy defines reality similarly as the absolute perfection.
+Applied to nature Spinozism is mechanical, and looks for necessary laws,
+while Platonism is teleological, and looks for adaptation and
+significance. Aristotle's position is intermediate. With Plato he
+affirms that the good is the ultimate principle. But this very principle
+is conceived to govern a universe of substances, each of which maintains
+its own proper being, and all of which are reciprocally determined in
+their changes. Final causes dominate nature, but work through efficient
+causes. Reality is not pure perfection, as in Platonism, nor the
+indifferent necessity, as in Spinozism, but the system of beings
+necessary to the complete progression toward the highest perfection. The
+Aristotelian philosophy promises, then, to overcome both the hard
+realism of Parmenides and Spinoza, and also the supernaturalism of
+Plato.
+
+[Sidenote: Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development to the
+Problem of Imperfection.]
+
+§ 164. But it promises, furthermore, to remedy the defect common to
+these two doctrines, the very besetting problem of this whole type of
+philosophy. That problem, as has been seen, is to provide for the
+imperfect within the perfect, for the temporal incidents of nature and
+history within the eternal being. Many absolutist philosophers have
+declared the explanation of this realm to be impossible, and have
+contented themselves with calling it the realm of opinion or appearance.
+And this realm of opinion or appearance has been used as a proof of the
+absolute. Zeno, the pupil of Parmenides, was the first to elaborate what
+have since come to be known as the paradoxes of the empirical world.
+Most of these paradoxes turn upon the infinite extension and
+divisibility of space and time. Zeno was especially interested in the
+difficulty of conceiving motion, which involves both space and time,
+and thought himself to have demonstrated its absurdity and
+impossibility.[337:10] His argument is thus the complement of
+Parmenides's argument for the indivisible and unchanging substance. Now
+the method which Zeno here adopts may be extended to cover the whole
+realm of nature and history. We should then be dialectically driven from
+this realm to take refuge in absolute being. But the empirical world is
+not destroyed by disparagement, and cannot long lack champions even
+among the absolutists themselves. The reconciliation of nature and
+history with the absolute being became the special interest of Leibniz,
+the great modern Aristotelian. As a scientist and man of affairs, he
+was profoundly dissatisfied with Spinoza's resolution of nature, the
+human individual, and the human society into the universal being. He
+became an advocate of individualism while retaining the general aim and
+method of rationalism.
+
+Like Aristotle, Leibniz attributes reality to individual substances,
+which he calls "monads"; and like Aristotle he conceives these monads to
+compose an ascending order, with God, the monad of monads, as its
+dominating goal.
+
+     "Furthermore, every substance is like an entire world and like
+     a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole world which it
+     portrays, each one in its own fashion; almost as the same city
+     is variously represented according to the various situations
+     of him who is regarding it. Thus the universe is multiplied in
+     some sort as many times as there are substances, and the glory
+     of God is multiplied in the same way by as many wholly
+     different representations of his works."[338:11]
+
+The very "glory of God," then, requires the innumerable finite
+individuals with all their characteristic imperfections, that the
+universe may lack no possible shade or quality of perspective.
+
+[Sidenote: The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved.]
+
+§ 165. But the besetting problem is in fact not solved, and is one of
+the chief incentives to that other philosophy of absolutism which
+defines an absolute spirit or mind. Both Aristotle and Leibniz undertake
+to make the perfection which determines the order of the hierarchy of
+substances, at the same time the responsible author of the whole
+hierarchy. In this case the dilemma is plain. If the divine form or the
+divine monad be other than the stages that lead up to it, these latter
+cannot be essential to it, for God is by definition absolutely
+self-sufficient. If, on the other hand, God is identical with the
+development in its entirety, then two quite incommensurable standards of
+perfection determine the supremacy of the divine nature, that of the
+whole and that of the highest parts of the whole. The union of these two
+and the definition of a perfection which may be at once the development
+and its goal, is the task of absolute idealism.
+
+[Sidenote: Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism.]
+
+§ 166. Of the two fundamental questions of epistemology, absolute
+realism answers the one explicitly, the other implicitly. As respects
+_the source of the most valid knowledge_, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle,
+Spinoza are all agreed: true knowledge is the work of reason, of pure
+intellection. Plato is the great exponent of dialectic, or the
+reciprocal affinities and necessities of ideas. Aristotle is the founder
+of deductive logic. Spinoza proposes to consider even "human actions and
+desires" as though he were "concerned with lines, planes, and solids."
+Empirical data may be the occasion, but cannot be the ground of the
+highest knowledge. According to Leibniz,
+
+     "it seems that necessary truths, such as we find in pure
+     mathematics, and especially in arithmetic and geometry, must
+     have principles whose proof does not depend upon instances,
+     nor, consequently, upon the witness of the senses, although
+     without the senses it would never have come into our heads to
+     think of them."[340:12]
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute Realism.]
+
+§ 167. The answers which these philosophies give to the question of _the
+relation between the state of knowledge and its object_, divide them
+into two groups. Among the ancients reason is regarded as the means of
+emancipation from the limitations of the private mind. "The sleeping
+turn aside each into a world of his own," but "the waking"--the wise
+men--"have one and the same world." What the individual knows belongs to
+himself only in so far as it is inadequate. Hence for Plato the ideas
+are not the attributes of a mind, but that self-subsistent truth to
+which, in its moments of insight, a mind may have access. Opinion is "my
+own," the truth is being. The position of Aristotle is equally clear.
+"Actual knowledge," he maintains, "is identical with its object."
+
+Spinoza and Leibniz belong to another age. Modern philosophy began with
+a new emphasis upon self-consciousness. In his celebrated argument--"I
+think, hence I am" (_cogito ergo sum_)--Descartes established the
+independent and substantial reality of the thinking activity. The "I
+think" is recognized as in itself a fundamental being, known intuitively
+to the thinker himself. Now although Spinoza and Leibniz are finally
+determined by the same motives that obtain in the cases of Plato and
+Aristotle, they must reckon with this new distinction between the
+thinker and his object. The result in the case of Spinoza is the
+doctrine of "parallelism," in which mind is defined as an "infinite
+attribute" of substance, an aspect or phase coextensive with the whole
+of being. The result in the case of Leibniz is his doctrine of
+"representation" and "preëstablished harmony," whereby each monadic
+substance is in itself an active spiritual entity, and belongs to the
+universe through its knowledge of a specific stage of the development of
+the universe. But both Spinoza and Leibniz subordinate such conceptions
+as these to the fundamental identity that pervades the whole. With
+Spinoza the attributes belong to the same absolute substance, and with
+Leibniz the monads represent the one universe. And with both, finally,
+the perfection of knowledge, or the knowledge of God, is
+indistinguishable from its object, God himself. The epistemological
+subtleties peculiar to these philosophers are not stable doctrines, but
+render inevitable either a return to the simpler and bolder realism of
+the Greeks, or a passing over into the more radical and systematic
+doctrine of absolute idealism.
+
+[Sidenote: The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity.]
+
+§ 168. We have met with two general motives, both of which are
+subordinated to the doctrine of an absolute being postulated and sought
+by philosophy. The one of these motives leads to the conception of the
+absolutely necessary and immutable substance, the other to the
+conception of a consummate perfection. There is an _interpretation of
+life_ appropriate to each of these conceptions. Both agree in regarding
+life seriously, in defining reason or philosophy as the highest human
+activity, and in emphasizing the identity of the individual's good with
+the good of the universe. But there are striking differences of tone and
+spirit.
+
+Although the metaphysics of the Stoics have various affiliations, the
+Stoic code of morality is the true practical sequel to the
+Eleatic-Spinozistic view of the world. The Stoic is one who has set his
+affections on the eternal being. He asks nothing of it for himself, but
+identifies himself with it. The saving grace is a sense of reality. The
+virtuous man is not one who remakes the world, or draws upon it for his
+private uses; even less one who rails against it, or complains that it
+has used him ill. He is rather one who recognizes that there is but one
+really valid claim, that of the universe itself. But he not only submits
+to this claim on account of its superiority; he makes it his own. The
+discipline of Stoicism is the regulation of the individual will to the
+end that it may coincide with the universal will. There is a part of man
+by virtue of which he is satisfied with what things are, whatever they
+be. That part, designated by the Stoics as "the ruling part," is the
+reason. In so far as man seeks to understand the laws and natures which
+actually prevail, he cannot be discontented with anything whatsoever
+that may be known to him.
+
+     "For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire
+     anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute
+     acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true:
+     wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these
+     things, the endeavor of the better part of ourselves is in
+     harmony with the order of nature as a whole."[344:13]
+
+In agreement with this teaching of Spinoza's is the famous Stoic formula
+to the effect that "nothing can happen contrary to the will of the wise
+man," who is free through his very acquiescence. If reason be the proper
+"ruling part," the first step in the moral life is the subordination of
+the appetitive nature and the enthronement of reason. One who is himself
+rational will then recognize the fellowship of all rational beings, and
+the unitary and beneficent rationality of the entire universe. The
+highest morality is thus already upon the plane of religion.
+
+[Sidenote: The Platonic Ethics of Perfection.]
+
+§ 169. With Spinoza and the Stoics, the perfection of the individual is
+reduced to what the universe requires of him. The good man is willing to
+be whatever he must be, for the sake of the whole with which through
+reason he is enabled to identify himself. With Plato and Aristotle the
+perfection of the individual himself is commended, that the universe may
+abound in perfection. The good man is the ideal man--the expression of
+the type. And how different the quality of a morality in keeping with
+this principle! The virtues which Plato enumerates--temperance, courage,
+wisdom, and justice--compose a consummate human nature. He is thinking
+not of the necessities but of the possibilities of life. Knowledge of
+the truth will indeed be the best of human living, but knowledge is not
+prized because it can reconcile man to his limitations; it is the very
+overflowing of his cup of life. The youth are to
+
+     "dwell in the land of health, amid fair sights and sounds; and
+     beauty, the effluence of fair works, will visit the eye and
+     ear, like a healthful breeze from a purer region, and
+     insensibly draw the soul even in childhood into harmony with
+     the beauty of reason."[345:14]
+
+Aristotle's account of human perfection is more circumstantial and more
+prosaic. "The function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with
+reason," and his happiness or well-being will consist in the fulness of
+rational living. But such fulness requires a sphere of life that will
+call forth and exercise the highest human capacities. Aristotle frankly
+pronounces "external goods" to be indispensable, and happiness to be
+therefore "a gift of the gods." The rational man will acquire a certain
+exquisiteness or finesse of action, a "mean" of conduct; and this virtue
+will be diversified through the various relations into which he must
+enter, and the different situations which he must meet. He will be not
+merely brave, temperate, and just, as Plato would have him, but liberal,
+magnificent, gentle, truthful, witty, friendly, and in all
+self-respecting or high-minded. In addition to these strictly moral
+virtues, he will possess the intellectual virtues of prudence and
+wisdom, the resources of art and science; and will finally possess the
+gift of insight, or intuitive reason. Speculation will be his highest
+activity, and the mark of his kinship with the gods who dwell in the
+perpetual contemplation of the truth.
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Fulfilment, and the Religion of
+Renunciation.]
+
+§ 170. Aristotle's ethics expresses the buoyancy of the ancient world,
+when the individual does not feel himself oppressed by the eternal
+reality, but rejoices in it. He is not too conscious of his sufferings
+to be disinterested in his admiration and wonder. It is this which
+distinguishes the religion of Plato and Aristotle from that of the
+Stoics and Spinoza. With both alike, religion consists not in making the
+world, but in contemplating it; not in coöperating with God, but in
+worshipping him. Plato and Aristotle, however, do not find any
+antagonism between the ways of God and the natural interests of men. God
+does not differ from men save in his exalted perfection. The
+contemplation and worship of him comes as the final and highest stage of
+a life which is organic and continuous throughout. The love of God is
+the natural love when it has found its true object.
+
+     "For he who has been instructed thus far in the things of
+     love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order
+     and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly
+     perceive a nature of wondrous beauty--and this, Socrates, is
+     that final cause of all our former toils, which in the first
+     place is everlasting--not growing and decaying, or waxing and
+     waning; in the next place not fair in one point of view and
+     foul in another, . . . or in the likeness of a face or hands
+     or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of
+     speech or knowledge, nor existing in any other being; . . .
+     but beauty only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting,
+     which without diminution and without increase, or any change,
+     is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all
+     other things."[347:15]
+
+The religion of Spinoza is the religion of one who has renounced the
+favor of the universe. He was deprived early in life of every benefit of
+fortune, and set out to find the good which required no special
+dispensation but only the common lot and the common human endowment. He
+found that good to consist in the conviction of the necessity, made
+acceptable through the supremacy of the understanding. The like faith of
+the Stoics makes of no account the difference of fortune between Marcus
+the emperor and Epictetus the slave.
+
+     "For two reasons, then, it is right to be content with that
+     which happens to thee; the one because it was done for thee
+     and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to
+     thee, originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy
+     destiny; and the other because even that which comes severally
+     to every man is to the power which administers the universe a
+     cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its very
+     continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if
+     thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and
+     the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou
+     dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art
+     dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of
+     the way."[348:16]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[306:1] By _Absolute Realism_ is meant that system of philosophy which
+defines the universe as the _absolute being_, implied in knowledge as
+its final object, but assumed to be independent of knowledge. In the
+_Spinozistic_ system this absolute being is conceived under the form of
+_substance_, or self-sufficiency; in _Platonism_ under the form of
+_perfection_; and in the _Aristotelian_ system under the form of a
+_hierarchy of substances_.
+
+[308:2] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 185.
+
+[309:3] When contrasted with the temporal realm of "generation and
+decay," this ultimate object is often called the _eternal_.
+
+[311:4] Holland, 1632-1677.
+
+[312:5] Spinoza: _Ethics_, Part I. Translation by Elwes, p. 45.
+
+[314:6] _Ibid._, p. 49.
+
+[318:7] _Ibid._, pp. 77, 81.
+
+[329:8] Plato: _Symposium_, 211. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[330:9] Plato: _Republic_, 533. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[337:10] See Burnet: _Op. cit._, pp. 322-333.
+
+[338:11] Leibniz: _Discourse on Metaphysics_. Translation by Montgomery,
+p. 15.
+
+In so far as the monads are spiritual this doctrine tends to be
+subjectivistic. Cf. Chap. IX.
+
+[340:12] Leibniz: _New Essays on the Human Understanding_. Translation
+by Latta, p. 363.
+
+[344:13] Spinoza: _Op. cit._, Part IV. Translation by Elwes, p. 243.
+
+[345:14] Plato: _Op. cit._, 401.
+
+[347:15] Plato: _Symposium_, 210-211. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[348:16] Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: _Thoughts_. Translation by Long, p.
+141.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+ABSOLUTE IDEALISM[349:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism.]
+
+§ 171. Absolute idealism is the most elaborately constructive of all the
+historical types of philosophy. Though it may have overlooked elementary
+truths, and have sought to combine irreconcilable principles, it cannot
+be charged with lack of sophistication or subtlety. Its great virtue is
+its recognition of problems--its exceeding circumspection; while its
+great promise is due to its comprehensiveness--its generous provision
+for all interests and points of view. But its very breadth and
+complexity render this philosophy peculiarly liable to the equivocal use
+of conceptions. This may be readily understood from the nature of the
+central doctrine of absolute idealism. According to this doctrine it is
+proposed to define the universe as an _absolute spirit_; or a being
+infinite, ultimate, eternal, and self-sufficient, like the being of
+Plato and Spinoza, but possessing at the same time the distinguishing
+properties of spirit. Such conceptions as self-consciousness, will,
+knowledge, and moral goodness are carried over from the realm of human
+endeavor and social relations to the unitary and all-inclusive reality.
+Now it has been objected that this procedure is either meaningless, in
+that it so applies the term spirit as to contradict its meaning; or
+prejudicial to spiritual interests, in that it neutralizes the
+properties of spirit through so extending their use. Thus one may
+contend that to affirm that the universe as a whole is spirit is
+meaningless, since moral goodness requires special conditions and
+relations that cannot be attributed to the universe as a whole; or one
+may contend that such doctrine is prejudicial to moral interests because
+by attributing spiritual perfection to the totality of being it
+discredits all moral loyalties and antagonisms. The difficulties that
+lie in the way of absolute idealism are due, then, to the complexity of
+its synthesis, to its complementary recognition of differences and
+resolution of them into unity. But this synthesis is due to the urgency
+of certain great problems which the first or realistic expression of
+the absolutist motive left undiscovered and unsolved.
+
+[Sidenote: The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism.]
+
+§ 172. It is natural to approach so deliberate and calculating a
+philosophy from the stand-point of the problems which it proposes to
+solve. One of these is the epistemological problem of the relation
+between the state of knowledge and its object. Naturalism and absolute
+realism side with common-sense in its assumption that although the real
+object is essential to the valid state of knowledge, its being known is
+not essential to the real object. Subjectivism, on the other hand,
+maintains that being is essentially the content of a knowing state, or
+an activity of the knower himself. Absolute idealism proposes to accept
+the general epistemological principle of subjectivism; but to satisfy
+the realistic demand for a standard, compelling object, by setting up an
+_absolute knower_, with whom all valid knowledge must be in agreement.
+This epistemological statement of absolute idealism is its most mature
+phase; and the culminating phase, in which it shows unmistakable signs
+of passing over into another doctrine. We must look for its pristine
+inspiration in its solution of another fundamental problem: that of the
+relation between the absolute and the empirical. Like absolute realism,
+this philosophy regards the universe as a unitary and internally
+necessary being, and undertakes to hold that being accountable for every
+item of experience. But we have found that absolute realism is beset
+with the difficulty of thus accounting for the fragmentariness and
+isolation of the individual. The contention that the universe must
+really be a rational or perfect unity is disputed by the evident
+multiplicity, irrelevance, and imperfection in the foreground of
+experience. The inference to perfection and the confession of
+imperfection seem equally unavoidable. Rational necessities and
+empirical facts are out of joint.
+
+[Sidenote: The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The Task of
+the New Absolutism.]
+
+§ 173. Even Plato had been conscious of a certain responsibility for
+matters of fact. Inasmuch as he attached the predicate of reality to the
+absolute perfection, he made that being the only source to which they
+could be referred. Perhaps, then, he suggests, they are due to the very
+bounteousness of God.
+
+     "He was good, and no goodness can ever have any jealousy of
+     anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all
+     things should be as like himself as possible."[352:2]
+
+Plotinus, in whom Platonism is leavened by the spirit of an age which
+is convinced of sin, and which is therefore more keenly aware of the
+positive existence of the imperfect, follows out this suggestion.
+Creation is "emanation"--the overflow of God's excess of goodness. But
+one does not readily understand how goodness, desiring all things to be
+like itself, should thereupon create evil--even to make it good. The
+Aristotelian philosophy, with its conception of the gradation of
+substances, would seem to be better equipped to meet the difficulty. A
+development requires stages; and every finite thing may thus be perfect
+in its way and perfect in its place, while in the absolute truth or God
+there is realized the meaning of the whole order. But if so, there is
+evidently something that escapes God, to wit, the meaningless and
+unfitness, the error and evil, of the stages in their successive
+isolation. Nor is it of any avail to insist (as did Plato, Aristotle,
+and Spinoza alike) that these are only privation, and therefore not to
+be counted in the sum of reality. For privation is itself an experience,
+with a great variety of implications, moral and psychological; and these
+cannot be attributed to God or deduced from him, in consideration of his
+absolute perfection.
+
+The task of the new absolutism is now in clear view. The perfect must
+be amended to admit the imperfect. The absolute significance must be so
+construed as to provide for the evident facts; for the unmeaning things
+and changes of the natural order; for ignorance, sin, despair, and every
+human deficiency. The new philosophy is to solve this problem by
+defining a _spiritual absolute_, and by so construing the life or
+dynamics of spirit, as to demonstrate the necessity of the very
+imperfection and opposition which is so baffling to the realist.
+
+[Sidenote: The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis of
+Experience.]
+
+§ 174. Absolute idealism, which is essentially a modern doctrine, does
+not begin with rhapsodies, but with a very sober analysis of familiar
+truths, conducted by the most sober of all philosophers, Immanuel Kant.
+This philosopher lived in Königsberg, Germany, at the close of the
+eighteenth century. He is related to absolute idealism much as Socrates
+is related to Platonism: he was not himself speculative, but employed a
+critical method which was transformed by his followers into a
+metaphysical construction. It is essential to the understanding both of
+Kant and of his more speculative successors, to observe that he begins
+with the recognition of certain non-philosophical truths--those of
+_natural science_ and _the moral consciousness_. He accepts the order of
+nature formulated in the Newtonian dynamics, and the moral order
+acknowledged in the common human conviction of duty. And he is
+interested in discovering the ground upon which these common
+affirmations rest, the structure which virtually supports them as types
+of knowledge. But a general importance attaches to the analysis because
+these two types of knowledge (together with the æsthetic judgment, which
+is similarly analyzed) are regarded by Kant as coextensive with
+experience itself. The _very least experience_ that can be reported upon
+at all is an experience of nature or duty, and as such will be informed
+with their characteristic principles. Let us consider the former type.
+The simplest instance of nature is the experience of the single
+perceived object. In the first place, such an object will be perceived
+as in space and time. These Kant calls the _forms of intuition_. An
+object cannot even be presented or given without them. But, furthermore,
+it will be regarded as substance, that is, as having a substratum that
+persists through changes of position or quality. It will also be
+regarded as causally dependent upon other objects like itself.
+Causality, substance, and like principles to the number of twelve, Kant
+calls the _categories of the understanding_. Both intuition and
+understanding are indispensable to the experience of any object
+whatsoever. They may be said to condition the object in general. Their
+principles condition the process of making something out of the manifold
+of sensation. But similarly, every moral experience recognizes what Kant
+calls _the categorical imperative_. The categorical imperative is the
+law of reasonableness or impartiality in conduct, requiring the
+individual to act on a maxim which he can "will to be law universal." No
+state of desire or situation calling for action means anything morally
+except in the light of this obligation. Thus certain principles of
+thought and action are said to be implicit in all experience. They are
+universal and necessary in the sense that they are discovered as the
+conditions not of any particular experience, but of experience in
+general. This implicit or virtual presence in experience in general,
+Kant calls their transcendental character, and the process of
+explicating them is his famous _Transcendental Deduction_.
+
+[Sidenote: Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which they
+Set in Order.]
+
+§ 175. The restriction which Kant puts upon his method is quite
+essential to its meaning. I deduce the categories, for example, just in
+so far as I find them to be necessary to perception. Without them my
+perception is blind, I make nothing of it; with them my experience
+becomes systematic and rational. But categories which I so deduce must
+be forever limited to the rôle for which they are defined. Categories
+without perceptions are "empty"; they have validity solely with
+reference to the experience which they set in order. Indeed, I cannot
+even complete that order. The orderly arrangement of parts of experience
+suggests, and suggests irresistibly, a perfect system. I can even define
+the ideas and ideals through which such a perfect system might be
+realized. But I cannot in the Kantian sense attach reality to it because
+it is not indispensable to experience. It must remain an ideal which
+regulates my thinking of such parts of it as fall within the range of my
+perception; or it may through my moral nature become the realm of my
+living and an object of faith. In short, Kant's is essentially a
+"critical philosophy," a logical and analytical study of the special
+terms and relations of human knowledge. He denies the validity of these
+terms and relations beyond this realm. His critiques are an inventory
+of the conditions, principles, and prospects of that cognition which,
+although not alone ideally conceivable, is alone possible.
+
+[Sidenote: The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the
+Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant. The Absolute
+Spirit.]
+
+§ 176. With the successors of Kant, as with the successors of Socrates,
+a criticism becomes a system of metaphysics. This transformation is
+effected in the post-Kantians by _a generalization of the human
+cognitive consciousness_. According to Kant's analysis it contains a
+manifold of sense which must be organized by categories in obedience to
+the ideal of a rational universe. The whole enterprise, with its
+problems given in perception, its instruments available in the
+activities of the understanding, and its ideals revealed in the reason,
+is an organic spiritual unity, manifesting itself in the
+self-consciousness of the thinker. Now in absolute idealism this very
+enterprise of knowledge, made universal and called the _absolute spirit_
+or _mind_, is taken to be the ultimate reality. And here at length would
+seem to be afforded the conception of a being to which the problematic
+and the rational, the data and the principles, the natural and the
+ideal, are alike indispensable. We are now to seek the real not in the
+ideal itself, but in that spiritual unity in which appearance is the
+incentive to truth, and natural imperfection the spring to goodness.
+This may be translated into the language which Plato uses in the
+"Symposium," when Diotima is revealing to Socrates the meaning of love.
+The new reality will be not the loved one, but love itself.
+
+     "What then is Love? Is he mortal?"
+
+     "No."
+
+     "What then?"
+
+     "As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal,
+     but is a mean between them."
+
+     "What is he then, Diotima?"
+
+     "He is a great spirit, and like all that is spiritual he is
+     intermediate between the divine and the mortal."[359:3]
+
+Reality is no longer the God who mingles not with men, but that power
+which, as Diotima further says, "interprets and conveys to the gods the
+prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and rewards of
+the gods."
+
+In speaking for such an idealism, Emerson says:
+
+     "Everything good is on the highway. The middle region of our
+     being is the temperate zone. We may climb into the thin and
+     cold realm of pure geometry and lifeless science, or sink into
+     that of sensation. Between these extremes is the equator of
+     life, of thought, of spirit, of poetry. . . . The mid-world is
+     best."[359:4]
+
+The new reality is this highway of the spirit, the very course and
+raceway of self-consciousness. It is traversed in the movement and
+self-correction of thought, in the interest in ideals, or in the
+submission of the will to the control of the moral law.
+
+[Sidenote: Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity.]
+
+§ 177. It is the last of these phases of self-consciousness that Fichte,
+who was Kant's immediate successor, regards as of paramount importance.
+As Platonism began with the ideal of the good or the object of life, so
+the new idealism begins with the conviction of duty, or _the story of
+life_. Being is the living moral nature compelled to build itself a
+natural order wherein it may obey the moral law, and to divide itself
+into a community of moral selves through which the moral virtues may be
+realized. Nature and society flow from the conception of an absolute
+moral activity, or ego. Such an ego could not be pure and isolated and
+yet be moral. The evidence of this is the common moral consciousness. My
+duty compels me to act upon the not-self or environment, and to respect
+and coöperate with other selves. Fichte's absolute is this moral
+consciousness universalized and made eternal. Moral value being its
+fundamental principle the universe must on that very account embrace
+both nature, or moral indifference, and humanity, or moral limitation.
+
+[Sidenote: Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment.]
+
+§ 178. But the Romanticists, who followed close upon Fichte, were
+dissatisfied with so hard and exclusive a conception of spiritual being.
+Life, they said, is not all duty. Indeed, the true spiritual life is
+quite other, not harsh and constrained, but free and spontaneous--a
+wealth of feeling playing about a constantly shifting centre. Spirit is
+not consecutive and law-abiding, but capricious and wanton, seeking the
+beautiful in no orderly progression, but in a refined and versatile
+sensibility. If this be the nature of spirit, and if spirit be the
+nature of reality, then he is most wise who is most rich in sentiment.
+The Romanticists were the exponents of an absolute sentimentalism. And
+they did not prove it, but like good sentimentalists they felt it.
+
+[Sidenote: Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic.]
+
+§ 179. Hegel, the master of the new idealism, set himself the task of
+construing spirit in terms as consecutive as those of Fichte, and as
+comprehensive as those of the Romanticists. Like Plato, he found in
+dialectic the supreme manifestation of the spiritual life. There is a
+certain flow of ideas which determines the meaning of experience, and
+is the truth of truths. But the mark of the new prophet is this: the
+flow of ideas itself is _a process of self-correction due to a sense of
+error_. Thus bare sensation is abstract and bare thought is abstract.
+The real, however, is not merely the concrete in which they are united,
+but the very process in the course of which through knowledge of
+abstraction thought arrives at the concrete. The principle of negation
+is the very life of thought, and it is _the life of thought_, rather
+than the outcome of thought, which is reality. The most general form of
+the dialectical process contains three moments: the moment of _thesis_,
+in which affirmation is made; the moment of _antithesis_, in which the
+opposite asserts itself; and the moment of _synthesis_, in which a
+reconciliation is effected in a new thesis. Thus thought is the
+progressive overcoming of contradiction; not the state of freedom from
+contradiction, but the act of escaping it. Such processes are more
+familiar in the moral life. Morality consists, so even common-sense
+asserts, in the overcoming of evil. Character is the resistance of
+temptation; goodness, a growth in grace through discipline. Of such, for
+Hegel, is the very kingdom of heaven. It is the task of the philosopher,
+a task to which Hegel applies himself most assiduously, to analyze the
+battle and the victory upon which spiritual being nourishes itself. And
+since the deeper processes are those of thought, the Hegelian philosophy
+centres in an ordering of notions, a demonstration of that necessary
+progression of thought which, in its whole dynamical logical history,
+constitutes the _absolute idea_.
+
+[Sidenote: The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History.]
+
+§ 180. The Hegelian philosophy, with its emphasis upon difference,
+antagonism, and development, is peculiarly qualified to be a philosophy
+of nature and history. Those principles of spiritual development which
+logic defines are conceived as incarnate in the evolution of the world.
+Nature, as the very antithesis to spirit, is now understood to be the
+foil of spirit. In nature spirit alienates itself in order to return
+enriched. The stages of nature are the preparation for the reviving of a
+spirituality that has been deliberately forfeited. The Romanticists,
+whether philosophers like Schelling or poets like Goethe and Wordsworth,
+were led by their feeling for the beauty of nature to attribute to it a
+much deeper and more direct spiritual significance. But Hegel and the
+Romanticists alike are truly expressed in Emerson's belief that the
+spiritual interpretation of nature is the "true science."
+
+     "The poet alone knows astronomy, chemistry, vegetation, and
+     animation, for he does not stop at these facts, but employs
+     them as signs. He knows why the plain or meadow of space was
+     strown with these flowers we call suns and moons and stars;
+     why the great deep is adorned with animals, with men, and
+     gods; for in every word he speaks he rides on them as the
+     horses of thought."[364:5]
+
+The new awakening of spirit which is for Hegel the consummation of the
+natural evolution, begins with the individual or _subjective_ spirit,
+and develops into the social or _objective_ spirit, which is morality
+and history. History is a veritable dialectic of nations, in the course
+of which the consciousness of individual liberty is developed, and
+coördinated with the unity of the state. The highest stage of spirit
+incarnate is that of _absolute_ spirit, embracing art, religion, and
+philosophy. In art the absolute idea obtains expression in sensuous
+existence, more perfectly in classical than in the symbolic art of the
+Orient, but most perfectly in the romantic art of the modern period. In
+religion the absolute idea is expressed in the imagination through
+worship. In Oriental pantheism, the individual is overwhelmed by his
+sense of the universal; in Greek religion, God is but a higher man;
+while in Christianity God and man are perfectly united in Christ.
+Finally, in philosophy the absolute idea reaches its highest possible
+expression in articulate thought.
+
+[Sidenote: Résumé. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the Problem of
+Evil.]
+
+§ 181. Such is absolute idealism approached from the stand-point of
+antecedent metaphysics. It is the most elaborate and subtle provision
+for antagonistic differences within unity that the speculative mind of
+man has as yet been able to make. It is the last and most thorough
+attempt to resolve individual and universal, temporal and eternal,
+natural and ideal, good and evil, into an absolute unity in which the
+universal, eternal, ideal, and good shall dominate, and in which all
+terms shall be related with such necessity as obtains in the definitions
+and theorems of geometry. There is to be some absolute meaning which is
+rational to the uttermost and the necessary ground of all the incidents
+of existence. Thought could undertake no more ambitious and exacting
+task. Nor is it evident after all that absolute idealism enjoys any
+better success in this task than absolute realism. The difference
+between them becomes much less marked when we reflect that the former,
+like the latter, must reserve the predicate of being for the unity of
+the whole. Even though evil and contradiction belong to the essence of
+things, move in the secret heart of a spiritual universe, the reality is
+not these in their severalty, but that life within which they fall, the
+story within which they "earn a place." And if absolute idealism has
+defined a new perfection, it has at the same time defined a new
+imperfection. The perfection is rich in contrast, and thus inclusive of
+both the lights and shades of experience; but the perfection belongs
+only to the composition of these elements within a single view. It is
+not necessary to such perfection that the evil should ever be viewed in
+isolation. The idealist employs the analogy of the drama or the picture
+whose very significance requires the balance of opposing forces; or the
+analogy of the symphony in which a higher musical quality is realized
+through the resolution of discord into harmony. But none of these
+unities requires any element whatsoever that does not partake of its
+beauty. It is quite irrelevant to the drama that the hero should
+himself have his own view of events with no understanding of their
+dramatic value, as it is irrelevant to the picture that an unbalanced
+fragment of it should dwell apart, or to the symphony that the discord
+should be heard without the harmony. One may multiply without end the
+internal differences and antagonisms that contribute to the internal
+meaning, and be as far as ever from understanding the external
+detachment of experiences that are not rational or good in themselves.
+And it is precisely this kind of fact that precipitates the whole
+problem. We do not judge of sin and error from experiences in which they
+conduct to goodness and truth, but from experiences in which they are
+stark and unresolved.
+
+In view of such considerations many idealists have been willing to
+confess their inability to solve this problem. To quote a recent
+expositor of Hegel,
+
+     "We need not, after all, be surprised at the apparently
+     insoluble problem which confronts us. For the question has
+     developed into the old difficulty of the origin of evil, which
+     has always baffled both theologians and philosophers. An
+     idealism which declares that the universe is in reality
+     perfect, can find, as most forms of popular idealism do, an
+     escape from the difficulties of the existence of evil, by
+     declaring that the universe is as yet only growing towards its
+     ideal perfection. But this refuge disappears with the reality
+     of time, and we are left with an awkward difference between
+     what philosophy tells us must be, and what our life tells us
+     actually is."[368:6]
+
+If the philosophy of eternal perfection persists in its fundamental
+doctrine in spite of this irreconcilable conflict with life, it is
+because it is believed that that doctrine _must_ be true. Let us turn,
+then, to its more constructive and compelling argument.
+
+[Sidenote: The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is Based upon
+the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge.]
+
+§ 182. The proof of absolute idealism is supposed by the majority of its
+exponents to follow from the problem of epistemology, and more
+particularly from the manifest dependence of truth upon the knowing
+mind. In its initial phase absolute idealism is indistinguishable from
+subjectivism. Like that philosophy it finds that the object of knowledge
+is inseparable from the state of knowledge throughout the whole range of
+experience. Since the knower can never escape himself, it may be set
+down as an elementary fact that reality (at any rate whatever reality
+can be known or even talked about) owes its being to mind.
+
+Thus Green, the English neo-Hegelian, maintains that "an object which
+no consciousness presented to itself would not be an object at all," and
+wonders that this principle is not generally taken for granted and made
+the starting-point for philosophy.[369:7] However, unless the very term
+"object" is intended to imply presence to a subject, this principle is
+by no means self-evident, and must be traced to its sources.
+
+We have already followed the fortunes of that empirical subjectivism
+which issues from the relativity of perception. At the very dawn of
+philosophy it was observed that what is seen, heard, or otherwise
+experienced through the senses, depends not only upon the use of
+sense-organs, but upon the special point of view occupied by each
+individual sentient being. It was therefore concluded that the
+perceptual world belonged to the human knower with his limitations and
+perspective, rather than to being itself. It was this epistemological
+principle upon which Berkeley founded his empirical idealism. Believing
+knowledge to consist essentially in perception, and believing perception
+to be subjective, he had to choose between the relegation of being to a
+region inaccessible to knowledge, and the definition of being in terms
+of subjectivity. To avoid scepticism he accepted the latter alternative.
+But among the Greeks with whom this theory of perception originated, it
+drew its meaning in large part from the distinction between perception
+and reason. Thus we read in Plato's "Sophist":
+
+     "And you would allow that we participate in generation with
+     the body, and by perception; but we participate with the soul
+     by thought in true essence, and essence you would affirm to be
+     always the same and immutable, whereas generation
+     varies."[370:8]
+
+It is conceived that although in perception man is condemned to a
+knowledge conditioned by the affections and station of his body, he may
+nevertheless escape himself and lay hold on the "true essence" of
+things, by virtue of thought. In other words, knowledge, in
+contradistinction to "opinion," is not made by the subject, but is the
+soul's participation in the eternal natures of things. In the moment of
+insight the varying course of the individual thinker coincides with the
+unvarying truth; but in that moment the individual thinker is ennobled
+through being assimilated to the truth, while the truth is no more, no
+less, the truth than before.
+
+[Sidenote: The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason.]
+
+§ 183. In absolute idealism, the principle of subjectivism is extended
+to reason itself. This extension seems to have been originally due to
+moral and religious interests. From the moral stand-point the
+contemplation of the truth is a _state_, and the highest state of the
+individual life. The religious interest unifies the individual life and
+directs attention to its spiritual development. Among the Greeks of the
+middle period life was as yet viewed objectively as the fulfilment of
+capacities, and knowledge was regarded as perfection of function, the
+exercise of the highest of human prerogatives. But as moral and
+religious interests became more absorbing, the individual lived more and
+more in his own self-consciousness. Even before the Christian era the
+Greek philosophers themselves were preoccupied with the task of winning
+a state of inner serenity. Thus the Stoics and Epicureans came to look
+upon knowledge as a means to the attainment of an inner freedom from
+distress and bondage to the world. In other words, the very reason was
+regarded as an activity of the self, and its fruits were valued for
+their enhancement of the welfare of the self. And if this be true of the
+Stoics and the Epicureans, it is still more clearly true of the
+neo-Platonists of the Christian era, who mediate between the ancient
+and mediæval worlds.
+
+[Sidenote: Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian
+Philosophy.]
+
+§ 184. It is well known that the early period of Christianity was a
+period of the most vivid self-consciousness. The individual believed
+that his natural and social environment was alien to his deeper
+spiritual interests. He therefore withdrew into himself. He believed
+himself to have but one duty, the salvation of his soul; and that duty
+required him to search his innermost springs of action in order to
+uproot any that might compromise him with the world and turn him from
+God. The drama of life was enacted within the circle of his own
+self-consciousness. Citizenship, bodily health, all forms of
+appreciation and knowledge, were identified in the parts they played
+here. In short the Christian consciousness, although renunciation was
+its deepest motive, was reflexive and centripetal to a degree hitherto
+unknown among the European peoples. And when with St. Augustine
+theoretical interests once more vigorously asserted themselves, this new
+emphasis was in the very foreground. St. Augustine wished to begin his
+system of thought with a first indubitable certainty, and selected
+neither being nor ideas, but _self_. St. Augustine's genius was
+primarily religious, and the "Confessions," in which he records the
+story of his hard winning of peace and right relations with God, is his
+most intimate book. How faithfully does he represent himself, and the
+blend of paganism and Christianity which was distinctive of his age,
+when in his systematic writings he draws upon religion for his knowledge
+of truth! In all my living, he argues, whether I sin or turn to God,
+whether I doubt or believe, whether I know or am ignorant, in all _I
+know that I am I_. Each and every state of my consciousness is a state
+of my self, and as such, sure evidence of my self's existence. If one
+were to follow St. Augustine's reflections further, one would find him
+reasoning from his own finite and evil self to an infinite and perfect
+Self, which centres like his in the conviction that I am I, but is
+endowed with all power and all worth. One would find him reflecting upon
+the possible union with God through the exaltation of the human
+self-consciousness. But this conception of God as the perfect self is so
+much a prophecy of things to come, that more than a dozen centuries
+elapsed before it was explicitly formulated by the post-Kantians. We
+must follow its more gradual development in the philosophies of
+Descartes and Kant.
+
+[Sidenote: Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the Thinking
+Self.]
+
+§ 185. When at the close of the sixteenth century the Frenchman, René
+Descartes, sought to construct philosophy anew and upon secure
+foundations, he too selected as the initial certainty of thought the
+thinker's knowledge of himself. This principle now received its classic
+formulation in the proposition, _Cogito ergo sum_--"I think, hence I
+am." The argument does not differ essentially from that of St.
+Augustine, but it now finds a place in a systematic and critical
+metaphysics. In that my thinking is certain of itself, says Descartes,
+in that I know myself before I know aught else, my self can never be
+dependent for its being upon anything else that I may come to know. A
+thinking self, with its knowledge and its volition, is quite capable of
+subsisting of itself. Such is, indeed, not the case with a finite self,
+for all finitude is significant of limitation, and in recognizing my
+limitations I postulate the infinite being or God. But the relation of
+my self to a physical world is quite without necessity. Human nature,
+with soul and body conjoined, is a combination of two substances,
+neither of which is a necessary consequence of the other. As a result
+of this combination the soul is to some extent affected by the body, and
+the body is to some extent directed by the soul; but the body could
+conceivably be an automaton, as the soul could conceivably be, and will
+in another life become, a free spirit. The consequences of this dualism
+for epistemology are very grave. If knowledge be the activity of a
+self-subsistent thinking spirit, how can it reveal the nature of an
+external world? The natural order is now literally "external." It is
+true that the whole body of exact science, that mechanical system to
+which Descartes attached so much importance, falls within the range of
+the soul's own thinking. But what assurance is there that it refers to a
+province of its own--a physical world in space? Descartes can only
+suppose that "clear and distinct" ideas must be trusted as faithful
+representations. It is true the external world makes its presence known
+directly, when it breaks in upon the soul in sense-perception. But
+Descartes's rationalism and love of mathematics forbade his attaching
+importance to this criterion. Real nature, that exactly definable and
+predictable order of moving bodies defined in physics, is not known
+through sense-perception, but through thought. Its necessities are the
+necessities of reason. Descartes finds himself, then, in the perplexing
+position of seeking an internal criterion for an external world. The
+problem of knowledge so stated sets going the whole epistemological
+movement of the eighteenth century, from Locke through Berkeley and Hume
+to Kant. And the issue of this development is the absolute idealism of
+Kant's successors.
+
+[Sidenote: Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers.]
+
+§ 186. Of the English philosophers who prepare the way for the
+epistemology of Kant, Hume is the most radical and momentous. It was he
+who roused Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers" to the task of the
+"Critical Philosophy." Hume is one of the two possible consequences of
+Descartes. One who attaches greater importance to the rational
+necessities of science than to its external reference, is not unwilling
+that nature should be swallowed up in mind. With Malebranche,
+Descartes's immediate successor in France, nature is thus provided for
+within the archetypal mind of God. With the English philosophers, on the
+other hand, externality is made the very mark of nature, and as a
+consequence sense-perception becomes the criterion of scientific truth.
+This empirical theory of knowledge, inaugurated and developed by Locke
+and Berkeley, culminates in Hume's designation of the _impression_ as
+the distinguishing element of nature, at once making up its content and
+certifying to its externality. The processes of nature are successions
+of impressions; and the laws of nature are their uniformities, or the
+expectations of uniformity which their repetitions engender. Hume does
+not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion. If the final mark of truth
+is the presence to sense of the individual element, then science can
+consist only of items of information and probable generalizations
+concerning their sequences. The effect is observed to follow upon the
+cause in fact, but there is no understanding of its necessity; therefore
+no absolute certainty attaches to the future effects of any cause.
+
+[Sidenote: To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind.]
+
+§ 187. But what has become of the dream of the mathematical physicist?
+Is the whole system of Newton, that brilliant triumph of the mechanical
+method, unfounded and dogmatic? It is the logical instability of this
+body of knowledge, made manifest in the well-founded scepticism of Hume,
+that rouses Kant to a reëxamination of the whole foundation of natural
+science. The general outline of his analysis has been developed above.
+It is of importance here to understand its relations to the problem of
+Descartes. Contrary to the view of the English philosophers, natural
+science is, says Kant, the work of the mind. The certainty of the causal
+relation is due to the human inability to think otherwise. Hume is
+mistaken in supposing that mere sensation gives us any knowledge of
+nature. The very least experience of objects involves the employment of
+principles which are furnished by the mind. Without the employment of
+such principles, or in bare sensation, there is no intelligible meaning
+whatsoever. But once admit the employment of such principles and
+formulate them systematically, and the whole Newtonian order of nature
+is seen to follow from them. Furthermore, since these principles or
+categories are the conditions of human experience, are the very
+instruments of knowledge, they are valid wherever there is any
+experience or knowledge. There is but one way to make anything at all
+out of nature, and that is to conceive it as an order of necessary
+events in space and time. Newtonian science is part of such a general
+conception, and is therefore necessary if knowledge is to be possible at
+all, even the least. Thus Kant turns upon Hume, and shuts him up to the
+choice between the utter abnegation of all knowledge, including the
+knowledge of his own scepticism, and the acceptance of the whole body of
+exact science.
+
+But with nature thus conditioned by the necessities of thought, what has
+become of its externality? That, Kant admits, has indeed vanished. Kant
+does not attempt, as did Descartes, to hold that the nature which mind
+constructs and controls, exists also outside of mind. The nature that is
+known is on that very account phenomenal, anthropocentric--created by
+its cognitive conditions. Descartes was right in maintaining that
+sense-perception certifies to the existence of a world outside the mind,
+but mistaken in calling it nature and identifying it with the realm of
+science. In short, Kant acknowledges the external world, and names it
+the _thing-in-itself_; but insists that because it is outside of mind it
+is outside of knowledge. Thus is the certainty of science saved at the
+cost of its metaphysical validity. It is necessarily true, but only of a
+conditioned or dependent world. And in saving science Kant has at the
+same time prejudiced metaphysics in general. For the human or
+naturalistic way of knowing is left in sole possession of the field,
+with the higher interest of reasons in the ultimate nature of being,
+degraded to the rank of practical faith.
+
+[Sidenote: The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general into an
+Absolute Mind.]
+
+§ 188. The transformation of this critical and agnostic doctrine into
+absolute idealism is inevitable. The metaphysical interest was bound to
+avail itself of the speculative suggestiveness with which the Kantian
+philosophy abounds. The transformation turns upon Kant's assumption that
+whatever is constructed by the mind is on that account phenomenon or
+appearance. Kant has carried along the presumption that whatever is act
+or content of mind is on that account not _real_ object or
+_thing-in-itself_. We have seen that this is generally accepted as true
+of the relativities of sense-perception. But is it true of thought? The
+post-Kantian idealist maintains that _that depends upon the thought_.
+The content of private individual thinking is in so far not real object;
+but it does not follow that this is true of such thinking as is
+universally valid. Now Kant has deduced his categories for thought in
+general. There are no empirical cases of thinking except the human
+thinkers; but the categories are not the property of any one human
+individual or any group of such individuals. They are the conditions of
+_experience in general_, and of every possibility of experience. The
+transition to absolute idealism is now readily made. _Thought in
+general_ becomes the _absolute mind_, and experience in general its
+content. The thing-in-itself drops out as having no meaning. The
+objectivity to which it testified is provided for in the completeness
+and self-sufficiency which is attributed to the absolute experience.
+Indeed, an altogether new definition of subjective and objective
+replaces the old. The subjective is that which is only insufficiently
+thought, as in the case of relativity and error; the objective is that
+which is completely thought. Thus the natural order is indeed
+phenomenal; but only because the principles of science are not the
+highest principles of thought, and not because nature is the fruit of
+thought. Thus Hegel expresses his relation to Kant as follows:
+
+     "According to Kant, the things that we know about are _to us_
+     appearances only, and we can never know their essential
+     nature, which belongs to another world, which we cannot
+     approach. . . . The true statement of the case is as follows.
+     The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere
+     phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the
+     true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is
+     to have their existence founded not in themselves, but in the
+     universal divine idea. This view of things, it is true, is as
+     idealist as Kant's, but in contradistinction to the
+     subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy should be
+     termed Absolute Idealism."[382:9]
+
+[Sidenote: The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite Mind to
+the Infinite Mind.]
+
+§ 189. Absolute idealism is thus reached after a long and devious course
+of development. But the argument may be stated much more briefly. Plato,
+it will be remembered, found that experience tends ever to transcend
+itself. The thinker finds himself compelled to pursue the ideal of
+immutable and universal truth, and must identify the ultimate being with
+that ideal. Similarly Hegel says:
+
+     "That upward spring of the mind signifies that the being which
+     the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute
+     truth; it signifies that beyond and above that appearance,
+     truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for
+     God."[382:10]
+
+The further argument of absolute idealism differs from that of Plato in
+that the dependence of truth upon the mind is accepted as a first
+principle. The ideal with which experience is informed is now _the state
+of perfect knowledge_, rather than the system of absolute truth. The
+content of the state of perfect knowledge will indeed be the system of
+absolute truth, but none the less _content_, precisely as finite
+knowledge is the content of a finite mind. In pursuing the truth, I who
+pursue, aim to realize in myself a certain highest state of knowledge.
+Were I to know all truth I should indeed have ceased to be the finite
+individual who began the quest, but the evolution would be continuous
+and the character of self-consciousness would never have been lost. I
+may say, in short, that God or being, is my perfect cognitive self.
+
+The argument for absolute idealism is a constructive interpretation of
+the subjectivistic contention that knowledge can never escape the circle
+of its own activity and states. To meet the demand for a final and
+standard truth, a demand which realism meets with its doctrine of a
+being independent of any mind, this philosophy defines a _standard
+mind_. The impossibility of defining objects in terms of relativity to a
+finite self, conducts dialectically to the conception of the _absolute
+self_. The sequel to my error or exclusiveness, is truth or
+inclusiveness. The outcome of the dialectic is determined by the
+symmetry of the antithesis. Thus, corrected experience implies a last
+correcting experience; partial cognition, complete cognition; empirical
+subject, transcendental subject; finite mind, an absolute mind. The
+following statement is taken from a contemporary exponent of the
+philosophy:
+
+     "What you and I lack, when we lament our human ignorance, is
+     simply a certain desirable and logically possible state of
+     mind, or type of experience; to wit, a state of mind in which
+     we should wisely be able to say that we had fulfilled in
+     experience what we now have merely in idea, namely, the
+     knowledge, the immediate and felt presence, of what we now
+     call the Absolute Reality. . . . There is an Absolute
+     Experience for which the conception of an absolute reality,
+     _i. e._, the conception of a system of ideal truth, is
+     fulfilled by the very contents that get presented to this
+     experience. This Absolute Experience is related to our
+     experience as an organic whole to its own fragments. It is an
+     experience which finds fulfilled all that the completest
+     thought can conceive as genuinely possible. Herein lies its
+     definition as an Absolute. For the Absolute Experience, as for
+     ours, there are data, contents, facts. But these data, these
+     contents, express, for the Absolute Experience, its own
+     meaning, its thought, its ideas. Contents beyond these that it
+     possesses, the Absolute Experience knows to be, in genuine
+     truth, impossible. Hence its contents are indeed
+     particular,--a selection from the world of bare or merely
+     conceptual possibilities,--but they form a self-determined
+     whole, than which nothing completer, more organic, more
+     fulfilled, more transparent, or more complete in meaning, is
+     concretely or genuinely possible. On the other hand, these
+     contents are not foreign to those of our finite experience,
+     but are inclusive of them in the unity of one life."[385:11]
+
+[Sidenote: The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism.]
+
+§ 190. As has been already intimated, at the opening of this chapter,
+the inclusion of the whole of reality within a single self is clearly a
+questionable proceeding. The need of avoiding the relativism of
+empirical idealism is evident. But if the very meaning of the
+self-consciousness be due to a certain selection and exclusion within
+the general field of experience, it is equally evident that the
+relativity of self-consciousness can never be overcome through appealing
+to a higher self. One must appeal _from_ the self to the realm of things
+as they are. Indeed, although the exponents of this philosophy use the
+language of spiritualism, and accept the idealistic epistemology, their
+absolute being tends ever to escape the special characters of the self.
+And inasmuch as the absolute self is commonly set over against the
+finite or empirical self, as the standard and test of truth, it is the
+less distinguishable from the realist's order of independent beings.
+
+[Sidenote: The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics of
+Absolute Idealism. Kant.]
+
+§ 191. But however much absolute idealism may tend to abandon its
+idealism for the sake of its absolutism within the field of metaphysics,
+such is not the case within the field of ethics and religion. The
+conception of the self here receives a new emphasis. The same
+self-consciousness which admits to the highest truth is the evidence of
+man's practical dignity. In virtue of his immediate apprehension of the
+principles of selfhood, and his direct participation in the life of
+spirit, man may be said to possess the innermost secret of the universe.
+In order to achieve goodness he must therefore recognize and express
+_himself_. The Kantian philosophy is here again the starting-point. It
+was Kant who first gave adequate expression to the Christian idea of the
+moral self-consciousness.
+
+     "_Duty!_ Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace
+     nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and
+     yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that
+     would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest
+     forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind,
+     . . . a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even
+     though they secretly counterwork it; what origin is there
+     worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble
+     descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the
+     inclinations . . . ? It can be nothing less than a power which
+     elevates man above himself, . . . a power which connects him
+     with an order of things that only the understanding can
+     conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the
+     whole sensible world, and with it the empirically determinable
+     existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all
+     ends."[387:12]
+
+With Kant there can be no morality except conduct be attended by the
+consciousness of this duty imposed by the higher nature upon the lower.
+It is this very recognition of a deeper self, of a personality that
+belongs to the sources and not to the consequences of nature, that
+constitutes man as a moral being, and only such action as is inspired
+with a reverence for it can be morally good. Kant does little more than
+to establish the uncompromising dignity of the moral will. In moral
+action man submits to a law that issues from himself in virtue of his
+rational nature. Here he yields nothing, as he owes nothing, to that
+appetency which binds him to the natural world. As a rational being he
+himself affirms the very principles which determine the organization of
+nature. This is his _freedom_, at once the ground and the implication
+of his duty. Man is free from nature to serve the higher law of his
+personality.
+
+[Sidenote: Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of
+Universal and Objective Spirit.]
+
+§ 192. There are two respects in which Kant's ethics has been regarded
+as inadequate by those who draw from it their fundamental principles. It
+is said that Kant is too rigoristic, that he makes too stern a business
+of morality, in speaking so much of law and so little of love and
+spontaneity. There are good reasons for this. Kant seeks to isolate the
+moral consciousness, and dwell upon it in its purity, in order that he
+may demonstrate its incommensurability with the values of inclination
+and sensibility. Furthermore, Kant may speak of the principle of the
+absolute, and recognize the deeper eternal order as a law, but he may
+not, if he is to be consistent with his own critical principles, affirm
+the metaphysical being of such an order. With his idealistic followers
+it is possible to define the spiritual setting of the moral life, but
+with Kant it is only possible to define the antagonism of principles.
+Hence the greater optimism of the post-Kantians. They know that the
+higher law is the reality, and that he who obeys it thus unites himself
+with the absolute self. That which for Kant is only a resolute
+obedience to more valid principles, to rationally superior rules for
+action, is for idealism man's appropriation of his spiritual birthright.
+Since the law is the deeper nature, man may respect and obey it as
+valid, and at the same time act upon it gladly in the sure knowledge
+that it will enhance his eternal welfare. Indeed, the knowledge that the
+very universe is founded upon this law will make him less suspicious of
+nature and less exclusive in his adherence to any single law. He will be
+more confident of the essential goodness of all manifestations of a
+universe which he knows to be fundamentally spiritual.
+
+But it has been urged, secondly, that the Kantian ethics is too formal,
+too little pertinent to the issues of life. Kant's moral law imposes
+only obedience to the law, or conduct conceived as suitable to a
+universal moral community. But what is the nature of such conduct in
+particular? It may be answered that to maintain the moral
+self-consciousness, to act dutifully and dutifully only, to be
+self-reliant and unswerving in the doing of what one ought to do, is to
+obtain a very specific character. But does this not leave the
+individual's conduct to his own interpretation of his duty? It was just
+this element of individualism which Hegel sought to eliminate through
+the application of his larger philosophical conception. If that which
+expresses itself within the individual consciousness as the moral law be
+indeed the law of that self in which the universe is grounded, it will
+appear as _objective spirit_ in the evolution of society. For Hegel,
+then, the most valid standard of goodness is to be found in that
+customary morality which bespeaks the moral leadings of the general
+humanity, and in those institutions, such as the family and the state,
+which are the moral acts of the absolute idea itself. Finally, in the
+realm of _absolute spirit_, in art, in revealed religion, and in
+philosophy, the individual may approach to the self-consciousness which
+is the perfect truth and goodness in and for itself.
+
+[Sidenote: The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute Idealism.]
+
+§ 193. Where the law of life is the implication in the finite
+self-consciousness of the eternal and divine self-consciousness, there
+can be no division between morality and religion, as there can be none
+between thought and will. Whatever man seeks is in the end God. As the
+perfect fulfilment of the thinking self, God is the truth; as the
+perfect fulfilment of the willing self, God is the good. The finite
+self-consciousness finds facts that are not understood, and so seeks to
+resolve itself into the perfect self wherein all that is given has
+meaning. On the other hand, the finite self-consciousness finds ideals
+that are not realized, and so seeks to resolve itself into that perfect
+self wherein all that is significant is given. All interests thus
+converge toward
+
+     "some state of conscious spirit in which the opposition of
+     cognition and volition is overcome--in which we neither judge
+     our ideas by the world, nor the world by our ideas, but are
+     aware that inner and outer are in such close and necessary
+     harmony that even the thought of possible discord has become
+     impossible. In its unity not only cognition and volition, but
+     feeling also, must be blended and united. In some way or
+     another it must have overcome the rift in discursive
+     knowledge, and the immediate must for it be no longer the
+     alien. It must be as direct as art, as certain and universal
+     as philosophy."[391:13]
+
+The religious consciousness proper to absolute idealism is both
+pantheistic and mystical, but with distinction. Platonism is pantheistic
+in that nature is resolved into God. All that is not perfect is esteemed
+only for its promise of perfection. And Platonism is mystical in that
+the purification and universalization of the affections brings one in
+the end to a perfection that exceeds all modes of thought and speech.
+With Spinoza, on the other hand, God may be said to be resolved into
+nature. Nature is made divine, but is none the less nature, for its
+divinity consists in its absolute necessity. Spinoza's pantheism passes
+over into mysticism because the absolute necessity exceeds in both unity
+and richness the laws known to the human understanding. In absolute
+idealism, finally, both God and nature are resolved into the self. For
+that which is divine in experience is self-consciousness, and this is at
+the same time the ground of nature. Thus in the highest knowledge the
+self is expanded and enriched without being left behind. The mystical
+experience proper to this philosophy is the consciousness of identity,
+together with the sense of universal immanence. The individual self may
+be directly sensible of the absolute self, for these are one spiritual
+life. Thus Emerson says:
+
+     "It is a secret which every intellectual man quickly learns,
+     that beyond the energy of his possessed and conscious
+     intellect he is capable of a new energy (as of an intellect
+     doubled on itself), by abandonment to the nature of things;
+     that beside his privacy of power as an individual man, there
+     is a great public power upon which he can draw, by unlocking,
+     at all risks, his human doors, and suffering the ethereal
+     tides to roll and circulate through him; then he is caught up
+     into the life of the Universe, his speech is thunder, his
+     thought is law, and his words are universally intelligible as
+     the plants and animals. The poet knows that he speaks
+     adequately then only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or 'with
+     the flower of the mind'; not with the intellect used as an
+     organ, but with the intellect released from all service and
+     suffered to take its direction from its celestial
+     life."[393:14]
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality.]
+
+§ 194. But the distinguishing flavor and quality of this religion arises
+from its spiritual hospitality. It is not, like Platonism, a
+contemplation of the best; nor, like pluralistic idealisms, a moral
+knight-errantry. It is neither a religion of exclusion, nor a religion
+of reconstruction, but a profound willingness that things should be as
+they really are. For this reason its devotees have recognized in Spinoza
+their true forerunner. But idealism is not Spinozism, though it may
+contain this as one of its strains. For it is not the worship of
+necessity, Emerson's "beautiful necessity, which makes man brave in
+believing that he cannot shun a danger that is appointed, nor incur one
+that is not"; but the worship of _that which is_ necessary.
+
+Not only must one understand that every effort, however despairing, is
+an element of sense in the universal significance;
+
+     "that the whole would not be what it is were not precisely
+     this finite purpose left in its own uniqueness to speak
+     precisely its own word--a word which no other purpose can
+     speak in the language of the divine will";[394:15]
+
+but one must have a zest for such participation, and a heart for the
+divine will which it profits. Indeed, so much is this religion a love of
+life, that it may, as in the case of the Romanticists, be a love of
+caprice. Battle and death, pain and joy, error and truth--all that
+belongs to the story of this mortal world, are to be felt as the thrill
+of health, and relished as the essences of God. Religion is an exuberant
+spirituality, a fearless sensibility, a knowledge of both good and evil,
+and a will to serve the good, while exulting that the evil will not
+yield without a battle.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[349:1] By _Absolute Idealism_ is meant that system of philosophy which
+defines the universe as the _absolute spirit_, which is the human
+_moral_, _cognitive_, or _appreciative consciousness_ universalized; or
+as the _absolute, transcendental mind_, whose state of _complete
+knowledge_ is implied in all finite thinking.
+
+[352:2] Plato: _Timæus_, 29. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[359:3] Plato: _Symposium_, 202. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[359:4] Emerson: _Essays, Second Series_, pp. 65-66.
+
+[364:5] Emerson: _Op. cit._, p. 25.
+
+The possibility of conflict between this method of nature study and the
+empirical method of science is significantly attested by the
+circumstance that in the year 1801 Hegel published a paper in which he
+maintained, on the ground of certain numerical harmonies, that there
+could be no planet between Mars and Jupiter, while at almost exactly the
+same time Piazzi discovered Ceres, the first of the asteroids.
+
+[368:6] McTaggart: _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic_, p. 181.
+
+[369:7] Green: _Prolegomena to Ethics_, p. 15.
+
+[370:8] Plato: _The Sophist_, 248. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[382:9] Hegel: _Encyclopädie_, § 45, lecture note. Quoted by McTaggart:
+_Op. cit._, p. 69.
+
+[382:10] Hegel: _Encyclopädie_, § 50. Quoted by McTaggart: _Op. cit._,
+p. 70.
+
+[385:11] Royce: _Conception of God_, pp. 19, 43-44.
+
+This argument is well summarized in Green's statement that "the
+existence of one connected world, which is the presupposition of
+knowledge, implies the action of one self-conditioning and
+self-determining mind." _Prolegomena to Ethics_, p. 181.
+
+[387:12] Kant: _Critical Examination of Practical Reason_. Translated by
+Abbott in _Kant's Theory of Ethics_, p. 180.
+
+[391:13] Quoted from McTaggart: _Op. cit._, pp. 231-232.
+
+[393:14] Emerson: _Op. cit._, pp. 30-31.
+
+[394:15] Royce: _The World and the Individual, First Series_, p. 465.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+
+[Sidenote: Liability of Philosophy to Revision, Due to its Systematic
+Character.]
+
+§ 195. One who consults a book of philosophy in the hope of finding
+there a definite body of truth, sanctioned by the consensus of experts,
+cannot fail to be disappointed. And it should now be plain that this is
+due not to the frailties of philosophers, but to the meaning of
+philosophy. Philosophy is not additive, but reconstructive. Natural
+science may advance step by step without ever losing ground; its
+empirical discoveries are in their severalty as true as they can ever
+be. Thus the stars and the species of animals may be recorded
+successively, and each generation of astronomers and zoölogists may take
+up the work at the point reached by its forerunners. The formulation of
+results does, it is true, require constant correction and revision--but
+there is a central body of data which is little affected, and which
+accumulates from age to age. Now the finality of scientific truth is
+proportional to the modesty of its claims. Items of truth persist,
+while the interpretation of them is subject to alteration with the
+general advance of knowledge; and, relatively speaking, science consists
+in items of truth, and philosophy in their interpretation. The liability
+to revision in science itself increases as that body of knowledge
+becomes more highly unified and systematic. Thus the present age, with
+its attempt to construct a single comprehensive system of mechanical
+science, is peculiarly an age when fundamental conceptions are subjected
+to a thorough reëxamination--when, for example, so ancient a conception
+as that of matter is threatened with displacement by that of energy. But
+philosophy is _essentially unitary and systematic_--and thus
+_superlatively liable to revision_.
+
+[Sidenote: The One Science and the Many Philosophies.]
+
+§ 196. It is noteworthy that it is only in this age of a highly
+systematic natural science that _different_ systems are projected, as in
+the case just noted of the rivalry between the strictly mechanical, or
+corpuscular, theory and the newer theory of energetics. It has
+heretofore been taken for granted that although there may be many
+philosophies, there is but one body of science. And it is still taken
+for granted that the experimental detail of the individual science is a
+common fund, to the progressive increase of which the individual
+scientist contributes the results of his special research; there being
+_rival_ schools of mechanics, physics, or chemistry, only in so far as
+_fundamental conceptions_ or _principles of orderly arrangement_ are in
+question. But philosophy deals exclusively with the most fundamental
+conceptions and the most general principles of orderly arrangement.
+Hence it is significant of the very task of philosophy that there should
+be many tentative systems of philosophy, even that each philosopher
+should project and construct his own philosophy. Philosophy as the truth
+of synthesis and reconciliation, of comprehensiveness and coördination,
+must be a living unity. It is a thinking of entire experience, and can
+be sufficient only through being all-sufficient. The heart of every
+philosophy is a harmonizing insight, an intellectual prospect within
+which all human interests and studies compose themselves. Such knowledge
+cannot be delegated to isolated co-laborers, but will be altogether
+missed if not loved and sought in its indivisible unity. There is no
+modest home-keeping philosophy; no safe and conservative philosophy,
+that can make sure of a part through renouncing the whole. There is no
+philosophy without intellectual temerity, as there is no religion
+without moral temerity. And the one is the supreme interest of thought,
+as the other is the supreme interest of life.
+
+[Sidenote: Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or Eclecticism of
+the Present Age.]
+
+§ 197. Though the many philosophies be inevitable, it must not be
+concluded that there is therefore no progress in philosophy. The
+solution from which every great philosophy is precipitated is the
+mingled wisdom of some latest age, with all of its inheritance. The
+"positive" knowledge furnished by the sciences, the refinements and
+distinctions of the philosophers, the ideals of society--these and the
+whole sum of civilization are its ingredients. Where there is no single
+system of philosophy significant enough to express the age, as did the
+systems of Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, and the
+others who belong to the roll of the great philosophers, there exists a
+_general sophistication_, which is more elusive but not less
+significant. The present age--at any rate from its own stand-point--is
+not an age of great philosophical systems. Such systems may indeed be
+living in our midst unrecognized; but historical perspective cannot
+safely be anticipated. It is certain that no living voice is known to
+speak for this generation as did Hegel, and even Spencer, for the last.
+There is, however, a significance in this very passing of Hegel and
+Spencer,--an enlightenment peculiar to an age which knows them, but has
+philosophically outlived them. There is a moral in the history of
+thought which just now no philosophy, whether naturalism, or
+transcendentalism, realism or idealism, can fail to draw. The
+characterization of this contemporary eclecticism or sophistication,
+difficult and uncertain as it must needs be, affords the best summary
+and interpretation with which to conclude this brief survey of the
+fortunes of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism and
+Absolutism.]
+
+§ 198. Since the problem of metaphysics is the crucial problem of
+philosophy, the question of its present status is fundamental in any
+characterization of the age. It will appear from the foregoing account
+of the course of metaphysical development that two fundamental
+tendencies have exhibited themselves from the beginning. The one of
+these is naturalistic and empirical, representing the claims of what
+common sense calls "matters of fact"; the other is transcendental and
+rational, representing the claims of the standards and ideals which are
+immanent in experience, and directly manifested in the great human
+interests of thought and action. These tendencies have on the whole been
+antagonistic; and the clear-cut and momentous systems of philosophy have
+been fundamentally determined by either the one or the other.
+
+Thus materialism is due to the attempt to reduce all of experience to
+the elements and principles of connection which are employed by the
+physical sciences to set in order the actual motions, or changes of
+place, which the parts of experience undergo. Materialism maintains that
+the motions of bodies are indifferent to considerations of worth, and
+denies that they issue from a deeper cause of another order. The very
+ideas of such non-mechanical elements or principles are here provided
+with a mechanical origin. Similarly a phenomenalism, like that of Hume,
+takes immediate presence to sense as the norm of being and knowledge.
+Individual items, directly verified in the moment of their occurrence,
+are held to be at once the content of all real truth, and the source of
+those abstract ideas which the misguided rationalists mistake for real
+truth.
+
+But the absolutist, on the other hand, contends that the thinker must
+_mean_ something by the reality which he seeks. If he had it for the
+looking, thought would not be, as it so evidently is, a purposive
+endeavor. And that which is meant by reality can be nothing short of the
+fulfilment or final realization of this endeavor of thought. To find out
+what thought seeks, to anticipate the consummation of thought and posit
+it as real, is therefore the first and fundamental procedure of
+philosophy. The mechanism of nature, and all matters of fact, must come
+to terms with this absolute reality, or be condemned as mere appearance.
+Thus Plato distinguishes the world of "generation" in which we
+participate by perception, from the "true essence" in which we
+participate by thought; and Schelling speaks of the modern experimental
+method as the "corruption" of philosophy and physics, in that it fails
+to construe nature in terms of spirit.
+
+[Sidenote: Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of
+Nature. The Neo-Fichteans.]
+
+§ 199. Now it would never occur to a sophisticated philosopher of the
+present, to one who has thought out to the end the whole tradition of
+philosophy, and felt the gravity of the great historical issues, to
+suffer either of these motives to dominate him to the exclusion of the
+other. Absolutism has long since ceased to speak slightingly of physical
+science, and of the world of perception. It is conceded that motions
+must be known in the mechanical way, and matters of fact in the
+matter-of-fact way. Furthermore, the prestige which science enjoyed in
+the nineteenth century, and the prestige which the empirical and secular
+world of action has enjoyed to a degree that has steadily increased
+since the Renaissance, have convinced the absolutist of the intrinsic
+significance of these parts of experience. They are no longer reduced,
+but are permitted to flourish in their own right. From the very councils
+of absolute idealism there has issued a distinction which is fast
+becoming current, between the World of Appreciation, or the realm of
+moral and logical principles, and the World of Description, or the realm
+of empirical generalizations and mechanical causes.[402:1] It is indeed
+maintained that the former of these is metaphysically superior; but the
+latter is ranked without the disparagement of its own proper categories.
+
+With the Fichteans this distinction corresponds to the distinction in
+the system of Fichte between the active moral ego, and the nature which
+it posits to act upon. But the _neo-Fichteans_ are concerned to show
+that the nature so posited, or the World of Description, is the _realm
+of mechanical science_, and that the entire system of mathematical and
+physical truth is therefore morally necessary.[403:2]
+
+[Sidenote: The Neo-Kantians.]
+
+§ 200. A more pronounced tendency in the same direction marks the work
+of the _neo-Kantians_. These philosophers repudiate the spiritualistic
+metaphysics of Schopenhauer, Fichte, and Hegel, believing the real
+significance of Kant to lie in his critical method, in his examination
+of the first principles of the different systems of knowledge, and
+especially in his analysis of the foundations of mathematics and
+physics.[403:3] In approaching mathematics and physics from a general
+logical stand-point, these neo-Kantians become scarcely distinguishable
+in interest and temper from those scientists who approach logic from the
+mathematical and physical stand-point.
+
+[Sidenote: Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism.]
+
+§ 201. The finite, moral individual, with his peculiar spiritual
+perspective, has long since been recognized as essential to the meaning
+of the universe rationally conceived. But in its first movement absolute
+idealism proposed to absorb him in the indivisible absolute self. It is
+now pointed out that Fichte, and even Hegel himself, means the absolute
+to be a plurality or society of persons.[404:4] It is commonly conceded
+that the will of the absolute must coincide with the wills of all finite
+creatures in their severalty, that God wills in and through men.[404:5]
+Corresponding to this individualistic tendency on the part of absolute
+idealism, there has been recently projected a _personal idealism_, or
+_humanism_, which springs freshly and directly from the same motive.
+This philosophy attributes ultimate importance to the human person with
+his freedom, his interests, his control over nature, and his hope of the
+advancement of the spiritual kingdom through coöperation with his
+fellows.[405:6]
+
+[Sidenote: Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of
+Fundamental Principles.]
+
+§ 202. Naturalism exhibits a moderation and liberality that is not less
+striking than that of absolutism. This abatement of its claims began in
+the last century with agnosticism. It was then conceded that there is an
+order other than that of natural science; but this order was held to be
+inaccessible to human knowledge. Such a theory is essentially unstable
+because it employs principles which define a non-natural order, but
+refuses to credit them or call them knowledge. The agnostic is in the
+paradoxical position of one who knows of an unknowable world.
+Present-day naturalism is more circumspect. It has interested itself in
+bringing to light that in the very procedure of science which, because
+it predetermines what nature shall be, cannot be included within nature.
+To this interest is due the rediscovery of the rational foundations of
+science. It was already known in the seventeenth century that exact
+science does not differ radically from mathematics, as mathematics does
+not differ radically from logic. Mathematics and mechanics are now being
+submitted to a critical examination which reveals the definitions and
+implications upon which they rest, and the general relation of these to
+the fundamental elements and necessities of thought.[406:7]
+
+[Sidenote: Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism.]
+
+§ 203. This rationalistic tendency in naturalism is balanced by a
+tendency which is more empirical, but equally subversive of the old
+ultra-naturalism. Goethe once wrote:
+
+     "I have observed that I hold that thought to be true which is
+     _fruitful for me_. . . . When I know my relation to myself and
+     to the outer world, I say that I possess the truth."
+
+Similarly, it is now frequently observed that all knowledge is _humanly
+fruitful_, and it is proposed that this shall be regarded as the very
+criterion of truth. According to this principle science as a whole, even
+knowledge as a whole, is primarily a human utility. The nature which
+science defines is an artifact or construct. It is designed to express
+briefly and conveniently what man may practically expect from his
+environment. This tendency is known as _pragmatism_. It ranges
+from systematic doctrines, reminiscent of Fichte, which seek to
+define practical needs and deduce knowledge from them, to the
+more irresponsible utterances of those who liken science to
+"shorthand,"[407:8] and mathematics to a game of chess. In any case
+pragmatism attributes to nature a certain dependence on will, and
+therefore implies, even when it does not avow, that will with its
+peculiar principles or values cannot be reduced to the terms of nature.
+In short, it would be more true to say that nature expresses will, than
+that will expresses nature.[408:9]
+
+[Sidenote: Summary, and Transition to Epistemology.]
+
+§ 204. Such, then, is the contemporary eclecticism as respects the
+central problem of metaphysics. There are _naturalistic_ and
+_individualistic_ tendencies in _absolutism_; _rationalistic_ and
+_ethical_ tendencies in _naturalism_; and finally the independent and
+spontaneous movements of _personal idealism_ and _pragmatism_.
+
+Since the rise of the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, metaphysics
+and epistemology have maintained relations so intimate that the present
+state of the former cannot be characterized without some reference to
+the present state of the latter. Indeed, the very issues upon which
+metaphysicians divide are most commonly those provoked by the problem
+of knowledge. The counter-tendencies of naturalism and absolutism are
+always connected, and often coincide with, the epistemological
+opposition between empiricism, which proclaims perception, and
+rationalism, which proclaims reason, to be the proper organ of
+knowledge. The other great epistemological controversy does not bear so
+direct and simple a relation to the central metaphysical issues, and
+must be examined on its own account.
+
+[Sidenote: The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism. Realistic
+Tendency in Empirical Idealism.]
+
+§ 205. The point of controversy is the dependence or independence of the
+object of knowledge on the state of knowledge; idealism maintaining that
+reality _is_ the knower or his content of mind, realism, that being
+known is a circumstance which appertains to some reality, without being
+the indispensable condition of reality as such. Now the sophisticated
+thought of the present age exhibits a tendency on the part of these
+opposite doctrines to approach and converge. It has been already
+remarked that the empirical idealism of the Berkeleyan type could not
+avoid transcending itself. Hume, who omitted Berkeley's active spirits,
+no longer had any subjective seat or locus for the perceptions to which
+Berkeley had reduced the outer world. And perceptions which are not the
+states of any subject, retain only their intrinsic character and become
+a series of elements. When there is nothing beyond, which appears, and
+nothing within to which it appears, there ceases to be any sense in
+using such terms as appearance, phenomenon, or impression. The term
+sensation is at present employed in the same ill-considered manner. But
+empirical idealism has come gradually to insist upon the importance of
+the content of perception, rather than the relation of perception to a
+self as its state. The terms _element_ and _experience_, which are
+replacing the subjectivistic terms, are frankly realistic.[410:10]
+
+[Sidenote: Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception of
+Experience.]
+
+§ 206. There is a similar realistic trend in the development of absolute
+idealism. The pure Hegelian philosophy was notably objective. The
+principles of development in which it centres were conceived by Hegel
+himself to manifest themselves most clearly in the progressions of
+nature and history. Many of Hegel's followers have been led by moral and
+religious interests to emphasize consciousness, and, upon
+epistemological grounds, to lay great stress upon the necessity of the
+union of the parts of experience within an enveloping self. But absolute
+idealism has much at heart the overcoming of relativism, and the
+absolute is defined in order to meet the demand for a being that shall
+not have the cognitive deficiencies of an object of finite thought. So
+it is quite possible for this philosophy, while maintaining its
+traditions on the whole, to abandon the term _self_ to the finite
+subject, and regard its absolute as a system of rational and universal
+principles--self-sufficient because externally independent and
+internally necessary. Hence the renewed study of categories as logical,
+mathematical, or mechanical principles, and entirely apart from their
+being the acts of a thinking self.
+
+Furthermore, it has been recognized that the general demand of idealism
+is met when reality is regarded as not outside of or other than
+knowledge, whatever be true of the question of dependence. Thus the
+conception of _experience_ is equally convenient here, in that it
+signifies what is immediately present in knowledge, without affirming it
+to _consist in_ being so presented.[411:11]
+
+[Sidenote: Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence Philosophy.]
+
+§ 207. And at this point idealism is met by a latter-day realism. The
+traditional modern realism springing from Descartes was dualistic. It
+was supposed that reality in itself was essentially extra-mental, and
+thus under the necessity of being either represented or misrepresented
+in thought. But the one of these alternatives is dogmatic, in that
+thought can never test the validity of its relation to that which is
+perpetually outside of it; while the other is agnostic, providing only
+for the knowledge of a world of appearance, an improper knowledge that
+is in fact not knowledge at all.
+
+But realism is not necessarily dualistic, since it requires only that
+being shall not be dependent upon being known. Furthermore, since
+empiricism is congenial to naturalism, it is an easy step to say that
+nature is directly known in perception. This first takes the form of
+positivism, or the theory that only such nature as can be directly known
+can be really known. But this agnostic provision for an unknown world
+beyond, inevitably falls away and leaves _reality as that which is
+directly known, but not conditioned by knowledge_. Again the term
+_experience_ is the most useful, and provides a common ground for
+_idealistic realism_ with _realistic idealism_. A new epistemological
+movement makes this conception of experience its starting-point. What is
+known as the _immanence philosophy_ defines reality as experience, and
+means by experience the subject matter of all knowledge--not defined as
+such, but regarded as capable of being such. Experience is conceived to
+be _both in and out_ of selves, cognition being but one of the special
+systems into which experience may enter.[413:12]
+
+[Sidenote: The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New
+Construction.]
+
+§ 208. Does this eclecticism of the age open any philosophical prospect?
+Is it more than a general compromise--a confession of failure on the
+part of each and every radical and clear-cut doctrine of metaphysics and
+epistemology? There is no final answer to such a question short of an
+independent construction, and such procedure would exceed the scope of
+the present discussion. But there is an evident interpretation of
+tradition that suggests a possible basis for such construction.
+
+[Sidenote: The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of Attempt to
+Reduce All Experience to it.]
+
+§ 209. Suppose it to be granted that the categories of nature are quite
+self-sufficient. This would mean that there might conceivably be a
+strictly physical order, governed only by mechanical principles, and by
+the more general logical and mathematical principles. The body of
+physical science so extended as to include such general conceptions as
+identity, difference, number, quality, space, and time, is the account
+of such an order. This order need have no value, and need not be known.
+But reality as a whole is evidently not such a strictly physical order,
+for the definition of the physical order involves the rejection of many
+of the most familiar aspects of experience, such as its value and its
+being known in conscious selves. Materialism, in that it proposes to
+conceive the whole of reality as physical, must attempt to reduce the
+residuum to physical terms, and with no hope of success. Goodness and
+knowledge cannot be explained as mass and force, or shown to be
+mechanical necessities.
+
+[Sidenote: Truth of Psychical Relations, but Impossibility of General
+Reduction to Them.]
+
+§ 210. Are we then to conclude that reality is not physical, and look
+for other terms to which we may reduce physical terms? There is no lack
+of such other terms. Indeed, we could as fairly have _begun_ elsewhere.
+Thus some parts of experience compose the consciousness of the
+individual, and are said to be known by him. Experience so contained is
+connected by the special relation of being known together. But this
+relation is quite indifferent to physical, moral, and logical relations.
+Thus we may be conscious of things which are physically disconnected,
+morally repugnant, and logically contradictory, or in all of these
+respects utterly irrelevant. Subjectivism, in that it proposes to
+conceive the whole of reality as consciousness, must attempt to reduce
+physical, moral, and logical relations to that co-presence in
+consciousness from which they are so sharply distinguished in their very
+definition. The historical failure of this attempt was inevitable.
+
+[Sidenote: Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of Ideal of
+Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing the Whole of Experience from
+it.]
+
+§ 211. But there is at least one further starting-point, the one
+adopted by the most subtle and elaborate of all reconstructive
+philosophies. Logical necessities are as evidently real as bodies or
+selves. It is possible to define general types of inference, as well as
+compact and internally necessary systems such as those of mathematics.
+There is a perfectly distinguishable strain of pure rationality in the
+universe. Whether or not it be possible to conceive a pure rationality
+as self-subsistent, inasmuch as there are degrees it is at any rate
+possible to conceive of a maximum of rationality. But similarly there
+are degrees of moral goodness. It is possible to define with more or
+less exactness a morally perfect person, or an ideal moral community.
+Here again it may be impossible that pure and unalloyed goodness should
+constitute a universe of itself. But that a maximum of goodness, with
+all of the accessories which it might involve, should be thus
+self-subsistent, is quite conceivable. It is thus possible to define an
+absolute and perfect order, in which logical necessity, the interest of
+thought, or moral goodness, the interest of will, or both together,
+should be realized to the maximum. Absolutism conceives reality under
+the form of this ideal, and attempts to reconstruct experience
+accordingly. But is the prospect of success any better than in the cases
+of materialism and subjectivism? It is evident that the ideal of logical
+necessity is due to the fact that certain parts of knowledge approach it
+more closely than others. Thus mechanics contains more that is arbitrary
+than mathematics, and mathematics more than logic. Similarly, the theory
+of the evolution of the planetary system, in that it requires the
+assumption of particular distances and particular masses for the parts
+of the primeval nebula, is more arbitrary than rational dynamics. It is
+impossible, then, in view of the parts of knowledge which belong to the
+lower end of the scale of rationality, to regard reality as a whole as
+the maximum of rationality; for either a purely dynamical, a purely
+mathematical, or a purely logical, realm would be more rational. The
+similar disproof of the moral perfection of reality is so unmistakable
+as to require no elucidation. It is evident that even where natural
+necessities are not antagonistic to moral proprieties, they are at any
+rate indifferent to them.
+
+[Sidenote: Error and Evil Cannot be Reduced to the Ideal.]
+
+§ 212. But thus far no reference has been made to error and to evil.
+These are the terms which the ideals of rationality and goodness must
+repudiate if they are to retain their meaning. Nevertheless experience
+contains them and psychology describes them. We have already followed
+the efforts which absolute idealism has made to show that logical
+perfection requires error, and that moral perfection requires evil. Is
+it conceivable that such efforts should be successful? Suppose a higher
+logic to make the principle of contradiction the very bond of
+rationality. What was formerly error is now indispensable to truth. But
+what of the new error--the unbalanced and mistaken thesis, the
+unresolved antithesis, the scattered and disconnected terms of thought?
+These fall outside the new truth as surely as the old error fell outside
+the old truth. And the case of moral goodness is precisely parallel. The
+higher goodness may be so defined as to require failure and sin. Thus it
+may be maintained that there can be no true success without struggle,
+and no true spiritual exaltation except through repentance. But what of
+failure unredeemed, sin unrepented, evil uncompensated and unresolved?
+Nothing has been gained after all but a new definition of goodness--and
+a new definition of evil. And this is an ethical, not a metaphysical
+question. The problem of evil, like the problem of error, is as far from
+solution as ever. Indeed, the very urgency of these problems is due to
+metaphysical absolutism. For this philosophy defines the universe as a
+perfect unity. Measured by the standard of such an ideal universe, the
+parts of finite experience take on a fragmentary and baffling character
+which they would not otherwise possess. The absolute perfection must by
+definition both determine and exclude the imperfect. Thus absolutism
+bankrupts the universe by holding it accountable for what it can never
+pay.
+
+[Sidenote: Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole.]
+
+§ 213. If the attempt to construct experience in the special terms of
+some part of experience be abandoned, how is reality to be defined? It
+is evident that in that case there can be no definition of reality as
+such. It must be regarded as a collection of all elements, relations,
+principles, systems, that compose it. All truths will be true of it, and
+it will be the subject of all truths. Reality is at least physical,
+psychical, moral, and rational. That which is physical is not
+necessarily moral or psychical, but may be either or both of these. Thus
+it is a commonplace of experience that what has bulk and weight may or
+may not be good, and may or may not be known. Similarly, that which is
+psychical may or may not be physical, moral, or rational; and that which
+is moral or rational may or may not be physical and psychical. There is,
+then, an indeterminism in the universe, a mere coincidence of
+principles, in that it contains physical, psychical, moral, logical
+orders, without being in all respects either a physical, a psychical, a
+moral, or a logical necessity.[420:13] Reality or experience itself is
+neutral in the sense of being exclusively predetermined by no one of the
+several systems it contains. But the different systems of experience
+retain their specific and proper natures, without the compromise which
+is involved in all attempts to extend some one until it shall embrace
+them all. If such a universe seems inconceivably desultory and chaotic,
+one may always remind one's self by directly consulting experience that
+it is not only found immediately and unreflectively, but returned to and
+lived in after every theoretical excursion.
+
+[Sidenote: Moral Implications of such a Pluralistic Philosophy. Purity
+of the Good.]
+
+§ 214. But what implications for life would be contained in such a
+philosophy? Even if it be theoretically clarifying, through being
+hospitable to all differences and adequate to the multifarious demands
+of experience, is it not on that very account morally dreary and
+stultifying? Is not its refusal to establish the universe upon moral
+foundations destructive both of the validity of goodness, and of the
+incentive to its attainment? Certainly not--if the validity of goodness
+be determined by criteria of worth, and if the incentive to goodness be
+the possibility of making that which merely exists, or is necessary,
+also good.
+
+This philosophy does not, it is true, define the good, but it makes
+ethics autonomous, thus distinguishing the good which it defines, and
+saving it from compromise with matter-of-fact, and logical or mechanical
+necessity. The criticism of life is founded upon an independent basis,
+and affords justification, of a selective and exclusive moral idealism.
+Just because it is not required that the good shall be held accountable
+for whatever is real, the ideal can be kept pure and intrinsically
+worthy. The analogy of logic is most illuminating. If it be insisted
+that whatever exists is logically necessary, logical necessity must be
+made to embrace that from which it is distinguished by definition, such
+as contradiction, mere empirical existence, and error. The consequence
+is a logical chaos which has in truth forfeited the name of logic.
+Similarly a goodness defined to make possible the deduction from it of
+moral evil or moral indifference loses the very distinguishing
+properties of goodness. The consequence is an ethical neutrality which
+invalidates the moral will. A metaphysical neutrality, on the other
+hand, although denying that reality as such is predestined to
+morality--and thus affording no possibility of an ethical
+absolutism--becomes the true ground for an ethical purism.
+
+[Sidenote: The Incentive to Goodness.]
+
+§ 215. But, secondly, there can be no lack of incentive to goodness in a
+universe which, though not all-good, is in no respect incapable of
+becoming good. That which is mechanically or logically necessary, and
+that which is psychically present, _may be good_. And what can the
+realization of goodness mean if not that what is natural and necessary,
+actual and real, shall be also good. The world is not good, will not be
+good, merely through being what it is, but is or shall be made good
+through the accession of goodness. It is this belief that the real is
+not necessarily, but may be, good; that the ideal is not necessarily,
+but may be, realized; which has inspired every faith in action.
+Philosophically it is only a question of permitting such faith to be
+sincere, or condemning it as shallow. If the world be made good through
+good-will, then the faith of moral action is rational; but if the world
+be good because whatever is must be good, then moral action is a
+tread-mill, and its attendant and animating faith only self-deception.
+Moral endeavor is the elevation of physical and psychical existence to
+the level of goodness.
+
+     "Relate the inheritance to life, convert the tradition into a
+     servant of character, draw upon the history for support in the
+     struggles of the spirit, declare a war of extermination
+     against the total evil of the world; and then raise new armies
+     and organize into fighting force every belief available in the
+     faith that has descended to you."[423:14]
+
+Evil is here a practical, not a theoretical, problem. It is not to be
+solved by thinking it good, for to think it good is to deaden the very
+nerve of action; but by destroying it and replacing it with good.
+
+[Sidenote: The Justification of Faith.]
+
+§ 216. The justification of faith is in the promise of reality. For
+what, after all, would be the meaning of a faith which declares that all
+things, good, bad, and indifferent, are everlastingly and necessarily
+what they are--even if it were concluded on philosophical grounds to
+call that ultimate necessity good. Faith has interests; faith is faith
+_in_ goodness or beauty. Then what more just and potent cause of despair
+than the thought that the ideal must be held accountable for error,
+ugliness, and evil, or for the indifferent necessities of
+nature?[424:15] Are ideals to be prized the less, or believed in the
+less, when there is no ground for their impeachment? How much more
+hopeful for what is worth the hoping, that nature should discern ideals
+and take some steps toward realizing them, than that ideals should have
+created nature--such as it is! How much better a report can we give of
+nature for its ideals, than of the ideals for their handiwork, if it be
+nature! Emerson writes:
+
+     "Suffice it for the joy of the universe that we have not
+     arrived at a wall, but at interminable oceans. Our life seems
+     not present so much as prospective; not for the affairs on
+     which it is wasted, but as a hint of this vast-flowing vigor.
+     Most of life seems to be mere advertisement of faculty;
+     information is given us not to sell ourselves cheap; that we
+     are very great. So, in particulars, our greatness is always in
+     a tendency or direction, not in an action. It is for us to
+     believe in the rule, not in the exception. The noble are thus
+     known from the ignoble. So in accepting the leading of the
+     sentiments, it is not what we believe concerning the
+     immortality of the soul or the like, but _the universal
+     impulse to believe_, that is the material circumstance and is
+     the principal fact in the history of the globe."[425:16]
+
+[Sidenote: The Worship and Service of God.]
+
+§ 217. If God be rid of the imputation of moral evil and indifference,
+he may be _intrinsically worshipful_, because regarded under the form of
+the highest ideals. And if the great cause of goodness be in fact at
+stake, God may both command the adoration of men through his purity, and
+reënforce their virtuous living through representing to them that
+realization of goodness in the universe at large which both contains and
+exceeds their individual endeavor.
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosopher and the Standards of the Marketplace.]
+
+§ 218. Bishop Berkeley wrote in his "Commonplace Book":
+
+     "My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign
+     countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my
+     heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction."
+
+If it be essential to the meaning of philosophy that it should issue
+from life, it is equally essential that it should return to life. But
+this connection of philosophy with life does not mean its reduction to
+the terms of life as conceived in the market-place. Philosophy cannot
+emanate from life, and quicken life, without elevating and ennobling it,
+and will therefore always be incommensurable with life narrowly
+conceived. Hence the philosopher must always be as little understood by
+men of the street as was Thales by the Thracian handmaiden. He has an
+innocence and a wisdom peculiar to his perspective.
+
+     "When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer
+     to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals
+     of anyone, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is
+     laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being
+     praised and glorified, he cannot help laughing very sincerely
+     in the simplicity of his heart; and this again makes him look
+     like a fool. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he
+     fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of
+     cattle--a swineherd, or shepherd, or cowherd, who is being
+     praised for the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them;
+     and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of
+     whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more
+     insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man
+     is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any
+     shepherd, for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a
+     wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed
+     proprietors of ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher
+     deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to
+     think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of
+     family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he has
+     had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that
+     their sentiments only betray the dulness and narrowness of
+     vision of those who utter them, and who are not educated
+     enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man
+     has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them
+     have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and
+     barbarians, many times over."[427:17]
+
+It is not to be expected that the opinion of the "narrow, keen, little,
+legal mind" should appreciate the philosophy which has acquired the
+"music of speech," and hymns "the true life which is lived by immortals
+or men blessed of heaven." Complacency cannot understand reverence, nor
+secularism, religion.
+
+[Sidenote: The Secularism of the Present Age.]
+
+§ 219. If we may believe the report of a contemporary philosopher, the
+present age is made insensible to the meaning of life through
+preoccupation with its very achievements:
+
+     "The world of finite interests and objects has rounded itself,
+     as it were, into a separate whole, within which the mind of
+     man can fortify itself, and live _securus adversus deos_, in
+     independence of the infinite. In the sphere of _thought_,
+     there has been forming itself an ever-increasing body of
+     science, which, tracing out the relation of finite things to
+     finite things, never finds it necessary to seek for a
+     beginning or an end to its infinite series of phenomena, and
+     which meets the claims of theology with the saying of the
+     astronomer, 'I do not need that hypothesis.' In the sphere of
+     _action_, again, the complexity of modern life presents a
+     thousand isolated interests, crossing each other in ways too
+     subtle to trace out--interests commercial, social, and
+     political--in pursuing one or other of which the individual
+     may find ample occupation for his existence, without ever
+     feeling the need of any return upon himself, or seeing any
+     reason to ask himself whether this endless striving has any
+     meaning or object beyond itself."[428:18]
+
+[Sidenote: The Value of Contemplation for Life.]
+
+§ 220. There is no dignity in living except it be in the solemn presence
+of the universe; and only contemplation can summon such a presence.
+Moreover, the sessions must be not infrequent, for memory is short and
+visions fade. Truth does not require, however, to be followed out of the
+world. There is a speculative detachment from life which is less
+courageous, even if more noble, than worldliness. Such is Dante's
+exalted but mediæval intellectualism.
+
+     "And it may be said that (as true friendship between men
+     consists in each wholly loving the other) the true philosopher
+     loves every part of wisdom, and wisdom every part of the
+     philosopher, inasmuch as she draws all to herself, and allows
+     no one of his thoughts to wander to other things."
+
+Even though, as Aristotle thought, pure contemplation be alone proper to
+the gods in their perfection and blessedness, for the sublunary world
+this is less worthy than that balance and unity of faculty which
+distinguished the humanity of the Greek.
+
+     "Then," writes Thucydides, "we are lovers of the beautiful,
+     yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without
+     loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and
+     ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avoid
+     poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing
+     nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the
+     State because he takes care of his own household; and even
+     those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea
+     of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in
+     public affairs not as a harmless, but as a useless character;
+     and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges, of
+     a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion,
+     not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained
+     by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar
+     power of thinking before we act, and of acting too, whereas
+     other men are courageous from ignorance, but hesitate upon
+     reflection."[429:19]
+
+Thus life may be broadened and deepened without being made thin and
+ineffectual. As the civil community is related to the individual's
+private interests, so the community of the universe is related to the
+civil community. There is a citizenship in this larger community which
+requires a wider and more generous interest, rooted in a deeper and more
+quiet reflection. The world, however, is not to be left behind, but
+served with a new sense of proportion, with the peculiar fortitude and
+reverence which are the proper fruits of philosophy.
+
+     "This is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge,
+     if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly
+     conjoined and united together than they have been; a
+     conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets: Saturn,
+     the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet
+     of civil society and action."[430:20]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[402:1] Cf. Josiah Royce: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, Lecture
+XII; _The World and the Individual, Second Series_.
+
+[403:2] Cf. Hugo Münsterberg: _Psychology and Life_. The more important
+writings of this school are: _Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten
+Jahrhunderts_, edited by Wilhelm Windelband, and contributed to by
+Windelband, H. Rickert, O. Liebmann, E. Troeltsch, B. Bauch, and others.
+This book contains an excellent bibliography. Also, Rickert: _Der
+Gegenstand der Erkenntnis_; _Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen
+Begriffsbildung_, and other works. Windelband: _Präludien_; _Geschichte
+und Naturwissenschaft_. Münsterberg: _Grundzüge der Psychologie_.
+Eucken: _Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart_.
+
+[403:3] Cf. F. A. Lange: _History of Materialism_, Book II, Chap. I, on
+_Kant and Materialism_; also Alois Riehl: _Introduction to the Theory of
+Science and Metaphysics_. Translation by Fairbanks. The more important
+writings of this school are: Hermann Cohen: _Kant's Theorie der
+Erfahrung_; _Die Logik der reinen Erkenntniss_, and other works. Paul
+Natorp: _Sozialpädagogik_; _Einleitung in die Psychologie nach
+kritischer Methode_, and other works. E. Cassirer: _Leibniz' System in
+seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen_. Riehl: _Der philosophische
+Kriticismus, und seine Bedeutung für die Positive Wissenschaft_. Cf.
+also E. Husserl: _Logische Untersuchungen_.
+
+[404:4] Cf. J. M. E. McTaggart: _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_, Chap.
+III.
+
+[404:5] Cf. Royce: _The Conception of God, Supplementary Essay_, pp.
+135-322; _The World and the Individual, First Series_.
+
+[405:6] This movement began as a criticism of Hegelianism in behalf of
+the human personality. Cf. Andrew Seth: _Hegelianism and Personality_;
+_Man and the Cosmos_; _Two Lectures on Theism_. G. H. Howison: _The
+Limits of Evolution_. The important writings of the more independent
+movement are: William James: _The Will to Believe_. H. Sturt, editor:
+_Personal Idealism, Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of Oxford
+University_. F. C. S. Schiller: _Humanism_. Henri Bergson: _Essai sur
+les données immédiates de la conscience_; _Matière et mémoire_. This
+movement is closely related to that of _Pragmatism_. See under § 203.
+
+[406:7] Cf. Bertrand Russell: _Principles of Mathematics_, Vol. I. Among
+the more important writings of this movement are the following:
+Giuseppi Peano: _Formulaire de Mathématique_, published by the _Rivista
+di matematica_, Tom. I-IV. Richard Dedekind: _Was sind und was
+sollen die Zahlen?_ Georg Cantor: _Grundlagen einer allgemeinen
+Mannigfaltigkeitslehre_. Louis Couturat: _De l'Infini Mathématique_, and
+articles in _Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale_. A. N. Whitehead: _A
+Treatise on Universal Algebra_. Heinrich Hertz: _Die Prinzipien der
+Mechanik_. Henri Poincaré: _La Science et l'Hypothèse_. For the bearing
+of these investigations on philosophy, see Royce: _The Sciences of the
+Ideal_, in _Science_, Vol. XX, No. 510.
+
+[407:8] The term used by Karl Pearson in his _Grammar of Science_.
+
+[408:9] The important English writings of the recent independent
+movement known as _pragmatism_ are: C. S. Peirce: _Illustrations of the
+Logic of Science_, in _Popular Science Monthly_, Vol. XII. W. James:
+_The Pragmatic Method_, in _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
+Scientific Methods_, Vol. I; _Humanism and Truth_, in _Mind_, Vol. XIII,
+N. S.; _The Essence of Humanism_, in _Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc.
+Meth._, Vol. II (with bibliography); _The Will to Believe_. John Dewey:
+_Studies in Logical Theory_. W. Caldwell: _Pragmatism_, in _Mind_, Vol.
+XXV., N. S. See also literature on _personal idealism_, § 201. A similar
+tendency has appeared in France in Bergson, LeRoy, Milhaud, and in
+Germany in Simmel.
+
+[410:10] Cf. Ernst Mach: _Analysis of Sensation_. Translation by
+Williams.
+
+[411:11] Cf. F. H. Bradley: _Appearance and Reality_.
+
+[413:12] Cf. Carstanjen: _Richard Avenarius, and his General Theory of
+Knowledge, Empiriocriticism_. Translation by H. Bosanquet, in _Mind_,
+Vol. VI, N. S. Also James: _Does Consciousness Exist?_ and _A World of
+Pure Experience_, in _Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth_., Vol. I;
+_The Thing and its Relations_, _ibid._, Vol. II.
+
+The standard literature of this movement is unfortunately not available
+in English. Among the more important writings are: R. Avenarius: _Kritik
+der reinen Erfahrung_; _Der menschliche Weltbegriff_, and other works.
+Joseph Petzoldt: _Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung_.
+Ernst Mach: _Die Analyse der Empfindung und das Verhältniss des
+Physischen zum Psychischen, 2. Auff._ Wilhelm Schuppe: _Grundriss der
+Erkenntnisstheorie und Logik_. Friedrich Carstanjen: _Einführung in die
+"Kritik der reinen Erfahrung"_--an exposition of Avenarius. Also
+articles by the above, R. Willy, R. v. Schubert-Soldern, and others, in
+the _Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie_.
+
+[420:13] It is not, of course, denied that there may be other orders,
+such as, _e. g._, an æsthetic order; or that there may be definite
+relations between these orders, such as, _e. g._, the psycho-physical
+relation.
+
+[423:14] Quoted from George A. Gordon: _The New Epoch for Faith_, p. 27.
+
+[424:15] Cf. James: _The Will to Believe_, essay on _The Dilemma of
+Determinism, passim_.
+
+[425:16] _Essays, Second Series_, p. 75.
+
+[427:17] Plato: _Theætetus_, 174-175. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[428:18] E. Caird: _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, pp. 218-219.
+
+[429:19] Translation by Jowett. Quoted by Laurie in his _Pre-Christian
+Education_, p. 213.
+
+[430:20] Bacon: _Advancement of Learning_, Book I.
+
+
+
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+
+The references contained in this bibliography have been selected on the
+score of availability in English for the general reader and beginning
+student of philosophy. But I have sought wherever possible to include
+passages from the great philosophers and men of letters. These are
+placed first in the list, followed by references to contemporary writers
+and secondary sources.
+
+
+CHAPTER I, THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, especially Book VII. Translations by Jowett and
+Vaughan. _Theaetetus_, 172 ff. Translation by Jowett.
+
+ARISTOTLE: _Ethics_, Book X. Translation by Welldon.
+
+MARCUS AURELIUS: _Thoughts._ Translation by Long.
+
+EPICTETUS: _Discourses._ Translation by Long.
+
+BACON: _The Advancement of Learning._
+
+EMERSON: _Representative Men--Plato; or the Philosopher._ _Conduct of
+Life--Culture._ _Essays, Second Series--Experience._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ROYCE, JOSIAH: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ Introduction.
+
+HIBBEN, J. G.: _Problems of Philosophy._ Introduction.
+
+
+CHAPTER II, POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Books II and III. Translation by Jowett. (Criticism
+of the poets as demoralizing.)
+
+WORDSWORTH: _Observations Prefixed to the Second Edition of the Lyrical
+Ballads._
+
+SHELLEY: _Defence of Poetry._
+
+EVERETT, C. C.: _Poetry, Comedy, and Duty._ (discussion of the
+Philosophy of Poetry.) _Essays, Theological and Literary._ (On the
+Poetry of Emerson, Goethe, Tennyson, Browning.)
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _Literature and Philosophy._ (Wordsworth, Dante, Goethe,
+etc.)
+
+ROYCE, JOSIAH: _Studies of Good and Evil._ Essay on _Tennyson and
+Pessimism_.
+
+SANTAYANA, GEORGE: _Poetry and Religion._ (Philosophy of poetry; Greek
+Poetry, Shakespeare, etc.)
+
+SNEATH, E. H.: _Philosophy in Poetry: A Study of Sir John Davies's Poem,
+"Nosce Teipsum."_
+
+
+CHAPTERS III AND IV, RELIGION.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Book III. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+(Criticism of religion from the stand-point of morality and politics.)
+
+ST. AUGUSTINE: _Confessions._ Translation by Pusey. (Document of
+religious experience.)
+
+THOMAS À KEMPIS: _Imitation of Christ._ Translation by Stanhope.
+(Mediæval programme of personal religion.)
+
+SPINOZA: _Theological-political Treatise._ Translation by Elwes. (One of
+the first great pleas for religious liberty and one of the first
+attempts to define the _essential_ in religion.)
+
+KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason--the Canon of Pure Reason_. Translation
+by Max Müller. _Critique of Practical Reason._ Translation by Abbott in
+_Theory of Ethics_. (Defines religion as the province of faith,
+distinguishes it from knowledge, and relates it to morality.)
+
+SCHLEIERMACHER: _On Religion._ _Speeches to its Cultured Despisers._
+Translation by Oman. (Ponderous, dogmatic in its philosophy, but
+profound and sympathetic in its understanding of religion.)
+
+ARNOLD: _Literature and Dogma._ (On the essence of religion as
+exemplified in Judaism and Christianity.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+SABATIER, A.: _Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based on Psychology
+and History._ Translation by Seed. _Religions of Authority and the
+Religion of the Spirit._ Translation by Houghton. (These books emphasize
+the essential importance of the believer's attitude to God.)
+
+JAMES, WILLIAM: _The Varieties of Religious Experience._ (A rich
+storehouse of religion, sympathetically interpreted.)
+
+EVERETT, C. C.: _The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith._ (A
+study in the definition and meaning of religion.)
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _Evolution of Religion._ (Indoctrinated with the author's
+idealistic philosophy.)
+
+FIELDING, H.: _The Hearts of Men._ (A plea for the universal religion.
+Special feeling for Indian religions.)
+
+HARNACK, A.: _What is Christianity?_ Translation by Saunders. (Attempt
+to define the _essence_ of Christianity.)
+
+PALMER, G. H.: _The Field of Ethics_, Chapters V and VI. (On the
+relation of ethics and religion.)
+
+BROWN, W. A.: _The Essence of Christianity._ (Special study of the
+definition of religion.)
+
+JASTROW, M.: _The Study of Religion._ (Method of history and psychology
+of religion.)
+
+SMITH, W. ROBERTSON: _The Religion of the Semites._ (Excellent study of
+tribal religions.)
+
+CLARKE, W. N.: _What Shall We Think of Christianity?_ (An interpretation
+of Christianity.)
+
+LEUBA, J. H.: _Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion._ In
+_The Monist_, Vol. XI, p. 195.
+
+STARBUCK, E. D.: _The Psychology of Religion._
+
+
+CHAPTER V, THE PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM OF SCIENCE.[434:A]
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Book VII, 526 ff. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+_Phaedo_, 96 ff. Translation by Jowett.
+
+BERKELEY: _Alciphron_, the Fourth Dialogue. _Siris_, especially 234-264.
+(On the failure of the scientist to grasp the deeper truth respecting
+causes and substances.)
+
+DESCARTES: _Discourse on Method._ Translation by Veitch.
+
+SPINOZA: _On the Improvement of the Understanding._ Translation by
+Elwes.
+
+KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason--Transcendental Æsthetic_ and
+_Transcendental Analytic._ Translation by Max Müller. (Studies of the
+Method of Science.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+WARD, JAMES: _Naturalism and Agnosticism._ (Full but clear account of
+recent development of natural science, and criticism of its use as
+philosophy.)
+
+MACH, ERNST: _Science of Mechanics._ (Historical and methodological.)
+
+JAMES, WILLIAM: _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II, Chap. xxviii.
+(Emphasizes the practical interest underlying science.)
+
+ROYCE, JOSIAH: _The World and the Individual, Second Series, Man and
+Nature._ (Interpretation of the province of natural science from the
+stand-point of absolute idealism.)
+
+PEARSON, KARL: _The Grammar of Science._ (The limits of science from the
+scientific stand-point.)
+
+CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: On the Aims and Instruments of
+Scientific Thought; The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences; On the Ethics
+of Belief._
+
+HUXLEY, T. H.: _Method and Results._ (The positivistic position.)
+
+MUENSTERBERG, HUGO: _Psychology and Life._ (Epistemological limitations
+of natural science applied to psychology, from idealistic stand-point.)
+
+FULLERTON, G. E.: _A System of Metaphysics_, Part II.
+
+TAYLOR, A. E.: _Elements of Metaphysics_, Book III.
+
+
+CHAPTERS VI AND VII, THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
+
+PLATO: _Dialogues_, especially _Protagoras_ and _Theaetetus_.
+Translation by Jowett. (The actual genesis of special problems.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+KUELPE, OSWALD: _Introduction to Philosophy._ Translation by Pillsbury
+and Titchener. (Full and accurate account of the traditional terms and
+doctrines of philosophy.)
+
+HIBBEN, J. G.: _Problems of Philosophy._ (Brief and elementary.)
+
+SIDGWICK, HENRY: _Philosophy, its Scope and Relations._
+
+PAULSEN, FRIEDRICH: _Introduction to Philosophy._ Translation by Thilly.
+
+BALDWIN, J. M.: _Dictionary of Philosophy._ (Full, and convenient for
+reference.)
+
+FERRIER, J. F.: _Lectures on Greek Philosophy._ (Interpretation of the
+beginning and early development of philosophy.)
+
+BURNET, J.: _Early Greek Philosophy._ Translation of the sources.
+
+FAIRBANKS, A.: _The First Philosophers of Greece._
+
+GOMPERZ, TH.: _Greek Thinkers_, Vol. I. Translation by Magnus. (On the
+first development of philosophical problems.)
+
+PALMER, G. H.: _The Field of Ethics._ (On the relations of the ethical
+problem.)
+
+PUFFER, ETHEL: _The Psychology of Beauty._ (On the relations of the
+æsthetical problem.)
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII, NATURALISM.[436:A]
+
+LUCRETIUS: _On the Nature of Things._ Translation by Munro. (Early
+materialism.)
+
+HOBBES: _Metaphysical System._ Edited by Calkins. _Leviathan_, Part I.
+(Modern materialism.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+BUECHNER, LOUIS: _Force and Matter._ Translation by Collingwood.
+(Nineteenth century materialism.)
+
+JANET, PAUL: _Materialism of the Present Day._ Translation by Masson.
+
+LANGE, F. A.: _History of Materialism._ Translation by Thomas.
+
+HAECKEL, ERNST: _The Riddle of the Universe._ Translation by McCabe.
+("Monism of Energy.")
+
+CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: The Ethics of Belief; Cosmic
+Emotion; Body and Mind._ (Positivism.)
+
+HUXLEY, T. H.: _Evolution and Ethics; Prolegomena._ (Distinguishes
+between the moral and natural.) _Science and Hebrew Tradition_; _Science
+and Christian Tradition_. (Controversies of the naturalist with
+Gladstone and Duke of Argyle.)
+
+SPENCER, HERBERT: _First Principles._ (The systematic evolutionary
+philosophy.) _Principles of Ethics._ (Ethics of naturalism.) _The Nature
+and Reality of Religion._ (Controversy with Frederick Harrison.)
+
+BALFOUR, A. J.: _Foundations of Belief_, Part I. (On the religious,
+moral, and æsthetic consequences of naturalism.)
+
+PATER, WALTER: _Marius the Epicurean._ (Refined hedonism.)
+
+ROMANES, G. J.: _Thoughts on Religion._ (Approached from stand-point of
+science.)
+
+BENTHAM, J.: _Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
+Legislation._ (Utilitarian.)
+
+STEPHEN, L.: _Science of Ethics._ (Evolutionary and social.)
+
+
+CHAPTER IX, SUBJECTIVISM.
+
+PLATO: _Theaetetus._ Translation by Jowett. (Exposition and criticism of
+Protagoras.)
+
+BERKELEY: _Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_; _Principles of
+Human Knowledge_.
+
+HUME: _An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding._
+
+SCHOPENHAUER: _The World as Will and Idea._ Translation by Haldane and
+Kemp.
+
+MILL, J. S.: _An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_,
+X-XIII.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: On the Nature of Things in
+Themselves._ (Panpsychism.)
+
+DEUSSEN, PAUL: _Elements of Metaphysics._ Translation by Duff.
+(Following Schopenhauer and Oriental philosophy.)
+
+PAULSEN, FR.: _Introduction to Philosophy._ (Panpsychism.)
+
+STRONG, C. A.: _Why the Mind Has a Body._ (Panpsychism.)
+
+JAMES, WILLIAM: _Reflex Action and Theism_, in _The Will to Believe_.
+(Morality and religion of individualism.)
+
+
+CHAPTER X, ABSOLUTE REALISM.
+
+PARMENIDES: _Fragments._ Arrangement and translation by Burnet or
+Fairbanks.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Books VI and VII. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+_Symposium_, _Phædrus_, _Phædo_, _Philebus_. Translation by Jowett.
+
+ARISTOTLE[437:A]: _Psychology._ Translations by Hammond and Wallace.
+_Ethics._ Translation by Welldon.
+
+SPINOZA: _Ethics_, especially Parts I and V. Translations by Elwes and
+Willis.
+
+LEIBNIZ: _Monadology_, and Selections. Translation by Latta. _Discourse
+on Metaphysics._ Translation by Montgomery.
+
+MARCUS AURELIUS: _Thoughts._ Translation by Long.
+
+EPICTETUS: _Discourses._ Translation by Long.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers._
+(The central conceptions of Plato and Aristotle.)
+
+JOACHIM: _A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza._
+
+
+CHAPTER XI, ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.
+
+DESCARTES: _Meditations._ Translation by Veitch.
+
+KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason._ Translation by Max Müller. _Critique of
+Practical Reason._ Translation by Abbott, in Kant's _Theory of Ethics_.
+
+FICHTE[437:A]: _Science of Ethics._ Translation by Kroeger. _Popular
+Works: The Nature of the Scholar_; _The Vocation of Man_; _The Doctrine
+of Religion_. Translation by Smith.
+
+SCHILLER: _Æsthetic Letters, Essays, and Philosophical Letters._
+Translation by Weiss. (Romanticism.)
+
+HEGEL[437:A]: _Ethics._ Translation by Sterrett. _Logic._ Translation,
+with Introduction, by Wallace. _Philosophy of Mind._ Translation, with
+Introduction, by Wallace. _Philosophy of Religion._ Translation by
+Spiers and Sanderson. _Philosophy of Right._ Translation by Dyde.
+
+GREEN, T. H.: _Prolegomena to Ethics._
+
+EMERSON: _The Conduct of Life--Fate._ _Essays, First Series--The
+Over-Soul; Circles._ _Essays, Second Series--The Poet; Experience;
+Nature._ (The appreciation of life consistent with absolute idealism.)
+
+WORDSWORTH: _Poems_, _passim_.
+
+COLERIDGE: _Aids to Reflection._ _The Friend._
+
+ROYCE, J.: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ (Sympathetic exposition of
+Kant, Fichte, Romanticism, and Hegel.) _The Conception of God._ (The
+epistemological argument.) _The World and the Individual, First Series._
+(Systematic development of absolute idealism; its moral and religious
+aspects.)
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _The Critical Philosophy of Kant._ (Exposition and
+interpretation from stand-point of later idealism.)
+
+EVERETT, C. C.: _Fichte's Science of Knowledge._
+
+MCTAGGART, J. M. E.: _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic._ Studies in
+Hegelian Cosmology.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[434:A] For further contemporary writings on this topic, see foot-notes
+under §§ 199, 200, 203.
+
+[436:A] For histories of philosophy, see supplementary bibliography at
+end.
+
+[437:A] The Metaphysics of Aristotle, Fichte, and Hegel must be found by
+the English reader mainly in the secondary sources.
+
+
+
+
+SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
+
+
+I.--GENERAL.
+
+ROGERS: _Student's History of Philosophy._ (Elementary and clear;
+copious quotations.)
+
+WEBER: _History of Philosophy._ Translation by Thilly. (Comprehensive
+and compact.)
+
+WINDELBAND: _A History of Philosophy._ Translation by Tufts. (Emphasis
+upon the problems and their development.)
+
+ERDMANN: _History of Philosophy._ Translation edited by Hough; in three
+volumes. (Detailed and accurate exposition.)
+
+UEBERWEG: _A History of Philosophy._ Translation by Morris and Porter,
+in two volumes. (Very complete; excellent account of the literature.)
+
+
+II.--SPECIAL PERIODS.
+
+FERRIER: _Lectures on Greek Philosophy._ (Excellent introduction.)
+
+MARSHALL: _Short History of Greek Philosophy._ (Brief and clear.)
+
+WINDELBAND: _History of Ancient Philosophy._ Translation by Cushman.
+(Very accurate and scholarly; also brief.)
+
+ZELLER: _Pre-Socratic Philosophy._ Translation by Alleyne. _Socrates and
+the Socratic Schools._ Translation by Reichel. (Full and accurate.)
+
+GOMPERZ: _Greek Thinkers._ Translated by Magnus, in four volumes. (Very
+full; especially on Plato. Goes no further than Plato.)
+
+BURNET: _Early Greek Philosophy._ (Translations of fragments, with
+commentary.)
+
+FAIRBANKS: _The First Philosophers of Greece._ (Translations of
+fragments, with commentary.)
+
+TURNER: _History of Philosophy._ (Excellent account of Scholastic
+philosophy.)
+
+ROYCE: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ (Very illuminating
+introductory exposition of modern idealism.)
+
+FALCKENBERG: _History of Modern Philosophy._
+
+HOEFFDING: _History of Modern Philosophy._ Translation by Meyer, in two
+volumes. (Full and good.)
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+  ABSOLUTE, the, 307, 309, 332, 391, 392, 400, 404;
+    being, 308;
+    substance, 312;
+    ideal, 326;
+    spirit, 349 (_note_), 358 ff.;
+    mind, 349 (_note_), 358, 380, 322 ff.
+
+  ABSOLUTE IDEALISM, chap. xi;
+    general meaning, 177, 349 (_note_), 400;
+    criticism of, 349, 365, 385, 411, 416;
+    epistemology of, 368 ff.;
+    as related to Kant, 380;
+    direct argument for, 383;
+    ethics of, 386 ff.;
+    religion of, 390 ff.;
+    of present day, 402 ff., 410.
+
+  ABSOLUTE REALISM, chap. x;
+    general meaning, 306 (_note_), 400;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 346;
+    criticism of, 338, 416.
+
+  ABSTRACT, the, 139.
+
+  ACTIVITY, 209, 285, 295.
+
+  ÆSTHETICS, 189.
+
+  AGNOSTICISM, 168, 252 ff.
+
+  ANAXAGORAS, 239;
+    quoted, 162.
+
+  ANAXIMANDER, 224.
+
+  ANSELM, SAINT, 200.
+
+  ANTHROPOMORPHISM, 109.
+
+  APPRECIATION, 25, 402.
+
+  ARISTOTLE, in formal logic, 186;
+    ethics of, 195, 345;
+    psychology of, 208;
+    philosophy of, 306, 332 ff.;
+    and Plato, 333, 336;
+    and Spinoza, 336;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    religion of, 346, 429;
+    on evil, 353.
+
+  ATOMISM, 166, 229.
+    Also see under LEUCIPPUS, and DEMOCRITUS.
+
+  ATTITUDE, 62.
+
+  ATTRIBUTE, in Spinoza, 312 ff.
+
+  AUGUSTINE, SAINT,
+    on communion with God, 68;
+    on pietism, 195;
+    his conception of self, 372.
+
+  AUTOMATISM, 248.
+
+
+  BAAL, religion of, 88.
+
+  BACON, FRANCIS, on thought and action, 430.
+
+  BALFOUR, A. J., on materialism, 264.
+
+  BEAUTY, in æsthetics, 189;
+    in Plato, 327, 332.
+
+  BEING, Eleatic conception of, 308 ff.
+
+  BELIEF, key to definition of religion, 58;
+    general characters applied to religion, 59 ff.;
+    in persons and dispositions, 62;
+    examples of religions, 66 ff.;
+    object of religions, 65, 82, 97;
+    relation to logic, 182, 183.
+
+  BENTHAM, 262.
+
+  BERKELEY, on idealism, 176;
+    relation to common-sense, 267;
+    his refutation of material substance, 275 ff.;
+    epistemology of, 277, 296, 369;
+    theory of mathematics, 279;
+    his spiritualism, 280, 284, 292;
+    his conception of God, 284, 293;
+    ethics of, 302;
+    religion of, 304.
+
+  BUDDHISM, 78.
+
+
+  CAUSE, in science, 131;
+    God as first, 203;
+    of motion, 231 ff.;
+    spirit as, 293 ff.
+
+  CHRISTIANITY, persistence of, 76;
+    essence of, 86;
+    development from Judaism, 94;
+    ethics of, 195, 198, 386;
+    idea of God in, 200 ff., 205;
+    emphasis on self-consciousness in, 372.
+
+  COMTE, 115.
+
+  CONTEMPLATION, 428.
+
+  CONVERSION, 69 ff.
+
+  CORPOREAL BEING, 224;
+    processes of, 225;
+    Berkeley's critique of, 278;
+    historical conceptions of, 229.
+
+  COSMOLOGICAL PROOF, the, of God, 203.
+
+  COSMOLOGY, general meaning of, 159;
+    mechanism in, 161, 225;
+    teleology in, 161.
+
+  COSMOS, origin of, 242.
+
+  CRITICAL METHOD, 319 ff.
+
+  CYNICISM, 259.
+
+  CYRENAICISM, 259.
+
+
+  DANTE, as philosopher-poet, 42 ff.;
+    general meaning of the _Divine Comedy_, 43;
+    and Thomas Aquinas, 43, 46;
+    his vision of the ways of God, 46;
+    on contemplation, 428.
+
+  DARWIN, 204.
+
+  DEISM, 207.
+
+  DEMOCRITUS, 247.
+    Also see ATOMISM.
+
+  DESCARTES, on function of philosophy, 154;
+    dualism of, 272, 412;
+    his theory of space and matter, 229;
+    automatism of, 248;
+    epistemology of, 341, 375;
+    his conception of self, 374.
+
+  DESCRIPTION, as method of science, 128.
+
+  DIALECTIC, in Plato, 320;
+    in Hegel, 361.
+
+  DIOGENES, 259.
+
+  DOGMATISM, 167.
+
+  DUALISM, general meaning, 162;
+    of Descartes, 272, 412.
+
+  DUTY, 196, 356, 360, 386.
+
+
+  ECLECTICISM, contemporary, 398 ff., 413.
+
+  ELEATICS.
+    See under PARMENIDES, and ZENO.
+
+  EMERSON, on spirit, 359;
+    on nature, 364;
+    on absolute, 392;
+    on necessity, 393;
+    on faith, 424.
+
+  EMPIRICISM, general meaning, 168;
+    in logic, 187;
+    in naturalism, 252 ff.;
+    of Locke, 274;
+    of Berkeley, 274 ff.
+
+  ENERGY, development of, conception of, 236 ff.
+
+  EPISTEMOLOGY, relation to metaphysics, 150;
+    definition of, 164;
+    fundamental problems of, 168, 172;
+    argument for God from, 202;
+    of naturalism, 248, 252 ff., 257;
+    of Descartes, 273, 341, 375;
+    of Berkeley, 277, 296;
+    of absolute realism, 339, 351;
+    of Leibniz, 340, 341;
+    of Plato, 340, 341;
+    of Hume, 376;
+    of Aristotle, 340, 341;
+    of absolute idealism, 351, 368 ff.;
+    of present day, 408 ff.
+
+  ETERNAL, the, 309.
+
+  ETHER, 230.
+
+  ETHICS, relation to metaphysics, 151, 196 ff., 360;
+    its origin in Socratic method, 181;
+    definition of, 191;
+    special problems and theories in, 191 ff.;
+    of Socrates, 192, 194;
+    of Aristotle, 195, 345;
+    of naturalism, 258 ff.;
+    of subjectivism, 298 ff.;
+    of Schopenhauer, 299;
+    argument for God from, 203;
+    individualism in, 301;
+    pluralism in, 302, 421;
+    of Stoics and Spinoza, 342;
+    Platonic, 342;
+    of Kant, 386;
+    of absolute idealism, 388.
+
+  EUDÆMONISM, 195.
+
+  EVIL, PROBLEM OF, 317, 336, 339, 352, 365 ff.;
+    in Greek philosophy, 352;
+    in absolute idealism, 367, 418.
+
+  EVOLUTION, of cosmos, 242 ff.;
+    of morality, 262.
+
+  EXPERIENCE, 410, 411, 412;
+    analysis of, by Kant, 354.
+
+
+  FAITH, 424;
+    special interests of, 199.
+    See also RELIGION and BELIEF.
+
+  FERGUSON, CHAS., quoted, 265.
+
+  FICHTE, 360, 402.
+
+  FIELDING, H., quoted on religion, 59, 74.
+
+  FORCE, development of conception of, 231 ff.
+
+  FORM, in Aristotle, 334.
+
+  FREEDOM, in ethics, 196, 388;
+    meanings and theories, 211.
+
+
+  GOD, as guarantee of ideals, 18, 425;
+    personality of, 62, 108 ff.;
+    St. Augustine's communion with, 68;
+    presence of, 68;
+    as a disposition from which consequences may be expected, 85;
+    meaning of, in religion, 87;
+    idea of, in Judaism and Christianity, 92;
+    why historical, 102;
+    social relation with, 103;
+    the ontological proof of, 200;
+    ethical and epistemological arguments for, 202;
+    cosmological proof of, 203;
+    teleological proof of, 204;
+    relation to the world, in theism, pantheism and deism, 205 ff.;
+    will of, 212;
+    conception of, in Berkeley, 284, 293 ff.;
+    conception and proof of, in Spinoza, 312 ff., 392, 393;
+    conception of, in Plato, 331, 352, 391, 393;
+    conception of, in Leibniz, 338, 353.
+    Also see ABSOLUTE.
+
+  GOETHE, on Spinoza, and on philosophy, 51;
+    on pragmatism, 407.
+
+  GOOD, the, theories of, in ethics, 191 ff.;
+    and the real, 326 ff., 421 ff.
+
+  GREEK, religion, in Homer and Lucretius, 89;
+    ideals, 195, 198, 429.
+
+  GREEN, T. H., quoted, 369, 385 (_note_).
+
+
+  HAECKEL, quoted, 236, 266.
+
+  HEDONISM, 192.
+
+  HEGEL, on science, 129;
+    philosophy of, 150, 361 ff.;
+    relation to Kant, 381;
+    on the absolute, 382;
+    ethics of, 390.
+
+  HERACLITUS, 308.
+
+  HISTORY, philosophy of, in Hegel, 363.
+
+  HOBBES, his misconception of relations of philosophy and science, 115;
+    quoted on ethics, 261.
+
+  Holbach, 251, 252.
+
+  HOMER, on Greek religion, 90.
+
+  HUMANISM, 320, 404, 405.
+
+  HUME, positivism of, 115, 377;
+    phenomenalism of, 283;
+    and Descartes, 376.
+
+  HUXLEY, quoted, 255, 266.
+
+  HYLOZOISM, 225.
+
+
+  IDEAL, the, in Plato, 326;
+    validity of, 416.
+
+  IDEALISM, various meanings of term, 173 (_note_);
+    meaning of, as theory of knowledge, 175 ff., 409;
+    of present day, 409 ff.;
+    empirical, see SUBJECTIVISM, PHENOMENALISM, SPIRITUALISM;
+    absolute, see ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.
+
+  IDEALS, in life, 10 ff.;
+    adoption of, 17 ff.
+
+  IDEAS, the, in Plato, 329.
+
+  IMAGINATION, in poetry, 99;
+    place of, in religion, 80, 97 ff.;
+    special functions of, in religion, 101 ff.;
+    scope of, in religion, 105 ff.;
+    and the personality of God, 110.
+
+  IMITATIO CHRISTI, quoted, 68.
+
+  IMMANENCE THEORY, 412, 413.
+
+  IMMORTALITY, 212.
+
+  INDIVIDUALISM, 301, 320, 338, 404.
+
+  INTUITIONISM, in ethics, 196.
+
+
+  JAMES, WILLIAM, quoted on religion, 65, 71, 305.
+
+  JUDAISM, development of, 92;
+    and Christianity, 94.
+
+
+  KANT, his transcendentalism, 177, 356;
+    his critique of knowledge, 354 ff., 377 ff.;
+    and absolute idealism, 380;
+    ethics of, 386.
+
+  KEPLER, quoted, 129.
+
+  KNOWLEDGE, of the means in life, 8;
+    of the end, 10;
+    in poetry, 27 ff.;
+    in religion, 82, 85, 97, 105;
+    general theory of, on epistemology, 164 ff.;
+    problem of source and criterion of, 168 ff.;
+    problem of relation to its object, 172 ff., 277, 340, 351, 368 ff.;
+    relation of logic to, 183 ff.;
+    account of, in naturalism, 253 ff.
+    Also see EPISTEMOLOGY.
+
+
+  LA METTRIE, quoted, 250.
+
+  LA PLACE, 242; quoted, 241.
+
+  LEIBNIZ, on function of philosophy, 155;
+    philosophy of, 333, 336 ff.;
+    epistemology of, 339.
+
+  LEUCIPPUS, quoted, 161.
+
+  LIFE, as a starting-point for thought, 3;
+    definition of, 5 ff.;
+    and self-consciousness, 6;
+    philosophy of 17 ff., 153;
+    mechanical theory of, 244 ff.;
+    return of philosophy to, 427 ff.;
+    contemplation in, 428.
+
+  LOCKE, epistemology of, 273.
+
+  LOGIC, origin in Socratic method, 181;
+    affiliations of, 182, 188;
+    definition of, 183;
+    parts of formal, 184 ff.;
+    present tendencies in, 187 ff.;
+    algebra of, 189.
+
+  LUCRETIUS, his criticism of Greek religion, quoted, 89 ff.;
+    on mechanism, 226, 240.
+
+
+  MCTAGGART, J. M. E., on Hegel, 367;
+    on the absolute, 391.
+
+  MACH, E., 283;
+    on philosophy and science, 120.
+
+  MALEBRANCHE, 376.
+
+  MARCUS AURELIUS, 348.
+
+  MATERIALISM, 254, 256;
+    general meaning, 223, 414;
+    development, 224 ff.;
+    and science, 228;
+    French, 249;
+    theory of mind in, 250.
+
+  MATHEMATICS, importance in science, 132;
+    logic in, 188;
+    Berkeley's conception of, 279;
+    Plato's conception of, 329, 335;
+    Spinoza's conception of, 311, 335.
+
+  MATTER, 225, 228;
+    and space, 229;
+    Berkeley's refutation of, 275 ff.;
+    in Plato and Aristotle, 334.
+
+  MECHANICAL THEORY, practical significance of its extension to the
+      world at large, 20;
+    in cosmology, 161, 225;
+    of Descartes, 231;
+    of Newton 232;
+    of origin of cosmos, 242;
+    of life, 244;
+    in Spinoza, 336.
+
+  METAPHYSICS, relation to epistemology, 150;
+    relation to ethics, 151, 196 ff.;
+    definition of, 158;
+    relation to logic, 188;
+    relation to theology, 207;
+    present tendencies in, 399 ff., 408.
+
+  MILL, J. S., 283 (_note_).
+
+  MIND, explanation of in naturalism, 237, 247 ff.;
+    of God, in Berkeley, 284, 294, 296;
+    absolute, 349 (_note_), 358, 382 ff.
+    Also see under SELF, and SOUL.
+
+  MODE, in Spinoza, 313.
+
+  MONADS, in Leibniz, 338.
+
+  MONISM, 159, 163.
+
+  MORALITY, and religion, 73;
+    grounds of, according to Kant, 356;
+    incentive to, 422.
+
+  MYSTICISM, general account, 171;
+    Schopenhauer's, 290;
+    types of religions, 391.
+
+
+  NAEGELI, C. v., quoted, 287.
+
+  NATURAL SCIENCE, true relations of, with philosophy, 116;
+    sphere of, with reference to philosophy, 117 ff.;
+    philosophy of, its procedure, 121, 135, 142, 154, 401;
+    origin of, as special interest, 123 ff.;
+    human value of, 126, 127, 143;
+    method and fundamental conceptions of, 406, 128 ff.;
+    general development of, 134;
+    limits of, because abstract, 136 ff., 414;
+    validity of, 142;
+    logic and, 188;
+    development of conceptions in, 229 ff.;
+    grounds of, according to Kant, 355, 377;
+    Hume on, 377;
+    permanence and progress in, 395 ff.
+
+  NATURAL SELECTION, 204, 245.
+
+  NATURALISM, chap. viii;
+    general meaning, 217, 223 (_note_), 399;
+    claims of, 239;
+    task of, 241;
+    criticism of, 117, 257, 263;
+    of present day, 405, 412.
+    Also see under MATERIALISM, and POSITIVISM.
+
+  NATURE, 160, 244, 337;
+    in Berkeley, 294;
+    in Spinoza, 317, 338;
+    in Hegel, 363;
+    in Kant, 377 ff.;
+    in contemporary philosophy, 401.
+    Also see NATURAL SCIENCE, and NATURALISM.
+
+  NEBULAR HYPOTHESIS, 242.
+
+  NECESSITY, of will, 211;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 393.
+
+  NEO-FICHTEANS, 402, 403 (_note_).
+
+  NEO-KANTIANS, 403.
+
+  NEWTON, 232, 235, 242, 355, 377.
+
+  NORMATIVE SCIENCES, the, 180.
+
+
+  OMAR KHAYYAM, quoted, 16;
+    as a philosopher-poet, 36.
+
+  ONTOLOGICAL PROOF, of God, 200.
+
+  ONTOLOGY, 159.
+
+  OPTIMISM, 104, 388, 422, 424.
+
+
+  PANPSYCHISM, 176, 238, 285 ff.
+
+  PANTHEISM, in primitive religion, 78;
+    general meaning, 205;
+    types of, 390.
+
+  PARKER, THEODORE, quoted on religion, 67.
+
+  PARMENIDES, and rationalism, 168;
+    philosophy of, 308 ff., 337;
+    and Aristotle, 336.
+
+  PATER, WALTER, on Wordsworth, 38;
+    on Cyrenaicism, 260;
+    on subjectivism, 270.
+
+  PAULSEN, FRIEDRICH, ethics of, quoted, 302.
+
+  PEARSON, KARL, quoted, 230.
+
+  PERCEPTION. See SENSE-PERCEPTION.
+
+  PERSONAL IDEALISM, 404, 405.
+
+  PERSONALITY, of God, important in understanding of religion, 62;
+    essential to religion? 108 ff.
+
+  PERSONS, description of belief in, 62;
+    imagination of, 101, 110.
+
+  PESSIMISM, 104, 299, 424.
+
+  PHENOMENALISM, general meaning, 176, 267 (_note_);
+    of Berkeley, 272, 275 ff.;
+    of Hume, 283;
+    various tendencies in, 281.
+
+  PHILOSOPHER, the practical man and the, chap. i;
+    the rôle of the, 306, 426.
+
+  PHILOSOPHY, commonly misconceived, 3;
+    of the devotee, 13;
+    of the man of affairs, 14;
+    of the voluptuary, 16;
+    of life, its general meaning, 17 ff., 153;
+    its relations with poetry, chap. ii, 112;
+    lack of, in Shakespeare, 33;
+    as expression of personality, 33;
+    as premature, 33;
+    in poetry of Omar Khayyam, 36;
+    in poetry of Wordsworth, 38 ff.;
+    in poetry of Dante, 42 ff.;
+    difference between philosophy and poetry, 48 ff.;
+    in religion, 108 ff.;
+    compared with religion, 112;
+    true attitude of, toward science, 116;
+    sphere of, in relation to science, 117, 395 ff.;
+    procedure of, with reference to science, 121, 135, 142, 154, 160;
+    human value of, 143, 426 ff.;
+    can its problem be divided? 149, 155;
+    origin of, 157;
+    special problems of, chap. vi, vii;
+    and psychology, 216;
+    peculiar object of, 308;
+    self-criticism in, 319 ff., 325;
+    permanence and progress in, 395 ff.;
+    contemporary, 398 ff.
+
+  PHYSICAL.
+    See CORPOREAL BEING, MATERIALISM, etc.
+
+  PHYSIOLOGY, 246.
+
+  PIETY, description and interpretation of, 72;
+    in ethics, 195.
+
+  PLATO, on Protagoras, 167, 269, 270, 298;
+    quoted, on Socrates, 170, 192, 194;
+    historical preparation for, 324;
+    psychology of, 209;
+    philosophy of, 306, 318, 326 ff., 382;
+    and Aristotle, 333;
+    and Spinoza, 318, 335;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 346, 391, 393;
+    on evil, 352;
+    on spirit, 359;
+    on reason and perception, 370;
+    on the philosopher, 426.
+
+  PLURALISM, general meaning of, 159, 163, 419;
+    in ethics, 302, 421 ff.;
+    in religion, 304.
+
+  POETRY, relations with philosophy, chap. ii;
+    as appreciation, 25;
+    virtue of sincerity in, 27;
+    the "barbarian" in, 28;
+    constructive knowledge in, 30;
+    difference between philosophy and, 48 ff.
+
+  POSITIVISM, on relation of philosophy and science, 115, 122;
+    general meaning of, 168, 234, 252 ff., 412.
+
+  PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE, of means, 8 ff.;
+    of end or purpose, 10 ff.;
+    implied in religion, 85, 97;
+    philosophy as, 153.
+
+  PRACTICAL MAN, the, and the philosopher, chap. i;
+    his failure to understand philosophy, 3;
+    his ideal, 14;
+    virtually a philosopher, 22.
+
+  PRAGMATISM, 151, 407, 408.
+
+  PRAYER, 103.
+
+  PREDICTION, in science, 130.
+
+  PRESENT DAY, philosophy of the, 398 ff.
+
+  PROTAGORAS, scepticism of, 166, 271;
+    subjectivism of, 269;
+    ethics of, 298.
+
+  PSYCHOLOGY, of religion, 58, 82;
+    inadequate to religion, 82;
+    as branch of philosophy, 208 ff., 216;
+    as natural science, 213;
+    affiliations of, 215;
+    limits of, 415.
+
+  PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM, 215, 252.
+
+  PURPOSE, in life, 10 ff.;
+    adoption of life-purpose, 17 ff.;
+    practical significance of, in the world at large, 20.
+    Also see TELEOLOGY, IDEAL, etc.
+
+
+  QUALITIES, primary and secondary, 254, 274, 277.
+
+
+  RATIONALISM, general meaning, 168, 416;
+    in logic, 180, 184;
+    in ethics, 193;
+    of eleatics, 310;
+    of Spinoza, 311;
+    in absolute realism, 339;
+    criticism of, 418.
+
+  REALISM, various meanings of term, 173 (_note_);
+    meaning of, as theory of knowledge, 172;
+    of Parmenides, 308 ff.;
+    of Plato and Aristotle, 341;
+    of present day, 409 ff.
+
+  REASON, 370.
+    See RATIONALISM.
+
+  RELATIVISM, 166, 267 ff.;
+    in ethics, 298.
+
+  RELIGION, chaps. iii, iv;
+    relation to poetry and philosophy, 49, 52;
+    difficulty of defining, 53;
+    possibility of defining, 54;
+    profitableness of defining, 54;
+    true method of defining, 56;
+    misconceptions of, 56;
+    as possessing the psychological character of belief, 59 ff.;
+    degree of, in individuals and moods, 60, 61;
+    definition of, as belief in disposition of universe, 64 ff., 82;
+    and morality, 73;
+    symbolism in, 75;
+    prophet and preacher of, 75;
+    conveyance of, 76;
+    primitive, 77;
+    Buddhism, 78;
+    the critical or enlightened type of, 80;
+    means to be true, 82 ff.;
+    implies a practical truth, 85;
+    cases of truth and error in, 88 ff.;
+    of Baal, 88;
+    Greek, 89;
+    of Jews, its development, 92;
+    Christian, 94;
+    definition of cognitive factor in, 97;
+    place of imagination in, 80, 97 ff.;
+    special functions of imagination in, 101 ff.;
+    relation of imagination and truth in, 105;
+    philosophy implied in, 108 ff.;
+    is personal god essential to, 108;
+    compared with philosophy, 112;
+    compared with science, 145;
+    special philosophical problems of, 199 ff.;
+    of naturalism, 263 ff.;
+    of subjectivism and spiritualism, 302 ff.;
+    of Plato and Aristotle, 346, 393;
+    of Stoics and Spinoza, 348, 393;
+    philosophy of, in Hegel, 365;
+    of absolute idealism, 390 ff.
+
+  RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA, interpretation of, 69 ff.
+
+  REPRESENTATIVE THEORY, of knowledge, 174, 412.
+
+  ROMANTICISM, 361.
+
+  ROUSSEAU, quoted on nature, 64.
+
+  ROYCE, JOSIAH, quoted on absolute idealism, 178, 384, 394.
+
+
+  SANTAYANA, GEORGE, quoted on poetry 28, 29.
+
+  SCEPTICISM, 166, 267 ff.
+    See under POSITIVISM, and AGNOSTICISM.
+
+  SCHELLING, misconception of science, 116.
+
+  SCHOLASTICISM, 333;
+    idea of God in, 201.
+
+  SCHOPENHAUER, his panpsychism or voluntarism, 177, 285 ff.;
+    universalizes subjectivism, 290;
+    mysticism of, 290;
+    ethics of, 299;
+    religion of, 303.
+
+  SCIENCE.
+    Also see under NATURAL SCIENCE, and NORMATIVE SCIENCE.
+
+  SECULARISM, of Shakespeare, 34;
+    of Periclean Age, 320;
+    of present age, 427.
+
+  SELF, problem of, 216;
+    proof of, in St. Augustine, 372;
+    proof of, in Descartes, 374;
+    deeper moral of, 387;
+    in contemporary philosophy, 411, 413.
+    Also see SOUL, and MIND.
+
+  SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, essential to human life, 6;
+    development of conception of, 371 ff.;
+    in absolute idealism, 383;
+    in idealistic ethics, 386.
+
+  SENSATIONALISM, 247, 255, 269.
+
+  SENSE-PERCEPTION, 168, 247, 269, 370;
+    being as, in Berkeley, 281.
+
+  SHAKESPEARE, general criticism of, 30 ff.;
+    his universality, 31;
+    lack of philosophy in, 33.
+
+  SHELLEY, quoted on poetry, 50.
+
+  SOCIAL RELATIONS, belief inspired by, analogue of religion, 62;
+    imagination of, extended to God, 101.
+
+  SOCRATES, rationalism of, 169;
+    and normative science, 180;
+    ethics of, 192, 194;
+    method of, 321 ff.
+
+  SOPHISTS, the, epistemology of, 165;
+    scepticism of, 271, 320;
+    ethics of, 298, 301;
+    age of, 320.
+
+  SOUL, the, in Aristotle, 208;
+    in Plato, 209;
+    as substance, 209;
+    intellectualism and voluntarism in theory of, 210;
+    immortality of, 212;
+    Berkeley's theory of, 284.
+    Also see under MIND, and SELF.
+
+  SPACE, importance in science, 130;
+    and matter, 229.
+
+  SPENCER, 236 (_note_), 243, 265.
+
+  SPINOZA, and Goethe, 51;
+    quoted on philosophy and life, 153;
+    philosophy of, 306, 311 ff.;
+    criticism and estimate of, 315 ff.;
+    and Plato, 318, 335;
+    and Aristotle, 336;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 348, 392, 393.
+
+  SPIRIT, the absolute, 358 ff.
+
+  SPIRITUALISM, general meaning, 176, 267 (_note_);
+    in Berkeley, 280, 292;
+    in Schopenhauer, 285;
+    criticism of, 288;
+    objective, 292.
+
+  STEVENSON, R. L., quoted on religion, 67.
+
+  STOICISM, ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 348.
+
+  SUBJECTIVISM, chap. ix;
+    general meaning, 175, 218, 267 (_note_), 415;
+    in æsthetics, 190;
+    of Berkeley, 275 ff.;
+    universalization of, in Schopenhauer, 290;
+    criticism of, 297, 415;
+    ethics of, 298 ff.;
+    in absolute idealism, 368;
+    of present day, 409.
+
+  SUBSTANCE, spiritual, 209, 284;
+    material, Berkeley's refutation of, 275 ff.;
+    Spinoza's conception of, 311;
+    the infinite, in Spinoza, 312;
+    Aristotle's conception of, 334;
+    Leibniz's conception of, 338.
+
+  SYMBOLISM, in religion, 75.
+
+
+  TELEOLOGY, in cosmology, 161;
+    proof of God from, 204;
+    Spinoza on, 318;
+    in Plato, 326 ff., 336;
+    in Aristotle, 336.
+
+  THEISM, 205.
+
+  THEOLOGY, relation to religion, 98;
+    in philosophy, 199 ff.;
+    relation to metaphysics, 207.
+
+  THOMSON, J., quoted, 104.
+
+  THOUGHT, and life, 6 ff.;
+    as being, in Hegel, 361 ff.
+
+  THUCYDIDES, on thought and action, 429.
+
+  TIME, importance in science, 130.
+
+  TRANSCENDENTALISM, 177, 349 (_note_), 356.
+    See IDEALISM, absolute.
+
+  TYNDALL, 115.
+
+
+  UNIVERSAL, scientific knowledge as, 125, 139.
+
+  UNIVERSE, the, as object of religious reaction, 64;
+    common object of philosophy and religion, 112;
+    as collective, 419.
+
+  UTILITARIANISM, 261.
+
+
+  VIRTUE, 198, 345.
+
+  VOLTAIRE, quoted, 231, 251.
+
+  VOLUNTARISM, in psychology, 210;
+    in Schopenhauer, 285.
+
+
+  WHITMAN, WALT, 27 ff.
+
+  WILL, in psychology, 210;
+    freedom and determination of, 211;
+    in Schopenhauer, 177;
+    as cause, in Berkeley, 293 ff.;
+    in pragmatism, 407.
+
+  WORDSWORTH, as philosopher-poet, 38 ff.;
+    his sense for the universal, 40;
+    quoted on poetry and philosophy, 48, 50.
+
+
+  ZENO, 337.
+
+
+
+
+TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:
+
+
+Ellipses match the original.
+
+Numbers in {braces} are subscripted in the original.
+
+Variations in spelling have been left as in the original. Examples
+include the following:
+
+     co-ordinated       coördinated
+     Kuelpe             Külpe's
+     Muensterberg       Münsterberg
+     Nirvana            Nirvâna
+     Phaedo             Phædo
+     pre-eminent        preëminent
+     pre-eminently      preëminently
+     reenforcement       reënforce
+     role               rôle
+     Theaetetus         Theætetus
+
+The word Phoenix uses an oe ligature in the original.
+
+The following corrections have been made to the text:
+
+     Page xv: CHAPTER VI. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY{original has
+     EPISTOMOLOGY}
+
+     Page 70: The psychology{original has pyschology} of conversion
+
+     Page 93: him who practices{original has practises} the social
+     virtues
+
+     Page 165: reality have resulted in no consensus{original has
+     concensus} of opinion
+
+     Page 196: but in a law to which it{original has its} owes
+     obedience
+
+     Page 261: 'justice,' 'gratitude,' '{quotation mark missing in
+     original}modesty,'
+
+     Page 283: retained after their original{original has orignal}
+     meaning
+
+     Page 288: nothing but the highest development{original has
+     devolpment} on our earth
+
+     Page 325: philosopher who defined being as{original has a} the
+     ideal
+
+     Page 405: Henri Bergson: _Essai{original has Essoi} sur les
+     données immédiates de la conscience_
+
+     Page 434: THOMAS À{original has �} KEMPIS: _Imitation of
+     Christ._
+
+     Page 436: HUXLEY, T. H.: _Evolution and Ethics;
+     Prolegomena._{original has Prologomena}
+
+     [51:11] Vol. I, p. 60.{period is missing in original}
+
+     [199:14] religion in these matters, cf.{original has Cf.}
+     Descartes:
+
+     [287:16] Translation by Haldane and Kemp{original has Komp}
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's The Approach to Philosophy, by Ralph Barton Perry
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diff --git a/25110-0.zip b/25110-0.zip
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+Project Gutenberg's The Approach to Philosophy, by Ralph Barton Perry
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Approach to Philosophy
+
+Author: Ralph Barton Perry
+
+Release Date: April 19, 2008 [EBook #25110]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Stephen Hope, Fox in the Stars, Lisa Reigel,
+and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's Notes: Some typographical errors have been corrected. A
+complete list follows the text. Words in Greek in the original are
+transliterated and placed between +plus signs+. Words italicized in the
+original are surrounded by _underscores_.
+
+
+
+
+THE
+APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+BY PROF. RALPH BARTON PERRY
+
+  THE FREE MAN AND THE SOLDIER
+  THE MORAL ECONOMY
+  THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
+
+
+
+
+THE APPROACH TO
+PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+BY
+
+RALPH BARTON PERRY, PH.D.
+  ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
+
+
+CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
+  NEW YORK CHICAGO BOSTON
+
+
+COPYRIGHT, 1905, BY
+CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
+
+Printed in the United States of America
+F
+
+
+
+
+THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED TO
+
+MY FATHER
+
+AS A TOKEN OF MY LOVE AND ESTEEM
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+In an essay on "The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time,"
+Professor Edward Caird says that "philosophy is not a first venture into
+a new field of thought, but the rethinking of a secular and religious
+consciousness which has been developed, in the main, independently of
+philosophy."[vii:A] If there be any inspiration and originality in this
+book, they are due to my great desire that philosophy should appear in
+its vital relations to more familiar experiences. If philosophy is, as
+is commonly assumed, appropriate to a phase in the development of every
+individual, it should _grow out_ of interests to which he is already
+alive. And if the great philosophers are indeed never dead, this fact
+should manifest itself in their classic or historical representation of
+a perennial outlook upon the world. I am not seeking to attach to
+philosophy a fictitious liveliness, wherewith to insinuate it into the
+good graces of the student. I hope rather to be true to the meaning of
+philosophy. For there is that in its stand-point and its problem which
+makes it universally significant entirely apart from dialectic and
+erudition. These are derived interests, indispensable to the scholar,
+but quite separable from that modicum of philosophy which helps to make
+the man. The present book is written for the sake of elucidating the
+inevitable philosophy. It seeks to make the reader more solicitously
+aware of the philosophy that is in him, or to provoke him to philosophy
+in his own interests. To this end I have sacrificed all else to the task
+of mediating between the tradition and technicalities of the academic
+discipline and the more common terms of life.
+
+The purpose of the book will in part account for those shortcomings that
+immediately reveal themselves to the eye of the scholar. In Part I
+various great human interests have been selected as points of departure.
+I have sought to introduce the general stand-point and problem of
+philosophy through its implication in practical life, poetry, religion,
+and science. But in so doing it has been necessary for me to deal
+shortly with topics of great independent importance, and so risk the
+disfavor of those better skilled in these several matters. This is
+evidently true of the chapter which deals with natural science. But the
+problem which I there faced differed radically from those of the
+foregoing chapters, and the method of treatment is correspondingly
+different. In the case of natural science one has to deal with a body of
+knowledge which is frequently regarded as the only knowledge. To write a
+chapter about science from a philosophical stand-point is, in the
+present state of opinion, to undertake a polemic against exclusive
+naturalism, an attitude which is itself philosophical, and as such is
+well known in the history of philosophy as _positivism_ or
+_agnosticism_. I have avoided the polemical spirit and method so far as
+possible, but have, nevertheless, here taken sides against a definite
+philosophical position. This chapter, together with the Conclusion, is
+therefore an exception to the purely introductory and expository
+representation which I have, on the whole, sought to give. The
+relatively great space accorded to the discussion of religion is, in my
+own belief, fair to the general interest in this topic, and to the
+intrinsic significance of its relation to philosophy.
+
+I have in Part II undertaken to furnish the reader with a map of the
+country to which he has been led. To this end I have attempted a brief
+survey of the entire programme of philosophy. An accurate and full
+account of philosophical terms can be found in such books as Külpe's
+"Introduction to Philosophy" and Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy,"
+and an attempt to emulate their thoroughness would be superfluous, even
+if it were conformable to the general spirit of this book. The scope of
+Part II is due in part to a desire for brevity, but chiefly to the hope
+of furnishing an epitome that shall follow the course of the _natural
+and historical differentiation_ of the general philosophical problem.
+
+Finally, I have in Part III sought to present the tradition of
+philosophy in the form of general types. My purpose in undertaking so
+difficult a task is to acquaint the reader with philosophy in the
+concrete; to show how certain underlying principles may determine the
+whole circle of philosophical ideas, and give them unity and distinctive
+flavor. Part II offers a general classification of philosophical
+problems and conceptions independently of any special point of view. But
+I have in Part III sought to emphasize the point of view, or the
+internal consistency that makes a _system of philosophy_ out of certain
+answers to the special problems of philosophy. In such a division into
+types, lines are of necessity drawn too sharply. There will be many
+historical philosophies that refuse to fit, and many possibilities
+unprovided for. I must leave it to the individual reader to overcome
+this abstractness through his own reflection upon the intermediate and
+variant stand-points.
+
+Although the order is on the whole that of progressive complexity, I
+have sought to treat each chapter with independence enough to make it
+possible for it to be read separately; and I have provided a carefully
+selected bibliography in the hope that this book may serve as a stimulus
+and guide to the reading of other books.
+
+The earlier chapters have already appeared as articles: Chapter I in the
+_International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. XIII, No. 4; Chapter II in the
+_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, No. 6; Chapter III in the _Monist_,
+Vol. XIV, No. 5; Chapter IV in the _International Journal of Ethics_,
+Vol. XV, No. 1; and some paragraphs of Chapter V in the _Journal of
+Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol. I, No. 7. I am
+indebted to the editors of these periodicals for permission to reprint
+with minor changes.
+
+In the writing of this, my first book, I have been often reminded that
+a higher critic, skilled in the study of internal evidence, could
+probably trace all of its ideas to suggestions that have come to me from
+my teachers and colleagues of the Department of Philosophy in Harvard
+University. I have unscrupulously forgotten what of their definite ideas
+I have adapted to my own use, but not that I received from them the
+major portion of my original philosophical capital. I am especially
+indebted to Professor William James for the inspiration and resources
+which I have received from his instruction and personal friendship.
+
+                                              RALPH BARTON PERRY.
+
+CAMBRIDGE, March, 1905.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[vii:A] Edw. Caird: _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 207.
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+
+PART I
+
+APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY
+                                                                    PAGE
+
+CHAPTER I. THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER                       3
+
+  §   1. Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?                     3
+  §   2. Life as a Starting-point for Thought                          4
+  §   3. The Practical Knowledge of Means                              8
+  §   4. The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose                10
+  §   5. The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and the
+             Voluptuary                                               12
+  §   6. The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life          17
+
+CHAPTER II. POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY                                     24
+
+  §   7. Who is the Philosopher-Poet?                                 24
+  §   8. Poetry as Appreciation                                       25
+  §   9. Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman                                 27
+  §  10. Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare                30
+  §  11. Philosophy in Poetry. The World-view. Omar Khayyam           36
+  §  12. Wordsworth                                                   38
+  §  13. Dante                                                        42
+  §  14. The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy                 48
+
+CHAPTER III. THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE                                 53
+
+  §  15. The Possibility of Defining Religion                         53
+  §  16. The Profitableness of Defining Religion                      54
+  §  17. The True Method of Defining Religion                         56
+  §  18. Religion as Belief                                           59
+  §  19. Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude              62
+  §  20. Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual
+             Environment, or Universe                                 64
+  §  21. Examples of Religious Belief                                 66
+  §  22. Typical Religious Phenomena. Conversion                      69
+  §  23. Piety                                                        72
+  §  24. Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance    74
+  §  25. Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions            77
+  §  26. Buddhism                                                     78
+  §  27. Critical Religion                                            79
+
+CHAPTER IV. THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION                82
+
+  §  28. Résumé of Psychology of Religion                             82
+  §  29. Religion Means to be True                                    82
+  §  30. Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a Disposition
+             from which Consequences May Rationally be Expected       85
+  §  31. Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The
+             Religion of Baal                                         88
+  §  32. Greek Religion                                               89
+  §  33. Judaism and Christianity                                     92
+  §  34. The Cognitive Factor in Religion                             96
+  §  35. The Place of Imagination in Religion                         97
+  §  36. The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination          101
+  §  37. The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion      105
+  §  38. The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions         108
+
+CHAPTER V. NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY                            114
+
+  §  39. The True Relations of Philosophy and Science.
+             Misconceptions and Antagonisms                          114
+  §  40. The Spheres of Philosophy and Science                       117
+  §  41. The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science                    120
+  §  42. The Origin of the Scientific Interest                       123
+  §  43. Skill as Free                                               123
+  §  44. Skill as Social                                             126
+  §  45. Science for Accommodation and Construction                  127
+  §  46. Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. The
+             Descriptive Method                                      128
+  §  47. Space, Time, and Prediction                                 130
+  §  48. The Quantitative Method                                     132
+  §  49. The General Development of Science                          134
+  §  50. The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science          135
+  §  51. Natural Science is Abstract                                 136
+  §  52. The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth                        139
+  §  53. But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality                   142
+  §  54. Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy          143
+
+
+PART II
+
+THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+CHAPTER VI. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY                             149
+
+  §  55. The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem
+             of Philosophy                                           149
+  §  56. The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon
+             the Initial Interest                                    152
+  §  57. Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life                    152
+  §  58. Philosophy as the Extension of Science                      154
+  §  59. The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical
+             Problem                                                 155
+  §  60. Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception             157
+  §  61. Monism and Pluralism                                        159
+  §  62. Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process            159
+  §  63. Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies                     160
+  §  64. Dualism                                                     162
+  §  65. The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism                     163
+  §  66. Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of
+             Knowledge                                               164
+  §  67. Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism                      166
+  §  68. The Source and Criterion of Knowledge according to
+             Empiricism and Rationalism. Mysticism                   168
+  §  69. The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to
+             Realism, and the Representative Theory                  172
+  §  70. The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to
+             Idealism                                                175
+  §  71. Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism                176
+  §  72. Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism                     177
+
+CHAPTER VII. THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION     180
+
+  §  73. The Normative Sciences                                      180
+  §  74. The Affiliations of Logic                                   182
+  §  75. Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in
+             Belief                                                  183
+  §  76. The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence,
+             Inference, and Observation                              184
+  §  77. Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment                  187
+  §  78. Priority of Concepts                                        188
+  §  79. Æsthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of
+             Beauty. Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies       189
+  §  80. Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral
+             Goodness                                                191
+  §  81. Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism                           191
+  §  82. Rationalism                                                 193
+  §  83. Eudæmonism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism           194
+  §  84. Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics                    196
+  §  85. The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions                      198
+  §  86. The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of Faith    199
+  §  87. Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God             200
+  §  88. The Ontological Proof of God                                200
+  §  89. The Cosmological Proof of God                               203
+  §  90. The Teleological Proof of God                               204
+  §  91. God and the World. Theism and Pantheism                     205
+  §  92. Deism                                                       206
+  §  93. Metaphysics and Theology                                    207
+  §  94. Psychology is the Theory of the Soul                        208
+  §  95. Spiritual Substance                                         209
+  §  96. Intellectualism and Voluntarism                             210
+  §  97. Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, and
+             Indeterminism                                           211
+  §  98. Immortality. Survival and Eternalism                        212
+  §  99. The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and Method  213
+  § 100. Psychology and Philosophy                                   216
+  § 101. Transition from Classification by Problems to
+             Classification by Doctrines. Naturalism. Subjectivism.
+             Absolute Idealism. Absolute Realism                     217
+
+
+PART III
+
+SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+CHAPTER VIII. NATURALISM                                             223
+
+  § 102. The General Meaning of Materialism                          223
+  § 103. Corporeal Being                                             224
+  § 104. Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism                225
+  § 105. Materialism and Physical Science                            228
+  § 106. The Development of the Conceptions of Physical Science.
+             Space and Matter                                        228
+  § 107. Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the
+             Conception of Force                                     231
+  § 108. The Development and Extension of the Conception of Energy   236
+  § 109. The Claims of Naturalism                                    239
+  § 110. The Task of Naturalism                                      241
+  § 111. The Origin of the Cosmos                                    242
+  § 112. Life. Natural Selection                                     244
+  § 113. Mechanical Physiology                                       246
+  § 114. Mind. The Reduction to Sensation                            247
+  § 115. Automatism                                                  248
+  § 116. Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon               250
+  § 117. Knowledge. Positivism and Agnosticism                       252
+  § 118. Experimentalism                                             255
+  § 119. Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic                    256
+  § 120. General Ethical Stand-point                                 258
+  § 121. Cynicism and Cyrenaicism                                    259
+  § 122. Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception of
+             Social Relations                                        260
+  § 123. Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic                          262
+  § 124. Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion                      263
+  § 125. Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, Wonder,
+             and Renunciation                                        265
+
+CHAPTER IX. SUBJECTIVISM                                             267
+
+  § 126. Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and
+             Scepticism                                              267
+  § 127. Phenomenalism and Spiritualism                              271
+  § 128. Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem
+             Inherited from Descartes and Locke                      272
+  § 129. The Refutation of Material Substance                        275
+  § 130. The Application of the Epistemological Principle            277
+  § 131. The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World               278
+  § 132. The Transition to Spiritualism                              280
+  § 133. Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism                  281
+  § 134. Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the
+             Perceiver                                               284
+  § 135. Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate
+             Knowledge of the Will                                   285
+  § 136. Panpsychism                                                 287
+  § 137. The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for
+             Objective Knowledge                                     288
+  § 138. Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism.
+             Mysticism                                               290
+  § 139. Objective Spiritualism                                      292
+  § 140. Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness, and Order  293
+  § 141. The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself    297
+  § 142. Ethical Theories. Relativism                                298
+  § 143. Pessimism and Self-denial                                   299
+  § 144. The Ethics of Welfare                                       300
+  § 145. The Ethical Community                                       302
+  § 146. The Religion of Mysticism                                   303
+  § 147. The Religion of Individual Coöperation with God             304
+
+CHAPTER X. ABSOLUTE REALISM                                          306
+
+  § 148. The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, or
+             the Absolute                                            306
+  § 149. The Eleatic Conception of Being                             309
+  § 150. Spinoza's Conception of Substance                           311
+  § 151. Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The Modes
+             and the Attributes                                      312
+  § 152. The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God                    315
+  § 153. Spinoza's Provision for the Finite                          317
+  § 154. Transition to Teleological Conceptions                      317
+  § 155. Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical                  319
+  § 156. Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists        319
+  § 157. Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher          321
+  § 158. Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth               323
+  § 159. The Historical Preparation for Plato                        324
+  § 160. Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good            326
+  § 161. The Progression of Experience toward God                    329
+  § 162. Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to
+             Platonism                                               332
+  § 163. The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of
+             Platonism and Spinozism                                 335
+  § 164. Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development to
+             the Problem of Imperfection                             336
+  § 165. The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved                338
+  § 166. Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism               339
+  § 167. The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute Realism  340
+  § 168. The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity               342
+  § 169. The Platonic Ethics of Perfection                           344
+  § 170. The Religion of Fulfilment and the Religion of
+             Renunciation                                            346
+
+CHAPTER XI. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM                                        349
+
+  § 171. General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism         349
+  § 172. The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism                351
+  § 173. The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The Task
+             of the New Absolutism                                   352
+  § 174. The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis of
+             Experience                                              354
+  § 175. Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which they
+             Set in Order                                            356
+  § 176. The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the
+             Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant.
+             The Absolute Spirit                                     358
+  § 177. Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity       360
+  § 178. Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment            361
+  § 179. Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic            361
+  § 180. The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History               363
+  § 181. Résumé. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the Problem
+             of Evil                                                 365
+  § 182. The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is Based
+             upon the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge             368
+  § 183. The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason            371
+  § 184. Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian
+             Philosophy                                              372
+  § 185. Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the Thinking
+             Self                                                    374
+  § 186. Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers              376
+  § 187. To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind       377
+  § 188. The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general into an
+             Absolute Mind                                           380
+  § 189. The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite Mind to
+             the Infinite Mind                                       382
+  § 190. The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism                 385
+  § 191. The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics
+             of Absolute Idealism. Kant                              386
+  § 192. Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of
+             Universal and Objective Spirit                          388
+  § 193. The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute Idealism   390
+  § 194. The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality                      393
+
+CHAPTER XII. CONCLUSION                                              395
+
+  § 195. Liability of Philosophy to Revision Due to its Systematic
+             Character                                               395
+  § 196. The One Science and the Many Philosophies                   396
+  § 197. Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or Eclecticism
+             of the Present Age                                      398
+  § 198. Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism and
+             Absolutism                                              399
+  § 199. Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of
+             Nature. The Neo-Fichteans                               401
+  § 200. The Neo-Kantians                                            403
+  § 201. Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism            404
+  § 202. Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of
+             Fundamental Principles                                  405
+  § 203. Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism                         407
+  § 204. Summary and Transition to Epistemology                      408
+  § 205. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism.
+             Realistic Tendency in Empirical Idealism                409
+  § 206. Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception of
+             Experience                                              410
+  § 207. Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence Philosophy  412
+  § 208. The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New
+             Construction                                            413
+  § 209. The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of Attempt
+             to Reduce all Experience to it                          414
+  § 210. Truth of Psychical Relations but Impossibility of General
+             Reduction to them                                       415
+  § 211. Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of Ideal
+             of Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing the Whole
+             of Experience from it                                   415
+  § 212. Error and Evil cannot be Reduced to the Ideal               417
+  § 213. Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole             419
+  § 214. Moral Implications of Such Pluralistic Philosophy. Purity
+             of the Good                                             420
+  § 215. The Incentive to Goodness                                   422
+  § 216. The Justification of Faith                                  423
+  § 217. The Worship and Service of God                              425
+  § 218. The Philosopher and the Standards of the Market-Place       425
+  § 219. The Secularism of the Present Age                           427
+  § 220. The Value of Contemplation for Life                         428
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                         431
+
+INDEX                                                                441
+
+
+
+
+PART I
+
+APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF
+PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER
+
+
+[Sidenote: Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?]
+
+§ 1. Philosophy suffers the distinction of being regarded as essentially
+an academic pursuit. The term _philosophy_, to be sure, is used in
+common speech to denote a stoical manner of accepting the vicissitudes
+of life; but this conception sheds little or no light upon the meaning
+of philosophy as a branch of scholarship. The men who write the books on
+"Epistemology" or "Ontology," are regarded by the average man of
+affairs, even though he may have enjoyed a "higher education," with
+little sympathy and less intelligence. Not even philology seems less
+concerned with the real business of life. The pursuit of philosophy
+appears to be a phenomenon of extreme and somewhat effete culture, with
+its own peculiar traditions, problems, and aims, and with little or
+nothing to contribute to the real enterprises of society. It is easy to
+prove to the satisfaction of the philosopher that such a view is
+radically mistaken. But it is another and more serious matter to bridge
+over the very real gap that separates philosophy and common-sense. Such
+an aim is realized only when philosophy is seen to issue from some
+special interest that is humanly important; or when, after starting in
+thought at a point where one deals with ideas and interests common to
+all, one is led by the inevitableness of consistent thinking into the
+sphere of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Life as a Starting-point for Thought.]
+
+§ 2. There is but one starting-point for reflection when all men are
+invited to share in it. Though there be a great many special platforms
+where special groups of men may take their stand together, there is only
+one platform broad enough for all. This universal stand-point, or common
+platform, is _life_. It is our more definite thesis, then, that
+philosophy, even to its most abstruse technicality, is rooted in life;
+and that it is inseparably bound up with the satisfaction of practical
+needs, and the solution of practical problems.
+
+Every man knows what it is to live, and his immediate experience will
+verify those features of the adventure that stand out conspicuously. To
+begin with, life is our birthright. We did not ask for it, but when we
+grew old enough to be self-conscious we found ourselves in possession
+of it. Nor is it a gift to be neglected, even if we had the will. As is
+true of no other gift of nature, we must use it, or cease to be. There
+is a unique urgency about life. But we have already implied more, in so
+far as we have said that it must be _used_, and have thereby referred to
+some form of movement or activity as its inseparable attribute. To
+live is to find one's self compelled to do something. To do
+_something_--there is another implication of life: some outer
+expression, some medium in which to register the degree and form of its
+activity. Such we recognize as the environment of life, the real objects
+among which it is placed; which it may change, or from which it may
+suffer change. Not only do we find our lives as unsolicited active
+powers, but find, as well, an arena prescribed for their exercise. That
+we shall act, and in a certain time and place, and with reference to
+certain other realities, this is the general condition of things that is
+encountered when each one of us discovers life. In short, to live means
+to be compelled to do something under certain circumstances.
+
+There is another very common aspect of life that would not at first
+glance seem worthy of mention. Not only does life, as we have just
+described it, mean opportunity, but it means self-conscious opportunity.
+The facts are such as we have found them to be, and as each one of us
+has previously found them for himself. But when we discover life for
+ourselves, we who make the discovery, and we who live, are identical.
+From that moment we both live, and know that we live. Moreover, such is
+the essential unity of our natures that our living must now express our
+knowing, and our knowing guide and illuminate our living. Consider the
+allegory of the centipede. From the beginning of time he had manipulated
+his countless legs with exquisite precision. Men had regarded him with
+wonder and amazement. But he was innocent of his own art, being a
+contrivance of nature, perfectly constructed to do her bidding. One day
+the centipede discovered life. He discovered himself as one who walks,
+and the newly awakened intelligence, first observing, then foreseeing,
+at length began to direct the process. And from that moment the
+centipede, because he could not remember the proper order of his going,
+lost all his former skill, and became the poor clumsy victim of his own
+self-consciousness. This same self-consciousness is the inconvenience
+and the great glory of human life. We must stumble along as best we
+can, guided by the feeble light of our own little intelligence. If
+nature starts us on our way, she soon hands over the torch, and bids us
+find the trail for ourselves. Most men are brave enough to regard this
+as the best thing of all; some despair on account of it. In either case
+it is admittedly the true story of human life. We must live as separate
+selves, observing, foreseeing, and planning. There are two things that
+we can do about it. We can repudiate our natures, decline the
+responsibility, and degenerate to the level of those animals that never
+had our chance; or we can leap joyously to the helm, and with all the
+strength and wisdom in us guide our lives to their destination. But if
+we do the former, we shall be unable to forget what might have been, and
+shall be haunted by a sense of ignominy; and if we do the second, we
+shall experience the unique happiness of fulfilment and
+self-realization.
+
+Life, then, is a situation that appeals to intelligent activity. Humanly
+speaking, there is no such thing as a situation that is not at the same
+time a theory. As we live we are all theorists. Whoever has any
+misgivings as to the practical value of theory, let him remember that,
+speaking generally of human life, it is true to say that there is no
+practice that does not issue at length from reflection. That which is
+the commonest experience of mankind is the conjunction of these two, the
+thought and the deed. And as surely as we are all practical theorists,
+so surely is philosophy the outcome of the broadening and deepening of
+practical theory. But to understand how the practical man becomes the
+philosopher, we must inquire somewhat more carefully into the manner of
+his thought about life.
+
+[Sidenote: The Practical Knowledge of Means.]
+
+§ 3. Let anyone inspect the last moment in his life, and in all
+probability he will find that his mind was employed to discover the
+means to some end. He was already bent upon some definite achievement,
+and was thoughtful for the sake of selecting the economical and
+effectual way. His theory made his practice skilful. So through life his
+knowledge shows him how to work his will. Example, experience, and books
+have taught him the uses of nature and society, and in his thoughtful
+living he is enabled to reach the goal he has set for the next hour,
+day, or year of his activity. The long periods of human life are spent
+in elaborating the means to some unquestioned end. Here one meets the
+curious truth that we wake up in the middle of life, already making
+headway, and under the guidance of some invisible steersman. When first
+we take the business of life seriously, there is a considerable stock in
+trade in the shape of habits, and inclinations to all sorts of things
+that we never consciously elected to pursue. Since we do not begin at
+the beginning, our first problem is to accommodate ourselves to
+ourselves, and our first deliberate acts are in fulfilment of plans
+outlined by some predecessor that has already spoken for us. The same
+thing is true of the race of men. At a certain stage in their
+development men found themselves engaged in all manner of ritual and
+custom, and burdened with concerns that were not of their own choosing.
+They were burning incense, keeping festivals, and naming names, all of
+which they must now proceed to justify with myth and legend, in order to
+render intelligible to themselves the deliberate and self-conscious
+repetition of them. Even so much justification was left to the few, and
+the great majority continued to seek that good which social usage
+countenanced and individual predisposition confirmed. So every man of us
+acts from day to day for love's sake, or wealth's sake, or power's
+sake, or for the sake of some near and tangible object; reflecting only
+for the greater efficiency of his endeavor.
+
+[Sidenote: The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose.]
+
+§ 4. But if this be the common manner of thinking about life, it does
+not represent the whole of such thought. Nor does it follow that because
+it occupies us so much, it is therefore correspondingly fundamental.
+Like the myth makers of old, we all want more or less to know the
+_reason of our ends_. Here, then, we meet with a somewhat different type
+of reflection upon life, the reflection that underlies the adoption of a
+life purpose. It is obvious that most ends are selected for the sake of
+other ends, and so are virtually means. Thus one may struggle for years
+to secure a college education. This definite end has been adopted for
+the sake of a somewhat more indefinite end of self-advancement, and from
+it there issues a whole series of minor ends, which form a hierarchy of
+steps ascending to the highest goal of aspiration. Now upon the face of
+things we live very unsystematic lives, and yet were we to examine
+ourselves in this fashion, we should all find our lives to be marvels of
+organization. Their growth, as we have seen, began before we were
+conscious of it; and we are commonly so absorbed in some particular
+flower or fruit that we forget the roots, and the design of the whole.
+But a little reflection reveals a remarkable unitary adjustment of
+parts. The unity is due to the dominance of a group of central purposes.
+Judged from the stand-point of experience, it seems bitter irony to say
+that everyone gets from life just what he wishes. But a candid searching
+of our own hearts will incline us to admit that, after all, the way we
+go and the length we go is determined pretty much by the kind and the
+intensity of our secret longing. That for which in the time of choice we
+are willing to sacrifice all else, is the formula that defines the law
+of each individual life. All this is not intended to mean that we have
+each named a clear and definite ideal which is our chosen goal. On the
+contrary, such a conception may be almost meaningless to some of us. In
+general the higher the ideal the vaguer and less vivid is its
+presentation to our consciousness. But, named or unnamed, sharp or
+blurred, vivid or half-forgotten, there may be found in the heart of
+every man that which of all things he wants to be, that which of all
+deeds he wants to do. If he has had the normal youth of dreaming, he
+has seen it, and warmed to the picture of his imagination; if he has
+been somewhat more thoughtful than the ordinary, his reason has defined
+it, and adopted it for his vocation; if neither, it has been present as
+an undertone throughout the rendering of his more inevitable life. He
+will recognize it when it is named as the desire to do the will of God,
+or to have as good a time as possible, or to make other people as happy
+as possible, or to be equal to his responsibilities, or to fulfil the
+expectation of his mother, or to be distinguished, wealthy, or
+influential. This list of ideals is miscellaneous, and ethically
+reducible to more fundamental concepts, but these are the terms in which
+men are ordinarily conscious of their most intimate purposes. We must
+now inquire respecting the nature of the thought that determines the
+selection of such a purpose, or justifies it when it has been
+unconsciously accepted.
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and the
+Voluptuary.]
+
+§ 5. What is most worth while? So far as human action is concerned this
+obviously depends upon what is possible, upon what is expected of us by
+our own natures, and upon what interests and concerns are conserved by
+the trend of events in our environment. What I had best do, presupposes
+what I have the strength and the skill to do, what I feel called upon to
+do, and what are the great causes that are entitled to promotion at my
+hands. It seems that practically we cannot separate the ideal from the
+real. We may feel that the highest ideal is an immediate utterance of
+conscience, as mysterious in origin as it is authoritative in
+expression. We may be willing to defy the universe, and expatriate
+ourselves from our natural and social environment, for the sake of the
+holy law of duty. Such men as Count Tolstoi have little to say of the
+possible, or the expedient, or the actual, and are satisfied to stand
+almost alone against the brutal facts of usage and economy. We all have
+a secret sense of chivalry, that prompts, however ineffectually, to a
+like devotion. But that which in such moral purposes appears to indicate
+a severance of the ideal and the real, is, if we will but stop to
+consider, only a severance of the ideal and the apparent. The martyr is
+more sure of reality than the adventurer. He is convinced that though
+his contemporaries and his environment be against him; the fundamental
+or eventual order of things is for him. He believes in a spiritual world
+more abiding, albeit less obvious, than the material world. Though
+every temporal event contradict him, he lives in the certainty that
+eternity is his. Such an one may have found his ideal in the voice of
+God and His prophets, or he may have been led to God as the
+justification of his irresistible ideal; but in either case the
+selection of his ideal is reasonable to him in so far as it is
+harmonious with the ultimate nature of things, or stands for the promise
+of reality. In this wise, thought about life expands into some
+conception of the deeper forces of the world, and life itself, in
+respect of its fundamental attachment to an ideal, implies some belief
+concerning the fundamental nature of its environment.
+
+But lest in this account life be credited with too much gravity and
+import, or it seem to be assumed that life is all knight-errantry, let
+us turn to our less quixotic, and perhaps more effectual, man of
+affairs. He works for his daily bread, and for success in his vocation.
+He has selected his vocation for its promise of return in the form of
+wealth, comfort, fame, or influence. He likewise performs such
+additional service to his family and his community as is demanded of him
+by public opinion and his own sense of responsibility. He may have a
+certain contempt for the man who sees visions. This may be his manner of
+testifying to his own preference for the ideal of usefulness and
+immediate efficiency. But even so he would never for an instant admit
+that he was pursuing a merely conventional good. He may be largely
+imitative in his standards of value, recognizing such aims as are common
+to some time or race; nevertheless none would be more sure than he of
+the truth of his ideal. Question him, and he will maintain that his is
+the reasonable life under the conditions of human existence. He may
+maintain that if there be a God, he can best serve Him by promoting the
+tangible welfare of himself and those dependent upon him. He may
+maintain that, since there is no God, he must win such rewards as the
+world can give. If he have something of the heroic in him, he may tell
+you that, since there is no God, he will labor to the uttermost for his
+fellow-men. Where he has not solved the problem of life for himself, he
+may believe himself to be obeying the insight of some one wiser than
+himself, or of society as expressed in its customs and institutions. But
+no man ever admitted that his life was purely a matter of expediency, or
+that in his dominant ideal he was the victim of chance. In the
+background of the busiest and most preoccupied life of affairs, there
+dwells the conviction that such living is appropriate to the universe;
+that it is called for by the circumstances of its origin, opportunities,
+and destiny.
+
+Finally, the man who makes light of life has of all men the most
+transparent inner consciousness. In him may be clearly observed the
+relation between the ideal and the reflection that is assumed to justify
+it.
+
+     "A Moment's Halt--a momentary taste
+      Of Being from the Well amid the Waste--
+      And Lo!--the phantom Caravan has reach'd
+      The Nothing it set out from-- . . ."
+
+     "We are no other than a moving row
+      Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go
+      Round with the Sun-illumin'd Lantern held
+      In Midnight by the Master of the Show."
+
+Where the setting of life is construed in these terms, there is but one
+natural and appropriate manner of life. Once believing in the isolation
+and insignificance of life, one is sceptical of all worth save such as
+may be tasted in the moment of its purchase. If one's ideas and
+experiences are no concern of the world's, but incidents of a purely
+local and transient interest, they will realize most when they realize
+an immediate gratification. Where one does not believe that he is a
+member of the universe, and a contributor to its ends, he does well to
+minimize the friction that arises from its accidental propinquity, and
+to kindle some little fire of enjoyment in his own lonely heart. This is
+the life of abandonment to pleasure, accompanied by the conviction that
+the conditions of life warrant no more strenuous or heroic plan.
+
+[Sidenote: The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life.]
+
+§ 6. In such wise do we adopt the life purpose, or justify it when
+unconsciously adopted. The pursuit of an ideal implies a belief in its
+effectuality. Such a belief will invariably appear when the groundwork
+of the daily living is laid bare by a little reflection. And if our
+analysis has not been in error, there is something more definite to be
+obtained from it. We all believe in the practical wisdom of our
+fundamental ideals; but we believe, besides, that such wisdom involves
+the sanction of the universe as a whole. The momentousness of an
+individual's life will be satisfied with nothing less final than an
+absolutely wise disposition of it. For every individual, his life is all
+his power and riches, and is not to be spent save for the _greatest good
+that he can reasonably pursue_. But the solution of such a problem is
+not to be obtained short of a searching of entire reality. Every life
+will represent more or less of such wisdom and enlightenment; and in the
+end the best selection of ideal will denote the greatest wealth of
+experience. It is not always true that he who has seen more will live
+more wisely, for in an individual case instinct or authority may be
+better sources of aspiration than experience. But we trust instinct and
+authority because we believe them to represent a comprehensive
+experience on the part of the race as a whole, or on the part of God. He
+whose knowledge is broadest and truest would know best what is finally
+worth living for. On this account, most men can see no more reasonable
+plan of life than obedience to God's will, for God in the abundance of
+his wisdom, and since all eternity is plain before him, must see with
+certainty that which is supremely worthy.
+
+We mean, then, that the selection of our ideals shall be determined by
+the largest possible knowledge of the facts pertaining to life. We mean
+to select as one would select who knew all about the antecedents and
+surroundings and remote consequences of life. In our own weakness and
+finitude we may go but a little way in the direction of such an
+insight, and may prefer to accept the judgment of tradition or
+authority, but we recognize a distinct type of knowledge as alone worthy
+to justify an individual's adoption of an ideal. That type of knowledge
+is the knowledge that comprehends the universe in its totality. Such
+knowledge does not involve completeness of information respecting all
+parts of reality. This, humanly speaking, is both unattainable and
+inconceivable. It involves rather a conception of the _kind_ of reality
+that is fundamental. For a wise purpose it is unnecessary that we should
+know many matters of fact, or even specific laws, provided we are
+convinced of the inner and essential character of the universe. Some of
+the alternatives are matters of every-day thought and speech. One cannot
+tell the simplest story of human life without disclosing them. To live
+the human life means to pursue ideals, that is, to have a thing in mind,
+and then to try to accomplish it. Here is one kind of reality and power.
+The planetary system, on the other hand, does not pursue ideals, but
+moves unconscious of itself, with a mechanical precision that can be
+expressed in a mathematical formula; and is representative of another
+kind of reality and power. Hence a very common and a very practical
+question: Is there an underlying law, like the law of gravitation,
+fundamentally and permanently governing life, in spite of its apparent
+direction by ideal and aspiration? Or is there an underlying power, like
+purpose, fundamentally and permanently governing the planetary system
+and all celestial worlds, in spite of the apparent control of blind and
+irresistible forces? This is a practical question because nothing could
+be more pertinent to our choice of ideals. Nothing could make more
+difference to life than a belief in the life or lifelessness of its
+environment. The faiths that generate or confirm our ideals always refer
+to this great issue. And this is but one, albeit the most profound, of
+the many issues that arise from the desire to obtain some conviction of
+the inner and essential character of life. Though so intimately
+connected with practical concerns, these issues are primarily the
+business of thought. In grappling with them, thought is called upon for
+its greatest comprehensiveness, penetration, and self-consistency. By
+the necessity of concentration, thought is sometimes led to forget its
+origin and the source of its problems. But in naming itself philosophy,
+thought has only recognized the definiteness and earnestness of its
+largest task. Philosophy is still thought about life, representing but
+the deepening and broadening of the common practical thoughtfulness.
+
+We who began together at the starting-point of _life_, have now entered
+together the haven of _philosophy_. It is not a final haven, but only
+the point of departure for the field of philosophy proper. Nevertheless
+that field is now in the plain view of the man who occupies the
+practical stand-point. He must recognize in philosophy a kind of
+reflection that differs only in extent and persistence from the
+reflection that guides and justifies his life. He may not consciously
+identify himself with any one of the three general groups which have
+been characterized. But if he is neither an idealist, nor a philistine,
+nor a pleasure lover, surely he is compounded of such elements, and does
+not escape their implications. He desires something most of all, even
+though his highest ideal be only an inference from the gradation of his
+immediate purposes. This highest ideal represents what he conceives to
+be the greatest worth or value attainable in the universe, and its
+adoption is based upon the largest generalization that he can make or
+borrow. The complete justification of his ideal would involve a true
+knowledge of the essential character of the universe. For such knowledge
+he substitutes either authority or his own imperfect insight. But in
+either case his life is naturally and organically correlated with a
+_thought about the universe in its totality, or in its deepest and
+essential character_. Such thought, the activity and its results, is
+philosophy. Hence he who lives is, _ipso facto_, a philosopher. He is
+not only a potential philosopher, but a partial philosopher. He has
+already begun to be a philosopher. Between the fitful or prudential
+thinking of some little man of affairs, and the sustained thought of the
+devoted lover of truth, there is indeed a long journey, but it is a
+straight journey along the same road. Philosophy is neither accidental
+nor supernatural, but inevitable and normal. Philosophy is not properly
+a vocation, but the ground and inspiration of all vocations. In the
+hands of its devotees it grows technical and complex, as do all efforts
+of thought, and to pursue philosophy bravely and faithfully is to
+encounter obstacles and labyrinths innumerable. The general problem of
+philosophy is mother of a whole brood of problems, little and great. But
+whether we be numbered among its devotees, or their beneficiaries, an
+equal significance attaches to the truth that philosophy is continuous
+with life.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+[Sidenote: Who is the Philosopher-Poet?]
+
+§ 7. As the ultimate criticism of all human interests, philosophy may be
+approached by avenues as various as these interests. Only when
+philosophy is discovered as the implication of well-recognized special
+interests, is the significance of its function fully appreciated. For
+the sake of such a further understanding of philosophy, those who find
+either inspiration or entertainment in poetry are invited in the present
+chapter to consider certain of the relations between poetry and
+philosophy.
+
+We must at the very outset decline to accept unqualifiedly the poet's
+opinion in the matter, for he would not think it presumptuous to
+incorporate philosophy in poetry. "No man," said Coleridge, "was ever
+yet a great poet without being at the same time a great philosopher."
+This would seem to mean that a great poet is a great philosopher, and
+more too. We shall do better to begin with the prosaic and matter of
+fact minimum of truth: some poetry is philosophical. This will enable
+us to search for the portion of philosophy that is in some poetry,
+without finally defining their respective boundaries. It may be that all
+true poetry is philosophical, as it may be that all true philosophy is
+poetical; but it is much more certain that much actual poetry is far
+from philosophical, and that most actual philosophy was not conceived or
+written by a poet. The mere poet and the mere philosopher must be
+tolerated, if it be only for the purpose of shedding light upon the
+philosopher-poet and the poet-philosopher. And it is to the
+philosopher-poet that we turn, in the hope that under the genial spell
+of poetry we may be brought with understanding to the more forbidding
+land of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Poetry as Appreciation.]
+
+§ 8. Poetry is well characterized, though not defined, as an
+interpretation of life. The term "life" here signifies the human
+purposive consciousness, and active pursuit of ends. An interpretation
+of life is, then, a selection and account of such values in human
+experience as are actually sought or are worth the seeking. For the poet
+all things are good or bad, and never only matters of fact. He is
+neither an annalist nor a statistician, and is even an observer only
+for the sake of a higher design. He is one who appreciates, and
+expresses his appreciation so fittingly that it becomes a kind of truth,
+and a permanently communicable object. That "unbodied joy," the
+skylark's song and flight, is through the genius of Shelley so
+faithfully embodied, that it may enter as a definite joy into the lives
+of countless human beings. The sensuous or suggestive values of nature
+are caught by the poet's quick feeling for beauty, and fixed by his
+creative activity. Or with his ready sympathy he may perceive the value
+of some human ideal or mastering passion, and make it a reality for our
+common feeling. Where the poet has to do with the base and hateful, his
+attitude is still appreciative. The evil is apprehended as part of a
+dramatic whole having positive moral or æsthetic value. Moral ideas may
+appear in both poetry and life as the inspiration and justification of
+struggle. Where there is no conception of its moral significance, the
+repulsive possesses for the poet's consciousness the æsthetic value of
+diversity and contrast. Even where the evil and ugly is isolated, as in
+certain of Browning's dramatic monologues, it forms, both for the poet
+and the reader, but a part of some larger perception of life or
+character, which is sublime or beautiful or good. Poetry involves,
+then, the discovery and presentation of human experiences that are
+satisfying and appealing. It is a language for human pleasures and
+ideals. Poetry is without doubt a great deal more than this, and only
+after a careful analysis of its peculiar language could one distinguish
+it from kindred arts; but it will suffice for our purposes to
+characterize and not differentiate. Starting from this most general
+truth respecting poetry, we may now look for that aspect of it whereby
+it may be a witness of philosophical truth.
+
+[Sidenote: Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman.]
+
+§ 9. For the answer to our question, we must turn to an examination of
+the intellectual elements of poetry. In the first place, the common
+demand that the poet shall be accurate in his representations is
+suggestive of an indispensable intellectual factor in his genius. As we
+have seen, he is not to reproduce nature, but the human appreciative
+experience of nature. Nevertheless, he must even here be true to his
+object. His art involves his ability to express genuinely and sincerely
+what he himself experiences in the presence of nature, or what he can
+catch of the inner lives of others by virtue of his intelligent
+sympathy. No amount of emotion or even of imagination will profit a
+poet, unless he can render a true account of them. To be sure, he need
+not define, or even explain; for it is his function to transfer the
+immediate qualities of experience: but he must be able to speak the
+truth, and, in order to speak it, he must have known it. In all this,
+however, we have made no demand that the poet should see more than one
+thing at a time. Sincerity of expression does not require what is
+distinctly another mode of intelligence, _comprehensiveness of view_. It
+is easier, and accordingly more usual, to render an account of the
+moments and casual units of experience, than of its totality. There are
+poets, little and great, who possess the intellectual virtue of
+sincerity, without the intellectual power of synthesis and
+reconciliation. This distinction will enable us to separate the
+intelligence exhibited in all poetry, from that distinct form of
+intelligence exhibited in such poetry as is properly to be called
+philosophical.
+
+The "barbarian" in poetry has recently been defined as "the man who
+regards his passions as their own excuse for being; who does not
+domesticate them either by understanding their cause or by conceiving
+their ideal goal."[28:1] One will readily appreciate the application of
+this definition to Walt Whitman. What little unity there is in this
+poet's world, is the composition of a purely sensuous experience,
+
+     "The earth expending right hand and left hand,
+      The picture alive, every part in its best light,
+      The music falling in where it is wanted, and stopping where
+          it is not wanted."
+
+In many passages Whitman manifests a marvellous ability to discover and
+communicate a fresh gladness about the commonest experiences. We cannot
+but rejoice with him in all sights and sounds. But though we cannot deny
+him truth, his truth is honesty and not understanding. The experiences
+in which he discovers so much worth, are random and capricious, and do
+not constitute a universe. To the solution of ultimate questions he
+contributes a sense of mystery, and the conviction
+
+     "That you are here--that life exists and identity,
+      That the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse."
+
+His world is justly described by the writer just quoted as "a
+phantasmagoria of continuous visions, vivid, impressive, but monotonous
+and hard to distinguish in memory, like the waves of the sea or the
+decorations of some barbarous temple, sublime only by the infinite
+aggregation of parts."[30:2]
+
+As is Walt Whitman, so are many poets greater and less. Some who have
+seen the world-view, exhibit the same particularism in their lyric
+moods; although, generally speaking, a poet who once has comprehended
+the world, will see the parts of it in the light of that wisdom. But
+Walt Whitman is peculiarly representative of the poetry that can be
+true, without being wise in the manner that we shall come shortly to
+understand as the manner of philosophy. He is as desultory in his poet
+raptures as is the common man when he lives in his immediate
+experiences. The truth won by each is the clear vision of one thing, or
+of a limited collection of things, and not the broad inclusive vision of
+all things.
+
+[Sidenote: Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare.]
+
+§ 10. The transition from Whitman to Shakespeare may seem somewhat
+abrupt, but the very differences between these poets serve to mark out
+an interesting affinity. Neither has put any unitary construction upon
+human life and its environment. Neither, as poet, is the witness of any
+world-view; which will mean for us that neither is a philosopher-poet.
+As respects Shakespeare, this is a hard saying. We are accustomed to the
+critical judgment that finds in the Shakespearian dramas an apprehension
+of the universal in human life. But though this judgment is true, it is
+by no means conclusive as respects Shakespeare's relation to the
+philosophical type of thought. For there can be universality without
+philosophy. Thus, to know the groups and the marks of the vertebrates is
+to know a truth which possesses generality, in contradistinction to the
+particularism of Whitman's poetic consciousness. Even so to know well
+the groups and marks of human character, vertebrate and invertebrate, is
+to know that of which the average man, in his hand to hand struggle with
+life, is ignorant. Such a wisdom Shakespeare possessed to a unique
+degree, and it enabled him to reconstruct human life. He did not merely
+perceive human states and motives, but he understood human nature so
+well that he could create consistent men and women. Moreover,
+Shakespeare's knowledge was not only thus universal in being a knowledge
+of general groups and laws, but also in respect of its extensity. His
+understanding was as rich as it was acute. It is true, then, that
+Shakespeare read human life as an open book, knowing certainly the
+manner of human thinking and feeling, and the power and interplay of
+human motives. But it is equally true, on the other hand, that he
+possessed no unitary conception of the meaning and larger relations of
+human life. Such a conception might have been expressed either by means
+of the outlook of some dominating and persistent type of personality, or
+by a pervading suggestion of some constant world-setting for the
+variable enterprise of mankind. It could appear only provided the poet's
+appreciation of life in detail were determined by an interpretation of
+the meaning of life as a whole. Shakespeare apparently possessed no such
+interpretation. Even when Hamlet is groping after some larger truth that
+may bear upon the definite problems of life, he represents but one, and
+that a strange and unusual, type of human nature. And Hamlet's
+reflections, it should be noted, have no outcome. There is no
+Shakespearian answer to the riddles that Hamlet propounds. The poet's
+genius is not less amazing for this fact; indeed, his peculiar
+distinction can only be comprehended upon this basis. Shakespeare put no
+construction upon life, and by virtue of this very reserve accomplished
+an art of surpassing fidelity and vividness. The absence of philosophy
+in Shakespeare, and the presence of the most characteristic quality of
+his genius, may both be imputed by the one affirmation, that _there is
+no Shakespearian point of view_.
+
+This truth signifies both gain and loss. The philosophical criticism of
+life may vary from the ideal objectivity of absolute truth, to the
+subjectivity of a personal religion. Philosophy aims to correct the
+partiality of particular points of view by means of a point of view that
+shall comprehend their relations, and effect such reconciliations or
+transformations as shall enable them to constitute a universe.
+Philosophy always assumes the hypothetical view of omniscience. The
+necessity of such a final criticism is implicit in every scientific item
+of knowledge, and in every judgment that is passed upon life. Philosophy
+makes a distinct and peculiar contribution to human knowledge by its
+heroic effort to measure all knowledges and all ideals by the standard
+of totality. Nevertheless it is significant that no human individual can
+possibly possess the range of omniscience. The most adequate knowledge
+of which any generation of men is capable, will always be that which is
+conceived by the most synthetic and vigorously metaphysical minds; but
+every individual philosophy will nevertheless be a premature synthesis.
+The effort to complete knowledge is the indispensable test of the
+adequacy of prevailing conceptions, but the completed knowledge of any
+individual mind will shortly become an historical monument. It will
+belong primarily to the personal life of its creator, as the
+articulation of his personal covenant with the universe. There is a
+sound justification for such a conclusion of things in the case of the
+individual, for the conditions of human life make it inevitable; but it
+will always possess a felt unity, and many distinct features, that are
+private and subjective. Now such a projection of personality, with its
+coloring and its selection, Shakespeare has avoided; and very largely as
+a consequence, his dramas are a storehouse of genuine human nature.
+Ambition, mercy, hate, madness, guilelessness, conventionality, mirth,
+bravery, deceit, purity--these, and all human states and attributes save
+piety, are upon his pages as real, and as mysterious withal, as they are
+in the great historical society. For an ordinary reader, these states
+and attributes are more real in Hamlet or Lear than in his own direct
+experience, because in Hamlet and Lear he can see them with the eye and
+intelligence of genius. But Shakespeare is the world all over again,
+and there is loss as well as gain in such realism. Here is human life,
+no doubt, and a brilliant pageantry it is; but human life as varied and
+as problematic as it is in the living. Shakespeare's fundamental
+intellectual resource is the historical and psychological knowledge of
+such principles as govern the construction of human natures. The goods
+for which men undertake, and live or die, are any goods, justified only
+by the actual human striving for them. The virtues are the old winning
+virtues of the secular life, and the heroisms of the common conscience.
+Beyond its empirical generality, his knowledge is universal only in the
+sense that space and time are universal. His consciousness _contains_
+its representative creations, and expresses them unspoiled by any
+transforming thought. His poetic consciousness is like the very stage to
+which he likens all the world: men and women meet there, and things
+happen there. The stage itself creates no unity save the occasion and
+the place. Shakespeare's consciousness is universal because it is a fair
+field with no favors. But even so it is particular, because, though each
+may enter and depart in peace, when all enter together there is anarchy
+and a babel of voices. All Shakespeare is like all the world seen
+through the eyes of each of its inhabitants. Human experience in
+Shakespeare is human experience as everyone feels it, as comprehensive
+as the aggregate of innumerable lives. But human experience in
+philosophy is the experience of all as thought by a synthetic mind.
+Hence the wealth of life depicted by Shakespeare serves only to point
+out the philosopher's problem, and to challenge his powers. Here he will
+find material, and not results; much to philosophize about, but no
+philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Philosophy in Poetry. The World-View. Omar Khayyam.]
+
+§ 11. The discussion up to this point has attributed to poetry very
+definite intellectual factors that nevertheless do not constitute
+philosophy. Walt Whitman speaks his feeling with truth, but in general
+manifests no comprehensive insight. Shakespeare has not only sincerity
+of expression but an understanding mind. He has a knowledge not only of
+particular experiences, but of human nature; and a consciousness full
+and varied like society itself. But there is a kind of knowledge
+possessed by neither, the knowledge sought by coördinating all aspects
+of human experience, both particular and general. Not even Shakespeare
+is wise as one who, having seen the whole, can fundamentally interpret a
+part. But though the philosopher-poet may not yet be found, we cannot
+longer be ignorant of his nature. He will be, like all poets, one who
+appreciates experiences or finds things good, and he will faithfully
+reproduce the values which he discovers. But he must _justify himself in
+view of the fundamental nature of the universe_. The values which he
+apprehends must be harmonious, and so far above the plurality of goods
+as to transcend and unify them. The philosopher-poet will find reality
+as a whole to be something that accredits the order of values in his
+inner life. He will not only find certain things to be most worthy
+objects of action or contemplation, but he will see why they are worthy,
+because he will have construed the judgment of the universe in their
+favor.
+
+In this general sense, Omar Khayyam is a philosopher-poet. To be sure
+his universe is quite the opposite of that which most poets conceive,
+and is perhaps profoundly antagonistic to the very spirit of poetry; but
+it is none the less true that the joys to which Omar invites us are such
+as his universe prescribes for human life.
+
+     "Some for the Glories of This World; and some
+      Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come;
+      Ah, take the Cash, and let the Credit go,
+      Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum."
+
+Herein is both poetry and philosophy, albeit but a poor brand of each.
+We are invited to occupy ourselves only with spiritual cash, because the
+universe is spiritually insolvent. The immediately gratifying feelings
+are the only feelings that the world can guarantee. Omar Khayyam is a
+philosopher-poet, because his immediate delight in "youth's
+sweet-scented manuscript" is part of a consciousness that vaguely sees,
+though it cannot grasp, "this sorry scheme of things entire."
+
+     "Drink for you know not whence you come, nor why;
+      Drink for you know not why you go, nor where."
+
+[Sidenote: Wordsworth.]
+
+§ 12. But the poet in his world-view ordinarily sees other than
+darkness. The same innate spiritual enterprise that sustains religious
+faith leads the poet more often to find the universe positively
+congenial to his ideals, and to ideals in general. He interprets human
+experience in the light of the spirituality of all the world. It is to
+Wordsworth that we of the present age are chiefly indebted for such
+imagery, and it will profit us to consider somewhat carefully the
+philosophical quality of his poetry.
+
+Walter Pater, in introducing his appreciation of Wordsworth, writes that
+"an intimate consciousness of the expression of natural things, which
+weighs, listens, penetrates, where the earlier mind passed roughly by,
+is a large element in the complexion of modern poetry." We recognize at
+once the truth of this characterization as applied to Wordsworth. But
+there is something more distinguished about this poet's sensibility even
+than its extreme fineness and delicacy; a quality that is suggested,
+though not made explicit, by Shelley's allusion to Wordsworth's
+experience as "a sort of thought in sense." Nature possessed for him not
+merely enjoyable and describable characters of great variety and
+minuteness, but an immediately apprehended unity and meaning. It would
+be a great mistake to construe this meaning in sense as analogous to the
+crude symbolism of the educator Froebel, to whom, as he said, "the world
+of crystals proclaimed, in distinct and univocal terms, the laws of
+human life." Wordsworth did not attach ideas to sense, but regarded
+sense itself as a communication of truth. We readily call to mind his
+unique capacity for apprehending the characteristic flavor of a certain
+place in a certain moment of time, the individuality of a situation. Now
+in such moments he felt that he was receiving intelligences, none the
+less direct and significant for their inarticulate form. Like the boy
+on Windermere, whom he himself describes,
+
+                          "while he hung
+     Loitering, a gentle shock of mild surprise
+     Has carried far into his heart the voice
+     Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene
+     Would enter unawares into his mind,
+     With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,
+     Its woods, and that uncertain heaven received
+     Into the bosom of the steady lake."
+
+For our purpose it is essential that we should recognize in this
+appreciation of nature, expressed in almost every poem that Wordsworth
+wrote, a consciousness respecting the fundamental nature of the world.
+Conversation, as we know, denotes an interchange of commensurable
+meanings. Whatever the code may be, whether words or the most subtle
+form of suggestion, communication is impossible without community of
+nature. Hence, in believing himself to be holding converse with the
+so-called physical world, Wordsworth conceives that world as
+fundamentally like himself. He finds the most profound thing in all the
+world to be the universal spiritual life. In nature this life manifests
+itself most directly, clothed in its own proper dignity and peace. But
+it may be discovered in the humanity that is most close to nature, in
+the avocations of plain and simple people, and the unsophisticated
+delights of children; and, with the perspective of contemplation, even
+"among the multitudes of that huge city."
+
+So Wordsworth is rendering a true account of his own experience of
+reality when, as in "The Prelude," he says unequivocally:
+
+     "A gracious spirit o'er this earth presides,
+      And in the heart of man; invisibly
+      It comes to works of unreproved delight,
+      And tendency benign; directing those
+      Who care not, know not, think not, what they do."
+
+Wordsworth is not a philosopher-poet because by searching his pages we
+can find an explicit philosophical creed such as this, but because all
+the joys of which his poet-soul compels him to sing have their peculiar
+note, and compose their peculiar harmony, by virtue of such an
+indwelling consciousness. Here is one who is a philosopher in and
+through his poetry. He is a philosopher in so far as the detail of his
+appreciation finds fundamental justification in a world-view. From the
+immanence of "the universal heart" there follows, not through any
+mediate reasoning, but by the immediate experience of its propriety, a
+conception of that which is of supreme worth in life. The highest and
+best of which life is capable is contemplation, or the consciousness of
+the universal indwelling of God. Of those who fail to live thus
+fittingly in the midst of the divine life, Walter Pater speaks for
+Wordsworth as follows:
+
+     "To higher or lower ends they move too often with something of
+     a sad countenance, with hurried and ignoble gait, becoming,
+     unconsciously, something like thorns, in their anxiety to bear
+     grapes; it being possible for people, in the pursuit of even
+     great ends, to become themselves thin and impoverished in
+     spirit and temper, thus diminishing the sum of perfection in
+     the world at its very sources."[42:3]
+
+The quiet and worshipful spirit, won by the cultivation of the emotions
+appropriate to the presence of nature and society, is the mark of the
+completest life and the most acceptable service. Thus for Wordsworth the
+meaning of life is inseparable from the meaning of the universe. In
+apprehending that which is good and beautiful in human experience, he
+was attended by a vision of the totality of things. Herein he has had to
+do, if not with the form, at any rate with the very substance of
+philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Dante.]
+
+§ 13. Unquestionably the supreme philosopher-poet is Dante. He is not
+only philosophical in the temper of his mind, but his greatest poem is
+the incarnation of a definite system of philosophy, the most definite
+that the world has seen. That conception of the world which in the
+thirteenth century found argumentative and orderly expression in the
+"Summa Theologiæ" of Thomas of Aquino, and constituted the faith of the
+church, is visualized by Dante, and made the basis of an interpretation
+of life.
+
+The "Divina Commedia" deals with all the heavens to the Empyrean itself,
+and with all spiritual life to the very presence of God. It derives its
+imagery from the cosmology of the day, its dramatic motive from the
+Christian and Greek conceptions of God and his dealings with the world.
+Sin is punished because of the justice of God; knowledge, virtue, and
+faith lead, through God's grace and mercy manifested in Christ, to a
+perpetual union with Him. Hell, purgatory, and paradise give place and
+setting to the events of the drama. But the deeper meaning of the poem
+is allegorical. In a letter quoted by Lowell, Dante writes:
+
+     "The literal subject of the whole work is the state of the
+     soul after death, simply considered. But if the work be taken
+     allegorically the subject is man, as by merit or demerit,
+     through freedom of the will, he renders himself liable to the
+     reward or punishment of justice."[43:4]
+
+In other words, the inner and essential meaning of the poem has to do
+not with external retribution, but with character, and the laws which
+determine its own proper ruin or perfection. The punishments described
+in the "Inferno" are accounts of the state of guilt itself, implications
+of the will that has chosen the part of brutishness. Sin itself is
+damnable and deadening, but the knowledge that the soul that sinneth
+shall die is the first way of emancipation from sin. The guidance of
+Virgil through hell and purgatory signifies the knowledge of good and
+evil, or moral insight, as the guide of man through this life of
+struggle and progress. The earthly paradise, at the close of the
+"Purgatorio," represents the highest state to which human character can
+attain when choice is determined by ordinary experience, intelligence,
+and understanding. Here man stands alone, endowed with an enlightened
+conscience. Here are uttered the last words of Virgil to Dante, the
+explorer of the spiritual country:
+
+     "Expect no more or word or sign from me. Free, upright, and
+     sane is thine own free will, and it would be wrong not to act
+     according to its pleasure; wherefore thee over thyself I crown
+     and mitre."[44:5]
+
+But moral self-reliance is not the last word. As Beatrice, the image of
+tenderness and holiness, comes to Dante in the earthly paradise, and
+leads him from the summit of purgatory into the heaven of heavens, and
+even to the eternal light; so there is added to the mere human,
+intellectual, and moral resources of the soul, the sustaining power of
+the divine grace, the illuminating power of divine truth, and the
+transforming power of divine love. Through the aid of this higher
+wisdom, the journey of life becomes the way to God. Thus the allegorical
+truth of the "Divina Commedia" is not merely an analysis of the moral
+nature of man, but the revelation of a universal spiritual order,
+manifesting itself in the moral evolution of the individual, and above
+all in his ultimate community with the eternal goodness.
+
+     "Thou shouldst not, if I deem aright, wonder more at thy
+     ascent, than at a stream if from a high mountain it descends
+     to the base. A marvel it would be in thee, if, deprived of
+     hindrance, thou hadst sat below, even as quiet by living fire
+     in earth would be."[45:6]
+
+Such, in brief, is Dante's world-view, so suggestive of the freer
+idealistic conceptions of later thought as to justify a recent
+characterization of him as one who, "accepting without a shadow of a
+doubt or hesitation all the constitutive ideas of mediæval thought and
+life, grasped them so firmly and gave them such luminous expression that
+the spirit in them broke away from the form."[46:7]
+
+But it must be added, as in the case of Wordsworth, that Dante is a
+philosopher-poet not because St. Thomas Aquinas appears and speaks with
+authority in the Thirteenth Canto of the "Paradiso," nor even because a
+philosophical doctrine can be consistently formulated from his writings,
+but because his consciousness of life is informed with a sense of its
+universal bearings. There is a famous passage in the Twenty-second Canto
+of the "Paradiso," in which Dante describes himself as looking down upon
+the earth from the starry heaven.
+
+     "'Thou art so near the ultimate salvation,' began Beatrice,
+     'that thou oughtest to have thine eyes clear and sharp. And
+     therefore ere thou further enterest it, look back downward,
+     and see how great a world I have already set beneath thy feet,
+     in order that thy heart, so far as it is able, may present
+     itself joyous to the triumphant crowd which comes glad through
+     this round ether.' With my sight I returned through each and
+     all the seven spheres, and saw this globe such that I smiled
+     at its mean semblance; and that counsel I approve as the best
+     which holds it of least account; and he who thinks of other
+     things maybe called truly worthy."
+
+Dante's scale of values is that which appears from the starry heaven.
+His austere piety, his invincible courage, and his uncompromising hatred
+of wrong, are neither accidents of temperament nor blind reactions, but
+compose the proper character of one who has both seen the world from
+God, and returned to see God from the world. He was, as Lowell has said,
+"a man of genius who could hold heartbreak at bay for twenty years, and
+would not let himself die till he had done his task"; and his power was
+not obstinacy, but a vision of the ways of God. He knew a truth that
+justified him in his sacrifices, and made a great glory of his defeat
+and exile. Even so his poetry or appreciation of life is the expression
+of an inward contemplation of the world in its unity or essence. It is
+but an elaboration of the piety which he attributes to the lesser saints
+of paradise, when he has them say:
+
+     "Nay, it is essential to this blessed existence to hold
+     ourselves within the divine will, whereby our very wills are
+     made one. So that as we are from stage to stage throughout
+     this realm, to all the realm is pleasing, as to the King who
+     inwills us with His will. And His will is our peace; it is
+     that sea whereunto is moving all that which It creates and
+     which nature makes."[47:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy.]
+
+§ 14. There now remains the brief task of distinguishing the
+philosopher-poet from the philosopher himself. The philosopher-poet is
+one who, having made the philosophical point of view his own, expresses
+himself in the form of poetry. The philosophical point of view is that
+from which the universe is comprehended in its totality. The wisdom of
+the philosopher is the knowledge of each through the knowledge of all.
+Wherein, then, does the poet, when possessed of such wisdom, differ from
+the philosopher proper? To this question one can give readily enough the
+general answer, that the difference lies in the mode of utterance.
+Furthermore, we have already given some account of the peculiar manner
+of the poet. He invites us to experience with him the beautiful and
+moving in nature and life. That which the poet has to express, and that
+which he aims to arouse in others, is an appreciative experience. He
+requires what Wordsworth calls "an atmosphere of sensation in which to
+move his wings." Therefore if he is to be philosophical in intelligence,
+and yet essentially a poet, he must find his universal truth in
+immediate experience. He must be one who, in seeing the many, sees the
+one. The philosopher-poet is he who visualizes a fundamental
+interpretation of the world. "A poem," says one poet, "is the very image
+of life expressed in its eternal truth."
+
+The philosopher proper, on the other hand, has the sterner and less
+inviting task of rendering such an interpretation articulate to thought.
+That which the poet sees, the philosopher must define. That which the
+poet divines, the philosopher must calculate. The philosopher must dig
+for that which the poet sees shining through. As the poet transcends
+thought for the sake of experience, the philosopher must transcend
+experience for the sake of thought. As the poet sees all, and all in
+each, so the philosopher, knowing each, must think all consistently
+together, and then know each again. It is the part of philosophy to
+collect and criticise evidence, to formulate and coördinate conceptions,
+and finally to define in exact terms. The reanimation of the structure
+of thought is accomplished primarily in religion, which is a general
+conception of the world made the basis of daily living.
+
+For religion there is no subjective correlative less than life itself.
+Poetry is another and more circumscribed means of restoring thought to
+life. By the poet's imagination, and through the art of his expression,
+thought may be sensuously perceived. "If the time should ever come,"
+says Wordsworth, "when what is now called Science, thus familiarized to
+men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh, and blood,
+the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and
+will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of
+the household of man."[50:9] As respects truth, philosophy has an
+indubitable priority. The very sternness of the philosopher's task is
+due to his supreme dedication to truth. But if validity be the merit of
+philosophy, it can well be supplemented by immediacy, which is the merit
+of poetry. Presuppose in the poet conviction of a sound philosophy, and
+we may say with Shelley, of his handiwork, that "it is the perfect and
+consummate surface and bloom of all things; it is as the odor and the
+color of the rose to the texture of the elements which compose it, as
+the form and splendor of unfaded beauty to the secrets of anatomy and
+corruption." "Indeed," as he adds, "what were our consolations on this
+side of the grave--and our aspirations beyond it--if poetry did not
+ascend to bring light and fire from those eternal regions where the
+owl-winged faculty of calculation dare not ever soar?"[51:10]
+
+The unity in outlook, attended by differences of method and form, which
+may exist between poet and philosopher, is signally illustrated by the
+relation between Goethe and Spinoza. What Goethe saw and felt, Spinoza
+proved and defined. The universal and eternal substance was to Spinoza,
+as philosopher, a theorem, and to Goethe, as poet, a perception and an
+emotion. Goethe writes to Jacobi that when philosophy "lays itself out
+for division," he cannot get on with it, but when it "confirms our
+original feeling as though we were one with nature," it is welcome to
+him. In the same letter Goethe expresses his appreciation of Spinoza as
+the complement of his own nature:
+
+     "His all-reconciling peace contrasted with my all-agitating
+     endeavor; his intellectual method was the opposite counterpart
+     of my poetic way of feeling and expressing myself; and even
+     the inflexible regularity of his logical procedure, which
+     might be considered ill-adapted to moral subjects, made me his
+     most passionate scholar and his devoted adherent. Mind and
+     heart, understanding and sense, were drawn together with an
+     inevitable elective affinity, and this at the same time
+     produced an intimate union between individuals of the most
+     different types."[51:11]
+
+It appears, then, that some poets share with all philosophers that
+point of view from which the horizon line is the boundary of all the
+world. Poetry is not always or essentially philosophical, but may be so;
+and when the poetic imagination restores philosophy to immediacy, human
+experience reaches its most exalted state, excepting only religion
+itself, wherein God is both seen and also served. Nor is the part of
+philosophy in poetry and religion either ignoble or presumptuous, for,
+humanly speaking, "the owl-winged faculty of calculation" is the only
+safe and sure means of access to that place on high,
+
+     "Where the nightingale doth sing
+      Not a senseless, trancèd thing,
+      But a divine melodious truth;
+      Philosophic numbers smooth;
+      Tales and golden histories
+      Of heaven and its mysteries."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[28:1] George Santayana, in his _Poetry and Religion_, p. 176.
+
+[30:2] Santayana: _op. cit._, p. 180.
+
+[42:3] _Appreciations_, p. 59.
+
+[43:4] Letter to Can Grande. See Lowell's _Essay on Dante_, p. 34.
+
+[44:5] _Purgatorio_, Canto XXVII. Translation by Norton.
+
+[45:6] _Paradiso_, Canto I.
+
+[46:7] Edward Caird, in his _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 24.
+
+[47:8] _Paradiso_, Canto III.
+
+[50:9] Observations prefixed to the second edition of _Lyrical Ballads_.
+
+[51:10] _A Defence of Poetry._
+
+[51:11] Quoted by Caird in his _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p.
+60.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Possibility of Defining Religion.]
+
+§ 15. The least religious experience is so mysterious and so complex
+that a moderate degree of reflection upon it tends to a sense of
+intellectual impotence. "If I speak," says Emerson, "I define and
+confine, and am less." One would gladly set down religion among the
+unspeakable things and avoid the imputation of degrading it. It is
+certain that the enterprise of defining religion is at present in
+disrepute. It has been undertaken so often and so unsuccessfully that
+contemporary students for the most part prefer to supply a list of
+historical definitions of religion, and let their variety demonstrate
+their futility. Metaphysicians and psychologists agree that in view of
+the differences of creed, ritual, organization, conduct, and temperament
+that have been true of different religions in different times and
+places, one may as well abandon the idea that there is a constant
+element.
+
+But on the other hand we have the testimony afforded by the name
+religion; and the ordinary judgments of men to the effect that it
+signifies something to be religious, and to be more or less religious.
+There is an elementary logical principle to the effect that a group name
+implies certain common group characters. Impatience with abstract or
+euphemistic definitions should not blind us to the truth. Even the
+psychologist tends in his description of religious phenomena to single
+out and emphasize what he calls a _typical_ religious experience. And
+the same applies to the idealist's treatment of the matter.[54:1]
+Religion, he reasons, is essentially a development of which the true
+meaning can be seen only in the higher stages. The primitive religion is
+therefore only implicit religion. But lower stages cannot be regarded as
+belonging to a single development with higher stages, if there be not
+some actual promise of the later in the earlier, or some element which
+endures throughout. It is unavoidable, then, to assume that in dealing
+with religion we are dealing with a specific and definable experience.
+
+[Sidenote: The Profitableness of Defining Religion.]
+
+§ 16. The profitableness of undertaking such a definition is another
+matter. It may well be that in so human and practical an affair as
+religion, definition is peculiarly inappropriate. But is there not a
+human and practical value in the very defining of religion? Is there not
+a demand for it in the peculiar relation that exists between religion
+and the progress of enlightenment? Religion associates itself with the
+habits of society. The progress of enlightenment means that more or less
+all the time, and very profoundly at certain critical times, society
+must change its habits. The consequence is that religion is likely to be
+abandoned with the old habits. The need of a new religion is therefore a
+chronic one. The reformer in religion, or the man who wishes to be both
+enlightened and religious, is chiefly occupied with the problem of
+disentangling religion pure and undefiled from definite discredited
+practices and opinions. And the solution of the problem turns upon some
+apprehension of the essence of religion. There is a large amount of
+necessary and unnecessary tragedy due to the extrinsic connection
+between ideas and certain modes of their expression. There can be no
+more serious and urgent duty than that of expressing as directly, and so
+as truly as possible, the great permanent human concerns. The men to
+whom educational reform has been largely due have been the men who have
+remembered for their fellows what this whole business of education is
+after all for. Comenius and Pestalozzi served society by stripping
+educational activity of its historical and institutional accessories,
+and laying bare the genuine human need that these are designed to
+satisfy. There is a similar virtue in the insistent attempt to
+distinguish between the essential and the accessory in religion.
+
+[Sidenote: The True Method of Defining Religion.]
+
+§ 17. Although declining to be discouraged by the conspicuousness of
+past failures in this connection, one may well profit by them. The
+amazing complexity of religious phenomena must somehow be seen to be
+consistent with their common nature. The religious experience must not
+only be found, but must also be reconciled with "the varieties of
+religious experience." The inadequacy of the well-known definitions of
+religion may be attributed to several causes. The commonest fallacy is
+to define religion in terms of a religion. My definition of religion
+must include my brother's religion, even though he live on the other
+side of the globe, and my ancestor's religion, in spite of his
+prehistoric remoteness. Error may easily arise through the attempt to
+define religion in terms of my own religion, or what I conceive to be
+the true religion. Whatever the relation between ideal religion and
+actual religion, the field of religion contains by common consent cults
+that must on their own grounds condemn one another; religions that are
+bad religions, and yet religions.
+
+A more enlightened fallacy, and a more dangerous one, is due to the
+supposition that religion can be defined exclusively in terms of some
+department of human nature. There have been descriptions of religion in
+terms of feeling, intellect, and conduct respectively. But it is always
+easy to overthrow such a description, by raising the question of its
+application to evidently religious experiences that belong to some other
+aspect of life. Religion is not feeling, because there are many
+phlegmatic, God-fearing men whose religion consists in good works.
+Religion is not conduct, for there are many mystics whose very religion
+is withdrawal from the field of action. Religion is not intellection,
+for no one has ever been able to formulate a creed that is common to all
+religions. Yet without a doubt one must look for the essence of religion
+in human nature. The present psychological interest in religion has
+emphasized this truth. How, then, may we describe it in terms of
+certain constant conditions of human life, and yet escape the
+abstractness of the facultative method? Modern psychology suggests an
+answer in demonstrating the interdependence of knowledge, feeling, and
+volition.[58:2] The perfect case of this unity is _belief_. The
+believing experience is cognitive in intent, but practical and emotional
+as well in content. I believe what I take for granted; and the object of
+my belief is not merely known, but also felt and acted upon. _What I
+believe expresses itself in my total experience._
+
+There is some hope, then, of an adequate definition of the religious
+experience, if it be regarded as belonging to the psychological type of
+belief.[58:3] Belief, however, is a broader category than religion.
+There must be some _religious type_ of believing. An account of religion
+in terms of believing, and the particular type of it here in question,
+would, then, constitute the central stem of a psychology of religion,
+and affords the proper conceptions for a description of the religious
+experience. Even here the reservation must be made that belief is always
+more than the believing _state_, in that it means to be _true_.[59:4]
+Hence to complete an account of religion one should consider its object,
+or its cognitive implications. But this direct treatment of the relation
+between religion and philosophy must be deferred until in the present
+chapter we shall have come to appreciate the inwardness of the religious
+consciousness. To this end we must permit ourselves to be enlightened by
+the experience of religious people as viewed from within. It is not our
+opinion of a man's religion that is here in question, but the content
+and meaning which it has for him.
+
+     "I would have you," says Fielding, in his "Hearts of Men," "go
+     and kneel beside the Mahommedan as he prays at the sunset
+     hour, and put your heart to his and wait for the echo that
+     will surely come. . . . I would have you go to the hillman
+     smearing the stone with butter that his god may be pleased, to
+     the woman crying to the forest god for her sick child, to the
+     boy before his monks learning to be good. No matter where you
+     go, no matter what the faith is called, if you have the
+     hearing ear, if your heart is in unison with the heart of the
+     world, you will hear always the same song."[59:5]
+
+[Sidenote: Religion as Belief.]
+
+§ 18. The general identification of religion with belief is made without
+serious difficulty. The essential factor in belief, is, as we have seen,
+the reaction of the whole personality to a fixed object or accepted
+situation. A similar principle underlies common judgments about a man's
+religion. He is accounted most religious whose religion penetrates his
+life most intimately. In the man whose religion consists in the outer
+exercise of attendance upon church, we recognize the sham. He _appears_
+to be religious. He does one of the things which a religious man would
+do; but an object of religious faith is not the constant environment of
+his life. He may or may not feel sure of God from his pew, but God is
+not among the things that count in his daily life. God does not enter
+into his calculations or determine his scale of values. Again,
+discursive thinking is regarded as an interruption of religion. When I
+am at pains to justify my religion, I am already doubting; and for
+common opinion doubt is identical with irreligion. In so far as I am
+religious, my religion stands in no need of justification, even though I
+regard it as justifiable. In my religious experience I am taking
+something for granted; in other words I act about it and feel about it
+in a manner that is going to be determined by the special conditions of
+my mood and temperament. The mechanical and prosaic man acknowledges God
+in his mechanical and prosaic way. He believes in divine retribution as
+he believes in commercial or social retribution. He is as careful to
+prepare for the next world as he is to be respectable in this. The poet,
+on the other hand, believes in God after the manner of his genius.
+Though he worship God in spirit he may conduct his life in an irregular
+manner peculiar to himself. Difference of mood in the same individual
+may be judged by the same measure. When God is most real to him, brought
+home to him most vividly, or consciously obeyed, in these moments he is
+most religious. When, on the other hand, God is merely a name to him,
+and church a routine, or when both are forgotten in the daily
+occupations, he is least religious. His life on the whole is said to be
+religious in so far as periods of the second type are subordinated to
+periods of the first type. Further well-known elements of belief,
+corollaries of the above, are evidently present in religion. A certain
+_imagery remains constant_ throughout an individual's experience. He
+comes back to it as to a physical object in space. And although religion
+is sporadically an exclusive and isolated affair, it tends strongly to
+be social. The religious object, or God, is a social object, common to
+me and to my neighbor, and presupposed in our collective undertakings.
+This reduction of religion to the type of the believing state should
+thus provide us with an answer to that old and fundamental question
+concerning the relative priority of faith and works. The test of the
+faith is in the works, and the works are religious in so far as they are
+the expression of the faith. Religion is not the doing of anything nor
+the feeling of anything nor the thinking of anything, but the reacting
+as a whole, in terms of all possible activities of human life, to some
+accepted situation.
+
+[Sidenote: Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude.]
+
+§ 19. We may now face the more interesting but difficult question of the
+special character of religious belief. In spite of the fact that in
+these days the personality of God is often regarded as a transient
+feature of religion, that type of belief which throws most light upon
+the religious experience is the _belief in persons_. Our belief in
+persons consists in the practical recognition of a more or less
+persistent disposition toward ourselves. The outward behavior of our
+fellow-men is construed in terms of the practical bearing of the
+attitude which it implies. The extraordinary feature of such belief is
+the disproportion between its vividness and the direct evidence for it.
+Of this we are most aware in connection with those personalities which
+we regard as distinctly friendly or hostile to ourselves. We are always
+more or less clearly in the presence of our friends and enemies. Their
+well-wishing or their ill-wishing haunts the scene of our living. There
+is no more important constituent of what the psychologists call our
+"general feeling tone." There are times when we are entirely possessed
+by a state that is either exuberance in the presence of those who love
+us, or awkwardness and stupidity in the presence of those whom we
+believe to suspect and dislike us. The latter state may easily become
+chronic. Many men live permanently in the presence of an accusing
+audience. The inner life which expresses itself in the words, "Everybody
+hates me!" is perhaps the most common form of morbid self-consciousness.
+On the other hand, buoyancy of spirits springs largely from a constant
+faith in the good-will of one's fellows. In this case one is filled with
+a sense of security, and is conscious of a sympathetic reinforcement
+that adds to private joys and compensates for private sorrows. And this
+sense of attitude is wonderfully discriminating. We can feel the
+presence of a "great man," a "formidable person," a superior or
+inferior, one who is interested or indifferent to our talk, and all the
+subtlest degrees of approval and disapproval.
+
+A similar sensibility may quicken us even in situations where no direct
+individual attitude to ourselves is implied. We regard places and
+communities as congenial when we are in sympathy with the prevailing
+purposes or standards of value. We may feel ill at ease or thoroughly at
+home in cities where we know no single human soul. Indeed, in a
+misanthrope like Rousseau (and who has not his Rousseau moods!) the mere
+absence of social repression arouses a most intoxicating sense of
+tunefulness and security. Nature plays the part of an indulgent parent
+who permits all sorts of personal liberties.
+
+     "The view of a fine country, a succession of agreeable
+     prospects, a free air, a good appetite, and the health I gain
+     by walking; the freedom of inns, and the distance from
+     everything that can make me recollect the dependence of my
+     situation, conspire to free my soul, and give boldness to my
+     thoughts, throwing me, in a manner, into the immensity of
+     things, where I combine, choose, and appropriate them to my
+     fancy, without restraint or fear. I dispose of all nature as I
+     please."[64:6]
+
+[Sidenote: Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual
+Environment, or Universe.]
+
+§ 20. In such confidence or distrust, inspired originally by the social
+environment, and similarly suggested by other surroundings of life, we
+have the key to the religious consciousness. But it is now time to add
+that in the case of religion these attitudes are concerned with the
+universal or supernatural rather than with present and normal human
+relationships. Religious reactions are "total reactions."
+
+     "To get at them," says William James, "you must go behind the
+     foreground of existence and reach down to that curious _sense
+     of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence_,
+     intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious,
+     which in some degree everyone possesses. This _sense of the
+     world's presence_, appealing as it does to our peculiar
+     individual temperament, makes us either strenuous or careless,
+     devout or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant about life at large;
+     and our reaction, involuntary and inarticulate and often half
+     unconscious as it is, is the completest of all our answers to
+     the question, 'What is the character of this universe in which
+     we dwell?'"[65:7]
+
+This _residual environment_, or profounder realm of tradition and
+nature, may have any degree of unity from chaos to cosmos. For religion
+its significance lies in the idea of original and far-reaching power
+rather than in the idea of totality. But that which is at first only
+"beyond," is _practically_ the same object as that which comes in the
+development of thought to be conceived as the "world" or the "universe."
+We may therefore use these latter terms to indicate the object of
+religion, until the treatment of special instances shall define it more
+precisely. Religion is, then, _man's sense of the disposition of the
+universe to himself_. We shall expect to find, as in the social
+phenomena with which we have just dealt, that the manifestation of this
+sense consists in a general reaction appropriate to the disposition so
+attributed. He will be fundamentally ill at ease, profoundly confident,
+or will habitually take precautions to be safe. The ultimate nature of
+the world is here no speculative problem. The savage who could feel some
+joy at living in the universe would be more religious than the sublimest
+dialectician. It is in the vividness of the sense of this presence that
+the acuteness of religion consists. I am religious in so far as the
+whole tone and temper of my living reflects a belief as to what the
+universe thinks of such as me.
+
+[Sidenote: Examples of Religious Belief.]
+
+§ 21. The examples that follow are selected because their differences
+in personal flavor serve to throw into relief their common religious
+character. Theodore Parker, in describing his own boyhood, writes as
+follows:
+
+     "I can hardly think without a shudder of the terrible effect
+     the doctrine of eternal damnation had on me. How many, many
+     hours have I wept with terror as I lay on my bed, till,
+     between praying and weeping, sleep gave me repose. But before
+     I was nine years old this fear went away, and I saw clearer
+     light in the goodness of God. But for years, say from seven
+     till ten, I said my prayers with much devotion, I think, and
+     then continued to repeat, 'Lord, forgive my sins,' till sleep
+     came on me."[67:8]
+
+Compare with this Stevenson's Christmas letter to his mother, in which
+he says:
+
+     "The whole necessary morality is kindness; and it should
+     spring, of itself, from the one fundamental doctrine, Faith.
+     If you are sure that God, in the long run, means kindness by
+     you, you should be happy; and if happy, surely you should be
+     kind."[67:9]
+
+Here is destiny frowning and destiny smiling, but in each case so real,
+so present, as to be immediately responded to with helpless terror and
+with grateful warm-heartedness.
+
+The author of the "Imitatio Christi" speaks thus of the daily living of
+the Christian:
+
+     "The life of a Christian who has dedicated himself to the
+     service of God should abound with eminent virtues of all
+     kinds, that he may be really the same person which he is by
+     outward appearance and profession. Indeed, he ought not only
+     to be the same, but much more, in his inward disposition of
+     soul; because he professes to serve a God who sees the inward
+     parts, a searcher of the heart and reins, a God and Father of
+     spirits: and therefore, since we are always in His sight, we
+     should be exceedingly careful to avoid all impurity, all that
+     may give offence to Him whose eyes cannot behold iniquity. We
+     should, in a word, so far as mortal and frail nature can,
+     imitate the blessed angels in all manner of holiness, since
+     we, as well as they, are always in His presence. . . . And good
+     men have always this notion of the thing. For they depend upon
+     God for the success of all they do, even of their best and
+     wisest undertakings."[68:10]
+
+Such is to be the practical acknowledgment of God in the routine of
+life. The more direct response to this presence appears abundantly in
+St. Augustine's conversation and reminiscence with God.
+
+     "How evil have not my deeds been; or if not my deeds my words;
+     or if not my words my will? But Thou, O Lord, art good and
+     merciful, and Thy right hand had respect unto the profoundness
+     of my death, and removed from the bottom of my heart that
+     abyss of corruption. And this was the result, that I willed
+     not to do what I willed, and willed to do what thou
+     willedst. . . . How sweet did it suddenly become to me to be
+     without the delights of trifles! And what at one time I
+     feared to lose, it was now a joy to me to put away. For Thou
+     didst cast them away from me, Thou true and highest sweetness.
+     Thou didst cast them away, and instead of them didst enter in
+     Thyself--sweeter than all pleasure, though not to flesh and
+     blood; brighter than all light, but more veiled than all
+     mysteries; more exalted than all honor, but not to the exalted
+     in their own conceits. Now was my soul free from the gnawing
+     cares of seeking and getting. . . . And I babbled unto Thee my
+     brightness, my riches, and my health, the Lord my God."[69:11]
+
+In these two passages we meet with religious conduct and with the
+supreme religious experience, the direct worship of God. In each case
+the heart of the matter is an individual's indubitable conviction of the
+world's favorable concern for him. The deeper order of things
+constitutes the real and the profoundly congenial community in which he
+lives.
+
+[Sidenote: Typical Religious Phenomena: Conversion.]
+
+§ 22. Let us now apply this general account of the religious experience
+to certain typical religious phenomena: _conversion_; _piety_; and
+religious _instruments_, _symbolisms_, _and_ modes of _conveyance_.
+Although recent study of the phenomenon of _conversion_ has brought to
+light a considerable amount of interesting material, there is some
+danger of misconceiving its importance. The psychology of conversion is
+primarily the psychology of crisis or radical alteration, rather than
+the psychology of religion. For the majority of religious men and women
+conversion is an insignificant event, and in very many cases it never
+occurs at all. Religion is more purely present where it is normal and
+monotonous. But this phenomenon is nevertheless highly significant in
+that religion and irreligion are placed in close juxtaposition, and the
+contribution of religion at its inception thereby emphasized. In general
+it is found that conversion takes place during the period of
+adolescence. But this is the time of the most sudden expansion of the
+environment of life; a time when there is the awakening consciousness of
+many a new presence. This is sometimes expressed by saying that it is a
+period of acute self-consciousness. Life is conscious of itself as over
+against its inheritance; the whole setting of life sweeps into view.
+Some solution of the life problem, some coming to terms with the
+universe, is the normal issue of it. Religious conversion signifies,
+then, that in this fundamental adjustment a man defines and accepts for
+his life a certain attitude on the part of the universe. The examples
+cited by the psychologists, as well as the generalizations which they
+derive, bear out this interpretation.
+
+     "General Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, considers
+     that the first vital step in saving outcasts consists in
+     making them feel that some decent human being cares enough for
+     them to take an interest in the question whether they are to
+     rise or sink."[71:12]
+
+The new state is here one of courage and hope stimulated by the glow of
+friendly interest. The convert is no longer "out in the cold." He is
+told that the world wishes him well, and this is brought home to him
+through representations of the tenderness of Christ, and through the
+direct ministerings of those who mediate it. But somehow the convert
+must be persuaded to realize all this. He must _believe_ it before it
+can mean anything to him. He is therefore urged to pray--a proceeding
+that is at first ridiculous to him, since it involves taking for granted
+what he disbelieves. But therein lies the critical point. It is peculiar
+to the object in this case that it can exist only for one who already
+believes in it. The psychologists call this the element of
+"self-surrender." To be converted a man must somehow suffer his
+surroundings to put into him a new heart, which may thereupon confirm
+its object. Such belief is tremendously tenacious because it so largely
+creates its own evidence. Once believe that "God, in the long run, means
+kindness by you," and you are likely to stand by it to the end--the more
+so in this case because the external evidence either way is to the
+average man so insufficient. Such a belief as this is inspired in the
+convert, not by reasoning, but by all the powers of suggestion that
+personality and social contagion can afford.
+
+[Sidenote: Piety.]
+
+§ 23. The psychologists describe _piety_ as a sense of unity. One feels
+after reading their accounts that they are too abstract. For there are
+many kinds of unity, characteristic of widely varying moods and states.
+Any state of rapt attention is a state of unity, and this occurs in the
+most secular and humdrum moments of life. Nor does it help matters to
+say that in the case of religion this unity must have been preceded by a
+state of division; for we cannot properly characterize any state of mind
+in terms of another state unless the latter be retained in the former.
+And that which is characteristic of the religious sense of unity would
+seem to be just such an overcoming of difference. There is a recognition
+of two distinct attitudes, which may be more or less in sympathy with
+one another, but which are both present even in their fullest harmony.
+Were I to be taken out of myself so completely as to forget myself, I
+should inevitably lose that sense of sympathy from which arises the
+peculiar exultation of religious faith, a heightened experience of the
+same type with the freedom and spontaneity that I experience in the
+presence of those with whom I feel most in accord. The further graces
+and powers of religion readily submit to a similar description. My sense
+of positive sympathy expresses itself in an attitude of well-wishing;
+living in an atmosphere of kindness I instinctively endeavor to
+propagate it. My buoyancy is distinctly of that quality which to a
+lesser degree is due to any sense of social security; my power is that
+of one who works in an environment that reënforces him. I experience the
+objective or even cosmical character of my enterprises. They have a
+momentum which makes me their instrument rather than their perpetrator.
+A paradoxical relation between religion and morality has always
+interested observers of custom and history. Religion is apparently as
+capable of the most fiendish malevolence as of the most saintly
+gentleness. Fielding writes that,
+
+     "When religion is brought out or into daily life and used as
+     a guide or a weapon in the world it has no effect either for
+     good or evil. Its effect is simply in strengthening the heart,
+     in blinding the eyes, in deafening the ears. It is an
+     intensive force, an intoxicant. It doubles or trebles a man's
+     powers. It is an impulsive force sending him headlong down the
+     path of emotion, whether that path lead to glory or to infamy.
+     It is a tremendous stimulant, that is all."[74:13]
+
+Religion does not originate life purposes or define their meaning, but
+stimulates them by the same means that works in all corporate and social
+activity. To work with the universe is the most tremendous incentive
+that can appeal to the individual will. Hence in highly ethical
+religions the power for good exceeds that of any other social and
+spiritual agency. Such religion makes present, actual, and real, that
+good on the whole which the individual otherwise tends to distinguish
+from that which is good for _him_. In daily life the morally valid and
+the practically urgent are commonly arrayed against one another; but the
+ethical religion makes the valid urgent.
+
+[Sidenote: Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance.]
+
+§ 24. The _instruments_ of religion are legion, and it is in order here
+only to mention certain prominent cases in which their selection would
+seem to have direct reference to the provocation and perpetuation of
+such a sense of attitude as we have been describing. This is true in a
+general way of all _symbolism_. There is no essential difference between
+the religious symbol and such symbols as serve to remind us of human
+relationships. In both cases the perceptual absence of will is
+compensated for by the presence of some object associated with that
+will. The function of this object is due to its power to revive and
+perpetuate a certain special social atmosphere. But the most important
+vehicle of religion has always been personality. It is, after all, to
+priests, prophets, and believers that religious cults have owed their
+long life. The traits that mark the prophet are both curious and
+sublime. He is most remarkable for the confidence with which he speaks
+for the universe. Whether it be due to lack of a sense of humor or to a
+profound conviction of truth, is indifferent to our purpose. The power
+of such men is undoubtedly in their suggestion of a force greater than
+they, whose designs they bring directly and socially to the attention of
+men. The prophet in his prophesying is indeed not altogether
+distinguished from God, and it is through the mediation of a directly
+perceptible human attitude that a divine attitude gets itself fixed in
+the imagination of the believer. What is true of the prophet is equally
+true of the preacher whose function it is not to represent God in his
+own person, but to depict him with his tongue. It is generally
+recognized that the preacher is neither a moralizer nor a theologian.
+But it is less perfectly understood that it is his function to suggest
+the presence of God. His proper language is that of the imagination, and
+the picture which he portrays is that of a reciprocal social
+relationship between man and the Supreme Master of the situation of
+life. He will not define God or prove God, but introduce Him and talk
+about Him. And at the same time the association of prayer and worship
+with his sermon, and the atmosphere created by the meeting together of a
+body of disciples, will act as the confirmation of his suggestions of
+such a living presence.
+
+The _conveyance_ of any single religious cult from generation to
+generation affords a signal illustration of the importance in religion
+of the recognition of attitude. Religions manage somehow to survive any
+amount of transformation of creed and ritual. It is not what is done, or
+what is thought, that identifies the faith of the first Christians with
+that of the last, but a certain reckoning with the disposition of God.
+The successive generations of Christians are introduced into the
+spiritual world of their fathers, with its furnishing of hopes and fears
+remaining substantially the same; and their Christianity consists in
+their continuing to live in it with only a slight and gradual
+renovation. To any given individual God is more or less completely
+represented by his elders in the faith in their exhortations and
+ministerings; and through them he fixes as the centre of his system an
+image of God his accuser or redeemer.
+
+[Sidenote: Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions.]
+
+§ 25. The complete verification of this interpretation of the religious
+experience would require the application of it to the different
+historical cults. In general the examination of such instances is
+entirely beyond the scope of this chapter; but a brief consideration may
+be given to those which seem to afford reasonable grounds for objection.
+
+First, it may be said that in _primitive religions_, notably in
+fetichism, tabooism, and totemism, there is no recognition of a cosmical
+unity. It is quite evident that there is no conception of a universe.
+But it is equally evident that the natural and historical environment in
+its generality has a very specific practical significance for the
+primitive believer. It is often said with truth that these earliest
+religions are more profoundly pantheistic than polytheistic. Man
+recognizes an all-pervading interest that is capable of being directed
+to himself. The selection of a deity is not due to any special
+qualification for deification possessed by the individual object itself,
+but to the tacit presumption that, as Thales said, "all things are full
+of gods." The disposition of residual reality manifests to the believer
+no consistency or unity, but it is nevertheless the most constant object
+of his will. He lives in the midst of a capriciousness which he must
+appease if he is to establish himself at all.
+
+[Sidenote: Buddhism.]
+
+§ 26. Secondly, in the case of _Buddhism_ we are said to meet with a
+religion that is essentially atheistic.
+
+     "Whether Buddhas arise, O priests, or whether Buddhas do not
+     arise, it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary
+     constitution of being, that all its constituents are
+     transitory."[78:14]
+
+The secret of life lies in the application of this truth:
+
+       "O builder! I've discovered thee!
+     This fabric thou shalt ne'er rebuild!
+     Thy rafters all are broken now,
+     And pointed roof demolished lies!
+     This mind has demolition reached,
+     And seen the last of all desire!"[78:15]
+
+The case of Buddha himself and of the exponents of his purely esoteric
+doctrine, belong to the reflective type which will presently be given
+special consideration. But with the ordinary believer, even where an
+extraneous but almost inevitable polytheism is least in evidence, the
+religious experience consists in substantially the same elements that
+appear in theistic religions. The individual is here living
+appropriately to the ultimate nature of things, with the ceaseless
+periods of time in full view. That which is brought home to him is the
+illusoriness and hollowness of things when taken in the spirit of active
+endeavor. The only profound and abiding good is nothingness. While
+nature and society conspire to mock him, Nirvana invites him to its
+peace. The religious course of his life consists in the use of such
+means as can win him this end. From the stand-point of the universe he
+has the sympathy only of that wisdom whose essence is self-destruction.
+And this truth is mediated by the imagination of divine sympathy, for
+the Blessed One remains as the perpetual incarnation of his own
+blessedness.
+
+[Sidenote: Critical Religion.]
+
+§ 27. Finally there remains the consideration of the bearing of this
+interpretation upon the more refined and disciplined religions. The
+religion of the critically enlightened man is less naive and credulous
+in its imagery. God tends to vanish into an ideal or a universal, into
+some object of theoretical definition. Here we are on that borderland
+where an assignment of individual cases can never be made with any
+certainty of correctness. We can generalize only by describing the
+conditions that such cases must fulfil if they are properly to be
+denominated religious. And there can be no question of the justice of
+deriving such a description from the reports of historical and
+institutional religions. An idealistic philosophy will, then, be a
+religion just in so far as it is rendered practically vivid by the
+imagination. Such imagination must create and sustain a social
+relationship. The question of the legitimacy of this imagination is
+another matter. It raises the issue concerning the judgment of truth
+implied in religion, and this is the topic of the next chapter. At any
+rate the religious experience _may be_ realized by virtue of the
+metaphorical or poetical representation of a situation as one of
+intercommunication between persons, where reflective definition at the
+same time denies it. The human worshipper may supply the personality of
+God from himself, viewing himself as from the divine stand-point. But
+whatever faculty supplies this indispensable social quality of religion,
+he who defines God as the ultimate goodness or the ultimate truth, has
+certainly not yet worshipped Him. He begins to be religious only when
+such an ideal determines the atmosphere of his daily living; when he
+regards the immanence of such an ideal in nature and history as the
+object of his will; and when he responds to its presence in the spirit
+of his conduct and his contemplation.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[54:1] Cf. Caird: _The Evolution of Religion_, Lectures II, III.
+
+[58:2] Cf. Leuba: _Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion_,
+_Monist_, Vol. XI, p. 195.
+
+[58:3] Cf. Leuba: _Ibid._
+
+[59:4] Cf. § 29.
+
+[59:5] P. 322.
+
+[64:6] Rousseau: _Confessions_, Book IV, p. 125.
+
+[65:7] William James: _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 35.
+The italics are mine. I am in the present chapter under constant
+obligation to this wonderfully sympathetic and stimulating book.
+
+[67:8] Chadwick: _Theodore Parker_, p. 18.
+
+[67:9] Stevenson: _Letters_, Vol. I, p. 229.
+
+[68:10] Thomas à Kempis: _Imitation of Christ_, Chap. XIX. Translation
+by Stanhope, p. 44.
+
+[69:11] St. Augustine: _Confessions_, Book I, Chap. I. Translation in
+Schaff: _Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, Vol. I, p. 129.
+
+[71:12] James: _Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 203.
+
+[74:13] Fielding: _op. cit._, p. 152.
+
+[78:14] Warren: _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 14.
+
+[78:15] _Ibid._, p. 83.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION
+
+
+[Sidenote: Résumé of Psychology of Religion.]
+
+§ 28. It has been maintained that religion is closely analogous to one's
+belief in the disposition toward one's self of men or communities. In
+the case of religion this disposition is attributed to the more or less
+vaguely conceived residual environment that is recognized as lying
+outside of the more familiar natural and social relations. After the
+rise of science this residual environment tends to be conceived as a
+unity which is ultimate or fundamental, but for the religious
+consciousness it is more commonly regarded as a general source of
+influence practically worthy of consideration. Such a belief, like all
+belief, is vitally manifested, with such emphasis upon action, feeling,
+or intellection as temperament and mood may determine.
+
+[Sidenote: Religion Means to be True.]
+
+§ 29. But if the psychology of belief is the proper starting-point for a
+description of the religious experience, it is none the less suggestive
+of the fact that religion, just because it _is_ belief, is not wholly a
+matter for psychology. For religion _means to be true_, and thus submits
+itself to valuation as a case of knowledge. The psychological study of
+religion is misleading when accepted as a substitute for philosophical
+criticism. The religious man takes his religion not as a narcotic, but
+as an enlightenment. Its subjective worth is due at any rate in part to
+the supposition of its objective worth. As in any case of insight, that
+which warms the heart must have satisfied the mind. The religious
+experience purports to be the part of wisdom, and to afford only such
+happiness as increasing wisdom would confirm. And the charm of truth
+cannot survive its truthfulness. Hence, though religion may be
+described, it cannot be justified, from the stand-point of therapeutics.
+Were such the case it would be the real problem of religious leaders to
+find a drug capable of giving a constantly pleasant tone to their
+patient's experience.[83:1] There would be no difference between priests
+and physicians who make a specialty of nervous diseases, except that the
+former would aim at a more fundamental and perpetual suggestion of
+serenity. Now no man wants to be even a blessed fool. He does not want
+to dwell constantly in a fictitious world, even if it be after his own
+heart. He may from the cynical point of view actually do so, but if he
+be religious he thinks it is reality, and is satisfied only in so far as
+he thinks so. He regards the man who has said in his heart that there is
+no God as the fool, and not because he may have to suffer for it, but
+because he is cognitively blind to the real nature of things. Piety, on
+the other hand, he regards as the standard experience, the most
+veracious life. Hence, it is not an accident that religion has had its
+creeds and its controversies, its wars with science and its appeals to
+philosophy. The history of these affairs shows that religion commonly
+fails to understand the scope of its own demand for truth; but they have
+issued from the deep conviction that one's religion is, implicitly, at
+least, in the field of truth; that there are theoretical judgments whose
+truth would justify or contradict it.
+
+This general fact being admitted, there remains the task to which the
+present discussion addresses itself, that of defining the kind of
+_theoretical judgment_ implied in religion, and the relation to this
+central cognitive stem of its efflorescences of myth, theology, and
+ritual. It is impossible to separate the stem and the efflorescence, or
+to determine the precise spot at which destruction of the tissue would
+prove fatal to the plant, but it is possible to obtain some idea of the
+relative vitality of the parts.
+
+[Sidenote: Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a Disposition
+from which Consequences May Rationally be Expected.]
+
+§ 30. The difficulty of reaching a definite statement in this matter is
+due to the fact that the truth in which any religious experience centres
+is a practical and not a scientific truth. A practical truth does not
+commit itself to any single scientific statement, and can often survive
+the overthrow of that scientific statement in which at any given time it
+has found expression. In other words, an indefinite number of scientific
+truths are compatible with a single practical truth. An instance of this
+is the consistency with my expectation of the alternation of day and
+night, of either the Ptolemaic or Copernican formulation of the solar
+system. Now expectation that the sun will rise to-morrow is an excellent
+analogue of my religious belief. Celestial mechanics is as relevant to
+the one as metaphysics to the other. Neither is overthrown until a
+central practical judgment is discredited, and either could remain true
+through a very considerable alteration of logical definition; but
+neither is on this account exempt from theoretical responsibility. In so
+far as religion deliberately enters the field of science, and defines
+its formularies with the historical or metaphysical method, this
+difficulty does not, of course, exist. Grant that the years of
+Methuselah's life, or the precise place and manner of the temptation of
+Jesus, or the definition of Christ in the terms of the Athanasian Creed,
+are constitutive of Christianity, and the survival of that religion will
+be determined by the solution of ordinary problems of historical or
+metaphysical research. But the Christian will very properly claim that
+his religion is only externally and accidentally related to such
+propositions, since they are never or very rarely intended in his
+experience. As religious he is occupied with Christ as his saviour or
+with God as his protector and judge. The history of Jesus or the
+metaphysics of God essentially concern him only in so far as they may or
+may not invalidate this relationship. He cares only for the power and
+disposition of the divine, and these are affected by history and
+metaphysics only in so far as he has definitely put them to such proof.
+
+For my religion is my sense of a practical situation, and only when
+that has been proved to be folly has my religion become untrue. My God
+is my practical faith, my plan of salvation. My religion is overthrown
+if I am convinced that I have misconceived the situation and mistaken
+what I should do to be saved. The conception of God is very simple
+practically, and very complex theoretically, a fact that confirms its
+practical genesis. My conception of God contains _an idea of my own
+interests_, _an idea of the disposition of the universe toward my
+interests_, and _some working plan for the reconciliation of these two
+terms_. These three elements form a practical unity, but each is capable
+of emphasis, and a religion may be transformed through the modification
+of any one of them. It appears, then, as has always been somewhat
+vaguely recognized, that the truth of religion is ethical as well as
+metaphysical or scientific. My religion will be altered by a change in
+my conception of what constitutes my real interest, a change in my
+conception of the fundamental causes of reality, or a change in my
+conception of the manner in which my will may or may not affect these
+causes. God is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always a relation of
+entity to ideal: _reality regarded from the stand-point of its
+favorableness or unfavorableness to human life, and prescribing for the
+latter the propriety of a certain attitude_.
+
+[Sidenote: Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The
+Religion of Baal.]
+
+§ 31. The range of historical examples is limitless, but certain of
+these are especially calculated to emphasize the application of a
+criterion to religion. Such is the case with Elijah's encounter with the
+prophets of Baal, as narrated in the Old Testament.
+
+     "And Elijah came near unto all the people, and said, How long
+     halt ye between two opinions? If Yahweh be God, follow him:
+     but if Baal, then follow him. . . . And call ye on the name of
+     your god, and I will call on the name of Yahweh: and the God
+     that answereth by fire, let him be God. . . . And Elijah said
+     unto the prophets of Baal, Choose you one bullock for
+     yourselves, and dress it first; for ye are many; and call on
+     the name of your god, but put no fire under. And they took the
+     bullock which was given them, and they dressed it, and called
+     on the name of Baal from morning even until noon, saying, O
+     Baal, hear us. But there was no voice, nor any that
+     answered. . . . And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah
+     mocked them, and said, Cry aloud: for he is a god; either he
+     is musing, or he is gone aside, or he is in a journey, or
+     peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked. And they cried
+     aloud, and cut themselves after their manner with knives and
+     lances, till the blood gushed out upon them. . . . But there
+     was neither voice, nor any to answer, nor any that
+     regarded."[88:2]
+
+The religion of the followers of Baal here consists in a belief in the
+practical virtue of a mode of address and form of ritual associated with
+the traditions and customs of a certain social group. The prophets of
+this cult agree to regard the experiment proposed by Elijah as a crucial
+test, and that which is disproved from its failure is a plan of action.
+These prophets relied upon the presence of a certain motivity, from
+which a definite response could be evoked by an appeal which they were
+peculiarly able to make; but though "they prophesied until the time of
+the offering of the evening oblation," there was none that regarded.
+
+[Sidenote: Greek Religion.]
+
+§ 32. An equally familiar and more instructive example is the refutation
+of the Greek national religion by Lucretius. The conception of life
+which Lucretius finds unwarranted is best depicted in Homer. There we
+hear of a society composed of gods and men. Though the gods, on the one
+hand, have their own history, their affairs are never sharply sundered
+from those of men, who, on the other hand, must constantly reckon with
+them, gauge their attitude, and seek their favor by paying tribute to
+their individual humors and preferences. In the Ninth Book of the
+"Iliad," Phoenix addresses himself to the recalcitrant Achilles as
+follows:
+
+                         "It fits not one that moves
+     The hearts of all, to live unmov'd, and succor hates for loves.
+     The Gods themselves are flexible; whose virtues, honors, pow'rs,
+     Are more than thine, yet they will bend their breasts as we bend
+         ours.
+     Perfumes, benign devotions, savors of offerings burn'd,
+     And holy rites, the engines are with which their hearts are turn'd,
+     By men that pray to them."[90:3]
+
+Here is a general recognition of that which makes sacrifice rational. It
+is because he conceives this presupposition to be mistaken, that
+Lucretius declares the practices and fears which are founded upon it to
+be folly. It is the same with all that is practically based upon the
+expectation of a life beyond the grave. The correction of the popular
+religion is due in his opinion to that true view of the world taught by
+Epicurus, whose memory Lucretius thus invokes at the opening of the
+Third Book of the "De Rerum Natura":
+
+     "Thee, who first wast able amid such thick darkness to raise
+     on high so bright a beacon and shed a light on the true
+     interests of life, thee I follow, glory of the Greek race,
+     and plant now my footsteps firmly fixed in thy imprinted
+     marks. . . . For soon as thy philosophy issuing from a
+     godlike intellect has begun with loud voice, to proclaim the
+     nature of things, the terrors of the mind are dispelled, the
+     walls of the world part asunder, I see things in operation
+     throughout the whole void: the divinity of the gods is
+     revealed and their tranquil abodes which neither winds do
+     shake nor clouds drench with rains nor snow congealed by sharp
+     frost harms with hoary fall: an ever cloudless ether
+     o'ercanopies them, and they laugh with light shed largely
+     round. Nature too supplies all their wants and nothing ever
+     impairs their peace of mind. But on the other hand the
+     Acherusian quarters[91:4] are nowhere to be seen, though earth
+     is no bar to all things being descried, which are in operation
+     underneath our feet throughout the void."[91:5]
+
+In another passage, after describing the Phrygian worship of Cybele, he
+comments as follows:
+
+     "All which, well and beautifully as it is set forth and told,
+     is yet widely removed from true reason. For the nature of gods
+     must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together
+     with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our
+     concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all
+     dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us,
+     it is neither gained by favors nor moved by anger. . . . The
+     earth however is at all time without feeling, and because it
+     receives into it the first-beginnings of many things, it
+     brings them forth in many ways into the light of the
+     sun."[91:6]
+
+If the teaching of Epicurus be true it is evident that those who
+offered hecatombs with the idea that they were thereby mitigating anger,
+or securing special dispensation, were playing the fool. They were
+appealing to a fictitious motivity, one not grounded in "the nature of
+things." To one for whom the walls of the world had parted asunder, such
+a procedure was no longer possible; though he might choose to "call the
+sea Neptune" and reverence the earth as "mother of the gods."[92:7]
+
+[Sidenote: Judaism and Christianity.]
+
+§ 33. The history of religion contains no more impressive and dramatic
+chapter than that which records the development of the religion of the
+Jews. Passing over its obscure beginnings in the primitive Semitic cult,
+we find this religion first clearly defined as tribal self-interest
+sanctioned by Yahweh.[92:8] God's interest in his chosen people
+determines the prosperity of him who practices the social virtues.
+
+     "The name of Yahweh is a strong tower: the righteous runneth
+     into it, and is safe."
+
+     "He that is steadfast in righteousness shall attain unto
+     life."
+
+     "To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to Yahweh than
+     sacrifice."[93:9]
+
+But in time it is evident to the believer that his experience does not
+bear out this expectation. Neither as a Jew nor as a righteous man does
+he prosper more than his neighbor. He comes, therefore, to distrust the
+virtue of his wisdom.
+
+     "Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light
+     excelleth darkness. The wise man's eyes are in his head, and
+     the fool walketh in darkness: and yet I perceived that one
+     event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, As it
+     happeneth to the fool, so will it happen even to me; and why
+     was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also
+     was vanity. For of the wise man, even as of the fool, there is
+     no remembrance forever; seeing that in the days to come all
+     will have been already forgotten. And how doth the wise man
+     die even as the fool! So I hated life; because the work that
+     is wrought under the sun was grievous unto me: for all is
+     vanity and a striving after wind."[93:10]
+
+It is evident that he who expects the favor of fortune in return for
+his observance of precept is mistaken. The "work that is wrought under
+the sun" makes no special provision for him during his lifetime. Unless
+the cry of vanity is to be the last word there must be a
+reinterpretation of the promise of God. This appears in the new ideal of
+patient submission, and the chastened faith that expects only the love
+of God. And those whom God loves He will not forsake. They will come to
+their own, if not here, then beyond, according to His inscrutable but
+unswerving plan.
+
+     "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a
+     contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."
+
+     "For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth
+     eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and holy
+     place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit,
+     to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of
+     the contrite ones."[94:11]
+
+In this faith Judaism merges into Christianity.[94:12] In the whole
+course of this evolution God is regarded as the friend of his people,
+but his people learn to find a new significance in his friendship. That
+which is altered is the conduct which that friendship requires and the
+expectation which it determines. The practical ideal which the
+relationship sanctions, changes gradually from that of prudence to that
+of goodness for its own sake. God, once an instrument relevant to human
+temporal welfare, has come to be an object of disinterested service.
+
+No such transformation as this was absolutely realized during the period
+covered by the writings of the Old Testament, nor has it even yet been
+realized in the development of Christianity. But the evolution of both
+Judaism and Christianity has taken this direction. The criterion of this
+evolution is manifestly both ethical and metaphysical. A Christian avows
+that he rates purity of character above worldly prosperity, so that the
+former cannot properly be prized for the sake of the latter.
+Furthermore, he shares more or less unconsciously such philosophical and
+scientific opinions as deny truth to the conception of special
+interferences and dispensations from a supernatural agency. Therefore he
+looks for no fire from heaven to consume his sacrifice. But his religion
+is nevertheless a practical expectation. He believes that God is good,
+and that God loves him and sustains him. He believes that there obtains
+between himself, in so far as good, and the universe _sub specie
+eternitatis_, a real sympathy and reciprocal reenforcement. He believes
+that he secures through the profoundly potent forces of the universe
+that which he regards as of most worth; and that somewhat is added to
+these forces by virtue of his consecration. The God of the Christians
+cannot be defined short of some such account as this, inclusive of an
+ideal, an attitude, and an expectation. In other words the God of the
+Christians is to be known only in terms of the Christlike outlook upon
+life, in which the disciple is taught to emulate the master. When moral
+and intellectual development shall have discredited either its scale of
+values, or its conviction that cosmical events are in the end determined
+in accordance with that scale of values, then Christianity must either
+be transformed, or be untenable for the wise man. If we have conceived
+the essence of Christianity too broadly or vaguely, it does not much
+matter for our present purposes. Its essence is, at any rate, some such
+inwardness of life resolving ideality and reality into one, and drawing
+upon objective truth only to the extent required for the confirming of
+that relation.
+
+[Sidenote: The Cognitive Factor in Religion.]
+
+§ 34. We conclude, then, our attempt to emphasize the cognitive factor
+in religion, with the thesis that every religion centres in a practical
+secret of the universe. _To be religious is to believe that a certain
+correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality operative, and
+that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a certain type of
+living. Whatever demonstrates the futility, vanity, or self-deception of
+this living, discredits the religion. And, per contra, except as they
+define or refute such practical truth, religion is not essentially
+concerned with theoretical judgments._
+
+[Sidenote: The Place of Imagination in Religion.]
+
+§ 35. But neither religion nor any other human interest consists in
+essentials. Such a practical conviction as that which has been defined
+inevitably flowers into a marvelous complexity, and taps for its
+nourishment every spontaneity of human nature. If it be said that only
+the practical conviction is essential, this is not the same as to say
+that all else is superfluous. There may be no single utterance that my
+religion could not have spared, and yet were I to be altogether dumb my
+religion would, indeed, be as nothing. For if I believe, I accept a
+presence in my world, which as I live will figure in my dreams, or in my
+thoughts, or in my habits. And each of these expressions of myself will
+have a truth if it do but bear out my practical acceptance of that
+presence. The language of religion, like that of daily life, is not the
+language of science except it take it upon itself to be so. There is
+scarcely a sentence which I utter in my daily intercourse with men which
+is not guilty of transgressions against the canons of accurate and
+definite thinking. Yet if I deceive neither myself nor another, I am
+held to be truthful, even though my language deal with chance and
+accident, material purposes and spiritual causes, and though I vow that
+the sun smiles or the moon lets down her hair into the sea. Science is a
+special interest in the discovery of unequivocal and fixed conceptions,
+and employs its terms with an unalterable connotation. But no such
+algebra of thought is indispensable to life or conversation, and its
+lack is no proof of error. Such is the case also with that eminently
+living affair, religion. I may if I choose, and I will if my reasoning
+powers be at all awakened, be a theologian. But theology, like science,
+is a special intellectual spontaneity. St. Thomas, the master
+theologian, did not glide unwittingly from prayer into the _quæstiones_
+of the "Summa Theologiæ," but turned to them as to a fresh adventure.
+Theology is inevitable, because humanly speaking adventure is
+inevitable. For man, with his intellectual spontaneity, every object is
+a problem; and did he not seek sooner or later to define salvation,
+there would be good reason to believe that he did not practically reckon
+with any. But this is _similarly_ and _independently_ true of the
+imagination, the most familiar means with which man clothes and vivifies
+his convictions, the exuberance with which he plays about them and
+delights to confess them. The imagination of religion, contributing what
+Matthew Arnold called its "poetry and eloquence," does not submit itself
+to such canons as are binding upon theology or science, but exists and
+flourishes in its own right.
+
+The indispensableness to religion of the imagination is due to that
+faculty's power of realizing what is not perceptually present. Religion
+is not interested in the apparent, but in the secret essence or the
+transcendent universal. And yet this interest is a practical one.
+Imagination may introduce one into the vivid presence of the secret or
+the transcendent. It is evident that the religious imagination here
+coincides with poetry. For it is at least one of the interests of poetry
+to cultivate and satisfy a sense for the universal; to obtain an
+immediate experience or appreciation that shall have the vividness
+without the particularism of ordinary perception. And where a poet
+elects so to view the world, we allow him as a poet the privilege, and
+judge him by the standards to which he submits himself. That upon which
+we pass judgment is the _fitness of his expression_. This expression is
+not, except in the case of the theoretical mystic, regarded as
+constituting the most valid form of the idea, but is appreciated
+expressly for its fulfilment of the condition of immediacy. The same
+sort of critical attitude is in order with the fruits of the religious
+imagination. These may or may not fulfil enough of the requirements of
+that art to be properly denominated poetry; but like poetry they are the
+translation of ideas into a specific language. They must not, therefore,
+be judged as though they claimed to excel in point of validity, but only
+in point of consistency with the context of that language. And _the
+language of religion is the language of the practical life_. Such
+translation is as essential to an idea that is to enter into the
+religious experience, as translation into terms of immediacy is
+essential to an idea that is to enter into the appreciative
+consciousness of the poet. No object can find a place in my religion
+until it is conjoined with my purposes and hopes; until it is taken for
+granted and acted upon, like the love of my friends, or the courses of
+the stars, or the stretches of the sea.
+
+[Sidenote: The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination.]
+
+§ 36. The religious imagination, then, is to be understood and justified
+as that which brings the objects of religion within the range of living.
+The central religious object, as has been seen, is an _attitude_ of the
+residuum or totality of things. To be religious one must have a sense
+for the _presence of an attitude_, like his sense for the presence of
+his human fellows, with all the added appreciation that is proper in the
+case of an object that is unique in its mystery or in its majesty. It
+follows that the religious imagination fulfils its function in so far as
+it provides the object of religion with properties similar to those
+which lend vividness and reality to the normal social relations.
+
+The presence of one's fellows is in part the perceptual experience of
+their bodies. To this there corresponds in religion some extraordinary
+or subtle appearance. The gods may in visions or dreams be met with in
+their own proper embodiments; or, as is more common, they may be
+regarded as present for practical purposes: in some inanimate object,
+as in the case of the fetish; in some animal species, as in the case of
+the totem; in some place, as in the case of the shrine; or even in some
+human being, as in the case of the inspired prophet and miracle worker.
+In more refined and highly developed religions the medium of God's
+presence is less specific. He is perceived with
+
+                         "--a sense sublime
+     Of something far more deeply interfused,
+     Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
+     And the round ocean and the living air,
+     And the blue sky, and in the mind of man."
+
+God is here found in an interpretation of the common and the natural,
+rather than in any individual and peculiar embodiment. And here the
+poet's appreciation, if not his art, is peculiarly indispensable.
+
+But, furthermore, his fellows are inmates of "the household of man" in
+that he knows their history. They belong to the temporal context of
+actions and events. Similarly, the gods must be historical. The sacred
+traditions or books of religion are largely occupied with this history.
+The more individual and anthropomorphic the gods, the more local and
+episodic will be the account of their affairs. In the higher religions
+the acts of God are few and momentous, such as creation or special
+providence; or they are identical with the events of nature and human
+history when these are _construed_ as divine. To find God in this latter
+way requires an interpretation of the course of events in terms of some
+moral consistency, a faith that sees some purpose in their evident
+destination.
+
+There is still another and a more significant way in which men recognize
+one another: the way of address and conversation. And men have
+invariably held a similar intercourse with their gods. To this category
+belong communion and prayer, with all their varieties of expression. I
+have no god until I address him. This will be the most direct evidence
+of what is at least from my point of view a social relation. There can
+be no general definition of the form which this address will take. There
+may be as many special languages, as many attitudes, and as much
+playfulness and subtlety of symbolism as in human intercourse. But, on
+the other hand, there are certain utterances that are peculiarly
+appropriate to religion. In so far as he regards his object as endowed
+with both power and goodness the worshipper will use the language of
+adoration; and the sense of his dependence will speak in terms of
+consecration and thanksgiving.
+
+     "O God, thou art my God; early will I seek thee:
+      My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee,
+      In a dry and weary land, where no water is.
+      So have I looked upon thee in the sanctuary,
+      To see thy power and thy glory.
+      For thy loving-kindness is better than life;
+      My lips shall praise thee."
+
+These are expressions of a hopeful faith; but, on the other hand, God
+may be addressed in terms of hatred and distrust.
+
+     "Who is most wretched in this dolorous place?
+      I think myself; yet I would rather be
+      My miserable self than He, than He
+      Who formed such creatures to his own disgrace.
+
+     "The vilest thing must be less vile than Thou
+      From whom it had its being, God and Lord!
+      Creator of all woe and sin! abhorred,
+      Malignant and implacable."[104:13]
+
+In either case there may be an indefinite degree of hyperbole. The
+language of love and hate, of confidence and despair, is not the
+language of description. In this train of the religious consciousness
+there is occasion for whatever eloquence man can feel, and whatever
+rhetorical luxuriance he can utter.
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion.]
+
+§ 37. Such considerations as these serve to account for the exercise and
+certain of the fruits of the religious imagination, and to designate the
+general criterion governing its propriety. But _how is one to determine
+the boundary between the imaginative and the cognitive_? It is commonly
+agreed that what religion says and does is not all intended literally.
+But when is expression of religion only poetry and eloquence, and when
+is it matter of conviction? If we revert again to the cognitive aspect
+of religion, it is evident that there is but one test to apply:
+_whatever either fortifies or misleads the will is literal conviction_.
+This test cannot be applied absolutely, because it can properly be
+applied only to the intention of an individual experience. However I may
+express my religion, that which I express, is, we have seen, an
+expectation. The degree to which I literally mean what I say is then the
+degree to which it determines my expectations. Whatever adds no item to
+these expectations, but only recognizes and vitalizes them, is pure
+imagination. But it follows that it is entirely impossible from direct
+inspection to define any given _expression_ of religious experience as
+myth, or to define the degree to which it is myth. It submits to such
+distinctions only when viewed from the stand-point of the concrete
+religious experience which it expresses. Any such given expression could
+easily be all imagination to one, and all conviction to another.
+Consider the passage which follows:
+
+     "And I saw the heaven opened; and behold, a white horse, and
+     he that sat thereon, called Faithful and True; and in
+     righteousness he doth judge and make war. And his eyes are a
+     flame of fire, and upon his head are many diadems; and he hath
+     a name written, which no one knoweth but he himself. And he is
+     arrayed in a garment sprinkled with blood: and his name is
+     called The Word of God."[106:14]
+
+Is this all rhapsody, or is it in part true report? There is evidently
+no answer to the question so conceived. But if it were to express my own
+religious feeling it would have some specific proportion of literal and
+metaphorical significance, according to the degree to which its detail
+contributes different practical values to me. It might then be my
+guide-book to the heavens, or only my testimony to the dignity and
+mystery of the function of Christ.
+
+The development of religion bears in a very important way upon this last
+problem. The factor of imagination has undoubtedly come to have a more
+clearly recognized role in religion. There can be no doubt that what we
+now call myths were once beliefs, and that what we now call poetry was
+once history. If we go back sufficiently far we come to a time when the
+literal and the metaphorical were scarcely distinguishable, and this
+because science had not emerged from the early animistic extension of
+social relations. Men _meant_ to address their gods as they addressed
+their fellows, and expected them to hear and respond, as they looked for
+such reactions within the narrower circle of ordinary intercourse. The
+advance of science has brought into vogue a description of nature that
+inhibits such expectations. The result has been that men, continuing to
+use the same terms, essentially expressive as they are of a practical
+relationship, have come to regard them as only a general expression of
+their attitude. The differences of content that are in excess of factors
+of expectation remain as poetry and myth. On the other hand, it is
+equally possible, if not equally common, for that which was once
+imagined to come to be believed. Such a transformation is, perhaps,
+normally the case when the inspired utterance passes from its author to
+the cult. The prophets and sweet singers are likely to possess an
+exuberance of imagination not appreciated by their followers; and for
+this reason almost certainly misunderstood. For these reasons it is
+manifestly absurd to fasten the name of myth or the name of creed upon
+any religious utterance whatsoever, unless it be so regarded from the
+stand-point of the personal religion which it originally expressed, or
+unless one means by so doing to define it as an expression of his own
+religion. He who defines "the myth of creation," or "the poetical story
+of Samson," as parts of the pre-Christian Judaic religion, exhibits a
+total loss of historical sense. The distinction between cognition and
+fancy does not exist among objects, but only in the _intending_
+experience; hence, for me to attach my own distinction to any individual
+case of belief, viewed apart from the believer, is an utterly confusing
+projection of my own personality into the field of my study.
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions.]
+
+§ 38. Only after such considerations as these are we qualified to attack
+that much-vexed question as to whether religion deals invariably with a
+personal god. It is often assumed in discussion of this question that
+"personal god," as well as "god," is a distinct and familiar kind of
+entity, like a dragon or centaur; its existence alone being
+problematical. This is doubly false to the religious employment of such
+an object. If it be true that in religion we mean by God a practical
+interpretation of the world, _whatsoever be its nature_, then the
+personality of God must be a derivative of the attitude, and not of the
+nature of the world. Given the practical outlook upon life, there is no
+definable world that cannot be construed under the form of God. My god
+is my world practically recognized in respect of its fundamental or
+ultimate attitude to my ideals. In the sense, then, conveyed by this
+term _attitude_ my god will invariably possess the characters of
+personality. But the degree to which these characters will coincide with
+the characters which I assign to human persons, or the terms of any
+logical conception of personality, cannot be absolutely defined.
+Anthropomorphisms may be imagination or they may be literal conviction.
+This will depend, as above maintained, upon the degree to which they
+determine my expectations. Suppose the world to be theoretically
+conceived as governed by laws that are indifferent to all human
+interests. The practical expression of this conception appears in the
+naturalism of Lucretius, or Diogenes, or Omar Khayyam. Living in the
+vivid presence of an indifferent world, I may picture my gods as leading
+their own lives in some remote realm which is inaccessible to my
+petitions, or as regarding me with sinister and contemptuous cruelty. In
+the latter case I may shrink and cower, or return them contempt for
+contempt. I mean this literally only if I look for consequences
+following directly from the emotional coloring which I have bestowed
+upon them. It may well be that I mean merely to regard myself _sub
+specie eternitatis_, in which case I am _personifying_ in the sense of
+free imagination. In the religion of enlightenment the divine attitude
+tends to belong to the poetry and eloquence of religion rather than to
+its cognitive intent. This is true even of optimistic and idealistic
+religion. The love and providence of God are less commonly supposed to
+warrant an expectation of special and arbitrary favors, and have come
+more and more to mean the play of my own feeling about the general
+central conviction of the favorableness of the cosmos to my deeper or
+moral concerns. But the factor of personality cannot possibly be
+entirely eliminated, for the religious consciousness _creates_ a social
+relationship between man and the universe. Such an interpretation of
+life is not a case of the pathetic fallacy, unless it incorrectly
+_reckons with_ the inner feeling which it attributes to the universe. It
+is an obvious practical truth that the total or residual environment is
+significant for life. Grant this and you make rational a recognition of
+that significance, or a more or less constant sense of coincidence or
+conflict with cosmical forces. Permit this consciousness to stand, and
+you make some expression of it inevitable. Such an expression may,
+furthermore, with perfect propriety and in fulfilment of human nature,
+set forth and transfigure this central belief until it may enter into
+the context of immediacy.
+
+Thus any conception of the universe whatsoever may afford a basis for
+religion. But there is no religion that does not virtually make a more
+definite claim upon the nature of things, and this entirely
+independently of its theology, or explicit attempt to define itself.
+Every religion, even in the very living of it, is naturalistic, or
+dualistic, or pluralistic, or optimistic, or idealistic, or pessimistic.
+And there is in the realm of truth that which justifies or refutes these
+definite practical ways of construing the universe. But no historical
+religion is ever so vague even as this in its philosophical
+implications. Indeed, we shall always be brought eventually to the
+inner meaning of some individual religious experience, where no general
+criticism can be certainly valid.
+
+There is, then, a place in religion for that which is not directly
+answerable to philosophical or scientific standards. But there is
+always, on the other hand, an element of hope which conceives the nature
+of the world, and means to be grounded in reality. In respect of that
+element, philosophy is indispensable to religion. The meaning of
+religion is, in fact, the central problem of philosophy. There is a
+virtue in religion like that which Emerson ascribes to poetry. "The poet
+is in the right attitude; he is believing; the philosopher, after some
+struggle, having only reasons for believing." But whatever may be said
+to the disparagement of its dialectic, philosophy is the justification
+of religion, and the criticism of religions. To it must be assigned the
+task of so refining positive religion as to contribute to the perpetual
+establishment of true religion. And to philosophy, with religion,
+belongs the task of holding fast to the idea of the universe. There is
+no religion except before you begin, or after you have rested from, your
+philosophical speculation. But in the universe these interests have a
+common object. As philosophy is the articulation and vindication of
+religion, so is religion the realization of philosophy. In philosophy
+thought is brought up to the elevation of life, and in religion
+philosophy, as the sum of wisdom, enters into life.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[83:1] As Plato interprets the scepticism of Protagoras to mean that one
+state of mind cannot be more _true_ than another, but only _better_ or
+worse. Cf. _Theætetus_, 167.
+
+[88:2] Quoted with some omissions from _I Kings_, 18:21-29. The Hebrew
+term _Yahweh_, the name of the national deity, has been substituted for
+the English translation, "the Lord."
+
+[90:3] _Iliad_, Book IX, lines 467 _sq._ Translation by Chapman.
+
+[91:4] The supposed abode of departed spirits.
+
+[91:5] Lucretius: _De Rerum Natura_, Book III, lines 1 _sq._ Translated
+by Munro.
+
+[91:6] _Ibid._, Book II, lines 644 _sq._
+
+[92:7] It would be interesting to compare the equally famous criticism
+of Greek religion in Plato's _Republic_, Book II, 377 _sq._
+
+[92:8] Cf. W. Robertson Smith's admirable account of the Semitic
+religions:
+
+"What is requisite to religion is a practical acquaintance with the
+rules on which the deity acts and on which he expects his worshippers to
+frame their conduct--what in II Kings, 17:26 is called the 'manner,' or
+rather the 'customary law' (_mishpat_), of the god of the land. This is
+true even of the religion of Israel. When the prophets speak of the
+knowledge of God, they always mean a practical knowledge of the laws and
+principles of His government in Israel, and a summary expression for
+religion as a whole is 'the knowledge and fear of Jehovah,' _i. e._, the
+knowledge of what Jehovah prescribes, combined with a reverent
+obedience." _The Religion of the Semites_, p. 23.
+
+[93:9] _Proverbs_, 18:10; 11:19; 21:3.
+
+[93:10] _Ecclesiastes_, 2:13 _sq._
+
+[94:11] _Psalms_, 51:17; _Isaiah_, 57:15.
+
+[94:12] In this discussion of Judaism I am much indebted to Matthew
+Arnold's _Literature and Dogma_, especially Chapters I and II.
+
+[104:13] James Thomson: _The City of Dreadful Night_. Quoted by James,
+in _The Will to Believe, etc._, p. 45.
+
+[106:14] _Revelation_, 19:11-13.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+[Sidenote: The True Relations of Philosophy and Science. Misconceptions
+and Antagonisms.]
+
+§ 39. In the case of natural science we meet not only with a special
+human interest, but with a theoretical discipline. We are confronted,
+therefore, with a new question: that of the relation within the body of
+human knowledge of two of its constituent members. Owing to the militant
+temper of the representatives of both science and philosophy, this has
+long since ceased to be an academic question, and has frequently been
+met in the spirit of rivalry and partisanship. But the true order of
+knowledge is only temporarily distorted by the brilliant success of a
+special type of investigation; and the conquests of science are now so
+old a story that critical thought shows a disposition to judge of the
+issue with sobriety and logical highmindedness.
+
+In the seventeenth century a newly emancipated and too sanguine reason
+proposed to know the whole of nature at once in terms of mathematics
+and mechanics. Thus the system of the Englishman Hobbes was science
+swelled to world-proportions, simple, compact, conclusive, and
+all-comprehensive. Philosophy proposed to do the work of science, but in
+its own grand manner. The last twenty years of Hobbes's life, spent in
+repeated discomfiture at the hands of Seth Ward, Wallis, Boyle, and
+other scientific experts of the new Royal Society, certified
+conclusively to the failure of this enterprise, and the experimental
+specialist thereupon took exclusive possession of the field of natural
+law. But the idealist, on the other hand, reconstructed nature to meet
+the demands of philosophical knowledge and religious faith. There
+issued, together with little mutual understanding and less sympathy, on
+the one hand _positivism_, or exclusive experimentalism, and on the
+other hand a rabid and unsympathetic transcendentalism. Hume, who
+consigned to the flames all thought save "abstract reasoning concerning
+quantity or number," and "experimental reasoning concerning matter of
+fact and existence"; Comte, who assigned metaphysics to an immature
+stage in the development of human intelligence; and Tyndall, who reduced
+the religious consciousness to an emotional experience of mystery, are
+typical of the one attitude. The other is well exhibited in Schelling's
+reference to "the blind and thoughtless mode of investigating nature
+which has become generally established since the corruption of
+philosophy by Bacon, and of physics by Boyle." Dogmatic experimentalism
+and dogmatic idealism signify more or less consistently the abstract
+isolation of the scientific and philosophical motives.
+
+There is already a touch of quaintness in both of these attitudes. We of
+the present are in the habit of acknowledging the autonomy of science,
+and the unimpeachable validity of the results of experimental research
+in so far as they are sanctioned by the consensus of experts. But at the
+same time we recognize the definiteness of the task of science, and the
+validity of such reservations as may be made from a higher critical
+point of view. Science is to be transcended in so far as it is
+understood as a whole. Philosophy is critically empirical; empirical,
+because it regards all _bona fide_ descriptions of experience as
+knowledge; critical, because attentive to the conditions of both general
+and special knowledge. And in terms of a critical empiricism so defined,
+it is one of the problems of philosophy _to define and appraise the
+generating problem of science_, and so to determine the value
+assignable to natural laws in the whole system of knowledge.
+
+[Sidenote: The Spheres of Philosophy and Science.]
+
+§ 40. If this be the true function of philosophy with reference to
+science, several current notions of the relations of the spheres of
+these disciplines may be disproved. In the first place, philosophy will
+not be all the sciences regarded as one science. Science tends to unify
+without any higher criticism. The various sciences already regard the
+one nature as their common object, and the one system of interdependent
+laws as their common achievement. The philosopher who tries to be all
+science at once fails ignominiously because he tries to replace the work
+of a specialist with the work of a dilettante; and if philosophy be
+identical with that body of truth accumulated and organized by the
+coöperative activity of scientific men, then philosophy is a name and
+there is no occasion for the existence of the philosopher as such.
+Secondly, philosophy will not be the assembling of the sciences; for
+such would be a merely clerical work, and the philosopher would much
+better be regarded as non-existent than as a book-keeper. Nor, thirdly,
+is philosophy an auxiliary discipline that may be called upon in
+emergencies for the solution of some baffling problem of science. A
+problem defined by science must be solved in the scientific manner.
+Science will accept no aid from the gods when engaged in her own
+campaign, but will fight it out according to her own principles of
+warfare. And as long as science moves in her own plane, she can
+acknowledge no permanent barriers. There is then no need of any
+superscientific research that shall replace, or piece together, or
+extend the work of science. But the savant is not on this account in
+possession of the entire field of knowledge. It is true that he is not
+infrequently moved to such a conviction when he takes us about to view
+his estates. Together we ascend up into heaven, or make our beds in
+sheol, or take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts
+of the sea--and look in vain for anything that is not work done, or work
+projected, by natural science. Persuade him, however, to _define_ his
+estates, and he has circumscribed them. In his definition he must employ
+conceptions more fundamental than the working conceptions that he
+employs within his field of study. Indeed, in viewing his task as
+definite and specific he has undertaken the solution of the problem of
+philosophy. The logical self-consciousness has been awakened, and there
+is no honorable way of putting it to sleep again. This is precisely
+what takes place in any account of the generating problem of science. To
+define science is to define at least one realm that is other than
+science, the realm of active intellectual endeavor with its own proper
+categories. One cannot reflect upon science and assign it an end, and a
+method proper to that end, without bringing into the field of knowledge
+a broader field of experience than the field proper to science, broader
+at any rate by the presence in it of the scientific activity itself.
+
+Here, then, is the field proper to philosophy. The scientist _qua_
+scientist is intent upon his own determinate enterprise. The philosopher
+comes into being as one who is interested in observing what it is that
+the scientist is so intently doing. In taking this interest he has
+accepted as a field for investigation that which he would designate as
+the totality of interests or the inclusive experience. He can carry out
+his intention of defining the scientific attitude only by standing
+outside it, and determining it by means of nothing less than an
+exhaustive searching out of all attitudes. Philosophy is, to be sure,
+itself a definite activity and an attitude, but an attitude required by
+definition to be conscious of itself, and, if you please, conscious of
+its own consciousness, until its attitude shall have embraced in its
+object the very principle of attitudes. Philosophy defines itself and
+all other human tasks and interests. None have furnished a clearer
+justification of philosophy than those men of scientific predilections
+who have claimed the title of agnostics. A good instance is furnished by
+a contemporary physicist, who has chosen to call his reflections
+"antimetaphysical."
+
+     "Physical science does not pretend to be a _complete_ view of
+     the world; it simply claims that it is working toward such a
+     complete view in the future. The highest philosophy of the
+     scientific investigator is precisely this _toleration_ of an
+     incomplete conception of the world and the preference for it,
+     rather than an apparently perfect, but inadequate
+     conception."[120:1]
+
+It is apparent that if one were to challenge such a statement, the issue
+raised would at once be philosophical and not scientific. The problem
+here stated and answered, requires for its solution the widest
+inclusiveness of view, and a peculiar interest in critical reflection
+and logical coördination.
+
+[Sidenote: The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science.]
+
+§ 41. One may be prepared for a knowledge of the economic and social
+significance of the railway even if one does not know a throttle from a
+piston-rod, provided one has broad and well-balanced knowledge of the
+interplay of human social interests. One's proficiency here requires one
+to stand off from society, and to obtain a perspective that shall be as
+little distorted as possible. The reflection of the philosopher of
+science requires a similar quality of perspective. All knowledges,
+together with the knowing of them, must be his object yonder, standing
+apart in its wholeness and symmetry. Philosophy is the least dogmatic,
+the most empirical, of all disciplines, since it is the only
+investigation that can permit itself to be forgetful of nothing.
+
+But the most comprehensive view may be the most distorted and false. The
+true order of knowledge is the difficult task of logical analysis,
+requiring as its chief essential some determination of the scope of the
+working conceptions of the different independent branches of knowledge.
+In the case of natural science this would mean an examination of the
+method and results characteristic of this field, for the sake of
+defining the kind of truth which attaches to the laws which are being
+gradually formulated. But one must immediately reach either the one or
+the other of two very general conclusions. If the laws of natural
+science cover all possible knowledge of reality, then there is left to
+philosophy only the logical function of justifying this statement. Logic
+and natural science will then constitute the sum of knowledge. If, on
+the other hand, it be found that the aim of natural science is such as
+to exclude certain aspects of reality, then philosophy will not be
+restricted to logical criticism, but will have a cognitive field of its
+own. The great majority of philosophers have assumed the latter of these
+alternatives to be true, while most aggressive scientists have intended
+the former in their somewhat blind attacks upon "metaphysics." Although
+the selection of either of these alternatives involves us in the defence
+of a specific answer to a philosophical question, the issue is
+inevitable in any introduction to philosophy because of its bearing upon
+the extent of the field of that study. Furthermore there can be no
+better exposition of the meaning of philosophy of science than an
+illustration of its exercise. The following, then, is to be regarded as
+on the one hand a tentative refutation of _positivism_, or the _claim of
+natural science to be coextensive with knowable reality_; and on the
+other hand a programme for the procedure of philosophy with reference
+to natural science.
+
+[Sidenote: The Origin of the Scientific Interest.]
+
+§ 42. Science issues through imperceptible stages from organic habits
+and instincts which signify the possession by living creatures of a
+power to meet the environment on its own terms. Every organism possesses
+such a working knowledge of nature, and among men the first science
+consists in those habitual adjustments common to men and infra-human
+organisms. Man is already practising science before he recognizes it. As
+_skill_ it distinguishes itself early in his history from lore, or
+untested tradition. Skill is familiarity with general kinds of events,
+together with ability to identify an individual with reference to a
+kind, and so be prepared for the outcome. Thus man is inwardly prepared
+for the alternation of day and night, and the periods of the seasons. He
+practically anticipates the procession of natural events in the
+countless emergencies of his daily life. But science in the stricter
+sense begins when skill becomes _free_ and _social_.
+
+[Sidenote: Skill as Free.]
+
+§ 43. Skill may be said to be _free_ when the essential terms of the
+action have been abstracted from the circumstances attending them in
+individual experiences, and are retained as ideal plans applicable to
+any practical occasion. The monkey who swings with a trapeze from his
+perch on the side of the cage, counts upon swinging back again without
+any further effort on his own part. His act and its successful issue
+signify his practical familiarity with the natural motions of bodies. We
+can conceive such a performance to be accompanied by an almost entire
+failure to grasp its essentials. It would then be necessary for nearly
+the whole situation to be repeated in order to induce in the monkey the
+same action and expectation. He would require a similar form, color, and
+distance. But he might, on the other hand, regard as practically
+identical all suspended and freely swinging bodies capable of affording
+him support, and quite independently of their shape, size, time, or
+place. In this latter case his skill would be applicable to the widest
+possible number of cases that could present themselves. Having a
+discerning eye for essentials, he would lose no chance of a swing
+through looking for more than the bare necessities. When the
+physicist describes the pendulum in terms of a formula such as
+t = 2pi[squareroot(l/g)] he exhibits a similar discernment. He has
+found that the time occupied by an oscillation of any pendulum may be
+calculated exclusively in terms of its length and the acceleration due
+to gravity. The monkey's higher proficiency and the formula alike
+represent a knowledge that is free in the sense that it is contained in
+terms that require no single fixed context in immediacy. The knowledge
+is valid wherever these essential terms are present; and calculations
+may be based upon these essential terms, while attendant circumstances
+vary _ad infinitum_. Such knowledge is said to be _general_ or
+_universal_.
+
+There is another element of freedom, however, which so far has not been
+attributed to the monkey's knowledge, but which is evidently present in
+that of the physicist. The former has a practical ability to deal with a
+pendulum when he sees it. The latter, on the other hand, knows about a
+pendulum whether one be present or not. His knowledge is so retained as
+always to be available, even though it be not always applicable. His
+knowledge is not merely skill in treating a situation, but the
+possession of resources which he may employ at whatever time, and in
+whatever manner, may suit his interests. Knowing what he does about the
+pendulum, he may act from the idea of such a contrivance, and with the
+aid of it construct some more complex mechanism. His formulas are his
+instruments, which he may use on any occasion. Suppose that a situation
+with factors _a_, _b_, and _c_ requires factor _d_ in order to become
+_M_, as desired. Such a situation might easily be hopeless for an
+organism reacting directly to the stimulus _abc_, and yet be easily met
+by a free knowledge of _d_. One who knows that _l_, _m_, and _n_ will
+produce _d_, may by these means provide the missing factor, complete the
+sum of required conditions, _abcd_, and so obtain the end _M_. Such
+indirection might be used to obtain any required factor of the end, or
+of any near or remote means to the end. There is, in fact, no limit to
+the complexity of action made possible upon this basis; for since it is
+available in idea, the whole range of such knowledge may be brought to
+bear upon any individual problem.
+
+[Sidenote: Skill as Social.]
+
+§ 44. But knowledge of this free type becomes at the same time _social_
+or _institutional_. It consists no longer in a skilful adaptation of the
+individual organism, but in a system of terms common to all
+intelligence, and preserved in those books and other monuments which
+serve as the articulate memory of the race. A knowledge that is social
+must be composed of unequivocal conceptions and fixed symbols. The
+mathematical laws of the exact sciences represent the most successful
+attainment of this end so far as form is concerned. Furthermore, the
+amount of knowledge may now be increased from generation to generation
+through the service of those who make a vocation of its pursuit. Natural
+science is thus a cumulative racial proficiency, which any individual
+may bring to bear upon any emergency of his life.
+
+[Sidenote: Science for Accommodation and Construction.]
+
+§ 45. Such proficiency as science affords is in every case the
+anticipation of experience. This has a twofold value for mankind, that
+of _accommodation_, and that of _construction_. Primitively, where mere
+survival is the function of the organism as a whole, the value of
+accommodation is relatively fundamental. The knowledge of what may be
+expected enables the organism to save itself by means of its own
+counter-arrangement of natural processes. Construction is here for the
+sake of accommodation. But with the growth of civilization construction
+becomes a positive interest, and man tends to save himself for definite
+ends. Accommodation comes to take place for the sake of construction.
+Science then supplies the individual with the ways and means wherewith
+to execute life purposes which themselves tend to assume an absolute
+value that cannot be justified merely on the ground of science.
+
+[Sidenote: Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. The
+Descriptive Method.]
+
+§ 46. If natural science be animated by any special cognitive interest,
+this motive should appear in the development of its method and
+fundamental conceptions. If that interest has been truly defined, it
+should now enable us to understand the progressive and permanent in
+scientific investigation as directly related to it. For the aim of any
+discipline exercises a gradual selection from among possible methods,
+and gives to its laws their determinate and final form.
+
+The _descriptive method_ is at the present day fully established. A
+leading moral of the history of science is the superior usefulness of an
+exact account of the workings of nature to an explanation in terms of
+some qualitative potency. Explanation has been postponed by enlightened
+science until after a more careful observation of actual processes shall
+have been made; and at length it has been admitted that there is no need
+of any explanation but perfect description. Now the practical use of
+science defined above, requires no knowledge beyond the actual order of
+events. For such a purpose sufficient reason signifies only sufficient
+conditions. All other considerations are irrelevant, and it is proper
+to ignore them. Such has actually been the fate of the so-called
+metaphysical solution of special problems of nature. The case of Kepler
+is the classic instance. This great scientist supplemented his laws of
+planetary motion with the following speculation concerning the agencies
+at work:
+
+     "We must suppose one of two things: either that the moving
+     spirits, in proportion as they are more removed from the sun,
+     are more feeble; or that there is one moving spirit in the
+     centre of all the orbits, namely, in the sun, which urges each
+     body the more vehemently in proportion as it is nearer; but in
+     more distant spaces languishes in consequence of the
+     remoteness and attenuation of its virtue."[129:2]
+
+The following passage from Hegel affords an interesting analogy:
+
+     "The moon is the waterless crystal which seeks to complete
+     itself by means of our sea, to quench the thirst of its arid
+     rigidity, and therefore produces ebb and flow."[129:3]
+
+No scientist has ever sought to refute either of these theories. They
+have merely been neglected.
+
+They were advanced in obedience to a demand for the ultimate
+explanation of the phenomena in question, and were obtained by applying
+such general conceptions as were most satisfying to the reasons of their
+respective authors. But they contributed nothing whatsoever to a
+practical familiarity with the natural course of events, in this case
+the times and places of the planets and the tides. Hence they have not
+been used in the building of science. In our own day investigators have
+become conscious of their motive, and do not wait for historical
+selection to exclude powers and reasons from their province. They
+deliberately seek to formulate exact descriptions. To this end they
+employ symbols that shall serve to identify the terms of nature, and
+formulas that shall define their systematic relationship. These systems
+must be exact, or deductions cannot be made from them. Hence they tend
+ultimately to assume a mathematical form of expression.
+
+[Sidenote: Space, Time, and Prediction.]
+
+§ 47. But science tends to employ for these systems only such
+conceptions as relate to _prediction_; and of these the most fundamental
+are _space_ and _time_. The first science to establish its method was
+the science of astronomy, where measurement and computation in terms of
+space and time were the most obvious means of description; and the
+general application of the method of astronomy by Galileo and Newton, or
+the development of mechanics, is the most important factor in the
+establishment of modern science upon a permanent working basis. The
+persistence of the term _cause_, testifies to the fact that science is
+primarily concerned with the determination of _events_. Its definitions
+of objects are means of identification, while its laws are dynamical,
+_i. e._, have reference to the conditions under which these objects
+arise. Thus the chemist may know less about the properties of water than
+the poet; but he is preëminently skilled in its production from
+elements, and understands similarly the compounds into which it may
+enter. Now the general conditions of all anticipation, whereby it
+becomes exact and verifiable, are spacial and temporal. A predictable
+event must be assigned to what is here now, or there now; or what is
+here then, or there then. An experimentally verifiable system must
+contain space-time variables, for which can be substituted the here and
+now of the experimenter's immediate experience. Hence science deals
+primarily with calculable places and moments. The mechanical theory of
+nature owes its success to a union of space and time through its
+conceptions of _matter_ and _motion_.[132:4] And the projected theory of
+energetics must satisfy the same conditions.
+
+[Sidenote: The Quantitative Method.]
+
+§ 48. But, furthermore, science has, as we have seen, an interest in
+freeing its descriptions from the peculiar angle and relativity of an
+individual's experience, for the sake of affording him knowledge of that
+with which he must meet. Science enlightens the will by acquainting it
+with that which takes place in spite of it, and for which it must hold
+itself in readiness. To this end the individual benefits himself in so
+far as he eliminates himself from the objects which he investigates. His
+knowledge is useful in so far as it is valid for his own indefinitely
+varying stand-points, and those of other wills recognized by him in his
+practical relations. But in attempting to describe objects in terms
+other than those of a specific experience, science is compelled to
+describe them in terms of one another. For this purpose _the
+quantitative method_ is peculiarly serviceable. With its aid objects
+permit themselves to be described as multiples of one another, and as
+occupying positions in relation to one another. When all objects are
+described strictly in terms of one another, they are expressed in terms
+of arbitrary units, and located in terms of arbitrary spacial or
+temporal axes of reference. Thus there arises the universe of the
+scientific imagination, a vast complexity of material displacements and
+transformations, without color, music, pleasure, or any of all that rich
+variety of qualities that the least of human experiences contains. It
+does not completely rationalize or even completely describe such
+experiences, but formulates their succession. To this end they are
+reduced to terms that correspond to no specific experience, and for this
+very reason may be translated again into all definable hypothetical
+experiences. The solar system for astronomy is not a bird's-eye view of
+elliptical orbits, with the planets and satellites in definite phases.
+Nor is it this group of objects from any such point of view, or from any
+number of such points of view; but a formulation of their motions that
+will serve as the key to an infinite number of their appearances. Or,
+consider the picture of the ichthysauria romping in the mesozoic sea,
+that commonly accompanies a text-book of geology. Any such picture, and
+all such pictures, with their coloring and their temporal and spacial
+perspective, are imaginary. No such special and exclusive manifolds can
+be defined as having been then and there realized. But we have a
+geological knowledge of this period, that fulfils the formal demands of
+natural science, in so far as we can construct this and countless other
+specific experiences with reference to it.
+
+[Sidenote: The General Development of Science.]
+
+§ 49. Science, then, is to be understood as springing from the practical
+necessity of anticipating the environment. This anticipation appears
+first as congenital or acquired reactions on the part of the organism.
+Such reactions imply a fixed coördination or system in the environment
+whereby a given circumstance determines other circumstances; and science
+proper arises as the formulation of such systems. The requirement that
+they shall apply to the phenomena that _confront_ the will, determines
+their spacial, temporal, and quantitative form. The progress of science
+is marked by the growth of these conceptions in the direction of
+comprehensiveness on the one hand, and of refinement and delicacy on the
+other. Man lives in an environment that is growing at the same time
+richer and more extended, but with a compensatory simplification in the
+ever closer systematization of scientific conceptions under the form of
+the order of nature.
+
+[Sidenote: The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science.]
+
+§ 50. At the opening of this chapter it was maintained that it is a
+function of philosophy to criticise science through its generating
+problem, or its self-imposed task viewed as determining its province and
+selecting its categories. The above account of the origin and method of
+science must suffice as a definition of its generating problem, and
+afford the basis of our answer to the question of its limits. Enough has
+been said to make it clear that philosophy is not in the field of
+science, and is therefore not entitled to contest its result in detail
+or even to take sides within the province of its special problems.
+Furthermore, philosophy should not aim to restrain science by the
+imposition of external barriers. Whatever may be said of the sufficiency
+of its categories in any region of the world, that body of truth of
+which mathematics, mechanics, and physics are the foundations, must be
+regarded as a whole that tends to be all-comprehensive in its own terms.
+There remains for philosophy, then, the critical examination of these
+terms, and the appraisal as a whole of the truth that they may express.
+
+[Sidenote: Natural Science is Abstract.]
+
+§ 51. The impossibility of embracing the whole of knowledge within
+natural science is due to the fact that the latter is _abstract_. This
+follows from the fact that natural science is governed by a selective
+interest. The formulation of definitions and laws in exclusively
+mechanical terms is not due to the exhaustive or even preëminent reality
+of these properties, but to their peculiar serviceableness in a
+verifiable description of events. Natural science does not affirm that
+reality is essentially constituted of matter, or essentially
+characterized by motion; but is _interested_ in the mechanical aspect of
+reality, and describes it quite regardless of other evident aspects and
+without meaning to prejudice them. It is unfortunately true that the
+scientist has rarely been clear in his own mind on this point. It is
+only recently that he has partially freed himself from the habit of
+construing his terms as final and exhaustive.[137:5] This he was able
+to do even to his own satisfaction, only by allowing loose rein to the
+imagination. Consider the example of the atomic theory. In order to
+describe such occurrences as chemical combination, or changes in volume
+and density, the scientist has employed as a unit the least particle,
+physically indivisible and qualitatively homogeneous. Look for the atom
+in the body of science, and you will find it in physical laws governing
+expansion and contraction, and in chemical formulas. There the real
+responsibility of science ends. But whether through the need of popular
+exposition, or the undisciplined imagination of the investigator
+himself, atoms have figured in the history of thought as round
+corpuscles of a grayish hue scurrying hither and thither, and armed with
+special appliances wherewith to lock in molecular embrace. Although this
+is nonsense, we need not on that account conclude that there are no
+atoms. There are atoms in precisely the sense intended by scientific
+law, in that the formulas computed with the aid of this concept are true
+of certain natural processes. The conception of ether furnishes a
+similar case. Science is not responsible for the notion of a quivering
+gelatinous substance pervading space, but only for certain laws that,
+_e. g._, describe the velocity of light in terms of the vibration. It is
+true that there is such a thing as ether, not as gratuitously rounded
+out by the imagination, with various attributes of immediate experience,
+but just in so far as this concept is employed in verified descriptions
+of radiation, magnetism, or electricity. Strictly speaking science
+asserts nothing about the existence of ether, but only about the
+behavior, _e. g._, of light. If true descriptions of this and other
+phenomena are reached by employing units of wave propagation in an
+elastic medium, then ether is proved to exist in precisely the same
+sense that linear feet are proved to exist, if it be admitted that there
+are 90,000,000 x 5,280 of them between the earth and the sun. And to
+imagine in the one case a jelly with all the qualities of texture,
+color, and the like, that an individual object of sense would possess,
+is much the same as in the other to imagine the heavens filled with
+foot-rules and tape-measures. There is but one safe procedure in dealing
+with scientific concepts: to regard them as true so far as they
+describe, and no whit further. To supplement the strict meaning which
+has been verified and is contained in the formularies of science, with
+such vague predicates as will suffice to make entities of them, is mere
+ineptness and confusion of thought. And it is only such a
+supplementation that obscures their abstractness. For a mechanical
+description of things, true as it doubtless is, is even more indubitably
+incomplete.
+
+[Sidenote: The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth.]
+
+§ 52. But though the abstractness involved in scientific description is
+open and deliberate, we must come to a more precise understanding of it,
+if we are to draw any conclusion as to what it involves. In his
+"Principles of Human Knowledge," the English philosopher Bishop Berkeley
+raises the question as to the universal validity of mathematical
+demonstrations. If we prove from the image or figure of an isosceles
+right triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles,
+how can we know that this proposition holds of all triangles?
+
+     "To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view
+     whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an
+     isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a
+     determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends
+     to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness
+     soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the
+     equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all
+     concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have
+     in view includes all these particulars; but then there is not
+     the least mention made of them in the proof of the
+     proposition."[140:6]
+
+Of the total conditions present in the concrete picture of a triangle,
+one may in one's calculations neglect as many as one sees fit, and work
+with the remainder. Then, if one has clearly distinguished the
+conditions used, one may confidently assert that whatever has been found
+true of them holds regardless of the neglected conditions. These may be
+missing or replaced by others, provided the selected or (for any given
+investigation) essential conditions are not affected. That which is true
+once is true always, provided time is not one of its conditions; that
+which is true in one place is true everywhere, provided location is not
+one of its conditions. But, given any concrete situation, the more
+numerous the conditions one ignores in one's calculations, the less
+adequate are one's calculations to that situation. The number of its
+inhabitants, and any mathematical operation made with that number, is
+true, but only very abstractly true of a nation. A similar though less
+radical abstractness appertains to natural science. Simple qualities of
+sound or color, and distinctions of beauty or moral worth, together with
+many other ingredients of actual experience attributed therein to the
+objects of nature, are ignored in the mechanical scheme. There is a
+substitution of certain mechanical arrangements in the case of the first
+group of properties, the simple qualities of sense, so that they may be
+assimilated to the general scheme of events, and their occurrence
+predicted. But their intrinsic qualitative character is not reckoned
+with, even in psychology, where the physiological method finally
+replaces them with brain states. Over and above these neglected
+properties of things there remain the purposive activities of thought.
+It is equally preposterous to deny them and to describe them in
+mechanical terms. It is plain, then, that natural science calculates
+upon the basis of only a fraction of the conditions that present
+themselves in actual experience. Its conclusions, therefore, though true
+so far as they go, and they may be abstractly true of everything, are
+completely true of nothing.
+
+[Sidenote: But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality.]
+
+§ 53. Such, in brief, is the general charge of inadequacy which may be
+urged against natural science, not in the spirit of detraction, but for
+the sake of a more sound belief concerning reality. The philosopher
+falls into error no less radical than that of the dogmatic scientist,
+when he charges the scientist with untruth, and attaches to his concepts
+the predicate of unreality. The fact that the concepts of science are
+selected, and only inadequately true of reality, should not be taken to
+mean that they are sportive or arbitrary. They are not "devices" or
+abbreviations, in any sense that does not attach to such symbolism as
+all thought involves. Nor are they merely "hypothetical," though like
+all thought they are subject to correction.[142:7] The scientist does
+not merely assert that the equation for energy is true if nature's
+capacity for work be measurable, but _that such is actually the case_.
+The statistician does not arrive at results contingent upon the
+supposition that men are numerable, but declares his sums and averages
+to be categorically true. Similarly scientific laws are true; only, to
+be sure, so far as they go, but with no condition save the condition
+that attaches to all knowledge, viz., that it shall not need correction.
+The philosophy of science, therefore, is not the adversary of science,
+but supervenes upon science in the interests of the ideal of final
+truth. No philosophy of science is sound which does not primarily seek
+by an analysis of scientific concepts to understand science on its own
+grounds. Philosophy may understand science better than science
+understands itself, but only by holding fast to the conviction of its
+truth, and including it within whatever account of reality it may be
+able to formulate.
+
+[Sidenote: Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy.]
+
+§ 54. Though philosophy be the most ancient and most exalted of human
+disciplines, it is not infrequently charged with being the most
+unprofitable. Science has amassed a fortune of information, which has
+facilitated life and advanced civilization. Is not philosophy, on the
+other hand, all programme and idle questioning? In the first place, no
+questioning is idle that is logically possible. It is true that
+philosophy shows her skill rather in the asking than in the answering of
+questions. But the formal pertinence of a question is of the greatest
+significance. No valid though unanswered question can have a purely
+negative value, and especially as respects the consistency or
+completeness of truth. But, in the second place, philosophy with all its
+limitations serves mankind as indispensably as science. If science
+supplies the individual with means of self-preservation, and the
+instruments of achievement, philosophy supplies the ideals, or the
+objects of deliberate construction. Such reflection as justifies the
+adoption of a fundamental life purpose is always philosophical. For
+every judgment respecting final worth is a judgment _sub specie
+eternitatis_. And the urgency of life requires the individual to pass
+such judgments. It is true that however persistently reflective he may
+be in the matter, his conclusion will be premature in consideration of
+the amount of evidence logically demanded for such a judgment. But he
+must be as wise as he can, or he will be as foolish as conventionality
+and blind impulse may impel him to be. Philosophy determines for society
+what every individual must practically determine upon for himself, the
+most reasonable plan of reality as a whole which the data and reflection
+of an epoch can afford. It is philosophy's service to mankind to
+compensate for the enthusiasm and concentration of the specialist, a
+service needed in every "present day." Apart from the philosopher,
+public opinion is the victim of sensationalism, and individual opinion
+is further warped by accidental propinquity. It is the function of
+philosophy to interpret knowledge for the sake of a sober and wise
+belief. The philosopher is the true prophet, appearing before men in
+behalf of that which is finally the truth. He is the spokesman of the
+most considerate and comprehensive reflection possible at any stage in
+the development of human thought. Owing to a radical misconception of
+function, the man of science has in these later days begun to regard
+himself as the wise man, and to teach the people. Popular materialism is
+the logical outcome of this determination of belief by natural science.
+It may be that this is due as much to the indifference of the
+philosopher as to the forwardness of the scientist, but in any case the
+result is worse than conservative loyalty to religious tradition. For
+religion is corrected surely though slowly by the whole order of
+advancing truth. Its very inflexibility makes it proof against an
+over-emphasis upon new truth. It has generally turned out in time that
+the obstinate man of religion was more nearly right than the adaptable
+intellectual man of fashion. But philosophy, as a critique of science
+for the sake of faith, should provide the individual religious believer
+with intellectual enlightenment and gentleness. The quality,
+orderliness, and inclusiveness of knowledge, finally determine its
+value; and the philosopher, premature as his synthesis may some day
+prove to be, is the wisest man of his own generation. From him the man
+of faith should obtain such discipline of judgment as shall enable him
+to be fearless of advancing knowledge, because acquainted with its
+scope, and so intellectually candid with all his visions and his
+inspirations.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[120:1] Ernst Mach: _Science of Mechanics_. Translation by McCormack, p.
+464. No one has made more important contributions than Professor Mach to
+a certain definite modern philosophical movement. Cf. § 207.
+
+[129:2] Whewell: _History of the Inductive Sciences_, Vol. I, p. 289.
+Quoted from Kepler: _Mysterium Cosmographicum_.
+
+[129:3] Quoted by Sidgwick in his _Philosophy, its Scope and Relations_,
+p. 89.
+
+[132:4] The reader is referred to Mr. Bertrand Russell's chapters on
+_matter_ and _motion_ in his _Principles of Mathematics_, Vol. I.
+Material particles he defines as "many-one relations of all times to
+some places, or of all terms of a continuous one-dimensional series _t_
+to some terms of a continuous three-dimensional series _s_." Similarly,
+"when different times, throughout any period however short, are
+correlated with different places, there is motion; when different times,
+throughout some period however short, are all correlated with the same
+place, there is rest." _Op. cit._, p. 473.
+
+[137:5] That the scientist still permits himself to teach the people a
+loose exoteric theory of reality, is proven by Professor Ward's citation
+of instances in his _Naturalism and Agnosticism_. So eminent a physicist
+as Lord Kelvin is quoted as follows: "You can imagine particles of
+something, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This thing we call
+the luminiferous ether. That is the only substance we are confident of
+in dynamics. One thing we are sure of, and that is the reality and
+substantiality of the luminiferous ether." Vol. I, p. 113.
+
+[140:6] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Introduction. Edition
+of Fraser, p. 248.
+
+[142:7] The reader who cares to pursue this topic further is referred to
+the writer's discussion of "_Professor Ward's Philosophy of Science_" in
+the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods_, Vol. I,
+No. 13.
+
+
+
+
+PART II
+
+THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF
+PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem of
+Philosophy.]
+
+§ 55. The stand-point and purpose of the philosopher define his task,
+but they do not necessarily prearrange the division of it. That the task
+is a complex one, embracing many subordinate problems which must be
+treated _seriatim_, is attested both by the breadth of its scope and the
+variety of the interests from which it may be approached. But this
+complexity is qualified by the peculiar importance which here attaches
+to unity. That which lends philosophical quality to any reflection is a
+steadfast adherence to the ideals of inclusiveness and consistency.
+Hence, though the philosopher must of necessity occupy himself with
+subordinate problems, these cannot be completely isolated from one
+another, and solved successively. Perspective is his most indispensable
+requisite, and he has solved no problem finally until he has provided
+for the solution of all. His own peculiar conceptions are those which
+_order_ experience, and reconcile such aspects of it as other interests
+have distinguished. Hence the compatibility of any idea with all other
+ideas is the prime test of its philosophical sufficiency. On these
+grounds it may confidently be asserted that the work of philosophy
+cannot be assigned by the piece to different specialists, and then
+assembled. There are no special philosophical problems which can be
+finally solved upon their own merits. Indeed, such problems could never
+even be named, for in their discreteness they would cease to be
+philosophical.
+
+The case of _metaphysics_ and _epistemology_ affords an excellent
+illustration. The former of these is commonly defined as the theory of
+reality or of first principles, the latter as the theory of knowledge.
+But the most distinctive philosophical movement of the nineteenth
+century issues from the idea that knowing and being are
+identical.[150:1] The prime reality is defined as a knowing mind, and
+the terms of reality are interpreted as terms of a cognitive process.
+Ideas and logical principles _constitute_ the world. It is evident that
+in this Hegelian philosophy epistemology embraces metaphysics. In
+defining the relations of knowledge to its object, one has already
+defined one's fundamental philosophical conception, while _logic_, as
+the science of the universal necessities of thought, will embrace the
+first principles of reality. Now, were one to divide and arrange the
+problems of philosophy upon this basis, it is evident that one would not
+have deduced the arrangement from the general problem of philosophy, but
+from a single attempted solution of that problem. It might serve as an
+exposition of Hegel, but not as a general philosophical programme.
+
+Another case in point is provided by the present-day interest in what is
+called "_pragmatism_."[151:2] This doctrine is historically connected
+with Kant's principle of the "primacy of the practical reason," in which
+he maintained that the consciousness of duty is a profounder though less
+scientific insight than the knowledge of objects. The current doctrine
+maintains that thought with its fruits is an expression of interest, and
+that the will which evinces and realizes such an interest is more
+original and significant than that which the thinking defines. Such a
+view attaches a peculiar importance to the springs of conduct, and in
+its more systematic development[152:3] has regarded _ethics_ as the
+true propædeutic and proof of philosophy. But to make ethics the
+key-stone of the arch, is to define a special philosophical system; for
+it is the very problem of philosophy to dispose the parts of knowledge
+with a view to systematic construction. The relation of the provinces of
+metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics cannot, then, be defined
+without entering these provinces and answering the questions proper to
+them.
+
+[Sidenote: The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon
+the Initial Interest.]
+
+§ 56. Since the above terms exist, however, there can be no doubt but
+that important divisions within the general aim of philosophy have
+actually been made. The inevitableness of it appears in the variety of
+the sources from which that aim may spring. The point of departure will
+always determine the emphasis and the application which the philosophy
+receives. If philosophy be needed to supplement more special interests,
+it will receive a particular character from whatever interest it so
+supplements. He who approaches it from a definite stand-point will find
+in it primarily an interpretation of that stand-point.
+
+[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life.]
+
+§ 57. There are two sources of the philosophical aim, which are
+perennial in their human significance. He, firstly, who begins with the
+demands of life and its ideals, looks to philosophy for a reconciliation
+of these with the orderly procedure of nature. His philosophy will
+receive its form from its illumination of life, and it will be an
+ethical or religious philosophy. Spinoza, the great seventeenth-century
+philosopher who justified mysticism after the manner of
+mathematics,[153:4] displays this temper in his philosophy:
+
+     "After experience had taught me that all the usual
+     surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that
+     none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves
+     anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is
+     affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there
+     might be some real good having power to communicate itself,
+     which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all
+     else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the
+     discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous,
+     supreme, and unending happiness."[153:5]
+
+In pursuance of this aim, though he deals with the problem of being in
+the rigorous logical fashion of his day, the final words of his great
+work are, "Of Human Freedom":
+
+     "Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
+     scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
+     himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
+     necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
+     acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed
+     out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may
+     nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is
+     so seldom found. How would it be possible if salvation were
+     ready to our hand, and could without great labor be found,
+     that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things
+     excellent are as difficult as they are rare."[154:6]
+
+[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Extension of Science.]
+
+§ 58. On the other hand, one who looks to philosophy for the extension
+and correction of scientific knowledge will be primarily interested in
+the philosophical definition of ultimate conceptions, and in the method
+wherewith such a definition is obtained. Thus the philosophy of the
+scientist will tend to be logical and metaphysical. Such is the case
+with Descartes and Leibniz, who are nevertheless intimately related to
+Spinoza in the historical development of philosophy.
+
+     "Several years have now elapsed," says the former, "since I
+     first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth,
+     many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I
+     afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and
+     from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking
+     once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had
+     adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the
+     foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding
+     superstructure in the sciences."[155:7]
+
+Leibniz's mind was more predominantly logical even than Descartes's. He
+sought in philosophy a supreme intellectual synthesis, a science of the
+universe.
+
+     "Although," he says retrospectively, "I am one of those who
+     have worked much at mathematics, I have none the less
+     meditated upon philosophy from my youth up; for it always
+     seemed to me that there was a possibility of establishing
+     something solid in philosophy by clear demonstrations. . . .
+     I perceived, after much meditation, that it is impossible to
+     find the _principles of a real unity_ in matter alone, or in
+     that which is only passive, since it is nothing but a
+     collection or aggregation of parts _ad infinitum_."[155:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical Problem.]
+
+§ 59. Though these types are peculiarly representative, they are by no
+means exhaustive. There are as many possibilities of emphasis as there
+are incentives to philosophical reflection. It is not possible to
+exhaust the aspects of experience which may serve as bases from which
+such thought may issue, and to which, after its synthetic insight, it
+may return. But it is evident that such divisions of philosophy
+represent in their order, and in the sharpness with which they are
+sundered, the intellectual autobiography of the individual philosopher.
+There is but one method by which that which is peculiar either to the
+individual, or to the special position which he adopts, may be
+eliminated. Though it is impossible to tabulate the empty programme of
+philosophy, we may name certain special problems that have appeared _in
+its history_. Since this history comprehends the activities of many
+individuals, a general validity attaches to it. There has been,
+moreover, a certain periodicity in the emergence of these problems, so
+that it may fairly be claimed for them that they indicate inevitable
+phases in the development of human reflection upon experience. They
+represent a normal differentiation of interest which the individual
+mind, in the course of its own thinking, tends to follow. It is true
+that it can never be said with assurance that any age is utterly blind
+to any aspect of experience. This is obviously the case with the
+practical and theoretical interests which have just been distinguished.
+There is no age that does not have some practical consciousness of the
+world as a whole, nor any which does not seek more or less earnestly to
+universalize its science. But though it compel us to deal abstractly
+with historical epochs, there is abundant compensation in the
+possibility which this method affords of finding the divisions of
+philosophy in the manifestation of the living philosophical spirit.
+
+[Sidenote: Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception.]
+
+§ 60. To Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, is commonly
+awarded the honor of being the founder of European philosophy. If he
+deserve this distinction, it is on account of the question which he
+raised, and not on account of the answer which he gave to it. Aristotle
+informs us that Thales held "water" to be "the material cause of all
+things."[157:9] This crude theory is evidently due to an interest in the
+totality of things, an interest which is therefore philosophical. But
+the interest of this first philosopher has a more definite character. It
+looks toward the definition in terms of some single conception, of _the
+constitution_ of the world. As a child might conceivably think the moon
+to be made of green cheese, so philosophy in its childhood thinks here
+of all things as made of water. Water was a well-known substance,
+possessing well-known predicates. To define all nature in terms of it,
+was to maintain that in spite of superficial differences, all things
+have these predicates in common. They are the predicates which qualify
+for reality, and compose a community of nature from which all the
+individual objects and events of nature arise. The successors of Thales
+were evidently dissatisfied with his fundamental conception, because of
+its lack of generality. They seized upon vaguer substances like air and
+fire, for the very definiteness of the nature of water forbids the
+identification of other substances with it. But what is so obviously
+true of water is scarcely less true of air and fire; and it appeared at
+length that only a substance possessing the most general characters of
+body, such as shape, size, and mobility, could be thought as truly
+primeval and universal. In this wise a conception like our modern
+physical conception of matter came at length into vogue. Now the problem
+of which these were all tentative solutions is, in general, the problem
+of _metaphysics_; although this term belongs to a later era, arising
+only from the accidental place of the discussion of first principles
+_after physics_ in the system of Aristotle. _The attempt to secure a
+most fundamental conception which attaches some definite meaning to the
+reality including and informing every particular thing, is metaphysics._
+
+[Sidenote: Monism and Pluralism.]
+
+§ 61. It must not be supposed that metaphysics is dogmatically committed
+to the reduction of all reality to a unity of nature. It is quite
+consistent with its purpose that the parts of reality should be found to
+compose a group, or an indefinite multitude of irreducibly different
+entities. But it is clear that even such an account of things deals with
+what is true of all reality, and even in acknowledging the variety of
+its constituents, attributes to them some kind of relationship. The
+degree to which such a relationship is regarded as intimate and
+essential, determines the degree to which any metaphysical system is
+_monistic_,[159:10] rather than _pluralistic_. But the significance of
+this difference will be better appreciated after a further
+differentiation of the metaphysical problem has been noted.
+
+[Sidenote: Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process.]
+
+§ 62. It has already been suggested that the test of Thales's conception
+lay in the possibility of deriving nature from it. A world principle
+must be fruitful. Now an abstract distinction has prevailed more or less
+persistently in metaphysics, between _the general definition of being_,
+called _ontology_, and the study of the processes wherewith being is
+divided into things and events. This latter study has to do primarily
+with the details of experience enumerated and systematized by the
+natural sciences. _To reconcile_ these, _or the course of nature, with
+the fundamental definition of being_, is the problem of _cosmology_.
+Cosmology is the construing of the _prima facie_ reality in terms of the
+essential reality. It is the proof and the explanation of ontology.
+Since the most familiar part of the _prima facie_ reality, the part
+almost exclusively noticed by the naive mind, is embraced within the
+field of the physical sciences, the term cosmology has come more
+definitely to signify the _philosophy of nature_. It embraces such an
+examination of space, time, matter, causality, etc., as seeks to answer
+the most general questions about them, and provide for them in the world
+thought of as most profoundly real. Such a study receives its
+philosophical character from its affiliation with ontology, as the
+latter would find its application in cosmology.
+
+[Sidenote: Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies.]
+
+§ 63. But in addition to the consideration of the various parts of
+nature, cosmology has commonly dealt with a radical and far-reaching
+alternative that appeared at the very dawn of metaphysics. Differences
+may arise within a world constituted of a single substance or a small
+group of ultimate substances, by changes in the relative position and
+grouping of the parts. Hence the virtue of the conception of motion. The
+theory which explains all differences by motions of the parts of a
+qualitatively simple world, is called _mechanism_. Another source of
+change familiar to naive experience is _will_, or the action of living
+creatures. According to the mechanical theory, _changes occur on account
+of the natural motions of the parts of matter_; according to the latter
+or _teleological_ conception, _changes are made by a formative agency
+directed to some end_. Among the early Greek philosophers, Leucippus was
+an exponent of mechanism.
+
+     "He says that the worlds arise when many bodies are collected
+     together into the mighty void from the surrounding space and
+     rush together. They come into collision, and those which are
+     of similar shape and like form become entangled, and from
+     their entanglement the heavenly bodies arise."[161:11]
+
+Anaxagoras, on the other hand, was famed for his doctrine of the Nous,
+or Intelligence, to whose direction he attributed the whole process of
+the world. The following is translated from extant fragments of his
+book, "+peri physeôs+":
+
+     "And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it
+     began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve
+     first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends
+     over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And
+     all the things that are mingled together and separated off and
+     distinguished are all known by the Nous. And Nous set in order
+     all things that were to be and that were, and all things that
+     are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now
+     revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and
+     the ether that are separated off."[162:12]
+
+[Sidenote: Dualism.]
+
+§ 64. It is clear, furthermore, that the doctrine of Anaxagoras not only
+names a distinct kind of cause, but also ascribes to it an independence
+and intrinsic importance that do not belong to motion. Whereas motion is
+a property of matter, intelligence is an originative power working out
+purposes of its own choosing. Hence we have here to do with a new
+ontology. If we construe ultimate being in terms of mind, we have a
+definite substitute for the physical theories outlined above. Such a
+theory is scarcely to be attributed to any Greek philosopher of the
+early period; it belongs to a more sophisticated stage in the
+development of thought, after the rise of the problem of epistemology.
+But Anaxagoras's sharp distinction between the material of the world on
+the one hand, and the author of its order and evolution on the other, is
+in itself worthy of notice. It contains the germ of a recurrent
+philosophical _dualism_, which differs from pluralism in that it finds
+two and only two fundamental divisions of being, the physical, material,
+or potential on the one hand, and the mental, formal, or ideal on the
+other.
+
+[Sidenote: The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism.]
+
+§ 65. Finally, the alternative possibilities which these cosmological
+considerations introduce, bear directly upon the general question of the
+interdependence of the parts of the world, a question which has already
+appeared as pertinent in ontology. Monism and pluralism now obtain a new
+meaning. Where the world process is informed with some singleness of
+plan, as teleology proposes, the parts are reciprocally necessary, and
+inseparable from the unity. Where, on the other hand, the processes are
+random and reciprocally fortuitous, as Leucippus proposes, the world as
+a whole is an aggregate rather than a unity. In this way uniformity in
+kind of being may prevail in a world the relations of whose parts are
+due to chance, while diversity in kind of being may prevail in a world
+knit together by some thorough-going plan of organization. Thus monism
+and pluralism are conceptions as proper to cosmology as to ontology.
+
+But enough has been said to demonstrate the interdependence of ontology
+and cosmology, of the theory of being and the theory of differentiation
+and process. Such problems can be only abstractly sundered, and the
+distinctive character of any metaphysical system will usually consist in
+some theory determining their relation. Philosophy returns to these
+metaphysical problems with its thought enriched and its method
+complicated, after becoming thoroughly alive to the problems of
+epistemology, logic, and ethics.
+
+[Sidenote: Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of
+Knowledge.]
+
+§ 66. _Epistemology is the theory of the possibility of knowledge_, and
+issues from criticism and scepticism. If we revert again to the history
+of Greek philosophy, we find a first period of enterprising speculation
+giving place to a second period of hesitancy and doubt. This phase of
+thought occurs simultaneously with the brilliantly humanistic age of
+Pericles, and it is undoubtedly true that energy is withdrawn from
+speculation largely for the sake of expending it in the more lively and
+engaging pursuits of politics and art. But there are patent reasons
+within the sphere of philosophy itself for entailment of activity and
+taking of stock. For three centuries men have taken their philosophical
+powers for granted, and used them without questioning them. Repeated
+attacks upon the problem of reality have resulted in no consensus of
+opinion, but only in a disagreement among the wise men themselves. A
+great variety of mere theories has been substituted for the old
+unanimity of religious tradition and practical life. It is natural under
+these circumstances to infer that in philosophy man has overreached
+himself. He would more profitably busy himself with affairs that belong
+to his own sphere, and find a basis for life in his immediate relations
+with his fellows. The sophists, learned in tradition, and skilled in
+disputation, but for the most part entirely lacking in originality, are
+the new prophets. As teachers of rhetoric and morals, they represent the
+practical and secular spirit of their age; while in their avoidance of
+speculation, and their critical justification of that course, they
+express its sceptical philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism.]
+
+§ 67. In their self-justification certain of the sophists attached
+themselves to a definite doctrine maintained by those of their
+predecessors and contemporaries who were atomists, or followers of that
+same Leucippus whom we have quoted. This doctrine was the result of an
+attempt to construe perception in terms of the motion of atoms. Outer
+objects were said to give off fine particles which, through the
+mediation of the sense organs, impinged upon the soul-atom. But it was
+evident even to the early exponents of this theory that according to
+such an account, each perceiver is relegated to a world peculiar to his
+own stand-point. His perception informs him concerning his own states as
+affected by things, rather than concerning the things themselves. Upon
+this ground the great sophist Protagoras is said to have based his
+dictum: +Pantôn chrêmatôn metron anthrôpos+,--"Man is the measure of all
+things." This is the classic statement of the doctrine of relativity.
+But we have now entered into the province of epistemology, and various
+alternatives confront us. Reduce thought to perception, define
+perception as relative to each individual, and you arrive at
+_scepticism_, or _the denial of the possibility of valid knowledge_.
+Plato expounds this consequence in the well-known discussion of
+Protagoras that occurs in the "Theætetus."
+
+     "I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each
+     one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with
+     a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other
+     yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of
+     all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt
+     for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that
+     while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom, he
+     was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his
+     fellow-men--would not this have produced an overpowering
+     effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern
+     another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right
+     to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each,
+     as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole
+     judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why,
+     my friend, should Protagoras be preferred to the place of
+     wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we
+     poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure
+     of his own wisdom? . . . The attempt to supervise or refute
+     the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and
+     enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and
+     this must be the case if Protagoras's Truth is the real truth,
+     and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving
+     oracles out of the shrine of his book."[167:13]
+
+This is the full swing of the pendulum from _dogmatism_, or the
+uncritical conviction of truth. A modified form of scepticism has been
+developed in these later days under the influence of natural science,
+and is called _agnosticism_ or _positivism_. It accepts the Protagorean
+doctrine only in the sense of attributing to human knowledge as a whole
+an incapacity for exceeding the range of perception. Beyond this realm
+of natural science, where theories can be sensibly verified, lies the
+unknowable realm, more real, but forever inaccessible.
+
+[Sidenote: The Source and Criterion of Knowledge According to Empiricism
+and Rationalism. Mysticism.]
+
+§ 68. It is important to note that both scepticism and agnosticism agree
+in regarding _perception as the essential factor in knowledge_. So far
+at any rate as our knowledge is concerned, the certification of being
+consists in perceivability. Knowledge is coextensive with actual and
+possible human experience. This account of the source and criterion of
+knowledge is called _empiricism_, in distinction from the counter-theory
+of _rationalism_.
+
+The rationalistic motive was a quickening influence in Greek philosophy
+long before it became deliberate and conspicuous in Socrates and Plato.
+Parmenides, founder of the Eleatic School, has left behind him a poem
+divided into two parts: "The Way of Truth" and "The Way of
+Opinion."[168:14] In the first of these he expounds his esoteric
+philosophy, which is a definition of being established by dialectical
+reasoning. He finds that being must be single, eternal, and changeless,
+because otherwise it cannot be thought and defined without
+contradiction. The method which Parmenides here employs presupposes that
+knowledge consists in understanding rather than perception. Indeed, he
+regards the fact that the world of the senses is manifold and mutable as
+of little consequence to the wise man. The world of sense is the
+province of vulgar opinion, while that of reason is the absolute truth
+revealed only to the philosopher. The truth has no concern with
+appearance, but is answerable only to the test of rationality. _That
+world is real which one is able by thinking to make intelligible._ The
+world is what a world must be in order to be possible at all, and the
+philosopher can deduce it directly from the very conditions of thought
+which it must satisfy. He who would know reality may disregard what
+seems to be, provided he can by reflective analysis discover certain
+general necessities to which being must conform. This is rationalism in
+its extreme form.
+
+The rationalism of Socrates was more moderate, as it was more fruitful
+than that of Parmenides. As is well known, Socrates composed no
+philosophical books, but sought to inculcate wisdom in his teaching and
+conversation. His method of inculcating wisdom was to evoke it in his
+interlocutor by making him considerate of the meaning of his speech.
+Through his own questions he sought to arouse the questioning spirit,
+which should weigh the import of words, and be satisfied with nothing
+short of a definite and consistent judgment. In the Platonic dialogues
+the Socratic method obtains a place in literature. In the "Theætetus,"
+which is, perhaps, the greatest of all epistemological treatises,
+Socrates is represented as likening his vocation to that of the midwife.
+
+     "Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs,
+     but differs in that I attend men, and not women, and I look
+     after their souls when they are in labor, and not after their
+     bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining
+     whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings
+     forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And, like the
+     midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made
+     against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the
+     wit to answer them myself, is very just; the reason is that
+     the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to
+     bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor
+     have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my
+     own soul, but those who converse with me profit. . . . It is
+     quite clear that they never learned anything from me; the
+     many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own
+     making."[171:15]
+
+The principle underlying this method is the insistence that a
+proposition, to be true of reality, must at least bespeak a mind that is
+true to itself, internally luminous, and free from contradiction. That
+which is to me nothing that I can express in form that will convey
+precise meaning and bear analysis, is so far nothing at all. Being is
+not, as the empiricist would have it, ready at hand, ours for the
+looking, but is the fruit of critical reflection. Only reason,
+overcoming the relativity of perception, and the chaos of popular
+opinion, can lay hold on the universal truth.
+
+A very interesting tendency to clothe the articulations of thought with
+the immediacy of perception is exhibited in _mysticism_, which
+attributes the highest cognitive power to an experience that transcends
+thought, an ineffable insight that is the occasional reward of thought
+and virtuous living. This theory would seem to owe its great vigor to
+the fact that it promises to unite the universality of the rational
+object with the vivid presence of the empirical object, though it
+sacrifices the definite content of both. The mystic, empiricist, and
+rationalist are in these several ways led to revise their metaphysics
+upon the basis of their epistemology, or to define reality in terms
+dictated by the means of knowing it.
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to Realism,
+and the Representative Theory.]
+
+§ 69. But within the general field of epistemology there has arisen
+another issue of even greater significance in its bearing upon
+metaphysics. The first issue, as we have seen, has reference to the
+criterion of knowledge, to the possibility of arriving at certainty
+about reality, and the choice of means to that end. A second question
+arises, concerning _the relation between the knowledge and its object or
+that which is known_. This problem does not at first appear as an
+epistemological difficulty, but is due to the emphasis which the moral
+and religious interests of men give to the conception of the self. My
+knowing is a part of me, a function of that soul whose welfare and
+eternal happiness I am seeking to secure. Indeed, my knowing is, so the
+wise men have always taught, the greatest of my prerogatives. Wisdom
+appertains to the philosopher, as folly to the fool. But though my
+knowledge be a part of me, and in me, the same cannot, lightly at any
+rate, be said of what I know. It would seem that I must distinguish
+between the knowledge, which is my act or state, an event in my life,
+and the known, which is object, and belongs to the context of the outer
+world. _The object of knowledge_ would then be quite _independent of the
+circumstance that I know it_. This theory has acquired the name of
+_realism_,[173:16] and is evidently as close to common sense as any
+epistemological doctrine can be said to be. If the knowledge consists in
+some sign or symbol which in my mind stands for the object, but is
+quite other than the object, realism is given the form known as the
+_representative theory_. This theory is due to a radical distinction
+between the inner world of consciousness and the outer world of things,
+whereby in knowledge the outer object requires a substitute that is
+qualified to belong to the inner world. Where, on the other hand, no
+specific and exclusive nature is attributed to the inner world, realism
+may flourish without the representative theory. In such a case the
+object would be regarded as itself capable of entering into any number
+of individual experiences or of remaining outside them all, and without
+on either account forfeiting its identity. This view was taken for
+granted by Plato, but is elaborately defended in our own day. During the
+intervening period epistemology has been largely occupied with
+difficulties inherent in the representative theory, and from that
+discussion there has emerged the theory of _idealism_,[175:17] the great
+rival theory to that of realism.
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to
+Idealism.]
+
+§ 70. The representative theory contains at least one obvious
+difficulty. If the thinker be confined to his ideas, and if the reality
+be at the same time beyond these ideas, how can he ever verify their
+report? Indeed, what can it mean that an idea should be true of that
+which belongs to a wholly different category? How under such
+circumstances can that which is a part of the idea be attributed with
+any certainty to the object? Once grant that you know only your ideas,
+and the object reduces to an unknown _x_, which you retain to account
+for the outward pointing or reference of the ideas, but which is not
+missed if neglected. The obvious though radical theory of idealism is
+almost inevitably the next step. Why assume that there is any object
+other than the state of mind, since all positive content belongs to that
+realm? The eighteenth century English philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, was
+accused by his contemporaries of wilful eccentricity, and even madness,
+for his boldness in accepting this argument and drawing this conclusion:
+
+     "The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel
+     it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed;
+     meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it,
+     or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was
+     an odor--that is, it was smelt; there was a sound--that is, it
+     was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or
+     touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like
+     expressions. For as to what is said of the _absolute_
+     existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their
+     being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their
+     _esse_ is _percipi_; nor is it possible that they should have
+     any existence out of the minds or thinking thing which
+     perceives them."[176:18]
+
+[Sidenote: Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism.]
+
+§ 71. In this paragraph Berkeley maintains that it is essential to
+things, or at any rate to their qualities, that they _be perceived_.
+This principle when expressed as an epistemological or metaphysical
+generalization, is called _phenomenalism_. But in another phase of his
+thought Berkeley emphasizes the _perceiver_, or _spirit_. The theory
+which maintains that the only real substances are these active selves,
+with their powers and their states, has been called somewhat vaguely by
+the name of _spiritualism_.[176:19] Philosophically it shows a strong
+tendency to develop into either _panpsychism_ or _transcendentalism_.
+The former is radically empirical. Its classic representative is the
+German pessimist Schopenhauer, who defined reality in terms of will
+because that term signified to him most eloquently _the directly felt
+nature of the self_. This immediate revelation of the true inwardness of
+being serves as the key to an "intuitive interpretation" of the
+gradations of nature, and will finally awaken a sense of the presence of
+the universal Will.
+
+[Sidenote: Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism.]
+
+§ 72. _Transcendentalism_, or _absolute idealism_, on the other hand,
+emphasizes the _rational activity_, rather than the bare subjectivity,
+_of the self_. The term "transcendental" has become associated with this
+type of idealism through Kant, whose favorite form of argument, the
+"transcendental deduction," was an analysis of experience with a view to
+discovering the categories, or formal principles of thought, implied in
+its meaning. From the Kantian method arose the conception of a standard
+or _absolute mind_ for the standard experience. This mind is
+transcendental not in the sense of being alien, but in the sense of
+exceeding the human mind in the direction of what this means and strives
+to be. It is the ideal or normal mind, in which the true reality is
+contained, with all the chaos of finite experience compounded and
+redeemed. There is no being but the absolute, the one all-inclusive
+spiritual life, in whom all things are inherent, and whose perfection is
+the virtual implication of all purposive activities.
+
+     "God's life . . . sees the one plan fulfilled through all the
+     manifold lives, the single consciousness winning its purpose
+     by virtue of all the ideas, of all the individual selves, and
+     of all the lives. No finite view is wholly illusory. Every
+     finite intent taken precisely in its wholeness is fulfilled in
+     the Absolute. The least life is not neglected, the most
+     fleeting act is a recognized part of the world's meaning. You
+     are for the divine view all that you know yourself at this
+     instant to be. But you are also infinitely more. The
+     preciousness of your present purposes to yourself is only a
+     hint of that preciousness which in the end links their meaning
+     to the entire realm of Being."[178:20]
+
+The fruitfulness of the philosopher's reflective doubt concerning his
+own powers is now evident. Problems are raised which are not merely
+urgent in themselves, but which present wholly new alternatives to the
+metaphysician. Rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, are
+doctrines which, though springing from the epistemological query
+concerning the possibility of knowledge, may determine an entire
+philosophical system. They bear upon every question of metaphysics,
+whether the fundamental conception of being, or the problems of the
+world's unity, origin, and significance for human life.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[150:1] The post-Kantian movement in Germany--especially in so far as
+influenced by Hegel. See Chap. XII.
+
+[151:2] Cf. § 203.
+
+[152:3] _E. g._, the system of Fichte. Cf. § 177.
+
+[153:4] See Chap. XI.
+
+[153:5] Spinoza: _On the Improvement of the Understanding_. Translation
+by Elwes, p. 3.
+
+[154:6] Spinoza: _Ethics_, Part V, Proposition XLII. Translation by
+Elwes, p. 270.
+
+[155:7] Descartes: _Meditations_, I. Translation by Veitch, p. 97.
+
+[155:8] Leibniz: _New System of the Nature of Substances_. Translation
+by Latta, pp. 299, 300.
+
+[157:9] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 42.
+
+[159:10] No little ambiguity attaches to the term "monism" in current
+usage, because of its appropriation by those who maintain that the
+universe is unitary and homogeneous in _physical terms_ (cf. § 108). It
+should properly be used to emphasize the unity of the world in any
+terms.
+
+[161:11] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 358.
+
+[162:12] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 284.
+
+[167:13] Plato: _Theætetus_, 161. Translation by Jowett. References to
+Plato are to the marginal paging.
+
+[168:14] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, pp. 184, 187.
+
+[171:15] Plato: _Theætetus_, 150 B. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[173:16] Much ambiguity attaches to the terms "realism" and "idealism"
+in current usage. The first had at one time in the history of philosophy
+a much narrower meaning than that which it now possesses. It was used to
+apply to those who, after Plato, believed in the independent reality of
+ideas, universals, or general natures. _Realists_ in this sense were
+opposed to _nominalists_ and _conceptualists_. Nominalism maintained the
+exclusive reality of individual substances, and reduced ideas to
+particular signs having, like the _name_, a purely symbolical or
+descriptive value. Conceptualism sought to unite realism and nominalism
+through the conception of mind, or an individual substance whose
+meanings may possess universal validity. Though this dispute was of
+fundamental importance throughout the mediæval period, the issues
+involved have now been restated. Realism in the old sense will, if held,
+come within the scope of the broader epistemological realism defined
+above. Nominalism is covered by empirical tendencies, and conceptualism
+by modern idealism.
+
+The term _idealism_ is sometimes applied to Plato on account of his
+designation of ideas as the ultimate realities. This would be a natural
+use of the term, but in our own day it has become inseparably associated
+with the doctrine which attributes to being a dependence upon the
+activity of mind. It is of the utmost importance to keep these two
+meanings clear. In the preferred sense Plato is a realist, and so
+opposed to idealism.
+
+The term _idealism_ is further confused on account of its employment in
+literature and common speech to denote the control of ideals. Although
+this is a kindred meaning, the student of philosophy will gain little or
+no help from it, and will avoid confusion if he distinguishes the term
+in its technical use and permits it in that capacity to acquire an
+independent meaning.
+
+[175:17] See _note_, p. 173.
+
+[176:18] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Part I, Fraser's
+edition, p. 259.
+
+[176:19] To be distinguished from the religious sect which bears the
+same name.
+
+[178:20] Quoted from Professor Josiah Royce's _The World and the
+Individual, First Series_, pp. 426-427.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Normative Sciences.]
+
+§ 73. There are three sets of problems whose general philosophical
+importance depends upon the place which metaphysics assigns to the
+_human critical faculties_. Man passes judgment upon that which claims
+to be _true_, _beautiful_, or _good_, thus referring to ideals and
+standards that define these values. Attempts to make these ideals
+explicit, and to formulate principles which regulate their attainment,
+have resulted in the development of the three so-called _normative
+sciences_: _logic_, _æsthetics_, and _ethics_. These sciences are said
+to owe their origin to the Socratic method, and it is indeed certain
+that their problem is closely related to the general rationalistic
+attitude.[180:1] In Plato's dialogue, "Protagoras," one may observe the
+manner of the inception of both ethics and logic. The question at issue
+between Socrates and the master sophist Protagoras, is concerning the
+possibility of teaching virtue. Protagoras conducts his side of the
+discussion with the customary rhetorical flourish, expounding in set
+speeches the tradition and usage in which such a possibility is
+accepted. Socrates, on the other hand, conceives the issue quite
+differently. One can neither affirm nor deny anything of virtue unless
+one knows _what is meant by it_. Even the possession of such a meaning
+was scarcely recognized by Protagoras, who was led by Socrates's
+questions to attribute to the various virtues an external grouping
+analogous to that of the parts of the face. But Socrates shows that
+since justice, temperance, courage, and the like, are admittedly similar
+in that they are all virtues, they must have in common some essence,
+which is virtue in general. This he seeks to define in the terms,
+_virtue is knowledge_. The interest which Socrates here shows in the
+reduction of the ordinary moral judgments to a system centering in some
+single fundamental principle, is the ethical interest. But this is at
+the same time a particular application of the general rationalistic
+method of definition, and of the general rationalistic postulate that
+one knows nothing until one can form unitary and determinate
+conceptions. The recognition which Socrates thus gives to criteria of
+knowledge is an expression of the logical interest. In a certain sense,
+indeed, the whole labor of Socrates was in the cause of the logical
+interest. For he sought to demonstrate that belief is not necessarily
+knowledge; that belief may or may not be true. In order that it shall be
+true, and constitute knowledge, it must be well-grounded, and
+accompanied by an understanding of its object. Socrates thus set the
+problem of logic, the discovery, namely, of those characters by virtue
+of the possession of which belief is knowledge.
+
+[Sidenote: The Affiliations of Logic.]
+
+§ 74. Logic deals with the ground of belief, and thus distinguishes
+itself from the psychological account of the elements of the believing
+state.[182:2] But it is not possible sharply to sunder psychology and
+logic. This is due to the fact that the general principles which make
+belief true, may be regarded quite independently of this fact. They then
+become the _most general truth_, belonging to the absolute, archetypal
+realm, or to the mind of God.[182:3] When the general principles of
+certainty are so regarded, logic can be distinguished from metaphysics
+only by adding to the study of the general principles themselves, the
+study of the special conditions (mainly psychological) under which they
+may be realized among men. In the history of human thought the name of
+logic belongs to the study of this _attainment_ of truth, as the terms
+æsthetics and ethics belong to the studies of the attainment of beauty
+and goodness.[183:4] It is evident that logic will have a peculiar
+importance for the rationalist. For the empiricist, proposing to report
+upon things as they are given, will tend on the whole to maintain that
+knowledge has no properties save those which are given to it by its
+special subject-matter. One cannot, in short, define any absolute
+relationship between the normative sciences and the other branches of
+philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in
+Belief.]
+
+§ 75. _Logic is the formulation, as independently as possible of special
+subject-matter, of that which conditions truth in belief._ Since logic
+is concerned with truth only in so far as it is predicated of belief,
+and since belief in so far as true is knowledge, logic can be defined as
+the formulation of the most general principles of knowledge. The
+principles so formulated would be those virtually used to _justify_
+belief or to disprove the imputation of error.
+
+[Sidenote: The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence,
+Inference, and Observation.]
+
+§ 76. What is called _formal logic_ is animated with the hope of
+extracting these formulations directly from an analysis of the procedure
+of thought. The most general logical principles which have appeared in
+the historical development of formal logic are _definition_,
+_self-evidence_, _inference_, and _observation_. Each of these has been
+given special study, and each has given rise to special issues.
+
+_Definition_ has to do with the _formation of concepts_, or determinate
+and unequivocal meanings. The universality of such concepts, and their
+consequent relation to particular things, was, as we have seen,
+investigated at a very early date, and gave rise to the great
+realistic-nominalistic controversy.[184:5] A large part of the logical
+discussion in the Platonic dialogues is an outgrowth of the earlier
+"eristic," a form of disputation in favor with the sophists, and
+consisting in the adroit use of ambiguity.[184:6] It is natural that in
+its first conscious self-criticism thought should discover the need of
+definite terms. The perpetual importance of definition has been largely
+due to the great prestige in modern philosophy of the method of
+geometry, which was regarded by Descartes and Spinoza as the model for
+systems of necessary truth.
+
+_Self-evidence_ is the principle according to which _conviction of truth
+follows directly from an understanding of meaning_. In the practice of
+his intellectual midwifery, Socrates presupposed that thought is capable
+of bringing forth its own certainties. And rationalism has at all times
+regarded truth as ultimately accredited by internal marks recognizable
+by reason. Such truth arrived at antecedent to acquaintance with
+instances is called _a priori_, as distinguished from _a posteriori_
+knowledge, or observation after the fact. There can be no principles of
+self-evidence, but logicians have always been more or less concerned
+with the enumeration of alleged self-evident principles, notably those
+of _contradiction_ and _identity_. A philosophical interest in the
+mathematical method has led to a logical study of axioms, but with a
+view rather to their fruitfulness than their intrinsic truth. Indeed,
+the interest in self-evident truth has always been subordinate to the
+interest in systematic truth, and the discovery of first principles most
+commonly serves to determine the relative priority of definite
+concepts, or the correct point of departure for a series of inferences.
+
+The greater part of the famous Aristotelian logic consists in a study of
+_inference_, or _the derivation of new knowledge from old knowledge_.
+Aristotle sought to set down and classify every method of advancing from
+premises. The most important form of inference which he defined was the
+_syllogism_, a scheme of reasoning to a conclusion by means of two
+premises having one term in common. From the premises "all men are
+mortal" and "Socrates is a man," one may conclude that "Socrates is
+mortal." This is an instance not only of the syllogism in general, but
+of its most important "mood," the subsumption of a particular case under
+a general rule. Since the decline of Aristotle's influence in philosophy
+there has been a notable decrease of interest in the different forms of
+inference; though its fundamental importance as the very bone and sinew
+of _reasoning_ or _deductive thinking_ has never been challenged. Its
+loss of preëminence is in part due to the growth of empiricism,
+stimulated by the writings of Lord Bacon in the seventeenth century, and
+fostered by the subsequent development of experimental science.
+
+_Observation_ is the fundamental logical principle of empiricism. For a
+radical empiricism, knowledge would consist of descriptive
+generalizations based upon the summation of instances. That branch of
+logic which deals with _the advance from individual instances to general
+principles_, is called _inductive logic_. It has resulted in the
+announcement of canons of accuracy and freedom from preconception, and
+in the methodological study of hypothesis, experiment, and verification.
+Rules for observation directed to the end of discovering causes,
+constitute the most famous part of the epoch-making logic of J. S.
+Mills.[187:7]
+
+[Sidenote: Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment.]
+
+§ 77. There are two significant tendencies in contemporary logic.
+_Theories of the judgment_ have arisen in the course of an attempt to
+define the least complexity that must be present in order that thought
+shall come within the range of truth and error. It is evident that no
+one either knows or is in error until he takes some attitude which lays
+claim to knowledge. Denoting by the term _judgment_ this minimum of
+complexity in knowledge, an important question arises as to the sense in
+which the judgment involves the subject, predicate, and copula that are
+commonly present in its propositional form.
+
+[Sidenote: Priority of Concepts.]
+
+§ 78. But a more important logical development has been due to the
+recent analysis of definite accredited systems of knowledge. The study
+of the fundamental conceptions of mathematics and mechanics, together
+with an examination of the systematic structure of these sciences,
+furnishes the most notable cases. There are two senses in which such
+studies may be regarded as logical. In the first place, in so far as
+they bring to light the inner coherence of any body of truth, the kind
+of evidence upon which it rests, and the type of formal perfection which
+it seeks, they differ from formal logic only in that they derive their
+criteria from cases, rather than from the direct analysis of the
+procedure of thought. And since formal logic must itself make
+experiments, this difference is not a radical one. The study of cases
+tends chiefly to enrich _methodology_, or the knowledge of the special
+criteria of special sciences. In the second place, such studies serve to
+define the relatively few simple truths which are common to the
+relatively many complex truths. A study of the foundations of arithmetic
+reveals more elementary conceptions, such as _class_ and _order_, that
+must be employed in the very definition of number itself, and so are
+implied in every numerical calculation. It appears similarly that the
+axioms of geometry are special axioms which involve the acceptance of
+more general axioms or indefinables.[189:8] Logic in this sense, then,
+is the enumeration of conceptions and principles in the order of their
+indispensableness to knowledge. And while it must be observed that the
+most general conceptions and principles of knowledge are not necessarily
+those most significant for the existent world, nevertheless the careful
+analysis which such an enumeration involves is scarcely less fruitful
+for metaphysics than for logic.
+
+[Sidenote: Æsthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Beauty.
+Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies.]
+
+§ 79. _Æsthetics is the formulation, as independently as possible of
+special subject-matter, of that which conditions beauty._ As logic
+commonly refers to a judgment of truth, so æsthetics at any rate
+_refers_ to a judgment implied in appreciation. But while it is
+generally admitted that truth itself is by no means limited to the form
+of the judgment, the contrary is frequently maintained with reference
+to beauty. The aphorism, _De gustibus non est disputandum_, expresses a
+common opinion to the effect that beauty is not a property belonging to
+the object of which it is predicated, but a property generated by the
+appreciative consciousness. According to this opinion there can be no
+beauty except in the case of an object's presence in an individual
+experience. Investigators must of necessity refuse to leave individual
+caprice in complete possession of the field, but they have in many cases
+occupied themselves entirely with the _state of æsthetic enjoyment_ in
+the hope of discovering its constant factors. The opposing tendency
+defines certain _formal characters which the beautiful object must
+possess_. Evidently the latter school will attribute a more profound
+philosophical importance to the conception of beauty, since for them it
+is a principle that obtains in the world of being. This was the first
+notable contention, that of Plato. But even with the emphasis laid upon
+the subjective aspect of the æsthetic experience, great metaphysical
+importance may be attached to it, where, as in the case of the German
+Romanticists, reality is deliberately construed as a spiritual life
+which is to be appreciated rather than understood.
+
+As in the case of logic, a strong impulse has manifested itself in
+æsthetics to deal with groups of objects that lie within its province,
+rather than directly with its concepts and principles. The first special
+treatise on æsthetics, the "Poetics" of Aristotle, belongs to this type
+of inquiry, as does all criticism of art in so far as it aims at the
+formulation of general principles.
+
+[Sidenote: Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral
+Goodness.]
+
+§ 80. _Ethics_, the oldest and most popular of the normative sciences,
+_is the formulation, as independently as possible of special
+subject-matter, of that which conditions goodness of conduct_. Ethics is
+commonly concerned with goodness only in so far as it is predicated of
+conduct, or of character, which is a more or less permanent disposition
+to conduct. Since conduct, in so far as good, is said to constitute
+moral goodness, ethics may be defined as the formulation of the general
+principles of _morality_. The principles so formulated would be those
+virtually employed to _justify_ conduct, or to disprove the imputation
+of immorality.
+
+[Sidenote: Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism.]
+
+§ 81. The student of this science is confronted with a very considerable
+diversity of method and differentiation of problems. The earliest and
+most profound opposition of doctrine in ethics arose from the
+differences of interpretation of which the teaching of Socrates is
+capable. His doctrine is, as we have seen, verbally expressed in the
+proposition, _virtue is knowledge_. Socrates was primarily concerned to
+show that there is no real living without an understanding of the
+significance of life. To live well is to know the end of life, the good
+of it all, and to govern action with reference to that end. Virtue is
+therefore the practical wisdom that enables one to live consistently
+with his real intention. But what is the real intention, the end or good
+of life? In the "Protagoras," where Plato represents Socrates as
+expounding his position, virtue is interpreted to mean prudence, or
+foresight of pleasurable and painful consequences. He who knows,
+possesses all virtue in that he is qualified to adapt himself to the
+real situation and to gain the end of pleasure. All men, indeed, seek
+pleasure, but only virtuous men seek it wisely and well.
+
+     "And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some
+     pleasant things evil and some painful things good?--for I am
+     rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they
+     are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort,
+     and in as far as they are painful they are bad."[192:9]
+
+According to this view painful things are good only when they lead
+eventually to pleasure, and pleasant things evil only when their painful
+consequences outweigh their pleasantness. Hence moral differences reduce
+to differences of skill in the universal quest for pleasure, and
+_sensible gratification is the ultimate standard of moral value_. This
+ancient doctrine, known as _hedonism_, expressing as it does a part of
+life that will not suffer itself for long to be denied, is one of the
+great perennial tendencies of ethical thought. In the course of many
+centuries it has passed through a number of phases, varying its
+conception of pleasure from the tranquillity of the wise man to the
+sensuous titillations of the sybarite, and from the individualism of the
+latter to the universalism of the humanitarian. But in every case it
+shows a respect for the natural man, praising morality for its
+disciplinary and instrumental value in the service of such human wants
+as are the outgrowth of the animal instinct of self-preservation.
+
+[Sidenote: Rationalism.]
+
+§ 82. But if a man's life be regarded as a truer representation of his
+ideals than is his spoken theory, there is little to identify Socrates
+with the hedonists. At the conclusion of the defence of his own life,
+which Plato puts into his mouth in the well-known "Apology," he speaks
+thus:
+
+     "When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to
+     punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have
+     troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything,
+     more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something
+     when they are really nothing,--then reprove them, as I have
+     reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought
+     to care, and thinking that they are something when they are
+     really nothing."[194:10]
+
+It is plain that the man Socrates cared little for the pleasurable or
+painful consequences of his acts, provided they were worthy of the high
+calling of human nature. A man's virtue would now seem to possess an
+intrinsic nobility. If knowledge be virtue, then on this basis it must
+be because knowledge is itself excellent. Virtue as knowledge
+contributes to the good by constituting it. We meet here with the
+_rationalistic_ strain in ethics. It praises conduct for the _inherent
+worth which it may possess if it express that reason_ which the Stoics
+called "_the ruling part_." The riches of wisdom consist for the
+hedonist in their purchase of pleasure. For the rationalist, on the
+other hand, wisdom is not coin, but itself the very substance of value.
+
+[Sidenote: Eudæmonism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism.]
+
+§ 83. Rationalism has undergone modifications even more significant
+than those of hedonism, and involving at least one radically new group
+of conceptions. Among the Greeks rationalism and hedonism alike are
+_eudæmonistic_. They aim to portray _the fulness of life_ that makes
+"the happy man." In the ethics of Aristotle, whose synthetic mind weaves
+together these different strands, the Greek ideal finds its most
+complete expression as "the high-minded man," with all his powers and
+trappings. But the great spiritual transformation which accompanied the
+decline of Greek culture and the rise of Christianity, brought with it a
+new moral sensibility, which finds in man no virtue of himself, but only
+through the grace of God.
+
+     "And the virtues themselves," says St. Augustine, "if they
+     bear no relation to God, are in truth vices rather than
+     virtues; for although they are regarded by many as truly moral
+     when they are desired as ends in themselves and not for the
+     sake of something else, they are, nevertheless, inflated and
+     arrogant, and therefore not to be viewed as virtues but as
+     vices."[195:11]
+
+The new ideal is that of renunciation, obedience, and resignation.
+Ethically this expresses itself in _pietism_. Virtue is good neither in
+itself nor on account of its consequences, but because it is
+conformable to the will of God. The extreme inwardness of this ideal is
+characteristic of an age that despaired of attainment, whether of
+pleasure or knowledge. To all, even the persecuted, it is permitted to
+obey, and so gain entrance into the kingdom of the children of God. But
+as every special study tends to rely upon its own conceptions, pietism,
+involving as it does a relation to God, is replaced by _rigorism_ and
+_intuitionism_. The former doctrine defines virtue in terms of the inner
+attitude which it expresses. It must be done in the spirit of
+dutifulness, _because one ought_, and through sheer respect for the law
+which one's moral nature affirms. _Intuitionism_ has attempted to deal
+with the source of the moral law by defining conscience as a _special
+faculty_ or sense, qualified to pass directly upon moral questions, and
+deserving of implicit obediences. It is characteristic of this whole
+tendency to look for the spring of virtuous living, not in a good which
+such living obtains, but in a law to which it owes obedience.
+
+[Sidenote: Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics.]
+
+§ 84. This third general ethical tendency has thus been of the greatest
+importance in emphasizing the _consciousness of duty_, and has brought
+both hedonism and rationalism to a recognition of its fundamental
+importance. Ethics must deal not only with the moral ideal, but also
+with the ground of its appeal to the individual, and his obligation to
+pursue it. In connection with this recognition of moral responsibility,
+the problem of human _freedom_ has come to be regarded in the light of
+an inevitable point of contact between ethics and metaphysics. That
+which is absolutely binding upon the human will can be determined only
+in view of some theory of its ultimate nature. On this account the
+rationalistic and hedonistic motives are no longer abstractly sundered,
+as in the days of the Stoics and Epicureans, but tend to be absorbed in
+broader philosophical tendencies. Hedonism appears as the sequel to
+naturalism; or, more rarely, as part of a theistic system whose morality
+is divine legislation enforced by an appeal to motives of pleasure and
+pain. Rationalism, on the other hand, tends to be absorbed in
+rationalistic or idealistic philosophies, where man's rational nature is
+construed as his bond of kinship with the universe.
+
+Ethics has exhibited from the beginning a tendency to universalize its
+conceptions and take the central place in metaphysics. Thus with Plato
+good conduct was but a special case of goodness, the good being the most
+general principle of reality.[198:12] In modern times Fichte and his
+school have founded an ethical metaphysics upon the conception of
+duty.[198:13] In these cases ethics can be distinguished from
+metaphysics only by adding to the study of the good or of duty, a study
+of the special physical, psychological, and social conditions under
+which goodness and dutifulness may obtain in human life. It is possible
+to attach the name of ethics, and we have seen the same to be true of
+logic, either to a realm of ideal truth or to that realm wherein the
+ideal is realized in humanity.
+
+[Sidenote: The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions.]
+
+§ 85. A systematic study of ethics requires that the _virtues_, or types
+of moral practice, shall be interpreted in the light of the central
+conception of good, or of conscience. _Justice_, _temperance_, _wisdom_,
+and _courage_ were praised by the Greeks. Christianity added
+_self-sacrifice_, _humility_, _purity_, and _benevolence_. These and
+other virtues have been defined, justified, and co-ordinated with the
+aid of a standard of moral value or a canon of duty.
+
+There is in modern ethics a pronounced tendency, parallel to those
+already noted in logic and æsthetics, to study such phenomena belonging
+to its field as have become historically established. A very
+considerable investigation of _custom_, _institutions_, and other social
+forces has led to a contact of ethics with anthropology and sociology
+scarcely less significant than that with metaphysics.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+[Sidenote: The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of Faith.]
+
+§ 86. In that part of his philosophy in which he deals with faith, the
+great German philosopher Kant mentions God, Freedom, and Immortality as
+the three pre-eminent religious interests. Religion, as we have seen,
+sets up a social relationship between man and that massive drift of
+things which determines his destiny. Of the two terms of this relation,
+God signifies the latter, while freedom and immortality are prerogatives
+which religion bestows upon the former. Man, viewed from the stand-point
+of religion as an object of special interest to the universe, is said to
+have a soul; and by virtue of this soul he is said to be free and
+immortal, when thought of as having a life in certain senses independent
+of its immediate natural environment. The attempt to make this faith
+theoretically intelligible has led to the philosophical disciplines
+known as _theology_ and _psychology_.[199:14]
+
+[Sidenote: Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God.]
+
+§ 87. _Theology_, as a branch of philosophy, deals with _the proof and
+the nature of God_. Since "God" is not primarily a theoretical
+conception, the proof of God is not properly a philosophical problem.
+Historically, this task has been assumed as a legacy from Christian
+apologetics; and it has involved, at any rate so far as European
+philosophy is concerned, the definition of ultimate being in such
+spiritual terms as make possible the relation with man postulated in
+Christianity. For this it has been regarded as sufficient to ascribe to
+the world an underlying unity capable of bearing the predicates of
+perfection, omnipotence, and omniscience. Each proof of God has defined
+him pre-eminently in terms of some one of these his attributes.
+
+[Sidenote: The Ontological Proof of God.]
+
+§ 88. The _ontological_ proof of God held the foremost place in
+philosophy's contribution to Christianity up to the eighteenth century.
+This proof _infers the existence from the ideal_ of God, and so
+approaches the nature of God through the attribute of perfection. It
+owes the form in which it was accepted in the Middle Ages and
+Renaissance to St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury at the close of the
+eleventh century. He argued from the idea of a most perfect being to its
+existence, on the ground that non-existence, or existence only in idea,
+would contradict its perfection. It is evident that the force of this
+argument depends upon the necessity of the idea of God. The argument was
+accepted in Scholastic Philosophy[201:15] largely because of the virtual
+acceptance of this necessity. Mediæval thought was under the dominance
+of the philosophical ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and through them
+rationalism had come to be the unquestioned starting-point for all
+thought. For Plato reality and rationality meant one and the same thing,
+so that the ultimate reality was the highest principle of rationality,
+which he conceived to be the idea of the good. In the case of Aristotle
+the ideal of rationality was conceived to determine the course of the
+cosmical evolution as its immanent final cause. But in itself it was
+beyond the world, or transcendent. For Plato perfection itself is
+reality, whereas for Aristotle perfection determines the hierarchical
+order of natural substances. The latter theory, more suitable to the
+uses of Christianity, because it distinguished between God and the
+world, was incorporated into the great school systems. But both theories
+contain the essence of the ontological proof of God. In thought one
+seeks the perfect truth, and posits it as at once the culmination of
+insight and the meaning of life. The ideal of God is therefore a
+necessary idea, because implied in all the effort of thought as the
+object capable of finally satisfying it. St. Anselm adds little to the
+force of this argument, and does much to obscure its real significance.
+
+In stating the ontological argument the term perfection has been
+expressly emphasized, because it may be taken to embrace both truth and
+goodness. Owing to a habit of thought, due in the main to Plato, it was
+long customary to regard degrees of truth and goodness as
+interchangeable, and as equivalent to degrees of reality. The _ens
+realissimum_ was in its completeness the highest object both of the
+faculty of cognition and of the moral will. But even in the scholastic
+period these two different aspects of the ideal were clearly recognized,
+and led to sharply divergent tendencies. More recently they have been
+divided and embodied in separate arguments. _The epistemological_
+argument _defines God in terms of that absolute truth which is referred
+to in every judgment_. Under the influence of idealism this absolute
+truth has taken the form of a universal mind, or all-embracing standard
+experience, called more briefly the absolute. The _ethical_ argument, on
+the other hand, conceives God as _the perfect goodness implied in the
+moral struggle, or the power through which goodness is made to triumph
+in the universe_ to the justification of moral faith. While the former
+of these arguments identifies God with being, the latter defines God in
+terms of the intent or outcome of being. Thus, while the epistemological
+argument does not distinguish God and the world, the latter does so,
+assuming that independent reality can be attributed to the stages of a
+process and to the purpose that dominates it.
+
+[Sidenote: The Cosmological Proof of God.]
+
+§ 89. The _cosmological_ proof of God approaches him through the
+attribute of creative omnipotence. The common principle of causal
+explanation refers the origin of natural events to similar antecedent
+events. But there must be some _first cause_ from which the whole series
+is derived, a cause which is ultimate, sufficient to itself, and the
+responsible author of the world. Because God's function as creator was a
+part of the Christian teaching, and because explanation by causes is
+habitual with common sense, this argument has had great vogue. But in
+philosophy it has declined in importance, chiefly because it has been
+absorbed in arguments which deal with the _kind_ of causality proper to
+a first cause or world-ground. The argument that follows is a case in
+point.
+
+[Sidenote: The Teleological Proof of God.]
+
+§ 90. The _teleological_ proof argues that the world can owe its origin
+only to an _intelligent first cause_. The evidence for this is furnished
+by the cunning contrivances and beneficent adaptations of nature. These
+could not have come about through chance or the working of mechanical
+forces, but only through the foresight of a rational will. This argument
+originally infers God from the character of nature and history; and the
+extension of mechanical principles to organic and social phenomena,
+especially as stimulated by Darwin's principle of natural selection, has
+tended greatly to diminish its importance. When, on the other hand, for
+nature and history there are substituted the intellectual and moral
+activities themselves, and the inference is made to the ideal which they
+imply, the teleological argument merges into the ontological. But the
+old-fashioned statement of it remains in the form of religious faith,
+and in this capacity it has had the approval even of Hume and Kant, the
+philosophers who have contributed most forcibly to its overthrow as a
+demonstration of God. They agree that the _acknowledgment_ of God in
+nature and history is the sequel to a theistic belief, and an inevitable
+attitude on the part of the religious consciousness.
+
+[Sidenote: God and the World. Theism and Pantheism.]
+
+§ 91. Another group of ideas belonging to philosophical theology
+consists of three generalizations respecting God's relation to the
+world, known as _theism_, _pantheism_, and _deism_. Although,
+theoretically, these are corollaries of the different arguments for God,
+two of them, theism and pantheism, owe their importance to their rivalry
+as religious tendencies. _Theism_ emphasizes that attitude to God which
+recognizes in him an historical personage, in some sense distinct from
+both the world and man, which are his works and yet stand in an external
+relationship to him. It expresses the spirit of ethical and monotheistic
+religion, and is therefore the natural belief of the Christian.
+_Pantheism_ appears in primitive religion as an animistic or
+polytheistic sense of the presence of a divine principle diffused
+throughout nature. But it figures most notably in the history of
+religions, in the highly reflective Brahmanism of India. In sharp
+opposition to Christianity, this religion preaches the indivisible unity
+of the world and the illusoriness of the individual's sense of his own
+independent reality. In spite of the fact that such a doctrine is alien
+to the spirit of Christianity, it enters into Christian theology through
+the influence of philosophy. The theoretical idea of God tends, as we
+have seen, to the identification of him with the world as its most real
+principle. Or it bestows upon him a nature so logical and formal, and so
+far removed from the characters of humanity, as to forbid his entering
+into personal or social relations. Such reflections concerning God find
+their religious expression in a mystical sense of unity, which has in
+many cases either entirely replaced or profoundly modified the theistic
+strain in Christianity. In current philosophy pantheism appears in the
+epistemological argument which identifies God with being; while the
+chief bulwark of theism is the ethical argument, with its provision for
+a distinction between the actual world and ideal principle of evolution.
+
+[Sidenote: Deism.]
+
+§ 92. While theism and pantheism appear to be permanent phases in the
+philosophy of religion, _deism_ is the peculiar product of the
+eighteenth century. It is based upon a repudiation of supernaturalism
+and "enthusiasm," on the one hand, and a literal acceptance of the
+cosmological and teleological proofs on the other. Religions, like all
+else, were required, in this epoch of clear thinking, to submit to the
+canons of experimental observation and practical common sense. These
+authorize only a _natural religion_, the acknowledgment in pious living
+of a God who, having contrived this natural world, has given it over to
+the rule, not of priests and prophets, but of natural law. The
+artificiality of its conception of God, and the calculating spirit of
+its piety, make deism a much less genuine expression of the religious
+experience than either the moral chivalry of theism or the intellectual
+and mystical exaltation of pantheism.
+
+[Sidenote: Metaphysics and Theology.]
+
+§ 93. The systematic development of philosophy leads to the inclusion of
+conceptions of God within the problem of metaphysics, and the
+subordination of the proof of God to the determination of the
+fundamental principle of reality. There will always remain, however, an
+outstanding theological discipline, whose function it is to interpret
+worship, or the living religious attitude, in terms of the theoretical
+principles of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Psychology is the Theory of the Soul.]
+
+§ 94. _Psychology is the theory of the soul._ As we have already seen,
+the rise of scepticism directs attention from the object of thought to
+the thinker, and so emphasizes the self as a field for theoretical
+investigation. But the original and the dominating interest in the self
+is a practical one. The precept, +gnôthi seauton+, has its deepest
+justification in the concern for the salvation of one's soul. In
+primitive and half-instinctive belief the self is recognized in
+practical relations. In its animistic phase this belief admitted of such
+relations with all living creatures, and extended the conception of life
+very generally to natural processes. Thus in the beginning the self was
+doubtless indistinguishable from the vital principle. In the first
+treatise on psychology, the "+peri Psychês+" of Aristotle, this
+interpretation finds a place in theoretical philosophy. For Aristotle
+the soul is the _entelechy_ of the body--that function or activity which
+makes a man of it. He recognized, furthermore, three stages in this
+activity: the nutritive, sensitive, and rational souls, or the
+vegetable, animal, and distinctively human natures, respectively. The
+rational soul, in its own proper activity, is man's highest
+prerogative, the soul to be saved. By virtue of it man rises above
+bodily conditions, and lays hold on the divine and eternal. But Plato,
+who, as we have seen, was ever ready to grant reality to the ideal apart
+from the circumstances of its particular embodiment, had already
+undertaken to demonstrate the immortality of the soul on the ground of
+its distinctive nature.[209:16] According to his way of thinking, the
+soul's essentially moral nature made it incapable of destruction through
+the operation of natural causes. It is evident, then, that there were
+already ideas in vogue capable of interpreting the Christian teaching
+concerning the existence of a soul, or of an inner essence of man
+capable of being made an object of divine interest.
+
+[Sidenote: Spiritual Substance]
+
+§ 95. The immediate effect of Christianity was to introduce into
+philosophy as one of its cardinal doctrines the theory of a spiritual
+being, constituting the true self of the individual, and separable from
+the body. The difference recognized in Plato and Aristotle between the
+divine spark and the appetitive and perceptual parts of human nature was
+now emphasized. The former (frequently called the "spirit," to
+distinguish it from the lower soul) was defined as a _substance_ having
+the attributes of thought and will. The fundamental argument for its
+existence was the immediate appeal to self-consciousness; and it was
+further defined as indestructible on the ground of its being utterly
+discontinuous and incommensurable with its material environment. This
+theory survives at the present day in the conception of pure activity,
+but on the whole the attributes of the soul have superseded its
+substance.
+
+[Sidenote: Intellectualism and Voluntarism.]
+
+§ 96. _Intellectualism and voluntarism_ are the two rival possibilities
+of emphasis when the soul is defined in terms of its known activities.
+Wherever the essence of personality is in question, as also occurs in
+the case of theology, thought and will present their respective claims
+to the place of first importance. _Intellectualism would make will
+merely the concluding phase of thought, while voluntarism would reduce
+thought to one of the interests of a general appetency._ It is evident
+that idealistic theories will be much concerned with this question of
+priority. It is also true, though less evident, that intellectualism,
+since it emphasizes the general and objective features of the mind,
+tends to subordinate the individual to the universal; while voluntarism,
+emphasizing desire and action, is relatively individualistic, and so,
+since there are many individuals, also pluralistic.[211:17]
+
+[Sidenote: Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, and
+Indeterminism.]
+
+§ 97. The question of the _freedom of the will_ furnishes a favorite
+controversial topic in philosophy. For the interest at stake is no less
+than the individual's responsibility before man and God for his good or
+bad works. It bears alike upon science, religion, and philosophy, and is
+at the same time a question of most fundamental practical importance.
+But this diffusion of the problem has led to so considerable a
+complication of it that it becomes necessary in outlining it to define
+two issues. In the first place, the concept of freedom is designed to
+express generally the distinction between man and the rest of nature. To
+make man in all respects _the product and creature of his natural
+environment_ would be to deny freedom and accept the radically
+_necessitarian_ doctrine. The question still remains, however, as to the
+causes which dominate man. He may be free from nature, and yet be ruled
+by God, or by distinctively spiritual causes, such as ideas or
+character. Where in general the will is regarded as submitting only to a
+_spiritual causation_ proper to its own realm, the conception is best
+named _determinism_; though in the tradition of philosophy it is held to
+be a doctrine of freedom, because contrasted with the necessitarianism
+above defined. There remains _indeterminism_, which attributes to the
+will a spontaneity that makes possible the _direct presence to it of
+genuine alternatives_. The issue may here coincide with that between
+intellectualism and voluntarism. If, _e.g._, in God's act of creation,
+his ideals and standards are prior to his fiat, his conduct is
+determined; whereas it is free in the radical or indeterministic sense
+if his ideals themselves are due to his sheer will. This theory involves
+at a certain point in action the absence of cause. On this account the
+free will is often identified with _chance_, in which case it loses its
+distinction from nature, and we have swung round the circle.
+
+[Sidenote: Immortality. Survival and Eternalism.]
+
+§ 98. There is similar complexity in the problem concerning
+_immortality_. Were the extreme claims of naturalism to be established,
+there would be no ground whatsoever upon which to maintain the
+immortality of man, mere dust returning unto dust. The philosophical
+concept of immortality is due to the supposition that the quintessence
+of the individual's nature is divine.[213:18] But several possibilities
+are at this point open to us. The first would maintain the survival
+after death of a recognizable and discrete personality. Another would
+suppose a preservation after death, through being taken up into the life
+of God. Still another, the theory commonly maintained on the ground of
+rationalistic and idealistic metaphysics, would deny that immortality
+has to do with life after death, and affirm that it signifies the
+perpetual membership of the human individual in a realm of eternity
+through the truth or virtue that is in him. But this interpretation
+evidently leaves open the question of the immortality of that which is
+distinctive and personal in human nature.
+
+[Sidenote: The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and Method.]
+
+§ 99. So far we have followed the fortunes only of the "spirit" of man.
+What of that lower soul through which he is identified with the fortunes
+of his body? When philosophy gradually ceased, in the sixteenth and
+seventeenth centuries, to be "the handmaid of religion," there arose a
+renewed interest in that part of human nature lying between the strictly
+physiological functions, on the one hand, and thought and will on the
+other. Descartes and Spinoza analyzed what they called the "passions,"
+meaning such states of mind as are conditioned by a concern for the
+interests of the body. At a later period, certain English philosophers,
+following Locke, traced the dependence of ideas upon the senses. Their
+method was that of _introspection_, or the direct examination by the
+individual of his own ideas, and for the sake of noting their origin and
+composition from simple factors. The lineal descendants of these same
+English philosophers defined more carefully the process of
+_association_, whereby the complexity and sequence of ideas are brought
+about, and made certain conjectures as to its dependence upon properties
+and transactions in the physical brain. These are the three main
+philosophical sources of what has now grown to be the separate _natural
+science of psychology_. It will be noted that there are two
+characteristics which all of these studies have in common. They deal
+with the experience of the individual as composing his own private
+history, and tend to attribute the specific course which this private
+history takes to bodily conditions. It is only recently that these
+investigations have acquired sufficient unity and exclusiveness of aim
+to warrant their being regarded as a special science. But such is now so
+far the case that the psychologist of this type pursues his way quite
+independently of philosophy. It is true his research has advanced
+considerably beyond his understanding of its province. But it is
+generally recognized that he must examine those very _factors of
+subjectivity_ which the natural scientist otherwise seeks to evade, and,
+furthermore, that he must seek to _provide for them in nature_. He
+treats the inner life in what Locke called "the plain historical
+method," that is to say, instead of interpreting and defining its ideas,
+he analyzes and reports upon its content. He would not seek to justify a
+moral judgment, as would ethics, or to criticise the cogency of thought,
+as would logic; but only to describe the actual state as he found it. In
+order to make his data commensurable with the phenomena of nature, he
+discovers or defines bodily conditions for the subjective content which
+he analyzes. His fundamental principle of method is the postulate of
+_psycho-physical parallelism_, according to which he assumes a _state of
+brain or nervous system for every state of mind_. But in adopting a
+province and a method the psychologist foregoes finality of truth after
+the manner of all natural science. He deals admittedly with an aspect of
+experience, and his conclusions are no more adequate to the nature of
+the self than they are to the nature of outer objects. An admirable
+reference to this abstract division of experience occurs in Külpe's
+"Introduction to Philosophy":
+
+     "For the developed consciousness, as for the naive, every
+     experience is an unitary whole; and it is only the habit of
+     abstract reflection upon experience that makes the objective
+     and subjective worlds seem to fall apart as originally
+     different forms of existence. Just as a plane curve can be
+     represented in analytical geometry as the function of two
+     variables, the abscissæ and the ordinates, without prejudice
+     to the unitary course of the curve itself, so the world of
+     human experience may be reduced to a subjective and an
+     objective factor, without prejudice to its real
+     coherence."[215:19]
+
+[Sidenote: Psychology and Philosophy.]
+
+§ 100. The problems of psychology, like those of theology, tend to
+disappear as independent philosophical topics. The ultimate nature of
+the self will continue to interest philosophers--more deeply, perhaps,
+than any aspect of experience--but their conception of it will be a
+corollary of their metaphysics and epistemology. The remainder of the
+field of the old philosophical psychology, the introspective and
+experimental analysis of special states of mind, is already the
+province of a natural science which is becoming more and more free from
+the stand-point and method of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Transition from Classification by Problems to Classification
+by Doctrines. Naturalism. Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute
+Realism.]
+
+§ 101. Reminding ourselves anew that philosophical problems cannot be
+treated in isolation from one another, we shall hereinafter seek to
+become acquainted with general stand-points that give systematic unity
+to the issues which have been enumerated. Such stand-points are not
+clearly defined by those who occupy them, and they afford no clear-cut
+classification of all historical philosophical philosophies. But
+system-making in philosophy is commonly due to the moving in an
+individual mind of some most significant idea; and certain of these
+ideas have reappeared so frequently as to define more or less clearly
+marked tendencies, or continuous strands, out of which the history of
+thought is forever weaving itself. Such is clearly the case with
+_naturalism_. From the beginning until now there have been men whose
+philosophy is a summation of the natural sciences, whose entire thought
+is based upon an acceptance of the methods and the fundamental
+conceptions of these disciplines. This tendency stands in the history
+of thought for the conviction that the visible and tangible world which
+interacts with the body is veritable reality. This philosophy is
+realistic and empirical to an extent entirely determined by its belief
+concerning being. But while naturalism is only secondarily
+epistemological, _subjectivism_ and _absolute idealism_ have their very
+source in the self-examination and the self-criticism of thought.
+Subjectivism signifies the conviction that the knower cannot escape
+himself. If reality is to be kept within the range of possible
+knowledge, it must be defined in terms of the processes or states of
+selves. _Absolute idealism_ arises from a union of this epistemological
+motive with a recognition of what are regarded as the logical
+necessities to which reality must submit. Reality must be both knowledge
+and rational knowledge; the object, in short, of an absolute mind, which
+shall be at once all-containing and systematic. This rationalistic
+motive was, however, not originally associated with an idealistic
+epistemology, but with the common-sense principle that being is
+discovered and not constituted by thought. Such an _absolute realism_
+is, like naturalism, primarily metaphysical rather than
+epistemological; but, unlike naturalism, it seeks to define reality as
+a logical or ethical necessity.
+
+Under these several divisions, then, we shall meet once more with the
+special problems of philosophy, but this time they will be ranged in an
+order that is determined by some central doctrine. They will appear as
+parts not of the general problem of philosophy, but of some definite
+system of philosophy.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[180:1] Cf. § 68.
+
+[182:2] The Socratic distinction between the logical and the
+psychological treatment of belief finds its best expression in Plato's
+_Gorgias_, especially, 454, 455. Cf. also § 29.
+
+[182:3] Thus, e. g. Hegel. See § 179. Cf. also §§ 199, 200.
+
+[183:4] Cf. § 84.
+
+[184:5] See § 69, _note_.
+
+[184:6] The reader will find a good illustration of eristic in Plato's
+_Euthydemus_, 275.
+
+[187:7] The reader can find these rules, and the detail of the
+traditional formal logic, in any elementary text-book, such as, e. g.,
+Jevons: _Elements of Logic_.
+
+[189:8] What is called "the algebra of logic" seeks to obtain an
+unequivocal symbolic expression for these truths.
+
+[192:9] Plato: _Protagoras_, 351. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[194:10] Plato: _Apology_, 41. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[195:11] Quoted by Paulsen in his _System of Ethics_. Translation by
+Thilly, p. 69.
+
+[198:12] Cf. § 160.
+
+[198:13] Cf. § 177.
+
+[199:14] Concerning the duty of philosophy to religion in these matters,
+cf. Descartes: _Meditations_, _Dedication_. Translation by Veitch, p.
+81.
+
+[201:15] The school-philosophy that flourished from the eleventh to the
+fifteenth century, under the authority of the church.
+
+[209:16] Especially in the _Phædo_.
+
+[211:17] Schopenhauer is a notable exception. Cf. §§ 135, 138.
+
+[213:18] It is interesting, however, to observe that current
+spiritualistic theories maintain a naturalistic theory of immortality,
+verifiable, it is alleged, in certain extraordinary empirical
+observations.
+
+[215:19] Translation by Pillsbury and Titchener, p. 59.
+
+
+
+
+PART III
+
+SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+NATURALISM[223:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: The General Meaning of Materialism.]
+
+§ 102. The meaning conveyed by any philosophical term consists largely
+of the distinctions which it suggests. Its peculiar quality, like the
+physiognomy of the battle-scarred veteran, is a composite of the
+controversies which it has survived. There is, therefore, an almost
+unavoidable confusion attendant upon the denomination of any early phase
+of philosophy as _materialism_. But in the historical beginnings of
+thought, as also in the common-sense of all ages, there is at any rate
+present a very essential strand of this theory. The naive habit of mind
+which, in the sixth century before Christ, prompted successive Greek
+thinkers to define reality in terms of water, air, and fire, is in this
+respect one with that exhibited in Dr. Samuel Johnson's smiting the
+ground with his stick in curt refutation of Bishop Berkeley's
+idea-philosophy. There is a theoretical instinct, not accidental or
+perverse, but springing from the very life-preserving equipment of the
+organism, which attributes reality to _tangible space-filling things
+encountered by the body_. For obvious reasons of self-interest the
+organism is first of all endowed with a sense of contact, and the more
+delicate senses enter into its practical economy as means of
+anticipating or avoiding contact. From such practical expectations
+concerning the proximity of that which may press upon, injure, or
+displace the body, arise the first crude judgments of reality. And these
+are at the same time the nucleus of naive philosophy and the germinal
+phase of materialism.
+
+[Sidenote: Corporeal Being.]
+
+§ 103. The first philosophical movement among the Greeks was a series of
+attempts to reduce the tangible world to unity, and of these the
+conception offered by Anaximander is of marked interest in its bearing
+upon the development of materialism. This philosopher is remarkable for
+having _defined_ his first principle, instead of having chosen it from
+among the different elements already distinguished by common-sense. He
+thought the unity of nature to consist in its periodic evolution from
+and return into one infinite sum of material (+to apeiron+), which, much
+in the manner of the "nebula" of modern science, is conceived as both
+indeterminate in its actual state and infinitely rich in its
+potentiality. The conception of matter, the most familiar commonplace of
+science, begins to be recognizable. It has here reached the point of
+signifying a common substance for all tangible things, a substance that
+in its own general and omnipresent nature is without the special marks
+that distinguish these tangible things from one another. And in so far
+the philosophy of Anaximander is materialistic.
+
+[Sidenote: Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism.]
+
+§ 104. But the earliest thinkers are said to be _hylozoists_, rather
+than strict materialists, because of their failure to make certain
+distinctions in connection with the _processes_ of matter. The term
+hylozoism unites with the conception of the formless material of the
+world (+hylê+), that of an animating power to which its formations and
+transformations are due. Hylozoism itself was not a deliberate synthesis
+of these two conceptions, but a primitive practical tendency to
+universalize the conception, of life. Such "animism" instinctively
+associates with an object's bulk and hardness a capacity for locomotion
+and general initiative. And the material principles defined by the
+philosophers retain this vague and comprehensive attribute as a matter
+of course, until it is distinguished and separated through attempts to
+understand it.
+
+That aspect of natural process which was most impressive to Greek minds
+of the reflective type was the alternation of "generation and decay." In
+full accord with his more ancient master, Epicurus, the Latin poet
+Lucretius writes:
+
+     "Thus neither can death-dealing motions keep the mastery
+     always, nor entomb existence forevermore; nor, on the other
+     hand, can the birth and increase giving motions of things
+     preserve them always after they are born. Thus the war of
+     first beginnings waged from eternity is carried on with
+     dubious issue: now here, now there, the life-bringing elements
+     of things get the mastery and are o'ermastered in turn: with
+     the funeral wail blends the cry which babies raise when they
+     enter the borders of light; and no night ever followed day,
+     nor morning night, that heard not, mingling with the sickly
+     infant's cries, wailings of the attendants on death and black
+     funeral."[226:2]
+
+In a similar vein, the earliest conceptions of natural evolution
+attributed it to the coworking of two principles, that of Love or union
+and that of Hate or dissolution. The process is here distinguished from
+the material of nature, but is still described in the language of
+practical life. A distinction between two aspects of vital phenomena is
+the next step. These may be regarded in respect either of the motion and
+change which attend them, or the rationality which informs them. Life is
+both effective and significant. Although neither of these ideas ever
+wholly ceases to be animistic, they may nevertheless be applied quite
+independently of one another. The one reduces the primitive animistic
+world to the lower end of its scale, the other construes it in terms of
+a purposive utility commensurable with that of human action. Now it is
+with _mechanism_, the former of these diverging ways, that the
+development of materialism is identified. For this philosophy a thing
+need have no value to justify its existence, nor any acting intelligence
+to which it may owe its origin. Its bulk and position are sufficient for
+its being, and the operation of forces capable of integrating, dividing,
+or moving it is sufficient for its derivation and history. In short,
+there is no rhyme or reason at the heart of things, but only actual
+matter distributed by sheer force. With this elimination of the element
+of purposiveness from the hylozoistic world, the content and process of
+nature are fitted to one another. Matter is that which is moved by
+force, and force is the determining principle of the motions of matter.
+Materialism is now definitely equipped with its fundamental conceptions.
+
+[Sidenote: Materialism and Physical Science.]
+
+§ 105. The central conceptions of materialism as a philosophical theory
+differ from those employed in the physical sciences only in what is
+demanded of them. The scientist reports upon physical phenomena without
+accepting any further responsibility, while those who like Lucretius
+maintain a physical metaphysics, must, like him, prove that "the minute
+bodies of matter from everlasting continually uphold the sum of things."
+But, though they employ them in their own way, materialists and all
+other exponents of naturalism derive their central conceptions from the
+physical sciences, and so reflect the historical development through
+which these sciences have passed. To certain historical phases of
+physical science, in so far as these bear directly upon the meaning of
+naturalism, we now turn.
+
+[Sidenote: The Development of the Conceptions of Physical Science. Space
+and Matter.]
+
+§ 106. From the earliest times down to the present day the groundwork of
+materialism has most commonly been cast in the form of an _atomic
+theory_. Democritus, the first system-builder of this school, adopted
+the conception of indivisible particles (+atomoi+), impenetrable in
+their occupancy of space, and varying among themselves only in form,
+order, and position. To provide for the motion that distributes them he
+conceived them as separated from one another by empty space. From this
+it follows that the void is as real as matter, or, as Democritus himself
+is reputed to have said, "thing is not more real than no-thing."
+
+But atomism has not been by any means universally regarded as the most
+satisfactory conception of the relation between space and matter. Not
+only does it require two kinds of being, with the different attributes
+of extension and hardness, respectively,[229:3] but it would also seem
+to be experimentally inadequate in the case of the more subtle physical
+processes, such as light. The former of these is a speculative
+consideration, and as such had no little weight with the French
+philosopher Descartes, whose divisions and definitions so profoundly
+affected the course of thought in these matters after the sixteenth
+century. Holding also "that a vacuum or space in which there is
+absolutely no body is repugnant to reason," and that an indivisible
+space-filling particle is self-contradictory, he was led to _identify
+space and matter_; that is, to make matter as indispensable to space as
+space to matter. There is, then, but one kind of corporeal being, whose
+attribute is extension, and whose modes are motion and rest. The most
+famous application of the mechanical conceptions which he bases upon
+this first principle, is his theory of the planets, which are conceived
+to be embedded in a transparent medium, and to move with it, vortex
+fashion, about the sun.[230:4]
+
+But the conception of the space-filling continuity of material substance
+owes its prominence at the present time to the experimental hypothesis
+of _ether_. This substance, originally conceived to occupy the
+intermolecular spaces and to serve as a medium for the propagation of
+undulations, is now regarded by many physicists as replacing matter. "It
+is the great hope of science at the present day," says a contemporary
+exponent of naturalism, "that hard and heavy matter will be shown to be
+ether in motion."[231:5] Such a theory would reduce bodies to the
+relative displacements of parts of a continuous substance, which would
+be first of all defined as spacial, and would possess such further
+properties as special scientific hypotheses might require.
+
+Two broadly contrasting theories thus appear: that which defines matter
+as a continuous substance coextensive with space; and that which defines
+it as a discrete substance divided by empty space. But both theories are
+seriously affected by the peculiarly significant development of the
+conception of force.
+
+[Sidenote: Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the
+Conception of Force.]
+
+§ 107. In the Cartesian system the cause of motion was pressure within a
+plenum. But in the seventeenth century this notion encountered the
+system of Newton, a system which seemed to involve action at a distance.
+In the year 1728 Voltaire wrote from London:
+
+     "When a Frenchman arrives in London, he finds a very great
+     change, in philosophy as well as in most other things. In
+     Paris he left the world all full of matter; here he finds
+     absolute vacua. At Paris the universe is seen filled up with
+     ethereal vortices, while here the same space is occupied with
+     the play of the invisible forces of gravitation. In Paris the
+     earth is painted for us longish like an egg, and in London it
+     is oblate like a melon. At Paris the pressure of the moon
+     causes the ebb and flow of tides; in England, on the other
+     hand, the sea gravitates toward the moon, so that at the same
+     time when the Parisians demand high water of the moon, the
+     gentlemen of London require an ebb."[232:6]
+
+But these differences are not matters of taste, nor even rival
+hypotheses upon an equal footing. The Newtonian system of mechanics, the
+consummation of a development initiated by Galileo, differed from the
+vortex theory of Descartes as exact science differs from speculation and
+unverified conjecture. And this difference of method carried with it
+eventually certain profound differences of content, distinguishing the
+Newtonian theory even from that of Democritus, with which it had so much
+in common. Although Democritus had sought to avoid the element of
+purposiveness in the older hylozoism by referring the motions of bodies
+as far as possible to the impact of other bodies, he nevertheless
+attributed these motions ultimately to _weight_, signifying thereby a
+certain _downward disposition_. Now it is true that in his general
+belief Newton himself is not free from hylozoism. He thought of the
+motions of the planets themselves as initiated and quickened by a power
+emanating ultimately from God. They are "impressed by an intelligent
+Agent," and
+
+     "can be the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and skill
+     of a powerful ever-living Agent who, being in all places, is
+     more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless
+     uniform _sensorium_, and thereby to form and reform the parts
+     of the universe, than we are by our will to move the parts of
+     our own bodies."[233:7]
+
+But by the side of these statements must be set his famous disclaimer,
+"_hypotheses non fingo_." In his capacity of natural philosopher he did
+not seek to explain motions, but only to describe them. Disbelieving as
+he did in action at a distance, he saw no possibility of explanation
+short of a reference of them to God; but such "hypotheses" he thought to
+be no proper concern of science. As a consequence, the mathematical
+formulation of motions came, through him, to be regarded as the entire
+content of mechanics. The notion of an efficient cause of motion is
+still suggested by the term _force_, but even this term within the
+system of mechanics refers always to a definite amount of motion, or
+measurement of relative motion. And the same is true of _attraction_,
+_action_, _reaction_, and the like. The further explanation of motion,
+the definition of a virtue or potency that produces it, first a
+neglected problem, then an irrelevant problem, is finally, for a
+naturalistic philosophy in which this progression is completed, an
+insoluble problem. For the sequel to this purely descriptive procedure
+on the part of science is the disavowal of "metaphysics" by those who
+will have no philosophy but science. Thus the scientific conservatism of
+Newton has led to the positivistic and agnostic phase of naturalism. But
+a further treatment of this development must be reserved until the issue
+of epistemology shall have been definitely raised.
+
+A different emphasis within the general mechanical scheme, attaching
+especial importance to the conceptions of force and energy, has led to a
+rival tendency in science and a contrasting type of naturalism. The
+mechanical hypotheses hitherto described are all of a simple and readily
+depicted type. They suggest an imagery quite in accord with common-sense
+and with observation of the motions of great masses like the planets.
+Material particles are conceived to move within a containing space; the
+motions of corpuscles, atoms, or the minute parts of ether, differing
+only in degree from those of visible bodies. The whole physical
+universe may be represented in the imagination as an aggregate of bodies
+participating in motions of extraordinary complexity, but of one type.
+But now let the emphasis be placed upon the determining causes rather
+than upon the moving bodies themselves. In other words, let the bodies
+be regarded as attributive and the forces as substantive. The result is
+a radical alteration of the mechanical scheme and the transcendence of
+common-sense imagery. This was one direction of outgrowth from the work
+of Newton. His force of gravitation prevailed between bodies separated
+by spaces of great magnitude. Certain of the followers of Newton,
+notably Cotes, accepting the formulas of the master but neglecting his
+allusions to the agency of God, accepted the principle of action at a
+distance. _Force_, in short, _was conceived to pervade space of itself_.
+But if force be granted this substantial and self-dependent character,
+what further need is there of matter as a separate form of entity? For
+does not the presence of matter consist essentially in resistance,
+itself a case of force? Such reflections as these led Boscovich and
+others to the radical departure of defining material particles _as
+centres of force_.
+
+[Sidenote: The Development and Extension of the Conception of Energy.]
+
+§ 108. But a more fruitful hypothesis of the same general order is due
+to the attention directed to the conception of _energy_, or capacity for
+work, by experimental discoveries of the possibility of reciprocal
+transformations without loss, of motion, heat, electricity, and other
+processes. The principle of the conservation of energy affirms the
+quantitative constancy of that which is so transformed, measured, for
+example, in terms of capacity to move units of mass against gravity. The
+exponents of what is called "energetics" have in many cases come to
+regard that the quantity of which is so conserved, as a substantial
+reality whose forms and distributions compose nature. A contemporary
+scientist, whose synthetic and dogmatic habit of mind has made him
+eminent in the ranks of popular philosophy, writes as follows:
+
+     "Mechanical and chemical energy, sound and heat, light and
+     electricity, are mutually convertible; they seem to be but
+     different modes of one and the same fundamental force or
+     _energy_. Thence follows the important thesis of the unity of
+     all natural forces, or, as it may also be expressed, the
+     'monism of energy.'"[236:8]
+
+The conception of energy seems, indeed, to afford an exceptional
+opportunity to naturalism. We have seen that the matter-motion theory
+was satisfied to ignore, or regard as insoluble, problems concerning the
+ultimate causes of things. Furthermore, as we shall presently see to
+better advantage, the more strictly materialistic type of naturalism
+must regard thought as an anomaly, and has no little difficulty with
+life. But the conception of energy is more adaptable, and hence better
+qualified to serve as a common denominator for various aspects of
+experience. The very readiness with which we can picture the corpuscular
+scheme is a source of embarrassment to the seeker after unity. That
+which is so distinct is bristling with incompatibilities. The most
+aggressive materialist hesitates to describe thought as a motion of
+bodies in space. Energy, on the other hand, exacts little if anything
+beyond the character of measurable power. Thought is at any rate in some
+sense a power, and to some degree measurable. Recent discoveries of the
+dependence of capacity for mental exertion upon physical vitality and
+measurements of chemical energy received into the system as food, and
+somehow exhausted by the activities of thought, have lent plausibility
+to the hypothesis of a universal energy of which physical and
+"psychical" processes are alike manifestations. And the conception of
+energy seems capable not only of unifying nature, but also of satisfying
+the metaphysical demand for an efficient and moving cause. This term,
+like "force" and "power," is endowed with such a significance by common
+sense. Indeed, naturalism would seem here to have swung round toward its
+hylozoistic starting-point. The exponent of energetics, like the naive
+animistic thinker, attributes to nature a power like that which he feels
+welling up within himself. When he acts upon the environment, like meets
+like. Energetics, it is true, may obtain a definite meaning for its
+central conception from the measurable behavior of external bodies, and
+a meaning that may be quite free from vitalism or teleology. But in his
+extension of the conception the author of a philosophical energetics
+abandons this strict meaning, and blends his thought even with a phase
+of subjectivism, known as _panpsychism_.[238:9] This theory regards the
+inward life of all nature as homogeneous with an immediately felt
+activity or appetency, as energetics finds the inner life to be
+homogeneous with the forces of nature. Both owe their philosophical
+appeal to their apparent success in unifying the world upon a direct
+empirical basis, and to their provision for the practical sense of
+reality.
+
+Such, in brief, are the main alternatives available for a naturalistic
+theory of being, in consequence of the historical development of the
+fundamental conceptions of natural science.
+
+[Sidenote: The Claims of Naturalism.]
+
+§ 109. We turn now to an examination of the manner in which naturalism,
+equipped with working principles, seeks to meet the special requirements
+of philosophy. The conception of the unity of nature is directly in the
+line of a purely scientific development, but naturalism takes the bold
+and radical step of regarding nature so unified as coextensive with the
+real, or at any rate knowable, universe. It will be remembered that
+among the early Greeks Anaxagoras had referred the creative and
+formative processes of nature to a non-natural or rational agency, which
+he called the _Nous_. The adventitious character of this principle, the
+external and almost purely nominal part which it played in the actual
+cosmology of Anaxagoras, betrayed it into the hands of the atomists,
+with their more consistently naturalistic creed. Better, these maintain,
+the somewhat dogmatic extension of conceptions proved to be successful
+in the description of nature, than a vague dualism which can serve only
+to distract the scientific attention and people the world with
+obscurities. There is a remarkable passage in Lucretius in which atomism
+is thus written large and inspired with cosmical eloquence:
+
+     "For verily not by design did the first-beginnings of things
+     station themselves each in its right place guided by keen
+     intelligence, nor did they bargain sooth to say what motions
+     each should assume, but because many in number and shifting
+     about in many ways throughout the universe, they are driven
+     and tormented by blows during infinite time past, after trying
+     motions and unions of every kind at length they fall into
+     arrangements such as those out of which our sum of things has
+     been formed, and by which too it is preserved through many
+     great years, when once it has been thrown into the appropriate
+     motions, and causes the streams to replenish the greedy sea
+     with copious river waters, and the earth, fostered by the heat
+     of the sun, to renew its produce, and the race of living
+     things to come up and flourish, and the gliding fires of ether
+     to live: all which these several things could in no wise bring
+     to pass, unless a store of matter could rise up from infinite
+     space, out of which store they are wont to make up in due
+     season whatever has been lost."[240:10]
+
+The prophecy of La Place, the great French mathematician, voices the
+similar faith of the eighteenth century in a mechanical understanding
+of the universe:
+
+     "The human mind, in the perfection it has been able to give to
+     astronomy, affords a feeble outline of such an intelligence.
+     Its discoveries in mechanics and in geometry, joined to that
+     of universal gravitation, have brought it within reach of
+     comprehending in the same analytical expressions the past and
+     future states of the system of the world."[241:11]
+
+As for God, the creative and presiding intelligence, La Place had "no
+need of any such hypothesis."
+
+[Sidenote: The Task of Naturalism.]
+
+§ 110. But these are the boasts of Homeric heroes before going into
+battle. The moment such a general position is assumed there arise sundry
+difficulties in the application of naturalistic principles to special
+interests and groups of facts. It is one thing to project a mechanical
+scheme in the large, but quite another to make explicit provision within
+it for the origin of nature, for life, for the human self with its
+ideals, and for society with its institutions. The naturalistic method
+of meeting these problems involves a reduction all along the line in the
+direction of such categories as are derived from the infra-organic
+world. That which is not like the planetary system must be construed as
+mechanical by indirection and subtlety.
+
+[Sidenote: The Origin of the Cosmos.]
+
+§ 111. The origin of the present known natural world was the first
+philosophical question to be definitely met by science. The general form
+of solution which naturalism offers is anticipated in the most ancient
+theories of nature. These already suppose that the observed mechanical
+processes of the circular or periodic type, like the revolutions and
+rotations of the stars, are incidents in a historical mechanical process
+of a larger scale. Prior to the present fixed motions of the celestial
+bodies, the whole mass of cosmic matter participated in irregular
+motions analogous to present terrestrial redistributions. Such motions
+may be understood to have resulted in the integration of separate
+bodies, to which they at the same time imparted a rotary motion. It is
+such a hypothesis that Lucretius paints in his bold, impressionistic
+colors.
+
+But the development of mechanics paved the way for a definite scientific
+theory, the so-called "nebular hypothesis," announced by La Place in
+1796, and by the philosopher Kant at a still earlier date. Largely
+through the Newtonian principle of the parallelogram of forces, the
+present masses, orbits, and velocities were analyzed into a more
+primitive process of concentration within a nebulous or highly diffused
+aggregate of matter. And with the aid of the principle of the
+conservation of energy this theory appears to make possible the
+derivation of heat, light, and other apparently non-mechanical processes
+from the same original energy of motion.
+
+But a persistently philosophical mind at once raises the question of the
+origin of this primeval nebula itself, with a definite organization and
+a vast potential energy that must, after all, be regarded as a part of
+nature rather than its source. Several courses are here open to
+naturalism. It may maintain that the question of ultimate origin is
+unanswerable; it may regard such a process of concentration as extending
+back through an infinitely long past;[243:12] or, and this is the
+favorite alternative for more constructive minds, the historical
+cosmical process may be included within a still higher type of periodic
+process, which is regarded as eternal. This last course has been
+followed in the well-known synthetic naturalism of Herbert Spencer.
+"Evolution," he says, "is the progressive integration of matter and
+dissipation of motion." But such a process eventually runs down, and may
+be conceived as giving place to a counter-process of devolution which
+scatters the parts of matter and gathers another store of potential
+motion. The two processes in alternation will then constitute a cosmical
+system without beginning or end.
+
+In such wise a sweeping survey of the physical universe may be thought
+in the terms of natural science. The uniformitarian method in geology,
+resolving the history of the crust of the earth into known processes,
+such as erosion and igneous fusion;[244:13] and spectral analysis, with
+its discoveries concerning the chemical constituents of distant bodies
+through the study of their light, have powerfully reënforced this effort
+of thought, and apparently completed an outline sketch of the universe
+in terms of infra-organic processes.
+
+[Sidenote: Life. Natural Selection.]
+
+§ 112. But the cosmos must be made internally homogeneous in these same
+terms. There awaits solution, in the first place, the serious problem of
+the genesis and maintenance of life within a nature that is originally
+and ultimately inorganic. The assimilation of the field of biology and
+physiology to the mechanical cosmos had made little real progress prior
+to the nineteenth century. Mechanical theories had, indeed, been
+projected in the earliest age of philosophy, and proposed anew in the
+seventeenth century.[245:14] Nevertheless, the structural and functional
+teleology of the organism remained as apparently irrefutable testimony
+to the inworking of some principle other than that of mechanical
+necessity. Indeed, the only fruitful method applicable to organic
+phenomena was that which explained them in terms of purposive
+adaptation. And it was its provision for a mechanical interpretation of
+this very principle that gave to the Darwinian _law of natural
+selection_, promulgated in 1859 in the "Origin of Species," so profound
+a significance for naturalism. It threatened to reduce the last
+stronghold of teleology, and completely to dispense with the intelligent
+Author of nature.
+
+Darwin's hypothesis sought to explain the origin of animal species by
+survival under competitive conditions of existence through the
+possession of a structure suited to the environment. Only the most
+elementary organism need be presupposed, together with slight variations
+in the course of subsequent generations, and both may be conceived to
+arise mechanically. There will then result in surviving organisms a
+gradual accumulation of such variations as promote survival under the
+special conditions of the environment. Such a principle had been
+suggested as early as the time of Empedocles, but it remained for Darwin
+to establish it with an unanswerable array of observation and
+experimentation. If any organism whatsoever endowed with the power of
+generation be allowed to have somehow come to be, naturalism now
+promises to account for the whole subsequent history of organic
+phenomena and the origin of any known species.
+
+[Sidenote: Mechanical Physiology.]
+
+§ 113. But what of life itself? The question of the derivation of
+organic from inorganic matter has proved insoluble by direct means, and
+the case of naturalism must here rest upon such facts as the chemical
+homogeneity of these two kinds of matter, and the conformity of
+physiological processes to more general physical laws. Organic matter
+differs from inorganic only through the presence of proteid, a peculiar
+product of known elements, which cannot be artificially produced, but
+which is by natural means perpetually dissolved into these elements
+without any discoverable residuum. Respiration may be studied as a case
+of aerodynamics, the circulation of the blood as a case of
+hydrodynamics, and the heat given off in the course of work done by the
+body as a case of thermodynamics. And although vitalistic theories still
+retain a place in physiology, as do teleological theories in biology, on
+the whole the naturalistic programme of a reduction of organic processes
+to the type of the inorganic tends to prevail.
+
+[Sidenote: Mind. The Reduction to Sensation.]
+
+§ 114. The history of naturalism shows that, as in the case of life, so
+also in the case of _mind_, its hypotheses were projected by the Greeks,
+but precisely formulated and verified only in the modern period of
+science. In the philosophy of Democritus the soul was itself an atom,
+finer, rounder, and smoother than the ordinary, but thoroughly a part of
+the mechanism of nature. The processes of the soul are construed as
+interactions between the soul and surrounding objects. In sensation, the
+thing perceived produces images by means of effluxes which impinge upon
+the soul-atom. These images are not true reports of the outer world, but
+must be revised by thought before its real atomic structure emerges.
+For this higher critical exercise of thought Democritus devised no
+special atomic genesis. The result may be expressed either as the
+invalidity of such operations of mind as he could provide for in his
+universe, or the irreducibility to his chosen first principles of the
+very thought which defined them. Later naturalism has generally
+sacrificed epistemology to cosmology, and reduced thought to sensation.
+Similarly, will has been regarded as a highly developed case of
+instinct. Knowledge and will, construed as sensation and instinct, may
+thus be interpreted in the naturalistic manner within the field of
+biology.
+
+[Sidenote: Automatism.]
+
+§ 115. But the actual content of sensation, and the actual feelings
+which attend upon the promptings of instinct, still stubbornly testify
+to the presence in the universe of something belonging to a wholly
+different category from matter and motion. The attitude of naturalism in
+this crucial issue has never been fixed and unwavering, but there has
+gradually come to predominate a method of denying to the inner life all
+efficacy and real significance in the cosmos, while admitting its
+presence on the scene. It is a strange fact of history that Descartes,
+the French philosopher who prided himself on having rid the soul of all
+dependence on nature, should have greatly contributed to this method.
+But it is perhaps not so strange when we consider that every dualism is,
+after all, symmetrical, and that consequently whatever rids the soul of
+nature at the same time rids nature of the soul. It was Descartes who
+first conceived the body and soul to be utterly distinct substances. The
+corollary to this doctrine was his _automatism_, applied in his own
+system to animals other than man, but which those less concerned with
+religious tradition and less firmly convinced of the soul's originating
+activity were not slow to apply universally. This theory conceived the
+vital processes to take place quite regardless of any inner
+consciousness, or even without its attendance. To this radical theory
+the French materialists of the eighteenth century were especially
+attracted. With them the active soul of Descartes, the distinct
+spiritual entity, disappeared. This latter author had himself admitted a
+department of the self, which he called the "passions," in which the
+course and content of mind is determined by bodily conditions. Extending
+this conception to the whole province of mind, they employed it to
+demonstrate the thorough-going subordination of mind to body. La
+Mettrie, a physician and the author of a book entitled "L'Homme
+Machine," was first interested in this thesis by a fever delirium, and
+afterward adduced anatomical and pathological data in support of it. The
+angle from which he views human life is well illustrated in the
+following:
+
+     "What would have sufficed in the case of Julius Cæsar, of
+     Seneca, of Petronius, to turn their fearlessness into timidity
+     or braggartry? An obstruction in the spleen, the liver, or the
+     _vena portae_. For the imagination is intimately connected
+     with these viscera, and from them arise all the curious
+     phenomena of hypochondria and hysteria. . . . 'A mere nothing,
+     a little fibre, some trifling thing that the most subtle
+     anatomy cannot discover, would have made two idiots out of
+     Erasmus and Fontenelle.'"[250:15]
+
+[Sidenote: Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon.]
+
+§ 116. The extreme claim that the soul is a physical organ of the body,
+identical with the brain, marked the culmination of this militant
+materialism, so good an instance of that over-simplification and
+whole-hearted conviction characteristic of the doctrinaire propagandism
+of France. Locke, the Englishman, had admitted that possibly the
+substance which thinks is corporeal. In the letters of Voltaire this
+thought has already found a more positive expression:
+
+     "I am body, and I think; more I do not know. Shall I then
+     attribute to an unknown cause what I can so easily attribute
+     to the only fruitful cause I am acquainted with? In fact,
+     where is the man who, without an absurd godlessness, dare
+     assert that it is impossible for the Creator to endow matter
+     with thought and feeling?"[251:16]
+
+Finally, Holbach, the great systematizer of this movement, takes the
+affair out of the hands of the Creator and definitively announces that
+"a sensitive soul is nothing but a human brain so constituted that it
+easily receives the motions communicated to it."[251:17]
+
+This theory has been considerably tempered since the age of Holbach.
+Naturalism has latterly been less interested in identifying the soul
+with the body, and more interested in demonstrating its dependence upon
+specific bodily conditions, after the manner of La Mettrie. The
+so-called higher faculties, such as thought and will, have been related
+to central or _cortical_ processes of the nervous system, processes of
+connection and complication which within the brain itself supplement the
+impulses and sensations congenitally and externally stimulated. The
+term "epiphenomenon" has been adopted to express the distinctness but
+entire dependence of the mind. Man is "a conscious automaton." The real
+course of nature passes through his nervous system, while consciousness
+attends upon its functions like a shadow, present but not
+efficient.[252:18]
+
+[Sidenote: Knowledge, Positivism and Agnosticism.]
+
+§ 117. Holbach's "Système de la Nature," published in 1770, marks the
+culmination of the unequivocally materialistic form of naturalism. Its
+epistemological difficulties, always more or less in evidence, have
+since that day sufficed to discredit materialism, and to foster the
+growth of a critical and apologetic form of naturalism known as
+_positivism_ or _agnosticism_. The modesty of this doctrine does not, it
+is true, strike very deep. For, although it disclaims knowledge of
+ultimate reality, it also forbids anyone else to have any. Knowledge, it
+affirms, can be of but one type, that which comprises the verifiable
+laws governing nature. All questions concerning first causes are
+futile, a stimulus only to excursions of fancy popularly mistaken for
+knowledge. The superior certainty and stability which attaches to
+natural science is to be permanently secured by the savant's steadfast
+refusal to be led away after the false gods of metaphysics.
+
+But though this is sufficient ground for an agnostic policy, it does
+prove an agnostic theory. The latter has sprung from a closer analysis
+of knowledge, though it fails to make a very brave showing for
+thoroughness and consistency. The crucial point has already been brought
+within our view. The general principles of naturalism require that
+knowledge shall be reduced to sensations, or impressions of the
+environment upon the organism. But the environment and the sensations do
+not correspond. The environment is matter and motion, force and energy;
+the sensations are of motions, to be sure, but much more conspicuously
+of colors, sounds, odors, pleasures, and pains. Critically, this may be
+expressed by saying that since the larger part of sense-perception is so
+unmistakably subjective, and since all knowledge alike must be derived
+from this source, knowledge as a whole must be regarded as dealing only
+with appearances. There are at least three agnostic methods progressing
+from this point. All agree that the inner or essential reality is
+unfathomable. But, in the first place, those most close to the tradition
+of materialism maintain that the most significant appearances, the
+primary qualities, are those which compose a purely quantitative and
+corporeal world. The inner essence of things may at any rate be
+_approached_ by a monism of matter or of energy. This theory is
+epistemological only to the extent of moderating its claims in the hope
+of lessening its responsibility. Another agnosticism places all sense
+qualities on a par, but would regard physics and psychology as
+complementary reports upon the two distinct series of phenomena in which
+the underlying reality expresses itself. This theory is epistemological
+to the extent of granting knowledge, viewed as perception, as good a
+standing in the universe as that which is accorded to its object. But
+such a dualism tends almost irresistibly to relapse into materialistic
+monism, because of the fundamental place of physical conceptions in the
+system of the sciences. Finally, in another and a more radical phase of
+agnosticism, we find an attempt to make full provision for the
+legitimate problems of epistemology. The only datum, the only existent
+accessible to knowledge, is said to be the sensation, or state of
+consciousness. In the words of Huxley:
+
+     "What, after all, do we know of this terrible 'matter' except
+     as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of
+     our own consciousness? And what do we know of that 'spirit'
+     over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation
+     is arising, . . . except that it is also a name for an unknown
+     and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of
+     consciousness?"[255:19]
+
+The physical world is now to be regarded as a construction which does
+not assimilate to itself the content of sensations, but enables one to
+anticipate them. The sensation signifies a contact to which science can
+provide a key for practical guidance.
+
+[Sidenote: Experimentalism.]
+
+§ 118. This last phase of naturalism is an attempt to state a pure and
+consistent experimentalism, a workable theory of the routine of
+sensations. But it commonly falls into the error of the vicious circle.
+The hypothetical cause of sensations is said to be matter. From this
+point of view the sensation is a complex, comprising elaborate physical
+and physiological processes. But these processes themselves, on the
+other hand, are said to be analyzable into sensations. Now two such
+methods of analysis cannot be equally ultimate. If all of reality is
+finally reducible to sensations, then the term sensation must be used
+in a new sense to connote a self-subsistent being, and can no longer
+refer merely to a function of certain physiological processes. The issue
+of this would be some form of idealism or of the experience-philosophy
+that is now coming so rapidly to the front.[256:20] But while it is true
+that idealism has sometimes been intended, and that a radically new
+philosophy of experience has sometimes been closely approached, those,
+nevertheless, who have developed experimentalism from the naturalistic
+stand-point have in reality achieved only a thinly disguised
+materialism. For _the very ground of their agnosticism is
+materialistic_.[256:21] Knowledge of reality itself is said to be
+unattainable, because knowledge, in order to come within the order of
+nature, must be regarded as reducible to sensation; and because
+sensation itself, when regarded as a part of nature, is only a
+physiological process, a special phenomenon, in no way qualified to be
+knowledge that is true of reality.
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic.]
+
+§ 119. Perhaps, after all, it would be as fair to the spirit of
+naturalism to relieve it of responsibility for an epistemology. It has
+never thoroughly reckoned with this problem. It has deliberately
+selected from among the elements of experience, and been so highly
+constructive in its method as to forfeit its claim to pure empiricism;
+and, on the other hand, has, in this same selection of categories and in
+its insistence upon the test of experiment, fallen short of a
+thorough-going rationalism. While, on the one hand, it defines and
+constructs, it does so, on the other hand, within the field of
+perception and with constant reference to the test of perception. The
+explanation and justification of this procedure is to be found in the
+aim of natural science rather than in that of philosophy. It is this
+special interest, rather than the general problem of being, that
+determines the order of its categories. Naturalism as an account of
+reality is acceptable only so far as its success in satisfying specific
+demands obtains for it a certain logical immunity. These demands are
+unquestionably valid and fundamental, but they are not coextensive with
+the demand for truth. They coincide rather with the immediate practical
+need of a formulation of the spacial and temporal changes that confront
+the will. Hence naturalism is acceptable to common-sense as an account
+of what the every-day attitude to the environment treats as its object.
+Naturalism is common-sense about the "outer world," revised and brought
+up to date with the aid of the results of science. Its deepest spring is
+the organic instinct for the reality of the tangible, the vital
+recognition of the significance of that which is on the plane of
+interaction with the body.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+[Sidenote: General Ethical Stand-point.]
+
+§ 120. Oddly enough, although common-sense is ready to intrust to
+naturalism the description of the situation of life, it prefers to deal
+otherwise with its ideals. Indeed, common-sense is not without a certain
+suspicion that naturalism is the advocate of moral reversion. It is
+recognized as the prophecy of the brute majority of life, of those
+considerations of expediency and pleasure that are the warrant for its
+secular moods rather than for its sustaining ideals. And that strand of
+life is indeed its special province. For the naturalistic method of
+reduction must find the key to human action among those practical
+conditions that are common to man and his inferiors in the scale of
+being. In short, human life, like all life, must be construed as the
+adjustment of the organism to its natural environment for the sake of
+preservation and economic advancement.
+
+[Sidenote: Cynicism and Cyrenaicism.]
+
+§ 121. Early in Greek philosophy this general idea of life was
+picturesquely interpreted in two contrasting ways, those of the Cynic
+and the Cyrenaic. Both of these wise men postulated the spiritual
+indifference of the universe at large, and looked only to the _contact_
+of life with its immediate environment. But while the one hoped only to
+hedge himself about, the other sought confidently the gratification of
+his sensibilities. The figure of the Cynic is the more familiar.
+Diogenes of the tub practised self-mortification until his dermal and
+spiritual callousness were alike impervious. From behind his protective
+sheath he could without affectation despise both nature and society. He
+could reckon himself more blessed than Alexander, because, with demand
+reduced to the minimum, he could be sure of a surplus of supply. Having
+renounced all goods save the bare necessities of life, he could neglect
+both promises and threats and be played upon by no one. He was securely
+intrenched within himself, an unfurnished habitation, but the citadel of
+a king. The Cyrenaic, on the other hand, did not seek to make impervious
+the surface of contact with nature and society, but sought to heighten
+its sensibility, that it might become a medium of pleasurable feeling.
+For the inspiration with which it may be pursued this ideal has nowhere
+been more eloquently set forth than in the pages of Walter Pater, who
+styles himself "the new Cyrenaic."
+
+     "Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the
+     end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a
+     variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is
+     to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass
+     most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the
+     focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their
+     purest energy?
+
+     To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this
+     ecstacy, is success in life. . . . While all melts under our
+     feet, we may well catch at any exquisite passion, or any
+     contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to
+     set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the
+     senses, strange dyes, strange colors, and curious odors, or
+     work of the artist's hands, or the face of one's friend. Not
+     to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those
+     about us, and in the brilliancy of their gifts some tragic
+     dividing of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of
+     frost and sun, to sleep before evening."[261:22]
+
+[Sidenote: Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception of
+Social Relations.]
+
+§ 122. In the course of modern philosophy the ethics of naturalism has
+undergone a transformation and development that equip it much more
+formidably for its competition with rival theories. If the Cynic and
+Cyrenaic philosophies of life seem too egoistic and narrow in outlook,
+this inadequacy has been largely overcome through the modern conception
+of the relation of the individual to society. Man is regarded as so
+dependent upon social relations that it is both natural and rational for
+him to govern his actions with a concern for the community. There was a
+time when this relation of dependence was viewed as external, a barter
+of goods between the individual and society, sanctioned by an implied
+contract. Thomas Hobbes, whose unblushing materialism and egoism
+stimulated by opposition the whole development of English ethics,
+conceived morality to consist in rules of action which condition the
+stability of the state, and so secure for the individual that "peace"
+which self-interest teaches him is essential to his welfare.
+
+     "And therefore so long a man is in the condition of mere
+     nature, which is a condition of war, as private appetite is
+     the measure of good and evil: and consequently all men agree
+     on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the ways or
+     means of peace, which, as I have showed before, are 'justice,'
+     'gratitude,' 'modesty,' 'equity,' 'mercy,' and the rest of
+     the laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, 'moral virtues';
+     and their contrary 'vices,' evil."[262:23]
+
+Jeremy Bentham, the apostle of utilitarianism in the eighteenth century,
+defined political and social sanctions through which the individual
+could purchase security and good repute with action conducive to the
+common welfare. But the nineteenth century has understood the matter
+better--and the idea of an evolution under conditions that select and
+reject, is here again the illuminating thought. No individual,
+evolutionary naturalism maintains, has survived the perils of life
+without possessing as an inalienable part of his nature, congenital like
+his egoism, certain impulses and instinctive desires in the interest of
+the community as a whole. The latest generation of a race whose
+perpetuation has been conditioned by a capacity to sustain social
+relations and make common cause against a more external environment,
+_is_ moral, and does not adopt morality in the course of a calculating
+egoism. Conscience is the racial instinct of self-preservation uttering
+itself in the individual member, who draws his very life-blood from the
+greater organism.
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic.]
+
+§ 123. This latest word of naturalistic ethics has not won acceptance
+as the last word in ethics, and this in spite of its indubitable truth
+within its scope. For the deeper ethical interest seeks not so much to
+account for the moral nature as to construe and justify its promptings.
+The evolutionary theory reveals the genesis of conscience, and
+demonstrates its continuity with nature, but this falls as far short of
+realizing the purpose of ethical study as a history of the natural
+genesis of thought would fall short of logic. Indeed, naturalism shows
+here, as in the realm of epistemology, a persistent failure to
+appreciate the central problem. Its acceptance as a philosophy, we are
+again reminded, can be accounted for only on the score of its genuinely
+rudimentary character. As a rudimentary phase of thought it is both
+indispensable and inadequate. It is the philosophy of instinct, which
+should in normal development precede a philosophy of reason, in which it
+is eventually assimilated and supplemented.
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion.]
+
+§ 124. There is, finally, an inspiration for life which this philosophy
+of naturalism may convey--atheism, its detractors would call it, but
+none the less a faith and a spiritual exaltation that spring from its
+summing up of truth. It is well first to realize that which is
+dispiriting in it, its failure to provide for the freedom, immortality,
+and moral providence of the more sanguine faith.
+
+     "For what is man looked at from this point of view? . . . Man,
+     so far as natural science by itself is able to teach us, is no
+     longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaven-descended
+     heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his
+     story a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the
+     meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which
+     first converted a dead organic compound into the living
+     progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows
+     nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine,
+     disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords
+     of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a
+     race with conscience enough to feel that it is vile, and
+     intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant. . . . We
+     sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared
+     with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the
+     divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of
+     our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed,
+     and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the
+     race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will
+     go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The
+     uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a
+     brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will
+     be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. 'Imperishable
+     monuments' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself, and love
+     stronger than death, will be as though they had never been.
+     Nor will anything that _is_ be better or be worse for all that
+     the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have
+     striven through countless generations to effect."[265:24]
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, Wonder,
+and Renunciation.]
+
+§ 125. But though our philosopher must accept the truth of this terrible
+picture, he is not left without spiritual resources. The abstract
+religion provided for the agnostic faithful by Herbert Spencer does not,
+it is true, afford any nourishment to the religious nature. He would
+have men look for a deep spring of life in the negative idea of mystery,
+the apotheosis of ignorance, while religious faith to live at all must
+lay hold upon reality. But there does spring from naturalism a positive
+religion, whose fundamental motives are those of service, wonder, and
+renunciation: service of humanity in the present, wonder at the natural
+truth, and renunciation of a universe keyed to vibrate with human
+ideals.
+
+     "Have you," writes Charles Ferguson, "had dreams of Nirvana
+     and sickly visions and raptures? Have you imagined that the
+     end of your life is to be absorbed back into the life of God,
+     and to flee the earth and forget all? Or do you want to walk
+     on air, or fly on wings, or build a heavenly city in the
+     clouds? Come, let us take our kit on our shoulders, and go out
+     and build the city _here_."[265:25]
+
+For Haeckel "natural religion" is such as
+
+     "the astonishment with which we gaze upon the starry heavens
+     and the microscopic life in a drop of water, the awe with
+     which we trace the marvellous working of energy in the motion
+     of matter, the reverence with which we grasp the universal
+     dominance of the law of substance throughout the
+     universe."[266:26]
+
+There is a deeper and a sincerer note in the stout, forlorn humanism of
+Huxley:
+
+     "That which lies before the human race is a constant struggle
+     to maintain and improve, in opposition to the State of Nature,
+     the State of Art of an organized polity; in which, and by
+     which, man may develop a worthy civilization, capable of
+     maintaining and constantly improving itself, until the
+     evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its
+     downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway; and,
+     once more, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of
+     our planet."[266:27]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[223:1] PRELIMINARY NOTE.--By _naturalism_ is meant that system of
+philosophy which defines the universe in the terms of _natural science_.
+In its dogmatic phase, wherein it maintains that _being is corporeal_,
+it is called _materialism_. In its critical phase, wherein it makes the
+general assertion that the natural sciences constitute the only
+_possible knowledge_, whatever be the nature of reality itself, it is
+called _positivism_, _agnosticism_, or simply _naturalism_.
+
+[226:2] Lucretius: _De Rerum Natura_, Bk. II, lines 569-580. Translation
+by Munro.
+
+[229:3] The reader will find an interesting account of these opposing
+views in Locke's chapter on _Space_, in his _Essay Concerning Human
+Understanding_.
+
+[230:4] Descartes distinguished his theory from that of Democritus in
+the _Principles of Philosophy_, Part IV, § ccii.
+
+[231:5] Pearson: _Grammar of Science_, pp. 259-260. Cf. _ibid._, Chap.
+VII, entire.
+
+[232:6] Quoted in Ueberweg: _History of Philosophy_, II, p. 124.
+
+[233:7] Quoted from the _Opticks_ of Newton by James Ward, in his
+_Naturalism and Agnosticism_, I, p. 43.
+
+[236:8] Haeckel: _Riddle of the Universe_. Translation by McCabe, p.
+254.
+
+The best systematic presentation of "energetics" is to be found in
+Ostwald's _Vorlesungen über Natur-Philosophie_. Herbert Spencer, in his
+well-known _First Principles_, makes philosophical use of both "force"
+and "energy."
+
+[238:9] Cf. Chap. IX.
+
+[240:10] Lucretius: _Op. cit._, Bk. I, lines 1021-1237.
+
+[241:11] Quoted from La Place's essay on _Probability_ by Ward: _Op.
+cit._, I, p. 41.
+
+[243:12] An interesting account and criticism of such a theory
+(Clifford's) is to be found in Royce's _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_,
+Lecture X.
+
+[244:13] This method replaced the old theory of "catastrophes" through
+the efforts of the English geologists, Hutton (1726-1797) and Lyell
+(1767-1849).
+
+[245:14] Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, published
+in 1628, was regarded as a step in this direction.
+
+[250:15] From the account of La Mettrie in Lange: _History of
+Materialism_. Translation by Thomas, II, pp. 67-68.
+
+[251:16] Quoted from Voltaire's London _Letter on the English_, by
+Lange: _Op. cit._, II, p. 18.
+
+[251:17] Quoted by Lange: _Op. cit._, II, p. 113.
+
+[252:18] The phrase "psycho-physical parallelism," current in
+psychology, may mean automatism of the kind expounded above, and may
+also mean dualism. It is used commonly as a methodological principle to
+signify that no causal relationship between mind and body, but one of
+_correspondence_, is to be looked for in empirical psychology. Cf. § 99.
+
+[255:19] Quoted by Ward: _Op. cit._, I, p. 18.
+
+[256:20] There are times when Huxley, _e. g._, would seem to be on the
+verge of the Berkeleyan idealism. Cf. Chap. IX.
+
+[256:21] For the case of Karl Pearson, read his _Grammar of Science_,
+Chap. II.
+
+[261:22] Pater: _The Renaissance_, pp. 249-250.
+
+[262:23] Hobbes: _Leviathan,_ Chap. XV.
+
+[265:24] Quoted from Balfour: _Foundations of Belief_, pp. 29-31.
+
+[265:25] Ferguson: _Religion of Democracy_, p. 10.
+
+[266:26] Haeckel: _Op. cit._, p. 344.
+
+[266:27] Huxley: _Evolution and Ethics_, p. 45. _Collected Essays_, Vol.
+IX.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+SUBJECTIVISM[267:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and
+Scepticism.]
+
+§ 126. When, in the year 1710, Bishop Berkeley maintained the thesis of
+empirical idealism, having rediscovered it and announced it with a
+justifiable sense of originality, he provoked a kind of critical
+judgment that was keenly annoying if not entirely surprising to him. In
+refuting the conception of material substance and demonstrating the
+dependence of being upon mind, he at once sought, as he did repeatedly
+in later years, to establish the world of practical belief, and so to
+reconcile metaphysics and common-sense. Yet he found himself hailed as a
+fool and a sceptic. In answer to an inquiry concerning the reception of
+his book in London, his friend Sir John Percival wrote as follows:
+
+     "I did but name the subject matter of your book of
+     _Principles_ to some ingenious friends of mine and they
+     immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time
+     refusing to read it, which I have not yet got one to do. A
+     physician of my acquaintance undertook to discover your
+     person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought
+     to take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire of
+     starting something new should put you upon such an
+     undertaking. Another told me that you are not gone so far as
+     another gentleman in town, who asserts not only that there is
+     no such thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no being
+     at all."[268:2]
+
+There can be no doubt but that the idea of the dependence of real things
+upon their appearance to the individual is a paradox to common-sense. It
+is a paradox because it seems to reverse the theoretical instinct
+itself, and to define the real in those very terms which disciplined
+thought learns to neglect. In the early history of thought the nature of
+the thinker himself is recognized as that which is likely to distort
+truth rather than that which conditions it. When the wise man, the
+devotee of truth, first makes his appearance, his authority is
+acknowledged because he has renounced himself. As witness of the
+universal being he purges himself of whatever is peculiar to his own
+individuality, or even to his human nature. In the aloofness of his
+meditation he escapes the cloud of opinion and prejudice that obscures
+the vision of the common man. In short, the element of belief dependent
+upon the thinker himself is the dross which must be refined away in
+order to obtain the pure truth. When, then, in the critical epoch of the
+Greek sophists, Protagoras declares that there is no belief that is not
+of this character, his philosophy is promptly recognized as scepticism.
+Protagoras argues that sense qualities are clearly dependent upon the
+actual operations of the senses, and that all knowledge reduces
+ultimately to these terms.
+
+     "The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling;
+     there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire,
+     fear, and many more which are named, as well as innumerable
+     others which have no name; _with each of them there is born an
+     object of sense_,--all sorts of colors born with all sorts of
+     sight and sounds in like manner with hearing, and other
+     objects with the other senses."[269:3]
+
+If the objects are "born with" the senses, it follows that they are born
+with and appertain to the individual perceiver.
+
+     "Either show, if you can, that our sensations are not
+     relative and individual, or, if you admit that they are
+     individual, prove that this does not involve the consequence
+     that the appearance becomes, or, if you like to say, is to the
+     individual only."[270:4]
+
+The same motif is thus rendered by Walter Pater in the Conclusion of his
+"Renaissance":
+
+     "At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of
+     external objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and
+     importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand
+     forms of action. But when reflexion begins to act upon those
+     objects they are dissipated under its influence; the cohesive
+     force seems suspended like a trick of magic; each object is
+     loosed into a group of impressions--color, odor, texture--in
+     the mind of the observer. . . . Experience, already reduced to
+     a swarm of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by
+     that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has
+     ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can
+     only conjecture to be without. Every one of these impressions
+     is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each
+     mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world."
+
+The Protagorean generalization is due to the reflection that all
+experience is some individual experience, that no subject of discourse
+escapes the imputation of belonging to some individual's private
+history. The individual must start with his own experiences and ideas,
+and he can never get beyond them, for he cannot see outside his own
+vision, or even think outside his own mind. The scepticism of this
+theory is explicit, and the formulas of Protagoras--the famous "_Man is
+the measure of all things_," and the more exact formula, "_The truth is
+what appears to each man at each time_"[271:5]--have been the articles
+of scepticism throughout the history of thought.
+
+[Sidenote: Phenomenalism and Spiritualism.]
+
+§ 127. There is, therefore, nothing really surprising in the reception
+accorded the "new philosophy" of Bishop Berkeley. A sceptical relativism
+is the earliest phase of subjectivism, and its avoidance at once becomes
+the most urgent problem of any philosophy which proposes to proceed
+forth from this principle. And this problem Berkeley meets with great
+adroitness and a wise recognition of difficulties. But his sanguine
+temperament and speculative interest impel him to what he regards as the
+extension of his first principle, the reintroduction of the conception
+of substance under the form of spirit, and of the objective order of
+nature under the form of the mind of God. In short, there are two
+motives at work in him, side by side: the epistemological motive,
+restricting reality to perceptions and thoughts, and the
+metaphysical-religious motive, leading him eventually to the definition
+of reality in terms of perceiving and thinking spirits. And from the
+time of Berkeley these two principles, _phenomenalism_ and
+_spiritualism_, have remained as distinct and alternating phases of
+subjectivism. The former is its critical and dialectical conception, the
+latter its constructive and practical conception.
+
+[Sidenote: Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem
+Inherited from Descartes and Locke.]
+
+§ 128. As _phenomenalism_ has its classic statement and proof in the
+writings of Berkeley, we shall do well to return to these. The fact that
+this philosopher wished to be regarded as the prophet of common-sense
+has already been mentioned. This purpose reveals itself explicitly in
+the series of "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." The form in which
+Berkeley here advances his thesis is further determined by the manner in
+which the lines were drawn in his day of thought. The world of
+enlightened public opinion was then threefold, consisting of God,
+physical nature, and the soul. In the early years of the seventeenth
+century Descartes had sharply distinguished between the two
+substances--mind, with its attribute of thought; and body, with its
+attribute of extension--and divided the finite world between them. God
+was regarded as the infinite and sustaining cause of both. Stated in the
+terms of epistemology, the object of clear thinking is the physical
+cosmos, the subject of clear thinking the immortal soul. The realm of
+perception, wherein the mind is subjected to the body, embarrasses the
+Cartesian system, and has no clear title to any place in it. And without
+attaching cognitive importance to this realm, the system is utterly
+dogmatic in its epistemology.[273:6] For what one substance thinks, must
+be assumed to be somehow true of another quite independent substance
+without any medium of communication. Now between Descartes and Berkeley
+appeared the sober and questioning "Essay Concerning Human
+Understanding," by John Locke. This is an interesting combination (they
+cannot be said to blend) of traditional metaphysics and revolutionary
+epistemology. The universe still consists of God, the immortal thinking
+soul, and a corporeal nature, the object of its thought. But, except for
+certain proofs of God and self, knowledge is entirely reduced to the
+perceptual type, to sensations, or ideas directly imparted to the mind
+by the objects themselves. To escape dogmatism it is maintained that
+the real is what is _observed to be present_. But Locke thinks the
+qualities so discovered belong in part to the perceiver and in part to
+the substance outside the mind. Color is a case of the former, a
+"secondary quality"; and extension a case of the latter, a "primary
+quality." And evidently the above empirical test of knowledge is not
+equally well met in these two cases. When I see a red object I know that
+red exists, for it is observed to be present, and I make no claim for it
+beyond the present. But when I note that the red object is square, I am
+supposed to know a property that will continue to exist in the object
+after I have closed my eyes or turned to something else. Here my claim
+exceeds my observation, and the empirical principle adopted at the
+outset would seem to be violated. Berkeley develops his philosophy from
+this criticism. His refutation of material substance is intended as a
+full acceptance of the implications of the new empirical epistemology.
+Knowledge is to be all of the perceptual type, where what is known is
+directly presented; and, in conformity with this principle, being is to
+be restricted to the content of the living pulses of experience.
+
+[Sidenote: The Refutation of Material Substance.]
+
+§ 129. Berkeley, then, beginning with the threefold world of Descartes
+and of common-sense, proposes to apply Locke's theory of knowledge to
+the discomfiture of corporeal nature. It was a radical doctrine, because
+it meant for him and for his contemporaries the denial of all finite
+objects outside the mind. But at the same time it meant a restoration of
+the homogeneity of experience, the reëstablishment of the qualitative
+world of every-day living, and so had its basis of appeal to
+common-sense. The encounter between Hylas, the advocate of the
+traditional philosophy, and Philonous, who represents the author
+himself, begins with an exchange of the charge of innovation.
+
+     _Hyl._ I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I
+     heard of you.
+
+     _Phil._ Pray, what were those?
+
+     _Hyl._ You were represented, in last night's conversation, as
+     one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever
+     entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such
+     thing as _material substance_ in the world.
+
+     _Phil._ That there is no such thing as what _philosophers_
+     call _material substance_, I am seriously persuaded: but if I
+     were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I
+     should then have the same reason to renounce this that I
+     imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.
+
+     _Hyl._ What! can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant
+     to Common-Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than
+     to believe there is no such thing as _matter_?
+
+     _Phil._ Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you,
+     who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater
+     sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to
+     Common-Sense, than I who believe no such thing?[276:7]
+
+Philonous now proceeds with his case. Beginning by obtaining from Hylas
+the admission that pleasure and pain are essentially relative and
+subjective, he argues that sensations such as heat, since they are
+inseparable from these feelings, must be similarly regarded. And he is
+about to annex other qualities in turn to this core of subjectivity,
+when Hylas enters a general demurrer:
+
+     "Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this
+     time. You asked me whether heat and cold, sweetness and
+     bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to
+     which I answered simply that they were. Whereas I should have
+     thus distinguished:--those qualities as perceived by us, are
+     pleasures or pains; but not as existing in the external
+     objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there
+     is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only
+     that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the
+     fire or sugar."[276:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Application of the Epistemological Principle.]
+
+§ 130. Here the argument touches upon profound issues. Philonous now
+assumes the extreme empirical contention _that knowledge applies only to
+its own psychological moment, that its object in no way extends beyond
+that individual situation which we call the state of knowing_. The full
+import of such an epistemology Berkeley never recognized, but he is
+clearly employing it here, and the overthrow of Hylas is inevitable so
+long as he does not challenge it or turn it against his opponent. This,
+however, as a protagonist of Berkeley's own making, he fails to do, and
+he plays into Philonous's hands by admitting that what is known only in
+perception must for that reason _consist_ in perception. He frankly owns
+"that it is vain to stand out any longer," that "colors, sounds, tastes,
+in a word, all those termed _secondary qualities_, have certainly no
+existence without the mind."[277:9]
+
+Hylas has now arrived at the distinction between primary and secondary
+qualities. "Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest" are
+the attributes of an external substance which is the cause of
+sensations. But the same epistemological principle readily reduces these
+also to dependence on mind, for, like the secondary qualities, their
+content is given only in perception. Hylas is then driven to defend a
+general material substratum, which is the cause of ideas, but to which
+none of the definite content of these ideas can be attributed. In short,
+he has put all the content of knowledge on the one side, and admitted
+its inseparability from the perceiving spirit, and left the being of
+things standing empty and forlorn on the other. This amounts, as
+Philonous reminds him, to the denial of the reality of the known world.
+
+     "You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the
+     _reality_ of sensible things; since you made it to consist in
+     an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say,
+     you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which
+     was to show your principles led to Scepticism."[278:10]
+
+[Sidenote: The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World.]
+
+§ 131. Having advanced the direct empiricist argument for phenomenalism,
+Berkeley now gives the rationalistic motive an opportunity to express
+itself in the queries of Hylas as to whether there be not an "absolute
+extension," somehow abstracted by thought from the relativities of
+perception. Is there not at least a _conceivable_ world independent of
+perception?
+
+The answers of Philonous throw much light upon the Berkeleyan position.
+He admits that thought is capable of separating the primary from the
+secondary qualities in certain _operations_, but at the same time denies
+that this is forming an idea of them as separate.
+
+     "I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general
+     propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without
+     mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat
+     of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I
+     can pronounce the word _motion_ by itself, I can form the idea
+     of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may
+     be made of extension and figures, without any mention of
+     _great_ or _small_, or any other sensible mode or quality,
+     that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of
+     extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible
+     quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the
+     mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what
+     other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being
+     altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when
+     laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I
+     believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas
+     of extension."[279:11]
+
+Berkeley denies that we have ideas of pure extension or motion, because,
+although we do actually _deal_ with these and find them intelligible, we
+can never obtain a state of mind in which they appear as the content. He
+applies this psychological test because of his adherence to the general
+empirical postulate that knowledge is limited to the individual content
+of its own individual states. "It is a universally received maxim," he
+says, "that _everything which exists is particular_." Now the truth of
+mathematical reckoning is not particular, but is valid wherever the
+conditions to which it refers are fulfilled. Mathematical reckoning, if
+it is to be particular, must be regarded as a particular act or state of
+some thinker. Its truth must then be construed as relative to the
+interests of the thinker, as a symbolism which has an instrumental
+rather than a purely cognitive value. This conclusion cannot be disputed
+short of a radical stand against the general epistemological principle
+to which Berkeley is so far true, the principle that the reality which
+is known in any state of thinking or perceiving is the state itself.
+
+[Sidenote: The Transition to Spiritualism.]
+
+§ 132. This concludes the purely phenomenalistic strain of Berkeley's
+thought. He has taken the immediate apprehension of sensible objects in
+a state of mind centring about the pleasure and pain of an individual,
+to be the norm of knowledge. He has further maintained that knowledge
+cannot escape the particularity of its own states. The result is that
+the universe is composed of private perceptions and ideas. Strictly on
+the basis of what has preceded, Hylas is justified in regarding this
+conclusion as no less sceptical than that to which his own position had
+been reduced; for while he had been compelled to admit that the real is
+unknowable, Philonous has apparently defined the knowable as relative to
+the individual. But the supplementary metaphysics which had hitherto
+been kept in the background is now revealed. It is maintained that
+though perceptions know no external world, they do nevertheless reveal a
+spiritual substance of which they are the states. Although it has
+hitherto been argued that the _esse_ of things is in their _percipi_,
+this is now replaced by the more fundamental principle that the _esse_
+of things is in their _percipere_ or _velle_. The real world consists
+not in perceptions, but in perceivers.
+
+[Sidenote: Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism.]
+
+§ 133. Now it is at once evident that the epistemological theory which
+has been Berkeley's dialectical weapon in the foregoing argument is no
+longer available. And those who have cared more for this theory than for
+metaphysical speculation have attempted to stop at this point, and so to
+construe phenomenalism as to make it self-sufficient on its own
+grounds. Such attempts are so instructive as to make it worth our while
+to review them before proceeding with the development of the
+spiritualistic motive in subjectivism.
+
+The world is to be regarded as made up of sense-perceptions, ideas, or
+phenomena. What is to be accepted as the fundamental category which
+gives to all of these terms their subjectivistic significance? So far
+there seems to be nothing in view save the principle of relativity. The
+type to which these were reduced was that of the peculiar or unsharable
+experience best represented by an individual's pleasure and pain. But
+relativity will not work as a general principle of being. It consigns
+the individual to his private mind, and cannot provide for the validity
+of knowledge enough even to maintain itself. Some other course, then,
+must be followed. Perception may be given a psycho-physical definition,
+which employs physical terms as fundamental;[282:12] but this flagrantly
+contradicts the phenomenalistic first principle. Or, reality may be
+regarded as so stamped with its marks as to insure the proprietorship of
+thought. But this definition of certain objective entities of mind, of
+beings attributed to intelligence because of their intrinsic
+intelligibility, is inconsistent with empiricism, if indeed it does not
+lead eventually to a realism of the Platonic type.[283:13] Finally, and
+most commonly, the terms of phenomenalism have been retained after their
+original meaning has been suffered to lapse. The "impressions" of Hume,
+_e. g._, are the remnant of the Berkeleyan world with the spirit
+stricken out. There is no longer any point in calling them impressions,
+for they now mean only elements or qualities. As a consequence this
+outgrowth of the Berkeleyanism epistemology is at present merging into a
+realistic philosophy of experience.[283:14] Any one, then, of these
+three may be the last state of one who undertakes to remain exclusively
+faithful to the phenomenalistic aspect of Berkeleyanism, embodied in the
+principle _esse est percipi_.
+
+[Sidenote: Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the
+Perceiver.]
+
+§ 134. Let us now follow the fortunes of the other phase of
+subjectivism--that which develops the conception of the perceiver rather
+than the perceived. When Berkeley holds that
+
+     "all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in a
+     word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the
+     world, have not any subsistence without a Mind,"
+
+his thought has transcended the epistemology with which he overthrew the
+conception of material substance, in two directions. For neither mind of
+the finite type nor mind of the divine type is perceived. But the first
+of these may yet be regarded as a direct empirical datum, even though
+sharply distinguished from an object of perception. In the third
+dialogue, Philonous thus expounds this new kind of knowledge:
+
+     "I own I have properly no _idea_, either of God or any other
+     spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by
+     things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless
+     know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as
+     certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I
+     mean by the terms _I_ and _myself_; and I know this
+     immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I
+     perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound."[284:15]
+
+The knowledge here provided for may be regarded as empirical because
+the reality in question is an individual present in the moment of the
+knowledge. Particular acts of perception are said directly to reveal not
+only perceptual objects, but perceiving subjects. And the conception of
+spiritual substance, once accredited, may then be extended to account
+for social relations and to fill in the nature of God. The latter
+extension, in so far as it attributes such further predicates as
+universality and infinity, implies still a third epistemology, and
+threatens to pass over into rationalism. But the knowledge of one's
+fellow-men may, it is claimed, be regarded as immediate, like the
+knowledge of one's self. Perceptual and volitional activity has a sense
+for itself and also a sense for other like activity. The self is both
+self-conscious and socially conscious in an immediate experience of the
+same type.
+
+[Sidenote: Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate
+Knowledge of the Will.]
+
+§ 135. But this general spiritualistic conception is developed with less
+singleness of purpose in Berkeley than among the _voluntarists_ and
+_panpsychists_ who spring from Schopenhauer, the orientalist, pessimist,
+and mystic among the German Kantians of the early nineteenth century.
+His great book, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," opens with the
+phenomenalistic contention that "the world is my idea." It soon appears,
+however, that the "my" is more profoundly significant than the "idea."
+Nature is my creation, due to the working within me of certain fixed
+principles of thought, such as space, time, and causality. But nature,
+just because it is my creation, is less than me: is but a manifestation
+of the true being for which I must look _within_ myself. But this inner
+self cannot be made an object of thought, for that would be only to
+create another term of nature. The will itself, from which such creation
+springs, is "that which is most immediate" in one's consciousness, and
+"makes itself known in a direct manner in its particular acts." The term
+_will_ is used by Schopenhauer as a general term covering the whole
+dynamics of life, instinct and desire, as well as volition. It is that
+sense of life-preserving and life-enhancing appetency which is the
+conscious accompaniment of struggle. With its aid the inwardness of the
+whole world may now be apprehended.
+
+     "Whoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge
+     _in abstracto_, and therefore clear and certain, of what
+     everyone knows directly _in concreto_, _i. e._, as feeling, a
+     knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his
+     phenomenal being, . . . and that his will is that which is
+     most immediate in his consciousness, . . . will find that of
+     itself it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost
+     being of the whole of nature; for he now transfers it to all
+     those phenomena which are not given to him, like his own
+     phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge,
+     but only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as _idea_
+     alone."[287:16]
+
+The heart of reality is thus known by an "intuitive interpretation,"
+which begins at home in the individual's own heart.
+
+[Sidenote: Panpsychism.]
+
+§ 136. The panpsychist follows the same course of reflection. There is
+an outwardness and an inwardness of nature, corresponding to the
+knower's body on the one hand, and his feeling or will on the other.
+With this principle in hand one may pass down the whole scale of being
+and discover no breach of continuity. Such an interpretation of nature
+has been well set forth by a contemporary writer, who quotes the
+following from the botanist, C. v. Naegeli:
+
+     "Sensation is clearly connected with the reflex actions of
+     higher animals. We are obliged to concede it to the other
+     animals also, and we have no grounds for denying it to plants
+     and inorganic bodies. The sensation arouses in us a condition
+     of comfort and discomfort. In general, the feeling of
+     pleasure arises when the natural impulses are satisfied, the
+     feeling of pain when they are not satisfied. Since all
+     material processes are composed of movements of molecules and
+     elementary atoms, pleasure and pain must have their seat in
+     these particles. . . . Thus the same mental thread runs
+     through all material phenomena. The human mind is nothing but
+     the highest development on our earth of the mental processes
+     which universally animate and move nature."[288:17]
+
+According to panpsychism, then, physical nature is the manifestation of
+an _appetency or bare consciousness generalized from the thinker's
+awareness of his most intimate self_. Such appetency or bare
+consciousness is the essential or substantial state of that which
+appears as physical nature.
+
+[Sidenote: The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for
+Objective Knowledge.]
+
+§ 137. We must now turn to the efforts which this doctrine has made to
+maintain itself against the sceptical trend of its own epistemology. For
+precisely as in the case of phenomenalism its dialectical principle
+threatens to be self-destructive. Immediate presence is still the test
+of knowledge. But does not immediate presence connote relativity and
+inadequacy, at best; an initial phase of knowledge that must be
+supplemented and corrected before objective reality and valid truth are
+apprehended? Does not the individuality of the individual thinker
+connote the very maximum of error? Indeed, spiritualism would seem to
+have exceeded even Protagoreanism itself, and to have passed from
+scepticism to deliberate nihilism. The object of knowledge is no longer
+even, as with the phenomenalist, the thinker's thought, but only his
+_thinking_. And if the thinker's thought is relative to him, then the
+thinker's act of thinking is the very vanishing-point of relativity, the
+negative term of a negating relation. How is a real, a self-subsistent
+world to be composed of such? Impelled by a half-conscious realization
+of the hopelessness of this situation, the exponent of spiritualism has
+sought to universalize his conception; to define an _absolute or
+ultimate spirit_ other than the individual thinker, though known in and
+through him. But it is clear that this development of spiritualism, like
+all of the speculative procedure of subjectivism, threatens to exceed
+the scope of the original principle of knowledge. There is a strong
+presumption against the possibility of introducing a knowledge of God by
+the way of the particular presentations of an individual consciousness.
+
+[Sidenote: Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism.
+Mysticism.]
+
+§ 138. Schopenhauer must be credited with a genuine effort to accept the
+metaphysical consequences of his epistemology. His epistemology, as we
+have seen, defined knowledge as centripetal. The object of real
+knowledge is identical with the subject of knowledge. If I am to know
+the universal will, therefore, I must in knowing become that will. And
+this Schopenhauer maintains. The innermost heart of the individual into
+which he may retreat, even from his private will, is--the universal. But
+there is another way of arriving at the same knowledge. In contemplation
+I may become absorbed in principles and laws, rather than be diverted by
+the particular spacial and temporal objects, until (and this is
+peculiarly true of the æsthetic experience) my interest no longer
+distinguishes itself, but coincides with truth. In other words, abstract
+thinking and pure willing are not opposite extremes, but adjacent points
+on the deeper or transcendent circle of experience. One may reach this
+part of the circle by moving in either of two directions that at the
+start are directly opposite: by turning in upon the subject or by
+utterly giving one's self up to the object. Reality obtains no
+definition by this means. Philosophy, for Schopenhauer, is rather a
+programme for realizing the state in which I will the universal and know
+the universal will. The final theory of knowledge, then, is mysticism,
+reality directly apprehended in a supreme and incommunicable experience,
+direct and vivid, like perception, and at the same time universal, like
+thought. But the empiricism with which Schopenhauer began, the appeal to
+a familiar experience of self as will, has meanwhile been forgotten. The
+idea as object of my perception, and the will as its subject were in the
+beginning regarded as common and verifiable items of experience. But
+who, save the occasional philosopher, knows a universal will? Nor have
+attempts to avoid mysticism, while retaining Schopenhauer's first
+principle, been successful. Certain voluntarists and panpsychists have
+attempted to do without the universal will, and define the world solely
+in terms of the many individual wills. But, as Schopenhauer himself
+pointed out, individual wills cannot be distinguished except in terms of
+something other than will, such as space and time. The same is true if
+for will there be substituted inner feeling or consciousness. Within
+this category individuals can be distinguished only as points of view,
+which to be comparable at all must contain common objects, or be
+defined in terms of a system of relations like that of the physical
+world or that of an ethical community. The conception of pure will or
+pure feeling inevitably attaches to itself that of an undivided unity,
+if for no other reason because there is no ground for distinction. And
+such a unity, a will or consciousness that is no particular act or idea,
+can be known only in the unique experience which mysticism provides.
+
+[Sidenote: Objective Spiritualism.]
+
+§ 139. The way of Schopenhauer is the way of one who adheres to the
+belief that what the thinker knows must always be a part of himself, his
+state or his activity. From this point of view the important element of
+being, its very essence or substance, is not any definable nature but an
+immediate relation to the knower. The consequence is that the universe
+in the last analysis can only be defined as a supreme state or activity
+into which the individual's consciousness may develop. Spiritualism has,
+however, other interests, interests which may be quite independent of
+epistemology. It is speculatively interested in a kind of being which it
+defines as spiritual, and in terms of which it proposes to define the
+universe. Such procedure is radically different from the
+epistemological criticism which led Berkeley to maintain that the
+_esse_ of objects is in their _percipi_, or Schopenhauer to maintain
+that "the world is my idea," or that led both of these philosophers to
+find a deeper reality in immediately intuited self-activity. For now it
+is proposed to _understand_ spirit, discover its properties, and to
+acknowledge it only where these properties appear. I may now know spirit
+as an object; which in its properties, to be sure, is quite different
+from matter, but which like matter is capable of subsisting quite
+independently of my knowledge. This is a metaphysical spiritualism quite
+distinct from epistemological spiritualism, and by no means easily made
+consistent therewith. Indeed, it exhibits an almost irrepressible
+tendency to overstep the bounds both of empiricism and subjectivism, an
+historical connection with which alone justifies its introduction in the
+present chapter.
+
+[Sidenote: Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness and Order.]
+
+§ 140. To return again to the instructive example of Bishop Berkeley, we
+find him proving God from the evidence of him in experience, or the need
+of him to support the claims of experience.
+
+     "But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find
+     the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like
+     dependence on _my_ will. When in broad daylight I open my
+     eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or
+     no, or to determine what particular objects shall present
+     themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and
+     other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of
+     _my_ will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that
+     produces them.
+
+     The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than
+     those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness,
+     order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those
+     which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a
+     regular train or series--the admirable connection whereof
+     sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its
+     Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the
+     Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called
+     _the laws of nature_."[294:18]
+
+Of the attributes of experience here in question, independence or
+"steadiness" is not regarded as _prima facie_ evidence of spirit, but
+rather as an aspect of experience for which some cause is necessary. But
+it is assumed that the power to "produce," with which such a cause must
+be endowed, is the peculiar prerogative of spirit, and that this cause
+gives further evidence of its spiritual nature, of its eminently
+spiritual nature, in the orderliness and the goodness of its effects.
+
+     "The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the
+     goodness that perfects all things is the Supreme
+     Being."[294:19]
+
+That spirit is possessed of causal efficacy, Berkeley has in an earlier
+passage proved by a direct appeal to the individual's sense of power.
+
+     "I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary
+     and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than
+     _willing_, and straightway this or that idea arises in my
+     fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way
+     for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very
+     properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and
+     grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents,
+     or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse
+     ourselves with words."[295:20]
+
+Although Berkeley is here in general agreement with a very considerable
+variety of philosophical views, it will be readily observed that this
+doctrine tends to lapse into mysticism whenever it is retained in its
+purity. Berkeley himself admitted that there was no "idea" of such
+power. And philosophers will as a rule either obtain an idea
+corresponding to a term or amend the term--always excepting the mystical
+appeal to an inarticulate and indefinable experience. Hence pure power
+revealed in an ineffable immediate experience tends to give place to
+kinds of power to which some definite meaning may be attached. The
+energy of physics, defined by measurable quantitative equivalence, is a
+case in point. The idealistic trend is in another direction, power
+coming to signify ethical or logical connection. Similarly, in the later
+philosophy of Berkeley himself, God is known by the nature of his
+activity rather than by the fact of his activity; and we are said "to
+account for a thing, when we show that it is so best." God's power, in
+short, becomes indistinguishable from his universality attended with the
+attributes of goodness and orderliness. But this means that the analogy
+of the human spirit, conscious of its own activity, is no longer the
+basis of the argument. By the divine will is now meant ethical
+principles, rather than the "here am I willing" of the empirical
+consciousness. Similarly the divine mind is defined in terms of logical
+principles, such as coherence and order, rather than in terms of the
+"here am I thinking" of the finite knower himself. But enough has been
+said to make it plain that this is no longer the stand-point of
+empirio-idealism. Indeed, in his last philosophical writing, the
+"Siris," Berkeley is so far removed from the principles of knowledge
+which made him at once the disciple and the critic of Locke, as to
+pronounce himself the devotee of Platonism and the prophet of
+transcendentalism. The former strain appears in his conclusion that
+"the _principles_ of science are neither objects of sense nor
+imagination; and that intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to
+truth."[297:21] His transcendentalism appears in his belief that such
+principles, participating in the vital unity of the Individual Purpose,
+constitute the meaning and so the substantial essence of the universe.
+
+[Sidenote: The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself.]
+
+§ 141. Such then are the various paths which lead from subjectivism to
+other types of philosophy, demonstrating the peculiar aptitude of the
+former for departing from its first principle. Beginning with the
+relativity of all knowable reality to the individual knower, it
+undertakes to conceive reality in one or the other of the terms of this
+relation, as particular state of knowledge or as individual subject of
+knowledge. But these terms develop an intrinsic nature of their own, and
+become respectively _empirical datum_, and _logical_ or _ethical
+principle_. In either case the subjectivistic principle of knowledge has
+been abandoned. Those whose speculative interest in a definable
+objective world has been less strong than their attachment to this
+principle, have either accepted the imputation of scepticism, or had
+recourse to the radical epistemological doctrine of mysticism.
+
+[Sidenote: Ethical Theories. Relativism.]
+
+§ 142. Since the essence of subjectivism is epistemological rather than
+metaphysical, its practical and religious implications are various. The
+ethical theories which are corollary to the tendencies expounded above,
+range from extreme egoism to a mystical universalism. The close
+connection between the former and relativism is evident, and the form of
+egoism most consistent with epistemological relativism is to be found
+among those same Sophists who first maintained this latter doctrine. If
+we may believe Plato, the Sophists sought to create for their individual
+pupils an _appearance_ of good. In the "Theaetetus," Socrates is
+represented as speaking thus on behalf of Protagoras:
+
+     "And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no
+     existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the
+     evils which are and appear to a man, into goods which are and
+     appear to him. . . . I say that they (the wise men) are the
+     physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of
+     plants--for the husbandmen also take away the evil and
+     disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and
+     healthy sensations as well as true ones; and the wise and good
+     rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil seem just to
+     states; for whatever appears to be just and fair to a state,
+     while sanctioned by a state, is just and fair to it; but the
+     teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the
+     evil, both in appearance and in reality."[299:22]
+
+As truth is indistinguishable from the appearance of truth to the
+individual, so good is indistinguishable from a particular seeming good.
+The supreme moral value according to this plan of life is the agreeable
+feeling tone of that dream world to which the individual is forever
+consigned. The possible perfection of an experience which is "reduced to
+a swarm of impressions," and "ringed round" for each one of us by a
+"thick wall of personality" has been brilliantly depicted in the passage
+already quoted from Walter Pater, in whom the naturalistic and
+subjectivistic motives unite.[299:23] If all my experience is strictly
+my own, then my good must likewise be my own. And if all of my
+experience is valid only in its instants of immediacy, then my best good
+must likewise consist in some "exquisite passion," or stirring of the
+senses.
+
+[Sidenote: Pessimism and Self-denial.]
+
+§ 143. But for Schopenhauer the internal world opens out into the
+boundless and unfathomable sea of the universal will. If I retire from
+the world upon my own private feelings, I am still short of the true
+life, for I am asserting myself against the world. I should seek a sense
+of unison with a world whose deeper heart-beats I may learn to feel and
+adopt as the rhythm of my own. The folly of willing for one's private
+self is the ground of Schopenhauer's pessimism.
+
+     "All _willing_ arises from want, therefore from deficiency,
+     and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends
+     it; yet for one wish that is satisfied there remain at least
+     ten which are denied. Further, the desire lasts long, the
+     demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily
+     measured out. But even the final satisfaction is itself only
+     apparent; every satisfied wish at once makes room for a new
+     one, both are illusions; the one is known to be so, the other
+     not yet. No attained object of desire can give lasting
+     satisfaction, but merely a fleeting gratification; it is like
+     the alms thrown to the beggar, that keeps him alive to-day
+     that his misery may be prolonged till the morrow. . . . The
+     subject of willing is thus constantly stretched on the
+     revolving wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the
+     Danaids, is the ever-longing Tantalus."[300:24]
+
+The escape from this torture and self-deception is possible through the
+same mystical experience, the same blending with the universe that
+conditions knowledge.
+
+[Sidenote: The Ethics of Welfare.]
+
+§ 144. But though pleasant dreaming be the most consistent practical
+sequel to a subjectivistic epistemology, its _individualism_ presents
+another basis for life with quite different possibilities of emphasis.
+It may develop into an aggressive egoism of the type represented by the
+sophist Thrasymachus, in his proclamation that "might is right, justice
+the interest of the stronger."[301:25] But more commonly it is tempered
+by a conception of social interest, and serves as the champion of action
+against contemplation. The gospel of action is always individualistic.
+It requires of the individual a sense of his independence, and of the
+real virtue of his initiative. Hence those voluntarists who emphasize
+the many individual wills and decline to reduce them, after the manner
+of Schopenhauer, to a universal, may be said to afford a direct
+justification of it. It is true that this practical realism threatens
+the tenability of an epistemological idealism, but the two have been
+united, and because of their common emphasis upon the individual such
+procedure is not entirely inconsequential. Friedrich Paulsen, whose
+panpsychism has already been cited, is an excellent case in point. The
+only good, he maintains, is "welfare," the fulfilment of those natural
+desires which both distinguish the individual and signify his
+continuity with all grades of being.
+
+     "The goal at which the will aims does not consist in a maximum
+     of pleasurable feelings, but in the normal exercise of the
+     vital functions for which the species is predisposed. In the
+     case of man the mode of life is on the whole determined by the
+     nature of the historical unity from which the individual
+     evolves as a member. Here the objective content of life, after
+     which the will strives, also enters into consciousness with
+     the progressive evolution of presentation; the type of life
+     becomes a conscious ideal of life."[302:26]
+
+Here, contrary to the teaching of Schopenhauer, the good consists in
+individual attainment, the extension and fulfilment of the _distinct_
+interests that arise from the common fund of nature. To be and to do to
+the uttermost, to realize the maximum from nature's investment in one's
+special capacities and powers--this is indeed the first principle of a
+morality of action.
+
+[Sidenote: The Ethical Community.]
+
+§ 145. But a type of ethics still further removed from the initial
+relativism has been adopted and more or less successfully assimilated by
+subjectivistic philosophies. Accepting Berkeley's spirits, with their
+indefinite capacities, and likewise the stability of the ideal
+principles that underlie a God-administered world, and morality becomes
+the obedience which the individual renders to the law. The individual,
+free to act in his own right, coöperates with the purposes of the
+general spiritual community, whose laws are worthy of obedience though
+not coercive. The recognition of such a spiritual citizenship, entailing
+opportunities, duties, and obligations, rather than thraldom, partakes
+of the truth as well as the inadequacy of common-sense.
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Mysticism.]
+
+§ 146. As for religion, at least two distinct practical appreciations of
+the universe have been historically associated with this chapter in
+philosophy. The one of these is the mysticism of Schopenhauer, the
+religious sequel to a universalistic voluntarism. Schopenhauer's ethics,
+his very philosophy, is religion. For the good and the true are alike
+attainable only through identification with the Absolute Will. This
+consummation of life, transcending practical and theoretical
+differences, engulfing and effacing all qualities and all values, is
+like the Nirvâna of the Orient--a positive ideal only for one who has
+appraised the apparent world at its real value.
+
+     "Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the
+     entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full
+     of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom
+     the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world,
+     which is so real, with all it's suns and milky-ways--is
+     nothing."[304:27]
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Individual Coöperation with God.]
+
+§ 147. From the union of the two motives of voluntarism and
+individualism springs another and a more familiar type of religion, that
+of coöperative spiritual endeavor. In the religion of Schopenhauer the
+soul must utterly lose itself for the sake of peace; here the soul must
+persist in its own being and activity for the sake of the progressive
+goodness of the world. For Schopenhauer God is the universal solution,
+in which all motions cease and all differences disappear; here God is
+the General of moral forces. The deeper and more significant universe is
+
+     "a society of rational agents, acting under the eye of
+     Providence, concurring in one design to promote the common
+     benefit of the whole, and conforming their actions to the
+     established laws and order of the Divine parental wisdom:
+     wherein each particular agent shall not consider himself
+     apart, but as the member of a great City, whose author and
+     founder is God: in which the civil laws are no other than the
+     rules of virtue and the duties of religion: and where
+     everyone's true interest is combined with his duty."[304:28]
+
+But so uncompromising an optimism is not essential to this religion.
+Its distinction lies rather in its acceptance of the manifest plurality
+of souls, and its appeal to the faith that is engendered by
+service.[305:29] As William James has said:
+
+     "Even God's being is sacred from ours. To coöperate with his
+     creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants
+     of us. In such coöperation with his purposes, not in any
+     chimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretical
+     drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our
+     destiny."[305:30]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[267:1] PRELIMINARY NOTE. By _Subjectivism_ is meant that system of
+philosophy which construes the universe in accordance with the
+epistemological principle that _all knowledge is of its own states or
+activities_. In so far as subjectivism reduces reality to _states of
+knowledge_, such as _perceptions_ or _ideas_, it is _phenomenalism_. In
+so far as it reduces reality to a more _internal active principle_ such
+as _spirit_ or _will_, it is _spiritualism_.
+
+[268:2] Berkeley: _Complete Works_, Vol. I, p. 352. Fraser's edition.
+
+[269:3] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 156. Translation by Jowett. The italics are
+mine.
+
+[270:4] Plato: _Op. cit._, 166.
+
+[271:5] +alêthes ho hekastô hekastote dokei.+
+
+[273:6] For another issue out of this situation, cf. §§ 185-187.
+
+[276:7] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 380-381.
+
+[276:8] _Ibid._, p. 389.
+
+[277:9] _Ibid._, p. 397.
+
+[278:10] _Ibid._, p. 418.
+
+[279:11] _Ibid._, pp. 403-404.
+
+[282:12] Cf. Pearson: _Grammar of Science_, Chap. II. See above, § 118.
+
+[283:13] See Chap. XI. Cf. also § 140.
+
+[283:14] The same may be said of the "permanent possibilities of
+sensation," proposed by J. S. Mill. Such possibilities outside of actual
+perception are either nothing or things such as they are known to be
+_in_ perception. In either case they are not perceptions.
+
+In Ernst Mach's _Analysis of Sensations_, the reader will find an
+interesting transition from sensationalism to realism through the
+substitution of the term _Bestandtheil_ for _Empfindung_. (See
+Translation by Williams, pp. 18-20.) See below, § 207.
+
+[284:15] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, p. 447.
+
+[287:16] Schopenhauer: _The World as Will and Idea_. Translation by
+Haldane and Kemp, Vol. I, p. 141.
+
+[288:17] Quoted from Naegeli: _Die Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der
+Abstammungslehre_, by Friedrich Paulsen, in his _Introduction to
+Philosophy_. Translation by Thilly, p. 103.
+
+[294:18] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, p. 273.
+
+[294:19] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 272-273.
+
+[295:20] _Op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 278.
+
+[297:21] _Op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 249.
+
+[299:22] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 167. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[299:23] See § 121.
+
+[300:24] Schopenhauer: _Op. cit._ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, Vol.
+I, pp. 253-254.
+
+[301:25] See Plato: _Republic_, Bk. I, 338.
+
+[302:26] Paulsen: _Op. cit._, p. 423.
+
+[304:27] Schopenhauer: _Op. cit._ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, p.
+532.
+
+[304:28] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 138.
+
+[305:29] For an interesting characterization of this type of religion,
+cf. Royce: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, p. 46.
+
+[305:30] James: _The Will to Believe_, p. 141.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+ABSOLUTE REALISM[306:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, or the
+Absolute.]
+
+§ 148. No one has understood better than the philosopher himself that he
+cannot hope to be popular with men of practical common-sense. Indeed, it
+has commonly been a matter of pride with him. The classic representation
+of the philosopher's faith in himself is to be found in Plato's
+"Republic." The philosopher is there portrayed in the famous cave simile
+as one who having seen the light itself can no longer distinguish the
+shadows which are apparent to those who sit perpetually in the twilight.
+Within the cave of shadows he is indeed less at his ease than those who
+have never seen the sun. But since he knows the source of the shadows,
+his knowledge surrounds that of the shadow connoisseurs. And his
+equanimity need not suffer from the contempt of those whom he
+understands better than they understand themselves. The history of
+philosophy is due to the dogged persistence with which the philosopher
+has taken himself seriously and endured the poor opinion of the world.
+But the pride of the philosopher has done more than perpetuate the
+philosophical outlook and problem; it has led to the formulation of a
+definite philosophical conception, and of two great philosophical
+doctrines. The conception is that of the _absolute_; and the doctrines
+are that of the _absolute being_, and that of the _absolute self_ or
+_mind_. The former of these doctrines is the topic of the present
+chapter.
+
+Among the early Greeks the rôle of the philosopher was one of
+superlative dignity. In point of knowledge he was less easily satisfied
+than other men. He thought beyond immediate practical problems, devoting
+himself to a profounder reflection, that could not but induce in him a
+sense of superior intellectual worth. The familiar was not binding upon
+him, for his thought was emancipated from routine and superficiality.
+Furthermore his intellectual courage and resolution did not permit him
+to indulge in triviality, doubt, or paradox. He sought his own with a
+faith that could not be denied. Even Heraclitus the Dark, who was also
+called "the Weeping Philosopher," because he found at the very heart of
+nature that transiency which the philosophical mind seeks to escape,
+felt himself to be exalted as well as isolated by that insight. But this
+sentiment of personal aloofness led at once to a division of experience.
+He who knows truly belongs to another and more abiding world. As there
+is a philosophical way of thought, there is a philosophical way of life,
+and _a philosophical object_. Since the philosopher and the common man
+do not see alike, the terms of their experience are incommensurable. In
+Parmenides the Eleatic this motive is most strikingly exhibited. There
+is a _Way of Truth_ which diverges from the _Way of Opinion_. The
+philosopher walks the former way alone. And there is an object of truth,
+accessible only to one who takes this way of truth. Parmenides finds
+this object to be the content of pure affirmation.
+
+     "One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that _It
+     is_. In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and
+     indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end.
+     Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now _it is_, all at once,
+     a continuous one."[308:2]
+
+The philosophy of Parmenides, commonly called the Eleatic Philosophy,
+is notable for this emergence of the pure concept of _absolute being_ as
+the final object of knowledge. The philosopher aims to discover that
+which is, and so turns away from that which is not or that which ceases
+to be. The negative and transient aspects of experience only hinder him
+in his search for the eternal. It was the great Eleatic insight to
+realize that the outcome of thought is thus predetermined; that the
+answer to philosophy is contained in the question of philosophy. The
+philosopher, in that he resolutely avoids all partiality, relativity,
+and superficiality, must affirm a complete, universal, and ultimate
+being as the very object of that perfect knowledge which he means to
+possess. This object is known in the history of these philosophies as
+the _infinite_ or _absolute_.[309:3]
+
+[Sidenote: The Eleatic Conception of Being.]
+
+§ 149. The Eleatic reasons somewhat as follows. The philosopher seeks to
+know what is. The object of his knowledge will then contain as its
+primary and essential predicate, that of being. It is a step further to
+_define_ being in terms of this essential predicate.
+
+Parmenides thinks of being as a power or strength, a positive
+self-maintenance to which all affirmations refer. The remainder of the
+Eleatic philosophy is the analysis of this concept and the proof of its
+implications. Being must persist through all change, and span all
+chasms. Before being there can be only nothing, which is the same as to
+say that so far as being is concerned there is no before. Similarly
+there can be no after or beyond. There can be no motion, change, or
+division of being, because being will be in all parts of every division,
+and in all stages of every process. Hence being is "uncreated and
+indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end."
+
+The argument turns upon the application to being as a whole of the
+meaning and the implications of _only being_. Being is the affirmative
+or positive. From that _alone_, one can derive only such properties as
+eternity or unity. For generation and decay and plurality may belong to
+that which is _also_ affirmative and positive, but not to that which is
+affirmative and positive _only_. The Eleatic philosophy is due, then, to
+the determination to derive the whole of reality from the bare necessity
+of being, to cut down reality to what flows entirely from the assertion
+of its only known necessary aspect, that of being. We meet here in its
+simplest form a persistent rationalistic motive, the attempt to derive
+the universe from the isolation and analysis of its most universal
+character. As in the case of every well-defined philosophy, this motive
+is always attended by a "besetting" problem. Here it is the accounting
+for what, empirically at least, is alien to that universal character.
+And this difficulty is emphasized rather than resolved by Parmenides in
+his designation of a limbo of opinion, "in which is no true belief at
+all," to which the manifold of common experience with all its
+irrelevancies can be relegated.
+
+[Sidenote: Spinoza's Conception of Substance.]
+
+§ 150. The Eleatic philosophy, enriched and supplemented, appears many
+centuries later in the rigorous rationalism of Spinoza.[311:4] With
+Spinoza philosophy is a demonstration of necessities after the manner of
+geometry. Reality is to be set forth in theorems derived from
+fundamental axioms and definitions. As in the case of Parmenides, these
+necessities are the implications of the very problem of being. The
+philosopher's problem is made to solve itself. But for Spinoza that
+problem is more definite and more pregnant. The problematic being must
+not only be, but must be _sufficient to itself_. What the philosopher
+seeks to know is primarily an intrinsic entity. Its nature must be
+independent of other natures, and my knowledge of it independent of my
+knowledge of anything else. Reality is something which need not be
+sought further. So construed, being is in Spinoza's philosophy termed
+_substance_. It will be seen that to define substance is to affirm the
+existence of it, for substance is so defined as to embody the very
+qualification for existence. Whatever exists exists under the form of
+substance, as that "which is in itself, and is conceived through itself:
+in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently
+of any other conception."[312:5]
+
+[Sidenote: Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The Modes and
+the Attributes.]
+
+§ 151. There remains but one further fundamental thesis for the
+establishment of the Spinozistic philosophy, the thesis which maintains
+the exclusive existence of the one "absolutely infinite being," or God.
+The exclusive existence of God follows from his existence, because of
+the exhaustiveness of his nature. His is the nature "consisting in
+infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite
+essentiality." He will contain all meaning, and all possible meaning,
+within his fixed and necessary constitution. It is evident that if such
+a God exist, nothing can fall outside of him. One such substance must be
+the only substance. But upon what grounds are we to assert God's
+existence?
+
+To proceed further with Spinoza's philosophy we must introduce two terms
+which are scarcely less fundamental in his system than that of
+substance. The one of these is "attribute," by which he means _kind_ or
+general property; the other is "mode," by which he means _case_ or
+individual thing. Spinoza's proof of God consists in showing that no
+single mode, single attribute, or finite group of modes or attributes,
+can be a substance; but only an infinite system of all modes of all
+attributes. Translated into common speech this means that neither kinds
+nor cases, nor special groups of either, can stand alone and be of
+themselves, but only the unity of all possible cases of all possible
+kinds.
+
+The argument concerning the possible substantiality of the case or
+individual thing is relatively simple. Suppose an attribute or kind,
+_A_, of which there are cases _am_{1}, _am_{2}, _am_{3}, etc. The
+number of cases is never involved in the nature of the kind, as is seen
+for example in the fact that the definition of triangle prescribes no
+special number of individual triangles. Hence _am_{1}, _am_{2},
+_am_{3}, etc., must be explained by something outside of their nature.
+Their being cases of _A_ does not account for their existing severally.
+This is Spinoza's statement of the argument that individual events, such
+as motions or sensations, are not self-dependent, but belong to a
+context of like events which are mutually dependent.
+
+The question of the attribute is more difficult. Why may not an
+attribute as a complete domain of interdependent events, itself be
+independent or substantial? Spinoza's predecessor, Descartes, had
+maintained precisely that thesis in behalf of the domain of thought and
+the domain of space. Spinoza's answer rests upon the famous ontological
+argument, inherited from scholasticism and generally accepted in the
+first period of modern philosophy. The evidence of existence, he
+declares, is clear and distinct conceivability.
+
+     "For a person to say that he has a clear and distinct--that
+     is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is not sure
+     whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said
+     that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was
+     false."[314:6]
+
+Now we can form a clear and distinct idea of an absolutely infinite
+being that shall have all possible attributes. This idea is a
+well-recognized standard and object of reference for thought. But it is
+a conception which is highly qualified, not only through its clearness
+and distinctness, but also through its abundance of content. It affirms
+itself therefore with a certainty that surpasses any other certainty,
+because it is supported by each and every other certainty, and even by
+the residuum of possibility. If any intelligible meaning be permitted to
+affirm itself, so much the more irresistible is the claim of this
+infinitely rich meaning. Since every attribute contributes to its
+validity, the being with infinite attributes is infinitely or absolutely
+valid. The conclusion of the argument is now obvious. If the being
+constituted by the infinite attributes exists, it swallows up all
+possibilities and exists exclusively.
+
+[Sidenote: The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God.]
+
+§ 152. The vulnerable point in Spinoza's argument can thus be expressed:
+that which is important is questionable, and that which is
+unquestionable is of doubtful importance. Have I indeed a clear and
+distinct idea of an absolutely infinite being? The answer turns upon the
+meaning of the phrase "idea of." It is true I can add to such meaning
+as I apprehend the thought of possible other meaning, and suppose the
+whole to have a definiteness and systematic unity like that of the
+triangle. But such an idea is problematic. I am compelled to use the
+term "possible," and so to confess the failure of definite content to
+measure up to my idea. My idea of an absolutely infinite being is like
+my idea of a universal language: I can think _of_ it, but I cannot
+_think it out_, for lack of data or because of the conflicting testimony
+of other data. If I mean the infinity of my being to be a term of
+inclusiveness, and to insist that the all must be, and that there can be
+nothing not included in the all, I can scarcely be denied. But it is
+reasonable to doubt the importance of such a truth. If, on the other
+hand, I mean that my infinite being shall have the compactness and
+organic unity of a triangle, I must admit that such a being is indeed
+problematic. The degree to which the meaning of the part is dependent
+upon the meaning of the whole, or the degree to which the geometrical
+analogy is to be preferred to the analogy of aggregates, like the events
+within a year, is a problem that falls quite outside Spinoza's
+fundamental arguments.
+
+[Sidenote: Spinoza's Provision for the Finite.]
+
+§ 153. But the advance of Spinoza over the Eleatics must not be lost
+sight of. The modern philosopher has so conceived being as to provide
+for parts within an individual unity. The geometrical analogy is a most
+illuminating one, for it enables us to understand how manyness may be
+indispensable to a being that is essentially unitary. The triangle as
+triangle is one. But it could not be such without sides and angles. The
+unity is equally necessary to the parts, for sides and angles of a
+triangle could not be such without an arrangement governed by the nature
+triangle. The whole of nature may be similarly conceived: as the
+reciprocal necessity of _natura naturans_, or nature defined in respect
+of its unity, and _natura naturata_, or nature specified in detail.
+There is some promise here of a reconciliation of the _Way of Opinion_
+with the _Way of Truth_. Opinion would be a gathering of detail, truth a
+comprehension of the intelligible unity. Both would be provided for
+through the consideration that whatever is complete and necessary must
+be made up of incompletenesses that are necessary to it.
+
+[Sidenote: Transition to Teleological Conceptions.]
+
+§ 154. This consideration, however, does not receive its most effective
+formulation in Spinoza. The isolation of the parts, the actual
+severalty and irrelevance of the modes, still presents a grave problem.
+Is there a kind of whole to which not only parts but fragments, or parts
+in their very incompleteness, are indispensable? This would seem to be
+true of a _progression_ or _development_, since that would require both
+perfection as its end, and degrees of imperfection as its stages.
+Spinoza was prevented from making much of this idea by his rejection of
+the principle of _teleology_. He regarded appreciation or valuation as a
+projection of personal bias. "Nature has no particular goal in view,"
+and "final causes are mere human figments." "The perfection of things is
+to be reckoned only from their own nature and power."[318:7] The
+philosophical method which Spinoza here repudiates, the interpretation
+of the world in moral terms, is _Platonism_, an independent and
+profoundly important movement, belonging to the same general realistic
+type with Eleaticism and Spinozism. Absolute being is again the
+fundamental conception. Here, however, it is conceived that being is
+primarily not affirmation or self-sufficiency, but the _good_ or
+_ideal_. There are few great metaphysical systems that have not been
+deeply influenced by Platonism; hence the importance of understanding it
+in its purity. To this end we must return again to the early Greek
+conception of the philosopher; for Platonism, like Eleaticism, is a
+sequel to the philosopher's self-consciousness.
+
+[Sidenote: Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical.]
+
+§ 155. Although the first Greek philosophers, such men as Thales,
+Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, were clearly aware of their
+distinction and high calling, it by no means follows that they were good
+judges of themselves. Their sense of intellectual power was
+unsuspecting; and they praised philosophy without definitely raising the
+question of its meaning. They were like unskilled players who try all
+the stops and scales of an organ, and know that somehow they can make a
+music that exceeds the noises, monotones or simple melodies of those who
+play upon lesser instruments. They knew their power rather than their
+instrument or their art. The first philosophers, in short, were
+self-conscious but not self-critical.
+
+[Sidenote: Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists.]
+
+§ 156. The immediately succeeding phase in the history of Greek
+philosophy was a curtailment, but only in the most superficial sense a
+criticism, of the activity of the philosopher. In the Periclean Age
+philosophy suffered more from inattention than from refutation. The
+scepticism of the sophists, who were the knowing men of this age, was
+not so much conviction as indisposition. They failed to recognize the
+old philosophical problem; it did not _appeal_ to them as a genuine
+problem. The sophists were the intellectual men of an age of _humanism_,
+_individualism_, and _secularism_. These were years in which the circle
+of human society, the state with its institutions, citizenship with its
+manifold activities and interests, bounded the horizon of thought. What
+need to look beyond? Life was not a problem, but an abundant opportunity
+and a sense of capacity. The world was not a mystery, but a place of
+entertainment and a sphere of action. Of this the sophists were faithful
+witnesses. In their love of novelty, irreverence, impressionism,
+elegance of speech, and above all in their praise of individual
+efficiency, they preached and pandered to their age. Their public,
+though it loved to abuse them, was the greatest sophist of them
+all--brilliant and capricious, incomparably rich in all but wisdom. The
+majority belonged to what Plato called "the sight-loving, art-loving,
+busy class." This is an age, then, when the man of practical
+common-sense is preëminent, and the philosopher with his dark sayings
+has passed away. The pride of wisdom has given way to the pride of power
+and the pride of cleverness. The many men pursue the many goods of life,
+and there is no spirit among them all who, sitting apart in
+contemplation, wonders at the meaning of the whole.
+
+[Sidenote: Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher.]
+
+§ 157. But in their midst there moved a strange prophet, whom they
+mistook for one of themselves. Socrates was not one who prayed in the
+wilderness, but a man of the streets and the market-place, who talked
+rather more incessantly than the rest, and apparently with less right.
+He did not testify to the truth, but pleaded ignorance in extenuation of
+an exasperating habit of asking questions. There was, however, a humor
+and a method in his innocence that arrested attention. He was a
+formidable adversary in discussion from his very irresponsibility; and
+he was especially successful with the more rhetorical sophists because
+he chose his own weapons, and substituted critical analysis, question
+and answer, for the long speeches to which these teachers were
+habituated by their profession. He appeared to be governed by an
+insatiable inquisitiveness, and a somewhat malicious desire to discredit
+those who spoke with authority.
+
+But to those who knew him better, and especially to Plato, who knew him
+best, Socrates was at once the sweetest and most compelling spirit of
+his age. There was a kind of truth in the quality of his character. He
+was perhaps _the first of all reverent men_. In the presence of conceit
+his self-depreciation was ironical, but in another presence it was most
+genuine, and his deepest spring of thought and action. This other
+presence was his own ideal. Socrates was sincerely humble because,
+expecting so much of philosophy, he saw his own deficiency. Unlike the
+unskilled player, he did not seek to _make_ music; but he loved music,
+and knew that such music as is indeed music was beyond his power. On the
+other hand he was well aware of his superiority to those in whom
+self-satisfaction was possible because they had no conception of the
+ideal. Of such he could say in truth that they did not know enough even
+to realize the extent of their ignorance. The world has long been
+familiar with the vivid portrayal of the Socratic consciousness which is
+contained in Plato's "Apology." Socrates had set out in life with the
+opinion that his was an age of exceptional enlightenment. But as he
+came to know men he found that after all no one of them really knew what
+he was about. Each "sight-loving, art-loving, busy" man was quite blind
+to the meaning of life. While he was capable of practical achievement,
+his judgments concerning the real virtue of his achievements were
+conventional and ungrounded, a mere reflection of tradition and opinion.
+When asked concerning the meaning of life, or the ground of his
+opinions, he was thrown into confusion or aggravated to meaningless
+reiteration. Such men, Socrates reflected, were both unwise and
+confirmed in their folly through being unconscious of it. Because he
+knew that vanity is vanity, that opinion is indeed mere opinion,
+Socrates felt himself to be the wisest man in a generation of dogged
+unwisdom.
+
+[Sidenote: Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth.]
+
+§ 158. It is scarcely necessary to point out that this insight, however
+negatively it be used, is a revelation of positive knowledge. Heraclitus
+and Parmenides claimed to know; Socrates disclaimed knowledge _for
+reasons_. Like all real criticism this is at once a confounding of error
+and a prophecy of truth. The truth so discovered is indeed not ordinary
+truth concerning historical or physical things, but not on that account
+less significant and necessary. This truth, it will also be admitted, is
+virtually rather than actually set forth by Socrates himself. He knew
+that life has some meaning which those who live with conviction desire
+at heart to realize, and that knowledge has principles with which those
+who speak with conviction intend to be consistent. There is, in short, a
+rational life and a rational discourse. Furthermore, a rational life
+will be a life wisely directed to the end of the good; and a rational
+discourse one constructed with reference to the real natures of things,
+and the necessities which flow from these natures. But Socrates did not
+conclusively define either the meaning of life or the form of perfect
+knowledge. He testified to the necessity of some such truths, and his
+testimony demonstrated both the blindness of his contemporaries and also
+his own deficiency.
+
+[Sidenote: The Historical Preparation for Plato.]
+
+§ 159. The character and method of Socrates have their best foil in the
+sophists, but their bearing on the earlier philosophers is for our
+purposes even more instructive. Unlike Socrates these philosophers had
+not made a study of the task of the philosopher. They _were_
+philosophers--"spectators of all time and all existence"; but they were
+precritical or dogmatic philosophers, to whom it had not occurred to
+define the requirements of philosophy. They knew no perfect knowledge
+other than their own actual knowledge. They defined being and
+interpreted life without reflecting upon the quality of the knowledge
+whose object is being, or the quality of insight that would indeed be
+practical wisdom. But when through Socrates the whole philosophical
+prospect is again revealed after the period of humanistic concentration,
+it is as an ideal whose possibilities, whose necessities, are conceived
+before they are realized. Socrates celebrates the rôle of the
+philosopher without assigning it to himself. The new philosophical
+object is the philosopher himself; and the new insight a knowledge of
+knowledge itself. These three types of intellectual procedure, dogmatic
+speculation concerning being, humanistic interest in life, and the
+self-criticism of thought, form the historical preparation for Plato,
+the philosopher who defined being as the ideal of thought, and upon this
+ground interpreted life.
+
+There is no more striking case in history of the subtle continuity of
+thought than the relation between Plato and his master Socrates. The
+wonder of it is due to the absence of any formulation of doctrine on
+the part of Socrates himself. He only lived and talked; and yet Plato
+created a system of philosophy in which he is faithfully embodied. The
+form of embodiment is the dialogue, in which the talking of Socrates is
+perpetuated and conducted to profounder issues, and in which his life is
+both rendered and interpreted. But as the vehicle of Plato's thought
+preserves and makes perfect the Socratic method, so the thought itself
+begins with the Socratic motive and remains to the end an expression of
+it. The presentiment of perfect knowledge which distinguished Socrates
+from his contemporaries becomes in Plato the clear vision of a realm of
+ideal truth.
+
+[Sidenote: Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good.]
+
+§ 160. Plato begins his philosophy with the philosopher and the
+philosopher's interest. The philosopher is a lover, who like all lovers
+longs for the beautiful. But he is the supreme lover, for he loves not
+the individual beautiful object but the Absolute Beauty itself. He is a
+lover too in that he does not possess, but somehow apprehends his object
+from afar. Though imperfect, he seeks perfection; though standing like
+all his fellows in the twilight of half-reality, he faces toward the
+sun. Now it is the fundamental proposition of the Platonic philosophy
+that reality is the sun itself, or the perfection whose possession every
+wise thinker covets, whose presence would satisfy every longing of
+experience. The real is that beloved object which is "truly beautiful,
+delicate, perfect, and blessed." There is both a serious ground for such
+an affirmation and an important truth in its meaning. The ground is the
+evident incompleteness of every special judgment concerning experience.
+We understand only in part, and we know that we understand only in part.
+What we discover is real enough for practical purposes, but even
+common-sense questions the true reality of its objects. Special
+judgments seem to terminate our thought abruptly and arbitrarily. We
+give "the best answer we can," but such answers do not come as the
+completion of our thinking. Our thought is in some sense surely a
+seeking, and it would appear that we are not permitted to rest and be
+satisfied at any stage of it. If we do so we are like the
+sophists--blind to our own ignorance. But it is equally true that our
+thought is straightforward and progressive. We are not permitted to
+return to earlier stages, but must push on to that which is not less,
+but more, than what we have as yet found. There is good hope, then, of
+understanding what the ideal may be from our knowledge of the direction
+which it impels us to follow.
+
+But to understand Plato's conception of the progression of experience we
+must again catch up the Socratic strain which he weaves into every
+theme. For Socrates, student of life and mankind, all objects were
+objects of interest, and all interests practical interests. One is
+ignorant when one does not know the good of things; opinionative when
+one rates things by conventional standards; wise when one knows their
+real good. In Platonism this practical interpretation of experience
+appears in the principle that the object of perfect knowledge is _the
+good_. The nature of things which one seeks to know better is the good
+of things, the absolute being which is the goal of all thinking is the
+very good itself. Plato does not use the term good in any merely
+utilitarian sense. Indeed it is very significant that for Plato there is
+no cleavage between theoretical and practical interests. To be morally
+good is to know the good, to set one's heart on the true object of
+affection; and to be theoretically sound is to understand perfection.
+The good itself is the end of every aim, that in which all interests
+converge. Hence it cannot be defined, as might a special good, in terms
+of the fulfilment of a set of concrete conditions, but only in terms of
+the sense or direction of all purposes. The following passage occurs in
+the "Symposium":
+
+     "The true order of going or being led by others to the things
+     of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which
+     he mounts upward for the sake of that other beauty, going from
+     one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair
+     forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions,
+     until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute
+     beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty
+     is."[329:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Progression of Experience toward God.]
+
+§ 161. There is, then, a "true order of going," and an order that leads
+from one to many, from thence to forms, from thence to morality, and
+from thence to the general objects of thought or _the ideas_. In the
+"Republic," where the proper education of the philosopher is in
+question, it is proposed that he shall study arithmetic, geometry,
+astronomy, and dialectic. Thus in each case mathematics is the first
+advance in knowledge, and dialectic the nearest to perfection. Most of
+Plato's examples are drawn from mathematics. This science replaces the
+variety and vagueness of the forms of experience with _clear_,
+_unitary_, _definite_, and _eternal_ natures, such as the number and
+the geometrical figure. Thus certain individual things are approximately
+triangular, but subject to alteration, and indefinitely many. On the
+other hand the triangle as defined by geometry is the fixed and
+unequivocal nature or idea which such experiences suggest; and the
+philosophical mind will at once pass to it from these. But the
+mathematical objects are themselves not thoroughly understood when
+understood only in mathematical terms, for the foundations of
+mathematics are arbitrary. And the same is true of all the so-called
+special sciences. Even the scientists themselves, says Plato,
+
+     "only dream about being, but never can behold the waking
+     reality so long as they leave the hypotheses they use
+     unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For
+     when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the
+     conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of
+     he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a conventional
+     statement will ever become science?"[330:9]
+
+Within the science of dialectics we are to understand the connections
+and sequences of ideas themselves, in the hope of eliminating every
+arbitrariness and conventionality within a system of truth that is pure
+and self-luminous rationality. To this science, which is the great
+interest of his later years, Plato contributes only incomplete studies
+and experiments. We must be satisfied with the playful answer with
+which, in the "Republic," he replies to Glaucon's entreaty that "he
+proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain, and
+describe that in like manner": "Dear Glaucon, you will not be able to
+follow me here, though I would do my best."
+
+But a philosophical system has been projected. The real is that perfect
+significance or meaning which thought and every interest suggests, and
+toward which there is in experience an appreciable movement. It is this
+significance which makes things what they really are, and which
+constitutes our understanding of them. In itself it transcends the steps
+which lead to it; "for God," says Plato, "mingles not with men." But it
+is nevertheless the meaning of human life. And this we can readily
+conceive. The last word may transform the sentence from nonsense into
+sense, and it would be true to say that its sense mingles not with
+nonsense. Similarly the last touch of the brush may transform an
+inchoate mass of color into a picture, disarray into an object of
+beauty; and its beauty mingles not with ugliness. So life, when it
+finally realizes itself, obtains a new and incommensurable quality of
+perfection in which humanity is transformed into deity. There is frankly
+no provision for imperfection in such a world. In his later writings
+Plato sounds his characteristic note less frequently, and permits the
+ideal to create a cosmos through the admixture of matter. But in his
+moment of inspiration, the Platonist will have no sense for the
+imperfect. It is the darkness behind his back, or the twilight through
+which he passes on his way to the light. He will use even the beauties
+of earth only "as steps along which he mounts upward for the sake of
+that other beauty."
+
+[Sidenote: Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to
+Platonism.]
+
+§ 162. We have met, then, with two distinct philosophical doctrines
+which arise from the conception of the _absolute_, or the philosopher's
+peculiar object: the doctrine of the _absolute being_ or _substance_,
+and that of the _absolute ideal_ or _good_. Both doctrines are realistic
+in that they assume reality to be demonstrated or revealed, rather than
+created, by knowledge. Both are rationalistic in that they develop a
+system of philosophy from the problem of philosophy, or deduce a
+definition of reality from the conception, of reality. There remains a
+third doctrine of the same type--the philosophy of Aristotle, the most
+elaborately constructed system of Greek antiquity, and the most potent
+influence exerted upon the Scholastic Philosophy of the long mediæval
+period. This philosophy was rehabilitated in the eighteenth century by
+Leibniz, the brilliant librarian of the court of Hanover. The
+extraordinary comprehensiveness of Aristotle's philosophy makes it quite
+impossible to render here even a general account of it. There is
+scarcely any human discipline that does not to some extent draw upon it.
+We are concerned only with the central principles of the metaphysics.
+
+Upon the common ground of rationalism and realism, Plato and Aristotle
+are complementary in temper, method, and principle. Plato's is the
+genius of inspiration and fertility, Aristotle's the genius of
+erudition, mastery, and synthesis. In form, Plato's is the gift of
+expression, Aristotle's the gift of arrangement. Plato was born and bred
+an aristocrat, and became the lover of the best--the uncompromising
+purist; Aristotle is middle-class, and limitlessly wide, hospitable, and
+patient in his interests. Thus while both are speculative and acute,
+Plato's mind is intensive and profound, Aristotle's extensive and
+orderly. It was inevitable, then, that Aristotle should find Plato
+one-sided. The philosophy of the ideal is not worldly enough to be true.
+It is a religion rather than a theory of reality. Aristotle, however,
+would not renounce it, but construe it that it may better provide for
+nature and history. This is the significance of his new terminology.
+Matter, to which Plato reluctantly concedes some room as a principle of
+degradation in the universe, is now admitted to good standing. _Matter_
+or material is indispensable to being as its potentiality or that out of
+which it is constituted. The ideal, on the other hand, loses its
+exclusive title to the predicate of reality, and becomes the _form_, or
+the determinate nature which exists only in its particular embodiments.
+The being or _substance_ is the concrete individual, of which these are
+the abstracted aspects. Aristotle's "form," like Plato's "idea," is a
+teleological principle. The essential nature of the object is its
+perfection. It is furthermore essential to the object that it should
+strive after a higher perfection. With Aristotle, however, the reality
+is not the consummation of the process, the highest perfection in and
+for itself, but the very hierarchy of objects that ascends toward it.
+The highest perfection, or God, is not itself coextensive with being,
+but the final cause of being--that on account of which the whole
+progression of events takes place. Reality is the development with all
+of its ascending stages from the maximum of potentiality, or matter, to
+the maximum of actuality, or God the pure form.
+
+[Sidenote: The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of Platonism
+and Spinozism.]
+
+§ 163. To understand the virtue of this philosophy as a basis for the
+reconciliation of different interests, we must recall the relation
+between Plato and Spinoza. Their characteristic difference appears to
+the best advantage in connection with mathematical truth. Both regarded
+geometry as the best model for philosophical thinking, but for different
+reasons. Spinoza prized geometry for its necessity, and proposed to
+extend it. His philosophy is the attempt to formulate a geometry of
+being, which shall set forth the inevitable certainties of the universe.
+Plato, on the other hand, prized geometry rather for its definition of
+types, for its knowledge of pure or perfect natures such as the circle
+and triangle, which in immediate experience are only approximated. His
+philosophy defines reality similarly as the absolute perfection.
+Applied to nature Spinozism is mechanical, and looks for necessary laws,
+while Platonism is teleological, and looks for adaptation and
+significance. Aristotle's position is intermediate. With Plato he
+affirms that the good is the ultimate principle. But this very principle
+is conceived to govern a universe of substances, each of which maintains
+its own proper being, and all of which are reciprocally determined in
+their changes. Final causes dominate nature, but work through efficient
+causes. Reality is not pure perfection, as in Platonism, nor the
+indifferent necessity, as in Spinozism, but the system of beings
+necessary to the complete progression toward the highest perfection. The
+Aristotelian philosophy promises, then, to overcome both the hard
+realism of Parmenides and Spinoza, and also the supernaturalism of
+Plato.
+
+[Sidenote: Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development to the
+Problem of Imperfection.]
+
+§ 164. But it promises, furthermore, to remedy the defect common to
+these two doctrines, the very besetting problem of this whole type of
+philosophy. That problem, as has been seen, is to provide for the
+imperfect within the perfect, for the temporal incidents of nature and
+history within the eternal being. Many absolutist philosophers have
+declared the explanation of this realm to be impossible, and have
+contented themselves with calling it the realm of opinion or appearance.
+And this realm of opinion or appearance has been used as a proof of the
+absolute. Zeno, the pupil of Parmenides, was the first to elaborate what
+have since come to be known as the paradoxes of the empirical world.
+Most of these paradoxes turn upon the infinite extension and
+divisibility of space and time. Zeno was especially interested in the
+difficulty of conceiving motion, which involves both space and time,
+and thought himself to have demonstrated its absurdity and
+impossibility.[337:10] His argument is thus the complement of
+Parmenides's argument for the indivisible and unchanging substance. Now
+the method which Zeno here adopts may be extended to cover the whole
+realm of nature and history. We should then be dialectically driven from
+this realm to take refuge in absolute being. But the empirical world is
+not destroyed by disparagement, and cannot long lack champions even
+among the absolutists themselves. The reconciliation of nature and
+history with the absolute being became the special interest of Leibniz,
+the great modern Aristotelian. As a scientist and man of affairs, he
+was profoundly dissatisfied with Spinoza's resolution of nature, the
+human individual, and the human society into the universal being. He
+became an advocate of individualism while retaining the general aim and
+method of rationalism.
+
+Like Aristotle, Leibniz attributes reality to individual substances,
+which he calls "monads"; and like Aristotle he conceives these monads to
+compose an ascending order, with God, the monad of monads, as its
+dominating goal.
+
+     "Furthermore, every substance is like an entire world and like
+     a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole world which it
+     portrays, each one in its own fashion; almost as the same city
+     is variously represented according to the various situations
+     of him who is regarding it. Thus the universe is multiplied in
+     some sort as many times as there are substances, and the glory
+     of God is multiplied in the same way by as many wholly
+     different representations of his works."[338:11]
+
+The very "glory of God," then, requires the innumerable finite
+individuals with all their characteristic imperfections, that the
+universe may lack no possible shade or quality of perspective.
+
+[Sidenote: The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved.]
+
+§ 165. But the besetting problem is in fact not solved, and is one of
+the chief incentives to that other philosophy of absolutism which
+defines an absolute spirit or mind. Both Aristotle and Leibniz undertake
+to make the perfection which determines the order of the hierarchy of
+substances, at the same time the responsible author of the whole
+hierarchy. In this case the dilemma is plain. If the divine form or the
+divine monad be other than the stages that lead up to it, these latter
+cannot be essential to it, for God is by definition absolutely
+self-sufficient. If, on the other hand, God is identical with the
+development in its entirety, then two quite incommensurable standards of
+perfection determine the supremacy of the divine nature, that of the
+whole and that of the highest parts of the whole. The union of these two
+and the definition of a perfection which may be at once the development
+and its goal, is the task of absolute idealism.
+
+[Sidenote: Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism.]
+
+§ 166. Of the two fundamental questions of epistemology, absolute
+realism answers the one explicitly, the other implicitly. As respects
+_the source of the most valid knowledge_, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle,
+Spinoza are all agreed: true knowledge is the work of reason, of pure
+intellection. Plato is the great exponent of dialectic, or the
+reciprocal affinities and necessities of ideas. Aristotle is the founder
+of deductive logic. Spinoza proposes to consider even "human actions and
+desires" as though he were "concerned with lines, planes, and solids."
+Empirical data may be the occasion, but cannot be the ground of the
+highest knowledge. According to Leibniz,
+
+     "it seems that necessary truths, such as we find in pure
+     mathematics, and especially in arithmetic and geometry, must
+     have principles whose proof does not depend upon instances,
+     nor, consequently, upon the witness of the senses, although
+     without the senses it would never have come into our heads to
+     think of them."[340:12]
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute Realism.]
+
+§ 167. The answers which these philosophies give to the question of _the
+relation between the state of knowledge and its object_, divide them
+into two groups. Among the ancients reason is regarded as the means of
+emancipation from the limitations of the private mind. "The sleeping
+turn aside each into a world of his own," but "the waking"--the wise
+men--"have one and the same world." What the individual knows belongs to
+himself only in so far as it is inadequate. Hence for Plato the ideas
+are not the attributes of a mind, but that self-subsistent truth to
+which, in its moments of insight, a mind may have access. Opinion is "my
+own," the truth is being. The position of Aristotle is equally clear.
+"Actual knowledge," he maintains, "is identical with its object."
+
+Spinoza and Leibniz belong to another age. Modern philosophy began with
+a new emphasis upon self-consciousness. In his celebrated argument--"I
+think, hence I am" (_cogito ergo sum_)--Descartes established the
+independent and substantial reality of the thinking activity. The "I
+think" is recognized as in itself a fundamental being, known intuitively
+to the thinker himself. Now although Spinoza and Leibniz are finally
+determined by the same motives that obtain in the cases of Plato and
+Aristotle, they must reckon with this new distinction between the
+thinker and his object. The result in the case of Spinoza is the
+doctrine of "parallelism," in which mind is defined as an "infinite
+attribute" of substance, an aspect or phase coextensive with the whole
+of being. The result in the case of Leibniz is his doctrine of
+"representation" and "preëstablished harmony," whereby each monadic
+substance is in itself an active spiritual entity, and belongs to the
+universe through its knowledge of a specific stage of the development of
+the universe. But both Spinoza and Leibniz subordinate such conceptions
+as these to the fundamental identity that pervades the whole. With
+Spinoza the attributes belong to the same absolute substance, and with
+Leibniz the monads represent the one universe. And with both, finally,
+the perfection of knowledge, or the knowledge of God, is
+indistinguishable from its object, God himself. The epistemological
+subtleties peculiar to these philosophers are not stable doctrines, but
+render inevitable either a return to the simpler and bolder realism of
+the Greeks, or a passing over into the more radical and systematic
+doctrine of absolute idealism.
+
+[Sidenote: The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity.]
+
+§ 168. We have met with two general motives, both of which are
+subordinated to the doctrine of an absolute being postulated and sought
+by philosophy. The one of these motives leads to the conception of the
+absolutely necessary and immutable substance, the other to the
+conception of a consummate perfection. There is an _interpretation of
+life_ appropriate to each of these conceptions. Both agree in regarding
+life seriously, in defining reason or philosophy as the highest human
+activity, and in emphasizing the identity of the individual's good with
+the good of the universe. But there are striking differences of tone and
+spirit.
+
+Although the metaphysics of the Stoics have various affiliations, the
+Stoic code of morality is the true practical sequel to the
+Eleatic-Spinozistic view of the world. The Stoic is one who has set his
+affections on the eternal being. He asks nothing of it for himself, but
+identifies himself with it. The saving grace is a sense of reality. The
+virtuous man is not one who remakes the world, or draws upon it for his
+private uses; even less one who rails against it, or complains that it
+has used him ill. He is rather one who recognizes that there is but one
+really valid claim, that of the universe itself. But he not only submits
+to this claim on account of its superiority; he makes it his own. The
+discipline of Stoicism is the regulation of the individual will to the
+end that it may coincide with the universal will. There is a part of man
+by virtue of which he is satisfied with what things are, whatever they
+be. That part, designated by the Stoics as "the ruling part," is the
+reason. In so far as man seeks to understand the laws and natures which
+actually prevail, he cannot be discontented with anything whatsoever
+that may be known to him.
+
+     "For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire
+     anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute
+     acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true:
+     wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these
+     things, the endeavor of the better part of ourselves is in
+     harmony with the order of nature as a whole."[344:13]
+
+In agreement with this teaching of Spinoza's is the famous Stoic formula
+to the effect that "nothing can happen contrary to the will of the wise
+man," who is free through his very acquiescence. If reason be the proper
+"ruling part," the first step in the moral life is the subordination of
+the appetitive nature and the enthronement of reason. One who is himself
+rational will then recognize the fellowship of all rational beings, and
+the unitary and beneficent rationality of the entire universe. The
+highest morality is thus already upon the plane of religion.
+
+[Sidenote: The Platonic Ethics of Perfection.]
+
+§ 169. With Spinoza and the Stoics, the perfection of the individual is
+reduced to what the universe requires of him. The good man is willing to
+be whatever he must be, for the sake of the whole with which through
+reason he is enabled to identify himself. With Plato and Aristotle the
+perfection of the individual himself is commended, that the universe may
+abound in perfection. The good man is the ideal man--the expression of
+the type. And how different the quality of a morality in keeping with
+this principle! The virtues which Plato enumerates--temperance, courage,
+wisdom, and justice--compose a consummate human nature. He is thinking
+not of the necessities but of the possibilities of life. Knowledge of
+the truth will indeed be the best of human living, but knowledge is not
+prized because it can reconcile man to his limitations; it is the very
+overflowing of his cup of life. The youth are to
+
+     "dwell in the land of health, amid fair sights and sounds; and
+     beauty, the effluence of fair works, will visit the eye and
+     ear, like a healthful breeze from a purer region, and
+     insensibly draw the soul even in childhood into harmony with
+     the beauty of reason."[345:14]
+
+Aristotle's account of human perfection is more circumstantial and more
+prosaic. "The function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with
+reason," and his happiness or well-being will consist in the fulness of
+rational living. But such fulness requires a sphere of life that will
+call forth and exercise the highest human capacities. Aristotle frankly
+pronounces "external goods" to be indispensable, and happiness to be
+therefore "a gift of the gods." The rational man will acquire a certain
+exquisiteness or finesse of action, a "mean" of conduct; and this virtue
+will be diversified through the various relations into which he must
+enter, and the different situations which he must meet. He will be not
+merely brave, temperate, and just, as Plato would have him, but liberal,
+magnificent, gentle, truthful, witty, friendly, and in all
+self-respecting or high-minded. In addition to these strictly moral
+virtues, he will possess the intellectual virtues of prudence and
+wisdom, the resources of art and science; and will finally possess the
+gift of insight, or intuitive reason. Speculation will be his highest
+activity, and the mark of his kinship with the gods who dwell in the
+perpetual contemplation of the truth.
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Fulfilment, and the Religion of
+Renunciation.]
+
+§ 170. Aristotle's ethics expresses the buoyancy of the ancient world,
+when the individual does not feel himself oppressed by the eternal
+reality, but rejoices in it. He is not too conscious of his sufferings
+to be disinterested in his admiration and wonder. It is this which
+distinguishes the religion of Plato and Aristotle from that of the
+Stoics and Spinoza. With both alike, religion consists not in making the
+world, but in contemplating it; not in coöperating with God, but in
+worshipping him. Plato and Aristotle, however, do not find any
+antagonism between the ways of God and the natural interests of men. God
+does not differ from men save in his exalted perfection. The
+contemplation and worship of him comes as the final and highest stage of
+a life which is organic and continuous throughout. The love of God is
+the natural love when it has found its true object.
+
+     "For he who has been instructed thus far in the things of
+     love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order
+     and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly
+     perceive a nature of wondrous beauty--and this, Socrates, is
+     that final cause of all our former toils, which in the first
+     place is everlasting--not growing and decaying, or waxing and
+     waning; in the next place not fair in one point of view and
+     foul in another, . . . or in the likeness of a face or hands
+     or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of
+     speech or knowledge, nor existing in any other being; . . .
+     but beauty only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting,
+     which without diminution and without increase, or any change,
+     is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all
+     other things."[347:15]
+
+The religion of Spinoza is the religion of one who has renounced the
+favor of the universe. He was deprived early in life of every benefit of
+fortune, and set out to find the good which required no special
+dispensation but only the common lot and the common human endowment. He
+found that good to consist in the conviction of the necessity, made
+acceptable through the supremacy of the understanding. The like faith of
+the Stoics makes of no account the difference of fortune between Marcus
+the emperor and Epictetus the slave.
+
+     "For two reasons, then, it is right to be content with that
+     which happens to thee; the one because it was done for thee
+     and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to
+     thee, originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy
+     destiny; and the other because even that which comes severally
+     to every man is to the power which administers the universe a
+     cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its very
+     continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if
+     thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and
+     the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou
+     dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art
+     dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of
+     the way."[348:16]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[306:1] By _Absolute Realism_ is meant that system of philosophy which
+defines the universe as the _absolute being_, implied in knowledge as
+its final object, but assumed to be independent of knowledge. In the
+_Spinozistic_ system this absolute being is conceived under the form of
+_substance_, or self-sufficiency; in _Platonism_ under the form of
+_perfection_; and in the _Aristotelian_ system under the form of a
+_hierarchy of substances_.
+
+[308:2] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 185.
+
+[309:3] When contrasted with the temporal realm of "generation and
+decay," this ultimate object is often called the _eternal_.
+
+[311:4] Holland, 1632-1677.
+
+[312:5] Spinoza: _Ethics_, Part I. Translation by Elwes, p. 45.
+
+[314:6] _Ibid._, p. 49.
+
+[318:7] _Ibid._, pp. 77, 81.
+
+[329:8] Plato: _Symposium_, 211. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[330:9] Plato: _Republic_, 533. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[337:10] See Burnet: _Op. cit._, pp. 322-333.
+
+[338:11] Leibniz: _Discourse on Metaphysics_. Translation by Montgomery,
+p. 15.
+
+In so far as the monads are spiritual this doctrine tends to be
+subjectivistic. Cf. Chap. IX.
+
+[340:12] Leibniz: _New Essays on the Human Understanding_. Translation
+by Latta, p. 363.
+
+[344:13] Spinoza: _Op. cit._, Part IV. Translation by Elwes, p. 243.
+
+[345:14] Plato: _Op. cit._, 401.
+
+[347:15] Plato: _Symposium_, 210-211. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[348:16] Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: _Thoughts_. Translation by Long, p.
+141.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+ABSOLUTE IDEALISM[349:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism.]
+
+§ 171. Absolute idealism is the most elaborately constructive of all the
+historical types of philosophy. Though it may have overlooked elementary
+truths, and have sought to combine irreconcilable principles, it cannot
+be charged with lack of sophistication or subtlety. Its great virtue is
+its recognition of problems--its exceeding circumspection; while its
+great promise is due to its comprehensiveness--its generous provision
+for all interests and points of view. But its very breadth and
+complexity render this philosophy peculiarly liable to the equivocal use
+of conceptions. This may be readily understood from the nature of the
+central doctrine of absolute idealism. According to this doctrine it is
+proposed to define the universe as an _absolute spirit_; or a being
+infinite, ultimate, eternal, and self-sufficient, like the being of
+Plato and Spinoza, but possessing at the same time the distinguishing
+properties of spirit. Such conceptions as self-consciousness, will,
+knowledge, and moral goodness are carried over from the realm of human
+endeavor and social relations to the unitary and all-inclusive reality.
+Now it has been objected that this procedure is either meaningless, in
+that it so applies the term spirit as to contradict its meaning; or
+prejudicial to spiritual interests, in that it neutralizes the
+properties of spirit through so extending their use. Thus one may
+contend that to affirm that the universe as a whole is spirit is
+meaningless, since moral goodness requires special conditions and
+relations that cannot be attributed to the universe as a whole; or one
+may contend that such doctrine is prejudicial to moral interests because
+by attributing spiritual perfection to the totality of being it
+discredits all moral loyalties and antagonisms. The difficulties that
+lie in the way of absolute idealism are due, then, to the complexity of
+its synthesis, to its complementary recognition of differences and
+resolution of them into unity. But this synthesis is due to the urgency
+of certain great problems which the first or realistic expression of
+the absolutist motive left undiscovered and unsolved.
+
+[Sidenote: The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism.]
+
+§ 172. It is natural to approach so deliberate and calculating a
+philosophy from the stand-point of the problems which it proposes to
+solve. One of these is the epistemological problem of the relation
+between the state of knowledge and its object. Naturalism and absolute
+realism side with common-sense in its assumption that although the real
+object is essential to the valid state of knowledge, its being known is
+not essential to the real object. Subjectivism, on the other hand,
+maintains that being is essentially the content of a knowing state, or
+an activity of the knower himself. Absolute idealism proposes to accept
+the general epistemological principle of subjectivism; but to satisfy
+the realistic demand for a standard, compelling object, by setting up an
+_absolute knower_, with whom all valid knowledge must be in agreement.
+This epistemological statement of absolute idealism is its most mature
+phase; and the culminating phase, in which it shows unmistakable signs
+of passing over into another doctrine. We must look for its pristine
+inspiration in its solution of another fundamental problem: that of the
+relation between the absolute and the empirical. Like absolute realism,
+this philosophy regards the universe as a unitary and internally
+necessary being, and undertakes to hold that being accountable for every
+item of experience. But we have found that absolute realism is beset
+with the difficulty of thus accounting for the fragmentariness and
+isolation of the individual. The contention that the universe must
+really be a rational or perfect unity is disputed by the evident
+multiplicity, irrelevance, and imperfection in the foreground of
+experience. The inference to perfection and the confession of
+imperfection seem equally unavoidable. Rational necessities and
+empirical facts are out of joint.
+
+[Sidenote: The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The Task of
+the New Absolutism.]
+
+§ 173. Even Plato had been conscious of a certain responsibility for
+matters of fact. Inasmuch as he attached the predicate of reality to the
+absolute perfection, he made that being the only source to which they
+could be referred. Perhaps, then, he suggests, they are due to the very
+bounteousness of God.
+
+     "He was good, and no goodness can ever have any jealousy of
+     anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all
+     things should be as like himself as possible."[352:2]
+
+Plotinus, in whom Platonism is leavened by the spirit of an age which
+is convinced of sin, and which is therefore more keenly aware of the
+positive existence of the imperfect, follows out this suggestion.
+Creation is "emanation"--the overflow of God's excess of goodness. But
+one does not readily understand how goodness, desiring all things to be
+like itself, should thereupon create evil--even to make it good. The
+Aristotelian philosophy, with its conception of the gradation of
+substances, would seem to be better equipped to meet the difficulty. A
+development requires stages; and every finite thing may thus be perfect
+in its way and perfect in its place, while in the absolute truth or God
+there is realized the meaning of the whole order. But if so, there is
+evidently something that escapes God, to wit, the meaningless and
+unfitness, the error and evil, of the stages in their successive
+isolation. Nor is it of any avail to insist (as did Plato, Aristotle,
+and Spinoza alike) that these are only privation, and therefore not to
+be counted in the sum of reality. For privation is itself an experience,
+with a great variety of implications, moral and psychological; and these
+cannot be attributed to God or deduced from him, in consideration of his
+absolute perfection.
+
+The task of the new absolutism is now in clear view. The perfect must
+be amended to admit the imperfect. The absolute significance must be so
+construed as to provide for the evident facts; for the unmeaning things
+and changes of the natural order; for ignorance, sin, despair, and every
+human deficiency. The new philosophy is to solve this problem by
+defining a _spiritual absolute_, and by so construing the life or
+dynamics of spirit, as to demonstrate the necessity of the very
+imperfection and opposition which is so baffling to the realist.
+
+[Sidenote: The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis of
+Experience.]
+
+§ 174. Absolute idealism, which is essentially a modern doctrine, does
+not begin with rhapsodies, but with a very sober analysis of familiar
+truths, conducted by the most sober of all philosophers, Immanuel Kant.
+This philosopher lived in Königsberg, Germany, at the close of the
+eighteenth century. He is related to absolute idealism much as Socrates
+is related to Platonism: he was not himself speculative, but employed a
+critical method which was transformed by his followers into a
+metaphysical construction. It is essential to the understanding both of
+Kant and of his more speculative successors, to observe that he begins
+with the recognition of certain non-philosophical truths--those of
+_natural science_ and _the moral consciousness_. He accepts the order of
+nature formulated in the Newtonian dynamics, and the moral order
+acknowledged in the common human conviction of duty. And he is
+interested in discovering the ground upon which these common
+affirmations rest, the structure which virtually supports them as types
+of knowledge. But a general importance attaches to the analysis because
+these two types of knowledge (together with the æsthetic judgment, which
+is similarly analyzed) are regarded by Kant as coextensive with
+experience itself. The _very least experience_ that can be reported upon
+at all is an experience of nature or duty, and as such will be informed
+with their characteristic principles. Let us consider the former type.
+The simplest instance of nature is the experience of the single
+perceived object. In the first place, such an object will be perceived
+as in space and time. These Kant calls the _forms of intuition_. An
+object cannot even be presented or given without them. But, furthermore,
+it will be regarded as substance, that is, as having a substratum that
+persists through changes of position or quality. It will also be
+regarded as causally dependent upon other objects like itself.
+Causality, substance, and like principles to the number of twelve, Kant
+calls the _categories of the understanding_. Both intuition and
+understanding are indispensable to the experience of any object
+whatsoever. They may be said to condition the object in general. Their
+principles condition the process of making something out of the manifold
+of sensation. But similarly, every moral experience recognizes what Kant
+calls _the categorical imperative_. The categorical imperative is the
+law of reasonableness or impartiality in conduct, requiring the
+individual to act on a maxim which he can "will to be law universal." No
+state of desire or situation calling for action means anything morally
+except in the light of this obligation. Thus certain principles of
+thought and action are said to be implicit in all experience. They are
+universal and necessary in the sense that they are discovered as the
+conditions not of any particular experience, but of experience in
+general. This implicit or virtual presence in experience in general,
+Kant calls their transcendental character, and the process of
+explicating them is his famous _Transcendental Deduction_.
+
+[Sidenote: Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which they
+Set in Order.]
+
+§ 175. The restriction which Kant puts upon his method is quite
+essential to its meaning. I deduce the categories, for example, just in
+so far as I find them to be necessary to perception. Without them my
+perception is blind, I make nothing of it; with them my experience
+becomes systematic and rational. But categories which I so deduce must
+be forever limited to the rôle for which they are defined. Categories
+without perceptions are "empty"; they have validity solely with
+reference to the experience which they set in order. Indeed, I cannot
+even complete that order. The orderly arrangement of parts of experience
+suggests, and suggests irresistibly, a perfect system. I can even define
+the ideas and ideals through which such a perfect system might be
+realized. But I cannot in the Kantian sense attach reality to it because
+it is not indispensable to experience. It must remain an ideal which
+regulates my thinking of such parts of it as fall within the range of my
+perception; or it may through my moral nature become the realm of my
+living and an object of faith. In short, Kant's is essentially a
+"critical philosophy," a logical and analytical study of the special
+terms and relations of human knowledge. He denies the validity of these
+terms and relations beyond this realm. His critiques are an inventory
+of the conditions, principles, and prospects of that cognition which,
+although not alone ideally conceivable, is alone possible.
+
+[Sidenote: The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the
+Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant. The Absolute
+Spirit.]
+
+§ 176. With the successors of Kant, as with the successors of Socrates,
+a criticism becomes a system of metaphysics. This transformation is
+effected in the post-Kantians by _a generalization of the human
+cognitive consciousness_. According to Kant's analysis it contains a
+manifold of sense which must be organized by categories in obedience to
+the ideal of a rational universe. The whole enterprise, with its
+problems given in perception, its instruments available in the
+activities of the understanding, and its ideals revealed in the reason,
+is an organic spiritual unity, manifesting itself in the
+self-consciousness of the thinker. Now in absolute idealism this very
+enterprise of knowledge, made universal and called the _absolute spirit_
+or _mind_, is taken to be the ultimate reality. And here at length would
+seem to be afforded the conception of a being to which the problematic
+and the rational, the data and the principles, the natural and the
+ideal, are alike indispensable. We are now to seek the real not in the
+ideal itself, but in that spiritual unity in which appearance is the
+incentive to truth, and natural imperfection the spring to goodness.
+This may be translated into the language which Plato uses in the
+"Symposium," when Diotima is revealing to Socrates the meaning of love.
+The new reality will be not the loved one, but love itself.
+
+     "What then is Love? Is he mortal?"
+
+     "No."
+
+     "What then?"
+
+     "As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal,
+     but is a mean between them."
+
+     "What is he then, Diotima?"
+
+     "He is a great spirit, and like all that is spiritual he is
+     intermediate between the divine and the mortal."[359:3]
+
+Reality is no longer the God who mingles not with men, but that power
+which, as Diotima further says, "interprets and conveys to the gods the
+prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and rewards of
+the gods."
+
+In speaking for such an idealism, Emerson says:
+
+     "Everything good is on the highway. The middle region of our
+     being is the temperate zone. We may climb into the thin and
+     cold realm of pure geometry and lifeless science, or sink into
+     that of sensation. Between these extremes is the equator of
+     life, of thought, of spirit, of poetry. . . . The mid-world is
+     best."[359:4]
+
+The new reality is this highway of the spirit, the very course and
+raceway of self-consciousness. It is traversed in the movement and
+self-correction of thought, in the interest in ideals, or in the
+submission of the will to the control of the moral law.
+
+[Sidenote: Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity.]
+
+§ 177. It is the last of these phases of self-consciousness that Fichte,
+who was Kant's immediate successor, regards as of paramount importance.
+As Platonism began with the ideal of the good or the object of life, so
+the new idealism begins with the conviction of duty, or _the story of
+life_. Being is the living moral nature compelled to build itself a
+natural order wherein it may obey the moral law, and to divide itself
+into a community of moral selves through which the moral virtues may be
+realized. Nature and society flow from the conception of an absolute
+moral activity, or ego. Such an ego could not be pure and isolated and
+yet be moral. The evidence of this is the common moral consciousness. My
+duty compels me to act upon the not-self or environment, and to respect
+and coöperate with other selves. Fichte's absolute is this moral
+consciousness universalized and made eternal. Moral value being its
+fundamental principle the universe must on that very account embrace
+both nature, or moral indifference, and humanity, or moral limitation.
+
+[Sidenote: Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment.]
+
+§ 178. But the Romanticists, who followed close upon Fichte, were
+dissatisfied with so hard and exclusive a conception of spiritual being.
+Life, they said, is not all duty. Indeed, the true spiritual life is
+quite other, not harsh and constrained, but free and spontaneous--a
+wealth of feeling playing about a constantly shifting centre. Spirit is
+not consecutive and law-abiding, but capricious and wanton, seeking the
+beautiful in no orderly progression, but in a refined and versatile
+sensibility. If this be the nature of spirit, and if spirit be the
+nature of reality, then he is most wise who is most rich in sentiment.
+The Romanticists were the exponents of an absolute sentimentalism. And
+they did not prove it, but like good sentimentalists they felt it.
+
+[Sidenote: Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic.]
+
+§ 179. Hegel, the master of the new idealism, set himself the task of
+construing spirit in terms as consecutive as those of Fichte, and as
+comprehensive as those of the Romanticists. Like Plato, he found in
+dialectic the supreme manifestation of the spiritual life. There is a
+certain flow of ideas which determines the meaning of experience, and
+is the truth of truths. But the mark of the new prophet is this: the
+flow of ideas itself is _a process of self-correction due to a sense of
+error_. Thus bare sensation is abstract and bare thought is abstract.
+The real, however, is not merely the concrete in which they are united,
+but the very process in the course of which through knowledge of
+abstraction thought arrives at the concrete. The principle of negation
+is the very life of thought, and it is _the life of thought_, rather
+than the outcome of thought, which is reality. The most general form of
+the dialectical process contains three moments: the moment of _thesis_,
+in which affirmation is made; the moment of _antithesis_, in which the
+opposite asserts itself; and the moment of _synthesis_, in which a
+reconciliation is effected in a new thesis. Thus thought is the
+progressive overcoming of contradiction; not the state of freedom from
+contradiction, but the act of escaping it. Such processes are more
+familiar in the moral life. Morality consists, so even common-sense
+asserts, in the overcoming of evil. Character is the resistance of
+temptation; goodness, a growth in grace through discipline. Of such, for
+Hegel, is the very kingdom of heaven. It is the task of the philosopher,
+a task to which Hegel applies himself most assiduously, to analyze the
+battle and the victory upon which spiritual being nourishes itself. And
+since the deeper processes are those of thought, the Hegelian philosophy
+centres in an ordering of notions, a demonstration of that necessary
+progression of thought which, in its whole dynamical logical history,
+constitutes the _absolute idea_.
+
+[Sidenote: The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History.]
+
+§ 180. The Hegelian philosophy, with its emphasis upon difference,
+antagonism, and development, is peculiarly qualified to be a philosophy
+of nature and history. Those principles of spiritual development which
+logic defines are conceived as incarnate in the evolution of the world.
+Nature, as the very antithesis to spirit, is now understood to be the
+foil of spirit. In nature spirit alienates itself in order to return
+enriched. The stages of nature are the preparation for the reviving of a
+spirituality that has been deliberately forfeited. The Romanticists,
+whether philosophers like Schelling or poets like Goethe and Wordsworth,
+were led by their feeling for the beauty of nature to attribute to it a
+much deeper and more direct spiritual significance. But Hegel and the
+Romanticists alike are truly expressed in Emerson's belief that the
+spiritual interpretation of nature is the "true science."
+
+     "The poet alone knows astronomy, chemistry, vegetation, and
+     animation, for he does not stop at these facts, but employs
+     them as signs. He knows why the plain or meadow of space was
+     strown with these flowers we call suns and moons and stars;
+     why the great deep is adorned with animals, with men, and
+     gods; for in every word he speaks he rides on them as the
+     horses of thought."[364:5]
+
+The new awakening of spirit which is for Hegel the consummation of the
+natural evolution, begins with the individual or _subjective_ spirit,
+and develops into the social or _objective_ spirit, which is morality
+and history. History is a veritable dialectic of nations, in the course
+of which the consciousness of individual liberty is developed, and
+coördinated with the unity of the state. The highest stage of spirit
+incarnate is that of _absolute_ spirit, embracing art, religion, and
+philosophy. In art the absolute idea obtains expression in sensuous
+existence, more perfectly in classical than in the symbolic art of the
+Orient, but most perfectly in the romantic art of the modern period. In
+religion the absolute idea is expressed in the imagination through
+worship. In Oriental pantheism, the individual is overwhelmed by his
+sense of the universal; in Greek religion, God is but a higher man;
+while in Christianity God and man are perfectly united in Christ.
+Finally, in philosophy the absolute idea reaches its highest possible
+expression in articulate thought.
+
+[Sidenote: Résumé. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the Problem of
+Evil.]
+
+§ 181. Such is absolute idealism approached from the stand-point of
+antecedent metaphysics. It is the most elaborate and subtle provision
+for antagonistic differences within unity that the speculative mind of
+man has as yet been able to make. It is the last and most thorough
+attempt to resolve individual and universal, temporal and eternal,
+natural and ideal, good and evil, into an absolute unity in which the
+universal, eternal, ideal, and good shall dominate, and in which all
+terms shall be related with such necessity as obtains in the definitions
+and theorems of geometry. There is to be some absolute meaning which is
+rational to the uttermost and the necessary ground of all the incidents
+of existence. Thought could undertake no more ambitious and exacting
+task. Nor is it evident after all that absolute idealism enjoys any
+better success in this task than absolute realism. The difference
+between them becomes much less marked when we reflect that the former,
+like the latter, must reserve the predicate of being for the unity of
+the whole. Even though evil and contradiction belong to the essence of
+things, move in the secret heart of a spiritual universe, the reality is
+not these in their severalty, but that life within which they fall, the
+story within which they "earn a place." And if absolute idealism has
+defined a new perfection, it has at the same time defined a new
+imperfection. The perfection is rich in contrast, and thus inclusive of
+both the lights and shades of experience; but the perfection belongs
+only to the composition of these elements within a single view. It is
+not necessary to such perfection that the evil should ever be viewed in
+isolation. The idealist employs the analogy of the drama or the picture
+whose very significance requires the balance of opposing forces; or the
+analogy of the symphony in which a higher musical quality is realized
+through the resolution of discord into harmony. But none of these
+unities requires any element whatsoever that does not partake of its
+beauty. It is quite irrelevant to the drama that the hero should
+himself have his own view of events with no understanding of their
+dramatic value, as it is irrelevant to the picture that an unbalanced
+fragment of it should dwell apart, or to the symphony that the discord
+should be heard without the harmony. One may multiply without end the
+internal differences and antagonisms that contribute to the internal
+meaning, and be as far as ever from understanding the external
+detachment of experiences that are not rational or good in themselves.
+And it is precisely this kind of fact that precipitates the whole
+problem. We do not judge of sin and error from experiences in which they
+conduct to goodness and truth, but from experiences in which they are
+stark and unresolved.
+
+In view of such considerations many idealists have been willing to
+confess their inability to solve this problem. To quote a recent
+expositor of Hegel,
+
+     "We need not, after all, be surprised at the apparently
+     insoluble problem which confronts us. For the question has
+     developed into the old difficulty of the origin of evil, which
+     has always baffled both theologians and philosophers. An
+     idealism which declares that the universe is in reality
+     perfect, can find, as most forms of popular idealism do, an
+     escape from the difficulties of the existence of evil, by
+     declaring that the universe is as yet only growing towards its
+     ideal perfection. But this refuge disappears with the reality
+     of time, and we are left with an awkward difference between
+     what philosophy tells us must be, and what our life tells us
+     actually is."[368:6]
+
+If the philosophy of eternal perfection persists in its fundamental
+doctrine in spite of this irreconcilable conflict with life, it is
+because it is believed that that doctrine _must_ be true. Let us turn,
+then, to its more constructive and compelling argument.
+
+[Sidenote: The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is Based upon
+the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge.]
+
+§ 182. The proof of absolute idealism is supposed by the majority of its
+exponents to follow from the problem of epistemology, and more
+particularly from the manifest dependence of truth upon the knowing
+mind. In its initial phase absolute idealism is indistinguishable from
+subjectivism. Like that philosophy it finds that the object of knowledge
+is inseparable from the state of knowledge throughout the whole range of
+experience. Since the knower can never escape himself, it may be set
+down as an elementary fact that reality (at any rate whatever reality
+can be known or even talked about) owes its being to mind.
+
+Thus Green, the English neo-Hegelian, maintains that "an object which
+no consciousness presented to itself would not be an object at all," and
+wonders that this principle is not generally taken for granted and made
+the starting-point for philosophy.[369:7] However, unless the very term
+"object" is intended to imply presence to a subject, this principle is
+by no means self-evident, and must be traced to its sources.
+
+We have already followed the fortunes of that empirical subjectivism
+which issues from the relativity of perception. At the very dawn of
+philosophy it was observed that what is seen, heard, or otherwise
+experienced through the senses, depends not only upon the use of
+sense-organs, but upon the special point of view occupied by each
+individual sentient being. It was therefore concluded that the
+perceptual world belonged to the human knower with his limitations and
+perspective, rather than to being itself. It was this epistemological
+principle upon which Berkeley founded his empirical idealism. Believing
+knowledge to consist essentially in perception, and believing perception
+to be subjective, he had to choose between the relegation of being to a
+region inaccessible to knowledge, and the definition of being in terms
+of subjectivity. To avoid scepticism he accepted the latter alternative.
+But among the Greeks with whom this theory of perception originated, it
+drew its meaning in large part from the distinction between perception
+and reason. Thus we read in Plato's "Sophist":
+
+     "And you would allow that we participate in generation with
+     the body, and by perception; but we participate with the soul
+     by thought in true essence, and essence you would affirm to be
+     always the same and immutable, whereas generation
+     varies."[370:8]
+
+It is conceived that although in perception man is condemned to a
+knowledge conditioned by the affections and station of his body, he may
+nevertheless escape himself and lay hold on the "true essence" of
+things, by virtue of thought. In other words, knowledge, in
+contradistinction to "opinion," is not made by the subject, but is the
+soul's participation in the eternal natures of things. In the moment of
+insight the varying course of the individual thinker coincides with the
+unvarying truth; but in that moment the individual thinker is ennobled
+through being assimilated to the truth, while the truth is no more, no
+less, the truth than before.
+
+[Sidenote: The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason.]
+
+§ 183. In absolute idealism, the principle of subjectivism is extended
+to reason itself. This extension seems to have been originally due to
+moral and religious interests. From the moral stand-point the
+contemplation of the truth is a _state_, and the highest state of the
+individual life. The religious interest unifies the individual life and
+directs attention to its spiritual development. Among the Greeks of the
+middle period life was as yet viewed objectively as the fulfilment of
+capacities, and knowledge was regarded as perfection of function, the
+exercise of the highest of human prerogatives. But as moral and
+religious interests became more absorbing, the individual lived more and
+more in his own self-consciousness. Even before the Christian era the
+Greek philosophers themselves were preoccupied with the task of winning
+a state of inner serenity. Thus the Stoics and Epicureans came to look
+upon knowledge as a means to the attainment of an inner freedom from
+distress and bondage to the world. In other words, the very reason was
+regarded as an activity of the self, and its fruits were valued for
+their enhancement of the welfare of the self. And if this be true of the
+Stoics and the Epicureans, it is still more clearly true of the
+neo-Platonists of the Christian era, who mediate between the ancient
+and mediæval worlds.
+
+[Sidenote: Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian
+Philosophy.]
+
+§ 184. It is well known that the early period of Christianity was a
+period of the most vivid self-consciousness. The individual believed
+that his natural and social environment was alien to his deeper
+spiritual interests. He therefore withdrew into himself. He believed
+himself to have but one duty, the salvation of his soul; and that duty
+required him to search his innermost springs of action in order to
+uproot any that might compromise him with the world and turn him from
+God. The drama of life was enacted within the circle of his own
+self-consciousness. Citizenship, bodily health, all forms of
+appreciation and knowledge, were identified in the parts they played
+here. In short the Christian consciousness, although renunciation was
+its deepest motive, was reflexive and centripetal to a degree hitherto
+unknown among the European peoples. And when with St. Augustine
+theoretical interests once more vigorously asserted themselves, this new
+emphasis was in the very foreground. St. Augustine wished to begin his
+system of thought with a first indubitable certainty, and selected
+neither being nor ideas, but _self_. St. Augustine's genius was
+primarily religious, and the "Confessions," in which he records the
+story of his hard winning of peace and right relations with God, is his
+most intimate book. How faithfully does he represent himself, and the
+blend of paganism and Christianity which was distinctive of his age,
+when in his systematic writings he draws upon religion for his knowledge
+of truth! In all my living, he argues, whether I sin or turn to God,
+whether I doubt or believe, whether I know or am ignorant, in all _I
+know that I am I_. Each and every state of my consciousness is a state
+of my self, and as such, sure evidence of my self's existence. If one
+were to follow St. Augustine's reflections further, one would find him
+reasoning from his own finite and evil self to an infinite and perfect
+Self, which centres like his in the conviction that I am I, but is
+endowed with all power and all worth. One would find him reflecting upon
+the possible union with God through the exaltation of the human
+self-consciousness. But this conception of God as the perfect self is so
+much a prophecy of things to come, that more than a dozen centuries
+elapsed before it was explicitly formulated by the post-Kantians. We
+must follow its more gradual development in the philosophies of
+Descartes and Kant.
+
+[Sidenote: Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the Thinking
+Self.]
+
+§ 185. When at the close of the sixteenth century the Frenchman, René
+Descartes, sought to construct philosophy anew and upon secure
+foundations, he too selected as the initial certainty of thought the
+thinker's knowledge of himself. This principle now received its classic
+formulation in the proposition, _Cogito ergo sum_--"I think, hence I
+am." The argument does not differ essentially from that of St.
+Augustine, but it now finds a place in a systematic and critical
+metaphysics. In that my thinking is certain of itself, says Descartes,
+in that I know myself before I know aught else, my self can never be
+dependent for its being upon anything else that I may come to know. A
+thinking self, with its knowledge and its volition, is quite capable of
+subsisting of itself. Such is, indeed, not the case with a finite self,
+for all finitude is significant of limitation, and in recognizing my
+limitations I postulate the infinite being or God. But the relation of
+my self to a physical world is quite without necessity. Human nature,
+with soul and body conjoined, is a combination of two substances,
+neither of which is a necessary consequence of the other. As a result
+of this combination the soul is to some extent affected by the body, and
+the body is to some extent directed by the soul; but the body could
+conceivably be an automaton, as the soul could conceivably be, and will
+in another life become, a free spirit. The consequences of this dualism
+for epistemology are very grave. If knowledge be the activity of a
+self-subsistent thinking spirit, how can it reveal the nature of an
+external world? The natural order is now literally "external." It is
+true that the whole body of exact science, that mechanical system to
+which Descartes attached so much importance, falls within the range of
+the soul's own thinking. But what assurance is there that it refers to a
+province of its own--a physical world in space? Descartes can only
+suppose that "clear and distinct" ideas must be trusted as faithful
+representations. It is true the external world makes its presence known
+directly, when it breaks in upon the soul in sense-perception. But
+Descartes's rationalism and love of mathematics forbade his attaching
+importance to this criterion. Real nature, that exactly definable and
+predictable order of moving bodies defined in physics, is not known
+through sense-perception, but through thought. Its necessities are the
+necessities of reason. Descartes finds himself, then, in the perplexing
+position of seeking an internal criterion for an external world. The
+problem of knowledge so stated sets going the whole epistemological
+movement of the eighteenth century, from Locke through Berkeley and Hume
+to Kant. And the issue of this development is the absolute idealism of
+Kant's successors.
+
+[Sidenote: Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers.]
+
+§ 186. Of the English philosophers who prepare the way for the
+epistemology of Kant, Hume is the most radical and momentous. It was he
+who roused Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers" to the task of the
+"Critical Philosophy." Hume is one of the two possible consequences of
+Descartes. One who attaches greater importance to the rational
+necessities of science than to its external reference, is not unwilling
+that nature should be swallowed up in mind. With Malebranche,
+Descartes's immediate successor in France, nature is thus provided for
+within the archetypal mind of God. With the English philosophers, on the
+other hand, externality is made the very mark of nature, and as a
+consequence sense-perception becomes the criterion of scientific truth.
+This empirical theory of knowledge, inaugurated and developed by Locke
+and Berkeley, culminates in Hume's designation of the _impression_ as
+the distinguishing element of nature, at once making up its content and
+certifying to its externality. The processes of nature are successions
+of impressions; and the laws of nature are their uniformities, or the
+expectations of uniformity which their repetitions engender. Hume does
+not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion. If the final mark of truth
+is the presence to sense of the individual element, then science can
+consist only of items of information and probable generalizations
+concerning their sequences. The effect is observed to follow upon the
+cause in fact, but there is no understanding of its necessity; therefore
+no absolute certainty attaches to the future effects of any cause.
+
+[Sidenote: To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind.]
+
+§ 187. But what has become of the dream of the mathematical physicist?
+Is the whole system of Newton, that brilliant triumph of the mechanical
+method, unfounded and dogmatic? It is the logical instability of this
+body of knowledge, made manifest in the well-founded scepticism of Hume,
+that rouses Kant to a reëxamination of the whole foundation of natural
+science. The general outline of his analysis has been developed above.
+It is of importance here to understand its relations to the problem of
+Descartes. Contrary to the view of the English philosophers, natural
+science is, says Kant, the work of the mind. The certainty of the causal
+relation is due to the human inability to think otherwise. Hume is
+mistaken in supposing that mere sensation gives us any knowledge of
+nature. The very least experience of objects involves the employment of
+principles which are furnished by the mind. Without the employment of
+such principles, or in bare sensation, there is no intelligible meaning
+whatsoever. But once admit the employment of such principles and
+formulate them systematically, and the whole Newtonian order of nature
+is seen to follow from them. Furthermore, since these principles or
+categories are the conditions of human experience, are the very
+instruments of knowledge, they are valid wherever there is any
+experience or knowledge. There is but one way to make anything at all
+out of nature, and that is to conceive it as an order of necessary
+events in space and time. Newtonian science is part of such a general
+conception, and is therefore necessary if knowledge is to be possible at
+all, even the least. Thus Kant turns upon Hume, and shuts him up to the
+choice between the utter abnegation of all knowledge, including the
+knowledge of his own scepticism, and the acceptance of the whole body of
+exact science.
+
+But with nature thus conditioned by the necessities of thought, what has
+become of its externality? That, Kant admits, has indeed vanished. Kant
+does not attempt, as did Descartes, to hold that the nature which mind
+constructs and controls, exists also outside of mind. The nature that is
+known is on that very account phenomenal, anthropocentric--created by
+its cognitive conditions. Descartes was right in maintaining that
+sense-perception certifies to the existence of a world outside the mind,
+but mistaken in calling it nature and identifying it with the realm of
+science. In short, Kant acknowledges the external world, and names it
+the _thing-in-itself_; but insists that because it is outside of mind it
+is outside of knowledge. Thus is the certainty of science saved at the
+cost of its metaphysical validity. It is necessarily true, but only of a
+conditioned or dependent world. And in saving science Kant has at the
+same time prejudiced metaphysics in general. For the human or
+naturalistic way of knowing is left in sole possession of the field,
+with the higher interest of reasons in the ultimate nature of being,
+degraded to the rank of practical faith.
+
+[Sidenote: The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general into an
+Absolute Mind.]
+
+§ 188. The transformation of this critical and agnostic doctrine into
+absolute idealism is inevitable. The metaphysical interest was bound to
+avail itself of the speculative suggestiveness with which the Kantian
+philosophy abounds. The transformation turns upon Kant's assumption that
+whatever is constructed by the mind is on that account phenomenon or
+appearance. Kant has carried along the presumption that whatever is act
+or content of mind is on that account not _real_ object or
+_thing-in-itself_. We have seen that this is generally accepted as true
+of the relativities of sense-perception. But is it true of thought? The
+post-Kantian idealist maintains that _that depends upon the thought_.
+The content of private individual thinking is in so far not real object;
+but it does not follow that this is true of such thinking as is
+universally valid. Now Kant has deduced his categories for thought in
+general. There are no empirical cases of thinking except the human
+thinkers; but the categories are not the property of any one human
+individual or any group of such individuals. They are the conditions of
+_experience in general_, and of every possibility of experience. The
+transition to absolute idealism is now readily made. _Thought in
+general_ becomes the _absolute mind_, and experience in general its
+content. The thing-in-itself drops out as having no meaning. The
+objectivity to which it testified is provided for in the completeness
+and self-sufficiency which is attributed to the absolute experience.
+Indeed, an altogether new definition of subjective and objective
+replaces the old. The subjective is that which is only insufficiently
+thought, as in the case of relativity and error; the objective is that
+which is completely thought. Thus the natural order is indeed
+phenomenal; but only because the principles of science are not the
+highest principles of thought, and not because nature is the fruit of
+thought. Thus Hegel expresses his relation to Kant as follows:
+
+     "According to Kant, the things that we know about are _to us_
+     appearances only, and we can never know their essential
+     nature, which belongs to another world, which we cannot
+     approach. . . . The true statement of the case is as follows.
+     The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere
+     phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the
+     true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is
+     to have their existence founded not in themselves, but in the
+     universal divine idea. This view of things, it is true, is as
+     idealist as Kant's, but in contradistinction to the
+     subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy should be
+     termed Absolute Idealism."[382:9]
+
+[Sidenote: The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite Mind to
+the Infinite Mind.]
+
+§ 189. Absolute idealism is thus reached after a long and devious course
+of development. But the argument may be stated much more briefly. Plato,
+it will be remembered, found that experience tends ever to transcend
+itself. The thinker finds himself compelled to pursue the ideal of
+immutable and universal truth, and must identify the ultimate being with
+that ideal. Similarly Hegel says:
+
+     "That upward spring of the mind signifies that the being which
+     the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute
+     truth; it signifies that beyond and above that appearance,
+     truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for
+     God."[382:10]
+
+The further argument of absolute idealism differs from that of Plato in
+that the dependence of truth upon the mind is accepted as a first
+principle. The ideal with which experience is informed is now _the state
+of perfect knowledge_, rather than the system of absolute truth. The
+content of the state of perfect knowledge will indeed be the system of
+absolute truth, but none the less _content_, precisely as finite
+knowledge is the content of a finite mind. In pursuing the truth, I who
+pursue, aim to realize in myself a certain highest state of knowledge.
+Were I to know all truth I should indeed have ceased to be the finite
+individual who began the quest, but the evolution would be continuous
+and the character of self-consciousness would never have been lost. I
+may say, in short, that God or being, is my perfect cognitive self.
+
+The argument for absolute idealism is a constructive interpretation of
+the subjectivistic contention that knowledge can never escape the circle
+of its own activity and states. To meet the demand for a final and
+standard truth, a demand which realism meets with its doctrine of a
+being independent of any mind, this philosophy defines a _standard
+mind_. The impossibility of defining objects in terms of relativity to a
+finite self, conducts dialectically to the conception of the _absolute
+self_. The sequel to my error or exclusiveness, is truth or
+inclusiveness. The outcome of the dialectic is determined by the
+symmetry of the antithesis. Thus, corrected experience implies a last
+correcting experience; partial cognition, complete cognition; empirical
+subject, transcendental subject; finite mind, an absolute mind. The
+following statement is taken from a contemporary exponent of the
+philosophy:
+
+     "What you and I lack, when we lament our human ignorance, is
+     simply a certain desirable and logically possible state of
+     mind, or type of experience; to wit, a state of mind in which
+     we should wisely be able to say that we had fulfilled in
+     experience what we now have merely in idea, namely, the
+     knowledge, the immediate and felt presence, of what we now
+     call the Absolute Reality. . . . There is an Absolute
+     Experience for which the conception of an absolute reality,
+     _i. e._, the conception of a system of ideal truth, is
+     fulfilled by the very contents that get presented to this
+     experience. This Absolute Experience is related to our
+     experience as an organic whole to its own fragments. It is an
+     experience which finds fulfilled all that the completest
+     thought can conceive as genuinely possible. Herein lies its
+     definition as an Absolute. For the Absolute Experience, as for
+     ours, there are data, contents, facts. But these data, these
+     contents, express, for the Absolute Experience, its own
+     meaning, its thought, its ideas. Contents beyond these that it
+     possesses, the Absolute Experience knows to be, in genuine
+     truth, impossible. Hence its contents are indeed
+     particular,--a selection from the world of bare or merely
+     conceptual possibilities,--but they form a self-determined
+     whole, than which nothing completer, more organic, more
+     fulfilled, more transparent, or more complete in meaning, is
+     concretely or genuinely possible. On the other hand, these
+     contents are not foreign to those of our finite experience,
+     but are inclusive of them in the unity of one life."[385:11]
+
+[Sidenote: The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism.]
+
+§ 190. As has been already intimated, at the opening of this chapter,
+the inclusion of the whole of reality within a single self is clearly a
+questionable proceeding. The need of avoiding the relativism of
+empirical idealism is evident. But if the very meaning of the
+self-consciousness be due to a certain selection and exclusion within
+the general field of experience, it is equally evident that the
+relativity of self-consciousness can never be overcome through appealing
+to a higher self. One must appeal _from_ the self to the realm of things
+as they are. Indeed, although the exponents of this philosophy use the
+language of spiritualism, and accept the idealistic epistemology, their
+absolute being tends ever to escape the special characters of the self.
+And inasmuch as the absolute self is commonly set over against the
+finite or empirical self, as the standard and test of truth, it is the
+less distinguishable from the realist's order of independent beings.
+
+[Sidenote: The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics of
+Absolute Idealism. Kant.]
+
+§ 191. But however much absolute idealism may tend to abandon its
+idealism for the sake of its absolutism within the field of metaphysics,
+such is not the case within the field of ethics and religion. The
+conception of the self here receives a new emphasis. The same
+self-consciousness which admits to the highest truth is the evidence of
+man's practical dignity. In virtue of his immediate apprehension of the
+principles of selfhood, and his direct participation in the life of
+spirit, man may be said to possess the innermost secret of the universe.
+In order to achieve goodness he must therefore recognize and express
+_himself_. The Kantian philosophy is here again the starting-point. It
+was Kant who first gave adequate expression to the Christian idea of the
+moral self-consciousness.
+
+     "_Duty!_ Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace
+     nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and
+     yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that
+     would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest
+     forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind,
+     . . . a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even
+     though they secretly counterwork it; what origin is there
+     worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble
+     descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the
+     inclinations . . . ? It can be nothing less than a power which
+     elevates man above himself, . . . a power which connects him
+     with an order of things that only the understanding can
+     conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the
+     whole sensible world, and with it the empirically determinable
+     existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all
+     ends."[387:12]
+
+With Kant there can be no morality except conduct be attended by the
+consciousness of this duty imposed by the higher nature upon the lower.
+It is this very recognition of a deeper self, of a personality that
+belongs to the sources and not to the consequences of nature, that
+constitutes man as a moral being, and only such action as is inspired
+with a reverence for it can be morally good. Kant does little more than
+to establish the uncompromising dignity of the moral will. In moral
+action man submits to a law that issues from himself in virtue of his
+rational nature. Here he yields nothing, as he owes nothing, to that
+appetency which binds him to the natural world. As a rational being he
+himself affirms the very principles which determine the organization of
+nature. This is his _freedom_, at once the ground and the implication
+of his duty. Man is free from nature to serve the higher law of his
+personality.
+
+[Sidenote: Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of
+Universal and Objective Spirit.]
+
+§ 192. There are two respects in which Kant's ethics has been regarded
+as inadequate by those who draw from it their fundamental principles. It
+is said that Kant is too rigoristic, that he makes too stern a business
+of morality, in speaking so much of law and so little of love and
+spontaneity. There are good reasons for this. Kant seeks to isolate the
+moral consciousness, and dwell upon it in its purity, in order that he
+may demonstrate its incommensurability with the values of inclination
+and sensibility. Furthermore, Kant may speak of the principle of the
+absolute, and recognize the deeper eternal order as a law, but he may
+not, if he is to be consistent with his own critical principles, affirm
+the metaphysical being of such an order. With his idealistic followers
+it is possible to define the spiritual setting of the moral life, but
+with Kant it is only possible to define the antagonism of principles.
+Hence the greater optimism of the post-Kantians. They know that the
+higher law is the reality, and that he who obeys it thus unites himself
+with the absolute self. That which for Kant is only a resolute
+obedience to more valid principles, to rationally superior rules for
+action, is for idealism man's appropriation of his spiritual birthright.
+Since the law is the deeper nature, man may respect and obey it as
+valid, and at the same time act upon it gladly in the sure knowledge
+that it will enhance his eternal welfare. Indeed, the knowledge that the
+very universe is founded upon this law will make him less suspicious of
+nature and less exclusive in his adherence to any single law. He will be
+more confident of the essential goodness of all manifestations of a
+universe which he knows to be fundamentally spiritual.
+
+But it has been urged, secondly, that the Kantian ethics is too formal,
+too little pertinent to the issues of life. Kant's moral law imposes
+only obedience to the law, or conduct conceived as suitable to a
+universal moral community. But what is the nature of such conduct in
+particular? It may be answered that to maintain the moral
+self-consciousness, to act dutifully and dutifully only, to be
+self-reliant and unswerving in the doing of what one ought to do, is to
+obtain a very specific character. But does this not leave the
+individual's conduct to his own interpretation of his duty? It was just
+this element of individualism which Hegel sought to eliminate through
+the application of his larger philosophical conception. If that which
+expresses itself within the individual consciousness as the moral law be
+indeed the law of that self in which the universe is grounded, it will
+appear as _objective spirit_ in the evolution of society. For Hegel,
+then, the most valid standard of goodness is to be found in that
+customary morality which bespeaks the moral leadings of the general
+humanity, and in those institutions, such as the family and the state,
+which are the moral acts of the absolute idea itself. Finally, in the
+realm of _absolute spirit_, in art, in revealed religion, and in
+philosophy, the individual may approach to the self-consciousness which
+is the perfect truth and goodness in and for itself.
+
+[Sidenote: The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute Idealism.]
+
+§ 193. Where the law of life is the implication in the finite
+self-consciousness of the eternal and divine self-consciousness, there
+can be no division between morality and religion, as there can be none
+between thought and will. Whatever man seeks is in the end God. As the
+perfect fulfilment of the thinking self, God is the truth; as the
+perfect fulfilment of the willing self, God is the good. The finite
+self-consciousness finds facts that are not understood, and so seeks to
+resolve itself into the perfect self wherein all that is given has
+meaning. On the other hand, the finite self-consciousness finds ideals
+that are not realized, and so seeks to resolve itself into that perfect
+self wherein all that is significant is given. All interests thus
+converge toward
+
+     "some state of conscious spirit in which the opposition of
+     cognition and volition is overcome--in which we neither judge
+     our ideas by the world, nor the world by our ideas, but are
+     aware that inner and outer are in such close and necessary
+     harmony that even the thought of possible discord has become
+     impossible. In its unity not only cognition and volition, but
+     feeling also, must be blended and united. In some way or
+     another it must have overcome the rift in discursive
+     knowledge, and the immediate must for it be no longer the
+     alien. It must be as direct as art, as certain and universal
+     as philosophy."[391:13]
+
+The religious consciousness proper to absolute idealism is both
+pantheistic and mystical, but with distinction. Platonism is pantheistic
+in that nature is resolved into God. All that is not perfect is esteemed
+only for its promise of perfection. And Platonism is mystical in that
+the purification and universalization of the affections brings one in
+the end to a perfection that exceeds all modes of thought and speech.
+With Spinoza, on the other hand, God may be said to be resolved into
+nature. Nature is made divine, but is none the less nature, for its
+divinity consists in its absolute necessity. Spinoza's pantheism passes
+over into mysticism because the absolute necessity exceeds in both unity
+and richness the laws known to the human understanding. In absolute
+idealism, finally, both God and nature are resolved into the self. For
+that which is divine in experience is self-consciousness, and this is at
+the same time the ground of nature. Thus in the highest knowledge the
+self is expanded and enriched without being left behind. The mystical
+experience proper to this philosophy is the consciousness of identity,
+together with the sense of universal immanence. The individual self may
+be directly sensible of the absolute self, for these are one spiritual
+life. Thus Emerson says:
+
+     "It is a secret which every intellectual man quickly learns,
+     that beyond the energy of his possessed and conscious
+     intellect he is capable of a new energy (as of an intellect
+     doubled on itself), by abandonment to the nature of things;
+     that beside his privacy of power as an individual man, there
+     is a great public power upon which he can draw, by unlocking,
+     at all risks, his human doors, and suffering the ethereal
+     tides to roll and circulate through him; then he is caught up
+     into the life of the Universe, his speech is thunder, his
+     thought is law, and his words are universally intelligible as
+     the plants and animals. The poet knows that he speaks
+     adequately then only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or 'with
+     the flower of the mind'; not with the intellect used as an
+     organ, but with the intellect released from all service and
+     suffered to take its direction from its celestial
+     life."[393:14]
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality.]
+
+§ 194. But the distinguishing flavor and quality of this religion arises
+from its spiritual hospitality. It is not, like Platonism, a
+contemplation of the best; nor, like pluralistic idealisms, a moral
+knight-errantry. It is neither a religion of exclusion, nor a religion
+of reconstruction, but a profound willingness that things should be as
+they really are. For this reason its devotees have recognized in Spinoza
+their true forerunner. But idealism is not Spinozism, though it may
+contain this as one of its strains. For it is not the worship of
+necessity, Emerson's "beautiful necessity, which makes man brave in
+believing that he cannot shun a danger that is appointed, nor incur one
+that is not"; but the worship of _that which is_ necessary.
+
+Not only must one understand that every effort, however despairing, is
+an element of sense in the universal significance;
+
+     "that the whole would not be what it is were not precisely
+     this finite purpose left in its own uniqueness to speak
+     precisely its own word--a word which no other purpose can
+     speak in the language of the divine will";[394:15]
+
+but one must have a zest for such participation, and a heart for the
+divine will which it profits. Indeed, so much is this religion a love of
+life, that it may, as in the case of the Romanticists, be a love of
+caprice. Battle and death, pain and joy, error and truth--all that
+belongs to the story of this mortal world, are to be felt as the thrill
+of health, and relished as the essences of God. Religion is an exuberant
+spirituality, a fearless sensibility, a knowledge of both good and evil,
+and a will to serve the good, while exulting that the evil will not
+yield without a battle.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[349:1] By _Absolute Idealism_ is meant that system of philosophy which
+defines the universe as the _absolute spirit_, which is the human
+_moral_, _cognitive_, or _appreciative consciousness_ universalized; or
+as the _absolute, transcendental mind_, whose state of _complete
+knowledge_ is implied in all finite thinking.
+
+[352:2] Plato: _Timæus_, 29. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[359:3] Plato: _Symposium_, 202. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[359:4] Emerson: _Essays, Second Series_, pp. 65-66.
+
+[364:5] Emerson: _Op. cit._, p. 25.
+
+The possibility of conflict between this method of nature study and the
+empirical method of science is significantly attested by the
+circumstance that in the year 1801 Hegel published a paper in which he
+maintained, on the ground of certain numerical harmonies, that there
+could be no planet between Mars and Jupiter, while at almost exactly the
+same time Piazzi discovered Ceres, the first of the asteroids.
+
+[368:6] McTaggart: _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic_, p. 181.
+
+[369:7] Green: _Prolegomena to Ethics_, p. 15.
+
+[370:8] Plato: _The Sophist_, 248. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[382:9] Hegel: _Encyclopädie_, § 45, lecture note. Quoted by McTaggart:
+_Op. cit._, p. 69.
+
+[382:10] Hegel: _Encyclopädie_, § 50. Quoted by McTaggart: _Op. cit._,
+p. 70.
+
+[385:11] Royce: _Conception of God_, pp. 19, 43-44.
+
+This argument is well summarized in Green's statement that "the
+existence of one connected world, which is the presupposition of
+knowledge, implies the action of one self-conditioning and
+self-determining mind." _Prolegomena to Ethics_, p. 181.
+
+[387:12] Kant: _Critical Examination of Practical Reason_. Translated by
+Abbott in _Kant's Theory of Ethics_, p. 180.
+
+[391:13] Quoted from McTaggart: _Op. cit._, pp. 231-232.
+
+[393:14] Emerson: _Op. cit._, pp. 30-31.
+
+[394:15] Royce: _The World and the Individual, First Series_, p. 465.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+
+[Sidenote: Liability of Philosophy to Revision, Due to its Systematic
+Character.]
+
+§ 195. One who consults a book of philosophy in the hope of finding
+there a definite body of truth, sanctioned by the consensus of experts,
+cannot fail to be disappointed. And it should now be plain that this is
+due not to the frailties of philosophers, but to the meaning of
+philosophy. Philosophy is not additive, but reconstructive. Natural
+science may advance step by step without ever losing ground; its
+empirical discoveries are in their severalty as true as they can ever
+be. Thus the stars and the species of animals may be recorded
+successively, and each generation of astronomers and zoölogists may take
+up the work at the point reached by its forerunners. The formulation of
+results does, it is true, require constant correction and revision--but
+there is a central body of data which is little affected, and which
+accumulates from age to age. Now the finality of scientific truth is
+proportional to the modesty of its claims. Items of truth persist,
+while the interpretation of them is subject to alteration with the
+general advance of knowledge; and, relatively speaking, science consists
+in items of truth, and philosophy in their interpretation. The liability
+to revision in science itself increases as that body of knowledge
+becomes more highly unified and systematic. Thus the present age, with
+its attempt to construct a single comprehensive system of mechanical
+science, is peculiarly an age when fundamental conceptions are subjected
+to a thorough reëxamination--when, for example, so ancient a conception
+as that of matter is threatened with displacement by that of energy. But
+philosophy is _essentially unitary and systematic_--and thus
+_superlatively liable to revision_.
+
+[Sidenote: The One Science and the Many Philosophies.]
+
+§ 196. It is noteworthy that it is only in this age of a highly
+systematic natural science that _different_ systems are projected, as in
+the case just noted of the rivalry between the strictly mechanical, or
+corpuscular, theory and the newer theory of energetics. It has
+heretofore been taken for granted that although there may be many
+philosophies, there is but one body of science. And it is still taken
+for granted that the experimental detail of the individual science is a
+common fund, to the progressive increase of which the individual
+scientist contributes the results of his special research; there being
+_rival_ schools of mechanics, physics, or chemistry, only in so far as
+_fundamental conceptions_ or _principles of orderly arrangement_ are in
+question. But philosophy deals exclusively with the most fundamental
+conceptions and the most general principles of orderly arrangement.
+Hence it is significant of the very task of philosophy that there should
+be many tentative systems of philosophy, even that each philosopher
+should project and construct his own philosophy. Philosophy as the truth
+of synthesis and reconciliation, of comprehensiveness and coördination,
+must be a living unity. It is a thinking of entire experience, and can
+be sufficient only through being all-sufficient. The heart of every
+philosophy is a harmonizing insight, an intellectual prospect within
+which all human interests and studies compose themselves. Such knowledge
+cannot be delegated to isolated co-laborers, but will be altogether
+missed if not loved and sought in its indivisible unity. There is no
+modest home-keeping philosophy; no safe and conservative philosophy,
+that can make sure of a part through renouncing the whole. There is no
+philosophy without intellectual temerity, as there is no religion
+without moral temerity. And the one is the supreme interest of thought,
+as the other is the supreme interest of life.
+
+[Sidenote: Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or Eclecticism of
+the Present Age.]
+
+§ 197. Though the many philosophies be inevitable, it must not be
+concluded that there is therefore no progress in philosophy. The
+solution from which every great philosophy is precipitated is the
+mingled wisdom of some latest age, with all of its inheritance. The
+"positive" knowledge furnished by the sciences, the refinements and
+distinctions of the philosophers, the ideals of society--these and the
+whole sum of civilization are its ingredients. Where there is no single
+system of philosophy significant enough to express the age, as did the
+systems of Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, and the
+others who belong to the roll of the great philosophers, there exists a
+_general sophistication_, which is more elusive but not less
+significant. The present age--at any rate from its own stand-point--is
+not an age of great philosophical systems. Such systems may indeed be
+living in our midst unrecognized; but historical perspective cannot
+safely be anticipated. It is certain that no living voice is known to
+speak for this generation as did Hegel, and even Spencer, for the last.
+There is, however, a significance in this very passing of Hegel and
+Spencer,--an enlightenment peculiar to an age which knows them, but has
+philosophically outlived them. There is a moral in the history of
+thought which just now no philosophy, whether naturalism, or
+transcendentalism, realism or idealism, can fail to draw. The
+characterization of this contemporary eclecticism or sophistication,
+difficult and uncertain as it must needs be, affords the best summary
+and interpretation with which to conclude this brief survey of the
+fortunes of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism and
+Absolutism.]
+
+§ 198. Since the problem of metaphysics is the crucial problem of
+philosophy, the question of its present status is fundamental in any
+characterization of the age. It will appear from the foregoing account
+of the course of metaphysical development that two fundamental
+tendencies have exhibited themselves from the beginning. The one of
+these is naturalistic and empirical, representing the claims of what
+common sense calls "matters of fact"; the other is transcendental and
+rational, representing the claims of the standards and ideals which are
+immanent in experience, and directly manifested in the great human
+interests of thought and action. These tendencies have on the whole been
+antagonistic; and the clear-cut and momentous systems of philosophy have
+been fundamentally determined by either the one or the other.
+
+Thus materialism is due to the attempt to reduce all of experience to
+the elements and principles of connection which are employed by the
+physical sciences to set in order the actual motions, or changes of
+place, which the parts of experience undergo. Materialism maintains that
+the motions of bodies are indifferent to considerations of worth, and
+denies that they issue from a deeper cause of another order. The very
+ideas of such non-mechanical elements or principles are here provided
+with a mechanical origin. Similarly a phenomenalism, like that of Hume,
+takes immediate presence to sense as the norm of being and knowledge.
+Individual items, directly verified in the moment of their occurrence,
+are held to be at once the content of all real truth, and the source of
+those abstract ideas which the misguided rationalists mistake for real
+truth.
+
+But the absolutist, on the other hand, contends that the thinker must
+_mean_ something by the reality which he seeks. If he had it for the
+looking, thought would not be, as it so evidently is, a purposive
+endeavor. And that which is meant by reality can be nothing short of the
+fulfilment or final realization of this endeavor of thought. To find out
+what thought seeks, to anticipate the consummation of thought and posit
+it as real, is therefore the first and fundamental procedure of
+philosophy. The mechanism of nature, and all matters of fact, must come
+to terms with this absolute reality, or be condemned as mere appearance.
+Thus Plato distinguishes the world of "generation" in which we
+participate by perception, from the "true essence" in which we
+participate by thought; and Schelling speaks of the modern experimental
+method as the "corruption" of philosophy and physics, in that it fails
+to construe nature in terms of spirit.
+
+[Sidenote: Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of
+Nature. The Neo-Fichteans.]
+
+§ 199. Now it would never occur to a sophisticated philosopher of the
+present, to one who has thought out to the end the whole tradition of
+philosophy, and felt the gravity of the great historical issues, to
+suffer either of these motives to dominate him to the exclusion of the
+other. Absolutism has long since ceased to speak slightingly of physical
+science, and of the world of perception. It is conceded that motions
+must be known in the mechanical way, and matters of fact in the
+matter-of-fact way. Furthermore, the prestige which science enjoyed in
+the nineteenth century, and the prestige which the empirical and secular
+world of action has enjoyed to a degree that has steadily increased
+since the Renaissance, have convinced the absolutist of the intrinsic
+significance of these parts of experience. They are no longer reduced,
+but are permitted to flourish in their own right. From the very councils
+of absolute idealism there has issued a distinction which is fast
+becoming current, between the World of Appreciation, or the realm of
+moral and logical principles, and the World of Description, or the realm
+of empirical generalizations and mechanical causes.[402:1] It is indeed
+maintained that the former of these is metaphysically superior; but the
+latter is ranked without the disparagement of its own proper categories.
+
+With the Fichteans this distinction corresponds to the distinction in
+the system of Fichte between the active moral ego, and the nature which
+it posits to act upon. But the _neo-Fichteans_ are concerned to show
+that the nature so posited, or the World of Description, is the _realm
+of mechanical science_, and that the entire system of mathematical and
+physical truth is therefore morally necessary.[403:2]
+
+[Sidenote: The Neo-Kantians.]
+
+§ 200. A more pronounced tendency in the same direction marks the work
+of the _neo-Kantians_. These philosophers repudiate the spiritualistic
+metaphysics of Schopenhauer, Fichte, and Hegel, believing the real
+significance of Kant to lie in his critical method, in his examination
+of the first principles of the different systems of knowledge, and
+especially in his analysis of the foundations of mathematics and
+physics.[403:3] In approaching mathematics and physics from a general
+logical stand-point, these neo-Kantians become scarcely distinguishable
+in interest and temper from those scientists who approach logic from the
+mathematical and physical stand-point.
+
+[Sidenote: Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism.]
+
+§ 201. The finite, moral individual, with his peculiar spiritual
+perspective, has long since been recognized as essential to the meaning
+of the universe rationally conceived. But in its first movement absolute
+idealism proposed to absorb him in the indivisible absolute self. It is
+now pointed out that Fichte, and even Hegel himself, means the absolute
+to be a plurality or society of persons.[404:4] It is commonly conceded
+that the will of the absolute must coincide with the wills of all finite
+creatures in their severalty, that God wills in and through men.[404:5]
+Corresponding to this individualistic tendency on the part of absolute
+idealism, there has been recently projected a _personal idealism_, or
+_humanism_, which springs freshly and directly from the same motive.
+This philosophy attributes ultimate importance to the human person with
+his freedom, his interests, his control over nature, and his hope of the
+advancement of the spiritual kingdom through coöperation with his
+fellows.[405:6]
+
+[Sidenote: Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of
+Fundamental Principles.]
+
+§ 202. Naturalism exhibits a moderation and liberality that is not less
+striking than that of absolutism. This abatement of its claims began in
+the last century with agnosticism. It was then conceded that there is an
+order other than that of natural science; but this order was held to be
+inaccessible to human knowledge. Such a theory is essentially unstable
+because it employs principles which define a non-natural order, but
+refuses to credit them or call them knowledge. The agnostic is in the
+paradoxical position of one who knows of an unknowable world.
+Present-day naturalism is more circumspect. It has interested itself in
+bringing to light that in the very procedure of science which, because
+it predetermines what nature shall be, cannot be included within nature.
+To this interest is due the rediscovery of the rational foundations of
+science. It was already known in the seventeenth century that exact
+science does not differ radically from mathematics, as mathematics does
+not differ radically from logic. Mathematics and mechanics are now being
+submitted to a critical examination which reveals the definitions and
+implications upon which they rest, and the general relation of these to
+the fundamental elements and necessities of thought.[406:7]
+
+[Sidenote: Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism.]
+
+§ 203. This rationalistic tendency in naturalism is balanced by a
+tendency which is more empirical, but equally subversive of the old
+ultra-naturalism. Goethe once wrote:
+
+     "I have observed that I hold that thought to be true which is
+     _fruitful for me_. . . . When I know my relation to myself and
+     to the outer world, I say that I possess the truth."
+
+Similarly, it is now frequently observed that all knowledge is _humanly
+fruitful_, and it is proposed that this shall be regarded as the very
+criterion of truth. According to this principle science as a whole, even
+knowledge as a whole, is primarily a human utility. The nature which
+science defines is an artifact or construct. It is designed to express
+briefly and conveniently what man may practically expect from his
+environment. This tendency is known as _pragmatism_. It ranges
+from systematic doctrines, reminiscent of Fichte, which seek to
+define practical needs and deduce knowledge from them, to the
+more irresponsible utterances of those who liken science to
+"shorthand,"[407:8] and mathematics to a game of chess. In any case
+pragmatism attributes to nature a certain dependence on will, and
+therefore implies, even when it does not avow, that will with its
+peculiar principles or values cannot be reduced to the terms of nature.
+In short, it would be more true to say that nature expresses will, than
+that will expresses nature.[408:9]
+
+[Sidenote: Summary, and Transition to Epistemology.]
+
+§ 204. Such, then, is the contemporary eclecticism as respects the
+central problem of metaphysics. There are _naturalistic_ and
+_individualistic_ tendencies in _absolutism_; _rationalistic_ and
+_ethical_ tendencies in _naturalism_; and finally the independent and
+spontaneous movements of _personal idealism_ and _pragmatism_.
+
+Since the rise of the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, metaphysics
+and epistemology have maintained relations so intimate that the present
+state of the former cannot be characterized without some reference to
+the present state of the latter. Indeed, the very issues upon which
+metaphysicians divide are most commonly those provoked by the problem
+of knowledge. The counter-tendencies of naturalism and absolutism are
+always connected, and often coincide with, the epistemological
+opposition between empiricism, which proclaims perception, and
+rationalism, which proclaims reason, to be the proper organ of
+knowledge. The other great epistemological controversy does not bear so
+direct and simple a relation to the central metaphysical issues, and
+must be examined on its own account.
+
+[Sidenote: The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism. Realistic
+Tendency in Empirical Idealism.]
+
+§ 205. The point of controversy is the dependence or independence of the
+object of knowledge on the state of knowledge; idealism maintaining that
+reality _is_ the knower or his content of mind, realism, that being
+known is a circumstance which appertains to some reality, without being
+the indispensable condition of reality as such. Now the sophisticated
+thought of the present age exhibits a tendency on the part of these
+opposite doctrines to approach and converge. It has been already
+remarked that the empirical idealism of the Berkeleyan type could not
+avoid transcending itself. Hume, who omitted Berkeley's active spirits,
+no longer had any subjective seat or locus for the perceptions to which
+Berkeley had reduced the outer world. And perceptions which are not the
+states of any subject, retain only their intrinsic character and become
+a series of elements. When there is nothing beyond, which appears, and
+nothing within to which it appears, there ceases to be any sense in
+using such terms as appearance, phenomenon, or impression. The term
+sensation is at present employed in the same ill-considered manner. But
+empirical idealism has come gradually to insist upon the importance of
+the content of perception, rather than the relation of perception to a
+self as its state. The terms _element_ and _experience_, which are
+replacing the subjectivistic terms, are frankly realistic.[410:10]
+
+[Sidenote: Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception of
+Experience.]
+
+§ 206. There is a similar realistic trend in the development of absolute
+idealism. The pure Hegelian philosophy was notably objective. The
+principles of development in which it centres were conceived by Hegel
+himself to manifest themselves most clearly in the progressions of
+nature and history. Many of Hegel's followers have been led by moral and
+religious interests to emphasize consciousness, and, upon
+epistemological grounds, to lay great stress upon the necessity of the
+union of the parts of experience within an enveloping self. But absolute
+idealism has much at heart the overcoming of relativism, and the
+absolute is defined in order to meet the demand for a being that shall
+not have the cognitive deficiencies of an object of finite thought. So
+it is quite possible for this philosophy, while maintaining its
+traditions on the whole, to abandon the term _self_ to the finite
+subject, and regard its absolute as a system of rational and universal
+principles--self-sufficient because externally independent and
+internally necessary. Hence the renewed study of categories as logical,
+mathematical, or mechanical principles, and entirely apart from their
+being the acts of a thinking self.
+
+Furthermore, it has been recognized that the general demand of idealism
+is met when reality is regarded as not outside of or other than
+knowledge, whatever be true of the question of dependence. Thus the
+conception of _experience_ is equally convenient here, in that it
+signifies what is immediately present in knowledge, without affirming it
+to _consist in_ being so presented.[411:11]
+
+[Sidenote: Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence Philosophy.]
+
+§ 207. And at this point idealism is met by a latter-day realism. The
+traditional modern realism springing from Descartes was dualistic. It
+was supposed that reality in itself was essentially extra-mental, and
+thus under the necessity of being either represented or misrepresented
+in thought. But the one of these alternatives is dogmatic, in that
+thought can never test the validity of its relation to that which is
+perpetually outside of it; while the other is agnostic, providing only
+for the knowledge of a world of appearance, an improper knowledge that
+is in fact not knowledge at all.
+
+But realism is not necessarily dualistic, since it requires only that
+being shall not be dependent upon being known. Furthermore, since
+empiricism is congenial to naturalism, it is an easy step to say that
+nature is directly known in perception. This first takes the form of
+positivism, or the theory that only such nature as can be directly known
+can be really known. But this agnostic provision for an unknown world
+beyond, inevitably falls away and leaves _reality as that which is
+directly known, but not conditioned by knowledge_. Again the term
+_experience_ is the most useful, and provides a common ground for
+_idealistic realism_ with _realistic idealism_. A new epistemological
+movement makes this conception of experience its starting-point. What is
+known as the _immanence philosophy_ defines reality as experience, and
+means by experience the subject matter of all knowledge--not defined as
+such, but regarded as capable of being such. Experience is conceived to
+be _both in and out_ of selves, cognition being but one of the special
+systems into which experience may enter.[413:12]
+
+[Sidenote: The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New
+Construction.]
+
+§ 208. Does this eclecticism of the age open any philosophical prospect?
+Is it more than a general compromise--a confession of failure on the
+part of each and every radical and clear-cut doctrine of metaphysics and
+epistemology? There is no final answer to such a question short of an
+independent construction, and such procedure would exceed the scope of
+the present discussion. But there is an evident interpretation of
+tradition that suggests a possible basis for such construction.
+
+[Sidenote: The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of Attempt to
+Reduce All Experience to it.]
+
+§ 209. Suppose it to be granted that the categories of nature are quite
+self-sufficient. This would mean that there might conceivably be a
+strictly physical order, governed only by mechanical principles, and by
+the more general logical and mathematical principles. The body of
+physical science so extended as to include such general conceptions as
+identity, difference, number, quality, space, and time, is the account
+of such an order. This order need have no value, and need not be known.
+But reality as a whole is evidently not such a strictly physical order,
+for the definition of the physical order involves the rejection of many
+of the most familiar aspects of experience, such as its value and its
+being known in conscious selves. Materialism, in that it proposes to
+conceive the whole of reality as physical, must attempt to reduce the
+residuum to physical terms, and with no hope of success. Goodness and
+knowledge cannot be explained as mass and force, or shown to be
+mechanical necessities.
+
+[Sidenote: Truth of Psychical Relations, but Impossibility of General
+Reduction to Them.]
+
+§ 210. Are we then to conclude that reality is not physical, and look
+for other terms to which we may reduce physical terms? There is no lack
+of such other terms. Indeed, we could as fairly have _begun_ elsewhere.
+Thus some parts of experience compose the consciousness of the
+individual, and are said to be known by him. Experience so contained is
+connected by the special relation of being known together. But this
+relation is quite indifferent to physical, moral, and logical relations.
+Thus we may be conscious of things which are physically disconnected,
+morally repugnant, and logically contradictory, or in all of these
+respects utterly irrelevant. Subjectivism, in that it proposes to
+conceive the whole of reality as consciousness, must attempt to reduce
+physical, moral, and logical relations to that co-presence in
+consciousness from which they are so sharply distinguished in their very
+definition. The historical failure of this attempt was inevitable.
+
+[Sidenote: Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of Ideal of
+Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing the Whole of Experience from
+it.]
+
+§ 211. But there is at least one further starting-point, the one
+adopted by the most subtle and elaborate of all reconstructive
+philosophies. Logical necessities are as evidently real as bodies or
+selves. It is possible to define general types of inference, as well as
+compact and internally necessary systems such as those of mathematics.
+There is a perfectly distinguishable strain of pure rationality in the
+universe. Whether or not it be possible to conceive a pure rationality
+as self-subsistent, inasmuch as there are degrees it is at any rate
+possible to conceive of a maximum of rationality. But similarly there
+are degrees of moral goodness. It is possible to define with more or
+less exactness a morally perfect person, or an ideal moral community.
+Here again it may be impossible that pure and unalloyed goodness should
+constitute a universe of itself. But that a maximum of goodness, with
+all of the accessories which it might involve, should be thus
+self-subsistent, is quite conceivable. It is thus possible to define an
+absolute and perfect order, in which logical necessity, the interest of
+thought, or moral goodness, the interest of will, or both together,
+should be realized to the maximum. Absolutism conceives reality under
+the form of this ideal, and attempts to reconstruct experience
+accordingly. But is the prospect of success any better than in the cases
+of materialism and subjectivism? It is evident that the ideal of logical
+necessity is due to the fact that certain parts of knowledge approach it
+more closely than others. Thus mechanics contains more that is arbitrary
+than mathematics, and mathematics more than logic. Similarly, the theory
+of the evolution of the planetary system, in that it requires the
+assumption of particular distances and particular masses for the parts
+of the primeval nebula, is more arbitrary than rational dynamics. It is
+impossible, then, in view of the parts of knowledge which belong to the
+lower end of the scale of rationality, to regard reality as a whole as
+the maximum of rationality; for either a purely dynamical, a purely
+mathematical, or a purely logical, realm would be more rational. The
+similar disproof of the moral perfection of reality is so unmistakable
+as to require no elucidation. It is evident that even where natural
+necessities are not antagonistic to moral proprieties, they are at any
+rate indifferent to them.
+
+[Sidenote: Error and Evil Cannot be Reduced to the Ideal.]
+
+§ 212. But thus far no reference has been made to error and to evil.
+These are the terms which the ideals of rationality and goodness must
+repudiate if they are to retain their meaning. Nevertheless experience
+contains them and psychology describes them. We have already followed
+the efforts which absolute idealism has made to show that logical
+perfection requires error, and that moral perfection requires evil. Is
+it conceivable that such efforts should be successful? Suppose a higher
+logic to make the principle of contradiction the very bond of
+rationality. What was formerly error is now indispensable to truth. But
+what of the new error--the unbalanced and mistaken thesis, the
+unresolved antithesis, the scattered and disconnected terms of thought?
+These fall outside the new truth as surely as the old error fell outside
+the old truth. And the case of moral goodness is precisely parallel. The
+higher goodness may be so defined as to require failure and sin. Thus it
+may be maintained that there can be no true success without struggle,
+and no true spiritual exaltation except through repentance. But what of
+failure unredeemed, sin unrepented, evil uncompensated and unresolved?
+Nothing has been gained after all but a new definition of goodness--and
+a new definition of evil. And this is an ethical, not a metaphysical
+question. The problem of evil, like the problem of error, is as far from
+solution as ever. Indeed, the very urgency of these problems is due to
+metaphysical absolutism. For this philosophy defines the universe as a
+perfect unity. Measured by the standard of such an ideal universe, the
+parts of finite experience take on a fragmentary and baffling character
+which they would not otherwise possess. The absolute perfection must by
+definition both determine and exclude the imperfect. Thus absolutism
+bankrupts the universe by holding it accountable for what it can never
+pay.
+
+[Sidenote: Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole.]
+
+§ 213. If the attempt to construct experience in the special terms of
+some part of experience be abandoned, how is reality to be defined? It
+is evident that in that case there can be no definition of reality as
+such. It must be regarded as a collection of all elements, relations,
+principles, systems, that compose it. All truths will be true of it, and
+it will be the subject of all truths. Reality is at least physical,
+psychical, moral, and rational. That which is physical is not
+necessarily moral or psychical, but may be either or both of these. Thus
+it is a commonplace of experience that what has bulk and weight may or
+may not be good, and may or may not be known. Similarly, that which is
+psychical may or may not be physical, moral, or rational; and that which
+is moral or rational may or may not be physical and psychical. There is,
+then, an indeterminism in the universe, a mere coincidence of
+principles, in that it contains physical, psychical, moral, logical
+orders, without being in all respects either a physical, a psychical, a
+moral, or a logical necessity.[420:13] Reality or experience itself is
+neutral in the sense of being exclusively predetermined by no one of the
+several systems it contains. But the different systems of experience
+retain their specific and proper natures, without the compromise which
+is involved in all attempts to extend some one until it shall embrace
+them all. If such a universe seems inconceivably desultory and chaotic,
+one may always remind one's self by directly consulting experience that
+it is not only found immediately and unreflectively, but returned to and
+lived in after every theoretical excursion.
+
+[Sidenote: Moral Implications of such a Pluralistic Philosophy. Purity
+of the Good.]
+
+§ 214. But what implications for life would be contained in such a
+philosophy? Even if it be theoretically clarifying, through being
+hospitable to all differences and adequate to the multifarious demands
+of experience, is it not on that very account morally dreary and
+stultifying? Is not its refusal to establish the universe upon moral
+foundations destructive both of the validity of goodness, and of the
+incentive to its attainment? Certainly not--if the validity of goodness
+be determined by criteria of worth, and if the incentive to goodness be
+the possibility of making that which merely exists, or is necessary,
+also good.
+
+This philosophy does not, it is true, define the good, but it makes
+ethics autonomous, thus distinguishing the good which it defines, and
+saving it from compromise with matter-of-fact, and logical or mechanical
+necessity. The criticism of life is founded upon an independent basis,
+and affords justification, of a selective and exclusive moral idealism.
+Just because it is not required that the good shall be held accountable
+for whatever is real, the ideal can be kept pure and intrinsically
+worthy. The analogy of logic is most illuminating. If it be insisted
+that whatever exists is logically necessary, logical necessity must be
+made to embrace that from which it is distinguished by definition, such
+as contradiction, mere empirical existence, and error. The consequence
+is a logical chaos which has in truth forfeited the name of logic.
+Similarly a goodness defined to make possible the deduction from it of
+moral evil or moral indifference loses the very distinguishing
+properties of goodness. The consequence is an ethical neutrality which
+invalidates the moral will. A metaphysical neutrality, on the other
+hand, although denying that reality as such is predestined to
+morality--and thus affording no possibility of an ethical
+absolutism--becomes the true ground for an ethical purism.
+
+[Sidenote: The Incentive to Goodness.]
+
+§ 215. But, secondly, there can be no lack of incentive to goodness in a
+universe which, though not all-good, is in no respect incapable of
+becoming good. That which is mechanically or logically necessary, and
+that which is psychically present, _may be good_. And what can the
+realization of goodness mean if not that what is natural and necessary,
+actual and real, shall be also good. The world is not good, will not be
+good, merely through being what it is, but is or shall be made good
+through the accession of goodness. It is this belief that the real is
+not necessarily, but may be, good; that the ideal is not necessarily,
+but may be, realized; which has inspired every faith in action.
+Philosophically it is only a question of permitting such faith to be
+sincere, or condemning it as shallow. If the world be made good through
+good-will, then the faith of moral action is rational; but if the world
+be good because whatever is must be good, then moral action is a
+tread-mill, and its attendant and animating faith only self-deception.
+Moral endeavor is the elevation of physical and psychical existence to
+the level of goodness.
+
+     "Relate the inheritance to life, convert the tradition into a
+     servant of character, draw upon the history for support in the
+     struggles of the spirit, declare a war of extermination
+     against the total evil of the world; and then raise new armies
+     and organize into fighting force every belief available in the
+     faith that has descended to you."[423:14]
+
+Evil is here a practical, not a theoretical, problem. It is not to be
+solved by thinking it good, for to think it good is to deaden the very
+nerve of action; but by destroying it and replacing it with good.
+
+[Sidenote: The Justification of Faith.]
+
+§ 216. The justification of faith is in the promise of reality. For
+what, after all, would be the meaning of a faith which declares that all
+things, good, bad, and indifferent, are everlastingly and necessarily
+what they are--even if it were concluded on philosophical grounds to
+call that ultimate necessity good. Faith has interests; faith is faith
+_in_ goodness or beauty. Then what more just and potent cause of despair
+than the thought that the ideal must be held accountable for error,
+ugliness, and evil, or for the indifferent necessities of
+nature?[424:15] Are ideals to be prized the less, or believed in the
+less, when there is no ground for their impeachment? How much more
+hopeful for what is worth the hoping, that nature should discern ideals
+and take some steps toward realizing them, than that ideals should have
+created nature--such as it is! How much better a report can we give of
+nature for its ideals, than of the ideals for their handiwork, if it be
+nature! Emerson writes:
+
+     "Suffice it for the joy of the universe that we have not
+     arrived at a wall, but at interminable oceans. Our life seems
+     not present so much as prospective; not for the affairs on
+     which it is wasted, but as a hint of this vast-flowing vigor.
+     Most of life seems to be mere advertisement of faculty;
+     information is given us not to sell ourselves cheap; that we
+     are very great. So, in particulars, our greatness is always in
+     a tendency or direction, not in an action. It is for us to
+     believe in the rule, not in the exception. The noble are thus
+     known from the ignoble. So in accepting the leading of the
+     sentiments, it is not what we believe concerning the
+     immortality of the soul or the like, but _the universal
+     impulse to believe_, that is the material circumstance and is
+     the principal fact in the history of the globe."[425:16]
+
+[Sidenote: The Worship and Service of God.]
+
+§ 217. If God be rid of the imputation of moral evil and indifference,
+he may be _intrinsically worshipful_, because regarded under the form of
+the highest ideals. And if the great cause of goodness be in fact at
+stake, God may both command the adoration of men through his purity, and
+reënforce their virtuous living through representing to them that
+realization of goodness in the universe at large which both contains and
+exceeds their individual endeavor.
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosopher and the Standards of the Marketplace.]
+
+§ 218. Bishop Berkeley wrote in his "Commonplace Book":
+
+     "My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign
+     countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my
+     heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction."
+
+If it be essential to the meaning of philosophy that it should issue
+from life, it is equally essential that it should return to life. But
+this connection of philosophy with life does not mean its reduction to
+the terms of life as conceived in the market-place. Philosophy cannot
+emanate from life, and quicken life, without elevating and ennobling it,
+and will therefore always be incommensurable with life narrowly
+conceived. Hence the philosopher must always be as little understood by
+men of the street as was Thales by the Thracian handmaiden. He has an
+innocence and a wisdom peculiar to his perspective.
+
+     "When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer
+     to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals
+     of anyone, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is
+     laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being
+     praised and glorified, he cannot help laughing very sincerely
+     in the simplicity of his heart; and this again makes him look
+     like a fool. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he
+     fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of
+     cattle--a swineherd, or shepherd, or cowherd, who is being
+     praised for the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them;
+     and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of
+     whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more
+     insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man
+     is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any
+     shepherd, for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a
+     wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed
+     proprietors of ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher
+     deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to
+     think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of
+     family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he has
+     had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that
+     their sentiments only betray the dulness and narrowness of
+     vision of those who utter them, and who are not educated
+     enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man
+     has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them
+     have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and
+     barbarians, many times over."[427:17]
+
+It is not to be expected that the opinion of the "narrow, keen, little,
+legal mind" should appreciate the philosophy which has acquired the
+"music of speech," and hymns "the true life which is lived by immortals
+or men blessed of heaven." Complacency cannot understand reverence, nor
+secularism, religion.
+
+[Sidenote: The Secularism of the Present Age.]
+
+§ 219. If we may believe the report of a contemporary philosopher, the
+present age is made insensible to the meaning of life through
+preoccupation with its very achievements:
+
+     "The world of finite interests and objects has rounded itself,
+     as it were, into a separate whole, within which the mind of
+     man can fortify itself, and live _securus adversus deos_, in
+     independence of the infinite. In the sphere of _thought_,
+     there has been forming itself an ever-increasing body of
+     science, which, tracing out the relation of finite things to
+     finite things, never finds it necessary to seek for a
+     beginning or an end to its infinite series of phenomena, and
+     which meets the claims of theology with the saying of the
+     astronomer, 'I do not need that hypothesis.' In the sphere of
+     _action_, again, the complexity of modern life presents a
+     thousand isolated interests, crossing each other in ways too
+     subtle to trace out--interests commercial, social, and
+     political--in pursuing one or other of which the individual
+     may find ample occupation for his existence, without ever
+     feeling the need of any return upon himself, or seeing any
+     reason to ask himself whether this endless striving has any
+     meaning or object beyond itself."[428:18]
+
+[Sidenote: The Value of Contemplation for Life.]
+
+§ 220. There is no dignity in living except it be in the solemn presence
+of the universe; and only contemplation can summon such a presence.
+Moreover, the sessions must be not infrequent, for memory is short and
+visions fade. Truth does not require, however, to be followed out of the
+world. There is a speculative detachment from life which is less
+courageous, even if more noble, than worldliness. Such is Dante's
+exalted but mediæval intellectualism.
+
+     "And it may be said that (as true friendship between men
+     consists in each wholly loving the other) the true philosopher
+     loves every part of wisdom, and wisdom every part of the
+     philosopher, inasmuch as she draws all to herself, and allows
+     no one of his thoughts to wander to other things."
+
+Even though, as Aristotle thought, pure contemplation be alone proper to
+the gods in their perfection and blessedness, for the sublunary world
+this is less worthy than that balance and unity of faculty which
+distinguished the humanity of the Greek.
+
+     "Then," writes Thucydides, "we are lovers of the beautiful,
+     yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without
+     loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and
+     ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avoid
+     poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing
+     nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the
+     State because he takes care of his own household; and even
+     those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea
+     of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in
+     public affairs not as a harmless, but as a useless character;
+     and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges, of
+     a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion,
+     not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained
+     by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar
+     power of thinking before we act, and of acting too, whereas
+     other men are courageous from ignorance, but hesitate upon
+     reflection."[429:19]
+
+Thus life may be broadened and deepened without being made thin and
+ineffectual. As the civil community is related to the individual's
+private interests, so the community of the universe is related to the
+civil community. There is a citizenship in this larger community which
+requires a wider and more generous interest, rooted in a deeper and more
+quiet reflection. The world, however, is not to be left behind, but
+served with a new sense of proportion, with the peculiar fortitude and
+reverence which are the proper fruits of philosophy.
+
+     "This is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge,
+     if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly
+     conjoined and united together than they have been; a
+     conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets: Saturn,
+     the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet
+     of civil society and action."[430:20]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[402:1] Cf. Josiah Royce: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, Lecture
+XII; _The World and the Individual, Second Series_.
+
+[403:2] Cf. Hugo Münsterberg: _Psychology and Life_. The more important
+writings of this school are: _Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten
+Jahrhunderts_, edited by Wilhelm Windelband, and contributed to by
+Windelband, H. Rickert, O. Liebmann, E. Troeltsch, B. Bauch, and others.
+This book contains an excellent bibliography. Also, Rickert: _Der
+Gegenstand der Erkenntnis_; _Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen
+Begriffsbildung_, and other works. Windelband: _Präludien_; _Geschichte
+und Naturwissenschaft_. Münsterberg: _Grundzüge der Psychologie_.
+Eucken: _Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart_.
+
+[403:3] Cf. F. A. Lange: _History of Materialism_, Book II, Chap. I, on
+_Kant and Materialism_; also Alois Riehl: _Introduction to the Theory of
+Science and Metaphysics_. Translation by Fairbanks. The more important
+writings of this school are: Hermann Cohen: _Kant's Theorie der
+Erfahrung_; _Die Logik der reinen Erkenntniss_, and other works. Paul
+Natorp: _Sozialpädagogik_; _Einleitung in die Psychologie nach
+kritischer Methode_, and other works. E. Cassirer: _Leibniz' System in
+seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen_. Riehl: _Der philosophische
+Kriticismus, und seine Bedeutung für die Positive Wissenschaft_. Cf.
+also E. Husserl: _Logische Untersuchungen_.
+
+[404:4] Cf. J. M. E. McTaggart: _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_, Chap.
+III.
+
+[404:5] Cf. Royce: _The Conception of God, Supplementary Essay_, pp.
+135-322; _The World and the Individual, First Series_.
+
+[405:6] This movement began as a criticism of Hegelianism in behalf of
+the human personality. Cf. Andrew Seth: _Hegelianism and Personality_;
+_Man and the Cosmos_; _Two Lectures on Theism_. G. H. Howison: _The
+Limits of Evolution_. The important writings of the more independent
+movement are: William James: _The Will to Believe_. H. Sturt, editor:
+_Personal Idealism, Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of Oxford
+University_. F. C. S. Schiller: _Humanism_. Henri Bergson: _Essai sur
+les données immédiates de la conscience_; _Matière et mémoire_. This
+movement is closely related to that of _Pragmatism_. See under § 203.
+
+[406:7] Cf. Bertrand Russell: _Principles of Mathematics_, Vol. I. Among
+the more important writings of this movement are the following:
+Giuseppi Peano: _Formulaire de Mathématique_, published by the _Rivista
+di matematica_, Tom. I-IV. Richard Dedekind: _Was sind und was
+sollen die Zahlen?_ Georg Cantor: _Grundlagen einer allgemeinen
+Mannigfaltigkeitslehre_. Louis Couturat: _De l'Infini Mathématique_, and
+articles in _Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale_. A. N. Whitehead: _A
+Treatise on Universal Algebra_. Heinrich Hertz: _Die Prinzipien der
+Mechanik_. Henri Poincaré: _La Science et l'Hypothèse_. For the bearing
+of these investigations on philosophy, see Royce: _The Sciences of the
+Ideal_, in _Science_, Vol. XX, No. 510.
+
+[407:8] The term used by Karl Pearson in his _Grammar of Science_.
+
+[408:9] The important English writings of the recent independent
+movement known as _pragmatism_ are: C. S. Peirce: _Illustrations of the
+Logic of Science_, in _Popular Science Monthly_, Vol. XII. W. James:
+_The Pragmatic Method_, in _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
+Scientific Methods_, Vol. I; _Humanism and Truth_, in _Mind_, Vol. XIII,
+N. S.; _The Essence of Humanism_, in _Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc.
+Meth._, Vol. II (with bibliography); _The Will to Believe_. John Dewey:
+_Studies in Logical Theory_. W. Caldwell: _Pragmatism_, in _Mind_, Vol.
+XXV., N. S. See also literature on _personal idealism_, § 201. A similar
+tendency has appeared in France in Bergson, LeRoy, Milhaud, and in
+Germany in Simmel.
+
+[410:10] Cf. Ernst Mach: _Analysis of Sensation_. Translation by
+Williams.
+
+[411:11] Cf. F. H. Bradley: _Appearance and Reality_.
+
+[413:12] Cf. Carstanjen: _Richard Avenarius, and his General Theory of
+Knowledge, Empiriocriticism_. Translation by H. Bosanquet, in _Mind_,
+Vol. VI, N. S. Also James: _Does Consciousness Exist?_ and _A World of
+Pure Experience_, in _Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth_., Vol. I;
+_The Thing and its Relations_, _ibid._, Vol. II.
+
+The standard literature of this movement is unfortunately not available
+in English. Among the more important writings are: R. Avenarius: _Kritik
+der reinen Erfahrung_; _Der menschliche Weltbegriff_, and other works.
+Joseph Petzoldt: _Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung_.
+Ernst Mach: _Die Analyse der Empfindung und das Verhältniss des
+Physischen zum Psychischen, 2. Auff._ Wilhelm Schuppe: _Grundriss der
+Erkenntnisstheorie und Logik_. Friedrich Carstanjen: _Einführung in die
+"Kritik der reinen Erfahrung"_--an exposition of Avenarius. Also
+articles by the above, R. Willy, R. v. Schubert-Soldern, and others, in
+the _Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie_.
+
+[420:13] It is not, of course, denied that there may be other orders,
+such as, _e. g._, an æsthetic order; or that there may be definite
+relations between these orders, such as, _e. g._, the psycho-physical
+relation.
+
+[423:14] Quoted from George A. Gordon: _The New Epoch for Faith_, p. 27.
+
+[424:15] Cf. James: _The Will to Believe_, essay on _The Dilemma of
+Determinism, passim_.
+
+[425:16] _Essays, Second Series_, p. 75.
+
+[427:17] Plato: _Theætetus_, 174-175. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[428:18] E. Caird: _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, pp. 218-219.
+
+[429:19] Translation by Jowett. Quoted by Laurie in his _Pre-Christian
+Education_, p. 213.
+
+[430:20] Bacon: _Advancement of Learning_, Book I.
+
+
+
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+
+The references contained in this bibliography have been selected on the
+score of availability in English for the general reader and beginning
+student of philosophy. But I have sought wherever possible to include
+passages from the great philosophers and men of letters. These are
+placed first in the list, followed by references to contemporary writers
+and secondary sources.
+
+
+CHAPTER I, THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, especially Book VII. Translations by Jowett and
+Vaughan. _Theaetetus_, 172 ff. Translation by Jowett.
+
+ARISTOTLE: _Ethics_, Book X. Translation by Welldon.
+
+MARCUS AURELIUS: _Thoughts._ Translation by Long.
+
+EPICTETUS: _Discourses._ Translation by Long.
+
+BACON: _The Advancement of Learning._
+
+EMERSON: _Representative Men--Plato; or the Philosopher._ _Conduct of
+Life--Culture._ _Essays, Second Series--Experience._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ROYCE, JOSIAH: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ Introduction.
+
+HIBBEN, J. G.: _Problems of Philosophy._ Introduction.
+
+
+CHAPTER II, POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Books II and III. Translation by Jowett. (Criticism
+of the poets as demoralizing.)
+
+WORDSWORTH: _Observations Prefixed to the Second Edition of the Lyrical
+Ballads._
+
+SHELLEY: _Defence of Poetry._
+
+EVERETT, C. C.: _Poetry, Comedy, and Duty._ (discussion of the
+Philosophy of Poetry.) _Essays, Theological and Literary._ (On the
+Poetry of Emerson, Goethe, Tennyson, Browning.)
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _Literature and Philosophy._ (Wordsworth, Dante, Goethe,
+etc.)
+
+ROYCE, JOSIAH: _Studies of Good and Evil._ Essay on _Tennyson and
+Pessimism_.
+
+SANTAYANA, GEORGE: _Poetry and Religion._ (Philosophy of poetry; Greek
+Poetry, Shakespeare, etc.)
+
+SNEATH, E. H.: _Philosophy in Poetry: A Study of Sir John Davies's Poem,
+"Nosce Teipsum."_
+
+
+CHAPTERS III AND IV, RELIGION.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Book III. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+(Criticism of religion from the stand-point of morality and politics.)
+
+ST. AUGUSTINE: _Confessions._ Translation by Pusey. (Document of
+religious experience.)
+
+THOMAS À KEMPIS: _Imitation of Christ._ Translation by Stanhope.
+(Mediæval programme of personal religion.)
+
+SPINOZA: _Theological-political Treatise._ Translation by Elwes. (One of
+the first great pleas for religious liberty and one of the first
+attempts to define the _essential_ in religion.)
+
+KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason--the Canon of Pure Reason_. Translation
+by Max Müller. _Critique of Practical Reason._ Translation by Abbott in
+_Theory of Ethics_. (Defines religion as the province of faith,
+distinguishes it from knowledge, and relates it to morality.)
+
+SCHLEIERMACHER: _On Religion._ _Speeches to its Cultured Despisers._
+Translation by Oman. (Ponderous, dogmatic in its philosophy, but
+profound and sympathetic in its understanding of religion.)
+
+ARNOLD: _Literature and Dogma._ (On the essence of religion as
+exemplified in Judaism and Christianity.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+SABATIER, A.: _Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based on Psychology
+and History._ Translation by Seed. _Religions of Authority and the
+Religion of the Spirit._ Translation by Houghton. (These books emphasize
+the essential importance of the believer's attitude to God.)
+
+JAMES, WILLIAM: _The Varieties of Religious Experience._ (A rich
+storehouse of religion, sympathetically interpreted.)
+
+EVERETT, C. C.: _The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith._ (A
+study in the definition and meaning of religion.)
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _Evolution of Religion._ (Indoctrinated with the author's
+idealistic philosophy.)
+
+FIELDING, H.: _The Hearts of Men._ (A plea for the universal religion.
+Special feeling for Indian religions.)
+
+HARNACK, A.: _What is Christianity?_ Translation by Saunders. (Attempt
+to define the _essence_ of Christianity.)
+
+PALMER, G. H.: _The Field of Ethics_, Chapters V and VI. (On the
+relation of ethics and religion.)
+
+BROWN, W. A.: _The Essence of Christianity._ (Special study of the
+definition of religion.)
+
+JASTROW, M.: _The Study of Religion._ (Method of history and psychology
+of religion.)
+
+SMITH, W. ROBERTSON: _The Religion of the Semites._ (Excellent study of
+tribal religions.)
+
+CLARKE, W. N.: _What Shall We Think of Christianity?_ (An interpretation
+of Christianity.)
+
+LEUBA, J. H.: _Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion._ In
+_The Monist_, Vol. XI, p. 195.
+
+STARBUCK, E. D.: _The Psychology of Religion._
+
+
+CHAPTER V, THE PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM OF SCIENCE.[434:A]
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Book VII, 526 ff. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+_Phaedo_, 96 ff. Translation by Jowett.
+
+BERKELEY: _Alciphron_, the Fourth Dialogue. _Siris_, especially 234-264.
+(On the failure of the scientist to grasp the deeper truth respecting
+causes and substances.)
+
+DESCARTES: _Discourse on Method._ Translation by Veitch.
+
+SPINOZA: _On the Improvement of the Understanding._ Translation by
+Elwes.
+
+KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason--Transcendental Æsthetic_ and
+_Transcendental Analytic._ Translation by Max Müller. (Studies of the
+Method of Science.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+WARD, JAMES: _Naturalism and Agnosticism._ (Full but clear account of
+recent development of natural science, and criticism of its use as
+philosophy.)
+
+MACH, ERNST: _Science of Mechanics._ (Historical and methodological.)
+
+JAMES, WILLIAM: _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II, Chap. xxviii.
+(Emphasizes the practical interest underlying science.)
+
+ROYCE, JOSIAH: _The World and the Individual, Second Series, Man and
+Nature._ (Interpretation of the province of natural science from the
+stand-point of absolute idealism.)
+
+PEARSON, KARL: _The Grammar of Science._ (The limits of science from the
+scientific stand-point.)
+
+CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: On the Aims and Instruments of
+Scientific Thought; The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences; On the Ethics
+of Belief._
+
+HUXLEY, T. H.: _Method and Results._ (The positivistic position.)
+
+MUENSTERBERG, HUGO: _Psychology and Life._ (Epistemological limitations
+of natural science applied to psychology, from idealistic stand-point.)
+
+FULLERTON, G. E.: _A System of Metaphysics_, Part II.
+
+TAYLOR, A. E.: _Elements of Metaphysics_, Book III.
+
+
+CHAPTERS VI AND VII, THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
+
+PLATO: _Dialogues_, especially _Protagoras_ and _Theaetetus_.
+Translation by Jowett. (The actual genesis of special problems.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+KUELPE, OSWALD: _Introduction to Philosophy._ Translation by Pillsbury
+and Titchener. (Full and accurate account of the traditional terms and
+doctrines of philosophy.)
+
+HIBBEN, J. G.: _Problems of Philosophy._ (Brief and elementary.)
+
+SIDGWICK, HENRY: _Philosophy, its Scope and Relations._
+
+PAULSEN, FRIEDRICH: _Introduction to Philosophy._ Translation by Thilly.
+
+BALDWIN, J. M.: _Dictionary of Philosophy._ (Full, and convenient for
+reference.)
+
+FERRIER, J. F.: _Lectures on Greek Philosophy._ (Interpretation of the
+beginning and early development of philosophy.)
+
+BURNET, J.: _Early Greek Philosophy._ Translation of the sources.
+
+FAIRBANKS, A.: _The First Philosophers of Greece._
+
+GOMPERZ, TH.: _Greek Thinkers_, Vol. I. Translation by Magnus. (On the
+first development of philosophical problems.)
+
+PALMER, G. H.: _The Field of Ethics._ (On the relations of the ethical
+problem.)
+
+PUFFER, ETHEL: _The Psychology of Beauty._ (On the relations of the
+æsthetical problem.)
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII, NATURALISM.[436:A]
+
+LUCRETIUS: _On the Nature of Things._ Translation by Munro. (Early
+materialism.)
+
+HOBBES: _Metaphysical System._ Edited by Calkins. _Leviathan_, Part I.
+(Modern materialism.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+BUECHNER, LOUIS: _Force and Matter._ Translation by Collingwood.
+(Nineteenth century materialism.)
+
+JANET, PAUL: _Materialism of the Present Day._ Translation by Masson.
+
+LANGE, F. A.: _History of Materialism._ Translation by Thomas.
+
+HAECKEL, ERNST: _The Riddle of the Universe._ Translation by McCabe.
+("Monism of Energy.")
+
+CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: The Ethics of Belief; Cosmic
+Emotion; Body and Mind._ (Positivism.)
+
+HUXLEY, T. H.: _Evolution and Ethics; Prolegomena._ (Distinguishes
+between the moral and natural.) _Science and Hebrew Tradition_; _Science
+and Christian Tradition_. (Controversies of the naturalist with
+Gladstone and Duke of Argyle.)
+
+SPENCER, HERBERT: _First Principles._ (The systematic evolutionary
+philosophy.) _Principles of Ethics._ (Ethics of naturalism.) _The Nature
+and Reality of Religion._ (Controversy with Frederick Harrison.)
+
+BALFOUR, A. J.: _Foundations of Belief_, Part I. (On the religious,
+moral, and æsthetic consequences of naturalism.)
+
+PATER, WALTER: _Marius the Epicurean._ (Refined hedonism.)
+
+ROMANES, G. J.: _Thoughts on Religion._ (Approached from stand-point of
+science.)
+
+BENTHAM, J.: _Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
+Legislation._ (Utilitarian.)
+
+STEPHEN, L.: _Science of Ethics._ (Evolutionary and social.)
+
+
+CHAPTER IX, SUBJECTIVISM.
+
+PLATO: _Theaetetus._ Translation by Jowett. (Exposition and criticism of
+Protagoras.)
+
+BERKELEY: _Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_; _Principles of
+Human Knowledge_.
+
+HUME: _An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding._
+
+SCHOPENHAUER: _The World as Will and Idea._ Translation by Haldane and
+Kemp.
+
+MILL, J. S.: _An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_,
+X-XIII.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: On the Nature of Things in
+Themselves._ (Panpsychism.)
+
+DEUSSEN, PAUL: _Elements of Metaphysics._ Translation by Duff.
+(Following Schopenhauer and Oriental philosophy.)
+
+PAULSEN, FR.: _Introduction to Philosophy._ (Panpsychism.)
+
+STRONG, C. A.: _Why the Mind Has a Body._ (Panpsychism.)
+
+JAMES, WILLIAM: _Reflex Action and Theism_, in _The Will to Believe_.
+(Morality and religion of individualism.)
+
+
+CHAPTER X, ABSOLUTE REALISM.
+
+PARMENIDES: _Fragments._ Arrangement and translation by Burnet or
+Fairbanks.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Books VI and VII. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+_Symposium_, _Phædrus_, _Phædo_, _Philebus_. Translation by Jowett.
+
+ARISTOTLE[437:A]: _Psychology._ Translations by Hammond and Wallace.
+_Ethics._ Translation by Welldon.
+
+SPINOZA: _Ethics_, especially Parts I and V. Translations by Elwes and
+Willis.
+
+LEIBNIZ: _Monadology_, and Selections. Translation by Latta. _Discourse
+on Metaphysics._ Translation by Montgomery.
+
+MARCUS AURELIUS: _Thoughts._ Translation by Long.
+
+EPICTETUS: _Discourses._ Translation by Long.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers._
+(The central conceptions of Plato and Aristotle.)
+
+JOACHIM: _A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza._
+
+
+CHAPTER XI, ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.
+
+DESCARTES: _Meditations._ Translation by Veitch.
+
+KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason._ Translation by Max Müller. _Critique of
+Practical Reason._ Translation by Abbott, in Kant's _Theory of Ethics_.
+
+FICHTE[437:A]: _Science of Ethics._ Translation by Kroeger. _Popular
+Works: The Nature of the Scholar_; _The Vocation of Man_; _The Doctrine
+of Religion_. Translation by Smith.
+
+SCHILLER: _Æsthetic Letters, Essays, and Philosophical Letters._
+Translation by Weiss. (Romanticism.)
+
+HEGEL[437:A]: _Ethics._ Translation by Sterrett. _Logic._ Translation,
+with Introduction, by Wallace. _Philosophy of Mind._ Translation, with
+Introduction, by Wallace. _Philosophy of Religion._ Translation by
+Spiers and Sanderson. _Philosophy of Right._ Translation by Dyde.
+
+GREEN, T. H.: _Prolegomena to Ethics._
+
+EMERSON: _The Conduct of Life--Fate._ _Essays, First Series--The
+Over-Soul; Circles._ _Essays, Second Series--The Poet; Experience;
+Nature._ (The appreciation of life consistent with absolute idealism.)
+
+WORDSWORTH: _Poems_, _passim_.
+
+COLERIDGE: _Aids to Reflection._ _The Friend._
+
+ROYCE, J.: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ (Sympathetic exposition of
+Kant, Fichte, Romanticism, and Hegel.) _The Conception of God._ (The
+epistemological argument.) _The World and the Individual, First Series._
+(Systematic development of absolute idealism; its moral and religious
+aspects.)
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _The Critical Philosophy of Kant._ (Exposition and
+interpretation from stand-point of later idealism.)
+
+EVERETT, C. C.: _Fichte's Science of Knowledge._
+
+MCTAGGART, J. M. E.: _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic._ Studies in
+Hegelian Cosmology.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[434:A] For further contemporary writings on this topic, see foot-notes
+under §§ 199, 200, 203.
+
+[436:A] For histories of philosophy, see supplementary bibliography at
+end.
+
+[437:A] The Metaphysics of Aristotle, Fichte, and Hegel must be found by
+the English reader mainly in the secondary sources.
+
+
+
+
+SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
+
+
+I.--GENERAL.
+
+ROGERS: _Student's History of Philosophy._ (Elementary and clear;
+copious quotations.)
+
+WEBER: _History of Philosophy._ Translation by Thilly. (Comprehensive
+and compact.)
+
+WINDELBAND: _A History of Philosophy._ Translation by Tufts. (Emphasis
+upon the problems and their development.)
+
+ERDMANN: _History of Philosophy._ Translation edited by Hough; in three
+volumes. (Detailed and accurate exposition.)
+
+UEBERWEG: _A History of Philosophy._ Translation by Morris and Porter,
+in two volumes. (Very complete; excellent account of the literature.)
+
+
+II.--SPECIAL PERIODS.
+
+FERRIER: _Lectures on Greek Philosophy._ (Excellent introduction.)
+
+MARSHALL: _Short History of Greek Philosophy._ (Brief and clear.)
+
+WINDELBAND: _History of Ancient Philosophy._ Translation by Cushman.
+(Very accurate and scholarly; also brief.)
+
+ZELLER: _Pre-Socratic Philosophy._ Translation by Alleyne. _Socrates and
+the Socratic Schools._ Translation by Reichel. (Full and accurate.)
+
+GOMPERZ: _Greek Thinkers._ Translated by Magnus, in four volumes. (Very
+full; especially on Plato. Goes no further than Plato.)
+
+BURNET: _Early Greek Philosophy._ (Translations of fragments, with
+commentary.)
+
+FAIRBANKS: _The First Philosophers of Greece._ (Translations of
+fragments, with commentary.)
+
+TURNER: _History of Philosophy._ (Excellent account of Scholastic
+philosophy.)
+
+ROYCE: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ (Very illuminating
+introductory exposition of modern idealism.)
+
+FALCKENBERG: _History of Modern Philosophy._
+
+HOEFFDING: _History of Modern Philosophy._ Translation by Meyer, in two
+volumes. (Full and good.)
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+  ABSOLUTE, the, 307, 309, 332, 391, 392, 400, 404;
+    being, 308;
+    substance, 312;
+    ideal, 326;
+    spirit, 349 (_note_), 358 ff.;
+    mind, 349 (_note_), 358, 380, 322 ff.
+
+  ABSOLUTE IDEALISM, chap. xi;
+    general meaning, 177, 349 (_note_), 400;
+    criticism of, 349, 365, 385, 411, 416;
+    epistemology of, 368 ff.;
+    as related to Kant, 380;
+    direct argument for, 383;
+    ethics of, 386 ff.;
+    religion of, 390 ff.;
+    of present day, 402 ff., 410.
+
+  ABSOLUTE REALISM, chap. x;
+    general meaning, 306 (_note_), 400;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 346;
+    criticism of, 338, 416.
+
+  ABSTRACT, the, 139.
+
+  ACTIVITY, 209, 285, 295.
+
+  ÆSTHETICS, 189.
+
+  AGNOSTICISM, 168, 252 ff.
+
+  ANAXAGORAS, 239;
+    quoted, 162.
+
+  ANAXIMANDER, 224.
+
+  ANSELM, SAINT, 200.
+
+  ANTHROPOMORPHISM, 109.
+
+  APPRECIATION, 25, 402.
+
+  ARISTOTLE, in formal logic, 186;
+    ethics of, 195, 345;
+    psychology of, 208;
+    philosophy of, 306, 332 ff.;
+    and Plato, 333, 336;
+    and Spinoza, 336;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    religion of, 346, 429;
+    on evil, 353.
+
+  ATOMISM, 166, 229.
+    Also see under LEUCIPPUS, and DEMOCRITUS.
+
+  ATTITUDE, 62.
+
+  ATTRIBUTE, in Spinoza, 312 ff.
+
+  AUGUSTINE, SAINT,
+    on communion with God, 68;
+    on pietism, 195;
+    his conception of self, 372.
+
+  AUTOMATISM, 248.
+
+
+  BAAL, religion of, 88.
+
+  BACON, FRANCIS, on thought and action, 430.
+
+  BALFOUR, A. J., on materialism, 264.
+
+  BEAUTY, in æsthetics, 189;
+    in Plato, 327, 332.
+
+  BEING, Eleatic conception of, 308 ff.
+
+  BELIEF, key to definition of religion, 58;
+    general characters applied to religion, 59 ff.;
+    in persons and dispositions, 62;
+    examples of religions, 66 ff.;
+    object of religions, 65, 82, 97;
+    relation to logic, 182, 183.
+
+  BENTHAM, 262.
+
+  BERKELEY, on idealism, 176;
+    relation to common-sense, 267;
+    his refutation of material substance, 275 ff.;
+    epistemology of, 277, 296, 369;
+    theory of mathematics, 279;
+    his spiritualism, 280, 284, 292;
+    his conception of God, 284, 293;
+    ethics of, 302;
+    religion of, 304.
+
+  BUDDHISM, 78.
+
+
+  CAUSE, in science, 131;
+    God as first, 203;
+    of motion, 231 ff.;
+    spirit as, 293 ff.
+
+  CHRISTIANITY, persistence of, 76;
+    essence of, 86;
+    development from Judaism, 94;
+    ethics of, 195, 198, 386;
+    idea of God in, 200 ff., 205;
+    emphasis on self-consciousness in, 372.
+
+  COMTE, 115.
+
+  CONTEMPLATION, 428.
+
+  CONVERSION, 69 ff.
+
+  CORPOREAL BEING, 224;
+    processes of, 225;
+    Berkeley's critique of, 278;
+    historical conceptions of, 229.
+
+  COSMOLOGICAL PROOF, the, of God, 203.
+
+  COSMOLOGY, general meaning of, 159;
+    mechanism in, 161, 225;
+    teleology in, 161.
+
+  COSMOS, origin of, 242.
+
+  CRITICAL METHOD, 319 ff.
+
+  CYNICISM, 259.
+
+  CYRENAICISM, 259.
+
+
+  DANTE, as philosopher-poet, 42 ff.;
+    general meaning of the _Divine Comedy_, 43;
+    and Thomas Aquinas, 43, 46;
+    his vision of the ways of God, 46;
+    on contemplation, 428.
+
+  DARWIN, 204.
+
+  DEISM, 207.
+
+  DEMOCRITUS, 247.
+    Also see ATOMISM.
+
+  DESCARTES, on function of philosophy, 154;
+    dualism of, 272, 412;
+    his theory of space and matter, 229;
+    automatism of, 248;
+    epistemology of, 341, 375;
+    his conception of self, 374.
+
+  DESCRIPTION, as method of science, 128.
+
+  DIALECTIC, in Plato, 320;
+    in Hegel, 361.
+
+  DIOGENES, 259.
+
+  DOGMATISM, 167.
+
+  DUALISM, general meaning, 162;
+    of Descartes, 272, 412.
+
+  DUTY, 196, 356, 360, 386.
+
+
+  ECLECTICISM, contemporary, 398 ff., 413.
+
+  ELEATICS.
+    See under PARMENIDES, and ZENO.
+
+  EMERSON, on spirit, 359;
+    on nature, 364;
+    on absolute, 392;
+    on necessity, 393;
+    on faith, 424.
+
+  EMPIRICISM, general meaning, 168;
+    in logic, 187;
+    in naturalism, 252 ff.;
+    of Locke, 274;
+    of Berkeley, 274 ff.
+
+  ENERGY, development of, conception of, 236 ff.
+
+  EPISTEMOLOGY, relation to metaphysics, 150;
+    definition of, 164;
+    fundamental problems of, 168, 172;
+    argument for God from, 202;
+    of naturalism, 248, 252 ff., 257;
+    of Descartes, 273, 341, 375;
+    of Berkeley, 277, 296;
+    of absolute realism, 339, 351;
+    of Leibniz, 340, 341;
+    of Plato, 340, 341;
+    of Hume, 376;
+    of Aristotle, 340, 341;
+    of absolute idealism, 351, 368 ff.;
+    of present day, 408 ff.
+
+  ETERNAL, the, 309.
+
+  ETHER, 230.
+
+  ETHICS, relation to metaphysics, 151, 196 ff., 360;
+    its origin in Socratic method, 181;
+    definition of, 191;
+    special problems and theories in, 191 ff.;
+    of Socrates, 192, 194;
+    of Aristotle, 195, 345;
+    of naturalism, 258 ff.;
+    of subjectivism, 298 ff.;
+    of Schopenhauer, 299;
+    argument for God from, 203;
+    individualism in, 301;
+    pluralism in, 302, 421;
+    of Stoics and Spinoza, 342;
+    Platonic, 342;
+    of Kant, 386;
+    of absolute idealism, 388.
+
+  EUDÆMONISM, 195.
+
+  EVIL, PROBLEM OF, 317, 336, 339, 352, 365 ff.;
+    in Greek philosophy, 352;
+    in absolute idealism, 367, 418.
+
+  EVOLUTION, of cosmos, 242 ff.;
+    of morality, 262.
+
+  EXPERIENCE, 410, 411, 412;
+    analysis of, by Kant, 354.
+
+
+  FAITH, 424;
+    special interests of, 199.
+    See also RELIGION and BELIEF.
+
+  FERGUSON, CHAS., quoted, 265.
+
+  FICHTE, 360, 402.
+
+  FIELDING, H., quoted on religion, 59, 74.
+
+  FORCE, development of conception of, 231 ff.
+
+  FORM, in Aristotle, 334.
+
+  FREEDOM, in ethics, 196, 388;
+    meanings and theories, 211.
+
+
+  GOD, as guarantee of ideals, 18, 425;
+    personality of, 62, 108 ff.;
+    St. Augustine's communion with, 68;
+    presence of, 68;
+    as a disposition from which consequences may be expected, 85;
+    meaning of, in religion, 87;
+    idea of, in Judaism and Christianity, 92;
+    why historical, 102;
+    social relation with, 103;
+    the ontological proof of, 200;
+    ethical and epistemological arguments for, 202;
+    cosmological proof of, 203;
+    teleological proof of, 204;
+    relation to the world, in theism, pantheism and deism, 205 ff.;
+    will of, 212;
+    conception of, in Berkeley, 284, 293 ff.;
+    conception and proof of, in Spinoza, 312 ff., 392, 393;
+    conception of, in Plato, 331, 352, 391, 393;
+    conception of, in Leibniz, 338, 353.
+    Also see ABSOLUTE.
+
+  GOETHE, on Spinoza, and on philosophy, 51;
+    on pragmatism, 407.
+
+  GOOD, the, theories of, in ethics, 191 ff.;
+    and the real, 326 ff., 421 ff.
+
+  GREEK, religion, in Homer and Lucretius, 89;
+    ideals, 195, 198, 429.
+
+  GREEN, T. H., quoted, 369, 385 (_note_).
+
+
+  HAECKEL, quoted, 236, 266.
+
+  HEDONISM, 192.
+
+  HEGEL, on science, 129;
+    philosophy of, 150, 361 ff.;
+    relation to Kant, 381;
+    on the absolute, 382;
+    ethics of, 390.
+
+  HERACLITUS, 308.
+
+  HISTORY, philosophy of, in Hegel, 363.
+
+  HOBBES, his misconception of relations of philosophy and science, 115;
+    quoted on ethics, 261.
+
+  Holbach, 251, 252.
+
+  HOMER, on Greek religion, 90.
+
+  HUMANISM, 320, 404, 405.
+
+  HUME, positivism of, 115, 377;
+    phenomenalism of, 283;
+    and Descartes, 376.
+
+  HUXLEY, quoted, 255, 266.
+
+  HYLOZOISM, 225.
+
+
+  IDEAL, the, in Plato, 326;
+    validity of, 416.
+
+  IDEALISM, various meanings of term, 173 (_note_);
+    meaning of, as theory of knowledge, 175 ff., 409;
+    of present day, 409 ff.;
+    empirical, see SUBJECTIVISM, PHENOMENALISM, SPIRITUALISM;
+    absolute, see ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.
+
+  IDEALS, in life, 10 ff.;
+    adoption of, 17 ff.
+
+  IDEAS, the, in Plato, 329.
+
+  IMAGINATION, in poetry, 99;
+    place of, in religion, 80, 97 ff.;
+    special functions of, in religion, 101 ff.;
+    scope of, in religion, 105 ff.;
+    and the personality of God, 110.
+
+  IMITATIO CHRISTI, quoted, 68.
+
+  IMMANENCE THEORY, 412, 413.
+
+  IMMORTALITY, 212.
+
+  INDIVIDUALISM, 301, 320, 338, 404.
+
+  INTUITIONISM, in ethics, 196.
+
+
+  JAMES, WILLIAM, quoted on religion, 65, 71, 305.
+
+  JUDAISM, development of, 92;
+    and Christianity, 94.
+
+
+  KANT, his transcendentalism, 177, 356;
+    his critique of knowledge, 354 ff., 377 ff.;
+    and absolute idealism, 380;
+    ethics of, 386.
+
+  KEPLER, quoted, 129.
+
+  KNOWLEDGE, of the means in life, 8;
+    of the end, 10;
+    in poetry, 27 ff.;
+    in religion, 82, 85, 97, 105;
+    general theory of, on epistemology, 164 ff.;
+    problem of source and criterion of, 168 ff.;
+    problem of relation to its object, 172 ff., 277, 340, 351, 368 ff.;
+    relation of logic to, 183 ff.;
+    account of, in naturalism, 253 ff.
+    Also see EPISTEMOLOGY.
+
+
+  LA METTRIE, quoted, 250.
+
+  LA PLACE, 242; quoted, 241.
+
+  LEIBNIZ, on function of philosophy, 155;
+    philosophy of, 333, 336 ff.;
+    epistemology of, 339.
+
+  LEUCIPPUS, quoted, 161.
+
+  LIFE, as a starting-point for thought, 3;
+    definition of, 5 ff.;
+    and self-consciousness, 6;
+    philosophy of 17 ff., 153;
+    mechanical theory of, 244 ff.;
+    return of philosophy to, 427 ff.;
+    contemplation in, 428.
+
+  LOCKE, epistemology of, 273.
+
+  LOGIC, origin in Socratic method, 181;
+    affiliations of, 182, 188;
+    definition of, 183;
+    parts of formal, 184 ff.;
+    present tendencies in, 187 ff.;
+    algebra of, 189.
+
+  LUCRETIUS, his criticism of Greek religion, quoted, 89 ff.;
+    on mechanism, 226, 240.
+
+
+  MCTAGGART, J. M. E., on Hegel, 367;
+    on the absolute, 391.
+
+  MACH, E., 283;
+    on philosophy and science, 120.
+
+  MALEBRANCHE, 376.
+
+  MARCUS AURELIUS, 348.
+
+  MATERIALISM, 254, 256;
+    general meaning, 223, 414;
+    development, 224 ff.;
+    and science, 228;
+    French, 249;
+    theory of mind in, 250.
+
+  MATHEMATICS, importance in science, 132;
+    logic in, 188;
+    Berkeley's conception of, 279;
+    Plato's conception of, 329, 335;
+    Spinoza's conception of, 311, 335.
+
+  MATTER, 225, 228;
+    and space, 229;
+    Berkeley's refutation of, 275 ff.;
+    in Plato and Aristotle, 334.
+
+  MECHANICAL THEORY, practical significance of its extension to the
+      world at large, 20;
+    in cosmology, 161, 225;
+    of Descartes, 231;
+    of Newton 232;
+    of origin of cosmos, 242;
+    of life, 244;
+    in Spinoza, 336.
+
+  METAPHYSICS, relation to epistemology, 150;
+    relation to ethics, 151, 196 ff.;
+    definition of, 158;
+    relation to logic, 188;
+    relation to theology, 207;
+    present tendencies in, 399 ff., 408.
+
+  MILL, J. S., 283 (_note_).
+
+  MIND, explanation of in naturalism, 237, 247 ff.;
+    of God, in Berkeley, 284, 294, 296;
+    absolute, 349 (_note_), 358, 382 ff.
+    Also see under SELF, and SOUL.
+
+  MODE, in Spinoza, 313.
+
+  MONADS, in Leibniz, 338.
+
+  MONISM, 159, 163.
+
+  MORALITY, and religion, 73;
+    grounds of, according to Kant, 356;
+    incentive to, 422.
+
+  MYSTICISM, general account, 171;
+    Schopenhauer's, 290;
+    types of religions, 391.
+
+
+  NAEGELI, C. v., quoted, 287.
+
+  NATURAL SCIENCE, true relations of, with philosophy, 116;
+    sphere of, with reference to philosophy, 117 ff.;
+    philosophy of, its procedure, 121, 135, 142, 154, 401;
+    origin of, as special interest, 123 ff.;
+    human value of, 126, 127, 143;
+    method and fundamental conceptions of, 406, 128 ff.;
+    general development of, 134;
+    limits of, because abstract, 136 ff., 414;
+    validity of, 142;
+    logic and, 188;
+    development of conceptions in, 229 ff.;
+    grounds of, according to Kant, 355, 377;
+    Hume on, 377;
+    permanence and progress in, 395 ff.
+
+  NATURAL SELECTION, 204, 245.
+
+  NATURALISM, chap. viii;
+    general meaning, 217, 223 (_note_), 399;
+    claims of, 239;
+    task of, 241;
+    criticism of, 117, 257, 263;
+    of present day, 405, 412.
+    Also see under MATERIALISM, and POSITIVISM.
+
+  NATURE, 160, 244, 337;
+    in Berkeley, 294;
+    in Spinoza, 317, 338;
+    in Hegel, 363;
+    in Kant, 377 ff.;
+    in contemporary philosophy, 401.
+    Also see NATURAL SCIENCE, and NATURALISM.
+
+  NEBULAR HYPOTHESIS, 242.
+
+  NECESSITY, of will, 211;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 393.
+
+  NEO-FICHTEANS, 402, 403 (_note_).
+
+  NEO-KANTIANS, 403.
+
+  NEWTON, 232, 235, 242, 355, 377.
+
+  NORMATIVE SCIENCES, the, 180.
+
+
+  OMAR KHAYYAM, quoted, 16;
+    as a philosopher-poet, 36.
+
+  ONTOLOGICAL PROOF, of God, 200.
+
+  ONTOLOGY, 159.
+
+  OPTIMISM, 104, 388, 422, 424.
+
+
+  PANPSYCHISM, 176, 238, 285 ff.
+
+  PANTHEISM, in primitive religion, 78;
+    general meaning, 205;
+    types of, 390.
+
+  PARKER, THEODORE, quoted on religion, 67.
+
+  PARMENIDES, and rationalism, 168;
+    philosophy of, 308 ff., 337;
+    and Aristotle, 336.
+
+  PATER, WALTER, on Wordsworth, 38;
+    on Cyrenaicism, 260;
+    on subjectivism, 270.
+
+  PAULSEN, FRIEDRICH, ethics of, quoted, 302.
+
+  PEARSON, KARL, quoted, 230.
+
+  PERCEPTION. See SENSE-PERCEPTION.
+
+  PERSONAL IDEALISM, 404, 405.
+
+  PERSONALITY, of God, important in understanding of religion, 62;
+    essential to religion? 108 ff.
+
+  PERSONS, description of belief in, 62;
+    imagination of, 101, 110.
+
+  PESSIMISM, 104, 299, 424.
+
+  PHENOMENALISM, general meaning, 176, 267 (_note_);
+    of Berkeley, 272, 275 ff.;
+    of Hume, 283;
+    various tendencies in, 281.
+
+  PHILOSOPHER, the practical man and the, chap. i;
+    the rôle of the, 306, 426.
+
+  PHILOSOPHY, commonly misconceived, 3;
+    of the devotee, 13;
+    of the man of affairs, 14;
+    of the voluptuary, 16;
+    of life, its general meaning, 17 ff., 153;
+    its relations with poetry, chap. ii, 112;
+    lack of, in Shakespeare, 33;
+    as expression of personality, 33;
+    as premature, 33;
+    in poetry of Omar Khayyam, 36;
+    in poetry of Wordsworth, 38 ff.;
+    in poetry of Dante, 42 ff.;
+    difference between philosophy and poetry, 48 ff.;
+    in religion, 108 ff.;
+    compared with religion, 112;
+    true attitude of, toward science, 116;
+    sphere of, in relation to science, 117, 395 ff.;
+    procedure of, with reference to science, 121, 135, 142, 154, 160;
+    human value of, 143, 426 ff.;
+    can its problem be divided? 149, 155;
+    origin of, 157;
+    special problems of, chap. vi, vii;
+    and psychology, 216;
+    peculiar object of, 308;
+    self-criticism in, 319 ff., 325;
+    permanence and progress in, 395 ff.;
+    contemporary, 398 ff.
+
+  PHYSICAL.
+    See CORPOREAL BEING, MATERIALISM, etc.
+
+  PHYSIOLOGY, 246.
+
+  PIETY, description and interpretation of, 72;
+    in ethics, 195.
+
+  PLATO, on Protagoras, 167, 269, 270, 298;
+    quoted, on Socrates, 170, 192, 194;
+    historical preparation for, 324;
+    psychology of, 209;
+    philosophy of, 306, 318, 326 ff., 382;
+    and Aristotle, 333;
+    and Spinoza, 318, 335;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 346, 391, 393;
+    on evil, 352;
+    on spirit, 359;
+    on reason and perception, 370;
+    on the philosopher, 426.
+
+  PLURALISM, general meaning of, 159, 163, 419;
+    in ethics, 302, 421 ff.;
+    in religion, 304.
+
+  POETRY, relations with philosophy, chap. ii;
+    as appreciation, 25;
+    virtue of sincerity in, 27;
+    the "barbarian" in, 28;
+    constructive knowledge in, 30;
+    difference between philosophy and, 48 ff.
+
+  POSITIVISM, on relation of philosophy and science, 115, 122;
+    general meaning of, 168, 234, 252 ff., 412.
+
+  PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE, of means, 8 ff.;
+    of end or purpose, 10 ff.;
+    implied in religion, 85, 97;
+    philosophy as, 153.
+
+  PRACTICAL MAN, the, and the philosopher, chap. i;
+    his failure to understand philosophy, 3;
+    his ideal, 14;
+    virtually a philosopher, 22.
+
+  PRAGMATISM, 151, 407, 408.
+
+  PRAYER, 103.
+
+  PREDICTION, in science, 130.
+
+  PRESENT DAY, philosophy of the, 398 ff.
+
+  PROTAGORAS, scepticism of, 166, 271;
+    subjectivism of, 269;
+    ethics of, 298.
+
+  PSYCHOLOGY, of religion, 58, 82;
+    inadequate to religion, 82;
+    as branch of philosophy, 208 ff., 216;
+    as natural science, 213;
+    affiliations of, 215;
+    limits of, 415.
+
+  PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM, 215, 252.
+
+  PURPOSE, in life, 10 ff.;
+    adoption of life-purpose, 17 ff.;
+    practical significance of, in the world at large, 20.
+    Also see TELEOLOGY, IDEAL, etc.
+
+
+  QUALITIES, primary and secondary, 254, 274, 277.
+
+
+  RATIONALISM, general meaning, 168, 416;
+    in logic, 180, 184;
+    in ethics, 193;
+    of eleatics, 310;
+    of Spinoza, 311;
+    in absolute realism, 339;
+    criticism of, 418.
+
+  REALISM, various meanings of term, 173 (_note_);
+    meaning of, as theory of knowledge, 172;
+    of Parmenides, 308 ff.;
+    of Plato and Aristotle, 341;
+    of present day, 409 ff.
+
+  REASON, 370.
+    See RATIONALISM.
+
+  RELATIVISM, 166, 267 ff.;
+    in ethics, 298.
+
+  RELIGION, chaps. iii, iv;
+    relation to poetry and philosophy, 49, 52;
+    difficulty of defining, 53;
+    possibility of defining, 54;
+    profitableness of defining, 54;
+    true method of defining, 56;
+    misconceptions of, 56;
+    as possessing the psychological character of belief, 59 ff.;
+    degree of, in individuals and moods, 60, 61;
+    definition of, as belief in disposition of universe, 64 ff., 82;
+    and morality, 73;
+    symbolism in, 75;
+    prophet and preacher of, 75;
+    conveyance of, 76;
+    primitive, 77;
+    Buddhism, 78;
+    the critical or enlightened type of, 80;
+    means to be true, 82 ff.;
+    implies a practical truth, 85;
+    cases of truth and error in, 88 ff.;
+    of Baal, 88;
+    Greek, 89;
+    of Jews, its development, 92;
+    Christian, 94;
+    definition of cognitive factor in, 97;
+    place of imagination in, 80, 97 ff.;
+    special functions of imagination in, 101 ff.;
+    relation of imagination and truth in, 105;
+    philosophy implied in, 108 ff.;
+    is personal god essential to, 108;
+    compared with philosophy, 112;
+    compared with science, 145;
+    special philosophical problems of, 199 ff.;
+    of naturalism, 263 ff.;
+    of subjectivism and spiritualism, 302 ff.;
+    of Plato and Aristotle, 346, 393;
+    of Stoics and Spinoza, 348, 393;
+    philosophy of, in Hegel, 365;
+    of absolute idealism, 390 ff.
+
+  RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA, interpretation of, 69 ff.
+
+  REPRESENTATIVE THEORY, of knowledge, 174, 412.
+
+  ROMANTICISM, 361.
+
+  ROUSSEAU, quoted on nature, 64.
+
+  ROYCE, JOSIAH, quoted on absolute idealism, 178, 384, 394.
+
+
+  SANTAYANA, GEORGE, quoted on poetry 28, 29.
+
+  SCEPTICISM, 166, 267 ff.
+    See under POSITIVISM, and AGNOSTICISM.
+
+  SCHELLING, misconception of science, 116.
+
+  SCHOLASTICISM, 333;
+    idea of God in, 201.
+
+  SCHOPENHAUER, his panpsychism or voluntarism, 177, 285 ff.;
+    universalizes subjectivism, 290;
+    mysticism of, 290;
+    ethics of, 299;
+    religion of, 303.
+
+  SCIENCE.
+    Also see under NATURAL SCIENCE, and NORMATIVE SCIENCE.
+
+  SECULARISM, of Shakespeare, 34;
+    of Periclean Age, 320;
+    of present age, 427.
+
+  SELF, problem of, 216;
+    proof of, in St. Augustine, 372;
+    proof of, in Descartes, 374;
+    deeper moral of, 387;
+    in contemporary philosophy, 411, 413.
+    Also see SOUL, and MIND.
+
+  SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, essential to human life, 6;
+    development of conception of, 371 ff.;
+    in absolute idealism, 383;
+    in idealistic ethics, 386.
+
+  SENSATIONALISM, 247, 255, 269.
+
+  SENSE-PERCEPTION, 168, 247, 269, 370;
+    being as, in Berkeley, 281.
+
+  SHAKESPEARE, general criticism of, 30 ff.;
+    his universality, 31;
+    lack of philosophy in, 33.
+
+  SHELLEY, quoted on poetry, 50.
+
+  SOCIAL RELATIONS, belief inspired by, analogue of religion, 62;
+    imagination of, extended to God, 101.
+
+  SOCRATES, rationalism of, 169;
+    and normative science, 180;
+    ethics of, 192, 194;
+    method of, 321 ff.
+
+  SOPHISTS, the, epistemology of, 165;
+    scepticism of, 271, 320;
+    ethics of, 298, 301;
+    age of, 320.
+
+  SOUL, the, in Aristotle, 208;
+    in Plato, 209;
+    as substance, 209;
+    intellectualism and voluntarism in theory of, 210;
+    immortality of, 212;
+    Berkeley's theory of, 284.
+    Also see under MIND, and SELF.
+
+  SPACE, importance in science, 130;
+    and matter, 229.
+
+  SPENCER, 236 (_note_), 243, 265.
+
+  SPINOZA, and Goethe, 51;
+    quoted on philosophy and life, 153;
+    philosophy of, 306, 311 ff.;
+    criticism and estimate of, 315 ff.;
+    and Plato, 318, 335;
+    and Aristotle, 336;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 348, 392, 393.
+
+  SPIRIT, the absolute, 358 ff.
+
+  SPIRITUALISM, general meaning, 176, 267 (_note_);
+    in Berkeley, 280, 292;
+    in Schopenhauer, 285;
+    criticism of, 288;
+    objective, 292.
+
+  STEVENSON, R. L., quoted on religion, 67.
+
+  STOICISM, ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 348.
+
+  SUBJECTIVISM, chap. ix;
+    general meaning, 175, 218, 267 (_note_), 415;
+    in æsthetics, 190;
+    of Berkeley, 275 ff.;
+    universalization of, in Schopenhauer, 290;
+    criticism of, 297, 415;
+    ethics of, 298 ff.;
+    in absolute idealism, 368;
+    of present day, 409.
+
+  SUBSTANCE, spiritual, 209, 284;
+    material, Berkeley's refutation of, 275 ff.;
+    Spinoza's conception of, 311;
+    the infinite, in Spinoza, 312;
+    Aristotle's conception of, 334;
+    Leibniz's conception of, 338.
+
+  SYMBOLISM, in religion, 75.
+
+
+  TELEOLOGY, in cosmology, 161;
+    proof of God from, 204;
+    Spinoza on, 318;
+    in Plato, 326 ff., 336;
+    in Aristotle, 336.
+
+  THEISM, 205.
+
+  THEOLOGY, relation to religion, 98;
+    in philosophy, 199 ff.;
+    relation to metaphysics, 207.
+
+  THOMSON, J., quoted, 104.
+
+  THOUGHT, and life, 6 ff.;
+    as being, in Hegel, 361 ff.
+
+  THUCYDIDES, on thought and action, 429.
+
+  TIME, importance in science, 130.
+
+  TRANSCENDENTALISM, 177, 349 (_note_), 356.
+    See IDEALISM, absolute.
+
+  TYNDALL, 115.
+
+
+  UNIVERSAL, scientific knowledge as, 125, 139.
+
+  UNIVERSE, the, as object of religious reaction, 64;
+    common object of philosophy and religion, 112;
+    as collective, 419.
+
+  UTILITARIANISM, 261.
+
+
+  VIRTUE, 198, 345.
+
+  VOLTAIRE, quoted, 231, 251.
+
+  VOLUNTARISM, in psychology, 210;
+    in Schopenhauer, 285.
+
+
+  WHITMAN, WALT, 27 ff.
+
+  WILL, in psychology, 210;
+    freedom and determination of, 211;
+    in Schopenhauer, 177;
+    as cause, in Berkeley, 293 ff.;
+    in pragmatism, 407.
+
+  WORDSWORTH, as philosopher-poet, 38 ff.;
+    his sense for the universal, 40;
+    quoted on poetry and philosophy, 48, 50.
+
+
+  ZENO, 337.
+
+
+
+
+TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:
+
+
+Ellipses match the original.
+
+Numbers in {braces} are subscripted in the original.
+
+Variations in spelling have been left as in the original. Examples
+include the following:
+
+     co-ordinated       coördinated
+     Kuelpe             Külpe's
+     Muensterberg       Münsterberg
+     Nirvana            Nirvâna
+     Phaedo             Phædo
+     pre-eminent        preëminent
+     pre-eminently      preëminently
+     reenforcement       reënforce
+     role               rôle
+     Theaetetus         Theætetus
+
+The word Phoenix uses an oe ligature in the original.
+
+The following corrections have been made to the text:
+
+     Page xv: CHAPTER VI. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY{original has
+     EPISTOMOLOGY}
+
+     Page 70: The psychology{original has pyschology} of conversion
+
+     Page 93: him who practices{original has practises} the social
+     virtues
+
+     Page 165: reality have resulted in no consensus{original has
+     concensus} of opinion
+
+     Page 196: but in a law to which it{original has its} owes
+     obedience
+
+     Page 261: 'justice,' 'gratitude,' '{quotation mark missing in
+     original}modesty,'
+
+     Page 283: retained after their original{original has orignal}
+     meaning
+
+     Page 288: nothing but the highest development{original has
+     devolpment} on our earth
+
+     Page 325: philosopher who defined being as{original has a} the
+     ideal
+
+     Page 405: Henri Bergson: _Essai{original has Essoi} sur les
+     données immédiates de la conscience_
+
+     Page 434: THOMAS À{original has Á} KEMPIS: _Imitation of
+     Christ._
+
+     Page 436: HUXLEY, T. H.: _Evolution and Ethics;
+     Prolegomena._{original has Prologomena}
+
+     [51:11] Vol. I, p. 60.{period is missing in original}
+
+     [199:14] religion in these matters, cf.{original has Cf.}
+     Descartes:
+
+     [287:16] Translation by Haldane and Kemp{original has Komp}
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+Project Gutenberg's The Approach to Philosophy, by Ralph Barton Perry
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Approach to Philosophy
+
+Author: Ralph Barton Perry
+
+Release Date: April 19, 2008 [EBook #25110]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Stephen Hope, Fox in the Stars, Lisa Reigel,
+and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+
+<div class = "notebox"><p>Transcriber's Notes:<br /><br />
+Greek words that may not display correctly in all browsers are
+transliterated in the text using popups like this:
+<ins class="greek" title="biblos">&#946;&#953;&#946;&#955;&#959;&#962;</ins>.
+Position your mouse over the line to see the transliteration.</p>
+
+<p>A few typographical errors have been corrected. A complete list follows
+the text.</p>
+
+<p>Click on the page number to see an image of the page.</p>
+</div>
+
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i"></a>[<a href="./images/i.png">i</a>]</span></p>
+<p class="gap">&nbsp;</p>
+<h1>THE</h1>
+<h1>APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY</h1>
+
+<p class="gap"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii"></a>[<a href="./images/ii.png">ii</a>]</span></p>
+<h2>BY PROF. RALPH BARTON PERRY</h2>
+
+<p class="p4">THE FREE MAN AND THE SOLDIER<br />
+THE MORAL ECONOMY<br />
+THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY</p>
+
+<p class="gap">&nbsp;</p>
+<p class="p3">CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS</p>
+
+
+
+<p class="biggap">&nbsp;</p>
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii"></a>[<a href="./images/iii.png">iii</a>]</span></p>
+<h1>THE APPROACH TO<br />
+PHILOSOPHY</h1>
+
+<p class="gap">&nbsp;</p>
+<p class="p3">BY</p>
+
+
+<h2>RALPH BARTON PERRY, <span class="smcap">Ph.D.</span></h2>
+<h3>ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY</h3>
+
+<p class="gap">&nbsp;</p>
+<p class="p2">CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS</p>
+<p class="p4">NEW YORK CHICAGO BOSTON</p>
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv"></a>[<a href="./images/iv.png">iv</a>]</span></p>
+<p class="p4"><span class="smcap">Copyright, 1905, by</span></p>
+<p class="p3">CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS</p>
+<p class="p4">Printed in the United States of America<br />
+F</p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v"></a>[<a href="./images/v.png">v</a>]</span></p>
+<p class="p3">THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED TO</p>
+
+<p class="p2">MY FATHER</p>
+
+<p class="p3">AS A TOKEN OF MY LOVE AND ESTEEM</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi"></a>[<a href="./images/vi.png">vi</a>]</span></p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii"></a>[<a href="./images/vii.png">vii</a>]</span></p>
+<h2>PREFACE</h2>
+
+
+<p>In an essay on "The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time,"
+Professor Edward Caird says that "philosophy is not a first venture into
+a new field of thought, but the rethinking of a secular and religious
+consciousness which has been developed, in the main, independently of
+philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_VII:A_1" id="FNanchor_VII:A_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_VII:A_1" class="fnanchor">[vii:A]</a> If there be any inspiration and originality in this
+book, they are due to my great desire that philosophy should appear in
+its vital relations to more familiar experiences. If philosophy is, as
+is commonly assumed, appropriate to a phase in the development of every
+individual, it should <i>grow out</i> of interests to which he is already
+alive. And if the great philosophers are indeed never dead, this fact
+should manifest itself in their classic or historical representation of
+a perennial outlook upon the world. I am not seeking to attach to
+philosophy a fictitious liveliness, wherewith to insinuate it into the
+good graces of the student. I hope <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii"></a>[<a href="./images/viii.png">viii</a>]</span>rather to be true to the meaning of
+philosophy. For there is that in its stand-point and its problem which
+makes it universally significant entirely apart from dialectic and
+erudition. These are derived interests, indispensable to the scholar,
+but quite separable from that modicum of philosophy which helps to make
+the man. The present book is written for the sake of elucidating the
+inevitable philosophy. It seeks to make the reader more solicitously
+aware of the philosophy that is in him, or to provoke him to philosophy
+in his own interests. To this end I have sacrificed all else to the task
+of mediating between the tradition and technicalities of the academic
+discipline and the more common terms of life.</p>
+
+<p>The purpose of the book will in part account for those shortcomings that
+immediately reveal themselves to the eye of the scholar. In Part I
+various great human interests have been selected as points of departure.
+I have sought to introduce the general stand-point and problem of
+philosophy through its implication in practical life, poetry, religion,
+and science. But in so doing it has been necessary for me to deal
+shortly with topics of great independent importance, and so risk the
+disfavor of those better skilled in these several <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix"></a>[<a href="./images/ix.png">ix</a>]</span>matters. This is
+evidently true of the chapter which deals with natural science. But the
+problem which I there faced differed radically from those of the
+foregoing chapters, and the method of treatment is correspondingly
+different. In the case of natural science one has to deal with a body of
+knowledge which is frequently regarded as the only knowledge. To write a
+chapter about science from a philosophical stand-point is, in the
+present state of opinion, to undertake a polemic against exclusive
+naturalism, an attitude which is itself philosophical, and as such is
+well known in the history of philosophy as <i>positivism</i> or
+<i>agnosticism</i>. I have avoided the polemical spirit and method so far as
+possible, but have, nevertheless, here taken sides against a definite
+philosophical position. This chapter, together with the Conclusion, is
+therefore an exception to the purely introductory and expository
+representation which I have, on the whole, sought to give. The
+relatively great space accorded to the discussion of religion is, in my
+own belief, fair to the general interest in this topic, and to the
+intrinsic significance of its relation to philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>I have in Part II undertaken to furnish the reader with a map of the
+country to which he has <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x"></a>[<a href="./images/x.png">x</a>]</span>been led. To this end I have attempted a brief
+survey of the entire programme of philosophy. An accurate and full
+account of philosophical terms can be found in such books as K&uuml;lpe's
+"Introduction to Philosophy" and Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy,"
+and an attempt to emulate their thoroughness would be superfluous, even
+if it were conformable to the general spirit of this book. The scope of
+Part II is due in part to a desire for brevity, but chiefly to the hope
+of furnishing an epitome that shall follow the course of the <i>natural
+and historical differentiation</i> of the general philosophical problem.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, I have in Part III sought to present the tradition of
+philosophy in the form of general types. My purpose in undertaking so
+difficult a task is to acquaint the reader with philosophy in the
+concrete; to show how certain underlying principles may determine the
+whole circle of philosophical ideas, and give them unity and distinctive
+flavor. Part II offers a general classification of philosophical
+problems and conceptions independently of any special point of view. But
+I have in Part III sought to emphasize the point of view, or the
+internal consistency that makes a <i>system of philosophy</i> out of certain
+answers to the special <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi"></a>[<a href="./images/xi.png">xi</a>]</span>problems of philosophy. In such a division into
+types, lines are of necessity drawn too sharply. There will be many
+historical philosophies that refuse to fit, and many possibilities
+unprovided for. I must leave it to the individual reader to overcome
+this abstractness through his own reflection upon the intermediate and
+variant stand-points.</p>
+
+<p>Although the order is on the whole that of progressive complexity, I
+have sought to treat each chapter with independence enough to make it
+possible for it to be read separately; and I have provided a carefully
+selected bibliography in the hope that this book may serve as a stimulus
+and guide to the reading of other books.</p>
+
+<p>The earlier chapters have already appeared as articles: Chapter I in the
+<i>International Journal of Ethics</i>, Vol. XIII, No. 4; Chapter II in the
+<i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol. XI, No. 6; Chapter III in the <i>Monist</i>,
+Vol. XIV, No. 5; Chapter IV in the <i>International Journal of Ethics</i>,
+Vol. XV, No. 1; and some paragraphs of Chapter V in the <i>Journal of
+Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods</i>, Vol. I, No. 7. I am
+indebted to the editors of these periodicals for permission to reprint
+with minor changes.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii"></a>[<a href="./images/xii.png">xii</a>]</span>In the writing of this, my first book, I have been often reminded that
+a higher critic, skilled in the study of internal evidence, could
+probably trace all of its ideas to suggestions that have come to me from
+my teachers and colleagues of the Department of Philosophy in Harvard
+University. I have unscrupulously forgotten what of their definite ideas
+I have adapted to my own use, but not that I received from them the
+major portion of my original philosophical capital. I am especially
+indebted to Professor William James for the inspiration and resources
+which I have received from his instruction and personal friendship.</p>
+
+<p class="authorsc">Ralph Barton Perry.</p>
+
+<p style="margin-left: 1em;"><span class="smcap">Cambridge</span>, March, 1905.</p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_VII:A_1" id="Footnote_VII:A_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_VII:A_1"><span class="label">[vii:A]</span></a> Edw. Caird: <i>Literature and Philosophy</i>, Vol. I, p.
+207.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii"></a>[<a href="./images/xiii.png">xiii</a>]</span></p>
+<h2>TABLE OF CONTENTS</h2>
+
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table summary="Table of Contents" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0">
+<tr>
+<td class="tdcenter" colspan="4">PART I</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdcenter" colspan="4">APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdright" colspan="4"><span style="font-size:x-small">PAGE</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter I. The Practical Man and the Philosopher</span></td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_1">1</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_2">2</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Life as a Starting-point for Thought</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_4">4</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_3">3</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Practical Knowledge of Means</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_8">8</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_4">4</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_10">10</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_5">5</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and the Voluptuary</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_12">12</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_6">6</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_17">17</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter II. Poetry and Philosophy</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_24">24</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_7">7</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Who is the Philosopher-Poet?</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_24">24</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_8">8</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Poetry as Appreciation</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_25">25</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_9">9</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_27">27</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_10">10</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_30">30</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_11">11</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Philosophy in Poetry. The World-view. Omar Khayyam</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_12">12</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Wordsworth</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_38">38</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_13">13</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Dante</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_42">42</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_14">14</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_48">48</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv"></a>[<a href="./images/xiv.png">xiv</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Chapter III. The Religious Experience</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_53">53</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_15">15</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Possibility of Defining Religion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_53">53</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_16">16</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Profitableness of Defining Religion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_54">54</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_17">17</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The True Method of Defining Religion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_56">56</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_18">18</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Religion as Belief</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_59">59</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_19">19</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_62">62</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_20">20</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual Environment, or Universe</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_64">64</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_21">21</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Examples of Religious Belief</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_66">66</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_22">22</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Typical Religious Phenomena. Conversion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_69">69</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_23">23</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Piety</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_72">72</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_24">24</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_74">74</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_25">25</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_77">77</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_26">26</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Buddhism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_78">78</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_27">27</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Critical Religion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_79">79</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter IV. The Philosophical Implications of Religion</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_82">82</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_28">28</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">R&eacute;sum&eacute; of Psychology of Religion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_82">82</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_29">29</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Religion Means to be True</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_82">82</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_30">30</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a Disposition from which Consequences May Rationally be Expected</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_85">85</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_31">31</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The Religion of Baal</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_88">88</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_32">32</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Greek Religion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_89">89</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_33">33</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Judaism and Christianity</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_92">92</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_34">34</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Cognitive Factor in Religion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_96">96</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_35">35</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Place of Imagination in Religion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_97">97</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_36">36</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_101">101</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_37">37</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_105">105</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv"></a>[<a href="./images/xv.png">xv</a>]</span>&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_38">38</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_108">108</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter V. Natural Science and Philosophy</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_114">114</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_39">39</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The True Relations of Philosophy and Science. Misconceptions and Antagonisms</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_114">114</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_40">40</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Spheres of Philosophy and Science</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_117">117</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_41">41</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_120">120</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_42">42</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Origin of the Scientific Interest</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_123">123</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_43">43</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Skill as Free</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_123">123</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_44">44</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Skill as Social</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_126">126</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_45">45</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Science for Accommodation and Construction</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_127">127</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_46">46</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. The Descriptive Method</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_47">47</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Space, Time, and Prediction</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_130">130</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_48">48</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Quantitative Method</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_132">132</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_49">49</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The General Development of Science</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_134">134</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_50">50</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_135">135</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_51">51</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Natural Science is Abstract</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_136">136</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_52">52</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_139">139</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_53">53</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_142">142</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_54">54</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_143">143</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdcenter" colspan="4">PART II</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdcenter" colspan="4">THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY</td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter VI. Metaphysics and Epistemology</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_149">149</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_55">55</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem of Philosophy</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_149">149</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_56">56</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon the Initial Interest</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_152">152</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi"></a>[<a href="./images/xvi.png">xvi</a>]</span>&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_57">57</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_152">152</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_58">58</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Philosophy as the Extension of Science</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_154">154</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_59">59</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical Problem</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_155">155</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_60">60</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_157">157</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_61">61</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Monism and Pluralism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_159">159</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_62">62</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_159">159</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_63">63</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_160">160</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_64">64</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Dualism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_162">162</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_65">65</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_163">163</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_66">66</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of Knowledge</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_164">164</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_67">67</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_166">166</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_68">68</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Source and Criterion of Knowledge according to Empiricism and Rationalism. Mysticism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_168">168</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_69">69</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to Realism, and the Representative Theory</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_172">172</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_70">70</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to Idealism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_175">175</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_71">71</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_176">176</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_72">72</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_177">177</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter VII. The Normative Sciences and the Problems of Religion</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_180">180</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_73">73</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Normative Sciences</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_180">180</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_74">74</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Affiliations of Logic</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_182">182</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_75">75</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in Belief</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_183">183</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_76">76</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence, Inference, and Observation</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_184">184</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_77">77</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_187">187</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii"></a>[<a href="./images/xvii.png">xvii</a>]</span>&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_78">78</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Priority of Concepts</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_188">188</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_79">79</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">&AElig;sthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Beauty. Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_189">189</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_80">80</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral Goodness</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_191">191</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_81">81</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_191">191</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_82">82</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Rationalism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_193">193</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_83">83</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Eud&aelig;monism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_194">194</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_84">84</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_196">196</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_85">85</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_198">198</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_86">86</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of Faith</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_199">199</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_87">87</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_200">200</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_88">88</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Ontological Proof of God</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_200">200</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_89">89</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Cosmological Proof of God</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_203">203</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_90">90</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Teleological Proof of God</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_204">204</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_91">91</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">God and the World. Theism and Pantheism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_205">205</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_92">92</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Deism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_206">206</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_93">93</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Metaphysics and Theology</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_207">207</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_94">94</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Psychology is the Theory of the Soul</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_208">208</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_95">95</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Spiritual Substance</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_209">209</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_96">96</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Intellectualism and Voluntarism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_210">210</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_97">97</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, and Indeterminism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_211">211</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_98">98</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Immortality. Survival and Eternalism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_212">212</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_99">99</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and Method</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_213">213</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_100">100</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Psychology and Philosophy</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_216">216</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_101">101</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Transition from Classification by Problems to Classification by Doctrines. Naturalism. Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute Realism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_217">217</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdcenter" colspan="4"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii"></a>[<a href="./images/xviii.png">xviii</a>]</span>PART III</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdcenter" colspan="4">SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY</td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII. Naturalism</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_223">223</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_102">102</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The General Meaning of Materialism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_223">223</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_103">103</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Corporeal Being</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_224">224</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_104">104</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_225">225</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_105">105</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Materialism and Physical Science</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_228">228</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_106">106</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Development of the Conceptions of Physical Science. Space and Matter</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_228">228</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_107">107</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the Conception of Force</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_231">231</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_108">108</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Development and Extension of the Conception of Energy</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_236">236</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_109">109</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Claims of Naturalism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_239">239</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_110">110</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Task of Naturalism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_241">241</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_111">111</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Origin of the Cosmos</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_242">242</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_112">112</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Life. Natural Selection</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_244">244</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_113">113</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Mechanical Physiology</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_246">246</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_114">114</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Mind. The Reduction to Sensation</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_247">247</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_115">115</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Automatism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_248">248</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_116">116</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_250">250</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_117">117</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Knowledge. Positivism and Agnosticism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_252">252</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_118">118</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Experimentalism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_255">255</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_119">119</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_256">256</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_120">120</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">General Ethical Stand-point</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_258">258</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_121">121</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Cynicism and Cyrenaicism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_259">259</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_122">122</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception of Social Relations</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_260">260</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_123">123</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_262">262</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix"></a>[<a href="./images/xix.png">xix</a>]</span>&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_124">124</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_263">263</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_125">125</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, Wonder, and Renunciation</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_265">265</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter IX. Subjectivism</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_267">267</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_126">126</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and Scepticism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_267">267</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_127">127</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Phenomenalism and Spiritualism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_271">271</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_128">128</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem Inherited from Descartes and Locke</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_272">272</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_129">129</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Refutation of Material Substance</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_275">275</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_130">130</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Application of the Epistemological Principle</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_277">277</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_131">131</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_278">278</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_132">132</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Transition to Spiritualism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_280">280</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_133">133</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_281">281</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_134">134</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the Perceiver</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_284">284</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_135">135</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate Knowledge of the Will</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_285">285</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_136">136</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Panpsychism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_287">287</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_137">137</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for Objective Knowledge</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_288">288</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_138">138</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism. Mysticism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_290">290</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_139">139</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Objective Spiritualism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_292">292</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_140">140</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness, and Order</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_293">293</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_141">141</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_297">297</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_142">142</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Ethical Theories. Relativism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_298">298</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_143">143</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Pessimism and Self-denial</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_299">299</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx"></a>[<a href="./images/xx.png">xx</a>]</span>&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_144">144</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Ethics of Welfare</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_300">300</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_145">145</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Ethical Community</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_302">302</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_146">146</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Religion of Mysticism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_303">303</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_147">147</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Religion of Individual Co&ouml;peration with God</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_304">304</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter X. Absolute Realism</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_306">306</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_148">148</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, or the Absolute</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_306">306</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_149">149</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Eleatic Conception of Being</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_309">309</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_150">150</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Spinoza's Conception of Substance</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_311">311</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_151">151</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The Modes and the Attributes</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_312">312</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_152">152</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_315">315</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_153">153</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Spinoza's Provision for the Finite</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_317">317</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_154">154</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Transition to Teleological Conceptions</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_317">317</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_155">155</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_319">319</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_156">156</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_319">319</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_157">157</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_321">321</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_158">158</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_323">323</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_159">159</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Historical Preparation for Plato</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_324">324</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_160">160</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_326">326</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_161">161</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Progression of Experience toward God</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_329">329</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_162">162</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to Platonism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_332">332</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_163">163</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of Platonism and Spinozism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_335">335</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_164">164</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development to the Problem of Imperfection</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_336">336</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_165">165</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_338">338</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi"></a>[<a href="./images/xxi.png">xxi</a>]</span>&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_166">166</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_339">339</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_167">167</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute Realism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_340">340</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_168">168</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_342">342</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_169">169</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Platonic Ethics of Perfection</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_344">344</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_170">170</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Religion of Fulfilment and the Religion of Renunciation</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_346">346</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter XI. Absolute Idealism</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_349">349</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_171">171</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_349">349</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_172">172</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_351">351</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_173">173</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The Task of the New Absolutism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_352">352</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_174">174</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis of Experience</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_354">354</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_175">175</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which they Set in Order</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_356">356</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_176">176</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant. The Absolute Spirit</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_358">358</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_177">177</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_360">360</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_178">178</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_361">361</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_179">179</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_361">361</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_180">180</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_363">363</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_181">181</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">R&eacute;sum&eacute;. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the Problem of Evil</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_365">365</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii"></a>[<a href="./images/xxii.png">xxii</a>]</span>&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_182">182</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is Based upon the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_368">368</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_183">183</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_371">371</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_184">184</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian Philosophy</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_372">372</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_185">185</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the Thinking Self</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_374">374</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_186">186</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_376">376</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_187">187</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_377">377</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_188">188</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general into an Absolute Mind</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_380">380</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_189">189</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite Mind to the Infinite Mind</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_382">382</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_190">190</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_385">385</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_191">191</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics of Absolute Idealism. Kant</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_386">386</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_192">192</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of Universal and Objective Spirit</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_388">388</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_193">193</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute Idealism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_390">390</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_194">194</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_393">393</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter XII. Conclusion</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_395">395</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_195">195</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Liability of Philosophy to Revision Due to its Systematic Character</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_395">395</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_196">196</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The One Science and the Many Philosophies</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_396">396</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_197">197</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or Eclecticism of the Present Age</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_398">398</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_198">198</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism and Absolutism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_399">399</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii"></a>[<a href="./images/xxiii.png">xxiii</a>]</span>&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_199">199</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of Nature. The Neo-Fichteans</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_401">401</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_200">200</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Neo-Kantians</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_403">403</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_201">201</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_404">404</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_202">202</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of Fundamental Principles</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_405">405</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_203">203</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_407">407</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_204">204</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Summary and Transition to Epistemology</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_408">408</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_205">205</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism. Realistic Tendency in Empirical Idealism</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_409">409</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_206">206</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception of Experience</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_410">410</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_207">207</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence Philosophy</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_412">412</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_208">208</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New Construction</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_413">413</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_209">209</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of Attempt to Reduce all Experience to it</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_414">414</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_210">210</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Truth of Psychical Relations but Impossibility of General Reduction to them</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_415">415</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_211">211</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of Ideal of Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing the Whole of Experience from it</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_415">415</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_212">212</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Error and Evil cannot be Reduced to the Ideal</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_417">417</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_213">213</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_419">419</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_214">214</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Moral Implications of Such Pluralistic Philosophy. Purity of the Good</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_420">420</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_215">215</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Incentive to Goodness</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_422">422</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_216">216</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Justification of Faith</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_423">423</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv"></a>[<a href="./images/xxiv.png">xxiv</a>]</span>&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_217">217</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Worship and Service of God</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_425">425</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_218">218</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Philosopher and the Standards of the Market-Place</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_425">425</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_219">219</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Secularism of the Present Age</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_427">427</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="sectdr">&sect;</td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_220">220</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The Value of Contemplation for Life</td>
+  <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_428">428</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Bibliography</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_431">431</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Index</span></td>
+  <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_441">441</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1"></a>[<a href="./images/1.png">1</a>]</span></p>
+<h2>PART I</h2>
+
+<h3>APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF<br />
+PHILOSOPHY</h3>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2"></a>[<a href="./images/2.png">2</a>]</span></p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3"></a>[<a href="./images/3.png">3</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_I" id="Chap_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2>
+
+<h3>THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER</h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?</div>
+
+<p class="section"><a name="Section_1" id="Section_1">&sect; 1</a>. Philosophy suffers the distinction of being regarded as essentially
+an academic pursuit. The term <i>philosophy</i>, to be sure, is used in
+common speech to denote a stoical manner of accepting the vicissitudes
+of life; but this conception sheds little or no light upon the meaning
+of philosophy as a branch of scholarship. The men who write the books on
+"Epistemology" or "Ontology," are regarded by the average man of
+affairs, even though he may have enjoyed a "higher education," with
+little sympathy and less intelligence. Not even philology seems less
+concerned with the real business of life. The pursuit of philosophy
+appears to be a phenomenon of extreme and somewhat effete culture, with
+its own peculiar traditions, problems, and aims, and with little or
+nothing to contribute to the real enterprises of society. It is easy to
+prove to the satisfaction of the philosopher that such a view is
+radically <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4"></a>[<a href="./images/4.png">4</a>]</span>mistaken. But it is another and more serious matter to bridge
+over the very real gap that separates philosophy and common-sense. Such
+an aim is realized only when philosophy is seen to issue from some
+special interest that is humanly important; or when, after starting in
+thought at a point where one deals with ideas and interests common to
+all, one is led by the inevitableness of consistent thinking into the
+sphere of philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Life as a Starting-point for Thought.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_2" id="Section_2">2</a>. There is but one starting-point for reflection when all men are
+invited to share in it. Though there be a great many special platforms
+where special groups of men may take their stand together, there is only
+one platform broad enough for all. This universal stand-point, or common
+platform, is <i>life</i>. It is our more definite thesis, then, that
+philosophy, even to its most abstruse technicality, is rooted in life;
+and that it is inseparably bound up with the satisfaction of practical
+needs, and the solution of practical problems.</p>
+
+<p>Every man knows what it is to live, and his immediate experience will
+verify those features of the adventure that stand out conspicuously. To
+begin with, life is our birthright. We did not ask for it, but when we
+grew old enough to be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5"></a>[<a href="./images/5.png">5</a>]</span>self-conscious we found ourselves in possession
+of it. Nor is it a gift to be neglected, even if we had the will. As is
+true of no other gift of nature, we must use it, or cease to be. There
+is a unique urgency about life. But we have already implied more, in so
+far as we have said that it must be <i>used</i>, and have thereby referred to
+some form of movement or activity as its inseparable attribute. To live
+is to find one's self compelled to do something. To do
+<i>something</i>&mdash;there is another implication of life: some outer
+expression, some medium in which to register the degree and form of its
+activity. Such we recognize as the environment of life, the real objects
+among which it is placed; which it may change, or from which it may
+suffer change. Not only do we find our lives as unsolicited active
+powers, but find, as well, an arena prescribed for their exercise. That
+we shall act, and in a certain time and place, and with reference to
+certain other realities, this is the general condition of things that is
+encountered when each one of us discovers life. In short, to live means
+to be compelled to do something under certain circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>There is another very common aspect of life that would not at first
+glance seem worthy of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6"></a>[<a href="./images/6.png">6</a>]</span>mention. Not only does life, as we have just
+described it, mean opportunity, but it means self-conscious opportunity.
+The facts are such as we have found them to be, and as each one of us
+has previously found them for himself. But when we discover life for
+ourselves, we who make the discovery, and we who live, are identical.
+From that moment we both live, and know that we live. Moreover, such is
+the essential unity of our natures that our living must now express our
+knowing, and our knowing guide and illuminate our living. Consider the
+allegory of the centipede. From the beginning of time he had manipulated
+his countless legs with exquisite precision. Men had regarded him with
+wonder and amazement. But he was innocent of his own art, being a
+contrivance of nature, perfectly constructed to do her bidding. One day
+the centipede discovered life. He discovered himself as one who walks,
+and the newly awakened intelligence, first observing, then foreseeing,
+at length began to direct the process. And from that moment the
+centipede, because he could not remember the proper order of his going,
+lost all his former skill, and became the poor clumsy victim of his own
+self-consciousness. This same self-consciousness is the inconvenience
+and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7"></a>[<a href="./images/7.png">7</a>]</span>great glory of human life. We must stumble along as best we
+can, guided by the feeble light of our own little intelligence. If
+nature starts us on our way, she soon hands over the torch, and bids us
+find the trail for ourselves. Most men are brave enough to regard this
+as the best thing of all; some despair on account of it. In either case
+it is admittedly the true story of human life. We must live as separate
+selves, observing, foreseeing, and planning. There are two things that
+we can do about it. We can repudiate our natures, decline the
+responsibility, and degenerate to the level of those animals that never
+had our chance; or we can leap joyously to the helm, and with all the
+strength and wisdom in us guide our lives to their destination. But if
+we do the former, we shall be unable to forget what might have been, and
+shall be haunted by a sense of ignominy; and if we do the second, we
+shall experience the unique happiness of fulfilment and
+self-realization.</p>
+
+<p>Life, then, is a situation that appeals to intelligent activity. Humanly
+speaking, there is no such thing as a situation that is not at the same
+time a theory. As we live we are all theorists. Whoever has any
+misgivings as to the practical <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8"></a>[<a href="./images/8.png">8</a>]</span>value of theory, let him remember that,
+speaking generally of human life, it is true to say that there is no
+practice that does not issue at length from reflection. That which is
+the commonest experience of mankind is the conjunction of these two, the
+thought and the deed. And as surely as we are all practical theorists,
+so surely is philosophy the outcome of the broadening and deepening of
+practical theory. But to understand how the practical man becomes the
+philosopher, we must inquire somewhat more carefully into the manner of
+his thought about life.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Practical Knowledge of Means.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_3" id="Section_3">3</a>. Let anyone inspect the last moment in his life, and in all
+probability he will find that his mind was employed to discover the
+means to some end. He was already bent upon some definite achievement,
+and was thoughtful for the sake of selecting the economical and
+effectual way. His theory made his practice skilful. So through life his
+knowledge shows him how to work his will. Example, experience, and books
+have taught him the uses of nature and society, and in his thoughtful
+living he is enabled to reach the goal he has set for the next hour,
+day, or year of his activity. The long periods of human life are spent
+in elaborating the means to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9"></a>[<a href="./images/9.png">9</a>]</span>some unquestioned end. Here one meets the
+curious truth that we wake up in the middle of life, already making
+headway, and under the guidance of some invisible steersman. When first
+we take the business of life seriously, there is a considerable stock in
+trade in the shape of habits, and inclinations to all sorts of things
+that we never consciously elected to pursue. Since we do not begin at
+the beginning, our first problem is to accommodate ourselves to
+ourselves, and our first deliberate acts are in fulfilment of plans
+outlined by some predecessor that has already spoken for us. The same
+thing is true of the race of men. At a certain stage in their
+development men found themselves engaged in all manner of ritual and
+custom, and burdened with concerns that were not of their own choosing.
+They were burning incense, keeping festivals, and naming names, all of
+which they must now proceed to justify with myth and legend, in order to
+render intelligible to themselves the deliberate and self-conscious
+repetition of them. Even so much justification was left to the few, and
+the great majority continued to seek that good which social usage
+countenanced and individual predisposition confirmed. So every man of us
+acts from day to day for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10"></a>[<a href="./images/10.png">10</a>]</span>love's sake, or wealth's sake, or power's
+sake, or for the sake of some near and tangible object; reflecting only
+for the greater efficiency of his endeavor.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_4" id="Section_4">4</a>. But if this be the common manner of thinking about life, it does
+not represent the whole of such thought. Nor does it follow that because
+it occupies us so much, it is therefore correspondingly fundamental.
+Like the myth makers of old, we all want more or less to know the
+<i>reason of our ends</i>. Here, then, we meet with a somewhat different type
+of reflection upon life, the reflection that underlies the adoption of a
+life purpose. It is obvious that most ends are selected for the sake of
+other ends, and so are virtually means. Thus one may struggle for years
+to secure a college education. This definite end has been adopted for
+the sake of a somewhat more indefinite end of self-advancement, and from
+it there issues a whole series of minor ends, which form a hierarchy of
+steps ascending to the highest goal of aspiration. Now upon the face of
+things we live very unsystematic lives, and yet were we to examine
+ourselves in this fashion, we should all find our lives to be marvels of
+organization. Their growth, as we have seen, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11"></a>[<a href="./images/11.png">11</a>]</span>began before we were
+conscious of it; and we are commonly so absorbed in some particular
+flower or fruit that we forget the roots, and the design of the whole.
+But a little reflection reveals a remarkable unitary adjustment of
+parts. The unity is due to the dominance of a group of central purposes.
+Judged from the stand-point of experience, it seems bitter irony to say
+that everyone gets from life just what he wishes. But a candid searching
+of our own hearts will incline us to admit that, after all, the way we
+go and the length we go is determined pretty much by the kind and the
+intensity of our secret longing. That for which in the time of choice we
+are willing to sacrifice all else, is the formula that defines the law
+of each individual life. All this is not intended to mean that we have
+each named a clear and definite ideal which is our chosen goal. On the
+contrary, such a conception may be almost meaningless to some of us. In
+general the higher the ideal the vaguer and less vivid is its
+presentation to our consciousness. But, named or unnamed, sharp or
+blurred, vivid or half-forgotten, there may be found in the heart of
+every man that which of all things he wants to be, that which of all
+deeds he wants to do. If he has had the normal youth <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12"></a>[<a href="./images/12.png">12</a>]</span>of dreaming, he
+has seen it, and warmed to the picture of his imagination; if he has
+been somewhat more thoughtful than the ordinary, his reason has defined
+it, and adopted it for his vocation; if neither, it has been present as
+an undertone throughout the rendering of his more inevitable life. He
+will recognize it when it is named as the desire to do the will of God,
+or to have as good a time as possible, or to make other people as happy
+as possible, or to be equal to his responsibilities, or to fulfil the
+expectation of his mother, or to be distinguished, wealthy, or
+influential. This list of ideals is miscellaneous, and ethically
+reducible to more fundamental concepts, but these are the terms in which
+men are ordinarily conscious of their most intimate purposes. We must
+now inquire respecting the nature of the thought that determines the
+selection of such a purpose, or justifies it when it has been
+unconsciously accepted.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and the
+Voluptuary.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_5" id="Section_5">5</a>. What is most worth while? So far as human action is concerned this
+obviously depends upon what is possible, upon what is expected of us by
+our own natures, and upon what interests and concerns are conserved by
+the trend of events in our <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13"></a>[<a href="./images/13.png">13</a>]</span>environment. What I had best do, presupposes
+what I have the strength and the skill to do, what I feel called upon to
+do, and what are the great causes that are entitled to promotion at my
+hands. It seems that practically we cannot separate the ideal from the
+real. We may feel that the highest ideal is an immediate utterance of
+conscience, as mysterious in origin as it is authoritative in
+expression. We may be willing to defy the universe, and expatriate
+ourselves from our natural and social environment, for the sake of the
+holy law of duty. Such men as Count Tolstoi have little to say of the
+possible, or the expedient, or the actual, and are satisfied to stand
+almost alone against the brutal facts of usage and economy. We all have
+a secret sense of chivalry, that prompts, however ineffectually, to a
+like devotion. But that which in such moral purposes appears to indicate
+a severance of the ideal and the real, is, if we will but stop to
+consider, only a severance of the ideal and the apparent. The martyr is
+more sure of reality than the adventurer. He is convinced that though
+his contemporaries and his environment be against him; the fundamental
+or eventual order of things is for him. He believes in a spiritual world
+more abiding, albeit less <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14"></a>[<a href="./images/14.png">14</a>]</span>obvious, than the material world. Though
+every temporal event contradict him, he lives in the certainty that
+eternity is his. Such an one may have found his ideal in the voice of
+God and His prophets, or he may have been led to God as the
+justification of his irresistible ideal; but in either case the
+selection of his ideal is reasonable to him in so far as it is
+harmonious with the ultimate nature of things, or stands for the promise
+of reality. In this wise, thought about life expands into some
+conception of the deeper forces of the world, and life itself, in
+respect of its fundamental attachment to an ideal, implies some belief
+concerning the fundamental nature of its environment.</p>
+
+<p>But lest in this account life be credited with too much gravity and
+import, or it seem to be assumed that life is all knight-errantry, let
+us turn to our less quixotic, and perhaps more effectual, man of
+affairs. He works for his daily bread, and for success in his vocation.
+He has selected his vocation for its promise of return in the form of
+wealth, comfort, fame, or influence. He likewise performs such
+additional service to his family and his community as is demanded of him
+by public opinion and his own sense of responsibility. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15"></a>[<a href="./images/15.png">15</a>]</span>He may have a
+certain contempt for the man who sees visions. This may be his manner of
+testifying to his own preference for the ideal of usefulness and
+immediate efficiency. But even so he would never for an instant admit
+that he was pursuing a merely conventional good. He may be largely
+imitative in his standards of value, recognizing such aims as are common
+to some time or race; nevertheless none would be more sure than he of
+the truth of his ideal. Question him, and he will maintain that his is
+the reasonable life under the conditions of human existence. He may
+maintain that if there be a God, he can best serve Him by promoting the
+tangible welfare of himself and those dependent upon him. He may
+maintain that, since there is no God, he must win such rewards as the
+world can give. If he have something of the heroic in him, he may tell
+you that, since there is no God, he will labor to the uttermost for his
+fellow-men. Where he has not solved the problem of life for himself, he
+may believe himself to be obeying the insight of some one wiser than
+himself, or of society as expressed in its customs and institutions. But
+no man ever admitted that his life was purely a matter of expediency, or
+that in his dominant ideal he was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16"></a>[<a href="./images/16.png">16</a>]</span>the victim of chance. In the
+background of the busiest and most preoccupied life of affairs, there
+dwells the conviction that such living is appropriate to the universe;
+that it is called for by the circumstances of its origin, opportunities,
+and destiny.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, the man who makes light of life has of all men the most
+transparent inner consciousness. In him may be clearly observed the
+relation between the ideal and the reflection that is assumed to justify
+it.</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"A Moment's Halt&mdash;a momentary taste<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Of Being from the Well amid the Waste&mdash;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">And Lo!&mdash;the phantom Caravan has reach'd<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">The Nothing it set out from&mdash;&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;."<br /></span>
+</div><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"We are no other than a moving row<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Round with the Sun-illumin'd Lantern held<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">In Midnight by the Master of the Show."<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>Where the setting of life is construed in these terms, there is but one
+natural and appropriate manner of life. Once believing in the isolation
+and insignificance of life, one is sceptical of all worth save such as
+may be tasted in the moment of its purchase. If one's ideas and
+experiences are no concern of the world's, but incidents of a purely
+local and transient interest, they will realize <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17"></a>[<a href="./images/17.png">17</a>]</span>most when they realize
+an immediate gratification. Where one does not believe that he is a
+member of the universe, and a contributor to its ends, he does well to
+minimize the friction that arises from its accidental propinquity, and
+to kindle some little fire of enjoyment in his own lonely heart. This is
+the life of abandonment to pleasure, accompanied by the conviction that
+the conditions of life warrant no more strenuous or heroic plan.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_6" id="Section_6">6</a>. In such wise do we adopt the life purpose, or justify it when
+unconsciously adopted. The pursuit of an ideal implies a belief in its
+effectuality. Such a belief will invariably appear when the groundwork
+of the daily living is laid bare by a little reflection. And if our
+analysis has not been in error, there is something more definite to be
+obtained from it. We all believe in the practical wisdom of our
+fundamental ideals; but we believe, besides, that such wisdom involves
+the sanction of the universe as a whole. The momentousness of an
+individual's life will be satisfied with nothing less final than an
+absolutely wise disposition of it. For every individual, his life is all
+his power and riches, and is not to be spent save for the <i>greatest good
+that <span class='pagenum' style="font-style: normal"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18"></a>[<a href="./images/18.png">18</a>]</span>he can reasonably pursue</i>. But the solution of such a problem is
+not to be obtained short of a searching of entire reality. Every life
+will represent more or less of such wisdom and enlightenment; and in the
+end the best selection of ideal will denote the greatest wealth of
+experience. It is not always true that he who has seen more will live
+more wisely, for in an individual case instinct or authority may be
+better sources of aspiration than experience. But we trust instinct and
+authority because we believe them to represent a comprehensive
+experience on the part of the race as a whole, or on the part of God. He
+whose knowledge is broadest and truest would know best what is finally
+worth living for. On this account, most men can see no more reasonable
+plan of life than obedience to God's will, for God in the abundance of
+his wisdom, and since all eternity is plain before him, must see with
+certainty that which is supremely worthy.</p>
+
+<p>We mean, then, that the selection of our ideals shall be determined by
+the largest possible knowledge of the facts pertaining to life. We mean
+to select as one would select who knew all about the antecedents and
+surroundings and remote consequences of life. In our own weakness and
+finitude <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19"></a>[<a href="./images/19.png">19</a>]</span>we may go but a little way in the direction of such an
+insight, and may prefer to accept the judgment of tradition or
+authority, but we recognize a distinct type of knowledge as alone worthy
+to justify an individual's adoption of an ideal. That type of knowledge
+is the knowledge that comprehends the universe in its totality. Such
+knowledge does not involve completeness of information respecting all
+parts of reality. This, humanly speaking, is both unattainable and
+inconceivable. It involves rather a conception of the <i>kind</i> of reality
+that is fundamental. For a wise purpose it is unnecessary that we should
+know many matters of fact, or even specific laws, provided we are
+convinced of the inner and essential character of the universe. Some of
+the alternatives are matters of every-day thought and speech. One cannot
+tell the simplest story of human life without disclosing them. To live
+the human life means to pursue ideals, that is, to have a thing in mind,
+and then to try to accomplish it. Here is one kind of reality and power.
+The planetary system, on the other hand, does not pursue ideals, but
+moves unconscious of itself, with a mechanical precision that can be
+expressed in a mathematical formula; and is representative of another
+kind of reality <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20"></a>[<a href="./images/20.png">20</a>]</span>and power. Hence a very common and a very practical
+question: Is there an underlying law, like the law of gravitation,
+fundamentally and permanently governing life, in spite of its apparent
+direction by ideal and aspiration? Or is there an underlying power, like
+purpose, fundamentally and permanently governing the planetary system
+and all celestial worlds, in spite of the apparent control of blind and
+irresistible forces? This is a practical question because nothing could
+be more pertinent to our choice of ideals. Nothing could make more
+difference to life than a belief in the life or lifelessness of its
+environment. The faiths that generate or confirm our ideals always refer
+to this great issue. And this is but one, albeit the most profound, of
+the many issues that arise from the desire to obtain some conviction of
+the inner and essential character of life. Though so intimately
+connected with practical concerns, these issues are primarily the
+business of thought. In grappling with them, thought is called upon for
+its greatest comprehensiveness, penetration, and self-consistency. By
+the necessity of concentration, thought is sometimes led to forget its
+origin and the source of its problems. But in naming itself philosophy,
+thought has only recognized the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21"></a>[<a href="./images/21.png">21</a>]</span>definiteness and earnestness of its
+largest task. Philosophy is still thought about life, representing but
+the deepening and broadening of the common practical thoughtfulness.</p>
+
+<p>We who began together at the starting-point of <i>life</i>, have now entered
+together the haven of <i>philosophy</i>. It is not a final haven, but only
+the point of departure for the field of philosophy proper. Nevertheless
+that field is now in the plain view of the man who occupies the
+practical stand-point. He must recognize in philosophy a kind of
+reflection that differs only in extent and persistence from the
+reflection that guides and justifies his life. He may not consciously
+identify himself with any one of the three general groups which have
+been characterized. But if he is neither an idealist, nor a philistine,
+nor a pleasure lover, surely he is compounded of such elements, and does
+not escape their implications. He desires something most of all, even
+though his highest ideal be only an inference from the gradation of his
+immediate purposes. This highest ideal represents what he conceives to
+be the greatest worth or value attainable in the universe, and its
+adoption is based upon the largest generalization that he can make or
+borrow. The complete <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22"></a>[<a href="./images/22.png">22</a>]</span>justification of his ideal would involve a true
+knowledge of the essential character of the universe. For such knowledge
+he substitutes either authority or his own imperfect insight. But in
+either case his life is naturally and organically correlated with a
+<i>thought about the universe in its totality, or in its deepest and
+essential character</i>. Such thought, the activity and its results, is
+philosophy. Hence he who lives is, <i>ipso facto</i>, a philosopher. He is
+not only a potential philosopher, but a partial philosopher. He has
+already begun to be a philosopher. Between the fitful or prudential
+thinking of some little man of affairs, and the sustained thought of the
+devoted lover of truth, there is indeed a long journey, but it is a
+straight journey along the same road. Philosophy is neither accidental
+nor supernatural, but inevitable and normal. Philosophy is not properly
+a vocation, but the ground and inspiration of all vocations. In the
+hands of its devotees it grows technical and complex, as do all efforts
+of thought, and to pursue philosophy bravely and faithfully is to
+encounter obstacles and labyrinths innumerable. The general problem of
+philosophy is mother of a whole brood of problems, little and great. But
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23"></a>[<a href="./images/23.png">23</a>]</span>whether we be numbered among its devotees, or their beneficiaries, an
+equal significance attaches to the truth that philosophy is continuous
+with life.</p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24"></a>[<a href="./images/24.png">24</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_II" id="Chap_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2>
+
+<h3>POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY</h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">Who is the Philosopher-Poet?</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_7" id="Section_7">7</a>. As the ultimate criticism of all human interests, philosophy may be
+approached by avenues as various as these interests. Only when
+philosophy is discovered as the implication of well-recognized special
+interests, is the significance of its function fully appreciated. For
+the sake of such a further understanding of philosophy, those who find
+either inspiration or entertainment in poetry are invited in the present
+chapter to consider certain of the relations between poetry and
+philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>We must at the very outset decline to accept unqualifiedly the poet's
+opinion in the matter, for he would not think it presumptuous to
+incorporate philosophy in poetry. "No man," said Coleridge, "was ever
+yet a great poet without being at the same time a great philosopher."
+This would seem to mean that a great poet is a great philosopher, and
+more too. We shall do better to begin with the prosaic and matter of
+fact minimum of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25"></a>[<a href="./images/25.png">25</a>]</span>truth: some poetry is philosophical. This will enable
+us to search for the portion of philosophy that is in some poetry,
+without finally defining their respective boundaries. It may be that all
+true poetry is philosophical, as it may be that all true philosophy is
+poetical; but it is much more certain that much actual poetry is far
+from philosophical, and that most actual philosophy was not conceived or
+written by a poet. The mere poet and the mere philosopher must be
+tolerated, if it be only for the purpose of shedding light upon the
+philosopher-poet and the poet-philosopher. And it is to the
+philosopher-poet that we turn, in the hope that under the genial spell
+of poetry we may be brought with understanding to the more forbidding
+land of philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Poetry as Appreciation.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_8" id="Section_8">8</a>. Poetry is well characterized, though not defined, as an
+interpretation of life. The term "life" here signifies the human
+purposive consciousness, and active pursuit of ends. An interpretation
+of life is, then, a selection and account of such values in human
+experience as are actually sought or are worth the seeking. For the poet
+all things are good or bad, and never only matters of fact. He is
+neither an annalist nor a statistician, and is even an observer <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26"></a>[<a href="./images/26.png">26</a>]</span>only
+for the sake of a higher design. He is one who appreciates, and
+expresses his appreciation so fittingly that it becomes a kind of truth,
+and a permanently communicable object. That "unbodied joy," the
+skylark's song and flight, is through the genius of Shelley so
+faithfully embodied, that it may enter as a definite joy into the lives
+of countless human beings. The sensuous or suggestive values of nature
+are caught by the poet's quick feeling for beauty, and fixed by his
+creative activity. Or with his ready sympathy he may perceive the value
+of some human ideal or mastering passion, and make it a reality for our
+common feeling. Where the poet has to do with the base and hateful, his
+attitude is still appreciative. The evil is apprehended as part of a
+dramatic whole having positive moral or &aelig;sthetic value. Moral ideas may
+appear in both poetry and life as the inspiration and justification of
+struggle. Where there is no conception of its moral significance, the
+repulsive possesses for the poet's consciousness the &aelig;sthetic value of
+diversity and contrast. Even where the evil and ugly is isolated, as in
+certain of Browning's dramatic monologues, it forms, both for the poet
+and the reader, but a part of some larger perception of life or
+character, which is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27"></a>[<a href="./images/27.png">27</a>]</span>sublime or beautiful or good. Poetry involves,
+then, the discovery and presentation of human experiences that are
+satisfying and appealing. It is a language for human pleasures and
+ideals. Poetry is without doubt a great deal more than this, and only
+after a careful analysis of its peculiar language could one distinguish
+it from kindred arts; but it will suffice for our purposes to
+characterize and not differentiate. Starting from this most general
+truth respecting poetry, we may now look for that aspect of it whereby
+it may be a witness of philosophical truth.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_9" id="Section_9">9</a>. For the answer to our question, we must turn to an examination of
+the intellectual elements of poetry. In the first place, the common
+demand that the poet shall be accurate in his representations is
+suggestive of an indispensable intellectual factor in his genius. As we
+have seen, he is not to reproduce nature, but the human appreciative
+experience of nature. Nevertheless, he must even here be true to his
+object. His art involves his ability to express genuinely and sincerely
+what he himself experiences in the presence of nature, or what he can
+catch of the inner lives of others by virtue of his intelligent
+sympathy. No amount of emotion or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28"></a>[<a href="./images/28.png">28</a>]</span>even of imagination will profit a
+poet, unless he can render a true account of them. To be sure, he need
+not define, or even explain; for it is his function to transfer the
+immediate qualities of experience: but he must be able to speak the
+truth, and, in order to speak it, he must have known it. In all this,
+however, we have made no demand that the poet should see more than one
+thing at a time. Sincerity of expression does not require what is
+distinctly another mode of intelligence, <i>comprehensiveness of view</i>. It
+is easier, and accordingly more usual, to render an account of the
+moments and casual units of experience, than of its totality. There are
+poets, little and great, who possess the intellectual virtue of
+sincerity, without the intellectual power of synthesis and
+reconciliation. This distinction will enable us to separate the
+intelligence exhibited in all poetry, from that distinct form of
+intelligence exhibited in such poetry as is properly to be called
+philosophical.</p>
+
+<p>The "barbarian" in poetry has recently been defined as "the man who
+regards his passions as their own excuse for being; who does not
+domesticate them either by understanding their cause or by conceiving
+their ideal goal."<a name="FNanchor_28:1_2" id="FNanchor_28:1_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_28:1_2" class="fnanchor">[28:1]</a> One will readily <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29"></a>[<a href="./images/29.png">29</a>]</span>appreciate the application of
+this definition to Walt Whitman. What little unity there is in this
+poet's world, is the composition of a purely sensuous experience,</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"The earth expending right hand and left hand,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">The picture alive, every part in its best light,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">The music falling in where it is wanted, and stopping where it is not wanted."<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>In many passages Whitman manifests a marvellous ability to discover and
+communicate a fresh gladness about the commonest experiences. We cannot
+but rejoice with him in all sights and sounds. But though we cannot deny
+him truth, his truth is honesty and not understanding. The experiences
+in which he discovers so much worth, are random and capricious, and do
+not constitute a universe. To the solution of ultimate questions he
+contributes a sense of mystery, and the conviction</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"That you are here&mdash;that life exists and identity,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">That the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse."<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>His world is justly described by the writer just quoted as "a
+phantasmagoria of continuous visions, vivid, impressive, but monotonous
+and hard to distinguish in memory, like the waves of the sea <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30"></a>[<a href="./images/30.png">30</a>]</span>or the
+decorations of some barbarous temple, sublime only by the infinite
+aggregation of parts."<a name="FNanchor_30:2_3" id="FNanchor_30:2_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_30:2_3" class="fnanchor">[30:2]</a></p>
+
+<p>As is Walt Whitman, so are many poets greater and less. Some who have
+seen the world-view, exhibit the same particularism in their lyric
+moods; although, generally speaking, a poet who once has comprehended
+the world, will see the parts of it in the light of that wisdom. But
+Walt Whitman is peculiarly representative of the poetry that can be
+true, without being wise in the manner that we shall come shortly to
+understand as the manner of philosophy. He is as desultory in his poet
+raptures as is the common man when he lives in his immediate
+experiences. The truth won by each is the clear vision of one thing, or
+of a limited collection of things, and not the broad inclusive vision of
+all things.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_10" id="Section_10">10</a>. The transition from Whitman to Shakespeare may seem somewhat
+abrupt, but the very differences between these poets serve to mark out
+an interesting affinity. Neither has put any unitary construction upon
+human life and its environment. Neither, as poet, is the witness of any
+world-view; which will mean for us that neither is a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31"></a>[<a href="./images/31.png">31</a>]</span>philosopher-poet.
+As respects Shakespeare, this is a hard saying. We are accustomed to the
+critical judgment that finds in the Shakespearian dramas an apprehension
+of the universal in human life. But though this judgment is true, it is
+by no means conclusive as respects Shakespeare's relation to the
+philosophical type of thought. For there can be universality without
+philosophy. Thus, to know the groups and the marks of the vertebrates is
+to know a truth which possesses generality, in contradistinction to the
+particularism of Whitman's poetic consciousness. Even so to know well
+the groups and marks of human character, vertebrate and invertebrate, is
+to know that of which the average man, in his hand to hand struggle with
+life, is ignorant. Such a wisdom Shakespeare possessed to a unique
+degree, and it enabled him to reconstruct human life. He did not merely
+perceive human states and motives, but he understood human nature so
+well that he could create consistent men and women. Moreover,
+Shakespeare's knowledge was not only thus universal in being a knowledge
+of general groups and laws, but also in respect of its extensity. His
+understanding was as rich as it was acute. It is true, then, that
+Shakespeare read human life as an open book, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32"></a>[<a href="./images/32.png">32</a>]</span>knowing certainly the
+manner of human thinking and feeling, and the power and interplay of
+human motives. But it is equally true, on the other hand, that he
+possessed no unitary conception of the meaning and larger relations of
+human life. Such a conception might have been expressed either by means
+of the outlook of some dominating and persistent type of personality, or
+by a pervading suggestion of some constant world-setting for the
+variable enterprise of mankind. It could appear only provided the poet's
+appreciation of life in detail were determined by an interpretation of
+the meaning of life as a whole. Shakespeare apparently possessed no such
+interpretation. Even when Hamlet is groping after some larger truth that
+may bear upon the definite problems of life, he represents but one, and
+that a strange and unusual, type of human nature. And Hamlet's
+reflections, it should be noted, have no outcome. There is no
+Shakespearian answer to the riddles that Hamlet propounds. The poet's
+genius is not less amazing for this fact; indeed, his peculiar
+distinction can only be comprehended upon this basis. Shakespeare put no
+construction upon life, and by virtue of this very reserve accomplished
+an art of surpassing fidelity and vividness. The absence of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33"></a>[<a href="./images/33.png">33</a>]</span>philosophy
+in Shakespeare, and the presence of the most characteristic quality of
+his genius, may both be imputed by the one affirmation, that <i>there is
+no Shakespearian point of view</i>.</p>
+
+<p>This truth signifies both gain and loss. The philosophical criticism of
+life may vary from the ideal objectivity of absolute truth, to the
+subjectivity of a personal religion. Philosophy aims to correct the
+partiality of particular points of view by means of a point of view that
+shall comprehend their relations, and effect such reconciliations or
+transformations as shall enable them to constitute a universe.
+Philosophy always assumes the hypothetical view of omniscience. The
+necessity of such a final criticism is implicit in every scientific item
+of knowledge, and in every judgment that is passed upon life. Philosophy
+makes a distinct and peculiar contribution to human knowledge by its
+heroic effort to measure all knowledges and all ideals by the standard
+of totality. Nevertheless it is significant that no human individual can
+possibly possess the range of omniscience. The most adequate knowledge
+of which any generation of men is capable, will always be that which is
+conceived by the most synthetic and vigorously metaphysical minds; but
+every individual philosophy <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34"></a>[<a href="./images/34.png">34</a>]</span>will nevertheless be a premature synthesis.
+The effort to complete knowledge is the indispensable test of the
+adequacy of prevailing conceptions, but the completed knowledge of any
+individual mind will shortly become an historical monument. It will
+belong primarily to the personal life of its creator, as the
+articulation of his personal covenant with the universe. There is a
+sound justification for such a conclusion of things in the case of the
+individual, for the conditions of human life make it inevitable; but it
+will always possess a felt unity, and many distinct features, that are
+private and subjective. Now such a projection of personality, with its
+coloring and its selection, Shakespeare has avoided; and very largely as
+a consequence, his dramas are a storehouse of genuine human nature.
+Ambition, mercy, hate, madness, guilelessness, conventionality, mirth,
+bravery, deceit, purity&mdash;these, and all human states and attributes save
+piety, are upon his pages as real, and as mysterious withal, as they are
+in the great historical society. For an ordinary reader, these states
+and attributes are more real in Hamlet or Lear than in his own direct
+experience, because in Hamlet and Lear he can see them with the eye and
+intelligence of genius. But Shakespeare is the world all over again,
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35"></a>[<a href="./images/35.png">35</a>]</span>and there is loss as well as gain in such realism. Here is human life,
+no doubt, and a brilliant pageantry it is; but human life as varied and
+as problematic as it is in the living. Shakespeare's fundamental
+intellectual resource is the historical and psychological knowledge of
+such principles as govern the construction of human natures. The goods
+for which men undertake, and live or die, are any goods, justified only
+by the actual human striving for them. The virtues are the old winning
+virtues of the secular life, and the heroisms of the common conscience.
+Beyond its empirical generality, his knowledge is universal only in the
+sense that space and time are universal. His consciousness <i>contains</i>
+its representative creations, and expresses them unspoiled by any
+transforming thought. His poetic consciousness is like the very stage to
+which he likens all the world: men and women meet there, and things
+happen there. The stage itself creates no unity save the occasion and
+the place. Shakespeare's consciousness is universal because it is a fair
+field with no favors. But even so it is particular, because, though each
+may enter and depart in peace, when all enter together there is anarchy
+and a babel of voices. All Shakespeare is like all the world seen
+through the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36"></a>[<a href="./images/36.png">36</a>]</span>eyes of each of its inhabitants. Human experience in
+Shakespeare is human experience as everyone feels it, as comprehensive
+as the aggregate of innumerable lives. But human experience in
+philosophy is the experience of all as thought by a synthetic mind.
+Hence the wealth of life depicted by Shakespeare serves only to point
+out the philosopher's problem, and to challenge his powers. Here he will
+find material, and not results; much to philosophize about, but no
+philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Philosophy in Poetry. The World-View. Omar Khayyam.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_11" id="Section_11">11</a>. The discussion up to this point has attributed to poetry very
+definite intellectual factors that nevertheless do not constitute
+philosophy. Walt Whitman speaks his feeling with truth, but in general
+manifests no comprehensive insight. Shakespeare has not only sincerity
+of expression but an understanding mind. He has a knowledge not only of
+particular experiences, but of human nature; and a consciousness full
+and varied like society itself. But there is a kind of knowledge
+possessed by neither, the knowledge sought by co&ouml;rdinating all aspects
+of human experience, both particular and general. Not even Shakespeare
+is wise as one who, having seen the whole, can fundamentally interpret a
+part. But though the philosopher-poet <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37"></a>[<a href="./images/37.png">37</a>]</span>may not yet be found, we cannot
+longer be ignorant of his nature. He will be, like all poets, one who
+appreciates experiences or finds things good, and he will faithfully
+reproduce the values which he discovers. But he must <i>justify himself in
+view of the fundamental nature of the universe</i>. The values which he
+apprehends must be harmonious, and so far above the plurality of goods
+as to transcend and unify them. The philosopher-poet will find reality
+as a whole to be something that accredits the order of values in his
+inner life. He will not only find certain things to be most worthy
+objects of action or contemplation, but he will see why they are worthy,
+because he will have construed the judgment of the universe in their
+favor.</p>
+
+<p>In this general sense, Omar Khayyam is a philosopher-poet. To be sure
+his universe is quite the opposite of that which most poets conceive,
+and is perhaps profoundly antagonistic to the very spirit of poetry; but
+it is none the less true that the joys to which Omar invites us are such
+as his universe prescribes for human life.</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"Some for the Glories of This World; and some<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Ah, take the Cash, and let the Credit go,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum."<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38"></a>[<a href="./images/38.png">38</a>]</span>Herein is both poetry and philosophy, albeit but a poor brand of each.
+We are invited to occupy ourselves only with spiritual cash, because the
+universe is spiritually insolvent. The immediately gratifying feelings
+are the only feelings that the world can guarantee. Omar Khayyam is a
+philosopher-poet, because his immediate delight in "youth's
+sweet-scented manuscript" is part of a consciousness that vaguely sees,
+though it cannot grasp, "this sorry scheme of things entire."</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"Drink for you know not whence you come, nor why;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Drink for you know not why you go, nor where."<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Wordsworth.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_12" id="Section_12">12</a>. But the poet in his world-view ordinarily sees other than
+darkness. The same innate spiritual enterprise that sustains religious
+faith leads the poet more often to find the universe positively
+congenial to his ideals, and to ideals in general. He interprets human
+experience in the light of the spirituality of all the world. It is to
+Wordsworth that we of the present age are chiefly indebted for such
+imagery, and it will profit us to consider somewhat carefully the
+philosophical quality of his poetry.</p>
+
+<p>Walter Pater, in introducing his appreciation of Wordsworth, writes that
+"an intimate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39"></a>[<a href="./images/39.png">39</a>]</span>consciousness of the expression of natural things, which
+weighs, listens, penetrates, where the earlier mind passed roughly by,
+is a large element in the complexion of modern poetry." We recognize at
+once the truth of this characterization as applied to Wordsworth. But
+there is something more distinguished about this poet's sensibility even
+than its extreme fineness and delicacy; a quality that is suggested,
+though not made explicit, by Shelley's allusion to Wordsworth's
+experience as "a sort of thought in sense." Nature possessed for him not
+merely enjoyable and describable characters of great variety and
+minuteness, but an immediately apprehended unity and meaning. It would
+be a great mistake to construe this meaning in sense as analogous to the
+crude symbolism of the educator Froebel, to whom, as he said, "the world
+of crystals proclaimed, in distinct and univocal terms, the laws of
+human life." Wordsworth did not attach ideas to sense, but regarded
+sense itself as a communication of truth. We readily call to mind his
+unique capacity for apprehending the characteristic flavor of a certain
+place in a certain moment of time, the individuality of a situation. Now
+in such moments he felt that he was receiving intelligences, none the
+less direct and significant <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40"></a>[<a href="./images/40.png">40</a>]</span>for their inarticulate form. Like the boy
+on Windermere, whom he himself describes,</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i7half">"while he hung<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Loitering, a gentle shock of mild surprise<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Has carried far into his heart the voice<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Would enter unawares into his mind,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Its woods, and that uncertain heaven received<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Into the bosom of the steady lake."<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>For our purpose it is essential that we should recognize in this
+appreciation of nature, expressed in almost every poem that Wordsworth
+wrote, a consciousness respecting the fundamental nature of the world.
+Conversation, as we know, denotes an interchange of commensurable
+meanings. Whatever the code may be, whether words or the most subtle
+form of suggestion, communication is impossible without community of
+nature. Hence, in believing himself to be holding converse with the
+so-called physical world, Wordsworth conceives that world as
+fundamentally like himself. He finds the most profound thing in all the
+world to be the universal spiritual life. In nature this life manifests
+itself most directly, clothed in its own proper dignity and peace. But
+it may be discovered in the humanity that is most close to nature, in
+the avocations of plain and simple people, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41"></a>[<a href="./images/41.png">41</a>]</span>the unsophisticated
+delights of children; and, with the perspective of contemplation, even
+"among the multitudes of that huge city."</p>
+
+<p>So Wordsworth is rendering a true account of his own experience of
+reality when, as in "The Prelude," he says unequivocally:</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"A gracious spirit o'er this earth presides,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">And in the heart of man; invisibly<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">It comes to works of unreproved delight,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">And tendency benign; directing those<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Who care not, know not, think not, what they do."<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>Wordsworth is not a philosopher-poet because by searching his pages we
+can find an explicit philosophical creed such as this, but because all
+the joys of which his poet-soul compels him to sing have their peculiar
+note, and compose their peculiar harmony, by virtue of such an
+indwelling consciousness. Here is one who is a philosopher in and
+through his poetry. He is a philosopher in so far as the detail of his
+appreciation finds fundamental justification in a world-view. From the
+immanence of "the universal heart" there follows, not through any
+mediate reasoning, but by the immediate experience of its propriety, a
+conception of that which is of supreme worth in life. The highest and
+best of which life is capable is contemplation, or the consciousness of
+the universal indwelling of God. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42"></a>[<a href="./images/42.png">42</a>]</span>Of those who fail to live thus
+fittingly in the midst of the divine life, Walter Pater speaks for
+Wordsworth as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"To higher or lower ends they move too often with something of
+a sad countenance, with hurried and ignoble gait, becoming,
+unconsciously, something like thorns, in their anxiety to bear
+grapes; it being possible for people, in the pursuit of even
+great ends, to become themselves thin and impoverished in
+spirit and temper, thus diminishing the sum of perfection in
+the world at its very sources."<a name="FNanchor_42:3_4" id="FNanchor_42:3_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_42:3_4" class="fnanchor">[42:3]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The quiet and worshipful spirit, won by the cultivation of the emotions
+appropriate to the presence of nature and society, is the mark of the
+completest life and the most acceptable service. Thus for Wordsworth the
+meaning of life is inseparable from the meaning of the universe. In
+apprehending that which is good and beautiful in human experience, he
+was attended by a vision of the totality of things. Herein he has had to
+do, if not with the form, at any rate with the very substance of
+philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Dante.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_13" id="Section_13">13</a>. Unquestionably the supreme philosopher-poet is Dante. He is not
+only philosophical in the temper of his mind, but his greatest poem is
+the incarnation of a definite system of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43"></a>[<a href="./images/43.png">43</a>]</span>philosophy, the most definite
+that the world has seen. That conception of the world which in the
+thirteenth century found argumentative and orderly expression in the
+"Summa Theologi&aelig;" of Thomas of Aquino, and constituted the faith of the
+church, is visualized by Dante, and made the basis of an interpretation
+of life.</p>
+
+<p>The "Divina Commedia" deals with all the heavens to the Empyrean itself,
+and with all spiritual life to the very presence of God. It derives its
+imagery from the cosmology of the day, its dramatic motive from the
+Christian and Greek conceptions of God and his dealings with the world.
+Sin is punished because of the justice of God; knowledge, virtue, and
+faith lead, through God's grace and mercy manifested in Christ, to a
+perpetual union with Him. Hell, purgatory, and paradise give place and
+setting to the events of the drama. But the deeper meaning of the poem
+is allegorical. In a letter quoted by Lowell, Dante writes:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The literal subject of the whole work is the state of the
+soul after death, simply considered. But if the work be taken
+allegorically the subject is man, as by merit or demerit,
+through freedom of the will, he renders himself liable to the
+reward or punishment of justice."<a name="FNanchor_43:4_5" id="FNanchor_43:4_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_43:4_5" class="fnanchor">[43:4]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44"></a>[<a href="./images/44.png">44</a>]</span>In other words, the inner and essential meaning of the poem has to do
+not with external retribution, but with character, and the laws which
+determine its own proper ruin or perfection. The punishments described
+in the "Inferno" are accounts of the state of guilt itself, implications
+of the will that has chosen the part of brutishness. Sin itself is
+damnable and deadening, but the knowledge that the soul that sinneth
+shall die is the first way of emancipation from sin. The guidance of
+Virgil through hell and purgatory signifies the knowledge of good and
+evil, or moral insight, as the guide of man through this life of
+struggle and progress. The earthly paradise, at the close of the
+"Purgatorio," represents the highest state to which human character can
+attain when choice is determined by ordinary experience, intelligence,
+and understanding. Here man stands alone, endowed with an enlightened
+conscience. Here are uttered the last words of Virgil to Dante, the
+explorer of the spiritual country:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Expect no more or word or sign from me. Free, upright, and
+sane is thine own free will, and it would be wrong not to act
+according to its pleasure; wherefore thee over thyself I crown
+and mitre."<a name="FNanchor_44:5_6" id="FNanchor_44:5_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_44:5_6" class="fnanchor">[44:5]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45"></a>[<a href="./images/45.png">45</a>]</span>But moral self-reliance is not the last word. As Beatrice, the image of
+tenderness and holiness, comes to Dante in the earthly paradise, and
+leads him from the summit of purgatory into the heaven of heavens, and
+even to the eternal light; so there is added to the mere human,
+intellectual, and moral resources of the soul, the sustaining power of
+the divine grace, the illuminating power of divine truth, and the
+transforming power of divine love. Through the aid of this higher
+wisdom, the journey of life becomes the way to God. Thus the allegorical
+truth of the "Divina Commedia" is not merely an analysis of the moral
+nature of man, but the revelation of a universal spiritual order,
+manifesting itself in the moral evolution of the individual, and above
+all in his ultimate community with the eternal goodness.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Thou shouldst not, if I deem aright, wonder more at thy
+ascent, than at a stream if from a high mountain it descends
+to the base. A marvel it would be in thee, if, deprived of
+hindrance, thou hadst sat below, even as quiet by living fire
+in earth would be."<a name="FNanchor_45:6_7" id="FNanchor_45:6_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_45:6_7" class="fnanchor">[45:6]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Such, in brief, is Dante's world-view, so suggestive of the freer
+idealistic conceptions of later thought as to justify a recent
+characterization of him as one who, "accepting without a shadow of a
+doubt <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46"></a>[<a href="./images/46.png">46</a>]</span>or hesitation all the constitutive ideas of medi&aelig;val thought and
+life, grasped them so firmly and gave them such luminous expression that
+the spirit in them broke away from the form."<a name="FNanchor_46:7_8" id="FNanchor_46:7_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_46:7_8" class="fnanchor">[46:7]</a></p>
+
+<p>But it must be added, as in the case of Wordsworth, that Dante is a
+philosopher-poet not because St. Thomas Aquinas appears and speaks with
+authority in the Thirteenth Canto of the "Paradiso," nor even because a
+philosophical doctrine can be consistently formulated from his writings,
+but because his consciousness of life is informed with a sense of its
+universal bearings. There is a famous passage in the Twenty-second Canto
+of the "Paradiso," in which Dante describes himself as looking down upon
+the earth from the starry heaven.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"'Thou art so near the ultimate salvation,' began Beatrice,
+'that thou oughtest to have thine eyes clear and sharp. And
+therefore ere thou further enterest it, look back downward,
+and see how great a world I have already set beneath thy feet,
+in order that thy heart, so far as it is able, may present
+itself joyous to the triumphant crowd which comes glad through
+this round ether.' With my sight I returned through each and
+all the seven spheres, and saw this globe such that I smiled
+at its mean semblance; and that counsel I approve as the best
+which holds it of least account; and he who thinks of other
+things maybe called truly worthy."</p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47"></a>[<a href="./images/47.png">47</a>]</span>Dante's scale of values is that which appears from the starry heaven.
+His austere piety, his invincible courage, and his uncompromising hatred
+of wrong, are neither accidents of temperament nor blind reactions, but
+compose the proper character of one who has both seen the world from
+God, and returned to see God from the world. He was, as Lowell has said,
+"a man of genius who could hold heartbreak at bay for twenty years, and
+would not let himself die till he had done his task"; and his power was
+not obstinacy, but a vision of the ways of God. He knew a truth that
+justified him in his sacrifices, and made a great glory of his defeat
+and exile. Even so his poetry or appreciation of life is the expression
+of an inward contemplation of the world in its unity or essence. It is
+but an elaboration of the piety which he attributes to the lesser saints
+of paradise, when he has them say:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Nay, it is essential to this blessed existence to hold
+ourselves within the divine will, whereby our very wills are
+made one. So that as we are from stage to stage throughout
+this realm, to all the realm is pleasing, as to the King who
+inwills us with His will. And His will is our peace; it is
+that sea whereunto is moving all that which It creates and
+which nature makes."<a name="FNanchor_47:8_9" id="FNanchor_47:8_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_47:8_9" class="fnanchor">[47:8]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48"></a>[<a href="./images/48.png">48</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_14" id="Section_14">14</a>. There now remains the brief task of distinguishing the
+philosopher-poet from the philosopher himself. The philosopher-poet is
+one who, having made the philosophical point of view his own, expresses
+himself in the form of poetry. The philosophical point of view is that
+from which the universe is comprehended in its totality. The wisdom of
+the philosopher is the knowledge of each through the knowledge of all.
+Wherein, then, does the poet, when possessed of such wisdom, differ from
+the philosopher proper? To this question one can give readily enough the
+general answer, that the difference lies in the mode of utterance.
+Furthermore, we have already given some account of the peculiar manner
+of the poet. He invites us to experience with him the beautiful and
+moving in nature and life. That which the poet has to express, and that
+which he aims to arouse in others, is an appreciative experience. He
+requires what Wordsworth calls "an atmosphere of sensation in which to
+move his wings." Therefore if he is to be philosophical in intelligence,
+and yet essentially a poet, he must find his universal truth in
+immediate experience. He must be one who, in seeing the many, sees the
+one. The philosopher-poet is he <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49"></a>[<a href="./images/49.png">49</a>]</span>who visualizes a fundamental
+interpretation of the world. "A poem," says one poet, "is the very image
+of life expressed in its eternal truth."</p>
+
+<p>The philosopher proper, on the other hand, has the sterner and less
+inviting task of rendering such an interpretation articulate to thought.
+That which the poet sees, the philosopher must define. That which the
+poet divines, the philosopher must calculate. The philosopher must dig
+for that which the poet sees shining through. As the poet transcends
+thought for the sake of experience, the philosopher must transcend
+experience for the sake of thought. As the poet sees all, and all in
+each, so the philosopher, knowing each, must think all consistently
+together, and then know each again. It is the part of philosophy to
+collect and criticise evidence, to formulate and co&ouml;rdinate conceptions,
+and finally to define in exact terms. The reanimation of the structure
+of thought is accomplished primarily in religion, which is a general
+conception of the world made the basis of daily living.</p>
+
+<p>For religion there is no subjective correlative less than life itself.
+Poetry is another and more circumscribed means of restoring thought to
+life. By the poet's imagination, and through the art of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50"></a>[<a href="./images/50.png">50</a>]</span>his expression,
+thought may be sensuously perceived. "If the time should ever come,"
+says Wordsworth, "when what is now called Science, thus familiarized to
+men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh, and blood,
+the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and
+will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of
+the household of man."<a name="FNanchor_50:9_10" id="FNanchor_50:9_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_50:9_10" class="fnanchor">[50:9]</a> As respects truth, philosophy has an
+indubitable priority. The very sternness of the philosopher's task is
+due to his supreme dedication to truth. But if validity be the merit of
+philosophy, it can well be supplemented by immediacy, which is the merit
+of poetry. Presuppose in the poet conviction of a sound philosophy, and
+we may say with Shelley, of his handiwork, that "it is the perfect and
+consummate surface and bloom of all things; it is as the odor and the
+color of the rose to the texture of the elements which compose it, as
+the form and splendor of unfaded beauty to the secrets of anatomy and
+corruption." "Indeed," as he adds, "what were our consolations on this
+side of the grave&mdash;and our aspirations beyond it&mdash;if poetry did not
+ascend to bring light and fire <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51"></a>[<a href="./images/51.png">51</a>]</span>from those eternal regions where the
+owl-winged faculty of calculation dare not ever soar?"<a name="FNanchor_51:10_11" id="FNanchor_51:10_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_51:10_11" class="fnanchor">[51:10]</a></p>
+
+<p>The unity in outlook, attended by differences of method and form, which
+may exist between poet and philosopher, is signally illustrated by the
+relation between Goethe and Spinoza. What Goethe saw and felt, Spinoza
+proved and defined. The universal and eternal substance was to Spinoza,
+as philosopher, a theorem, and to Goethe, as poet, a perception and an
+emotion. Goethe writes to Jacobi that when philosophy "lays itself out
+for division," he cannot get on with it, but when it "confirms our
+original feeling as though we were one with nature," it is welcome to
+him. In the same letter Goethe expresses his appreciation of Spinoza as
+the complement of his own nature:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"His all-reconciling peace contrasted with my all-agitating
+endeavor; his intellectual method was the opposite counterpart
+of my poetic way of feeling and expressing myself; and even
+the inflexible regularity of his logical procedure, which
+might be considered ill-adapted to moral subjects, made me his
+most passionate scholar and his devoted adherent. Mind and
+heart, understanding and sense, were drawn together with an
+inevitable elective affinity, and this at the same time
+produced an intimate union between individuals of the most
+different types."<a name="FNanchor_51:11_12" id="FNanchor_51:11_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_51:11_12" class="fnanchor">[51:11]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52"></a>[<a href="./images/52.png">52</a>]</span>It appears, then, that some poets share with all philosophers that
+point of view from which the horizon line is the boundary of all the
+world. Poetry is not always or essentially philosophical, but may be so;
+and when the poetic imagination restores philosophy to immediacy, human
+experience reaches its most exalted state, excepting only religion
+itself, wherein God is both seen and also served. Nor is the part of
+philosophy in poetry and religion either ignoble or presumptuous, for,
+humanly speaking, "the owl-winged faculty of calculation" is the only
+safe and sure means of access to that place on high,</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"Where the nightingale doth sing<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Not a senseless, tranc&egrave;d thing,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">But a divine melodious truth;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Philosophic numbers smooth;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Tales and golden histories<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Of heaven and its mysteries."<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28:1_2" id="Footnote_28:1_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28:1_2"><span class="label">[28:1]</span></a> George Santayana, in his <i>Poetry and Religion</i>, p. 176.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30:2_3" id="Footnote_30:2_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30:2_3"><span class="label">[30:2]</span></a> Santayana: <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 180.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42:3_4" id="Footnote_42:3_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42:3_4"><span class="label">[42:3]</span></a> <i>Appreciations</i>, p. 59.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43:4_5" id="Footnote_43:4_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43:4_5"><span class="label">[43:4]</span></a> Letter to Can Grande. See Lowell's <i>Essay on Dante</i>, p.
+34.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44:5_6" id="Footnote_44:5_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44:5_6"><span class="label">[44:5]</span></a> <i>Purgatorio</i>, Canto XXVII. Translation by Norton.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45:6_7" id="Footnote_45:6_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45:6_7"><span class="label">[45:6]</span></a> <i>Paradiso</i>, Canto I.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46:7_8" id="Footnote_46:7_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46:7_8"><span class="label">[46:7]</span></a> Edward Caird, in his <i>Literature and Philosophy</i>, Vol.
+I, p. 24.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47:8_9" id="Footnote_47:8_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47:8_9"><span class="label">[47:8]</span></a> <i>Paradiso</i>, Canto III.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50:9_10" id="Footnote_50:9_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50:9_10"><span class="label">[50:9]</span></a> Observations prefixed to the second edition of <i>Lyrical
+Ballads</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51:10_11" id="Footnote_51:10_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51:10_11"><span class="label">[51:10]</span></a> <i>A Defence of Poetry.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51:11_12" id="Footnote_51:11_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51:11_12"><span class="label">[51:11]</span></a> Quoted by Caird in his <i>Literature and Philosophy</i>,
+Vol. I, p. 60.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53"></a>[<a href="./images/53.png">53</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_III" id="Chap_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2>
+
+<h3>THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE</h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Possibility of Defining Religion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_15" id="Section_15">15</a>. The least religious experience is so mysterious and so complex
+that a moderate degree of reflection upon it tends to a sense of
+intellectual impotence. "If I speak," says Emerson, "I define and
+confine, and am less." One would gladly set down religion among the
+unspeakable things and avoid the imputation of degrading it. It is
+certain that the enterprise of defining religion is at present in
+disrepute. It has been undertaken so often and so unsuccessfully that
+contemporary students for the most part prefer to supply a list of
+historical definitions of religion, and let their variety demonstrate
+their futility. Metaphysicians and psychologists agree that in view of
+the differences of creed, ritual, organization, conduct, and temperament
+that have been true of different religions in different times and
+places, one may as well abandon the idea that there is a constant
+element.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54"></a>[<a href="./images/54.png">54</a>]</span>But on the other hand we have the testimony afforded by the name
+religion; and the ordinary judgments of men to the effect that it
+signifies something to be religious, and to be more or less religious.
+There is an elementary logical principle to the effect that a group name
+implies certain common group characters. Impatience with abstract or
+euphemistic definitions should not blind us to the truth. Even the
+psychologist tends in his description of religious phenomena to single
+out and emphasize what he calls a <i>typical</i> religious experience. And
+the same applies to the idealist's treatment of the matter.<a name="FNanchor_54:1_13" id="FNanchor_54:1_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_54:1_13" class="fnanchor">[54:1]</a>
+Religion, he reasons, is essentially a development of which the true
+meaning can be seen only in the higher stages. The primitive religion is
+therefore only implicit religion. But lower stages cannot be regarded as
+belonging to a single development with higher stages, if there be not
+some actual promise of the later in the earlier, or some element which
+endures throughout. It is unavoidable, then, to assume that in dealing
+with religion we are dealing with a specific and definable experience.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Profitableness of Defining Religion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_16" id="Section_16">16</a>. The profitableness of undertaking such a definition is another
+matter. It may well be that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55"></a>[<a href="./images/55.png">55</a>]</span>in so human and practical an affair as
+religion, definition is peculiarly inappropriate. But is there not a
+human and practical value in the very defining of religion? Is there not
+a demand for it in the peculiar relation that exists between religion
+and the progress of enlightenment? Religion associates itself with the
+habits of society. The progress of enlightenment means that more or less
+all the time, and very profoundly at certain critical times, society
+must change its habits. The consequence is that religion is likely to be
+abandoned with the old habits. The need of a new religion is therefore a
+chronic one. The reformer in religion, or the man who wishes to be both
+enlightened and religious, is chiefly occupied with the problem of
+disentangling religion pure and undefiled from definite discredited
+practices and opinions. And the solution of the problem turns upon some
+apprehension of the essence of religion. There is a large amount of
+necessary and unnecessary tragedy due to the extrinsic connection
+between ideas and certain modes of their expression. There can be no
+more serious and urgent duty than that of expressing as directly, and so
+as truly as possible, the great permanent human concerns. The men to
+whom educational <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56"></a>[<a href="./images/56.png">56</a>]</span>reform has been largely due have been the men who have
+remembered for their fellows what this whole business of education is
+after all for. Comenius and Pestalozzi served society by stripping
+educational activity of its historical and institutional accessories,
+and laying bare the genuine human need that these are designed to
+satisfy. There is a similar virtue in the insistent attempt to
+distinguish between the essential and the accessory in religion.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The True Method of Defining Religion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_17" id="Section_17">17</a>. Although declining to be discouraged by the conspicuousness of
+past failures in this connection, one may well profit by them. The
+amazing complexity of religious phenomena must somehow be seen to be
+consistent with their common nature. The religious experience must not
+only be found, but must also be reconciled with "the varieties of
+religious experience." The inadequacy of the well-known definitions of
+religion may be attributed to several causes. The commonest fallacy is
+to define religion in terms of a religion. My definition of religion
+must include my brother's religion, even though he live on the other
+side of the globe, and my ancestor's religion, in spite of his
+prehistoric remoteness. Error may easily arise through the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57"></a>[<a href="./images/57.png">57</a>]</span>attempt to
+define religion in terms of my own religion, or what I conceive to be
+the true religion. Whatever the relation between ideal religion and
+actual religion, the field of religion contains by common consent cults
+that must on their own grounds condemn one another; religions that are
+bad religions, and yet religions.</p>
+
+<p>A more enlightened fallacy, and a more dangerous one, is due to the
+supposition that religion can be defined exclusively in terms of some
+department of human nature. There have been descriptions of religion in
+terms of feeling, intellect, and conduct respectively. But it is always
+easy to overthrow such a description, by raising the question of its
+application to evidently religious experiences that belong to some other
+aspect of life. Religion is not feeling, because there are many
+phlegmatic, God-fearing men whose religion consists in good works.
+Religion is not conduct, for there are many mystics whose very religion
+is withdrawal from the field of action. Religion is not intellection,
+for no one has ever been able to formulate a creed that is common to all
+religions. Yet without a doubt one must look for the essence of religion
+in human nature. The present psychological interest in religion has
+emphasized this truth. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58"></a>[<a href="./images/58.png">58</a>]</span>How, then, may we describe it in terms of
+certain constant conditions of human life, and yet escape the
+abstractness of the facultative method? Modern psychology suggests an
+answer in demonstrating the interdependence of knowledge, feeling, and
+volition.<a name="FNanchor_58:2_14" id="FNanchor_58:2_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_58:2_14" class="fnanchor">[58:2]</a> The perfect case of this unity is <i>belief</i>. The
+believing experience is cognitive in intent, but practical and emotional
+as well in content. I believe what I take for granted; and the object of
+my belief is not merely known, but also felt and acted upon. <i>What I
+believe expresses itself in my total experience.</i></p>
+
+<p>There is some hope, then, of an adequate definition of the religious
+experience, if it be regarded as belonging to the psychological type of
+belief.<a name="FNanchor_58:3_15" id="FNanchor_58:3_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_58:3_15" class="fnanchor">[58:3]</a> Belief, however, is a broader category than religion.
+There must be some <i>religious type</i> of believing. An account of religion
+in terms of believing, and the particular type of it here in question,
+would, then, constitute the central stem of a psychology of religion,
+and affords the proper conceptions for a description of the religious
+experience. Even here the reservation must be made that belief is always
+more than the believing <i>state</i>, in that it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59"></a>[<a href="./images/59.png">59</a>]</span>means to be <i>true</i>.<a name="FNanchor_59:4_16" id="FNanchor_59:4_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_59:4_16" class="fnanchor">[59:4]</a>
+Hence to complete an account of religion one should consider its object,
+or its cognitive implications. But this direct treatment of the relation
+between religion and philosophy must be deferred until in the present
+chapter we shall have come to appreciate the inwardness of the religious
+consciousness. To this end we must permit ourselves to be enlightened by
+the experience of religious people as viewed from within. It is not our
+opinion of a man's religion that is here in question, but the content
+and meaning which it has for him.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I would have you," says Fielding, in his "Hearts of Men," "go
+and kneel beside the Mahommedan as he prays at the sunset
+hour, and put your heart to his and wait for the echo that
+will surely come.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. I would have you go to the hillman
+smearing the stone with butter that his god may be pleased, to
+the woman crying to the forest god for her sick child, to the
+boy before his monks learning to be good. No matter where you
+go, no matter what the faith is called, if you have the
+hearing ear, if your heart is in unison with the heart of the
+world, you will hear always the same song."<a name="FNanchor_59:5_17" id="FNanchor_59:5_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_59:5_17" class="fnanchor">[59:5]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Religion as Belief.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_18" id="Section_18">18</a>. The general identification of religion with belief is made without
+serious difficulty. The essential factor in belief, is, as we have seen,
+the reaction of the whole personality <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60"></a>[<a href="./images/60.png">60</a>]</span>to a fixed object or accepted
+situation. A similar principle underlies common judgments about a man's
+religion. He is accounted most religious whose religion penetrates his
+life most intimately. In the man whose religion consists in the outer
+exercise of attendance upon church, we recognize the sham. He <i>appears</i>
+to be religious. He does one of the things which a religious man would
+do; but an object of religious faith is not the constant environment of
+his life. He may or may not feel sure of God from his pew, but God is
+not among the things that count in his daily life. God does not enter
+into his calculations or determine his scale of values. Again,
+discursive thinking is regarded as an interruption of religion. When I
+am at pains to justify my religion, I am already doubting; and for
+common opinion doubt is identical with irreligion. In so far as I am
+religious, my religion stands in no need of justification, even though I
+regard it as justifiable. In my religious experience I am taking
+something for granted; in other words I act about it and feel about it
+in a manner that is going to be determined by the special conditions of
+my mood and temperament. The mechanical and prosaic man acknowledges God
+in his mechanical and prosaic <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61"></a>[<a href="./images/61.png">61</a>]</span>way. He believes in divine retribution as
+he believes in commercial or social retribution. He is as careful to
+prepare for the next world as he is to be respectable in this. The poet,
+on the other hand, believes in God after the manner of his genius.
+Though he worship God in spirit he may conduct his life in an irregular
+manner peculiar to himself. Difference of mood in the same individual
+may be judged by the same measure. When God is most real to him, brought
+home to him most vividly, or consciously obeyed, in these moments he is
+most religious. When, on the other hand, God is merely a name to him,
+and church a routine, or when both are forgotten in the daily
+occupations, he is least religious. His life on the whole is said to be
+religious in so far as periods of the second type are subordinated to
+periods of the first type. Further well-known elements of belief,
+corollaries of the above, are evidently present in religion. A certain
+<i>imagery remains constant</i> throughout an individual's experience. He
+comes back to it as to a physical object in space. And although religion
+is sporadically an exclusive and isolated affair, it tends strongly to
+be social. The religious object, or God, is a social object, common to
+me and to my neighbor, and presupposed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62"></a>[<a href="./images/62.png">62</a>]</span>in our collective undertakings.
+This reduction of religion to the type of the believing state should
+thus provide us with an answer to that old and fundamental question
+concerning the relative priority of faith and works. The test of the
+faith is in the works, and the works are religious in so far as they are
+the expression of the faith. Religion is not the doing of anything nor
+the feeling of anything nor the thinking of anything, but the reacting
+as a whole, in terms of all possible activities of human life, to some
+accepted situation.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_19" id="Section_19">19</a>. We may now face the more interesting but difficult question of the
+special character of religious belief. In spite of the fact that in
+these days the personality of God is often regarded as a transient
+feature of religion, that type of belief which throws most light upon
+the religious experience is the <i>belief in persons</i>. Our belief in
+persons consists in the practical recognition of a more or less
+persistent disposition toward ourselves. The outward behavior of our
+fellow-men is construed in terms of the practical bearing of the
+attitude which it implies. The extraordinary feature of such belief is
+the disproportion between its vividness and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63"></a>[<a href="./images/63.png">63</a>]</span>direct evidence for it.
+Of this we are most aware in connection with those personalities which
+we regard as distinctly friendly or hostile to ourselves. We are always
+more or less clearly in the presence of our friends and enemies. Their
+well-wishing or their ill-wishing haunts the scene of our living. There
+is no more important constituent of what the psychologists call our
+"general feeling tone." There are times when we are entirely possessed
+by a state that is either exuberance in the presence of those who love
+us, or awkwardness and stupidity in the presence of those whom we
+believe to suspect and dislike us. The latter state may easily become
+chronic. Many men live permanently in the presence of an accusing
+audience. The inner life which expresses itself in the words, "Everybody
+hates me!" is perhaps the most common form of morbid self-consciousness.
+On the other hand, buoyancy of spirits springs largely from a constant
+faith in the good-will of one's fellows. In this case one is filled with
+a sense of security, and is conscious of a sympathetic reinforcement
+that adds to private joys and compensates for private sorrows. And this
+sense of attitude is wonderfully discriminating. We can feel the
+presence of a "great man," a "formidable person," a superior <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64"></a>[<a href="./images/64.png">64</a>]</span>or
+inferior, one who is interested or indifferent to our talk, and all the
+subtlest degrees of approval and disapproval.</p>
+
+<p>A similar sensibility may quicken us even in situations where no direct
+individual attitude to ourselves is implied. We regard places and
+communities as congenial when we are in sympathy with the prevailing
+purposes or standards of value. We may feel ill at ease or thoroughly at
+home in cities where we know no single human soul. Indeed, in a
+misanthrope like Rousseau (and who has not his Rousseau moods!) the mere
+absence of social repression arouses a most intoxicating sense of
+tunefulness and security. Nature plays the part of an indulgent parent
+who permits all sorts of personal liberties.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The view of a fine country, a succession of agreeable
+prospects, a free air, a good appetite, and the health I gain
+by walking; the freedom of inns, and the distance from
+everything that can make me recollect the dependence of my
+situation, conspire to free my soul, and give boldness to my
+thoughts, throwing me, in a manner, into the immensity of
+things, where I combine, choose, and appropriate them to my
+fancy, without restraint or fear. I dispose of all nature as I
+please."<a name="FNanchor_64:6_18" id="FNanchor_64:6_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_64:6_18" class="fnanchor">[64:6]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual
+Environment, or Universe.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_20" id="Section_20">20</a>. In such confidence or distrust, inspired <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65"></a>[<a href="./images/65.png">65</a>]</span>originally by the social
+environment, and similarly suggested by other surroundings of life, we
+have the key to the religious consciousness. But it is now time to add
+that in the case of religion these attitudes are concerned with the
+universal or supernatural rather than with present and normal human
+relationships. Religious reactions are "total reactions."</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"To get at them," says William James, "you must go behind the
+foreground of existence and reach down to that curious <i>sense
+of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence</i>,
+intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious,
+which in some degree everyone possesses. This <i>sense of the
+world's presence</i>, appealing as it does to our peculiar
+individual temperament, makes us either strenuous or careless,
+devout or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant about life at large;
+and our reaction, involuntary and inarticulate and often half
+unconscious as it is, is the completest of all our answers to
+the question, 'What is the character of this universe in which
+we dwell?'"<a name="FNanchor_65:7_19" id="FNanchor_65:7_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_65:7_19" class="fnanchor">[65:7]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>This <i>residual environment</i>, or profounder realm of tradition and
+nature, may have any degree of unity from chaos to cosmos. For religion
+its <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66"></a>[<a href="./images/66.png">66</a>]</span>significance lies in the idea of original and far-reaching power
+rather than in the idea of totality. But that which is at first only
+"beyond," is <i>practically</i> the same object as that which comes in the
+development of thought to be conceived as the "world" or the "universe."
+We may therefore use these latter terms to indicate the object of
+religion, until the treatment of special instances shall define it more
+precisely. Religion is, then, <i>man's sense of the disposition of the
+universe to himself</i>. We shall expect to find, as in the social
+phenomena with which we have just dealt, that the manifestation of this
+sense consists in a general reaction appropriate to the disposition so
+attributed. He will be fundamentally ill at ease, profoundly confident,
+or will habitually take precautions to be safe. The ultimate nature of
+the world is here no speculative problem. The savage who could feel some
+joy at living in the universe would be more religious than the sublimest
+dialectician. It is in the vividness of the sense of this presence that
+the acuteness of religion consists. I am religious in so far as the
+whole tone and temper of my living reflects a belief as to what the
+universe thinks of such as me.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Examples of Religious Belief.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_21" id="Section_21">21</a>. The examples that follow are selected <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67"></a>[<a href="./images/67.png">67</a>]</span>because their differences
+in personal flavor serve to throw into relief their common religious
+character. Theodore Parker, in describing his own boyhood, writes as
+follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I can hardly think without a shudder of the terrible effect
+the doctrine of eternal damnation had on me. How many, many
+hours have I wept with terror as I lay on my bed, till,
+between praying and weeping, sleep gave me repose. But before
+I was nine years old this fear went away, and I saw clearer
+light in the goodness of God. But for years, say from seven
+till ten, I said my prayers with much devotion, I think, and
+then continued to repeat, 'Lord, forgive my sins,' till sleep
+came on me."<a name="FNanchor_67:8_20" id="FNanchor_67:8_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_67:8_20" class="fnanchor">[67:8]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Compare with this Stevenson's Christmas letter to his mother, in which
+he says:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The whole necessary morality is kindness; and it should
+spring, of itself, from the one fundamental doctrine, Faith.
+If you are sure that God, in the long run, means kindness by
+you, you should be happy; and if happy, surely you should be
+kind."<a name="FNanchor_67:9_21" id="FNanchor_67:9_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_67:9_21" class="fnanchor">[67:9]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Here is destiny frowning and destiny smiling, but in each case so real,
+so present, as to be immediately responded to with helpless terror and
+with grateful warm-heartedness.</p>
+
+<p>The author of the "Imitatio Christi" speaks thus of the daily living of
+the Christian:</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68"></a>[<a href="./images/68.png">68</a>]</span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"The life of a Christian who has dedicated himself to the
+service of God should abound with eminent virtues of all
+kinds, that he may be really the same person which he is by
+outward appearance and profession. Indeed, he ought not only
+to be the same, but much more, in his inward disposition of
+soul; because he professes to serve a God who sees the inward
+parts, a searcher of the heart and reins, a God and Father of
+spirits: and therefore, since we are always in His sight, we
+should be exceedingly careful to avoid all impurity, all that
+may give offence to Him whose eyes cannot behold iniquity. We
+should, in a word, so far as mortal and frail nature can,
+imitate the blessed angels in all manner of holiness, since
+we, as well as they, are always in His presence.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. And good
+men have always this notion of the thing. For they depend upon
+God for the success of all they do, even of their best and
+wisest undertakings."<a name="FNanchor_68:10_22" id="FNanchor_68:10_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_68:10_22" class="fnanchor">[68:10]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Such is to be the practical acknowledgment of God in the routine of
+life. The more direct response to this presence appears abundantly in
+St. Augustine's conversation and reminiscence with God.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"How evil have not my deeds been; or if not my deeds my words;
+or if not my words my will? But Thou, O Lord, art good and
+merciful, and Thy right hand had respect unto the profoundness
+of my death, and removed from the bottom of my heart that
+abyss of corruption. And this was the result, that I willed
+not to do what I willed, and willed to do what thou
+willedst.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. How sweet did it suddenly become to me to be
+without the delights of trifles! And what at one time I
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69"></a>[<a href="./images/69.png">69</a>]</span>feared to lose, it was now a joy to me to put away. For Thou
+didst cast them away from me, Thou true and highest sweetness.
+Thou didst cast them away, and instead of them didst enter in
+Thyself&mdash;sweeter than all pleasure, though not to flesh and
+blood; brighter than all light, but more veiled than all
+mysteries; more exalted than all honor, but not to the exalted
+in their own conceits. Now was my soul free from the gnawing
+cares of seeking and getting.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. And I babbled unto Thee my
+brightness, my riches, and my health, the Lord my God."<a name="FNanchor_69:11_23" id="FNanchor_69:11_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_69:11_23" class="fnanchor">[69:11]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>In these two passages we meet with religious conduct and with the
+supreme religious experience, the direct worship of God. In each case
+the heart of the matter is an individual's indubitable conviction of the
+world's favorable concern for him. The deeper order of things
+constitutes the real and the profoundly congenial community in which he
+lives.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Typical Religious Phenomena: Conversion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_22" id="Section_22">22</a>. Let us now apply this general account of the religious experience
+to certain typical religious phenomena: <i>conversion</i>; <i>piety</i>; and
+religious <i>instruments</i>, <i>symbolisms</i>, <i>and</i> modes of <i>conveyance</i>.
+Although recent study of the phenomenon of <i>conversion</i> has brought to
+light a considerable amount of interesting <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70"></a>[<a href="./images/70.png">70</a>]</span>material, there is some
+danger of misconceiving its importance. The psychology of conversion is
+primarily the psychology of crisis or radical alteration, rather than
+the psychology of religion. For the majority of religious men and women
+conversion is an insignificant event, and in very many cases it never
+occurs at all. Religion is more purely present where it is normal and
+monotonous. But this phenomenon is nevertheless highly significant in
+that religion and irreligion are placed in close juxtaposition, and the
+contribution of religion at its inception thereby emphasized. In general
+it is found that conversion takes place during the period of
+adolescence. But this is the time of the most sudden expansion of the
+environment of life; a time when there is the awakening consciousness of
+many a new presence. This is sometimes expressed by saying that it is a
+period of acute self-consciousness. Life is conscious of itself as over
+against its inheritance; the whole setting of life sweeps into view.
+Some solution of the life problem, some coming to terms with the
+universe, is the normal issue of it. Religious conversion signifies,
+then, that in this fundamental adjustment a man defines and accepts for
+his life a certain attitude on the part of the universe. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71"></a>[<a href="./images/71.png">71</a>]</span>examples
+cited by the psychologists, as well as the generalizations which they
+derive, bear out this interpretation.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"General Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, considers
+that the first vital step in saving outcasts consists in
+making them feel that some decent human being cares enough for
+them to take an interest in the question whether they are to
+rise or sink."<a name="FNanchor_71:12_24" id="FNanchor_71:12_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_71:12_24" class="fnanchor">[71:12]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The new state is here one of courage and hope stimulated by the glow of
+friendly interest. The convert is no longer "out in the cold." He is
+told that the world wishes him well, and this is brought home to him
+through representations of the tenderness of Christ, and through the
+direct ministerings of those who mediate it. But somehow the convert
+must be persuaded to realize all this. He must <i>believe</i> it before it
+can mean anything to him. He is therefore urged to pray&mdash;a proceeding
+that is at first ridiculous to him, since it involves taking for granted
+what he disbelieves. But therein lies the critical point. It is peculiar
+to the object in this case that it can exist only for one who already
+believes in it. The psychologists call this the element of
+"self-surrender." To be converted a man must somehow suffer his
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72"></a>[<a href="./images/72.png">72</a>]</span>surroundings to put into him a new heart, which may thereupon confirm
+its object. Such belief is tremendously tenacious because it so largely
+creates its own evidence. Once believe that "God, in the long run, means
+kindness by you," and you are likely to stand by it to the end&mdash;the more
+so in this case because the external evidence either way is to the
+average man so insufficient. Such a belief as this is inspired in the
+convert, not by reasoning, but by all the powers of suggestion that
+personality and social contagion can afford.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Piety.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_23" id="Section_23">23</a>. The psychologists describe <i>piety</i> as a sense of unity. One feels
+after reading their accounts that they are too abstract. For there are
+many kinds of unity, characteristic of widely varying moods and states.
+Any state of rapt attention is a state of unity, and this occurs in the
+most secular and humdrum moments of life. Nor does it help matters to
+say that in the case of religion this unity must have been preceded by a
+state of division; for we cannot properly characterize any state of mind
+in terms of another state unless the latter be retained in the former.
+And that which is characteristic of the religious sense of unity would
+seem to be just such an overcoming of difference. There is a recognition
+of two distinct <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73"></a>[<a href="./images/73.png">73</a>]</span>attitudes, which may be more or less in sympathy with
+one another, but which are both present even in their fullest harmony.
+Were I to be taken out of myself so completely as to forget myself, I
+should inevitably lose that sense of sympathy from which arises the
+peculiar exultation of religious faith, a heightened experience of the
+same type with the freedom and spontaneity that I experience in the
+presence of those with whom I feel most in accord. The further graces
+and powers of religion readily submit to a similar description. My sense
+of positive sympathy expresses itself in an attitude of well-wishing;
+living in an atmosphere of kindness I instinctively endeavor to
+propagate it. My buoyancy is distinctly of that quality which to a
+lesser degree is due to any sense of social security; my power is that
+of one who works in an environment that re&euml;nforces him. I experience the
+objective or even cosmical character of my enterprises. They have a
+momentum which makes me their instrument rather than their perpetrator.
+A paradoxical relation between religion and morality has always
+interested observers of custom and history. Religion is apparently as
+capable of the most fiendish malevolence as of the most saintly
+gentleness. Fielding writes that,</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74"></a>[<a href="./images/74.png">74</a>]</span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"When religion is brought out or into daily life and used as
+a guide or a weapon in the world it has no effect either for
+good or evil. Its effect is simply in strengthening the heart,
+in blinding the eyes, in deafening the ears. It is an
+intensive force, an intoxicant. It doubles or trebles a man's
+powers. It is an impulsive force sending him headlong down the
+path of emotion, whether that path lead to glory or to infamy.
+It is a tremendous stimulant, that is all."<a name="FNanchor_74:13_25" id="FNanchor_74:13_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_74:13_25" class="fnanchor">[74:13]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Religion does not originate life purposes or define their meaning, but
+stimulates them by the same means that works in all corporate and social
+activity. To work with the universe is the most tremendous incentive
+that can appeal to the individual will. Hence in highly ethical
+religions the power for good exceeds that of any other social and
+spiritual agency. Such religion makes present, actual, and real, that
+good on the whole which the individual otherwise tends to distinguish
+from that which is good for <i>him</i>. In daily life the morally valid and
+the practically urgent are commonly arrayed against one another; but the
+ethical religion makes the valid urgent.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_24" id="Section_24">24</a>. The <i>instruments</i> of religion are legion, and it is in order here
+only to mention certain prominent cases in which their selection would
+seem to have direct reference to the provocation and perpetuation of
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75"></a>[<a href="./images/75.png">75</a>]</span>such a sense of attitude as we have been describing. This is true in a
+general way of all <i>symbolism</i>. There is no essential difference between
+the religious symbol and such symbols as serve to remind us of human
+relationships. In both cases the perceptual absence of will is
+compensated for by the presence of some object associated with that
+will. The function of this object is due to its power to revive and
+perpetuate a certain special social atmosphere. But the most important
+vehicle of religion has always been personality. It is, after all, to
+priests, prophets, and believers that religious cults have owed their
+long life. The traits that mark the prophet are both curious and
+sublime. He is most remarkable for the confidence with which he speaks
+for the universe. Whether it be due to lack of a sense of humor or to a
+profound conviction of truth, is indifferent to our purpose. The power
+of such men is undoubtedly in their suggestion of a force greater than
+they, whose designs they bring directly and socially to the attention of
+men. The prophet in his prophesying is indeed not altogether
+distinguished from God, and it is through the mediation of a directly
+perceptible human attitude that a divine attitude gets itself fixed in
+the imagination of the believer. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76"></a>[<a href="./images/76.png">76</a>]</span>What is true of the prophet is equally
+true of the preacher whose function it is not to represent God in his
+own person, but to depict him with his tongue. It is generally
+recognized that the preacher is neither a moralizer nor a theologian.
+But it is less perfectly understood that it is his function to suggest
+the presence of God. His proper language is that of the imagination, and
+the picture which he portrays is that of a reciprocal social
+relationship between man and the Supreme Master of the situation of
+life. He will not define God or prove God, but introduce Him and talk
+about Him. And at the same time the association of prayer and worship
+with his sermon, and the atmosphere created by the meeting together of a
+body of disciples, will act as the confirmation of his suggestions of
+such a living presence.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>conveyance</i> of any single religious cult from generation to
+generation affords a signal illustration of the importance in religion
+of the recognition of attitude. Religions manage somehow to survive any
+amount of transformation of creed and ritual. It is not what is done, or
+what is thought, that identifies the faith of the first Christians with
+that of the last, but a certain reckoning with the disposition of God.
+The successive <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77"></a>[<a href="./images/77.png">77</a>]</span>generations of Christians are introduced into the
+spiritual world of their fathers, with its furnishing of hopes and fears
+remaining substantially the same; and their Christianity consists in
+their continuing to live in it with only a slight and gradual
+renovation. To any given individual God is more or less completely
+represented by his elders in the faith in their exhortations and
+ministerings; and through them he fixes as the centre of his system an
+image of God his accuser or redeemer.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_25" id="Section_25">25</a>. The complete verification of this interpretation of the religious
+experience would require the application of it to the different
+historical cults. In general the examination of such instances is
+entirely beyond the scope of this chapter; but a brief consideration may
+be given to those which seem to afford reasonable grounds for objection.</p>
+
+<p>First, it may be said that in <i>primitive religions</i>, notably in
+fetichism, tabooism, and totemism, there is no recognition of a cosmical
+unity. It is quite evident that there is no conception of a universe.
+But it is equally evident that the natural and historical environment in
+its generality has a very specific practical significance for the
+primitive believer. It is often said with truth that these <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78"></a>[<a href="./images/78.png">78</a>]</span>earliest
+religions are more profoundly pantheistic than polytheistic. Man
+recognizes an all-pervading interest that is capable of being directed
+to himself. The selection of a deity is not due to any special
+qualification for deification possessed by the individual object itself,
+but to the tacit presumption that, as Thales said, "all things are full
+of gods." The disposition of residual reality manifests to the believer
+no consistency or unity, but it is nevertheless the most constant object
+of his will. He lives in the midst of a capriciousness which he must
+appease if he is to establish himself at all.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Buddhism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_26" id="Section_26">26</a>. Secondly, in the case of <i>Buddhism</i> we are said to meet with a
+religion that is essentially atheistic.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Whether Buddhas arise, O priests, or whether Buddhas do not
+arise, it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary
+constitution of being, that all its constituents are
+transitory."<a name="FNanchor_78:14_26" id="FNanchor_78:14_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_78:14_26" class="fnanchor">[78:14]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The secret of life lies in the application of this truth:</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i1">"O builder! I've discovered thee!<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">This fabric thou shalt ne'er rebuild!<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Thy rafters all are broken now,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">And pointed roof demolished lies!<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">This mind has demolition reached,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">And seen the last of all desire!"<a name="FNanchor_78:15_27" id="FNanchor_78:15_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_78:15_27" class="fnanchor">[78:15]</a><br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79"></a>[<a href="./images/79.png">79</a>]</span>The case of Buddha himself and of the exponents of his purely esoteric
+doctrine, belong to the reflective type which will presently be given
+special consideration. But with the ordinary believer, even where an
+extraneous but almost inevitable polytheism is least in evidence, the
+religious experience consists in substantially the same elements that
+appear in theistic religions. The individual is here living
+appropriately to the ultimate nature of things, with the ceaseless
+periods of time in full view. That which is brought home to him is the
+illusoriness and hollowness of things when taken in the spirit of active
+endeavor. The only profound and abiding good is nothingness. While
+nature and society conspire to mock him, Nirvana invites him to its
+peace. The religious course of his life consists in the use of such
+means as can win him this end. From the stand-point of the universe he
+has the sympathy only of that wisdom whose essence is self-destruction.
+And this truth is mediated by the imagination of divine sympathy, for
+the Blessed One remains as the perpetual incarnation of his own
+blessedness.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Critical Religion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_27" id="Section_27">27</a>. Finally there remains the consideration of the bearing of this
+interpretation upon the more <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80"></a>[<a href="./images/80.png">80</a>]</span>refined and disciplined religions. The
+religion of the critically enlightened man is less naive and credulous
+in its imagery. God tends to vanish into an ideal or a universal, into
+some object of theoretical definition. Here we are on that borderland
+where an assignment of individual cases can never be made with any
+certainty of correctness. We can generalize only by describing the
+conditions that such cases must fulfil if they are properly to be
+denominated religious. And there can be no question of the justice of
+deriving such a description from the reports of historical and
+institutional religions. An idealistic philosophy will, then, be a
+religion just in so far as it is rendered practically vivid by the
+imagination. Such imagination must create and sustain a social
+relationship. The question of the legitimacy of this imagination is
+another matter. It raises the issue concerning the judgment of truth
+implied in religion, and this is the topic of the next chapter. At any
+rate the religious experience <i>may be</i> realized by virtue of the
+metaphorical or poetical representation of a situation as one of
+intercommunication between persons, where reflective definition at the
+same time denies it. The human worshipper <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81"></a>[<a href="./images/81.png">81</a>]</span>may supply the personality of
+God from himself, viewing himself as from the divine stand-point. But
+whatever faculty supplies this indispensable social quality of religion,
+he who defines God as the ultimate goodness or the ultimate truth, has
+certainly not yet worshipped Him. He begins to be religious only when
+such an ideal determines the atmosphere of his daily living; when he
+regards the immanence of such an ideal in nature and history as the
+object of his will; and when he responds to its presence in the spirit
+of his conduct and his contemplation.</p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54:1_13" id="Footnote_54:1_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54:1_13"><span class="label">[54:1]</span></a> Cf. Caird: <i>The Evolution of Religion</i>, Lectures II,
+III.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58:2_14" id="Footnote_58:2_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58:2_14"><span class="label">[58:2]</span></a> Cf. Leuba: <i>Introduction to a Psychological Study of
+Religion</i>, <i>Monist</i>, Vol. XI, p. 195.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58:3_15" id="Footnote_58:3_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58:3_15"><span class="label">[58:3]</span></a> Cf. Leuba: <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59:4_16" id="Footnote_59:4_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59:4_16"><span class="label">[59:4]</span></a> Cf. &sect; <a href="#Section_29">29</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59:5_17" id="Footnote_59:5_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59:5_17"><span class="label">[59:5]</span></a> P. 322.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64:6_18" id="Footnote_64:6_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64:6_18"><span class="label">[64:6]</span></a> Rousseau: <i>Confessions</i>, Book IV, p. 125.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65:7_19" id="Footnote_65:7_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65:7_19"><span class="label">[65:7]</span></a> William James: <i>The Varieties of Religious Experience</i>,
+p. 35. The italics are mine. I am in the present chapter under constant
+obligation to this wonderfully sympathetic and stimulating book.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67:8_20" id="Footnote_67:8_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67:8_20"><span class="label">[67:8]</span></a> Chadwick: <i>Theodore Parker</i>, p. 18.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67:9_21" id="Footnote_67:9_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67:9_21"><span class="label">[67:9]</span></a> Stevenson: <i>Letters</i>, Vol. I, p. 229.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68:10_22" id="Footnote_68:10_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68:10_22"><span class="label">[68:10]</span></a> Thomas &agrave; Kempis: <i>Imitation of Christ</i>, Chap. XIX.
+Translation by Stanhope, p. 44.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69:11_23" id="Footnote_69:11_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69:11_23"><span class="label">[69:11]</span></a> St. Augustine: <i>Confessions</i>, Book I, Chap. I.
+Translation in Schaff: <i>Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers</i>, Vol. I, p.
+129.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71:12_24" id="Footnote_71:12_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71:12_24"><span class="label">[71:12]</span></a> James: <i>Varieties of Religious Experience</i>, p. 203.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74:13_25" id="Footnote_74:13_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74:13_25"><span class="label">[74:13]</span></a> Fielding: <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 152.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78:14_26" id="Footnote_78:14_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78:14_26"><span class="label">[78:14]</span></a> Warren: <i>Buddhism in Translations</i>, p. 14.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78:15_27" id="Footnote_78:15_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78:15_27"><span class="label">[78:15]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 83.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82"></a>[<a href="./images/82.png">82</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_IV" id="Chap_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2>
+
+<h3>THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION</h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">R&eacute;sum&eacute; of Psychology of Religion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_28" id="Section_28">28</a>. It has been maintained that religion is closely analogous to one's
+belief in the disposition toward one's self of men or communities. In
+the case of religion this disposition is attributed to the more or less
+vaguely conceived residual environment that is recognized as lying
+outside of the more familiar natural and social relations. After the
+rise of science this residual environment tends to be conceived as a
+unity which is ultimate or fundamental, but for the religious
+consciousness it is more commonly regarded as a general source of
+influence practically worthy of consideration. Such a belief, like all
+belief, is vitally manifested, with such emphasis upon action, feeling,
+or intellection as temperament and mood may determine.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Religion Means to be True.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_29" id="Section_29">29</a>. But if the psychology of belief is the proper starting-point for a
+description of the religious experience, it is none the less suggestive
+of the fact that religion, just <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83"></a>[<a href="./images/83.png">83</a>]</span>because it <i>is</i> belief, is not wholly a
+matter for psychology. For religion <i>means to be true</i>, and thus submits
+itself to valuation as a case of knowledge. The psychological study of
+religion is misleading when accepted as a substitute for philosophical
+criticism. The religious man takes his religion not as a narcotic, but
+as an enlightenment. Its subjective worth is due at any rate in part to
+the supposition of its objective worth. As in any case of insight, that
+which warms the heart must have satisfied the mind. The religious
+experience purports to be the part of wisdom, and to afford only such
+happiness as increasing wisdom would confirm. And the charm of truth
+cannot survive its truthfulness. Hence, though religion may be
+described, it cannot be justified, from the stand-point of therapeutics.
+Were such the case it would be the real problem of religious leaders to
+find a drug capable of giving a constantly pleasant tone to their
+patient's experience.<a name="FNanchor_83:1_28" id="FNanchor_83:1_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_83:1_28" class="fnanchor">[83:1]</a> There would be no difference between priests
+and physicians who make a specialty of nervous diseases, except that the
+former would aim at a more fundamental and perpetual <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84"></a>[<a href="./images/84.png">84</a>]</span>suggestion of
+serenity. Now no man wants to be even a blessed fool. He does not want
+to dwell constantly in a fictitious world, even if it be after his own
+heart. He may from the cynical point of view actually do so, but if he
+be religious he thinks it is reality, and is satisfied only in so far as
+he thinks so. He regards the man who has said in his heart that there is
+no God as the fool, and not because he may have to suffer for it, but
+because he is cognitively blind to the real nature of things. Piety, on
+the other hand, he regards as the standard experience, the most
+veracious life. Hence, it is not an accident that religion has had its
+creeds and its controversies, its wars with science and its appeals to
+philosophy. The history of these affairs shows that religion commonly
+fails to understand the scope of its own demand for truth; but they have
+issued from the deep conviction that one's religion is, implicitly, at
+least, in the field of truth; that there are theoretical judgments whose
+truth would justify or contradict it.</p>
+
+<p>This general fact being admitted, there remains the task to which the
+present discussion addresses itself, that of defining the kind of
+<i>theoretical judgment</i> implied in religion, and the relation to this
+central cognitive stem of its efflorescences of myth, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85"></a>[<a href="./images/85.png">85</a>]</span>theology, and
+ritual. It is impossible to separate the stem and the efflorescence, or
+to determine the precise spot at which destruction of the tissue would
+prove fatal to the plant, but it is possible to obtain some idea of the
+relative vitality of the parts.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a Disposition
+from which Consequences May Rationally be Expected.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_30" id="Section_30">30</a>. The difficulty of reaching a definite statement in this matter is
+due to the fact that the truth in which any religious experience centres
+is a practical and not a scientific truth. A practical truth does not
+commit itself to any single scientific statement, and can often survive
+the overthrow of that scientific statement in which at any given time it
+has found expression. In other words, an indefinite number of scientific
+truths are compatible with a single practical truth. An instance of this
+is the consistency with my expectation of the alternation of day and
+night, of either the Ptolemaic or Copernican formulation of the solar
+system. Now expectation that the sun will rise to-morrow is an excellent
+analogue of my religious belief. Celestial mechanics is as relevant to
+the one as metaphysics to the other. Neither is overthrown until a
+central practical judgment is discredited, and either could remain true
+through <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86"></a>[<a href="./images/86.png">86</a>]</span>a very considerable alteration of logical definition; but
+neither is on this account exempt from theoretical responsibility. In so
+far as religion deliberately enters the field of science, and defines
+its formularies with the historical or metaphysical method, this
+difficulty does not, of course, exist. Grant that the years of
+Methuselah's life, or the precise place and manner of the temptation of
+Jesus, or the definition of Christ in the terms of the Athanasian Creed,
+are constitutive of Christianity, and the survival of that religion will
+be determined by the solution of ordinary problems of historical or
+metaphysical research. But the Christian will very properly claim that
+his religion is only externally and accidentally related to such
+propositions, since they are never or very rarely intended in his
+experience. As religious he is occupied with Christ as his saviour or
+with God as his protector and judge. The history of Jesus or the
+metaphysics of God essentially concern him only in so far as they may or
+may not invalidate this relationship. He cares only for the power and
+disposition of the divine, and these are affected by history and
+metaphysics only in so far as he has definitely put them to such proof.</p>
+
+<p>For my religion is my sense of a practical situation, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87"></a>[<a href="./images/87.png">87</a>]</span>and only when
+that has been proved to be folly has my religion become untrue. My God
+is my practical faith, my plan of salvation. My religion is overthrown
+if I am convinced that I have misconceived the situation and mistaken
+what I should do to be saved. The conception of God is very simple
+practically, and very complex theoretically, a fact that confirms its
+practical genesis. My conception of God contains <i>an idea of my own
+interests</i>, <i>an idea of the disposition of the universe toward my
+interests</i>, and <i>some working plan for the reconciliation of these two
+terms</i>. These three elements form a practical unity, but each is capable
+of emphasis, and a religion may be transformed through the modification
+of any one of them. It appears, then, as has always been somewhat
+vaguely recognized, that the truth of religion is ethical as well as
+metaphysical or scientific. My religion will be altered by a change in
+my conception of what constitutes my real interest, a change in my
+conception of the fundamental causes of reality, or a change in my
+conception of the manner in which my will may or may not affect these
+causes. God is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always a relation of
+entity to ideal: <i>reality regarded from the stand-point of its
+favorableness or unfavorableness <span class='pagenum' style="font-style: normal;"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88"></a>[<a href="./images/88.png">88</a>]</span>to human life, and prescribing for the
+latter the propriety of a certain attitude</i>.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The
+Religion of Baal.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_31" id="Section_31">31</a>. The range of historical examples is limitless, but certain of
+these are especially calculated to emphasize the application of a
+criterion to religion. Such is the case with Elijah's encounter with the
+prophets of Baal, as narrated in the Old Testament.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"And Elijah came near unto all the people, and said, How long
+halt ye between two opinions? If Yahweh be God, follow him:
+but if Baal, then follow him.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. And call ye on the name of
+your god, and I will call on the name of Yahweh: and the God
+that answereth by fire, let him be God.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. And Elijah said
+unto the prophets of Baal, Choose you one bullock for
+yourselves, and dress it first; for ye are many; and call on
+the name of your god, but put no fire under. And they took the
+bullock which was given them, and they dressed it, and called
+on the name of Baal from morning even until noon, saying, O
+Baal, hear us. But there was no voice, nor any that
+answered.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah mocked
+them, and said, Cry aloud: for he is a god; either he is
+musing, or he is gone aside, or he is in a journey, or
+peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked. And they cried
+aloud, and cut themselves after their manner with knives and
+lances, till the blood gushed out upon them.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. But there was
+neither voice, nor any to answer, nor any that
+regarded."<a name="FNanchor_88:2_29" id="FNanchor_88:2_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_88:2_29" class="fnanchor">[88:2]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89"></a>[<a href="./images/89.png">89</a>]</span>The religion of the followers of Baal here consists in a belief in the
+practical virtue of a mode of address and form of ritual associated with
+the traditions and customs of a certain social group. The prophets of
+this cult agree to regard the experiment proposed by Elijah as a crucial
+test, and that which is disproved from its failure is a plan of action.
+These prophets relied upon the presence of a certain motivity, from
+which a definite response could be evoked by an appeal which they were
+peculiarly able to make; but though "they prophesied until the time of
+the offering of the evening oblation," there was none that regarded.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Greek Religion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_32" id="Section_32">32</a>. An equally familiar and more instructive example is the refutation
+of the Greek national religion by Lucretius. The conception of life
+which Lucretius finds unwarranted is best depicted in Homer. There we
+hear of a society composed of gods and men. Though the gods, on the one
+hand, have their own history, their affairs are never sharply sundered
+from those of men, who, on the other hand, must constantly reckon with
+them, gauge their attitude, and seek their favor by paying tribute to
+their individual humors and preferences. In the Ninth Book of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90"></a>[<a href="./images/90.png">90</a>]</span>the
+"Iliad," Ph&oelig;nix addresses himself to the recalcitrant Achilles as
+follows:</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i7">"It fits not one that moves<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">The hearts of all, to live unmov'd, and succor hates for loves.<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">The Gods themselves are flexible; whose virtues, honors, pow'rs,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Are more than thine, yet they will bend their breasts as we bend ours.<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Perfumes, benign devotions, savors of offerings burn'd,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">And holy rites, the engines are with which their hearts are turn'd,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">By men that pray to them."<a name="FNanchor_90:3_30" id="FNanchor_90:3_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_90:3_30" class="fnanchor">[90:3]</a><br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>Here is a general recognition of that which makes sacrifice rational. It
+is because he conceives this presupposition to be mistaken, that
+Lucretius declares the practices and fears which are founded upon it to
+be folly. It is the same with all that is practically based upon the
+expectation of a life beyond the grave. The correction of the popular
+religion is due in his opinion to that true view of the world taught by
+Epicurus, whose memory Lucretius thus invokes at the opening of the
+Third Book of the "De Rerum Natura":</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Thee, who first wast able amid such thick darkness to raise
+on high so bright a beacon and shed a light on the true
+interests of life, thee I follow, glory of the Greek race, and
+plant now my footsteps firmly fixed in thy imprinted marks.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.
+For soon as thy philosophy <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91"></a>[<a href="./images/91.png">91</a>]</span>issuing from a godlike intellect
+has begun with loud voice, to proclaim the nature of things,
+the terrors of the mind are dispelled, the walls of the world
+part asunder, I see things in operation throughout the whole
+void: the divinity of the gods is revealed and their tranquil
+abodes which neither winds do shake nor clouds drench with
+rains nor snow congealed by sharp frost harms with hoary fall:
+an ever cloudless ether o'ercanopies them, and they laugh with
+light shed largely round. Nature too supplies all their wants
+and nothing ever impairs their peace of mind. But on the other
+hand the Acherusian quarters<a name="FNanchor_91:4_31" id="FNanchor_91:4_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_91:4_31" class="fnanchor">[91:4]</a> are nowhere to be seen,
+though earth is no bar to all things being descried, which are
+in operation underneath our feet throughout the void."<a name="FNanchor_91:5_32" id="FNanchor_91:5_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_91:5_32" class="fnanchor">[91:5]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>In another passage, after describing the Phrygian worship of Cybele, he
+comments as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"All which, well and beautifully as it is set forth and told,
+is yet widely removed from true reason. For the nature of gods
+must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together
+with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our
+concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all
+dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us,
+it is neither gained by favors nor moved by anger.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. The
+earth however is at all time without feeling, and because it
+receives into it the first-beginnings of many things, it
+brings them forth in many ways into the light of the
+sun."<a name="FNanchor_91:6_33" id="FNanchor_91:6_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_91:6_33" class="fnanchor">[91:6]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>If the teaching of Epicurus be true it is evident <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92"></a>[<a href="./images/92.png">92</a>]</span>that those who
+offered hecatombs with the idea that they were thereby mitigating anger,
+or securing special dispensation, were playing the fool. They were
+appealing to a fictitious motivity, one not grounded in "the nature of
+things." To one for whom the walls of the world had parted asunder, such
+a procedure was no longer possible; though he might choose to "call the
+sea Neptune" and reverence the earth as "mother of the gods."<a name="FNanchor_92:7_34" id="FNanchor_92:7_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_92:7_34" class="fnanchor">[92:7]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Judaism and Christianity.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_33" id="Section_33">33</a>. The history of religion contains no more impressive and dramatic
+chapter than that which records the development of the religion of the
+Jews. Passing over its obscure beginnings in the primitive Semitic cult,
+we find this religion first clearly defined as tribal self-interest
+sanctioned by Yahweh.<a name="FNanchor_92:8_35" id="FNanchor_92:8_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_92:8_35" class="fnanchor">[92:8]</a> God's interest <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93"></a>[<a href="./images/93.png">93</a>]</span>in his chosen people
+determines the prosperity of him who practices the social virtues.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The name of Yahweh is a strong tower: the righteous runneth
+into it, and is safe."</p>
+
+<p>"He that is steadfast in righteousness shall attain unto
+life."</p>
+
+<p>"To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to Yahweh than
+sacrifice."<a name="FNanchor_93:9_36" id="FNanchor_93:9_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_93:9_36" class="fnanchor">[93:9]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>But in time it is evident to the believer that his experience does not
+bear out this expectation. Neither as a Jew nor as a righteous man does
+he prosper more than his neighbor. He comes, therefore, to distrust the
+virtue of his wisdom.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light
+excelleth darkness. The wise man's eyes are in his head, and
+the fool walketh in darkness: and yet I perceived that one
+event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, As it
+happeneth to the fool, so will it happen even to me; and why
+was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also
+was vanity. For of the wise man, even as of the fool, there is
+no remembrance forever; seeing that in the days to come all
+will have been already forgotten. And how doth the wise man
+die even as the fool! So I hated life; because the work that
+is wrought under the sun was grievous unto me: for all is
+vanity and a striving after wind."<a name="FNanchor_93:10_37" id="FNanchor_93:10_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_93:10_37" class="fnanchor">[93:10]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>It is evident that he who expects the favor of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94"></a>[<a href="./images/94.png">94</a>]</span>fortune in return for
+his observance of precept is mistaken. The "work that is wrought under
+the sun" makes no special provision for him during his lifetime. Unless
+the cry of vanity is to be the last word there must be a
+reinterpretation of the promise of God. This appears in the new ideal of
+patient submission, and the chastened faith that expects only the love
+of God. And those whom God loves He will not forsake. They will come to
+their own, if not here, then beyond, according to His inscrutable but
+unswerving plan.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a
+contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."</p>
+
+<p>"For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth
+eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and holy
+place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit,
+to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of
+the contrite ones."<a name="FNanchor_94:11_38" id="FNanchor_94:11_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_94:11_38" class="fnanchor">[94:11]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>In this faith Judaism merges into Christianity.<a name="FNanchor_94:12_39" id="FNanchor_94:12_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_94:12_39" class="fnanchor">[94:12]</a> In the whole
+course of this evolution God is regarded as the friend of his people,
+but his people learn to find a new significance in his friendship. That
+which is altered is the conduct which that friendship requires and the
+expectation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95"></a>[<a href="./images/95.png">95</a>]</span>which it determines. The practical ideal which the
+relationship sanctions, changes gradually from that of prudence to that
+of goodness for its own sake. God, once an instrument relevant to human
+temporal welfare, has come to be an object of disinterested service.</p>
+
+<p>No such transformation as this was absolutely realized during the period
+covered by the writings of the Old Testament, nor has it even yet been
+realized in the development of Christianity. But the evolution of both
+Judaism and Christianity has taken this direction. The criterion of this
+evolution is manifestly both ethical and metaphysical. A Christian avows
+that he rates purity of character above worldly prosperity, so that the
+former cannot properly be prized for the sake of the latter.
+Furthermore, he shares more or less unconsciously such philosophical and
+scientific opinions as deny truth to the conception of special
+interferences and dispensations from a supernatural agency. Therefore he
+looks for no fire from heaven to consume his sacrifice. But his religion
+is nevertheless a practical expectation. He believes that God is good,
+and that God loves him and sustains him. He believes that there obtains
+between himself, in so far as good, and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96"></a>[<a href="./images/96.png">96</a>]</span>universe <i>sub specie
+eternitatis</i>, a real sympathy and reciprocal reenforcement. He believes
+that he secures through the profoundly potent forces of the universe
+that which he regards as of most worth; and that somewhat is added to
+these forces by virtue of his consecration. The God of the Christians
+cannot be defined short of some such account as this, inclusive of an
+ideal, an attitude, and an expectation. In other words the God of the
+Christians is to be known only in terms of the Christlike outlook upon
+life, in which the disciple is taught to emulate the master. When moral
+and intellectual development shall have discredited either its scale of
+values, or its conviction that cosmical events are in the end determined
+in accordance with that scale of values, then Christianity must either
+be transformed, or be untenable for the wise man. If we have conceived
+the essence of Christianity too broadly or vaguely, it does not much
+matter for our present purposes. Its essence is, at any rate, some such
+inwardness of life resolving ideality and reality into one, and drawing
+upon objective truth only to the extent required for the confirming of
+that relation.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Cognitive Factor in Religion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_34" id="Section_34">34</a>. We conclude, then, our attempt to emphasize the cognitive factor
+in religion, with the thesis <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97"></a>[<a href="./images/97.png">97</a>]</span>that every religion centres in a practical
+secret of the universe. <i>To be religious is to believe that a certain
+correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality operative, and
+that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a certain type of
+living. Whatever demonstrates the futility, vanity, or self-deception of
+this living, discredits the religion. And, per contra, except as they
+define or refute such practical truth, religion is not essentially
+concerned with theoretical judgments.</i></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Place of Imagination in Religion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_35" id="Section_35">35</a>. But neither religion nor any other human interest consists in
+essentials. Such a practical conviction as that which has been defined
+inevitably flowers into a marvelous complexity, and taps for its
+nourishment every spontaneity of human nature. If it be said that only
+the practical conviction is essential, this is not the same as to say
+that all else is superfluous. There may be no single utterance that my
+religion could not have spared, and yet were I to be altogether dumb my
+religion would, indeed, be as nothing. For if I believe, I accept a
+presence in my world, which as I live will figure in my dreams, or in my
+thoughts, or in my habits. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98"></a>[<a href="./images/98.png">98</a>]</span>And each of these expressions of myself will
+have a truth if it do but bear out my practical acceptance of that
+presence. The language of religion, like that of daily life, is not the
+language of science except it take it upon itself to be so. There is
+scarcely a sentence which I utter in my daily intercourse with men which
+is not guilty of transgressions against the canons of accurate and
+definite thinking. Yet if I deceive neither myself nor another, I am
+held to be truthful, even though my language deal with chance and
+accident, material purposes and spiritual causes, and though I vow that
+the sun smiles or the moon lets down her hair into the sea. Science is a
+special interest in the discovery of unequivocal and fixed conceptions,
+and employs its terms with an unalterable connotation. But no such
+algebra of thought is indispensable to life or conversation, and its
+lack is no proof of error. Such is the case also with that eminently
+living affair, religion. I may if I choose, and I will if my reasoning
+powers be at all awakened, be a theologian. But theology, like science,
+is a special intellectual spontaneity. St. Thomas, the master
+theologian, did not glide unwittingly from prayer into the <i>qu&aelig;stiones</i>
+of the "Summa Theologi&aelig;," but turned to them as to a fresh adventure.
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99"></a>[<a href="./images/99.png">99</a>]</span>Theology is inevitable, because humanly speaking adventure is
+inevitable. For man, with his intellectual spontaneity, every object is
+a problem; and did he not seek sooner or later to define salvation,
+there would be good reason to believe that he did not practically reckon
+with any. But this is <i>similarly</i> and <i>independently</i> true of the
+imagination, the most familiar means with which man clothes and vivifies
+his convictions, the exuberance with which he plays about them and
+delights to confess them. The imagination of religion, contributing what
+Matthew Arnold called its "poetry and eloquence," does not submit itself
+to such canons as are binding upon theology or science, but exists and
+flourishes in its own right.</p>
+
+<p>The indispensableness to religion of the imagination is due to that
+faculty's power of realizing what is not perceptually present. Religion
+is not interested in the apparent, but in the secret essence or the
+transcendent universal. And yet this interest is a practical one.
+Imagination may introduce one into the vivid presence of the secret or
+the transcendent. It is evident that the religious imagination here
+coincides with poetry. For it is at least one of the interests of poetry
+to cultivate and satisfy a sense for the universal; to obtain an
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100"></a>[<a href="./images/100.png">100</a>]</span>immediate experience or appreciation that shall have the vividness
+without the particularism of ordinary perception. And where a poet
+elects so to view the world, we allow him as a poet the privilege, and
+judge him by the standards to which he submits himself. That upon which
+we pass judgment is the <i>fitness of his expression</i>. This expression is
+not, except in the case of the theoretical mystic, regarded as
+constituting the most valid form of the idea, but is appreciated
+expressly for its fulfilment of the condition of immediacy. The same
+sort of critical attitude is in order with the fruits of the religious
+imagination. These may or may not fulfil enough of the requirements of
+that art to be properly denominated poetry; but like poetry they are the
+translation of ideas into a specific language. They must not, therefore,
+be judged as though they claimed to excel in point of validity, but only
+in point of consistency with the context of that language. And <i>the
+language of religion is the language of the practical life</i>. Such
+translation is as essential to an idea that is to enter into the
+religious experience, as translation into terms of immediacy is
+essential to an idea that is to enter into the appreciative
+consciousness of the poet. No object can <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101"></a>[<a href="./images/101.png">101</a>]</span>find a place in my religion
+until it is conjoined with my purposes and hopes; until it is taken for
+granted and acted upon, like the love of my friends, or the courses of
+the stars, or the stretches of the sea.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_36" id="Section_36">36</a>. The religious imagination, then, is to be understood and justified
+as that which brings the objects of religion within the range of living.
+The central religious object, as has been seen, is an <i>attitude</i> of the
+residuum or totality of things. To be religious one must have a sense
+for the <i>presence of an attitude</i>, like his sense for the presence of
+his human fellows, with all the added appreciation that is proper in the
+case of an object that is unique in its mystery or in its majesty. It
+follows that the religious imagination fulfils its function in so far as
+it provides the object of religion with properties similar to those
+which lend vividness and reality to the normal social relations.</p>
+
+<p>The presence of one's fellows is in part the perceptual experience of
+their bodies. To this there corresponds in religion some extraordinary
+or subtle appearance. The gods may in visions or dreams be met with in
+their own proper embodiments; or, as is more common, they may be
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102"></a>[<a href="./images/102.png">102</a>]</span>regarded as present for practical purposes: in some inanimate object,
+as in the case of the fetish; in some animal species, as in the case of
+the totem; in some place, as in the case of the shrine; or even in some
+human being, as in the case of the inspired prophet and miracle worker.
+In more refined and highly developed religions the medium of God's
+presence is less specific. He is perceived with</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i8">"&mdash;a sense sublime<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Of something far more deeply interfused,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">And the round ocean and the living air,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">And the blue sky, and in the mind of man."<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>God is here found in an interpretation of the common and the natural,
+rather than in any individual and peculiar embodiment. And here the
+poet's appreciation, if not his art, is peculiarly indispensable.</p>
+
+<p>But, furthermore, his fellows are inmates of "the household of man" in
+that he knows their history. They belong to the temporal context of
+actions and events. Similarly, the gods must be historical. The sacred
+traditions or books of religion are largely occupied with this history.
+The more individual and anthropomorphic the gods, the more local and
+episodic will be the account of their affairs. In the higher religions
+the acts of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103"></a>[<a href="./images/103.png">103</a>]</span>God are few and momentous, such as creation or special
+providence; or they are identical with the events of nature and human
+history when these are <i>construed</i> as divine. To find God in this latter
+way requires an interpretation of the course of events in terms of some
+moral consistency, a faith that sees some purpose in their evident
+destination.</p>
+
+<p>There is still another and a more significant way in which men recognize
+one another: the way of address and conversation. And men have
+invariably held a similar intercourse with their gods. To this category
+belong communion and prayer, with all their varieties of expression. I
+have no god until I address him. This will be the most direct evidence
+of what is at least from my point of view a social relation. There can
+be no general definition of the form which this address will take. There
+may be as many special languages, as many attitudes, and as much
+playfulness and subtlety of symbolism as in human intercourse. But, on
+the other hand, there are certain utterances that are peculiarly
+appropriate to religion. In so far as he regards his object as endowed
+with both power and goodness the worshipper will use the language of
+adoration; and the sense of his dependence <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104"></a>[<a href="./images/104.png">104</a>]</span>will speak in terms of
+consecration and thanksgiving.</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"O God, thou art my God; early will I seek thee:<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">In a dry and weary land, where no water is.<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">So have I looked upon thee in the sanctuary,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">To see thy power and thy glory.<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">For thy loving-kindness is better than life;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">My lips shall praise thee."<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>These are expressions of a hopeful faith; but, on the other hand, God
+may be addressed in terms of hatred and distrust.</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"Who is most wretched in this dolorous place?<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">I think myself; yet I would rather be<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">My miserable self than He, than He<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Who formed such creatures to his own disgrace.<br /></span>
+</div><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i0">"The vilest thing must be less vile than Thou<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">From whom it had its being, God and Lord!<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Creator of all woe and sin! abhorred,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0i">Malignant and implacable."<a name="FNanchor_104:13_40" id="FNanchor_104:13_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_104:13_40" class="fnanchor">[104:13]</a><br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>In either case there may be an indefinite degree of hyperbole. The
+language of love and hate, of confidence and despair, is not the
+language of description. In this train of the religious consciousness
+there is occasion for whatever eloquence man can feel, and whatever
+rhetorical luxuriance he can utter.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105"></a>[<a href="./images/105.png">105</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_37" id="Section_37">37</a>. Such considerations as these serve to account for the exercise and
+certain of the fruits of the religious imagination, and to designate the
+general criterion governing its propriety. But <i>how is one to determine
+the boundary between the imaginative and the cognitive</i>? It is commonly
+agreed that what religion says and does is not all intended literally.
+But when is expression of religion only poetry and eloquence, and when
+is it matter of conviction? If we revert again to the cognitive aspect
+of religion, it is evident that there is but one test to apply:
+<i>whatever either fortifies or misleads the will is literal conviction</i>.
+This test cannot be applied absolutely, because it can properly be
+applied only to the intention of an individual experience. However I may
+express my religion, that which I express, is, we have seen, an
+expectation. The degree to which I literally mean what I say is then the
+degree to which it determines my expectations. Whatever adds no item to
+these expectations, but only recognizes and vitalizes them, is pure
+imagination. But it follows that it is entirely impossible from direct
+inspection to define any given <i>expression</i> of religious experience as
+myth, or to define the degree to which it is myth. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106"></a>[<a href="./images/106.png">106</a>]</span>It submits to such
+distinctions only when viewed from the stand-point of the concrete
+religious experience which it expresses. Any such given expression could
+easily be all imagination to one, and all conviction to another.
+Consider the passage which follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"And I saw the heaven opened; and behold, a white horse, and
+he that sat thereon, called Faithful and True; and in
+righteousness he doth judge and make war. And his eyes are a
+flame of fire, and upon his head are many diadems; and he hath
+a name written, which no one knoweth but he himself. And he is
+arrayed in a garment sprinkled with blood: and his name is
+called The Word of God."<a name="FNanchor_106:14_41" id="FNanchor_106:14_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_106:14_41" class="fnanchor">[106:14]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Is this all rhapsody, or is it in part true report? There is evidently
+no answer to the question so conceived. But if it were to express my own
+religious feeling it would have some specific proportion of literal and
+metaphorical significance, according to the degree to which its detail
+contributes different practical values to me. It might then be my
+guide-book to the heavens, or only my testimony to the dignity and
+mystery of the function of Christ.</p>
+
+<p>The development of religion bears in a very important way upon this last
+problem. The factor <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107"></a>[<a href="./images/107.png">107</a>]</span>of imagination has undoubtedly come to have a more
+clearly recognized role in religion. There can be no doubt that what we
+now call myths were once beliefs, and that what we now call poetry was
+once history. If we go back sufficiently far we come to a time when the
+literal and the metaphorical were scarcely distinguishable, and this
+because science had not emerged from the early animistic extension of
+social relations. Men <i>meant</i> to address their gods as they addressed
+their fellows, and expected them to hear and respond, as they looked for
+such reactions within the narrower circle of ordinary intercourse. The
+advance of science has brought into vogue a description of nature that
+inhibits such expectations. The result has been that men, continuing to
+use the same terms, essentially expressive as they are of a practical
+relationship, have come to regard them as only a general expression of
+their attitude. The differences of content that are in excess of factors
+of expectation remain as poetry and myth. On the other hand, it is
+equally possible, if not equally common, for that which was once
+imagined to come to be believed. Such a transformation is, perhaps,
+normally the case when the inspired utterance passes from its author to
+the cult. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108"></a>[<a href="./images/108.png">108</a>]</span>prophets and sweet singers are likely to possess an
+exuberance of imagination not appreciated by their followers; and for
+this reason almost certainly misunderstood. For these reasons it is
+manifestly absurd to fasten the name of myth or the name of creed upon
+any religious utterance whatsoever, unless it be so regarded from the
+stand-point of the personal religion which it originally expressed, or
+unless one means by so doing to define it as an expression of his own
+religion. He who defines "the myth of creation," or "the poetical story
+of Samson," as parts of the pre-Christian Judaic religion, exhibits a
+total loss of historical sense. The distinction between cognition and
+fancy does not exist among objects, but only in the <i>intending</i>
+experience; hence, for me to attach my own distinction to any individual
+case of belief, viewed apart from the believer, is an utterly confusing
+projection of my own personality into the field of my study.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_38" id="Section_38">38</a>. Only after such considerations as these are we qualified to attack
+that much-vexed question as to whether religion deals invariably with a
+personal god. It is often assumed in discussion of this question that
+"personal god," as well as "god," is a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109"></a>[<a href="./images/109.png">109</a>]</span>distinct and familiar kind of
+entity, like a dragon or centaur; its existence alone being
+problematical. This is doubly false to the religious employment of such
+an object. If it be true that in religion we mean by God a practical
+interpretation of the world, <i>whatsoever be its nature</i>, then the
+personality of God must be a derivative of the attitude, and not of the
+nature of the world. Given the practical outlook upon life, there is no
+definable world that cannot be construed under the form of God. My god
+is my world practically recognized in respect of its fundamental or
+ultimate attitude to my ideals. In the sense, then, conveyed by this
+term <i>attitude</i> my god will invariably possess the characters of
+personality. But the degree to which these characters will coincide with
+the characters which I assign to human persons, or the terms of any
+logical conception of personality, cannot be absolutely defined.
+Anthropomorphisms may be imagination or they may be literal conviction.
+This will depend, as above maintained, upon the degree to which they
+determine my expectations. Suppose the world to be theoretically
+conceived as governed by laws that are indifferent to all human
+interests. The practical expression of this conception appears in the
+naturalism of Lucretius, or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110"></a>[<a href="./images/110.png">110</a>]</span>Diogenes, or Omar Khayyam. Living in the
+vivid presence of an indifferent world, I may picture my gods as leading
+their own lives in some remote realm which is inaccessible to my
+petitions, or as regarding me with sinister and contemptuous cruelty. In
+the latter case I may shrink and cower, or return them contempt for
+contempt. I mean this literally only if I look for consequences
+following directly from the emotional coloring which I have bestowed
+upon them. It may well be that I mean merely to regard myself <i>sub
+specie eternitatis</i>, in which case I am <i>personifying</i> in the sense of
+free imagination. In the religion of enlightenment the divine attitude
+tends to belong to the poetry and eloquence of religion rather than to
+its cognitive intent. This is true even of optimistic and idealistic
+religion. The love and providence of God are less commonly supposed to
+warrant an expectation of special and arbitrary favors, and have come
+more and more to mean the play of my own feeling about the general
+central conviction of the favorableness of the cosmos to my deeper or
+moral concerns. But the factor of personality cannot possibly be
+entirely eliminated, for the religious consciousness <i>creates</i> a social
+relationship between man and the universe. Such an interpretation of
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111"></a>[<a href="./images/111.png">111</a>]</span>life is not a case of the pathetic fallacy, unless it incorrectly
+<i>reckons with</i> the inner feeling which it attributes to the universe. It
+is an obvious practical truth that the total or residual environment is
+significant for life. Grant this and you make rational a recognition of
+that significance, or a more or less constant sense of coincidence or
+conflict with cosmical forces. Permit this consciousness to stand, and
+you make some expression of it inevitable. Such an expression may,
+furthermore, with perfect propriety and in fulfilment of human nature,
+set forth and transfigure this central belief until it may enter into
+the context of immediacy.</p>
+
+<p>Thus any conception of the universe whatsoever may afford a basis for
+religion. But there is no religion that does not virtually make a more
+definite claim upon the nature of things, and this entirely
+independently of its theology, or explicit attempt to define itself.
+Every religion, even in the very living of it, is naturalistic, or
+dualistic, or pluralistic, or optimistic, or idealistic, or pessimistic.
+And there is in the realm of truth that which justifies or refutes these
+definite practical ways of construing the universe. But no historical
+religion is ever so vague even as this in its philosophical
+implications. Indeed, we shall always <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112"></a>[<a href="./images/112.png">112</a>]</span>be brought eventually to the
+inner meaning of some individual religious experience, where no general
+criticism can be certainly valid.</p>
+
+<p>There is, then, a place in religion for that which is not directly
+answerable to philosophical or scientific standards. But there is
+always, on the other hand, an element of hope which conceives the nature
+of the world, and means to be grounded in reality. In respect of that
+element, philosophy is indispensable to religion. The meaning of
+religion is, in fact, the central problem of philosophy. There is a
+virtue in religion like that which Emerson ascribes to poetry. "The poet
+is in the right attitude; he is believing; the philosopher, after some
+struggle, having only reasons for believing." But whatever may be said
+to the disparagement of its dialectic, philosophy is the justification
+of religion, and the criticism of religions. To it must be assigned the
+task of so refining positive religion as to contribute to the perpetual
+establishment of true religion. And to philosophy, with religion,
+belongs the task of holding fast to the idea of the universe. There is
+no religion except before you begin, or after you have rested from, your
+philosophical speculation. But in the universe these interests have a
+common object. As <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113"></a>[<a href="./images/113.png">113</a>]</span>philosophy is the articulation and vindication of
+religion, so is religion the realization of philosophy. In philosophy
+thought is brought up to the elevation of life, and in religion
+philosophy, as the sum of wisdom, enters into life.</p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83:1_28" id="Footnote_83:1_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83:1_28"><span class="label">[83:1]</span></a> As Plato interprets the scepticism of Protagoras to mean
+that one state of mind cannot be more <i>true</i> than another, but only
+<i>better</i> or worse. Cf. <i>The&aelig;tetus</i>, 167.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88:2_29" id="Footnote_88:2_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88:2_29"><span class="label">[88:2]</span></a> Quoted with some omissions from <i>I Kings</i>, 18:21-29. The
+Hebrew term <i>Yahweh</i>, the name of the national deity, has been
+substituted for the English translation, "the Lord."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_90:3_30" id="Footnote_90:3_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90:3_30"><span class="label">[90:3]</span></a> <i>Iliad</i>, Book IX, lines 467 <i>sq.</i> Translation by
+Chapman.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91:4_31" id="Footnote_91:4_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91:4_31"><span class="label">[91:4]</span></a> The supposed abode of departed spirits.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91:5_32" id="Footnote_91:5_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91:5_32"><span class="label">[91:5]</span></a> Lucretius: <i>De Rerum Natura</i>, Book III, lines 1 <i>sq.</i>
+Translated by Munro.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91:6_33" id="Footnote_91:6_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91:6_33"><span class="label">[91:6]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Book II, lines 644 <i>sq.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92:7_34" id="Footnote_92:7_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92:7_34"><span class="label">[92:7]</span></a> It would be interesting to compare the equally famous
+criticism of Greek religion in Plato's <i>Republic</i>, Book II, 377 <i>sq.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92:8_35" id="Footnote_92:8_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92:8_35"><span class="label">[92:8]</span></a> Cf. W. Robertson Smith's admirable account of the
+Semitic religions:</p>
+
+<p>"What is requisite to religion is a practical acquaintance with the
+rules on which the deity acts and on which he expects his worshippers to
+frame their conduct&mdash;what in II Kings, 17:26 is called the 'manner,' or
+rather the 'customary law' (<i>mishpat</i>), of the god of the land. This is
+true even of the religion of Israel. When the prophets speak of the
+knowledge of God, they always mean a practical knowledge of the laws and
+principles of His government in Israel, and a summary expression for
+religion as a whole is 'the knowledge and fear of Jehovah,' <i>i. e.</i>, the
+knowledge of what Jehovah prescribes, combined with a reverent
+obedience." <i>The Religion of the Semites</i>, p. 23.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93:9_36" id="Footnote_93:9_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93:9_36"><span class="label">[93:9]</span></a> <i>Proverbs</i>, 18:10; 11:19; 21:3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93:10_37" id="Footnote_93:10_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93:10_37"><span class="label">[93:10]</span></a> <i>Ecclesiastes</i>, 2:13 <i>sq.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94:11_38" id="Footnote_94:11_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94:11_38"><span class="label">[94:11]</span></a> <i>Psalms</i>, 51:17; <i>Isaiah</i>, 57:15.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94:12_39" id="Footnote_94:12_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94:12_39"><span class="label">[94:12]</span></a> In this discussion of Judaism I am much indebted to
+Matthew Arnold's <i>Literature and Dogma</i>, especially Chapters I and II.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_104:13_40" id="Footnote_104:13_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104:13_40"><span class="label">[104:13]</span></a> James Thomson: <i>The City of Dreadful Night</i>. Quoted by
+James, in <i>The Will to Believe, etc.</i>, p. 45.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_106:14_41" id="Footnote_106:14_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106:14_41"><span class="label">[106:14]</span></a> <i>Revelation</i>, 19:11-13.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114"></a>[<a href="./images/114.png">114</a>]</span></p>
+<h2>CHAPTER V</h2>
+
+<h3>NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY</h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">The True Relations of Philosophy and Science. Misconceptions
+and Antagonisms.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_39" id="Section_39">39</a>. In the case of natural science we meet not only with a special
+human interest, but with a theoretical discipline. We are confronted,
+therefore, with a new question: that of the relation within the body of
+human knowledge of two of its constituent members. Owing to the militant
+temper of the representatives of both science and philosophy, this has
+long since ceased to be an academic question, and has frequently been
+met in the spirit of rivalry and partisanship. But the true order of
+knowledge is only temporarily distorted by the brilliant success of a
+special type of investigation; and the conquests of science are now so
+old a story that critical thought shows a disposition to judge of the
+issue with sobriety and logical highmindedness.</p>
+
+<p>In the seventeenth century a newly emancipated and too sanguine reason
+proposed to know the whole of nature at once in terms of mathematics
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115"></a>[<a href="./images/115.png">115</a>]</span>and mechanics. Thus the system of the Englishman Hobbes was science
+swelled to world-proportions, simple, compact, conclusive, and
+all-comprehensive. Philosophy proposed to do the work of science, but in
+its own grand manner. The last twenty years of Hobbes's life, spent in
+repeated discomfiture at the hands of Seth Ward, Wallis, Boyle, and
+other scientific experts of the new Royal Society, certified
+conclusively to the failure of this enterprise, and the experimental
+specialist thereupon took exclusive possession of the field of natural
+law. But the idealist, on the other hand, reconstructed nature to meet
+the demands of philosophical knowledge and religious faith. There
+issued, together with little mutual understanding and less sympathy, on
+the one hand <i>positivism</i>, or exclusive experimentalism, and on the
+other hand a rabid and unsympathetic transcendentalism. Hume, who
+consigned to the flames all thought save "abstract reasoning concerning
+quantity or number," and "experimental reasoning concerning matter of
+fact and existence"; Comte, who assigned metaphysics to an immature
+stage in the development of human intelligence; and Tyndall, who reduced
+the religious consciousness to an emotional experience of mystery, are
+typical of the one <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116"></a>[<a href="./images/116.png">116</a>]</span>attitude. The other is well exhibited in Schelling's
+reference to "the blind and thoughtless mode of investigating nature
+which has become generally established since the corruption of
+philosophy by Bacon, and of physics by Boyle." Dogmatic experimentalism
+and dogmatic idealism signify more or less consistently the abstract
+isolation of the scientific and philosophical motives.</p>
+
+<p>There is already a touch of quaintness in both of these attitudes. We of
+the present are in the habit of acknowledging the autonomy of science,
+and the unimpeachable validity of the results of experimental research
+in so far as they are sanctioned by the consensus of experts. But at the
+same time we recognize the definiteness of the task of science, and the
+validity of such reservations as may be made from a higher critical
+point of view. Science is to be transcended in so far as it is
+understood as a whole. Philosophy is critically empirical; empirical,
+because it regards all <i>bona fide</i> descriptions of experience as
+knowledge; critical, because attentive to the conditions of both general
+and special knowledge. And in terms of a critical empiricism so defined,
+it is one of the problems of philosophy <i>to define and appraise the
+generating problem of science</i>, and so to determine the value
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117"></a>[<a href="./images/117.png">117</a>]</span>assignable to natural laws in the whole system of knowledge.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Spheres of Philosophy and Science.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_40" id="Section_40">40</a>. If this be the true function of philosophy with reference to
+science, several current notions of the relations of the spheres of
+these disciplines may be disproved. In the first place, philosophy will
+not be all the sciences regarded as one science. Science tends to unify
+without any higher criticism. The various sciences already regard the
+one nature as their common object, and the one system of interdependent
+laws as their common achievement. The philosopher who tries to be all
+science at once fails ignominiously because he tries to replace the work
+of a specialist with the work of a dilettante; and if philosophy be
+identical with that body of truth accumulated and organized by the
+co&ouml;perative activity of scientific men, then philosophy is a name and
+there is no occasion for the existence of the philosopher as such.
+Secondly, philosophy will not be the assembling of the sciences; for
+such would be a merely clerical work, and the philosopher would much
+better be regarded as non-existent than as a book-keeper. Nor, thirdly,
+is philosophy an auxiliary discipline that may be called upon in
+emergencies for the solution of some baffling problem <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118"></a>[<a href="./images/118.png">118</a>]</span>of science. A
+problem defined by science must be solved in the scientific manner.
+Science will accept no aid from the gods when engaged in her own
+campaign, but will fight it out according to her own principles of
+warfare. And as long as science moves in her own plane, she can
+acknowledge no permanent barriers. There is then no need of any
+superscientific research that shall replace, or piece together, or
+extend the work of science. But the savant is not on this account in
+possession of the entire field of knowledge. It is true that he is not
+infrequently moved to such a conviction when he takes us about to view
+his estates. Together we ascend up into heaven, or make our beds in
+sheol, or take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts
+of the sea&mdash;and look in vain for anything that is not work done, or work
+projected, by natural science. Persuade him, however, to <i>define</i> his
+estates, and he has circumscribed them. In his definition he must employ
+conceptions more fundamental than the working conceptions that he
+employs within his field of study. Indeed, in viewing his task as
+definite and specific he has undertaken the solution of the problem of
+philosophy. The logical self-consciousness has been awakened, and there
+is no honorable <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119"></a>[<a href="./images/119.png">119</a>]</span>way of putting it to sleep again. This is precisely
+what takes place in any account of the generating problem of science. To
+define science is to define at least one realm that is other than
+science, the realm of active intellectual endeavor with its own proper
+categories. One cannot reflect upon science and assign it an end, and a
+method proper to that end, without bringing into the field of knowledge
+a broader field of experience than the field proper to science, broader
+at any rate by the presence in it of the scientific activity itself.</p>
+
+<p>Here, then, is the field proper to philosophy. The scientist <i>qua</i>
+scientist is intent upon his own determinate enterprise. The philosopher
+comes into being as one who is interested in observing what it is that
+the scientist is so intently doing. In taking this interest he has
+accepted as a field for investigation that which he would designate as
+the totality of interests or the inclusive experience. He can carry out
+his intention of defining the scientific attitude only by standing
+outside it, and determining it by means of nothing less than an
+exhaustive searching out of all attitudes. Philosophy is, to be sure,
+itself a definite activity and an attitude, but an attitude required by
+definition to be conscious of itself, and, if you please, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120"></a>[<a href="./images/120.png">120</a>]</span>conscious of
+its own consciousness, until its attitude shall have embraced in its
+object the very principle of attitudes. Philosophy defines itself and
+all other human tasks and interests. None have furnished a clearer
+justification of philosophy than those men of scientific predilections
+who have claimed the title of agnostics. A good instance is furnished by
+a contemporary physicist, who has chosen to call his reflections
+"antimetaphysical."</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Physical science does not pretend to be a <i>complete</i> view of
+the world; it simply claims that it is working toward such a
+complete view in the future. The highest philosophy of the
+scientific investigator is precisely this <i>toleration</i> of an
+incomplete conception of the world and the preference for it,
+rather than an apparently perfect, but inadequate
+conception."<a name="FNanchor_120:1_42" id="FNanchor_120:1_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_120:1_42" class="fnanchor">[120:1]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>It is apparent that if one were to challenge such a statement, the issue
+raised would at once be philosophical and not scientific. The problem
+here stated and answered, requires for its solution the widest
+inclusiveness of view, and a peculiar interest in critical reflection
+and logical co&ouml;rdination.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_41" id="Section_41">41</a>. One may be prepared for a knowledge of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121"></a>[<a href="./images/121.png">121</a>]</span>the economic and social
+significance of the railway even if one does not know a throttle from a
+piston-rod, provided one has broad and well-balanced knowledge of the
+interplay of human social interests. One's proficiency here requires one
+to stand off from society, and to obtain a perspective that shall be as
+little distorted as possible. The reflection of the philosopher of
+science requires a similar quality of perspective. All knowledges,
+together with the knowing of them, must be his object yonder, standing
+apart in its wholeness and symmetry. Philosophy is the least dogmatic,
+the most empirical, of all disciplines, since it is the only
+investigation that can permit itself to be forgetful of nothing.</p>
+
+<p>But the most comprehensive view may be the most distorted and false. The
+true order of knowledge is the difficult task of logical analysis,
+requiring as its chief essential some determination of the scope of the
+working conceptions of the different independent branches of knowledge.
+In the case of natural science this would mean an examination of the
+method and results characteristic of this field, for the sake of
+defining the kind of truth which attaches to the laws which are being
+gradually formulated. But one must immediately <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122"></a>[<a href="./images/122.png">122</a>]</span>reach either the one or
+the other of two very general conclusions. If the laws of natural
+science cover all possible knowledge of reality, then there is left to
+philosophy only the logical function of justifying this statement. Logic
+and natural science will then constitute the sum of knowledge. If, on
+the other hand, it be found that the aim of natural science is such as
+to exclude certain aspects of reality, then philosophy will not be
+restricted to logical criticism, but will have a cognitive field of its
+own. The great majority of philosophers have assumed the latter of these
+alternatives to be true, while most aggressive scientists have intended
+the former in their somewhat blind attacks upon "metaphysics." Although
+the selection of either of these alternatives involves us in the defence
+of a specific answer to a philosophical question, the issue is
+inevitable in any introduction to philosophy because of its bearing upon
+the extent of the field of that study. Furthermore there can be no
+better exposition of the meaning of philosophy of science than an
+illustration of its exercise. The following, then, is to be regarded as
+on the one hand a tentative refutation of <i>positivism</i>, or the <i>claim of
+natural science to be coextensive with knowable reality</i>; and on the
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123"></a>[<a href="./images/123.png">123</a>]</span>other hand a programme for the procedure of philosophy with reference
+to natural science.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Origin of the Scientific Interest.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_42" id="Section_42">42</a>. Science issues through imperceptible stages from organic habits
+and instincts which signify the possession by living creatures of a
+power to meet the environment on its own terms. Every organism possesses
+such a working knowledge of nature, and among men the first science
+consists in those habitual adjustments common to men and infra-human
+organisms. Man is already practising science before he recognizes it. As
+<i>skill</i> it distinguishes itself early in his history from lore, or
+untested tradition. Skill is familiarity with general kinds of events,
+together with ability to identify an individual with reference to a
+kind, and so be prepared for the outcome. Thus man is inwardly prepared
+for the alternation of day and night, and the periods of the seasons. He
+practically anticipates the procession of natural events in the
+countless emergencies of his daily life. But science in the stricter
+sense begins when skill becomes <i>free</i> and <i>social</i>.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Skill as Free.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_43" id="Section_43">43</a>. Skill may be said to be <i>free</i> when the essential terms of the
+action have been abstracted from the circumstances attending them in
+individual <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124"></a>[<a href="./images/124.png">124</a>]</span>experiences, and are retained as ideal plans applicable to
+any practical occasion. The monkey who swings with a trapeze from his
+perch on the side of the cage, counts upon swinging back again without
+any further effort on his own part. His act and its successful issue
+signify his practical familiarity with the natural motions of bodies. We
+can conceive such a performance to be accompanied by an almost entire
+failure to grasp its essentials. It would then be necessary for nearly
+the whole situation to be repeated in order to induce in the monkey the
+same action and expectation. He would require a similar form, color, and
+distance. But he might, on the other hand, regard as practically
+identical all suspended and freely swinging bodies capable of affording
+him support, and quite independently of their shape, size, time, or
+place. In this latter case his skill would be applicable to the widest
+possible number of cases that could present themselves. Having a
+discerning eye for essentials, he would lose no chance of a swing
+through looking for more than the bare necessities. When the physicist
+describes the pendulum in terms of a formula such as t&nbsp;=&nbsp;2&#960;&radic;l/g he exhibits a similar discernment. He has found
+that the time occupied by an oscillation of any <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125"></a>[<a href="./images/125.png">125</a>]</span>pendulum may be
+calculated exclusively in terms of its length and the acceleration due
+to gravity. The monkey's higher proficiency and the formula alike
+represent a knowledge that is free in the sense that it is contained in
+terms that require no single fixed context in immediacy. The knowledge
+is valid wherever these essential terms are present; and calculations
+may be based upon these essential terms, while attendant circumstances
+vary <i>ad infinitum</i>. Such knowledge is said to be <i>general</i> or
+<i>universal</i>.</p>
+
+<p>There is another element of freedom, however, which so far has not been
+attributed to the monkey's knowledge, but which is evidently present in
+that of the physicist. The former has a practical ability to deal with a
+pendulum when he sees it. The latter, on the other hand, knows about a
+pendulum whether one be present or not. His knowledge is so retained as
+always to be available, even though it be not always applicable. His
+knowledge is not merely skill in treating a situation, but the
+possession of resources which he may employ at whatever time, and in
+whatever manner, may suit his interests. Knowing what he does about the
+pendulum, he may act from the idea of such a contrivance, and with the
+aid of it construct <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126"></a>[<a href="./images/126.png">126</a>]</span>some more complex mechanism. His formulas are his
+instruments, which he may use on any occasion. Suppose that a situation
+with factors <i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, and <i>c</i> requires factor <i>d</i> in order to become
+<i>M</i>, as desired. Such a situation might easily be hopeless for an
+organism reacting directly to the stimulus <i>abc</i>, and yet be easily met
+by a free knowledge of <i>d</i>. One who knows that <i>l</i>, <i>m</i>, and <i>n</i> will
+produce <i>d</i>, may by these means provide the missing factor, complete the
+sum of required conditions, <i>abcd</i>, and so obtain the end <i>M</i>. Such
+indirection might be used to obtain any required factor of the end, or
+of any near or remote means to the end. There is, in fact, no limit to
+the complexity of action made possible upon this basis; for since it is
+available in idea, the whole range of such knowledge may be brought to
+bear upon any individual problem.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Skill as Social.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_44" id="Section_44">44</a>. But knowledge of this free type becomes at the same time <i>social</i>
+or <i>institutional</i>. It consists no longer in a skilful adaptation of the
+individual organism, but in a system of terms common to all
+intelligence, and preserved in those books and other monuments which
+serve as the articulate memory of the race. A knowledge that is social
+must be composed of unequivocal conceptions and fixed symbols. The
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127"></a>[<a href="./images/127.png">127</a>]</span>mathematical laws of the exact sciences represent the most successful
+attainment of this end so far as form is concerned. Furthermore, the
+amount of knowledge may now be increased from generation to generation
+through the service of those who make a vocation of its pursuit. Natural
+science is thus a cumulative racial proficiency, which any individual
+may bring to bear upon any emergency of his life.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Science for Accommodation and Construction.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_45" id="Section_45">45</a>. Such proficiency as science affords is in every case the
+anticipation of experience. This has a twofold value for mankind, that
+of <i>accommodation</i>, and that of <i>construction</i>. Primitively, where mere
+survival is the function of the organism as a whole, the value of
+accommodation is relatively fundamental. The knowledge of what may be
+expected enables the organism to save itself by means of its own
+counter-arrangement of natural processes. Construction is here for the
+sake of accommodation. But with the growth of civilization construction
+becomes a positive interest, and man tends to save himself for definite
+ends. Accommodation comes to take place for the sake of construction.
+Science then supplies the individual with the ways and means wherewith
+to execute life purposes which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128"></a>[<a href="./images/128.png">128</a>]</span>themselves tend to assume an absolute
+value that cannot be justified merely on the ground of science.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. The
+Descriptive Method.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_46" id="Section_46">46</a>. If natural science be animated by any special cognitive interest,
+this motive should appear in the development of its method and
+fundamental conceptions. If that interest has been truly defined, it
+should now enable us to understand the progressive and permanent in
+scientific investigation as directly related to it. For the aim of any
+discipline exercises a gradual selection from among possible methods,
+and gives to its laws their determinate and final form.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>descriptive method</i> is at the present day fully established. A
+leading moral of the history of science is the superior usefulness of an
+exact account of the workings of nature to an explanation in terms of
+some qualitative potency. Explanation has been postponed by enlightened
+science until after a more careful observation of actual processes shall
+have been made; and at length it has been admitted that there is no need
+of any explanation but perfect description. Now the practical use of
+science defined above, requires no knowledge beyond the actual order of
+events. For such a purpose sufficient reason signifies only sufficient
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129"></a>[<a href="./images/129.png">129</a>]</span>conditions. All other considerations are irrelevant, and it is proper
+to ignore them. Such has actually been the fate of the so-called
+metaphysical solution of special problems of nature. The case of Kepler
+is the classic instance. This great scientist supplemented his laws of
+planetary motion with the following speculation concerning the agencies
+at work:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"We must suppose one of two things: either that the moving
+spirits, in proportion as they are more removed from the sun,
+are more feeble; or that there is one moving spirit in the
+centre of all the orbits, namely, in the sun, which urges each
+body the more vehemently in proportion as it is nearer; but in
+more distant spaces languishes in consequence of the
+remoteness and attenuation of its virtue."<a name="FNanchor_129:2_43" id="FNanchor_129:2_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_129:2_43" class="fnanchor">[129:2]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The following passage from Hegel affords an interesting analogy:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The moon is the waterless crystal which seeks to complete
+itself by means of our sea, to quench the thirst of its arid
+rigidity, and therefore produces ebb and flow."<a name="FNanchor_129:3_44" id="FNanchor_129:3_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_129:3_44" class="fnanchor">[129:3]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>No scientist has ever sought to refute either of these theories. They
+have merely been neglected.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130"></a>[<a href="./images/130.png">130</a>]</span>They were advanced in obedience to a demand for the ultimate
+explanation of the phenomena in question, and were obtained by applying
+such general conceptions as were most satisfying to the reasons of their
+respective authors. But they contributed nothing whatsoever to a
+practical familiarity with the natural course of events, in this case
+the times and places of the planets and the tides. Hence they have not
+been used in the building of science. In our own day investigators have
+become conscious of their motive, and do not wait for historical
+selection to exclude powers and reasons from their province. They
+deliberately seek to formulate exact descriptions. To this end they
+employ symbols that shall serve to identify the terms of nature, and
+formulas that shall define their systematic relationship. These systems
+must be exact, or deductions cannot be made from them. Hence they tend
+ultimately to assume a mathematical form of expression.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Space, Time, and Prediction.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_47" id="Section_47">47</a>. But science tends to employ for these systems only such
+conceptions as relate to <i>prediction</i>; and of these the most fundamental
+are <i>space</i> and <i>time</i>. The first science to establish its method was
+the science of astronomy, where measurement and computation in terms of
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131"></a>[<a href="./images/131.png">131</a>]</span>space and time were the most obvious means of description; and the
+general application of the method of astronomy by Galileo and Newton, or
+the development of mechanics, is the most important factor in the
+establishment of modern science upon a permanent working basis. The
+persistence of the term <i>cause</i>, testifies to the fact that science is
+primarily concerned with the determination of <i>events</i>. Its definitions
+of objects are means of identification, while its laws are dynamical,
+<i>i. e.</i>, have reference to the conditions under which these objects
+arise. Thus the chemist may know less about the properties of water than
+the poet; but he is pre&euml;minently skilled in its production from
+elements, and understands similarly the compounds into which it may
+enter. Now the general conditions of all anticipation, whereby it
+becomes exact and verifiable, are spacial and temporal. A predictable
+event must be assigned to what is here now, or there now; or what is
+here then, or there then. An experimentally verifiable system must
+contain space-time variables, for which can be substituted the here and
+now of the experimenter's immediate experience. Hence science deals
+primarily with calculable places and moments. The mechanical theory of
+nature owes its <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132"></a>[<a href="./images/132.png">132</a>]</span>success to a union of space and time through its
+conceptions of <i>matter</i> and <i>motion</i>.<a name="FNanchor_132:4_45" id="FNanchor_132:4_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_132:4_45" class="fnanchor">[132:4]</a> And the projected theory of
+energetics must satisfy the same conditions.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Quantitative Method.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_48" id="Section_48">48</a>. But, furthermore, science has, as we have seen, an interest in
+freeing its descriptions from the peculiar angle and relativity of an
+individual's experience, for the sake of affording him knowledge of that
+with which he must meet. Science enlightens the will by acquainting it
+with that which takes place in spite of it, and for which it must hold
+itself in readiness. To this end the individual benefits himself in so
+far as he eliminates himself from the objects which he investigates. His
+knowledge is useful in so far as it is valid for his own indefinitely
+varying stand-points, and those of other wills recognized by him in his
+practical relations. But in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133"></a>[<a href="./images/133.png">133</a>]</span>attempting to describe objects in terms
+other than those of a specific experience, science is compelled to
+describe them in terms of one another. For this purpose <i>the
+quantitative method</i> is peculiarly serviceable. With its aid objects
+permit themselves to be described as multiples of one another, and as
+occupying positions in relation to one another. When all objects are
+described strictly in terms of one another, they are expressed in terms
+of arbitrary units, and located in terms of arbitrary spacial or
+temporal axes of reference. Thus there arises the universe of the
+scientific imagination, a vast complexity of material displacements and
+transformations, without color, music, pleasure, or any of all that rich
+variety of qualities that the least of human experiences contains. It
+does not completely rationalize or even completely describe such
+experiences, but formulates their succession. To this end they are
+reduced to terms that correspond to no specific experience, and for this
+very reason may be translated again into all definable hypothetical
+experiences. The solar system for astronomy is not a bird's-eye view of
+elliptical orbits, with the planets and satellites in definite phases.
+Nor is it this group of objects from any such point of view, or from any
+number <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134"></a>[<a href="./images/134.png">134</a>]</span>of such points of view; but a formulation of their motions that
+will serve as the key to an infinite number of their appearances. Or,
+consider the picture of the ichthysauria romping in the mesozoic sea,
+that commonly accompanies a text-book of geology. Any such picture, and
+all such pictures, with their coloring and their temporal and spacial
+perspective, are imaginary. No such special and exclusive manifolds can
+be defined as having been then and there realized. But we have a
+geological knowledge of this period, that fulfils the formal demands of
+natural science, in so far as we can construct this and countless other
+specific experiences with reference to it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The General Development of Science.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_49" id="Section_49">49</a>. Science, then, is to be understood as springing from the practical
+necessity of anticipating the environment. This anticipation appears
+first as congenital or acquired reactions on the part of the organism.
+Such reactions imply a fixed co&ouml;rdination or system in the environment
+whereby a given circumstance determines other circumstances; and science
+proper arises as the formulation of such systems. The requirement that
+they shall apply to the phenomena that <i>confront</i> the will, determines
+their spacial, temporal, and quantitative form. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135"></a>[<a href="./images/135.png">135</a>]</span>progress of science
+is marked by the growth of these conceptions in the direction of
+comprehensiveness on the one hand, and of refinement and delicacy on the
+other. Man lives in an environment that is growing at the same time
+richer and more extended, but with a compensatory simplification in the
+ever closer systematization of scientific conceptions under the form of
+the order of nature.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_50" id="Section_50">50</a>. At the opening of this chapter it was maintained that it is a
+function of philosophy to criticise science through its generating
+problem, or its self-imposed task viewed as determining its province and
+selecting its categories. The above account of the origin and method of
+science must suffice as a definition of its generating problem, and
+afford the basis of our answer to the question of its limits. Enough has
+been said to make it clear that philosophy is not in the field of
+science, and is therefore not entitled to contest its result in detail
+or even to take sides within the province of its special problems.
+Furthermore, philosophy should not aim to restrain science by the
+imposition of external barriers. Whatever may be said of the sufficiency
+of its categories in any region of the world, that body <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136"></a>[<a href="./images/136.png">136</a>]</span>of truth of
+which mathematics, mechanics, and physics are the foundations, must be
+regarded as a whole that tends to be all-comprehensive in its own terms.
+There remains for philosophy, then, the critical examination of these
+terms, and the appraisal as a whole of the truth that they may express.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Natural Science is Abstract.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_51" id="Section_51">51</a>. The impossibility of embracing the whole of knowledge within
+natural science is due to the fact that the latter is <i>abstract</i>. This
+follows from the fact that natural science is governed by a selective
+interest. The formulation of definitions and laws in exclusively
+mechanical terms is not due to the exhaustive or even pre&euml;minent reality
+of these properties, but to their peculiar serviceableness in a
+verifiable description of events. Natural science does not affirm that
+reality is essentially constituted of matter, or essentially
+characterized by motion; but is <i>interested</i> in the mechanical aspect of
+reality, and describes it quite regardless of other evident aspects and
+without meaning to prejudice them. It is unfortunately true that the
+scientist has rarely been clear in his own mind on this point. It is
+only recently that he has partially freed himself from the habit of
+construing his terms as final and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137"></a>[<a href="./images/137.png">137</a>]</span>exhaustive.<a name="FNanchor_137:5_46" id="FNanchor_137:5_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_137:5_46" class="fnanchor">[137:5]</a> This he was able
+to do even to his own satisfaction, only by allowing loose rein to the
+imagination. Consider the example of the atomic theory. In order to
+describe such occurrences as chemical combination, or changes in volume
+and density, the scientist has employed as a unit the least particle,
+physically indivisible and qualitatively homogeneous. Look for the atom
+in the body of science, and you will find it in physical laws governing
+expansion and contraction, and in chemical formulas. There the real
+responsibility of science ends. But whether through the need of popular
+exposition, or the undisciplined imagination of the investigator
+himself, atoms have figured in the history of thought as round
+corpuscles of a grayish hue scurrying hither and thither, and armed with
+special appliances wherewith to lock in molecular embrace. Although this
+is nonsense, we need not on that account conclude that there <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138"></a>[<a href="./images/138.png">138</a>]</span>are no
+atoms. There are atoms in precisely the sense intended by scientific
+law, in that the formulas computed with the aid of this concept are true
+of certain natural processes. The conception of ether furnishes a
+similar case. Science is not responsible for the notion of a quivering
+gelatinous substance pervading space, but only for certain laws that,
+<i>e. g.</i>, describe the velocity of light in terms of the vibration. It is
+true that there is such a thing as ether, not as gratuitously rounded
+out by the imagination, with various attributes of immediate experience,
+but just in so far as this concept is employed in verified descriptions
+of radiation, magnetism, or electricity. Strictly speaking science
+asserts nothing about the existence of ether, but only about the
+behavior, <i>e. g.</i>, of light. If true descriptions of this and other
+phenomena are reached by employing units of wave propagation in an
+elastic medium, then ether is proved to exist in precisely the same
+sense that linear feet are proved to exist, if it be admitted that there
+are 90,000,000 &times; 5,280 of them between the earth and the sun. And to
+imagine in the one case a jelly with all the qualities of texture,
+color, and the like, that an individual object of sense would possess,
+is much the same as in the other to imagine <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139"></a>[<a href="./images/139.png">139</a>]</span>the heavens filled with
+foot-rules and tape-measures. There is but one safe procedure in dealing
+with scientific concepts: to regard them as true so far as they
+describe, and no whit further. To supplement the strict meaning which
+has been verified and is contained in the formularies of science, with
+such vague predicates as will suffice to make entities of them, is mere
+ineptness and confusion of thought. And it is only such a
+supplementation that obscures their abstractness. For a mechanical
+description of things, true as it doubtless is, is even more indubitably
+incomplete.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_52" id="Section_52">52</a>. But though the abstractness involved in scientific description is
+open and deliberate, we must come to a more precise understanding of it,
+if we are to draw any conclusion as to what it involves. In his
+"Principles of Human Knowledge," the English philosopher Bishop Berkeley
+raises the question as to the universal validity of mathematical
+demonstrations. If we prove from the image or figure of an isosceles
+right triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles,
+how can we know that this proposition holds of all triangles?</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view
+whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140"></a>[<a href="./images/140.png">140</a>]</span>that of an
+isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a
+determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends
+to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness
+soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the
+equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all
+concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have
+in view includes all these particulars; but then there is not
+the least mention made of them in the proof of the
+proposition."<a name="FNanchor_140:6_47" id="FNanchor_140:6_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_140:6_47" class="fnanchor">[140:6]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Of the total conditions present in the concrete picture of a triangle,
+one may in one's calculations neglect as many as one sees fit, and work
+with the remainder. Then, if one has clearly distinguished the
+conditions used, one may confidently assert that whatever has been found
+true of them holds regardless of the neglected conditions. These may be
+missing or replaced by others, provided the selected or (for any given
+investigation) essential conditions are not affected. That which is true
+once is true always, provided time is not one of its conditions; that
+which is true in one place is true everywhere, provided location is not
+one of its conditions. But, given any concrete situation, the more
+numerous the conditions one ignores in one's calculations, the less
+adequate are one's calculations to that situation. The number of its
+inhabitants, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141"></a>[<a href="./images/141.png">141</a>]</span>and any mathematical operation made with that number, is
+true, but only very abstractly true of a nation. A similar though less
+radical abstractness appertains to natural science. Simple qualities of
+sound or color, and distinctions of beauty or moral worth, together with
+many other ingredients of actual experience attributed therein to the
+objects of nature, are ignored in the mechanical scheme. There is a
+substitution of certain mechanical arrangements in the case of the first
+group of properties, the simple qualities of sense, so that they may be
+assimilated to the general scheme of events, and their occurrence
+predicted. But their intrinsic qualitative character is not reckoned
+with, even in psychology, where the physiological method finally
+replaces them with brain states. Over and above these neglected
+properties of things there remain the purposive activities of thought.
+It is equally preposterous to deny them and to describe them in
+mechanical terms. It is plain, then, that natural science calculates
+upon the basis of only a fraction of the conditions that present
+themselves in actual experience. Its conclusions, therefore, though true
+so far as they go, and they may be abstractly true of everything, are
+completely true of nothing.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142"></a>[<a href="./images/142.png">142</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_53" id="Section_53">53</a>. Such, in brief, is the general charge of inadequacy which may be
+urged against natural science, not in the spirit of detraction, but for
+the sake of a more sound belief concerning reality. The philosopher
+falls into error no less radical than that of the dogmatic scientist,
+when he charges the scientist with untruth, and attaches to his concepts
+the predicate of unreality. The fact that the concepts of science are
+selected, and only inadequately true of reality, should not be taken to
+mean that they are sportive or arbitrary. They are not "devices" or
+abbreviations, in any sense that does not attach to such symbolism as
+all thought involves. Nor are they merely "hypothetical," though like
+all thought they are subject to correction.<a name="FNanchor_142:7_48" id="FNanchor_142:7_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_142:7_48" class="fnanchor">[142:7]</a> The scientist does
+not merely assert that the equation for energy is true if nature's
+capacity for work be measurable, but <i>that such is actually the case</i>.
+The statistician does not arrive at results contingent upon the
+supposition that men are numerable, but declares his sums and averages
+to be categorically true. Similarly scientific laws are true; only, to
+be sure, so <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143"></a>[<a href="./images/143.png">143</a>]</span>far as they go, but with no condition save the condition
+that attaches to all knowledge, viz., that it shall not need correction.
+The philosophy of science, therefore, is not the adversary of science,
+but supervenes upon science in the interests of the ideal of final
+truth. No philosophy of science is sound which does not primarily seek
+by an analysis of scientific concepts to understand science on its own
+grounds. Philosophy may understand science better than science
+understands itself, but only by holding fast to the conviction of its
+truth, and including it within whatever account of reality it may be
+able to formulate.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_54" id="Section_54">54</a>. Though philosophy be the most ancient and most exalted of human
+disciplines, it is not infrequently charged with being the most
+unprofitable. Science has amassed a fortune of information, which has
+facilitated life and advanced civilization. Is not philosophy, on the
+other hand, all programme and idle questioning? In the first place, no
+questioning is idle that is logically possible. It is true that
+philosophy shows her skill rather in the asking than in the answering of
+questions. But the formal pertinence of a question is of the greatest
+significance. No valid though unanswered question <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144"></a>[<a href="./images/144.png">144</a>]</span>can have a purely
+negative value, and especially as respects the consistency or
+completeness of truth. But, in the second place, philosophy with all its
+limitations serves mankind as indispensably as science. If science
+supplies the individual with means of self-preservation, and the
+instruments of achievement, philosophy supplies the ideals, or the
+objects of deliberate construction. Such reflection as justifies the
+adoption of a fundamental life purpose is always philosophical. For
+every judgment respecting final worth is a judgment <i>sub specie
+eternitatis</i>. And the urgency of life requires the individual to pass
+such judgments. It is true that however persistently reflective he may
+be in the matter, his conclusion will be premature in consideration of
+the amount of evidence logically demanded for such a judgment. But he
+must be as wise as he can, or he will be as foolish as conventionality
+and blind impulse may impel him to be. Philosophy determines for society
+what every individual must practically determine upon for himself, the
+most reasonable plan of reality as a whole which the data and reflection
+of an epoch can afford. It is philosophy's service to mankind to
+compensate for the enthusiasm and concentration of the specialist, a
+service needed in every "present <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145"></a>[<a href="./images/145.png">145</a>]</span>day." Apart from the philosopher,
+public opinion is the victim of sensationalism, and individual opinion
+is further warped by accidental propinquity. It is the function of
+philosophy to interpret knowledge for the sake of a sober and wise
+belief. The philosopher is the true prophet, appearing before men in
+behalf of that which is finally the truth. He is the spokesman of the
+most considerate and comprehensive reflection possible at any stage in
+the development of human thought. Owing to a radical misconception of
+function, the man of science has in these later days begun to regard
+himself as the wise man, and to teach the people. Popular materialism is
+the logical outcome of this determination of belief by natural science.
+It may be that this is due as much to the indifference of the
+philosopher as to the forwardness of the scientist, but in any case the
+result is worse than conservative loyalty to religious tradition. For
+religion is corrected surely though slowly by the whole order of
+advancing truth. Its very inflexibility makes it proof against an
+over-emphasis upon new truth. It has generally turned out in time that
+the obstinate man of religion was more nearly right than the adaptable
+intellectual man of fashion. But <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146"></a>[<a href="./images/146.png">146</a>]</span>philosophy, as a critique of science
+for the sake of faith, should provide the individual religious believer
+with intellectual enlightenment and gentleness. The quality,
+orderliness, and inclusiveness of knowledge, finally determine its
+value; and the philosopher, premature as his synthesis may some day
+prove to be, is the wisest man of his own generation. From him the man
+of faith should obtain such discipline of judgment as shall enable him
+to be fearless of advancing knowledge, because acquainted with its
+scope, and so intellectually candid with all his visions and his
+inspirations.</p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_120:1_42" id="Footnote_120:1_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120:1_42"><span class="label">[120:1]</span></a> Ernst Mach: <i>Science of Mechanics</i>. Translation by
+McCormack, p. 464. No one has made more important contributions than
+Professor Mach to a certain definite modern philosophical movement. Cf.
+&sect; <a href="#Section_207">207</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_129:2_43" id="Footnote_129:2_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129:2_43"><span class="label">[129:2]</span></a> Whewell: <i>History of the Inductive Sciences</i>, Vol. I,
+p. 289. Quoted from Kepler: <i>Mysterium Cosmographicum</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_129:3_44" id="Footnote_129:3_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129:3_44"><span class="label">[129:3]</span></a> Quoted by Sidgwick in his <i>Philosophy, its Scope and
+Relations</i>, p. 89.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_132:4_45" id="Footnote_132:4_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132:4_45"><span class="label">[132:4]</span></a> The reader is referred to Mr. Bertrand Russell's
+chapters on <i>matter</i> and <i>motion</i> in his <i>Principles of Mathematics</i>,
+Vol. I. Material particles he defines as "many-one relations of all
+times to some places, or of all terms of a continuous one-dimensional
+series <i>t</i> to some terms of a continuous three-dimensional series <i>s</i>."
+Similarly, "when different times, throughout any period however short,
+are correlated with different places, there is motion; when different
+times, throughout some period however short, are all correlated with the
+same place, there is rest." <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 473.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_137:5_46" id="Footnote_137:5_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137:5_46"><span class="label">[137:5]</span></a> That the scientist still permits himself to teach the
+people a loose exoteric theory of reality, is proven by Professor Ward's
+citation of instances in his <i>Naturalism and Agnosticism</i>. So eminent a
+physicist as Lord Kelvin is quoted as follows: "You can imagine
+particles of something, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This
+thing we call the luminiferous ether. That is the only substance we are
+confident of in dynamics. One thing we are sure of, and that is the
+reality and substantiality of the luminiferous ether." Vol. I, p. 113.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_140:6_47" id="Footnote_140:6_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140:6_47"><span class="label">[140:6]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Principles of Human Knowledge</i>,
+Introduction. Edition of Fraser, p. 248.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_142:7_48" id="Footnote_142:7_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142:7_48"><span class="label">[142:7]</span></a> The reader who cares to pursue this topic further is
+referred to the writer's discussion of "<i>Professor Ward's Philosophy of
+Science</i>" in the <i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific
+Methods</i>, Vol. I, No. 13.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147"></a>[<a href="./images/147.png">147</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="PART_II" id="PART_II"></a>PART II</h2>
+
+<h3>THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF<br />
+PHILOSOPHY</h3>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148"></a>[<a href="./images/148.png">148</a>]</span></p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149"></a>[<a href="./images/149.png">149</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_VI" id="Chap_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2>
+
+<h3>METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY</h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem of
+Philosophy.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_55" id="Section_55">55</a>. The stand-point and purpose of the philosopher define his task,
+but they do not necessarily prearrange the division of it. That the task
+is a complex one, embracing many subordinate problems which must be
+treated <i>seriatim</i>, is attested both by the breadth of its scope and the
+variety of the interests from which it may be approached. But this
+complexity is qualified by the peculiar importance which here attaches
+to unity. That which lends philosophical quality to any reflection is a
+steadfast adherence to the ideals of inclusiveness and consistency.
+Hence, though the philosopher must of necessity occupy himself with
+subordinate problems, these cannot be completely isolated from one
+another, and solved successively. Perspective is his most indispensable
+requisite, and he has solved no problem finally until he has provided
+for the solution of all. His own peculiar conceptions are <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150"></a>[<a href="./images/150.png">150</a>]</span>those which
+<i>order</i> experience, and reconcile such aspects of it as other interests
+have distinguished. Hence the compatibility of any idea with all other
+ideas is the prime test of its philosophical sufficiency. On these
+grounds it may confidently be asserted that the work of philosophy
+cannot be assigned by the piece to different specialists, and then
+assembled. There are no special philosophical problems which can be
+finally solved upon their own merits. Indeed, such problems could never
+even be named, for in their discreteness they would cease to be
+philosophical.</p>
+
+<p>The case of <i>metaphysics</i> and <i>epistemology</i> affords an excellent
+illustration. The former of these is commonly defined as the theory of
+reality or of first principles, the latter as the theory of knowledge.
+But the most distinctive philosophical movement of the nineteenth
+century issues from the idea that knowing and being are
+identical.<a name="FNanchor_150:1_49" id="FNanchor_150:1_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_150:1_49" class="fnanchor">[150:1]</a> The prime reality is defined as a knowing mind, and
+the terms of reality are interpreted as terms of a cognitive process.
+Ideas and logical principles <i>constitute</i> the world. It is evident that
+in this Hegelian philosophy epistemology embraces <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151"></a>[<a href="./images/151.png">151</a>]</span>metaphysics. In
+defining the relations of knowledge to its object, one has already
+defined one's fundamental philosophical conception, while <i>logic</i>, as
+the science of the universal necessities of thought, will embrace the
+first principles of reality. Now, were one to divide and arrange the
+problems of philosophy upon this basis, it is evident that one would not
+have deduced the arrangement from the general problem of philosophy, but
+from a single attempted solution of that problem. It might serve as an
+exposition of Hegel, but not as a general philosophical programme.</p>
+
+<p>Another case in point is provided by the present-day interest in what is
+called "<i>pragmatism</i>."<a name="FNanchor_151:2_50" id="FNanchor_151:2_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_151:2_50" class="fnanchor">[151:2]</a> This doctrine is historically connected
+with Kant's principle of the "primacy of the practical reason," in which
+he maintained that the consciousness of duty is a profounder though less
+scientific insight than the knowledge of objects. The current doctrine
+maintains that thought with its fruits is an expression of interest, and
+that the will which evinces and realizes such an interest is more
+original and significant than that which the thinking defines. Such a
+view attaches a peculiar importance to the springs of conduct, and in
+its more <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152"></a>[<a href="./images/152.png">152</a>]</span>systematic development<a name="FNanchor_152:3_51" id="FNanchor_152:3_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_152:3_51" class="fnanchor">[152:3]</a> has regarded <i>ethics</i> as the
+true prop&aelig;deutic and proof of philosophy. But to make ethics the
+key-stone of the arch, is to define a special philosophical system; for
+it is the very problem of philosophy to dispose the parts of knowledge
+with a view to systematic construction. The relation of the provinces of
+metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics cannot, then, be defined
+without entering these provinces and answering the questions proper to
+them.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon
+the Initial Interest.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_56" id="Section_56">56</a>. Since the above terms exist, however, there can be no doubt but
+that important divisions within the general aim of philosophy have
+actually been made. The inevitableness of it appears in the variety of
+the sources from which that aim may spring. The point of departure will
+always determine the emphasis and the application which the philosophy
+receives. If philosophy be needed to supplement more special interests,
+it will receive a particular character from whatever interest it so
+supplements. He who approaches it from a definite stand-point will find
+in it primarily an interpretation of that stand-point.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_57" id="Section_57">57</a>. There are two sources of the philosophical <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153"></a>[<a href="./images/153.png">153</a>]</span>aim, which are
+perennial in their human significance. He, firstly, who begins with the
+demands of life and its ideals, looks to philosophy for a reconciliation
+of these with the orderly procedure of nature. His philosophy will
+receive its form from its illumination of life, and it will be an
+ethical or religious philosophy. Spinoza, the great seventeenth-century
+philosopher who justified mysticism after the manner of
+mathematics,<a name="FNanchor_153:4_52" id="FNanchor_153:4_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_153:4_52" class="fnanchor">[153:4]</a> displays this temper in his philosophy:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"After experience had taught me that all the usual
+surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that
+none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves
+anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is
+affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there
+might be some real good having power to communicate itself,
+which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all
+else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the
+discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous,
+supreme, and unending happiness."<a name="FNanchor_153:5_53" id="FNanchor_153:5_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_153:5_53" class="fnanchor">[153:5]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>In pursuance of this aim, though he deals with the problem of being in
+the rigorous logical fashion of his day, the final words of his great
+work are, "Of Human Freedom":</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
+scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154"></a>[<a href="./images/154.png">154</a>]</span>conscious of
+himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
+necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
+acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed
+out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may
+nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is
+so seldom found. How would it be possible if salvation were
+ready to our hand, and could without great labor be found,
+that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things
+excellent are as difficult as they are rare."<a name="FNanchor_154:6_54" id="FNanchor_154:6_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_154:6_54" class="fnanchor">[154:6]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Philosophy as the Extension of Science.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_58" id="Section_58">58</a>. On the other hand, one who looks to philosophy for the extension
+and correction of scientific knowledge will be primarily interested in
+the philosophical definition of ultimate conceptions, and in the method
+wherewith such a definition is obtained. Thus the philosophy of the
+scientist will tend to be logical and metaphysical. Such is the case
+with Descartes and Leibniz, who are nevertheless intimately related to
+Spinoza in the historical development of philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Several years have now elapsed," says the former, "since I
+first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth,
+many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I
+afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and
+from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking
+once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had
+adopted, and of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155"></a>[<a href="./images/155.png">155</a>]</span>commencing anew the work of building from the
+foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding
+superstructure in the sciences."<a name="FNanchor_155:7_55" id="FNanchor_155:7_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_155:7_55" class="fnanchor">[155:7]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Leibniz's mind was more predominantly logical even than Descartes's. He
+sought in philosophy a supreme intellectual synthesis, a science of the
+universe.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Although," he says retrospectively, "I am one of those who
+have worked much at mathematics, I have none the less
+meditated upon philosophy from my youth up; for it always
+seemed to me that there was a possibility of establishing
+something solid in philosophy by clear demonstrations.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. I
+perceived, after much meditation, that it is impossible to
+find the <i>principles of a real unity</i> in matter alone, or in
+that which is only passive, since it is nothing but a
+collection or aggregation of parts <i>ad infinitum</i>."<a name="FNanchor_155:8_56" id="FNanchor_155:8_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_155:8_56" class="fnanchor">[155:8]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical Problem.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_59" id="Section_59">59</a>. Though these types are peculiarly representative, they are by no
+means exhaustive. There are as many possibilities of emphasis as there
+are incentives to philosophical reflection. It is not possible to
+exhaust the aspects of experience which may serve as bases from which
+such thought may issue, and to which, after its synthetic insight, it
+may return. But it is evident that such divisions of philosophy
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156"></a>[<a href="./images/156.png">156</a>]</span>represent in their order, and in the sharpness with which they are
+sundered, the intellectual autobiography of the individual philosopher.
+There is but one method by which that which is peculiar either to the
+individual, or to the special position which he adopts, may be
+eliminated. Though it is impossible to tabulate the empty programme of
+philosophy, we may name certain special problems that have appeared <i>in
+its history</i>. Since this history comprehends the activities of many
+individuals, a general validity attaches to it. There has been,
+moreover, a certain periodicity in the emergence of these problems, so
+that it may fairly be claimed for them that they indicate inevitable
+phases in the development of human reflection upon experience. They
+represent a normal differentiation of interest which the individual
+mind, in the course of its own thinking, tends to follow. It is true
+that it can never be said with assurance that any age is utterly blind
+to any aspect of experience. This is obviously the case with the
+practical and theoretical interests which have just been distinguished.
+There is no age that does not have some practical consciousness of the
+world as a whole, nor any which does not seek more or less earnestly to
+universalize its science. But though it compel us to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157"></a>[<a href="./images/157.png">157</a>]</span>deal abstractly
+with historical epochs, there is abundant compensation in the
+possibility which this method affords of finding the divisions of
+philosophy in the manifestation of the living philosophical spirit.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_60" id="Section_60">60</a>. To Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, is commonly
+awarded the honor of being the founder of European philosophy. If he
+deserve this distinction, it is on account of the question which he
+raised, and not on account of the answer which he gave to it. Aristotle
+informs us that Thales held "water" to be "the material cause of all
+things."<a name="FNanchor_157:9_57" id="FNanchor_157:9_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_157:9_57" class="fnanchor">[157:9]</a> This crude theory is evidently due to an interest in the
+totality of things, an interest which is therefore philosophical. But
+the interest of this first philosopher has a more definite character. It
+looks toward the definition in terms of some single conception, of <i>the
+constitution</i> of the world. As a child might conceivably think the moon
+to be made of green cheese, so philosophy in its childhood thinks here
+of all things as made of water. Water was a well-known substance,
+possessing well-known predicates. To define all nature in terms of it,
+was to maintain that in spite of superficial <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158"></a>[<a href="./images/158.png">158</a>]</span>differences, all things
+have these predicates in common. They are the predicates which qualify
+for reality, and compose a community of nature from which all the
+individual objects and events of nature arise. The successors of Thales
+were evidently dissatisfied with his fundamental conception, because of
+its lack of generality. They seized upon vaguer substances like air and
+fire, for the very definiteness of the nature of water forbids the
+identification of other substances with it. But what is so obviously
+true of water is scarcely less true of air and fire; and it appeared at
+length that only a substance possessing the most general characters of
+body, such as shape, size, and mobility, could be thought as truly
+primeval and universal. In this wise a conception like our modern
+physical conception of matter came at length into vogue. Now the problem
+of which these were all tentative solutions is, in general, the problem
+of <i>metaphysics</i>; although this term belongs to a later era, arising
+only from the accidental place of the discussion of first principles
+<i>after physics</i> in the system of Aristotle. <i>The attempt to secure a
+most fundamental conception which attaches some definite meaning to the
+reality including and informing every particular thing, is metaphysics.</i></p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159"></a>[<a href="./images/159.png">159</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Monism and Pluralism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_61" id="Section_61">61</a>. It must not be supposed that metaphysics is dogmatically committed
+to the reduction of all reality to a unity of nature. It is quite
+consistent with its purpose that the parts of reality should be found to
+compose a group, or an indefinite multitude of irreducibly different
+entities. But it is clear that even such an account of things deals with
+what is true of all reality, and even in acknowledging the variety of
+its constituents, attributes to them some kind of relationship. The
+degree to which such a relationship is regarded as intimate and
+essential, determines the degree to which any metaphysical system is
+<i>monistic</i>,<a name="FNanchor_159:10_58" id="FNanchor_159:10_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_159:10_58" class="fnanchor">[159:10]</a> rather than <i>pluralistic</i>. But the significance of
+this difference will be better appreciated after a further
+differentiation of the metaphysical problem has been noted.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_62" id="Section_62">62</a>. It has already been suggested that the test of Thales's conception
+lay in the possibility of deriving nature from it. A world principle
+must be fruitful. Now an abstract distinction has prevailed more or less
+persistently in metaphysics, between <i>the general definition of being</i>,
+called <i>ontology</i>, and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160"></a>[<a href="./images/160.png">160</a>]</span>study of the processes wherewith being is
+divided into things and events. This latter study has to do primarily
+with the details of experience enumerated and systematized by the
+natural sciences. <i>To reconcile</i> these, <i>or the course of nature, with
+the fundamental definition of being</i>, is the problem of <i>cosmology</i>.
+Cosmology is the construing of the <i>prima facie</i> reality in terms of the
+essential reality. It is the proof and the explanation of ontology.
+Since the most familiar part of the <i>prima facie</i> reality, the part
+almost exclusively noticed by the naive mind, is embraced within the
+field of the physical sciences, the term cosmology has come more
+definitely to signify the <i>philosophy of nature</i>. It embraces such an
+examination of space, time, matter, causality, etc., as seeks to answer
+the most general questions about them, and provide for them in the world
+thought of as most profoundly real. Such a study receives its
+philosophical character from its affiliation with ontology, as the
+latter would find its application in cosmology.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_63" id="Section_63">63</a>. But in addition to the consideration of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161"></a>[<a href="./images/161.png">161</a>]</span>the various parts of
+nature, cosmology has commonly dealt with a radical and far-reaching
+alternative that appeared at the very dawn of metaphysics. Differences
+may arise within a world constituted of a single substance or a small
+group of ultimate substances, by changes in the relative position and
+grouping of the parts. Hence the virtue of the conception of motion. The
+theory which explains all differences by motions of the parts of a
+qualitatively simple world, is called <i>mechanism</i>. Another source of
+change familiar to naive experience is <i>will</i>, or the action of living
+creatures. According to the mechanical theory, <i>changes occur on account
+of the natural motions of the parts of matter</i>; according to the latter
+or <i>teleological</i> conception, <i>changes are made by a formative agency
+directed to some end</i>. Among the early Greek philosophers, Leucippus was
+an exponent of mechanism.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"He says that the worlds arise when many bodies are collected
+together into the mighty void from the surrounding space and
+rush together. They come into collision, and those which are
+of similar shape and like form become entangled, and from
+their entanglement the heavenly bodies arise."<a name="FNanchor_161:11_59" id="FNanchor_161:11_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_161:11_59" class="fnanchor">[161:11]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162"></a>[<a href="./images/162.png">162</a>]</span>Anaxagoras, on the other hand, was famed for his doctrine of the Nous,
+or Intelligence, to whose direction he attributed the whole process of
+the world. The following is translated from extant fragments of his
+book, "<ins class="greek" title="peri physe&ocirc;s">&#960;&#949;&#961;&#8054; &#966;&#8059;&#963;&#949;&#969;&#962;</ins>":</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it
+began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve
+first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends
+over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And
+all the things that are mingled together and separated off and
+distinguished are all known by the Nous. And Nous set in order
+all things that were to be and that were, and all things that
+are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now
+revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and
+the ether that are separated off."<a name="FNanchor_162:12_60" id="FNanchor_162:12_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_162:12_60" class="fnanchor">[162:12]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Dualism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_64" id="Section_64">64</a>. It is clear, furthermore, that the doctrine of Anaxagoras not only
+names a distinct kind of cause, but also ascribes to it an independence
+and intrinsic importance that do not belong to motion. Whereas motion is
+a property of matter, intelligence is an originative power working out
+purposes of its own choosing. Hence we have here to do with a new
+ontology. If we construe ultimate being in terms of mind, we have a
+definite substitute for the physical theories outlined above. Such a
+theory is scarcely to be attributed to any Greek philosopher of the
+early <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163"></a>[<a href="./images/163.png">163</a>]</span>period; it belongs to a more sophisticated stage in the
+development of thought, after the rise of the problem of epistemology.
+But Anaxagoras's sharp distinction between the material of the world on
+the one hand, and the author of its order and evolution on the other, is
+in itself worthy of notice. It contains the germ of a recurrent
+philosophical <i>dualism</i>, which differs from pluralism in that it finds
+two and only two fundamental divisions of being, the physical, material,
+or potential on the one hand, and the mental, formal, or ideal on the
+other.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_65" id="Section_65">65</a>. Finally, the alternative possibilities which these cosmological
+considerations introduce, bear directly upon the general question of the
+interdependence of the parts of the world, a question which has already
+appeared as pertinent in ontology. Monism and pluralism now obtain a new
+meaning. Where the world process is informed with some singleness of
+plan, as teleology proposes, the parts are reciprocally necessary, and
+inseparable from the unity. Where, on the other hand, the processes are
+random and reciprocally fortuitous, as Leucippus proposes, the world as
+a whole is an aggregate rather than a unity. In this way uniformity in
+kind of being <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164"></a>[<a href="./images/164.png">164</a>]</span>may prevail in a world the relations of whose parts are
+due to chance, while diversity in kind of being may prevail in a world
+knit together by some thorough-going plan of organization. Thus monism
+and pluralism are conceptions as proper to cosmology as to ontology.</p>
+
+<p>But enough has been said to demonstrate the interdependence of ontology
+and cosmology, of the theory of being and the theory of differentiation
+and process. Such problems can be only abstractly sundered, and the
+distinctive character of any metaphysical system will usually consist in
+some theory determining their relation. Philosophy returns to these
+metaphysical problems with its thought enriched and its method
+complicated, after becoming thoroughly alive to the problems of
+epistemology, logic, and ethics.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of
+Knowledge.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_66" id="Section_66">66</a>. <i>Epistemology is the theory of the possibility of knowledge</i>, and
+issues from criticism and scepticism. If we revert again to the history
+of Greek philosophy, we find a first period of enterprising speculation
+giving place to a second period of hesitancy and doubt. This phase of
+thought occurs simultaneously with the brilliantly humanistic age of
+Pericles, and it is undoubtedly true that energy is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165"></a>[<a href="./images/165.png">165</a>]</span>withdrawn from
+speculation largely for the sake of expending it in the more lively and
+engaging pursuits of politics and art. But there are patent reasons
+within the sphere of philosophy itself for entailment of activity and
+taking of stock. For three centuries men have taken their philosophical
+powers for granted, and used them without questioning them. Repeated
+attacks upon the problem of reality have resulted in no consensus of
+opinion, but only in a disagreement among the wise men themselves. A
+great variety of mere theories has been substituted for the old
+unanimity of religious tradition and practical life. It is natural under
+these circumstances to infer that in philosophy man has overreached
+himself. He would more profitably busy himself with affairs that belong
+to his own sphere, and find a basis for life in his immediate relations
+with his fellows. The sophists, learned in tradition, and skilled in
+disputation, but for the most part entirely lacking in originality, are
+the new prophets. As teachers of rhetoric and morals, they represent the
+practical and secular spirit of their age; while in their avoidance of
+speculation, and their critical justification of that course, they
+express its sceptical philosophy.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166"></a>[<a href="./images/166.png">166</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_67" id="Section_67">67</a>. In their self-justification certain of the sophists attached
+themselves to a definite doctrine maintained by those of their
+predecessors and contemporaries who were atomists, or followers of that
+same Leucippus whom we have quoted. This doctrine was the result of an
+attempt to construe perception in terms of the motion of atoms. Outer
+objects were said to give off fine particles which, through the
+mediation of the sense organs, impinged upon the soul-atom. But it was
+evident even to the early exponents of this theory that according to
+such an account, each perceiver is relegated to a world peculiar to his
+own stand-point. His perception informs him concerning his own states as
+affected by things, rather than concerning the things themselves. Upon
+this ground the great sophist Protagoras is said to have based his
+dictum: <ins class="greek" title="Pant&ocirc;n chr&ecirc;mat&ocirc;n metron anthr&ocirc;pos">&#928;&#8049;&#957;&#964;&#969;&#957; &#967;&#961;&#951;&#956;&#8049;&#964;&#969;&#957; &#956;&#8051;&#964;&#961;&#959;&#957; &#7940;&#957;&#952;&#961;&#969;&#960;&#959;&#962;</ins>,&mdash;"Man is the measure
+of all things." This is the classic statement of the doctrine of
+relativity. But we have now entered into the province of epistemology,
+and various alternatives confront us. Reduce thought to perception,
+define perception as relative to each individual, and you arrive at
+<i>scepticism</i>, or <i>the denial of the possibility of valid knowledge</i>.
+Plato <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167"></a>[<a href="./images/167.png">167</a>]</span>expounds this consequence in the well-known discussion of
+Protagoras that occurs in the "The&aelig;tetus."</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each
+one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with
+a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other
+yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of
+all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt
+for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that
+while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom, he
+was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his
+fellow-men&mdash;would not this have produced an overpowering
+effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern
+another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right
+to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each,
+as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole
+judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why,
+my friend, should Protagoras be preferred to the place of
+wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we
+poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure
+of his own wisdom?&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. The attempt to supervise or refute the
+notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous
+piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and this
+must be the case if Protagoras's Truth is the real truth, and
+the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving
+oracles out of the shrine of his book."<a name="FNanchor_167:13_61" id="FNanchor_167:13_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_167:13_61" class="fnanchor">[167:13]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>This is the full swing of the pendulum from <i>dogmatism</i>, or the
+uncritical conviction of truth. A modified form of scepticism has been
+developed in these later days under the influence of natural <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168"></a>[<a href="./images/168.png">168</a>]</span>science,
+and is called <i>agnosticism</i> or <i>positivism</i>. It accepts the Protagorean
+doctrine only in the sense of attributing to human knowledge as a whole
+an incapacity for exceeding the range of perception. Beyond this realm
+of natural science, where theories can be sensibly verified, lies the
+unknowable realm, more real, but forever inaccessible.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Source and Criterion of Knowledge According to Empiricism
+and Rationalism. Mysticism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_68" id="Section_68">68</a>. It is important to note that both scepticism and agnosticism agree
+in regarding <i>perception as the essential factor in knowledge</i>. So far
+at any rate as our knowledge is concerned, the certification of being
+consists in perceivability. Knowledge is coextensive with actual and
+possible human experience. This account of the source and criterion of
+knowledge is called <i>empiricism</i>, in distinction from the counter-theory
+of <i>rationalism</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The rationalistic motive was a quickening influence in Greek philosophy
+long before it became deliberate and conspicuous in Socrates and Plato.
+Parmenides, founder of the Eleatic School, has left behind him a poem
+divided into two parts: "The Way of Truth" and "The Way of
+Opinion."<a name="FNanchor_168:14_62" id="FNanchor_168:14_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_168:14_62" class="fnanchor">[168:14]</a> In the first of these he expounds his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169"></a>[<a href="./images/169.png">169</a>]</span>esoteric
+philosophy, which is a definition of being established by dialectical
+reasoning. He finds that being must be single, eternal, and changeless,
+because otherwise it cannot be thought and defined without
+contradiction. The method which Parmenides here employs presupposes that
+knowledge consists in understanding rather than perception. Indeed, he
+regards the fact that the world of the senses is manifold and mutable as
+of little consequence to the wise man. The world of sense is the
+province of vulgar opinion, while that of reason is the absolute truth
+revealed only to the philosopher. The truth has no concern with
+appearance, but is answerable only to the test of rationality. <i>That
+world is real which one is able by thinking to make intelligible.</i> The
+world is what a world must be in order to be possible at all, and the
+philosopher can deduce it directly from the very conditions of thought
+which it must satisfy. He who would know reality may disregard what
+seems to be, provided he can by reflective analysis discover certain
+general necessities to which being must conform. This is rationalism in
+its extreme form.</p>
+
+<p>The rationalism of Socrates was more moderate, as it was more fruitful
+than that of Parmenides. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170"></a>[<a href="./images/170.png">170</a>]</span>As is well known, Socrates composed no
+philosophical books, but sought to inculcate wisdom in his teaching and
+conversation. His method of inculcating wisdom was to evoke it in his
+interlocutor by making him considerate of the meaning of his speech.
+Through his own questions he sought to arouse the questioning spirit,
+which should weigh the import of words, and be satisfied with nothing
+short of a definite and consistent judgment. In the Platonic dialogues
+the Socratic method obtains a place in literature. In the "The&aelig;tetus,"
+which is, perhaps, the greatest of all epistemological treatises,
+Socrates is represented as likening his vocation to that of the midwife.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs,
+but differs in that I attend men, and not women, and I look
+after their souls when they are in labor, and not after their
+bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining
+whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings
+forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And, like the
+midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made
+against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the
+wit to answer them myself, is very just; the reason is that
+the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to
+bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor
+have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my
+own soul, but those who converse with me profit.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. It is
+quite clear that they never <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171"></a>[<a href="./images/171.png">171</a>]</span>learned anything from me; the
+many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own
+making."<a name="FNanchor_171:15_63" id="FNanchor_171:15_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_171:15_63" class="fnanchor">[171:15]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The principle underlying this method is the insistence that a
+proposition, to be true of reality, must at least bespeak a mind that is
+true to itself, internally luminous, and free from contradiction. That
+which is to me nothing that I can express in form that will convey
+precise meaning and bear analysis, is so far nothing at all. Being is
+not, as the empiricist would have it, ready at hand, ours for the
+looking, but is the fruit of critical reflection. Only reason,
+overcoming the relativity of perception, and the chaos of popular
+opinion, can lay hold on the universal truth.</p>
+
+<p>A very interesting tendency to clothe the articulations of thought with
+the immediacy of perception is exhibited in <i>mysticism</i>, which
+attributes the highest cognitive power to an experience that transcends
+thought, an ineffable insight that is the occasional reward of thought
+and virtuous living. This theory would seem to owe its great vigor to
+the fact that it promises to unite the universality of the rational
+object with the vivid presence of the empirical object, though it
+sacrifices the definite content of both. The mystic, empiricist, and
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172"></a>[<a href="./images/172.png">172</a>]</span>rationalist are in these several ways led to revise their metaphysics
+upon the basis of their epistemology, or to define reality in terms
+dictated by the means of knowing it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to Realism,
+and the Representative Theory.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_69" id="Section_69">69</a>. But within the general field of epistemology there has arisen
+another issue of even greater significance in its bearing upon
+metaphysics. The first issue, as we have seen, has reference to the
+criterion of knowledge, to the possibility of arriving at certainty
+about reality, and the choice of means to that end. A second question
+arises, concerning <i>the relation between the knowledge and its object or
+that which is known</i>. This problem does not at first appear as an
+epistemological difficulty, but is due to the emphasis which the moral
+and religious interests of men give to the conception of the self. My
+knowing is a part of me, a function of that soul whose welfare and
+eternal happiness I am seeking to secure. Indeed, my knowing is, so the
+wise men have always taught, the greatest of my prerogatives. Wisdom
+appertains to the philosopher, as folly to the fool. But though my
+knowledge be a part of me, and in me, the same cannot, lightly at any
+rate, be said of what I know. It would seem that I must <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173"></a>[<a href="./images/173.png">173</a>]</span>distinguish
+between the knowledge, which is my act or state, an event in my life,
+and the known, which is object, and belongs to the context of the outer
+world. <i>The object of knowledge</i> would then be quite <i>independent of the
+circumstance that I know it</i>. This theory has acquired the name of
+<i>realism</i>,<a name="FNanchor_173:16_64" id="FNanchor_173:16_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_173:16_64" class="fnanchor">[173:16]</a> and is evidently as close to common sense as any
+epistemological doctrine can be said to be. If the knowledge consists in
+some sign or symbol which in my mind stands for the object, but is
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174"></a>[<a href="./images/174.png">174</a>]</span>quite other than the object, realism is given the form known as the
+<i>representative theory</i>. This theory is due to a radical distinction
+between the inner world of consciousness and the outer world of things,
+whereby in knowledge the outer object requires a substitute that is
+qualified to belong to the inner world. Where, on the other hand, no
+specific and exclusive nature is attributed to the inner world, realism
+may flourish without the representative theory. In such a case the
+object would be regarded as itself capable of entering into any number
+of individual experiences or of remaining outside them all, and without
+on either account forfeiting its identity. This view was taken for
+granted by Plato, but is elaborately defended in our own day. During the
+intervening period epistemology has been largely occupied with
+difficulties inherent in the representative theory, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175"></a>[<a href="./images/175.png">175</a>]</span>from that
+discussion there has emerged the theory of <i>idealism</i>,<a name="FNanchor_175:17_65" id="FNanchor_175:17_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_175:17_65" class="fnanchor">[175:17]</a> the great
+rival theory to that of realism.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to
+Idealism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_70" id="Section_70">70</a>. The representative theory contains at least one obvious
+difficulty. If the thinker be confined to his ideas, and if the reality
+be at the same time beyond these ideas, how can he ever verify their
+report? Indeed, what can it mean that an idea should be true of that
+which belongs to a wholly different category? How under such
+circumstances can that which is a part of the idea be attributed with
+any certainty to the object? Once grant that you know only your ideas,
+and the object reduces to an unknown <i>x</i>, which you retain to account
+for the outward pointing or reference of the ideas, but which is not
+missed if neglected. The obvious though radical theory of idealism is
+almost inevitably the next step. Why assume that there is any object
+other than the state of mind, since all positive content belongs to that
+realm? The eighteenth century English philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, was
+accused by his contemporaries of wilful eccentricity, and even madness,
+for his boldness in accepting this argument and drawing this conclusion:</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176"></a>[<a href="./images/176.png">176</a>]</span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel
+it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed;
+meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it,
+or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was
+an odor&mdash;that is, it was smelt; there was a sound&mdash;that is, it
+was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or
+touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like
+expressions. For as to what is said of the <i>absolute</i>
+existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their
+being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their
+<i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i>; nor is it possible that they should have
+any existence out of the minds or thinking thing which
+perceives them."<a name="FNanchor_176:18_66" id="FNanchor_176:18_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_176:18_66" class="fnanchor">[176:18]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_71" id="Section_71">71</a>. In this paragraph Berkeley maintains that it is essential to
+things, or at any rate to their qualities, that they <i>be perceived</i>.
+This principle when expressed as an epistemological or metaphysical
+generalization, is called <i>phenomenalism</i>. But in another phase of his
+thought Berkeley emphasizes the <i>perceiver</i>, or <i>spirit</i>. The theory
+which maintains that the only real substances are these active selves,
+with their powers and their states, has been called somewhat vaguely by
+the name of <i>spiritualism</i>.<a name="FNanchor_176:19_67" id="FNanchor_176:19_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_176:19_67" class="fnanchor">[176:19]</a> Philosophically it shows a strong
+tendency to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177"></a>[<a href="./images/177.png">177</a>]</span>develop into either <i>panpsychism</i> or <i>transcendentalism</i>.
+The former is radically empirical. Its classic representative is the
+German pessimist Schopenhauer, who defined reality in terms of will
+because that term signified to him most eloquently <i>the directly felt
+nature of the self</i>. This immediate revelation of the true inwardness of
+being serves as the key to an "intuitive interpretation" of the
+gradations of nature, and will finally awaken a sense of the presence of
+the universal Will.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_72" id="Section_72">72</a>. <i>Transcendentalism</i>, or <i>absolute idealism</i>, on the other hand,
+emphasizes the <i>rational activity</i>, rather than the bare subjectivity,
+<i>of the self</i>. The term "transcendental" has become associated with this
+type of idealism through Kant, whose favorite form of argument, the
+"transcendental deduction," was an analysis of experience with a view to
+discovering the categories, or formal principles of thought, implied in
+its meaning. From the Kantian method arose the conception of a standard
+or <i>absolute mind</i> for the standard experience. This mind is
+transcendental not in the sense of being alien, but in the sense of
+exceeding the human mind in the direction of what this means and strives
+to be. It is the ideal or normal mind, in which the true <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178"></a>[<a href="./images/178.png">178</a>]</span>reality is
+contained, with all the chaos of finite experience compounded and
+redeemed. There is no being but the absolute, the one all-inclusive
+spiritual life, in whom all things are inherent, and whose perfection is
+the virtual implication of all purposive activities.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"God's life .&nbsp;.&nbsp;. sees the one plan fulfilled through all the
+manifold lives, the single consciousness winning its purpose
+by virtue of all the ideas, of all the individual selves, and
+of all the lives. No finite view is wholly illusory. Every
+finite intent taken precisely in its wholeness is fulfilled in
+the Absolute. The least life is not neglected, the most
+fleeting act is a recognized part of the world's meaning. You
+are for the divine view all that you know yourself at this
+instant to be. But you are also infinitely more. The
+preciousness of your present purposes to yourself is only a
+hint of that preciousness which in the end links their meaning
+to the entire realm of Being."<a name="FNanchor_178:20_68" id="FNanchor_178:20_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_178:20_68" class="fnanchor">[178:20]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The fruitfulness of the philosopher's reflective doubt concerning his
+own powers is now evident. Problems are raised which are not merely
+urgent in themselves, but which present wholly new alternatives to the
+metaphysician. Rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, are
+doctrines which, though springing from the epistemological query
+concerning the possibility of knowledge, may <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179"></a>[<a href="./images/179.png">179</a>]</span>determine an entire
+philosophical system. They bear upon every question of metaphysics,
+whether the fundamental conception of being, or the problems of the
+world's unity, origin, and significance for human life.</p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_150:1_49" id="Footnote_150:1_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150:1_49"><span class="label">[150:1]</span></a> The post-Kantian movement in Germany&mdash;especially in so
+far as influenced by Hegel. See <a href="#Chap_XII">Chap. XII</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_151:2_50" id="Footnote_151:2_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151:2_50"><span class="label">[151:2]</span></a> Cf. &sect; <a href="#Section_203">203</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_152:3_51" id="Footnote_152:3_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152:3_51"><span class="label">[152:3]</span></a> <i>E. g.</i>, the system of Fichte. Cf. &sect; <a href="#Section_177">177</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_153:4_52" id="Footnote_153:4_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153:4_52"><span class="label">[153:4]</span></a> See <a href="#Chap_XI">Chap. XI</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_153:5_53" id="Footnote_153:5_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153:5_53"><span class="label">[153:5]</span></a> Spinoza: <i>On the Improvement of the Understanding</i>.
+Translation by Elwes, p. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_154:6_54" id="Footnote_154:6_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154:6_54"><span class="label">[154:6]</span></a> Spinoza: <i>Ethics</i>, Part V, Proposition XLII.
+Translation by Elwes, p. 270.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_155:7_55" id="Footnote_155:7_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155:7_55"><span class="label">[155:7]</span></a> Descartes: <i>Meditations</i>, I. Translation by Veitch, p.
+97.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_155:8_56" id="Footnote_155:8_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155:8_56"><span class="label">[155:8]</span></a> Leibniz: <i>New System of the Nature of Substances</i>.
+Translation by Latta, pp. 299, 300.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_157:9_57" id="Footnote_157:9_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157:9_57"><span class="label">[157:9]</span></a> Burnet: <i>Early Greek Philosophy</i>, p. 42.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_159:10_58" id="Footnote_159:10_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159:10_58"><span class="label">[159:10]</span></a> No little ambiguity attaches to the term "monism" in
+current usage, because of its appropriation by those who maintain that
+the universe is unitary and homogeneous in <i>physical terms</i> (cf. &sect; <a href="#Section_108">108</a>).
+It should properly be used to emphasize the unity of the world in any
+terms.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_161:11_59" id="Footnote_161:11_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161:11_59"><span class="label">[161:11]</span></a> Burnet: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 358.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_162:12_60" id="Footnote_162:12_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162:12_60"><span class="label">[162:12]</span></a> Burnet: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 284.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_167:13_61" id="Footnote_167:13_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167:13_61"><span class="label">[167:13]</span></a> Plato: <i>The&aelig;tetus</i>, 161. Translation by Jowett.
+References to Plato are to the marginal paging.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_168:14_62" id="Footnote_168:14_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168:14_62"><span class="label">[168:14]</span></a> Burnet: <i>Early Greek Philosophy</i>, pp. 184, 187.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_171:15_63" id="Footnote_171:15_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_171:15_63"><span class="label">[171:15]</span></a> Plato: <i>The&aelig;tetus</i>, 150 B. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_173:16_64" id="Footnote_173:16_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_173:16_64"><span class="label">[173:16]</span></a> Much ambiguity attaches to the terms "realism" and
+"idealism" in current usage. The first had at one time in the history of
+philosophy a much narrower meaning than that which it now possesses. It
+was used to apply to those who, after Plato, believed in the independent
+reality of ideas, universals, or general natures. <i>Realists</i> in this
+sense were opposed to <i>nominalists</i> and <i>conceptualists</i>. Nominalism
+maintained the exclusive reality of individual substances, and reduced
+ideas to particular signs having, like the <i>name</i>, a purely symbolical
+or descriptive value. Conceptualism sought to unite realism and
+nominalism through the conception of mind, or an individual substance
+whose meanings may possess universal validity. Though this dispute was
+of fundamental importance throughout the medi&aelig;val period, the issues
+involved have now been restated. Realism in the old sense will, if held,
+come within the scope of the broader epistemological realism defined
+above. Nominalism is covered by empirical tendencies, and conceptualism
+by modern idealism.</p>
+
+<p>The term <i>idealism</i> is sometimes applied to Plato on account of his
+designation of ideas as the ultimate realities. This would be a natural
+use of the term, but in our own day it has become inseparably associated
+with the doctrine which attributes to being a dependence upon the
+activity of mind. It is of the utmost importance to keep these two
+meanings clear. In the preferred sense Plato is a realist, and so
+opposed to idealism.</p>
+
+<p>The term <i>idealism</i> is further confused on account of its employment in
+literature and common speech to denote the control of ideals. Although
+this is a kindred meaning, the student of philosophy will gain little or
+no help from it, and will avoid confusion if he distinguishes the term
+in its technical use and permits it in that capacity to acquire an
+independent meaning.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_175:17_65" id="Footnote_175:17_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_175:17_65"><span class="label">[175:17]</span></a> See <a href="#Footnote_173:16_64"><i>note</i></a>, p. 173.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_176:18_66" id="Footnote_176:18_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176:18_66"><span class="label">[176:18]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Principles of Human Knowledge</i>, Part I,
+Fraser's edition, p. 259.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_176:19_67" id="Footnote_176:19_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176:19_67"><span class="label">[176:19]</span></a> To be distinguished from the religious sect which
+bears the same name.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_178:20_68" id="Footnote_178:20_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_178:20_68"><span class="label">[178:20]</span></a> Quoted from Professor Josiah Royce's <i>The World and
+the Individual, First Series</i>, pp. 426-427.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180"></a>[<a href="./images/180.png">180</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_VII" id="Chap_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2>
+
+<h3>THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION</h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Normative Sciences.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_73" id="Section_73">73</a>. There are three sets of problems whose general philosophical
+importance depends upon the place which metaphysics assigns to the
+<i>human critical faculties</i>. Man passes judgment upon that which claims
+to be <i>true</i>, <i>beautiful</i>, or <i>good</i>, thus referring to ideals and
+standards that define these values. Attempts to make these ideals
+explicit, and to formulate principles which regulate their attainment,
+have resulted in the development of the three so-called <i>normative
+sciences</i>: <i>logic</i>, <i>&aelig;sthetics</i>, and <i>ethics</i>. These sciences are said
+to owe their origin to the Socratic method, and it is indeed certain
+that their problem is closely related to the general rationalistic
+attitude.<a name="FNanchor_180:1_69" id="FNanchor_180:1_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_180:1_69" class="fnanchor">[180:1]</a> In Plato's dialogue, "Protagoras," one may observe the
+manner of the inception of both ethics and logic. The question at issue
+between Socrates and the master sophist <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181"></a>[<a href="./images/181.png">181</a>]</span>Protagoras, is concerning the
+possibility of teaching virtue. Protagoras conducts his side of the
+discussion with the customary rhetorical flourish, expounding in set
+speeches the tradition and usage in which such a possibility is
+accepted. Socrates, on the other hand, conceives the issue quite
+differently. One can neither affirm nor deny anything of virtue unless
+one knows <i>what is meant by it</i>. Even the possession of such a meaning
+was scarcely recognized by Protagoras, who was led by Socrates's
+questions to attribute to the various virtues an external grouping
+analogous to that of the parts of the face. But Socrates shows that
+since justice, temperance, courage, and the like, are admittedly similar
+in that they are all virtues, they must have in common some essence,
+which is virtue in general. This he seeks to define in the terms,
+<i>virtue is knowledge</i>. The interest which Socrates here shows in the
+reduction of the ordinary moral judgments to a system centering in some
+single fundamental principle, is the ethical interest. But this is at
+the same time a particular application of the general rationalistic
+method of definition, and of the general rationalistic postulate that
+one knows nothing until one can form unitary and determinate
+conceptions. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182"></a>[<a href="./images/182.png">182</a>]</span>recognition which Socrates thus gives to criteria of
+knowledge is an expression of the logical interest. In a certain sense,
+indeed, the whole labor of Socrates was in the cause of the logical
+interest. For he sought to demonstrate that belief is not necessarily
+knowledge; that belief may or may not be true. In order that it shall be
+true, and constitute knowledge, it must be well-grounded, and
+accompanied by an understanding of its object. Socrates thus set the
+problem of logic, the discovery, namely, of those characters by virtue
+of the possession of which belief is knowledge.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Affiliations of Logic.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_74" id="Section_74">74</a>. Logic deals with the ground of belief, and thus distinguishes
+itself from the psychological account of the elements of the believing
+state.<a name="FNanchor_182:2_70" id="FNanchor_182:2_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_182:2_70" class="fnanchor">[182:2]</a> But it is not possible sharply to sunder psychology and
+logic. This is due to the fact that the general principles which make
+belief true, may be regarded quite independently of this fact. They then
+become the <i>most general truth</i>, belonging to the absolute, archetypal
+realm, or to the mind of God.<a name="FNanchor_182:3_71" id="FNanchor_182:3_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_182:3_71" class="fnanchor">[182:3]</a> When the general principles of
+certainty are so regarded, logic can be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183"></a>[<a href="./images/183.png">183</a>]</span>distinguished from metaphysics
+only by adding to the study of the general principles themselves, the
+study of the special conditions (mainly psychological) under which they
+may be realized among men. In the history of human thought the name of
+logic belongs to the study of this <i>attainment</i> of truth, as the terms
+&aelig;sthetics and ethics belong to the studies of the attainment of beauty
+and goodness.<a name="FNanchor_183:4_72" id="FNanchor_183:4_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_183:4_72" class="fnanchor">[183:4]</a> It is evident that logic will have a peculiar
+importance for the rationalist. For the empiricist, proposing to report
+upon things as they are given, will tend on the whole to maintain that
+knowledge has no properties save those which are given to it by its
+special subject-matter. One cannot, in short, define any absolute
+relationship between the normative sciences and the other branches of
+philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in
+Belief.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_75" id="Section_75">75</a>. <i>Logic is the formulation, as independently as possible of special
+subject-matter, of that which conditions truth in belief.</i> Since logic
+is concerned with truth only in so far as it is predicated of belief,
+and since belief in so far as true is knowledge, logic can be defined as
+the formulation of the most general principles of knowledge. The
+principles so <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184"></a>[<a href="./images/184.png">184</a>]</span>formulated would be those virtually used to <i>justify</i>
+belief or to disprove the imputation of error.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence,
+Inference, and Observation.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_76" id="Section_76">76</a>. What is called <i>formal logic</i> is animated with the hope of
+extracting these formulations directly from an analysis of the procedure
+of thought. The most general logical principles which have appeared in
+the historical development of formal logic are <i>definition</i>,
+<i>self-evidence</i>, <i>inference</i>, and <i>observation</i>. Each of these has been
+given special study, and each has given rise to special issues.</p>
+
+<p><i>Definition</i> has to do with the <i>formation of concepts</i>, or determinate
+and unequivocal meanings. The universality of such concepts, and their
+consequent relation to particular things, was, as we have seen,
+investigated at a very early date, and gave rise to the great
+realistic-nominalistic controversy.<a name="FNanchor_184:5_73" id="FNanchor_184:5_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_184:5_73" class="fnanchor">[184:5]</a> A large part of the logical
+discussion in the Platonic dialogues is an outgrowth of the earlier
+"eristic," a form of disputation in favor with the sophists, and
+consisting in the adroit use of ambiguity.<a name="FNanchor_184:6_74" id="FNanchor_184:6_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_184:6_74" class="fnanchor">[184:6]</a> It is natural that in
+its first conscious self-criticism thought should discover the need of
+definite terms. The perpetual importance of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185"></a>[<a href="./images/185.png">185</a>]</span>definition has been largely
+due to the great prestige in modern philosophy of the method of
+geometry, which was regarded by Descartes and Spinoza as the model for
+systems of necessary truth.</p>
+
+<p><i>Self-evidence</i> is the principle according to which <i>conviction of truth
+follows directly from an understanding of meaning</i>. In the practice of
+his intellectual midwifery, Socrates presupposed that thought is capable
+of bringing forth its own certainties. And rationalism has at all times
+regarded truth as ultimately accredited by internal marks recognizable
+by reason. Such truth arrived at antecedent to acquaintance with
+instances is called <i>a priori</i>, as distinguished from <i>a posteriori</i>
+knowledge, or observation after the fact. There can be no principles of
+self-evidence, but logicians have always been more or less concerned
+with the enumeration of alleged self-evident principles, notably those
+of <i>contradiction</i> and <i>identity</i>. A philosophical interest in the
+mathematical method has led to a logical study of axioms, but with a
+view rather to their fruitfulness than their intrinsic truth. Indeed,
+the interest in self-evident truth has always been subordinate to the
+interest in systematic truth, and the discovery of first principles most
+commonly serves to determine the relative <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186"></a>[<a href="./images/186.png">186</a>]</span>priority of definite
+concepts, or the correct point of departure for a series of inferences.</p>
+
+<p>The greater part of the famous Aristotelian logic consists in a study of
+<i>inference</i>, or <i>the derivation of new knowledge from old knowledge</i>.
+Aristotle sought to set down and classify every method of advancing from
+premises. The most important form of inference which he defined was the
+<i>syllogism</i>, a scheme of reasoning to a conclusion by means of two
+premises having one term in common. From the premises "all men are
+mortal" and "Socrates is a man," one may conclude that "Socrates is
+mortal." This is an instance not only of the syllogism in general, but
+of its most important "mood," the subsumption of a particular case under
+a general rule. Since the decline of Aristotle's influence in philosophy
+there has been a notable decrease of interest in the different forms of
+inference; though its fundamental importance as the very bone and sinew
+of <i>reasoning</i> or <i>deductive thinking</i> has never been challenged. Its
+loss of pre&euml;minence is in part due to the growth of empiricism,
+stimulated by the writings of Lord Bacon in the seventeenth century, and
+fostered by the subsequent development of experimental science.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187"></a>[<a href="./images/187.png">187</a>]</span><i>Observation</i> is the fundamental logical principle of empiricism. For a
+radical empiricism, knowledge would consist of descriptive
+generalizations based upon the summation of instances. That branch of
+logic which deals with <i>the advance from individual instances to general
+principles</i>, is called <i>inductive logic</i>. It has resulted in the
+announcement of canons of accuracy and freedom from preconception, and
+in the methodological study of hypothesis, experiment, and verification.
+Rules for observation directed to the end of discovering causes,
+constitute the most famous part of the epoch-making logic of J. S.
+Mills.<a name="FNanchor_187:7_75" id="FNanchor_187:7_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_187:7_75" class="fnanchor">[187:7]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_77" id="Section_77">77</a>. There are two significant tendencies in contemporary logic.
+<i>Theories of the judgment</i> have arisen in the course of an attempt to
+define the least complexity that must be present in order that thought
+shall come within the range of truth and error. It is evident that no
+one either knows or is in error until he takes some attitude which lays
+claim to knowledge. Denoting by the term <i>judgment</i> this minimum of
+complexity in knowledge, an important question arises as to the sense in
+which the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188"></a>[<a href="./images/188.png">188</a>]</span>judgment involves the subject, predicate, and copula that are
+commonly present in its propositional form.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Priority of Concepts.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_78" id="Section_78">78</a>. But a more important logical development has been due to the
+recent analysis of definite accredited systems of knowledge. The study
+of the fundamental conceptions of mathematics and mechanics, together
+with an examination of the systematic structure of these sciences,
+furnishes the most notable cases. There are two senses in which such
+studies may be regarded as logical. In the first place, in so far as
+they bring to light the inner coherence of any body of truth, the kind
+of evidence upon which it rests, and the type of formal perfection which
+it seeks, they differ from formal logic only in that they derive their
+criteria from cases, rather than from the direct analysis of the
+procedure of thought. And since formal logic must itself make
+experiments, this difference is not a radical one. The study of cases
+tends chiefly to enrich <i>methodology</i>, or the knowledge of the special
+criteria of special sciences. In the second place, such studies serve to
+define the relatively few simple truths which are common to the
+relatively many complex truths. A study of the foundations of arithmetic
+reveals <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189"></a>[<a href="./images/189.png">189</a>]</span>more elementary conceptions, such as <i>class</i> and <i>order</i>, that
+must be employed in the very definition of number itself, and so are
+implied in every numerical calculation. It appears similarly that the
+axioms of geometry are special axioms which involve the acceptance of
+more general axioms or indefinables.<a name="FNanchor_189:8_76" id="FNanchor_189:8_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_189:8_76" class="fnanchor">[189:8]</a> Logic in this sense, then,
+is the enumeration of conceptions and principles in the order of their
+indispensableness to knowledge. And while it must be observed that the
+most general conceptions and principles of knowledge are not necessarily
+those most significant for the existent world, nevertheless the careful
+analysis which such an enumeration involves is scarcely less fruitful
+for metaphysics than for logic.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">&AElig;sthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Beauty.
+Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_79" id="Section_79">79</a>. <i>&AElig;sthetics is the formulation, as independently as possible of
+special subject-matter, of that which conditions beauty.</i> As logic
+commonly refers to a judgment of truth, so &aelig;sthetics at any rate
+<i>refers</i> to a judgment implied in appreciation. But while it is
+generally admitted that truth itself is by no means limited to the form
+of the judgment, the contrary is frequently <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190"></a>[<a href="./images/190.png">190</a>]</span>maintained with reference
+to beauty. The aphorism, <i>De gustibus non est disputandum</i>, expresses a
+common opinion to the effect that beauty is not a property belonging to
+the object of which it is predicated, but a property generated by the
+appreciative consciousness. According to this opinion there can be no
+beauty except in the case of an object's presence in an individual
+experience. Investigators must of necessity refuse to leave individual
+caprice in complete possession of the field, but they have in many cases
+occupied themselves entirely with the <i>state of &aelig;sthetic enjoyment</i> in
+the hope of discovering its constant factors. The opposing tendency
+defines certain <i>formal characters which the beautiful object must
+possess</i>. Evidently the latter school will attribute a more profound
+philosophical importance to the conception of beauty, since for them it
+is a principle that obtains in the world of being. This was the first
+notable contention, that of Plato. But even with the emphasis laid upon
+the subjective aspect of the &aelig;sthetic experience, great metaphysical
+importance may be attached to it, where, as in the case of the German
+Romanticists, reality is deliberately construed as a spiritual life
+which is to be appreciated rather than understood.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191"></a>[<a href="./images/191.png">191</a>]</span>As in the case of logic, a strong impulse has manifested itself in
+&aelig;sthetics to deal with groups of objects that lie within its province,
+rather than directly with its concepts and principles. The first special
+treatise on &aelig;sthetics, the "Poetics" of Aristotle, belongs to this type
+of inquiry, as does all criticism of art in so far as it aims at the
+formulation of general principles.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral
+Goodness.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_80" id="Section_80">80</a>. <i>Ethics</i>, the oldest and most popular of the normative sciences,
+<i>is the formulation, as independently as possible of special
+subject-matter, of that which conditions goodness of conduct</i>. Ethics is
+commonly concerned with goodness only in so far as it is predicated of
+conduct, or of character, which is a more or less permanent disposition
+to conduct. Since conduct, in so far as good, is said to constitute
+moral goodness, ethics may be defined as the formulation of the general
+principles of <i>morality</i>. The principles so formulated would be those
+virtually employed to <i>justify</i> conduct, or to disprove the imputation
+of immorality.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_81" id="Section_81">81</a>. The student of this science is confronted with a very considerable
+diversity of method and differentiation of problems. The earliest and
+most profound opposition of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192"></a>[<a href="./images/192.png">192</a>]</span>doctrine in ethics arose from the
+differences of interpretation of which the teaching of Socrates is
+capable. His doctrine is, as we have seen, verbally expressed in the
+proposition, <i>virtue is knowledge</i>. Socrates was primarily concerned to
+show that there is no real living without an understanding of the
+significance of life. To live well is to know the end of life, the good
+of it all, and to govern action with reference to that end. Virtue is
+therefore the practical wisdom that enables one to live consistently
+with his real intention. But what is the real intention, the end or good
+of life? In the "Protagoras," where Plato represents Socrates as
+expounding his position, virtue is interpreted to mean prudence, or
+foresight of pleasurable and painful consequences. He who knows,
+possesses all virtue in that he is qualified to adapt himself to the
+real situation and to gain the end of pleasure. All men, indeed, seek
+pleasure, but only virtuous men seek it wisely and well.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some
+pleasant things evil and some painful things good?&mdash;for I am
+rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they
+are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort,
+and in as far as they are painful they are bad."<a name="FNanchor_192:9_77" id="FNanchor_192:9_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_192:9_77" class="fnanchor">[192:9]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193"></a>[<a href="./images/193.png">193</a>]</span>According to this view painful things are good only when they lead
+eventually to pleasure, and pleasant things evil only when their painful
+consequences outweigh their pleasantness. Hence moral differences reduce
+to differences of skill in the universal quest for pleasure, and
+<i>sensible gratification is the ultimate standard of moral value</i>. This
+ancient doctrine, known as <i>hedonism</i>, expressing as it does a part of
+life that will not suffer itself for long to be denied, is one of the
+great perennial tendencies of ethical thought. In the course of many
+centuries it has passed through a number of phases, varying its
+conception of pleasure from the tranquillity of the wise man to the
+sensuous titillations of the sybarite, and from the individualism of the
+latter to the universalism of the humanitarian. But in every case it
+shows a respect for the natural man, praising morality for its
+disciplinary and instrumental value in the service of such human wants
+as are the outgrowth of the animal instinct of self-preservation.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Rationalism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_82" id="Section_82">82</a>. But if a man's life be regarded as a truer representation of his
+ideals than is his spoken theory, there is little to identify Socrates
+with the hedonists. At the conclusion of the defence of his own life,
+which Plato puts into his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194"></a>[<a href="./images/194.png">194</a>]</span>mouth in the well-known "Apology," he speaks
+thus:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to
+punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have
+troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything,
+more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something
+when they are really nothing,&mdash;then reprove them, as I have
+reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought
+to care, and thinking that they are something when they are
+really nothing."<a name="FNanchor_194:10_78" id="FNanchor_194:10_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_194:10_78" class="fnanchor">[194:10]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>It is plain that the man Socrates cared little for the pleasurable or
+painful consequences of his acts, provided they were worthy of the high
+calling of human nature. A man's virtue would now seem to possess an
+intrinsic nobility. If knowledge be virtue, then on this basis it must
+be because knowledge is itself excellent. Virtue as knowledge
+contributes to the good by constituting it. We meet here with the
+<i>rationalistic</i> strain in ethics. It praises conduct for the <i>inherent
+worth which it may possess if it express that reason</i> which the Stoics
+called "<i>the ruling part</i>." The riches of wisdom consist for the
+hedonist in their purchase of pleasure. For the rationalist, on the
+other hand, wisdom is not coin, but itself the very substance of value.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Eud&aelig;monism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_83" id="Section_83">83</a>. Rationalism has undergone modifications <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195"></a>[<a href="./images/195.png">195</a>]</span>even more significant
+than those of hedonism, and involving at least one radically new group
+of conceptions. Among the Greeks rationalism and hedonism alike are
+<i>eud&aelig;monistic</i>. They aim to portray <i>the fulness of life</i> that makes
+"the happy man." In the ethics of Aristotle, whose synthetic mind weaves
+together these different strands, the Greek ideal finds its most
+complete expression as "the high-minded man," with all his powers and
+trappings. But the great spiritual transformation which accompanied the
+decline of Greek culture and the rise of Christianity, brought with it a
+new moral sensibility, which finds in man no virtue of himself, but only
+through the grace of God.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"And the virtues themselves," says St. Augustine, "if they
+bear no relation to God, are in truth vices rather than
+virtues; for although they are regarded by many as truly moral
+when they are desired as ends in themselves and not for the
+sake of something else, they are, nevertheless, inflated and
+arrogant, and therefore not to be viewed as virtues but as
+vices."<a name="FNanchor_195:11_79" id="FNanchor_195:11_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_195:11_79" class="fnanchor">[195:11]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The new ideal is that of renunciation, obedience, and resignation.
+Ethically this expresses itself in <i>pietism</i>. Virtue is good neither in
+itself nor on account of its consequences, but because it is
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196"></a>[<a href="./images/196.png">196</a>]</span>conformable to the will of God. The extreme inwardness of this ideal is
+characteristic of an age that despaired of attainment, whether of
+pleasure or knowledge. To all, even the persecuted, it is permitted to
+obey, and so gain entrance into the kingdom of the children of God. But
+as every special study tends to rely upon its own conceptions, pietism,
+involving as it does a relation to God, is replaced by <i>rigorism</i> and
+<i>intuitionism</i>. The former doctrine defines virtue in terms of the inner
+attitude which it expresses. It must be done in the spirit of
+dutifulness, <i>because one ought</i>, and through sheer respect for the law
+which one's moral nature affirms. <i>Intuitionism</i> has attempted to deal
+with the source of the moral law by defining conscience as a <i>special
+faculty</i> or sense, qualified to pass directly upon moral questions, and
+deserving of implicit obediences. It is characteristic of this whole
+tendency to look for the spring of virtuous living, not in a good which
+such living obtains, but in a law to which it owes obedience.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_84" id="Section_84">84</a>. This third general ethical tendency has thus been of the greatest
+importance in emphasizing the <i>consciousness of duty</i>, and has brought
+both hedonism and rationalism to a recognition of its fundamental
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197"></a>[<a href="./images/197.png">197</a>]</span>importance. Ethics must deal not only with the moral ideal, but also
+with the ground of its appeal to the individual, and his obligation to
+pursue it. In connection with this recognition of moral responsibility,
+the problem of human <i>freedom</i> has come to be regarded in the light of
+an inevitable point of contact between ethics and metaphysics. That
+which is absolutely binding upon the human will can be determined only
+in view of some theory of its ultimate nature. On this account the
+rationalistic and hedonistic motives are no longer abstractly sundered,
+as in the days of the Stoics and Epicureans, but tend to be absorbed in
+broader philosophical tendencies. Hedonism appears as the sequel to
+naturalism; or, more rarely, as part of a theistic system whose morality
+is divine legislation enforced by an appeal to motives of pleasure and
+pain. Rationalism, on the other hand, tends to be absorbed in
+rationalistic or idealistic philosophies, where man's rational nature is
+construed as his bond of kinship with the universe.</p>
+
+<p>Ethics has exhibited from the beginning a tendency to universalize its
+conceptions and take the central place in metaphysics. Thus with Plato
+good conduct was but a special case of goodness, the good being the most
+general principle of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198"></a>[<a href="./images/198.png">198</a>]</span>reality.<a name="FNanchor_198:12_80" id="FNanchor_198:12_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_198:12_80" class="fnanchor">[198:12]</a> In modern times Fichte and his
+school have founded an ethical metaphysics upon the conception of
+duty.<a name="FNanchor_198:13_81" id="FNanchor_198:13_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_198:13_81" class="fnanchor">[198:13]</a> In these cases ethics can be distinguished from
+metaphysics only by adding to the study of the good or of duty, a study
+of the special physical, psychological, and social conditions under
+which goodness and dutifulness may obtain in human life. It is possible
+to attach the name of ethics, and we have seen the same to be true of
+logic, either to a realm of ideal truth or to that realm wherein the
+ideal is realized in humanity.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_85" id="Section_85">85</a>. A systematic study of ethics requires that the <i>virtues</i>, or types
+of moral practice, shall be interpreted in the light of the central
+conception of good, or of conscience. <i>Justice</i>, <i>temperance</i>, <i>wisdom</i>,
+and <i>courage</i> were praised by the Greeks. Christianity added
+<i>self-sacrifice</i>, <i>humility</i>, <i>purity</i>, and <i>benevolence</i>. These and
+other virtues have been defined, justified, and co-ordinated with the
+aid of a standard of moral value or a canon of duty.</p>
+
+<p>There is in modern ethics a pronounced tendency, parallel to those
+already noted in logic and &aelig;sthetics, to study such phenomena belonging
+to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199"></a>[<a href="./images/199.png">199</a>]</span>its field as have become historically established. A very
+considerable investigation of <i>custom</i>, <i>institutions</i>, and other social
+forces has led to a contact of ethics with anthropology and sociology
+scarcely less significant than that with metaphysics.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of Faith.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_86" id="Section_86">86</a>. In that part of his philosophy in which he deals with faith, the
+great German philosopher Kant mentions God, Freedom, and Immortality as
+the three pre-eminent religious interests. Religion, as we have seen,
+sets up a social relationship between man and that massive drift of
+things which determines his destiny. Of the two terms of this relation,
+God signifies the latter, while freedom and immortality are prerogatives
+which religion bestows upon the former. Man, viewed from the stand-point
+of religion as an object of special interest to the universe, is said to
+have a soul; and by virtue of this soul he is said to be free and
+immortal, when thought of as having a life in certain senses independent
+of its immediate natural environment. The attempt to make this faith
+theoretically intelligible has led to the philosophical disciplines
+known as <i>theology</i> and <i>psychology</i>.<a name="FNanchor_199:14_82" id="FNanchor_199:14_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_199:14_82" class="fnanchor">[199:14]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200"></a>[<a href="./images/200.png">200</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_87" id="Section_87">87</a>. <i>Theology</i>, as a branch of philosophy, deals with <i>the proof and
+the nature of God</i>. Since "God" is not primarily a theoretical
+conception, the proof of God is not properly a philosophical problem.
+Historically, this task has been assumed as a legacy from Christian
+apologetics; and it has involved, at any rate so far as European
+philosophy is concerned, the definition of ultimate being in such
+spiritual terms as make possible the relation with man postulated in
+Christianity. For this it has been regarded as sufficient to ascribe to
+the world an underlying unity capable of bearing the predicates of
+perfection, omnipotence, and omniscience. Each proof of God has defined
+him pre-eminently in terms of some one of these his attributes.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Ontological Proof of God.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_88" id="Section_88">88</a>. The <i>ontological</i> proof of God held the foremost place in
+philosophy's contribution to Christianity up to the eighteenth century.
+This proof <i>infers the existence from the ideal</i> of God, and so
+approaches the nature of God through the attribute of perfection. It
+owes the form in which it was accepted in the Middle Ages and
+Renaissance to St. Anselm, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201"></a>[<a href="./images/201.png">201</a>]</span>Archbishop of Canterbury at the close of the
+eleventh century. He argued from the idea of a most perfect being to its
+existence, on the ground that non-existence, or existence only in idea,
+would contradict its perfection. It is evident that the force of this
+argument depends upon the necessity of the idea of God. The argument was
+accepted in Scholastic Philosophy<a name="FNanchor_201:15_83" id="FNanchor_201:15_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_201:15_83" class="fnanchor">[201:15]</a> largely because of the virtual
+acceptance of this necessity. Medi&aelig;val thought was under the dominance
+of the philosophical ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and through them
+rationalism had come to be the unquestioned starting-point for all
+thought. For Plato reality and rationality meant one and the same thing,
+so that the ultimate reality was the highest principle of rationality,
+which he conceived to be the idea of the good. In the case of Aristotle
+the ideal of rationality was conceived to determine the course of the
+cosmical evolution as its immanent final cause. But in itself it was
+beyond the world, or transcendent. For Plato perfection itself is
+reality, whereas for Aristotle perfection determines the hierarchical
+order of natural substances. The latter theory, more suitable to the
+uses of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202"></a>[<a href="./images/202.png">202</a>]</span>Christianity, because it distinguished between God and the
+world, was incorporated into the great school systems. But both theories
+contain the essence of the ontological proof of God. In thought one
+seeks the perfect truth, and posits it as at once the culmination of
+insight and the meaning of life. The ideal of God is therefore a
+necessary idea, because implied in all the effort of thought as the
+object capable of finally satisfying it. St. Anselm adds little to the
+force of this argument, and does much to obscure its real significance.</p>
+
+<p>In stating the ontological argument the term perfection has been
+expressly emphasized, because it may be taken to embrace both truth and
+goodness. Owing to a habit of thought, due in the main to Plato, it was
+long customary to regard degrees of truth and goodness as
+interchangeable, and as equivalent to degrees of reality. The <i>ens
+realissimum</i> was in its completeness the highest object both of the
+faculty of cognition and of the moral will. But even in the scholastic
+period these two different aspects of the ideal were clearly recognized,
+and led to sharply divergent tendencies. More recently they have been
+divided and embodied in separate arguments. <i>The epistemological</i>
+argument <i>defines God in terms of that absolute <span class='pagenum' style="font-style: normal;"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203"></a>[<a href="./images/203.png">203</a>]</span>truth which is referred
+to in every judgment</i>. Under the influence of idealism this absolute
+truth has taken the form of a universal mind, or all-embracing standard
+experience, called more briefly the absolute. The <i>ethical</i> argument, on
+the other hand, conceives God as <i>the perfect goodness implied in the
+moral struggle, or the power through which goodness is made to triumph
+in the universe</i> to the justification of moral faith. While the former
+of these arguments identifies God with being, the latter defines God in
+terms of the intent or outcome of being. Thus, while the epistemological
+argument does not distinguish God and the world, the latter does so,
+assuming that independent reality can be attributed to the stages of a
+process and to the purpose that dominates it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Cosmological Proof of God.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_89" id="Section_89">89</a>. The <i>cosmological</i> proof of God approaches him through the
+attribute of creative omnipotence. The common principle of causal
+explanation refers the origin of natural events to similar antecedent
+events. But there must be some <i>first cause</i> from which the whole series
+is derived, a cause which is ultimate, sufficient to itself, and the
+responsible author of the world. Because God's function as creator was a
+part of the Christian teaching, and because <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204"></a>[<a href="./images/204.png">204</a>]</span>explanation by causes is
+habitual with common sense, this argument has had great vogue. But in
+philosophy it has declined in importance, chiefly because it has been
+absorbed in arguments which deal with the <i>kind</i> of causality proper to
+a first cause or world-ground. The argument that follows is a case in
+point.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Teleological Proof of God.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_90" id="Section_90">90</a>. The <i>teleological</i> proof argues that the world can owe its origin
+only to an <i>intelligent first cause</i>. The evidence for this is furnished
+by the cunning contrivances and beneficent adaptations of nature. These
+could not have come about through chance or the working of mechanical
+forces, but only through the foresight of a rational will. This argument
+originally infers God from the character of nature and history; and the
+extension of mechanical principles to organic and social phenomena,
+especially as stimulated by Darwin's principle of natural selection, has
+tended greatly to diminish its importance. When, on the other hand, for
+nature and history there are substituted the intellectual and moral
+activities themselves, and the inference is made to the ideal which they
+imply, the teleological argument merges into the ontological. But the
+old-fashioned statement of it remains in the form of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205"></a>[<a href="./images/205.png">205</a>]</span>religious faith,
+and in this capacity it has had the approval even of Hume and Kant, the
+philosophers who have contributed most forcibly to its overthrow as a
+demonstration of God. They agree that the <i>acknowledgment</i> of God in
+nature and history is the sequel to a theistic belief, and an inevitable
+attitude on the part of the religious consciousness.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">God and the World. Theism and Pantheism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_91" id="Section_91">91</a>. Another group of ideas belonging to philosophical theology
+consists of three generalizations respecting God's relation to the
+world, known as <i>theism</i>, <i>pantheism</i>, and <i>deism</i>. Although,
+theoretically, these are corollaries of the different arguments for God,
+two of them, theism and pantheism, owe their importance to their rivalry
+as religious tendencies. <i>Theism</i> emphasizes that attitude to God which
+recognizes in him an historical personage, in some sense distinct from
+both the world and man, which are his works and yet stand in an external
+relationship to him. It expresses the spirit of ethical and monotheistic
+religion, and is therefore the natural belief of the Christian.
+<i>Pantheism</i> appears in primitive religion as an animistic or
+polytheistic sense of the presence of a divine principle diffused
+throughout nature. But it figures most notably <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206"></a>[<a href="./images/206.png">206</a>]</span>in the history of
+religions, in the highly reflective Brahmanism of India. In sharp
+opposition to Christianity, this religion preaches the indivisible unity
+of the world and the illusoriness of the individual's sense of his own
+independent reality. In spite of the fact that such a doctrine is alien
+to the spirit of Christianity, it enters into Christian theology through
+the influence of philosophy. The theoretical idea of God tends, as we
+have seen, to the identification of him with the world as its most real
+principle. Or it bestows upon him a nature so logical and formal, and so
+far removed from the characters of humanity, as to forbid his entering
+into personal or social relations. Such reflections concerning God find
+their religious expression in a mystical sense of unity, which has in
+many cases either entirely replaced or profoundly modified the theistic
+strain in Christianity. In current philosophy pantheism appears in the
+epistemological argument which identifies God with being; while the
+chief bulwark of theism is the ethical argument, with its provision for
+a distinction between the actual world and ideal principle of evolution.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Deism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_92" id="Section_92">92</a>. While theism and pantheism appear to be permanent phases in the
+philosophy of religion, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207"></a>[<a href="./images/207.png">207</a>]</span><i>deism</i> is the peculiar product of the
+eighteenth century. It is based upon a repudiation of supernaturalism
+and "enthusiasm," on the one hand, and a literal acceptance of the
+cosmological and teleological proofs on the other. Religions, like all
+else, were required, in this epoch of clear thinking, to submit to the
+canons of experimental observation and practical common sense. These
+authorize only a <i>natural religion</i>, the acknowledgment in pious living
+of a God who, having contrived this natural world, has given it over to
+the rule, not of priests and prophets, but of natural law. The
+artificiality of its conception of God, and the calculating spirit of
+its piety, make deism a much less genuine expression of the religious
+experience than either the moral chivalry of theism or the intellectual
+and mystical exaltation of pantheism.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Metaphysics and Theology.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_93" id="Section_93">93</a>. The systematic development of philosophy leads to the inclusion of
+conceptions of God within the problem of metaphysics, and the
+subordination of the proof of God to the determination of the
+fundamental principle of reality. There will always remain, however, an
+outstanding theological discipline, whose function it is to interpret
+worship, or the living religious <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208"></a>[<a href="./images/208.png">208</a>]</span>attitude, in terms of the theoretical
+principles of philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Psychology is the Theory of the Soul.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_94" id="Section_94">94</a>. <i>Psychology is the theory of the soul.</i> As we have already seen,
+the rise of scepticism directs attention from the object of thought to
+the thinker, and so emphasizes the self as a field for theoretical
+investigation. But the original and the dominating interest in the self
+is a practical one. The precept, <ins class="greek" title="gn&ocirc;thi seauton">&#947;&#957;&#8182;&#952;&#953; &#963;&#949;&#945;&#965;&#964;&#8057;&#957;</ins>, has its
+deepest justification in the concern for the salvation of one's soul. In
+primitive and half-instinctive belief the self is recognized in
+practical relations. In its animistic phase this belief admitted of such
+relations with all living creatures, and extended the conception of life
+very generally to natural processes. Thus in the beginning the self was
+doubtless indistinguishable from the vital principle. In the first
+treatise on psychology, the "<ins class="greek" title="peri Psych&ecirc;s">&#960;&#949;&#961;&#8054; &#936;&#965;&#967;&#8134;&#962;</ins>" of Aristotle, this
+interpretation finds a place in theoretical philosophy. For Aristotle
+the soul is the <i>entelechy</i> of the body&mdash;that function or activity which
+makes a man of it. He recognized, furthermore, three stages in this
+activity: the nutritive, sensitive, and rational souls, or the
+vegetable, animal, and distinctively human natures, respectively. The
+rational soul, in its <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209"></a>[<a href="./images/209.png">209</a>]</span>own proper activity, is man's highest
+prerogative, the soul to be saved. By virtue of it man rises above
+bodily conditions, and lays hold on the divine and eternal. But Plato,
+who, as we have seen, was ever ready to grant reality to the ideal apart
+from the circumstances of its particular embodiment, had already
+undertaken to demonstrate the immortality of the soul on the ground of
+its distinctive nature.<a name="FNanchor_209:16_84" id="FNanchor_209:16_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_209:16_84" class="fnanchor">[209:16]</a> According to his way of thinking, the
+soul's essentially moral nature made it incapable of destruction through
+the operation of natural causes. It is evident, then, that there were
+already ideas in vogue capable of interpreting the Christian teaching
+concerning the existence of a soul, or of an inner essence of man
+capable of being made an object of divine interest.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Spiritual Substance</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_95" id="Section_95">95</a>. The immediate effect of Christianity was to introduce into
+philosophy as one of its cardinal doctrines the theory of a spiritual
+being, constituting the true self of the individual, and separable from
+the body. The difference recognized in Plato and Aristotle between the
+divine spark and the appetitive and perceptual parts of human nature was
+now emphasized. The former (frequently called the "spirit," to
+distinguish <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210"></a>[<a href="./images/210.png">210</a>]</span>it from the lower soul) was defined as a <i>substance</i> having
+the attributes of thought and will. The fundamental argument for its
+existence was the immediate appeal to self-consciousness; and it was
+further defined as indestructible on the ground of its being utterly
+discontinuous and incommensurable with its material environment. This
+theory survives at the present day in the conception of pure activity,
+but on the whole the attributes of the soul have superseded its
+substance.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Intellectualism and Voluntarism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_96" id="Section_96">96</a>. <i>Intellectualism and voluntarism</i> are the two rival possibilities
+of emphasis when the soul is defined in terms of its known activities.
+Wherever the essence of personality is in question, as also occurs in
+the case of theology, thought and will present their respective claims
+to the place of first importance. <i>Intellectualism would make will
+merely the concluding phase of thought, while voluntarism would reduce
+thought to one of the interests of a general appetency.</i> It is evident
+that idealistic theories will be much concerned with this question of
+priority. It is also true, though less evident, that intellectualism,
+since it emphasizes the general and objective features of the mind,
+tends to subordinate the individual to the universal; while voluntarism,
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211"></a>[<a href="./images/211.png">211</a>]</span>emphasizing desire and action, is relatively individualistic, and so,
+since there are many individuals, also pluralistic.<a name="FNanchor_211:17_85" id="FNanchor_211:17_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_211:17_85" class="fnanchor">[211:17]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, and
+Indeterminism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_97" id="Section_97">97</a>. The question of the <i>freedom of the will</i> furnishes a favorite
+controversial topic in philosophy. For the interest at stake is no less
+than the individual's responsibility before man and God for his good or
+bad works. It bears alike upon science, religion, and philosophy, and is
+at the same time a question of most fundamental practical importance.
+But this diffusion of the problem has led to so considerable a
+complication of it that it becomes necessary in outlining it to define
+two issues. In the first place, the concept of freedom is designed to
+express generally the distinction between man and the rest of nature. To
+make man in all respects <i>the product and creature of his natural
+environment</i> would be to deny freedom and accept the radically
+<i>necessitarian</i> doctrine. The question still remains, however, as to the
+causes which dominate man. He may be free from nature, and yet be ruled
+by God, or by distinctively spiritual causes, such as ideas or
+character. Where in general the will is regarded as submitting only to a
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212"></a>[<a href="./images/212.png">212</a>]</span><i>spiritual causation</i> proper to its own realm, the conception is best
+named <i>determinism</i>; though in the tradition of philosophy it is held to
+be a doctrine of freedom, because contrasted with the necessitarianism
+above defined. There remains <i>indeterminism</i>, which attributes to the
+will a spontaneity that makes possible the <i>direct presence to it of
+genuine alternatives</i>. The issue may here coincide with that between
+intellectualism and voluntarism. If, <i>e.g.</i>, in God's act of creation,
+his ideals and standards are prior to his fiat, his conduct is
+determined; whereas it is free in the radical or indeterministic sense
+if his ideals themselves are due to his sheer will. This theory involves
+at a certain point in action the absence of cause. On this account the
+free will is often identified with <i>chance</i>, in which case it loses its
+distinction from nature, and we have swung round the circle.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Immortality. Survival and Eternalism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_98" id="Section_98">98</a>. There is similar complexity in the problem concerning
+<i>immortality</i>. Were the extreme claims of naturalism to be established,
+there would be no ground whatsoever upon which to maintain the
+immortality of man, mere dust returning unto dust. The philosophical
+concept of immortality is due to the supposition that the quintessence
+of the individual's nature is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213"></a>[<a href="./images/213.png">213</a>]</span>divine.<a name="FNanchor_213:18_86" id="FNanchor_213:18_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_213:18_86" class="fnanchor">[213:18]</a> But several possibilities
+are at this point open to us. The first would maintain the survival
+after death of a recognizable and discrete personality. Another would
+suppose a preservation after death, through being taken up into the life
+of God. Still another, the theory commonly maintained on the ground of
+rationalistic and idealistic metaphysics, would deny that immortality
+has to do with life after death, and affirm that it signifies the
+perpetual membership of the human individual in a realm of eternity
+through the truth or virtue that is in him. But this interpretation
+evidently leaves open the question of the immortality of that which is
+distinctive and personal in human nature.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and Method.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_99" id="Section_99">99</a>. So far we have followed the fortunes only of the "spirit" of man.
+What of that lower soul through which he is identified with the fortunes
+of his body? When philosophy gradually ceased, in the sixteenth and
+seventeenth centuries, to be "the handmaid of religion," there arose a
+renewed interest in that part of human nature lying between the strictly
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214"></a>[<a href="./images/214.png">214</a>]</span>physiological functions, on the one hand, and thought and will on the
+other. Descartes and Spinoza analyzed what they called the "passions,"
+meaning such states of mind as are conditioned by a concern for the
+interests of the body. At a later period, certain English philosophers,
+following Locke, traced the dependence of ideas upon the senses. Their
+method was that of <i>introspection</i>, or the direct examination by the
+individual of his own ideas, and for the sake of noting their origin and
+composition from simple factors. The lineal descendants of these same
+English philosophers defined more carefully the process of
+<i>association</i>, whereby the complexity and sequence of ideas are brought
+about, and made certain conjectures as to its dependence upon properties
+and transactions in the physical brain. These are the three main
+philosophical sources of what has now grown to be the separate <i>natural
+science of psychology</i>. It will be noted that there are two
+characteristics which all of these studies have in common. They deal
+with the experience of the individual as composing his own private
+history, and tend to attribute the specific course which this private
+history takes to bodily conditions. It is only recently that these
+investigations have <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215"></a>[<a href="./images/215.png">215</a>]</span>acquired sufficient unity and exclusiveness of aim
+to warrant their being regarded as a special science. But such is now so
+far the case that the psychologist of this type pursues his way quite
+independently of philosophy. It is true his research has advanced
+considerably beyond his understanding of its province. But it is
+generally recognized that he must examine those very <i>factors of
+subjectivity</i> which the natural scientist otherwise seeks to evade, and,
+furthermore, that he must seek to <i>provide for them in nature</i>. He
+treats the inner life in what Locke called "the plain historical
+method," that is to say, instead of interpreting and defining its ideas,
+he analyzes and reports upon its content. He would not seek to justify a
+moral judgment, as would ethics, or to criticise the cogency of thought,
+as would logic; but only to describe the actual state as he found it. In
+order to make his data commensurable with the phenomena of nature, he
+discovers or defines bodily conditions for the subjective content which
+he analyzes. His fundamental principle of method is the postulate of
+<i>psycho-physical parallelism</i>, according to which he assumes a <i>state of
+brain or nervous system for every state of mind</i>. But in adopting a
+province and a method the psychologist <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216"></a>[<a href="./images/216.png">216</a>]</span>foregoes finality of truth after
+the manner of all natural science. He deals admittedly with an aspect of
+experience, and his conclusions are no more adequate to the nature of
+the self than they are to the nature of outer objects. An admirable
+reference to this abstract division of experience occurs in K&uuml;lpe's
+"Introduction to Philosophy":</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"For the developed consciousness, as for the naive, every
+experience is an unitary whole; and it is only the habit of
+abstract reflection upon experience that makes the objective
+and subjective worlds seem to fall apart as originally
+different forms of existence. Just as a plane curve can be
+represented in analytical geometry as the function of two
+variables, the absciss&aelig; and the ordinates, without prejudice
+to the unitary course of the curve itself, so the world of
+human experience may be reduced to a subjective and an
+objective factor, without prejudice to its real
+coherence."<a name="FNanchor_215:19_87" id="FNanchor_215:19_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_215:19_87" class="fnanchor">[215:19]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Psychology and Philosophy.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_100" id="Section_100">100</a>. The problems of psychology, like those of theology, tend to
+disappear as independent philosophical topics. The ultimate nature of
+the self will continue to interest philosophers&mdash;more deeply, perhaps,
+than any aspect of experience&mdash;but their conception of it will be a
+corollary of their metaphysics and epistemology. The remainder of the
+field of the old philosophical psychology, the introspective and
+experimental <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217"></a>[<a href="./images/217.png">217</a>]</span>analysis of special states of mind, is already the
+province of a natural science which is becoming more and more free from
+the stand-point and method of philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Transition from Classification by Problems to Classification
+by Doctrines. Naturalism. Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute
+Realism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_101" id="Section_101">101</a>. Reminding ourselves anew that philosophical problems cannot be
+treated in isolation from one another, we shall hereinafter seek to
+become acquainted with general stand-points that give systematic unity
+to the issues which have been enumerated. Such stand-points are not
+clearly defined by those who occupy them, and they afford no clear-cut
+classification of all historical philosophical philosophies. But
+system-making in philosophy is commonly due to the moving in an
+individual mind of some most significant idea; and certain of these
+ideas have reappeared so frequently as to define more or less clearly
+marked tendencies, or continuous strands, out of which the history of
+thought is forever weaving itself. Such is clearly the case with
+<i>naturalism</i>. From the beginning until now there have been men whose
+philosophy is a summation of the natural sciences, whose entire thought
+is based upon an acceptance of the methods and the fundamental
+conceptions <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218"></a>[<a href="./images/218.png">218</a>]</span>of these disciplines. This tendency stands in the history
+of thought for the conviction that the visible and tangible world which
+interacts with the body is veritable reality. This philosophy is
+realistic and empirical to an extent entirely determined by its belief
+concerning being. But while naturalism is only secondarily
+epistemological, <i>subjectivism</i> and <i>absolute idealism</i> have their very
+source in the self-examination and the self-criticism of thought.
+Subjectivism signifies the conviction that the knower cannot escape
+himself. If reality is to be kept within the range of possible
+knowledge, it must be defined in terms of the processes or states of
+selves. <i>Absolute idealism</i> arises from a union of this epistemological
+motive with a recognition of what are regarded as the logical
+necessities to which reality must submit. Reality must be both knowledge
+and rational knowledge; the object, in short, of an absolute mind, which
+shall be at once all-containing and systematic. This rationalistic
+motive was, however, not originally associated with an idealistic
+epistemology, but with the common-sense principle that being is
+discovered and not constituted by thought. Such an <i>absolute realism</i>
+is, like naturalism, primarily metaphysical rather than
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219"></a>[<a href="./images/219.png">219</a>]</span>epistemological; but, unlike naturalism, it seeks to define reality as
+a logical or ethical necessity.</p>
+
+<p>Under these several divisions, then, we shall meet once more with the
+special problems of philosophy, but this time they will be ranged in an
+order that is determined by some central doctrine. They will appear as
+parts not of the general problem of philosophy, but of some definite
+system of philosophy.</p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_180:1_69" id="Footnote_180:1_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_180:1_69"><span class="label">[180:1]</span></a> Cf. &sect; <a href="#Section_68">68</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_182:2_70" id="Footnote_182:2_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182:2_70"><span class="label">[182:2]</span></a> The Socratic distinction between the logical and the
+psychological treatment of belief finds its best expression in Plato's
+<i>Gorgias</i>, especially, 454, 455. Cf. also &sect; <a href="#Section_29">29</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_182:3_71" id="Footnote_182:3_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182:3_71"><span class="label">[182:3]</span></a> Thus, e. g. Hegel. See &sect; <a href="#Section_179">179</a>. Cf. also &sect;&sect; <a href="#Section_199">199</a>, <a href="#Section_200">200</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_183:4_72" id="Footnote_183:4_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_183:4_72"><span class="label">[183:4]</span></a> Cf. &sect; <a href="#Section_84">84</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_184:5_73" id="Footnote_184:5_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184:5_73"><span class="label">[184:5]</span></a> See &sect; 69, <a href="#Footnote_173:16_64"><i>note</i></a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_184:6_74" id="Footnote_184:6_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184:6_74"><span class="label">[184:6]</span></a> The reader will find a good illustration of eristic in
+Plato's <i>Euthydemus</i>, 275.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_187:7_75" id="Footnote_187:7_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_187:7_75"><span class="label">[187:7]</span></a> The reader can find these rules, and the detail of the
+traditional formal logic, in any elementary text-book, such as, e. g.,
+Jevons: <i>Elements of Logic</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_189:8_76" id="Footnote_189:8_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_189:8_76"><span class="label">[189:8]</span></a> What is called "the algebra of logic" seeks to obtain
+an unequivocal symbolic expression for these truths.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_192:9_77" id="Footnote_192:9_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_192:9_77"><span class="label">[192:9]</span></a> Plato: <i>Protagoras</i>, 351. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_194:10_78" id="Footnote_194:10_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_194:10_78"><span class="label">[194:10]</span></a> Plato: <i>Apology</i>, 41. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_195:11_79" id="Footnote_195:11_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_195:11_79"><span class="label">[195:11]</span></a> Quoted by Paulsen in his <i>System of Ethics</i>.
+Translation by Thilly, p. 69.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_198:12_80" id="Footnote_198:12_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198:12_80"><span class="label">[198:12]</span></a> Cf. &sect; <a href="#Section_160">160</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_198:13_81" id="Footnote_198:13_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198:13_81"><span class="label">[198:13]</span></a> Cf. &sect; <a href="#Section_177">177</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_199:14_82" id="Footnote_199:14_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_199:14_82"><span class="label">[199:14]</span></a> Concerning the duty of philosophy to religion in these
+matters, cf. Descartes: <i>Meditations</i>, <i>Dedication</i>. Translation by
+Veitch, p. 81.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_201:15_83" id="Footnote_201:15_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_201:15_83"><span class="label">[201:15]</span></a> The school-philosophy that flourished from the
+eleventh to the fifteenth century, under the authority of the church.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_209:16_84" id="Footnote_209:16_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_209:16_84"><span class="label">[209:16]</span></a> Especially in the <i>Ph&aelig;do</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_211:17_85" id="Footnote_211:17_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_211:17_85"><span class="label">[211:17]</span></a> Schopenhauer is a notable exception. Cf. &sect;&sect; <a href="#Section_135">135</a>, <a href="#Section_138">138</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_213:18_86" id="Footnote_213:18_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_213:18_86"><span class="label">[213:18]</span></a> It is interesting, however, to observe that current
+spiritualistic theories maintain a naturalistic theory of immortality,
+verifiable, it is alleged, in certain extraordinary empirical
+observations.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_215:19_87" id="Footnote_215:19_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_215:19_87"><span class="label">[215:19]</span></a> Translation by Pillsbury and Titchener, p. 59.</p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220"></a>[<a href="./images/220.png">220</a>]</span></p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221"></a>[<a href="./images/221.png">221</a>]</span></p>
+<h2>PART III</h2>
+
+<h3>SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY</h3>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222"></a>[<a href="./images/222.png">222</a>]</span></p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223"></a>[<a href="./images/223.png">223</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_VIII" id="Chap_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h2>
+
+<h3>NATURALISM<a name="FNanchor_223:1_88" id="FNanchor_223:1_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_223:1_88" class="fnanchor" style="font-weight: normal; font-size: 80%">[223:1]</a></h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">The General Meaning of Materialism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_102" id="Section_102">102</a>. The meaning conveyed by any philosophical term consists largely
+of the distinctions which it suggests. Its peculiar quality, like the
+physiognomy of the battle-scarred veteran, is a composite of the
+controversies which it has survived. There is, therefore, an almost
+unavoidable confusion attendant upon the denomination of any early phase
+of philosophy as <i>materialism</i>. But in the historical beginnings of
+thought, as also in the common-sense of all ages, there is at any rate
+present a very essential strand of this theory. The naive habit of mind
+which, in the sixth century before Christ, prompted successive Greek
+thinkers to define reality in terms <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224"></a>[<a href="./images/224.png">224</a>]</span>of water, air, and fire, is in this
+respect one with that exhibited in Dr. Samuel Johnson's smiting the
+ground with his stick in curt refutation of Bishop Berkeley's
+idea-philosophy. There is a theoretical instinct, not accidental or
+perverse, but springing from the very life-preserving equipment of the
+organism, which attributes reality to <i>tangible space-filling things
+encountered by the body</i>. For obvious reasons of self-interest the
+organism is first of all endowed with a sense of contact, and the more
+delicate senses enter into its practical economy as means of
+anticipating or avoiding contact. From such practical expectations
+concerning the proximity of that which may press upon, injure, or
+displace the body, arise the first crude judgments of reality. And these
+are at the same time the nucleus of naive philosophy and the germinal
+phase of materialism.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Corporeal Being.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_103" id="Section_103">103</a>. The first philosophical movement among the Greeks was a series of
+attempts to reduce the tangible world to unity, and of these the
+conception offered by Anaximander is of marked interest in its bearing
+upon the development of materialism. This philosopher is remarkable for
+having <i>defined</i> his first principle, instead of having chosen it from
+among the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225"></a>[<a href="./images/225.png">225</a>]</span>different elements already distinguished by common-sense. He
+thought the unity of nature to consist in its periodic evolution from
+and return into one infinite sum of material (<ins class="greek" title="to apeiron">&#964;&#8056; &#7940;&#960;&#949;&#953;&#961;&#959;&#957;</ins>),
+which, much in the manner of the "nebula" of modern science, is
+conceived as both indeterminate in its actual state and infinitely rich
+in its potentiality. The conception of matter, the most familiar
+commonplace of science, begins to be recognizable. It has here reached
+the point of signifying a common substance for all tangible things, a
+substance that in its own general and omnipresent nature is without the
+special marks that distinguish these tangible things from one another.
+And in so far the philosophy of Anaximander is materialistic.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_104" id="Section_104">104</a>. But the earliest thinkers are said to be <i>hylozoists</i>, rather
+than strict materialists, because of their failure to make certain
+distinctions in connection with the <i>processes</i> of matter. The term
+hylozoism unites with the conception of the formless material of the
+world (<ins class="greek" title="hyl&ecirc;">&#8021;&#955;&#951;</ins>), that of an animating power to which its
+formations and transformations are due. Hylozoism itself was not a
+deliberate synthesis of these two conceptions, but a primitive practical
+tendency to universalize the conception, of life. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226"></a>[<a href="./images/226.png">226</a>]</span>Such "animism"
+instinctively associates with an object's bulk and hardness a capacity
+for locomotion and general initiative. And the material principles
+defined by the philosophers retain this vague and comprehensive
+attribute as a matter of course, until it is distinguished and separated
+through attempts to understand it.</p>
+
+<p>That aspect of natural process which was most impressive to Greek minds
+of the reflective type was the alternation of "generation and decay." In
+full accord with his more ancient master, Epicurus, the Latin poet
+Lucretius writes:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Thus neither can death-dealing motions keep the mastery
+always, nor entomb existence forevermore; nor, on the other
+hand, can the birth and increase giving motions of things
+preserve them always after they are born. Thus the war of
+first beginnings waged from eternity is carried on with
+dubious issue: now here, now there, the life-bringing elements
+of things get the mastery and are o'ermastered in turn: with
+the funeral wail blends the cry which babies raise when they
+enter the borders of light; and no night ever followed day,
+nor morning night, that heard not, mingling with the sickly
+infant's cries, wailings of the attendants on death and black
+funeral."<a name="FNanchor_226:2_89" id="FNanchor_226:2_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_226:2_89" class="fnanchor">[226:2]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>In a similar vein, the earliest conceptions of natural evolution
+attributed it to the coworking of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227"></a>[<a href="./images/227.png">227</a>]</span>two principles, that of Love or union
+and that of Hate or dissolution. The process is here distinguished from
+the material of nature, but is still described in the language of
+practical life. A distinction between two aspects of vital phenomena is
+the next step. These may be regarded in respect either of the motion and
+change which attend them, or the rationality which informs them. Life is
+both effective and significant. Although neither of these ideas ever
+wholly ceases to be animistic, they may nevertheless be applied quite
+independently of one another. The one reduces the primitive animistic
+world to the lower end of its scale, the other construes it in terms of
+a purposive utility commensurable with that of human action. Now it is
+with <i>mechanism</i>, the former of these diverging ways, that the
+development of materialism is identified. For this philosophy a thing
+need have no value to justify its existence, nor any acting intelligence
+to which it may owe its origin. Its bulk and position are sufficient for
+its being, and the operation of forces capable of integrating, dividing,
+or moving it is sufficient for its derivation and history. In short,
+there is no rhyme or reason at the heart of things, but only actual
+matter distributed by sheer force. With this elimination <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228"></a>[<a href="./images/228.png">228</a>]</span>of the element
+of purposiveness from the hylozoistic world, the content and process of
+nature are fitted to one another. Matter is that which is moved by
+force, and force is the determining principle of the motions of matter.
+Materialism is now definitely equipped with its fundamental conceptions.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Materialism and Physical Science.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_105" id="Section_105">105</a>. The central conceptions of materialism as a philosophical theory
+differ from those employed in the physical sciences only in what is
+demanded of them. The scientist reports upon physical phenomena without
+accepting any further responsibility, while those who like Lucretius
+maintain a physical metaphysics, must, like him, prove that "the minute
+bodies of matter from everlasting continually uphold the sum of things."
+But, though they employ them in their own way, materialists and all
+other exponents of naturalism derive their central conceptions from the
+physical sciences, and so reflect the historical development through
+which these sciences have passed. To certain historical phases of
+physical science, in so far as these bear directly upon the meaning of
+naturalism, we now turn.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Development of the Conceptions of Physical Science. Space
+and Matter.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_106" id="Section_106">106</a>. From the earliest times down to the present day the groundwork of
+materialism has <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229"></a>[<a href="./images/229.png">229</a>]</span>most commonly been cast in the form of an <i>atomic
+theory</i>. Democritus, the first system-builder of this school, adopted
+the conception of indivisible particles (<ins class="greek" title="atomoi">&#7940;&#964;&#959;&#956;&#959;&#953;</ins>), impenetrable
+in their occupancy of space, and varying among themselves only in form,
+order, and position. To provide for the motion that distributes them he
+conceived them as separated from one another by empty space. From this
+it follows that the void is as real as matter, or, as Democritus himself
+is reputed to have said, "thing is not more real than no-thing."</p>
+
+<p>But atomism has not been by any means universally regarded as the most
+satisfactory conception of the relation between space and matter. Not
+only does it require two kinds of being, with the different attributes
+of extension and hardness, respectively,<a name="FNanchor_229:3_90" id="FNanchor_229:3_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_229:3_90" class="fnanchor">[229:3]</a> but it would also seem
+to be experimentally inadequate in the case of the more subtle physical
+processes, such as light. The former of these is a speculative
+consideration, and as such had no little weight with the French
+philosopher Descartes, whose divisions and definitions so profoundly
+affected the course of thought in these <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230"></a>[<a href="./images/230.png">230</a>]</span>matters after the sixteenth
+century. Holding also "that a vacuum or space in which there is
+absolutely no body is repugnant to reason," and that an indivisible
+space-filling particle is self-contradictory, he was led to <i>identify
+space and matter</i>; that is, to make matter as indispensable to space as
+space to matter. There is, then, but one kind of corporeal being, whose
+attribute is extension, and whose modes are motion and rest. The most
+famous application of the mechanical conceptions which he bases upon
+this first principle, is his theory of the planets, which are conceived
+to be embedded in a transparent medium, and to move with it, vortex
+fashion, about the sun.<a name="FNanchor_230:4_91" id="FNanchor_230:4_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_230:4_91" class="fnanchor">[230:4]</a></p>
+
+<p>But the conception of the space-filling continuity of material substance
+owes its prominence at the present time to the experimental hypothesis
+of <i>ether</i>. This substance, originally conceived to occupy the
+intermolecular spaces and to serve as a medium for the propagation of
+undulations, is now regarded by many physicists as replacing matter. "It
+is the great hope of science at the present day," says a contemporary
+exponent of naturalism, "that hard and heavy matter will be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231"></a>[<a href="./images/231.png">231</a>]</span>shown to be
+ether in motion."<a name="FNanchor_231:5_92" id="FNanchor_231:5_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_231:5_92" class="fnanchor">[231:5]</a> Such a theory would reduce bodies to the
+relative displacements of parts of a continuous substance, which would
+be first of all defined as spacial, and would possess such further
+properties as special scientific hypotheses might require.</p>
+
+<p>Two broadly contrasting theories thus appear: that which defines matter
+as a continuous substance coextensive with space; and that which defines
+it as a discrete substance divided by empty space. But both theories are
+seriously affected by the peculiarly significant development of the
+conception of force.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the
+Conception of Force.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_107" id="Section_107">107</a>. In the Cartesian system the cause of motion was pressure within a
+plenum. But in the seventeenth century this notion encountered the
+system of Newton, a system which seemed to involve action at a distance.
+In the year 1728 Voltaire wrote from London:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"When a Frenchman arrives in London, he finds a very great
+change, in philosophy as well as in most other things. In
+Paris he left the world all full of matter; here he finds
+absolute vacua. At Paris the universe is seen filled up with
+ethereal vortices, while here the same <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232"></a>[<a href="./images/232.png">232</a>]</span>space is occupied with
+the play of the invisible forces of gravitation. In Paris the
+earth is painted for us longish like an egg, and in London it
+is oblate like a melon. At Paris the pressure of the moon
+causes the ebb and flow of tides; in England, on the other
+hand, the sea gravitates toward the moon, so that at the same
+time when the Parisians demand high water of the moon, the
+gentlemen of London require an ebb."<a name="FNanchor_232:6_93" id="FNanchor_232:6_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_232:6_93" class="fnanchor">[232:6]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>But these differences are not matters of taste, nor even rival
+hypotheses upon an equal footing. The Newtonian system of mechanics, the
+consummation of a development initiated by Galileo, differed from the
+vortex theory of Descartes as exact science differs from speculation and
+unverified conjecture. And this difference of method carried with it
+eventually certain profound differences of content, distinguishing the
+Newtonian theory even from that of Democritus, with which it had so much
+in common. Although Democritus had sought to avoid the element of
+purposiveness in the older hylozoism by referring the motions of bodies
+as far as possible to the impact of other bodies, he nevertheless
+attributed these motions ultimately to <i>weight</i>, signifying thereby a
+certain <i>downward disposition</i>. Now it is true that in his general
+belief Newton himself is not free from hylozoism. He thought of the
+motions of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233"></a>[<a href="./images/233.png">233</a>]</span>planets themselves as initiated and quickened by a power
+emanating ultimately from God. They are "impressed by an intelligent
+Agent," and</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"can be the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and skill
+of a powerful ever-living Agent who, being in all places, is
+more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless
+uniform <i>sensorium</i>, and thereby to form and reform the parts
+of the universe, than we are by our will to move the parts of
+our own bodies."<a name="FNanchor_233:7_94" id="FNanchor_233:7_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_233:7_94" class="fnanchor">[233:7]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>But by the side of these statements must be set his famous disclaimer,
+"<i>hypotheses non fingo</i>." In his capacity of natural philosopher he did
+not seek to explain motions, but only to describe them. Disbelieving as
+he did in action at a distance, he saw no possibility of explanation
+short of a reference of them to God; but such "hypotheses" he thought to
+be no proper concern of science. As a consequence, the mathematical
+formulation of motions came, through him, to be regarded as the entire
+content of mechanics. The notion of an efficient cause of motion is
+still suggested by the term <i>force</i>, but even this term within the
+system of mechanics refers always to a definite amount of motion, or
+measurement of relative motion. And the same is true of <i>attraction</i>,
+<i>action</i>, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234"></a>[<a href="./images/234.png">234</a>]</span><i>reaction</i>, and the like. The further explanation of motion,
+the definition of a virtue or potency that produces it, first a
+neglected problem, then an irrelevant problem, is finally, for a
+naturalistic philosophy in which this progression is completed, an
+insoluble problem. For the sequel to this purely descriptive procedure
+on the part of science is the disavowal of "metaphysics" by those who
+will have no philosophy but science. Thus the scientific conservatism of
+Newton has led to the positivistic and agnostic phase of naturalism. But
+a further treatment of this development must be reserved until the issue
+of epistemology shall have been definitely raised.</p>
+
+<p>A different emphasis within the general mechanical scheme, attaching
+especial importance to the conceptions of force and energy, has led to a
+rival tendency in science and a contrasting type of naturalism. The
+mechanical hypotheses hitherto described are all of a simple and readily
+depicted type. They suggest an imagery quite in accord with common-sense
+and with observation of the motions of great masses like the planets.
+Material particles are conceived to move within a containing space; the
+motions of corpuscles, atoms, or the minute parts of ether, differing
+only in degree <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235"></a>[<a href="./images/235.png">235</a>]</span>from those of visible bodies. The whole physical
+universe may be represented in the imagination as an aggregate of bodies
+participating in motions of extraordinary complexity, but of one type.
+But now let the emphasis be placed upon the determining causes rather
+than upon the moving bodies themselves. In other words, let the bodies
+be regarded as attributive and the forces as substantive. The result is
+a radical alteration of the mechanical scheme and the transcendence of
+common-sense imagery. This was one direction of outgrowth from the work
+of Newton. His force of gravitation prevailed between bodies separated
+by spaces of great magnitude. Certain of the followers of Newton,
+notably Cotes, accepting the formulas of the master but neglecting his
+allusions to the agency of God, accepted the principle of action at a
+distance. <i>Force</i>, in short, <i>was conceived to pervade space of itself</i>.
+But if force be granted this substantial and self-dependent character,
+what further need is there of matter as a separate form of entity? For
+does not the presence of matter consist essentially in resistance,
+itself a case of force? Such reflections as these led Boscovich and
+others to the radical departure of defining material particles <i>as
+centres of force</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236"></a>[<a href="./images/236.png">236</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Development and Extension of the Conception of Energy.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_108" id="Section_108">108</a>. But a more fruitful hypothesis of the same general order is due
+to the attention directed to the conception of <i>energy</i>, or capacity for
+work, by experimental discoveries of the possibility of reciprocal
+transformations without loss, of motion, heat, electricity, and other
+processes. The principle of the conservation of energy affirms the
+quantitative constancy of that which is so transformed, measured, for
+example, in terms of capacity to move units of mass against gravity. The
+exponents of what is called "energetics" have in many cases come to
+regard that the quantity of which is so conserved, as a substantial
+reality whose forms and distributions compose nature. A contemporary
+scientist, whose synthetic and dogmatic habit of mind has made him
+eminent in the ranks of popular philosophy, writes as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mechanical and chemical energy, sound and heat, light and
+electricity, are mutually convertible; they seem to be but
+different modes of one and the same fundamental force or
+<i>energy</i>. Thence follows the important thesis of the unity of
+all natural forces, or, as it may also be expressed, the
+'monism of energy.'"<a name="FNanchor_236:8_95" id="FNanchor_236:8_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_236:8_95" class="fnanchor">[236:8]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237"></a>[<a href="./images/237.png">237</a>]</span>The conception of energy seems, indeed, to afford an exceptional
+opportunity to naturalism. We have seen that the matter-motion theory
+was satisfied to ignore, or regard as insoluble, problems concerning the
+ultimate causes of things. Furthermore, as we shall presently see to
+better advantage, the more strictly materialistic type of naturalism
+must regard thought as an anomaly, and has no little difficulty with
+life. But the conception of energy is more adaptable, and hence better
+qualified to serve as a common denominator for various aspects of
+experience. The very readiness with which we can picture the corpuscular
+scheme is a source of embarrassment to the seeker after unity. That
+which is so distinct is bristling with incompatibilities. The most
+aggressive materialist hesitates to describe thought as a motion of
+bodies in space. Energy, on the other hand, exacts little if anything
+beyond the character of measurable power. Thought is at any rate in some
+sense a power, and to some degree measurable. Recent discoveries of the
+dependence of capacity for mental exertion upon physical vitality and
+measurements of chemical energy received into the system <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238"></a>[<a href="./images/238.png">238</a>]</span>as food, and
+somehow exhausted by the activities of thought, have lent plausibility
+to the hypothesis of a universal energy of which physical and
+"psychical" processes are alike manifestations. And the conception of
+energy seems capable not only of unifying nature, but also of satisfying
+the metaphysical demand for an efficient and moving cause. This term,
+like "force" and "power," is endowed with such a significance by common
+sense. Indeed, naturalism would seem here to have swung round toward its
+hylozoistic starting-point. The exponent of energetics, like the naive
+animistic thinker, attributes to nature a power like that which he feels
+welling up within himself. When he acts upon the environment, like meets
+like. Energetics, it is true, may obtain a definite meaning for its
+central conception from the measurable behavior of external bodies, and
+a meaning that may be quite free from vitalism or teleology. But in his
+extension of the conception the author of a philosophical energetics
+abandons this strict meaning, and blends his thought even with a phase
+of subjectivism, known as <i>panpsychism</i>.<a name="FNanchor_238:9_96" id="FNanchor_238:9_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_238:9_96" class="fnanchor">[238:9]</a> This theory regards the
+inward life of all nature as homogeneous with an immediately felt
+activity or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239"></a>[<a href="./images/239.png">239</a>]</span>appetency, as energetics finds the inner life to be
+homogeneous with the forces of nature. Both owe their philosophical
+appeal to their apparent success in unifying the world upon a direct
+empirical basis, and to their provision for the practical sense of
+reality.</p>
+
+<p>Such, in brief, are the main alternatives available for a naturalistic
+theory of being, in consequence of the historical development of the
+fundamental conceptions of natural science.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Claims of Naturalism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_109" id="Section_109">109</a>. We turn now to an examination of the manner in which naturalism,
+equipped with working principles, seeks to meet the special requirements
+of philosophy. The conception of the unity of nature is directly in the
+line of a purely scientific development, but naturalism takes the bold
+and radical step of regarding nature so unified as coextensive with the
+real, or at any rate knowable, universe. It will be remembered that
+among the early Greeks Anaxagoras had referred the creative and
+formative processes of nature to a non-natural or rational agency, which
+he called the <i>Nous</i>. The adventitious character of this principle, the
+external and almost purely nominal part which it played in the actual
+cosmology of Anaxagoras, betrayed it into the hands <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240"></a>[<a href="./images/240.png">240</a>]</span>of the atomists,
+with their more consistently naturalistic creed. Better, these maintain,
+the somewhat dogmatic extension of conceptions proved to be successful
+in the description of nature, than a vague dualism which can serve only
+to distract the scientific attention and people the world with
+obscurities. There is a remarkable passage in Lucretius in which atomism
+is thus written large and inspired with cosmical eloquence:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"For verily not by design did the first-beginnings of things
+station themselves each in its right place guided by keen
+intelligence, nor did they bargain sooth to say what motions
+each should assume, but because many in number and shifting
+about in many ways throughout the universe, they are driven
+and tormented by blows during infinite time past, after trying
+motions and unions of every kind at length they fall into
+arrangements such as those out of which our sum of things has
+been formed, and by which too it is preserved through many
+great years, when once it has been thrown into the appropriate
+motions, and causes the streams to replenish the greedy sea
+with copious river waters, and the earth, fostered by the heat
+of the sun, to renew its produce, and the race of living
+things to come up and flourish, and the gliding fires of ether
+to live: all which these several things could in no wise bring
+to pass, unless a store of matter could rise up from infinite
+space, out of which store they are wont to make up in due
+season whatever has been lost."<a name="FNanchor_240:10_97" id="FNanchor_240:10_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_240:10_97" class="fnanchor">[240:10]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The prophecy of La Place, the great French mathematician, voices the
+similar faith of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241"></a>[<a href="./images/241.png">241</a>]</span>eighteenth century in a mechanical understanding
+of the universe:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The human mind, in the perfection it has been able to give to
+astronomy, affords a feeble outline of such an intelligence.
+Its discoveries in mechanics and in geometry, joined to that
+of universal gravitation, have brought it within reach of
+comprehending in the same analytical expressions the past and
+future states of the system of the world."<a name="FNanchor_241:11_98" id="FNanchor_241:11_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_241:11_98" class="fnanchor">[241:11]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>As for God, the creative and presiding intelligence, La Place had "no
+need of any such hypothesis."</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Task of Naturalism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_110" id="Section_110">110</a>. But these are the boasts of Homeric heroes before going into
+battle. The moment such a general position is assumed there arise sundry
+difficulties in the application of naturalistic principles to special
+interests and groups of facts. It is one thing to project a mechanical
+scheme in the large, but quite another to make explicit provision within
+it for the origin of nature, for life, for the human self with its
+ideals, and for society with its institutions. The naturalistic method
+of meeting these problems involves a reduction all along the line in the
+direction of such categories as are derived from the infra-organic
+world. That which is not like the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242"></a>[<a href="./images/242.png">242</a>]</span>planetary system must be construed as
+mechanical by indirection and subtlety.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Origin of the Cosmos.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_111" id="Section_111">111</a>. The origin of the present known natural world was the first
+philosophical question to be definitely met by science. The general form
+of solution which naturalism offers is anticipated in the most ancient
+theories of nature. These already suppose that the observed mechanical
+processes of the circular or periodic type, like the revolutions and
+rotations of the stars, are incidents in a historical mechanical process
+of a larger scale. Prior to the present fixed motions of the celestial
+bodies, the whole mass of cosmic matter participated in irregular
+motions analogous to present terrestrial redistributions. Such motions
+may be understood to have resulted in the integration of separate
+bodies, to which they at the same time imparted a rotary motion. It is
+such a hypothesis that Lucretius paints in his bold, impressionistic
+colors.</p>
+
+<p>But the development of mechanics paved the way for a definite scientific
+theory, the so-called "nebular hypothesis," announced by La Place in
+1796, and by the philosopher Kant at a still earlier date. Largely
+through the Newtonian principle of the parallelogram of forces, the
+present masses, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243"></a>[<a href="./images/243.png">243</a>]</span>orbits, and velocities were analyzed into a more
+primitive process of concentration within a nebulous or highly diffused
+aggregate of matter. And with the aid of the principle of the
+conservation of energy this theory appears to make possible the
+derivation of heat, light, and other apparently non-mechanical processes
+from the same original energy of motion.</p>
+
+<p>But a persistently philosophical mind at once raises the question of the
+origin of this primeval nebula itself, with a definite organization and
+a vast potential energy that must, after all, be regarded as a part of
+nature rather than its source. Several courses are here open to
+naturalism. It may maintain that the question of ultimate origin is
+unanswerable; it may regard such a process of concentration as extending
+back through an infinitely long past;<a name="FNanchor_243:12_99" id="FNanchor_243:12_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_243:12_99" class="fnanchor">[243:12]</a> or, and this is the
+favorite alternative for more constructive minds, the historical
+cosmical process may be included within a still higher type of periodic
+process, which is regarded as eternal. This last course has been
+followed in the well-known synthetic naturalism of Herbert Spencer.
+"Evolution," he says, "is the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244"></a>[<a href="./images/244.png">244</a>]</span>progressive integration of matter and
+dissipation of motion." But such a process eventually runs down, and may
+be conceived as giving place to a counter-process of devolution which
+scatters the parts of matter and gathers another store of potential
+motion. The two processes in alternation will then constitute a cosmical
+system without beginning or end.</p>
+
+<p>In such wise a sweeping survey of the physical universe may be thought
+in the terms of natural science. The uniformitarian method in geology,
+resolving the history of the crust of the earth into known processes,
+such as erosion and igneous fusion;<a name="FNanchor_244:13_100" id="FNanchor_244:13_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_244:13_100" class="fnanchor">[244:13]</a> and spectral analysis, with
+its discoveries concerning the chemical constituents of distant bodies
+through the study of their light, have powerfully re&euml;nforced this effort
+of thought, and apparently completed an outline sketch of the universe
+in terms of infra-organic processes.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Life. Natural Selection.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_112" id="Section_112">112</a>. But the cosmos must be made internally homogeneous in these same
+terms. There awaits solution, in the first place, the serious problem of
+the genesis and maintenance of life within a nature that is originally
+and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245"></a>[<a href="./images/245.png">245</a>]</span>ultimately inorganic. The assimilation of the field of biology and
+physiology to the mechanical cosmos had made little real progress prior
+to the nineteenth century. Mechanical theories had, indeed, been
+projected in the earliest age of philosophy, and proposed anew in the
+seventeenth century.<a name="FNanchor_245:14_101" id="FNanchor_245:14_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_245:14_101" class="fnanchor">[245:14]</a> Nevertheless, the structural and functional
+teleology of the organism remained as apparently irrefutable testimony
+to the inworking of some principle other than that of mechanical
+necessity. Indeed, the only fruitful method applicable to organic
+phenomena was that which explained them in terms of purposive
+adaptation. And it was its provision for a mechanical interpretation of
+this very principle that gave to the Darwinian <i>law of natural
+selection</i>, promulgated in 1859 in the "Origin of Species," so profound
+a significance for naturalism. It threatened to reduce the last
+stronghold of teleology, and completely to dispense with the intelligent
+Author of nature.</p>
+
+<p>Darwin's hypothesis sought to explain the origin of animal species by
+survival under competitive conditions of existence through the
+possession of a structure suited to the environment. Only the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246"></a>[<a href="./images/246.png">246</a>]</span>most
+elementary organism need be presupposed, together with slight variations
+in the course of subsequent generations, and both may be conceived to
+arise mechanically. There will then result in surviving organisms a
+gradual accumulation of such variations as promote survival under the
+special conditions of the environment. Such a principle had been
+suggested as early as the time of Empedocles, but it remained for Darwin
+to establish it with an unanswerable array of observation and
+experimentation. If any organism whatsoever endowed with the power of
+generation be allowed to have somehow come to be, naturalism now
+promises to account for the whole subsequent history of organic
+phenomena and the origin of any known species.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Mechanical Physiology.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_113" id="Section_113">113</a>. But what of life itself? The question of the derivation of
+organic from inorganic matter has proved insoluble by direct means, and
+the case of naturalism must here rest upon such facts as the chemical
+homogeneity of these two kinds of matter, and the conformity of
+physiological processes to more general physical laws. Organic matter
+differs from inorganic only through the presence of proteid, a peculiar
+product of known elements, which cannot be artificially <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247"></a>[<a href="./images/247.png">247</a>]</span>produced, but
+which is by natural means perpetually dissolved into these elements
+without any discoverable residuum. Respiration may be studied as a case
+of aerodynamics, the circulation of the blood as a case of
+hydrodynamics, and the heat given off in the course of work done by the
+body as a case of thermodynamics. And although vitalistic theories still
+retain a place in physiology, as do teleological theories in biology, on
+the whole the naturalistic programme of a reduction of organic processes
+to the type of the inorganic tends to prevail.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Mind. The Reduction to Sensation.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_114" id="Section_114">114</a>. The history of naturalism shows that, as in the case of life, so
+also in the case of <i>mind</i>, its hypotheses were projected by the Greeks,
+but precisely formulated and verified only in the modern period of
+science. In the philosophy of Democritus the soul was itself an atom,
+finer, rounder, and smoother than the ordinary, but thoroughly a part of
+the mechanism of nature. The processes of the soul are construed as
+interactions between the soul and surrounding objects. In sensation, the
+thing perceived produces images by means of effluxes which impinge upon
+the soul-atom. These images are not true reports of the outer world, but
+must be revised by <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248"></a>[<a href="./images/248.png">248</a>]</span>thought before its real atomic structure emerges.
+For this higher critical exercise of thought Democritus devised no
+special atomic genesis. The result may be expressed either as the
+invalidity of such operations of mind as he could provide for in his
+universe, or the irreducibility to his chosen first principles of the
+very thought which defined them. Later naturalism has generally
+sacrificed epistemology to cosmology, and reduced thought to sensation.
+Similarly, will has been regarded as a highly developed case of
+instinct. Knowledge and will, construed as sensation and instinct, may
+thus be interpreted in the naturalistic manner within the field of
+biology.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Automatism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_115" id="Section_115">115</a>. But the actual content of sensation, and the actual feelings
+which attend upon the promptings of instinct, still stubbornly testify
+to the presence in the universe of something belonging to a wholly
+different category from matter and motion. The attitude of naturalism in
+this crucial issue has never been fixed and unwavering, but there has
+gradually come to predominate a method of denying to the inner life all
+efficacy and real significance in the cosmos, while admitting its
+presence on the scene. It is a strange fact of history that Descartes,
+the French philosopher who <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249"></a>[<a href="./images/249.png">249</a>]</span>prided himself on having rid the soul of all
+dependence on nature, should have greatly contributed to this method.
+But it is perhaps not so strange when we consider that every dualism is,
+after all, symmetrical, and that consequently whatever rids the soul of
+nature at the same time rids nature of the soul. It was Descartes who
+first conceived the body and soul to be utterly distinct substances. The
+corollary to this doctrine was his <i>automatism</i>, applied in his own
+system to animals other than man, but which those less concerned with
+religious tradition and less firmly convinced of the soul's originating
+activity were not slow to apply universally. This theory conceived the
+vital processes to take place quite regardless of any inner
+consciousness, or even without its attendance. To this radical theory
+the French materialists of the eighteenth century were especially
+attracted. With them the active soul of Descartes, the distinct
+spiritual entity, disappeared. This latter author had himself admitted a
+department of the self, which he called the "passions," in which the
+course and content of mind is determined by bodily conditions. Extending
+this conception to the whole province of mind, they employed it to
+demonstrate the thorough-going subordination of mind <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250"></a>[<a href="./images/250.png">250</a>]</span>to body. La
+Mettrie, a physician and the author of a book entitled "L'Homme
+Machine," was first interested in this thesis by a fever delirium, and
+afterward adduced anatomical and pathological data in support of it. The
+angle from which he views human life is well illustrated in the
+following:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"What would have sufficed in the case of Julius C&aelig;sar, of
+Seneca, of Petronius, to turn their fearlessness into timidity
+or braggartry? An obstruction in the spleen, the liver, or the
+<i>vena portae</i>. For the imagination is intimately connected
+with these viscera, and from them arise all the curious
+phenomena of hypochondria and hysteria.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. 'A mere nothing, a
+little fibre, some trifling thing that the most subtle anatomy
+cannot discover, would have made two idiots out of Erasmus and
+Fontenelle.'"<a name="FNanchor_250:15_102" id="FNanchor_250:15_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_250:15_102" class="fnanchor">[250:15]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_116" id="Section_116">116</a>. The extreme claim that the soul is a physical organ of the body,
+identical with the brain, marked the culmination of this militant
+materialism, so good an instance of that over-simplification and
+whole-hearted conviction characteristic of the doctrinaire propagandism
+of France. Locke, the Englishman, had admitted that possibly the
+substance which thinks is corporeal. In the letters of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251"></a>[<a href="./images/251.png">251</a>]</span>Voltaire this
+thought has already found a more positive expression:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I am body, and I think; more I do not know. Shall I then
+attribute to an unknown cause what I can so easily attribute
+to the only fruitful cause I am acquainted with? In fact,
+where is the man who, without an absurd godlessness, dare
+assert that it is impossible for the Creator to endow matter
+with thought and feeling?"<a name="FNanchor_251:16_103" id="FNanchor_251:16_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_251:16_103" class="fnanchor">[251:16]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Finally, Holbach, the great systematizer of this movement, takes the
+affair out of the hands of the Creator and definitively announces that
+"a sensitive soul is nothing but a human brain so constituted that it
+easily receives the motions communicated to it."<a name="FNanchor_251:17_104" id="FNanchor_251:17_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_251:17_104" class="fnanchor">[251:17]</a></p>
+
+<p>This theory has been considerably tempered since the age of Holbach.
+Naturalism has latterly been less interested in identifying the soul
+with the body, and more interested in demonstrating its dependence upon
+specific bodily conditions, after the manner of La Mettrie. The
+so-called higher faculties, such as thought and will, have been related
+to central or <i>cortical</i> processes of the nervous system, processes of
+connection and complication which within the brain itself supplement the
+impulses and sensations congenitally and externally <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252"></a>[<a href="./images/252.png">252</a>]</span>stimulated. The
+term "epiphenomenon" has been adopted to express the distinctness but
+entire dependence of the mind. Man is "a conscious automaton." The real
+course of nature passes through his nervous system, while consciousness
+attends upon its functions like a shadow, present but not
+efficient.<a name="FNanchor_252:18_105" id="FNanchor_252:18_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_252:18_105" class="fnanchor">[252:18]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Knowledge, Positivism and Agnosticism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_117" id="Section_117">117</a>. Holbach's "Syst&egrave;me de la Nature," published in 1770, marks the
+culmination of the unequivocally materialistic form of naturalism. Its
+epistemological difficulties, always more or less in evidence, have
+since that day sufficed to discredit materialism, and to foster the
+growth of a critical and apologetic form of naturalism known as
+<i>positivism</i> or <i>agnosticism</i>. The modesty of this doctrine does not, it
+is true, strike very deep. For, although it disclaims knowledge of
+ultimate reality, it also forbids anyone else to have any. Knowledge, it
+affirms, can be of but one type, that which comprises the verifiable
+laws governing nature. All questions concerning <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253"></a>[<a href="./images/253.png">253</a>]</span>first causes are
+futile, a stimulus only to excursions of fancy popularly mistaken for
+knowledge. The superior certainty and stability which attaches to
+natural science is to be permanently secured by the savant's steadfast
+refusal to be led away after the false gods of metaphysics.</p>
+
+<p>But though this is sufficient ground for an agnostic policy, it does
+prove an agnostic theory. The latter has sprung from a closer analysis
+of knowledge, though it fails to make a very brave showing for
+thoroughness and consistency. The crucial point has already been brought
+within our view. The general principles of naturalism require that
+knowledge shall be reduced to sensations, or impressions of the
+environment upon the organism. But the environment and the sensations do
+not correspond. The environment is matter and motion, force and energy;
+the sensations are of motions, to be sure, but much more conspicuously
+of colors, sounds, odors, pleasures, and pains. Critically, this may be
+expressed by saying that since the larger part of sense-perception is so
+unmistakably subjective, and since all knowledge alike must be derived
+from this source, knowledge as a whole must be regarded as dealing only
+with appearances. There are at least three agnostic <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254"></a>[<a href="./images/254.png">254</a>]</span>methods progressing
+from this point. All agree that the inner or essential reality is
+unfathomable. But, in the first place, those most close to the tradition
+of materialism maintain that the most significant appearances, the
+primary qualities, are those which compose a purely quantitative and
+corporeal world. The inner essence of things may at any rate be
+<i>approached</i> by a monism of matter or of energy. This theory is
+epistemological only to the extent of moderating its claims in the hope
+of lessening its responsibility. Another agnosticism places all sense
+qualities on a par, but would regard physics and psychology as
+complementary reports upon the two distinct series of phenomena in which
+the underlying reality expresses itself. This theory is epistemological
+to the extent of granting knowledge, viewed as perception, as good a
+standing in the universe as that which is accorded to its object. But
+such a dualism tends almost irresistibly to relapse into materialistic
+monism, because of the fundamental place of physical conceptions in the
+system of the sciences. Finally, in another and a more radical phase of
+agnosticism, we find an attempt to make full provision for the
+legitimate problems of epistemology. The only datum, the only existent
+accessible to knowledge, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255"></a>[<a href="./images/255.png">255</a>]</span>is said to be the sensation, or state of
+consciousness. In the words of Huxley:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"What, after all, do we know of this terrible 'matter' except
+as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of
+our own consciousness? And what do we know of that 'spirit'
+over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation
+is arising, .&nbsp;.&nbsp;. except that it is also a name for an unknown
+and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of
+consciousness?"<a name="FNanchor_255:19_106" id="FNanchor_255:19_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_255:19_106" class="fnanchor">[255:19]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The physical world is now to be regarded as a construction which does
+not assimilate to itself the content of sensations, but enables one to
+anticipate them. The sensation signifies a contact to which science can
+provide a key for practical guidance.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Experimentalism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_118" id="Section_118">118</a>. This last phase of naturalism is an attempt to state a pure and
+consistent experimentalism, a workable theory of the routine of
+sensations. But it commonly falls into the error of the vicious circle.
+The hypothetical cause of sensations is said to be matter. From this
+point of view the sensation is a complex, comprising elaborate physical
+and physiological processes. But these processes themselves, on the
+other hand, are said to be analyzable into sensations. Now two such
+methods of analysis cannot be equally ultimate. If all of reality is
+finally reducible to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256"></a>[<a href="./images/256.png">256</a>]</span>sensations, then the term sensation must be used
+in a new sense to connote a self-subsistent being, and can no longer
+refer merely to a function of certain physiological processes. The issue
+of this would be some form of idealism or of the experience-philosophy
+that is now coming so rapidly to the front.<a name="FNanchor_256:20_107" id="FNanchor_256:20_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_256:20_107" class="fnanchor">[256:20]</a> But while it is true
+that idealism has sometimes been intended, and that a radically new
+philosophy of experience has sometimes been closely approached, those,
+nevertheless, who have developed experimentalism from the naturalistic
+stand-point have in reality achieved only a thinly disguised
+materialism. For <i>the very ground of their agnosticism is
+materialistic</i>.<a name="FNanchor_256:21_108" id="FNanchor_256:21_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_256:21_108" class="fnanchor">[256:21]</a> Knowledge of reality itself is said to be
+unattainable, because knowledge, in order to come within the order of
+nature, must be regarded as reducible to sensation; and because
+sensation itself, when regarded as a part of nature, is only a
+physiological process, a special phenomenon, in no way qualified to be
+knowledge that is true of reality.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_119" id="Section_119">119</a>. Perhaps, after all, it would be as fair to the spirit of
+naturalism to relieve it of responsibility <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257"></a>[<a href="./images/257.png">257</a>]</span>for an epistemology. It has
+never thoroughly reckoned with this problem. It has deliberately
+selected from among the elements of experience, and been so highly
+constructive in its method as to forfeit its claim to pure empiricism;
+and, on the other hand, has, in this same selection of categories and in
+its insistence upon the test of experiment, fallen short of a
+thorough-going rationalism. While, on the one hand, it defines and
+constructs, it does so, on the other hand, within the field of
+perception and with constant reference to the test of perception. The
+explanation and justification of this procedure is to be found in the
+aim of natural science rather than in that of philosophy. It is this
+special interest, rather than the general problem of being, that
+determines the order of its categories. Naturalism as an account of
+reality is acceptable only so far as its success in satisfying specific
+demands obtains for it a certain logical immunity. These demands are
+unquestionably valid and fundamental, but they are not coextensive with
+the demand for truth. They coincide rather with the immediate practical
+need of a formulation of the spacial and temporal changes that confront
+the will. Hence naturalism is acceptable to common-sense as an account
+of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258"></a>[<a href="./images/258.png">258</a>]</span>what the every-day attitude to the environment treats as its object.
+Naturalism is common-sense about the "outer world," revised and brought
+up to date with the aid of the results of science. Its deepest spring is
+the organic instinct for the reality of the tangible, the vital
+recognition of the significance of that which is on the plane of
+interaction with the body.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<div class="sidenote">General Ethical Stand-point.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_120" id="Section_120">120</a>. Oddly enough, although common-sense is ready to intrust to
+naturalism the description of the situation of life, it prefers to deal
+otherwise with its ideals. Indeed, common-sense is not without a certain
+suspicion that naturalism is the advocate of moral reversion. It is
+recognized as the prophecy of the brute majority of life, of those
+considerations of expediency and pleasure that are the warrant for its
+secular moods rather than for its sustaining ideals. And that strand of
+life is indeed its special province. For the naturalistic method of
+reduction must find the key to human action among those practical
+conditions that are common to man and his inferiors in the scale of
+being. In short, human life, like all life, must be construed as the
+adjustment of the organism to its natural environment for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259"></a>[<a href="./images/259.png">259</a>]</span>the sake of
+preservation and economic advancement.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Cynicism and Cyrenaicism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_121" id="Section_121">121</a>. Early in Greek philosophy this general idea of life was
+picturesquely interpreted in two contrasting ways, those of the Cynic
+and the Cyrenaic. Both of these wise men postulated the spiritual
+indifference of the universe at large, and looked only to the <i>contact</i>
+of life with its immediate environment. But while the one hoped only to
+hedge himself about, the other sought confidently the gratification of
+his sensibilities. The figure of the Cynic is the more familiar.
+Diogenes of the tub practised self-mortification until his dermal and
+spiritual callousness were alike impervious. From behind his protective
+sheath he could without affectation despise both nature and society. He
+could reckon himself more blessed than Alexander, because, with demand
+reduced to the minimum, he could be sure of a surplus of supply. Having
+renounced all goods save the bare necessities of life, he could neglect
+both promises and threats and be played upon by no one. He was securely
+intrenched within himself, an unfurnished habitation, but the citadel of
+a king. The Cyrenaic, on the other hand, did not seek to make impervious
+the surface <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260"></a>[<a href="./images/260.png">260</a>]</span>of contact with nature and society, but sought to heighten
+its sensibility, that it might become a medium of pleasurable feeling.
+For the inspiration with which it may be pursued this ideal has nowhere
+been more eloquently set forth than in the pages of Walter Pater, who
+styles himself "the new Cyrenaic."</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the
+end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a
+variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is
+to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass
+most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the
+focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their
+purest energy?</p>
+
+<p>To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this
+ecstacy, is success in life.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. While all melts under our
+feet, we may well catch at any exquisite passion, or any
+contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to
+set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the
+senses, strange dyes, strange colors, and curious odors, or
+work of the artist's hands, or the face of one's friend. Not
+to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those
+about us, and in the brilliancy of their gifts some tragic
+dividing of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of
+frost and sun, to sleep before evening."<a name="FNanchor_261:22_109" id="FNanchor_261:22_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_261:22_109" class="fnanchor">[261:22]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception of
+Social Relations.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_122" id="Section_122">122</a>. In the course of modern philosophy the ethics of naturalism has
+undergone a transformation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261"></a>[<a href="./images/261.png">261</a>]</span>and development that equip it much more
+formidably for its competition with rival theories. If the Cynic and
+Cyrenaic philosophies of life seem too egoistic and narrow in outlook,
+this inadequacy has been largely overcome through the modern conception
+of the relation of the individual to society. Man is regarded as so
+dependent upon social relations that it is both natural and rational for
+him to govern his actions with a concern for the community. There was a
+time when this relation of dependence was viewed as external, a barter
+of goods between the individual and society, sanctioned by an implied
+contract. Thomas Hobbes, whose unblushing materialism and egoism
+stimulated by opposition the whole development of English ethics,
+conceived morality to consist in rules of action which condition the
+stability of the state, and so secure for the individual that "peace"
+which self-interest teaches him is essential to his welfare.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"And therefore so long a man is in the condition of mere
+nature, which is a condition of war, as private appetite is
+the measure of good and evil: and consequently all men agree
+on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the ways or
+means of peace, which, as I have showed before, are 'justice,'
+'gratitude,' 'modesty,' <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262"></a>[<a href="./images/262.png">262</a>]</span>'equity,' 'mercy,' and the rest of
+the laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, 'moral virtues';
+and their contrary 'vices,' evil."<a name="FNanchor_262:23_110" id="FNanchor_262:23_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_262:23_110" class="fnanchor">[262:23]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Jeremy Bentham, the apostle of utilitarianism in the eighteenth century,
+defined political and social sanctions through which the individual
+could purchase security and good repute with action conducive to the
+common welfare. But the nineteenth century has understood the matter
+better&mdash;and the idea of an evolution under conditions that select and
+reject, is here again the illuminating thought. No individual,
+evolutionary naturalism maintains, has survived the perils of life
+without possessing as an inalienable part of his nature, congenital like
+his egoism, certain impulses and instinctive desires in the interest of
+the community as a whole. The latest generation of a race whose
+perpetuation has been conditioned by a capacity to sustain social
+relations and make common cause against a more external environment,
+<i>is</i> moral, and does not adopt morality in the course of a calculating
+egoism. Conscience is the racial instinct of self-preservation uttering
+itself in the individual member, who draws his very life-blood from the
+greater organism.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_123" id="Section_123">123</a>. This latest word of naturalistic ethics has <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263"></a>[<a href="./images/263.png">263</a>]</span>not won acceptance
+as the last word in ethics, and this in spite of its indubitable truth
+within its scope. For the deeper ethical interest seeks not so much to
+account for the moral nature as to construe and justify its promptings.
+The evolutionary theory reveals the genesis of conscience, and
+demonstrates its continuity with nature, but this falls as far short of
+realizing the purpose of ethical study as a history of the natural
+genesis of thought would fall short of logic. Indeed, naturalism shows
+here, as in the realm of epistemology, a persistent failure to
+appreciate the central problem. Its acceptance as a philosophy, we are
+again reminded, can be accounted for only on the score of its genuinely
+rudimentary character. As a rudimentary phase of thought it is both
+indispensable and inadequate. It is the philosophy of instinct, which
+should in normal development precede a philosophy of reason, in which it
+is eventually assimilated and supplemented.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_124" id="Section_124">124</a>. There is, finally, an inspiration for life which this philosophy
+of naturalism may convey&mdash;atheism, its detractors would call it, but
+none the less a faith and a spiritual exaltation that spring from its
+summing up of truth. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264"></a>[<a href="./images/264.png">264</a>]</span>It is well first to realize that which is
+dispiriting in it, its failure to provide for the freedom, immortality,
+and moral providence of the more sanguine faith.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"For what is man looked at from this point of view?&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. Man, so
+far as natural science by itself is able to teach us, is no
+longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaven-descended
+heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his
+story a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the
+meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which
+first converted a dead organic compound into the living
+progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows
+nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine,
+disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords
+of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a
+race with conscience enough to feel that it is vile, and
+intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. We
+sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared
+with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the
+divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of
+our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed,
+and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the
+race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will
+go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The
+uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a
+brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will
+be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. 'Imperishable
+monuments' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself, and love
+stronger than death, will be as though they had never been.
+Nor will anything that <i>is</i> be better or be worse for all that
+the labor, genius, devotion, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265"></a>[<a href="./images/265.png">265</a>]</span>and suffering of man have
+striven through countless generations to effect."<a name="FNanchor_265:24_111" id="FNanchor_265:24_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_265:24_111" class="fnanchor">[265:24]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, Wonder,
+and Renunciation.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_125" id="Section_125">125</a>. But though our philosopher must accept the truth of this terrible
+picture, he is not left without spiritual resources. The abstract
+religion provided for the agnostic faithful by Herbert Spencer does not,
+it is true, afford any nourishment to the religious nature. He would
+have men look for a deep spring of life in the negative idea of mystery,
+the apotheosis of ignorance, while religious faith to live at all must
+lay hold upon reality. But there does spring from naturalism a positive
+religion, whose fundamental motives are those of service, wonder, and
+renunciation: service of humanity in the present, wonder at the natural
+truth, and renunciation of a universe keyed to vibrate with human
+ideals.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Have you," writes Charles Ferguson, "had dreams of Nirvana
+and sickly visions and raptures? Have you imagined that the
+end of your life is to be absorbed back into the life of God,
+and to flee the earth and forget all? Or do you want to walk
+on air, or fly on wings, or build a heavenly city in the
+clouds? Come, let us take our kit on our shoulders, and go out
+and build the city <i>here</i>."<a name="FNanchor_265:25_112" id="FNanchor_265:25_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_265:25_112" class="fnanchor">[265:25]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266"></a>[<a href="./images/266.png">266</a>]</span>For Haeckel "natural religion" is such as</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"the astonishment with which we gaze upon the starry heavens
+and the microscopic life in a drop of water, the awe with
+which we trace the marvellous working of energy in the motion
+of matter, the reverence with which we grasp the universal
+dominance of the law of substance throughout the
+universe."<a name="FNanchor_266:26_113" id="FNanchor_266:26_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_266:26_113" class="fnanchor">[266:26]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>There is a deeper and a sincerer note in the stout, forlorn humanism of
+Huxley:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"That which lies before the human race is a constant struggle
+to maintain and improve, in opposition to the State of Nature,
+the State of Art of an organized polity; in which, and by
+which, man may develop a worthy civilization, capable of
+maintaining and constantly improving itself, until the
+evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its
+downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway; and,
+once more, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of
+our planet."<a name="FNanchor_266:27_114" id="FNanchor_266:27_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_266:27_114" class="fnanchor">[266:27]</a></p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_223:1_88" id="Footnote_223:1_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_223:1_88"><span class="label">[223:1]</span></a> <span class="smcap">Preliminary Note.</span>&mdash;By <i>naturalism</i> is meant that system
+of philosophy which defines the universe in the terms of <i>natural
+science</i>. In its dogmatic phase, wherein it maintains that <i>being is
+corporeal</i>, it is called <i>materialism</i>. In its critical phase, wherein
+it makes the general assertion that the natural sciences constitute the
+only <i>possible knowledge</i>, whatever be the nature of reality itself, it
+is called <i>positivism</i>, <i>agnosticism</i>, or simply <i>naturalism</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_226:2_89" id="Footnote_226:2_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_226:2_89"><span class="label">[226:2]</span></a> Lucretius: <i>De Rerum Natura</i>, Bk. II, lines 569-580.
+Translation by Munro.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_229:3_90" id="Footnote_229:3_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_229:3_90"><span class="label">[229:3]</span></a> The reader will find an interesting account of these
+opposing views in Locke's chapter on <i>Space</i>, in his <i>Essay Concerning
+Human Understanding</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_230:4_91" id="Footnote_230:4_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_230:4_91"><span class="label">[230:4]</span></a> Descartes distinguished his theory from that of
+Democritus in the <i>Principles of Philosophy</i>, Part IV, &sect; ccii.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_231:5_92" id="Footnote_231:5_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_231:5_92"><span class="label">[231:5]</span></a> Pearson: <i>Grammar of Science</i>, pp. 259-260. Cf.
+<i>ibid.</i>, Chap. VII, entire.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_232:6_93" id="Footnote_232:6_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_232:6_93"><span class="label">[232:6]</span></a> Quoted in Ueberweg: <i>History of Philosophy</i>, II, p.
+124.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_233:7_94" id="Footnote_233:7_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_233:7_94"><span class="label">[233:7]</span></a> Quoted from the <i>Opticks</i> of Newton by James Ward, in
+his <i>Naturalism and Agnosticism</i>, I, p. 43.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_236:8_95" id="Footnote_236:8_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_236:8_95"><span class="label">[236:8]</span></a> Haeckel: <i>Riddle of the Universe</i>. Translation by
+McCabe, p. 254.</p>
+
+<p>The best systematic presentation of "energetics" is to be found in
+Ostwald's <i>Vorlesungen &uuml;ber Natur-Philosophie</i>. Herbert Spencer, in his
+well-known <i>First Principles</i>, makes philosophical use of both "force"
+and "energy."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_238:9_96" id="Footnote_238:9_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_238:9_96"><span class="label">[238:9]</span></a> Cf. <a href="#Chap_IX">Chap. IX</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_240:10_97" id="Footnote_240:10_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_240:10_97"><span class="label">[240:10]</span></a> Lucretius: <i>Op. cit.</i>, Bk. I, lines 1021-1237.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_241:11_98" id="Footnote_241:11_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_241:11_98"><span class="label">[241:11]</span></a> Quoted from La Place's essay on <i>Probability</i> by Ward:
+<i>Op. cit.</i>, I, p. 41.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_243:12_99" id="Footnote_243:12_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_243:12_99"><span class="label">[243:12]</span></a> An interesting account and criticism of such a theory
+(Clifford's) is to be found in Royce's <i>Spirit of Modern Philosophy</i>,
+Lecture X.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_244:13_100" id="Footnote_244:13_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_244:13_100"><span class="label">[244:13]</span></a> This method replaced the old theory of "catastrophes"
+through the efforts of the English geologists, Hutton (1726-1797) and
+Lyell (1767-1849).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_245:14_101" id="Footnote_245:14_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_245:14_101"><span class="label">[245:14]</span></a> Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood,
+published in 1628, was regarded as a step in this direction.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_250:15_102" id="Footnote_250:15_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_250:15_102"><span class="label">[250:15]</span></a> From the account of La Mettrie in Lange: <i>History of
+Materialism</i>. Translation by Thomas, II, pp. 67-68.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_251:16_103" id="Footnote_251:16_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251:16_103"><span class="label">[251:16]</span></a> Quoted from Voltaire's London <i>Letter on the English</i>,
+by Lange: <i>Op. cit.</i>, II, p. 18.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_251:17_104" id="Footnote_251:17_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251:17_104"><span class="label">[251:17]</span></a> Quoted by Lange: <i>Op. cit.</i>, II, p. 113.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_252:18_105" id="Footnote_252:18_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_252:18_105"><span class="label">[252:18]</span></a> The phrase "psycho-physical parallelism," current in
+psychology, may mean automatism of the kind expounded above, and may
+also mean dualism. It is used commonly as a methodological principle to
+signify that no causal relationship between mind and body, but one of
+<i>correspondence</i>, is to be looked for in empirical psychology. Cf. &sect;
+<a href="#Section_99">99</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_255:19_106" id="Footnote_255:19_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_255:19_106"><span class="label">[255:19]</span></a> Quoted by Ward: <i>Op. cit.</i>, I, p. 18.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_256:20_107" id="Footnote_256:20_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256:20_107"><span class="label">[256:20]</span></a> There are times when Huxley, <i>e. g.</i>, would seem to be
+on the verge of the Berkeleyan idealism. Cf. <a href="#Chap_IX">Chap. IX</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_256:21_108" id="Footnote_256:21_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256:21_108"><span class="label">[256:21]</span></a> For the case of Karl Pearson, read his <i>Grammar of
+Science</i>, Chap. II.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_261:22_109" id="Footnote_261:22_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_261:22_109"><span class="label">[261:22]</span></a> Pater: <i>The Renaissance</i>, pp. 249-250.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_262:23_110" id="Footnote_262:23_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_262:23_110"><span class="label">[262:23]</span></a> Hobbes: <i>Leviathan,</i> Chap. XV.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_265:24_111" id="Footnote_265:24_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265:24_111"><span class="label">[265:24]</span></a> Quoted from Balfour: <i>Foundations of Belief</i>, pp.
+29-31.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_265:25_112" id="Footnote_265:25_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265:25_112"><span class="label">[265:25]</span></a> Ferguson: <i>Religion of Democracy</i>, p. 10.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_266:26_113" id="Footnote_266:26_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266:26_113"><span class="label">[266:26]</span></a> Haeckel: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 344.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_266:27_114" id="Footnote_266:27_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266:27_114"><span class="label">[266:27]</span></a> Huxley: <i>Evolution and Ethics</i>, p. 45. <i>Collected
+Essays</i>, Vol. IX.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267"></a>[<a href="./images/267.png">267</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_IX" id="Chap_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX</h2>
+
+<h3>SUBJECTIVISM<a name="FNanchor_267:1_115" id="FNanchor_267:1_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_267:1_115" class="fnanchor" style="font-weight: normal; font-size: 80%;">[267:1]</a></h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and
+Scepticism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_126" id="Section_126">126</a>. When, in the year 1710, Bishop Berkeley maintained the thesis of
+empirical idealism, having rediscovered it and announced it with a
+justifiable sense of originality, he provoked a kind of critical
+judgment that was keenly annoying if not entirely surprising to him. In
+refuting the conception of material substance and demonstrating the
+dependence of being upon mind, he at once sought, as he did repeatedly
+in later years, to establish the world of practical belief, and so to
+reconcile metaphysics and common-sense. Yet he found himself hailed as a
+fool and a sceptic. In answer to an inquiry <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268"></a>[<a href="./images/268.png">268</a>]</span>concerning the reception of
+his book in London, his friend Sir John Percival wrote as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I did but name the subject matter of your book of
+<i>Principles</i> to some ingenious friends of mine and they
+immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time
+refusing to read it, which I have not yet got one to do. A
+physician of my acquaintance undertook to discover your
+person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought
+to take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire of
+starting something new should put you upon such an
+undertaking. Another told me that you are not gone so far as
+another gentleman in town, who asserts not only that there is
+no such thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no being
+at all."<a name="FNanchor_268:2_116" id="FNanchor_268:2_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_268:2_116" class="fnanchor">[268:2]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>There can be no doubt but that the idea of the dependence of real things
+upon their appearance to the individual is a paradox to common-sense. It
+is a paradox because it seems to reverse the theoretical instinct
+itself, and to define the real in those very terms which disciplined
+thought learns to neglect. In the early history of thought the nature of
+the thinker himself is recognized as that which is likely to distort
+truth rather than that which conditions it. When the wise man, the
+devotee of truth, first makes his appearance, his authority is
+acknowledged because he has renounced himself. As witness of the
+universal <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269"></a>[<a href="./images/269.png">269</a>]</span>being he purges himself of whatever is peculiar to his own
+individuality, or even to his human nature. In the aloofness of his
+meditation he escapes the cloud of opinion and prejudice that obscures
+the vision of the common man. In short, the element of belief dependent
+upon the thinker himself is the dross which must be refined away in
+order to obtain the pure truth. When, then, in the critical epoch of the
+Greek sophists, Protagoras declares that there is no belief that is not
+of this character, his philosophy is promptly recognized as scepticism.
+Protagoras argues that sense qualities are clearly dependent upon the
+actual operations of the senses, and that all knowledge reduces
+ultimately to these terms.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling;
+there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire,
+fear, and many more which are named, as well as innumerable
+others which have no name; <i>with each of them there is born an
+object of sense</i>,&mdash;all sorts of colors born with all sorts of
+sight and sounds in like manner with hearing, and other
+objects with the other senses."<a name="FNanchor_269:3_117" id="FNanchor_269:3_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_269:3_117" class="fnanchor">[269:3]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>If the objects are "born with" the senses, it follows that they are born
+with and appertain to the individual perceiver.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270"></a>[<a href="./images/270.png">270</a>]</span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"Either show, if you can, that our sensations are not
+relative and individual, or, if you admit that they are
+individual, prove that this does not involve the consequence
+that the appearance becomes, or, if you like to say, is to the
+individual only."<a name="FNanchor_270:4_118" id="FNanchor_270:4_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_270:4_118" class="fnanchor">[270:4]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The same motif is thus rendered by Walter Pater in the Conclusion of his
+"Renaissance":</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of
+external objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and
+importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand
+forms of action. But when reflexion begins to act upon those
+objects they are dissipated under its influence; the cohesive
+force seems suspended like a trick of magic; each object is
+loosed into a group of impressions&mdash;color, odor, texture&mdash;in
+the mind of the observer.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. Experience, already reduced to a
+swarm of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by
+that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has
+ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can
+only conjecture to be without. Every one of these impressions
+is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each
+mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world."</p></div>
+
+<p>The Protagorean generalization is due to the reflection that all
+experience is some individual experience, that no subject of discourse
+escapes the imputation of belonging to some individual's private
+history. The individual must start with his own experiences and ideas,
+and he can never get <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271"></a>[<a href="./images/271.png">271</a>]</span>beyond them, for he cannot see outside his own
+vision, or even think outside his own mind. The scepticism of this
+theory is explicit, and the formulas of Protagoras&mdash;the famous "<i>Man is
+the measure of all things</i>," and the more exact formula, "<i>The truth is
+what appears to each man at each time</i>"<a name="FNanchor_271:5_119" id="FNanchor_271:5_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_271:5_119" class="fnanchor">[271:5]</a>&mdash;have been the articles
+of scepticism throughout the history of thought.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Phenomenalism and Spiritualism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_127" id="Section_127">127</a>. There is, therefore, nothing really surprising in the reception
+accorded the "new philosophy" of Bishop Berkeley. A sceptical relativism
+is the earliest phase of subjectivism, and its avoidance at once becomes
+the most urgent problem of any philosophy which proposes to proceed
+forth from this principle. And this problem Berkeley meets with great
+adroitness and a wise recognition of difficulties. But his sanguine
+temperament and speculative interest impel him to what he regards as the
+extension of his first principle, the reintroduction of the conception
+of substance under the form of spirit, and of the objective order of
+nature under the form of the mind of God. In short, there are two
+motives at work in him, side by side: the epistemological motive,
+restricting reality to perceptions <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272"></a>[<a href="./images/272.png">272</a>]</span>and thoughts, and the
+metaphysical-religious motive, leading him eventually to the definition
+of reality in terms of perceiving and thinking spirits. And from the
+time of Berkeley these two principles, <i>phenomenalism</i> and
+<i>spiritualism</i>, have remained as distinct and alternating phases of
+subjectivism. The former is its critical and dialectical conception, the
+latter its constructive and practical conception.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem
+Inherited from Descartes and Locke.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_128" id="Section_128">128</a>. As <i>phenomenalism</i> has its classic statement and proof in the
+writings of Berkeley, we shall do well to return to these. The fact that
+this philosopher wished to be regarded as the prophet of common-sense
+has already been mentioned. This purpose reveals itself explicitly in
+the series of "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." The form in which
+Berkeley here advances his thesis is further determined by the manner in
+which the lines were drawn in his day of thought. The world of
+enlightened public opinion was then threefold, consisting of God,
+physical nature, and the soul. In the early years of the seventeenth
+century Descartes had sharply distinguished between the two
+substances&mdash;mind, with its attribute of thought; and body, with its
+attribute of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273"></a>[<a href="./images/273.png">273</a>]</span>extension&mdash;and divided the finite world between them. God
+was regarded as the infinite and sustaining cause of both. Stated in the
+terms of epistemology, the object of clear thinking is the physical
+cosmos, the subject of clear thinking the immortal soul. The realm of
+perception, wherein the mind is subjected to the body, embarrasses the
+Cartesian system, and has no clear title to any place in it. And without
+attaching cognitive importance to this realm, the system is utterly
+dogmatic in its epistemology.<a name="FNanchor_273:6_120" id="FNanchor_273:6_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_273:6_120" class="fnanchor">[273:6]</a> For what one substance thinks, must
+be assumed to be somehow true of another quite independent substance
+without any medium of communication. Now between Descartes and Berkeley
+appeared the sober and questioning "Essay Concerning Human
+Understanding," by John Locke. This is an interesting combination (they
+cannot be said to blend) of traditional metaphysics and revolutionary
+epistemology. The universe still consists of God, the immortal thinking
+soul, and a corporeal nature, the object of its thought. But, except for
+certain proofs of God and self, knowledge is entirely reduced to the
+perceptual type, to sensations, or ideas directly imparted to the mind
+by the objects <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274"></a>[<a href="./images/274.png">274</a>]</span>themselves. To escape dogmatism it is maintained that
+the real is what is <i>observed to be present</i>. But Locke thinks the
+qualities so discovered belong in part to the perceiver and in part to
+the substance outside the mind. Color is a case of the former, a
+"secondary quality"; and extension a case of the latter, a "primary
+quality." And evidently the above empirical test of knowledge is not
+equally well met in these two cases. When I see a red object I know that
+red exists, for it is observed to be present, and I make no claim for it
+beyond the present. But when I note that the red object is square, I am
+supposed to know a property that will continue to exist in the object
+after I have closed my eyes or turned to something else. Here my claim
+exceeds my observation, and the empirical principle adopted at the
+outset would seem to be violated. Berkeley develops his philosophy from
+this criticism. His refutation of material substance is intended as a
+full acceptance of the implications of the new empirical epistemology.
+Knowledge is to be all of the perceptual type, where what is known is
+directly presented; and, in conformity with this principle, being is to
+be restricted to the content of the living pulses of experience.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275"></a>[<a href="./images/275.png">275</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Refutation of Material Substance.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_129" id="Section_129">129</a>. Berkeley, then, beginning with the threefold world of Descartes
+and of common-sense, proposes to apply Locke's theory of knowledge to
+the discomfiture of corporeal nature. It was a radical doctrine, because
+it meant for him and for his contemporaries the denial of all finite
+objects outside the mind. But at the same time it meant a restoration of
+the homogeneity of experience, the re&euml;stablishment of the qualitative
+world of every-day living, and so had its basis of appeal to
+common-sense. The encounter between Hylas, the advocate of the
+traditional philosophy, and Philonous, who represents the author
+himself, begins with an exchange of the charge of innovation.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p><i>Hyl.</i> I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I
+heard of you.</p>
+
+<p><i>Phil.</i> Pray, what were those?</p>
+
+<p><i>Hyl.</i> You were represented, in last night's conversation, as
+one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever
+entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such
+thing as <i>material substance</i> in the world.</p>
+
+<p><i>Phil.</i> That there is no such thing as what <i>philosophers</i>
+call <i>material substance</i>, I am seriously persuaded: but if I
+were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I
+should then have the same reason to renounce this that I
+imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.</p>
+
+<p><i>Hyl.</i> What! can anything be more fantastical, more <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276"></a>[<a href="./images/276.png">276</a>]</span>repugnant
+to Common-Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than
+to believe there is no such thing as <i>matter</i>?</p>
+
+<p><i>Phil.</i> Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you,
+who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater
+sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to
+Common-Sense, than I who believe no such thing?<a name="FNanchor_276:7_121" id="FNanchor_276:7_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_276:7_121" class="fnanchor">[276:7]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Philonous now proceeds with his case. Beginning by obtaining from Hylas
+the admission that pleasure and pain are essentially relative and
+subjective, he argues that sensations such as heat, since they are
+inseparable from these feelings, must be similarly regarded. And he is
+about to annex other qualities in turn to this core of subjectivity,
+when Hylas enters a general demurrer:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this
+time. You asked me whether heat and cold, sweetness and
+bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to
+which I answered simply that they were. Whereas I should have
+thus distinguished:&mdash;those qualities as perceived by us, are
+pleasures or pains; but not as existing in the external
+objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there
+is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only
+that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the
+fire or sugar."<a name="FNanchor_276:8_122" id="FNanchor_276:8_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_276:8_122" class="fnanchor">[276:8]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277"></a>[<a href="./images/277.png">277</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Application of the Epistemological Principle.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_130" id="Section_130">130</a>. Here the argument touches upon profound issues. Philonous now
+assumes the extreme empirical contention <i>that knowledge applies only to
+its own psychological moment, that its object in no way extends beyond
+that individual situation which we call the state of knowing</i>. The full
+import of such an epistemology Berkeley never recognized, but he is
+clearly employing it here, and the overthrow of Hylas is inevitable so
+long as he does not challenge it or turn it against his opponent. This,
+however, as a protagonist of Berkeley's own making, he fails to do, and
+he plays into Philonous's hands by admitting that what is known only in
+perception must for that reason <i>consist</i> in perception. He frankly owns
+"that it is vain to stand out any longer," that "colors, sounds, tastes,
+in a word, all those termed <i>secondary qualities</i>, have certainly no
+existence without the mind."<a name="FNanchor_277:9_123" id="FNanchor_277:9_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_277:9_123" class="fnanchor">[277:9]</a></p>
+
+<p>Hylas has now arrived at the distinction between primary and secondary
+qualities. "Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest" are
+the attributes of an external substance which is the cause of
+sensations. But the same epistemological principle readily reduces these
+also to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278"></a>[<a href="./images/278.png">278</a>]</span>dependence on mind, for, like the secondary qualities, their
+content is given only in perception. Hylas is then driven to defend a
+general material substratum, which is the cause of ideas, but to which
+none of the definite content of these ideas can be attributed. In short,
+he has put all the content of knowledge on the one side, and admitted
+its inseparability from the perceiving spirit, and left the being of
+things standing empty and forlorn on the other. This amounts, as
+Philonous reminds him, to the denial of the reality of the known world.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the
+<i>reality</i> of sensible things; since you made it to consist in
+an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say,
+you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which
+was to show your principles led to Scepticism."<a name="FNanchor_278:10_124" id="FNanchor_278:10_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_278:10_124" class="fnanchor">[278:10]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_131" id="Section_131">131</a>. Having advanced the direct empiricist argument for phenomenalism,
+Berkeley now gives the rationalistic motive an opportunity to express
+itself in the queries of Hylas as to whether there be not an "absolute
+extension," somehow abstracted by thought from the relativities of
+perception. Is there not at least a <i>conceivable</i> world independent of
+perception?</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279"></a>[<a href="./images/279.png">279</a>]</span>The answers of Philonous throw much light upon the Berkeleyan position.
+He admits that thought is capable of separating the primary from the
+secondary qualities in certain <i>operations</i>, but at the same time denies
+that this is forming an idea of them as separate.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general
+propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without
+mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat
+of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I
+can pronounce the word <i>motion</i> by itself, I can form the idea
+of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may
+be made of extension and figures, without any mention of
+<i>great</i> or <i>small</i>, or any other sensible mode or quality,
+that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of
+extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible
+quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the
+mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what
+other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being
+altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when
+laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I
+believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas
+of extension."<a name="FNanchor_279:11_125" id="FNanchor_279:11_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_279:11_125" class="fnanchor">[279:11]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Berkeley denies that we have ideas of pure extension or motion, because,
+although we do actually <i>deal</i> with these and find them intelligible, we
+can never obtain a state of mind in which they appear as the content. He
+applies this psychological test <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280"></a>[<a href="./images/280.png">280</a>]</span>because of his adherence to the general
+empirical postulate that knowledge is limited to the individual content
+of its own individual states. "It is a universally received maxim," he
+says, "that <i>everything which exists is particular</i>." Now the truth of
+mathematical reckoning is not particular, but is valid wherever the
+conditions to which it refers are fulfilled. Mathematical reckoning, if
+it is to be particular, must be regarded as a particular act or state of
+some thinker. Its truth must then be construed as relative to the
+interests of the thinker, as a symbolism which has an instrumental
+rather than a purely cognitive value. This conclusion cannot be disputed
+short of a radical stand against the general epistemological principle
+to which Berkeley is so far true, the principle that the reality which
+is known in any state of thinking or perceiving is the state itself.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Transition to Spiritualism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_132" id="Section_132">132</a>. This concludes the purely phenomenalistic strain of Berkeley's
+thought. He has taken the immediate apprehension of sensible objects in
+a state of mind centring about the pleasure and pain of an individual,
+to be the norm of knowledge. He has further maintained that knowledge
+cannot escape the particularity of its own states. The result is that
+the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281"></a>[<a href="./images/281.png">281</a>]</span>universe is composed of private perceptions and ideas. Strictly on
+the basis of what has preceded, Hylas is justified in regarding this
+conclusion as no less sceptical than that to which his own position had
+been reduced; for while he had been compelled to admit that the real is
+unknowable, Philonous has apparently defined the knowable as relative to
+the individual. But the supplementary metaphysics which had hitherto
+been kept in the background is now revealed. It is maintained that
+though perceptions know no external world, they do nevertheless reveal a
+spiritual substance of which they are the states. Although it has
+hitherto been argued that the <i>esse</i> of things is in their <i>percipi</i>,
+this is now replaced by the more fundamental principle that the <i>esse</i>
+of things is in their <i>percipere</i> or <i>velle</i>. The real world consists
+not in perceptions, but in perceivers.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_133" id="Section_133">133</a>. Now it is at once evident that the epistemological theory which
+has been Berkeley's dialectical weapon in the foregoing argument is no
+longer available. And those who have cared more for this theory than for
+metaphysical speculation have attempted to stop at this point, and so to
+construe phenomenalism as to make it self-sufficient on its own
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282"></a>[<a href="./images/282.png">282</a>]</span>grounds. Such attempts are so instructive as to make it worth our while
+to review them before proceeding with the development of the
+spiritualistic motive in subjectivism.</p>
+
+<p>The world is to be regarded as made up of sense-perceptions, ideas, or
+phenomena. What is to be accepted as the fundamental category which
+gives to all of these terms their subjectivistic significance? So far
+there seems to be nothing in view save the principle of relativity. The
+type to which these were reduced was that of the peculiar or unsharable
+experience best represented by an individual's pleasure and pain. But
+relativity will not work as a general principle of being. It consigns
+the individual to his private mind, and cannot provide for the validity
+of knowledge enough even to maintain itself. Some other course, then,
+must be followed. Perception may be given a psycho-physical definition,
+which employs physical terms as fundamental;<a name="FNanchor_282:12_126" id="FNanchor_282:12_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_282:12_126" class="fnanchor">[282:12]</a> but this flagrantly
+contradicts the phenomenalistic first principle. Or, reality may be
+regarded as so stamped with its marks as to insure the proprietorship of
+thought. But this definition of certain objective entities of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283"></a>[<a href="./images/283.png">283</a>]</span>mind, of
+beings attributed to intelligence because of their intrinsic
+intelligibility, is inconsistent with empiricism, if indeed it does not
+lead eventually to a realism of the Platonic type.<a name="FNanchor_283:13_127" id="FNanchor_283:13_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_283:13_127" class="fnanchor">[283:13]</a> Finally, and
+most commonly, the terms of phenomenalism have been retained after their
+original meaning has been suffered to lapse. The "impressions" of Hume,
+<i>e. g.</i>, are the remnant of the Berkeleyan world with the spirit
+stricken out. There is no longer any point in calling them impressions,
+for they now mean only elements or qualities. As a consequence this
+outgrowth of the Berkeleyanism epistemology is at present merging into a
+realistic philosophy of experience.<a name="FNanchor_283:14_128" id="FNanchor_283:14_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_283:14_128" class="fnanchor">[283:14]</a> Any one, then, of these
+three may be the last state of one who undertakes to remain exclusively
+faithful to the phenomenalistic aspect of Berkeleyanism, embodied in the
+principle <i>esse est percipi</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284"></a>[<a href="./images/284.png">284</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the
+Perceiver.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_134" id="Section_134">134</a>. Let us now follow the fortunes of the other phase of
+subjectivism&mdash;that which develops the conception of the perceiver rather
+than the perceived. When Berkeley holds that</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in a
+word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the
+world, have not any subsistence without a Mind,"</p></div>
+
+<p>his thought has transcended the epistemology with which he overthrew the
+conception of material substance, in two directions. For neither mind of
+the finite type nor mind of the divine type is perceived. But the first
+of these may yet be regarded as a direct empirical datum, even though
+sharply distinguished from an object of perception. In the third
+dialogue, Philonous thus expounds this new kind of knowledge:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I own I have properly no <i>idea</i>, either of God or any other
+spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by
+things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless
+know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as
+certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I
+mean by the terms <i>I</i> and <i>myself</i>; and I know this
+immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I
+perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound."<a name="FNanchor_284:15_129" id="FNanchor_284:15_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_284:15_129" class="fnanchor">[284:15]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285"></a>[<a href="./images/285.png">285</a>]</span>The knowledge here provided for may be regarded as empirical because
+the reality in question is an individual present in the moment of the
+knowledge. Particular acts of perception are said directly to reveal not
+only perceptual objects, but perceiving subjects. And the conception of
+spiritual substance, once accredited, may then be extended to account
+for social relations and to fill in the nature of God. The latter
+extension, in so far as it attributes such further predicates as
+universality and infinity, implies still a third epistemology, and
+threatens to pass over into rationalism. But the knowledge of one's
+fellow-men may, it is claimed, be regarded as immediate, like the
+knowledge of one's self. Perceptual and volitional activity has a sense
+for itself and also a sense for other like activity. The self is both
+self-conscious and socially conscious in an immediate experience of the
+same type.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate
+Knowledge of the Will.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_135" id="Section_135">135</a>. But this general spiritualistic conception is developed with less
+singleness of purpose in Berkeley than among the <i>voluntarists</i> and
+<i>panpsychists</i> who spring from Schopenhauer, the orientalist, pessimist,
+and mystic among the German Kantians of the early nineteenth century.
+His great <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286"></a>[<a href="./images/286.png">286</a>]</span>book, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," opens with the
+phenomenalistic contention that "the world is my idea." It soon appears,
+however, that the "my" is more profoundly significant than the "idea."
+Nature is my creation, due to the working within me of certain fixed
+principles of thought, such as space, time, and causality. But nature,
+just because it is my creation, is less than me: is but a manifestation
+of the true being for which I must look <i>within</i> myself. But this inner
+self cannot be made an object of thought, for that would be only to
+create another term of nature. The will itself, from which such creation
+springs, is "that which is most immediate" in one's consciousness, and
+"makes itself known in a direct manner in its particular acts." The term
+<i>will</i> is used by Schopenhauer as a general term covering the whole
+dynamics of life, instinct and desire, as well as volition. It is that
+sense of life-preserving and life-enhancing appetency which is the
+conscious accompaniment of struggle. With its aid the inwardness of the
+whole world may now be apprehended.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Whoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge
+<i>in abstracto</i>, and therefore clear and certain, of what
+everyone knows directly <i>in concreto</i>, <i>i. e.</i>, as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287"></a>[<a href="./images/287.png">287</a>]</span>feeling, a
+knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his
+phenomenal being, .&nbsp;.&nbsp;. and that his will is that which is most
+immediate in his consciousness, .&nbsp;.&nbsp;. will find that of itself
+it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost being of
+the whole of nature; for he now transfers it to all those
+phenomena which are not given to him, like his own phenomenal
+existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge, but only in
+the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as <i>idea</i> alone."<a name="FNanchor_287:16_130" id="FNanchor_287:16_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_287:16_130" class="fnanchor">[287:16]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The heart of reality is thus known by an "intuitive interpretation,"
+which begins at home in the individual's own heart.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Panpsychism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_136" id="Section_136">136</a>. The panpsychist follows the same course of reflection. There is
+an outwardness and an inwardness of nature, corresponding to the
+knower's body on the one hand, and his feeling or will on the other.
+With this principle in hand one may pass down the whole scale of being
+and discover no breach of continuity. Such an interpretation of nature
+has been well set forth by a contemporary writer, who quotes the
+following from the botanist, C. v. Naegeli:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Sensation is clearly connected with the reflex actions of
+higher animals. We are obliged to concede it to the other
+animals also, and we have no grounds for denying it to plants
+and inorganic bodies. The sensation arouses in us a condition
+of comfort and discomfort. In general, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288"></a>[<a href="./images/288.png">288</a>]</span>the feeling of
+pleasure arises when the natural impulses are satisfied, the
+feeling of pain when they are not satisfied. Since all
+material processes are composed of movements of molecules and
+elementary atoms, pleasure and pain must have their seat in
+these particles.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. Thus the same mental thread runs through
+all material phenomena. The human mind is nothing but the
+highest development on our earth of the mental processes which
+universally animate and move nature."<a name="FNanchor_288:17_131" id="FNanchor_288:17_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_288:17_131" class="fnanchor">[288:17]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>According to panpsychism, then, physical nature is the manifestation of
+an <i>appetency or bare consciousness generalized from the thinker's
+awareness of his most intimate self</i>. Such appetency or bare
+consciousness is the essential or substantial state of that which
+appears as physical nature.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for
+Objective Knowledge.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_137" id="Section_137">137</a>. We must now turn to the efforts which this doctrine has made to
+maintain itself against the sceptical trend of its own epistemology. For
+precisely as in the case of phenomenalism its dialectical principle
+threatens to be self-destructive. Immediate presence is still the test
+of knowledge. But does not immediate presence connote relativity and
+inadequacy, at best; an initial phase of knowledge that must be
+supplemented and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289"></a>[<a href="./images/289.png">289</a>]</span>corrected before objective reality and valid truth are
+apprehended? Does not the individuality of the individual thinker
+connote the very maximum of error? Indeed, spiritualism would seem to
+have exceeded even Protagoreanism itself, and to have passed from
+scepticism to deliberate nihilism. The object of knowledge is no longer
+even, as with the phenomenalist, the thinker's thought, but only his
+<i>thinking</i>. And if the thinker's thought is relative to him, then the
+thinker's act of thinking is the very vanishing-point of relativity, the
+negative term of a negating relation. How is a real, a self-subsistent
+world to be composed of such? Impelled by a half-conscious realization
+of the hopelessness of this situation, the exponent of spiritualism has
+sought to universalize his conception; to define an <i>absolute or
+ultimate spirit</i> other than the individual thinker, though known in and
+through him. But it is clear that this development of spiritualism, like
+all of the speculative procedure of subjectivism, threatens to exceed
+the scope of the original principle of knowledge. There is a strong
+presumption against the possibility of introducing a knowledge of God by
+the way of the particular presentations of an individual consciousness.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290"></a>[<a href="./images/290.png">290</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism.
+Mysticism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_138" id="Section_138">138</a>. Schopenhauer must be credited with a genuine effort to accept the
+metaphysical consequences of his epistemology. His epistemology, as we
+have seen, defined knowledge as centripetal. The object of real
+knowledge is identical with the subject of knowledge. If I am to know
+the universal will, therefore, I must in knowing become that will. And
+this Schopenhauer maintains. The innermost heart of the individual into
+which he may retreat, even from his private will, is&mdash;the universal. But
+there is another way of arriving at the same knowledge. In contemplation
+I may become absorbed in principles and laws, rather than be diverted by
+the particular spacial and temporal objects, until (and this is
+peculiarly true of the &aelig;sthetic experience) my interest no longer
+distinguishes itself, but coincides with truth. In other words, abstract
+thinking and pure willing are not opposite extremes, but adjacent points
+on the deeper or transcendent circle of experience. One may reach this
+part of the circle by moving in either of two directions that at the
+start are directly opposite: by turning in upon the subject or by
+utterly giving one's self up to the object. Reality obtains no
+definition by this means. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291"></a>[<a href="./images/291.png">291</a>]</span>Philosophy, for Schopenhauer, is rather a
+programme for realizing the state in which I will the universal and know
+the universal will. The final theory of knowledge, then, is mysticism,
+reality directly apprehended in a supreme and incommunicable experience,
+direct and vivid, like perception, and at the same time universal, like
+thought. But the empiricism with which Schopenhauer began, the appeal to
+a familiar experience of self as will, has meanwhile been forgotten. The
+idea as object of my perception, and the will as its subject were in the
+beginning regarded as common and verifiable items of experience. But
+who, save the occasional philosopher, knows a universal will? Nor have
+attempts to avoid mysticism, while retaining Schopenhauer's first
+principle, been successful. Certain voluntarists and panpsychists have
+attempted to do without the universal will, and define the world solely
+in terms of the many individual wills. But, as Schopenhauer himself
+pointed out, individual wills cannot be distinguished except in terms of
+something other than will, such as space and time. The same is true if
+for will there be substituted inner feeling or consciousness. Within
+this category individuals can be distinguished only as points of view,
+which to be comparable at all must <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292"></a>[<a href="./images/292.png">292</a>]</span>contain common objects, or be
+defined in terms of a system of relations like that of the physical
+world or that of an ethical community. The conception of pure will or
+pure feeling inevitably attaches to itself that of an undivided unity,
+if for no other reason because there is no ground for distinction. And
+such a unity, a will or consciousness that is no particular act or idea,
+can be known only in the unique experience which mysticism provides.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Objective Spiritualism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_139" id="Section_139">139</a>. The way of Schopenhauer is the way of one who adheres to the
+belief that what the thinker knows must always be a part of himself, his
+state or his activity. From this point of view the important element of
+being, its very essence or substance, is not any definable nature but an
+immediate relation to the knower. The consequence is that the universe
+in the last analysis can only be defined as a supreme state or activity
+into which the individual's consciousness may develop. Spiritualism has,
+however, other interests, interests which may be quite independent of
+epistemology. It is speculatively interested in a kind of being which it
+defines as spiritual, and in terms of which it proposes to define the
+universe. Such procedure is radically different from the
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293"></a>[<a href="./images/293.png">293</a>]</span>epistemological criticism which led Berkeley to maintain that the
+<i>esse</i> of objects is in their <i>percipi</i>, or Schopenhauer to maintain
+that "the world is my idea," or that led both of these philosophers to
+find a deeper reality in immediately intuited self-activity. For now it
+is proposed to <i>understand</i> spirit, discover its properties, and to
+acknowledge it only where these properties appear. I may now know spirit
+as an object; which in its properties, to be sure, is quite different
+from matter, but which like matter is capable of subsisting quite
+independently of my knowledge. This is a metaphysical spiritualism quite
+distinct from epistemological spiritualism, and by no means easily made
+consistent therewith. Indeed, it exhibits an almost irrepressible
+tendency to overstep the bounds both of empiricism and subjectivism, an
+historical connection with which alone justifies its introduction in the
+present chapter.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness and Order.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_140" id="Section_140">140</a>. To return again to the instructive example of Bishop Berkeley, we
+find him proving God from the evidence of him in experience, or the need
+of him to support the claims of experience.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find
+the ideas actually perceived by Sense <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294"></a>[<a href="./images/294.png">294</a>]</span>have not a like
+dependence on <i>my</i> will. When in broad daylight I open my
+eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or
+no, or to determine what particular objects shall present
+themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and
+other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of
+<i>my</i> will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that
+produces them.</p>
+
+<p>The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than
+those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness,
+order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those
+which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a
+regular train or series&mdash;the admirable connection whereof
+sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its
+Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the
+Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called
+<i>the laws of nature</i>."<a name="FNanchor_294:18_132" id="FNanchor_294:18_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_294:18_132" class="fnanchor">[294:18]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Of the attributes of experience here in question, independence or
+"steadiness" is not regarded as <i>prima facie</i> evidence of spirit, but
+rather as an aspect of experience for which some cause is necessary. But
+it is assumed that the power to "produce," with which such a cause must
+be endowed, is the peculiar prerogative of spirit, and that this cause
+gives further evidence of its spiritual nature, of its eminently
+spiritual nature, in the orderliness and the goodness of its effects.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the
+goodness that perfects all things is the Supreme
+Being."<a name="FNanchor_294:19_133" id="FNanchor_294:19_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_294:19_133" class="fnanchor">[294:19]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295"></a>[<a href="./images/295.png">295</a>]</span>That spirit is possessed of causal efficacy, Berkeley has in an earlier
+passage proved by a direct appeal to the individual's sense of power.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary
+and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than
+<i>willing</i>, and straightway this or that idea arises in my
+fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way
+for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very
+properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and
+grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents,
+or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse
+ourselves with words."<a name="FNanchor_295:20_134" id="FNanchor_295:20_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_295:20_134" class="fnanchor">[295:20]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Although Berkeley is here in general agreement with a very considerable
+variety of philosophical views, it will be readily observed that this
+doctrine tends to lapse into mysticism whenever it is retained in its
+purity. Berkeley himself admitted that there was no "idea" of such
+power. And philosophers will as a rule either obtain an idea
+corresponding to a term or amend the term&mdash;always excepting the mystical
+appeal to an inarticulate and indefinable experience. Hence pure power
+revealed in an ineffable immediate experience tends to give place to
+kinds of power to which some definite meaning may be attached. The
+energy of physics, defined by measurable <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296"></a>[<a href="./images/296.png">296</a>]</span>quantitative equivalence, is a
+case in point. The idealistic trend is in another direction, power
+coming to signify ethical or logical connection. Similarly, in the later
+philosophy of Berkeley himself, God is known by the nature of his
+activity rather than by the fact of his activity; and we are said "to
+account for a thing, when we show that it is so best." God's power, in
+short, becomes indistinguishable from his universality attended with the
+attributes of goodness and orderliness. But this means that the analogy
+of the human spirit, conscious of its own activity, is no longer the
+basis of the argument. By the divine will is now meant ethical
+principles, rather than the "here am I willing" of the empirical
+consciousness. Similarly the divine mind is defined in terms of logical
+principles, such as coherence and order, rather than in terms of the
+"here am I thinking" of the finite knower himself. But enough has been
+said to make it plain that this is no longer the stand-point of
+empirio-idealism. Indeed, in his last philosophical writing, the
+"Siris," Berkeley is so far removed from the principles of knowledge
+which made him at once the disciple and the critic of Locke, as to
+pronounce himself the devotee of Platonism and the prophet of
+transcendentalism. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297"></a>[<a href="./images/297.png">297</a>]</span>The former strain appears in his conclusion that
+"the <i>principles</i> of science are neither objects of sense nor
+imagination; and that intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to
+truth."<a name="FNanchor_297:21_135" id="FNanchor_297:21_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_297:21_135" class="fnanchor">[297:21]</a> His transcendentalism appears in his belief that such
+principles, participating in the vital unity of the Individual Purpose,
+constitute the meaning and so the substantial essence of the universe.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_141" id="Section_141">141</a>. Such then are the various paths which lead from subjectivism to
+other types of philosophy, demonstrating the peculiar aptitude of the
+former for departing from its first principle. Beginning with the
+relativity of all knowable reality to the individual knower, it
+undertakes to conceive reality in one or the other of the terms of this
+relation, as particular state of knowledge or as individual subject of
+knowledge. But these terms develop an intrinsic nature of their own, and
+become respectively <i>empirical datum</i>, and <i>logical</i> or <i>ethical
+principle</i>. In either case the subjectivistic principle of knowledge has
+been abandoned. Those whose speculative interest in a definable
+objective world has been less strong than their attachment to this
+principle, have either accepted the imputation of scepticism, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298"></a>[<a href="./images/298.png">298</a>]</span>or had
+recourse to the radical epistemological doctrine of mysticism.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Ethical Theories. Relativism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_142" id="Section_142">142</a>. Since the essence of subjectivism is epistemological rather than
+metaphysical, its practical and religious implications are various. The
+ethical theories which are corollary to the tendencies expounded above,
+range from extreme egoism to a mystical universalism. The close
+connection between the former and relativism is evident, and the form of
+egoism most consistent with epistemological relativism is to be found
+among those same Sophists who first maintained this latter doctrine. If
+we may believe Plato, the Sophists sought to create for their individual
+pupils an <i>appearance</i> of good. In the "Theaetetus," Socrates is
+represented as speaking thus on behalf of Protagoras:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no
+existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the
+evils which are and appear to a man, into goods which are and
+appear to him.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. I say that they (the wise men) are the
+physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of
+plants&mdash;for the husbandmen also take away the evil and
+disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and
+healthy sensations as well as true ones; and the wise and good
+rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil seem just to
+states; for whatever appears to be just and fair to a state,
+while <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299"></a>[<a href="./images/299.png">299</a>]</span>sanctioned by a state, is just and fair to it; but the
+teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the
+evil, both in appearance and in reality."<a name="FNanchor_299:22_136" id="FNanchor_299:22_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_299:22_136" class="fnanchor">[299:22]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>As truth is indistinguishable from the appearance of truth to the
+individual, so good is indistinguishable from a particular seeming good.
+The supreme moral value according to this plan of life is the agreeable
+feeling tone of that dream world to which the individual is forever
+consigned. The possible perfection of an experience which is "reduced to
+a swarm of impressions," and "ringed round" for each one of us by a
+"thick wall of personality" has been brilliantly depicted in the passage
+already quoted from Walter Pater, in whom the naturalistic and
+subjectivistic motives unite.<a name="FNanchor_299:23_137" id="FNanchor_299:23_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_299:23_137" class="fnanchor">[299:23]</a> If all my experience is strictly
+my own, then my good must likewise be my own. And if all of my
+experience is valid only in its instants of immediacy, then my best good
+must likewise consist in some "exquisite passion," or stirring of the
+senses.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Pessimism and Self-denial.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_143" id="Section_143">143</a>. But for Schopenhauer the internal world opens out into the
+boundless and unfathomable sea of the universal will. If I retire from
+the world upon my own <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300"></a>[<a href="./images/300.png">300</a>]</span>private feelings, I am still short of the true
+life, for I am asserting myself against the world. I should seek a sense
+of unison with a world whose deeper heart-beats I may learn to feel and
+adopt as the rhythm of my own. The folly of willing for one's private
+self is the ground of Schopenhauer's pessimism.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"All <i>willing</i> arises from want, therefore from deficiency,
+and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends
+it; yet for one wish that is satisfied there remain at least
+ten which are denied. Further, the desire lasts long, the
+demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily
+measured out. But even the final satisfaction is itself only
+apparent; every satisfied wish at once makes room for a new
+one, both are illusions; the one is known to be so, the other
+not yet. No attained object of desire can give lasting
+satisfaction, but merely a fleeting gratification; it is like
+the alms thrown to the beggar, that keeps him alive to-day
+that his misery may be prolonged till the morrow.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. The
+subject of willing is thus constantly stretched on the
+revolving wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the
+Danaids, is the ever-longing Tantalus."<a name="FNanchor_300:24_138" id="FNanchor_300:24_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_300:24_138" class="fnanchor">[300:24]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The escape from this torture and self-deception is possible through the
+same mystical experience, the same blending with the universe that
+conditions knowledge.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Ethics of Welfare.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_144" id="Section_144">144</a>. But though pleasant dreaming be the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301"></a>[<a href="./images/301.png">301</a>]</span>most consistent practical
+sequel to a subjectivistic epistemology, its <i>individualism</i> presents
+another basis for life with quite different possibilities of emphasis.
+It may develop into an aggressive egoism of the type represented by the
+sophist Thrasymachus, in his proclamation that "might is right, justice
+the interest of the stronger."<a name="FNanchor_301:25_139" id="FNanchor_301:25_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_301:25_139" class="fnanchor">[301:25]</a> But more commonly it is tempered
+by a conception of social interest, and serves as the champion of action
+against contemplation. The gospel of action is always individualistic.
+It requires of the individual a sense of his independence, and of the
+real virtue of his initiative. Hence those voluntarists who emphasize
+the many individual wills and decline to reduce them, after the manner
+of Schopenhauer, to a universal, may be said to afford a direct
+justification of it. It is true that this practical realism threatens
+the tenability of an epistemological idealism, but the two have been
+united, and because of their common emphasis upon the individual such
+procedure is not entirely inconsequential. Friedrich Paulsen, whose
+panpsychism has already been cited, is an excellent case in point. The
+only good, he maintains, is "welfare," the fulfilment of those natural
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302"></a>[<a href="./images/302.png">302</a>]</span>desires which both distinguish the individual and signify his
+continuity with all grades of being.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The goal at which the will aims does not consist in a maximum
+of pleasurable feelings, but in the normal exercise of the
+vital functions for which the species is predisposed. In the
+case of man the mode of life is on the whole determined by the
+nature of the historical unity from which the individual
+evolves as a member. Here the objective content of life, after
+which the will strives, also enters into consciousness with
+the progressive evolution of presentation; the type of life
+becomes a conscious ideal of life."<a name="FNanchor_302:26_140" id="FNanchor_302:26_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_302:26_140" class="fnanchor">[302:26]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Here, contrary to the teaching of Schopenhauer, the good consists in
+individual attainment, the extension and fulfilment of the <i>distinct</i>
+interests that arise from the common fund of nature. To be and to do to
+the uttermost, to realize the maximum from nature's investment in one's
+special capacities and powers&mdash;this is indeed the first principle of a
+morality of action.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Ethical Community.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_145" id="Section_145">145</a>. But a type of ethics still further removed from the initial
+relativism has been adopted and more or less successfully assimilated by
+subjectivistic philosophies. Accepting Berkeley's spirits, with their
+indefinite capacities, and likewise the stability of the ideal
+principles that underlie a God-administered world, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303"></a>[<a href="./images/303.png">303</a>]</span>and morality becomes
+the obedience which the individual renders to the law. The individual,
+free to act in his own right, co&ouml;perates with the purposes of the
+general spiritual community, whose laws are worthy of obedience though
+not coercive. The recognition of such a spiritual citizenship, entailing
+opportunities, duties, and obligations, rather than thraldom, partakes
+of the truth as well as the inadequacy of common-sense.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Religion of Mysticism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_146" id="Section_146">146</a>. As for religion, at least two distinct practical appreciations of
+the universe have been historically associated with this chapter in
+philosophy. The one of these is the mysticism of Schopenhauer, the
+religious sequel to a universalistic voluntarism. Schopenhauer's ethics,
+his very philosophy, is religion. For the good and the true are alike
+attainable only through identification with the Absolute Will. This
+consummation of life, transcending practical and theoretical
+differences, engulfing and effacing all qualities and all values, is
+like the Nirv&acirc;na of the Orient&mdash;a positive ideal only for one who has
+appraised the apparent world at its real value.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the
+entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full
+of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304"></a>[<a href="./images/304.png">304</a>]</span>those in whom
+the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world,
+which is so real, with all it's suns and milky-ways&mdash;is
+nothing."<a name="FNanchor_304:27_141" id="FNanchor_304:27_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_304:27_141" class="fnanchor">[304:27]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Religion of Individual Co&ouml;peration with God.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_147" id="Section_147">147</a>. From the union of the two motives of voluntarism and
+individualism springs another and a more familiar type of religion, that
+of co&ouml;perative spiritual endeavor. In the religion of Schopenhauer the
+soul must utterly lose itself for the sake of peace; here the soul must
+persist in its own being and activity for the sake of the progressive
+goodness of the world. For Schopenhauer God is the universal solution,
+in which all motions cease and all differences disappear; here God is
+the General of moral forces. The deeper and more significant universe is</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"a society of rational agents, acting under the eye of
+Providence, concurring in one design to promote the common
+benefit of the whole, and conforming their actions to the
+established laws and order of the Divine parental wisdom:
+wherein each particular agent shall not consider himself
+apart, but as the member of a great City, whose author and
+founder is God: in which the civil laws are no other than the
+rules of virtue and the duties of religion: and where
+everyone's true interest is combined with his duty."<a name="FNanchor_304:28_142" id="FNanchor_304:28_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_304:28_142" class="fnanchor">[304:28]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305"></a>[<a href="./images/305.png">305</a>]</span>But so uncompromising an optimism is not essential to this religion.
+Its distinction lies rather in its acceptance of the manifest plurality
+of souls, and its appeal to the faith that is engendered by
+service.<a name="FNanchor_305:29_143" id="FNanchor_305:29_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_305:29_143" class="fnanchor">[305:29]</a> As William James has said:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Even God's being is sacred from ours. To co&ouml;perate with his
+creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants
+of us. In such co&ouml;peration with his purposes, not in any
+chimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretical
+drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our
+destiny."<a name="FNanchor_305:30_144" id="FNanchor_305:30_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_305:30_144" class="fnanchor">[305:30]</a></p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_267:1_115" id="Footnote_267:1_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_267:1_115"><span class="label">[267:1]</span></a> <span class="smcap">Preliminary Note.</span> By <i>Subjectivism</i> is meant that
+system of philosophy which construes the universe in accordance with the
+epistemological principle that <i>all knowledge is of its own states or
+activities</i>. In so far as subjectivism reduces reality to <i>states of
+knowledge</i>, such as <i>perceptions</i> or <i>ideas</i>, it is <i>phenomenalism</i>. In
+so far as it reduces reality to a more <i>internal active principle</i> such
+as <i>spirit</i> or <i>will</i>, it is <i>spiritualism</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_268:2_116" id="Footnote_268:2_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_268:2_116"><span class="label">[268:2]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Complete Works</i>, Vol. I, p. 352. Fraser's
+edition.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_269:3_117" id="Footnote_269:3_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_269:3_117"><span class="label">[269:3]</span></a> Plato: <i>Theaetetus</i>, 156. Translation by Jowett. The
+italics are mine.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_270:4_118" id="Footnote_270:4_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_270:4_118"><span class="label">[270:4]</span></a> Plato: <i>Op. cit.</i>, 166.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_271:5_119" id="Footnote_271:5_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_271:5_119"><span class="label">[271:5]</span></a> <ins class="greek" title="al&ecirc;thes ho hekast&ocirc; hekastote dokei">&#7936;&#955;&#951;&#952;&#8050;&#962; &#8003; &#7953;&#954;&#8049;&#963;&#964;&#8179; &#7953;&#954;&#8049;&#963;&#964;&#959;&#964;&#949; &#948;&#959;&#954;&#949;&#8150;</ins>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_273:6_120" id="Footnote_273:6_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_273:6_120"><span class="label">[273:6]</span></a> For another issue out of this situation, cf. &sect;&sect;
+<a href="#Section_185">185-187</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_276:7_121" id="Footnote_276:7_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276:7_121"><span class="label">[276:7]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Op. cit.</i>, Vol. I, pp. 380-381.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_276:8_122" id="Footnote_276:8_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276:8_122"><span class="label">[276:8]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 389.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_277:9_123" id="Footnote_277:9_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_277:9_123"><span class="label">[277:9]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 397.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_278:10_124" id="Footnote_278:10_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_278:10_124"><span class="label">[278:10]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 418.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_279:11_125" id="Footnote_279:11_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_279:11_125"><span class="label">[279:11]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 403-404.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_282:12_126" id="Footnote_282:12_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_282:12_126"><span class="label">[282:12]</span></a> Cf. Pearson: <i>Grammar of Science</i>, Chap. II. See
+above, &sect; <a href="#Section_118">118</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_283:13_127" id="Footnote_283:13_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283:13_127"><span class="label">[283:13]</span></a> See <a href="#Chap_XI">Chap. XI</a>. Cf. also &sect; <a href="#Section_140">140</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_283:14_128" id="Footnote_283:14_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283:14_128"><span class="label">[283:14]</span></a> The same may be said of the "permanent possibilities
+of sensation," proposed by J. S. Mill. Such possibilities outside of
+actual perception are either nothing or things such as they are known to
+be <i>in</i> perception. In either case they are not perceptions.</p>
+
+<p>In Ernst Mach's <i>Analysis of Sensations</i>, the reader will find an
+interesting transition from sensationalism to realism through the
+substitution of the term <i>Bestandtheil</i> for <i>Empfindung</i>. (See
+Translation by Williams, pp. 18-20.) See below, &sect; <a href="#Section_207">207</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_284:15_129" id="Footnote_284:15_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_284:15_129"><span class="label">[284:15]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 447.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_287:16_130" id="Footnote_287:16_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_287:16_130"><span class="label">[287:16]</span></a> Schopenhauer: <i>The World as Will and Idea</i>.
+Translation by Haldane and Kemp, Vol. I, p. 141.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_288:17_131" id="Footnote_288:17_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_288:17_131"><span class="label">[288:17]</span></a> Quoted from Naegeli: <i>Die Mechanisch-physiologische
+Theorie der Abstammungslehre</i>, by Friedrich Paulsen, in his
+<i>Introduction to Philosophy</i>. Translation by Thilly, p. 103.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_294:18_132" id="Footnote_294:18_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_294:18_132"><span class="label">[294:18]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 273.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_294:19_133" id="Footnote_294:19_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_294:19_133"><span class="label">[294:19]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, Vol. I, pp. 272-273.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_295:20_134" id="Footnote_295:20_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_295:20_134"><span class="label">[295:20]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, Vol. III, p. 278.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_297:21_135" id="Footnote_297:21_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_297:21_135"><span class="label">[297:21]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, Vol. III, p. 249.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_299:22_136" id="Footnote_299:22_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_299:22_136"><span class="label">[299:22]</span></a> Plato: <i>Theaetetus</i>, 167. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_299:23_137" id="Footnote_299:23_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_299:23_137"><span class="label">[299:23]</span></a> See &sect; <a href="#Section_121">121</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_300:24_138" id="Footnote_300:24_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_300:24_138"><span class="label">[300:24]</span></a> Schopenhauer: <i>Op. cit.</i> Translation by Haldane and
+Kemp, Vol. I, pp. 253-254.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_301:25_139" id="Footnote_301:25_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_301:25_139"><span class="label">[301:25]</span></a> See Plato: <i>Republic</i>, Bk. I, 338.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_302:26_140" id="Footnote_302:26_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_302:26_140"><span class="label">[302:26]</span></a> Paulsen: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 423.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_304:27_141" id="Footnote_304:27_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_304:27_141"><span class="label">[304:27]</span></a> Schopenhauer: <i>Op. cit.</i> Translation by Haldane and
+Kemp, p. 532.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_304:28_142" id="Footnote_304:28_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_304:28_142"><span class="label">[304:28]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Op. cit.</i>, Vol. II, p. 138.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_305:29_143" id="Footnote_305:29_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_305:29_143"><span class="label">[305:29]</span></a> For an interesting characterization of this type of
+religion, cf. Royce: <i>Spirit of Modern Philosophy</i>, p. 46.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_305:30_144" id="Footnote_305:30_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_305:30_144"><span class="label">[305:30]</span></a> James: <i>The Will to Believe</i>, p. 141.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306"></a>[<a href="./images/306.png">306</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_X" id="Chap_X"></a>CHAPTER X</h2>
+
+<h3>ABSOLUTE REALISM<a name="FNanchor_306:1_145" id="FNanchor_306:1_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_306:1_145" class="fnanchor" style="font-weight: normal; font-size: 80%;">[306:1]</a></h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, or the
+Absolute.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_148" id="Section_148">148</a>. No one has understood better than the philosopher himself that he
+cannot hope to be popular with men of practical common-sense. Indeed, it
+has commonly been a matter of pride with him. The classic representation
+of the philosopher's faith in himself is to be found in Plato's
+"Republic." The philosopher is there portrayed in the famous cave simile
+as one who having seen the light itself can no longer distinguish the
+shadows which are apparent to those who sit perpetually in the twilight.
+Within the cave of shadows he is indeed less at his ease than those who
+have never seen the sun. But since he knows the source of the shadows,
+his knowledge surrounds <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307"></a>[<a href="./images/307.png">307</a>]</span>that of the shadow connoisseurs. And his
+equanimity need not suffer from the contempt of those whom he
+understands better than they understand themselves. The history of
+philosophy is due to the dogged persistence with which the philosopher
+has taken himself seriously and endured the poor opinion of the world.
+But the pride of the philosopher has done more than perpetuate the
+philosophical outlook and problem; it has led to the formulation of a
+definite philosophical conception, and of two great philosophical
+doctrines. The conception is that of the <i>absolute</i>; and the doctrines
+are that of the <i>absolute being</i>, and that of the <i>absolute self</i> or
+<i>mind</i>. The former of these doctrines is the topic of the present
+chapter.</p>
+
+<p>Among the early Greeks the r&ocirc;le of the philosopher was one of
+superlative dignity. In point of knowledge he was less easily satisfied
+than other men. He thought beyond immediate practical problems, devoting
+himself to a profounder reflection, that could not but induce in him a
+sense of superior intellectual worth. The familiar was not binding upon
+him, for his thought was emancipated from routine and superficiality.
+Furthermore his intellectual courage and resolution did not permit him
+to indulge in triviality, doubt, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308"></a>[<a href="./images/308.png">308</a>]</span>or paradox. He sought his own with a
+faith that could not be denied. Even Heraclitus the Dark, who was also
+called "the Weeping Philosopher," because he found at the very heart of
+nature that transiency which the philosophical mind seeks to escape,
+felt himself to be exalted as well as isolated by that insight. But this
+sentiment of personal aloofness led at once to a division of experience.
+He who knows truly belongs to another and more abiding world. As there
+is a philosophical way of thought, there is a philosophical way of life,
+and <i>a philosophical object</i>. Since the philosopher and the common man
+do not see alike, the terms of their experience are incommensurable. In
+Parmenides the Eleatic this motive is most strikingly exhibited. There
+is a <i>Way of Truth</i> which diverges from the <i>Way of Opinion</i>. The
+philosopher walks the former way alone. And there is an object of truth,
+accessible only to one who takes this way of truth. Parmenides finds
+this object to be the content of pure affirmation.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that <i>It
+is</i>. In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and
+indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end.
+Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now <i>it is</i>, all at once,
+a continuous one."<a name="FNanchor_308:2_146" id="FNanchor_308:2_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_308:2_146" class="fnanchor">[308:2]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309"></a>[<a href="./images/309.png">309</a>]</span>The philosophy of Parmenides, commonly called the Eleatic Philosophy,
+is notable for this emergence of the pure concept of <i>absolute being</i> as
+the final object of knowledge. The philosopher aims to discover that
+which is, and so turns away from that which is not or that which ceases
+to be. The negative and transient aspects of experience only hinder him
+in his search for the eternal. It was the great Eleatic insight to
+realize that the outcome of thought is thus predetermined; that the
+answer to philosophy is contained in the question of philosophy. The
+philosopher, in that he resolutely avoids all partiality, relativity,
+and superficiality, must affirm a complete, universal, and ultimate
+being as the very object of that perfect knowledge which he means to
+possess. This object is known in the history of these philosophies as
+the <i>infinite</i> or <i>absolute</i>.<a name="FNanchor_309:3_147" id="FNanchor_309:3_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_309:3_147" class="fnanchor">[309:3]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Eleatic Conception of Being.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_149" id="Section_149">149</a>. The Eleatic reasons somewhat as follows. The philosopher seeks to
+know what is. The object of his knowledge will then contain as its
+primary and essential predicate, that of being. It is a step further to
+<i>define</i> being in terms of this essential predicate.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310"></a>[<a href="./images/310.png">310</a>]</span>Parmenides thinks of being as a power or strength, a positive
+self-maintenance to which all affirmations refer. The remainder of the
+Eleatic philosophy is the analysis of this concept and the proof of its
+implications. Being must persist through all change, and span all
+chasms. Before being there can be only nothing, which is the same as to
+say that so far as being is concerned there is no before. Similarly
+there can be no after or beyond. There can be no motion, change, or
+division of being, because being will be in all parts of every division,
+and in all stages of every process. Hence being is "uncreated and
+indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end."</p>
+
+<p>The argument turns upon the application to being as a whole of the
+meaning and the implications of <i>only being</i>. Being is the affirmative
+or positive. From that <i>alone</i>, one can derive only such properties as
+eternity or unity. For generation and decay and plurality may belong to
+that which is <i>also</i> affirmative and positive, but not to that which is
+affirmative and positive <i>only</i>. The Eleatic philosophy is due, then, to
+the determination to derive the whole of reality from the bare necessity
+of being, to cut down reality to what flows entirely from the assertion
+of its only known <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311"></a>[<a href="./images/311.png">311</a>]</span>necessary aspect, that of being. We meet here in its
+simplest form a persistent rationalistic motive, the attempt to derive
+the universe from the isolation and analysis of its most universal
+character. As in the case of every well-defined philosophy, this motive
+is always attended by a "besetting" problem. Here it is the accounting
+for what, empirically at least, is alien to that universal character.
+And this difficulty is emphasized rather than resolved by Parmenides in
+his designation of a limbo of opinion, "in which is no true belief at
+all," to which the manifold of common experience with all its
+irrelevancies can be relegated.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Spinoza's Conception of Substance.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_150" id="Section_150">150</a>. The Eleatic philosophy, enriched and supplemented, appears many
+centuries later in the rigorous rationalism of Spinoza.<a name="FNanchor_311:4_148" id="FNanchor_311:4_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_311:4_148" class="fnanchor">[311:4]</a> With
+Spinoza philosophy is a demonstration of necessities after the manner of
+geometry. Reality is to be set forth in theorems derived from
+fundamental axioms and definitions. As in the case of Parmenides, these
+necessities are the implications of the very problem of being. The
+philosopher's problem is made to solve itself. But for Spinoza that
+problem is more definite and more pregnant. The problematic being must
+not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312"></a>[<a href="./images/312.png">312</a>]</span>only be, but must be <i>sufficient to itself</i>. What the philosopher
+seeks to know is primarily an intrinsic entity. Its nature must be
+independent of other natures, and my knowledge of it independent of my
+knowledge of anything else. Reality is something which need not be
+sought further. So construed, being is in Spinoza's philosophy termed
+<i>substance</i>. It will be seen that to define substance is to affirm the
+existence of it, for substance is so defined as to embody the very
+qualification for existence. Whatever exists exists under the form of
+substance, as that "which is in itself, and is conceived through itself:
+in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently
+of any other conception."<a name="FNanchor_312:5_149" id="FNanchor_312:5_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_312:5_149" class="fnanchor">[312:5]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The Modes and
+the Attributes.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_151" id="Section_151">151</a>. There remains but one further fundamental thesis for the
+establishment of the Spinozistic philosophy, the thesis which maintains
+the exclusive existence of the one "absolutely infinite being," or God.
+The exclusive existence of God follows from his existence, because of
+the exhaustiveness of his nature. His is the nature "consisting in
+infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite
+essentiality." He will contain all <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313"></a>[<a href="./images/313.png">313</a>]</span>meaning, and all possible meaning,
+within his fixed and necessary constitution. It is evident that if such
+a God exist, nothing can fall outside of him. One such substance must be
+the only substance. But upon what grounds are we to assert God's
+existence?</p>
+
+<p>To proceed further with Spinoza's philosophy we must introduce two terms
+which are scarcely less fundamental in his system than that of
+substance. The one of these is "attribute," by which he means <i>kind</i> or
+general property; the other is "mode," by which he means <i>case</i> or
+individual thing. Spinoza's proof of God consists in showing that no
+single mode, single attribute, or finite group of modes or attributes,
+can be a substance; but only an infinite system of all modes of all
+attributes. Translated into common speech this means that neither kinds
+nor cases, nor special groups of either, can stand alone and be of
+themselves, but only the unity of all possible cases of all possible
+kinds.</p>
+
+<p>The argument concerning the possible substantiality of the case or
+individual thing is relatively simple. Suppose an attribute or kind,
+<i>A</i>, of which there are cases <i>am</i><sub>1</sub>, <i>am</i><sub>2</sub>, <i>am</i><sub>3</sub>, etc. The
+number of cases is never involved in the nature of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314"></a>[<a href="./images/314.png">314</a>]</span>kind, as is seen
+for example in the fact that the definition of triangle prescribes no
+special number of individual triangles. Hence <i>am</i><sub>1</sub>, <i>am</i><sub>2</sub>,
+<i>am</i><sub>3</sub>, etc., must be explained by something outside of their nature.
+Their being cases of <i>A</i> does not account for their existing severally.
+This is Spinoza's statement of the argument that individual events, such
+as motions or sensations, are not self-dependent, but belong to a
+context of like events which are mutually dependent.</p>
+
+<p>The question of the attribute is more difficult. Why may not an
+attribute as a complete domain of interdependent events, itself be
+independent or substantial? Spinoza's predecessor, Descartes, had
+maintained precisely that thesis in behalf of the domain of thought and
+the domain of space. Spinoza's answer rests upon the famous ontological
+argument, inherited from scholasticism and generally accepted in the
+first period of modern philosophy. The evidence of existence, he
+declares, is clear and distinct conceivability.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"For a person to say that he has a clear and distinct&mdash;that
+is, a true&mdash;idea of a substance, but that he is not sure
+whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said
+that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was
+false."<a name="FNanchor_314:6_150" id="FNanchor_314:6_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_314:6_150" class="fnanchor">[314:6]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315"></a>[<a href="./images/315.png">315</a>]</span>Now we can form a clear and distinct idea of an absolutely infinite
+being that shall have all possible attributes. This idea is a
+well-recognized standard and object of reference for thought. But it is
+a conception which is highly qualified, not only through its clearness
+and distinctness, but also through its abundance of content. It affirms
+itself therefore with a certainty that surpasses any other certainty,
+because it is supported by each and every other certainty, and even by
+the residuum of possibility. If any intelligible meaning be permitted to
+affirm itself, so much the more irresistible is the claim of this
+infinitely rich meaning. Since every attribute contributes to its
+validity, the being with infinite attributes is infinitely or absolutely
+valid. The conclusion of the argument is now obvious. If the being
+constituted by the infinite attributes exists, it swallows up all
+possibilities and exists exclusively.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_152" id="Section_152">152</a>. The vulnerable point in Spinoza's argument can thus be expressed:
+that which is important is questionable, and that which is
+unquestionable is of doubtful importance. Have I indeed a clear and
+distinct idea of an absolutely infinite being? The answer turns upon the
+meaning of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316"></a>[<a href="./images/316.png">316</a>]</span>phrase "idea of." It is true I can add to such meaning
+as I apprehend the thought of possible other meaning, and suppose the
+whole to have a definiteness and systematic unity like that of the
+triangle. But such an idea is problematic. I am compelled to use the
+term "possible," and so to confess the failure of definite content to
+measure up to my idea. My idea of an absolutely infinite being is like
+my idea of a universal language: I can think <i>of</i> it, but I cannot
+<i>think it out</i>, for lack of data or because of the conflicting testimony
+of other data. If I mean the infinity of my being to be a term of
+inclusiveness, and to insist that the all must be, and that there can be
+nothing not included in the all, I can scarcely be denied. But it is
+reasonable to doubt the importance of such a truth. If, on the other
+hand, I mean that my infinite being shall have the compactness and
+organic unity of a triangle, I must admit that such a being is indeed
+problematic. The degree to which the meaning of the part is dependent
+upon the meaning of the whole, or the degree to which the geometrical
+analogy is to be preferred to the analogy of aggregates, like the events
+within a year, is a problem that falls quite outside Spinoza's
+fundamental arguments.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317"></a>[<a href="./images/317.png">317</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Spinoza's Provision for the Finite.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_153" id="Section_153">153</a>. But the advance of Spinoza over the Eleatics must not be lost
+sight of. The modern philosopher has so conceived being as to provide
+for parts within an individual unity. The geometrical analogy is a most
+illuminating one, for it enables us to understand how manyness may be
+indispensable to a being that is essentially unitary. The triangle as
+triangle is one. But it could not be such without sides and angles. The
+unity is equally necessary to the parts, for sides and angles of a
+triangle could not be such without an arrangement governed by the nature
+triangle. The whole of nature may be similarly conceived: as the
+reciprocal necessity of <i>natura naturans</i>, or nature defined in respect
+of its unity, and <i>natura naturata</i>, or nature specified in detail.
+There is some promise here of a reconciliation of the <i>Way of Opinion</i>
+with the <i>Way of Truth</i>. Opinion would be a gathering of detail, truth a
+comprehension of the intelligible unity. Both would be provided for
+through the consideration that whatever is complete and necessary must
+be made up of incompletenesses that are necessary to it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Transition to Teleological Conceptions.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_154" id="Section_154">154</a>. This consideration, however, does not receive its most effective
+formulation in Spinoza. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318"></a>[<a href="./images/318.png">318</a>]</span>The isolation of the parts, the actual
+severalty and irrelevance of the modes, still presents a grave problem.
+Is there a kind of whole to which not only parts but fragments, or parts
+in their very incompleteness, are indispensable? This would seem to be
+true of a <i>progression</i> or <i>development</i>, since that would require both
+perfection as its end, and degrees of imperfection as its stages.
+Spinoza was prevented from making much of this idea by his rejection of
+the principle of <i>teleology</i>. He regarded appreciation or valuation as a
+projection of personal bias. "Nature has no particular goal in view,"
+and "final causes are mere human figments." "The perfection of things is
+to be reckoned only from their own nature and power."<a name="FNanchor_318:7_151" id="FNanchor_318:7_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_318:7_151" class="fnanchor">[318:7]</a> The
+philosophical method which Spinoza here repudiates, the interpretation
+of the world in moral terms, is <i>Platonism</i>, an independent and
+profoundly important movement, belonging to the same general realistic
+type with Eleaticism and Spinozism. Absolute being is again the
+fundamental conception. Here, however, it is conceived that being is
+primarily not affirmation or self-sufficiency, but the <i>good</i> or
+<i>ideal</i>. There are few great metaphysical systems that have not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319"></a>[<a href="./images/319.png">319</a>]</span>been
+deeply influenced by Platonism; hence the importance of understanding it
+in its purity. To this end we must return again to the early Greek
+conception of the philosopher; for Platonism, like Eleaticism, is a
+sequel to the philosopher's self-consciousness.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_155" id="Section_155">155</a>. Although the first Greek philosophers, such men as Thales,
+Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, were clearly aware of their
+distinction and high calling, it by no means follows that they were good
+judges of themselves. Their sense of intellectual power was
+unsuspecting; and they praised philosophy without definitely raising the
+question of its meaning. They were like unskilled players who try all
+the stops and scales of an organ, and know that somehow they can make a
+music that exceeds the noises, monotones or simple melodies of those who
+play upon lesser instruments. They knew their power rather than their
+instrument or their art. The first philosophers, in short, were
+self-conscious but not self-critical.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_156" id="Section_156">156</a>. The immediately succeeding phase in the history of Greek
+philosophy was a curtailment, but <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320"></a>[<a href="./images/320.png">320</a>]</span>only in the most superficial sense a
+criticism, of the activity of the philosopher. In the Periclean Age
+philosophy suffered more from inattention than from refutation. The
+scepticism of the sophists, who were the knowing men of this age, was
+not so much conviction as indisposition. They failed to recognize the
+old philosophical problem; it did not <i>appeal</i> to them as a genuine
+problem. The sophists were the intellectual men of an age of <i>humanism</i>,
+<i>individualism</i>, and <i>secularism</i>. These were years in which the circle
+of human society, the state with its institutions, citizenship with its
+manifold activities and interests, bounded the horizon of thought. What
+need to look beyond? Life was not a problem, but an abundant opportunity
+and a sense of capacity. The world was not a mystery, but a place of
+entertainment and a sphere of action. Of this the sophists were faithful
+witnesses. In their love of novelty, irreverence, impressionism,
+elegance of speech, and above all in their praise of individual
+efficiency, they preached and pandered to their age. Their public,
+though it loved to abuse them, was the greatest sophist of them
+all&mdash;brilliant and capricious, incomparably rich in all but wisdom. The
+majority belonged to what <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321"></a>[<a href="./images/321.png">321</a>]</span>Plato called "the sight-loving, art-loving,
+busy class." This is an age, then, when the man of practical
+common-sense is pre&euml;minent, and the philosopher with his dark sayings
+has passed away. The pride of wisdom has given way to the pride of power
+and the pride of cleverness. The many men pursue the many goods of life,
+and there is no spirit among them all who, sitting apart in
+contemplation, wonders at the meaning of the whole.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_157" id="Section_157">157</a>. But in their midst there moved a strange prophet, whom they
+mistook for one of themselves. Socrates was not one who prayed in the
+wilderness, but a man of the streets and the market-place, who talked
+rather more incessantly than the rest, and apparently with less right.
+He did not testify to the truth, but pleaded ignorance in extenuation of
+an exasperating habit of asking questions. There was, however, a humor
+and a method in his innocence that arrested attention. He was a
+formidable adversary in discussion from his very irresponsibility; and
+he was especially successful with the more rhetorical sophists because
+he chose his own weapons, and substituted critical analysis, question
+and answer, for the long speeches to which these teachers were
+habituated by their profession. He appeared to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322"></a>[<a href="./images/322.png">322</a>]</span>be governed by an
+insatiable inquisitiveness, and a somewhat malicious desire to discredit
+those who spoke with authority.</p>
+
+<p>But to those who knew him better, and especially to Plato, who knew him
+best, Socrates was at once the sweetest and most compelling spirit of
+his age. There was a kind of truth in the quality of his character. He
+was perhaps <i>the first of all reverent men</i>. In the presence of conceit
+his self-depreciation was ironical, but in another presence it was most
+genuine, and his deepest spring of thought and action. This other
+presence was his own ideal. Socrates was sincerely humble because,
+expecting so much of philosophy, he saw his own deficiency. Unlike the
+unskilled player, he did not seek to <i>make</i> music; but he loved music,
+and knew that such music as is indeed music was beyond his power. On the
+other hand he was well aware of his superiority to those in whom
+self-satisfaction was possible because they had no conception of the
+ideal. Of such he could say in truth that they did not know enough even
+to realize the extent of their ignorance. The world has long been
+familiar with the vivid portrayal of the Socratic consciousness which is
+contained in Plato's "Apology." Socrates had set out in life with the
+opinion <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323"></a>[<a href="./images/323.png">323</a>]</span>that his was an age of exceptional enlightenment. But as he
+came to know men he found that after all no one of them really knew what
+he was about. Each "sight-loving, art-loving, busy" man was quite blind
+to the meaning of life. While he was capable of practical achievement,
+his judgments concerning the real virtue of his achievements were
+conventional and ungrounded, a mere reflection of tradition and opinion.
+When asked concerning the meaning of life, or the ground of his
+opinions, he was thrown into confusion or aggravated to meaningless
+reiteration. Such men, Socrates reflected, were both unwise and
+confirmed in their folly through being unconscious of it. Because he
+knew that vanity is vanity, that opinion is indeed mere opinion,
+Socrates felt himself to be the wisest man in a generation of dogged
+unwisdom.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_158" id="Section_158">158</a>. It is scarcely necessary to point out that this insight, however
+negatively it be used, is a revelation of positive knowledge. Heraclitus
+and Parmenides claimed to know; Socrates disclaimed knowledge <i>for
+reasons</i>. Like all real criticism this is at once a confounding of error
+and a prophecy of truth. The truth so discovered is indeed not ordinary
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324"></a>[<a href="./images/324.png">324</a>]</span>truth concerning historical or physical things, but not on that account
+less significant and necessary. This truth, it will also be admitted, is
+virtually rather than actually set forth by Socrates himself. He knew
+that life has some meaning which those who live with conviction desire
+at heart to realize, and that knowledge has principles with which those
+who speak with conviction intend to be consistent. There is, in short, a
+rational life and a rational discourse. Furthermore, a rational life
+will be a life wisely directed to the end of the good; and a rational
+discourse one constructed with reference to the real natures of things,
+and the necessities which flow from these natures. But Socrates did not
+conclusively define either the meaning of life or the form of perfect
+knowledge. He testified to the necessity of some such truths, and his
+testimony demonstrated both the blindness of his contemporaries and also
+his own deficiency.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Historical Preparation for Plato.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_159" id="Section_159">159</a>. The character and method of Socrates have their best foil in the
+sophists, but their bearing on the earlier philosophers is for our
+purposes even more instructive. Unlike Socrates these philosophers had
+not made a study of the task of the philosopher. They <i>were</i>
+philosophers&mdash;"spectators of all time and all <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325"></a>[<a href="./images/325.png">325</a>]</span>existence"; but they were
+precritical or dogmatic philosophers, to whom it had not occurred to
+define the requirements of philosophy. They knew no perfect knowledge
+other than their own actual knowledge. They defined being and
+interpreted life without reflecting upon the quality of the knowledge
+whose object is being, or the quality of insight that would indeed be
+practical wisdom. But when through Socrates the whole philosophical
+prospect is again revealed after the period of humanistic concentration,
+it is as an ideal whose possibilities, whose necessities, are conceived
+before they are realized. Socrates celebrates the r&ocirc;le of the
+philosopher without assigning it to himself. The new philosophical
+object is the philosopher himself; and the new insight a knowledge of
+knowledge itself. These three types of intellectual procedure, dogmatic
+speculation concerning being, humanistic interest in life, and the
+self-criticism of thought, form the historical preparation for Plato,
+the philosopher who defined being as the ideal of thought, and upon this
+ground interpreted life.</p>
+
+<p>There is no more striking case in history of the subtle continuity of
+thought than the relation between Plato and his master Socrates. The
+wonder of it is due to the absence of any formulation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326"></a>[<a href="./images/326.png">326</a>]</span>of doctrine on
+the part of Socrates himself. He only lived and talked; and yet Plato
+created a system of philosophy in which he is faithfully embodied. The
+form of embodiment is the dialogue, in which the talking of Socrates is
+perpetuated and conducted to profounder issues, and in which his life is
+both rendered and interpreted. But as the vehicle of Plato's thought
+preserves and makes perfect the Socratic method, so the thought itself
+begins with the Socratic motive and remains to the end an expression of
+it. The presentiment of perfect knowledge which distinguished Socrates
+from his contemporaries becomes in Plato the clear vision of a realm of
+ideal truth.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_160" id="Section_160">160</a>. Plato begins his philosophy with the philosopher and the
+philosopher's interest. The philosopher is a lover, who like all lovers
+longs for the beautiful. But he is the supreme lover, for he loves not
+the individual beautiful object but the Absolute Beauty itself. He is a
+lover too in that he does not possess, but somehow apprehends his object
+from afar. Though imperfect, he seeks perfection; though standing like
+all his fellows in the twilight of half-reality, he faces toward the
+sun. Now it is the fundamental proposition of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327"></a>[<a href="./images/327.png">327</a>]</span>Platonic philosophy
+that reality is the sun itself, or the perfection whose possession every
+wise thinker covets, whose presence would satisfy every longing of
+experience. The real is that beloved object which is "truly beautiful,
+delicate, perfect, and blessed." There is both a serious ground for such
+an affirmation and an important truth in its meaning. The ground is the
+evident incompleteness of every special judgment concerning experience.
+We understand only in part, and we know that we understand only in part.
+What we discover is real enough for practical purposes, but even
+common-sense questions the true reality of its objects. Special
+judgments seem to terminate our thought abruptly and arbitrarily. We
+give "the best answer we can," but such answers do not come as the
+completion of our thinking. Our thought is in some sense surely a
+seeking, and it would appear that we are not permitted to rest and be
+satisfied at any stage of it. If we do so we are like the
+sophists&mdash;blind to our own ignorance. But it is equally true that our
+thought is straightforward and progressive. We are not permitted to
+return to earlier stages, but must push on to that which is not less,
+but more, than what we have as yet found. There is good hope, then, of
+understanding what <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328"></a>[<a href="./images/328.png">328</a>]</span>the ideal may be from our knowledge of the direction
+which it impels us to follow.</p>
+
+<p>But to understand Plato's conception of the progression of experience we
+must again catch up the Socratic strain which he weaves into every
+theme. For Socrates, student of life and mankind, all objects were
+objects of interest, and all interests practical interests. One is
+ignorant when one does not know the good of things; opinionative when
+one rates things by conventional standards; wise when one knows their
+real good. In Platonism this practical interpretation of experience
+appears in the principle that the object of perfect knowledge is <i>the
+good</i>. The nature of things which one seeks to know better is the good
+of things, the absolute being which is the goal of all thinking is the
+very good itself. Plato does not use the term good in any merely
+utilitarian sense. Indeed it is very significant that for Plato there is
+no cleavage between theoretical and practical interests. To be morally
+good is to know the good, to set one's heart on the true object of
+affection; and to be theoretically sound is to understand perfection.
+The good itself is the end of every aim, that in which all interests
+converge. Hence it cannot be defined, as might a special good, in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329"></a>[<a href="./images/329.png">329</a>]</span>terms
+of the fulfilment of a set of concrete conditions, but only in terms of
+the sense or direction of all purposes. The following passage occurs in
+the "Symposium":</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The true order of going or being led by others to the things
+of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which
+he mounts upward for the sake of that other beauty, going from
+one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair
+forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions,
+until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute
+beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty
+is."<a name="FNanchor_329:8_152" id="FNanchor_329:8_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_329:8_152" class="fnanchor">[329:8]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Progression of Experience toward God.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_161" id="Section_161">161</a>. There is, then, a "true order of going," and an order that leads
+from one to many, from thence to forms, from thence to morality, and
+from thence to the general objects of thought or <i>the ideas</i>. In the
+"Republic," where the proper education of the philosopher is in
+question, it is proposed that he shall study arithmetic, geometry,
+astronomy, and dialectic. Thus in each case mathematics is the first
+advance in knowledge, and dialectic the nearest to perfection. Most of
+Plato's examples are drawn from mathematics. This science replaces the
+variety and vagueness of the forms of experience with <i>clear</i>,
+<i>unitary</i>, <i>definite</i>, and <i>eternal</i> natures, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330"></a>[<a href="./images/330.png">330</a>]</span>such as the number and
+the geometrical figure. Thus certain individual things are approximately
+triangular, but subject to alteration, and indefinitely many. On the
+other hand the triangle as defined by geometry is the fixed and
+unequivocal nature or idea which such experiences suggest; and the
+philosophical mind will at once pass to it from these. But the
+mathematical objects are themselves not thoroughly understood when
+understood only in mathematical terms, for the foundations of
+mathematics are arbitrary. And the same is true of all the so-called
+special sciences. Even the scientists themselves, says Plato,</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"only dream about being, but never can behold the waking
+reality so long as they leave the hypotheses they use
+unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For
+when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the
+conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of
+he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a conventional
+statement will ever become science?"<a name="FNanchor_330:9_153" id="FNanchor_330:9_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_330:9_153" class="fnanchor">[330:9]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Within the science of dialectics we are to understand the connections
+and sequences of ideas themselves, in the hope of eliminating every
+arbitrariness and conventionality within a system of truth that is pure
+and self-luminous rationality. To <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331"></a>[<a href="./images/331.png">331</a>]</span>this science, which is the great
+interest of his later years, Plato contributes only incomplete studies
+and experiments. We must be satisfied with the playful answer with
+which, in the "Republic," he replies to Glaucon's entreaty that "he
+proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain, and
+describe that in like manner": "Dear Glaucon, you will not be able to
+follow me here, though I would do my best."</p>
+
+<p>But a philosophical system has been projected. The real is that perfect
+significance or meaning which thought and every interest suggests, and
+toward which there is in experience an appreciable movement. It is this
+significance which makes things what they really are, and which
+constitutes our understanding of them. In itself it transcends the steps
+which lead to it; "for God," says Plato, "mingles not with men." But it
+is nevertheless the meaning of human life. And this we can readily
+conceive. The last word may transform the sentence from nonsense into
+sense, and it would be true to say that its sense mingles not with
+nonsense. Similarly the last touch of the brush may transform an
+inchoate mass of color into a picture, disarray into an object of
+beauty; and its beauty mingles not with ugliness. So life, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332"></a>[<a href="./images/332.png">332</a>]</span>when it
+finally realizes itself, obtains a new and incommensurable quality of
+perfection in which humanity is transformed into deity. There is frankly
+no provision for imperfection in such a world. In his later writings
+Plato sounds his characteristic note less frequently, and permits the
+ideal to create a cosmos through the admixture of matter. But in his
+moment of inspiration, the Platonist will have no sense for the
+imperfect. It is the darkness behind his back, or the twilight through
+which he passes on his way to the light. He will use even the beauties
+of earth only "as steps along which he mounts upward for the sake of
+that other beauty."</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to
+Platonism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_162" id="Section_162">162</a>. We have met, then, with two distinct philosophical doctrines
+which arise from the conception of the <i>absolute</i>, or the philosopher's
+peculiar object: the doctrine of the <i>absolute being</i> or <i>substance</i>,
+and that of the <i>absolute ideal</i> or <i>good</i>. Both doctrines are realistic
+in that they assume reality to be demonstrated or revealed, rather than
+created, by knowledge. Both are rationalistic in that they develop a
+system of philosophy from the problem of philosophy, or deduce a
+definition of reality <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333"></a>[<a href="./images/333.png">333</a>]</span>from the conception, of reality. There remains a
+third doctrine of the same type&mdash;the philosophy of Aristotle, the most
+elaborately constructed system of Greek antiquity, and the most potent
+influence exerted upon the Scholastic Philosophy of the long medi&aelig;val
+period. This philosophy was rehabilitated in the eighteenth century by
+Leibniz, the brilliant librarian of the court of Hanover. The
+extraordinary comprehensiveness of Aristotle's philosophy makes it quite
+impossible to render here even a general account of it. There is
+scarcely any human discipline that does not to some extent draw upon it.
+We are concerned only with the central principles of the metaphysics.</p>
+
+<p>Upon the common ground of rationalism and realism, Plato and Aristotle
+are complementary in temper, method, and principle. Plato's is the
+genius of inspiration and fertility, Aristotle's the genius of
+erudition, mastery, and synthesis. In form, Plato's is the gift of
+expression, Aristotle's the gift of arrangement. Plato was born and bred
+an aristocrat, and became the lover of the best&mdash;the uncompromising
+purist; Aristotle is middle-class, and limitlessly wide, hospitable, and
+patient in his interests. Thus while both are speculative and acute,
+Plato's mind is intensive <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334"></a>[<a href="./images/334.png">334</a>]</span>and profound, Aristotle's extensive and
+orderly. It was inevitable, then, that Aristotle should find Plato
+one-sided. The philosophy of the ideal is not worldly enough to be true.
+It is a religion rather than a theory of reality. Aristotle, however,
+would not renounce it, but construe it that it may better provide for
+nature and history. This is the significance of his new terminology.
+Matter, to which Plato reluctantly concedes some room as a principle of
+degradation in the universe, is now admitted to good standing. <i>Matter</i>
+or material is indispensable to being as its potentiality or that out of
+which it is constituted. The ideal, on the other hand, loses its
+exclusive title to the predicate of reality, and becomes the <i>form</i>, or
+the determinate nature which exists only in its particular embodiments.
+The being or <i>substance</i> is the concrete individual, of which these are
+the abstracted aspects. Aristotle's "form," like Plato's "idea," is a
+teleological principle. The essential nature of the object is its
+perfection. It is furthermore essential to the object that it should
+strive after a higher perfection. With Aristotle, however, the reality
+is not the consummation of the process, the highest perfection in and
+for itself, but the very hierarchy of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335"></a>[<a href="./images/335.png">335</a>]</span>objects that ascends toward it.
+The highest perfection, or God, is not itself coextensive with being,
+but the final cause of being&mdash;that on account of which the whole
+progression of events takes place. Reality is the development with all
+of its ascending stages from the maximum of potentiality, or matter, to
+the maximum of actuality, or God the pure form.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of Platonism
+and Spinozism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_163" id="Section_163">163</a>. To understand the virtue of this philosophy as a basis for the
+reconciliation of different interests, we must recall the relation
+between Plato and Spinoza. Their characteristic difference appears to
+the best advantage in connection with mathematical truth. Both regarded
+geometry as the best model for philosophical thinking, but for different
+reasons. Spinoza prized geometry for its necessity, and proposed to
+extend it. His philosophy is the attempt to formulate a geometry of
+being, which shall set forth the inevitable certainties of the universe.
+Plato, on the other hand, prized geometry rather for its definition of
+types, for its knowledge of pure or perfect natures such as the circle
+and triangle, which in immediate experience are only approximated. His
+philosophy defines reality similarly as the absolute <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336"></a>[<a href="./images/336.png">336</a>]</span>perfection.
+Applied to nature Spinozism is mechanical, and looks for necessary laws,
+while Platonism is teleological, and looks for adaptation and
+significance. Aristotle's position is intermediate. With Plato he
+affirms that the good is the ultimate principle. But this very principle
+is conceived to govern a universe of substances, each of which maintains
+its own proper being, and all of which are reciprocally determined in
+their changes. Final causes dominate nature, but work through efficient
+causes. Reality is not pure perfection, as in Platonism, nor the
+indifferent necessity, as in Spinozism, but the system of beings
+necessary to the complete progression toward the highest perfection. The
+Aristotelian philosophy promises, then, to overcome both the hard
+realism of Parmenides and Spinoza, and also the supernaturalism of
+Plato.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development to the
+Problem of Imperfection.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_164" id="Section_164">164</a>. But it promises, furthermore, to remedy the defect common to
+these two doctrines, the very besetting problem of this whole type of
+philosophy. That problem, as has been seen, is to provide for the
+imperfect within the perfect, for the temporal incidents of nature and
+history within the eternal being. Many absolutist philosophers have
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337"></a>[<a href="./images/337.png">337</a>]</span>declared the explanation of this realm to be impossible, and have
+contented themselves with calling it the realm of opinion or appearance.
+And this realm of opinion or appearance has been used as a proof of the
+absolute. Zeno, the pupil of Parmenides, was the first to elaborate what
+have since come to be known as the paradoxes of the empirical world.
+Most of these paradoxes turn upon the infinite extension and
+divisibility of space and time. Zeno was especially interested in the
+difficulty of conceiving motion, which involves both space and time, and
+thought himself to have demonstrated its absurdity and
+impossibility.<a name="FNanchor_337:10_154" id="FNanchor_337:10_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_337:10_154" class="fnanchor">[337:10]</a> His argument is thus the complement of
+Parmenides's argument for the indivisible and unchanging substance. Now
+the method which Zeno here adopts may be extended to cover the whole
+realm of nature and history. We should then be dialectically driven from
+this realm to take refuge in absolute being. But the empirical world is
+not destroyed by disparagement, and cannot long lack champions even
+among the absolutists themselves. The reconciliation of nature and
+history with the absolute being became the special interest of Leibniz,
+the great modern Aristotelian. As a scientist and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338"></a>[<a href="./images/338.png">338</a>]</span>man of affairs, he
+was profoundly dissatisfied with Spinoza's resolution of nature, the
+human individual, and the human society into the universal being. He
+became an advocate of individualism while retaining the general aim and
+method of rationalism.</p>
+
+<p>Like Aristotle, Leibniz attributes reality to individual substances,
+which he calls "monads"; and like Aristotle he conceives these monads to
+compose an ascending order, with God, the monad of monads, as its
+dominating goal.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Furthermore, every substance is like an entire world and like
+a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole world which it
+portrays, each one in its own fashion; almost as the same city
+is variously represented according to the various situations
+of him who is regarding it. Thus the universe is multiplied in
+some sort as many times as there are substances, and the glory
+of God is multiplied in the same way by as many wholly
+different representations of his works."<a name="FNanchor_338:11_155" id="FNanchor_338:11_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_338:11_155" class="fnanchor">[338:11]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The very "glory of God," then, requires the innumerable finite
+individuals with all their characteristic imperfections, that the
+universe may lack no possible shade or quality of perspective.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_165" id="Section_165">165</a>. But the besetting problem is in fact not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339"></a>[<a href="./images/339.png">339</a>]</span>solved, and is one of
+the chief incentives to that other philosophy of absolutism which
+defines an absolute spirit or mind. Both Aristotle and Leibniz undertake
+to make the perfection which determines the order of the hierarchy of
+substances, at the same time the responsible author of the whole
+hierarchy. In this case the dilemma is plain. If the divine form or the
+divine monad be other than the stages that lead up to it, these latter
+cannot be essential to it, for God is by definition absolutely
+self-sufficient. If, on the other hand, God is identical with the
+development in its entirety, then two quite incommensurable standards of
+perfection determine the supremacy of the divine nature, that of the
+whole and that of the highest parts of the whole. The union of these two
+and the definition of a perfection which may be at once the development
+and its goal, is the task of absolute idealism.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_166" id="Section_166">166</a>. Of the two fundamental questions of epistemology, absolute
+realism answers the one explicitly, the other implicitly. As respects
+<i>the source of the most valid knowledge</i>, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle,
+Spinoza are all agreed: true knowledge is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340"></a>[<a href="./images/340.png">340</a>]</span>the work of reason, of pure
+intellection. Plato is the great exponent of dialectic, or the
+reciprocal affinities and necessities of ideas. Aristotle is the founder
+of deductive logic. Spinoza proposes to consider even "human actions and
+desires" as though he were "concerned with lines, planes, and solids."
+Empirical data may be the occasion, but cannot be the ground of the
+highest knowledge. According to Leibniz,</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"it seems that necessary truths, such as we find in pure
+mathematics, and especially in arithmetic and geometry, must
+have principles whose proof does not depend upon instances,
+nor, consequently, upon the witness of the senses, although
+without the senses it would never have come into our heads to
+think of them."<a name="FNanchor_340:12_156" id="FNanchor_340:12_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_340:12_156" class="fnanchor">[340:12]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute Realism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_167" id="Section_167">167</a>. The answers which these philosophies give to the question of <i>the
+relation between the state of knowledge and its object</i>, divide them
+into two groups. Among the ancients reason is regarded as the means of
+emancipation from the limitations of the private mind. "The sleeping
+turn aside each into a world of his own," but "the waking"&mdash;the wise
+men&mdash;"have one and the same world." What the individual knows belongs to
+himself only in so <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341"></a>[<a href="./images/341.png">341</a>]</span>far as it is inadequate. Hence for Plato the ideas
+are not the attributes of a mind, but that self-subsistent truth to
+which, in its moments of insight, a mind may have access. Opinion is "my
+own," the truth is being. The position of Aristotle is equally clear.
+"Actual knowledge," he maintains, "is identical with its object."</p>
+
+<p>Spinoza and Leibniz belong to another age. Modern philosophy began with
+a new emphasis upon self-consciousness. In his celebrated argument&mdash;"I
+think, hence I am" (<i>cogito ergo sum</i>)&mdash;Descartes established the
+independent and substantial reality of the thinking activity. The "I
+think" is recognized as in itself a fundamental being, known intuitively
+to the thinker himself. Now although Spinoza and Leibniz are finally
+determined by the same motives that obtain in the cases of Plato and
+Aristotle, they must reckon with this new distinction between the
+thinker and his object. The result in the case of Spinoza is the
+doctrine of "parallelism," in which mind is defined as an "infinite
+attribute" of substance, an aspect or phase coextensive with the whole
+of being. The result in the case of Leibniz is his doctrine of
+"representation" and "pre&euml;stablished harmony," whereby each monadic
+substance is in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342"></a>[<a href="./images/342.png">342</a>]</span>itself an active spiritual entity, and belongs to the
+universe through its knowledge of a specific stage of the development of
+the universe. But both Spinoza and Leibniz subordinate such conceptions
+as these to the fundamental identity that pervades the whole. With
+Spinoza the attributes belong to the same absolute substance, and with
+Leibniz the monads represent the one universe. And with both, finally,
+the perfection of knowledge, or the knowledge of God, is
+indistinguishable from its object, God himself. The epistemological
+subtleties peculiar to these philosophers are not stable doctrines, but
+render inevitable either a return to the simpler and bolder realism of
+the Greeks, or a passing over into the more radical and systematic
+doctrine of absolute idealism.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_168" id="Section_168">168</a>. We have met with two general motives, both of which are
+subordinated to the doctrine of an absolute being postulated and sought
+by philosophy. The one of these motives leads to the conception of the
+absolutely necessary and immutable substance, the other to the
+conception of a consummate perfection. There is an <i>interpretation of
+life</i> appropriate to each of these conceptions. Both agree in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343"></a>[<a href="./images/343.png">343</a>]</span>regarding
+life seriously, in defining reason or philosophy as the highest human
+activity, and in emphasizing the identity of the individual's good with
+the good of the universe. But there are striking differences of tone and
+spirit.</p>
+
+<p>Although the metaphysics of the Stoics have various affiliations, the
+Stoic code of morality is the true practical sequel to the
+Eleatic-Spinozistic view of the world. The Stoic is one who has set his
+affections on the eternal being. He asks nothing of it for himself, but
+identifies himself with it. The saving grace is a sense of reality. The
+virtuous man is not one who remakes the world, or draws upon it for his
+private uses; even less one who rails against it, or complains that it
+has used him ill. He is rather one who recognizes that there is but one
+really valid claim, that of the universe itself. But he not only submits
+to this claim on account of its superiority; he makes it his own. The
+discipline of Stoicism is the regulation of the individual will to the
+end that it may coincide with the universal will. There is a part of man
+by virtue of which he is satisfied with what things are, whatever they
+be. That part, designated by the Stoics as "the ruling part," is the
+reason. In so far as man seeks to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344"></a>[<a href="./images/344.png">344</a>]</span>understand the laws and natures which
+actually prevail, he cannot be discontented with anything whatsoever
+that may be known to him.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire
+anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute
+acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true:
+wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these
+things, the endeavor of the better part of ourselves is in
+harmony with the order of nature as a whole."<a name="FNanchor_344:13_157" id="FNanchor_344:13_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_344:13_157" class="fnanchor">[344:13]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>In agreement with this teaching of Spinoza's is the famous Stoic formula
+to the effect that "nothing can happen contrary to the will of the wise
+man," who is free through his very acquiescence. If reason be the proper
+"ruling part," the first step in the moral life is the subordination of
+the appetitive nature and the enthronement of reason. One who is himself
+rational will then recognize the fellowship of all rational beings, and
+the unitary and beneficent rationality of the entire universe. The
+highest morality is thus already upon the plane of religion.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Platonic Ethics of Perfection.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_169" id="Section_169">169</a>. With Spinoza and the Stoics, the perfection of the individual is
+reduced to what the universe requires of him. The good man is willing to
+be whatever he must <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345"></a>[<a href="./images/345.png">345</a>]</span>be, for the sake of the whole with which through
+reason he is enabled to identify himself. With Plato and Aristotle the
+perfection of the individual himself is commended, that the universe may
+abound in perfection. The good man is the ideal man&mdash;the expression of
+the type. And how different the quality of a morality in keeping with
+this principle! The virtues which Plato enumerates&mdash;temperance, courage,
+wisdom, and justice&mdash;compose a consummate human nature. He is thinking
+not of the necessities but of the possibilities of life. Knowledge of
+the truth will indeed be the best of human living, but knowledge is not
+prized because it can reconcile man to his limitations; it is the very
+overflowing of his cup of life. The youth are to</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"dwell in the land of health, amid fair sights and sounds; and
+beauty, the effluence of fair works, will visit the eye and
+ear, like a healthful breeze from a purer region, and
+insensibly draw the soul even in childhood into harmony with
+the beauty of reason."<a name="FNanchor_345:14_158" id="FNanchor_345:14_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_345:14_158" class="fnanchor">[345:14]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Aristotle's account of human perfection is more circumstantial and more
+prosaic. "The function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with
+reason," and his happiness or well-being will <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346"></a>[<a href="./images/346.png">346</a>]</span>consist in the fulness of
+rational living. But such fulness requires a sphere of life that will
+call forth and exercise the highest human capacities. Aristotle frankly
+pronounces "external goods" to be indispensable, and happiness to be
+therefore "a gift of the gods." The rational man will acquire a certain
+exquisiteness or finesse of action, a "mean" of conduct; and this virtue
+will be diversified through the various relations into which he must
+enter, and the different situations which he must meet. He will be not
+merely brave, temperate, and just, as Plato would have him, but liberal,
+magnificent, gentle, truthful, witty, friendly, and in all
+self-respecting or high-minded. In addition to these strictly moral
+virtues, he will possess the intellectual virtues of prudence and
+wisdom, the resources of art and science; and will finally possess the
+gift of insight, or intuitive reason. Speculation will be his highest
+activity, and the mark of his kinship with the gods who dwell in the
+perpetual contemplation of the truth.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Religion of Fulfilment, and the Religion of
+Renunciation.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_170" id="Section_170">170</a>. Aristotle's ethics expresses the buoyancy of the ancient world,
+when the individual does not feel himself oppressed by the eternal
+reality, but rejoices in it. He is not too conscious of his sufferings
+to be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347"></a>[<a href="./images/347.png">347</a>]</span>disinterested in his admiration and wonder. It is this which
+distinguishes the religion of Plato and Aristotle from that of the
+Stoics and Spinoza. With both alike, religion consists not in making the
+world, but in contemplating it; not in co&ouml;perating with God, but in
+worshipping him. Plato and Aristotle, however, do not find any
+antagonism between the ways of God and the natural interests of men. God
+does not differ from men save in his exalted perfection. The
+contemplation and worship of him comes as the final and highest stage of
+a life which is organic and continuous throughout. The love of God is
+the natural love when it has found its true object.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"For he who has been instructed thus far in the things of
+love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order
+and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly
+perceive a nature of wondrous beauty&mdash;and this, Socrates, is
+that final cause of all our former toils, which in the first
+place is everlasting&mdash;not growing and decaying, or waxing and
+waning; in the next place not fair in one point of view and
+foul in another, .&nbsp;.&nbsp;. or in the likeness of a face or hands or
+any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech
+or knowledge, nor existing in any other being; .&nbsp;.&nbsp;. but beauty
+only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which
+without diminution and without increase, or any change, is
+imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all
+other things."<a name="FNanchor_347:15_159" id="FNanchor_347:15_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_347:15_159" class="fnanchor">[347:15]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348"></a>[<a href="./images/348.png">348</a>]</span>The religion of Spinoza is the religion of one who has renounced the
+favor of the universe. He was deprived early in life of every benefit of
+fortune, and set out to find the good which required no special
+dispensation but only the common lot and the common human endowment. He
+found that good to consist in the conviction of the necessity, made
+acceptable through the supremacy of the understanding. The like faith of
+the Stoics makes of no account the difference of fortune between Marcus
+the emperor and Epictetus the slave.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"For two reasons, then, it is right to be content with that
+which happens to thee; the one because it was done for thee
+and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to
+thee, originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy
+destiny; and the other because even that which comes severally
+to every man is to the power which administers the universe a
+cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its very
+continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if
+thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and
+the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou
+dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art
+dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of
+the way."<a name="FNanchor_348:16_160" id="FNanchor_348:16_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_348:16_160" class="fnanchor">[348:16]</a></p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_306:1_145" id="Footnote_306:1_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_306:1_145"><span class="label">[306:1]</span></a> By <i>Absolute Realism</i> is meant that system of
+philosophy which defines the universe as the <i>absolute being</i>, implied
+in knowledge as its final object, but assumed to be independent of
+knowledge. In the <i>Spinozistic</i> system this absolute being is conceived
+under the form of <i>substance</i>, or self-sufficiency; in <i>Platonism</i> under
+the form of <i>perfection</i>; and in the <i>Aristotelian</i> system under the
+form of a <i>hierarchy of substances</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_308:2_146" id="Footnote_308:2_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_308:2_146"><span class="label">[308:2]</span></a> Burnet: <i>Early Greek Philosophy</i>, p. 185.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_309:3_147" id="Footnote_309:3_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_309:3_147"><span class="label">[309:3]</span></a> When contrasted with the temporal realm of "generation
+and decay," this ultimate object is often called the <i>eternal</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_311:4_148" id="Footnote_311:4_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_311:4_148"><span class="label">[311:4]</span></a> Holland, 1632-1677.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_312:5_149" id="Footnote_312:5_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_312:5_149"><span class="label">[312:5]</span></a> Spinoza: <i>Ethics</i>, Part I. Translation by Elwes, p.
+45.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_314:6_150" id="Footnote_314:6_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_314:6_150"><span class="label">[314:6]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 49.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_318:7_151" id="Footnote_318:7_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_318:7_151"><span class="label">[318:7]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 77, 81.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_329:8_152" id="Footnote_329:8_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_329:8_152"><span class="label">[329:8]</span></a> Plato: <i>Symposium</i>, 211. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_330:9_153" id="Footnote_330:9_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_330:9_153"><span class="label">[330:9]</span></a> Plato: <i>Republic</i>, 533. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_337:10_154" id="Footnote_337:10_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_337:10_154"><span class="label">[337:10]</span></a> See Burnet: <i>Op. cit.</i>, pp. 322-333.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_338:11_155" id="Footnote_338:11_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_338:11_155"><span class="label">[338:11]</span></a> Leibniz: <i>Discourse on Metaphysics</i>. Translation by
+Montgomery, p. 15.
+
+In so far as the monads are spiritual this doctrine tends to be
+subjectivistic. Cf. <a href="#Chap_IX">Chap. IX</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_340:12_156" id="Footnote_340:12_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_340:12_156"><span class="label">[340:12]</span></a> Leibniz: <i>New Essays on the Human Understanding</i>.
+Translation by Latta, p. 363.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_344:13_157" id="Footnote_344:13_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_344:13_157"><span class="label">[344:13]</span></a> Spinoza: <i>Op. cit.</i>, Part IV. Translation by Elwes, p.
+243.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_345:14_158" id="Footnote_345:14_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_345:14_158"><span class="label">[345:14]</span></a> Plato: <i>Op. cit.</i>, 401.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_347:15_159" id="Footnote_347:15_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_347:15_159"><span class="label">[347:15]</span></a> Plato: <i>Symposium</i>, 210-211. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_348:16_160" id="Footnote_348:16_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_348:16_160"><span class="label">[348:16]</span></a> Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: <i>Thoughts</i>. Translation by
+Long, p. 141.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349"></a>[<a href="./images/349.png">349</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_XI" id="Chap_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI</h2>
+
+<h3>ABSOLUTE IDEALISM<a name="FNanchor_349:1_161" id="FNanchor_349:1_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_349:1_161" class="fnanchor" style="font-weight: normal; font-size: 80%;">[349:1]</a></h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_171" id="Section_171">171</a>. Absolute idealism is the most elaborately constructive of all the
+historical types of philosophy. Though it may have overlooked elementary
+truths, and have sought to combine irreconcilable principles, it cannot
+be charged with lack of sophistication or subtlety. Its great virtue is
+its recognition of problems&mdash;its exceeding circumspection; while its
+great promise is due to its comprehensiveness&mdash;its generous provision
+for all interests and points of view. But its very breadth and
+complexity render this philosophy peculiarly liable to the equivocal use
+of conceptions. This may be readily understood from the nature of the
+central doctrine of absolute idealism. According to this doctrine it is
+proposed to define the universe as an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350"></a>[<a href="./images/350.png">350</a>]</span><i>absolute spirit</i>; or a being
+infinite, ultimate, eternal, and self-sufficient, like the being of
+Plato and Spinoza, but possessing at the same time the distinguishing
+properties of spirit. Such conceptions as self-consciousness, will,
+knowledge, and moral goodness are carried over from the realm of human
+endeavor and social relations to the unitary and all-inclusive reality.
+Now it has been objected that this procedure is either meaningless, in
+that it so applies the term spirit as to contradict its meaning; or
+prejudicial to spiritual interests, in that it neutralizes the
+properties of spirit through so extending their use. Thus one may
+contend that to affirm that the universe as a whole is spirit is
+meaningless, since moral goodness requires special conditions and
+relations that cannot be attributed to the universe as a whole; or one
+may contend that such doctrine is prejudicial to moral interests because
+by attributing spiritual perfection to the totality of being it
+discredits all moral loyalties and antagonisms. The difficulties that
+lie in the way of absolute idealism are due, then, to the complexity of
+its synthesis, to its complementary recognition of differences and
+resolution of them into unity. But this synthesis is due to the urgency
+of certain great problems which the first <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351"></a>[<a href="./images/351.png">351</a>]</span>or realistic expression of
+the absolutist motive left undiscovered and unsolved.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_172" id="Section_172">172</a>. It is natural to approach so deliberate and calculating a
+philosophy from the stand-point of the problems which it proposes to
+solve. One of these is the epistemological problem of the relation
+between the state of knowledge and its object. Naturalism and absolute
+realism side with common-sense in its assumption that although the real
+object is essential to the valid state of knowledge, its being known is
+not essential to the real object. Subjectivism, on the other hand,
+maintains that being is essentially the content of a knowing state, or
+an activity of the knower himself. Absolute idealism proposes to accept
+the general epistemological principle of subjectivism; but to satisfy
+the realistic demand for a standard, compelling object, by setting up an
+<i>absolute knower</i>, with whom all valid knowledge must be in agreement.
+This epistemological statement of absolute idealism is its most mature
+phase; and the culminating phase, in which it shows unmistakable signs
+of passing over into another doctrine. We must look for its pristine
+inspiration in its solution of another fundamental problem: that of the
+relation between the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352"></a>[<a href="./images/352.png">352</a>]</span>absolute and the empirical. Like absolute realism,
+this philosophy regards the universe as a unitary and internally
+necessary being, and undertakes to hold that being accountable for every
+item of experience. But we have found that absolute realism is beset
+with the difficulty of thus accounting for the fragmentariness and
+isolation of the individual. The contention that the universe must
+really be a rational or perfect unity is disputed by the evident
+multiplicity, irrelevance, and imperfection in the foreground of
+experience. The inference to perfection and the confession of
+imperfection seem equally unavoidable. Rational necessities and
+empirical facts are out of joint.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The Task of
+the New Absolutism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_173" id="Section_173">173</a>. Even Plato had been conscious of a certain responsibility for
+matters of fact. Inasmuch as he attached the predicate of reality to the
+absolute perfection, he made that being the only source to which they
+could be referred. Perhaps, then, he suggests, they are due to the very
+bounteousness of God.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"He was good, and no goodness can ever have any jealousy of
+anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all
+things should be as like himself as possible."<a name="FNanchor_352:2_162" id="FNanchor_352:2_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_352:2_162" class="fnanchor">[352:2]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353"></a>[<a href="./images/353.png">353</a>]</span>Plotinus, in whom Platonism is leavened by the spirit of an age which
+is convinced of sin, and which is therefore more keenly aware of the
+positive existence of the imperfect, follows out this suggestion.
+Creation is "emanation"&mdash;the overflow of God's excess of goodness. But
+one does not readily understand how goodness, desiring all things to be
+like itself, should thereupon create evil&mdash;even to make it good. The
+Aristotelian philosophy, with its conception of the gradation of
+substances, would seem to be better equipped to meet the difficulty. A
+development requires stages; and every finite thing may thus be perfect
+in its way and perfect in its place, while in the absolute truth or God
+there is realized the meaning of the whole order. But if so, there is
+evidently something that escapes God, to wit, the meaningless and
+unfitness, the error and evil, of the stages in their successive
+isolation. Nor is it of any avail to insist (as did Plato, Aristotle,
+and Spinoza alike) that these are only privation, and therefore not to
+be counted in the sum of reality. For privation is itself an experience,
+with a great variety of implications, moral and psychological; and these
+cannot be attributed to God or deduced from him, in consideration of his
+absolute perfection.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354"></a>[<a href="./images/354.png">354</a>]</span>The task of the new absolutism is now in clear view. The perfect must
+be amended to admit the imperfect. The absolute significance must be so
+construed as to provide for the evident facts; for the unmeaning things
+and changes of the natural order; for ignorance, sin, despair, and every
+human deficiency. The new philosophy is to solve this problem by
+defining a <i>spiritual absolute</i>, and by so construing the life or
+dynamics of spirit, as to demonstrate the necessity of the very
+imperfection and opposition which is so baffling to the realist.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis of
+Experience.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_174" id="Section_174">174</a>. Absolute idealism, which is essentially a modern doctrine, does
+not begin with rhapsodies, but with a very sober analysis of familiar
+truths, conducted by the most sober of all philosophers, Immanuel Kant.
+This philosopher lived in K&ouml;nigsberg, Germany, at the close of the
+eighteenth century. He is related to absolute idealism much as Socrates
+is related to Platonism: he was not himself speculative, but employed a
+critical method which was transformed by his followers into a
+metaphysical construction. It is essential to the understanding both of
+Kant and of his more speculative successors, to observe that he begins
+with the recognition of certain non-philosophical truths<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355"></a>[<a href="./images/355.png">355</a>]</span>&mdash;those of
+<i>natural science</i> and <i>the moral consciousness</i>. He accepts the order of
+nature formulated in the Newtonian dynamics, and the moral order
+acknowledged in the common human conviction of duty. And he is
+interested in discovering the ground upon which these common
+affirmations rest, the structure which virtually supports them as types
+of knowledge. But a general importance attaches to the analysis because
+these two types of knowledge (together with the &aelig;sthetic judgment, which
+is similarly analyzed) are regarded by Kant as coextensive with
+experience itself. The <i>very least experience</i> that can be reported upon
+at all is an experience of nature or duty, and as such will be informed
+with their characteristic principles. Let us consider the former type.
+The simplest instance of nature is the experience of the single
+perceived object. In the first place, such an object will be perceived
+as in space and time. These Kant calls the <i>forms of intuition</i>. An
+object cannot even be presented or given without them. But, furthermore,
+it will be regarded as substance, that is, as having a substratum that
+persists through changes of position or quality. It will also be
+regarded as causally dependent upon other objects like itself.
+Causality, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356"></a>[<a href="./images/356.png">356</a>]</span>substance, and like principles to the number of twelve, Kant
+calls the <i>categories of the understanding</i>. Both intuition and
+understanding are indispensable to the experience of any object
+whatsoever. They may be said to condition the object in general. Their
+principles condition the process of making something out of the manifold
+of sensation. But similarly, every moral experience recognizes what Kant
+calls <i>the categorical imperative</i>. The categorical imperative is the
+law of reasonableness or impartiality in conduct, requiring the
+individual to act on a maxim which he can "will to be law universal." No
+state of desire or situation calling for action means anything morally
+except in the light of this obligation. Thus certain principles of
+thought and action are said to be implicit in all experience. They are
+universal and necessary in the sense that they are discovered as the
+conditions not of any particular experience, but of experience in
+general. This implicit or virtual presence in experience in general,
+Kant calls their transcendental character, and the process of
+explicating them is his famous <i>Transcendental Deduction</i>.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which they
+Set in Order.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_175" id="Section_175">175</a>. The restriction which Kant puts upon his method is quite
+essential to its meaning. I <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357"></a>[<a href="./images/357.png">357</a>]</span>deduce the categories, for example, just in
+so far as I find them to be necessary to perception. Without them my
+perception is blind, I make nothing of it; with them my experience
+becomes systematic and rational. But categories which I so deduce must
+be forever limited to the r&ocirc;le for which they are defined. Categories
+without perceptions are "empty"; they have validity solely with
+reference to the experience which they set in order. Indeed, I cannot
+even complete that order. The orderly arrangement of parts of experience
+suggests, and suggests irresistibly, a perfect system. I can even define
+the ideas and ideals through which such a perfect system might be
+realized. But I cannot in the Kantian sense attach reality to it because
+it is not indispensable to experience. It must remain an ideal which
+regulates my thinking of such parts of it as fall within the range of my
+perception; or it may through my moral nature become the realm of my
+living and an object of faith. In short, Kant's is essentially a
+"critical philosophy," a logical and analytical study of the special
+terms and relations of human knowledge. He denies the validity of these
+terms and relations beyond this realm. His critiques are an inventory
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358"></a>[<a href="./images/358.png">358</a>]</span>of the conditions, principles, and prospects of that cognition which,
+although not alone ideally conceivable, is alone possible.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the
+Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant. The Absolute
+Spirit.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_176" id="Section_176">176</a>. With the successors of Kant, as with the successors of Socrates,
+a criticism becomes a system of metaphysics. This transformation is
+effected in the post-Kantians by <i>a generalization of the human
+cognitive consciousness</i>. According to Kant's analysis it contains a
+manifold of sense which must be organized by categories in obedience to
+the ideal of a rational universe. The whole enterprise, with its
+problems given in perception, its instruments available in the
+activities of the understanding, and its ideals revealed in the reason,
+is an organic spiritual unity, manifesting itself in the
+self-consciousness of the thinker. Now in absolute idealism this very
+enterprise of knowledge, made universal and called the <i>absolute spirit</i>
+or <i>mind</i>, is taken to be the ultimate reality. And here at length would
+seem to be afforded the conception of a being to which the problematic
+and the rational, the data and the principles, the natural and the
+ideal, are alike indispensable. We are now to seek the real not in the
+ideal itself, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359"></a>[<a href="./images/359.png">359</a>]</span>but in that spiritual unity in which appearance is the
+incentive to truth, and natural imperfection the spring to goodness.
+This may be translated into the language which Plato uses in the
+"Symposium," when Diotima is revealing to Socrates the meaning of love.
+The new reality will be not the loved one, but love itself.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"What then is Love? Is he mortal?"</p>
+
+<p>"No."</p>
+
+<p>"What then?"</p>
+
+<p>"As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal,
+but is a mean between them."</p>
+
+<p>"What is he then, Diotima?"</p>
+
+<p>"He is a great spirit, and like all that is spiritual he is
+intermediate between the divine and the mortal."<a name="FNanchor_359:3_163" id="FNanchor_359:3_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_359:3_163" class="fnanchor">[359:3]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Reality is no longer the God who mingles not with men, but that power
+which, as Diotima further says, "interprets and conveys to the gods the
+prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and rewards of
+the gods."</p>
+
+<p>In speaking for such an idealism, Emerson says:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Everything good is on the highway. The middle region of our
+being is the temperate zone. We may climb into the thin and
+cold realm of pure geometry and lifeless science, or sink into
+that of sensation. Between these extremes is the equator of
+life, of thought, of spirit, of poetry.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. The mid-world is
+best."<a name="FNanchor_359:4_164" id="FNanchor_359:4_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_359:4_164" class="fnanchor">[359:4]</a></p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360"></a>[<a href="./images/360.png">360</a>]</span>The new reality is this highway of the spirit, the very course and
+raceway of self-consciousness. It is traversed in the movement and
+self-correction of thought, in the interest in ideals, or in the
+submission of the will to the control of the moral law.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_177" id="Section_177">177</a>. It is the last of these phases of self-consciousness that Fichte,
+who was Kant's immediate successor, regards as of paramount importance.
+As Platonism began with the ideal of the good or the object of life, so
+the new idealism begins with the conviction of duty, or <i>the story of
+life</i>. Being is the living moral nature compelled to build itself a
+natural order wherein it may obey the moral law, and to divide itself
+into a community of moral selves through which the moral virtues may be
+realized. Nature and society flow from the conception of an absolute
+moral activity, or ego. Such an ego could not be pure and isolated and
+yet be moral. The evidence of this is the common moral consciousness. My
+duty compels me to act upon the not-self or environment, and to respect
+and co&ouml;perate with other selves. Fichte's absolute is this moral
+consciousness universalized and made eternal. Moral value being its
+fundamental principle the universe must on that very account <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361"></a>[<a href="./images/361.png">361</a>]</span>embrace
+both nature, or moral indifference, and humanity, or moral limitation.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_178" id="Section_178">178</a>. But the Romanticists, who followed close upon Fichte, were
+dissatisfied with so hard and exclusive a conception of spiritual being.
+Life, they said, is not all duty. Indeed, the true spiritual life is
+quite other, not harsh and constrained, but free and spontaneous&mdash;a
+wealth of feeling playing about a constantly shifting centre. Spirit is
+not consecutive and law-abiding, but capricious and wanton, seeking the
+beautiful in no orderly progression, but in a refined and versatile
+sensibility. If this be the nature of spirit, and if spirit be the
+nature of reality, then he is most wise who is most rich in sentiment.
+The Romanticists were the exponents of an absolute sentimentalism. And
+they did not prove it, but like good sentimentalists they felt it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_179" id="Section_179">179</a>. Hegel, the master of the new idealism, set himself the task of
+construing spirit in terms as consecutive as those of Fichte, and as
+comprehensive as those of the Romanticists. Like Plato, he found in
+dialectic the supreme manifestation of the spiritual life. There is a
+certain flow of ideas which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362"></a>[<a href="./images/362.png">362</a>]</span>determines the meaning of experience, and
+is the truth of truths. But the mark of the new prophet is this: the
+flow of ideas itself is <i>a process of self-correction due to a sense of
+error</i>. Thus bare sensation is abstract and bare thought is abstract.
+The real, however, is not merely the concrete in which they are united,
+but the very process in the course of which through knowledge of
+abstraction thought arrives at the concrete. The principle of negation
+is the very life of thought, and it is <i>the life of thought</i>, rather
+than the outcome of thought, which is reality. The most general form of
+the dialectical process contains three moments: the moment of <i>thesis</i>,
+in which affirmation is made; the moment of <i>antithesis</i>, in which the
+opposite asserts itself; and the moment of <i>synthesis</i>, in which a
+reconciliation is effected in a new thesis. Thus thought is the
+progressive overcoming of contradiction; not the state of freedom from
+contradiction, but the act of escaping it. Such processes are more
+familiar in the moral life. Morality consists, so even common-sense
+asserts, in the overcoming of evil. Character is the resistance of
+temptation; goodness, a growth in grace through discipline. Of such, for
+Hegel, is the very kingdom of heaven. It is the task of the philosopher,
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363"></a>[<a href="./images/363.png">363</a>]</span>a task to which Hegel applies himself most assiduously, to analyze the
+battle and the victory upon which spiritual being nourishes itself. And
+since the deeper processes are those of thought, the Hegelian philosophy
+centres in an ordering of notions, a demonstration of that necessary
+progression of thought which, in its whole dynamical logical history,
+constitutes the <i>absolute idea</i>.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_180" id="Section_180">180</a>. The Hegelian philosophy, with its emphasis upon difference,
+antagonism, and development, is peculiarly qualified to be a philosophy
+of nature and history. Those principles of spiritual development which
+logic defines are conceived as incarnate in the evolution of the world.
+Nature, as the very antithesis to spirit, is now understood to be the
+foil of spirit. In nature spirit alienates itself in order to return
+enriched. The stages of nature are the preparation for the reviving of a
+spirituality that has been deliberately forfeited. The Romanticists,
+whether philosophers like Schelling or poets like Goethe and Wordsworth,
+were led by their feeling for the beauty of nature to attribute to it a
+much deeper and more direct spiritual significance. But Hegel and the
+Romanticists alike are truly expressed in Emerson's belief that the
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364"></a>[<a href="./images/364.png">364</a>]</span>spiritual interpretation of nature is the "true science."</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The poet alone knows astronomy, chemistry, vegetation, and
+animation, for he does not stop at these facts, but employs
+them as signs. He knows why the plain or meadow of space was
+strown with these flowers we call suns and moons and stars;
+why the great deep is adorned with animals, with men, and
+gods; for in every word he speaks he rides on them as the
+horses of thought."<a name="FNanchor_364:5_165" id="FNanchor_364:5_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_364:5_165" class="fnanchor">[364:5]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The new awakening of spirit which is for Hegel the consummation of the
+natural evolution, begins with the individual or <i>subjective</i> spirit,
+and develops into the social or <i>objective</i> spirit, which is morality
+and history. History is a veritable dialectic of nations, in the course
+of which the consciousness of individual liberty is developed, and
+co&ouml;rdinated with the unity of the state. The highest stage of spirit
+incarnate is that of <i>absolute</i> spirit, embracing art, religion, and
+philosophy. In art the absolute idea obtains expression in sensuous
+existence, more perfectly in classical than in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365"></a>[<a href="./images/365.png">365</a>]</span>the symbolic art of the
+Orient, but most perfectly in the romantic art of the modern period. In
+religion the absolute idea is expressed in the imagination through
+worship. In Oriental pantheism, the individual is overwhelmed by his
+sense of the universal; in Greek religion, God is but a higher man;
+while in Christianity God and man are perfectly united in Christ.
+Finally, in philosophy the absolute idea reaches its highest possible
+expression in articulate thought.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">R&eacute;sum&eacute;. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the Problem of
+Evil.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_181" id="Section_181">181</a>. Such is absolute idealism approached from the stand-point of
+antecedent metaphysics. It is the most elaborate and subtle provision
+for antagonistic differences within unity that the speculative mind of
+man has as yet been able to make. It is the last and most thorough
+attempt to resolve individual and universal, temporal and eternal,
+natural and ideal, good and evil, into an absolute unity in which the
+universal, eternal, ideal, and good shall dominate, and in which all
+terms shall be related with such necessity as obtains in the definitions
+and theorems of geometry. There is to be some absolute meaning which is
+rational to the uttermost and the necessary ground of all the incidents
+of existence. Thought could undertake no <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366"></a>[<a href="./images/366.png">366</a>]</span>more ambitious and exacting
+task. Nor is it evident after all that absolute idealism enjoys any
+better success in this task than absolute realism. The difference
+between them becomes much less marked when we reflect that the former,
+like the latter, must reserve the predicate of being for the unity of
+the whole. Even though evil and contradiction belong to the essence of
+things, move in the secret heart of a spiritual universe, the reality is
+not these in their severalty, but that life within which they fall, the
+story within which they "earn a place." And if absolute idealism has
+defined a new perfection, it has at the same time defined a new
+imperfection. The perfection is rich in contrast, and thus inclusive of
+both the lights and shades of experience; but the perfection belongs
+only to the composition of these elements within a single view. It is
+not necessary to such perfection that the evil should ever be viewed in
+isolation. The idealist employs the analogy of the drama or the picture
+whose very significance requires the balance of opposing forces; or the
+analogy of the symphony in which a higher musical quality is realized
+through the resolution of discord into harmony. But none of these
+unities requires any element whatsoever that does not partake of its
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367"></a>[<a href="./images/367.png">367</a>]</span>beauty. It is quite irrelevant to the drama that the hero should
+himself have his own view of events with no understanding of their
+dramatic value, as it is irrelevant to the picture that an unbalanced
+fragment of it should dwell apart, or to the symphony that the discord
+should be heard without the harmony. One may multiply without end the
+internal differences and antagonisms that contribute to the internal
+meaning, and be as far as ever from understanding the external
+detachment of experiences that are not rational or good in themselves.
+And it is precisely this kind of fact that precipitates the whole
+problem. We do not judge of sin and error from experiences in which they
+conduct to goodness and truth, but from experiences in which they are
+stark and unresolved.</p>
+
+<p>In view of such considerations many idealists have been willing to
+confess their inability to solve this problem. To quote a recent
+expositor of Hegel,</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"We need not, after all, be surprised at the apparently
+insoluble problem which confronts us. For the question has
+developed into the old difficulty of the origin of evil, which
+has always baffled both theologians and philosophers. An
+idealism which declares that the universe is in reality
+perfect, can find, as most forms of popular <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368"></a>[<a href="./images/368.png">368</a>]</span>idealism do, an
+escape from the difficulties of the existence of evil, by
+declaring that the universe is as yet only growing towards its
+ideal perfection. But this refuge disappears with the reality
+of time, and we are left with an awkward difference between
+what philosophy tells us must be, and what our life tells us
+actually is."<a name="FNanchor_368:6_166" id="FNanchor_368:6_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_368:6_166" class="fnanchor">[368:6]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>If the philosophy of eternal perfection persists in its fundamental
+doctrine in spite of this irreconcilable conflict with life, it is
+because it is believed that that doctrine <i>must</i> be true. Let us turn,
+then, to its more constructive and compelling argument.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is Based upon
+the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_182" id="Section_182">182</a>. The proof of absolute idealism is supposed by the majority of its
+exponents to follow from the problem of epistemology, and more
+particularly from the manifest dependence of truth upon the knowing
+mind. In its initial phase absolute idealism is indistinguishable from
+subjectivism. Like that philosophy it finds that the object of knowledge
+is inseparable from the state of knowledge throughout the whole range of
+experience. Since the knower can never escape himself, it may be set
+down as an elementary fact that reality (at any rate whatever reality
+can be known or even talked about) owes its being to mind.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369"></a>[<a href="./images/369.png">369</a>]</span>Thus Green, the English neo-Hegelian, maintains that "an object which
+no consciousness presented to itself would not be an object at all," and
+wonders that this principle is not generally taken for granted and made
+the starting-point for philosophy.<a name="FNanchor_369:7_167" id="FNanchor_369:7_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_369:7_167" class="fnanchor">[369:7]</a> However, unless the very term
+"object" is intended to imply presence to a subject, this principle is
+by no means self-evident, and must be traced to its sources.</p>
+
+<p>We have already followed the fortunes of that empirical subjectivism
+which issues from the relativity of perception. At the very dawn of
+philosophy it was observed that what is seen, heard, or otherwise
+experienced through the senses, depends not only upon the use of
+sense-organs, but upon the special point of view occupied by each
+individual sentient being. It was therefore concluded that the
+perceptual world belonged to the human knower with his limitations and
+perspective, rather than to being itself. It was this epistemological
+principle upon which Berkeley founded his empirical idealism. Believing
+knowledge to consist essentially in perception, and believing perception
+to be subjective, he had to choose between the relegation of being to a
+region <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370"></a>[<a href="./images/370.png">370</a>]</span>inaccessible to knowledge, and the definition of being in terms
+of subjectivity. To avoid scepticism he accepted the latter alternative.
+But among the Greeks with whom this theory of perception originated, it
+drew its meaning in large part from the distinction between perception
+and reason. Thus we read in Plato's "Sophist":</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"And you would allow that we participate in generation with
+the body, and by perception; but we participate with the soul
+by thought in true essence, and essence you would affirm to be
+always the same and immutable, whereas generation
+varies."<a name="FNanchor_370:8_168" id="FNanchor_370:8_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_370:8_168" class="fnanchor">[370:8]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>It is conceived that although in perception man is condemned to a
+knowledge conditioned by the affections and station of his body, he may
+nevertheless escape himself and lay hold on the "true essence" of
+things, by virtue of thought. In other words, knowledge, in
+contradistinction to "opinion," is not made by the subject, but is the
+soul's participation in the eternal natures of things. In the moment of
+insight the varying course of the individual thinker coincides with the
+unvarying truth; but in that moment the individual thinker is ennobled
+through being assimilated to the truth, while the truth is no more, no
+less, the truth than before.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371"></a>[<a href="./images/371.png">371</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_183" id="Section_183">183</a>. In absolute idealism, the principle of subjectivism is extended
+to reason itself. This extension seems to have been originally due to
+moral and religious interests. From the moral stand-point the
+contemplation of the truth is a <i>state</i>, and the highest state of the
+individual life. The religious interest unifies the individual life and
+directs attention to its spiritual development. Among the Greeks of the
+middle period life was as yet viewed objectively as the fulfilment of
+capacities, and knowledge was regarded as perfection of function, the
+exercise of the highest of human prerogatives. But as moral and
+religious interests became more absorbing, the individual lived more and
+more in his own self-consciousness. Even before the Christian era the
+Greek philosophers themselves were preoccupied with the task of winning
+a state of inner serenity. Thus the Stoics and Epicureans came to look
+upon knowledge as a means to the attainment of an inner freedom from
+distress and bondage to the world. In other words, the very reason was
+regarded as an activity of the self, and its fruits were valued for
+their enhancement of the welfare of the self. And if this be true of the
+Stoics and the Epicureans, it is still more clearly true of the
+neo-Platonists of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372"></a>[<a href="./images/372.png">372</a>]</span>the Christian era, who mediate between the ancient
+and medi&aelig;val worlds.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian
+Philosophy.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_184" id="Section_184">184</a>. It is well known that the early period of Christianity was a
+period of the most vivid self-consciousness. The individual believed
+that his natural and social environment was alien to his deeper
+spiritual interests. He therefore withdrew into himself. He believed
+himself to have but one duty, the salvation of his soul; and that duty
+required him to search his innermost springs of action in order to
+uproot any that might compromise him with the world and turn him from
+God. The drama of life was enacted within the circle of his own
+self-consciousness. Citizenship, bodily health, all forms of
+appreciation and knowledge, were identified in the parts they played
+here. In short the Christian consciousness, although renunciation was
+its deepest motive, was reflexive and centripetal to a degree hitherto
+unknown among the European peoples. And when with St. Augustine
+theoretical interests once more vigorously asserted themselves, this new
+emphasis was in the very foreground. St. Augustine wished to begin his
+system of thought with a first indubitable certainty, and selected
+neither being nor ideas, but <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373"></a>[<a href="./images/373.png">373</a>]</span><i>self</i>. St. Augustine's genius was
+primarily religious, and the "Confessions," in which he records the
+story of his hard winning of peace and right relations with God, is his
+most intimate book. How faithfully does he represent himself, and the
+blend of paganism and Christianity which was distinctive of his age,
+when in his systematic writings he draws upon religion for his knowledge
+of truth! In all my living, he argues, whether I sin or turn to God,
+whether I doubt or believe, whether I know or am ignorant, in all <i>I
+know that I am I</i>. Each and every state of my consciousness is a state
+of my self, and as such, sure evidence of my self's existence. If one
+were to follow St. Augustine's reflections further, one would find him
+reasoning from his own finite and evil self to an infinite and perfect
+Self, which centres like his in the conviction that I am I, but is
+endowed with all power and all worth. One would find him reflecting upon
+the possible union with God through the exaltation of the human
+self-consciousness. But this conception of God as the perfect self is so
+much a prophecy of things to come, that more than a dozen centuries
+elapsed before it was explicitly formulated by the post-Kantians. We
+must follow its more gradual <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374"></a>[<a href="./images/374.png">374</a>]</span>development in the philosophies of
+Descartes and Kant.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the Thinking
+Self.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_185" id="Section_185">185</a>. When at the close of the sixteenth century the Frenchman, Ren&eacute;
+Descartes, sought to construct philosophy anew and upon secure
+foundations, he too selected as the initial certainty of thought the
+thinker's knowledge of himself. This principle now received its classic
+formulation in the proposition, <i>Cogito ergo sum</i>&mdash;"I think, hence I
+am." The argument does not differ essentially from that of St.
+Augustine, but it now finds a place in a systematic and critical
+metaphysics. In that my thinking is certain of itself, says Descartes,
+in that I know myself before I know aught else, my self can never be
+dependent for its being upon anything else that I may come to know. A
+thinking self, with its knowledge and its volition, is quite capable of
+subsisting of itself. Such is, indeed, not the case with a finite self,
+for all finitude is significant of limitation, and in recognizing my
+limitations I postulate the infinite being or God. But the relation of
+my self to a physical world is quite without necessity. Human nature,
+with soul and body conjoined, is a combination of two substances,
+neither of which is a necessary consequence of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375"></a>[<a href="./images/375.png">375</a>]</span>other. As a result
+of this combination the soul is to some extent affected by the body, and
+the body is to some extent directed by the soul; but the body could
+conceivably be an automaton, as the soul could conceivably be, and will
+in another life become, a free spirit. The consequences of this dualism
+for epistemology are very grave. If knowledge be the activity of a
+self-subsistent thinking spirit, how can it reveal the nature of an
+external world? The natural order is now literally "external." It is
+true that the whole body of exact science, that mechanical system to
+which Descartes attached so much importance, falls within the range of
+the soul's own thinking. But what assurance is there that it refers to a
+province of its own&mdash;a physical world in space? Descartes can only
+suppose that "clear and distinct" ideas must be trusted as faithful
+representations. It is true the external world makes its presence known
+directly, when it breaks in upon the soul in sense-perception. But
+Descartes's rationalism and love of mathematics forbade his attaching
+importance to this criterion. Real nature, that exactly definable and
+predictable order of moving bodies defined in physics, is not known
+through sense-perception, but through thought. Its necessities <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376"></a>[<a href="./images/376.png">376</a>]</span>are the
+necessities of reason. Descartes finds himself, then, in the perplexing
+position of seeking an internal criterion for an external world. The
+problem of knowledge so stated sets going the whole epistemological
+movement of the eighteenth century, from Locke through Berkeley and Hume
+to Kant. And the issue of this development is the absolute idealism of
+Kant's successors.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_186" id="Section_186">186</a>. Of the English philosophers who prepare the way for the
+epistemology of Kant, Hume is the most radical and momentous. It was he
+who roused Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers" to the task of the
+"Critical Philosophy." Hume is one of the two possible consequences of
+Descartes. One who attaches greater importance to the rational
+necessities of science than to its external reference, is not unwilling
+that nature should be swallowed up in mind. With Malebranche,
+Descartes's immediate successor in France, nature is thus provided for
+within the archetypal mind of God. With the English philosophers, on the
+other hand, externality is made the very mark of nature, and as a
+consequence sense-perception becomes the criterion of scientific truth.
+This empirical theory of knowledge, inaugurated and developed by Locke
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377"></a>[<a href="./images/377.png">377</a>]</span>and Berkeley, culminates in Hume's designation of the <i>impression</i> as
+the distinguishing element of nature, at once making up its content and
+certifying to its externality. The processes of nature are successions
+of impressions; and the laws of nature are their uniformities, or the
+expectations of uniformity which their repetitions engender. Hume does
+not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion. If the final mark of truth
+is the presence to sense of the individual element, then science can
+consist only of items of information and probable generalizations
+concerning their sequences. The effect is observed to follow upon the
+cause in fact, but there is no understanding of its necessity; therefore
+no absolute certainty attaches to the future effects of any cause.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_187" id="Section_187">187</a>. But what has become of the dream of the mathematical physicist?
+Is the whole system of Newton, that brilliant triumph of the mechanical
+method, unfounded and dogmatic? It is the logical instability of this
+body of knowledge, made manifest in the well-founded scepticism of Hume,
+that rouses Kant to a re&euml;xamination of the whole foundation of natural
+science. The general outline of his analysis has been developed above.
+It is of importance here <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378"></a>[<a href="./images/378.png">378</a>]</span>to understand its relations to the problem of
+Descartes. Contrary to the view of the English philosophers, natural
+science is, says Kant, the work of the mind. The certainty of the causal
+relation is due to the human inability to think otherwise. Hume is
+mistaken in supposing that mere sensation gives us any knowledge of
+nature. The very least experience of objects involves the employment of
+principles which are furnished by the mind. Without the employment of
+such principles, or in bare sensation, there is no intelligible meaning
+whatsoever. But once admit the employment of such principles and
+formulate them systematically, and the whole Newtonian order of nature
+is seen to follow from them. Furthermore, since these principles or
+categories are the conditions of human experience, are the very
+instruments of knowledge, they are valid wherever there is any
+experience or knowledge. There is but one way to make anything at all
+out of nature, and that is to conceive it as an order of necessary
+events in space and time. Newtonian science is part of such a general
+conception, and is therefore necessary if knowledge is to be possible at
+all, even the least. Thus Kant turns upon Hume, and shuts him up to the
+choice between the utter abnegation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379"></a>[<a href="./images/379.png">379</a>]</span>of all knowledge, including the
+knowledge of his own scepticism, and the acceptance of the whole body of
+exact science.</p>
+
+<p>But with nature thus conditioned by the necessities of thought, what has
+become of its externality? That, Kant admits, has indeed vanished. Kant
+does not attempt, as did Descartes, to hold that the nature which mind
+constructs and controls, exists also outside of mind. The nature that is
+known is on that very account phenomenal, anthropocentric&mdash;created by
+its cognitive conditions. Descartes was right in maintaining that
+sense-perception certifies to the existence of a world outside the mind,
+but mistaken in calling it nature and identifying it with the realm of
+science. In short, Kant acknowledges the external world, and names it
+the <i>thing-in-itself</i>; but insists that because it is outside of mind it
+is outside of knowledge. Thus is the certainty of science saved at the
+cost of its metaphysical validity. It is necessarily true, but only of a
+conditioned or dependent world. And in saving science Kant has at the
+same time prejudiced metaphysics in general. For the human or
+naturalistic way of knowing is left in sole possession of the field,
+with the higher interest of reasons in the ultimate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380"></a>[<a href="./images/380.png">380</a>]</span>nature of being,
+degraded to the rank of practical faith.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general into an
+Absolute Mind.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_188" id="Section_188">188</a>. The transformation of this critical and agnostic doctrine into
+absolute idealism is inevitable. The metaphysical interest was bound to
+avail itself of the speculative suggestiveness with which the Kantian
+philosophy abounds. The transformation turns upon Kant's assumption that
+whatever is constructed by the mind is on that account phenomenon or
+appearance. Kant has carried along the presumption that whatever is act
+or content of mind is on that account not <i>real</i> object or
+<i>thing-in-itself</i>. We have seen that this is generally accepted as true
+of the relativities of sense-perception. But is it true of thought? The
+post-Kantian idealist maintains that <i>that depends upon the thought</i>.
+The content of private individual thinking is in so far not real object;
+but it does not follow that this is true of such thinking as is
+universally valid. Now Kant has deduced his categories for thought in
+general. There are no empirical cases of thinking except the human
+thinkers; but the categories are not the property of any one human
+individual or any group of such individuals. They are the conditions of
+<i>experience <span class='pagenum' style="font-style: normal;"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381"></a>[<a href="./images/381.png">381</a>]</span>in general</i>, and of every possibility of experience. The
+transition to absolute idealism is now readily made. <i>Thought in
+general</i> becomes the <i>absolute mind</i>, and experience in general its
+content. The thing-in-itself drops out as having no meaning. The
+objectivity to which it testified is provided for in the completeness
+and self-sufficiency which is attributed to the absolute experience.
+Indeed, an altogether new definition of subjective and objective
+replaces the old. The subjective is that which is only insufficiently
+thought, as in the case of relativity and error; the objective is that
+which is completely thought. Thus the natural order is indeed
+phenomenal; but only because the principles of science are not the
+highest principles of thought, and not because nature is the fruit of
+thought. Thus Hegel expresses his relation to Kant as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"According to Kant, the things that we know about are <i>to us</i>
+appearances only, and we can never know their essential
+nature, which belongs to another world, which we cannot
+approach.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. The true statement of the case is as follows. The
+things of which we have direct consciousness are mere
+phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the
+true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is
+to have their existence founded not in themselves, but in the
+universal divine idea. This view of things, it is true, is as
+idealist <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382"></a>[<a href="./images/382.png">382</a>]</span>as Kant's, but in contradistinction to the
+subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy should be
+termed Absolute Idealism."<a name="FNanchor_382:9_169" id="FNanchor_382:9_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_382:9_169" class="fnanchor">[382:9]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite Mind to
+the Infinite Mind.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_189" id="Section_189">189</a>. Absolute idealism is thus reached after a long and devious course
+of development. But the argument may be stated much more briefly. Plato,
+it will be remembered, found that experience tends ever to transcend
+itself. The thinker finds himself compelled to pursue the ideal of
+immutable and universal truth, and must identify the ultimate being with
+that ideal. Similarly Hegel says:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"That upward spring of the mind signifies that the being which
+the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute
+truth; it signifies that beyond and above that appearance,
+truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for
+God."<a name="FNanchor_382:10_170" id="FNanchor_382:10_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_382:10_170" class="fnanchor">[382:10]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The further argument of absolute idealism differs from that of Plato in
+that the dependence of truth upon the mind is accepted as a first
+principle. The ideal with which experience is informed is now <i>the state
+of perfect knowledge</i>, rather than the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383"></a>[<a href="./images/383.png">383</a>]</span>system of absolute truth. The
+content of the state of perfect knowledge will indeed be the system of
+absolute truth, but none the less <i>content</i>, precisely as finite
+knowledge is the content of a finite mind. In pursuing the truth, I who
+pursue, aim to realize in myself a certain highest state of knowledge.
+Were I to know all truth I should indeed have ceased to be the finite
+individual who began the quest, but the evolution would be continuous
+and the character of self-consciousness would never have been lost. I
+may say, in short, that God or being, is my perfect cognitive self.</p>
+
+<p>The argument for absolute idealism is a constructive interpretation of
+the subjectivistic contention that knowledge can never escape the circle
+of its own activity and states. To meet the demand for a final and
+standard truth, a demand which realism meets with its doctrine of a
+being independent of any mind, this philosophy defines a <i>standard
+mind</i>. The impossibility of defining objects in terms of relativity to a
+finite self, conducts dialectically to the conception of the <i>absolute
+self</i>. The sequel to my error or exclusiveness, is truth or
+inclusiveness. The outcome of the dialectic is determined by the
+symmetry of the antithesis. Thus, corrected experience implies a last
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384"></a>[<a href="./images/384.png">384</a>]</span>correcting experience; partial cognition, complete cognition; empirical
+subject, transcendental subject; finite mind, an absolute mind. The
+following statement is taken from a contemporary exponent of the
+philosophy:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"What you and I lack, when we lament our human ignorance, is
+simply a certain desirable and logically possible state of
+mind, or type of experience; to wit, a state of mind in which
+we should wisely be able to say that we had fulfilled in
+experience what we now have merely in idea, namely, the
+knowledge, the immediate and felt presence, of what we now
+call the Absolute Reality.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. There is an Absolute Experience
+for which the conception of an absolute reality, <i>i. e.</i>, the
+conception of a system of ideal truth, is fulfilled by the
+very contents that get presented to this experience. This
+Absolute Experience is related to our experience as an organic
+whole to its own fragments. It is an experience which finds
+fulfilled all that the completest thought can conceive as
+genuinely possible. Herein lies its definition as an Absolute.
+For the Absolute Experience, as for ours, there are data,
+contents, facts. But these data, these contents, express, for
+the Absolute Experience, its own meaning, its thought, its
+ideas. Contents beyond these that it possesses, the Absolute
+Experience knows to be, in genuine truth, impossible. Hence
+its contents are indeed particular,&mdash;a selection from the
+world of bare or merely conceptual possibilities,&mdash;but they
+form a self-determined whole, than which nothing completer,
+more organic, more fulfilled, more transparent, or more
+complete in meaning, is concretely or genuinely possible. On
+the other hand, these contents are not foreign to those of our
+finite <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385"></a>[<a href="./images/385.png">385</a>]</span>experience, but are inclusive of them in the unity of
+one life."<a name="FNanchor_385:11_171" id="FNanchor_385:11_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_385:11_171" class="fnanchor">[385:11]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_190" id="Section_190">190</a>. As has been already intimated, at the opening of this chapter,
+the inclusion of the whole of reality within a single self is clearly a
+questionable proceeding. The need of avoiding the relativism of
+empirical idealism is evident. But if the very meaning of the
+self-consciousness be due to a certain selection and exclusion within
+the general field of experience, it is equally evident that the
+relativity of self-consciousness can never be overcome through appealing
+to a higher self. One must appeal <i>from</i> the self to the realm of things
+as they are. Indeed, although the exponents of this philosophy use the
+language of spiritualism, and accept the idealistic epistemology, their
+absolute being tends ever to escape the special characters of the self.
+And inasmuch as the absolute self is commonly set over against the
+finite or empirical self, as the standard and test of truth, it is the
+less <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386"></a>[<a href="./images/386.png">386</a>]</span>distinguishable from the realist's order of independent beings.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics of
+Absolute Idealism. Kant.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_191" id="Section_191">191</a>. But however much absolute idealism may tend to abandon its
+idealism for the sake of its absolutism within the field of metaphysics,
+such is not the case within the field of ethics and religion. The
+conception of the self here receives a new emphasis. The same
+self-consciousness which admits to the highest truth is the evidence of
+man's practical dignity. In virtue of his immediate apprehension of the
+principles of selfhood, and his direct participation in the life of
+spirit, man may be said to possess the innermost secret of the universe.
+In order to achieve goodness he must therefore recognize and express
+<i>himself</i>. The Kantian philosophy is here again the starting-point. It
+was Kant who first gave adequate expression to the Christian idea of the
+moral self-consciousness.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"<i>Duty!</i> Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace
+nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and
+yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that
+would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest
+forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind, .&nbsp;.&nbsp;.
+a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387"></a>[<a href="./images/387.png">387</a>]</span>secretly counterwork it; what origin is there worthy of thee,
+and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which
+proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations .&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;? It can
+be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself,
+.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. a power which connects him with an order of things that
+only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the
+same time commands the whole sensible world, and with it the
+empirically determinable existence of man in time, as well as
+the sum total of all ends."<a name="FNanchor_387:12_172" id="FNanchor_387:12_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_387:12_172" class="fnanchor">[387:12]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>With Kant there can be no morality except conduct be attended by the
+consciousness of this duty imposed by the higher nature upon the lower.
+It is this very recognition of a deeper self, of a personality that
+belongs to the sources and not to the consequences of nature, that
+constitutes man as a moral being, and only such action as is inspired
+with a reverence for it can be morally good. Kant does little more than
+to establish the uncompromising dignity of the moral will. In moral
+action man submits to a law that issues from himself in virtue of his
+rational nature. Here he yields nothing, as he owes nothing, to that
+appetency which binds him to the natural world. As a rational being he
+himself affirms the very principles which determine the organization of
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388"></a>[<a href="./images/388.png">388</a>]</span>nature. This is his <i>freedom</i>, at once the ground and the implication
+of his duty. Man is free from nature to serve the higher law of his
+personality.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of
+Universal and Objective Spirit.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_192" id="Section_192">192</a>. There are two respects in which Kant's ethics has been regarded
+as inadequate by those who draw from it their fundamental principles. It
+is said that Kant is too rigoristic, that he makes too stern a business
+of morality, in speaking so much of law and so little of love and
+spontaneity. There are good reasons for this. Kant seeks to isolate the
+moral consciousness, and dwell upon it in its purity, in order that he
+may demonstrate its incommensurability with the values of inclination
+and sensibility. Furthermore, Kant may speak of the principle of the
+absolute, and recognize the deeper eternal order as a law, but he may
+not, if he is to be consistent with his own critical principles, affirm
+the metaphysical being of such an order. With his idealistic followers
+it is possible to define the spiritual setting of the moral life, but
+with Kant it is only possible to define the antagonism of principles.
+Hence the greater optimism of the post-Kantians. They know that the
+higher law is the reality, and that he who obeys it thus unites himself
+with the absolute self. That <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389"></a>[<a href="./images/389.png">389</a>]</span>which for Kant is only a resolute
+obedience to more valid principles, to rationally superior rules for
+action, is for idealism man's appropriation of his spiritual birthright.
+Since the law is the deeper nature, man may respect and obey it as
+valid, and at the same time act upon it gladly in the sure knowledge
+that it will enhance his eternal welfare. Indeed, the knowledge that the
+very universe is founded upon this law will make him less suspicious of
+nature and less exclusive in his adherence to any single law. He will be
+more confident of the essential goodness of all manifestations of a
+universe which he knows to be fundamentally spiritual.</p>
+
+<p>But it has been urged, secondly, that the Kantian ethics is too formal,
+too little pertinent to the issues of life. Kant's moral law imposes
+only obedience to the law, or conduct conceived as suitable to a
+universal moral community. But what is the nature of such conduct in
+particular? It may be answered that to maintain the moral
+self-consciousness, to act dutifully and dutifully only, to be
+self-reliant and unswerving in the doing of what one ought to do, is to
+obtain a very specific character. But does this not leave the
+individual's conduct to his own interpretation of his duty? <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390"></a>[<a href="./images/390.png">390</a>]</span>It was just
+this element of individualism which Hegel sought to eliminate through
+the application of his larger philosophical conception. If that which
+expresses itself within the individual consciousness as the moral law be
+indeed the law of that self in which the universe is grounded, it will
+appear as <i>objective spirit</i> in the evolution of society. For Hegel,
+then, the most valid standard of goodness is to be found in that
+customary morality which bespeaks the moral leadings of the general
+humanity, and in those institutions, such as the family and the state,
+which are the moral acts of the absolute idea itself. Finally, in the
+realm of <i>absolute spirit</i>, in art, in revealed religion, and in
+philosophy, the individual may approach to the self-consciousness which
+is the perfect truth and goodness in and for itself.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute Idealism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_193" id="Section_193">193</a>. Where the law of life is the implication in the finite
+self-consciousness of the eternal and divine self-consciousness, there
+can be no division between morality and religion, as there can be none
+between thought and will. Whatever man seeks is in the end God. As the
+perfect fulfilment of the thinking self, God is the truth; as the
+perfect fulfilment of the willing self, God is the good. The finite
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391"></a>[<a href="./images/391.png">391</a>]</span>self-consciousness finds facts that are not understood, and so seeks to
+resolve itself into the perfect self wherein all that is given has
+meaning. On the other hand, the finite self-consciousness finds ideals
+that are not realized, and so seeks to resolve itself into that perfect
+self wherein all that is significant is given. All interests thus
+converge toward</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"some state of conscious spirit in which the opposition of
+cognition and volition is overcome&mdash;in which we neither judge
+our ideas by the world, nor the world by our ideas, but are
+aware that inner and outer are in such close and necessary
+harmony that even the thought of possible discord has become
+impossible. In its unity not only cognition and volition, but
+feeling also, must be blended and united. In some way or
+another it must have overcome the rift in discursive
+knowledge, and the immediate must for it be no longer the
+alien. It must be as direct as art, as certain and universal
+as philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_391:13_173" id="FNanchor_391:13_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_391:13_173" class="fnanchor">[391:13]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The religious consciousness proper to absolute idealism is both
+pantheistic and mystical, but with distinction. Platonism is pantheistic
+in that nature is resolved into God. All that is not perfect is esteemed
+only for its promise of perfection. And Platonism is mystical in that
+the purification and universalization of the affections brings one <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392"></a>[<a href="./images/392.png">392</a>]</span>in
+the end to a perfection that exceeds all modes of thought and speech.
+With Spinoza, on the other hand, God may be said to be resolved into
+nature. Nature is made divine, but is none the less nature, for its
+divinity consists in its absolute necessity. Spinoza's pantheism passes
+over into mysticism because the absolute necessity exceeds in both unity
+and richness the laws known to the human understanding. In absolute
+idealism, finally, both God and nature are resolved into the self. For
+that which is divine in experience is self-consciousness, and this is at
+the same time the ground of nature. Thus in the highest knowledge the
+self is expanded and enriched without being left behind. The mystical
+experience proper to this philosophy is the consciousness of identity,
+together with the sense of universal immanence. The individual self may
+be directly sensible of the absolute self, for these are one spiritual
+life. Thus Emerson says:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is a secret which every intellectual man quickly learns,
+that beyond the energy of his possessed and conscious
+intellect he is capable of a new energy (as of an intellect
+doubled on itself), by abandonment to the nature of things;
+that beside his privacy of power as an individual man, there
+is a great public power upon which he can draw, by unlocking,
+at all risks, his human doors, and suffering the ethereal
+tides to roll and circulate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393"></a>[<a href="./images/393.png">393</a>]</span>through him; then he is caught up
+into the life of the Universe, his speech is thunder, his
+thought is law, and his words are universally intelligible as
+the plants and animals. The poet knows that he speaks
+adequately then only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or 'with
+the flower of the mind'; not with the intellect used as an
+organ, but with the intellect released from all service and
+suffered to take its direction from its celestial
+life."<a name="FNanchor_393:14_174" id="FNanchor_393:14_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_393:14_174" class="fnanchor">[393:14]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_194" id="Section_194">194</a>. But the distinguishing flavor and quality of this religion arises
+from its spiritual hospitality. It is not, like Platonism, a
+contemplation of the best; nor, like pluralistic idealisms, a moral
+knight-errantry. It is neither a religion of exclusion, nor a religion
+of reconstruction, but a profound willingness that things should be as
+they really are. For this reason its devotees have recognized in Spinoza
+their true forerunner. But idealism is not Spinozism, though it may
+contain this as one of its strains. For it is not the worship of
+necessity, Emerson's "beautiful necessity, which makes man brave in
+believing that he cannot shun a danger that is appointed, nor incur one
+that is not"; but the worship of <i>that which is</i> necessary.</p>
+
+<p>Not only must one understand that every effort, however despairing, is
+an element of sense in the universal significance;</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394"></a>[<a href="./images/394.png">394</a>]</span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"that the whole would not be what it is were not precisely
+this finite purpose left in its own uniqueness to speak
+precisely its own word&mdash;a word which no other purpose can
+speak in the language of the divine will";<a name="FNanchor_394:15_175" id="FNanchor_394:15_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_394:15_175" class="fnanchor">[394:15]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>but one must have a zest for such participation, and a heart for the
+divine will which it profits. Indeed, so much is this religion a love of
+life, that it may, as in the case of the Romanticists, be a love of
+caprice. Battle and death, pain and joy, error and truth&mdash;all that
+belongs to the story of this mortal world, are to be felt as the thrill
+of health, and relished as the essences of God. Religion is an exuberant
+spirituality, a fearless sensibility, a knowledge of both good and evil,
+and a will to serve the good, while exulting that the evil will not
+yield without a battle.</p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_349:1_161" id="Footnote_349:1_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_349:1_161"><span class="label">[349:1]</span></a> By <i>Absolute Idealism</i> is meant that system of
+philosophy which defines the universe as the <i>absolute spirit</i>, which is
+the human <i>moral</i>, <i>cognitive</i>, or <i>appreciative consciousness</i>
+universalized; or as the <i>absolute, transcendental mind</i>, whose state of
+<i>complete knowledge</i> is implied in all finite thinking.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_352:2_162" id="Footnote_352:2_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_352:2_162"><span class="label">[352:2]</span></a> Plato: <i>Tim&aelig;us</i>, 29. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_359:3_163" id="Footnote_359:3_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_359:3_163"><span class="label">[359:3]</span></a> Plato: <i>Symposium</i>, 202. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_359:4_164" id="Footnote_359:4_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_359:4_164"><span class="label">[359:4]</span></a> Emerson: <i>Essays, Second Series</i>, pp. 65-66.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_364:5_165" id="Footnote_364:5_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_364:5_165"><span class="label">[364:5]</span></a> Emerson: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 25.</p>
+
+<p>The possibility of conflict between this method of nature study and the
+empirical method of science is significantly attested by the
+circumstance that in the year 1801 Hegel published a paper in which he
+maintained, on the ground of certain numerical harmonies, that there
+could be no planet between Mars and Jupiter, while at almost exactly the
+same time Piazzi discovered Ceres, the first of the asteroids.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_368:6_166" id="Footnote_368:6_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_368:6_166"><span class="label">[368:6]</span></a> McTaggart: <i>Studies in Hegelian Dialectic</i>, p. 181.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_369:7_167" id="Footnote_369:7_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_369:7_167"><span class="label">[369:7]</span></a> Green: <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>, p. 15.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_370:8_168" id="Footnote_370:8_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_370:8_168"><span class="label">[370:8]</span></a> Plato: <i>The Sophist</i>, 248. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_382:9_169" id="Footnote_382:9_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_382:9_169"><span class="label">[382:9]</span></a> Hegel: <i>Encyclop&auml;die</i>, &sect; 45, lecture note. Quoted by
+McTaggart: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 69.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_382:10_170" id="Footnote_382:10_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_382:10_170"><span class="label">[382:10]</span></a> Hegel: <i>Encyclop&auml;die</i>, &sect; 50. Quoted by McTaggart: <i>Op.
+cit.</i>, p. 70.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_385:11_171" id="Footnote_385:11_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_385:11_171"><span class="label">[385:11]</span></a> Royce: <i>Conception of God</i>, pp. 19, 43-44.
+
+This argument is well summarized in Green's statement that "the
+existence of one connected world, which is the presupposition of
+knowledge, implies the action of one self-conditioning and
+self-determining mind." <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>, p. 181.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_387:12_172" id="Footnote_387:12_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_387:12_172"><span class="label">[387:12]</span></a> Kant: <i>Critical Examination of Practical Reason</i>.
+Translated by Abbott in <i>Kant's Theory of Ethics</i>, p. 180.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_391:13_173" id="Footnote_391:13_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_391:13_173"><span class="label">[391:13]</span></a> Quoted from McTaggart: <i>Op. cit.</i>, pp. 231-232.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_393:14_174" id="Footnote_393:14_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_393:14_174"><span class="label">[393:14]</span></a> Emerson: <i>Op. cit.</i>, pp. 30-31.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_394:15_175" id="Footnote_394:15_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_394:15_175"><span class="label">[394:15]</span></a> Royce: <i>The World and the Individual, First Series</i>,
+p. 465.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395"></a>[<a href="./images/395.png">395</a>]</span></p>
+<h2><a name="Chap_XII" id="Chap_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII</h2>
+
+<h3>CONCLUSION</h3>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">Liability of Philosophy to Revision, Due to its Systematic
+Character.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_195" id="Section_195">195</a>. One who consults a book of philosophy in the hope of finding
+there a definite body of truth, sanctioned by the consensus of experts,
+cannot fail to be disappointed. And it should now be plain that this is
+due not to the frailties of philosophers, but to the meaning of
+philosophy. Philosophy is not additive, but reconstructive. Natural
+science may advance step by step without ever losing ground; its
+empirical discoveries are in their severalty as true as they can ever
+be. Thus the stars and the species of animals may be recorded
+successively, and each generation of astronomers and zo&ouml;logists may take
+up the work at the point reached by its forerunners. The formulation of
+results does, it is true, require constant correction and revision&mdash;but
+there is a central body of data which is little affected, and which
+accumulates from age to age. Now the finality of scientific truth is
+proportional to the modesty of its claims. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396"></a>[<a href="./images/396.png">396</a>]</span>Items of truth persist,
+while the interpretation of them is subject to alteration with the
+general advance of knowledge; and, relatively speaking, science consists
+in items of truth, and philosophy in their interpretation. The liability
+to revision in science itself increases as that body of knowledge
+becomes more highly unified and systematic. Thus the present age, with
+its attempt to construct a single comprehensive system of mechanical
+science, is peculiarly an age when fundamental conceptions are subjected
+to a thorough re&euml;xamination&mdash;when, for example, so ancient a conception
+as that of matter is threatened with displacement by that of energy. But
+philosophy is <i>essentially unitary and systematic</i>&mdash;and thus
+<i>superlatively liable to revision</i>.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The One Science and the Many Philosophies.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_196" id="Section_196">196</a>. It is noteworthy that it is only in this age of a highly
+systematic natural science that <i>different</i> systems are projected, as in
+the case just noted of the rivalry between the strictly mechanical, or
+corpuscular, theory and the newer theory of energetics. It has
+heretofore been taken for granted that although there may be many
+philosophies, there is but one body of science. And it is still taken
+for granted that the experimental detail of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397"></a>[<a href="./images/397.png">397</a>]</span>the individual science is a
+common fund, to the progressive increase of which the individual
+scientist contributes the results of his special research; there being
+<i>rival</i> schools of mechanics, physics, or chemistry, only in so far as
+<i>fundamental conceptions</i> or <i>principles of orderly arrangement</i> are in
+question. But philosophy deals exclusively with the most fundamental
+conceptions and the most general principles of orderly arrangement.
+Hence it is significant of the very task of philosophy that there should
+be many tentative systems of philosophy, even that each philosopher
+should project and construct his own philosophy. Philosophy as the truth
+of synthesis and reconciliation, of comprehensiveness and co&ouml;rdination,
+must be a living unity. It is a thinking of entire experience, and can
+be sufficient only through being all-sufficient. The heart of every
+philosophy is a harmonizing insight, an intellectual prospect within
+which all human interests and studies compose themselves. Such knowledge
+cannot be delegated to isolated co-laborers, but will be altogether
+missed if not loved and sought in its indivisible unity. There is no
+modest home-keeping philosophy; no safe and conservative philosophy,
+that can make sure of a part through renouncing the whole. There is no
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398"></a>[<a href="./images/398.png">398</a>]</span>philosophy without intellectual temerity, as there is no religion
+without moral temerity. And the one is the supreme interest of thought,
+as the other is the supreme interest of life.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or Eclecticism of
+the Present Age.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_197" id="Section_197">197</a>. Though the many philosophies be inevitable, it must not be
+concluded that there is therefore no progress in philosophy. The
+solution from which every great philosophy is precipitated is the
+mingled wisdom of some latest age, with all of its inheritance. The
+"positive" knowledge furnished by the sciences, the refinements and
+distinctions of the philosophers, the ideals of society&mdash;these and the
+whole sum of civilization are its ingredients. Where there is no single
+system of philosophy significant enough to express the age, as did the
+systems of Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, and the
+others who belong to the roll of the great philosophers, there exists a
+<i>general sophistication</i>, which is more elusive but not less
+significant. The present age&mdash;at any rate from its own stand-point&mdash;is
+not an age of great philosophical systems. Such systems may indeed be
+living in our midst unrecognized; but historical perspective cannot
+safely be anticipated. It is certain that no living voice is known to
+speak <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399"></a>[<a href="./images/399.png">399</a>]</span>for this generation as did Hegel, and even Spencer, for the last.
+There is, however, a significance in this very passing of Hegel and
+Spencer,&mdash;an enlightenment peculiar to an age which knows them, but has
+philosophically outlived them. There is a moral in the history of
+thought which just now no philosophy, whether naturalism, or
+transcendentalism, realism or idealism, can fail to draw. The
+characterization of this contemporary eclecticism or sophistication,
+difficult and uncertain as it must needs be, affords the best summary
+and interpretation with which to conclude this brief survey of the
+fortunes of philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism and
+Absolutism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_198" id="Section_198">198</a>. Since the problem of metaphysics is the crucial problem of
+philosophy, the question of its present status is fundamental in any
+characterization of the age. It will appear from the foregoing account
+of the course of metaphysical development that two fundamental
+tendencies have exhibited themselves from the beginning. The one of
+these is naturalistic and empirical, representing the claims of what
+common sense calls "matters of fact"; the other is transcendental and
+rational, representing the claims of the standards and ideals which are
+immanent in experience, and directly manifested in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400"></a>[<a href="./images/400.png">400</a>]</span>the great human
+interests of thought and action. These tendencies have on the whole been
+antagonistic; and the clear-cut and momentous systems of philosophy have
+been fundamentally determined by either the one or the other.</p>
+
+<p>Thus materialism is due to the attempt to reduce all of experience to
+the elements and principles of connection which are employed by the
+physical sciences to set in order the actual motions, or changes of
+place, which the parts of experience undergo. Materialism maintains that
+the motions of bodies are indifferent to considerations of worth, and
+denies that they issue from a deeper cause of another order. The very
+ideas of such non-mechanical elements or principles are here provided
+with a mechanical origin. Similarly a phenomenalism, like that of Hume,
+takes immediate presence to sense as the norm of being and knowledge.
+Individual items, directly verified in the moment of their occurrence,
+are held to be at once the content of all real truth, and the source of
+those abstract ideas which the misguided rationalists mistake for real
+truth.</p>
+
+<p>But the absolutist, on the other hand, contends that the thinker must
+<i>mean</i> something by the reality which he seeks. If he had it for the
+looking, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401"></a>[<a href="./images/401.png">401</a>]</span>thought would not be, as it so evidently is, a purposive
+endeavor. And that which is meant by reality can be nothing short of the
+fulfilment or final realization of this endeavor of thought. To find out
+what thought seeks, to anticipate the consummation of thought and posit
+it as real, is therefore the first and fundamental procedure of
+philosophy. The mechanism of nature, and all matters of fact, must come
+to terms with this absolute reality, or be condemned as mere appearance.
+Thus Plato distinguishes the world of "generation" in which we
+participate by perception, from the "true essence" in which we
+participate by thought; and Schelling speaks of the modern experimental
+method as the "corruption" of philosophy and physics, in that it fails
+to construe nature in terms of spirit.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of
+Nature. The Neo-Fichteans.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_199" id="Section_199">199</a>. Now it would never occur to a sophisticated philosopher of the
+present, to one who has thought out to the end the whole tradition of
+philosophy, and felt the gravity of the great historical issues, to
+suffer either of these motives to dominate him to the exclusion of the
+other. Absolutism has long since ceased to speak slightingly of physical
+science, and of the world of perception. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402"></a>[<a href="./images/402.png">402</a>]</span>It is conceded that motions
+must be known in the mechanical way, and matters of fact in the
+matter-of-fact way. Furthermore, the prestige which science enjoyed in
+the nineteenth century, and the prestige which the empirical and secular
+world of action has enjoyed to a degree that has steadily increased
+since the Renaissance, have convinced the absolutist of the intrinsic
+significance of these parts of experience. They are no longer reduced,
+but are permitted to flourish in their own right. From the very councils
+of absolute idealism there has issued a distinction which is fast
+becoming current, between the World of Appreciation, or the realm of
+moral and logical principles, and the World of Description, or the realm
+of empirical generalizations and mechanical causes.<a name="FNanchor_402:1_176" id="FNanchor_402:1_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_402:1_176" class="fnanchor">[402:1]</a> It is indeed
+maintained that the former of these is metaphysically superior; but the
+latter is ranked without the disparagement of its own proper categories.</p>
+
+<p>With the Fichteans this distinction corresponds to the distinction in
+the system of Fichte between the active moral ego, and the nature which
+it posits to act upon. But the <i>neo-Fichteans</i> are <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403"></a>[<a href="./images/403.png">403</a>]</span>concerned to show
+that the nature so posited, or the World of Description, is the <i>realm
+of mechanical science</i>, and that the entire system of mathematical and
+physical truth is therefore morally necessary.<a name="FNanchor_403:2_177" id="FNanchor_403:2_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_403:2_177" class="fnanchor">[403:2]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Neo-Kantians.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_200" id="Section_200">200</a>. A more pronounced tendency in the same direction marks the work
+of the <i>neo-Kantians</i>. These philosophers repudiate the spiritualistic
+metaphysics of Schopenhauer, Fichte, and Hegel, believing the real
+significance of Kant to lie in his critical method, in his examination
+of the first principles of the different systems of knowledge, and
+especially in his analysis of the foundations of mathematics and
+physics.<a name="FNanchor_403:3_178" id="FNanchor_403:3_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_403:3_178" class="fnanchor">[403:3]</a> In approaching mathematics and physics <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404"></a>[<a href="./images/404.png">404</a>]</span>from a general
+logical stand-point, these neo-Kantians become scarcely distinguishable
+in interest and temper from those scientists who approach logic from the
+mathematical and physical stand-point.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_201" id="Section_201">201</a>. The finite, moral individual, with his peculiar spiritual
+perspective, has long since been recognized as essential to the meaning
+of the universe rationally conceived. But in its first movement absolute
+idealism proposed to absorb him in the indivisible absolute self. It is
+now pointed out that Fichte, and even Hegel himself, means the absolute
+to be a plurality or society of persons.<a name="FNanchor_404:4_179" id="FNanchor_404:4_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_404:4_179" class="fnanchor">[404:4]</a> It is commonly conceded
+that the will of the absolute must coincide with the wills of all finite
+creatures in their severalty, that God wills in and through men.<a name="FNanchor_404:5_180" id="FNanchor_404:5_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_404:5_180" class="fnanchor">[404:5]</a>
+Corresponding to this individualistic tendency on the part of absolute
+idealism, there has been recently <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405"></a>[<a href="./images/405.png">405</a>]</span>projected a <i>personal idealism</i>, or
+<i>humanism</i>, which springs freshly and directly from the same motive.
+This philosophy attributes ultimate importance to the human person with
+his freedom, his interests, his control over nature, and his hope of the
+advancement of the spiritual kingdom through co&ouml;peration with his
+fellows.<a name="FNanchor_405:6_181" id="FNanchor_405:6_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_405:6_181" class="fnanchor">[405:6]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of
+Fundamental Principles.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_202" id="Section_202">202</a>. Naturalism exhibits a moderation and liberality that is not less
+striking than that of absolutism. This abatement of its claims began in
+the last century with agnosticism. It was then conceded that there is an
+order other than that of natural science; but this order was held to be
+inaccessible to human knowledge. Such a theory is essentially unstable
+because it employs principles which define a non-natural order, but
+refuses to credit them or call them knowledge. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406"></a>[<a href="./images/406.png">406</a>]</span>agnostic is in the
+paradoxical position of one who knows of an unknowable world.
+Present-day naturalism is more circumspect. It has interested itself in
+bringing to light that in the very procedure of science which, because
+it predetermines what nature shall be, cannot be included within nature.
+To this interest is due the rediscovery of the rational foundations of
+science. It was already known in the seventeenth century that exact
+science does not differ radically from mathematics, as mathematics does
+not differ radically from logic. Mathematics and mechanics are now being
+submitted to a critical examination which reveals the definitions and
+implications upon which they rest, and the general relation of these to
+the fundamental elements and necessities of thought.<a name="FNanchor_406:7_182" id="FNanchor_406:7_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_406:7_182" class="fnanchor">[406:7]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407"></a>[<a href="./images/407.png">407</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_203" id="Section_203">203</a>. This rationalistic tendency in naturalism is balanced by a
+tendency which is more empirical, but equally subversive of the old
+ultra-naturalism. Goethe once wrote:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"I have observed that I hold that thought to be true which is
+<i>fruitful for me</i>.&nbsp;.&nbsp;.&nbsp;. When I know my relation to myself and to
+the outer world, I say that I possess the truth."</p></div>
+
+<p>Similarly, it is now frequently observed that all knowledge is <i>humanly
+fruitful</i>, and it is proposed that this shall be regarded as the very
+criterion of truth. According to this principle science as a whole, even
+knowledge as a whole, is primarily a human utility. The nature which
+science defines is an artifact or construct. It is designed to express
+briefly and conveniently what man may practically expect from his
+environment. This tendency is known as <i>pragmatism</i>. It ranges from
+systematic doctrines, reminiscent of Fichte, which seek to define
+practical needs and deduce knowledge from them, to the more
+irresponsible utterances of those who liken science to
+"shorthand,"<a name="FNanchor_407:8_183" id="FNanchor_407:8_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_407:8_183" class="fnanchor">[407:8]</a> and mathematics to a game of chess. In any case
+pragmatism attributes to nature a certain dependence on will, and
+therefore implies, even when it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408"></a>[<a href="./images/408.png">408</a>]</span>does not avow, that will with its
+peculiar principles or values cannot be reduced to the terms of nature.
+In short, it would be more true to say that nature expresses will, than
+that will expresses nature.<a name="FNanchor_408:9_184" id="FNanchor_408:9_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_408:9_184" class="fnanchor">[408:9]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Summary, and Transition to Epistemology.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_204" id="Section_204">204</a>. Such, then, is the contemporary eclecticism as respects the
+central problem of metaphysics. There are <i>naturalistic</i> and
+<i>individualistic</i> tendencies in <i>absolutism</i>; <i>rationalistic</i> and
+<i>ethical</i> tendencies in <i>naturalism</i>; and finally the independent and
+spontaneous movements of <i>personal idealism</i> and <i>pragmatism</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Since the rise of the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, metaphysics
+and epistemology have maintained relations so intimate that the present
+state of the former cannot be characterized without some reference to
+the present state of the latter. Indeed, the very issues upon which
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409"></a>[<a href="./images/409.png">409</a>]</span>metaphysicians divide are most commonly those provoked by the problem
+of knowledge. The counter-tendencies of naturalism and absolutism are
+always connected, and often coincide with, the epistemological
+opposition between empiricism, which proclaims perception, and
+rationalism, which proclaims reason, to be the proper organ of
+knowledge. The other great epistemological controversy does not bear so
+direct and simple a relation to the central metaphysical issues, and
+must be examined on its own account.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism. Realistic
+Tendency in Empirical Idealism.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_205" id="Section_205">205</a>. The point of controversy is the dependence or independence of the
+object of knowledge on the state of knowledge; idealism maintaining that
+reality <i>is</i> the knower or his content of mind, realism, that being
+known is a circumstance which appertains to some reality, without being
+the indispensable condition of reality as such. Now the sophisticated
+thought of the present age exhibits a tendency on the part of these
+opposite doctrines to approach and converge. It has been already
+remarked that the empirical idealism of the Berkeleyan type could not
+avoid transcending itself. Hume, who omitted Berkeley's active spirits,
+no longer had any subjective seat or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410"></a>[<a href="./images/410.png">410</a>]</span>locus for the perceptions to which
+Berkeley had reduced the outer world. And perceptions which are not the
+states of any subject, retain only their intrinsic character and become
+a series of elements. When there is nothing beyond, which appears, and
+nothing within to which it appears, there ceases to be any sense in
+using such terms as appearance, phenomenon, or impression. The term
+sensation is at present employed in the same ill-considered manner. But
+empirical idealism has come gradually to insist upon the importance of
+the content of perception, rather than the relation of perception to a
+self as its state. The terms <i>element</i> and <i>experience</i>, which are
+replacing the subjectivistic terms, are frankly realistic.<a name="FNanchor_410:10_185" id="FNanchor_410:10_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_410:10_185" class="fnanchor">[410:10]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception of
+Experience.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_206" id="Section_206">206</a>. There is a similar realistic trend in the development of absolute
+idealism. The pure Hegelian philosophy was notably objective. The
+principles of development in which it centres were conceived by Hegel
+himself to manifest themselves most clearly in the progressions of
+nature and history. Many of Hegel's followers have been led by moral and
+religious interests to emphasize <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411"></a>[<a href="./images/411.png">411</a>]</span>consciousness, and, upon
+epistemological grounds, to lay great stress upon the necessity of the
+union of the parts of experience within an enveloping self. But absolute
+idealism has much at heart the overcoming of relativism, and the
+absolute is defined in order to meet the demand for a being that shall
+not have the cognitive deficiencies of an object of finite thought. So
+it is quite possible for this philosophy, while maintaining its
+traditions on the whole, to abandon the term <i>self</i> to the finite
+subject, and regard its absolute as a system of rational and universal
+principles&mdash;self-sufficient because externally independent and
+internally necessary. Hence the renewed study of categories as logical,
+mathematical, or mechanical principles, and entirely apart from their
+being the acts of a thinking self.</p>
+
+<p>Furthermore, it has been recognized that the general demand of idealism
+is met when reality is regarded as not outside of or other than
+knowledge, whatever be true of the question of dependence. Thus the
+conception of <i>experience</i> is equally convenient here, in that it
+signifies what is immediately present in knowledge, without affirming it
+to <i>consist in</i> being so presented.<a name="FNanchor_411:11_186" id="FNanchor_411:11_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_411:11_186" class="fnanchor">[411:11]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412"></a>[<a href="./images/412.png">412</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence Philosophy.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_207" id="Section_207">207</a>. And at this point idealism is met by a latter-day realism. The
+traditional modern realism springing from Descartes was dualistic. It
+was supposed that reality in itself was essentially extra-mental, and
+thus under the necessity of being either represented or misrepresented
+in thought. But the one of these alternatives is dogmatic, in that
+thought can never test the validity of its relation to that which is
+perpetually outside of it; while the other is agnostic, providing only
+for the knowledge of a world of appearance, an improper knowledge that
+is in fact not knowledge at all.</p>
+
+<p>But realism is not necessarily dualistic, since it requires only that
+being shall not be dependent upon being known. Furthermore, since
+empiricism is congenial to naturalism, it is an easy step to say that
+nature is directly known in perception. This first takes the form of
+positivism, or the theory that only such nature as can be directly known
+can be really known. But this agnostic provision for an unknown world
+beyond, inevitably falls away and leaves <i>reality as that which is
+directly known, but not conditioned by knowledge</i>. Again the term
+<i>experience</i> is the most useful, and provides a common ground for
+<i>idealistic realism</i> <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413"></a>[<a href="./images/413.png">413</a>]</span>with <i>realistic idealism</i>. A new epistemological
+movement makes this conception of experience its starting-point. What is
+known as the <i>immanence philosophy</i> defines reality as experience, and
+means by experience the subject matter of all knowledge&mdash;not defined as
+such, but regarded as capable of being such. Experience is conceived to
+be <i>both in and out</i> of selves, cognition being but one of the special
+systems into which experience may enter.<a name="FNanchor_413:12_187" id="FNanchor_413:12_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_413:12_187" class="fnanchor">[413:12]</a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New
+Construction.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_208" id="Section_208">208</a>. Does this eclecticism of the age open any philosophical prospect?
+Is it more than a general compromise&mdash;a confession of failure on the
+part of each and every radical and clear-cut doctrine of metaphysics and
+epistemology? There is no final answer to such a question short of an
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414"></a>[<a href="./images/414.png">414</a>]</span>independent construction, and such procedure would exceed the scope of
+the present discussion. But there is an evident interpretation of
+tradition that suggests a possible basis for such construction.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of Attempt to
+Reduce All Experience to it.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_209" id="Section_209">209</a>. Suppose it to be granted that the categories of nature are quite
+self-sufficient. This would mean that there might conceivably be a
+strictly physical order, governed only by mechanical principles, and by
+the more general logical and mathematical principles. The body of
+physical science so extended as to include such general conceptions as
+identity, difference, number, quality, space, and time, is the account
+of such an order. This order need have no value, and need not be known.
+But reality as a whole is evidently not such a strictly physical order,
+for the definition of the physical order involves the rejection of many
+of the most familiar aspects of experience, such as its value and its
+being known in conscious selves. Materialism, in that it proposes to
+conceive the whole of reality as physical, must attempt to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415"></a>[<a href="./images/415.png">415</a>]</span>reduce the
+residuum to physical terms, and with no hope of success. Goodness and
+knowledge cannot be explained as mass and force, or shown to be
+mechanical necessities.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Truth of Psychical Relations, but Impossibility of General
+Reduction to Them.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_210" id="Section_210">210</a>. Are we then to conclude that reality is not physical, and look
+for other terms to which we may reduce physical terms? There is no lack
+of such other terms. Indeed, we could as fairly have <i>begun</i> elsewhere.
+Thus some parts of experience compose the consciousness of the
+individual, and are said to be known by him. Experience so contained is
+connected by the special relation of being known together. But this
+relation is quite indifferent to physical, moral, and logical relations.
+Thus we may be conscious of things which are physically disconnected,
+morally repugnant, and logically contradictory, or in all of these
+respects utterly irrelevant. Subjectivism, in that it proposes to
+conceive the whole of reality as consciousness, must attempt to reduce
+physical, moral, and logical relations to that co-presence in
+consciousness from which they are so sharply distinguished in their very
+definition. The historical failure of this attempt was inevitable.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of Ideal of
+Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing the Whole of Experience from
+it.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_211" id="Section_211">211</a>. But there is at least one further <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416"></a>[<a href="./images/416.png">416</a>]</span>starting-point, the one
+adopted by the most subtle and elaborate of all reconstructive
+philosophies. Logical necessities are as evidently real as bodies or
+selves. It is possible to define general types of inference, as well as
+compact and internally necessary systems such as those of mathematics.
+There is a perfectly distinguishable strain of pure rationality in the
+universe. Whether or not it be possible to conceive a pure rationality
+as self-subsistent, inasmuch as there are degrees it is at any rate
+possible to conceive of a maximum of rationality. But similarly there
+are degrees of moral goodness. It is possible to define with more or
+less exactness a morally perfect person, or an ideal moral community.
+Here again it may be impossible that pure and unalloyed goodness should
+constitute a universe of itself. But that a maximum of goodness, with
+all of the accessories which it might involve, should be thus
+self-subsistent, is quite conceivable. It is thus possible to define an
+absolute and perfect order, in which logical necessity, the interest of
+thought, or moral goodness, the interest of will, or both together,
+should be realized to the maximum. Absolutism conceives reality <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417"></a>[<a href="./images/417.png">417</a>]</span>under
+the form of this ideal, and attempts to reconstruct experience
+accordingly. But is the prospect of success any better than in the cases
+of materialism and subjectivism? It is evident that the ideal of logical
+necessity is due to the fact that certain parts of knowledge approach it
+more closely than others. Thus mechanics contains more that is arbitrary
+than mathematics, and mathematics more than logic. Similarly, the theory
+of the evolution of the planetary system, in that it requires the
+assumption of particular distances and particular masses for the parts
+of the primeval nebula, is more arbitrary than rational dynamics. It is
+impossible, then, in view of the parts of knowledge which belong to the
+lower end of the scale of rationality, to regard reality as a whole as
+the maximum of rationality; for either a purely dynamical, a purely
+mathematical, or a purely logical, realm would be more rational. The
+similar disproof of the moral perfection of reality is so unmistakable
+as to require no elucidation. It is evident that even where natural
+necessities are not antagonistic to moral proprieties, they are at any
+rate indifferent to them.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Error and Evil Cannot be Reduced to the Ideal.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_212" id="Section_212">212</a>. But thus far no reference has been made to error and to evil.
+These are the terms which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418"></a>[<a href="./images/418.png">418</a>]</span>the ideals of rationality and goodness must
+repudiate if they are to retain their meaning. Nevertheless experience
+contains them and psychology describes them. We have already followed
+the efforts which absolute idealism has made to show that logical
+perfection requires error, and that moral perfection requires evil. Is
+it conceivable that such efforts should be successful? Suppose a higher
+logic to make the principle of contradiction the very bond of
+rationality. What was formerly error is now indispensable to truth. But
+what of the new error&mdash;the unbalanced and mistaken thesis, the
+unresolved antithesis, the scattered and disconnected terms of thought?
+These fall outside the new truth as surely as the old error fell outside
+the old truth. And the case of moral goodness is precisely parallel. The
+higher goodness may be so defined as to require failure and sin. Thus it
+may be maintained that there can be no true success without struggle,
+and no true spiritual exaltation except through repentance. But what of
+failure unredeemed, sin unrepented, evil uncompensated and unresolved?
+Nothing has been gained after all but a new definition of goodness&mdash;and
+a new definition of evil. And this is an ethical, not a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419"></a>[<a href="./images/419.png">419</a>]</span>metaphysical
+question. The problem of evil, like the problem of error, is as far from
+solution as ever. Indeed, the very urgency of these problems is due to
+metaphysical absolutism. For this philosophy defines the universe as a
+perfect unity. Measured by the standard of such an ideal universe, the
+parts of finite experience take on a fragmentary and baffling character
+which they would not otherwise possess. The absolute perfection must by
+definition both determine and exclude the imperfect. Thus absolutism
+bankrupts the universe by holding it accountable for what it can never
+pay.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_213" id="Section_213">213</a>. If the attempt to construct experience in the special terms of
+some part of experience be abandoned, how is reality to be defined? It
+is evident that in that case there can be no definition of reality as
+such. It must be regarded as a collection of all elements, relations,
+principles, systems, that compose it. All truths will be true of it, and
+it will be the subject of all truths. Reality is at least physical,
+psychical, moral, and rational. That which is physical is not
+necessarily moral or psychical, but may be either or both of these. Thus
+it is a commonplace of experience that what has bulk and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420"></a>[<a href="./images/420.png">420</a>]</span>weight may or
+may not be good, and may or may not be known. Similarly, that which is
+psychical may or may not be physical, moral, or rational; and that which
+is moral or rational may or may not be physical and psychical. There is,
+then, an indeterminism in the universe, a mere coincidence of
+principles, in that it contains physical, psychical, moral, logical
+orders, without being in all respects either a physical, a psychical, a
+moral, or a logical necessity.<a name="FNanchor_420:13_188" id="FNanchor_420:13_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_420:13_188" class="fnanchor">[420:13]</a> Reality or experience itself is
+neutral in the sense of being exclusively predetermined by no one of the
+several systems it contains. But the different systems of experience
+retain their specific and proper natures, without the compromise which
+is involved in all attempts to extend some one until it shall embrace
+them all. If such a universe seems inconceivably desultory and chaotic,
+one may always remind one's self by directly consulting experience that
+it is not only found immediately and unreflectively, but returned to and
+lived in after every theoretical excursion.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Moral Implications of such a Pluralistic Philosophy. Purity
+of the Good.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_214" id="Section_214">214</a>. But what implications for life would be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421"></a>[<a href="./images/421.png">421</a>]</span>contained in such a
+philosophy? Even if it be theoretically clarifying, through being
+hospitable to all differences and adequate to the multifarious demands
+of experience, is it not on that very account morally dreary and
+stultifying? Is not its refusal to establish the universe upon moral
+foundations destructive both of the validity of goodness, and of the
+incentive to its attainment? Certainly not&mdash;if the validity of goodness
+be determined by criteria of worth, and if the incentive to goodness be
+the possibility of making that which merely exists, or is necessary,
+also good.</p>
+
+<p>This philosophy does not, it is true, define the good, but it makes
+ethics autonomous, thus distinguishing the good which it defines, and
+saving it from compromise with matter-of-fact, and logical or mechanical
+necessity. The criticism of life is founded upon an independent basis,
+and affords justification, of a selective and exclusive moral idealism.
+Just because it is not required that the good shall be held accountable
+for whatever is real, the ideal can be kept pure and intrinsically
+worthy. The analogy of logic is most illuminating. If it be insisted
+that whatever exists is logically necessary, logical necessity must be
+made to embrace <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422"></a>[<a href="./images/422.png">422</a>]</span>that from which it is distinguished by definition, such
+as contradiction, mere empirical existence, and error. The consequence
+is a logical chaos which has in truth forfeited the name of logic.
+Similarly a goodness defined to make possible the deduction from it of
+moral evil or moral indifference loses the very distinguishing
+properties of goodness. The consequence is an ethical neutrality which
+invalidates the moral will. A metaphysical neutrality, on the other
+hand, although denying that reality as such is predestined to
+morality&mdash;and thus affording no possibility of an ethical
+absolutism&mdash;becomes the true ground for an ethical purism.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Incentive to Goodness.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_215" id="Section_215">215</a>. But, secondly, there can be no lack of incentive to goodness in a
+universe which, though not all-good, is in no respect incapable of
+becoming good. That which is mechanically or logically necessary, and
+that which is psychically present, <i>may be good</i>. And what can the
+realization of goodness mean if not that what is natural and necessary,
+actual and real, shall be also good. The world is not good, will not be
+good, merely through being what it is, but is or shall be made good
+through the accession of goodness. It is this belief that the real is
+not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423"></a>[<a href="./images/423.png">423</a>]</span>necessarily, but may be, good; that the ideal is not necessarily,
+but may be, realized; which has inspired every faith in action.
+Philosophically it is only a question of permitting such faith to be
+sincere, or condemning it as shallow. If the world be made good through
+good-will, then the faith of moral action is rational; but if the world
+be good because whatever is must be good, then moral action is a
+tread-mill, and its attendant and animating faith only self-deception.
+Moral endeavor is the elevation of physical and psychical existence to
+the level of goodness.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Relate the inheritance to life, convert the tradition into a
+servant of character, draw upon the history for support in the
+struggles of the spirit, declare a war of extermination
+against the total evil of the world; and then raise new armies
+and organize into fighting force every belief available in the
+faith that has descended to you."<a name="FNanchor_423:14_189" id="FNanchor_423:14_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_423:14_189" class="fnanchor">[423:14]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Evil is here a practical, not a theoretical, problem. It is not to be
+solved by thinking it good, for to think it good is to deaden the very
+nerve of action; but by destroying it and replacing it with good.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Justification of Faith.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_216" id="Section_216">216</a>. The justification of faith is in the promise <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424"></a>[<a href="./images/424.png">424</a>]</span>of reality. For
+what, after all, would be the meaning of a faith which declares that all
+things, good, bad, and indifferent, are everlastingly and necessarily
+what they are&mdash;even if it were concluded on philosophical grounds to
+call that ultimate necessity good. Faith has interests; faith is faith
+<i>in</i> goodness or beauty. Then what more just and potent cause of despair
+than the thought that the ideal must be held accountable for error,
+ugliness, and evil, or for the indifferent necessities of
+nature?<a name="FNanchor_424:15_190" id="FNanchor_424:15_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_424:15_190" class="fnanchor">[424:15]</a> Are ideals to be prized the less, or believed in the
+less, when there is no ground for their impeachment? How much more
+hopeful for what is worth the hoping, that nature should discern ideals
+and take some steps toward realizing them, than that ideals should have
+created nature&mdash;such as it is! How much better a report can we give of
+nature for its ideals, than of the ideals for their handiwork, if it be
+nature! Emerson writes:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Suffice it for the joy of the universe that we have not
+arrived at a wall, but at interminable oceans. Our life seems
+not present so much as prospective; not for the affairs on
+which it is wasted, but as a hint of this vast-flowing vigor.
+Most of life seems to be mere <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425"></a>[<a href="./images/425.png">425</a>]</span>advertisement of faculty;
+information is given us not to sell ourselves cheap; that we
+are very great. So, in particulars, our greatness is always in
+a tendency or direction, not in an action. It is for us to
+believe in the rule, not in the exception. The noble are thus
+known from the ignoble. So in accepting the leading of the
+sentiments, it is not what we believe concerning the
+immortality of the soul or the like, but <i>the universal
+impulse to believe</i>, that is the material circumstance and is
+the principal fact in the history of the globe."<a name="FNanchor_425:16_191" id="FNanchor_425:16_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_425:16_191" class="fnanchor">[425:16]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Worship and Service of God.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_217" id="Section_217">217</a>. If God be rid of the imputation of moral evil and indifference,
+he may be <i>intrinsically worshipful</i>, because regarded under the form of
+the highest ideals. And if the great cause of goodness be in fact at
+stake, God may both command the adoration of men through his purity, and
+re&euml;nforce their virtuous living through representing to them that
+realization of goodness in the universe at large which both contains and
+exceeds their individual endeavor.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Philosopher and the Standards of the Marketplace.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_218" id="Section_218">218</a>. Bishop Berkeley wrote in his "Commonplace Book":</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign
+countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my
+heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction."</p></div>
+
+<p>If it be essential to the meaning of philosophy that it should issue
+from life, it is equally essential <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426"></a>[<a href="./images/426.png">426</a>]</span>that it should return to life. But
+this connection of philosophy with life does not mean its reduction to
+the terms of life as conceived in the market-place. Philosophy cannot
+emanate from life, and quicken life, without elevating and ennobling it,
+and will therefore always be incommensurable with life narrowly
+conceived. Hence the philosopher must always be as little understood by
+men of the street as was Thales by the Thracian handmaiden. He has an
+innocence and a wisdom peculiar to his perspective.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer
+to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals
+of anyone, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is
+laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being
+praised and glorified, he cannot help laughing very sincerely
+in the simplicity of his heart; and this again makes him look
+like a fool. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he
+fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of
+cattle&mdash;a swineherd, or shepherd, or cowherd, who is being
+praised for the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them;
+and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of
+whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more
+insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man
+is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any
+shepherd, for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a
+wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed
+proprietors of ten thousand <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427"></a>[<a href="./images/427.png">427</a>]</span>acres and more, our philosopher
+deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to
+think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of
+family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he has
+had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that
+their sentiments only betray the dulness and narrowness of
+vision of those who utter them, and who are not educated
+enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man
+has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them
+have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and
+barbarians, many times over."<a name="FNanchor_427:17_192" id="FNanchor_427:17_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_427:17_192" class="fnanchor">[427:17]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>It is not to be expected that the opinion of the "narrow, keen, little,
+legal mind" should appreciate the philosophy which has acquired the
+"music of speech," and hymns "the true life which is lived by immortals
+or men blessed of heaven." Complacency cannot understand reverence, nor
+secularism, religion.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Secularism of the Present Age.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_219" id="Section_219">219</a>. If we may believe the report of a contemporary philosopher, the
+present age is made insensible to the meaning of life through
+preoccupation with its very achievements:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"The world of finite interests and objects has rounded itself,
+as it were, into a separate whole, within which the mind of
+man can fortify itself, and live <i>securus adversus deos</i>, in
+independence of the infinite. In the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428"></a>[<a href="./images/428.png">428</a>]</span>sphere of <i>thought</i>,
+there has been forming itself an ever-increasing body of
+science, which, tracing out the relation of finite things to
+finite things, never finds it necessary to seek for a
+beginning or an end to its infinite series of phenomena, and
+which meets the claims of theology with the saying of the
+astronomer, 'I do not need that hypothesis.' In the sphere of
+<i>action</i>, again, the complexity of modern life presents a
+thousand isolated interests, crossing each other in ways too
+subtle to trace out&mdash;interests commercial, social, and
+political&mdash;in pursuing one or other of which the individual
+may find ample occupation for his existence, without ever
+feeling the need of any return upon himself, or seeing any
+reason to ask himself whether this endless striving has any
+meaning or object beyond itself."<a name="FNanchor_428:18_193" id="FNanchor_428:18_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_428:18_193" class="fnanchor">[428:18]</a></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Value of Contemplation for Life.</div>
+
+<p class="section">&sect; <a name="Section_220" id="Section_220">220</a>. There is no dignity in living except it be in the solemn presence
+of the universe; and only contemplation can summon such a presence.
+Moreover, the sessions must be not infrequent, for memory is short and
+visions fade. Truth does not require, however, to be followed out of the
+world. There is a speculative detachment from life which is less
+courageous, even if more noble, than worldliness. Such is Dante's
+exalted but medi&aelig;val intellectualism.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"And it may be said that (as true friendship between men
+consists in each wholly loving the other) the true philosopher
+loves every part of wisdom, and wisdom <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429"></a>[<a href="./images/429.png">429</a>]</span>every part of the
+philosopher, inasmuch as she draws all to herself, and allows
+no one of his thoughts to wander to other things."</p></div>
+
+<p>Even though, as Aristotle thought, pure contemplation be alone proper to
+the gods in their perfection and blessedness, for the sublunary world
+this is less worthy than that balance and unity of faculty which
+distinguished the humanity of the Greek.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"Then," writes Thucydides, "we are lovers of the beautiful,
+yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without
+loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and
+ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avoid
+poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing
+nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the
+State because he takes care of his own household; and even
+those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea
+of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in
+public affairs not as a harmless, but as a useless character;
+and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges, of
+a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion,
+not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained
+by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar
+power of thinking before we act, and of acting too, whereas
+other men are courageous from ignorance, but hesitate upon
+reflection."<a name="FNanchor_429:19_194" id="FNanchor_429:19_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_429:19_194" class="fnanchor">[429:19]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Thus life may be broadened and deepened without being made thin and
+ineffectual. As the civil <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430"></a>[<a href="./images/430.png">430</a>]</span>community is related to the individual's
+private interests, so the community of the universe is related to the
+civil community. There is a citizenship in this larger community which
+requires a wider and more generous interest, rooted in a deeper and more
+quiet reflection. The world, however, is not to be left behind, but
+served with a new sense of proportion, with the peculiar fortitude and
+reverence which are the proper fruits of philosophy.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"This is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge,
+if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly
+conjoined and united together than they have been; a
+conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets: Saturn,
+the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet
+of civil society and action."<a name="FNanchor_430:20_195" id="FNanchor_430:20_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_430:20_195" class="fnanchor">[430:20]</a></p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_402:1_176" id="Footnote_402:1_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_402:1_176"><span class="label">[402:1]</span></a> Cf. Josiah Royce: <i>The Spirit of Modern Philosophy</i>,
+Lecture XII; <i>The World and the Individual, Second Series</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_403:2_177" id="Footnote_403:2_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_403:2_177"><span class="label">[403:2]</span></a> Cf. Hugo M&uuml;nsterberg: <i>Psychology and Life</i>. The more
+important writings of this school are: <i>Die Philosophie im Beginn des
+zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts</i>, edited by Wilhelm Windelband, and contributed
+to by Windelband, H. Rickert, O. Liebmann, E. Troeltsch, B. Bauch, and
+others. This book contains an excellent bibliography. Also, Rickert:
+<i>Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis</i>; <i>Die Grenzen der
+naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung</i>, and other works. Windelband:
+<i>Pr&auml;ludien</i>; <i>Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft</i>. M&uuml;nsterberg: <i>Grundz&uuml;ge
+der Psychologie</i>. Eucken: <i>Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_403:3_178" id="Footnote_403:3_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_403:3_178"><span class="label">[403:3]</span></a> Cf. F. A. Lange: <i>History of Materialism</i>, Book II,
+Chap. I, on <i>Kant and Materialism</i>; also Alois Riehl: <i>Introduction to
+the Theory of Science and Metaphysics</i>. Translation by Fairbanks. The
+more important writings of this school are: Hermann Cohen: <i>Kant's
+Theorie der Erfahrung</i>; <i>Die Logik der reinen Erkenntniss</i>, and other
+works. Paul Natorp: <i>Sozialp&auml;dagogik</i>; <i>Einleitung in die Psychologie
+nach kritischer Methode</i>, and other works. E. Cassirer: <i>Leibniz' System
+in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen</i>. Riehl: <i>Der philosophische
+Kriticismus, und seine Bedeutung f&uuml;r die Positive Wissenschaft</i>. Cf.
+also E. Husserl: <i>Logische Untersuchungen</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_404:4_179" id="Footnote_404:4_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_404:4_179"><span class="label">[404:4]</span></a> Cf. J. M. E. McTaggart: <i>Studies in Hegelian
+Cosmology</i>, Chap. III.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_404:5_180" id="Footnote_404:5_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_404:5_180"><span class="label">[404:5]</span></a> Cf. Royce: <i>The Conception of God, Supplementary
+Essay</i>, pp. 135-322; <i>The World and the Individual, First Series</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_405:6_181" id="Footnote_405:6_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_405:6_181"><span class="label">[405:6]</span></a> This movement began as a criticism of Hegelianism in
+behalf of the human personality. Cf. Andrew Seth: <i>Hegelianism and
+Personality</i>; <i>Man and the Cosmos</i>; <i>Two Lectures on Theism</i>. G. H.
+Howison: <i>The Limits of Evolution</i>. The important writings of the more
+independent movement are: William James: <i>The Will to Believe</i>. H.
+Sturt, editor: <i>Personal Idealism, Philosophical Essays by Eight Members
+of Oxford University</i>. F. C. S. Schiller: <i>Humanism</i>. Henri Bergson:
+<i>Essai sur les donn&eacute;es imm&eacute;diates de la conscience</i>; <i>Mati&egrave;re et
+m&eacute;moire</i>. This movement is closely related to that of <i>Pragmatism</i>. See
+under &sect; <a href="#Section_203">203</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_406:7_182" id="Footnote_406:7_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_406:7_182"><span class="label">[406:7]</span></a> Cf. Bertrand Russell: <i>Principles of Mathematics</i>, Vol.
+I. Among the more important writings of this movement are the following:
+Giuseppi Peano: <i>Formulaire de Math&eacute;matique</i>, published by the <i>Rivista
+di matematica</i>, Tom. I-IV. Richard Dedekind: <i>Was sind und was sollen
+die Zahlen?</i> Georg Cantor: <i>Grundlagen einer allgemeinen
+Mannigfaltigkeitslehre</i>. Louis Couturat: <i>De l'Infini Math&eacute;matique</i>, and
+articles in <i>Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale</i>. A. N. Whitehead: <i>A
+Treatise on Universal Algebra</i>. Heinrich Hertz: <i>Die Prinzipien der
+Mechanik</i>. Henri Poincar&eacute;: <i>La Science et l'Hypoth&egrave;se</i>. For the bearing
+of these investigations on philosophy, see Royce: <i>The Sciences of the
+Ideal</i>, in <i>Science</i>, Vol. XX, No. 510.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_407:8_183" id="Footnote_407:8_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_407:8_183"><span class="label">[407:8]</span></a> The term used by Karl Pearson in his <i>Grammar of
+Science</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_408:9_184" id="Footnote_408:9_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_408:9_184"><span class="label">[408:9]</span></a> The important English writings of the recent
+independent movement known as <i>pragmatism</i> are: C. S. Peirce:
+<i>Illustrations of the Logic of Science</i>, in <i>Popular Science Monthly</i>,
+Vol. XII. W. James: <i>The Pragmatic Method</i>, in <i>Journal of Philosophy,
+Psychology, and Scientific Methods</i>, Vol. I; <i>Humanism and Truth</i>, in
+<i>Mind</i>, Vol. XIII, N. S.; <i>The Essence of Humanism</i>, in <i>Jour. of Phil.,
+Psych., and Sc. Meth.</i>, Vol. II (with bibliography); <i>The Will to
+Believe</i>. John Dewey: <i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>. W. Caldwell:
+<i>Pragmatism</i>, in <i>Mind</i>, Vol. XXV., N. S. See also literature on
+<i>personal idealism</i>, &sect; <a href="#Section_201">201</a>. A similar tendency has appeared in France in
+Bergson, LeRoy, Milhaud, and in Germany in Simmel.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_410:10_185" id="Footnote_410:10_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_410:10_185"><span class="label">[410:10]</span></a> Cf. Ernst Mach: <i>Analysis of Sensation</i>. Translation
+by Williams.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_411:11_186" id="Footnote_411:11_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_411:11_186"><span class="label">[411:11]</span></a> Cf. F. H. Bradley: <i>Appearance and Reality</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_413:12_187" id="Footnote_413:12_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_413:12_187"><span class="label">[413:12]</span></a> Cf. Carstanjen: <i>Richard Avenarius, and his General
+Theory of Knowledge, Empiriocriticism</i>. Translation by H. Bosanquet, in
+<i>Mind</i>, Vol. VI, N. S. Also James: <i>Does Consciousness Exist?</i> and <i>A
+World of Pure Experience</i>, in <i>Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth</i>.,
+Vol. I; <i>The Thing and its Relations</i>, <i>ibid.</i>, Vol. II.</p>
+
+<p>The standard literature of this movement is unfortunately not available
+in English. Among the more important writings are: R. Avenarius: <i>Kritik
+der reinen Erfahrung</i>; <i>Der menschliche Weltbegriff</i>, and other works.
+Joseph Petzoldt: <i>Einf&uuml;hrung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung</i>.
+Ernst Mach: <i>Die Analyse der Empfindung und das Verh&auml;ltniss des
+Physischen zum Psychischen, 2. Auff.</i> Wilhelm Schuppe: <i>Grundriss der
+Erkenntnisstheorie und Logik</i>. Friedrich Carstanjen: <i>Einf&uuml;hrung in die
+"Kritik der reinen Erfahrung"</i>&mdash;an exposition of Avenarius. Also
+articles by the above, R. Willy, R. v. Schubert-Soldern, and others, in
+the <i>Vierteljahrsschrift f&uuml;r wissenschaftliche Philosophie</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_420:13_188" id="Footnote_420:13_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_420:13_188"><span class="label">[420:13]</span></a> It is not, of course, denied that there may be other
+orders, such as, <i>e. g.</i>, an &aelig;sthetic order; or that there may be
+definite relations between these orders, such as, <i>e. g.</i>, the
+psycho-physical relation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_423:14_189" id="Footnote_423:14_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_423:14_189"><span class="label">[423:14]</span></a> Quoted from George A. Gordon: <i>The New Epoch for
+Faith</i>, p. 27.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_424:15_190" id="Footnote_424:15_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_424:15_190"><span class="label">[424:15]</span></a> Cf. James: <i>The Will to Believe</i>, essay on <i>The
+Dilemma of Determinism, passim</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_425:16_191" id="Footnote_425:16_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_425:16_191"><span class="label">[425:16]</span></a> <i>Essays, Second Series</i>, p. 75.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_427:17_192" id="Footnote_427:17_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_427:17_192"><span class="label">[427:17]</span></a> Plato: <i>The&aelig;tetus</i>, 174-175. Translation by Jowett.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_428:18_193" id="Footnote_428:18_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_428:18_193"><span class="label">[428:18]</span></a> E. Caird: <i>Literature and Philosophy</i>, Vol. I, pp.
+218-219.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_429:19_194" id="Footnote_429:19_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_429:19_194"><span class="label">[429:19]</span></a> Translation by Jowett. Quoted by Laurie in his
+<i>Pre-Christian Education</i>, p. 213.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_430:20_195" id="Footnote_430:20_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_430:20_195"><span class="label">[430:20]</span></a> Bacon: <i>Advancement of Learning</i>, Book I.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431"></a>[<a href="./images/431.png">431</a>]</span></p>
+<h2>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h2>
+
+
+<p>The references contained in this bibliography have been selected on the
+score of availability in English for the general reader and beginning
+student of philosophy. But I have sought wherever possible to include
+passages from the great philosophers and men of letters. These are
+placed first in the list, followed by references to contemporary writers
+and secondary sources.</p>
+
+
+<p class="sectctr">CHAPTER I, THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Republic</i>, especially Book VII. Translations by Jowett and
+Vaughan. <i>Theaetetus</i>, 172 ff. Translation by Jowett.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Aristotle</span>: <i>Ethics</i>, Book X. Translation by Welldon.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Marcus Aurelius</span>: <i>Thoughts.</i> Translation by Long.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Epictetus</span>: <i>Discourses.</i> Translation by Long.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Bacon</span>: <i>The Advancement of Learning.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Emerson</span>: <i>Representative Men&mdash;Plato; or the Philosopher.</i> <i>Conduct of
+Life&mdash;Culture.</i> <i>Essays, Second Series&mdash;Experience.</i></p>
+
+<hr style='width: 30%;' />
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Royce, Josiah</span>: <i>Spirit of Modern Philosophy.</i> Introduction.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hibben, J. G.</span>: <i>Problems of Philosophy.</i> Introduction.</p>
+
+
+<p class="sectctr">CHAPTER II, POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Republic</i>, Books II and III. Translation by Jowett. (Criticism
+of the poets as demoralizing.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Wordsworth</span>: <i>Observations Prefixed to the Second Edition of the Lyrical
+Ballads.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Shelley</span>: <i>Defence of Poetry.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432"></a>[<a href="./images/432.png">432</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Everett, C. C.</span>: <i>Poetry, Comedy, and Duty.</i> (discussion of the
+Philosophy of Poetry.) <i>Essays, Theological and Literary.</i> (On the
+Poetry of Emerson, Goethe, Tennyson, Browning.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Caird, Edward</span>: <i>Literature and Philosophy.</i> (Wordsworth, Dante, Goethe,
+etc.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Royce, Josiah</span>: <i>Studies of Good and Evil.</i> Essay on <i>Tennyson and
+Pessimism</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Santayana, George</span>: <i>Poetry and Religion.</i> (Philosophy of poetry; Greek
+Poetry, Shakespeare, etc.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Sneath, E. H.</span>: <i>Philosophy in Poetry: A Study of Sir John Davies's Poem,
+"Nosce Teipsum."</i></p>
+
+
+<p class="sectctr"><span class="smcap">Chapters III and IV, Religion.</span></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Republic</i>, Book III. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+(Criticism of religion from the stand-point of morality and politics.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">St. Augustine</span>: <i>Confessions.</i> Translation by Pusey. (Document of
+religious experience.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Thomas &agrave; Kempis</span>: <i>Imitation of Christ.</i> Translation by Stanhope.
+(Medi&aelig;val programme of personal religion.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Spinoza</span>: <i>Theological-political Treatise.</i> Translation by Elwes. (One of
+the first great pleas for religious liberty and one of the first
+attempts to define the <i>essential</i> in religion.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Kant</span>: <i>Critique of Pure Reason&mdash;the Canon of Pure Reason</i>. Translation
+by Max M&uuml;ller. <i>Critique of Practical Reason.</i> Translation by Abbott in
+<i>Theory of Ethics</i>. (Defines religion as the province of faith,
+distinguishes it from knowledge, and relates it to morality.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Schleiermacher</span>: <i>On Religion.</i> <i>Speeches to its Cultured Despisers.</i>
+Translation by Oman. (Ponderous, dogmatic in its philosophy, but
+profound and sympathetic in its understanding of religion.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433"></a>[<a href="./images/433.png">433</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Arnold</span>: <i>Literature and Dogma.</i> (On the essence of religion as
+exemplified in Judaism and Christianity.)</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 30%;' />
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Sabatier, A.</span>: <i>Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based on Psychology
+and History.</i> Translation by Seed. <i>Religions of Authority and the
+Religion of the Spirit.</i> Translation by Houghton. (These books emphasize
+the essential importance of the believer's attitude to God.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">James, William</span>: <i>The Varieties of Religious Experience.</i> (A rich
+storehouse of religion, sympathetically interpreted.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Everett, C. C.</span>: <i>The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith.</i> (A
+study in the definition and meaning of religion.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Caird, Edward</span>: <i>Evolution of Religion.</i> (Indoctrinated with the author's
+idealistic philosophy.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Fielding, H.</span>: <i>The Hearts of Men.</i> (A plea for the universal religion.
+Special feeling for Indian religions.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Harnack, A.</span>: <i>What is Christianity?</i> Translation by Saunders. (Attempt
+to define the <i>essence</i> of Christianity.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Palmer, G. H.</span>: <i>The Field of Ethics</i>, Chapters V and VI. (On the
+relation of ethics and religion.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Brown, W. A.</span>: <i>The Essence of Christianity.</i> (Special study of the
+definition of religion.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Jastrow, M.</span>: <i>The Study of Religion.</i> (Method of history and psychology
+of religion.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Smith, W. Robertson</span>: <i>The Religion of the Semites.</i> (Excellent study of
+tribal religions.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Clarke, W. N.</span>: <i>What Shall We Think of Christianity?</i> (An interpretation
+of Christianity.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Leuba, J. H.</span>: <i>Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion.</i> In
+<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. XI, p. 195.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Starbuck, E. D.</span>: <i>The Psychology of Religion.</i></p>
+
+
+<p class="sectctr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434"></a>[<a href="./images/434.png">434</a>]</span>
+CHAPTER V, THE PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM OF SCIENCE.<a name="FNanchor_434:A_196" id="FNanchor_434:A_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_434:A_196" class="fnanchor">[434:A]</a></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Republic</i>, Book VII, 526 ff. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+<i>Phaedo</i>, 96 ff. Translation by Jowett.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Berkeley</span>: <i>Alciphron</i>, the Fourth Dialogue. <i>Siris</i>, especially 234-264.
+(On the failure of the scientist to grasp the deeper truth respecting
+causes and substances.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Descartes</span>: <i>Discourse on Method.</i> Translation by Veitch.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Spinoza</span>: <i>On the Improvement of the Understanding.</i> Translation by
+Elwes.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Kant</span>: <i>Critique of Pure Reason&mdash;Transcendental &AElig;sthetic</i> and
+<i>Transcendental Analytic.</i> Translation by Max M&uuml;ller. (Studies of the
+Method of Science.)</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 30%;' />
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Ward, James</span>: <i>Naturalism and Agnosticism.</i> (Full but clear account of
+recent development of natural science, and criticism of its use as
+philosophy.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Mach, Ernst</span>: <i>Science of Mechanics.</i> (Historical and methodological.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">James, William</span>: <i>Principles of Psychology</i>, Vol. II, Chap. xxviii.
+(Emphasizes the practical interest underlying science.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Royce, Josiah</span>: <i>The World and the Individual, Second Series, Man and
+Nature.</i> (Interpretation of the province of natural science from the
+stand-point of absolute idealism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Pearson, Karl</span>: <i>The Grammar of Science.</i> (The limits of science from the
+scientific stand-point.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Clifford, W. K.</span>: <i>Lectures and Essays: On the Aims and Instruments of
+Scientific Thought; The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences; On the Ethics
+of Belief.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435"></a>[<a href="./images/435.png">435</a>]</span>
+<span class="smcap">Huxley, T. H.</span>: <i>Method and Results.</i> (The positivistic position.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Muensterberg, Hugo</span>: <i>Psychology and Life.</i> (Epistemological limitations
+of natural science applied to psychology, from idealistic stand-point.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Fullerton, G. E.</span>: <i>A System of Metaphysics</i>, Part II.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Taylor, A. E.</span>: <i>Elements of Metaphysics</i>, Book III.</p>
+
+
+<p class="sectctr">CHAPTERS VI AND VII, THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Dialogues</i>, especially <i>Protagoras</i> and <i>Theaetetus</i>.
+Translation by Jowett. (The actual genesis of special problems.)</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 30%;' />
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Kuelpe, Oswald</span>: <i>Introduction to Philosophy.</i> Translation by Pillsbury
+and Titchener. (Full and accurate account of the traditional terms and
+doctrines of philosophy.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hibben, J. G.</span>: <i>Problems of Philosophy.</i> (Brief and elementary.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Sidgwick, Henry</span>: <i>Philosophy, its Scope and Relations.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Paulsen, Friedrich</span>: <i>Introduction to Philosophy.</i> Translation by Thilly.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Baldwin, J. M.</span>: <i>Dictionary of Philosophy.</i> (Full, and convenient for
+reference.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Ferrier, J. F.</span>: <i>Lectures on Greek Philosophy.</i> (Interpretation of the
+beginning and early development of philosophy.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Burnet, J.</span>: <i>Early Greek Philosophy.</i> Translation of the sources.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Fairbanks, A.</span>: <i>The First Philosophers of Greece.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Gomperz, Th.</span>: <i>Greek Thinkers</i>, Vol. I. Translation by Magnus. (On the
+first development of philosophical problems.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Palmer, G. H.</span>: <i>The Field of Ethics.</i> (On the relations of the ethical
+problem.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Puffer, Ethel</span>: <i>The Psychology of Beauty.</i> (On the relations of the
+&aelig;sthetical problem.)</p>
+
+
+<p class="sectctr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436"></a>[<a href="./images/436.png">436</a>]</span>
+CHAPTER VIII, NATURALISM.<a name="FNanchor_436:A_197" id="FNanchor_436:A_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_436:A_197" class="fnanchor">[436:A]</a></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Lucretius</span>: <i>On the Nature of Things.</i> Translation by Munro. (Early
+materialism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hobbes</span>: <i>Metaphysical System.</i> Edited by Calkins. <i>Leviathan</i>, Part I.
+(Modern materialism.)</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 30%;' />
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Buechner, Louis</span>: <i>Force and Matter.</i> Translation by Collingwood.
+(Nineteenth century materialism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Janet, Paul</span>: <i>Materialism of the Present Day.</i> Translation by Masson.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Lange, F. A.</span>: <i>History of Materialism.</i> Translation by Thomas.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Haeckel, Ernst</span>: <i>The Riddle of the Universe.</i> Translation by McCabe.
+("Monism of Energy.")</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Clifford, W. K.</span>: <i>Lectures and Essays: The Ethics of Belief; Cosmic
+Emotion; Body and Mind.</i> (Positivism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Huxley, T. H.</span>: <i>Evolution and Ethics; Prolegomena.</i> (Distinguishes
+between the moral and natural.) <i>Science and Hebrew Tradition</i>; <i>Science
+and Christian Tradition</i>. (Controversies of the naturalist with
+Gladstone and Duke of Argyle.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Spencer, Herbert</span>: <i>First Principles.</i> (The systematic evolutionary
+philosophy.) <i>Principles of Ethics.</i> (Ethics of naturalism.) <i>The Nature
+and Reality of Religion.</i> (Controversy with Frederick Harrison.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Balfour, A. J.</span>: <i>Foundations of Belief</i>, Part I. (On the religious,
+moral, and &aelig;sthetic consequences of naturalism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Pater, Walter</span>: <i>Marius the Epicurean.</i> (Refined hedonism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Romanes, G. J.</span>: <i>Thoughts on Religion.</i> (Approached from stand-point of
+science.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437"></a>[<a href="./images/437.png">437</a>]</span>
+<span class="smcap">Bentham, J.</span>: <i>Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
+Legislation.</i> (Utilitarian.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Stephen, L.</span>: <i>Science of Ethics.</i> (Evolutionary and social.)</p>
+
+
+<p class="sectctr">CHAPTER IX, SUBJECTIVISM.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Theaetetus.</i> Translation by Jowett. (Exposition and criticism of
+Protagoras.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Berkeley</span>: <i>Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous</i>; <i>Principles of
+Human Knowledge</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hume</span>: <i>An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Schopenhauer</span>: <i>The World as Will and Idea.</i> Translation by Haldane and
+Kemp.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Mill, J. S.</span>: <i>An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy</i>,
+X-XIII.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 30%;' />
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Clifford, W. K.</span>: <i>Lectures and Essays: On the Nature of Things in
+Themselves.</i> (Panpsychism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Deussen, Paul</span>: <i>Elements of Metaphysics.</i> Translation by Duff.
+(Following Schopenhauer and Oriental philosophy.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Paulsen, Fr.</span>: <i>Introduction to Philosophy.</i> (Panpsychism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Strong, C. A.</span>: <i>Why the Mind Has a Body.</i> (Panpsychism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">James, William</span>: <i>Reflex Action and Theism</i>, in <i>The Will to Believe</i>.
+(Morality and religion of individualism.)</p>
+
+
+<p class="sectctr">CHAPTER X, ABSOLUTE REALISM.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Parmenides</span>: <i>Fragments.</i> Arrangement and translation by Burnet or
+Fairbanks.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Republic</i>, Books VI and VII. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+<i>Symposium</i>, <i>Ph&aelig;drus</i>, <i>Ph&aelig;do</i>, <i>Philebus</i>. Translation by Jowett.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Aristotle</span><a name="FNanchor_437:A_198" id="FNanchor_437:A_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_437:A_198" class="fnanchor">[437:A]</a>: <i>Psychology.</i> Translations by Hammond and Wallace.
+<i>Ethics.</i> Translation by Welldon.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438"></a>[<a href="./images/438.png">438</a>]</span>
+<span class="smcap">Spinoza</span>: <i>Ethics</i>, especially Parts I and V. Translations by Elwes and
+Willis.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Leibniz</span>: <i>Monadology</i>, and Selections. Translation by Latta. <i>Discourse
+on Metaphysics.</i> Translation by Montgomery.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Marcus Aurelius</span>: <i>Thoughts.</i> Translation by Long.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Epictetus</span>: <i>Discourses.</i> Translation by Long.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 30%;' />
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Caird, Edward</span>: <i>The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers.</i>
+(The central conceptions of Plato and Aristotle.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Joachim</span>: <i>A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza.</i></p>
+
+
+<p class="sectctr">CHAPTER XI, ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Descartes</span>: <i>Meditations.</i> Translation by Veitch.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Kant</span>: <i>Critique of Pure Reason.</i> Translation by Max M&uuml;ller. <i>Critique of
+Practical Reason.</i> Translation by Abbott, in Kant's <i>Theory of Ethics</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Fichte</span><a href="#Footnote_437:A_198" class="fnanchor">[437:A]</a>: <i>Science of Ethics.</i> Translation by Kroeger. <i>Popular
+Works: The Nature of the Scholar</i>; <i>The Vocation of Man</i>; <i>The Doctrine
+of Religion</i>. Translation by Smith.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Schiller</span>: <i>&AElig;sthetic Letters, Essays, and Philosophical Letters.</i>
+Translation by Weiss. (Romanticism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hegel</span><a href="#Footnote_437:A_198" class="fnanchor">[437:A]</a>: <i>Ethics.</i> Translation by Sterrett. <i>Logic.</i> Translation,
+with Introduction, by Wallace. <i>Philosophy of Mind.</i> Translation, with
+Introduction, by Wallace. <i>Philosophy of Religion.</i> Translation by
+Spiers and Sanderson. <i>Philosophy of Right.</i> Translation by Dyde.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Green, T. H.</span>: <i>Prolegomena to Ethics.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Emerson</span>: <i>The Conduct of Life&mdash;Fate.</i> <i>Essays, First Series&mdash;The
+Over-Soul; Circles.</i> <i>Essays, Second Series&mdash;The Poet; Experience;
+Nature.</i> (The appreciation of life consistent with absolute idealism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Wordsworth</span>: <i>Poems</i>, <i>passim</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Coleridge</span>: <i>Aids to Reflection.</i> <i>The Friend.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439"></a>[<a href="./images/439.png">439</a>]</span>
+<span class="smcap">Royce, J.</span>: <i>Spirit of Modern Philosophy.</i> (Sympathetic exposition of
+Kant, Fichte, Romanticism, and Hegel.) <i>The Conception of God.</i> (The
+epistemological argument.) <i>The World and the Individual, First Series.</i>
+(Systematic development of absolute idealism; its moral and religious
+aspects.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Caird, Edward</span>: <i>The Critical Philosophy of Kant.</i> (Exposition and
+interpretation from stand-point of later idealism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Everett, C. C.</span>: <i>Fichte's Science of Knowledge.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">McTaggart, J. M. E.</span>: <i>Studies in Hegelian Dialectic.</i> Studies in
+Hegelian Cosmology.</p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 90%;" />
+<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_434:A_196" id="Footnote_434:A_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_434:A_196"><span class="label">[434:A]</span></a> For further contemporary writings on this topic, see
+foot-notes under &sect;&sect; <a href="#Footnote_403:2_177">199</a>, <a href="#Footnote_403:3_178">200</a>, <a href="#Footnote_408:9_184">203</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_436:A_197" id="Footnote_436:A_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_436:A_197"><span class="label">[436:A]</span></a> For histories of philosophy, see <a href="#Supplementary_Bibliography">supplementary
+bibliography</a> at end.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_437:A_198" id="Footnote_437:A_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_437:A_198"><span class="label">[437:A]</span></a> The Metaphysics of Aristotle, Fichte, and Hegel must be
+found by the English reader mainly in the secondary sources.</p></div>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="Supplementary_Bibliography" id="Supplementary_Bibliography"></a>SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">I.&mdash;GENERAL.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Rogers</span>: <i>Student's History of Philosophy.</i> (Elementary and clear;
+copious quotations.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Weber</span>: <i>History of Philosophy.</i> Translation by Thilly. (Comprehensive
+and compact.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Windelband</span>: <i>A History of Philosophy.</i> Translation by Tufts. (Emphasis
+upon the problems and their development.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Erdmann</span>: <i>History of Philosophy.</i> Translation edited by Hough; in three
+volumes. (Detailed and accurate exposition.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Ueberweg</span>: <i>A History of Philosophy.</i> Translation by Morris and Porter,
+in two volumes. (Very complete; excellent account of the literature.)</p>
+
+
+<p class="center">II.&mdash;SPECIAL PERIODS.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Ferrier</span>: <i>Lectures on Greek Philosophy.</i> (Excellent introduction.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Marshall</span>: <i>Short History of Greek Philosophy.</i> (Brief and clear.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440"></a>[<a href="./images/440.png">440</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Windelband</span>: <i>History of Ancient Philosophy.</i> Translation by Cushman.
+(Very accurate and scholarly; also brief.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Zeller</span>: <i>Pre-Socratic Philosophy.</i> Translation by Alleyne. <i>Socrates and
+the Socratic Schools.</i> Translation by Reichel. (Full and accurate.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Gomperz</span>: <i>Greek Thinkers.</i> Translated by Magnus, in four volumes. (Very
+full; especially on Plato. Goes no further than Plato.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Burnet</span>: <i>Early Greek Philosophy.</i> (Translations of fragments, with
+commentary.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Fairbanks</span>: <i>The First Philosophers of Greece.</i> (Translations of
+fragments, with commentary.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Turner</span>: <i>History of Philosophy.</i> (Excellent account of Scholastic
+philosophy.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Royce</span>: <i>The Spirit of Modern Philosophy.</i> (Very illuminating
+introductory exposition of modern idealism.)</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Falckenberg</span>: <i>History of Modern Philosophy.</i></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hoeffding</span>: <i>History of Modern Philosophy.</i> Translation by Meyer, in two
+volumes. (Full and good.)</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441"></a>[<a href="./images/441.png">441</a>]</span></p>
+<h2>INDEX</h2>
+
+
+<ul class="list">
+  <li><a name="Absolute" id="Absolute"></a><span class="smcap">Absolute</span>, the, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">being, <a href="#Page_309">308</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">substance, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ideal, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">spirit, <a href="#Footnote_349:1_161">349 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">mind, <a href="#Footnote_349:1_161">349 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><a name="Absolute_Idealism" id="Absolute_Idealism"></a><span class="smcap">Absolute Idealism</span>, <a href="#Chap_XI">chap. xi</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Footnote_349:1_161">349 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_368">368 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as related to Kant, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">direct argument for, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_386">386 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_390">390 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_402">402 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Absolute Realism</span>, <a href="#Chap_X">chap. x</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Footnote_306:1_145">306 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Abstract</span>, the, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Activity</span>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">&AElig;sthetics</span>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Agnosticism" id="Agnosticism"></a><span class="smcap">Agnosticism</span>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Anaxagoras</span>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">quoted, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Anaximander</span>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Anselm, Saint</span>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Anthropomorphism</span>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Appreciation</span>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Aristotle</span>, in formal logic, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">psychology of, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and Plato, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and Spinoza, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on evil, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap"><a name="Atomism" id="Atomism"></a>Atomism</span>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Leucippus">Leucippus</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Democritus">Democritus</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Attitude</span>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Attribute</span>, in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_312">312 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Augustine, Saint</span>, on communion with God, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on pietism, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his conception of self, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Automatism</span>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Baal</span>, religion of, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Bacon, Francis</span>, on thought and action, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Balfour, A. J.</span>, on materialism, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Beauty</span>, in &aelig;sthetics, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Plato, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Being</span>, Eleatic conception of, <a href="#Page_309">308 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><a name="Belief" id="Belief"></a><span class="smcap">Belief</span>, key to definition of religion, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general characters applied to religion, <a href="#Page_59">59 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in persons and dispositions, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">examples of religions, <a href="#Page_66">66 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">object of religions, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation to logic, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Bentham</span>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Berkeley</span>, on idealism, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation to common-sense, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his refutation of material substance, <a href="#Page_275">275 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">theory of mathematics, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his spiritualism, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his conception of God, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Buddhism</span>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Cause</span>, in science, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">God as first, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of motion, <a href="#Page_231">231 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">spirit as, <a href="#Page_293">293 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Christianity</span>, persistence of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">essence of, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">development from Judaism, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">idea of God in, <a href="#Page_200">200 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">emphasis on self-consciousness in, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Comte</span>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Contemplation</span>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Conversion</span>, <a href="#Page_69">69 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><a name="Corporeal_Being" id="Corporeal_Being"></a><span class="smcap">Corporeal Being</span>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">processes of, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Berkeley's critique of, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">historical conceptions of, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442"></a>[<a href="./images/442.png">442</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Cosmological Proof</span>, the, of God, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Cosmology</span>, general meaning of, <a href="#Page_160">159</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">mechanism in, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">teleology in, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Cosmos</span>, origin of, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Critical Method</span>, <a href="#Page_319">319 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Cynicism</span>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Cyrenaicism</span>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Dante</span>, as philosopher-poet, <a href="#Page_42">42 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general meaning of the <i>Divine Comedy</i>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and Thomas Aquinas, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his vision of the ways of God, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on contemplation, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Darwin</span>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Deism</span>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap"><a name="Democritus" id="Democritus"></a>Democritus</span>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Atomism">Atomism</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Descartes</span>, on function of philosophy, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">dualism of, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his theory of space and matter, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">automatism of, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his conception of self, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Description</span>, as method of science, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Dialectic</span>, in Plato, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Hegel, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Diogenes</span>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Dogmatism</span>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Dualism</span>, general meaning, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Descartes, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Duty</span>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Eclecticism</span>, contemporary, <a href="#Page_398">398 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Eleatics.</span></li>
+    <li class="subitem">See under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Parmenides">Parmenides</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Zeno">Zeno</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Emerson</span>, on spirit, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on nature, <a href="#Page_364">364</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on absolute, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on necessity, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on faith, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Empiricism</span>, general meaning, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in logic, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in naturalism, <a href="#Page_252">252 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Locke, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Berkeley, <a href="#Page_274">274 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Energy</span>, development of, conception of, <a href="#Page_236">236 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><a name="Epistemology" id="Epistemology"></a><span class="smcap">Epistemology</span>, relation to metaphysics, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">definition of, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">fundamental problems of, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">argument for God from, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of naturalism, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Descartes, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Berkeley, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of absolute realism, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Leibniz, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Plato, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Hume, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Aristotle, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_408">408 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Eternal</span>, the, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Ether</span>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Ethics</span>, relation to metaphysics, <a href="#Page_152">151</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">its origin in Socratic method, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">definition of, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">special problems and theories in, <a href="#Page_191">191 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Socrates, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Aristotle, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of naturalism, <a href="#Page_258">258 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of subjectivism, <a href="#Page_298">298 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">argument for God from, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">individualism in, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">pluralism in, <a href="#Page_305">302</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Stoics and Spinoza, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Platonic, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Kant, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Eud&aelig;monism</span>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Evil, Problem of</span>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Greek philosophy, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Evolution</span>, of cosmos, <a href="#Page_242">242 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of morality, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Experience</span>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">analysis of, by Kant, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Faith</span>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">special interests of, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">See also <span class="smcap"><a href="#Religion">Religion</a></span> and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Belief">Belief</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Ferguson, Chas.</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Fichte</span>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Fielding, H.</span>, quoted on religion, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Force</span>, development of conception of, <a href="#Page_231">231 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Form</span>, in Aristotle, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Freedom</span>, in ethics, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">meanings and theories, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">God</span>, as guarantee of ideals, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">personality of, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">St. Augustine's communion with, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">presence of, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443"></a>[<a href="./images/443.png">443</a>]</span>  as a disposition from which consequences may be expected, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">meaning of, in religion, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">idea of, in Judaism and Christianity, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">why historical, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">social relation with, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">the ontological proof of, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethical and epistemological arguments for, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">cosmological proof of, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">teleological proof of, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation to the world, in theism, pantheism and deism, <a href="#Page_205">205 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">will of, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">conception of, in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">conception and proof of, in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_312">312 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">conception of, in Plato, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">conception of, in Leibniz, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Absolute">Absolute</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Goethe</span>, on Spinoza, and on philosophy, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on pragmatism, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Good</span>, the, theories of, in ethics, <a href="#Page_191">191 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and the real, <a href="#Page_326">326 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Greek</span>, religion, in Homer and Lucretius, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ideals, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Green, T. H.</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Footnote_385:11_171">385 (<i>note</i>)</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Haeckel</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Hedonism</span>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Hegel</span>, on science, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation to Kant, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on the absolute, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_390">390</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Heraclitus</span>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">History</span>, philosophy of, in Hegel, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Hobbes</span>, his misconception of relations of philosophy and science, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">quoted on ethics, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Holbach</span>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Homer</span>, on Greek religion, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Humanism</span>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Hume</span>, positivism of, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">phenomenalism of, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and Descartes, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Huxley</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Hylozoism</span>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Ideal" id="Ideal"></a><span class="smcap">Ideal</span>, the, in Plato, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">validity of, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Idealism</span>, various meanings of term, <a href="#Footnote_173:16_64">173 (<i>note</i>)</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">meaning of, as theory of knowledge, <a href="#Page_175">175 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_409">409</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_409">409 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">empirical, see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Subjectivism">Subjectivism</a>, <a href="#Phenomenalism">Phenomenalism</a>, <a href="#Spiritualism">Spiritualism</a></span>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">absolute, see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Absolute_Idealism">Absolute Idealism</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Ideals</span>, in life, <a href="#Page_10">10 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">adoption of, <a href="#Page_17">17 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Ideas</span>, the, in Plato, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Imagination</span>, in poetry, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">place of, in religion, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">special functions of, in religion, <a href="#Page_101">101 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">scope of, in religion, <a href="#Page_105">105 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and the personality of God, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Imitatio Christi</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Immanence Theory</span>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Immortality</span>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Individualism</span>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Intuitionism</span>, in ethics, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">James, William</span>, quoted on religion, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Judaism</span>, development of, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and Christianity, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Kant</span>, his transcendentalism, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his critique of knowledge, <a href="#Page_354">354 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Kepler</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Knowledge</span>, of the means in life, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of the end, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in poetry, <a href="#Page_27">27 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in religion, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general theory of, on epistemology, <a href="#Page_164">164 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">problem of source and criterion of, <a href="#Page_168">168 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">problem of relation to its object, <a href="#Page_172">172 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation of logic to, <a href="#Page_183">183 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">account of, in naturalism, <a href="#Page_253">253 ff.</a></li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Epistemology">Epistemology</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">La Mettrie</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">La Place</span>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">quoted, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Leibniz</span>, on function of philosophy, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444"></a>[<a href="./images/444.png">444</a>]</span><span class="smcap"><a name="Leucippus" id="Leucippus"></a>Leucippus</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Life</span>, as a starting-point for thought, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">definition of, <a href="#Page_5">5 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and self-consciousness, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy of <a href="#Page_17">17 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">mechanical theory of, <a href="#Page_245">244 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">return of philosophy to, <a href="#Page_427">427 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">contemplation in, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Locke</span>, epistemology of, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Logic</span>, origin in Socratic method, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">affiliations of, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">definition of, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">parts of formal, <a href="#Page_184">184 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">present tendencies in, <a href="#Page_187">187 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">algebra of, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Lucretius</span>, his criticism of Greek religion, quoted, <a href="#Page_89">89 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on mechanism, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">McTaggart, J. M. E.</span>, on Hegel, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on the absolute, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Mach, E.</span>, <a href="#Footnote_283:14_128">283</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on philosophy and science, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Malebranche</span>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Marcus Aurelius</span>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Materialism" id="Materialism"></a><span class="smcap">Materialism</span>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">development, <a href="#Page_224">224 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and science, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">French, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">theory of mind in, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Mathematics</span>, importance in science, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">logic in, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Berkeley's conception of, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Plato's conception of, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Spinoza's conception of, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Matter</span>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and space, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Berkeley's refutation of, <a href="#Page_275">275 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Plato and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Mechanical Theory</span>, practical significance of its extension to the world at large, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in cosmology, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Descartes, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Newton <a href="#Page_232">232</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of origin of cosmos, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of life, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Metaphysics</span>, relation to epistemology, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation to ethics, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">definition of, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation to logic, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation to theology, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">present tendencies in, <a href="#Page_399">399 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Mill</span>, J. S., <a href="#Footnote_283:14_128">283 (<i>note</i>)</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Mind" id="Mind"></a><span class="smcap">Mind</span>, explanation of in naturalism, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of God, in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">absolute, <a href="#Footnote_349:1_161">349 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382 ff.</a></li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Self">Self</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Soul">Soul</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Mode</span>, in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Monads</span>, in Leibniz, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Monism</span>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Morality</span>, and religion, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">grounds of, according to Kant, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">incentive to, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Mysticism</span>, general account, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Schopenhauer's, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">types of religions, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Naegeli</span>, C. v., quoted, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Natural_Science" id="Natural_Science"></a><span class="smcap">Natural Science</span>, true relations of, with philosophy, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">sphere of, with reference to philosophy, <a href="#Page_117">117 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy of, its procedure, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">origin of, as special interest, <a href="#Page_123">123 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">human value of, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">method and fundamental conceptions of, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general development of, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">limits of, because abstract, <a href="#Page_136">136 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">validity of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">logic and, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">development of conceptions in, <a href="#Page_229">229 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">grounds of, according to Kant, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Hume on, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">permanence and progress in, <a href="#Page_395">395 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Natural Selection</span>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Naturalism" id="Naturalism"></a><span class="smcap">Naturalism</span>, <a href="#Chap_VIII">chap. viii</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Footnote_223:1_88">223 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">claims of, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">task of, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Materialism">Materialism</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Positivism">Positivism</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Nature</span>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Hegel, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Kant, <a href="#Page_377">377 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in contemporary philosophy, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Natural_Science">Natural Science</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Naturalism">Naturalism</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Nebular Hypothesis</span>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Necessity</span>, of will, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445"></a>[<a href="./images/445.png">445</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Neo-Fichteans</span>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Footnote_403:2_177">403 (<i>note</i>)</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Neo-Kantians</span>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Newton</span>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Normative_Sciences" id="Normative_Sciences"></a><span class="smcap">Normative Sciences</span>, the, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Omar Khayyam</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as a philosopher-poet, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Ontological Proof</span>, of God, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Ontology</span>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Optimism</span>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Panpsychism</span>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Pantheism</span>, in primitive religion, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">types of, <a href="#Page_390">390</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Parker, Theodore</span>, quoted on religion, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Parmenides" id="Parmenides"></a><span class="smcap">Parmenides</span>, and rationalism, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_308">308 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Pater, Walter</span>, on Wordsworth, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on Cyrenaicism, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on subjectivism, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Paulsen, Friedrich</span>, ethics of, quoted, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Pearson, Karl</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Perception.</span> See <span class="smcap"><a href="#Sense_perception">Sense-perception</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Personal Idealism</span>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Personality</span>, of God, important in understanding of religion, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">essential to religion? <a href="#Page_108">108 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Persons</span>, description of belief in, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">imagination of, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Pessimism</span>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Phenomenalism" id="Phenomenalism"></a><span class="smcap">Phenomenalism</span>, general meaning, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Footnote_267:1_115">267 (<i>note</i>)</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Berkeley, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Hume, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">various tendencies in, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Philosopher</span>, the practical man and the, <a href="#Chap_I">chap. i</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">the r&ocirc;le of the, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Philosophy</span>, commonly misconceived, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of the devotee, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of the man of affairs, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of the voluptuary, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of life, its general meaning, <a href="#Page_17">17 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">its relations with poetry, <a href="#Chap_II">chap. ii</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">lack of, in Shakespeare, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as expression of personality, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as premature, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in poetry of Omar Khayyam, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in poetry of Wordsworth, <a href="#Page_38">38 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in poetry of Dante, <a href="#Page_42">42 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">difference between philosophy and poetry, <a href="#Page_48">48 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in religion, <a href="#Page_108">108 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">compared with religion, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">true attitude of, toward science, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">sphere of, in relation to science, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">procedure of, with reference to science, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">human value of, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">can its problem be divided? <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">origin of, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">special problems of, <a href="#Chap_VI">chap. vi</a>, <a href="#Chap_VII">vii</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and psychology, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">peculiar object of, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">self-criticism in, <a href="#Page_319">319 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">permanence and progress in, <a href="#Page_395">395 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">contemporary, <a href="#Page_398">398 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Physical.</span></li>
+    <li class="subitem">See <span class="smcap"><a href="#Corporeal_Being">Corporeal Being</a>, <a href="#Materialism">Materialism</a></span>, etc.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Physiology</span>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Piety</span>, description and interpretation of, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in ethics, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Plato</span>, on Protagoras, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">quoted, on Socrates, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">historical preparation for, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">psychology of, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and Spinoza, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on evil, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on spirit, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on reason and perception, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">on the philosopher, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Pluralism</span>, general meaning of, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in ethics, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in religion, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Poetry</span>, relations with philosophy, <a href="#Chap_II">chap. ii</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as appreciation, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">virtue of sincerity in, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">the "barbarian" in, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">constructive knowledge in, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">difference between philosophy and, <a href="#Page_48">48 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><a name="Positivism" id="Positivism"></a><span class="smcap">Positivism</span>, on relation of philosophy and science, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446"></a>[<a href="./images/446.png">446</a>]</span> <a href="#Page_122">122</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general meaning of, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Practical Knowledge</span>, of means, <a href="#Page_8">8 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of end or purpose, <a href="#Page_10">10 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">implied in religion, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy as, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Practical Man</span>, the, and the philosopher, <a href="#Chap_I">chap. i</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his failure to understand philosophy, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his ideal, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">virtually a philosopher, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Pragmatism</span>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Prayer</span>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Prediction</span>, in science, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Present Day</span>, philosophy of the, <a href="#Page_398">398 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Protagoras</span>, scepticism of, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">subjectivism of, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Psychology</span>, of religion, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">inadequate to religion, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as branch of philosophy, <a href="#Page_208">208 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as natural science, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">affiliations of, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">limits of, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Psycho-physical Parallelism</span>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Footnote_252:18_105">252</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Purpose</span>, in life, <a href="#Page_10">10 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">adoption of life-purpose, <a href="#Page_17">17 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">practical significance of, in the world at large, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Teleology">Teleology</a>, <a href="#Ideal">Ideal</a></span>, etc.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Qualities</span>, primary and secondary, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Rationalism" id="Rationalism"></a><span class="smcap">Rationalism</span>, general meaning, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in logic, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in ethics, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of eleatics, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Spinoza, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in absolute realism, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Realism</span>, various meanings of term, <a href="#Footnote_173:16_64">173 (<i>note</i>)</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">meaning of, as theory of knowledge, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Parmenides, <a href="#Page_308">308 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Plato and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_409">409 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Reason</span>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">See <span class="smcap"><a href="#Rationalism">Rationalism</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Relativism</span>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in ethics, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Religion" id="Religion"></a><span class="smcap">Religion</span>, chaps. <a href="#Chap_III">iii</a>, <a href="#Chap_IV">iv</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation to poetry and philosophy, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">difficulty of defining, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">possibility of defining, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">profitableness of defining, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">true method of defining, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">misconceptions of, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as possessing the psychological character of belief, <a href="#Page_59">59 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">degree of, in individuals and moods, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">definition of, as belief in disposition of universe, <a href="#Page_65">64 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and morality, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">symbolism in, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">prophet and preacher of, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">conveyance of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">primitive, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Buddhism, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">the critical or enlightened type of, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">means to be true, <a href="#Page_82">82 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">implies a practical truth, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">cases of truth and error in, <a href="#Page_88">88 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Baal, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Greek, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Jews, its development, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Christian, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">definition of cognitive factor in, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">place of imagination in, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">special functions of imagination in, <a href="#Page_101">101 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation of imagination and truth in, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy implied in, <a href="#Page_108">108 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">is personal god essential to, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">compared with philosophy, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">compared with science, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">special philosophical problems of, <a href="#Page_199">199 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of naturalism, <a href="#Page_263">263 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of subjectivism and spiritualism, <a href="#Page_302">302 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Plato and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Stoics and Spinoza, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy of, in Hegel, <a href="#Page_367">365</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_390">390 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Religious Phenomena</span>, interpretation of, <a href="#Page_69">69 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Representative Theory</span>, of knowledge, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Romanticism</span>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Rousseau</span>, quoted on nature, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Royce, Josiah</span>, quoted on absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Santayana, George</span>, quoted on poetry <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447"></a>[<a href="./images/447.png">447</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Scepticism</span>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267 ff.</a></li>
+    <li class="subitem">See under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Positivism">Positivism</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Agnosticism">Agnosticism</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Schelling</span>, misconception of science, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Scholasticism</span>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">idea of God in, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Schopenhauer</span>, his panpsychism or voluntarism, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">universalizes subjectivism, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">mysticism of, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Science</span>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Natural_Science">Natural Science</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Normative_Sciences">Normative Science</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Secularism</span>, of Shakespeare, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Periclean Age, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of present age, <a href="#Page_427">427</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Self" id="Self"></a><span class="smcap">Self</span>, problem of, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">proof of, in St. Augustine, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">proof of, in Descartes, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">deeper moral of, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in contemporary philosophy, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Soul">Soul</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Mind">Mind</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Self-consciousness</span>, essential to human life, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">development of conception of, <a href="#Page_371">371 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in idealistic ethics, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Sensationalism</span>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Sense_perception" id="Sense_perception"></a><span class="smcap">Sense-perception</span>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">being as, in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Shakespeare</span>, general criticism of, <a href="#Page_30">30 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his universality, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">lack of philosophy in, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Shelley</span>, quoted on poetry, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Social Relations</span>, belief inspired by, analogue of religion, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">imagination of, extended to God, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Socrates</span>, rationalism of, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and normative science, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">method of, <a href="#Page_321">321 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Sophists</span>, the, epistemology of, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">scepticism of, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">age of, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Soul" id="Soul"></a><span class="smcap">Soul</span>, the, in Aristotle, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Plato, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as substance, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">intellectualism and voluntarism in theory of, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">immortality of, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Berkeley's theory of, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Also see under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Mind">Mind</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Self">Self</a></span>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Space</span>, importance in science, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and matter, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Spencer</span>, <a href="#Footnote_236:8_95">236 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Spinoza</span>, and Goethe, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">quoted on philosophy and life, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">criticism and estimate of, <a href="#Page_315">315 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and Plato, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Spirit</span>, the absolute, <a href="#Page_358">358 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><a name="Spiritualism" id="Spiritualism"></a><span class="smcap">Spiritualism</span>, general meaning, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Footnote_267:1_115">267 (<i>note</i>)</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">objective, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Stevenson</span>, R. L., quoted on religion, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Stoicism</span>, ethics of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Subjectivism" id="Subjectivism"></a><span class="smcap">Subjectivism</span>, <a href="#Chap_IX">chap. ix</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Footnote_267:1_115">267 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in &aelig;sthetics, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of Berkeley, <a href="#Page_275">275 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">universalization of, in Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_298">298 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_409">409</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Substance</span>, spiritual, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">material, Berkeley's refutation of, <a href="#Page_275">275 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Spinoza's conception of, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">the infinite, in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Aristotle's conception of, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Leibniz's conception of, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Symbolism</span>, in religion, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Teleology" id="Teleology"></a><span class="smcap">Teleology</span>, in cosmology, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">proof of God from, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">Spinoza on, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Plato, <a href="#Page_326">326 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Aristotle, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Theism</span>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Theology</span>, relation to religion, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in philosophy, <a href="#Page_199">199 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">relation to metaphysics, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Thomson, J.</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Thought</span>, and life, <a href="#Page_6">6 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as being, in Hegel, <a href="#Page_361">361 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448"></a>[<a href="./images/448.png">448</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Thucydides</span>, on thought and action, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Time</span>, importance in science, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Transcendentalism</span>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Footnote_349:1_161">349 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>.</li>
+    <li class="subitem">See <a href="#Absolute_Idealism"><span class="smcap">Idealism</span>, absolute</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Tyndall</span>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Universal</span>, scientific knowledge as, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Universe</span>, the, as object of religious reaction, <a href="#Page_65">64</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">common object of philosophy and religion, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as collective, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Utilitarianism</span>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Virtue</span>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Voltaire</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Voluntarism</span>, in psychology, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Whitman, Walt</span>, <a href="#Page_27">27 ff.</a></li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Will</span>, in psychology, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">freedom and determination of, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">as cause, in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_293">293 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">in pragmatism, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>.</li>
+
+  <li><span class="smcap">Wordsworth</span>, as philosopher-poet, <a href="#Page_38">38 ff.</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">his sense for the universal, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li>
+    <li class="subitem">quoted on poetry and philosophy, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>.</li>
+
+  <li>&nbsp;</li>
+
+  <li><a name="Zeno" id="Zeno"></a><span class="smcap">Zeno</span>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<div class="notebox">
+<h2>TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:</h2>
+
+<p>Pages vi, 2, 148, 220, and 222 are blank in the original.</p>
+
+<p>Ellipses match the original.</p>
+
+<p>Variations in spelling have been left as in the original. Examples
+include the following:</p>
+
+<table summary="spelling variants in original" style="margin-left: 10%" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="3">
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft">co-ordinated</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">co&ouml;rdinated</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft">Kuelpe</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">K&uuml;lpe's</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft">Muensterberg</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">M&uuml;nsterberg</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft">Nirvana</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Nirv&acirc;na</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft">Phaedo</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">Ph&aelig;do</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft">pre-eminent</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">pre&euml;minent</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft">pre-eminently</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">pre&euml;minently</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft" style="padding-right: 5em;">reenforcement</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">re&euml;nforce</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft">role</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">r&ocirc;le</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdleft">Theaetetus</td>
+  <td class="tdleft">The&aelig;tetus</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>The following corrections have been made to the text:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Page xv: <span class="smcap">Chapter VI. Metaphysics and Epistemology</span>{original has
+<span class="smcap">Epistomology</span>}</p>
+
+<p>Page 70: The psychology{original has pyschology} of conversion</p>
+
+<p>Page 93: him who practices{original has practises} the social
+virtues</p>
+
+<p>Page 165: reality have resulted in no consensus{original has
+concensus} of opinion</p>
+
+<p>Page 196: but in a law to which it{original has its} owes
+obedience</p>
+
+<p>Page 261: 'justice,' 'gratitude,' '{quotation mark missing in
+original}modesty,'</p>
+
+<p>Page 283: retained after their original{original has orignal}
+meaning</p>
+
+<p>Page 288: nothing but the highest development{original has
+devolpment} on our earth</p>
+
+<p>Page 325: philosopher who defined being as{original has a} the
+ideal</p>
+
+<p>Page 405: Henri Bergson: <i>Essai</i>{original has <i>Essoi</i>} <i>sur les
+donn&eacute;es imm&eacute;diates de la conscience</i></p>
+
+<p>Page 434: <span class="smcap">Thomas</span> &agrave;{original has &aacute;} <span class="smcap">Kempis</span>: <i>Imitation of
+Christ.</i></p>
+
+<p>Page 436: <span class="smcap">Huxley, T. H.</span>: <i>Evolution and Ethics;
+Prolegomena.</i>{original has Prologomena}</p>
+
+<p>[51:11] Vol. I, p. 60.{period is missing in original}</p>
+
+<p>[199:14] religion in these matters, cf.{original has Cf.}
+Descartes:</p>
+
+<p>[287:16] Translation by Haldane and Kemp{original has Komp}</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's The Approach to Philosophy, by Ralph Barton Perry
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+Project Gutenberg's The Approach to Philosophy, by Ralph Barton Perry
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Approach to Philosophy
+
+Author: Ralph Barton Perry
+
+Release Date: April 19, 2008 [EBook #25110]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Stephen Hope, Fox in the Stars, Lisa Reigel,
+and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's Notes: Some typographical errors have been corrected. A
+complete list follows the text. Words in Greek in the original are
+transliterated and placed between +plus signs+. In the transliterations
+e: and o: represent the vowel with a circumflex. Words italicized in
+the original are surrounded by _underscores_.
+
+
+
+
+THE
+APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+BY PROF. RALPH BARTON PERRY
+
+  THE FREE MAN AND THE SOLDIER
+  THE MORAL ECONOMY
+  THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
+
+
+
+
+THE APPROACH TO
+PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+BY
+
+RALPH BARTON PERRY, PH.D.
+  ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
+
+
+CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
+  NEW YORK CHICAGO BOSTON
+
+
+COPYRIGHT, 1905, BY
+CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
+
+Printed in the United States of America
+F
+
+
+
+
+THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED TO
+
+MY FATHER
+
+AS A TOKEN OF MY LOVE AND ESTEEM
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+In an essay on "The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time,"
+Professor Edward Caird says that "philosophy is not a first venture into
+a new field of thought, but the rethinking of a secular and religious
+consciousness which has been developed, in the main, independently of
+philosophy."[vii:A] If there be any inspiration and originality in this
+book, they are due to my great desire that philosophy should appear in
+its vital relations to more familiar experiences. If philosophy is, as
+is commonly assumed, appropriate to a phase in the development of every
+individual, it should _grow out_ of interests to which he is already
+alive. And if the great philosophers are indeed never dead, this fact
+should manifest itself in their classic or historical representation of
+a perennial outlook upon the world. I am not seeking to attach to
+philosophy a fictitious liveliness, wherewith to insinuate it into the
+good graces of the student. I hope rather to be true to the meaning of
+philosophy. For there is that in its stand-point and its problem which
+makes it universally significant entirely apart from dialectic and
+erudition. These are derived interests, indispensable to the scholar,
+but quite separable from that modicum of philosophy which helps to make
+the man. The present book is written for the sake of elucidating the
+inevitable philosophy. It seeks to make the reader more solicitously
+aware of the philosophy that is in him, or to provoke him to philosophy
+in his own interests. To this end I have sacrificed all else to the task
+of mediating between the tradition and technicalities of the academic
+discipline and the more common terms of life.
+
+The purpose of the book will in part account for those shortcomings that
+immediately reveal themselves to the eye of the scholar. In Part I
+various great human interests have been selected as points of departure.
+I have sought to introduce the general stand-point and problem of
+philosophy through its implication in practical life, poetry, religion,
+and science. But in so doing it has been necessary for me to deal
+shortly with topics of great independent importance, and so risk the
+disfavor of those better skilled in these several matters. This is
+evidently true of the chapter which deals with natural science. But the
+problem which I there faced differed radically from those of the
+foregoing chapters, and the method of treatment is correspondingly
+different. In the case of natural science one has to deal with a body of
+knowledge which is frequently regarded as the only knowledge. To write a
+chapter about science from a philosophical stand-point is, in the
+present state of opinion, to undertake a polemic against exclusive
+naturalism, an attitude which is itself philosophical, and as such is
+well known in the history of philosophy as _positivism_ or
+_agnosticism_. I have avoided the polemical spirit and method so far as
+possible, but have, nevertheless, here taken sides against a definite
+philosophical position. This chapter, together with the Conclusion, is
+therefore an exception to the purely introductory and expository
+representation which I have, on the whole, sought to give. The
+relatively great space accorded to the discussion of religion is, in my
+own belief, fair to the general interest in this topic, and to the
+intrinsic significance of its relation to philosophy.
+
+I have in Part II undertaken to furnish the reader with a map of the
+country to which he has been led. To this end I have attempted a brief
+survey of the entire programme of philosophy. An accurate and full
+account of philosophical terms can be found in such books as Kuelpe's
+"Introduction to Philosophy" and Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy,"
+and an attempt to emulate their thoroughness would be superfluous, even
+if it were conformable to the general spirit of this book. The scope of
+Part II is due in part to a desire for brevity, but chiefly to the hope
+of furnishing an epitome that shall follow the course of the _natural
+and historical differentiation_ of the general philosophical problem.
+
+Finally, I have in Part III sought to present the tradition of
+philosophy in the form of general types. My purpose in undertaking so
+difficult a task is to acquaint the reader with philosophy in the
+concrete; to show how certain underlying principles may determine the
+whole circle of philosophical ideas, and give them unity and distinctive
+flavor. Part II offers a general classification of philosophical
+problems and conceptions independently of any special point of view. But
+I have in Part III sought to emphasize the point of view, or the
+internal consistency that makes a _system of philosophy_ out of certain
+answers to the special problems of philosophy. In such a division into
+types, lines are of necessity drawn too sharply. There will be many
+historical philosophies that refuse to fit, and many possibilities
+unprovided for. I must leave it to the individual reader to overcome
+this abstractness through his own reflection upon the intermediate and
+variant stand-points.
+
+Although the order is on the whole that of progressive complexity, I
+have sought to treat each chapter with independence enough to make it
+possible for it to be read separately; and I have provided a carefully
+selected bibliography in the hope that this book may serve as a stimulus
+and guide to the reading of other books.
+
+The earlier chapters have already appeared as articles: Chapter I in the
+_International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. XIII, No. 4; Chapter II in the
+_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, No. 6; Chapter III in the _Monist_,
+Vol. XIV, No. 5; Chapter IV in the _International Journal of Ethics_,
+Vol. XV, No. 1; and some paragraphs of Chapter V in the _Journal of
+Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol. I, No. 7. I am
+indebted to the editors of these periodicals for permission to reprint
+with minor changes.
+
+In the writing of this, my first book, I have been often reminded that
+a higher critic, skilled in the study of internal evidence, could
+probably trace all of its ideas to suggestions that have come to me from
+my teachers and colleagues of the Department of Philosophy in Harvard
+University. I have unscrupulously forgotten what of their definite ideas
+I have adapted to my own use, but not that I received from them the
+major portion of my original philosophical capital. I am especially
+indebted to Professor William James for the inspiration and resources
+which I have received from his instruction and personal friendship.
+
+                                              RALPH BARTON PERRY.
+
+CAMBRIDGE, March, 1905.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[vii:A] Edw. Caird: _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 207.
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+
+PART I
+
+APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY
+                                                                    PAGE
+
+CHAPTER I. THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER                       3
+
+  Sect.   1. Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?                 3
+  Sect.   2. Life as a Starting-point for Thought                      4
+  Sect.   3. The Practical Knowledge of Means                          8
+  Sect.   4. The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose            10
+  Sect.   5. The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and
+                 the Voluptuary                                       12
+  Sect.   6. The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life      17
+
+CHAPTER II. POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY                                     24
+
+  Sect.   7. Who is the Philosopher-Poet?                             24
+  Sect.   8. Poetry as Appreciation                                   25
+  Sect.   9. Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman                             27
+  Sect.  10. Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare            30
+  Sect.  11. Philosophy in Poetry. The World-view. Omar Khayyam       36
+  Sect.  12. Wordsworth                                               38
+  Sect.  13. Dante                                                    42
+  Sect.  14. The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy             48
+
+CHAPTER III. THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE                                 53
+
+  Sect.  15. The Possibility of Defining Religion                     53
+  Sect.  16. The Profitableness of Defining Religion                  54
+  Sect.  17. The True Method of Defining Religion                     56
+  Sect.  18. Religion as Belief                                       59
+  Sect.  19. Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude          62
+  Sect.  20. Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual
+                 Environment, or Universe                             64
+  Sect.  21. Examples of Religious Belief                             66
+  Sect.  22. Typical Religious Phenomena. Conversion                  69
+  Sect.  23. Piety                                                    72
+  Sect.  24. Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of
+                 Conveyance                                           74
+  Sect.  25. Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions        77
+  Sect.  26. Buddhism                                                 78
+  Sect.  27. Critical Religion                                        79
+
+CHAPTER IV. THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION                82
+
+  Sect.  28. Resume of Psychology of Religion                         82
+  Sect.  29. Religion Means to be True                                82
+  Sect.  30. Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a
+                 Disposition from which Consequences May Rationally
+                 be Expected                                          85
+  Sect.  31. Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The
+                 Religion of Baal                                     88
+  Sect.  32. Greek Religion                                           89
+  Sect.  33. Judaism and Christianity                                 92
+  Sect.  34. The Cognitive Factor in Religion                         96
+  Sect.  35. The Place of Imagination in Religion                     97
+  Sect.  36. The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination      101
+  Sect.  37. The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion  105
+  Sect.  38. The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions     108
+
+CHAPTER V. NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY                            114
+
+  Sect.  39. The True Relations of Philosophy and Science.
+                 Misconceptions and Antagonisms                      114
+  Sect.  40. The Spheres of Philosophy and Science                   117
+  Sect.  41. The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science                120
+  Sect.  42. The Origin of the Scientific Interest                   123
+  Sect.  43. Skill as Free                                           123
+  Sect.  44. Skill as Social                                         126
+  Sect.  45. Science for Accommodation and Construction              127
+  Sect.  46. Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science.
+                 The Descriptive Method                              128
+  Sect.  47. Space, Time, and Prediction                             130
+  Sect.  48. The Quantitative Method                                 132
+  Sect.  49. The General Development of Science                      134
+  Sect.  50. The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science      135
+  Sect.  51. Natural Science is Abstract                             136
+  Sect.  52. The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth                    139
+  Sect.  53. But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality               142
+  Sect.  54. Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy      143
+
+
+PART II
+
+THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+CHAPTER VI. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY                             149
+
+  Sect.  55. The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the
+                 Problem of Philosophy                               149
+  Sect.  56. The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems
+                 upon the Initial Interest                           152
+  Sect.  57. Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life                152
+  Sect.  58. Philosophy as the Extension of Science                  154
+  Sect.  59. The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical
+                 Problem                                             155
+  Sect.  60. Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception         157
+  Sect.  61. Monism and Pluralism                                    159
+  Sect.  62. Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process        159
+  Sect.  63. Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies                 160
+  Sect.  64. Dualism                                                 162
+  Sect.  65. The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism                 163
+  Sect.  66. Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of
+                 Knowledge                                           164
+  Sect.  67. Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism                  166
+  Sect.  68. The Source and Criterion of Knowledge according to
+                 Empiricism and Rationalism. Mysticism               168
+  Sect.  69. The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to
+                 Realism, and the Representative Theory              172
+  Sect.  70. The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to
+                 Idealism                                            175
+  Sect.  71. Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism            176
+  Sect.  72. Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism                 177
+
+CHAPTER VII. THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION     180
+
+  Sect.  73. The Normative Sciences                                  180
+  Sect.  74. The Affiliations of Logic                               182
+  Sect.  75. Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth
+                 in Belief                                           183
+  Sect.  76. The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence,
+                 Inference, and Observation                          184
+  Sect.  77. Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment              187
+  Sect.  78. Priority of Concepts                                    188
+  Sect.  79. Aesthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of
+                 Beauty. Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies   189
+  Sect.  80. Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral
+                 Goodness                                            191
+  Sect.  81. Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism                       191
+  Sect.  82. Rationalism                                             193
+  Sect.  83. Eudaemonism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism      194
+  Sect.  84. Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics                196
+  Sect.  85. The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions                  198
+  Sect.  86. The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of
+                 Faith                                               199
+  Sect.  87. Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God         200
+  Sect.  88. The Ontological Proof of God                            200
+  Sect.  89. The Cosmological Proof of God                           203
+  Sect.  90. The Teleological Proof of God                           204
+  Sect.  91. God and the World. Theism and Pantheism                 205
+  Sect.  92. Deism                                                   206
+  Sect.  93. Metaphysics and Theology                                207
+  Sect.  94. Psychology is the Theory of the Soul                    208
+  Sect.  95. Spiritual Substance                                     209
+  Sect.  96. Intellectualism and Voluntarism                         210
+  Sect.  97. Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism,
+                 and Indeterminism                                   211
+  Sect.  98. Immortality. Survival and Eternalism                    212
+  Sect.  99. The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and
+                 Method                                              213
+  Sect. 100. Psychology and Philosophy                               216
+  Sect. 101. Transition from Classification by Problems to
+                 Classification by Doctrines. Naturalism.
+                 Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute Realism   217
+
+
+PART III
+
+SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+CHAPTER VIII. NATURALISM                                             223
+
+  Sect. 102. The General Meaning of Materialism                      223
+  Sect. 103. Corporeal Being                                         224
+  Sect. 104. Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism            225
+  Sect. 105. Materialism and Physical Science                        228
+  Sect. 106. The Development of the Conceptions of Physical
+                 Science. Space and Matter                           228
+  Sect. 107. Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the
+                 Conception of Force                                 231
+  Sect. 108. The Development and Extension of the Conception of
+                 Energy                                              236
+  Sect. 109. The Claims of Naturalism                                239
+  Sect. 110. The Task of Naturalism                                  241
+  Sect. 111. The Origin of the Cosmos                                242
+  Sect. 112. Life. Natural Selection                                 244
+  Sect. 113. Mechanical Physiology                                   246
+  Sect. 114. Mind. The Reduction to Sensation                        247
+  Sect. 115. Automatism                                              248
+  Sect. 116. Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon           250
+  Sect. 117. Knowledge. Positivism and Agnosticism                   252
+  Sect. 118. Experimentalism                                         255
+  Sect. 119. Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic                256
+  Sect. 120. General Ethical Stand-point                             258
+  Sect. 121. Cynicism and Cyrenaicism                                259
+  Sect. 122. Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception
+                 of Social Relations                                 260
+  Sect. 123. Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic                      262
+  Sect. 124. Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion                  263
+  Sect. 125. Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service,
+                 Wonder, and Renunciation                            265
+
+CHAPTER IX. SUBJECTIVISM                                             267
+
+  Sect. 126. Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and
+                 Scepticism                                          267
+  Sect. 127. Phenomenalism and Spiritualism                          271
+  Sect. 128. Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem
+                 Inherited from Descartes and Locke                  272
+  Sect. 129. The Refutation of Material Substance                    275
+  Sect. 130. The Application of the Epistemological Principle        277
+  Sect. 131. The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World           278
+  Sect. 132. The Transition to Spiritualism                          280
+  Sect. 133. Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism              281
+  Sect. 134. Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the
+                 Perceiver                                           284
+  Sect. 135. Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate
+                 Knowledge of the Will                               285
+  Sect. 136. Panpsychism                                             287
+  Sect. 137. The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision
+                 for Objective Knowledge                             288
+  Sect. 138. Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism.
+                 Mysticism                                           290
+  Sect. 139. Objective Spiritualism                                  292
+  Sect. 140. Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness, and
+                 Order                                               293
+  Sect. 141. The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend
+                 Itself                                              297
+  Sect. 142. Ethical Theories. Relativism                            298
+  Sect. 143. Pessimism and Self-denial                               299
+  Sect. 144. The Ethics of Welfare                                   300
+  Sect. 145. The Ethical Community                                   302
+  Sect. 146. The Religion of Mysticism                               303
+  Sect. 147. The Religion of Individual Cooperation with God         304
+
+CHAPTER X. ABSOLUTE REALISM                                          306
+
+  Sect. 148. The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object,
+                 or the Absolute                                     306
+  Sect. 149. The Eleatic Conception of Being                         309
+  Sect. 150. Spinoza's Conception of Substance                       311
+  Sect. 151. Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The
+                 Modes and the Attributes                            312
+  Sect. 152. The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God                315
+  Sect. 153. Spinoza's Provision for the Finite                      317
+  Sect. 154. Transition to Teleological Conceptions                  317
+  Sect. 155. Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical              319
+  Sect. 156. Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists    319
+  Sect. 157. Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher      321
+  Sect. 158. Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth           323
+  Sect. 159. The Historical Preparation for Plato                    324
+  Sect. 160. Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good        326
+  Sect. 161. The Progression of Experience toward God                329
+  Sect. 162. Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to
+                 Platonism                                           332
+  Sect. 163. The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of
+                 Platonism and Spinozism                             335
+  Sect. 164. Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development
+                 to the Problem of Imperfection                      336
+  Sect. 165. The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved            338
+  Sect. 166. Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism           339
+  Sect. 167. The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute
+                 Realism                                             340
+  Sect. 168. The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity           342
+  Sect. 169. The Platonic Ethics of Perfection                       344
+  Sect. 170. The Religion of Fulfilment and the Religion of
+                 Renunciation                                        346
+
+CHAPTER XI. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM                                        349
+
+  Sect. 171. General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism     349
+  Sect. 172. The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism            351
+  Sect. 173. The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The
+                 Task of the New Absolutism                          352
+  Sect. 174. The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis
+                 of Experience                                       354
+  Sect. 175. Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which
+                 they Set in Order                                   356
+  Sect. 176. The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of
+                 the Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed
+                 by Kant. The Absolute Spirit                        358
+  Sect. 177. Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity   360
+  Sect. 178. Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment        361
+  Sect. 179. Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic        361
+  Sect. 180. The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History           363
+  Sect. 181. Resume. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the
+                 Problem of Evil                                     365
+  Sect. 182. The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is
+                 Based upon the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge   368
+  Sect. 183. The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason        371
+  Sect. 184. Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian
+                 Philosophy                                          372
+  Sect. 185. Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the
+                 Thinking Self                                       374
+  Sect. 186. Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers          376
+  Sect. 187. To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind   377
+  Sect. 188. The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general
+                 into an Absolute Mind                               380
+  Sect. 189. The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite
+                 Mind to the Infinite Mind                           382
+  Sect. 190. The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism             385
+  Sect. 191. The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the
+                 Ethics of Absolute Idealism. Kant                   386
+  Sect. 192. Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of
+                 Universal and Objective Spirit                      388
+  Sect. 193. The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute
+                 Idealism                                            390
+  Sect. 194. The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality                  393
+
+CHAPTER XII. CONCLUSION                                              395
+
+  Sect. 195. Liability of Philosophy to Revision Due to its
+                 Systematic Character                                395
+  Sect. 196. The One Science and the Many Philosophies               396
+  Sect. 197. Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or
+                 Eclecticism of the Present Age                      398
+  Sect. 198. Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism
+                 and Absolutism                                      399
+  Sect. 199. Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition
+                 of Nature. The Neo-Fichteans                        401
+  Sect. 200. The Neo-Kantians                                        403
+  Sect. 201. Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism        404
+  Sect. 202. Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of
+                 Fundamental Principles                              405
+  Sect. 203. Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism                     407
+  Sect. 204. Summary and Transition to Epistemology                  408
+  Sect. 205. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism.
+             Realistic Tendency in Empirical Idealism                409
+  Sect. 206. Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception
+                 of Experience                                       410
+  Sect. 207. Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence
+                 Philosophy                                          412
+  Sect. 208. The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New
+                 Construction                                        413
+  Sect. 209. The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of
+                 Attempt to Reduce all Experience to it              414
+  Sect. 210. Truth of Psychical Relations but Impossibility of
+                 General Reduction to them                           415
+  Sect. 211. Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of
+                 Ideal of Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing
+                 the Whole of Experience from it                     415
+  Sect. 212. Error and Evil cannot be Reduced to the Ideal           417
+  Sect. 213. Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole         419
+  Sect. 214. Moral Implications of Such Pluralistic Philosophy.
+                 Purity of the Good                                  420
+  Sect. 215. The Incentive to Goodness                               422
+  Sect. 216. The Justification of Faith                              423
+  Sect. 217. The Worship and Service of God                          425
+  Sect. 218. The Philosopher and the Standards of the Market-Place   425
+  Sect. 219. The Secularism of the Present Age                       427
+  Sect. 220. The Value of Contemplation for Life                     428
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                         431
+
+INDEX                                                                441
+
+
+
+
+PART I
+
+APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF
+PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER
+
+
+[Sidenote: Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?]
+
+Sect. 1. Philosophy suffers the distinction of being regarded as
+essentially an academic pursuit. The term _philosophy_, to be sure, is
+used in common speech to denote a stoical manner of accepting the
+vicissitudes of life; but this conception sheds little or no light upon
+the meaning of philosophy as a branch of scholarship. The men who write
+the books on "Epistemology" or "Ontology," are regarded by the average
+man of affairs, even though he may have enjoyed a "higher education,"
+with little sympathy and less intelligence. Not even philology seems
+less concerned with the real business of life. The pursuit of philosophy
+appears to be a phenomenon of extreme and somewhat effete culture, with
+its own peculiar traditions, problems, and aims, and with little or
+nothing to contribute to the real enterprises of society. It is easy to
+prove to the satisfaction of the philosopher that such a view is
+radically mistaken. But it is another and more serious matter to bridge
+over the very real gap that separates philosophy and common-sense. Such
+an aim is realized only when philosophy is seen to issue from some
+special interest that is humanly important; or when, after starting in
+thought at a point where one deals with ideas and interests common to
+all, one is led by the inevitableness of consistent thinking into the
+sphere of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Life as a Starting-point for Thought.]
+
+Sect. 2. There is but one starting-point for reflection when all men are
+invited to share in it. Though there be a great many special platforms
+where special groups of men may take their stand together, there is only
+one platform broad enough for all. This universal stand-point, or common
+platform, is _life_. It is our more definite thesis, then, that
+philosophy, even to its most abstruse technicality, is rooted in life;
+and that it is inseparably bound up with the satisfaction of practical
+needs, and the solution of practical problems.
+
+Every man knows what it is to live, and his immediate experience will
+verify those features of the adventure that stand out conspicuously. To
+begin with, life is our birthright. We did not ask for it, but when we
+grew old enough to be self-conscious we found ourselves in possession
+of it. Nor is it a gift to be neglected, even if we had the will. As is
+true of no other gift of nature, we must use it, or cease to be. There
+is a unique urgency about life. But we have already implied more, in so
+far as we have said that it must be _used_, and have thereby referred to
+some form of movement or activity as its inseparable attribute. To
+live is to find one's self compelled to do something. To do
+_something_--there is another implication of life: some outer
+expression, some medium in which to register the degree and form of its
+activity. Such we recognize as the environment of life, the real objects
+among which it is placed; which it may change, or from which it may
+suffer change. Not only do we find our lives as unsolicited active
+powers, but find, as well, an arena prescribed for their exercise. That
+we shall act, and in a certain time and place, and with reference to
+certain other realities, this is the general condition of things that is
+encountered when each one of us discovers life. In short, to live means
+to be compelled to do something under certain circumstances.
+
+There is another very common aspect of life that would not at first
+glance seem worthy of mention. Not only does life, as we have just
+described it, mean opportunity, but it means self-conscious opportunity.
+The facts are such as we have found them to be, and as each one of us
+has previously found them for himself. But when we discover life for
+ourselves, we who make the discovery, and we who live, are identical.
+From that moment we both live, and know that we live. Moreover, such is
+the essential unity of our natures that our living must now express our
+knowing, and our knowing guide and illuminate our living. Consider the
+allegory of the centipede. From the beginning of time he had manipulated
+his countless legs with exquisite precision. Men had regarded him with
+wonder and amazement. But he was innocent of his own art, being a
+contrivance of nature, perfectly constructed to do her bidding. One day
+the centipede discovered life. He discovered himself as one who walks,
+and the newly awakened intelligence, first observing, then foreseeing,
+at length began to direct the process. And from that moment the
+centipede, because he could not remember the proper order of his going,
+lost all his former skill, and became the poor clumsy victim of his own
+self-consciousness. This same self-consciousness is the inconvenience
+and the great glory of human life. We must stumble along as best we
+can, guided by the feeble light of our own little intelligence. If
+nature starts us on our way, she soon hands over the torch, and bids us
+find the trail for ourselves. Most men are brave enough to regard this
+as the best thing of all; some despair on account of it. In either case
+it is admittedly the true story of human life. We must live as separate
+selves, observing, foreseeing, and planning. There are two things that
+we can do about it. We can repudiate our natures, decline the
+responsibility, and degenerate to the level of those animals that never
+had our chance; or we can leap joyously to the helm, and with all the
+strength and wisdom in us guide our lives to their destination. But if
+we do the former, we shall be unable to forget what might have been, and
+shall be haunted by a sense of ignominy; and if we do the second, we
+shall experience the unique happiness of fulfilment and
+self-realization.
+
+Life, then, is a situation that appeals to intelligent activity. Humanly
+speaking, there is no such thing as a situation that is not at the same
+time a theory. As we live we are all theorists. Whoever has any
+misgivings as to the practical value of theory, let him remember that,
+speaking generally of human life, it is true to say that there is no
+practice that does not issue at length from reflection. That which is
+the commonest experience of mankind is the conjunction of these two, the
+thought and the deed. And as surely as we are all practical theorists,
+so surely is philosophy the outcome of the broadening and deepening of
+practical theory. But to understand how the practical man becomes the
+philosopher, we must inquire somewhat more carefully into the manner of
+his thought about life.
+
+[Sidenote: The Practical Knowledge of Means.]
+
+Sect. 3. Let anyone inspect the last moment in his life, and in all
+probability he will find that his mind was employed to discover the
+means to some end. He was already bent upon some definite achievement,
+and was thoughtful for the sake of selecting the economical and
+effectual way. His theory made his practice skilful. So through life his
+knowledge shows him how to work his will. Example, experience, and books
+have taught him the uses of nature and society, and in his thoughtful
+living he is enabled to reach the goal he has set for the next hour,
+day, or year of his activity. The long periods of human life are spent
+in elaborating the means to some unquestioned end. Here one meets the
+curious truth that we wake up in the middle of life, already making
+headway, and under the guidance of some invisible steersman. When first
+we take the business of life seriously, there is a considerable stock in
+trade in the shape of habits, and inclinations to all sorts of things
+that we never consciously elected to pursue. Since we do not begin at
+the beginning, our first problem is to accommodate ourselves to
+ourselves, and our first deliberate acts are in fulfilment of plans
+outlined by some predecessor that has already spoken for us. The same
+thing is true of the race of men. At a certain stage in their
+development men found themselves engaged in all manner of ritual and
+custom, and burdened with concerns that were not of their own choosing.
+They were burning incense, keeping festivals, and naming names, all of
+which they must now proceed to justify with myth and legend, in order to
+render intelligible to themselves the deliberate and self-conscious
+repetition of them. Even so much justification was left to the few, and
+the great majority continued to seek that good which social usage
+countenanced and individual predisposition confirmed. So every man of us
+acts from day to day for love's sake, or wealth's sake, or power's
+sake, or for the sake of some near and tangible object; reflecting only
+for the greater efficiency of his endeavor.
+
+[Sidenote: The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose.]
+
+Sect. 4. But if this be the common manner of thinking about life, it
+does not represent the whole of such thought. Nor does it follow that
+because it occupies us so much, it is therefore correspondingly
+fundamental. Like the myth makers of old, we all want more or less to
+know the _reason of our ends_. Here, then, we meet with a somewhat
+different type of reflection upon life, the reflection that underlies
+the adoption of a life purpose. It is obvious that most ends are
+selected for the sake of other ends, and so are virtually means. Thus
+one may struggle for years to secure a college education. This definite
+end has been adopted for the sake of a somewhat more indefinite end of
+self-advancement, and from it there issues a whole series of minor ends,
+which form a hierarchy of steps ascending to the highest goal of
+aspiration. Now upon the face of things we live very unsystematic lives,
+and yet were we to examine ourselves in this fashion, we should all find
+our lives to be marvels of organization. Their growth, as we have seen,
+began before we were conscious of it; and we are commonly so absorbed
+in some particular flower or fruit that we forget the roots, and the
+design of the whole. But a little reflection reveals a remarkable
+unitary adjustment of parts. The unity is due to the dominance of a
+group of central purposes. Judged from the stand-point of experience, it
+seems bitter irony to say that everyone gets from life just what he
+wishes. But a candid searching of our own hearts will incline us to
+admit that, after all, the way we go and the length we go is determined
+pretty much by the kind and the intensity of our secret longing. That
+for which in the time of choice we are willing to sacrifice all else, is
+the formula that defines the law of each individual life. All this is
+not intended to mean that we have each named a clear and definite ideal
+which is our chosen goal. On the contrary, such a conception may be
+almost meaningless to some of us. In general the higher the ideal the
+vaguer and less vivid is its presentation to our consciousness. But,
+named or unnamed, sharp or blurred, vivid or half-forgotten, there may
+be found in the heart of every man that which of all things he wants to
+be, that which of all deeds he wants to do. If he has had the normal
+youth of dreaming, he has seen it, and warmed to the picture of his
+imagination; if he has been somewhat more thoughtful than the ordinary,
+his reason has defined it, and adopted it for his vocation; if neither,
+it has been present as an undertone throughout the rendering of his more
+inevitable life. He will recognize it when it is named as the desire to
+do the will of God, or to have as good a time as possible, or to make
+other people as happy as possible, or to be equal to his
+responsibilities, or to fulfil the expectation of his mother, or to be
+distinguished, wealthy, or influential. This list of ideals is
+miscellaneous, and ethically reducible to more fundamental concepts, but
+these are the terms in which men are ordinarily conscious of their most
+intimate purposes. We must now inquire respecting the nature of the
+thought that determines the selection of such a purpose, or justifies it
+when it has been unconsciously accepted.
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and the
+Voluptuary.]
+
+Sect. 5. What is most worth while? So far as human action is concerned
+this obviously depends upon what is possible, upon what is expected of
+us by our own natures, and upon what interests and concerns are
+conserved by the trend of events in our environment. What I had best
+do, presupposes what I have the strength and the skill to do, what I
+feel called upon to do, and what are the great causes that are entitled
+to promotion at my hands. It seems that practically we cannot separate
+the ideal from the real. We may feel that the highest ideal is an
+immediate utterance of conscience, as mysterious in origin as it is
+authoritative in expression. We may be willing to defy the universe, and
+expatriate ourselves from our natural and social environment, for the
+sake of the holy law of duty. Such men as Count Tolstoi have little to
+say of the possible, or the expedient, or the actual, and are satisfied
+to stand almost alone against the brutal facts of usage and economy. We
+all have a secret sense of chivalry, that prompts, however
+ineffectually, to a like devotion. But that which in such moral purposes
+appears to indicate a severance of the ideal and the real, is, if we
+will but stop to consider, only a severance of the ideal and the
+apparent. The martyr is more sure of reality than the adventurer. He is
+convinced that though his contemporaries and his environment be against
+him; the fundamental or eventual order of things is for him. He believes
+in a spiritual world more abiding, albeit less obvious, than the
+material world. Though every temporal event contradict him, he lives in
+the certainty that eternity is his. Such an one may have found his ideal
+in the voice of God and His prophets, or he may have been led to God as
+the justification of his irresistible ideal; but in either case the
+selection of his ideal is reasonable to him in so far as it is
+harmonious with the ultimate nature of things, or stands for the promise
+of reality. In this wise, thought about life expands into some
+conception of the deeper forces of the world, and life itself, in
+respect of its fundamental attachment to an ideal, implies some belief
+concerning the fundamental nature of its environment.
+
+But lest in this account life be credited with too much gravity and
+import, or it seem to be assumed that life is all knight-errantry, let
+us turn to our less quixotic, and perhaps more effectual, man of
+affairs. He works for his daily bread, and for success in his vocation.
+He has selected his vocation for its promise of return in the form of
+wealth, comfort, fame, or influence. He likewise performs such
+additional service to his family and his community as is demanded of him
+by public opinion and his own sense of responsibility. He may have a
+certain contempt for the man who sees visions. This may be his manner of
+testifying to his own preference for the ideal of usefulness and
+immediate efficiency. But even so he would never for an instant admit
+that he was pursuing a merely conventional good. He may be largely
+imitative in his standards of value, recognizing such aims as are common
+to some time or race; nevertheless none would be more sure than he of
+the truth of his ideal. Question him, and he will maintain that his is
+the reasonable life under the conditions of human existence. He may
+maintain that if there be a God, he can best serve Him by promoting the
+tangible welfare of himself and those dependent upon him. He may
+maintain that, since there is no God, he must win such rewards as the
+world can give. If he have something of the heroic in him, he may tell
+you that, since there is no God, he will labor to the uttermost for his
+fellow-men. Where he has not solved the problem of life for himself, he
+may believe himself to be obeying the insight of some one wiser than
+himself, or of society as expressed in its customs and institutions. But
+no man ever admitted that his life was purely a matter of expediency, or
+that in his dominant ideal he was the victim of chance. In the
+background of the busiest and most preoccupied life of affairs, there
+dwells the conviction that such living is appropriate to the universe;
+that it is called for by the circumstances of its origin, opportunities,
+and destiny.
+
+Finally, the man who makes light of life has of all men the most
+transparent inner consciousness. In him may be clearly observed the
+relation between the ideal and the reflection that is assumed to justify
+it.
+
+     "A Moment's Halt--a momentary taste
+      Of Being from the Well amid the Waste--
+      And Lo!--the phantom Caravan has reach'd
+      The Nothing it set out from-- . . ."
+
+     "We are no other than a moving row
+      Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go
+      Round with the Sun-illumin'd Lantern held
+      In Midnight by the Master of the Show."
+
+Where the setting of life is construed in these terms, there is but one
+natural and appropriate manner of life. Once believing in the isolation
+and insignificance of life, one is sceptical of all worth save such as
+may be tasted in the moment of its purchase. If one's ideas and
+experiences are no concern of the world's, but incidents of a purely
+local and transient interest, they will realize most when they realize
+an immediate gratification. Where one does not believe that he is a
+member of the universe, and a contributor to its ends, he does well to
+minimize the friction that arises from its accidental propinquity, and
+to kindle some little fire of enjoyment in his own lonely heart. This is
+the life of abandonment to pleasure, accompanied by the conviction that
+the conditions of life warrant no more strenuous or heroic plan.
+
+[Sidenote: The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life.]
+
+Sect. 6. In such wise do we adopt the life purpose, or justify it when
+unconsciously adopted. The pursuit of an ideal implies a belief in its
+effectuality. Such a belief will invariably appear when the groundwork
+of the daily living is laid bare by a little reflection. And if our
+analysis has not been in error, there is something more definite to be
+obtained from it. We all believe in the practical wisdom of our
+fundamental ideals; but we believe, besides, that such wisdom involves
+the sanction of the universe as a whole. The momentousness of an
+individual's life will be satisfied with nothing less final than an
+absolutely wise disposition of it. For every individual, his life is all
+his power and riches, and is not to be spent save for the _greatest good
+that he can reasonably pursue_. But the solution of such a problem is
+not to be obtained short of a searching of entire reality. Every life
+will represent more or less of such wisdom and enlightenment; and in the
+end the best selection of ideal will denote the greatest wealth of
+experience. It is not always true that he who has seen more will live
+more wisely, for in an individual case instinct or authority may be
+better sources of aspiration than experience. But we trust instinct and
+authority because we believe them to represent a comprehensive
+experience on the part of the race as a whole, or on the part of God. He
+whose knowledge is broadest and truest would know best what is finally
+worth living for. On this account, most men can see no more reasonable
+plan of life than obedience to God's will, for God in the abundance of
+his wisdom, and since all eternity is plain before him, must see with
+certainty that which is supremely worthy.
+
+We mean, then, that the selection of our ideals shall be determined by
+the largest possible knowledge of the facts pertaining to life. We mean
+to select as one would select who knew all about the antecedents and
+surroundings and remote consequences of life. In our own weakness and
+finitude we may go but a little way in the direction of such an
+insight, and may prefer to accept the judgment of tradition or
+authority, but we recognize a distinct type of knowledge as alone worthy
+to justify an individual's adoption of an ideal. That type of knowledge
+is the knowledge that comprehends the universe in its totality. Such
+knowledge does not involve completeness of information respecting all
+parts of reality. This, humanly speaking, is both unattainable and
+inconceivable. It involves rather a conception of the _kind_ of reality
+that is fundamental. For a wise purpose it is unnecessary that we should
+know many matters of fact, or even specific laws, provided we are
+convinced of the inner and essential character of the universe. Some of
+the alternatives are matters of every-day thought and speech. One cannot
+tell the simplest story of human life without disclosing them. To live
+the human life means to pursue ideals, that is, to have a thing in mind,
+and then to try to accomplish it. Here is one kind of reality and power.
+The planetary system, on the other hand, does not pursue ideals, but
+moves unconscious of itself, with a mechanical precision that can be
+expressed in a mathematical formula; and is representative of another
+kind of reality and power. Hence a very common and a very practical
+question: Is there an underlying law, like the law of gravitation,
+fundamentally and permanently governing life, in spite of its apparent
+direction by ideal and aspiration? Or is there an underlying power, like
+purpose, fundamentally and permanently governing the planetary system
+and all celestial worlds, in spite of the apparent control of blind and
+irresistible forces? This is a practical question because nothing could
+be more pertinent to our choice of ideals. Nothing could make more
+difference to life than a belief in the life or lifelessness of its
+environment. The faiths that generate or confirm our ideals always refer
+to this great issue. And this is but one, albeit the most profound, of
+the many issues that arise from the desire to obtain some conviction of
+the inner and essential character of life. Though so intimately
+connected with practical concerns, these issues are primarily the
+business of thought. In grappling with them, thought is called upon for
+its greatest comprehensiveness, penetration, and self-consistency. By
+the necessity of concentration, thought is sometimes led to forget its
+origin and the source of its problems. But in naming itself philosophy,
+thought has only recognized the definiteness and earnestness of its
+largest task. Philosophy is still thought about life, representing but
+the deepening and broadening of the common practical thoughtfulness.
+
+We who began together at the starting-point of _life_, have now entered
+together the haven of _philosophy_. It is not a final haven, but only
+the point of departure for the field of philosophy proper. Nevertheless
+that field is now in the plain view of the man who occupies the
+practical stand-point. He must recognize in philosophy a kind of
+reflection that differs only in extent and persistence from the
+reflection that guides and justifies his life. He may not consciously
+identify himself with any one of the three general groups which have
+been characterized. But if he is neither an idealist, nor a philistine,
+nor a pleasure lover, surely he is compounded of such elements, and does
+not escape their implications. He desires something most of all, even
+though his highest ideal be only an inference from the gradation of his
+immediate purposes. This highest ideal represents what he conceives to
+be the greatest worth or value attainable in the universe, and its
+adoption is based upon the largest generalization that he can make or
+borrow. The complete justification of his ideal would involve a true
+knowledge of the essential character of the universe. For such knowledge
+he substitutes either authority or his own imperfect insight. But in
+either case his life is naturally and organically correlated with a
+_thought about the universe in its totality, or in its deepest and
+essential character_. Such thought, the activity and its results, is
+philosophy. Hence he who lives is, _ipso facto_, a philosopher. He is
+not only a potential philosopher, but a partial philosopher. He has
+already begun to be a philosopher. Between the fitful or prudential
+thinking of some little man of affairs, and the sustained thought of the
+devoted lover of truth, there is indeed a long journey, but it is a
+straight journey along the same road. Philosophy is neither accidental
+nor supernatural, but inevitable and normal. Philosophy is not properly
+a vocation, but the ground and inspiration of all vocations. In the
+hands of its devotees it grows technical and complex, as do all efforts
+of thought, and to pursue philosophy bravely and faithfully is to
+encounter obstacles and labyrinths innumerable. The general problem of
+philosophy is mother of a whole brood of problems, little and great. But
+whether we be numbered among its devotees, or their beneficiaries, an
+equal significance attaches to the truth that philosophy is continuous
+with life.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+[Sidenote: Who is the Philosopher-Poet?]
+
+Sect. 7. As the ultimate criticism of all human interests, philosophy
+may be approached by avenues as various as these interests. Only when
+philosophy is discovered as the implication of well-recognized special
+interests, is the significance of its function fully appreciated. For
+the sake of such a further understanding of philosophy, those who find
+either inspiration or entertainment in poetry are invited in the present
+chapter to consider certain of the relations between poetry and
+philosophy.
+
+We must at the very outset decline to accept unqualifiedly the poet's
+opinion in the matter, for he would not think it presumptuous to
+incorporate philosophy in poetry. "No man," said Coleridge, "was ever
+yet a great poet without being at the same time a great philosopher."
+This would seem to mean that a great poet is a great philosopher, and
+more too. We shall do better to begin with the prosaic and matter of
+fact minimum of truth: some poetry is philosophical. This will enable
+us to search for the portion of philosophy that is in some poetry,
+without finally defining their respective boundaries. It may be that all
+true poetry is philosophical, as it may be that all true philosophy is
+poetical; but it is much more certain that much actual poetry is far
+from philosophical, and that most actual philosophy was not conceived or
+written by a poet. The mere poet and the mere philosopher must be
+tolerated, if it be only for the purpose of shedding light upon the
+philosopher-poet and the poet-philosopher. And it is to the
+philosopher-poet that we turn, in the hope that under the genial spell
+of poetry we may be brought with understanding to the more forbidding
+land of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Poetry as Appreciation.]
+
+Sect. 8. Poetry is well characterized, though not defined, as an
+interpretation of life. The term "life" here signifies the human
+purposive consciousness, and active pursuit of ends. An interpretation
+of life is, then, a selection and account of such values in human
+experience as are actually sought or are worth the seeking. For the poet
+all things are good or bad, and never only matters of fact. He is
+neither an annalist nor a statistician, and is even an observer only
+for the sake of a higher design. He is one who appreciates, and
+expresses his appreciation so fittingly that it becomes a kind of truth,
+and a permanently communicable object. That "unbodied joy," the
+skylark's song and flight, is through the genius of Shelley so
+faithfully embodied, that it may enter as a definite joy into the lives
+of countless human beings. The sensuous or suggestive values of nature
+are caught by the poet's quick feeling for beauty, and fixed by his
+creative activity. Or with his ready sympathy he may perceive the value
+of some human ideal or mastering passion, and make it a reality for our
+common feeling. Where the poet has to do with the base and hateful, his
+attitude is still appreciative. The evil is apprehended as part of a
+dramatic whole having positive moral or aesthetic value. Moral ideas may
+appear in both poetry and life as the inspiration and justification of
+struggle. Where there is no conception of its moral significance, the
+repulsive possesses for the poet's consciousness the aesthetic value of
+diversity and contrast. Even where the evil and ugly is isolated, as in
+certain of Browning's dramatic monologues, it forms, both for the poet
+and the reader, but a part of some larger perception of life or
+character, which is sublime or beautiful or good. Poetry involves,
+then, the discovery and presentation of human experiences that are
+satisfying and appealing. It is a language for human pleasures and
+ideals. Poetry is without doubt a great deal more than this, and only
+after a careful analysis of its peculiar language could one distinguish
+it from kindred arts; but it will suffice for our purposes to
+characterize and not differentiate. Starting from this most general
+truth respecting poetry, we may now look for that aspect of it whereby
+it may be a witness of philosophical truth.
+
+[Sidenote: Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman.]
+
+Sect. 9. For the answer to our question, we must turn to an examination
+of the intellectual elements of poetry. In the first place, the common
+demand that the poet shall be accurate in his representations is
+suggestive of an indispensable intellectual factor in his genius. As we
+have seen, he is not to reproduce nature, but the human appreciative
+experience of nature. Nevertheless, he must even here be true to his
+object. His art involves his ability to express genuinely and sincerely
+what he himself experiences in the presence of nature, or what he can
+catch of the inner lives of others by virtue of his intelligent
+sympathy. No amount of emotion or even of imagination will profit a
+poet, unless he can render a true account of them. To be sure, he need
+not define, or even explain; for it is his function to transfer the
+immediate qualities of experience: but he must be able to speak the
+truth, and, in order to speak it, he must have known it. In all this,
+however, we have made no demand that the poet should see more than one
+thing at a time. Sincerity of expression does not require what is
+distinctly another mode of intelligence, _comprehensiveness of view_. It
+is easier, and accordingly more usual, to render an account of the
+moments and casual units of experience, than of its totality. There are
+poets, little and great, who possess the intellectual virtue of
+sincerity, without the intellectual power of synthesis and
+reconciliation. This distinction will enable us to separate the
+intelligence exhibited in all poetry, from that distinct form of
+intelligence exhibited in such poetry as is properly to be called
+philosophical.
+
+The "barbarian" in poetry has recently been defined as "the man who
+regards his passions as their own excuse for being; who does not
+domesticate them either by understanding their cause or by conceiving
+their ideal goal."[28:1] One will readily appreciate the application of
+this definition to Walt Whitman. What little unity there is in this
+poet's world, is the composition of a purely sensuous experience,
+
+     "The earth expending right hand and left hand,
+      The picture alive, every part in its best light,
+      The music falling in where it is wanted, and stopping where
+          it is not wanted."
+
+In many passages Whitman manifests a marvellous ability to discover and
+communicate a fresh gladness about the commonest experiences. We cannot
+but rejoice with him in all sights and sounds. But though we cannot deny
+him truth, his truth is honesty and not understanding. The experiences
+in which he discovers so much worth, are random and capricious, and do
+not constitute a universe. To the solution of ultimate questions he
+contributes a sense of mystery, and the conviction
+
+     "That you are here--that life exists and identity,
+      That the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse."
+
+His world is justly described by the writer just quoted as "a
+phantasmagoria of continuous visions, vivid, impressive, but monotonous
+and hard to distinguish in memory, like the waves of the sea or the
+decorations of some barbarous temple, sublime only by the infinite
+aggregation of parts."[30:2]
+
+As is Walt Whitman, so are many poets greater and less. Some who have
+seen the world-view, exhibit the same particularism in their lyric
+moods; although, generally speaking, a poet who once has comprehended
+the world, will see the parts of it in the light of that wisdom. But
+Walt Whitman is peculiarly representative of the poetry that can be
+true, without being wise in the manner that we shall come shortly to
+understand as the manner of philosophy. He is as desultory in his poet
+raptures as is the common man when he lives in his immediate
+experiences. The truth won by each is the clear vision of one thing, or
+of a limited collection of things, and not the broad inclusive vision of
+all things.
+
+[Sidenote: Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare.]
+
+Sect. 10. The transition from Whitman to Shakespeare may seem somewhat
+abrupt, but the very differences between these poets serve to mark out
+an interesting affinity. Neither has put any unitary construction upon
+human life and its environment. Neither, as poet, is the witness of any
+world-view; which will mean for us that neither is a philosopher-poet.
+As respects Shakespeare, this is a hard saying. We are accustomed to the
+critical judgment that finds in the Shakespearian dramas an apprehension
+of the universal in human life. But though this judgment is true, it is
+by no means conclusive as respects Shakespeare's relation to the
+philosophical type of thought. For there can be universality without
+philosophy. Thus, to know the groups and the marks of the vertebrates is
+to know a truth which possesses generality, in contradistinction to the
+particularism of Whitman's poetic consciousness. Even so to know well
+the groups and marks of human character, vertebrate and invertebrate, is
+to know that of which the average man, in his hand to hand struggle with
+life, is ignorant. Such a wisdom Shakespeare possessed to a unique
+degree, and it enabled him to reconstruct human life. He did not merely
+perceive human states and motives, but he understood human nature so
+well that he could create consistent men and women. Moreover,
+Shakespeare's knowledge was not only thus universal in being a knowledge
+of general groups and laws, but also in respect of its extensity. His
+understanding was as rich as it was acute. It is true, then, that
+Shakespeare read human life as an open book, knowing certainly the
+manner of human thinking and feeling, and the power and interplay of
+human motives. But it is equally true, on the other hand, that he
+possessed no unitary conception of the meaning and larger relations of
+human life. Such a conception might have been expressed either by means
+of the outlook of some dominating and persistent type of personality, or
+by a pervading suggestion of some constant world-setting for the
+variable enterprise of mankind. It could appear only provided the poet's
+appreciation of life in detail were determined by an interpretation of
+the meaning of life as a whole. Shakespeare apparently possessed no such
+interpretation. Even when Hamlet is groping after some larger truth that
+may bear upon the definite problems of life, he represents but one, and
+that a strange and unusual, type of human nature. And Hamlet's
+reflections, it should be noted, have no outcome. There is no
+Shakespearian answer to the riddles that Hamlet propounds. The poet's
+genius is not less amazing for this fact; indeed, his peculiar
+distinction can only be comprehended upon this basis. Shakespeare put no
+construction upon life, and by virtue of this very reserve accomplished
+an art of surpassing fidelity and vividness. The absence of philosophy
+in Shakespeare, and the presence of the most characteristic quality of
+his genius, may both be imputed by the one affirmation, that _there is
+no Shakespearian point of view_.
+
+This truth signifies both gain and loss. The philosophical criticism of
+life may vary from the ideal objectivity of absolute truth, to the
+subjectivity of a personal religion. Philosophy aims to correct the
+partiality of particular points of view by means of a point of view that
+shall comprehend their relations, and effect such reconciliations or
+transformations as shall enable them to constitute a universe.
+Philosophy always assumes the hypothetical view of omniscience. The
+necessity of such a final criticism is implicit in every scientific item
+of knowledge, and in every judgment that is passed upon life. Philosophy
+makes a distinct and peculiar contribution to human knowledge by its
+heroic effort to measure all knowledges and all ideals by the standard
+of totality. Nevertheless it is significant that no human individual can
+possibly possess the range of omniscience. The most adequate knowledge
+of which any generation of men is capable, will always be that which is
+conceived by the most synthetic and vigorously metaphysical minds; but
+every individual philosophy will nevertheless be a premature synthesis.
+The effort to complete knowledge is the indispensable test of the
+adequacy of prevailing conceptions, but the completed knowledge of any
+individual mind will shortly become an historical monument. It will
+belong primarily to the personal life of its creator, as the
+articulation of his personal covenant with the universe. There is a
+sound justification for such a conclusion of things in the case of the
+individual, for the conditions of human life make it inevitable; but it
+will always possess a felt unity, and many distinct features, that are
+private and subjective. Now such a projection of personality, with its
+coloring and its selection, Shakespeare has avoided; and very largely as
+a consequence, his dramas are a storehouse of genuine human nature.
+Ambition, mercy, hate, madness, guilelessness, conventionality, mirth,
+bravery, deceit, purity--these, and all human states and attributes save
+piety, are upon his pages as real, and as mysterious withal, as they are
+in the great historical society. For an ordinary reader, these states
+and attributes are more real in Hamlet or Lear than in his own direct
+experience, because in Hamlet and Lear he can see them with the eye and
+intelligence of genius. But Shakespeare is the world all over again,
+and there is loss as well as gain in such realism. Here is human life,
+no doubt, and a brilliant pageantry it is; but human life as varied and
+as problematic as it is in the living. Shakespeare's fundamental
+intellectual resource is the historical and psychological knowledge of
+such principles as govern the construction of human natures. The goods
+for which men undertake, and live or die, are any goods, justified only
+by the actual human striving for them. The virtues are the old winning
+virtues of the secular life, and the heroisms of the common conscience.
+Beyond its empirical generality, his knowledge is universal only in the
+sense that space and time are universal. His consciousness _contains_
+its representative creations, and expresses them unspoiled by any
+transforming thought. His poetic consciousness is like the very stage to
+which he likens all the world: men and women meet there, and things
+happen there. The stage itself creates no unity save the occasion and
+the place. Shakespeare's consciousness is universal because it is a fair
+field with no favors. But even so it is particular, because, though each
+may enter and depart in peace, when all enter together there is anarchy
+and a babel of voices. All Shakespeare is like all the world seen
+through the eyes of each of its inhabitants. Human experience in
+Shakespeare is human experience as everyone feels it, as comprehensive
+as the aggregate of innumerable lives. But human experience in
+philosophy is the experience of all as thought by a synthetic mind.
+Hence the wealth of life depicted by Shakespeare serves only to point
+out the philosopher's problem, and to challenge his powers. Here he will
+find material, and not results; much to philosophize about, but no
+philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Philosophy in Poetry. The World-View. Omar Khayyam.]
+
+Sect. 11. The discussion up to this point has attributed to poetry very
+definite intellectual factors that nevertheless do not constitute
+philosophy. Walt Whitman speaks his feeling with truth, but in general
+manifests no comprehensive insight. Shakespeare has not only sincerity
+of expression but an understanding mind. He has a knowledge not only of
+particular experiences, but of human nature; and a consciousness full
+and varied like society itself. But there is a kind of knowledge
+possessed by neither, the knowledge sought by coordinating all aspects
+of human experience, both particular and general. Not even Shakespeare
+is wise as one who, having seen the whole, can fundamentally interpret a
+part. But though the philosopher-poet may not yet be found, we cannot
+longer be ignorant of his nature. He will be, like all poets, one who
+appreciates experiences or finds things good, and he will faithfully
+reproduce the values which he discovers. But he must _justify himself in
+view of the fundamental nature of the universe_. The values which he
+apprehends must be harmonious, and so far above the plurality of goods
+as to transcend and unify them. The philosopher-poet will find reality
+as a whole to be something that accredits the order of values in his
+inner life. He will not only find certain things to be most worthy
+objects of action or contemplation, but he will see why they are worthy,
+because he will have construed the judgment of the universe in their
+favor.
+
+In this general sense, Omar Khayyam is a philosopher-poet. To be sure
+his universe is quite the opposite of that which most poets conceive,
+and is perhaps profoundly antagonistic to the very spirit of poetry; but
+it is none the less true that the joys to which Omar invites us are such
+as his universe prescribes for human life.
+
+     "Some for the Glories of This World; and some
+      Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come;
+      Ah, take the Cash, and let the Credit go,
+      Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum."
+
+Herein is both poetry and philosophy, albeit but a poor brand of each.
+We are invited to occupy ourselves only with spiritual cash, because the
+universe is spiritually insolvent. The immediately gratifying feelings
+are the only feelings that the world can guarantee. Omar Khayyam is a
+philosopher-poet, because his immediate delight in "youth's
+sweet-scented manuscript" is part of a consciousness that vaguely sees,
+though it cannot grasp, "this sorry scheme of things entire."
+
+     "Drink for you know not whence you come, nor why;
+      Drink for you know not why you go, nor where."
+
+[Sidenote: Wordsworth.]
+
+Sect. 12. But the poet in his world-view ordinarily sees other than
+darkness. The same innate spiritual enterprise that sustains religious
+faith leads the poet more often to find the universe positively
+congenial to his ideals, and to ideals in general. He interprets human
+experience in the light of the spirituality of all the world. It is to
+Wordsworth that we of the present age are chiefly indebted for such
+imagery, and it will profit us to consider somewhat carefully the
+philosophical quality of his poetry.
+
+Walter Pater, in introducing his appreciation of Wordsworth, writes that
+"an intimate consciousness of the expression of natural things, which
+weighs, listens, penetrates, where the earlier mind passed roughly by,
+is a large element in the complexion of modern poetry." We recognize at
+once the truth of this characterization as applied to Wordsworth. But
+there is something more distinguished about this poet's sensibility even
+than its extreme fineness and delicacy; a quality that is suggested,
+though not made explicit, by Shelley's allusion to Wordsworth's
+experience as "a sort of thought in sense." Nature possessed for him not
+merely enjoyable and describable characters of great variety and
+minuteness, but an immediately apprehended unity and meaning. It would
+be a great mistake to construe this meaning in sense as analogous to the
+crude symbolism of the educator Froebel, to whom, as he said, "the world
+of crystals proclaimed, in distinct and univocal terms, the laws of
+human life." Wordsworth did not attach ideas to sense, but regarded
+sense itself as a communication of truth. We readily call to mind his
+unique capacity for apprehending the characteristic flavor of a certain
+place in a certain moment of time, the individuality of a situation. Now
+in such moments he felt that he was receiving intelligences, none the
+less direct and significant for their inarticulate form. Like the boy
+on Windermere, whom he himself describes,
+
+                          "while he hung
+     Loitering, a gentle shock of mild surprise
+     Has carried far into his heart the voice
+     Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene
+     Would enter unawares into his mind,
+     With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,
+     Its woods, and that uncertain heaven received
+     Into the bosom of the steady lake."
+
+For our purpose it is essential that we should recognize in this
+appreciation of nature, expressed in almost every poem that Wordsworth
+wrote, a consciousness respecting the fundamental nature of the world.
+Conversation, as we know, denotes an interchange of commensurable
+meanings. Whatever the code may be, whether words or the most subtle
+form of suggestion, communication is impossible without community of
+nature. Hence, in believing himself to be holding converse with the
+so-called physical world, Wordsworth conceives that world as
+fundamentally like himself. He finds the most profound thing in all the
+world to be the universal spiritual life. In nature this life manifests
+itself most directly, clothed in its own proper dignity and peace. But
+it may be discovered in the humanity that is most close to nature, in
+the avocations of plain and simple people, and the unsophisticated
+delights of children; and, with the perspective of contemplation, even
+"among the multitudes of that huge city."
+
+So Wordsworth is rendering a true account of his own experience of
+reality when, as in "The Prelude," he says unequivocally:
+
+     "A gracious spirit o'er this earth presides,
+      And in the heart of man; invisibly
+      It comes to works of unreproved delight,
+      And tendency benign; directing those
+      Who care not, know not, think not, what they do."
+
+Wordsworth is not a philosopher-poet because by searching his pages we
+can find an explicit philosophical creed such as this, but because all
+the joys of which his poet-soul compels him to sing have their peculiar
+note, and compose their peculiar harmony, by virtue of such an
+indwelling consciousness. Here is one who is a philosopher in and
+through his poetry. He is a philosopher in so far as the detail of his
+appreciation finds fundamental justification in a world-view. From the
+immanence of "the universal heart" there follows, not through any
+mediate reasoning, but by the immediate experience of its propriety, a
+conception of that which is of supreme worth in life. The highest and
+best of which life is capable is contemplation, or the consciousness of
+the universal indwelling of God. Of those who fail to live thus
+fittingly in the midst of the divine life, Walter Pater speaks for
+Wordsworth as follows:
+
+     "To higher or lower ends they move too often with something of
+     a sad countenance, with hurried and ignoble gait, becoming,
+     unconsciously, something like thorns, in their anxiety to bear
+     grapes; it being possible for people, in the pursuit of even
+     great ends, to become themselves thin and impoverished in
+     spirit and temper, thus diminishing the sum of perfection in
+     the world at its very sources."[42:3]
+
+The quiet and worshipful spirit, won by the cultivation of the emotions
+appropriate to the presence of nature and society, is the mark of the
+completest life and the most acceptable service. Thus for Wordsworth the
+meaning of life is inseparable from the meaning of the universe. In
+apprehending that which is good and beautiful in human experience, he
+was attended by a vision of the totality of things. Herein he has had to
+do, if not with the form, at any rate with the very substance of
+philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Dante.]
+
+Sect. 13. Unquestionably the supreme philosopher-poet is Dante. He is
+not only philosophical in the temper of his mind, but his greatest poem
+is the incarnation of a definite system of philosophy, the most
+definite that the world has seen. That conception of the world which in
+the thirteenth century found argumentative and orderly expression in the
+"Summa Theologiae" of Thomas of Aquino, and constituted the faith of the
+church, is visualized by Dante, and made the basis of an interpretation
+of life.
+
+The "Divina Commedia" deals with all the heavens to the Empyrean itself,
+and with all spiritual life to the very presence of God. It derives its
+imagery from the cosmology of the day, its dramatic motive from the
+Christian and Greek conceptions of God and his dealings with the world.
+Sin is punished because of the justice of God; knowledge, virtue, and
+faith lead, through God's grace and mercy manifested in Christ, to a
+perpetual union with Him. Hell, purgatory, and paradise give place and
+setting to the events of the drama. But the deeper meaning of the poem
+is allegorical. In a letter quoted by Lowell, Dante writes:
+
+     "The literal subject of the whole work is the state of the
+     soul after death, simply considered. But if the work be taken
+     allegorically the subject is man, as by merit or demerit,
+     through freedom of the will, he renders himself liable to the
+     reward or punishment of justice."[43:4]
+
+In other words, the inner and essential meaning of the poem has to do
+not with external retribution, but with character, and the laws which
+determine its own proper ruin or perfection. The punishments described
+in the "Inferno" are accounts of the state of guilt itself, implications
+of the will that has chosen the part of brutishness. Sin itself is
+damnable and deadening, but the knowledge that the soul that sinneth
+shall die is the first way of emancipation from sin. The guidance of
+Virgil through hell and purgatory signifies the knowledge of good and
+evil, or moral insight, as the guide of man through this life of
+struggle and progress. The earthly paradise, at the close of the
+"Purgatorio," represents the highest state to which human character can
+attain when choice is determined by ordinary experience, intelligence,
+and understanding. Here man stands alone, endowed with an enlightened
+conscience. Here are uttered the last words of Virgil to Dante, the
+explorer of the spiritual country:
+
+     "Expect no more or word or sign from me. Free, upright, and
+     sane is thine own free will, and it would be wrong not to act
+     according to its pleasure; wherefore thee over thyself I crown
+     and mitre."[44:5]
+
+But moral self-reliance is not the last word. As Beatrice, the image of
+tenderness and holiness, comes to Dante in the earthly paradise, and
+leads him from the summit of purgatory into the heaven of heavens, and
+even to the eternal light; so there is added to the mere human,
+intellectual, and moral resources of the soul, the sustaining power of
+the divine grace, the illuminating power of divine truth, and the
+transforming power of divine love. Through the aid of this higher
+wisdom, the journey of life becomes the way to God. Thus the allegorical
+truth of the "Divina Commedia" is not merely an analysis of the moral
+nature of man, but the revelation of a universal spiritual order,
+manifesting itself in the moral evolution of the individual, and above
+all in his ultimate community with the eternal goodness.
+
+     "Thou shouldst not, if I deem aright, wonder more at thy
+     ascent, than at a stream if from a high mountain it descends
+     to the base. A marvel it would be in thee, if, deprived of
+     hindrance, thou hadst sat below, even as quiet by living fire
+     in earth would be."[45:6]
+
+Such, in brief, is Dante's world-view, so suggestive of the freer
+idealistic conceptions of later thought as to justify a recent
+characterization of him as one who, "accepting without a shadow of a
+doubt or hesitation all the constitutive ideas of mediaeval thought and
+life, grasped them so firmly and gave them such luminous expression that
+the spirit in them broke away from the form."[46:7]
+
+But it must be added, as in the case of Wordsworth, that Dante is a
+philosopher-poet not because St. Thomas Aquinas appears and speaks with
+authority in the Thirteenth Canto of the "Paradiso," nor even because a
+philosophical doctrine can be consistently formulated from his writings,
+but because his consciousness of life is informed with a sense of its
+universal bearings. There is a famous passage in the Twenty-second Canto
+of the "Paradiso," in which Dante describes himself as looking down upon
+the earth from the starry heaven.
+
+     "'Thou art so near the ultimate salvation,' began Beatrice,
+     'that thou oughtest to have thine eyes clear and sharp. And
+     therefore ere thou further enterest it, look back downward,
+     and see how great a world I have already set beneath thy feet,
+     in order that thy heart, so far as it is able, may present
+     itself joyous to the triumphant crowd which comes glad through
+     this round ether.' With my sight I returned through each and
+     all the seven spheres, and saw this globe such that I smiled
+     at its mean semblance; and that counsel I approve as the best
+     which holds it of least account; and he who thinks of other
+     things maybe called truly worthy."
+
+Dante's scale of values is that which appears from the starry heaven.
+His austere piety, his invincible courage, and his uncompromising hatred
+of wrong, are neither accidents of temperament nor blind reactions, but
+compose the proper character of one who has both seen the world from
+God, and returned to see God from the world. He was, as Lowell has said,
+"a man of genius who could hold heartbreak at bay for twenty years, and
+would not let himself die till he had done his task"; and his power was
+not obstinacy, but a vision of the ways of God. He knew a truth that
+justified him in his sacrifices, and made a great glory of his defeat
+and exile. Even so his poetry or appreciation of life is the expression
+of an inward contemplation of the world in its unity or essence. It is
+but an elaboration of the piety which he attributes to the lesser saints
+of paradise, when he has them say:
+
+     "Nay, it is essential to this blessed existence to hold
+     ourselves within the divine will, whereby our very wills are
+     made one. So that as we are from stage to stage throughout
+     this realm, to all the realm is pleasing, as to the King who
+     inwills us with His will. And His will is our peace; it is
+     that sea whereunto is moving all that which It creates and
+     which nature makes."[47:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy.]
+
+Sect. 14. There now remains the brief task of distinguishing the
+philosopher-poet from the philosopher himself. The philosopher-poet is
+one who, having made the philosophical point of view his own, expresses
+himself in the form of poetry. The philosophical point of view is that
+from which the universe is comprehended in its totality. The wisdom of
+the philosopher is the knowledge of each through the knowledge of all.
+Wherein, then, does the poet, when possessed of such wisdom, differ from
+the philosopher proper? To this question one can give readily enough the
+general answer, that the difference lies in the mode of utterance.
+Furthermore, we have already given some account of the peculiar manner
+of the poet. He invites us to experience with him the beautiful and
+moving in nature and life. That which the poet has to express, and that
+which he aims to arouse in others, is an appreciative experience. He
+requires what Wordsworth calls "an atmosphere of sensation in which to
+move his wings." Therefore if he is to be philosophical in intelligence,
+and yet essentially a poet, he must find his universal truth in
+immediate experience. He must be one who, in seeing the many, sees the
+one. The philosopher-poet is he who visualizes a fundamental
+interpretation of the world. "A poem," says one poet, "is the very image
+of life expressed in its eternal truth."
+
+The philosopher proper, on the other hand, has the sterner and less
+inviting task of rendering such an interpretation articulate to thought.
+That which the poet sees, the philosopher must define. That which the
+poet divines, the philosopher must calculate. The philosopher must dig
+for that which the poet sees shining through. As the poet transcends
+thought for the sake of experience, the philosopher must transcend
+experience for the sake of thought. As the poet sees all, and all in
+each, so the philosopher, knowing each, must think all consistently
+together, and then know each again. It is the part of philosophy to
+collect and criticise evidence, to formulate and coordinate conceptions,
+and finally to define in exact terms. The reanimation of the structure
+of thought is accomplished primarily in religion, which is a general
+conception of the world made the basis of daily living.
+
+For religion there is no subjective correlative less than life itself.
+Poetry is another and more circumscribed means of restoring thought to
+life. By the poet's imagination, and through the art of his expression,
+thought may be sensuously perceived. "If the time should ever come,"
+says Wordsworth, "when what is now called Science, thus familiarized to
+men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh, and blood,
+the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and
+will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of
+the household of man."[50:9] As respects truth, philosophy has an
+indubitable priority. The very sternness of the philosopher's task is
+due to his supreme dedication to truth. But if validity be the merit of
+philosophy, it can well be supplemented by immediacy, which is the merit
+of poetry. Presuppose in the poet conviction of a sound philosophy, and
+we may say with Shelley, of his handiwork, that "it is the perfect and
+consummate surface and bloom of all things; it is as the odor and the
+color of the rose to the texture of the elements which compose it, as
+the form and splendor of unfaded beauty to the secrets of anatomy and
+corruption." "Indeed," as he adds, "what were our consolations on this
+side of the grave--and our aspirations beyond it--if poetry did not
+ascend to bring light and fire from those eternal regions where the
+owl-winged faculty of calculation dare not ever soar?"[51:10]
+
+The unity in outlook, attended by differences of method and form, which
+may exist between poet and philosopher, is signally illustrated by the
+relation between Goethe and Spinoza. What Goethe saw and felt, Spinoza
+proved and defined. The universal and eternal substance was to Spinoza,
+as philosopher, a theorem, and to Goethe, as poet, a perception and an
+emotion. Goethe writes to Jacobi that when philosophy "lays itself out
+for division," he cannot get on with it, but when it "confirms our
+original feeling as though we were one with nature," it is welcome to
+him. In the same letter Goethe expresses his appreciation of Spinoza as
+the complement of his own nature:
+
+     "His all-reconciling peace contrasted with my all-agitating
+     endeavor; his intellectual method was the opposite counterpart
+     of my poetic way of feeling and expressing myself; and even
+     the inflexible regularity of his logical procedure, which
+     might be considered ill-adapted to moral subjects, made me his
+     most passionate scholar and his devoted adherent. Mind and
+     heart, understanding and sense, were drawn together with an
+     inevitable elective affinity, and this at the same time
+     produced an intimate union between individuals of the most
+     different types."[51:11]
+
+It appears, then, that some poets share with all philosophers that
+point of view from which the horizon line is the boundary of all the
+world. Poetry is not always or essentially philosophical, but may be so;
+and when the poetic imagination restores philosophy to immediacy, human
+experience reaches its most exalted state, excepting only religion
+itself, wherein God is both seen and also served. Nor is the part of
+philosophy in poetry and religion either ignoble or presumptuous, for,
+humanly speaking, "the owl-winged faculty of calculation" is the only
+safe and sure means of access to that place on high,
+
+     "Where the nightingale doth sing
+      Not a senseless, tranced thing,
+      But a divine melodious truth;
+      Philosophic numbers smooth;
+      Tales and golden histories
+      Of heaven and its mysteries."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[28:1] George Santayana, in his _Poetry and Religion_, p. 176.
+
+[30:2] Santayana: _op. cit._, p. 180.
+
+[42:3] _Appreciations_, p. 59.
+
+[43:4] Letter to Can Grande. See Lowell's _Essay on Dante_, p. 34.
+
+[44:5] _Purgatorio_, Canto XXVII. Translation by Norton.
+
+[45:6] _Paradiso_, Canto I.
+
+[46:7] Edward Caird, in his _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 24.
+
+[47:8] _Paradiso_, Canto III.
+
+[50:9] Observations prefixed to the second edition of _Lyrical Ballads_.
+
+[51:10] _A Defence of Poetry._
+
+[51:11] Quoted by Caird in his _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p.
+60.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Possibility of Defining Religion.]
+
+Sect. 15. The least religious experience is so mysterious and so complex
+that a moderate degree of reflection upon it tends to a sense of
+intellectual impotence. "If I speak," says Emerson, "I define and
+confine, and am less." One would gladly set down religion among the
+unspeakable things and avoid the imputation of degrading it. It is
+certain that the enterprise of defining religion is at present in
+disrepute. It has been undertaken so often and so unsuccessfully that
+contemporary students for the most part prefer to supply a list of
+historical definitions of religion, and let their variety demonstrate
+their futility. Metaphysicians and psychologists agree that in view of
+the differences of creed, ritual, organization, conduct, and temperament
+that have been true of different religions in different times and
+places, one may as well abandon the idea that there is a constant
+element.
+
+But on the other hand we have the testimony afforded by the name
+religion; and the ordinary judgments of men to the effect that it
+signifies something to be religious, and to be more or less religious.
+There is an elementary logical principle to the effect that a group name
+implies certain common group characters. Impatience with abstract or
+euphemistic definitions should not blind us to the truth. Even the
+psychologist tends in his description of religious phenomena to single
+out and emphasize what he calls a _typical_ religious experience. And
+the same applies to the idealist's treatment of the matter.[54:1]
+Religion, he reasons, is essentially a development of which the true
+meaning can be seen only in the higher stages. The primitive religion is
+therefore only implicit religion. But lower stages cannot be regarded as
+belonging to a single development with higher stages, if there be not
+some actual promise of the later in the earlier, or some element which
+endures throughout. It is unavoidable, then, to assume that in dealing
+with religion we are dealing with a specific and definable experience.
+
+[Sidenote: The Profitableness of Defining Religion.]
+
+Sect. 16. The profitableness of undertaking such a definition is another
+matter. It may well be that in so human and practical an affair as
+religion, definition is peculiarly inappropriate. But is there not a
+human and practical value in the very defining of religion? Is there not
+a demand for it in the peculiar relation that exists between religion
+and the progress of enlightenment? Religion associates itself with the
+habits of society. The progress of enlightenment means that more or less
+all the time, and very profoundly at certain critical times, society
+must change its habits. The consequence is that religion is likely to be
+abandoned with the old habits. The need of a new religion is therefore a
+chronic one. The reformer in religion, or the man who wishes to be both
+enlightened and religious, is chiefly occupied with the problem of
+disentangling religion pure and undefiled from definite discredited
+practices and opinions. And the solution of the problem turns upon some
+apprehension of the essence of religion. There is a large amount of
+necessary and unnecessary tragedy due to the extrinsic connection
+between ideas and certain modes of their expression. There can be no
+more serious and urgent duty than that of expressing as directly, and so
+as truly as possible, the great permanent human concerns. The men to
+whom educational reform has been largely due have been the men who have
+remembered for their fellows what this whole business of education is
+after all for. Comenius and Pestalozzi served society by stripping
+educational activity of its historical and institutional accessories,
+and laying bare the genuine human need that these are designed to
+satisfy. There is a similar virtue in the insistent attempt to
+distinguish between the essential and the accessory in religion.
+
+[Sidenote: The True Method of Defining Religion.]
+
+Sect. 17. Although declining to be discouraged by the conspicuousness of
+past failures in this connection, one may well profit by them. The
+amazing complexity of religious phenomena must somehow be seen to be
+consistent with their common nature. The religious experience must not
+only be found, but must also be reconciled with "the varieties of
+religious experience." The inadequacy of the well-known definitions of
+religion may be attributed to several causes. The commonest fallacy is
+to define religion in terms of a religion. My definition of religion
+must include my brother's religion, even though he live on the other
+side of the globe, and my ancestor's religion, in spite of his
+prehistoric remoteness. Error may easily arise through the attempt to
+define religion in terms of my own religion, or what I conceive to be
+the true religion. Whatever the relation between ideal religion and
+actual religion, the field of religion contains by common consent cults
+that must on their own grounds condemn one another; religions that are
+bad religions, and yet religions.
+
+A more enlightened fallacy, and a more dangerous one, is due to the
+supposition that religion can be defined exclusively in terms of some
+department of human nature. There have been descriptions of religion in
+terms of feeling, intellect, and conduct respectively. But it is always
+easy to overthrow such a description, by raising the question of its
+application to evidently religious experiences that belong to some other
+aspect of life. Religion is not feeling, because there are many
+phlegmatic, God-fearing men whose religion consists in good works.
+Religion is not conduct, for there are many mystics whose very religion
+is withdrawal from the field of action. Religion is not intellection,
+for no one has ever been able to formulate a creed that is common to all
+religions. Yet without a doubt one must look for the essence of religion
+in human nature. The present psychological interest in religion has
+emphasized this truth. How, then, may we describe it in terms of
+certain constant conditions of human life, and yet escape the
+abstractness of the facultative method? Modern psychology suggests an
+answer in demonstrating the interdependence of knowledge, feeling, and
+volition.[58:2] The perfect case of this unity is _belief_. The
+believing experience is cognitive in intent, but practical and emotional
+as well in content. I believe what I take for granted; and the object of
+my belief is not merely known, but also felt and acted upon. _What I
+believe expresses itself in my total experience._
+
+There is some hope, then, of an adequate definition of the religious
+experience, if it be regarded as belonging to the psychological type of
+belief.[58:3] Belief, however, is a broader category than religion.
+There must be some _religious type_ of believing. An account of religion
+in terms of believing, and the particular type of it here in question,
+would, then, constitute the central stem of a psychology of religion,
+and affords the proper conceptions for a description of the religious
+experience. Even here the reservation must be made that belief is always
+more than the believing _state_, in that it means to be _true_.[59:4]
+Hence to complete an account of religion one should consider its object,
+or its cognitive implications. But this direct treatment of the relation
+between religion and philosophy must be deferred until in the present
+chapter we shall have come to appreciate the inwardness of the religious
+consciousness. To this end we must permit ourselves to be enlightened by
+the experience of religious people as viewed from within. It is not our
+opinion of a man's religion that is here in question, but the content
+and meaning which it has for him.
+
+     "I would have you," says Fielding, in his "Hearts of Men," "go
+     and kneel beside the Mahommedan as he prays at the sunset
+     hour, and put your heart to his and wait for the echo that
+     will surely come. . . . I would have you go to the hillman
+     smearing the stone with butter that his god may be pleased, to
+     the woman crying to the forest god for her sick child, to the
+     boy before his monks learning to be good. No matter where you
+     go, no matter what the faith is called, if you have the
+     hearing ear, if your heart is in unison with the heart of the
+     world, you will hear always the same song."[59:5]
+
+[Sidenote: Religion as Belief.]
+
+Sect. 18. The general identification of religion with belief is made
+without serious difficulty. The essential factor in belief, is, as we
+have seen, the reaction of the whole personality to a fixed object or
+accepted situation. A similar principle underlies common judgments about
+a man's religion. He is accounted most religious whose religion
+penetrates his life most intimately. In the man whose religion consists
+in the outer exercise of attendance upon church, we recognize the sham.
+He _appears_ to be religious. He does one of the things which a
+religious man would do; but an object of religious faith is not the
+constant environment of his life. He may or may not feel sure of God
+from his pew, but God is not among the things that count in his daily
+life. God does not enter into his calculations or determine his scale of
+values. Again, discursive thinking is regarded as an interruption of
+religion. When I am at pains to justify my religion, I am already
+doubting; and for common opinion doubt is identical with irreligion. In
+so far as I am religious, my religion stands in no need of
+justification, even though I regard it as justifiable. In my religious
+experience I am taking something for granted; in other words I act about
+it and feel about it in a manner that is going to be determined by the
+special conditions of my mood and temperament. The mechanical and
+prosaic man acknowledges God in his mechanical and prosaic way. He
+believes in divine retribution as he believes in commercial or social
+retribution. He is as careful to prepare for the next world as he is to
+be respectable in this. The poet, on the other hand, believes in God
+after the manner of his genius. Though he worship God in spirit he may
+conduct his life in an irregular manner peculiar to himself. Difference
+of mood in the same individual may be judged by the same measure. When
+God is most real to him, brought home to him most vividly, or
+consciously obeyed, in these moments he is most religious. When, on the
+other hand, God is merely a name to him, and church a routine, or when
+both are forgotten in the daily occupations, he is least religious. His
+life on the whole is said to be religious in so far as periods of the
+second type are subordinated to periods of the first type. Further
+well-known elements of belief, corollaries of the above, are evidently
+present in religion. A certain _imagery remains constant_ throughout an
+individual's experience. He comes back to it as to a physical object in
+space. And although religion is sporadically an exclusive and isolated
+affair, it tends strongly to be social. The religious object, or God, is
+a social object, common to me and to my neighbor, and presupposed in
+our collective undertakings. This reduction of religion to the type of
+the believing state should thus provide us with an answer to that old
+and fundamental question concerning the relative priority of faith and
+works. The test of the faith is in the works, and the works are
+religious in so far as they are the expression of the faith. Religion is
+not the doing of anything nor the feeling of anything nor the thinking
+of anything, but the reacting as a whole, in terms of all possible
+activities of human life, to some accepted situation.
+
+[Sidenote: Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude.]
+
+Sect. 19. We may now face the more interesting but difficult question of
+the special character of religious belief. In spite of the fact that in
+these days the personality of God is often regarded as a transient
+feature of religion, that type of belief which throws most light upon
+the religious experience is the _belief in persons_. Our belief in
+persons consists in the practical recognition of a more or less
+persistent disposition toward ourselves. The outward behavior of our
+fellow-men is construed in terms of the practical bearing of the
+attitude which it implies. The extraordinary feature of such belief is
+the disproportion between its vividness and the direct evidence for it.
+Of this we are most aware in connection with those personalities which
+we regard as distinctly friendly or hostile to ourselves. We are always
+more or less clearly in the presence of our friends and enemies. Their
+well-wishing or their ill-wishing haunts the scene of our living. There
+is no more important constituent of what the psychologists call our
+"general feeling tone." There are times when we are entirely possessed
+by a state that is either exuberance in the presence of those who love
+us, or awkwardness and stupidity in the presence of those whom we
+believe to suspect and dislike us. The latter state may easily become
+chronic. Many men live permanently in the presence of an accusing
+audience. The inner life which expresses itself in the words, "Everybody
+hates me!" is perhaps the most common form of morbid self-consciousness.
+On the other hand, buoyancy of spirits springs largely from a constant
+faith in the good-will of one's fellows. In this case one is filled with
+a sense of security, and is conscious of a sympathetic reinforcement
+that adds to private joys and compensates for private sorrows. And this
+sense of attitude is wonderfully discriminating. We can feel the
+presence of a "great man," a "formidable person," a superior or
+inferior, one who is interested or indifferent to our talk, and all the
+subtlest degrees of approval and disapproval.
+
+A similar sensibility may quicken us even in situations where no direct
+individual attitude to ourselves is implied. We regard places and
+communities as congenial when we are in sympathy with the prevailing
+purposes or standards of value. We may feel ill at ease or thoroughly at
+home in cities where we know no single human soul. Indeed, in a
+misanthrope like Rousseau (and who has not his Rousseau moods!) the mere
+absence of social repression arouses a most intoxicating sense of
+tunefulness and security. Nature plays the part of an indulgent parent
+who permits all sorts of personal liberties.
+
+     "The view of a fine country, a succession of agreeable
+     prospects, a free air, a good appetite, and the health I gain
+     by walking; the freedom of inns, and the distance from
+     everything that can make me recollect the dependence of my
+     situation, conspire to free my soul, and give boldness to my
+     thoughts, throwing me, in a manner, into the immensity of
+     things, where I combine, choose, and appropriate them to my
+     fancy, without restraint or fear. I dispose of all nature as I
+     please."[64:6]
+
+[Sidenote: Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual
+Environment, or Universe.]
+
+Sect. 20. In such confidence or distrust, inspired originally by the
+social environment, and similarly suggested by other surroundings of
+life, we have the key to the religious consciousness. But it is now time
+to add that in the case of religion these attitudes are concerned with
+the universal or supernatural rather than with present and normal human
+relationships. Religious reactions are "total reactions."
+
+     "To get at them," says William James, "you must go behind the
+     foreground of existence and reach down to that curious _sense
+     of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence_,
+     intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious,
+     which in some degree everyone possesses. This _sense of the
+     world's presence_, appealing as it does to our peculiar
+     individual temperament, makes us either strenuous or careless,
+     devout or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant about life at large;
+     and our reaction, involuntary and inarticulate and often half
+     unconscious as it is, is the completest of all our answers to
+     the question, 'What is the character of this universe in which
+     we dwell?'"[65:7]
+
+This _residual environment_, or profounder realm of tradition and
+nature, may have any degree of unity from chaos to cosmos. For religion
+its significance lies in the idea of original and far-reaching power
+rather than in the idea of totality. But that which is at first only
+"beyond," is _practically_ the same object as that which comes in the
+development of thought to be conceived as the "world" or the "universe."
+We may therefore use these latter terms to indicate the object of
+religion, until the treatment of special instances shall define it more
+precisely. Religion is, then, _man's sense of the disposition of the
+universe to himself_. We shall expect to find, as in the social
+phenomena with which we have just dealt, that the manifestation of this
+sense consists in a general reaction appropriate to the disposition so
+attributed. He will be fundamentally ill at ease, profoundly confident,
+or will habitually take precautions to be safe. The ultimate nature of
+the world is here no speculative problem. The savage who could feel some
+joy at living in the universe would be more religious than the sublimest
+dialectician. It is in the vividness of the sense of this presence that
+the acuteness of religion consists. I am religious in so far as the
+whole tone and temper of my living reflects a belief as to what the
+universe thinks of such as me.
+
+[Sidenote: Examples of Religious Belief.]
+
+Sect. 21. The examples that follow are selected because their
+differences in personal flavor serve to throw into relief their common
+religious character. Theodore Parker, in describing his own boyhood,
+writes as follows:
+
+     "I can hardly think without a shudder of the terrible effect
+     the doctrine of eternal damnation had on me. How many, many
+     hours have I wept with terror as I lay on my bed, till,
+     between praying and weeping, sleep gave me repose. But before
+     I was nine years old this fear went away, and I saw clearer
+     light in the goodness of God. But for years, say from seven
+     till ten, I said my prayers with much devotion, I think, and
+     then continued to repeat, 'Lord, forgive my sins,' till sleep
+     came on me."[67:8]
+
+Compare with this Stevenson's Christmas letter to his mother, in which
+he says:
+
+     "The whole necessary morality is kindness; and it should
+     spring, of itself, from the one fundamental doctrine, Faith.
+     If you are sure that God, in the long run, means kindness by
+     you, you should be happy; and if happy, surely you should be
+     kind."[67:9]
+
+Here is destiny frowning and destiny smiling, but in each case so real,
+so present, as to be immediately responded to with helpless terror and
+with grateful warm-heartedness.
+
+The author of the "Imitatio Christi" speaks thus of the daily living of
+the Christian:
+
+     "The life of a Christian who has dedicated himself to the
+     service of God should abound with eminent virtues of all
+     kinds, that he may be really the same person which he is by
+     outward appearance and profession. Indeed, he ought not only
+     to be the same, but much more, in his inward disposition of
+     soul; because he professes to serve a God who sees the inward
+     parts, a searcher of the heart and reins, a God and Father of
+     spirits: and therefore, since we are always in His sight, we
+     should be exceedingly careful to avoid all impurity, all that
+     may give offence to Him whose eyes cannot behold iniquity. We
+     should, in a word, so far as mortal and frail nature can,
+     imitate the blessed angels in all manner of holiness, since
+     we, as well as they, are always in His presence. . . . And good
+     men have always this notion of the thing. For they depend upon
+     God for the success of all they do, even of their best and
+     wisest undertakings."[68:10]
+
+Such is to be the practical acknowledgment of God in the routine of
+life. The more direct response to this presence appears abundantly in
+St. Augustine's conversation and reminiscence with God.
+
+     "How evil have not my deeds been; or if not my deeds my words;
+     or if not my words my will? But Thou, O Lord, art good and
+     merciful, and Thy right hand had respect unto the profoundness
+     of my death, and removed from the bottom of my heart that
+     abyss of corruption. And this was the result, that I willed
+     not to do what I willed, and willed to do what thou
+     willedst. . . . How sweet did it suddenly become to me to be
+     without the delights of trifles! And what at one time I
+     feared to lose, it was now a joy to me to put away. For Thou
+     didst cast them away from me, Thou true and highest sweetness.
+     Thou didst cast them away, and instead of them didst enter in
+     Thyself--sweeter than all pleasure, though not to flesh and
+     blood; brighter than all light, but more veiled than all
+     mysteries; more exalted than all honor, but not to the exalted
+     in their own conceits. Now was my soul free from the gnawing
+     cares of seeking and getting. . . . And I babbled unto Thee my
+     brightness, my riches, and my health, the Lord my God."[69:11]
+
+In these two passages we meet with religious conduct and with the
+supreme religious experience, the direct worship of God. In each case
+the heart of the matter is an individual's indubitable conviction of the
+world's favorable concern for him. The deeper order of things
+constitutes the real and the profoundly congenial community in which he
+lives.
+
+[Sidenote: Typical Religious Phenomena: Conversion.]
+
+Sect. 22. Let us now apply this general account of the religious
+experience to certain typical religious phenomena: _conversion_;
+_piety_; and religious _instruments_, _symbolisms_, _and_ modes of
+_conveyance_. Although recent study of the phenomenon of _conversion_
+has brought to light a considerable amount of interesting material,
+there is some danger of misconceiving its importance. The psychology of
+conversion is primarily the psychology of crisis or radical alteration,
+rather than the psychology of religion. For the majority of religious
+men and women conversion is an insignificant event, and in very many
+cases it never occurs at all. Religion is more purely present where it
+is normal and monotonous. But this phenomenon is nevertheless highly
+significant in that religion and irreligion are placed in close
+juxtaposition, and the contribution of religion at its inception thereby
+emphasized. In general it is found that conversion takes place during
+the period of adolescence. But this is the time of the most sudden
+expansion of the environment of life; a time when there is the awakening
+consciousness of many a new presence. This is sometimes expressed by
+saying that it is a period of acute self-consciousness. Life is
+conscious of itself as over against its inheritance; the whole setting
+of life sweeps into view. Some solution of the life problem, some coming
+to terms with the universe, is the normal issue of it. Religious
+conversion signifies, then, that in this fundamental adjustment a man
+defines and accepts for his life a certain attitude on the part of the
+universe. The examples cited by the psychologists, as well as the
+generalizations which they derive, bear out this interpretation.
+
+     "General Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, considers
+     that the first vital step in saving outcasts consists in
+     making them feel that some decent human being cares enough for
+     them to take an interest in the question whether they are to
+     rise or sink."[71:12]
+
+The new state is here one of courage and hope stimulated by the glow of
+friendly interest. The convert is no longer "out in the cold." He is
+told that the world wishes him well, and this is brought home to him
+through representations of the tenderness of Christ, and through the
+direct ministerings of those who mediate it. But somehow the convert
+must be persuaded to realize all this. He must _believe_ it before it
+can mean anything to him. He is therefore urged to pray--a proceeding
+that is at first ridiculous to him, since it involves taking for granted
+what he disbelieves. But therein lies the critical point. It is peculiar
+to the object in this case that it can exist only for one who already
+believes in it. The psychologists call this the element of
+"self-surrender." To be converted a man must somehow suffer his
+surroundings to put into him a new heart, which may thereupon confirm
+its object. Such belief is tremendously tenacious because it so largely
+creates its own evidence. Once believe that "God, in the long run, means
+kindness by you," and you are likely to stand by it to the end--the more
+so in this case because the external evidence either way is to the
+average man so insufficient. Such a belief as this is inspired in the
+convert, not by reasoning, but by all the powers of suggestion that
+personality and social contagion can afford.
+
+[Sidenote: Piety.]
+
+Sect. 23. The psychologists describe _piety_ as a sense of unity. One
+feels after reading their accounts that they are too abstract. For there
+are many kinds of unity, characteristic of widely varying moods and
+states. Any state of rapt attention is a state of unity, and this occurs
+in the most secular and humdrum moments of life. Nor does it help
+matters to say that in the case of religion this unity must have been
+preceded by a state of division; for we cannot properly characterize any
+state of mind in terms of another state unless the latter be retained in
+the former. And that which is characteristic of the religious sense of
+unity would seem to be just such an overcoming of difference. There is a
+recognition of two distinct attitudes, which may be more or less in
+sympathy with one another, but which are both present even in their
+fullest harmony. Were I to be taken out of myself so completely as to
+forget myself, I should inevitably lose that sense of sympathy from
+which arises the peculiar exultation of religious faith, a heightened
+experience of the same type with the freedom and spontaneity that I
+experience in the presence of those with whom I feel most in accord. The
+further graces and powers of religion readily submit to a similar
+description. My sense of positive sympathy expresses itself in an
+attitude of well-wishing; living in an atmosphere of kindness I
+instinctively endeavor to propagate it. My buoyancy is distinctly of
+that quality which to a lesser degree is due to any sense of social
+security; my power is that of one who works in an environment that
+reenforces him. I experience the objective or even cosmical character of
+my enterprises. They have a momentum which makes me their instrument
+rather than their perpetrator. A paradoxical relation between religion
+and morality has always interested observers of custom and history.
+Religion is apparently as capable of the most fiendish malevolence as of
+the most saintly gentleness. Fielding writes that,
+
+     "When religion is brought out or into daily life and used as
+     a guide or a weapon in the world it has no effect either for
+     good or evil. Its effect is simply in strengthening the heart,
+     in blinding the eyes, in deafening the ears. It is an
+     intensive force, an intoxicant. It doubles or trebles a man's
+     powers. It is an impulsive force sending him headlong down the
+     path of emotion, whether that path lead to glory or to infamy.
+     It is a tremendous stimulant, that is all."[74:13]
+
+Religion does not originate life purposes or define their meaning, but
+stimulates them by the same means that works in all corporate and social
+activity. To work with the universe is the most tremendous incentive
+that can appeal to the individual will. Hence in highly ethical
+religions the power for good exceeds that of any other social and
+spiritual agency. Such religion makes present, actual, and real, that
+good on the whole which the individual otherwise tends to distinguish
+from that which is good for _him_. In daily life the morally valid and
+the practically urgent are commonly arrayed against one another; but the
+ethical religion makes the valid urgent.
+
+[Sidenote: Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance.]
+
+Sect. 24. The _instruments_ of religion are legion, and it is in order
+here only to mention certain prominent cases in which their selection
+would seem to have direct reference to the provocation and perpetuation
+of such a sense of attitude as we have been describing. This is true in
+a general way of all _symbolism_. There is no essential difference
+between the religious symbol and such symbols as serve to remind us of
+human relationships. In both cases the perceptual absence of will is
+compensated for by the presence of some object associated with that
+will. The function of this object is due to its power to revive and
+perpetuate a certain special social atmosphere. But the most important
+vehicle of religion has always been personality. It is, after all, to
+priests, prophets, and believers that religious cults have owed their
+long life. The traits that mark the prophet are both curious and
+sublime. He is most remarkable for the confidence with which he speaks
+for the universe. Whether it be due to lack of a sense of humor or to a
+profound conviction of truth, is indifferent to our purpose. The power
+of such men is undoubtedly in their suggestion of a force greater than
+they, whose designs they bring directly and socially to the attention of
+men. The prophet in his prophesying is indeed not altogether
+distinguished from God, and it is through the mediation of a directly
+perceptible human attitude that a divine attitude gets itself fixed in
+the imagination of the believer. What is true of the prophet is equally
+true of the preacher whose function it is not to represent God in his
+own person, but to depict him with his tongue. It is generally
+recognized that the preacher is neither a moralizer nor a theologian.
+But it is less perfectly understood that it is his function to suggest
+the presence of God. His proper language is that of the imagination, and
+the picture which he portrays is that of a reciprocal social
+relationship between man and the Supreme Master of the situation of
+life. He will not define God or prove God, but introduce Him and talk
+about Him. And at the same time the association of prayer and worship
+with his sermon, and the atmosphere created by the meeting together of a
+body of disciples, will act as the confirmation of his suggestions of
+such a living presence.
+
+The _conveyance_ of any single religious cult from generation to
+generation affords a signal illustration of the importance in religion
+of the recognition of attitude. Religions manage somehow to survive any
+amount of transformation of creed and ritual. It is not what is done, or
+what is thought, that identifies the faith of the first Christians with
+that of the last, but a certain reckoning with the disposition of God.
+The successive generations of Christians are introduced into the
+spiritual world of their fathers, with its furnishing of hopes and fears
+remaining substantially the same; and their Christianity consists in
+their continuing to live in it with only a slight and gradual
+renovation. To any given individual God is more or less completely
+represented by his elders in the faith in their exhortations and
+ministerings; and through them he fixes as the centre of his system an
+image of God his accuser or redeemer.
+
+[Sidenote: Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions.]
+
+Sect. 25. The complete verification of this interpretation of the
+religious experience would require the application of it to the
+different historical cults. In general the examination of such instances
+is entirely beyond the scope of this chapter; but a brief consideration
+may be given to those which seem to afford reasonable grounds for
+objection.
+
+First, it may be said that in _primitive religions_, notably in
+fetichism, tabooism, and totemism, there is no recognition of a cosmical
+unity. It is quite evident that there is no conception of a universe.
+But it is equally evident that the natural and historical environment in
+its generality has a very specific practical significance for the
+primitive believer. It is often said with truth that these earliest
+religions are more profoundly pantheistic than polytheistic. Man
+recognizes an all-pervading interest that is capable of being directed
+to himself. The selection of a deity is not due to any special
+qualification for deification possessed by the individual object itself,
+but to the tacit presumption that, as Thales said, "all things are full
+of gods." The disposition of residual reality manifests to the believer
+no consistency or unity, but it is nevertheless the most constant object
+of his will. He lives in the midst of a capriciousness which he must
+appease if he is to establish himself at all.
+
+[Sidenote: Buddhism.]
+
+Sect. 26. Secondly, in the case of _Buddhism_ we are said to meet with a
+religion that is essentially atheistic.
+
+     "Whether Buddhas arise, O priests, or whether Buddhas do not
+     arise, it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary
+     constitution of being, that all its constituents are
+     transitory."[78:14]
+
+The secret of life lies in the application of this truth:
+
+       "O builder! I've discovered thee!
+     This fabric thou shalt ne'er rebuild!
+     Thy rafters all are broken now,
+     And pointed roof demolished lies!
+     This mind has demolition reached,
+     And seen the last of all desire!"[78:15]
+
+The case of Buddha himself and of the exponents of his purely esoteric
+doctrine, belong to the reflective type which will presently be given
+special consideration. But with the ordinary believer, even where an
+extraneous but almost inevitable polytheism is least in evidence, the
+religious experience consists in substantially the same elements that
+appear in theistic religions. The individual is here living
+appropriately to the ultimate nature of things, with the ceaseless
+periods of time in full view. That which is brought home to him is the
+illusoriness and hollowness of things when taken in the spirit of active
+endeavor. The only profound and abiding good is nothingness. While
+nature and society conspire to mock him, Nirvana invites him to its
+peace. The religious course of his life consists in the use of such
+means as can win him this end. From the stand-point of the universe he
+has the sympathy only of that wisdom whose essence is self-destruction.
+And this truth is mediated by the imagination of divine sympathy, for
+the Blessed One remains as the perpetual incarnation of his own
+blessedness.
+
+[Sidenote: Critical Religion.]
+
+Sect. 27. Finally there remains the consideration of the bearing of this
+interpretation upon the more refined and disciplined religions. The
+religion of the critically enlightened man is less naive and credulous
+in its imagery. God tends to vanish into an ideal or a universal, into
+some object of theoretical definition. Here we are on that borderland
+where an assignment of individual cases can never be made with any
+certainty of correctness. We can generalize only by describing the
+conditions that such cases must fulfil if they are properly to be
+denominated religious. And there can be no question of the justice of
+deriving such a description from the reports of historical and
+institutional religions. An idealistic philosophy will, then, be a
+religion just in so far as it is rendered practically vivid by the
+imagination. Such imagination must create and sustain a social
+relationship. The question of the legitimacy of this imagination is
+another matter. It raises the issue concerning the judgment of truth
+implied in religion, and this is the topic of the next chapter. At any
+rate the religious experience _may be_ realized by virtue of the
+metaphorical or poetical representation of a situation as one of
+intercommunication between persons, where reflective definition at the
+same time denies it. The human worshipper may supply the personality of
+God from himself, viewing himself as from the divine stand-point. But
+whatever faculty supplies this indispensable social quality of religion,
+he who defines God as the ultimate goodness or the ultimate truth, has
+certainly not yet worshipped Him. He begins to be religious only when
+such an ideal determines the atmosphere of his daily living; when he
+regards the immanence of such an ideal in nature and history as the
+object of his will; and when he responds to its presence in the spirit
+of his conduct and his contemplation.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[54:1] Cf. Caird: _The Evolution of Religion_, Lectures II, III.
+
+[58:2] Cf. Leuba: _Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion_,
+_Monist_, Vol. XI, p. 195.
+
+[58:3] Cf. Leuba: _Ibid._
+
+[59:4] Cf. Sect. 29.
+
+[59:5] P. 322.
+
+[64:6] Rousseau: _Confessions_, Book IV, p. 125.
+
+[65:7] William James: _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 35.
+The italics are mine. I am in the present chapter under constant
+obligation to this wonderfully sympathetic and stimulating book.
+
+[67:8] Chadwick: _Theodore Parker_, p. 18.
+
+[67:9] Stevenson: _Letters_, Vol. I, p. 229.
+
+[68:10] Thomas a Kempis: _Imitation of Christ_, Chap. XIX. Translation
+by Stanhope, p. 44.
+
+[69:11] St. Augustine: _Confessions_, Book I, Chap. I. Translation in
+Schaff: _Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, Vol. I, p. 129.
+
+[71:12] James: _Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 203.
+
+[74:13] Fielding: _op. cit._, p. 152.
+
+[78:14] Warren: _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 14.
+
+[78:15] _Ibid._, p. 83.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION
+
+
+[Sidenote: Resume of Psychology of Religion.]
+
+Sect. 28. It has been maintained that religion is closely analogous to
+one's belief in the disposition toward one's self of men or communities.
+In the case of religion this disposition is attributed to the more or
+less vaguely conceived residual environment that is recognized as lying
+outside of the more familiar natural and social relations. After the
+rise of science this residual environment tends to be conceived as a
+unity which is ultimate or fundamental, but for the religious
+consciousness it is more commonly regarded as a general source of
+influence practically worthy of consideration. Such a belief, like all
+belief, is vitally manifested, with such emphasis upon action, feeling,
+or intellection as temperament and mood may determine.
+
+[Sidenote: Religion Means to be True.]
+
+Sect. 29. But if the psychology of belief is the proper starting-point
+for a description of the religious experience, it is none the less
+suggestive of the fact that religion, just because it _is_ belief, is
+not wholly a matter for psychology. For religion _means to be true_, and
+thus submits itself to valuation as a case of knowledge. The
+psychological study of religion is misleading when accepted as a
+substitute for philosophical criticism. The religious man takes his
+religion not as a narcotic, but as an enlightenment. Its subjective
+worth is due at any rate in part to the supposition of its objective
+worth. As in any case of insight, that which warms the heart must have
+satisfied the mind. The religious experience purports to be the part of
+wisdom, and to afford only such happiness as increasing wisdom would
+confirm. And the charm of truth cannot survive its truthfulness. Hence,
+though religion may be described, it cannot be justified, from the
+stand-point of therapeutics. Were such the case it would be the real
+problem of religious leaders to find a drug capable of giving a
+constantly pleasant tone to their patient's experience.[83:1] There
+would be no difference between priests and physicians who make a
+specialty of nervous diseases, except that the former would aim at a
+more fundamental and perpetual suggestion of serenity. Now no man wants
+to be even a blessed fool. He does not want to dwell constantly in a
+fictitious world, even if it be after his own heart. He may from the
+cynical point of view actually do so, but if he be religious he thinks
+it is reality, and is satisfied only in so far as he thinks so. He
+regards the man who has said in his heart that there is no God as the
+fool, and not because he may have to suffer for it, but because he is
+cognitively blind to the real nature of things. Piety, on the other
+hand, he regards as the standard experience, the most veracious life.
+Hence, it is not an accident that religion has had its creeds and its
+controversies, its wars with science and its appeals to philosophy. The
+history of these affairs shows that religion commonly fails to
+understand the scope of its own demand for truth; but they have issued
+from the deep conviction that one's religion is, implicitly, at least,
+in the field of truth; that there are theoretical judgments whose truth
+would justify or contradict it.
+
+This general fact being admitted, there remains the task to which the
+present discussion addresses itself, that of defining the kind of
+_theoretical judgment_ implied in religion, and the relation to this
+central cognitive stem of its efflorescences of myth, theology, and
+ritual. It is impossible to separate the stem and the efflorescence, or
+to determine the precise spot at which destruction of the tissue would
+prove fatal to the plant, but it is possible to obtain some idea of the
+relative vitality of the parts.
+
+[Sidenote: Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a Disposition
+from which Consequences May Rationally be Expected.]
+
+Sect. 30. The difficulty of reaching a definite statement in this matter
+is due to the fact that the truth in which any religious experience
+centres is a practical and not a scientific truth. A practical truth
+does not commit itself to any single scientific statement, and can often
+survive the overthrow of that scientific statement in which at any given
+time it has found expression. In other words, an indefinite number of
+scientific truths are compatible with a single practical truth. An
+instance of this is the consistency with my expectation of the
+alternation of day and night, of either the Ptolemaic or Copernican
+formulation of the solar system. Now expectation that the sun will rise
+to-morrow is an excellent analogue of my religious belief. Celestial
+mechanics is as relevant to the one as metaphysics to the other. Neither
+is overthrown until a central practical judgment is discredited, and
+either could remain true through a very considerable alteration of
+logical definition; but neither is on this account exempt from
+theoretical responsibility. In so far as religion deliberately enters
+the field of science, and defines its formularies with the historical or
+metaphysical method, this difficulty does not, of course, exist. Grant
+that the years of Methuselah's life, or the precise place and manner of
+the temptation of Jesus, or the definition of Christ in the terms of the
+Athanasian Creed, are constitutive of Christianity, and the survival of
+that religion will be determined by the solution of ordinary problems of
+historical or metaphysical research. But the Christian will very
+properly claim that his religion is only externally and accidentally
+related to such propositions, since they are never or very rarely
+intended in his experience. As religious he is occupied with Christ as
+his saviour or with God as his protector and judge. The history of Jesus
+or the metaphysics of God essentially concern him only in so far as they
+may or may not invalidate this relationship. He cares only for the power
+and disposition of the divine, and these are affected by history and
+metaphysics only in so far as he has definitely put them to such proof.
+
+For my religion is my sense of a practical situation, and only when
+that has been proved to be folly has my religion become untrue. My God
+is my practical faith, my plan of salvation. My religion is overthrown
+if I am convinced that I have misconceived the situation and mistaken
+what I should do to be saved. The conception of God is very simple
+practically, and very complex theoretically, a fact that confirms its
+practical genesis. My conception of God contains _an idea of my own
+interests_, _an idea of the disposition of the universe toward my
+interests_, and _some working plan for the reconciliation of these two
+terms_. These three elements form a practical unity, but each is capable
+of emphasis, and a religion may be transformed through the modification
+of any one of them. It appears, then, as has always been somewhat
+vaguely recognized, that the truth of religion is ethical as well as
+metaphysical or scientific. My religion will be altered by a change in
+my conception of what constitutes my real interest, a change in my
+conception of the fundamental causes of reality, or a change in my
+conception of the manner in which my will may or may not affect these
+causes. God is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always a relation of
+entity to ideal: _reality regarded from the stand-point of its
+favorableness or unfavorableness to human life, and prescribing for the
+latter the propriety of a certain attitude_.
+
+[Sidenote: Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The
+Religion of Baal.]
+
+Sect. 31. The range of historical examples is limitless, but certain of
+these are especially calculated to emphasize the application of a
+criterion to religion. Such is the case with Elijah's encounter with the
+prophets of Baal, as narrated in the Old Testament.
+
+     "And Elijah came near unto all the people, and said, How long
+     halt ye between two opinions? If Yahweh be God, follow him:
+     but if Baal, then follow him. . . . And call ye on the name of
+     your god, and I will call on the name of Yahweh: and the God
+     that answereth by fire, let him be God. . . . And Elijah said
+     unto the prophets of Baal, Choose you one bullock for
+     yourselves, and dress it first; for ye are many; and call on
+     the name of your god, but put no fire under. And they took the
+     bullock which was given them, and they dressed it, and called
+     on the name of Baal from morning even until noon, saying, O
+     Baal, hear us. But there was no voice, nor any that
+     answered. . . . And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah
+     mocked them, and said, Cry aloud: for he is a god; either he
+     is musing, or he is gone aside, or he is in a journey, or
+     peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked. And they cried
+     aloud, and cut themselves after their manner with knives and
+     lances, till the blood gushed out upon them. . . . But there
+     was neither voice, nor any to answer, nor any that
+     regarded."[88:2]
+
+The religion of the followers of Baal here consists in a belief in the
+practical virtue of a mode of address and form of ritual associated with
+the traditions and customs of a certain social group. The prophets of
+this cult agree to regard the experiment proposed by Elijah as a crucial
+test, and that which is disproved from its failure is a plan of action.
+These prophets relied upon the presence of a certain motivity, from
+which a definite response could be evoked by an appeal which they were
+peculiarly able to make; but though "they prophesied until the time of
+the offering of the evening oblation," there was none that regarded.
+
+[Sidenote: Greek Religion.]
+
+Sect. 32. An equally familiar and more instructive example is the
+refutation of the Greek national religion by Lucretius. The conception
+of life which Lucretius finds unwarranted is best depicted in Homer.
+There we hear of a society composed of gods and men. Though the gods, on
+the one hand, have their own history, their affairs are never sharply
+sundered from those of men, who, on the other hand, must constantly
+reckon with them, gauge their attitude, and seek their favor by paying
+tribute to their individual humors and preferences. In the Ninth Book of
+the "Iliad," Phoenix addresses himself to the recalcitrant Achilles as
+follows:
+
+                         "It fits not one that moves
+     The hearts of all, to live unmov'd, and succor hates for loves.
+     The Gods themselves are flexible; whose virtues, honors, pow'rs,
+     Are more than thine, yet they will bend their breasts as we bend
+         ours.
+     Perfumes, benign devotions, savors of offerings burn'd,
+     And holy rites, the engines are with which their hearts are turn'd,
+     By men that pray to them."[90:3]
+
+Here is a general recognition of that which makes sacrifice rational. It
+is because he conceives this presupposition to be mistaken, that
+Lucretius declares the practices and fears which are founded upon it to
+be folly. It is the same with all that is practically based upon the
+expectation of a life beyond the grave. The correction of the popular
+religion is due in his opinion to that true view of the world taught by
+Epicurus, whose memory Lucretius thus invokes at the opening of the
+Third Book of the "De Rerum Natura":
+
+     "Thee, who first wast able amid such thick darkness to raise
+     on high so bright a beacon and shed a light on the true
+     interests of life, thee I follow, glory of the Greek race,
+     and plant now my footsteps firmly fixed in thy imprinted
+     marks. . . . For soon as thy philosophy issuing from a
+     godlike intellect has begun with loud voice, to proclaim the
+     nature of things, the terrors of the mind are dispelled, the
+     walls of the world part asunder, I see things in operation
+     throughout the whole void: the divinity of the gods is
+     revealed and their tranquil abodes which neither winds do
+     shake nor clouds drench with rains nor snow congealed by sharp
+     frost harms with hoary fall: an ever cloudless ether
+     o'ercanopies them, and they laugh with light shed largely
+     round. Nature too supplies all their wants and nothing ever
+     impairs their peace of mind. But on the other hand the
+     Acherusian quarters[91:4] are nowhere to be seen, though earth
+     is no bar to all things being descried, which are in operation
+     underneath our feet throughout the void."[91:5]
+
+In another passage, after describing the Phrygian worship of Cybele, he
+comments as follows:
+
+     "All which, well and beautifully as it is set forth and told,
+     is yet widely removed from true reason. For the nature of gods
+     must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together
+     with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our
+     concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all
+     dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us,
+     it is neither gained by favors nor moved by anger. . . . The
+     earth however is at all time without feeling, and because it
+     receives into it the first-beginnings of many things, it
+     brings them forth in many ways into the light of the
+     sun."[91:6]
+
+If the teaching of Epicurus be true it is evident that those who
+offered hecatombs with the idea that they were thereby mitigating anger,
+or securing special dispensation, were playing the fool. They were
+appealing to a fictitious motivity, one not grounded in "the nature of
+things." To one for whom the walls of the world had parted asunder, such
+a procedure was no longer possible; though he might choose to "call the
+sea Neptune" and reverence the earth as "mother of the gods."[92:7]
+
+[Sidenote: Judaism and Christianity.]
+
+Sect. 33. The history of religion contains no more impressive and
+dramatic chapter than that which records the development of the religion
+of the Jews. Passing over its obscure beginnings in the primitive
+Semitic cult, we find this religion first clearly defined as tribal
+self-interest sanctioned by Yahweh.[92:8] God's interest in his chosen
+people determines the prosperity of him who practices the social
+virtues.
+
+     "The name of Yahweh is a strong tower: the righteous runneth
+     into it, and is safe."
+
+     "He that is steadfast in righteousness shall attain unto
+     life."
+
+     "To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to Yahweh than
+     sacrifice."[93:9]
+
+But in time it is evident to the believer that his experience does not
+bear out this expectation. Neither as a Jew nor as a righteous man does
+he prosper more than his neighbor. He comes, therefore, to distrust the
+virtue of his wisdom.
+
+     "Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light
+     excelleth darkness. The wise man's eyes are in his head, and
+     the fool walketh in darkness: and yet I perceived that one
+     event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, As it
+     happeneth to the fool, so will it happen even to me; and why
+     was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also
+     was vanity. For of the wise man, even as of the fool, there is
+     no remembrance forever; seeing that in the days to come all
+     will have been already forgotten. And how doth the wise man
+     die even as the fool! So I hated life; because the work that
+     is wrought under the sun was grievous unto me: for all is
+     vanity and a striving after wind."[93:10]
+
+It is evident that he who expects the favor of fortune in return for
+his observance of precept is mistaken. The "work that is wrought under
+the sun" makes no special provision for him during his lifetime. Unless
+the cry of vanity is to be the last word there must be a
+reinterpretation of the promise of God. This appears in the new ideal of
+patient submission, and the chastened faith that expects only the love
+of God. And those whom God loves He will not forsake. They will come to
+their own, if not here, then beyond, according to His inscrutable but
+unswerving plan.
+
+     "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a
+     contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."
+
+     "For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth
+     eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and holy
+     place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit,
+     to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of
+     the contrite ones."[94:11]
+
+In this faith Judaism merges into Christianity.[94:12] In the whole
+course of this evolution God is regarded as the friend of his people,
+but his people learn to find a new significance in his friendship. That
+which is altered is the conduct which that friendship requires and the
+expectation which it determines. The practical ideal which the
+relationship sanctions, changes gradually from that of prudence to that
+of goodness for its own sake. God, once an instrument relevant to human
+temporal welfare, has come to be an object of disinterested service.
+
+No such transformation as this was absolutely realized during the period
+covered by the writings of the Old Testament, nor has it even yet been
+realized in the development of Christianity. But the evolution of both
+Judaism and Christianity has taken this direction. The criterion of this
+evolution is manifestly both ethical and metaphysical. A Christian avows
+that he rates purity of character above worldly prosperity, so that the
+former cannot properly be prized for the sake of the latter.
+Furthermore, he shares more or less unconsciously such philosophical and
+scientific opinions as deny truth to the conception of special
+interferences and dispensations from a supernatural agency. Therefore he
+looks for no fire from heaven to consume his sacrifice. But his religion
+is nevertheless a practical expectation. He believes that God is good,
+and that God loves him and sustains him. He believes that there obtains
+between himself, in so far as good, and the universe _sub specie
+eternitatis_, a real sympathy and reciprocal reenforcement. He believes
+that he secures through the profoundly potent forces of the universe
+that which he regards as of most worth; and that somewhat is added to
+these forces by virtue of his consecration. The God of the Christians
+cannot be defined short of some such account as this, inclusive of an
+ideal, an attitude, and an expectation. In other words the God of the
+Christians is to be known only in terms of the Christlike outlook upon
+life, in which the disciple is taught to emulate the master. When moral
+and intellectual development shall have discredited either its scale of
+values, or its conviction that cosmical events are in the end determined
+in accordance with that scale of values, then Christianity must either
+be transformed, or be untenable for the wise man. If we have conceived
+the essence of Christianity too broadly or vaguely, it does not much
+matter for our present purposes. Its essence is, at any rate, some such
+inwardness of life resolving ideality and reality into one, and drawing
+upon objective truth only to the extent required for the confirming of
+that relation.
+
+[Sidenote: The Cognitive Factor in Religion.]
+
+Sect. 34. We conclude, then, our attempt to emphasize the cognitive
+factor in religion, with the thesis that every religion centres in a
+practical secret of the universe. _To be religious is to believe that a
+certain correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality
+operative, and that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a
+certain type of living. Whatever demonstrates the futility, vanity, or
+self-deception of this living, discredits the religion. And, per contra,
+except as they define or refute such practical truth, religion is not
+essentially concerned with theoretical judgments._
+
+[Sidenote: The Place of Imagination in Religion.]
+
+Sect. 35. But neither religion nor any other human interest consists in
+essentials. Such a practical conviction as that which has been defined
+inevitably flowers into a marvelous complexity, and taps for its
+nourishment every spontaneity of human nature. If it be said that only
+the practical conviction is essential, this is not the same as to say
+that all else is superfluous. There may be no single utterance that my
+religion could not have spared, and yet were I to be altogether dumb my
+religion would, indeed, be as nothing. For if I believe, I accept a
+presence in my world, which as I live will figure in my dreams, or in my
+thoughts, or in my habits. And each of these expressions of myself will
+have a truth if it do but bear out my practical acceptance of that
+presence. The language of religion, like that of daily life, is not the
+language of science except it take it upon itself to be so. There is
+scarcely a sentence which I utter in my daily intercourse with men which
+is not guilty of transgressions against the canons of accurate and
+definite thinking. Yet if I deceive neither myself nor another, I am
+held to be truthful, even though my language deal with chance and
+accident, material purposes and spiritual causes, and though I vow that
+the sun smiles or the moon lets down her hair into the sea. Science is a
+special interest in the discovery of unequivocal and fixed conceptions,
+and employs its terms with an unalterable connotation. But no such
+algebra of thought is indispensable to life or conversation, and its
+lack is no proof of error. Such is the case also with that eminently
+living affair, religion. I may if I choose, and I will if my reasoning
+powers be at all awakened, be a theologian. But theology, like science,
+is a special intellectual spontaneity. St. Thomas, the master
+theologian, did not glide unwittingly from prayer into the _quaestiones_
+of the "Summa Theologiae," but turned to them as to a fresh adventure.
+Theology is inevitable, because humanly speaking adventure is
+inevitable. For man, with his intellectual spontaneity, every object is
+a problem; and did he not seek sooner or later to define salvation,
+there would be good reason to believe that he did not practically reckon
+with any. But this is _similarly_ and _independently_ true of the
+imagination, the most familiar means with which man clothes and vivifies
+his convictions, the exuberance with which he plays about them and
+delights to confess them. The imagination of religion, contributing what
+Matthew Arnold called its "poetry and eloquence," does not submit itself
+to such canons as are binding upon theology or science, but exists and
+flourishes in its own right.
+
+The indispensableness to religion of the imagination is due to that
+faculty's power of realizing what is not perceptually present. Religion
+is not interested in the apparent, but in the secret essence or the
+transcendent universal. And yet this interest is a practical one.
+Imagination may introduce one into the vivid presence of the secret or
+the transcendent. It is evident that the religious imagination here
+coincides with poetry. For it is at least one of the interests of poetry
+to cultivate and satisfy a sense for the universal; to obtain an
+immediate experience or appreciation that shall have the vividness
+without the particularism of ordinary perception. And where a poet
+elects so to view the world, we allow him as a poet the privilege, and
+judge him by the standards to which he submits himself. That upon which
+we pass judgment is the _fitness of his expression_. This expression is
+not, except in the case of the theoretical mystic, regarded as
+constituting the most valid form of the idea, but is appreciated
+expressly for its fulfilment of the condition of immediacy. The same
+sort of critical attitude is in order with the fruits of the religious
+imagination. These may or may not fulfil enough of the requirements of
+that art to be properly denominated poetry; but like poetry they are the
+translation of ideas into a specific language. They must not, therefore,
+be judged as though they claimed to excel in point of validity, but only
+in point of consistency with the context of that language. And _the
+language of religion is the language of the practical life_. Such
+translation is as essential to an idea that is to enter into the
+religious experience, as translation into terms of immediacy is
+essential to an idea that is to enter into the appreciative
+consciousness of the poet. No object can find a place in my religion
+until it is conjoined with my purposes and hopes; until it is taken for
+granted and acted upon, like the love of my friends, or the courses of
+the stars, or the stretches of the sea.
+
+[Sidenote: The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination.]
+
+Sect. 36. The religious imagination, then, is to be understood and
+justified as that which brings the objects of religion within the range
+of living. The central religious object, as has been seen, is an
+_attitude_ of the residuum or totality of things. To be religious one
+must have a sense for the _presence of an attitude_, like his sense for
+the presence of his human fellows, with all the added appreciation that
+is proper in the case of an object that is unique in its mystery or in
+its majesty. It follows that the religious imagination fulfils its
+function in so far as it provides the object of religion with properties
+similar to those which lend vividness and reality to the normal social
+relations.
+
+The presence of one's fellows is in part the perceptual experience of
+their bodies. To this there corresponds in religion some extraordinary
+or subtle appearance. The gods may in visions or dreams be met with in
+their own proper embodiments; or, as is more common, they may be
+regarded as present for practical purposes: in some inanimate object,
+as in the case of the fetish; in some animal species, as in the case of
+the totem; in some place, as in the case of the shrine; or even in some
+human being, as in the case of the inspired prophet and miracle worker.
+In more refined and highly developed religions the medium of God's
+presence is less specific. He is perceived with
+
+                         "--a sense sublime
+     Of something far more deeply interfused,
+     Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
+     And the round ocean and the living air,
+     And the blue sky, and in the mind of man."
+
+God is here found in an interpretation of the common and the natural,
+rather than in any individual and peculiar embodiment. And here the
+poet's appreciation, if not his art, is peculiarly indispensable.
+
+But, furthermore, his fellows are inmates of "the household of man" in
+that he knows their history. They belong to the temporal context of
+actions and events. Similarly, the gods must be historical. The sacred
+traditions or books of religion are largely occupied with this history.
+The more individual and anthropomorphic the gods, the more local and
+episodic will be the account of their affairs. In the higher religions
+the acts of God are few and momentous, such as creation or special
+providence; or they are identical with the events of nature and human
+history when these are _construed_ as divine. To find God in this latter
+way requires an interpretation of the course of events in terms of some
+moral consistency, a faith that sees some purpose in their evident
+destination.
+
+There is still another and a more significant way in which men recognize
+one another: the way of address and conversation. And men have
+invariably held a similar intercourse with their gods. To this category
+belong communion and prayer, with all their varieties of expression. I
+have no god until I address him. This will be the most direct evidence
+of what is at least from my point of view a social relation. There can
+be no general definition of the form which this address will take. There
+may be as many special languages, as many attitudes, and as much
+playfulness and subtlety of symbolism as in human intercourse. But, on
+the other hand, there are certain utterances that are peculiarly
+appropriate to religion. In so far as he regards his object as endowed
+with both power and goodness the worshipper will use the language of
+adoration; and the sense of his dependence will speak in terms of
+consecration and thanksgiving.
+
+     "O God, thou art my God; early will I seek thee:
+      My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee,
+      In a dry and weary land, where no water is.
+      So have I looked upon thee in the sanctuary,
+      To see thy power and thy glory.
+      For thy loving-kindness is better than life;
+      My lips shall praise thee."
+
+These are expressions of a hopeful faith; but, on the other hand, God
+may be addressed in terms of hatred and distrust.
+
+     "Who is most wretched in this dolorous place?
+      I think myself; yet I would rather be
+      My miserable self than He, than He
+      Who formed such creatures to his own disgrace.
+
+     "The vilest thing must be less vile than Thou
+      From whom it had its being, God and Lord!
+      Creator of all woe and sin! abhorred,
+      Malignant and implacable."[104:13]
+
+In either case there may be an indefinite degree of hyperbole. The
+language of love and hate, of confidence and despair, is not the
+language of description. In this train of the religious consciousness
+there is occasion for whatever eloquence man can feel, and whatever
+rhetorical luxuriance he can utter.
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion.]
+
+Sect. 37. Such considerations as these serve to account for the exercise
+and certain of the fruits of the religious imagination, and to designate
+the general criterion governing its propriety. But _how is one to
+determine the boundary between the imaginative and the cognitive_? It is
+commonly agreed that what religion says and does is not all intended
+literally. But when is expression of religion only poetry and eloquence,
+and when is it matter of conviction? If we revert again to the cognitive
+aspect of religion, it is evident that there is but one test to apply:
+_whatever either fortifies or misleads the will is literal conviction_.
+This test cannot be applied absolutely, because it can properly be
+applied only to the intention of an individual experience. However I may
+express my religion, that which I express, is, we have seen, an
+expectation. The degree to which I literally mean what I say is then the
+degree to which it determines my expectations. Whatever adds no item to
+these expectations, but only recognizes and vitalizes them, is pure
+imagination. But it follows that it is entirely impossible from direct
+inspection to define any given _expression_ of religious experience as
+myth, or to define the degree to which it is myth. It submits to such
+distinctions only when viewed from the stand-point of the concrete
+religious experience which it expresses. Any such given expression could
+easily be all imagination to one, and all conviction to another.
+Consider the passage which follows:
+
+     "And I saw the heaven opened; and behold, a white horse, and
+     he that sat thereon, called Faithful and True; and in
+     righteousness he doth judge and make war. And his eyes are a
+     flame of fire, and upon his head are many diadems; and he hath
+     a name written, which no one knoweth but he himself. And he is
+     arrayed in a garment sprinkled with blood: and his name is
+     called The Word of God."[106:14]
+
+Is this all rhapsody, or is it in part true report? There is evidently
+no answer to the question so conceived. But if it were to express my own
+religious feeling it would have some specific proportion of literal and
+metaphorical significance, according to the degree to which its detail
+contributes different practical values to me. It might then be my
+guide-book to the heavens, or only my testimony to the dignity and
+mystery of the function of Christ.
+
+The development of religion bears in a very important way upon this last
+problem. The factor of imagination has undoubtedly come to have a more
+clearly recognized role in religion. There can be no doubt that what we
+now call myths were once beliefs, and that what we now call poetry was
+once history. If we go back sufficiently far we come to a time when the
+literal and the metaphorical were scarcely distinguishable, and this
+because science had not emerged from the early animistic extension of
+social relations. Men _meant_ to address their gods as they addressed
+their fellows, and expected them to hear and respond, as they looked for
+such reactions within the narrower circle of ordinary intercourse. The
+advance of science has brought into vogue a description of nature that
+inhibits such expectations. The result has been that men, continuing to
+use the same terms, essentially expressive as they are of a practical
+relationship, have come to regard them as only a general expression of
+their attitude. The differences of content that are in excess of factors
+of expectation remain as poetry and myth. On the other hand, it is
+equally possible, if not equally common, for that which was once
+imagined to come to be believed. Such a transformation is, perhaps,
+normally the case when the inspired utterance passes from its author to
+the cult. The prophets and sweet singers are likely to possess an
+exuberance of imagination not appreciated by their followers; and for
+this reason almost certainly misunderstood. For these reasons it is
+manifestly absurd to fasten the name of myth or the name of creed upon
+any religious utterance whatsoever, unless it be so regarded from the
+stand-point of the personal religion which it originally expressed, or
+unless one means by so doing to define it as an expression of his own
+religion. He who defines "the myth of creation," or "the poetical story
+of Samson," as parts of the pre-Christian Judaic religion, exhibits a
+total loss of historical sense. The distinction between cognition and
+fancy does not exist among objects, but only in the _intending_
+experience; hence, for me to attach my own distinction to any individual
+case of belief, viewed apart from the believer, is an utterly confusing
+projection of my own personality into the field of my study.
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions.]
+
+Sect. 38. Only after such considerations as these are we qualified to
+attack that much-vexed question as to whether religion deals invariably
+with a personal god. It is often assumed in discussion of this question
+that "personal god," as well as "god," is a distinct and familiar kind
+of entity, like a dragon or centaur; its existence alone being
+problematical. This is doubly false to the religious employment of such
+an object. If it be true that in religion we mean by God a practical
+interpretation of the world, _whatsoever be its nature_, then the
+personality of God must be a derivative of the attitude, and not of the
+nature of the world. Given the practical outlook upon life, there is no
+definable world that cannot be construed under the form of God. My god
+is my world practically recognized in respect of its fundamental or
+ultimate attitude to my ideals. In the sense, then, conveyed by this
+term _attitude_ my god will invariably possess the characters of
+personality. But the degree to which these characters will coincide with
+the characters which I assign to human persons, or the terms of any
+logical conception of personality, cannot be absolutely defined.
+Anthropomorphisms may be imagination or they may be literal conviction.
+This will depend, as above maintained, upon the degree to which they
+determine my expectations. Suppose the world to be theoretically
+conceived as governed by laws that are indifferent to all human
+interests. The practical expression of this conception appears in the
+naturalism of Lucretius, or Diogenes, or Omar Khayyam. Living in the
+vivid presence of an indifferent world, I may picture my gods as leading
+their own lives in some remote realm which is inaccessible to my
+petitions, or as regarding me with sinister and contemptuous cruelty. In
+the latter case I may shrink and cower, or return them contempt for
+contempt. I mean this literally only if I look for consequences
+following directly from the emotional coloring which I have bestowed
+upon them. It may well be that I mean merely to regard myself _sub
+specie eternitatis_, in which case I am _personifying_ in the sense of
+free imagination. In the religion of enlightenment the divine attitude
+tends to belong to the poetry and eloquence of religion rather than to
+its cognitive intent. This is true even of optimistic and idealistic
+religion. The love and providence of God are less commonly supposed to
+warrant an expectation of special and arbitrary favors, and have come
+more and more to mean the play of my own feeling about the general
+central conviction of the favorableness of the cosmos to my deeper or
+moral concerns. But the factor of personality cannot possibly be
+entirely eliminated, for the religious consciousness _creates_ a social
+relationship between man and the universe. Such an interpretation of
+life is not a case of the pathetic fallacy, unless it incorrectly
+_reckons with_ the inner feeling which it attributes to the universe. It
+is an obvious practical truth that the total or residual environment is
+significant for life. Grant this and you make rational a recognition of
+that significance, or a more or less constant sense of coincidence or
+conflict with cosmical forces. Permit this consciousness to stand, and
+you make some expression of it inevitable. Such an expression may,
+furthermore, with perfect propriety and in fulfilment of human nature,
+set forth and transfigure this central belief until it may enter into
+the context of immediacy.
+
+Thus any conception of the universe whatsoever may afford a basis for
+religion. But there is no religion that does not virtually make a more
+definite claim upon the nature of things, and this entirely
+independently of its theology, or explicit attempt to define itself.
+Every religion, even in the very living of it, is naturalistic, or
+dualistic, or pluralistic, or optimistic, or idealistic, or pessimistic.
+And there is in the realm of truth that which justifies or refutes these
+definite practical ways of construing the universe. But no historical
+religion is ever so vague even as this in its philosophical
+implications. Indeed, we shall always be brought eventually to the
+inner meaning of some individual religious experience, where no general
+criticism can be certainly valid.
+
+There is, then, a place in religion for that which is not directly
+answerable to philosophical or scientific standards. But there is
+always, on the other hand, an element of hope which conceives the nature
+of the world, and means to be grounded in reality. In respect of that
+element, philosophy is indispensable to religion. The meaning of
+religion is, in fact, the central problem of philosophy. There is a
+virtue in religion like that which Emerson ascribes to poetry. "The poet
+is in the right attitude; he is believing; the philosopher, after some
+struggle, having only reasons for believing." But whatever may be said
+to the disparagement of its dialectic, philosophy is the justification
+of religion, and the criticism of religions. To it must be assigned the
+task of so refining positive religion as to contribute to the perpetual
+establishment of true religion. And to philosophy, with religion,
+belongs the task of holding fast to the idea of the universe. There is
+no religion except before you begin, or after you have rested from, your
+philosophical speculation. But in the universe these interests have a
+common object. As philosophy is the articulation and vindication of
+religion, so is religion the realization of philosophy. In philosophy
+thought is brought up to the elevation of life, and in religion
+philosophy, as the sum of wisdom, enters into life.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[83:1] As Plato interprets the scepticism of Protagoras to mean that one
+state of mind cannot be more _true_ than another, but only _better_ or
+worse. Cf. _Theaetetus_, 167.
+
+[88:2] Quoted with some omissions from _I Kings_, 18:21-29. The Hebrew
+term _Yahweh_, the name of the national deity, has been substituted for
+the English translation, "the Lord."
+
+[90:3] _Iliad_, Book IX, lines 467 _sq._ Translation by Chapman.
+
+[91:4] The supposed abode of departed spirits.
+
+[91:5] Lucretius: _De Rerum Natura_, Book III, lines 1 _sq._ Translated
+by Munro.
+
+[91:6] _Ibid._, Book II, lines 644 _sq._
+
+[92:7] It would be interesting to compare the equally famous criticism
+of Greek religion in Plato's _Republic_, Book II, 377 _sq._
+
+[92:8] Cf. W. Robertson Smith's admirable account of the Semitic
+religions:
+
+"What is requisite to religion is a practical acquaintance with the
+rules on which the deity acts and on which he expects his worshippers to
+frame their conduct--what in II Kings, 17:26 is called the 'manner,' or
+rather the 'customary law' (_mishpat_), of the god of the land. This is
+true even of the religion of Israel. When the prophets speak of the
+knowledge of God, they always mean a practical knowledge of the laws and
+principles of His government in Israel, and a summary expression for
+religion as a whole is 'the knowledge and fear of Jehovah,' _i. e._, the
+knowledge of what Jehovah prescribes, combined with a reverent
+obedience." _The Religion of the Semites_, p. 23.
+
+[93:9] _Proverbs_, 18:10; 11:19; 21:3.
+
+[93:10] _Ecclesiastes_, 2:13 _sq._
+
+[94:11] _Psalms_, 51:17; _Isaiah_, 57:15.
+
+[94:12] In this discussion of Judaism I am much indebted to Matthew
+Arnold's _Literature and Dogma_, especially Chapters I and II.
+
+[104:13] James Thomson: _The City of Dreadful Night_. Quoted by James,
+in _The Will to Believe, etc._, p. 45.
+
+[106:14] _Revelation_, 19:11-13.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+[Sidenote: The True Relations of Philosophy and Science. Misconceptions
+and Antagonisms.]
+
+Sect. 39. In the case of natural science we meet not only with a special
+human interest, but with a theoretical discipline. We are confronted,
+therefore, with a new question: that of the relation within the body of
+human knowledge of two of its constituent members. Owing to the militant
+temper of the representatives of both science and philosophy, this has
+long since ceased to be an academic question, and has frequently been
+met in the spirit of rivalry and partisanship. But the true order of
+knowledge is only temporarily distorted by the brilliant success of a
+special type of investigation; and the conquests of science are now so
+old a story that critical thought shows a disposition to judge of the
+issue with sobriety and logical highmindedness.
+
+In the seventeenth century a newly emancipated and too sanguine reason
+proposed to know the whole of nature at once in terms of mathematics
+and mechanics. Thus the system of the Englishman Hobbes was science
+swelled to world-proportions, simple, compact, conclusive, and
+all-comprehensive. Philosophy proposed to do the work of science, but in
+its own grand manner. The last twenty years of Hobbes's life, spent in
+repeated discomfiture at the hands of Seth Ward, Wallis, Boyle, and
+other scientific experts of the new Royal Society, certified
+conclusively to the failure of this enterprise, and the experimental
+specialist thereupon took exclusive possession of the field of natural
+law. But the idealist, on the other hand, reconstructed nature to meet
+the demands of philosophical knowledge and religious faith. There
+issued, together with little mutual understanding and less sympathy, on
+the one hand _positivism_, or exclusive experimentalism, and on the
+other hand a rabid and unsympathetic transcendentalism. Hume, who
+consigned to the flames all thought save "abstract reasoning concerning
+quantity or number," and "experimental reasoning concerning matter of
+fact and existence"; Comte, who assigned metaphysics to an immature
+stage in the development of human intelligence; and Tyndall, who reduced
+the religious consciousness to an emotional experience of mystery, are
+typical of the one attitude. The other is well exhibited in Schelling's
+reference to "the blind and thoughtless mode of investigating nature
+which has become generally established since the corruption of
+philosophy by Bacon, and of physics by Boyle." Dogmatic experimentalism
+and dogmatic idealism signify more or less consistently the abstract
+isolation of the scientific and philosophical motives.
+
+There is already a touch of quaintness in both of these attitudes. We of
+the present are in the habit of acknowledging the autonomy of science,
+and the unimpeachable validity of the results of experimental research
+in so far as they are sanctioned by the consensus of experts. But at the
+same time we recognize the definiteness of the task of science, and the
+validity of such reservations as may be made from a higher critical
+point of view. Science is to be transcended in so far as it is
+understood as a whole. Philosophy is critically empirical; empirical,
+because it regards all _bona fide_ descriptions of experience as
+knowledge; critical, because attentive to the conditions of both general
+and special knowledge. And in terms of a critical empiricism so defined,
+it is one of the problems of philosophy _to define and appraise the
+generating problem of science_, and so to determine the value
+assignable to natural laws in the whole system of knowledge.
+
+[Sidenote: The Spheres of Philosophy and Science.]
+
+Sect. 40. If this be the true function of philosophy with reference to
+science, several current notions of the relations of the spheres of
+these disciplines may be disproved. In the first place, philosophy will
+not be all the sciences regarded as one science. Science tends to unify
+without any higher criticism. The various sciences already regard the
+one nature as their common object, and the one system of interdependent
+laws as their common achievement. The philosopher who tries to be all
+science at once fails ignominiously because he tries to replace the work
+of a specialist with the work of a dilettante; and if philosophy be
+identical with that body of truth accumulated and organized by the
+cooperative activity of scientific men, then philosophy is a name and
+there is no occasion for the existence of the philosopher as such.
+Secondly, philosophy will not be the assembling of the sciences; for
+such would be a merely clerical work, and the philosopher would much
+better be regarded as non-existent than as a book-keeper. Nor, thirdly,
+is philosophy an auxiliary discipline that may be called upon in
+emergencies for the solution of some baffling problem of science. A
+problem defined by science must be solved in the scientific manner.
+Science will accept no aid from the gods when engaged in her own
+campaign, but will fight it out according to her own principles of
+warfare. And as long as science moves in her own plane, she can
+acknowledge no permanent barriers. There is then no need of any
+superscientific research that shall replace, or piece together, or
+extend the work of science. But the savant is not on this account in
+possession of the entire field of knowledge. It is true that he is not
+infrequently moved to such a conviction when he takes us about to view
+his estates. Together we ascend up into heaven, or make our beds in
+sheol, or take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts
+of the sea--and look in vain for anything that is not work done, or work
+projected, by natural science. Persuade him, however, to _define_ his
+estates, and he has circumscribed them. In his definition he must employ
+conceptions more fundamental than the working conceptions that he
+employs within his field of study. Indeed, in viewing his task as
+definite and specific he has undertaken the solution of the problem of
+philosophy. The logical self-consciousness has been awakened, and there
+is no honorable way of putting it to sleep again. This is precisely
+what takes place in any account of the generating problem of science. To
+define science is to define at least one realm that is other than
+science, the realm of active intellectual endeavor with its own proper
+categories. One cannot reflect upon science and assign it an end, and a
+method proper to that end, without bringing into the field of knowledge
+a broader field of experience than the field proper to science, broader
+at any rate by the presence in it of the scientific activity itself.
+
+Here, then, is the field proper to philosophy. The scientist _qua_
+scientist is intent upon his own determinate enterprise. The philosopher
+comes into being as one who is interested in observing what it is that
+the scientist is so intently doing. In taking this interest he has
+accepted as a field for investigation that which he would designate as
+the totality of interests or the inclusive experience. He can carry out
+his intention of defining the scientific attitude only by standing
+outside it, and determining it by means of nothing less than an
+exhaustive searching out of all attitudes. Philosophy is, to be sure,
+itself a definite activity and an attitude, but an attitude required by
+definition to be conscious of itself, and, if you please, conscious of
+its own consciousness, until its attitude shall have embraced in its
+object the very principle of attitudes. Philosophy defines itself and
+all other human tasks and interests. None have furnished a clearer
+justification of philosophy than those men of scientific predilections
+who have claimed the title of agnostics. A good instance is furnished by
+a contemporary physicist, who has chosen to call his reflections
+"antimetaphysical."
+
+     "Physical science does not pretend to be a _complete_ view of
+     the world; it simply claims that it is working toward such a
+     complete view in the future. The highest philosophy of the
+     scientific investigator is precisely this _toleration_ of an
+     incomplete conception of the world and the preference for it,
+     rather than an apparently perfect, but inadequate
+     conception."[120:1]
+
+It is apparent that if one were to challenge such a statement, the issue
+raised would at once be philosophical and not scientific. The problem
+here stated and answered, requires for its solution the widest
+inclusiveness of view, and a peculiar interest in critical reflection
+and logical coordination.
+
+[Sidenote: The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science.]
+
+Sect. 41. One may be prepared for a knowledge of the economic and social
+significance of the railway even if one does not know a throttle from a
+piston-rod, provided one has broad and well-balanced knowledge of the
+interplay of human social interests. One's proficiency here requires one
+to stand off from society, and to obtain a perspective that shall be as
+little distorted as possible. The reflection of the philosopher of
+science requires a similar quality of perspective. All knowledges,
+together with the knowing of them, must be his object yonder, standing
+apart in its wholeness and symmetry. Philosophy is the least dogmatic,
+the most empirical, of all disciplines, since it is the only
+investigation that can permit itself to be forgetful of nothing.
+
+But the most comprehensive view may be the most distorted and false. The
+true order of knowledge is the difficult task of logical analysis,
+requiring as its chief essential some determination of the scope of the
+working conceptions of the different independent branches of knowledge.
+In the case of natural science this would mean an examination of the
+method and results characteristic of this field, for the sake of
+defining the kind of truth which attaches to the laws which are being
+gradually formulated. But one must immediately reach either the one or
+the other of two very general conclusions. If the laws of natural
+science cover all possible knowledge of reality, then there is left to
+philosophy only the logical function of justifying this statement. Logic
+and natural science will then constitute the sum of knowledge. If, on
+the other hand, it be found that the aim of natural science is such as
+to exclude certain aspects of reality, then philosophy will not be
+restricted to logical criticism, but will have a cognitive field of its
+own. The great majority of philosophers have assumed the latter of these
+alternatives to be true, while most aggressive scientists have intended
+the former in their somewhat blind attacks upon "metaphysics." Although
+the selection of either of these alternatives involves us in the defence
+of a specific answer to a philosophical question, the issue is
+inevitable in any introduction to philosophy because of its bearing upon
+the extent of the field of that study. Furthermore there can be no
+better exposition of the meaning of philosophy of science than an
+illustration of its exercise. The following, then, is to be regarded as
+on the one hand a tentative refutation of _positivism_, or the _claim of
+natural science to be coextensive with knowable reality_; and on the
+other hand a programme for the procedure of philosophy with reference
+to natural science.
+
+[Sidenote: The Origin of the Scientific Interest.]
+
+Sect. 42. Science issues through imperceptible stages from organic
+habits and instincts which signify the possession by living creatures of
+a power to meet the environment on its own terms. Every organism
+possesses such a working knowledge of nature, and among men the first
+science consists in those habitual adjustments common to men and
+infra-human organisms. Man is already practising science before he
+recognizes it. As _skill_ it distinguishes itself early in his history
+from lore, or untested tradition. Skill is familiarity with general
+kinds of events, together with ability to identify an individual with
+reference to a kind, and so be prepared for the outcome. Thus man is
+inwardly prepared for the alternation of day and night, and the periods
+of the seasons. He practically anticipates the procession of natural
+events in the countless emergencies of his daily life. But science in
+the stricter sense begins when skill becomes _free_ and _social_.
+
+[Sidenote: Skill as Free.]
+
+Sect. 43. Skill may be said to be _free_ when the essential terms of the
+action have been abstracted from the circumstances attending them in
+individual experiences, and are retained as ideal plans applicable to
+any practical occasion. The monkey who swings with a trapeze from his
+perch on the side of the cage, counts upon swinging back again without
+any further effort on his own part. His act and its successful issue
+signify his practical familiarity with the natural motions of bodies. We
+can conceive such a performance to be accompanied by an almost entire
+failure to grasp its essentials. It would then be necessary for nearly
+the whole situation to be repeated in order to induce in the monkey the
+same action and expectation. He would require a similar form, color, and
+distance. But he might, on the other hand, regard as practically
+identical all suspended and freely swinging bodies capable of affording
+him support, and quite independently of their shape, size, time, or
+place. In this latter case his skill would be applicable to the widest
+possible number of cases that could present themselves. Having a
+discerning eye for essentials, he would lose no chance of a swing
+through looking for more than the bare necessities. When the
+physicist describes the pendulum in terms of a formula such as
+t = 2pi[squareroot(l/g)] he exhibits a similar discernment. He has
+found that the time occupied by an oscillation of any pendulum may be
+calculated exclusively in terms of its length and the acceleration due
+to gravity. The monkey's higher proficiency and the formula alike
+represent a knowledge that is free in the sense that it is contained in
+terms that require no single fixed context in immediacy. The knowledge
+is valid wherever these essential terms are present; and calculations
+may be based upon these essential terms, while attendant circumstances
+vary _ad infinitum_. Such knowledge is said to be _general_ or
+_universal_.
+
+There is another element of freedom, however, which so far has not been
+attributed to the monkey's knowledge, but which is evidently present in
+that of the physicist. The former has a practical ability to deal with a
+pendulum when he sees it. The latter, on the other hand, knows about a
+pendulum whether one be present or not. His knowledge is so retained as
+always to be available, even though it be not always applicable. His
+knowledge is not merely skill in treating a situation, but the
+possession of resources which he may employ at whatever time, and in
+whatever manner, may suit his interests. Knowing what he does about the
+pendulum, he may act from the idea of such a contrivance, and with the
+aid of it construct some more complex mechanism. His formulas are his
+instruments, which he may use on any occasion. Suppose that a situation
+with factors _a_, _b_, and _c_ requires factor _d_ in order to become
+_M_, as desired. Such a situation might easily be hopeless for an
+organism reacting directly to the stimulus _abc_, and yet be easily met
+by a free knowledge of _d_. One who knows that _l_, _m_, and _n_ will
+produce _d_, may by these means provide the missing factor, complete the
+sum of required conditions, _abcd_, and so obtain the end _M_. Such
+indirection might be used to obtain any required factor of the end, or
+of any near or remote means to the end. There is, in fact, no limit to
+the complexity of action made possible upon this basis; for since it is
+available in idea, the whole range of such knowledge may be brought to
+bear upon any individual problem.
+
+[Sidenote: Skill as Social.]
+
+Sect. 44. But knowledge of this free type becomes at the same time
+_social_ or _institutional_. It consists no longer in a skilful
+adaptation of the individual organism, but in a system of terms common
+to all intelligence, and preserved in those books and other monuments
+which serve as the articulate memory of the race. A knowledge that is
+social must be composed of unequivocal conceptions and fixed symbols.
+The mathematical laws of the exact sciences represent the most
+successful attainment of this end so far as form is concerned.
+Furthermore, the amount of knowledge may now be increased from
+generation to generation through the service of those who make a
+vocation of its pursuit. Natural science is thus a cumulative racial
+proficiency, which any individual may bring to bear upon any emergency
+of his life.
+
+[Sidenote: Science for Accommodation and Construction.]
+
+Sect. 45. Such proficiency as science affords is in every case the
+anticipation of experience. This has a twofold value for mankind, that
+of _accommodation_, and that of _construction_. Primitively, where mere
+survival is the function of the organism as a whole, the value of
+accommodation is relatively fundamental. The knowledge of what may be
+expected enables the organism to save itself by means of its own
+counter-arrangement of natural processes. Construction is here for the
+sake of accommodation. But with the growth of civilization construction
+becomes a positive interest, and man tends to save himself for definite
+ends. Accommodation comes to take place for the sake of construction.
+Science then supplies the individual with the ways and means wherewith
+to execute life purposes which themselves tend to assume an absolute
+value that cannot be justified merely on the ground of science.
+
+[Sidenote: Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. The
+Descriptive Method.]
+
+Sect. 46. If natural science be animated by any special cognitive
+interest, this motive should appear in the development of its method and
+fundamental conceptions. If that interest has been truly defined, it
+should now enable us to understand the progressive and permanent in
+scientific investigation as directly related to it. For the aim of any
+discipline exercises a gradual selection from among possible methods,
+and gives to its laws their determinate and final form.
+
+The _descriptive method_ is at the present day fully established. A
+leading moral of the history of science is the superior usefulness of an
+exact account of the workings of nature to an explanation in terms of
+some qualitative potency. Explanation has been postponed by enlightened
+science until after a more careful observation of actual processes shall
+have been made; and at length it has been admitted that there is no need
+of any explanation but perfect description. Now the practical use of
+science defined above, requires no knowledge beyond the actual order of
+events. For such a purpose sufficient reason signifies only sufficient
+conditions. All other considerations are irrelevant, and it is proper
+to ignore them. Such has actually been the fate of the so-called
+metaphysical solution of special problems of nature. The case of Kepler
+is the classic instance. This great scientist supplemented his laws of
+planetary motion with the following speculation concerning the agencies
+at work:
+
+     "We must suppose one of two things: either that the moving
+     spirits, in proportion as they are more removed from the sun,
+     are more feeble; or that there is one moving spirit in the
+     centre of all the orbits, namely, in the sun, which urges each
+     body the more vehemently in proportion as it is nearer; but in
+     more distant spaces languishes in consequence of the
+     remoteness and attenuation of its virtue."[129:2]
+
+The following passage from Hegel affords an interesting analogy:
+
+     "The moon is the waterless crystal which seeks to complete
+     itself by means of our sea, to quench the thirst of its arid
+     rigidity, and therefore produces ebb and flow."[129:3]
+
+No scientist has ever sought to refute either of these theories. They
+have merely been neglected.
+
+They were advanced in obedience to a demand for the ultimate
+explanation of the phenomena in question, and were obtained by applying
+such general conceptions as were most satisfying to the reasons of their
+respective authors. But they contributed nothing whatsoever to a
+practical familiarity with the natural course of events, in this case
+the times and places of the planets and the tides. Hence they have not
+been used in the building of science. In our own day investigators have
+become conscious of their motive, and do not wait for historical
+selection to exclude powers and reasons from their province. They
+deliberately seek to formulate exact descriptions. To this end they
+employ symbols that shall serve to identify the terms of nature, and
+formulas that shall define their systematic relationship. These systems
+must be exact, or deductions cannot be made from them. Hence they tend
+ultimately to assume a mathematical form of expression.
+
+[Sidenote: Space, Time, and Prediction.]
+
+Sect. 47. But science tends to employ for these systems only such
+conceptions as relate to _prediction_; and of these the most fundamental
+are _space_ and _time_. The first science to establish its method was
+the science of astronomy, where measurement and computation in terms of
+space and time were the most obvious means of description; and the
+general application of the method of astronomy by Galileo and Newton, or
+the development of mechanics, is the most important factor in the
+establishment of modern science upon a permanent working basis. The
+persistence of the term _cause_, testifies to the fact that science is
+primarily concerned with the determination of _events_. Its definitions
+of objects are means of identification, while its laws are dynamical,
+_i. e._, have reference to the conditions under which these objects
+arise. Thus the chemist may know less about the properties of water than
+the poet; but he is pre-eminently skilled in its production from
+elements, and understands similarly the compounds into which it may
+enter. Now the general conditions of all anticipation, whereby it
+becomes exact and verifiable, are spacial and temporal. A predictable
+event must be assigned to what is here now, or there now; or what is
+here then, or there then. An experimentally verifiable system must
+contain space-time variables, for which can be substituted the here and
+now of the experimenter's immediate experience. Hence science deals
+primarily with calculable places and moments. The mechanical theory of
+nature owes its success to a union of space and time through its
+conceptions of _matter_ and _motion_.[132:4] And the projected theory of
+energetics must satisfy the same conditions.
+
+[Sidenote: The Quantitative Method.]
+
+Sect. 48. But, furthermore, science has, as we have seen, an interest in
+freeing its descriptions from the peculiar angle and relativity of an
+individual's experience, for the sake of affording him knowledge of that
+with which he must meet. Science enlightens the will by acquainting it
+with that which takes place in spite of it, and for which it must hold
+itself in readiness. To this end the individual benefits himself in so
+far as he eliminates himself from the objects which he investigates. His
+knowledge is useful in so far as it is valid for his own indefinitely
+varying stand-points, and those of other wills recognized by him in his
+practical relations. But in attempting to describe objects in terms
+other than those of a specific experience, science is compelled to
+describe them in terms of one another. For this purpose _the
+quantitative method_ is peculiarly serviceable. With its aid objects
+permit themselves to be described as multiples of one another, and as
+occupying positions in relation to one another. When all objects are
+described strictly in terms of one another, they are expressed in terms
+of arbitrary units, and located in terms of arbitrary spacial or
+temporal axes of reference. Thus there arises the universe of the
+scientific imagination, a vast complexity of material displacements and
+transformations, without color, music, pleasure, or any of all that rich
+variety of qualities that the least of human experiences contains. It
+does not completely rationalize or even completely describe such
+experiences, but formulates their succession. To this end they are
+reduced to terms that correspond to no specific experience, and for this
+very reason may be translated again into all definable hypothetical
+experiences. The solar system for astronomy is not a bird's-eye view of
+elliptical orbits, with the planets and satellites in definite phases.
+Nor is it this group of objects from any such point of view, or from any
+number of such points of view; but a formulation of their motions that
+will serve as the key to an infinite number of their appearances. Or,
+consider the picture of the ichthysauria romping in the mesozoic sea,
+that commonly accompanies a text-book of geology. Any such picture, and
+all such pictures, with their coloring and their temporal and spacial
+perspective, are imaginary. No such special and exclusive manifolds can
+be defined as having been then and there realized. But we have a
+geological knowledge of this period, that fulfils the formal demands of
+natural science, in so far as we can construct this and countless other
+specific experiences with reference to it.
+
+[Sidenote: The General Development of Science.]
+
+Sect. 49. Science, then, is to be understood as springing from the
+practical necessity of anticipating the environment. This anticipation
+appears first as congenital or acquired reactions on the part of the
+organism. Such reactions imply a fixed coordination or system in the
+environment whereby a given circumstance determines other circumstances;
+and science proper arises as the formulation of such systems. The
+requirement that they shall apply to the phenomena that _confront_ the
+will, determines their spacial, temporal, and quantitative form. The
+progress of science is marked by the growth of these conceptions in the
+direction of comprehensiveness on the one hand, and of refinement and
+delicacy on the other. Man lives in an environment that is growing at
+the same time richer and more extended, but with a compensatory
+simplification in the ever closer systematization of scientific
+conceptions under the form of the order of nature.
+
+[Sidenote: The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science.]
+
+Sect. 50. At the opening of this chapter it was maintained that it is a
+function of philosophy to criticise science through its generating
+problem, or its self-imposed task viewed as determining its province and
+selecting its categories. The above account of the origin and method of
+science must suffice as a definition of its generating problem, and
+afford the basis of our answer to the question of its limits. Enough has
+been said to make it clear that philosophy is not in the field of
+science, and is therefore not entitled to contest its result in detail
+or even to take sides within the province of its special problems.
+Furthermore, philosophy should not aim to restrain science by the
+imposition of external barriers. Whatever may be said of the sufficiency
+of its categories in any region of the world, that body of truth of
+which mathematics, mechanics, and physics are the foundations, must be
+regarded as a whole that tends to be all-comprehensive in its own terms.
+There remains for philosophy, then, the critical examination of these
+terms, and the appraisal as a whole of the truth that they may express.
+
+[Sidenote: Natural Science is Abstract.]
+
+Sect. 51. The impossibility of embracing the whole of knowledge within
+natural science is due to the fact that the latter is _abstract_. This
+follows from the fact that natural science is governed by a selective
+interest. The formulation of definitions and laws in exclusively
+mechanical terms is not due to the exhaustive or even pre-eminent
+reality of these properties, but to their peculiar serviceableness in a
+verifiable description of events. Natural science does not affirm that
+reality is essentially constituted of matter, or essentially
+characterized by motion; but is _interested_ in the mechanical aspect of
+reality, and describes it quite regardless of other evident aspects and
+without meaning to prejudice them. It is unfortunately true that the
+scientist has rarely been clear in his own mind on this point. It is
+only recently that he has partially freed himself from the habit of
+construing his terms as final and exhaustive.[137:5] This he was able
+to do even to his own satisfaction, only by allowing loose rein to the
+imagination. Consider the example of the atomic theory. In order to
+describe such occurrences as chemical combination, or changes in volume
+and density, the scientist has employed as a unit the least particle,
+physically indivisible and qualitatively homogeneous. Look for the atom
+in the body of science, and you will find it in physical laws governing
+expansion and contraction, and in chemical formulas. There the real
+responsibility of science ends. But whether through the need of popular
+exposition, or the undisciplined imagination of the investigator
+himself, atoms have figured in the history of thought as round
+corpuscles of a grayish hue scurrying hither and thither, and armed with
+special appliances wherewith to lock in molecular embrace. Although this
+is nonsense, we need not on that account conclude that there are no
+atoms. There are atoms in precisely the sense intended by scientific
+law, in that the formulas computed with the aid of this concept are true
+of certain natural processes. The conception of ether furnishes a
+similar case. Science is not responsible for the notion of a quivering
+gelatinous substance pervading space, but only for certain laws that,
+_e. g._, describe the velocity of light in terms of the vibration. It is
+true that there is such a thing as ether, not as gratuitously rounded
+out by the imagination, with various attributes of immediate experience,
+but just in so far as this concept is employed in verified descriptions
+of radiation, magnetism, or electricity. Strictly speaking science
+asserts nothing about the existence of ether, but only about the
+behavior, _e. g._, of light. If true descriptions of this and other
+phenomena are reached by employing units of wave propagation in an
+elastic medium, then ether is proved to exist in precisely the same
+sense that linear feet are proved to exist, if it be admitted that there
+are 90,000,000 x 5,280 of them between the earth and the sun. And to
+imagine in the one case a jelly with all the qualities of texture,
+color, and the like, that an individual object of sense would possess,
+is much the same as in the other to imagine the heavens filled with
+foot-rules and tape-measures. There is but one safe procedure in dealing
+with scientific concepts: to regard them as true so far as they
+describe, and no whit further. To supplement the strict meaning which
+has been verified and is contained in the formularies of science, with
+such vague predicates as will suffice to make entities of them, is mere
+ineptness and confusion of thought. And it is only such a
+supplementation that obscures their abstractness. For a mechanical
+description of things, true as it doubtless is, is even more indubitably
+incomplete.
+
+[Sidenote: The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth.]
+
+Sect. 52. But though the abstractness involved in scientific description
+is open and deliberate, we must come to a more precise understanding of
+it, if we are to draw any conclusion as to what it involves. In his
+"Principles of Human Knowledge," the English philosopher Bishop Berkeley
+raises the question as to the universal validity of mathematical
+demonstrations. If we prove from the image or figure of an isosceles
+right triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles,
+how can we know that this proposition holds of all triangles?
+
+     "To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view
+     whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an
+     isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a
+     determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends
+     to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness
+     soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the
+     equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all
+     concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have
+     in view includes all these particulars; but then there is not
+     the least mention made of them in the proof of the
+     proposition."[140:6]
+
+Of the total conditions present in the concrete picture of a triangle,
+one may in one's calculations neglect as many as one sees fit, and work
+with the remainder. Then, if one has clearly distinguished the
+conditions used, one may confidently assert that whatever has been found
+true of them holds regardless of the neglected conditions. These may be
+missing or replaced by others, provided the selected or (for any given
+investigation) essential conditions are not affected. That which is true
+once is true always, provided time is not one of its conditions; that
+which is true in one place is true everywhere, provided location is not
+one of its conditions. But, given any concrete situation, the more
+numerous the conditions one ignores in one's calculations, the less
+adequate are one's calculations to that situation. The number of its
+inhabitants, and any mathematical operation made with that number, is
+true, but only very abstractly true of a nation. A similar though less
+radical abstractness appertains to natural science. Simple qualities of
+sound or color, and distinctions of beauty or moral worth, together with
+many other ingredients of actual experience attributed therein to the
+objects of nature, are ignored in the mechanical scheme. There is a
+substitution of certain mechanical arrangements in the case of the first
+group of properties, the simple qualities of sense, so that they may be
+assimilated to the general scheme of events, and their occurrence
+predicted. But their intrinsic qualitative character is not reckoned
+with, even in psychology, where the physiological method finally
+replaces them with brain states. Over and above these neglected
+properties of things there remain the purposive activities of thought.
+It is equally preposterous to deny them and to describe them in
+mechanical terms. It is plain, then, that natural science calculates
+upon the basis of only a fraction of the conditions that present
+themselves in actual experience. Its conclusions, therefore, though true
+so far as they go, and they may be abstractly true of everything, are
+completely true of nothing.
+
+[Sidenote: But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality.]
+
+Sect. 53. Such, in brief, is the general charge of inadequacy which may
+be urged against natural science, not in the spirit of detraction, but
+for the sake of a more sound belief concerning reality. The philosopher
+falls into error no less radical than that of the dogmatic scientist,
+when he charges the scientist with untruth, and attaches to his concepts
+the predicate of unreality. The fact that the concepts of science are
+selected, and only inadequately true of reality, should not be taken to
+mean that they are sportive or arbitrary. They are not "devices" or
+abbreviations, in any sense that does not attach to such symbolism as
+all thought involves. Nor are they merely "hypothetical," though like
+all thought they are subject to correction.[142:7] The scientist does
+not merely assert that the equation for energy is true if nature's
+capacity for work be measurable, but _that such is actually the case_.
+The statistician does not arrive at results contingent upon the
+supposition that men are numerable, but declares his sums and averages
+to be categorically true. Similarly scientific laws are true; only, to
+be sure, so far as they go, but with no condition save the condition
+that attaches to all knowledge, viz., that it shall not need correction.
+The philosophy of science, therefore, is not the adversary of science,
+but supervenes upon science in the interests of the ideal of final
+truth. No philosophy of science is sound which does not primarily seek
+by an analysis of scientific concepts to understand science on its own
+grounds. Philosophy may understand science better than science
+understands itself, but only by holding fast to the conviction of its
+truth, and including it within whatever account of reality it may be
+able to formulate.
+
+[Sidenote: Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy.]
+
+Sect. 54. Though philosophy be the most ancient and most exalted of
+human disciplines, it is not infrequently charged with being the most
+unprofitable. Science has amassed a fortune of information, which has
+facilitated life and advanced civilization. Is not philosophy, on the
+other hand, all programme and idle questioning? In the first place, no
+questioning is idle that is logically possible. It is true that
+philosophy shows her skill rather in the asking than in the answering of
+questions. But the formal pertinence of a question is of the greatest
+significance. No valid though unanswered question can have a purely
+negative value, and especially as respects the consistency or
+completeness of truth. But, in the second place, philosophy with all its
+limitations serves mankind as indispensably as science. If science
+supplies the individual with means of self-preservation, and the
+instruments of achievement, philosophy supplies the ideals, or the
+objects of deliberate construction. Such reflection as justifies the
+adoption of a fundamental life purpose is always philosophical. For
+every judgment respecting final worth is a judgment _sub specie
+eternitatis_. And the urgency of life requires the individual to pass
+such judgments. It is true that however persistently reflective he may
+be in the matter, his conclusion will be premature in consideration of
+the amount of evidence logically demanded for such a judgment. But he
+must be as wise as he can, or he will be as foolish as conventionality
+and blind impulse may impel him to be. Philosophy determines for society
+what every individual must practically determine upon for himself, the
+most reasonable plan of reality as a whole which the data and reflection
+of an epoch can afford. It is philosophy's service to mankind to
+compensate for the enthusiasm and concentration of the specialist, a
+service needed in every "present day." Apart from the philosopher,
+public opinion is the victim of sensationalism, and individual opinion
+is further warped by accidental propinquity. It is the function of
+philosophy to interpret knowledge for the sake of a sober and wise
+belief. The philosopher is the true prophet, appearing before men in
+behalf of that which is finally the truth. He is the spokesman of the
+most considerate and comprehensive reflection possible at any stage in
+the development of human thought. Owing to a radical misconception of
+function, the man of science has in these later days begun to regard
+himself as the wise man, and to teach the people. Popular materialism is
+the logical outcome of this determination of belief by natural science.
+It may be that this is due as much to the indifference of the
+philosopher as to the forwardness of the scientist, but in any case the
+result is worse than conservative loyalty to religious tradition. For
+religion is corrected surely though slowly by the whole order of
+advancing truth. Its very inflexibility makes it proof against an
+over-emphasis upon new truth. It has generally turned out in time that
+the obstinate man of religion was more nearly right than the adaptable
+intellectual man of fashion. But philosophy, as a critique of science
+for the sake of faith, should provide the individual religious believer
+with intellectual enlightenment and gentleness. The quality,
+orderliness, and inclusiveness of knowledge, finally determine its
+value; and the philosopher, premature as his synthesis may some day
+prove to be, is the wisest man of his own generation. From him the man
+of faith should obtain such discipline of judgment as shall enable him
+to be fearless of advancing knowledge, because acquainted with its
+scope, and so intellectually candid with all his visions and his
+inspirations.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[120:1] Ernst Mach: _Science of Mechanics_. Translation by McCormack, p.
+464. No one has made more important contributions than Professor Mach to
+a certain definite modern philosophical movement. Cf. Sect. 207.
+
+[129:2] Whewell: _History of the Inductive Sciences_, Vol. I, p. 289.
+Quoted from Kepler: _Mysterium Cosmographicum_.
+
+[129:3] Quoted by Sidgwick in his _Philosophy, its Scope and Relations_,
+p. 89.
+
+[132:4] The reader is referred to Mr. Bertrand Russell's chapters on
+_matter_ and _motion_ in his _Principles of Mathematics_, Vol. I.
+Material particles he defines as "many-one relations of all times to
+some places, or of all terms of a continuous one-dimensional series _t_
+to some terms of a continuous three-dimensional series _s_." Similarly,
+"when different times, throughout any period however short, are
+correlated with different places, there is motion; when different times,
+throughout some period however short, are all correlated with the same
+place, there is rest." _Op. cit._, p. 473.
+
+[137:5] That the scientist still permits himself to teach the people a
+loose exoteric theory of reality, is proven by Professor Ward's citation
+of instances in his _Naturalism and Agnosticism_. So eminent a physicist
+as Lord Kelvin is quoted as follows: "You can imagine particles of
+something, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This thing we call
+the luminiferous ether. That is the only substance we are confident of
+in dynamics. One thing we are sure of, and that is the reality and
+substantiality of the luminiferous ether." Vol. I, p. 113.
+
+[140:6] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Introduction. Edition
+of Fraser, p. 248.
+
+[142:7] The reader who cares to pursue this topic further is referred to
+the writer's discussion of "_Professor Ward's Philosophy of Science_" in
+the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods_, Vol. I,
+No. 13.
+
+
+
+
+PART II
+
+THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF
+PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem of
+Philosophy.]
+
+Sect. 55. The stand-point and purpose of the philosopher define his
+task, but they do not necessarily prearrange the division of it. That
+the task is a complex one, embracing many subordinate problems which
+must be treated _seriatim_, is attested both by the breadth of its scope
+and the variety of the interests from which it may be approached. But
+this complexity is qualified by the peculiar importance which here
+attaches to unity. That which lends philosophical quality to any
+reflection is a steadfast adherence to the ideals of inclusiveness and
+consistency. Hence, though the philosopher must of necessity occupy
+himself with subordinate problems, these cannot be completely isolated
+from one another, and solved successively. Perspective is his most
+indispensable requisite, and he has solved no problem finally until he
+has provided for the solution of all. His own peculiar conceptions are
+those which _order_ experience, and reconcile such aspects of it as
+other interests have distinguished. Hence the compatibility of any idea
+with all other ideas is the prime test of its philosophical sufficiency.
+On these grounds it may confidently be asserted that the work of
+philosophy cannot be assigned by the piece to different specialists, and
+then assembled. There are no special philosophical problems which can be
+finally solved upon their own merits. Indeed, such problems could never
+even be named, for in their discreteness they would cease to be
+philosophical.
+
+The case of _metaphysics_ and _epistemology_ affords an excellent
+illustration. The former of these is commonly defined as the theory of
+reality or of first principles, the latter as the theory of knowledge.
+But the most distinctive philosophical movement of the nineteenth
+century issues from the idea that knowing and being are
+identical.[150:1] The prime reality is defined as a knowing mind, and
+the terms of reality are interpreted as terms of a cognitive process.
+Ideas and logical principles _constitute_ the world. It is evident that
+in this Hegelian philosophy epistemology embraces metaphysics. In
+defining the relations of knowledge to its object, one has already
+defined one's fundamental philosophical conception, while _logic_, as
+the science of the universal necessities of thought, will embrace the
+first principles of reality. Now, were one to divide and arrange the
+problems of philosophy upon this basis, it is evident that one would not
+have deduced the arrangement from the general problem of philosophy, but
+from a single attempted solution of that problem. It might serve as an
+exposition of Hegel, but not as a general philosophical programme.
+
+Another case in point is provided by the present-day interest in what is
+called "_pragmatism_."[151:2] This doctrine is historically connected
+with Kant's principle of the "primacy of the practical reason," in which
+he maintained that the consciousness of duty is a profounder though less
+scientific insight than the knowledge of objects. The current doctrine
+maintains that thought with its fruits is an expression of interest, and
+that the will which evinces and realizes such an interest is more
+original and significant than that which the thinking defines. Such a
+view attaches a peculiar importance to the springs of conduct, and in
+its more systematic development[152:3] has regarded _ethics_ as the
+true propaedeutic and proof of philosophy. But to make ethics the
+key-stone of the arch, is to define a special philosophical system; for
+it is the very problem of philosophy to dispose the parts of knowledge
+with a view to systematic construction. The relation of the provinces of
+metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics cannot, then, be defined
+without entering these provinces and answering the questions proper to
+them.
+
+[Sidenote: The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon
+the Initial Interest.]
+
+Sect. 56. Since the above terms exist, however, there can be no doubt
+but that important divisions within the general aim of philosophy have
+actually been made. The inevitableness of it appears in the variety of
+the sources from which that aim may spring. The point of departure will
+always determine the emphasis and the application which the philosophy
+receives. If philosophy be needed to supplement more special interests,
+it will receive a particular character from whatever interest it so
+supplements. He who approaches it from a definite stand-point will find
+in it primarily an interpretation of that stand-point.
+
+[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life.]
+
+Sect. 57. There are two sources of the philosophical aim, which are
+perennial in their human significance. He, firstly, who begins with the
+demands of life and its ideals, looks to philosophy for a reconciliation
+of these with the orderly procedure of nature. His philosophy will
+receive its form from its illumination of life, and it will be an
+ethical or religious philosophy. Spinoza, the great seventeenth-century
+philosopher who justified mysticism after the manner of
+mathematics,[153:4] displays this temper in his philosophy:
+
+     "After experience had taught me that all the usual
+     surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that
+     none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves
+     anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is
+     affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there
+     might be some real good having power to communicate itself,
+     which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all
+     else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the
+     discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous,
+     supreme, and unending happiness."[153:5]
+
+In pursuance of this aim, though he deals with the problem of being in
+the rigorous logical fashion of his day, the final words of his great
+work are, "Of Human Freedom":
+
+     "Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
+     scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
+     himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
+     necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
+     acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed
+     out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may
+     nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is
+     so seldom found. How would it be possible if salvation were
+     ready to our hand, and could without great labor be found,
+     that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things
+     excellent are as difficult as they are rare."[154:6]
+
+[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Extension of Science.]
+
+Sect. 58. On the other hand, one who looks to philosophy for the
+extension and correction of scientific knowledge will be primarily
+interested in the philosophical definition of ultimate conceptions, and
+in the method wherewith such a definition is obtained. Thus the
+philosophy of the scientist will tend to be logical and metaphysical.
+Such is the case with Descartes and Leibniz, who are nevertheless
+intimately related to Spinoza in the historical development of
+philosophy.
+
+     "Several years have now elapsed," says the former, "since I
+     first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth,
+     many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I
+     afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and
+     from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking
+     once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had
+     adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the
+     foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding
+     superstructure in the sciences."[155:7]
+
+Leibniz's mind was more predominantly logical even than Descartes's. He
+sought in philosophy a supreme intellectual synthesis, a science of the
+universe.
+
+     "Although," he says retrospectively, "I am one of those who
+     have worked much at mathematics, I have none the less
+     meditated upon philosophy from my youth up; for it always
+     seemed to me that there was a possibility of establishing
+     something solid in philosophy by clear demonstrations. . . .
+     I perceived, after much meditation, that it is impossible to
+     find the _principles of a real unity_ in matter alone, or in
+     that which is only passive, since it is nothing but a
+     collection or aggregation of parts _ad infinitum_."[155:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical Problem.]
+
+Sect. 59. Though these types are peculiarly representative, they are by
+no means exhaustive. There are as many possibilities of emphasis as
+there are incentives to philosophical reflection. It is not possible to
+exhaust the aspects of experience which may serve as bases from which
+such thought may issue, and to which, after its synthetic insight, it
+may return. But it is evident that such divisions of philosophy
+represent in their order, and in the sharpness with which they are
+sundered, the intellectual autobiography of the individual philosopher.
+There is but one method by which that which is peculiar either to the
+individual, or to the special position which he adopts, may be
+eliminated. Though it is impossible to tabulate the empty programme of
+philosophy, we may name certain special problems that have appeared _in
+its history_. Since this history comprehends the activities of many
+individuals, a general validity attaches to it. There has been,
+moreover, a certain periodicity in the emergence of these problems, so
+that it may fairly be claimed for them that they indicate inevitable
+phases in the development of human reflection upon experience. They
+represent a normal differentiation of interest which the individual
+mind, in the course of its own thinking, tends to follow. It is true
+that it can never be said with assurance that any age is utterly blind
+to any aspect of experience. This is obviously the case with the
+practical and theoretical interests which have just been distinguished.
+There is no age that does not have some practical consciousness of the
+world as a whole, nor any which does not seek more or less earnestly to
+universalize its science. But though it compel us to deal abstractly
+with historical epochs, there is abundant compensation in the
+possibility which this method affords of finding the divisions of
+philosophy in the manifestation of the living philosophical spirit.
+
+[Sidenote: Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception.]
+
+Sect. 60. To Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, is commonly
+awarded the honor of being the founder of European philosophy. If he
+deserve this distinction, it is on account of the question which he
+raised, and not on account of the answer which he gave to it. Aristotle
+informs us that Thales held "water" to be "the material cause of all
+things."[157:9] This crude theory is evidently due to an interest in the
+totality of things, an interest which is therefore philosophical. But
+the interest of this first philosopher has a more definite character. It
+looks toward the definition in terms of some single conception, of _the
+constitution_ of the world. As a child might conceivably think the moon
+to be made of green cheese, so philosophy in its childhood thinks here
+of all things as made of water. Water was a well-known substance,
+possessing well-known predicates. To define all nature in terms of it,
+was to maintain that in spite of superficial differences, all things
+have these predicates in common. They are the predicates which qualify
+for reality, and compose a community of nature from which all the
+individual objects and events of nature arise. The successors of Thales
+were evidently dissatisfied with his fundamental conception, because of
+its lack of generality. They seized upon vaguer substances like air and
+fire, for the very definiteness of the nature of water forbids the
+identification of other substances with it. But what is so obviously
+true of water is scarcely less true of air and fire; and it appeared at
+length that only a substance possessing the most general characters of
+body, such as shape, size, and mobility, could be thought as truly
+primeval and universal. In this wise a conception like our modern
+physical conception of matter came at length into vogue. Now the problem
+of which these were all tentative solutions is, in general, the problem
+of _metaphysics_; although this term belongs to a later era, arising
+only from the accidental place of the discussion of first principles
+_after physics_ in the system of Aristotle. _The attempt to secure a
+most fundamental conception which attaches some definite meaning to the
+reality including and informing every particular thing, is metaphysics._
+
+[Sidenote: Monism and Pluralism.]
+
+Sect. 61. It must not be supposed that metaphysics is dogmatically
+committed to the reduction of all reality to a unity of nature. It is
+quite consistent with its purpose that the parts of reality should be
+found to compose a group, or an indefinite multitude of irreducibly
+different entities. But it is clear that even such an account of things
+deals with what is true of all reality, and even in acknowledging the
+variety of its constituents, attributes to them some kind of
+relationship. The degree to which such a relationship is regarded as
+intimate and essential, determines the degree to which any metaphysical
+system is _monistic_,[159:10] rather than _pluralistic_. But the
+significance of this difference will be better appreciated after a
+further differentiation of the metaphysical problem has been noted.
+
+[Sidenote: Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process.]
+
+Sect. 62. It has already been suggested that the test of Thales's
+conception lay in the possibility of deriving nature from it. A world
+principle must be fruitful. Now an abstract distinction has prevailed
+more or less persistently in metaphysics, between _the general
+definition of being_, called _ontology_, and the study of the processes
+wherewith being is divided into things and events. This latter study has
+to do primarily with the details of experience enumerated and
+systematized by the natural sciences. _To reconcile_ these, _or the
+course of nature, with the fundamental definition of being_, is the
+problem of _cosmology_. Cosmology is the construing of the _prima facie_
+reality in terms of the essential reality. It is the proof and the
+explanation of ontology. Since the most familiar part of the _prima
+facie_ reality, the part almost exclusively noticed by the naive mind,
+is embraced within the field of the physical sciences, the term
+cosmology has come more definitely to signify the _philosophy of
+nature_. It embraces such an examination of space, time, matter,
+causality, etc., as seeks to answer the most general questions about
+them, and provide for them in the world thought of as most profoundly
+real. Such a study receives its philosophical character from its
+affiliation with ontology, as the latter would find its application in
+cosmology.
+
+[Sidenote: Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies.]
+
+Sect. 63. But in addition to the consideration of the various parts of
+nature, cosmology has commonly dealt with a radical and far-reaching
+alternative that appeared at the very dawn of metaphysics. Differences
+may arise within a world constituted of a single substance or a small
+group of ultimate substances, by changes in the relative position and
+grouping of the parts. Hence the virtue of the conception of motion. The
+theory which explains all differences by motions of the parts of a
+qualitatively simple world, is called _mechanism_. Another source of
+change familiar to naive experience is _will_, or the action of living
+creatures. According to the mechanical theory, _changes occur on account
+of the natural motions of the parts of matter_; according to the latter
+or _teleological_ conception, _changes are made by a formative agency
+directed to some end_. Among the early Greek philosophers, Leucippus was
+an exponent of mechanism.
+
+     "He says that the worlds arise when many bodies are collected
+     together into the mighty void from the surrounding space and
+     rush together. They come into collision, and those which are
+     of similar shape and like form become entangled, and from
+     their entanglement the heavenly bodies arise."[161:11]
+
+Anaxagoras, on the other hand, was famed for his doctrine of the Nous,
+or Intelligence, to whose direction he attributed the whole process of
+the world. The following is translated from extant fragments of his
+book, "+peri physeo:s+":
+
+     "And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it
+     began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve
+     first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends
+     over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And
+     all the things that are mingled together and separated off and
+     distinguished are all known by the Nous. And Nous set in order
+     all things that were to be and that were, and all things that
+     are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now
+     revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and
+     the ether that are separated off."[162:12]
+
+[Sidenote: Dualism.]
+
+Sect. 64. It is clear, furthermore, that the doctrine of Anaxagoras not
+only names a distinct kind of cause, but also ascribes to it an
+independence and intrinsic importance that do not belong to motion.
+Whereas motion is a property of matter, intelligence is an originative
+power working out purposes of its own choosing. Hence we have here to do
+with a new ontology. If we construe ultimate being in terms of mind, we
+have a definite substitute for the physical theories outlined above.
+Such a theory is scarcely to be attributed to any Greek philosopher of
+the early period; it belongs to a more sophisticated stage in the
+development of thought, after the rise of the problem of epistemology.
+But Anaxagoras's sharp distinction between the material of the world on
+the one hand, and the author of its order and evolution on the other, is
+in itself worthy of notice. It contains the germ of a recurrent
+philosophical _dualism_, which differs from pluralism in that it finds
+two and only two fundamental divisions of being, the physical, material,
+or potential on the one hand, and the mental, formal, or ideal on the
+other.
+
+[Sidenote: The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism.]
+
+Sect. 65. Finally, the alternative possibilities which these
+cosmological considerations introduce, bear directly upon the general
+question of the interdependence of the parts of the world, a question
+which has already appeared as pertinent in ontology. Monism and
+pluralism now obtain a new meaning. Where the world process is informed
+with some singleness of plan, as teleology proposes, the parts are
+reciprocally necessary, and inseparable from the unity. Where, on the
+other hand, the processes are random and reciprocally fortuitous, as
+Leucippus proposes, the world as a whole is an aggregate rather than a
+unity. In this way uniformity in kind of being may prevail in a world
+the relations of whose parts are due to chance, while diversity in kind
+of being may prevail in a world knit together by some thorough-going
+plan of organization. Thus monism and pluralism are conceptions as
+proper to cosmology as to ontology.
+
+But enough has been said to demonstrate the interdependence of ontology
+and cosmology, of the theory of being and the theory of differentiation
+and process. Such problems can be only abstractly sundered, and the
+distinctive character of any metaphysical system will usually consist in
+some theory determining their relation. Philosophy returns to these
+metaphysical problems with its thought enriched and its method
+complicated, after becoming thoroughly alive to the problems of
+epistemology, logic, and ethics.
+
+[Sidenote: Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of
+Knowledge.]
+
+Sect. 66. _Epistemology is the theory of the possibility of knowledge_,
+and issues from criticism and scepticism. If we revert again to the
+history of Greek philosophy, we find a first period of enterprising
+speculation giving place to a second period of hesitancy and doubt. This
+phase of thought occurs simultaneously with the brilliantly humanistic
+age of Pericles, and it is undoubtedly true that energy is withdrawn
+from speculation largely for the sake of expending it in the more lively
+and engaging pursuits of politics and art. But there are patent reasons
+within the sphere of philosophy itself for entailment of activity and
+taking of stock. For three centuries men have taken their philosophical
+powers for granted, and used them without questioning them. Repeated
+attacks upon the problem of reality have resulted in no consensus of
+opinion, but only in a disagreement among the wise men themselves. A
+great variety of mere theories has been substituted for the old
+unanimity of religious tradition and practical life. It is natural under
+these circumstances to infer that in philosophy man has overreached
+himself. He would more profitably busy himself with affairs that belong
+to his own sphere, and find a basis for life in his immediate relations
+with his fellows. The sophists, learned in tradition, and skilled in
+disputation, but for the most part entirely lacking in originality, are
+the new prophets. As teachers of rhetoric and morals, they represent the
+practical and secular spirit of their age; while in their avoidance of
+speculation, and their critical justification of that course, they
+express its sceptical philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism.]
+
+Sect. 67. In their self-justification certain of the sophists attached
+themselves to a definite doctrine maintained by those of their
+predecessors and contemporaries who were atomists, or followers of that
+same Leucippus whom we have quoted. This doctrine was the result of an
+attempt to construe perception in terms of the motion of atoms. Outer
+objects were said to give off fine particles which, through the
+mediation of the sense organs, impinged upon the soul-atom. But it was
+evident even to the early exponents of this theory that according to
+such an account, each perceiver is relegated to a world peculiar to his
+own stand-point. His perception informs him concerning his own states as
+affected by things, rather than concerning the things themselves. Upon
+this ground the great sophist Protagoras is said to have based his
+dictum: +Panto:n chre:mato:n metron anthro:pos+,--"Man is the measure of
+all things." This is the classic statement of the doctrine of
+relativity. But we have now entered into the province of epistemology,
+and various alternatives confront us. Reduce thought to perception,
+define perception as relative to each individual, and you arrive at
+_scepticism_, or _the denial of the possibility of valid knowledge_.
+Plato expounds this consequence in the well-known discussion of
+Protagoras that occurs in the "Theaetetus."
+
+     "I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each
+     one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with
+     a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other
+     yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of
+     all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt
+     for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that
+     while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom, he
+     was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his
+     fellow-men--would not this have produced an overpowering
+     effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern
+     another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right
+     to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each,
+     as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole
+     judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why,
+     my friend, should Protagoras be preferred to the place of
+     wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we
+     poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure
+     of his own wisdom? . . . The attempt to supervise or refute
+     the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and
+     enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and
+     this must be the case if Protagoras's Truth is the real truth,
+     and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving
+     oracles out of the shrine of his book."[167:13]
+
+This is the full swing of the pendulum from _dogmatism_, or the
+uncritical conviction of truth. A modified form of scepticism has been
+developed in these later days under the influence of natural science,
+and is called _agnosticism_ or _positivism_. It accepts the Protagorean
+doctrine only in the sense of attributing to human knowledge as a whole
+an incapacity for exceeding the range of perception. Beyond this realm
+of natural science, where theories can be sensibly verified, lies the
+unknowable realm, more real, but forever inaccessible.
+
+[Sidenote: The Source and Criterion of Knowledge According to Empiricism
+and Rationalism. Mysticism.]
+
+Sect. 68. It is important to note that both scepticism and agnosticism
+agree in regarding _perception as the essential factor in knowledge_. So
+far at any rate as our knowledge is concerned, the certification of
+being consists in perceivability. Knowledge is coextensive with actual
+and possible human experience. This account of the source and criterion
+of knowledge is called _empiricism_, in distinction from the
+counter-theory of _rationalism_.
+
+The rationalistic motive was a quickening influence in Greek philosophy
+long before it became deliberate and conspicuous in Socrates and Plato.
+Parmenides, founder of the Eleatic School, has left behind him a poem
+divided into two parts: "The Way of Truth" and "The Way of
+Opinion."[168:14] In the first of these he expounds his esoteric
+philosophy, which is a definition of being established by dialectical
+reasoning. He finds that being must be single, eternal, and changeless,
+because otherwise it cannot be thought and defined without
+contradiction. The method which Parmenides here employs presupposes that
+knowledge consists in understanding rather than perception. Indeed, he
+regards the fact that the world of the senses is manifold and mutable as
+of little consequence to the wise man. The world of sense is the
+province of vulgar opinion, while that of reason is the absolute truth
+revealed only to the philosopher. The truth has no concern with
+appearance, but is answerable only to the test of rationality. _That
+world is real which one is able by thinking to make intelligible._ The
+world is what a world must be in order to be possible at all, and the
+philosopher can deduce it directly from the very conditions of thought
+which it must satisfy. He who would know reality may disregard what
+seems to be, provided he can by reflective analysis discover certain
+general necessities to which being must conform. This is rationalism in
+its extreme form.
+
+The rationalism of Socrates was more moderate, as it was more fruitful
+than that of Parmenides. As is well known, Socrates composed no
+philosophical books, but sought to inculcate wisdom in his teaching and
+conversation. His method of inculcating wisdom was to evoke it in his
+interlocutor by making him considerate of the meaning of his speech.
+Through his own questions he sought to arouse the questioning spirit,
+which should weigh the import of words, and be satisfied with nothing
+short of a definite and consistent judgment. In the Platonic dialogues
+the Socratic method obtains a place in literature. In the "Theaetetus,"
+which is, perhaps, the greatest of all epistemological treatises,
+Socrates is represented as likening his vocation to that of the midwife.
+
+     "Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs,
+     but differs in that I attend men, and not women, and I look
+     after their souls when they are in labor, and not after their
+     bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining
+     whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings
+     forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And, like the
+     midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made
+     against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the
+     wit to answer them myself, is very just; the reason is that
+     the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to
+     bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor
+     have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my
+     own soul, but those who converse with me profit. . . . It is
+     quite clear that they never learned anything from me; the
+     many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own
+     making."[171:15]
+
+The principle underlying this method is the insistence that a
+proposition, to be true of reality, must at least bespeak a mind that is
+true to itself, internally luminous, and free from contradiction. That
+which is to me nothing that I can express in form that will convey
+precise meaning and bear analysis, is so far nothing at all. Being is
+not, as the empiricist would have it, ready at hand, ours for the
+looking, but is the fruit of critical reflection. Only reason,
+overcoming the relativity of perception, and the chaos of popular
+opinion, can lay hold on the universal truth.
+
+A very interesting tendency to clothe the articulations of thought with
+the immediacy of perception is exhibited in _mysticism_, which
+attributes the highest cognitive power to an experience that transcends
+thought, an ineffable insight that is the occasional reward of thought
+and virtuous living. This theory would seem to owe its great vigor to
+the fact that it promises to unite the universality of the rational
+object with the vivid presence of the empirical object, though it
+sacrifices the definite content of both. The mystic, empiricist, and
+rationalist are in these several ways led to revise their metaphysics
+upon the basis of their epistemology, or to define reality in terms
+dictated by the means of knowing it.
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to Realism,
+and the Representative Theory.]
+
+Sect. 69. But within the general field of epistemology there has arisen
+another issue of even greater significance in its bearing upon
+metaphysics. The first issue, as we have seen, has reference to the
+criterion of knowledge, to the possibility of arriving at certainty
+about reality, and the choice of means to that end. A second question
+arises, concerning _the relation between the knowledge and its object or
+that which is known_. This problem does not at first appear as an
+epistemological difficulty, but is due to the emphasis which the moral
+and religious interests of men give to the conception of the self. My
+knowing is a part of me, a function of that soul whose welfare and
+eternal happiness I am seeking to secure. Indeed, my knowing is, so the
+wise men have always taught, the greatest of my prerogatives. Wisdom
+appertains to the philosopher, as folly to the fool. But though my
+knowledge be a part of me, and in me, the same cannot, lightly at any
+rate, be said of what I know. It would seem that I must distinguish
+between the knowledge, which is my act or state, an event in my life,
+and the known, which is object, and belongs to the context of the outer
+world. _The object of knowledge_ would then be quite _independent of the
+circumstance that I know it_. This theory has acquired the name of
+_realism_,[173:16] and is evidently as close to common sense as any
+epistemological doctrine can be said to be. If the knowledge consists in
+some sign or symbol which in my mind stands for the object, but is
+quite other than the object, realism is given the form known as the
+_representative theory_. This theory is due to a radical distinction
+between the inner world of consciousness and the outer world of things,
+whereby in knowledge the outer object requires a substitute that is
+qualified to belong to the inner world. Where, on the other hand, no
+specific and exclusive nature is attributed to the inner world, realism
+may flourish without the representative theory. In such a case the
+object would be regarded as itself capable of entering into any number
+of individual experiences or of remaining outside them all, and without
+on either account forfeiting its identity. This view was taken for
+granted by Plato, but is elaborately defended in our own day. During the
+intervening period epistemology has been largely occupied with
+difficulties inherent in the representative theory, and from that
+discussion there has emerged the theory of _idealism_,[175:17] the great
+rival theory to that of realism.
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to
+Idealism.]
+
+Sect. 70. The representative theory contains at least one obvious
+difficulty. If the thinker be confined to his ideas, and if the reality
+be at the same time beyond these ideas, how can he ever verify their
+report? Indeed, what can it mean that an idea should be true of that
+which belongs to a wholly different category? How under such
+circumstances can that which is a part of the idea be attributed with
+any certainty to the object? Once grant that you know only your ideas,
+and the object reduces to an unknown _x_, which you retain to account
+for the outward pointing or reference of the ideas, but which is not
+missed if neglected. The obvious though radical theory of idealism is
+almost inevitably the next step. Why assume that there is any object
+other than the state of mind, since all positive content belongs to that
+realm? The eighteenth century English philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, was
+accused by his contemporaries of wilful eccentricity, and even madness,
+for his boldness in accepting this argument and drawing this conclusion:
+
+     "The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel
+     it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed;
+     meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it,
+     or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was
+     an odor--that is, it was smelt; there was a sound--that is, it
+     was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or
+     touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like
+     expressions. For as to what is said of the _absolute_
+     existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their
+     being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their
+     _esse_ is _percipi_; nor is it possible that they should have
+     any existence out of the minds or thinking thing which
+     perceives them."[176:18]
+
+[Sidenote: Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism.]
+
+Sect. 71. In this paragraph Berkeley maintains that it is essential to
+things, or at any rate to their qualities, that they _be perceived_.
+This principle when expressed as an epistemological or metaphysical
+generalization, is called _phenomenalism_. But in another phase of his
+thought Berkeley emphasizes the _perceiver_, or _spirit_. The theory
+which maintains that the only real substances are these active selves,
+with their powers and their states, has been called somewhat vaguely by
+the name of _spiritualism_.[176:19] Philosophically it shows a strong
+tendency to develop into either _panpsychism_ or _transcendentalism_.
+The former is radically empirical. Its classic representative is the
+German pessimist Schopenhauer, who defined reality in terms of will
+because that term signified to him most eloquently _the directly felt
+nature of the self_. This immediate revelation of the true inwardness of
+being serves as the key to an "intuitive interpretation" of the
+gradations of nature, and will finally awaken a sense of the presence of
+the universal Will.
+
+[Sidenote: Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism.]
+
+Sect. 72. _Transcendentalism_, or _absolute idealism_, on the other
+hand, emphasizes the _rational activity_, rather than the bare
+subjectivity, _of the self_. The term "transcendental" has become
+associated with this type of idealism through Kant, whose favorite form
+of argument, the "transcendental deduction," was an analysis of
+experience with a view to discovering the categories, or formal
+principles of thought, implied in its meaning. From the Kantian method
+arose the conception of a standard or _absolute mind_ for the standard
+experience. This mind is transcendental not in the sense of being alien,
+but in the sense of exceeding the human mind in the direction of what
+this means and strives to be. It is the ideal or normal mind, in which
+the true reality is contained, with all the chaos of finite experience
+compounded and redeemed. There is no being but the absolute, the one
+all-inclusive spiritual life, in whom all things are inherent, and whose
+perfection is the virtual implication of all purposive activities.
+
+     "God's life . . . sees the one plan fulfilled through all the
+     manifold lives, the single consciousness winning its purpose
+     by virtue of all the ideas, of all the individual selves, and
+     of all the lives. No finite view is wholly illusory. Every
+     finite intent taken precisely in its wholeness is fulfilled in
+     the Absolute. The least life is not neglected, the most
+     fleeting act is a recognized part of the world's meaning. You
+     are for the divine view all that you know yourself at this
+     instant to be. But you are also infinitely more. The
+     preciousness of your present purposes to yourself is only a
+     hint of that preciousness which in the end links their meaning
+     to the entire realm of Being."[178:20]
+
+The fruitfulness of the philosopher's reflective doubt concerning his
+own powers is now evident. Problems are raised which are not merely
+urgent in themselves, but which present wholly new alternatives to the
+metaphysician. Rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, are
+doctrines which, though springing from the epistemological query
+concerning the possibility of knowledge, may determine an entire
+philosophical system. They bear upon every question of metaphysics,
+whether the fundamental conception of being, or the problems of the
+world's unity, origin, and significance for human life.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[150:1] The post-Kantian movement in Germany--especially in so far as
+influenced by Hegel. See Chap. XII.
+
+[151:2] Cf. Sect. 203.
+
+[152:3] _E. g._, the system of Fichte. Cf. Sect. 177.
+
+[153:4] See Chap. XI.
+
+[153:5] Spinoza: _On the Improvement of the Understanding_. Translation
+by Elwes, p. 3.
+
+[154:6] Spinoza: _Ethics_, Part V, Proposition XLII. Translation by
+Elwes, p. 270.
+
+[155:7] Descartes: _Meditations_, I. Translation by Veitch, p. 97.
+
+[155:8] Leibniz: _New System of the Nature of Substances_. Translation
+by Latta, pp. 299, 300.
+
+[157:9] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 42.
+
+[159:10] No little ambiguity attaches to the term "monism" in current
+usage, because of its appropriation by those who maintain that the
+universe is unitary and homogeneous in _physical terms_ (cf. Sect. 108).
+It should properly be used to emphasize the unity of the world in any
+terms.
+
+[161:11] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 358.
+
+[162:12] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 284.
+
+[167:13] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 161. Translation by Jowett. References to
+Plato are to the marginal paging.
+
+[168:14] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, pp. 184, 187.
+
+[171:15] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 150 B. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[173:16] Much ambiguity attaches to the terms "realism" and "idealism"
+in current usage. The first had at one time in the history of philosophy
+a much narrower meaning than that which it now possesses. It was used to
+apply to those who, after Plato, believed in the independent reality of
+ideas, universals, or general natures. _Realists_ in this sense were
+opposed to _nominalists_ and _conceptualists_. Nominalism maintained the
+exclusive reality of individual substances, and reduced ideas to
+particular signs having, like the _name_, a purely symbolical or
+descriptive value. Conceptualism sought to unite realism and nominalism
+through the conception of mind, or an individual substance whose
+meanings may possess universal validity. Though this dispute was of
+fundamental importance throughout the mediaeval period, the issues
+involved have now been restated. Realism in the old sense will, if held,
+come within the scope of the broader epistemological realism defined
+above. Nominalism is covered by empirical tendencies, and conceptualism
+by modern idealism.
+
+The term _idealism_ is sometimes applied to Plato on account of his
+designation of ideas as the ultimate realities. This would be a natural
+use of the term, but in our own day it has become inseparably associated
+with the doctrine which attributes to being a dependence upon the
+activity of mind. It is of the utmost importance to keep these two
+meanings clear. In the preferred sense Plato is a realist, and so
+opposed to idealism.
+
+The term _idealism_ is further confused on account of its employment in
+literature and common speech to denote the control of ideals. Although
+this is a kindred meaning, the student of philosophy will gain little or
+no help from it, and will avoid confusion if he distinguishes the term
+in its technical use and permits it in that capacity to acquire an
+independent meaning.
+
+[175:17] See _note_, p. 173.
+
+[176:18] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Part I, Fraser's
+edition, p. 259.
+
+[176:19] To be distinguished from the religious sect which bears the
+same name.
+
+[178:20] Quoted from Professor Josiah Royce's _The World and the
+Individual, First Series_, pp. 426-427.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Normative Sciences.]
+
+Sect. 73. There are three sets of problems whose general philosophical
+importance depends upon the place which metaphysics assigns to the
+_human critical faculties_. Man passes judgment upon that which claims
+to be _true_, _beautiful_, or _good_, thus referring to ideals and
+standards that define these values. Attempts to make these ideals
+explicit, and to formulate principles which regulate their attainment,
+have resulted in the development of the three so-called _normative
+sciences_: _logic_, _aesthetics_, and _ethics_. These sciences are said
+to owe their origin to the Socratic method, and it is indeed certain
+that their problem is closely related to the general rationalistic
+attitude.[180:1] In Plato's dialogue, "Protagoras," one may observe the
+manner of the inception of both ethics and logic. The question at issue
+between Socrates and the master sophist Protagoras, is concerning the
+possibility of teaching virtue. Protagoras conducts his side of the
+discussion with the customary rhetorical flourish, expounding in set
+speeches the tradition and usage in which such a possibility is
+accepted. Socrates, on the other hand, conceives the issue quite
+differently. One can neither affirm nor deny anything of virtue unless
+one knows _what is meant by it_. Even the possession of such a meaning
+was scarcely recognized by Protagoras, who was led by Socrates's
+questions to attribute to the various virtues an external grouping
+analogous to that of the parts of the face. But Socrates shows that
+since justice, temperance, courage, and the like, are admittedly similar
+in that they are all virtues, they must have in common some essence,
+which is virtue in general. This he seeks to define in the terms,
+_virtue is knowledge_. The interest which Socrates here shows in the
+reduction of the ordinary moral judgments to a system centering in some
+single fundamental principle, is the ethical interest. But this is at
+the same time a particular application of the general rationalistic
+method of definition, and of the general rationalistic postulate that
+one knows nothing until one can form unitary and determinate
+conceptions. The recognition which Socrates thus gives to criteria of
+knowledge is an expression of the logical interest. In a certain sense,
+indeed, the whole labor of Socrates was in the cause of the logical
+interest. For he sought to demonstrate that belief is not necessarily
+knowledge; that belief may or may not be true. In order that it shall be
+true, and constitute knowledge, it must be well-grounded, and
+accompanied by an understanding of its object. Socrates thus set the
+problem of logic, the discovery, namely, of those characters by virtue
+of the possession of which belief is knowledge.
+
+[Sidenote: The Affiliations of Logic.]
+
+Sect. 74. Logic deals with the ground of belief, and thus distinguishes
+itself from the psychological account of the elements of the believing
+state.[182:2] But it is not possible sharply to sunder psychology and
+logic. This is due to the fact that the general principles which make
+belief true, may be regarded quite independently of this fact. They then
+become the _most general truth_, belonging to the absolute, archetypal
+realm, or to the mind of God.[182:3] When the general principles of
+certainty are so regarded, logic can be distinguished from metaphysics
+only by adding to the study of the general principles themselves, the
+study of the special conditions (mainly psychological) under which they
+may be realized among men. In the history of human thought the name of
+logic belongs to the study of this _attainment_ of truth, as the terms
+aesthetics and ethics belong to the studies of the attainment of beauty
+and goodness.[183:4] It is evident that logic will have a peculiar
+importance for the rationalist. For the empiricist, proposing to report
+upon things as they are given, will tend on the whole to maintain that
+knowledge has no properties save those which are given to it by its
+special subject-matter. One cannot, in short, define any absolute
+relationship between the normative sciences and the other branches of
+philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in
+Belief.]
+
+Sect. 75. _Logic is the formulation, as independently as possible of
+special subject-matter, of that which conditions truth in belief._ Since
+logic is concerned with truth only in so far as it is predicated of
+belief, and since belief in so far as true is knowledge, logic can be
+defined as the formulation of the most general principles of knowledge.
+The principles so formulated would be those virtually used to _justify_
+belief or to disprove the imputation of error.
+
+[Sidenote: The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence,
+Inference, and Observation.]
+
+Sect. 76. What is called _formal logic_ is animated with the hope of
+extracting these formulations directly from an analysis of the procedure
+of thought. The most general logical principles which have appeared in
+the historical development of formal logic are _definition_,
+_self-evidence_, _inference_, and _observation_. Each of these has been
+given special study, and each has given rise to special issues.
+
+_Definition_ has to do with the _formation of concepts_, or determinate
+and unequivocal meanings. The universality of such concepts, and their
+consequent relation to particular things, was, as we have seen,
+investigated at a very early date, and gave rise to the great
+realistic-nominalistic controversy.[184:5] A large part of the logical
+discussion in the Platonic dialogues is an outgrowth of the earlier
+"eristic," a form of disputation in favor with the sophists, and
+consisting in the adroit use of ambiguity.[184:6] It is natural that in
+its first conscious self-criticism thought should discover the need of
+definite terms. The perpetual importance of definition has been largely
+due to the great prestige in modern philosophy of the method of
+geometry, which was regarded by Descartes and Spinoza as the model for
+systems of necessary truth.
+
+_Self-evidence_ is the principle according to which _conviction of truth
+follows directly from an understanding of meaning_. In the practice of
+his intellectual midwifery, Socrates presupposed that thought is capable
+of bringing forth its own certainties. And rationalism has at all times
+regarded truth as ultimately accredited by internal marks recognizable
+by reason. Such truth arrived at antecedent to acquaintance with
+instances is called _a priori_, as distinguished from _a posteriori_
+knowledge, or observation after the fact. There can be no principles of
+self-evidence, but logicians have always been more or less concerned
+with the enumeration of alleged self-evident principles, notably those
+of _contradiction_ and _identity_. A philosophical interest in the
+mathematical method has led to a logical study of axioms, but with a
+view rather to their fruitfulness than their intrinsic truth. Indeed,
+the interest in self-evident truth has always been subordinate to the
+interest in systematic truth, and the discovery of first principles most
+commonly serves to determine the relative priority of definite
+concepts, or the correct point of departure for a series of inferences.
+
+The greater part of the famous Aristotelian logic consists in a study of
+_inference_, or _the derivation of new knowledge from old knowledge_.
+Aristotle sought to set down and classify every method of advancing from
+premises. The most important form of inference which he defined was the
+_syllogism_, a scheme of reasoning to a conclusion by means of two
+premises having one term in common. From the premises "all men are
+mortal" and "Socrates is a man," one may conclude that "Socrates is
+mortal." This is an instance not only of the syllogism in general, but
+of its most important "mood," the subsumption of a particular case under
+a general rule. Since the decline of Aristotle's influence in philosophy
+there has been a notable decrease of interest in the different forms of
+inference; though its fundamental importance as the very bone and sinew
+of _reasoning_ or _deductive thinking_ has never been challenged. Its
+loss of pre-eminence is in part due to the growth of empiricism,
+stimulated by the writings of Lord Bacon in the seventeenth century, and
+fostered by the subsequent development of experimental science.
+
+_Observation_ is the fundamental logical principle of empiricism. For a
+radical empiricism, knowledge would consist of descriptive
+generalizations based upon the summation of instances. That branch of
+logic which deals with _the advance from individual instances to general
+principles_, is called _inductive logic_. It has resulted in the
+announcement of canons of accuracy and freedom from preconception, and
+in the methodological study of hypothesis, experiment, and verification.
+Rules for observation directed to the end of discovering causes,
+constitute the most famous part of the epoch-making logic of J. S.
+Mills.[187:7]
+
+[Sidenote: Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment.]
+
+Sect. 77. There are two significant tendencies in contemporary logic.
+_Theories of the judgment_ have arisen in the course of an attempt to
+define the least complexity that must be present in order that thought
+shall come within the range of truth and error. It is evident that no
+one either knows or is in error until he takes some attitude which lays
+claim to knowledge. Denoting by the term _judgment_ this minimum of
+complexity in knowledge, an important question arises as to the sense in
+which the judgment involves the subject, predicate, and copula that are
+commonly present in its propositional form.
+
+[Sidenote: Priority of Concepts.]
+
+Sect. 78. But a more important logical development has been due to the
+recent analysis of definite accredited systems of knowledge. The study
+of the fundamental conceptions of mathematics and mechanics, together
+with an examination of the systematic structure of these sciences,
+furnishes the most notable cases. There are two senses in which such
+studies may be regarded as logical. In the first place, in so far as
+they bring to light the inner coherence of any body of truth, the kind
+of evidence upon which it rests, and the type of formal perfection which
+it seeks, they differ from formal logic only in that they derive their
+criteria from cases, rather than from the direct analysis of the
+procedure of thought. And since formal logic must itself make
+experiments, this difference is not a radical one. The study of cases
+tends chiefly to enrich _methodology_, or the knowledge of the special
+criteria of special sciences. In the second place, such studies serve to
+define the relatively few simple truths which are common to the
+relatively many complex truths. A study of the foundations of arithmetic
+reveals more elementary conceptions, such as _class_ and _order_, that
+must be employed in the very definition of number itself, and so are
+implied in every numerical calculation. It appears similarly that the
+axioms of geometry are special axioms which involve the acceptance of
+more general axioms or indefinables.[189:8] Logic in this sense, then,
+is the enumeration of conceptions and principles in the order of their
+indispensableness to knowledge. And while it must be observed that the
+most general conceptions and principles of knowledge are not necessarily
+those most significant for the existent world, nevertheless the careful
+analysis which such an enumeration involves is scarcely less fruitful
+for metaphysics than for logic.
+
+[Sidenote: Aesthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Beauty.
+Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies.]
+
+Sect. 79. _Aesthetics is the formulation, as independently as possible
+of special subject-matter, of that which conditions beauty._ As logic
+commonly refers to a judgment of truth, so aesthetics at any rate
+_refers_ to a judgment implied in appreciation. But while it is
+generally admitted that truth itself is by no means limited to the form
+of the judgment, the contrary is frequently maintained with reference
+to beauty. The aphorism, _De gustibus non est disputandum_, expresses a
+common opinion to the effect that beauty is not a property belonging to
+the object of which it is predicated, but a property generated by the
+appreciative consciousness. According to this opinion there can be no
+beauty except in the case of an object's presence in an individual
+experience. Investigators must of necessity refuse to leave individual
+caprice in complete possession of the field, but they have in many cases
+occupied themselves entirely with the _state of aesthetic enjoyment_ in
+the hope of discovering its constant factors. The opposing tendency
+defines certain _formal characters which the beautiful object must
+possess_. Evidently the latter school will attribute a more profound
+philosophical importance to the conception of beauty, since for them it
+is a principle that obtains in the world of being. This was the first
+notable contention, that of Plato. But even with the emphasis laid upon
+the subjective aspect of the aesthetic experience, great metaphysical
+importance may be attached to it, where, as in the case of the German
+Romanticists, reality is deliberately construed as a spiritual life
+which is to be appreciated rather than understood.
+
+As in the case of logic, a strong impulse has manifested itself in
+aesthetics to deal with groups of objects that lie within its province,
+rather than directly with its concepts and principles. The first special
+treatise on aesthetics, the "Poetics" of Aristotle, belongs to this type
+of inquiry, as does all criticism of art in so far as it aims at the
+formulation of general principles.
+
+[Sidenote: Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral
+Goodness.]
+
+Sect. 80. _Ethics_, the oldest and most popular of the normative
+sciences, _is the formulation, as independently as possible of special
+subject-matter, of that which conditions goodness of conduct_. Ethics is
+commonly concerned with goodness only in so far as it is predicated of
+conduct, or of character, which is a more or less permanent disposition
+to conduct. Since conduct, in so far as good, is said to constitute
+moral goodness, ethics may be defined as the formulation of the general
+principles of _morality_. The principles so formulated would be those
+virtually employed to _justify_ conduct, or to disprove the imputation
+of immorality.
+
+[Sidenote: Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism.]
+
+Sect. 81. The student of this science is confronted with a very
+considerable diversity of method and differentiation of problems. The
+earliest and most profound opposition of doctrine in ethics arose from
+the differences of interpretation of which the teaching of Socrates is
+capable. His doctrine is, as we have seen, verbally expressed in the
+proposition, _virtue is knowledge_. Socrates was primarily concerned to
+show that there is no real living without an understanding of the
+significance of life. To live well is to know the end of life, the good
+of it all, and to govern action with reference to that end. Virtue is
+therefore the practical wisdom that enables one to live consistently
+with his real intention. But what is the real intention, the end or good
+of life? In the "Protagoras," where Plato represents Socrates as
+expounding his position, virtue is interpreted to mean prudence, or
+foresight of pleasurable and painful consequences. He who knows,
+possesses all virtue in that he is qualified to adapt himself to the
+real situation and to gain the end of pleasure. All men, indeed, seek
+pleasure, but only virtuous men seek it wisely and well.
+
+     "And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some
+     pleasant things evil and some painful things good?--for I am
+     rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they
+     are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort,
+     and in as far as they are painful they are bad."[192:9]
+
+According to this view painful things are good only when they lead
+eventually to pleasure, and pleasant things evil only when their painful
+consequences outweigh their pleasantness. Hence moral differences reduce
+to differences of skill in the universal quest for pleasure, and
+_sensible gratification is the ultimate standard of moral value_. This
+ancient doctrine, known as _hedonism_, expressing as it does a part of
+life that will not suffer itself for long to be denied, is one of the
+great perennial tendencies of ethical thought. In the course of many
+centuries it has passed through a number of phases, varying its
+conception of pleasure from the tranquillity of the wise man to the
+sensuous titillations of the sybarite, and from the individualism of the
+latter to the universalism of the humanitarian. But in every case it
+shows a respect for the natural man, praising morality for its
+disciplinary and instrumental value in the service of such human wants
+as are the outgrowth of the animal instinct of self-preservation.
+
+[Sidenote: Rationalism.]
+
+Sect. 82. But if a man's life be regarded as a truer representation of
+his ideals than is his spoken theory, there is little to identify
+Socrates with the hedonists. At the conclusion of the defence of his own
+life, which Plato puts into his mouth in the well-known "Apology," he
+speaks thus:
+
+     "When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to
+     punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have
+     troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything,
+     more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something
+     when they are really nothing,--then reprove them, as I have
+     reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought
+     to care, and thinking that they are something when they are
+     really nothing."[194:10]
+
+It is plain that the man Socrates cared little for the pleasurable or
+painful consequences of his acts, provided they were worthy of the high
+calling of human nature. A man's virtue would now seem to possess an
+intrinsic nobility. If knowledge be virtue, then on this basis it must
+be because knowledge is itself excellent. Virtue as knowledge
+contributes to the good by constituting it. We meet here with the
+_rationalistic_ strain in ethics. It praises conduct for the _inherent
+worth which it may possess if it express that reason_ which the Stoics
+called "_the ruling part_." The riches of wisdom consist for the
+hedonist in their purchase of pleasure. For the rationalist, on the
+other hand, wisdom is not coin, but itself the very substance of value.
+
+[Sidenote: Eudaemonism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism.]
+
+Sect. 83. Rationalism has undergone modifications even more significant
+than those of hedonism, and involving at least one radically new group
+of conceptions. Among the Greeks rationalism and hedonism alike are
+_eudaemonistic_. They aim to portray _the fulness of life_ that makes
+"the happy man." In the ethics of Aristotle, whose synthetic mind weaves
+together these different strands, the Greek ideal finds its most
+complete expression as "the high-minded man," with all his powers and
+trappings. But the great spiritual transformation which accompanied the
+decline of Greek culture and the rise of Christianity, brought with it a
+new moral sensibility, which finds in man no virtue of himself, but only
+through the grace of God.
+
+     "And the virtues themselves," says St. Augustine, "if they
+     bear no relation to God, are in truth vices rather than
+     virtues; for although they are regarded by many as truly moral
+     when they are desired as ends in themselves and not for the
+     sake of something else, they are, nevertheless, inflated and
+     arrogant, and therefore not to be viewed as virtues but as
+     vices."[195:11]
+
+The new ideal is that of renunciation, obedience, and resignation.
+Ethically this expresses itself in _pietism_. Virtue is good neither in
+itself nor on account of its consequences, but because it is
+conformable to the will of God. The extreme inwardness of this ideal is
+characteristic of an age that despaired of attainment, whether of
+pleasure or knowledge. To all, even the persecuted, it is permitted to
+obey, and so gain entrance into the kingdom of the children of God. But
+as every special study tends to rely upon its own conceptions, pietism,
+involving as it does a relation to God, is replaced by _rigorism_ and
+_intuitionism_. The former doctrine defines virtue in terms of the inner
+attitude which it expresses. It must be done in the spirit of
+dutifulness, _because one ought_, and through sheer respect for the law
+which one's moral nature affirms. _Intuitionism_ has attempted to deal
+with the source of the moral law by defining conscience as a _special
+faculty_ or sense, qualified to pass directly upon moral questions, and
+deserving of implicit obediences. It is characteristic of this whole
+tendency to look for the spring of virtuous living, not in a good which
+such living obtains, but in a law to which it owes obedience.
+
+[Sidenote: Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics.]
+
+Sect. 84. This third general ethical tendency has thus been of the
+greatest importance in emphasizing the _consciousness of duty_, and has
+brought both hedonism and rationalism to a recognition of its
+fundamental importance. Ethics must deal not only with the moral ideal,
+but also with the ground of its appeal to the individual, and his
+obligation to pursue it. In connection with this recognition of moral
+responsibility, the problem of human _freedom_ has come to be regarded
+in the light of an inevitable point of contact between ethics and
+metaphysics. That which is absolutely binding upon the human will can be
+determined only in view of some theory of its ultimate nature. On this
+account the rationalistic and hedonistic motives are no longer
+abstractly sundered, as in the days of the Stoics and Epicureans, but
+tend to be absorbed in broader philosophical tendencies. Hedonism
+appears as the sequel to naturalism; or, more rarely, as part of a
+theistic system whose morality is divine legislation enforced by an
+appeal to motives of pleasure and pain. Rationalism, on the other hand,
+tends to be absorbed in rationalistic or idealistic philosophies, where
+man's rational nature is construed as his bond of kinship with the
+universe.
+
+Ethics has exhibited from the beginning a tendency to universalize its
+conceptions and take the central place in metaphysics. Thus with Plato
+good conduct was but a special case of goodness, the good being the most
+general principle of reality.[198:12] In modern times Fichte and his
+school have founded an ethical metaphysics upon the conception of
+duty.[198:13] In these cases ethics can be distinguished from
+metaphysics only by adding to the study of the good or of duty, a study
+of the special physical, psychological, and social conditions under
+which goodness and dutifulness may obtain in human life. It is possible
+to attach the name of ethics, and we have seen the same to be true of
+logic, either to a realm of ideal truth or to that realm wherein the
+ideal is realized in humanity.
+
+[Sidenote: The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions.]
+
+Sect. 85. A systematic study of ethics requires that the _virtues_, or
+types of moral practice, shall be interpreted in the light of the
+central conception of good, or of conscience. _Justice_, _temperance_,
+_wisdom_, and _courage_ were praised by the Greeks. Christianity added
+_self-sacrifice_, _humility_, _purity_, and _benevolence_. These and
+other virtues have been defined, justified, and co-ordinated with the
+aid of a standard of moral value or a canon of duty.
+
+There is in modern ethics a pronounced tendency, parallel to those
+already noted in logic and aesthetics, to study such phenomena belonging
+to its field as have become historically established. A very
+considerable investigation of _custom_, _institutions_, and other social
+forces has led to a contact of ethics with anthropology and sociology
+scarcely less significant than that with metaphysics.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+[Sidenote: The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of Faith.]
+
+Sect. 86. In that part of his philosophy in which he deals with faith,
+the great German philosopher Kant mentions God, Freedom, and Immortality
+as the three pre-eminent religious interests. Religion, as we have seen,
+sets up a social relationship between man and that massive drift of
+things which determines his destiny. Of the two terms of this relation,
+God signifies the latter, while freedom and immortality are prerogatives
+which religion bestows upon the former. Man, viewed from the stand-point
+of religion as an object of special interest to the universe, is said to
+have a soul; and by virtue of this soul he is said to be free and
+immortal, when thought of as having a life in certain senses independent
+of its immediate natural environment. The attempt to make this faith
+theoretically intelligible has led to the philosophical disciplines
+known as _theology_ and _psychology_.[199:14]
+
+[Sidenote: Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God.]
+
+Sect. 87. _Theology_, as a branch of philosophy, deals with _the proof
+and the nature of God_. Since "God" is not primarily a theoretical
+conception, the proof of God is not properly a philosophical problem.
+Historically, this task has been assumed as a legacy from Christian
+apologetics; and it has involved, at any rate so far as European
+philosophy is concerned, the definition of ultimate being in such
+spiritual terms as make possible the relation with man postulated in
+Christianity. For this it has been regarded as sufficient to ascribe to
+the world an underlying unity capable of bearing the predicates of
+perfection, omnipotence, and omniscience. Each proof of God has defined
+him pre-eminently in terms of some one of these his attributes.
+
+[Sidenote: The Ontological Proof of God.]
+
+Sect. 88. The _ontological_ proof of God held the foremost place in
+philosophy's contribution to Christianity up to the eighteenth century.
+This proof _infers the existence from the ideal_ of God, and so
+approaches the nature of God through the attribute of perfection. It
+owes the form in which it was accepted in the Middle Ages and
+Renaissance to St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury at the close of the
+eleventh century. He argued from the idea of a most perfect being to its
+existence, on the ground that non-existence, or existence only in idea,
+would contradict its perfection. It is evident that the force of this
+argument depends upon the necessity of the idea of God. The argument was
+accepted in Scholastic Philosophy[201:15] largely because of the virtual
+acceptance of this necessity. Mediaeval thought was under the dominance
+of the philosophical ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and through them
+rationalism had come to be the unquestioned starting-point for all
+thought. For Plato reality and rationality meant one and the same thing,
+so that the ultimate reality was the highest principle of rationality,
+which he conceived to be the idea of the good. In the case of Aristotle
+the ideal of rationality was conceived to determine the course of the
+cosmical evolution as its immanent final cause. But in itself it was
+beyond the world, or transcendent. For Plato perfection itself is
+reality, whereas for Aristotle perfection determines the hierarchical
+order of natural substances. The latter theory, more suitable to the
+uses of Christianity, because it distinguished between God and the
+world, was incorporated into the great school systems. But both theories
+contain the essence of the ontological proof of God. In thought one
+seeks the perfect truth, and posits it as at once the culmination of
+insight and the meaning of life. The ideal of God is therefore a
+necessary idea, because implied in all the effort of thought as the
+object capable of finally satisfying it. St. Anselm adds little to the
+force of this argument, and does much to obscure its real significance.
+
+In stating the ontological argument the term perfection has been
+expressly emphasized, because it may be taken to embrace both truth and
+goodness. Owing to a habit of thought, due in the main to Plato, it was
+long customary to regard degrees of truth and goodness as
+interchangeable, and as equivalent to degrees of reality. The _ens
+realissimum_ was in its completeness the highest object both of the
+faculty of cognition and of the moral will. But even in the scholastic
+period these two different aspects of the ideal were clearly recognized,
+and led to sharply divergent tendencies. More recently they have been
+divided and embodied in separate arguments. _The epistemological_
+argument _defines God in terms of that absolute truth which is referred
+to in every judgment_. Under the influence of idealism this absolute
+truth has taken the form of a universal mind, or all-embracing standard
+experience, called more briefly the absolute. The _ethical_ argument, on
+the other hand, conceives God as _the perfect goodness implied in the
+moral struggle, or the power through which goodness is made to triumph
+in the universe_ to the justification of moral faith. While the former
+of these arguments identifies God with being, the latter defines God in
+terms of the intent or outcome of being. Thus, while the epistemological
+argument does not distinguish God and the world, the latter does so,
+assuming that independent reality can be attributed to the stages of a
+process and to the purpose that dominates it.
+
+[Sidenote: The Cosmological Proof of God.]
+
+Sect. 89. The _cosmological_ proof of God approaches him through the
+attribute of creative omnipotence. The common principle of causal
+explanation refers the origin of natural events to similar antecedent
+events. But there must be some _first cause_ from which the whole series
+is derived, a cause which is ultimate, sufficient to itself, and the
+responsible author of the world. Because God's function as creator was a
+part of the Christian teaching, and because explanation by causes is
+habitual with common sense, this argument has had great vogue. But in
+philosophy it has declined in importance, chiefly because it has been
+absorbed in arguments which deal with the _kind_ of causality proper to
+a first cause or world-ground. The argument that follows is a case in
+point.
+
+[Sidenote: The Teleological Proof of God.]
+
+Sect. 90. The _teleological_ proof argues that the world can owe its
+origin only to an _intelligent first cause_. The evidence for this is
+furnished by the cunning contrivances and beneficent adaptations of
+nature. These could not have come about through chance or the working of
+mechanical forces, but only through the foresight of a rational will.
+This argument originally infers God from the character of nature and
+history; and the extension of mechanical principles to organic and
+social phenomena, especially as stimulated by Darwin's principle of
+natural selection, has tended greatly to diminish its importance. When,
+on the other hand, for nature and history there are substituted the
+intellectual and moral activities themselves, and the inference is made
+to the ideal which they imply, the teleological argument merges into the
+ontological. But the old-fashioned statement of it remains in the form
+of religious faith, and in this capacity it has had the approval even
+of Hume and Kant, the philosophers who have contributed most forcibly to
+its overthrow as a demonstration of God. They agree that the
+_acknowledgment_ of God in nature and history is the sequel to a
+theistic belief, and an inevitable attitude on the part of the religious
+consciousness.
+
+[Sidenote: God and the World. Theism and Pantheism.]
+
+Sect. 91. Another group of ideas belonging to philosophical theology
+consists of three generalizations respecting God's relation to the
+world, known as _theism_, _pantheism_, and _deism_. Although,
+theoretically, these are corollaries of the different arguments for God,
+two of them, theism and pantheism, owe their importance to their rivalry
+as religious tendencies. _Theism_ emphasizes that attitude to God which
+recognizes in him an historical personage, in some sense distinct from
+both the world and man, which are his works and yet stand in an external
+relationship to him. It expresses the spirit of ethical and monotheistic
+religion, and is therefore the natural belief of the Christian.
+_Pantheism_ appears in primitive religion as an animistic or
+polytheistic sense of the presence of a divine principle diffused
+throughout nature. But it figures most notably in the history of
+religions, in the highly reflective Brahmanism of India. In sharp
+opposition to Christianity, this religion preaches the indivisible unity
+of the world and the illusoriness of the individual's sense of his own
+independent reality. In spite of the fact that such a doctrine is alien
+to the spirit of Christianity, it enters into Christian theology through
+the influence of philosophy. The theoretical idea of God tends, as we
+have seen, to the identification of him with the world as its most real
+principle. Or it bestows upon him a nature so logical and formal, and so
+far removed from the characters of humanity, as to forbid his entering
+into personal or social relations. Such reflections concerning God find
+their religious expression in a mystical sense of unity, which has in
+many cases either entirely replaced or profoundly modified the theistic
+strain in Christianity. In current philosophy pantheism appears in the
+epistemological argument which identifies God with being; while the
+chief bulwark of theism is the ethical argument, with its provision for
+a distinction between the actual world and ideal principle of evolution.
+
+[Sidenote: Deism.]
+
+Sect. 92. While theism and pantheism appear to be permanent phases in
+the philosophy of religion, _deism_ is the peculiar product of the
+eighteenth century. It is based upon a repudiation of supernaturalism
+and "enthusiasm," on the one hand, and a literal acceptance of the
+cosmological and teleological proofs on the other. Religions, like all
+else, were required, in this epoch of clear thinking, to submit to the
+canons of experimental observation and practical common sense. These
+authorize only a _natural religion_, the acknowledgment in pious living
+of a God who, having contrived this natural world, has given it over to
+the rule, not of priests and prophets, but of natural law. The
+artificiality of its conception of God, and the calculating spirit of
+its piety, make deism a much less genuine expression of the religious
+experience than either the moral chivalry of theism or the intellectual
+and mystical exaltation of pantheism.
+
+[Sidenote: Metaphysics and Theology.]
+
+Sect. 93. The systematic development of philosophy leads to the
+inclusion of conceptions of God within the problem of metaphysics, and
+the subordination of the proof of God to the determination of the
+fundamental principle of reality. There will always remain, however, an
+outstanding theological discipline, whose function it is to interpret
+worship, or the living religious attitude, in terms of the theoretical
+principles of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Psychology is the Theory of the Soul.]
+
+Sect. 94. _Psychology is the theory of the soul._ As we have already
+seen, the rise of scepticism directs attention from the object of
+thought to the thinker, and so emphasizes the self as a field for
+theoretical investigation. But the original and the dominating interest
+in the self is a practical one. The precept, +gno:thi seauton+, has its
+deepest justification in the concern for the salvation of one's soul. In
+primitive and half-instinctive belief the self is recognized in
+practical relations. In its animistic phase this belief admitted of such
+relations with all living creatures, and extended the conception of life
+very generally to natural processes. Thus in the beginning the self was
+doubtless indistinguishable from the vital principle. In the first
+treatise on psychology, the "+peri Psyche:s+" of Aristotle, this
+interpretation finds a place in theoretical philosophy. For Aristotle
+the soul is the _entelechy_ of the body--that function or activity which
+makes a man of it. He recognized, furthermore, three stages in this
+activity: the nutritive, sensitive, and rational souls, or the
+vegetable, animal, and distinctively human natures, respectively. The
+rational soul, in its own proper activity, is man's highest
+prerogative, the soul to be saved. By virtue of it man rises above
+bodily conditions, and lays hold on the divine and eternal. But Plato,
+who, as we have seen, was ever ready to grant reality to the ideal apart
+from the circumstances of its particular embodiment, had already
+undertaken to demonstrate the immortality of the soul on the ground of
+its distinctive nature.[209:16] According to his way of thinking, the
+soul's essentially moral nature made it incapable of destruction through
+the operation of natural causes. It is evident, then, that there were
+already ideas in vogue capable of interpreting the Christian teaching
+concerning the existence of a soul, or of an inner essence of man
+capable of being made an object of divine interest.
+
+[Sidenote: Spiritual Substance]
+
+Sect. 95. The immediate effect of Christianity was to introduce into
+philosophy as one of its cardinal doctrines the theory of a spiritual
+being, constituting the true self of the individual, and separable from
+the body. The difference recognized in Plato and Aristotle between the
+divine spark and the appetitive and perceptual parts of human nature was
+now emphasized. The former (frequently called the "spirit," to
+distinguish it from the lower soul) was defined as a _substance_ having
+the attributes of thought and will. The fundamental argument for its
+existence was the immediate appeal to self-consciousness; and it was
+further defined as indestructible on the ground of its being utterly
+discontinuous and incommensurable with its material environment. This
+theory survives at the present day in the conception of pure activity,
+but on the whole the attributes of the soul have superseded its
+substance.
+
+[Sidenote: Intellectualism and Voluntarism.]
+
+Sect. 96. _Intellectualism and voluntarism_ are the two rival
+possibilities of emphasis when the soul is defined in terms of its known
+activities. Wherever the essence of personality is in question, as also
+occurs in the case of theology, thought and will present their
+respective claims to the place of first importance. _Intellectualism
+would make will merely the concluding phase of thought, while
+voluntarism would reduce thought to one of the interests of a general
+appetency._ It is evident that idealistic theories will be much
+concerned with this question of priority. It is also true, though less
+evident, that intellectualism, since it emphasizes the general and
+objective features of the mind, tends to subordinate the individual to
+the universal; while voluntarism, emphasizing desire and action, is
+relatively individualistic, and so, since there are many individuals,
+also pluralistic.[211:17]
+
+[Sidenote: Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, and
+Indeterminism.]
+
+Sect. 97. The question of the _freedom of the will_ furnishes a favorite
+controversial topic in philosophy. For the interest at stake is no less
+than the individual's responsibility before man and God for his good or
+bad works. It bears alike upon science, religion, and philosophy, and is
+at the same time a question of most fundamental practical importance.
+But this diffusion of the problem has led to so considerable a
+complication of it that it becomes necessary in outlining it to define
+two issues. In the first place, the concept of freedom is designed to
+express generally the distinction between man and the rest of nature. To
+make man in all respects _the product and creature of his natural
+environment_ would be to deny freedom and accept the radically
+_necessitarian_ doctrine. The question still remains, however, as to the
+causes which dominate man. He may be free from nature, and yet be ruled
+by God, or by distinctively spiritual causes, such as ideas or
+character. Where in general the will is regarded as submitting only to a
+_spiritual causation_ proper to its own realm, the conception is best
+named _determinism_; though in the tradition of philosophy it is held to
+be a doctrine of freedom, because contrasted with the necessitarianism
+above defined. There remains _indeterminism_, which attributes to the
+will a spontaneity that makes possible the _direct presence to it of
+genuine alternatives_. The issue may here coincide with that between
+intellectualism and voluntarism. If, _e.g._, in God's act of creation,
+his ideals and standards are prior to his fiat, his conduct is
+determined; whereas it is free in the radical or indeterministic sense
+if his ideals themselves are due to his sheer will. This theory involves
+at a certain point in action the absence of cause. On this account the
+free will is often identified with _chance_, in which case it loses its
+distinction from nature, and we have swung round the circle.
+
+[Sidenote: Immortality. Survival and Eternalism.]
+
+Sect. 98. There is similar complexity in the problem concerning
+_immortality_. Were the extreme claims of naturalism to be established,
+there would be no ground whatsoever upon which to maintain the
+immortality of man, mere dust returning unto dust. The philosophical
+concept of immortality is due to the supposition that the quintessence
+of the individual's nature is divine.[213:18] But several possibilities
+are at this point open to us. The first would maintain the survival
+after death of a recognizable and discrete personality. Another would
+suppose a preservation after death, through being taken up into the life
+of God. Still another, the theory commonly maintained on the ground of
+rationalistic and idealistic metaphysics, would deny that immortality
+has to do with life after death, and affirm that it signifies the
+perpetual membership of the human individual in a realm of eternity
+through the truth or virtue that is in him. But this interpretation
+evidently leaves open the question of the immortality of that which is
+distinctive and personal in human nature.
+
+[Sidenote: The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and Method.]
+
+Sect. 99. So far we have followed the fortunes only of the "spirit" of
+man. What of that lower soul through which he is identified with the
+fortunes of his body? When philosophy gradually ceased, in the sixteenth
+and seventeenth centuries, to be "the handmaid of religion," there arose
+a renewed interest in that part of human nature lying between the
+strictly physiological functions, on the one hand, and thought and will
+on the other. Descartes and Spinoza analyzed what they called the
+"passions," meaning such states of mind as are conditioned by a concern
+for the interests of the body. At a later period, certain English
+philosophers, following Locke, traced the dependence of ideas upon the
+senses. Their method was that of _introspection_, or the direct
+examination by the individual of his own ideas, and for the sake of
+noting their origin and composition from simple factors. The lineal
+descendants of these same English philosophers defined more carefully
+the process of _association_, whereby the complexity and sequence of
+ideas are brought about, and made certain conjectures as to its
+dependence upon properties and transactions in the physical brain. These
+are the three main philosophical sources of what has now grown to be the
+separate _natural science of psychology_. It will be noted that there
+are two characteristics which all of these studies have in common. They
+deal with the experience of the individual as composing his own private
+history, and tend to attribute the specific course which this private
+history takes to bodily conditions. It is only recently that these
+investigations have acquired sufficient unity and exclusiveness of aim
+to warrant their being regarded as a special science. But such is now so
+far the case that the psychologist of this type pursues his way quite
+independently of philosophy. It is true his research has advanced
+considerably beyond his understanding of its province. But it is
+generally recognized that he must examine those very _factors of
+subjectivity_ which the natural scientist otherwise seeks to evade, and,
+furthermore, that he must seek to _provide for them in nature_. He
+treats the inner life in what Locke called "the plain historical
+method," that is to say, instead of interpreting and defining its ideas,
+he analyzes and reports upon its content. He would not seek to justify a
+moral judgment, as would ethics, or to criticise the cogency of thought,
+as would logic; but only to describe the actual state as he found it. In
+order to make his data commensurable with the phenomena of nature, he
+discovers or defines bodily conditions for the subjective content which
+he analyzes. His fundamental principle of method is the postulate of
+_psycho-physical parallelism_, according to which he assumes a _state of
+brain or nervous system for every state of mind_. But in adopting a
+province and a method the psychologist foregoes finality of truth after
+the manner of all natural science. He deals admittedly with an aspect of
+experience, and his conclusions are no more adequate to the nature of
+the self than they are to the nature of outer objects. An admirable
+reference to this abstract division of experience occurs in Kuelpe's
+"Introduction to Philosophy":
+
+     "For the developed consciousness, as for the naive, every
+     experience is an unitary whole; and it is only the habit of
+     abstract reflection upon experience that makes the objective
+     and subjective worlds seem to fall apart as originally
+     different forms of existence. Just as a plane curve can be
+     represented in analytical geometry as the function of two
+     variables, the abscissae and the ordinates, without prejudice
+     to the unitary course of the curve itself, so the world of
+     human experience may be reduced to a subjective and an
+     objective factor, without prejudice to its real
+     coherence."[215:19]
+
+[Sidenote: Psychology and Philosophy.]
+
+Sect. 100. The problems of psychology, like those of theology, tend to
+disappear as independent philosophical topics. The ultimate nature of
+the self will continue to interest philosophers--more deeply, perhaps,
+than any aspect of experience--but their conception of it will be a
+corollary of their metaphysics and epistemology. The remainder of the
+field of the old philosophical psychology, the introspective and
+experimental analysis of special states of mind, is already the
+province of a natural science which is becoming more and more free from
+the stand-point and method of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Transition from Classification by Problems to Classification
+by Doctrines. Naturalism. Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute
+Realism.]
+
+Sect. 101. Reminding ourselves anew that philosophical problems cannot
+be treated in isolation from one another, we shall hereinafter seek to
+become acquainted with general stand-points that give systematic unity
+to the issues which have been enumerated. Such stand-points are not
+clearly defined by those who occupy them, and they afford no clear-cut
+classification of all historical philosophical philosophies. But
+system-making in philosophy is commonly due to the moving in an
+individual mind of some most significant idea; and certain of these
+ideas have reappeared so frequently as to define more or less clearly
+marked tendencies, or continuous strands, out of which the history of
+thought is forever weaving itself. Such is clearly the case with
+_naturalism_. From the beginning until now there have been men whose
+philosophy is a summation of the natural sciences, whose entire thought
+is based upon an acceptance of the methods and the fundamental
+conceptions of these disciplines. This tendency stands in the history
+of thought for the conviction that the visible and tangible world which
+interacts with the body is veritable reality. This philosophy is
+realistic and empirical to an extent entirely determined by its belief
+concerning being. But while naturalism is only secondarily
+epistemological, _subjectivism_ and _absolute idealism_ have their very
+source in the self-examination and the self-criticism of thought.
+Subjectivism signifies the conviction that the knower cannot escape
+himself. If reality is to be kept within the range of possible
+knowledge, it must be defined in terms of the processes or states of
+selves. _Absolute idealism_ arises from a union of this epistemological
+motive with a recognition of what are regarded as the logical
+necessities to which reality must submit. Reality must be both knowledge
+and rational knowledge; the object, in short, of an absolute mind, which
+shall be at once all-containing and systematic. This rationalistic
+motive was, however, not originally associated with an idealistic
+epistemology, but with the common-sense principle that being is
+discovered and not constituted by thought. Such an _absolute realism_
+is, like naturalism, primarily metaphysical rather than
+epistemological; but, unlike naturalism, it seeks to define reality as
+a logical or ethical necessity.
+
+Under these several divisions, then, we shall meet once more with the
+special problems of philosophy, but this time they will be ranged in an
+order that is determined by some central doctrine. They will appear as
+parts not of the general problem of philosophy, but of some definite
+system of philosophy.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[180:1] Cf. Sect. 68.
+
+[182:2] The Socratic distinction between the logical and the
+psychological treatment of belief finds its best expression in Plato's
+_Gorgias_, especially, 454, 455. Cf. also Sect. 29.
+
+[182:3] Thus, e. g. Hegel. See Sect. 179. Cf. also Sects. 199, 200.
+
+[183:4] Cf. Sect. 84.
+
+[184:5] See Sect. 69, _note_.
+
+[184:6] The reader will find a good illustration of eristic in Plato's
+_Euthydemus_, 275.
+
+[187:7] The reader can find these rules, and the detail of the
+traditional formal logic, in any elementary text-book, such as, e. g.,
+Jevons: _Elements of Logic_.
+
+[189:8] What is called "the algebra of logic" seeks to obtain an
+unequivocal symbolic expression for these truths.
+
+[192:9] Plato: _Protagoras_, 351. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[194:10] Plato: _Apology_, 41. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[195:11] Quoted by Paulsen in his _System of Ethics_. Translation by
+Thilly, p. 69.
+
+[198:12] Cf. Sect. 160.
+
+[198:13] Cf. Sect. 177.
+
+[199:14] Concerning the duty of philosophy to religion in these matters,
+cf. Descartes: _Meditations_, _Dedication_. Translation by Veitch, p.
+81.
+
+[201:15] The school-philosophy that flourished from the eleventh to the
+fifteenth century, under the authority of the church.
+
+[209:16] Especially in the _Phaedo_.
+
+[211:17] Schopenhauer is a notable exception. Cf. Sects. 135, 138.
+
+[213:18] It is interesting, however, to observe that current
+spiritualistic theories maintain a naturalistic theory of immortality,
+verifiable, it is alleged, in certain extraordinary empirical
+observations.
+
+[215:19] Translation by Pillsbury and Titchener, p. 59.
+
+
+
+
+PART III
+
+SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+NATURALISM[223:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: The General Meaning of Materialism.]
+
+Sect. 102. The meaning conveyed by any philosophical term consists
+largely of the distinctions which it suggests. Its peculiar quality,
+like the physiognomy of the battle-scarred veteran, is a composite of
+the controversies which it has survived. There is, therefore, an almost
+unavoidable confusion attendant upon the denomination of any early phase
+of philosophy as _materialism_. But in the historical beginnings of
+thought, as also in the common-sense of all ages, there is at any rate
+present a very essential strand of this theory. The naive habit of mind
+which, in the sixth century before Christ, prompted successive Greek
+thinkers to define reality in terms of water, air, and fire, is in this
+respect one with that exhibited in Dr. Samuel Johnson's smiting the
+ground with his stick in curt refutation of Bishop Berkeley's
+idea-philosophy. There is a theoretical instinct, not accidental or
+perverse, but springing from the very life-preserving equipment of the
+organism, which attributes reality to _tangible space-filling things
+encountered by the body_. For obvious reasons of self-interest the
+organism is first of all endowed with a sense of contact, and the more
+delicate senses enter into its practical economy as means of
+anticipating or avoiding contact. From such practical expectations
+concerning the proximity of that which may press upon, injure, or
+displace the body, arise the first crude judgments of reality. And these
+are at the same time the nucleus of naive philosophy and the germinal
+phase of materialism.
+
+[Sidenote: Corporeal Being.]
+
+Sect. 103. The first philosophical movement among the Greeks was a
+series of attempts to reduce the tangible world to unity, and of these
+the conception offered by Anaximander is of marked interest in its
+bearing upon the development of materialism. This philosopher is
+remarkable for having _defined_ his first principle, instead of having
+chosen it from among the different elements already distinguished by
+common-sense. He thought the unity of nature to consist in its periodic
+evolution from and return into one infinite sum of material (+to
+apeiron+), which, much in the manner of the "nebula" of modern science,
+is conceived as both indeterminate in its actual state and infinitely
+rich in its potentiality. The conception of matter, the most familiar
+commonplace of science, begins to be recognizable. It has here reached
+the point of signifying a common substance for all tangible things, a
+substance that in its own general and omnipresent nature is without the
+special marks that distinguish these tangible things from one another.
+And in so far the philosophy of Anaximander is materialistic.
+
+[Sidenote: Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism.]
+
+Sect. 104. But the earliest thinkers are said to be _hylozoists_, rather
+than strict materialists, because of their failure to make certain
+distinctions in connection with the _processes_ of matter. The term
+hylozoism unites with the conception of the formless material of the
+world (+hyle:+), that of an animating power to which its formations and
+transformations are due. Hylozoism itself was not a deliberate synthesis
+of these two conceptions, but a primitive practical tendency to
+universalize the conception, of life. Such "animism" instinctively
+associates with an object's bulk and hardness a capacity for locomotion
+and general initiative. And the material principles defined by the
+philosophers retain this vague and comprehensive attribute as a matter
+of course, until it is distinguished and separated through attempts to
+understand it.
+
+That aspect of natural process which was most impressive to Greek minds
+of the reflective type was the alternation of "generation and decay." In
+full accord with his more ancient master, Epicurus, the Latin poet
+Lucretius writes:
+
+     "Thus neither can death-dealing motions keep the mastery
+     always, nor entomb existence forevermore; nor, on the other
+     hand, can the birth and increase giving motions of things
+     preserve them always after they are born. Thus the war of
+     first beginnings waged from eternity is carried on with
+     dubious issue: now here, now there, the life-bringing elements
+     of things get the mastery and are o'ermastered in turn: with
+     the funeral wail blends the cry which babies raise when they
+     enter the borders of light; and no night ever followed day,
+     nor morning night, that heard not, mingling with the sickly
+     infant's cries, wailings of the attendants on death and black
+     funeral."[226:2]
+
+In a similar vein, the earliest conceptions of natural evolution
+attributed it to the coworking of two principles, that of Love or union
+and that of Hate or dissolution. The process is here distinguished from
+the material of nature, but is still described in the language of
+practical life. A distinction between two aspects of vital phenomena is
+the next step. These may be regarded in respect either of the motion and
+change which attend them, or the rationality which informs them. Life is
+both effective and significant. Although neither of these ideas ever
+wholly ceases to be animistic, they may nevertheless be applied quite
+independently of one another. The one reduces the primitive animistic
+world to the lower end of its scale, the other construes it in terms of
+a purposive utility commensurable with that of human action. Now it is
+with _mechanism_, the former of these diverging ways, that the
+development of materialism is identified. For this philosophy a thing
+need have no value to justify its existence, nor any acting intelligence
+to which it may owe its origin. Its bulk and position are sufficient for
+its being, and the operation of forces capable of integrating, dividing,
+or moving it is sufficient for its derivation and history. In short,
+there is no rhyme or reason at the heart of things, but only actual
+matter distributed by sheer force. With this elimination of the element
+of purposiveness from the hylozoistic world, the content and process of
+nature are fitted to one another. Matter is that which is moved by
+force, and force is the determining principle of the motions of matter.
+Materialism is now definitely equipped with its fundamental conceptions.
+
+[Sidenote: Materialism and Physical Science.]
+
+Sect. 105. The central conceptions of materialism as a philosophical
+theory differ from those employed in the physical sciences only in what
+is demanded of them. The scientist reports upon physical phenomena
+without accepting any further responsibility, while those who like
+Lucretius maintain a physical metaphysics, must, like him, prove that
+"the minute bodies of matter from everlasting continually uphold the sum
+of things." But, though they employ them in their own way, materialists
+and all other exponents of naturalism derive their central conceptions
+from the physical sciences, and so reflect the historical development
+through which these sciences have passed. To certain historical phases
+of physical science, in so far as these bear directly upon the meaning
+of naturalism, we now turn.
+
+[Sidenote: The Development of the Conceptions of Physical Science. Space
+and Matter.]
+
+Sect. 106. From the earliest times down to the present day the
+groundwork of materialism has most commonly been cast in the form of an
+_atomic theory_. Democritus, the first system-builder of this school,
+adopted the conception of indivisible particles (+atomoi+), impenetrable
+in their occupancy of space, and varying among themselves only in form,
+order, and position. To provide for the motion that distributes them he
+conceived them as separated from one another by empty space. From this
+it follows that the void is as real as matter, or, as Democritus himself
+is reputed to have said, "thing is not more real than no-thing."
+
+But atomism has not been by any means universally regarded as the most
+satisfactory conception of the relation between space and matter. Not
+only does it require two kinds of being, with the different attributes
+of extension and hardness, respectively,[229:3] but it would also seem
+to be experimentally inadequate in the case of the more subtle physical
+processes, such as light. The former of these is a speculative
+consideration, and as such had no little weight with the French
+philosopher Descartes, whose divisions and definitions so profoundly
+affected the course of thought in these matters after the sixteenth
+century. Holding also "that a vacuum or space in which there is
+absolutely no body is repugnant to reason," and that an indivisible
+space-filling particle is self-contradictory, he was led to _identify
+space and matter_; that is, to make matter as indispensable to space as
+space to matter. There is, then, but one kind of corporeal being, whose
+attribute is extension, and whose modes are motion and rest. The most
+famous application of the mechanical conceptions which he bases upon
+this first principle, is his theory of the planets, which are conceived
+to be embedded in a transparent medium, and to move with it, vortex
+fashion, about the sun.[230:4]
+
+But the conception of the space-filling continuity of material substance
+owes its prominence at the present time to the experimental hypothesis
+of _ether_. This substance, originally conceived to occupy the
+intermolecular spaces and to serve as a medium for the propagation of
+undulations, is now regarded by many physicists as replacing matter. "It
+is the great hope of science at the present day," says a contemporary
+exponent of naturalism, "that hard and heavy matter will be shown to be
+ether in motion."[231:5] Such a theory would reduce bodies to the
+relative displacements of parts of a continuous substance, which would
+be first of all defined as spacial, and would possess such further
+properties as special scientific hypotheses might require.
+
+Two broadly contrasting theories thus appear: that which defines matter
+as a continuous substance coextensive with space; and that which defines
+it as a discrete substance divided by empty space. But both theories are
+seriously affected by the peculiarly significant development of the
+conception of force.
+
+[Sidenote: Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the
+Conception of Force.]
+
+Sect. 107. In the Cartesian system the cause of motion was pressure
+within a plenum. But in the seventeenth century this notion encountered
+the system of Newton, a system which seemed to involve action at a
+distance. In the year 1728 Voltaire wrote from London:
+
+     "When a Frenchman arrives in London, he finds a very great
+     change, in philosophy as well as in most other things. In
+     Paris he left the world all full of matter; here he finds
+     absolute vacua. At Paris the universe is seen filled up with
+     ethereal vortices, while here the same space is occupied with
+     the play of the invisible forces of gravitation. In Paris the
+     earth is painted for us longish like an egg, and in London it
+     is oblate like a melon. At Paris the pressure of the moon
+     causes the ebb and flow of tides; in England, on the other
+     hand, the sea gravitates toward the moon, so that at the same
+     time when the Parisians demand high water of the moon, the
+     gentlemen of London require an ebb."[232:6]
+
+But these differences are not matters of taste, nor even rival
+hypotheses upon an equal footing. The Newtonian system of mechanics, the
+consummation of a development initiated by Galileo, differed from the
+vortex theory of Descartes as exact science differs from speculation and
+unverified conjecture. And this difference of method carried with it
+eventually certain profound differences of content, distinguishing the
+Newtonian theory even from that of Democritus, with which it had so much
+in common. Although Democritus had sought to avoid the element of
+purposiveness in the older hylozoism by referring the motions of bodies
+as far as possible to the impact of other bodies, he nevertheless
+attributed these motions ultimately to _weight_, signifying thereby a
+certain _downward disposition_. Now it is true that in his general
+belief Newton himself is not free from hylozoism. He thought of the
+motions of the planets themselves as initiated and quickened by a power
+emanating ultimately from God. They are "impressed by an intelligent
+Agent," and
+
+     "can be the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and skill
+     of a powerful ever-living Agent who, being in all places, is
+     more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless
+     uniform _sensorium_, and thereby to form and reform the parts
+     of the universe, than we are by our will to move the parts of
+     our own bodies."[233:7]
+
+But by the side of these statements must be set his famous disclaimer,
+"_hypotheses non fingo_." In his capacity of natural philosopher he did
+not seek to explain motions, but only to describe them. Disbelieving as
+he did in action at a distance, he saw no possibility of explanation
+short of a reference of them to God; but such "hypotheses" he thought to
+be no proper concern of science. As a consequence, the mathematical
+formulation of motions came, through him, to be regarded as the entire
+content of mechanics. The notion of an efficient cause of motion is
+still suggested by the term _force_, but even this term within the
+system of mechanics refers always to a definite amount of motion, or
+measurement of relative motion. And the same is true of _attraction_,
+_action_, _reaction_, and the like. The further explanation of motion,
+the definition of a virtue or potency that produces it, first a
+neglected problem, then an irrelevant problem, is finally, for a
+naturalistic philosophy in which this progression is completed, an
+insoluble problem. For the sequel to this purely descriptive procedure
+on the part of science is the disavowal of "metaphysics" by those who
+will have no philosophy but science. Thus the scientific conservatism of
+Newton has led to the positivistic and agnostic phase of naturalism. But
+a further treatment of this development must be reserved until the issue
+of epistemology shall have been definitely raised.
+
+A different emphasis within the general mechanical scheme, attaching
+especial importance to the conceptions of force and energy, has led to a
+rival tendency in science and a contrasting type of naturalism. The
+mechanical hypotheses hitherto described are all of a simple and readily
+depicted type. They suggest an imagery quite in accord with common-sense
+and with observation of the motions of great masses like the planets.
+Material particles are conceived to move within a containing space; the
+motions of corpuscles, atoms, or the minute parts of ether, differing
+only in degree from those of visible bodies. The whole physical
+universe may be represented in the imagination as an aggregate of bodies
+participating in motions of extraordinary complexity, but of one type.
+But now let the emphasis be placed upon the determining causes rather
+than upon the moving bodies themselves. In other words, let the bodies
+be regarded as attributive and the forces as substantive. The result is
+a radical alteration of the mechanical scheme and the transcendence of
+common-sense imagery. This was one direction of outgrowth from the work
+of Newton. His force of gravitation prevailed between bodies separated
+by spaces of great magnitude. Certain of the followers of Newton,
+notably Cotes, accepting the formulas of the master but neglecting his
+allusions to the agency of God, accepted the principle of action at a
+distance. _Force_, in short, _was conceived to pervade space of itself_.
+But if force be granted this substantial and self-dependent character,
+what further need is there of matter as a separate form of entity? For
+does not the presence of matter consist essentially in resistance,
+itself a case of force? Such reflections as these led Boscovich and
+others to the radical departure of defining material particles _as
+centres of force_.
+
+[Sidenote: The Development and Extension of the Conception of Energy.]
+
+Sect. 108. But a more fruitful hypothesis of the same general order is
+due to the attention directed to the conception of _energy_, or capacity
+for work, by experimental discoveries of the possibility of reciprocal
+transformations without loss, of motion, heat, electricity, and other
+processes. The principle of the conservation of energy affirms the
+quantitative constancy of that which is so transformed, measured, for
+example, in terms of capacity to move units of mass against gravity. The
+exponents of what is called "energetics" have in many cases come to
+regard that the quantity of which is so conserved, as a substantial
+reality whose forms and distributions compose nature. A contemporary
+scientist, whose synthetic and dogmatic habit of mind has made him
+eminent in the ranks of popular philosophy, writes as follows:
+
+     "Mechanical and chemical energy, sound and heat, light and
+     electricity, are mutually convertible; they seem to be but
+     different modes of one and the same fundamental force or
+     _energy_. Thence follows the important thesis of the unity of
+     all natural forces, or, as it may also be expressed, the
+     'monism of energy.'"[236:8]
+
+The conception of energy seems, indeed, to afford an exceptional
+opportunity to naturalism. We have seen that the matter-motion theory
+was satisfied to ignore, or regard as insoluble, problems concerning the
+ultimate causes of things. Furthermore, as we shall presently see to
+better advantage, the more strictly materialistic type of naturalism
+must regard thought as an anomaly, and has no little difficulty with
+life. But the conception of energy is more adaptable, and hence better
+qualified to serve as a common denominator for various aspects of
+experience. The very readiness with which we can picture the corpuscular
+scheme is a source of embarrassment to the seeker after unity. That
+which is so distinct is bristling with incompatibilities. The most
+aggressive materialist hesitates to describe thought as a motion of
+bodies in space. Energy, on the other hand, exacts little if anything
+beyond the character of measurable power. Thought is at any rate in some
+sense a power, and to some degree measurable. Recent discoveries of the
+dependence of capacity for mental exertion upon physical vitality and
+measurements of chemical energy received into the system as food, and
+somehow exhausted by the activities of thought, have lent plausibility
+to the hypothesis of a universal energy of which physical and
+"psychical" processes are alike manifestations. And the conception of
+energy seems capable not only of unifying nature, but also of satisfying
+the metaphysical demand for an efficient and moving cause. This term,
+like "force" and "power," is endowed with such a significance by common
+sense. Indeed, naturalism would seem here to have swung round toward its
+hylozoistic starting-point. The exponent of energetics, like the naive
+animistic thinker, attributes to nature a power like that which he feels
+welling up within himself. When he acts upon the environment, like meets
+like. Energetics, it is true, may obtain a definite meaning for its
+central conception from the measurable behavior of external bodies, and
+a meaning that may be quite free from vitalism or teleology. But in his
+extension of the conception the author of a philosophical energetics
+abandons this strict meaning, and blends his thought even with a phase
+of subjectivism, known as _panpsychism_.[238:9] This theory regards the
+inward life of all nature as homogeneous with an immediately felt
+activity or appetency, as energetics finds the inner life to be
+homogeneous with the forces of nature. Both owe their philosophical
+appeal to their apparent success in unifying the world upon a direct
+empirical basis, and to their provision for the practical sense of
+reality.
+
+Such, in brief, are the main alternatives available for a naturalistic
+theory of being, in consequence of the historical development of the
+fundamental conceptions of natural science.
+
+[Sidenote: The Claims of Naturalism.]
+
+Sect. 109. We turn now to an examination of the manner in which
+naturalism, equipped with working principles, seeks to meet the special
+requirements of philosophy. The conception of the unity of nature is
+directly in the line of a purely scientific development, but naturalism
+takes the bold and radical step of regarding nature so unified as
+coextensive with the real, or at any rate knowable, universe. It will be
+remembered that among the early Greeks Anaxagoras had referred the
+creative and formative processes of nature to a non-natural or rational
+agency, which he called the _Nous_. The adventitious character of this
+principle, the external and almost purely nominal part which it played
+in the actual cosmology of Anaxagoras, betrayed it into the hands of
+the atomists, with their more consistently naturalistic creed. Better,
+these maintain, the somewhat dogmatic extension of conceptions proved to
+be successful in the description of nature, than a vague dualism which
+can serve only to distract the scientific attention and people the world
+with obscurities. There is a remarkable passage in Lucretius in which
+atomism is thus written large and inspired with cosmical eloquence:
+
+     "For verily not by design did the first-beginnings of things
+     station themselves each in its right place guided by keen
+     intelligence, nor did they bargain sooth to say what motions
+     each should assume, but because many in number and shifting
+     about in many ways throughout the universe, they are driven
+     and tormented by blows during infinite time past, after trying
+     motions and unions of every kind at length they fall into
+     arrangements such as those out of which our sum of things has
+     been formed, and by which too it is preserved through many
+     great years, when once it has been thrown into the appropriate
+     motions, and causes the streams to replenish the greedy sea
+     with copious river waters, and the earth, fostered by the heat
+     of the sun, to renew its produce, and the race of living
+     things to come up and flourish, and the gliding fires of ether
+     to live: all which these several things could in no wise bring
+     to pass, unless a store of matter could rise up from infinite
+     space, out of which store they are wont to make up in due
+     season whatever has been lost."[240:10]
+
+The prophecy of La Place, the great French mathematician, voices the
+similar faith of the eighteenth century in a mechanical understanding
+of the universe:
+
+     "The human mind, in the perfection it has been able to give to
+     astronomy, affords a feeble outline of such an intelligence.
+     Its discoveries in mechanics and in geometry, joined to that
+     of universal gravitation, have brought it within reach of
+     comprehending in the same analytical expressions the past and
+     future states of the system of the world."[241:11]
+
+As for God, the creative and presiding intelligence, La Place had "no
+need of any such hypothesis."
+
+[Sidenote: The Task of Naturalism.]
+
+Sect. 110. But these are the boasts of Homeric heroes before going into
+battle. The moment such a general position is assumed there arise sundry
+difficulties in the application of naturalistic principles to special
+interests and groups of facts. It is one thing to project a mechanical
+scheme in the large, but quite another to make explicit provision within
+it for the origin of nature, for life, for the human self with its
+ideals, and for society with its institutions. The naturalistic method
+of meeting these problems involves a reduction all along the line in the
+direction of such categories as are derived from the infra-organic
+world. That which is not like the planetary system must be construed as
+mechanical by indirection and subtlety.
+
+[Sidenote: The Origin of the Cosmos.]
+
+Sect. 111. The origin of the present known natural world was the first
+philosophical question to be definitely met by science. The general form
+of solution which naturalism offers is anticipated in the most ancient
+theories of nature. These already suppose that the observed mechanical
+processes of the circular or periodic type, like the revolutions and
+rotations of the stars, are incidents in a historical mechanical process
+of a larger scale. Prior to the present fixed motions of the celestial
+bodies, the whole mass of cosmic matter participated in irregular
+motions analogous to present terrestrial redistributions. Such motions
+may be understood to have resulted in the integration of separate
+bodies, to which they at the same time imparted a rotary motion. It is
+such a hypothesis that Lucretius paints in his bold, impressionistic
+colors.
+
+But the development of mechanics paved the way for a definite scientific
+theory, the so-called "nebular hypothesis," announced by La Place in
+1796, and by the philosopher Kant at a still earlier date. Largely
+through the Newtonian principle of the parallelogram of forces, the
+present masses, orbits, and velocities were analyzed into a more
+primitive process of concentration within a nebulous or highly diffused
+aggregate of matter. And with the aid of the principle of the
+conservation of energy this theory appears to make possible the
+derivation of heat, light, and other apparently non-mechanical processes
+from the same original energy of motion.
+
+But a persistently philosophical mind at once raises the question of the
+origin of this primeval nebula itself, with a definite organization and
+a vast potential energy that must, after all, be regarded as a part of
+nature rather than its source. Several courses are here open to
+naturalism. It may maintain that the question of ultimate origin is
+unanswerable; it may regard such a process of concentration as extending
+back through an infinitely long past;[243:12] or, and this is the
+favorite alternative for more constructive minds, the historical
+cosmical process may be included within a still higher type of periodic
+process, which is regarded as eternal. This last course has been
+followed in the well-known synthetic naturalism of Herbert Spencer.
+"Evolution," he says, "is the progressive integration of matter and
+dissipation of motion." But such a process eventually runs down, and may
+be conceived as giving place to a counter-process of devolution which
+scatters the parts of matter and gathers another store of potential
+motion. The two processes in alternation will then constitute a cosmical
+system without beginning or end.
+
+In such wise a sweeping survey of the physical universe may be thought
+in the terms of natural science. The uniformitarian method in geology,
+resolving the history of the crust of the earth into known processes,
+such as erosion and igneous fusion;[244:13] and spectral analysis, with
+its discoveries concerning the chemical constituents of distant bodies
+through the study of their light, have powerfully reenforced this effort
+of thought, and apparently completed an outline sketch of the universe
+in terms of infra-organic processes.
+
+[Sidenote: Life. Natural Selection.]
+
+Sect. 112. But the cosmos must be made internally homogeneous in these
+same terms. There awaits solution, in the first place, the serious
+problem of the genesis and maintenance of life within a nature that is
+originally and ultimately inorganic. The assimilation of the field of
+biology and physiology to the mechanical cosmos had made little real
+progress prior to the nineteenth century. Mechanical theories had,
+indeed, been projected in the earliest age of philosophy, and proposed
+anew in the seventeenth century.[245:14] Nevertheless, the structural
+and functional teleology of the organism remained as apparently
+irrefutable testimony to the inworking of some principle other than that
+of mechanical necessity. Indeed, the only fruitful method applicable to
+organic phenomena was that which explained them in terms of purposive
+adaptation. And it was its provision for a mechanical interpretation of
+this very principle that gave to the Darwinian _law of natural
+selection_, promulgated in 1859 in the "Origin of Species," so profound
+a significance for naturalism. It threatened to reduce the last
+stronghold of teleology, and completely to dispense with the intelligent
+Author of nature.
+
+Darwin's hypothesis sought to explain the origin of animal species by
+survival under competitive conditions of existence through the
+possession of a structure suited to the environment. Only the most
+elementary organism need be presupposed, together with slight variations
+in the course of subsequent generations, and both may be conceived to
+arise mechanically. There will then result in surviving organisms a
+gradual accumulation of such variations as promote survival under the
+special conditions of the environment. Such a principle had been
+suggested as early as the time of Empedocles, but it remained for Darwin
+to establish it with an unanswerable array of observation and
+experimentation. If any organism whatsoever endowed with the power of
+generation be allowed to have somehow come to be, naturalism now
+promises to account for the whole subsequent history of organic
+phenomena and the origin of any known species.
+
+[Sidenote: Mechanical Physiology.]
+
+Sect. 113. But what of life itself? The question of the derivation of
+organic from inorganic matter has proved insoluble by direct means, and
+the case of naturalism must here rest upon such facts as the chemical
+homogeneity of these two kinds of matter, and the conformity of
+physiological processes to more general physical laws. Organic matter
+differs from inorganic only through the presence of proteid, a peculiar
+product of known elements, which cannot be artificially produced, but
+which is by natural means perpetually dissolved into these elements
+without any discoverable residuum. Respiration may be studied as a case
+of aerodynamics, the circulation of the blood as a case of
+hydrodynamics, and the heat given off in the course of work done by the
+body as a case of thermodynamics. And although vitalistic theories still
+retain a place in physiology, as do teleological theories in biology, on
+the whole the naturalistic programme of a reduction of organic processes
+to the type of the inorganic tends to prevail.
+
+[Sidenote: Mind. The Reduction to Sensation.]
+
+Sect. 114. The history of naturalism shows that, as in the case of life,
+so also in the case of _mind_, its hypotheses were projected by the
+Greeks, but precisely formulated and verified only in the modern period
+of science. In the philosophy of Democritus the soul was itself an atom,
+finer, rounder, and smoother than the ordinary, but thoroughly a part of
+the mechanism of nature. The processes of the soul are construed as
+interactions between the soul and surrounding objects. In sensation, the
+thing perceived produces images by means of effluxes which impinge upon
+the soul-atom. These images are not true reports of the outer world, but
+must be revised by thought before its real atomic structure emerges.
+For this higher critical exercise of thought Democritus devised no
+special atomic genesis. The result may be expressed either as the
+invalidity of such operations of mind as he could provide for in his
+universe, or the irreducibility to his chosen first principles of the
+very thought which defined them. Later naturalism has generally
+sacrificed epistemology to cosmology, and reduced thought to sensation.
+Similarly, will has been regarded as a highly developed case of
+instinct. Knowledge and will, construed as sensation and instinct, may
+thus be interpreted in the naturalistic manner within the field of
+biology.
+
+[Sidenote: Automatism.]
+
+Sect. 115. But the actual content of sensation, and the actual feelings
+which attend upon the promptings of instinct, still stubbornly testify
+to the presence in the universe of something belonging to a wholly
+different category from matter and motion. The attitude of naturalism in
+this crucial issue has never been fixed and unwavering, but there has
+gradually come to predominate a method of denying to the inner life all
+efficacy and real significance in the cosmos, while admitting its
+presence on the scene. It is a strange fact of history that Descartes,
+the French philosopher who prided himself on having rid the soul of all
+dependence on nature, should have greatly contributed to this method.
+But it is perhaps not so strange when we consider that every dualism is,
+after all, symmetrical, and that consequently whatever rids the soul of
+nature at the same time rids nature of the soul. It was Descartes who
+first conceived the body and soul to be utterly distinct substances. The
+corollary to this doctrine was his _automatism_, applied in his own
+system to animals other than man, but which those less concerned with
+religious tradition and less firmly convinced of the soul's originating
+activity were not slow to apply universally. This theory conceived the
+vital processes to take place quite regardless of any inner
+consciousness, or even without its attendance. To this radical theory
+the French materialists of the eighteenth century were especially
+attracted. With them the active soul of Descartes, the distinct
+spiritual entity, disappeared. This latter author had himself admitted a
+department of the self, which he called the "passions," in which the
+course and content of mind is determined by bodily conditions. Extending
+this conception to the whole province of mind, they employed it to
+demonstrate the thorough-going subordination of mind to body. La
+Mettrie, a physician and the author of a book entitled "L'Homme
+Machine," was first interested in this thesis by a fever delirium, and
+afterward adduced anatomical and pathological data in support of it. The
+angle from which he views human life is well illustrated in the
+following:
+
+     "What would have sufficed in the case of Julius Caesar, of
+     Seneca, of Petronius, to turn their fearlessness into timidity
+     or braggartry? An obstruction in the spleen, the liver, or the
+     _vena portae_. For the imagination is intimately connected
+     with these viscera, and from them arise all the curious
+     phenomena of hypochondria and hysteria. . . . 'A mere nothing,
+     a little fibre, some trifling thing that the most subtle
+     anatomy cannot discover, would have made two idiots out of
+     Erasmus and Fontenelle.'"[250:15]
+
+[Sidenote: Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon.]
+
+Sect. 116. The extreme claim that the soul is a physical organ of the
+body, identical with the brain, marked the culmination of this militant
+materialism, so good an instance of that over-simplification and
+whole-hearted conviction characteristic of the doctrinaire propagandism
+of France. Locke, the Englishman, had admitted that possibly the
+substance which thinks is corporeal. In the letters of Voltaire this
+thought has already found a more positive expression:
+
+     "I am body, and I think; more I do not know. Shall I then
+     attribute to an unknown cause what I can so easily attribute
+     to the only fruitful cause I am acquainted with? In fact,
+     where is the man who, without an absurd godlessness, dare
+     assert that it is impossible for the Creator to endow matter
+     with thought and feeling?"[251:16]
+
+Finally, Holbach, the great systematizer of this movement, takes the
+affair out of the hands of the Creator and definitively announces that
+"a sensitive soul is nothing but a human brain so constituted that it
+easily receives the motions communicated to it."[251:17]
+
+This theory has been considerably tempered since the age of Holbach.
+Naturalism has latterly been less interested in identifying the soul
+with the body, and more interested in demonstrating its dependence upon
+specific bodily conditions, after the manner of La Mettrie. The
+so-called higher faculties, such as thought and will, have been related
+to central or _cortical_ processes of the nervous system, processes of
+connection and complication which within the brain itself supplement the
+impulses and sensations congenitally and externally stimulated. The
+term "epiphenomenon" has been adopted to express the distinctness but
+entire dependence of the mind. Man is "a conscious automaton." The real
+course of nature passes through his nervous system, while consciousness
+attends upon its functions like a shadow, present but not
+efficient.[252:18]
+
+[Sidenote: Knowledge, Positivism and Agnosticism.]
+
+Sect. 117. Holbach's "Systeme de la Nature," published in 1770, marks
+the culmination of the unequivocally materialistic form of naturalism.
+Its epistemological difficulties, always more or less in evidence, have
+since that day sufficed to discredit materialism, and to foster the
+growth of a critical and apologetic form of naturalism known as
+_positivism_ or _agnosticism_. The modesty of this doctrine does not, it
+is true, strike very deep. For, although it disclaims knowledge of
+ultimate reality, it also forbids anyone else to have any. Knowledge, it
+affirms, can be of but one type, that which comprises the verifiable
+laws governing nature. All questions concerning first causes are
+futile, a stimulus only to excursions of fancy popularly mistaken for
+knowledge. The superior certainty and stability which attaches to
+natural science is to be permanently secured by the savant's steadfast
+refusal to be led away after the false gods of metaphysics.
+
+But though this is sufficient ground for an agnostic policy, it does
+prove an agnostic theory. The latter has sprung from a closer analysis
+of knowledge, though it fails to make a very brave showing for
+thoroughness and consistency. The crucial point has already been brought
+within our view. The general principles of naturalism require that
+knowledge shall be reduced to sensations, or impressions of the
+environment upon the organism. But the environment and the sensations do
+not correspond. The environment is matter and motion, force and energy;
+the sensations are of motions, to be sure, but much more conspicuously
+of colors, sounds, odors, pleasures, and pains. Critically, this may be
+expressed by saying that since the larger part of sense-perception is so
+unmistakably subjective, and since all knowledge alike must be derived
+from this source, knowledge as a whole must be regarded as dealing only
+with appearances. There are at least three agnostic methods progressing
+from this point. All agree that the inner or essential reality is
+unfathomable. But, in the first place, those most close to the tradition
+of materialism maintain that the most significant appearances, the
+primary qualities, are those which compose a purely quantitative and
+corporeal world. The inner essence of things may at any rate be
+_approached_ by a monism of matter or of energy. This theory is
+epistemological only to the extent of moderating its claims in the hope
+of lessening its responsibility. Another agnosticism places all sense
+qualities on a par, but would regard physics and psychology as
+complementary reports upon the two distinct series of phenomena in which
+the underlying reality expresses itself. This theory is epistemological
+to the extent of granting knowledge, viewed as perception, as good a
+standing in the universe as that which is accorded to its object. But
+such a dualism tends almost irresistibly to relapse into materialistic
+monism, because of the fundamental place of physical conceptions in the
+system of the sciences. Finally, in another and a more radical phase of
+agnosticism, we find an attempt to make full provision for the
+legitimate problems of epistemology. The only datum, the only existent
+accessible to knowledge, is said to be the sensation, or state of
+consciousness. In the words of Huxley:
+
+     "What, after all, do we know of this terrible 'matter' except
+     as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of
+     our own consciousness? And what do we know of that 'spirit'
+     over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation
+     is arising, . . . except that it is also a name for an unknown
+     and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of
+     consciousness?"[255:19]
+
+The physical world is now to be regarded as a construction which does
+not assimilate to itself the content of sensations, but enables one to
+anticipate them. The sensation signifies a contact to which science can
+provide a key for practical guidance.
+
+[Sidenote: Experimentalism.]
+
+Sect. 118. This last phase of naturalism is an attempt to state a pure
+and consistent experimentalism, a workable theory of the routine of
+sensations. But it commonly falls into the error of the vicious circle.
+The hypothetical cause of sensations is said to be matter. From this
+point of view the sensation is a complex, comprising elaborate physical
+and physiological processes. But these processes themselves, on the
+other hand, are said to be analyzable into sensations. Now two such
+methods of analysis cannot be equally ultimate. If all of reality is
+finally reducible to sensations, then the term sensation must be used
+in a new sense to connote a self-subsistent being, and can no longer
+refer merely to a function of certain physiological processes. The issue
+of this would be some form of idealism or of the experience-philosophy
+that is now coming so rapidly to the front.[256:20] But while it is true
+that idealism has sometimes been intended, and that a radically new
+philosophy of experience has sometimes been closely approached, those,
+nevertheless, who have developed experimentalism from the naturalistic
+stand-point have in reality achieved only a thinly disguised
+materialism. For _the very ground of their agnosticism is
+materialistic_.[256:21] Knowledge of reality itself is said to be
+unattainable, because knowledge, in order to come within the order of
+nature, must be regarded as reducible to sensation; and because
+sensation itself, when regarded as a part of nature, is only a
+physiological process, a special phenomenon, in no way qualified to be
+knowledge that is true of reality.
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic.]
+
+Sect. 119. Perhaps, after all, it would be as fair to the spirit of
+naturalism to relieve it of responsibility for an epistemology. It has
+never thoroughly reckoned with this problem. It has deliberately
+selected from among the elements of experience, and been so highly
+constructive in its method as to forfeit its claim to pure empiricism;
+and, on the other hand, has, in this same selection of categories and in
+its insistence upon the test of experiment, fallen short of a
+thorough-going rationalism. While, on the one hand, it defines and
+constructs, it does so, on the other hand, within the field of
+perception and with constant reference to the test of perception. The
+explanation and justification of this procedure is to be found in the
+aim of natural science rather than in that of philosophy. It is this
+special interest, rather than the general problem of being, that
+determines the order of its categories. Naturalism as an account of
+reality is acceptable only so far as its success in satisfying specific
+demands obtains for it a certain logical immunity. These demands are
+unquestionably valid and fundamental, but they are not coextensive with
+the demand for truth. They coincide rather with the immediate practical
+need of a formulation of the spacial and temporal changes that confront
+the will. Hence naturalism is acceptable to common-sense as an account
+of what the every-day attitude to the environment treats as its object.
+Naturalism is common-sense about the "outer world," revised and brought
+up to date with the aid of the results of science. Its deepest spring is
+the organic instinct for the reality of the tangible, the vital
+recognition of the significance of that which is on the plane of
+interaction with the body.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+[Sidenote: General Ethical Stand-point.]
+
+Sect. 120. Oddly enough, although common-sense is ready to intrust to
+naturalism the description of the situation of life, it prefers to deal
+otherwise with its ideals. Indeed, common-sense is not without a certain
+suspicion that naturalism is the advocate of moral reversion. It is
+recognized as the prophecy of the brute majority of life, of those
+considerations of expediency and pleasure that are the warrant for its
+secular moods rather than for its sustaining ideals. And that strand of
+life is indeed its special province. For the naturalistic method of
+reduction must find the key to human action among those practical
+conditions that are common to man and his inferiors in the scale of
+being. In short, human life, like all life, must be construed as the
+adjustment of the organism to its natural environment for the sake of
+preservation and economic advancement.
+
+[Sidenote: Cynicism and Cyrenaicism.]
+
+Sect. 121. Early in Greek philosophy this general idea of life was
+picturesquely interpreted in two contrasting ways, those of the Cynic
+and the Cyrenaic. Both of these wise men postulated the spiritual
+indifference of the universe at large, and looked only to the _contact_
+of life with its immediate environment. But while the one hoped only to
+hedge himself about, the other sought confidently the gratification of
+his sensibilities. The figure of the Cynic is the more familiar.
+Diogenes of the tub practised self-mortification until his dermal and
+spiritual callousness were alike impervious. From behind his protective
+sheath he could without affectation despise both nature and society. He
+could reckon himself more blessed than Alexander, because, with demand
+reduced to the minimum, he could be sure of a surplus of supply. Having
+renounced all goods save the bare necessities of life, he could neglect
+both promises and threats and be played upon by no one. He was securely
+intrenched within himself, an unfurnished habitation, but the citadel of
+a king. The Cyrenaic, on the other hand, did not seek to make impervious
+the surface of contact with nature and society, but sought to heighten
+its sensibility, that it might become a medium of pleasurable feeling.
+For the inspiration with which it may be pursued this ideal has nowhere
+been more eloquently set forth than in the pages of Walter Pater, who
+styles himself "the new Cyrenaic."
+
+     "Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the
+     end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a
+     variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is
+     to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass
+     most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the
+     focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their
+     purest energy?
+
+     To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this
+     ecstacy, is success in life. . . . While all melts under our
+     feet, we may well catch at any exquisite passion, or any
+     contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to
+     set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the
+     senses, strange dyes, strange colors, and curious odors, or
+     work of the artist's hands, or the face of one's friend. Not
+     to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those
+     about us, and in the brilliancy of their gifts some tragic
+     dividing of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of
+     frost and sun, to sleep before evening."[261:22]
+
+[Sidenote: Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception of
+Social Relations.]
+
+Sect. 122. In the course of modern philosophy the ethics of naturalism
+has undergone a transformation and development that equip it much more
+formidably for its competition with rival theories. If the Cynic and
+Cyrenaic philosophies of life seem too egoistic and narrow in outlook,
+this inadequacy has been largely overcome through the modern conception
+of the relation of the individual to society. Man is regarded as so
+dependent upon social relations that it is both natural and rational for
+him to govern his actions with a concern for the community. There was a
+time when this relation of dependence was viewed as external, a barter
+of goods between the individual and society, sanctioned by an implied
+contract. Thomas Hobbes, whose unblushing materialism and egoism
+stimulated by opposition the whole development of English ethics,
+conceived morality to consist in rules of action which condition the
+stability of the state, and so secure for the individual that "peace"
+which self-interest teaches him is essential to his welfare.
+
+     "And therefore so long a man is in the condition of mere
+     nature, which is a condition of war, as private appetite is
+     the measure of good and evil: and consequently all men agree
+     on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the ways or
+     means of peace, which, as I have showed before, are 'justice,'
+     'gratitude,' 'modesty,' 'equity,' 'mercy,' and the rest of
+     the laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, 'moral virtues';
+     and their contrary 'vices,' evil."[262:23]
+
+Jeremy Bentham, the apostle of utilitarianism in the eighteenth century,
+defined political and social sanctions through which the individual
+could purchase security and good repute with action conducive to the
+common welfare. But the nineteenth century has understood the matter
+better--and the idea of an evolution under conditions that select and
+reject, is here again the illuminating thought. No individual,
+evolutionary naturalism maintains, has survived the perils of life
+without possessing as an inalienable part of his nature, congenital like
+his egoism, certain impulses and instinctive desires in the interest of
+the community as a whole. The latest generation of a race whose
+perpetuation has been conditioned by a capacity to sustain social
+relations and make common cause against a more external environment,
+_is_ moral, and does not adopt morality in the course of a calculating
+egoism. Conscience is the racial instinct of self-preservation uttering
+itself in the individual member, who draws his very life-blood from the
+greater organism.
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic.]
+
+Sect. 123. This latest word of naturalistic ethics has not won
+acceptance as the last word in ethics, and this in spite of its
+indubitable truth within its scope. For the deeper ethical interest
+seeks not so much to account for the moral nature as to construe and
+justify its promptings. The evolutionary theory reveals the genesis of
+conscience, and demonstrates its continuity with nature, but this falls
+as far short of realizing the purpose of ethical study as a history of
+the natural genesis of thought would fall short of logic. Indeed,
+naturalism shows here, as in the realm of epistemology, a persistent
+failure to appreciate the central problem. Its acceptance as a
+philosophy, we are again reminded, can be accounted for only on the
+score of its genuinely rudimentary character. As a rudimentary phase of
+thought it is both indispensable and inadequate. It is the philosophy of
+instinct, which should in normal development precede a philosophy of
+reason, in which it is eventually assimilated and supplemented.
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion.]
+
+Sect. 124. There is, finally, an inspiration for life which this
+philosophy of naturalism may convey--atheism, its detractors would call
+it, but none the less a faith and a spiritual exaltation that spring
+from its summing up of truth. It is well first to realize that which is
+dispiriting in it, its failure to provide for the freedom, immortality,
+and moral providence of the more sanguine faith.
+
+     "For what is man looked at from this point of view? . . . Man,
+     so far as natural science by itself is able to teach us, is no
+     longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaven-descended
+     heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his
+     story a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the
+     meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which
+     first converted a dead organic compound into the living
+     progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows
+     nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine,
+     disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords
+     of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a
+     race with conscience enough to feel that it is vile, and
+     intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant. . . . We
+     sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared
+     with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the
+     divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of
+     our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed,
+     and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the
+     race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will
+     go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The
+     uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a
+     brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will
+     be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. 'Imperishable
+     monuments' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself, and love
+     stronger than death, will be as though they had never been.
+     Nor will anything that _is_ be better or be worse for all that
+     the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have
+     striven through countless generations to effect."[265:24]
+
+[Sidenote: Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, Wonder,
+and Renunciation.]
+
+Sect. 125. But though our philosopher must accept the truth of this
+terrible picture, he is not left without spiritual resources. The
+abstract religion provided for the agnostic faithful by Herbert Spencer
+does not, it is true, afford any nourishment to the religious nature. He
+would have men look for a deep spring of life in the negative idea of
+mystery, the apotheosis of ignorance, while religious faith to live at
+all must lay hold upon reality. But there does spring from naturalism a
+positive religion, whose fundamental motives are those of service,
+wonder, and renunciation: service of humanity in the present, wonder at
+the natural truth, and renunciation of a universe keyed to vibrate with
+human ideals.
+
+     "Have you," writes Charles Ferguson, "had dreams of Nirvana
+     and sickly visions and raptures? Have you imagined that the
+     end of your life is to be absorbed back into the life of God,
+     and to flee the earth and forget all? Or do you want to walk
+     on air, or fly on wings, or build a heavenly city in the
+     clouds? Come, let us take our kit on our shoulders, and go out
+     and build the city _here_."[265:25]
+
+For Haeckel "natural religion" is such as
+
+     "the astonishment with which we gaze upon the starry heavens
+     and the microscopic life in a drop of water, the awe with
+     which we trace the marvellous working of energy in the motion
+     of matter, the reverence with which we grasp the universal
+     dominance of the law of substance throughout the
+     universe."[266:26]
+
+There is a deeper and a sincerer note in the stout, forlorn humanism of
+Huxley:
+
+     "That which lies before the human race is a constant struggle
+     to maintain and improve, in opposition to the State of Nature,
+     the State of Art of an organized polity; in which, and by
+     which, man may develop a worthy civilization, capable of
+     maintaining and constantly improving itself, until the
+     evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its
+     downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway; and,
+     once more, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of
+     our planet."[266:27]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[223:1] PRELIMINARY NOTE.--By _naturalism_ is meant that system of
+philosophy which defines the universe in the terms of _natural science_.
+In its dogmatic phase, wherein it maintains that _being is corporeal_,
+it is called _materialism_. In its critical phase, wherein it makes the
+general assertion that the natural sciences constitute the only
+_possible knowledge_, whatever be the nature of reality itself, it is
+called _positivism_, _agnosticism_, or simply _naturalism_.
+
+[226:2] Lucretius: _De Rerum Natura_, Bk. II, lines 569-580. Translation
+by Munro.
+
+[229:3] The reader will find an interesting account of these opposing
+views in Locke's chapter on _Space_, in his _Essay Concerning Human
+Understanding_.
+
+[230:4] Descartes distinguished his theory from that of Democritus in
+the _Principles of Philosophy_, Part IV, Sect. ccii.
+
+[231:5] Pearson: _Grammar of Science_, pp. 259-260. Cf. _ibid._, Chap.
+VII, entire.
+
+[232:6] Quoted in Ueberweg: _History of Philosophy_, II, p. 124.
+
+[233:7] Quoted from the _Opticks_ of Newton by James Ward, in his
+_Naturalism and Agnosticism_, I, p. 43.
+
+[236:8] Haeckel: _Riddle of the Universe_. Translation by McCabe, p.
+254.
+
+The best systematic presentation of "energetics" is to be found in
+Ostwald's _Vorlesungen ueber Natur-Philosophie_. Herbert Spencer, in his
+well-known _First Principles_, makes philosophical use of both "force"
+and "energy."
+
+[238:9] Cf. Chap. IX.
+
+[240:10] Lucretius: _Op. cit._, Bk. I, lines 1021-1237.
+
+[241:11] Quoted from La Place's essay on _Probability_ by Ward: _Op.
+cit._, I, p. 41.
+
+[243:12] An interesting account and criticism of such a theory
+(Clifford's) is to be found in Royce's _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_,
+Lecture X.
+
+[244:13] This method replaced the old theory of "catastrophes" through
+the efforts of the English geologists, Hutton (1726-1797) and Lyell
+(1767-1849).
+
+[245:14] Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, published
+in 1628, was regarded as a step in this direction.
+
+[250:15] From the account of La Mettrie in Lange: _History of
+Materialism_. Translation by Thomas, II, pp. 67-68.
+
+[251:16] Quoted from Voltaire's London _Letter on the English_, by
+Lange: _Op. cit._, II, p. 18.
+
+[251:17] Quoted by Lange: _Op. cit._, II, p. 113.
+
+[252:18] The phrase "psycho-physical parallelism," current in
+psychology, may mean automatism of the kind expounded above, and may
+also mean dualism. It is used commonly as a methodological principle to
+signify that no causal relationship between mind and body, but one of
+_correspondence_, is to be looked for in empirical psychology. Cf. Sect.
+99.
+
+[255:19] Quoted by Ward: _Op. cit._, I, p. 18.
+
+[256:20] There are times when Huxley, _e. g._, would seem to be on the
+verge of the Berkeleyan idealism. Cf. Chap. IX.
+
+[256:21] For the case of Karl Pearson, read his _Grammar of Science_,
+Chap. II.
+
+[261:22] Pater: _The Renaissance_, pp. 249-250.
+
+[262:23] Hobbes: _Leviathan,_ Chap. XV.
+
+[265:24] Quoted from Balfour: _Foundations of Belief_, pp. 29-31.
+
+[265:25] Ferguson: _Religion of Democracy_, p. 10.
+
+[266:26] Haeckel: _Op. cit._, p. 344.
+
+[266:27] Huxley: _Evolution and Ethics_, p. 45. _Collected Essays_, Vol.
+IX.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+SUBJECTIVISM[267:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and
+Scepticism.]
+
+Sect. 126. When, in the year 1710, Bishop Berkeley maintained the thesis
+of empirical idealism, having rediscovered it and announced it with a
+justifiable sense of originality, he provoked a kind of critical
+judgment that was keenly annoying if not entirely surprising to him. In
+refuting the conception of material substance and demonstrating the
+dependence of being upon mind, he at once sought, as he did repeatedly
+in later years, to establish the world of practical belief, and so to
+reconcile metaphysics and common-sense. Yet he found himself hailed as a
+fool and a sceptic. In answer to an inquiry concerning the reception of
+his book in London, his friend Sir John Percival wrote as follows:
+
+     "I did but name the subject matter of your book of
+     _Principles_ to some ingenious friends of mine and they
+     immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time
+     refusing to read it, which I have not yet got one to do. A
+     physician of my acquaintance undertook to discover your
+     person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought
+     to take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire of
+     starting something new should put you upon such an
+     undertaking. Another told me that you are not gone so far as
+     another gentleman in town, who asserts not only that there is
+     no such thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no being
+     at all."[268:2]
+
+There can be no doubt but that the idea of the dependence of real things
+upon their appearance to the individual is a paradox to common-sense. It
+is a paradox because it seems to reverse the theoretical instinct
+itself, and to define the real in those very terms which disciplined
+thought learns to neglect. In the early history of thought the nature of
+the thinker himself is recognized as that which is likely to distort
+truth rather than that which conditions it. When the wise man, the
+devotee of truth, first makes his appearance, his authority is
+acknowledged because he has renounced himself. As witness of the
+universal being he purges himself of whatever is peculiar to his own
+individuality, or even to his human nature. In the aloofness of his
+meditation he escapes the cloud of opinion and prejudice that obscures
+the vision of the common man. In short, the element of belief dependent
+upon the thinker himself is the dross which must be refined away in
+order to obtain the pure truth. When, then, in the critical epoch of the
+Greek sophists, Protagoras declares that there is no belief that is not
+of this character, his philosophy is promptly recognized as scepticism.
+Protagoras argues that sense qualities are clearly dependent upon the
+actual operations of the senses, and that all knowledge reduces
+ultimately to these terms.
+
+     "The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling;
+     there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire,
+     fear, and many more which are named, as well as innumerable
+     others which have no name; _with each of them there is born an
+     object of sense_,--all sorts of colors born with all sorts of
+     sight and sounds in like manner with hearing, and other
+     objects with the other senses."[269:3]
+
+If the objects are "born with" the senses, it follows that they are born
+with and appertain to the individual perceiver.
+
+     "Either show, if you can, that our sensations are not
+     relative and individual, or, if you admit that they are
+     individual, prove that this does not involve the consequence
+     that the appearance becomes, or, if you like to say, is to the
+     individual only."[270:4]
+
+The same motif is thus rendered by Walter Pater in the Conclusion of his
+"Renaissance":
+
+     "At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of
+     external objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and
+     importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand
+     forms of action. But when reflexion begins to act upon those
+     objects they are dissipated under its influence; the cohesive
+     force seems suspended like a trick of magic; each object is
+     loosed into a group of impressions--color, odor, texture--in
+     the mind of the observer. . . . Experience, already reduced to
+     a swarm of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by
+     that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has
+     ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can
+     only conjecture to be without. Every one of these impressions
+     is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each
+     mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world."
+
+The Protagorean generalization is due to the reflection that all
+experience is some individual experience, that no subject of discourse
+escapes the imputation of belonging to some individual's private
+history. The individual must start with his own experiences and ideas,
+and he can never get beyond them, for he cannot see outside his own
+vision, or even think outside his own mind. The scepticism of this
+theory is explicit, and the formulas of Protagoras--the famous "_Man is
+the measure of all things_," and the more exact formula, "_The truth is
+what appears to each man at each time_"[271:5]--have been the articles
+of scepticism throughout the history of thought.
+
+[Sidenote: Phenomenalism and Spiritualism.]
+
+Sect. 127. There is, therefore, nothing really surprising in the
+reception accorded the "new philosophy" of Bishop Berkeley. A sceptical
+relativism is the earliest phase of subjectivism, and its avoidance at
+once becomes the most urgent problem of any philosophy which proposes to
+proceed forth from this principle. And this problem Berkeley meets with
+great adroitness and a wise recognition of difficulties. But his
+sanguine temperament and speculative interest impel him to what he
+regards as the extension of his first principle, the reintroduction of
+the conception of substance under the form of spirit, and of the
+objective order of nature under the form of the mind of God. In short,
+there are two motives at work in him, side by side: the epistemological
+motive, restricting reality to perceptions and thoughts, and the
+metaphysical-religious motive, leading him eventually to the definition
+of reality in terms of perceiving and thinking spirits. And from the
+time of Berkeley these two principles, _phenomenalism_ and
+_spiritualism_, have remained as distinct and alternating phases of
+subjectivism. The former is its critical and dialectical conception, the
+latter its constructive and practical conception.
+
+[Sidenote: Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem
+Inherited from Descartes and Locke.]
+
+Sect. 128. As _phenomenalism_ has its classic statement and proof in the
+writings of Berkeley, we shall do well to return to these. The fact that
+this philosopher wished to be regarded as the prophet of common-sense
+has already been mentioned. This purpose reveals itself explicitly in
+the series of "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." The form in which
+Berkeley here advances his thesis is further determined by the manner in
+which the lines were drawn in his day of thought. The world of
+enlightened public opinion was then threefold, consisting of God,
+physical nature, and the soul. In the early years of the seventeenth
+century Descartes had sharply distinguished between the two
+substances--mind, with its attribute of thought; and body, with its
+attribute of extension--and divided the finite world between them. God
+was regarded as the infinite and sustaining cause of both. Stated in the
+terms of epistemology, the object of clear thinking is the physical
+cosmos, the subject of clear thinking the immortal soul. The realm of
+perception, wherein the mind is subjected to the body, embarrasses the
+Cartesian system, and has no clear title to any place in it. And without
+attaching cognitive importance to this realm, the system is utterly
+dogmatic in its epistemology.[273:6] For what one substance thinks, must
+be assumed to be somehow true of another quite independent substance
+without any medium of communication. Now between Descartes and Berkeley
+appeared the sober and questioning "Essay Concerning Human
+Understanding," by John Locke. This is an interesting combination (they
+cannot be said to blend) of traditional metaphysics and revolutionary
+epistemology. The universe still consists of God, the immortal thinking
+soul, and a corporeal nature, the object of its thought. But, except for
+certain proofs of God and self, knowledge is entirely reduced to the
+perceptual type, to sensations, or ideas directly imparted to the mind
+by the objects themselves. To escape dogmatism it is maintained that
+the real is what is _observed to be present_. But Locke thinks the
+qualities so discovered belong in part to the perceiver and in part to
+the substance outside the mind. Color is a case of the former, a
+"secondary quality"; and extension a case of the latter, a "primary
+quality." And evidently the above empirical test of knowledge is not
+equally well met in these two cases. When I see a red object I know that
+red exists, for it is observed to be present, and I make no claim for it
+beyond the present. But when I note that the red object is square, I am
+supposed to know a property that will continue to exist in the object
+after I have closed my eyes or turned to something else. Here my claim
+exceeds my observation, and the empirical principle adopted at the
+outset would seem to be violated. Berkeley develops his philosophy from
+this criticism. His refutation of material substance is intended as a
+full acceptance of the implications of the new empirical epistemology.
+Knowledge is to be all of the perceptual type, where what is known is
+directly presented; and, in conformity with this principle, being is to
+be restricted to the content of the living pulses of experience.
+
+[Sidenote: The Refutation of Material Substance.]
+
+Sect. 129. Berkeley, then, beginning with the threefold world of
+Descartes and of common-sense, proposes to apply Locke's theory of
+knowledge to the discomfiture of corporeal nature. It was a radical
+doctrine, because it meant for him and for his contemporaries the denial
+of all finite objects outside the mind. But at the same time it meant a
+restoration of the homogeneity of experience, the re-establishment of
+the qualitative world of every-day living, and so had its basis of
+appeal to common-sense. The encounter between Hylas, the advocate of the
+traditional philosophy, and Philonous, who represents the author
+himself, begins with an exchange of the charge of innovation.
+
+     _Hyl._ I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I
+     heard of you.
+
+     _Phil._ Pray, what were those?
+
+     _Hyl._ You were represented, in last night's conversation, as
+     one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever
+     entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such
+     thing as _material substance_ in the world.
+
+     _Phil._ That there is no such thing as what _philosophers_
+     call _material substance_, I am seriously persuaded: but if I
+     were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I
+     should then have the same reason to renounce this that I
+     imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.
+
+     _Hyl._ What! can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant
+     to Common-Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than
+     to believe there is no such thing as _matter_?
+
+     _Phil._ Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you,
+     who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater
+     sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to
+     Common-Sense, than I who believe no such thing?[276:7]
+
+Philonous now proceeds with his case. Beginning by obtaining from Hylas
+the admission that pleasure and pain are essentially relative and
+subjective, he argues that sensations such as heat, since they are
+inseparable from these feelings, must be similarly regarded. And he is
+about to annex other qualities in turn to this core of subjectivity,
+when Hylas enters a general demurrer:
+
+     "Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this
+     time. You asked me whether heat and cold, sweetness and
+     bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to
+     which I answered simply that they were. Whereas I should have
+     thus distinguished:--those qualities as perceived by us, are
+     pleasures or pains; but not as existing in the external
+     objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there
+     is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only
+     that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the
+     fire or sugar."[276:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Application of the Epistemological Principle.]
+
+Sect. 130. Here the argument touches upon profound issues. Philonous now
+assumes the extreme empirical contention _that knowledge applies only to
+its own psychological moment, that its object in no way extends beyond
+that individual situation which we call the state of knowing_. The full
+import of such an epistemology Berkeley never recognized, but he is
+clearly employing it here, and the overthrow of Hylas is inevitable so
+long as he does not challenge it or turn it against his opponent. This,
+however, as a protagonist of Berkeley's own making, he fails to do, and
+he plays into Philonous's hands by admitting that what is known only in
+perception must for that reason _consist_ in perception. He frankly owns
+"that it is vain to stand out any longer," that "colors, sounds, tastes,
+in a word, all those termed _secondary qualities_, have certainly no
+existence without the mind."[277:9]
+
+Hylas has now arrived at the distinction between primary and secondary
+qualities. "Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest" are
+the attributes of an external substance which is the cause of
+sensations. But the same epistemological principle readily reduces these
+also to dependence on mind, for, like the secondary qualities, their
+content is given only in perception. Hylas is then driven to defend a
+general material substratum, which is the cause of ideas, but to which
+none of the definite content of these ideas can be attributed. In short,
+he has put all the content of knowledge on the one side, and admitted
+its inseparability from the perceiving spirit, and left the being of
+things standing empty and forlorn on the other. This amounts, as
+Philonous reminds him, to the denial of the reality of the known world.
+
+     "You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the
+     _reality_ of sensible things; since you made it to consist in
+     an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say,
+     you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which
+     was to show your principles led to Scepticism."[278:10]
+
+[Sidenote: The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World.]
+
+Sect. 131. Having advanced the direct empiricist argument for
+phenomenalism, Berkeley now gives the rationalistic motive an
+opportunity to express itself in the queries of Hylas as to whether
+there be not an "absolute extension," somehow abstracted by thought from
+the relativities of perception. Is there not at least a _conceivable_
+world independent of perception?
+
+The answers of Philonous throw much light upon the Berkeleyan position.
+He admits that thought is capable of separating the primary from the
+secondary qualities in certain _operations_, but at the same time denies
+that this is forming an idea of them as separate.
+
+     "I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general
+     propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without
+     mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat
+     of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I
+     can pronounce the word _motion_ by itself, I can form the idea
+     of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may
+     be made of extension and figures, without any mention of
+     _great_ or _small_, or any other sensible mode or quality,
+     that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of
+     extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible
+     quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the
+     mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what
+     other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being
+     altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when
+     laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I
+     believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas
+     of extension."[279:11]
+
+Berkeley denies that we have ideas of pure extension or motion, because,
+although we do actually _deal_ with these and find them intelligible, we
+can never obtain a state of mind in which they appear as the content. He
+applies this psychological test because of his adherence to the general
+empirical postulate that knowledge is limited to the individual content
+of its own individual states. "It is a universally received maxim," he
+says, "that _everything which exists is particular_." Now the truth of
+mathematical reckoning is not particular, but is valid wherever the
+conditions to which it refers are fulfilled. Mathematical reckoning, if
+it is to be particular, must be regarded as a particular act or state of
+some thinker. Its truth must then be construed as relative to the
+interests of the thinker, as a symbolism which has an instrumental
+rather than a purely cognitive value. This conclusion cannot be disputed
+short of a radical stand against the general epistemological principle
+to which Berkeley is so far true, the principle that the reality which
+is known in any state of thinking or perceiving is the state itself.
+
+[Sidenote: The Transition to Spiritualism.]
+
+Sect. 132. This concludes the purely phenomenalistic strain of
+Berkeley's thought. He has taken the immediate apprehension of sensible
+objects in a state of mind centring about the pleasure and pain of an
+individual, to be the norm of knowledge. He has further maintained that
+knowledge cannot escape the particularity of its own states. The result
+is that the universe is composed of private perceptions and ideas.
+Strictly on the basis of what has preceded, Hylas is justified in
+regarding this conclusion as no less sceptical than that to which his
+own position had been reduced; for while he had been compelled to admit
+that the real is unknowable, Philonous has apparently defined the
+knowable as relative to the individual. But the supplementary
+metaphysics which had hitherto been kept in the background is now
+revealed. It is maintained that though perceptions know no external
+world, they do nevertheless reveal a spiritual substance of which they
+are the states. Although it has hitherto been argued that the _esse_ of
+things is in their _percipi_, this is now replaced by the more
+fundamental principle that the _esse_ of things is in their _percipere_
+or _velle_. The real world consists not in perceptions, but in
+perceivers.
+
+[Sidenote: Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism.]
+
+Sect. 133. Now it is at once evident that the epistemological theory
+which has been Berkeley's dialectical weapon in the foregoing argument
+is no longer available. And those who have cared more for this theory
+than for metaphysical speculation have attempted to stop at this point,
+and so to construe phenomenalism as to make it self-sufficient on its
+own grounds. Such attempts are so instructive as to make it worth our
+while to review them before proceeding with the development of the
+spiritualistic motive in subjectivism.
+
+The world is to be regarded as made up of sense-perceptions, ideas, or
+phenomena. What is to be accepted as the fundamental category which
+gives to all of these terms their subjectivistic significance? So far
+there seems to be nothing in view save the principle of relativity. The
+type to which these were reduced was that of the peculiar or unsharable
+experience best represented by an individual's pleasure and pain. But
+relativity will not work as a general principle of being. It consigns
+the individual to his private mind, and cannot provide for the validity
+of knowledge enough even to maintain itself. Some other course, then,
+must be followed. Perception may be given a psycho-physical definition,
+which employs physical terms as fundamental;[282:12] but this flagrantly
+contradicts the phenomenalistic first principle. Or, reality may be
+regarded as so stamped with its marks as to insure the proprietorship of
+thought. But this definition of certain objective entities of mind, of
+beings attributed to intelligence because of their intrinsic
+intelligibility, is inconsistent with empiricism, if indeed it does not
+lead eventually to a realism of the Platonic type.[283:13] Finally, and
+most commonly, the terms of phenomenalism have been retained after their
+original meaning has been suffered to lapse. The "impressions" of Hume,
+_e. g._, are the remnant of the Berkeleyan world with the spirit
+stricken out. There is no longer any point in calling them impressions,
+for they now mean only elements or qualities. As a consequence this
+outgrowth of the Berkeleyanism epistemology is at present merging into a
+realistic philosophy of experience.[283:14] Any one, then, of these
+three may be the last state of one who undertakes to remain exclusively
+faithful to the phenomenalistic aspect of Berkeleyanism, embodied in the
+principle _esse est percipi_.
+
+[Sidenote: Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the
+Perceiver.]
+
+Sect. 134. Let us now follow the fortunes of the other phase of
+subjectivism--that which develops the conception of the perceiver rather
+than the perceived. When Berkeley holds that
+
+     "all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in a
+     word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the
+     world, have not any subsistence without a Mind,"
+
+his thought has transcended the epistemology with which he overthrew the
+conception of material substance, in two directions. For neither mind of
+the finite type nor mind of the divine type is perceived. But the first
+of these may yet be regarded as a direct empirical datum, even though
+sharply distinguished from an object of perception. In the third
+dialogue, Philonous thus expounds this new kind of knowledge:
+
+     "I own I have properly no _idea_, either of God or any other
+     spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by
+     things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless
+     know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as
+     certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I
+     mean by the terms _I_ and _myself_; and I know this
+     immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I
+     perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound."[284:15]
+
+The knowledge here provided for may be regarded as empirical because
+the reality in question is an individual present in the moment of the
+knowledge. Particular acts of perception are said directly to reveal not
+only perceptual objects, but perceiving subjects. And the conception of
+spiritual substance, once accredited, may then be extended to account
+for social relations and to fill in the nature of God. The latter
+extension, in so far as it attributes such further predicates as
+universality and infinity, implies still a third epistemology, and
+threatens to pass over into rationalism. But the knowledge of one's
+fellow-men may, it is claimed, be regarded as immediate, like the
+knowledge of one's self. Perceptual and volitional activity has a sense
+for itself and also a sense for other like activity. The self is both
+self-conscious and socially conscious in an immediate experience of the
+same type.
+
+[Sidenote: Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate
+Knowledge of the Will.]
+
+Sect. 135. But this general spiritualistic conception is developed with
+less singleness of purpose in Berkeley than among the _voluntarists_ and
+_panpsychists_ who spring from Schopenhauer, the orientalist, pessimist,
+and mystic among the German Kantians of the early nineteenth century.
+His great book, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," opens with the
+phenomenalistic contention that "the world is my idea." It soon appears,
+however, that the "my" is more profoundly significant than the "idea."
+Nature is my creation, due to the working within me of certain fixed
+principles of thought, such as space, time, and causality. But nature,
+just because it is my creation, is less than me: is but a manifestation
+of the true being for which I must look _within_ myself. But this inner
+self cannot be made an object of thought, for that would be only to
+create another term of nature. The will itself, from which such creation
+springs, is "that which is most immediate" in one's consciousness, and
+"makes itself known in a direct manner in its particular acts." The term
+_will_ is used by Schopenhauer as a general term covering the whole
+dynamics of life, instinct and desire, as well as volition. It is that
+sense of life-preserving and life-enhancing appetency which is the
+conscious accompaniment of struggle. With its aid the inwardness of the
+whole world may now be apprehended.
+
+     "Whoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge
+     _in abstracto_, and therefore clear and certain, of what
+     everyone knows directly _in concreto_, _i. e._, as feeling, a
+     knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his
+     phenomenal being, . . . and that his will is that which is
+     most immediate in his consciousness, . . . will find that of
+     itself it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost
+     being of the whole of nature; for he now transfers it to all
+     those phenomena which are not given to him, like his own
+     phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge,
+     but only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as _idea_
+     alone."[287:16]
+
+The heart of reality is thus known by an "intuitive interpretation,"
+which begins at home in the individual's own heart.
+
+[Sidenote: Panpsychism.]
+
+Sect. 136. The panpsychist follows the same course of reflection. There
+is an outwardness and an inwardness of nature, corresponding to the
+knower's body on the one hand, and his feeling or will on the other.
+With this principle in hand one may pass down the whole scale of being
+and discover no breach of continuity. Such an interpretation of nature
+has been well set forth by a contemporary writer, who quotes the
+following from the botanist, C. v. Naegeli:
+
+     "Sensation is clearly connected with the reflex actions of
+     higher animals. We are obliged to concede it to the other
+     animals also, and we have no grounds for denying it to plants
+     and inorganic bodies. The sensation arouses in us a condition
+     of comfort and discomfort. In general, the feeling of
+     pleasure arises when the natural impulses are satisfied, the
+     feeling of pain when they are not satisfied. Since all
+     material processes are composed of movements of molecules and
+     elementary atoms, pleasure and pain must have their seat in
+     these particles. . . . Thus the same mental thread runs
+     through all material phenomena. The human mind is nothing but
+     the highest development on our earth of the mental processes
+     which universally animate and move nature."[288:17]
+
+According to panpsychism, then, physical nature is the manifestation of
+an _appetency or bare consciousness generalized from the thinker's
+awareness of his most intimate self_. Such appetency or bare
+consciousness is the essential or substantial state of that which
+appears as physical nature.
+
+[Sidenote: The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for
+Objective Knowledge.]
+
+Sect. 137. We must now turn to the efforts which this doctrine has made
+to maintain itself against the sceptical trend of its own epistemology.
+For precisely as in the case of phenomenalism its dialectical principle
+threatens to be self-destructive. Immediate presence is still the test
+of knowledge. But does not immediate presence connote relativity and
+inadequacy, at best; an initial phase of knowledge that must be
+supplemented and corrected before objective reality and valid truth are
+apprehended? Does not the individuality of the individual thinker
+connote the very maximum of error? Indeed, spiritualism would seem to
+have exceeded even Protagoreanism itself, and to have passed from
+scepticism to deliberate nihilism. The object of knowledge is no longer
+even, as with the phenomenalist, the thinker's thought, but only his
+_thinking_. And if the thinker's thought is relative to him, then the
+thinker's act of thinking is the very vanishing-point of relativity, the
+negative term of a negating relation. How is a real, a self-subsistent
+world to be composed of such? Impelled by a half-conscious realization
+of the hopelessness of this situation, the exponent of spiritualism has
+sought to universalize his conception; to define an _absolute or
+ultimate spirit_ other than the individual thinker, though known in and
+through him. But it is clear that this development of spiritualism, like
+all of the speculative procedure of subjectivism, threatens to exceed
+the scope of the original principle of knowledge. There is a strong
+presumption against the possibility of introducing a knowledge of God by
+the way of the particular presentations of an individual consciousness.
+
+[Sidenote: Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism.
+Mysticism.]
+
+Sect. 138. Schopenhauer must be credited with a genuine effort to accept
+the metaphysical consequences of his epistemology. His epistemology, as
+we have seen, defined knowledge as centripetal. The object of real
+knowledge is identical with the subject of knowledge. If I am to know
+the universal will, therefore, I must in knowing become that will. And
+this Schopenhauer maintains. The innermost heart of the individual into
+which he may retreat, even from his private will, is--the universal. But
+there is another way of arriving at the same knowledge. In contemplation
+I may become absorbed in principles and laws, rather than be diverted by
+the particular spacial and temporal objects, until (and this is
+peculiarly true of the aesthetic experience) my interest no longer
+distinguishes itself, but coincides with truth. In other words, abstract
+thinking and pure willing are not opposite extremes, but adjacent points
+on the deeper or transcendent circle of experience. One may reach this
+part of the circle by moving in either of two directions that at the
+start are directly opposite: by turning in upon the subject or by
+utterly giving one's self up to the object. Reality obtains no
+definition by this means. Philosophy, for Schopenhauer, is rather a
+programme for realizing the state in which I will the universal and know
+the universal will. The final theory of knowledge, then, is mysticism,
+reality directly apprehended in a supreme and incommunicable experience,
+direct and vivid, like perception, and at the same time universal, like
+thought. But the empiricism with which Schopenhauer began, the appeal to
+a familiar experience of self as will, has meanwhile been forgotten. The
+idea as object of my perception, and the will as its subject were in the
+beginning regarded as common and verifiable items of experience. But
+who, save the occasional philosopher, knows a universal will? Nor have
+attempts to avoid mysticism, while retaining Schopenhauer's first
+principle, been successful. Certain voluntarists and panpsychists have
+attempted to do without the universal will, and define the world solely
+in terms of the many individual wills. But, as Schopenhauer himself
+pointed out, individual wills cannot be distinguished except in terms of
+something other than will, such as space and time. The same is true if
+for will there be substituted inner feeling or consciousness. Within
+this category individuals can be distinguished only as points of view,
+which to be comparable at all must contain common objects, or be
+defined in terms of a system of relations like that of the physical
+world or that of an ethical community. The conception of pure will or
+pure feeling inevitably attaches to itself that of an undivided unity,
+if for no other reason because there is no ground for distinction. And
+such a unity, a will or consciousness that is no particular act or idea,
+can be known only in the unique experience which mysticism provides.
+
+[Sidenote: Objective Spiritualism.]
+
+Sect. 139. The way of Schopenhauer is the way of one who adheres to the
+belief that what the thinker knows must always be a part of himself, his
+state or his activity. From this point of view the important element of
+being, its very essence or substance, is not any definable nature but an
+immediate relation to the knower. The consequence is that the universe
+in the last analysis can only be defined as a supreme state or activity
+into which the individual's consciousness may develop. Spiritualism has,
+however, other interests, interests which may be quite independent of
+epistemology. It is speculatively interested in a kind of being which it
+defines as spiritual, and in terms of which it proposes to define the
+universe. Such procedure is radically different from the
+epistemological criticism which led Berkeley to maintain that the
+_esse_ of objects is in their _percipi_, or Schopenhauer to maintain
+that "the world is my idea," or that led both of these philosophers to
+find a deeper reality in immediately intuited self-activity. For now it
+is proposed to _understand_ spirit, discover its properties, and to
+acknowledge it only where these properties appear. I may now know spirit
+as an object; which in its properties, to be sure, is quite different
+from matter, but which like matter is capable of subsisting quite
+independently of my knowledge. This is a metaphysical spiritualism quite
+distinct from epistemological spiritualism, and by no means easily made
+consistent therewith. Indeed, it exhibits an almost irrepressible
+tendency to overstep the bounds both of empiricism and subjectivism, an
+historical connection with which alone justifies its introduction in the
+present chapter.
+
+[Sidenote: Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness and Order.]
+
+Sect. 140. To return again to the instructive example of Bishop
+Berkeley, we find him proving God from the evidence of him in
+experience, or the need of him to support the claims of experience.
+
+     "But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find
+     the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like
+     dependence on _my_ will. When in broad daylight I open my
+     eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or
+     no, or to determine what particular objects shall present
+     themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and
+     other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of
+     _my_ will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that
+     produces them.
+
+     The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than
+     those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness,
+     order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those
+     which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a
+     regular train or series--the admirable connection whereof
+     sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its
+     Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the
+     Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called
+     _the laws of nature_."[294:18]
+
+Of the attributes of experience here in question, independence or
+"steadiness" is not regarded as _prima facie_ evidence of spirit, but
+rather as an aspect of experience for which some cause is necessary. But
+it is assumed that the power to "produce," with which such a cause must
+be endowed, is the peculiar prerogative of spirit, and that this cause
+gives further evidence of its spiritual nature, of its eminently
+spiritual nature, in the orderliness and the goodness of its effects.
+
+     "The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the
+     goodness that perfects all things is the Supreme
+     Being."[294:19]
+
+That spirit is possessed of causal efficacy, Berkeley has in an earlier
+passage proved by a direct appeal to the individual's sense of power.
+
+     "I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary
+     and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than
+     _willing_, and straightway this or that idea arises in my
+     fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way
+     for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very
+     properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and
+     grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents,
+     or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse
+     ourselves with words."[295:20]
+
+Although Berkeley is here in general agreement with a very considerable
+variety of philosophical views, it will be readily observed that this
+doctrine tends to lapse into mysticism whenever it is retained in its
+purity. Berkeley himself admitted that there was no "idea" of such
+power. And philosophers will as a rule either obtain an idea
+corresponding to a term or amend the term--always excepting the mystical
+appeal to an inarticulate and indefinable experience. Hence pure power
+revealed in an ineffable immediate experience tends to give place to
+kinds of power to which some definite meaning may be attached. The
+energy of physics, defined by measurable quantitative equivalence, is a
+case in point. The idealistic trend is in another direction, power
+coming to signify ethical or logical connection. Similarly, in the later
+philosophy of Berkeley himself, God is known by the nature of his
+activity rather than by the fact of his activity; and we are said "to
+account for a thing, when we show that it is so best." God's power, in
+short, becomes indistinguishable from his universality attended with the
+attributes of goodness and orderliness. But this means that the analogy
+of the human spirit, conscious of its own activity, is no longer the
+basis of the argument. By the divine will is now meant ethical
+principles, rather than the "here am I willing" of the empirical
+consciousness. Similarly the divine mind is defined in terms of logical
+principles, such as coherence and order, rather than in terms of the
+"here am I thinking" of the finite knower himself. But enough has been
+said to make it plain that this is no longer the stand-point of
+empirio-idealism. Indeed, in his last philosophical writing, the
+"Siris," Berkeley is so far removed from the principles of knowledge
+which made him at once the disciple and the critic of Locke, as to
+pronounce himself the devotee of Platonism and the prophet of
+transcendentalism. The former strain appears in his conclusion that
+"the _principles_ of science are neither objects of sense nor
+imagination; and that intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to
+truth."[297:21] His transcendentalism appears in his belief that such
+principles, participating in the vital unity of the Individual Purpose,
+constitute the meaning and so the substantial essence of the universe.
+
+[Sidenote: The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself.]
+
+Sect. 141. Such then are the various paths which lead from subjectivism
+to other types of philosophy, demonstrating the peculiar aptitude of the
+former for departing from its first principle. Beginning with the
+relativity of all knowable reality to the individual knower, it
+undertakes to conceive reality in one or the other of the terms of this
+relation, as particular state of knowledge or as individual subject of
+knowledge. But these terms develop an intrinsic nature of their own, and
+become respectively _empirical datum_, and _logical_ or _ethical
+principle_. In either case the subjectivistic principle of knowledge has
+been abandoned. Those whose speculative interest in a definable
+objective world has been less strong than their attachment to this
+principle, have either accepted the imputation of scepticism, or had
+recourse to the radical epistemological doctrine of mysticism.
+
+[Sidenote: Ethical Theories. Relativism.]
+
+Sect. 142. Since the essence of subjectivism is epistemological rather
+than metaphysical, its practical and religious implications are various.
+The ethical theories which are corollary to the tendencies expounded
+above, range from extreme egoism to a mystical universalism. The close
+connection between the former and relativism is evident, and the form of
+egoism most consistent with epistemological relativism is to be found
+among those same Sophists who first maintained this latter doctrine. If
+we may believe Plato, the Sophists sought to create for their individual
+pupils an _appearance_ of good. In the "Theaetetus," Socrates is
+represented as speaking thus on behalf of Protagoras:
+
+     "And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no
+     existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the
+     evils which are and appear to a man, into goods which are and
+     appear to him. . . . I say that they (the wise men) are the
+     physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of
+     plants--for the husbandmen also take away the evil and
+     disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and
+     healthy sensations as well as true ones; and the wise and good
+     rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil seem just to
+     states; for whatever appears to be just and fair to a state,
+     while sanctioned by a state, is just and fair to it; but the
+     teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the
+     evil, both in appearance and in reality."[299:22]
+
+As truth is indistinguishable from the appearance of truth to the
+individual, so good is indistinguishable from a particular seeming good.
+The supreme moral value according to this plan of life is the agreeable
+feeling tone of that dream world to which the individual is forever
+consigned. The possible perfection of an experience which is "reduced to
+a swarm of impressions," and "ringed round" for each one of us by a
+"thick wall of personality" has been brilliantly depicted in the passage
+already quoted from Walter Pater, in whom the naturalistic and
+subjectivistic motives unite.[299:23] If all my experience is strictly
+my own, then my good must likewise be my own. And if all of my
+experience is valid only in its instants of immediacy, then my best good
+must likewise consist in some "exquisite passion," or stirring of the
+senses.
+
+[Sidenote: Pessimism and Self-denial.]
+
+Sect. 143. But for Schopenhauer the internal world opens out into the
+boundless and unfathomable sea of the universal will. If I retire from
+the world upon my own private feelings, I am still short of the true
+life, for I am asserting myself against the world. I should seek a sense
+of unison with a world whose deeper heart-beats I may learn to feel and
+adopt as the rhythm of my own. The folly of willing for one's private
+self is the ground of Schopenhauer's pessimism.
+
+     "All _willing_ arises from want, therefore from deficiency,
+     and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends
+     it; yet for one wish that is satisfied there remain at least
+     ten which are denied. Further, the desire lasts long, the
+     demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily
+     measured out. But even the final satisfaction is itself only
+     apparent; every satisfied wish at once makes room for a new
+     one, both are illusions; the one is known to be so, the other
+     not yet. No attained object of desire can give lasting
+     satisfaction, but merely a fleeting gratification; it is like
+     the alms thrown to the beggar, that keeps him alive to-day
+     that his misery may be prolonged till the morrow. . . . The
+     subject of willing is thus constantly stretched on the
+     revolving wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the
+     Danaids, is the ever-longing Tantalus."[300:24]
+
+The escape from this torture and self-deception is possible through the
+same mystical experience, the same blending with the universe that
+conditions knowledge.
+
+[Sidenote: The Ethics of Welfare.]
+
+Sect. 144. But though pleasant dreaming be the most consistent practical
+sequel to a subjectivistic epistemology, its _individualism_ presents
+another basis for life with quite different possibilities of emphasis.
+It may develop into an aggressive egoism of the type represented by the
+sophist Thrasymachus, in his proclamation that "might is right, justice
+the interest of the stronger."[301:25] But more commonly it is tempered
+by a conception of social interest, and serves as the champion of action
+against contemplation. The gospel of action is always individualistic.
+It requires of the individual a sense of his independence, and of the
+real virtue of his initiative. Hence those voluntarists who emphasize
+the many individual wills and decline to reduce them, after the manner
+of Schopenhauer, to a universal, may be said to afford a direct
+justification of it. It is true that this practical realism threatens
+the tenability of an epistemological idealism, but the two have been
+united, and because of their common emphasis upon the individual such
+procedure is not entirely inconsequential. Friedrich Paulsen, whose
+panpsychism has already been cited, is an excellent case in point. The
+only good, he maintains, is "welfare," the fulfilment of those natural
+desires which both distinguish the individual and signify his
+continuity with all grades of being.
+
+     "The goal at which the will aims does not consist in a maximum
+     of pleasurable feelings, but in the normal exercise of the
+     vital functions for which the species is predisposed. In the
+     case of man the mode of life is on the whole determined by the
+     nature of the historical unity from which the individual
+     evolves as a member. Here the objective content of life, after
+     which the will strives, also enters into consciousness with
+     the progressive evolution of presentation; the type of life
+     becomes a conscious ideal of life."[302:26]
+
+Here, contrary to the teaching of Schopenhauer, the good consists in
+individual attainment, the extension and fulfilment of the _distinct_
+interests that arise from the common fund of nature. To be and to do to
+the uttermost, to realize the maximum from nature's investment in one's
+special capacities and powers--this is indeed the first principle of a
+morality of action.
+
+[Sidenote: The Ethical Community.]
+
+Sect. 145. But a type of ethics still further removed from the initial
+relativism has been adopted and more or less successfully assimilated by
+subjectivistic philosophies. Accepting Berkeley's spirits, with their
+indefinite capacities, and likewise the stability of the ideal
+principles that underlie a God-administered world, and morality becomes
+the obedience which the individual renders to the law. The individual,
+free to act in his own right, cooperates with the purposes of the
+general spiritual community, whose laws are worthy of obedience though
+not coercive. The recognition of such a spiritual citizenship, entailing
+opportunities, duties, and obligations, rather than thraldom, partakes
+of the truth as well as the inadequacy of common-sense.
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Mysticism.]
+
+Sect. 146. As for religion, at least two distinct practical
+appreciations of the universe have been historically associated with
+this chapter in philosophy. The one of these is the mysticism of
+Schopenhauer, the religious sequel to a universalistic voluntarism.
+Schopenhauer's ethics, his very philosophy, is religion. For the good
+and the true are alike attainable only through identification with the
+Absolute Will. This consummation of life, transcending practical and
+theoretical differences, engulfing and effacing all qualities and all
+values, is like the Nirvana of the Orient--a positive ideal only for one
+who has appraised the apparent world at its real value.
+
+     "Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the
+     entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full
+     of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom
+     the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world,
+     which is so real, with all it's suns and milky-ways--is
+     nothing."[304:27]
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Individual Cooperation with God.]
+
+Sect. 147. From the union of the two motives of voluntarism and
+individualism springs another and a more familiar type of religion, that
+of cooperative spiritual endeavor. In the religion of Schopenhauer the
+soul must utterly lose itself for the sake of peace; here the soul must
+persist in its own being and activity for the sake of the progressive
+goodness of the world. For Schopenhauer God is the universal solution,
+in which all motions cease and all differences disappear; here God is
+the General of moral forces. The deeper and more significant universe is
+
+     "a society of rational agents, acting under the eye of
+     Providence, concurring in one design to promote the common
+     benefit of the whole, and conforming their actions to the
+     established laws and order of the Divine parental wisdom:
+     wherein each particular agent shall not consider himself
+     apart, but as the member of a great City, whose author and
+     founder is God: in which the civil laws are no other than the
+     rules of virtue and the duties of religion: and where
+     everyone's true interest is combined with his duty."[304:28]
+
+But so uncompromising an optimism is not essential to this religion.
+Its distinction lies rather in its acceptance of the manifest plurality
+of souls, and its appeal to the faith that is engendered by
+service.[305:29] As William James has said:
+
+     "Even God's being is sacred from ours. To cooperate with his
+     creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants
+     of us. In such cooperation with his purposes, not in any
+     chimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretical
+     drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our
+     destiny."[305:30]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[267:1] PRELIMINARY NOTE. By _Subjectivism_ is meant that system of
+philosophy which construes the universe in accordance with the
+epistemological principle that _all knowledge is of its own states or
+activities_. In so far as subjectivism reduces reality to _states of
+knowledge_, such as _perceptions_ or _ideas_, it is _phenomenalism_. In
+so far as it reduces reality to a more _internal active principle_ such
+as _spirit_ or _will_, it is _spiritualism_.
+
+[268:2] Berkeley: _Complete Works_, Vol. I, p. 352. Fraser's edition.
+
+[269:3] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 156. Translation by Jowett. The italics are
+mine.
+
+[270:4] Plato: _Op. cit._, 166.
+
+[271:5] +ale:thes ho hekasto: hekastote dokei.+
+
+[273:6] For another issue out of this situation, cf. Sects. 185-187.
+
+[276:7] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 380-381.
+
+[276:8] _Ibid._, p. 389.
+
+[277:9] _Ibid._, p. 397.
+
+[278:10] _Ibid._, p. 418.
+
+[279:11] _Ibid._, pp. 403-404.
+
+[282:12] Cf. Pearson: _Grammar of Science_, Chap. II. See above, Sect.
+118.
+
+[283:13] See Chap. XI. Cf. also Sect. 140.
+
+[283:14] The same may be said of the "permanent possibilities of
+sensation," proposed by J. S. Mill. Such possibilities outside of actual
+perception are either nothing or things such as they are known to be
+_in_ perception. In either case they are not perceptions.
+
+In Ernst Mach's _Analysis of Sensations_, the reader will find an
+interesting transition from sensationalism to realism through the
+substitution of the term _Bestandtheil_ for _Empfindung_. (See
+Translation by Williams, pp. 18-20.) See below, Sect. 207.
+
+[284:15] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, p. 447.
+
+[287:16] Schopenhauer: _The World as Will and Idea_. Translation by
+Haldane and Kemp, Vol. I, p. 141.
+
+[288:17] Quoted from Naegeli: _Die Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der
+Abstammungslehre_, by Friedrich Paulsen, in his _Introduction to
+Philosophy_. Translation by Thilly, p. 103.
+
+[294:18] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, p. 273.
+
+[294:19] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 272-273.
+
+[295:20] _Op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 278.
+
+[297:21] _Op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 249.
+
+[299:22] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 167. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[299:23] See Sect. 121.
+
+[300:24] Schopenhauer: _Op. cit._ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, Vol.
+I, pp. 253-254.
+
+[301:25] See Plato: _Republic_, Bk. I, 338.
+
+[302:26] Paulsen: _Op. cit._, p. 423.
+
+[304:27] Schopenhauer: _Op. cit._ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, p.
+532.
+
+[304:28] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 138.
+
+[305:29] For an interesting characterization of this type of religion,
+cf. Royce: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, p. 46.
+
+[305:30] James: _The Will to Believe_, p. 141.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+ABSOLUTE REALISM[306:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, or the
+Absolute.]
+
+Sect. 148. No one has understood better than the philosopher himself
+that he cannot hope to be popular with men of practical common-sense.
+Indeed, it has commonly been a matter of pride with him. The classic
+representation of the philosopher's faith in himself is to be found in
+Plato's "Republic." The philosopher is there portrayed in the famous
+cave simile as one who having seen the light itself can no longer
+distinguish the shadows which are apparent to those who sit perpetually
+in the twilight. Within the cave of shadows he is indeed less at his
+ease than those who have never seen the sun. But since he knows the
+source of the shadows, his knowledge surrounds that of the shadow
+connoisseurs. And his equanimity need not suffer from the contempt of
+those whom he understands better than they understand themselves. The
+history of philosophy is due to the dogged persistence with which the
+philosopher has taken himself seriously and endured the poor opinion of
+the world. But the pride of the philosopher has done more than
+perpetuate the philosophical outlook and problem; it has led to the
+formulation of a definite philosophical conception, and of two great
+philosophical doctrines. The conception is that of the _absolute_; and
+the doctrines are that of the _absolute being_, and that of the
+_absolute self_ or _mind_. The former of these doctrines is the topic of
+the present chapter.
+
+Among the early Greeks the role of the philosopher was one of
+superlative dignity. In point of knowledge he was less easily satisfied
+than other men. He thought beyond immediate practical problems, devoting
+himself to a profounder reflection, that could not but induce in him a
+sense of superior intellectual worth. The familiar was not binding upon
+him, for his thought was emancipated from routine and superficiality.
+Furthermore his intellectual courage and resolution did not permit him
+to indulge in triviality, doubt, or paradox. He sought his own with a
+faith that could not be denied. Even Heraclitus the Dark, who was also
+called "the Weeping Philosopher," because he found at the very heart of
+nature that transiency which the philosophical mind seeks to escape,
+felt himself to be exalted as well as isolated by that insight. But this
+sentiment of personal aloofness led at once to a division of experience.
+He who knows truly belongs to another and more abiding world. As there
+is a philosophical way of thought, there is a philosophical way of life,
+and _a philosophical object_. Since the philosopher and the common man
+do not see alike, the terms of their experience are incommensurable. In
+Parmenides the Eleatic this motive is most strikingly exhibited. There
+is a _Way of Truth_ which diverges from the _Way of Opinion_. The
+philosopher walks the former way alone. And there is an object of truth,
+accessible only to one who takes this way of truth. Parmenides finds
+this object to be the content of pure affirmation.
+
+     "One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that _It
+     is_. In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and
+     indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end.
+     Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now _it is_, all at once,
+     a continuous one."[308:2]
+
+The philosophy of Parmenides, commonly called the Eleatic Philosophy,
+is notable for this emergence of the pure concept of _absolute being_ as
+the final object of knowledge. The philosopher aims to discover that
+which is, and so turns away from that which is not or that which ceases
+to be. The negative and transient aspects of experience only hinder him
+in his search for the eternal. It was the great Eleatic insight to
+realize that the outcome of thought is thus predetermined; that the
+answer to philosophy is contained in the question of philosophy. The
+philosopher, in that he resolutely avoids all partiality, relativity,
+and superficiality, must affirm a complete, universal, and ultimate
+being as the very object of that perfect knowledge which he means to
+possess. This object is known in the history of these philosophies as
+the _infinite_ or _absolute_.[309:3]
+
+[Sidenote: The Eleatic Conception of Being.]
+
+Sect. 149. The Eleatic reasons somewhat as follows. The philosopher
+seeks to know what is. The object of his knowledge will then contain as
+its primary and essential predicate, that of being. It is a step further
+to _define_ being in terms of this essential predicate.
+
+Parmenides thinks of being as a power or strength, a positive
+self-maintenance to which all affirmations refer. The remainder of the
+Eleatic philosophy is the analysis of this concept and the proof of its
+implications. Being must persist through all change, and span all
+chasms. Before being there can be only nothing, which is the same as to
+say that so far as being is concerned there is no before. Similarly
+there can be no after or beyond. There can be no motion, change, or
+division of being, because being will be in all parts of every division,
+and in all stages of every process. Hence being is "uncreated and
+indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end."
+
+The argument turns upon the application to being as a whole of the
+meaning and the implications of _only being_. Being is the affirmative
+or positive. From that _alone_, one can derive only such properties as
+eternity or unity. For generation and decay and plurality may belong to
+that which is _also_ affirmative and positive, but not to that which is
+affirmative and positive _only_. The Eleatic philosophy is due, then, to
+the determination to derive the whole of reality from the bare necessity
+of being, to cut down reality to what flows entirely from the assertion
+of its only known necessary aspect, that of being. We meet here in its
+simplest form a persistent rationalistic motive, the attempt to derive
+the universe from the isolation and analysis of its most universal
+character. As in the case of every well-defined philosophy, this motive
+is always attended by a "besetting" problem. Here it is the accounting
+for what, empirically at least, is alien to that universal character.
+And this difficulty is emphasized rather than resolved by Parmenides in
+his designation of a limbo of opinion, "in which is no true belief at
+all," to which the manifold of common experience with all its
+irrelevancies can be relegated.
+
+[Sidenote: Spinoza's Conception of Substance.]
+
+Sect. 150. The Eleatic philosophy, enriched and supplemented, appears
+many centuries later in the rigorous rationalism of Spinoza.[311:4] With
+Spinoza philosophy is a demonstration of necessities after the manner of
+geometry. Reality is to be set forth in theorems derived from
+fundamental axioms and definitions. As in the case of Parmenides, these
+necessities are the implications of the very problem of being. The
+philosopher's problem is made to solve itself. But for Spinoza that
+problem is more definite and more pregnant. The problematic being must
+not only be, but must be _sufficient to itself_. What the philosopher
+seeks to know is primarily an intrinsic entity. Its nature must be
+independent of other natures, and my knowledge of it independent of my
+knowledge of anything else. Reality is something which need not be
+sought further. So construed, being is in Spinoza's philosophy termed
+_substance_. It will be seen that to define substance is to affirm the
+existence of it, for substance is so defined as to embody the very
+qualification for existence. Whatever exists exists under the form of
+substance, as that "which is in itself, and is conceived through itself:
+in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently
+of any other conception."[312:5]
+
+[Sidenote: Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The Modes and
+the Attributes.]
+
+Sect. 151. There remains but one further fundamental thesis for the
+establishment of the Spinozistic philosophy, the thesis which maintains
+the exclusive existence of the one "absolutely infinite being," or God.
+The exclusive existence of God follows from his existence, because of
+the exhaustiveness of his nature. His is the nature "consisting in
+infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite
+essentiality." He will contain all meaning, and all possible meaning,
+within his fixed and necessary constitution. It is evident that if such
+a God exist, nothing can fall outside of him. One such substance must be
+the only substance. But upon what grounds are we to assert God's
+existence?
+
+To proceed further with Spinoza's philosophy we must introduce two terms
+which are scarcely less fundamental in his system than that of
+substance. The one of these is "attribute," by which he means _kind_ or
+general property; the other is "mode," by which he means _case_ or
+individual thing. Spinoza's proof of God consists in showing that no
+single mode, single attribute, or finite group of modes or attributes,
+can be a substance; but only an infinite system of all modes of all
+attributes. Translated into common speech this means that neither kinds
+nor cases, nor special groups of either, can stand alone and be of
+themselves, but only the unity of all possible cases of all possible
+kinds.
+
+The argument concerning the possible substantiality of the case or
+individual thing is relatively simple. Suppose an attribute or kind,
+_A_, of which there are cases _am_{1}, _am_{2}, _am_{3}, etc. The
+number of cases is never involved in the nature of the kind, as is seen
+for example in the fact that the definition of triangle prescribes no
+special number of individual triangles. Hence _am_{1}, _am_{2},
+_am_{3}, etc., must be explained by something outside of their nature.
+Their being cases of _A_ does not account for their existing severally.
+This is Spinoza's statement of the argument that individual events, such
+as motions or sensations, are not self-dependent, but belong to a
+context of like events which are mutually dependent.
+
+The question of the attribute is more difficult. Why may not an
+attribute as a complete domain of interdependent events, itself be
+independent or substantial? Spinoza's predecessor, Descartes, had
+maintained precisely that thesis in behalf of the domain of thought and
+the domain of space. Spinoza's answer rests upon the famous ontological
+argument, inherited from scholasticism and generally accepted in the
+first period of modern philosophy. The evidence of existence, he
+declares, is clear and distinct conceivability.
+
+     "For a person to say that he has a clear and distinct--that
+     is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is not sure
+     whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said
+     that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was
+     false."[314:6]
+
+Now we can form a clear and distinct idea of an absolutely infinite
+being that shall have all possible attributes. This idea is a
+well-recognized standard and object of reference for thought. But it is
+a conception which is highly qualified, not only through its clearness
+and distinctness, but also through its abundance of content. It affirms
+itself therefore with a certainty that surpasses any other certainty,
+because it is supported by each and every other certainty, and even by
+the residuum of possibility. If any intelligible meaning be permitted to
+affirm itself, so much the more irresistible is the claim of this
+infinitely rich meaning. Since every attribute contributes to its
+validity, the being with infinite attributes is infinitely or absolutely
+valid. The conclusion of the argument is now obvious. If the being
+constituted by the infinite attributes exists, it swallows up all
+possibilities and exists exclusively.
+
+[Sidenote: The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God.]
+
+Sect. 152. The vulnerable point in Spinoza's argument can thus be
+expressed: that which is important is questionable, and that which is
+unquestionable is of doubtful importance. Have I indeed a clear and
+distinct idea of an absolutely infinite being? The answer turns upon the
+meaning of the phrase "idea of." It is true I can add to such meaning
+as I apprehend the thought of possible other meaning, and suppose the
+whole to have a definiteness and systematic unity like that of the
+triangle. But such an idea is problematic. I am compelled to use the
+term "possible," and so to confess the failure of definite content to
+measure up to my idea. My idea of an absolutely infinite being is like
+my idea of a universal language: I can think _of_ it, but I cannot
+_think it out_, for lack of data or because of the conflicting testimony
+of other data. If I mean the infinity of my being to be a term of
+inclusiveness, and to insist that the all must be, and that there can be
+nothing not included in the all, I can scarcely be denied. But it is
+reasonable to doubt the importance of such a truth. If, on the other
+hand, I mean that my infinite being shall have the compactness and
+organic unity of a triangle, I must admit that such a being is indeed
+problematic. The degree to which the meaning of the part is dependent
+upon the meaning of the whole, or the degree to which the geometrical
+analogy is to be preferred to the analogy of aggregates, like the events
+within a year, is a problem that falls quite outside Spinoza's
+fundamental arguments.
+
+[Sidenote: Spinoza's Provision for the Finite.]
+
+Sect. 153. But the advance of Spinoza over the Eleatics must not be lost
+sight of. The modern philosopher has so conceived being as to provide
+for parts within an individual unity. The geometrical analogy is a most
+illuminating one, for it enables us to understand how manyness may be
+indispensable to a being that is essentially unitary. The triangle as
+triangle is one. But it could not be such without sides and angles. The
+unity is equally necessary to the parts, for sides and angles of a
+triangle could not be such without an arrangement governed by the nature
+triangle. The whole of nature may be similarly conceived: as the
+reciprocal necessity of _natura naturans_, or nature defined in respect
+of its unity, and _natura naturata_, or nature specified in detail.
+There is some promise here of a reconciliation of the _Way of Opinion_
+with the _Way of Truth_. Opinion would be a gathering of detail, truth a
+comprehension of the intelligible unity. Both would be provided for
+through the consideration that whatever is complete and necessary must
+be made up of incompletenesses that are necessary to it.
+
+[Sidenote: Transition to Teleological Conceptions.]
+
+Sect. 154. This consideration, however, does not receive its most
+effective formulation in Spinoza. The isolation of the parts, the
+actual severalty and irrelevance of the modes, still presents a grave
+problem. Is there a kind of whole to which not only parts but fragments,
+or parts in their very incompleteness, are indispensable? This would
+seem to be true of a _progression_ or _development_, since that would
+require both perfection as its end, and degrees of imperfection as its
+stages. Spinoza was prevented from making much of this idea by his
+rejection of the principle of _teleology_. He regarded appreciation or
+valuation as a projection of personal bias. "Nature has no particular
+goal in view," and "final causes are mere human figments." "The
+perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and
+power."[318:7] The philosophical method which Spinoza here repudiates,
+the interpretation of the world in moral terms, is _Platonism_, an
+independent and profoundly important movement, belonging to the same
+general realistic type with Eleaticism and Spinozism. Absolute being is
+again the fundamental conception. Here, however, it is conceived that
+being is primarily not affirmation or self-sufficiency, but the _good_
+or _ideal_. There are few great metaphysical systems that have not been
+deeply influenced by Platonism; hence the importance of understanding it
+in its purity. To this end we must return again to the early Greek
+conception of the philosopher; for Platonism, like Eleaticism, is a
+sequel to the philosopher's self-consciousness.
+
+[Sidenote: Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical.]
+
+Sect. 155. Although the first Greek philosophers, such men as Thales,
+Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, were clearly aware of their
+distinction and high calling, it by no means follows that they were good
+judges of themselves. Their sense of intellectual power was
+unsuspecting; and they praised philosophy without definitely raising the
+question of its meaning. They were like unskilled players who try all
+the stops and scales of an organ, and know that somehow they can make a
+music that exceeds the noises, monotones or simple melodies of those who
+play upon lesser instruments. They knew their power rather than their
+instrument or their art. The first philosophers, in short, were
+self-conscious but not self-critical.
+
+[Sidenote: Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists.]
+
+Sect. 156. The immediately succeeding phase in the history of Greek
+philosophy was a curtailment, but only in the most superficial sense a
+criticism, of the activity of the philosopher. In the Periclean Age
+philosophy suffered more from inattention than from refutation. The
+scepticism of the sophists, who were the knowing men of this age, was
+not so much conviction as indisposition. They failed to recognize the
+old philosophical problem; it did not _appeal_ to them as a genuine
+problem. The sophists were the intellectual men of an age of _humanism_,
+_individualism_, and _secularism_. These were years in which the circle
+of human society, the state with its institutions, citizenship with its
+manifold activities and interests, bounded the horizon of thought. What
+need to look beyond? Life was not a problem, but an abundant opportunity
+and a sense of capacity. The world was not a mystery, but a place of
+entertainment and a sphere of action. Of this the sophists were faithful
+witnesses. In their love of novelty, irreverence, impressionism,
+elegance of speech, and above all in their praise of individual
+efficiency, they preached and pandered to their age. Their public,
+though it loved to abuse them, was the greatest sophist of them
+all--brilliant and capricious, incomparably rich in all but wisdom. The
+majority belonged to what Plato called "the sight-loving, art-loving,
+busy class." This is an age, then, when the man of practical
+common-sense is pre-eminent, and the philosopher with his dark sayings
+has passed away. The pride of wisdom has given way to the pride of power
+and the pride of cleverness. The many men pursue the many goods of life,
+and there is no spirit among them all who, sitting apart in
+contemplation, wonders at the meaning of the whole.
+
+[Sidenote: Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher.]
+
+Sect. 157. But in their midst there moved a strange prophet, whom they
+mistook for one of themselves. Socrates was not one who prayed in the
+wilderness, but a man of the streets and the market-place, who talked
+rather more incessantly than the rest, and apparently with less right.
+He did not testify to the truth, but pleaded ignorance in extenuation of
+an exasperating habit of asking questions. There was, however, a humor
+and a method in his innocence that arrested attention. He was a
+formidable adversary in discussion from his very irresponsibility; and
+he was especially successful with the more rhetorical sophists because
+he chose his own weapons, and substituted critical analysis, question
+and answer, for the long speeches to which these teachers were
+habituated by their profession. He appeared to be governed by an
+insatiable inquisitiveness, and a somewhat malicious desire to discredit
+those who spoke with authority.
+
+But to those who knew him better, and especially to Plato, who knew him
+best, Socrates was at once the sweetest and most compelling spirit of
+his age. There was a kind of truth in the quality of his character. He
+was perhaps _the first of all reverent men_. In the presence of conceit
+his self-depreciation was ironical, but in another presence it was most
+genuine, and his deepest spring of thought and action. This other
+presence was his own ideal. Socrates was sincerely humble because,
+expecting so much of philosophy, he saw his own deficiency. Unlike the
+unskilled player, he did not seek to _make_ music; but he loved music,
+and knew that such music as is indeed music was beyond his power. On the
+other hand he was well aware of his superiority to those in whom
+self-satisfaction was possible because they had no conception of the
+ideal. Of such he could say in truth that they did not know enough even
+to realize the extent of their ignorance. The world has long been
+familiar with the vivid portrayal of the Socratic consciousness which is
+contained in Plato's "Apology." Socrates had set out in life with the
+opinion that his was an age of exceptional enlightenment. But as he
+came to know men he found that after all no one of them really knew what
+he was about. Each "sight-loving, art-loving, busy" man was quite blind
+to the meaning of life. While he was capable of practical achievement,
+his judgments concerning the real virtue of his achievements were
+conventional and ungrounded, a mere reflection of tradition and opinion.
+When asked concerning the meaning of life, or the ground of his
+opinions, he was thrown into confusion or aggravated to meaningless
+reiteration. Such men, Socrates reflected, were both unwise and
+confirmed in their folly through being unconscious of it. Because he
+knew that vanity is vanity, that opinion is indeed mere opinion,
+Socrates felt himself to be the wisest man in a generation of dogged
+unwisdom.
+
+[Sidenote: Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth.]
+
+Sect. 158. It is scarcely necessary to point out that this insight,
+however negatively it be used, is a revelation of positive knowledge.
+Heraclitus and Parmenides claimed to know; Socrates disclaimed knowledge
+_for reasons_. Like all real criticism this is at once a confounding of
+error and a prophecy of truth. The truth so discovered is indeed not
+ordinary truth concerning historical or physical things, but not on
+that account less significant and necessary. This truth, it will also be
+admitted, is virtually rather than actually set forth by Socrates
+himself. He knew that life has some meaning which those who live with
+conviction desire at heart to realize, and that knowledge has principles
+with which those who speak with conviction intend to be consistent.
+There is, in short, a rational life and a rational discourse.
+Furthermore, a rational life will be a life wisely directed to the end
+of the good; and a rational discourse one constructed with reference to
+the real natures of things, and the necessities which flow from these
+natures. But Socrates did not conclusively define either the meaning of
+life or the form of perfect knowledge. He testified to the necessity of
+some such truths, and his testimony demonstrated both the blindness of
+his contemporaries and also his own deficiency.
+
+[Sidenote: The Historical Preparation for Plato.]
+
+Sect. 159. The character and method of Socrates have their best foil in
+the sophists, but their bearing on the earlier philosophers is for our
+purposes even more instructive. Unlike Socrates these philosophers had
+not made a study of the task of the philosopher. They _were_
+philosophers--"spectators of all time and all existence"; but they were
+precritical or dogmatic philosophers, to whom it had not occurred to
+define the requirements of philosophy. They knew no perfect knowledge
+other than their own actual knowledge. They defined being and
+interpreted life without reflecting upon the quality of the knowledge
+whose object is being, or the quality of insight that would indeed be
+practical wisdom. But when through Socrates the whole philosophical
+prospect is again revealed after the period of humanistic concentration,
+it is as an ideal whose possibilities, whose necessities, are conceived
+before they are realized. Socrates celebrates the role of the
+philosopher without assigning it to himself. The new philosophical
+object is the philosopher himself; and the new insight a knowledge of
+knowledge itself. These three types of intellectual procedure, dogmatic
+speculation concerning being, humanistic interest in life, and the
+self-criticism of thought, form the historical preparation for Plato,
+the philosopher who defined being as the ideal of thought, and upon this
+ground interpreted life.
+
+There is no more striking case in history of the subtle continuity of
+thought than the relation between Plato and his master Socrates. The
+wonder of it is due to the absence of any formulation of doctrine on
+the part of Socrates himself. He only lived and talked; and yet Plato
+created a system of philosophy in which he is faithfully embodied. The
+form of embodiment is the dialogue, in which the talking of Socrates is
+perpetuated and conducted to profounder issues, and in which his life is
+both rendered and interpreted. But as the vehicle of Plato's thought
+preserves and makes perfect the Socratic method, so the thought itself
+begins with the Socratic motive and remains to the end an expression of
+it. The presentiment of perfect knowledge which distinguished Socrates
+from his contemporaries becomes in Plato the clear vision of a realm of
+ideal truth.
+
+[Sidenote: Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good.]
+
+Sect. 160. Plato begins his philosophy with the philosopher and the
+philosopher's interest. The philosopher is a lover, who like all lovers
+longs for the beautiful. But he is the supreme lover, for he loves not
+the individual beautiful object but the Absolute Beauty itself. He is a
+lover too in that he does not possess, but somehow apprehends his object
+from afar. Though imperfect, he seeks perfection; though standing like
+all his fellows in the twilight of half-reality, he faces toward the
+sun. Now it is the fundamental proposition of the Platonic philosophy
+that reality is the sun itself, or the perfection whose possession every
+wise thinker covets, whose presence would satisfy every longing of
+experience. The real is that beloved object which is "truly beautiful,
+delicate, perfect, and blessed." There is both a serious ground for such
+an affirmation and an important truth in its meaning. The ground is the
+evident incompleteness of every special judgment concerning experience.
+We understand only in part, and we know that we understand only in part.
+What we discover is real enough for practical purposes, but even
+common-sense questions the true reality of its objects. Special
+judgments seem to terminate our thought abruptly and arbitrarily. We
+give "the best answer we can," but such answers do not come as the
+completion of our thinking. Our thought is in some sense surely a
+seeking, and it would appear that we are not permitted to rest and be
+satisfied at any stage of it. If we do so we are like the
+sophists--blind to our own ignorance. But it is equally true that our
+thought is straightforward and progressive. We are not permitted to
+return to earlier stages, but must push on to that which is not less,
+but more, than what we have as yet found. There is good hope, then, of
+understanding what the ideal may be from our knowledge of the direction
+which it impels us to follow.
+
+But to understand Plato's conception of the progression of experience we
+must again catch up the Socratic strain which he weaves into every
+theme. For Socrates, student of life and mankind, all objects were
+objects of interest, and all interests practical interests. One is
+ignorant when one does not know the good of things; opinionative when
+one rates things by conventional standards; wise when one knows their
+real good. In Platonism this practical interpretation of experience
+appears in the principle that the object of perfect knowledge is _the
+good_. The nature of things which one seeks to know better is the good
+of things, the absolute being which is the goal of all thinking is the
+very good itself. Plato does not use the term good in any merely
+utilitarian sense. Indeed it is very significant that for Plato there is
+no cleavage between theoretical and practical interests. To be morally
+good is to know the good, to set one's heart on the true object of
+affection; and to be theoretically sound is to understand perfection.
+The good itself is the end of every aim, that in which all interests
+converge. Hence it cannot be defined, as might a special good, in terms
+of the fulfilment of a set of concrete conditions, but only in terms of
+the sense or direction of all purposes. The following passage occurs in
+the "Symposium":
+
+     "The true order of going or being led by others to the things
+     of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which
+     he mounts upward for the sake of that other beauty, going from
+     one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair
+     forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions,
+     until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute
+     beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty
+     is."[329:8]
+
+[Sidenote: The Progression of Experience toward God.]
+
+Sect. 161. There is, then, a "true order of going," and an order that
+leads from one to many, from thence to forms, from thence to morality,
+and from thence to the general objects of thought or _the ideas_. In the
+"Republic," where the proper education of the philosopher is in
+question, it is proposed that he shall study arithmetic, geometry,
+astronomy, and dialectic. Thus in each case mathematics is the first
+advance in knowledge, and dialectic the nearest to perfection. Most of
+Plato's examples are drawn from mathematics. This science replaces the
+variety and vagueness of the forms of experience with _clear_,
+_unitary_, _definite_, and _eternal_ natures, such as the number and
+the geometrical figure. Thus certain individual things are approximately
+triangular, but subject to alteration, and indefinitely many. On the
+other hand the triangle as defined by geometry is the fixed and
+unequivocal nature or idea which such experiences suggest; and the
+philosophical mind will at once pass to it from these. But the
+mathematical objects are themselves not thoroughly understood when
+understood only in mathematical terms, for the foundations of
+mathematics are arbitrary. And the same is true of all the so-called
+special sciences. Even the scientists themselves, says Plato,
+
+     "only dream about being, but never can behold the waking
+     reality so long as they leave the hypotheses they use
+     unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For
+     when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the
+     conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of
+     he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a conventional
+     statement will ever become science?"[330:9]
+
+Within the science of dialectics we are to understand the connections
+and sequences of ideas themselves, in the hope of eliminating every
+arbitrariness and conventionality within a system of truth that is pure
+and self-luminous rationality. To this science, which is the great
+interest of his later years, Plato contributes only incomplete studies
+and experiments. We must be satisfied with the playful answer with
+which, in the "Republic," he replies to Glaucon's entreaty that "he
+proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain, and
+describe that in like manner": "Dear Glaucon, you will not be able to
+follow me here, though I would do my best."
+
+But a philosophical system has been projected. The real is that perfect
+significance or meaning which thought and every interest suggests, and
+toward which there is in experience an appreciable movement. It is this
+significance which makes things what they really are, and which
+constitutes our understanding of them. In itself it transcends the steps
+which lead to it; "for God," says Plato, "mingles not with men." But it
+is nevertheless the meaning of human life. And this we can readily
+conceive. The last word may transform the sentence from nonsense into
+sense, and it would be true to say that its sense mingles not with
+nonsense. Similarly the last touch of the brush may transform an
+inchoate mass of color into a picture, disarray into an object of
+beauty; and its beauty mingles not with ugliness. So life, when it
+finally realizes itself, obtains a new and incommensurable quality of
+perfection in which humanity is transformed into deity. There is frankly
+no provision for imperfection in such a world. In his later writings
+Plato sounds his characteristic note less frequently, and permits the
+ideal to create a cosmos through the admixture of matter. But in his
+moment of inspiration, the Platonist will have no sense for the
+imperfect. It is the darkness behind his back, or the twilight through
+which he passes on his way to the light. He will use even the beauties
+of earth only "as steps along which he mounts upward for the sake of
+that other beauty."
+
+[Sidenote: Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to
+Platonism.]
+
+Sect. 162. We have met, then, with two distinct philosophical doctrines
+which arise from the conception of the _absolute_, or the philosopher's
+peculiar object: the doctrine of the _absolute being_ or _substance_,
+and that of the _absolute ideal_ or _good_. Both doctrines are realistic
+in that they assume reality to be demonstrated or revealed, rather than
+created, by knowledge. Both are rationalistic in that they develop a
+system of philosophy from the problem of philosophy, or deduce a
+definition of reality from the conception, of reality. There remains a
+third doctrine of the same type--the philosophy of Aristotle, the most
+elaborately constructed system of Greek antiquity, and the most potent
+influence exerted upon the Scholastic Philosophy of the long mediaeval
+period. This philosophy was rehabilitated in the eighteenth century by
+Leibniz, the brilliant librarian of the court of Hanover. The
+extraordinary comprehensiveness of Aristotle's philosophy makes it quite
+impossible to render here even a general account of it. There is
+scarcely any human discipline that does not to some extent draw upon it.
+We are concerned only with the central principles of the metaphysics.
+
+Upon the common ground of rationalism and realism, Plato and Aristotle
+are complementary in temper, method, and principle. Plato's is the
+genius of inspiration and fertility, Aristotle's the genius of
+erudition, mastery, and synthesis. In form, Plato's is the gift of
+expression, Aristotle's the gift of arrangement. Plato was born and bred
+an aristocrat, and became the lover of the best--the uncompromising
+purist; Aristotle is middle-class, and limitlessly wide, hospitable, and
+patient in his interests. Thus while both are speculative and acute,
+Plato's mind is intensive and profound, Aristotle's extensive and
+orderly. It was inevitable, then, that Aristotle should find Plato
+one-sided. The philosophy of the ideal is not worldly enough to be true.
+It is a religion rather than a theory of reality. Aristotle, however,
+would not renounce it, but construe it that it may better provide for
+nature and history. This is the significance of his new terminology.
+Matter, to which Plato reluctantly concedes some room as a principle of
+degradation in the universe, is now admitted to good standing. _Matter_
+or material is indispensable to being as its potentiality or that out of
+which it is constituted. The ideal, on the other hand, loses its
+exclusive title to the predicate of reality, and becomes the _form_, or
+the determinate nature which exists only in its particular embodiments.
+The being or _substance_ is the concrete individual, of which these are
+the abstracted aspects. Aristotle's "form," like Plato's "idea," is a
+teleological principle. The essential nature of the object is its
+perfection. It is furthermore essential to the object that it should
+strive after a higher perfection. With Aristotle, however, the reality
+is not the consummation of the process, the highest perfection in and
+for itself, but the very hierarchy of objects that ascends toward it.
+The highest perfection, or God, is not itself coextensive with being,
+but the final cause of being--that on account of which the whole
+progression of events takes place. Reality is the development with all
+of its ascending stages from the maximum of potentiality, or matter, to
+the maximum of actuality, or God the pure form.
+
+[Sidenote: The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of Platonism
+and Spinozism.]
+
+Sect. 163. To understand the virtue of this philosophy as a basis for
+the reconciliation of different interests, we must recall the relation
+between Plato and Spinoza. Their characteristic difference appears to
+the best advantage in connection with mathematical truth. Both regarded
+geometry as the best model for philosophical thinking, but for different
+reasons. Spinoza prized geometry for its necessity, and proposed to
+extend it. His philosophy is the attempt to formulate a geometry of
+being, which shall set forth the inevitable certainties of the universe.
+Plato, on the other hand, prized geometry rather for its definition of
+types, for its knowledge of pure or perfect natures such as the circle
+and triangle, which in immediate experience are only approximated. His
+philosophy defines reality similarly as the absolute perfection.
+Applied to nature Spinozism is mechanical, and looks for necessary laws,
+while Platonism is teleological, and looks for adaptation and
+significance. Aristotle's position is intermediate. With Plato he
+affirms that the good is the ultimate principle. But this very principle
+is conceived to govern a universe of substances, each of which maintains
+its own proper being, and all of which are reciprocally determined in
+their changes. Final causes dominate nature, but work through efficient
+causes. Reality is not pure perfection, as in Platonism, nor the
+indifferent necessity, as in Spinozism, but the system of beings
+necessary to the complete progression toward the highest perfection. The
+Aristotelian philosophy promises, then, to overcome both the hard
+realism of Parmenides and Spinoza, and also the supernaturalism of
+Plato.
+
+[Sidenote: Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development to the
+Problem of Imperfection.]
+
+Sect. 164. But it promises, furthermore, to remedy the defect common to
+these two doctrines, the very besetting problem of this whole type of
+philosophy. That problem, as has been seen, is to provide for the
+imperfect within the perfect, for the temporal incidents of nature and
+history within the eternal being. Many absolutist philosophers have
+declared the explanation of this realm to be impossible, and have
+contented themselves with calling it the realm of opinion or appearance.
+And this realm of opinion or appearance has been used as a proof of the
+absolute. Zeno, the pupil of Parmenides, was the first to elaborate what
+have since come to be known as the paradoxes of the empirical world.
+Most of these paradoxes turn upon the infinite extension and
+divisibility of space and time. Zeno was especially interested in the
+difficulty of conceiving motion, which involves both space and time,
+and thought himself to have demonstrated its absurdity and
+impossibility.[337:10] His argument is thus the complement of
+Parmenides's argument for the indivisible and unchanging substance. Now
+the method which Zeno here adopts may be extended to cover the whole
+realm of nature and history. We should then be dialectically driven from
+this realm to take refuge in absolute being. But the empirical world is
+not destroyed by disparagement, and cannot long lack champions even
+among the absolutists themselves. The reconciliation of nature and
+history with the absolute being became the special interest of Leibniz,
+the great modern Aristotelian. As a scientist and man of affairs, he
+was profoundly dissatisfied with Spinoza's resolution of nature, the
+human individual, and the human society into the universal being. He
+became an advocate of individualism while retaining the general aim and
+method of rationalism.
+
+Like Aristotle, Leibniz attributes reality to individual substances,
+which he calls "monads"; and like Aristotle he conceives these monads to
+compose an ascending order, with God, the monad of monads, as its
+dominating goal.
+
+     "Furthermore, every substance is like an entire world and like
+     a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole world which it
+     portrays, each one in its own fashion; almost as the same city
+     is variously represented according to the various situations
+     of him who is regarding it. Thus the universe is multiplied in
+     some sort as many times as there are substances, and the glory
+     of God is multiplied in the same way by as many wholly
+     different representations of his works."[338:11]
+
+The very "glory of God," then, requires the innumerable finite
+individuals with all their characteristic imperfections, that the
+universe may lack no possible shade or quality of perspective.
+
+[Sidenote: The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved.]
+
+Sect. 165. But the besetting problem is in fact not solved, and is one
+of the chief incentives to that other philosophy of absolutism which
+defines an absolute spirit or mind. Both Aristotle and Leibniz undertake
+to make the perfection which determines the order of the hierarchy of
+substances, at the same time the responsible author of the whole
+hierarchy. In this case the dilemma is plain. If the divine form or the
+divine monad be other than the stages that lead up to it, these latter
+cannot be essential to it, for God is by definition absolutely
+self-sufficient. If, on the other hand, God is identical with the
+development in its entirety, then two quite incommensurable standards of
+perfection determine the supremacy of the divine nature, that of the
+whole and that of the highest parts of the whole. The union of these two
+and the definition of a perfection which may be at once the development
+and its goal, is the task of absolute idealism.
+
+[Sidenote: Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism.]
+
+Sect. 166. Of the two fundamental questions of epistemology, absolute
+realism answers the one explicitly, the other implicitly. As respects
+_the source of the most valid knowledge_, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle,
+Spinoza are all agreed: true knowledge is the work of reason, of pure
+intellection. Plato is the great exponent of dialectic, or the
+reciprocal affinities and necessities of ideas. Aristotle is the founder
+of deductive logic. Spinoza proposes to consider even "human actions and
+desires" as though he were "concerned with lines, planes, and solids."
+Empirical data may be the occasion, but cannot be the ground of the
+highest knowledge. According to Leibniz,
+
+     "it seems that necessary truths, such as we find in pure
+     mathematics, and especially in arithmetic and geometry, must
+     have principles whose proof does not depend upon instances,
+     nor, consequently, upon the witness of the senses, although
+     without the senses it would never have come into our heads to
+     think of them."[340:12]
+
+[Sidenote: The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute Realism.]
+
+Sect. 167. The answers which these philosophies give to the question of
+_the relation between the state of knowledge and its object_, divide
+them into two groups. Among the ancients reason is regarded as the means
+of emancipation from the limitations of the private mind. "The sleeping
+turn aside each into a world of his own," but "the waking"--the wise
+men--"have one and the same world." What the individual knows belongs to
+himself only in so far as it is inadequate. Hence for Plato the ideas
+are not the attributes of a mind, but that self-subsistent truth to
+which, in its moments of insight, a mind may have access. Opinion is "my
+own," the truth is being. The position of Aristotle is equally clear.
+"Actual knowledge," he maintains, "is identical with its object."
+
+Spinoza and Leibniz belong to another age. Modern philosophy began with
+a new emphasis upon self-consciousness. In his celebrated argument--"I
+think, hence I am" (_cogito ergo sum_)--Descartes established the
+independent and substantial reality of the thinking activity. The "I
+think" is recognized as in itself a fundamental being, known intuitively
+to the thinker himself. Now although Spinoza and Leibniz are finally
+determined by the same motives that obtain in the cases of Plato and
+Aristotle, they must reckon with this new distinction between the
+thinker and his object. The result in the case of Spinoza is the
+doctrine of "parallelism," in which mind is defined as an "infinite
+attribute" of substance, an aspect or phase coextensive with the whole
+of being. The result in the case of Leibniz is his doctrine of
+"representation" and "pre-established harmony," whereby each monadic
+substance is in itself an active spiritual entity, and belongs to the
+universe through its knowledge of a specific stage of the development of
+the universe. But both Spinoza and Leibniz subordinate such conceptions
+as these to the fundamental identity that pervades the whole. With
+Spinoza the attributes belong to the same absolute substance, and with
+Leibniz the monads represent the one universe. And with both, finally,
+the perfection of knowledge, or the knowledge of God, is
+indistinguishable from its object, God himself. The epistemological
+subtleties peculiar to these philosophers are not stable doctrines, but
+render inevitable either a return to the simpler and bolder realism of
+the Greeks, or a passing over into the more radical and systematic
+doctrine of absolute idealism.
+
+[Sidenote: The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity.]
+
+Sect. 168. We have met with two general motives, both of which are
+subordinated to the doctrine of an absolute being postulated and sought
+by philosophy. The one of these motives leads to the conception of the
+absolutely necessary and immutable substance, the other to the
+conception of a consummate perfection. There is an _interpretation of
+life_ appropriate to each of these conceptions. Both agree in regarding
+life seriously, in defining reason or philosophy as the highest human
+activity, and in emphasizing the identity of the individual's good with
+the good of the universe. But there are striking differences of tone and
+spirit.
+
+Although the metaphysics of the Stoics have various affiliations, the
+Stoic code of morality is the true practical sequel to the
+Eleatic-Spinozistic view of the world. The Stoic is one who has set his
+affections on the eternal being. He asks nothing of it for himself, but
+identifies himself with it. The saving grace is a sense of reality. The
+virtuous man is not one who remakes the world, or draws upon it for his
+private uses; even less one who rails against it, or complains that it
+has used him ill. He is rather one who recognizes that there is but one
+really valid claim, that of the universe itself. But he not only submits
+to this claim on account of its superiority; he makes it his own. The
+discipline of Stoicism is the regulation of the individual will to the
+end that it may coincide with the universal will. There is a part of man
+by virtue of which he is satisfied with what things are, whatever they
+be. That part, designated by the Stoics as "the ruling part," is the
+reason. In so far as man seeks to understand the laws and natures which
+actually prevail, he cannot be discontented with anything whatsoever
+that may be known to him.
+
+     "For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire
+     anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute
+     acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true:
+     wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these
+     things, the endeavor of the better part of ourselves is in
+     harmony with the order of nature as a whole."[344:13]
+
+In agreement with this teaching of Spinoza's is the famous Stoic formula
+to the effect that "nothing can happen contrary to the will of the wise
+man," who is free through his very acquiescence. If reason be the proper
+"ruling part," the first step in the moral life is the subordination of
+the appetitive nature and the enthronement of reason. One who is himself
+rational will then recognize the fellowship of all rational beings, and
+the unitary and beneficent rationality of the entire universe. The
+highest morality is thus already upon the plane of religion.
+
+[Sidenote: The Platonic Ethics of Perfection.]
+
+Sect. 169. With Spinoza and the Stoics, the perfection of the individual
+is reduced to what the universe requires of him. The good man is willing
+to be whatever he must be, for the sake of the whole with which through
+reason he is enabled to identify himself. With Plato and Aristotle the
+perfection of the individual himself is commended, that the universe may
+abound in perfection. The good man is the ideal man--the expression of
+the type. And how different the quality of a morality in keeping with
+this principle! The virtues which Plato enumerates--temperance, courage,
+wisdom, and justice--compose a consummate human nature. He is thinking
+not of the necessities but of the possibilities of life. Knowledge of
+the truth will indeed be the best of human living, but knowledge is not
+prized because it can reconcile man to his limitations; it is the very
+overflowing of his cup of life. The youth are to
+
+     "dwell in the land of health, amid fair sights and sounds; and
+     beauty, the effluence of fair works, will visit the eye and
+     ear, like a healthful breeze from a purer region, and
+     insensibly draw the soul even in childhood into harmony with
+     the beauty of reason."[345:14]
+
+Aristotle's account of human perfection is more circumstantial and more
+prosaic. "The function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with
+reason," and his happiness or well-being will consist in the fulness of
+rational living. But such fulness requires a sphere of life that will
+call forth and exercise the highest human capacities. Aristotle frankly
+pronounces "external goods" to be indispensable, and happiness to be
+therefore "a gift of the gods." The rational man will acquire a certain
+exquisiteness or finesse of action, a "mean" of conduct; and this virtue
+will be diversified through the various relations into which he must
+enter, and the different situations which he must meet. He will be not
+merely brave, temperate, and just, as Plato would have him, but liberal,
+magnificent, gentle, truthful, witty, friendly, and in all
+self-respecting or high-minded. In addition to these strictly moral
+virtues, he will possess the intellectual virtues of prudence and
+wisdom, the resources of art and science; and will finally possess the
+gift of insight, or intuitive reason. Speculation will be his highest
+activity, and the mark of his kinship with the gods who dwell in the
+perpetual contemplation of the truth.
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Fulfilment, and the Religion of
+Renunciation.]
+
+Sect. 170. Aristotle's ethics expresses the buoyancy of the ancient
+world, when the individual does not feel himself oppressed by the
+eternal reality, but rejoices in it. He is not too conscious of his
+sufferings to be disinterested in his admiration and wonder. It is this
+which distinguishes the religion of Plato and Aristotle from that of the
+Stoics and Spinoza. With both alike, religion consists not in making the
+world, but in contemplating it; not in cooperating with God, but in
+worshipping him. Plato and Aristotle, however, do not find any
+antagonism between the ways of God and the natural interests of men.
+God does not differ from men save in his exalted perfection. The
+contemplation and worship of him comes as the final and highest stage of
+a life which is organic and continuous throughout. The love of God is
+the natural love when it has found its true object.
+
+     "For he who has been instructed thus far in the things of
+     love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order
+     and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly
+     perceive a nature of wondrous beauty--and this, Socrates, is
+     that final cause of all our former toils, which in the first
+     place is everlasting--not growing and decaying, or waxing and
+     waning; in the next place not fair in one point of view and
+     foul in another, . . . or in the likeness of a face or hands
+     or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of
+     speech or knowledge, nor existing in any other being; . . .
+     but beauty only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting,
+     which without diminution and without increase, or any change,
+     is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all
+     other things."[347:15]
+
+The religion of Spinoza is the religion of one who has renounced the
+favor of the universe. He was deprived early in life of every benefit of
+fortune, and set out to find the good which required no special
+dispensation but only the common lot and the common human endowment. He
+found that good to consist in the conviction of the necessity, made
+acceptable through the supremacy of the understanding. The like faith of
+the Stoics makes of no account the difference of fortune between Marcus
+the emperor and Epictetus the slave.
+
+     "For two reasons, then, it is right to be content with that
+     which happens to thee; the one because it was done for thee
+     and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to
+     thee, originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy
+     destiny; and the other because even that which comes severally
+     to every man is to the power which administers the universe a
+     cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its very
+     continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if
+     thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and
+     the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou
+     dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art
+     dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of
+     the way."[348:16]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[306:1] By _Absolute Realism_ is meant that system of philosophy which
+defines the universe as the _absolute being_, implied in knowledge as
+its final object, but assumed to be independent of knowledge. In the
+_Spinozistic_ system this absolute being is conceived under the form of
+_substance_, or self-sufficiency; in _Platonism_ under the form of
+_perfection_; and in the _Aristotelian_ system under the form of a
+_hierarchy of substances_.
+
+[308:2] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 185.
+
+[309:3] When contrasted with the temporal realm of "generation and
+decay," this ultimate object is often called the _eternal_.
+
+[311:4] Holland, 1632-1677.
+
+[312:5] Spinoza: _Ethics_, Part I. Translation by Elwes, p. 45.
+
+[314:6] _Ibid._, p. 49.
+
+[318:7] _Ibid._, pp. 77, 81.
+
+[329:8] Plato: _Symposium_, 211. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[330:9] Plato: _Republic_, 533. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[337:10] See Burnet: _Op. cit._, pp. 322-333.
+
+[338:11] Leibniz: _Discourse on Metaphysics_. Translation by Montgomery,
+p. 15.
+
+In so far as the monads are spiritual this doctrine tends to be
+subjectivistic. Cf. Chap. IX.
+
+[340:12] Leibniz: _New Essays on the Human Understanding_. Translation
+by Latta, p. 363.
+
+[344:13] Spinoza: _Op. cit._, Part IV. Translation by Elwes, p. 243.
+
+[345:14] Plato: _Op. cit._, 401.
+
+[347:15] Plato: _Symposium_, 210-211. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[348:16] Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: _Thoughts_. Translation by Long, p.
+141.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+ABSOLUTE IDEALISM[349:1]
+
+
+[Sidenote: General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism.]
+
+Sect. 171. Absolute idealism is the most elaborately constructive of all
+the historical types of philosophy. Though it may have overlooked
+elementary truths, and have sought to combine irreconcilable principles,
+it cannot be charged with lack of sophistication or subtlety. Its great
+virtue is its recognition of problems--its exceeding circumspection;
+while its great promise is due to its comprehensiveness--its generous
+provision for all interests and points of view. But its very breadth and
+complexity render this philosophy peculiarly liable to the equivocal use
+of conceptions. This may be readily understood from the nature of the
+central doctrine of absolute idealism. According to this doctrine it is
+proposed to define the universe as an _absolute spirit_; or a being
+infinite, ultimate, eternal, and self-sufficient, like the being of
+Plato and Spinoza, but possessing at the same time the distinguishing
+properties of spirit. Such conceptions as self-consciousness, will,
+knowledge, and moral goodness are carried over from the realm of human
+endeavor and social relations to the unitary and all-inclusive reality.
+Now it has been objected that this procedure is either meaningless, in
+that it so applies the term spirit as to contradict its meaning; or
+prejudicial to spiritual interests, in that it neutralizes the
+properties of spirit through so extending their use. Thus one may
+contend that to affirm that the universe as a whole is spirit is
+meaningless, since moral goodness requires special conditions and
+relations that cannot be attributed to the universe as a whole; or one
+may contend that such doctrine is prejudicial to moral interests because
+by attributing spiritual perfection to the totality of being it
+discredits all moral loyalties and antagonisms. The difficulties that
+lie in the way of absolute idealism are due, then, to the complexity of
+its synthesis, to its complementary recognition of differences and
+resolution of them into unity. But this synthesis is due to the urgency
+of certain great problems which the first or realistic expression of
+the absolutist motive left undiscovered and unsolved.
+
+[Sidenote: The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism.]
+
+Sect. 172. It is natural to approach so deliberate and calculating a
+philosophy from the stand-point of the problems which it proposes to
+solve. One of these is the epistemological problem of the relation
+between the state of knowledge and its object. Naturalism and absolute
+realism side with common-sense in its assumption that although the real
+object is essential to the valid state of knowledge, its being known is
+not essential to the real object. Subjectivism, on the other hand,
+maintains that being is essentially the content of a knowing state, or
+an activity of the knower himself. Absolute idealism proposes to accept
+the general epistemological principle of subjectivism; but to satisfy
+the realistic demand for a standard, compelling object, by setting up an
+_absolute knower_, with whom all valid knowledge must be in agreement.
+This epistemological statement of absolute idealism is its most mature
+phase; and the culminating phase, in which it shows unmistakable signs
+of passing over into another doctrine. We must look for its pristine
+inspiration in its solution of another fundamental problem: that of the
+relation between the absolute and the empirical. Like absolute realism,
+this philosophy regards the universe as a unitary and internally
+necessary being, and undertakes to hold that being accountable for every
+item of experience. But we have found that absolute realism is beset
+with the difficulty of thus accounting for the fragmentariness and
+isolation of the individual. The contention that the universe must
+really be a rational or perfect unity is disputed by the evident
+multiplicity, irrelevance, and imperfection in the foreground of
+experience. The inference to perfection and the confession of
+imperfection seem equally unavoidable. Rational necessities and
+empirical facts are out of joint.
+
+[Sidenote: The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The Task of
+the New Absolutism.]
+
+Sect. 173. Even Plato had been conscious of a certain responsibility for
+matters of fact. Inasmuch as he attached the predicate of reality to the
+absolute perfection, he made that being the only source to which they
+could be referred. Perhaps, then, he suggests, they are due to the very
+bounteousness of God.
+
+     "He was good, and no goodness can ever have any jealousy of
+     anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all
+     things should be as like himself as possible."[352:2]
+
+Plotinus, in whom Platonism is leavened by the spirit of an age which
+is convinced of sin, and which is therefore more keenly aware of the
+positive existence of the imperfect, follows out this suggestion.
+Creation is "emanation"--the overflow of God's excess of goodness. But
+one does not readily understand how goodness, desiring all things to be
+like itself, should thereupon create evil--even to make it good. The
+Aristotelian philosophy, with its conception of the gradation of
+substances, would seem to be better equipped to meet the difficulty. A
+development requires stages; and every finite thing may thus be perfect
+in its way and perfect in its place, while in the absolute truth or God
+there is realized the meaning of the whole order. But if so, there is
+evidently something that escapes God, to wit, the meaningless and
+unfitness, the error and evil, of the stages in their successive
+isolation. Nor is it of any avail to insist (as did Plato, Aristotle,
+and Spinoza alike) that these are only privation, and therefore not to
+be counted in the sum of reality. For privation is itself an experience,
+with a great variety of implications, moral and psychological; and these
+cannot be attributed to God or deduced from him, in consideration of his
+absolute perfection.
+
+The task of the new absolutism is now in clear view. The perfect must
+be amended to admit the imperfect. The absolute significance must be so
+construed as to provide for the evident facts; for the unmeaning things
+and changes of the natural order; for ignorance, sin, despair, and every
+human deficiency. The new philosophy is to solve this problem by
+defining a _spiritual absolute_, and by so construing the life or
+dynamics of spirit, as to demonstrate the necessity of the very
+imperfection and opposition which is so baffling to the realist.
+
+[Sidenote: The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis of
+Experience.]
+
+Sect. 174. Absolute idealism, which is essentially a modern doctrine,
+does not begin with rhapsodies, but with a very sober analysis of
+familiar truths, conducted by the most sober of all philosophers,
+Immanuel Kant. This philosopher lived in Konigsberg, Germany, at the
+close of the eighteenth century. He is related to absolute idealism much
+as Socrates is related to Platonism: he was not himself speculative, but
+employed a critical method which was transformed by his followers into a
+metaphysical construction. It is essential to the understanding both of
+Kant and of his more speculative successors, to observe that he begins
+with the recognition of certain non-philosophical truths--those of
+_natural science_ and _the moral consciousness_. He accepts the order of
+nature formulated in the Newtonian dynamics, and the moral order
+acknowledged in the common human conviction of duty. And he is
+interested in discovering the ground upon which these common
+affirmations rest, the structure which virtually supports them as types
+of knowledge. But a general importance attaches to the analysis because
+these two types of knowledge (together with the aesthetic judgment,
+which is similarly analyzed) are regarded by Kant as coextensive with
+experience itself. The _very least experience_ that can be reported upon
+at all is an experience of nature or duty, and as such will be informed
+with their characteristic principles. Let us consider the former type.
+The simplest instance of nature is the experience of the single
+perceived object. In the first place, such an object will be perceived
+as in space and time. These Kant calls the _forms of intuition_. An
+object cannot even be presented or given without them. But, furthermore,
+it will be regarded as substance, that is, as having a substratum that
+persists through changes of position or quality. It will also be
+regarded as causally dependent upon other objects like itself.
+Causality, substance, and like principles to the number of twelve, Kant
+calls the _categories of the understanding_. Both intuition and
+understanding are indispensable to the experience of any object
+whatsoever. They may be said to condition the object in general. Their
+principles condition the process of making something out of the manifold
+of sensation. But similarly, every moral experience recognizes what Kant
+calls _the categorical imperative_. The categorical imperative is the
+law of reasonableness or impartiality in conduct, requiring the
+individual to act on a maxim which he can "will to be law universal." No
+state of desire or situation calling for action means anything morally
+except in the light of this obligation. Thus certain principles of
+thought and action are said to be implicit in all experience. They are
+universal and necessary in the sense that they are discovered as the
+conditions not of any particular experience, but of experience in
+general. This implicit or virtual presence in experience in general,
+Kant calls their transcendental character, and the process of
+explicating them is his famous _Transcendental Deduction_.
+
+[Sidenote: Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which they
+Set in Order.]
+
+Sect. 175. The restriction which Kant puts upon his method is quite
+essential to its meaning. I deduce the categories, for example, just in
+so far as I find them to be necessary to perception. Without them my
+perception is blind, I make nothing of it; with them my experience
+becomes systematic and rational. But categories which I so deduce must
+be forever limited to the role for which they are defined. Categories
+without perceptions are "empty"; they have validity solely with
+reference to the experience which they set in order. Indeed, I cannot
+even complete that order. The orderly arrangement of parts of experience
+suggests, and suggests irresistibly, a perfect system. I can even define
+the ideas and ideals through which such a perfect system might be
+realized. But I cannot in the Kantian sense attach reality to it because
+it is not indispensable to experience. It must remain an ideal which
+regulates my thinking of such parts of it as fall within the range of my
+perception; or it may through my moral nature become the realm of my
+living and an object of faith. In short, Kant's is essentially a
+"critical philosophy," a logical and analytical study of the special
+terms and relations of human knowledge. He denies the validity of these
+terms and relations beyond this realm. His critiques are an inventory
+of the conditions, principles, and prospects of that cognition which,
+although not alone ideally conceivable, is alone possible.
+
+[Sidenote: The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the
+Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant. The Absolute
+Spirit.]
+
+Sect. 176. With the successors of Kant, as with the successors of
+Socrates, a criticism becomes a system of metaphysics. This
+transformation is effected in the post-Kantians by _a generalization of
+the human cognitive consciousness_. According to Kant's analysis it
+contains a manifold of sense which must be organized by categories in
+obedience to the ideal of a rational universe. The whole enterprise,
+with its problems given in perception, its instruments available in the
+activities of the understanding, and its ideals revealed in the reason,
+is an organic spiritual unity, manifesting itself in the
+self-consciousness of the thinker. Now in absolute idealism this very
+enterprise of knowledge, made universal and called the _absolute spirit_
+or _mind_, is taken to be the ultimate reality. And here at length would
+seem to be afforded the conception of a being to which the problematic
+and the rational, the data and the principles, the natural and the
+ideal, are alike indispensable. We are now to seek the real not in the
+ideal itself, but in that spiritual unity in which appearance is the
+incentive to truth, and natural imperfection the spring to goodness.
+This may be translated into the language which Plato uses in the
+"Symposium," when Diotima is revealing to Socrates the meaning of love.
+The new reality will be not the loved one, but love itself.
+
+     "What then is Love? Is he mortal?"
+
+     "No."
+
+     "What then?"
+
+     "As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal,
+     but is a mean between them."
+
+     "What is he then, Diotima?"
+
+     "He is a great spirit, and like all that is spiritual he is
+     intermediate between the divine and the mortal."[359:3]
+
+Reality is no longer the God who mingles not with men, but that power
+which, as Diotima further says, "interprets and conveys to the gods the
+prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and rewards of
+the gods."
+
+In speaking for such an idealism, Emerson says:
+
+     "Everything good is on the highway. The middle region of our
+     being is the temperate zone. We may climb into the thin and
+     cold realm of pure geometry and lifeless science, or sink into
+     that of sensation. Between these extremes is the equator of
+     life, of thought, of spirit, of poetry. . . . The mid-world is
+     best."[359:4]
+
+The new reality is this highway of the spirit, the very course and
+raceway of self-consciousness. It is traversed in the movement and
+self-correction of thought, in the interest in ideals, or in the
+submission of the will to the control of the moral law.
+
+[Sidenote: Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity.]
+
+Sect. 177. It is the last of these phases of self-consciousness that
+Fichte, who was Kant's immediate successor, regards as of paramount
+importance. As Platonism began with the ideal of the good or the object
+of life, so the new idealism begins with the conviction of duty, or _the
+story of life_. Being is the living moral nature compelled to build
+itself a natural order wherein it may obey the moral law, and to divide
+itself into a community of moral selves through which the moral virtues
+may be realized. Nature and society flow from the conception of an
+absolute moral activity, or ego. Such an ego could not be pure and
+isolated and yet be moral. The evidence of this is the common moral
+consciousness. My duty compels me to act upon the not-self or
+environment, and to respect and cooperate with other selves. Fichte's
+absolute is this moral consciousness universalized and made eternal.
+Moral value being its fundamental principle the universe must on that
+very account embrace both nature, or moral indifference, and humanity,
+or moral limitation.
+
+[Sidenote: Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment.]
+
+Sect. 178. But the Romanticists, who followed close upon Fichte, were
+dissatisfied with so hard and exclusive a conception of spiritual being.
+Life, they said, is not all duty. Indeed, the true spiritual life is
+quite other, not harsh and constrained, but free and spontaneous--a
+wealth of feeling playing about a constantly shifting centre. Spirit is
+not consecutive and law-abiding, but capricious and wanton, seeking the
+beautiful in no orderly progression, but in a refined and versatile
+sensibility. If this be the nature of spirit, and if spirit be the
+nature of reality, then he is most wise who is most rich in sentiment.
+The Romanticists were the exponents of an absolute sentimentalism. And
+they did not prove it, but like good sentimentalists they felt it.
+
+[Sidenote: Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic.]
+
+Sect. 179. Hegel, the master of the new idealism, set himself the task
+of construing spirit in terms as consecutive as those of Fichte, and as
+comprehensive as those of the Romanticists. Like Plato, he found in
+dialectic the supreme manifestation of the spiritual life. There is a
+certain flow of ideas which determines the meaning of experience, and
+is the truth of truths. But the mark of the new prophet is this: the
+flow of ideas itself is _a process of self-correction due to a sense of
+error_. Thus bare sensation is abstract and bare thought is abstract.
+The real, however, is not merely the concrete in which they are united,
+but the very process in the course of which through knowledge of
+abstraction thought arrives at the concrete. The principle of negation
+is the very life of thought, and it is _the life of thought_, rather
+than the outcome of thought, which is reality. The most general form of
+the dialectical process contains three moments: the moment of _thesis_,
+in which affirmation is made; the moment of _antithesis_, in which the
+opposite asserts itself; and the moment of _synthesis_, in which a
+reconciliation is effected in a new thesis. Thus thought is the
+progressive overcoming of contradiction; not the state of freedom from
+contradiction, but the act of escaping it. Such processes are more
+familiar in the moral life. Morality consists, so even common-sense
+asserts, in the overcoming of evil. Character is the resistance of
+temptation; goodness, a growth in grace through discipline. Of such, for
+Hegel, is the very kingdom of heaven. It is the task of the philosopher,
+a task to which Hegel applies himself most assiduously, to analyze the
+battle and the victory upon which spiritual being nourishes itself. And
+since the deeper processes are those of thought, the Hegelian philosophy
+centres in an ordering of notions, a demonstration of that necessary
+progression of thought which, in its whole dynamical logical history,
+constitutes the _absolute idea_.
+
+[Sidenote: The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History.]
+
+Sect. 180. The Hegelian philosophy, with its emphasis upon difference,
+antagonism, and development, is peculiarly qualified to be a philosophy
+of nature and history. Those principles of spiritual development which
+logic defines are conceived as incarnate in the evolution of the world.
+Nature, as the very antithesis to spirit, is now understood to be the
+foil of spirit. In nature spirit alienates itself in order to return
+enriched. The stages of nature are the preparation for the reviving of a
+spirituality that has been deliberately forfeited. The Romanticists,
+whether philosophers like Schelling or poets like Goethe and Wordsworth,
+were led by their feeling for the beauty of nature to attribute to it a
+much deeper and more direct spiritual significance. But Hegel and the
+Romanticists alike are truly expressed in Emerson's belief that the
+spiritual interpretation of nature is the "true science."
+
+     "The poet alone knows astronomy, chemistry, vegetation, and
+     animation, for he does not stop at these facts, but employs
+     them as signs. He knows why the plain or meadow of space was
+     strown with these flowers we call suns and moons and stars;
+     why the great deep is adorned with animals, with men, and
+     gods; for in every word he speaks he rides on them as the
+     horses of thought."[364:5]
+
+The new awakening of spirit which is for Hegel the consummation of the
+natural evolution, begins with the individual or _subjective_ spirit,
+and develops into the social or _objective_ spirit, which is morality
+and history. History is a veritable dialectic of nations, in the course
+of which the consciousness of individual liberty is developed, and
+coordinated with the unity of the state. The highest stage of spirit
+incarnate is that of _absolute_ spirit, embracing art, religion, and
+philosophy. In art the absolute idea obtains expression in sensuous
+existence, more perfectly in classical than in the symbolic art of the
+Orient, but most perfectly in the romantic art of the modern period. In
+religion the absolute idea is expressed in the imagination through
+worship. In Oriental pantheism, the individual is overwhelmed by his
+sense of the universal; in Greek religion, God is but a higher man;
+while in Christianity God and man are perfectly united in Christ.
+Finally, in philosophy the absolute idea reaches its highest possible
+expression in articulate thought.
+
+[Sidenote: Resume. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the Problem of
+Evil.]
+
+Sect. 181. Such is absolute idealism approached from the stand-point of
+antecedent metaphysics. It is the most elaborate and subtle provision
+for antagonistic differences within unity that the speculative mind of
+man has as yet been able to make. It is the last and most thorough
+attempt to resolve individual and universal, temporal and eternal,
+natural and ideal, good and evil, into an absolute unity in which the
+universal, eternal, ideal, and good shall dominate, and in which all
+terms shall be related with such necessity as obtains in the definitions
+and theorems of geometry. There is to be some absolute meaning which is
+rational to the uttermost and the necessary ground of all the incidents
+of existence. Thought could undertake no more ambitious and exacting
+task. Nor is it evident after all that absolute idealism enjoys any
+better success in this task than absolute realism. The difference
+between them becomes much less marked when we reflect that the former,
+like the latter, must reserve the predicate of being for the unity of
+the whole. Even though evil and contradiction belong to the essence of
+things, move in the secret heart of a spiritual universe, the reality is
+not these in their severalty, but that life within which they fall, the
+story within which they "earn a place." And if absolute idealism has
+defined a new perfection, it has at the same time defined a new
+imperfection. The perfection is rich in contrast, and thus inclusive of
+both the lights and shades of experience; but the perfection belongs
+only to the composition of these elements within a single view. It is
+not necessary to such perfection that the evil should ever be viewed in
+isolation. The idealist employs the analogy of the drama or the picture
+whose very significance requires the balance of opposing forces; or the
+analogy of the symphony in which a higher musical quality is realized
+through the resolution of discord into harmony. But none of these
+unities requires any element whatsoever that does not partake of its
+beauty. It is quite irrelevant to the drama that the hero should
+himself have his own view of events with no understanding of their
+dramatic value, as it is irrelevant to the picture that an unbalanced
+fragment of it should dwell apart, or to the symphony that the discord
+should be heard without the harmony. One may multiply without end the
+internal differences and antagonisms that contribute to the internal
+meaning, and be as far as ever from understanding the external
+detachment of experiences that are not rational or good in themselves.
+And it is precisely this kind of fact that precipitates the whole
+problem. We do not judge of sin and error from experiences in which they
+conduct to goodness and truth, but from experiences in which they are
+stark and unresolved.
+
+In view of such considerations many idealists have been willing to
+confess their inability to solve this problem. To quote a recent
+expositor of Hegel,
+
+     "We need not, after all, be surprised at the apparently
+     insoluble problem which confronts us. For the question has
+     developed into the old difficulty of the origin of evil, which
+     has always baffled both theologians and philosophers. An
+     idealism which declares that the universe is in reality
+     perfect, can find, as most forms of popular idealism do, an
+     escape from the difficulties of the existence of evil, by
+     declaring that the universe is as yet only growing towards its
+     ideal perfection. But this refuge disappears with the reality
+     of time, and we are left with an awkward difference between
+     what philosophy tells us must be, and what our life tells us
+     actually is."[368:6]
+
+If the philosophy of eternal perfection persists in its fundamental
+doctrine in spite of this irreconcilable conflict with life, it is
+because it is believed that that doctrine _must_ be true. Let us turn,
+then, to its more constructive and compelling argument.
+
+[Sidenote: The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is Based upon
+the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge.]
+
+Sect. 182. The proof of absolute idealism is supposed by the majority of
+its exponents to follow from the problem of epistemology, and more
+particularly from the manifest dependence of truth upon the knowing
+mind. In its initial phase absolute idealism is indistinguishable from
+subjectivism. Like that philosophy it finds that the object of knowledge
+is inseparable from the state of knowledge throughout the whole range of
+experience. Since the knower can never escape himself, it may be set
+down as an elementary fact that reality (at any rate whatever reality
+can be known or even talked about) owes its being to mind.
+
+Thus Green, the English neo-Hegelian, maintains that "an object which
+no consciousness presented to itself would not be an object at all," and
+wonders that this principle is not generally taken for granted and made
+the starting-point for philosophy.[369:7] However, unless the very term
+"object" is intended to imply presence to a subject, this principle is
+by no means self-evident, and must be traced to its sources.
+
+We have already followed the fortunes of that empirical subjectivism
+which issues from the relativity of perception. At the very dawn of
+philosophy it was observed that what is seen, heard, or otherwise
+experienced through the senses, depends not only upon the use of
+sense-organs, but upon the special point of view occupied by each
+individual sentient being. It was therefore concluded that the
+perceptual world belonged to the human knower with his limitations and
+perspective, rather than to being itself. It was this epistemological
+principle upon which Berkeley founded his empirical idealism. Believing
+knowledge to consist essentially in perception, and believing perception
+to be subjective, he had to choose between the relegation of being to a
+region inaccessible to knowledge, and the definition of being in terms
+of subjectivity. To avoid scepticism he accepted the latter alternative.
+But among the Greeks with whom this theory of perception originated, it
+drew its meaning in large part from the distinction between perception
+and reason. Thus we read in Plato's "Sophist":
+
+     "And you would allow that we participate in generation with
+     the body, and by perception; but we participate with the soul
+     by thought in true essence, and essence you would affirm to be
+     always the same and immutable, whereas generation
+     varies."[370:8]
+
+It is conceived that although in perception man is condemned to a
+knowledge conditioned by the affections and station of his body, he may
+nevertheless escape himself and lay hold on the "true essence" of
+things, by virtue of thought. In other words, knowledge, in
+contradistinction to "opinion," is not made by the subject, but is the
+soul's participation in the eternal natures of things. In the moment of
+insight the varying course of the individual thinker coincides with the
+unvarying truth; but in that moment the individual thinker is ennobled
+through being assimilated to the truth, while the truth is no more, no
+less, the truth than before.
+
+[Sidenote: The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason.]
+
+Sect. 183. In absolute idealism, the principle of subjectivism is
+extended to reason itself. This extension seems to have been originally
+due to moral and religious interests. From the moral stand-point the
+contemplation of the truth is a _state_, and the highest state of the
+individual life. The religious interest unifies the individual life and
+directs attention to its spiritual development. Among the Greeks of the
+middle period life was as yet viewed objectively as the fulfilment of
+capacities, and knowledge was regarded as perfection of function, the
+exercise of the highest of human prerogatives. But as moral and
+religious interests became more absorbing, the individual lived more and
+more in his own self-consciousness. Even before the Christian era the
+Greek philosophers themselves were preoccupied with the task of winning
+a state of inner serenity. Thus the Stoics and Epicureans came to look
+upon knowledge as a means to the attainment of an inner freedom from
+distress and bondage to the world. In other words, the very reason was
+regarded as an activity of the self, and its fruits were valued for
+their enhancement of the welfare of the self. And if this be true of the
+Stoics and the Epicureans, it is still more clearly true of the
+neo-Platonists of the Christian era, who mediate between the ancient
+and mediaeval worlds.
+
+[Sidenote: Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian
+Philosophy.]
+
+Sect. 184. It is well known that the early period of Christianity was a
+period of the most vivid self-consciousness. The individual believed
+that his natural and social environment was alien to his deeper
+spiritual interests. He therefore withdrew into himself. He believed
+himself to have but one duty, the salvation of his soul; and that duty
+required him to search his innermost springs of action in order to
+uproot any that might compromise him with the world and turn him from
+God. The drama of life was enacted within the circle of his own
+self-consciousness. Citizenship, bodily health, all forms of
+appreciation and knowledge, were identified in the parts they played
+here. In short the Christian consciousness, although renunciation was
+its deepest motive, was reflexive and centripetal to a degree hitherto
+unknown among the European peoples. And when with St. Augustine
+theoretical interests once more vigorously asserted themselves, this new
+emphasis was in the very foreground. St. Augustine wished to begin his
+system of thought with a first indubitable certainty, and selected
+neither being nor ideas, but _self_. St. Augustine's genius was
+primarily religious, and the "Confessions," in which he records the
+story of his hard winning of peace and right relations with God, is his
+most intimate book. How faithfully does he represent himself, and the
+blend of paganism and Christianity which was distinctive of his age,
+when in his systematic writings he draws upon religion for his knowledge
+of truth! In all my living, he argues, whether I sin or turn to God,
+whether I doubt or believe, whether I know or am ignorant, in all _I
+know that I am I_. Each and every state of my consciousness is a state
+of my self, and as such, sure evidence of my self's existence. If one
+were to follow St. Augustine's reflections further, one would find him
+reasoning from his own finite and evil self to an infinite and perfect
+Self, which centres like his in the conviction that I am I, but is
+endowed with all power and all worth. One would find him reflecting upon
+the possible union with God through the exaltation of the human
+self-consciousness. But this conception of God as the perfect self is so
+much a prophecy of things to come, that more than a dozen centuries
+elapsed before it was explicitly formulated by the post-Kantians. We
+must follow its more gradual development in the philosophies of
+Descartes and Kant.
+
+[Sidenote: Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the Thinking
+Self.]
+
+Sect. 185. When at the close of the sixteenth century the Frenchman,
+Rene Descartes, sought to construct philosophy anew and upon secure
+foundations, he too selected as the initial certainty of thought the
+thinker's knowledge of himself. This principle now received its classic
+formulation in the proposition, _Cogito ergo sum_--"I think, hence I
+am." The argument does not differ essentially from that of St.
+Augustine, but it now finds a place in a systematic and critical
+metaphysics. In that my thinking is certain of itself, says Descartes,
+in that I know myself before I know aught else, my self can never be
+dependent for its being upon anything else that I may come to know. A
+thinking self, with its knowledge and its volition, is quite capable of
+subsisting of itself. Such is, indeed, not the case with a finite self,
+for all finitude is significant of limitation, and in recognizing my
+limitations I postulate the infinite being or God. But the relation of
+my self to a physical world is quite without necessity. Human nature,
+with soul and body conjoined, is a combination of two substances,
+neither of which is a necessary consequence of the other. As a result
+of this combination the soul is to some extent affected by the body, and
+the body is to some extent directed by the soul; but the body could
+conceivably be an automaton, as the soul could conceivably be, and will
+in another life become, a free spirit. The consequences of this dualism
+for epistemology are very grave. If knowledge be the activity of a
+self-subsistent thinking spirit, how can it reveal the nature of an
+external world? The natural order is now literally "external." It is
+true that the whole body of exact science, that mechanical system to
+which Descartes attached so much importance, falls within the range of
+the soul's own thinking. But what assurance is there that it refers to a
+province of its own--a physical world in space? Descartes can only
+suppose that "clear and distinct" ideas must be trusted as faithful
+representations. It is true the external world makes its presence known
+directly, when it breaks in upon the soul in sense-perception. But
+Descartes's rationalism and love of mathematics forbade his attaching
+importance to this criterion. Real nature, that exactly definable and
+predictable order of moving bodies defined in physics, is not known
+through sense-perception, but through thought. Its necessities are the
+necessities of reason. Descartes finds himself, then, in the perplexing
+position of seeking an internal criterion for an external world. The
+problem of knowledge so stated sets going the whole epistemological
+movement of the eighteenth century, from Locke through Berkeley and Hume
+to Kant. And the issue of this development is the absolute idealism of
+Kant's successors.
+
+[Sidenote: Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers.]
+
+Sect. 186. Of the English philosophers who prepare the way for the
+epistemology of Kant, Hume is the most radical and momentous. It was he
+who roused Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers" to the task of the
+"Critical Philosophy." Hume is one of the two possible consequences of
+Descartes. One who attaches greater importance to the rational
+necessities of science than to its external reference, is not unwilling
+that nature should be swallowed up in mind. With Malebranche,
+Descartes's immediate successor in France, nature is thus provided for
+within the archetypal mind of God. With the English philosophers, on the
+other hand, externality is made the very mark of nature, and as a
+consequence sense-perception becomes the criterion of scientific truth.
+This empirical theory of knowledge, inaugurated and developed by Locke
+and Berkeley, culminates in Hume's designation of the _impression_ as
+the distinguishing element of nature, at once making up its content and
+certifying to its externality. The processes of nature are successions
+of impressions; and the laws of nature are their uniformities, or the
+expectations of uniformity which their repetitions engender. Hume does
+not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion. If the final mark of truth
+is the presence to sense of the individual element, then science can
+consist only of items of information and probable generalizations
+concerning their sequences. The effect is observed to follow upon the
+cause in fact, but there is no understanding of its necessity; therefore
+no absolute certainty attaches to the future effects of any cause.
+
+[Sidenote: To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind.]
+
+Sect. 187. But what has become of the dream of the mathematical
+physicist? Is the whole system of Newton, that brilliant triumph of the
+mechanical method, unfounded and dogmatic? It is the logical instability
+of this body of knowledge, made manifest in the well-founded scepticism
+of Hume, that rouses Kant to a re-examination of the whole foundation of
+natural science. The general outline of his analysis has been developed
+above. It is of importance here to understand its relations to the
+problem of Descartes. Contrary to the view of the English philosophers,
+natural science is, says Kant, the work of the mind. The certainty of
+the causal relation is due to the human inability to think otherwise.
+Hume is mistaken in supposing that mere sensation gives us any knowledge
+of nature. The very least experience of objects involves the employment
+of principles which are furnished by the mind. Without the employment of
+such principles, or in bare sensation, there is no intelligible meaning
+whatsoever. But once admit the employment of such principles and
+formulate them systematically, and the whole Newtonian order of nature
+is seen to follow from them. Furthermore, since these principles or
+categories are the conditions of human experience, are the very
+instruments of knowledge, they are valid wherever there is any
+experience or knowledge. There is but one way to make anything at all
+out of nature, and that is to conceive it as an order of necessary
+events in space and time. Newtonian science is part of such a general
+conception, and is therefore necessary if knowledge is to be possible at
+all, even the least. Thus Kant turns upon Hume, and shuts him up to the
+choice between the utter abnegation of all knowledge, including the
+knowledge of his own scepticism, and the acceptance of the whole body of
+exact science.
+
+But with nature thus conditioned by the necessities of thought, what has
+become of its externality? That, Kant admits, has indeed vanished. Kant
+does not attempt, as did Descartes, to hold that the nature which mind
+constructs and controls, exists also outside of mind. The nature that is
+known is on that very account phenomenal, anthropocentric--created by
+its cognitive conditions. Descartes was right in maintaining that
+sense-perception certifies to the existence of a world outside the mind,
+but mistaken in calling it nature and identifying it with the realm of
+science. In short, Kant acknowledges the external world, and names it
+the _thing-in-itself_; but insists that because it is outside of mind it
+is outside of knowledge. Thus is the certainty of science saved at the
+cost of its metaphysical validity. It is necessarily true, but only of a
+conditioned or dependent world. And in saving science Kant has at the
+same time prejudiced metaphysics in general. For the human or
+naturalistic way of knowing is left in sole possession of the field,
+with the higher interest of reasons in the ultimate nature of being,
+degraded to the rank of practical faith.
+
+[Sidenote: The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general into an
+Absolute Mind.]
+
+Sect. 188. The transformation of this critical and agnostic doctrine
+into absolute idealism is inevitable. The metaphysical interest was
+bound to avail itself of the speculative suggestiveness with which the
+Kantian philosophy abounds. The transformation turns upon Kant's
+assumption that whatever is constructed by the mind is on that account
+phenomenon or appearance. Kant has carried along the presumption that
+whatever is act or content of mind is on that account not _real_ object
+or _thing-in-itself_. We have seen that this is generally accepted as
+true of the relativities of sense-perception. But is it true of thought?
+The post-Kantian idealist maintains that _that depends upon the
+thought_. The content of private individual thinking is in so far not
+real object; but it does not follow that this is true of such thinking
+as is universally valid. Now Kant has deduced his categories for thought
+in general. There are no empirical cases of thinking except the human
+thinkers; but the categories are not the property of any one human
+individual or any group of such individuals. They are the conditions of
+_experience in general_, and of every possibility of experience. The
+transition to absolute idealism is now readily made. _Thought in
+general_ becomes the _absolute mind_, and experience in general its
+content. The thing-in-itself drops out as having no meaning. The
+objectivity to which it testified is provided for in the completeness
+and self-sufficiency which is attributed to the absolute experience.
+Indeed, an altogether new definition of subjective and objective
+replaces the old. The subjective is that which is only insufficiently
+thought, as in the case of relativity and error; the objective is that
+which is completely thought. Thus the natural order is indeed
+phenomenal; but only because the principles of science are not the
+highest principles of thought, and not because nature is the fruit of
+thought. Thus Hegel expresses his relation to Kant as follows:
+
+     "According to Kant, the things that we know about are _to us_
+     appearances only, and we can never know their essential
+     nature, which belongs to another world, which we cannot
+     approach. . . . The true statement of the case is as follows.
+     The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere
+     phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the
+     true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is
+     to have their existence founded not in themselves, but in the
+     universal divine idea. This view of things, it is true, is as
+     idealist as Kant's, but in contradistinction to the
+     subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy should be
+     termed Absolute Idealism."[382:9]
+
+[Sidenote: The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite Mind to
+the Infinite Mind.]
+
+Sect. 189. Absolute idealism is thus reached after a long and devious
+course of development. But the argument may be stated much more briefly.
+Plato, it will be remembered, found that experience tends ever to
+transcend itself. The thinker finds himself compelled to pursue the
+ideal of immutable and universal truth, and must identify the ultimate
+being with that ideal. Similarly Hegel says:
+
+     "That upward spring of the mind signifies that the being which
+     the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute
+     truth; it signifies that beyond and above that appearance,
+     truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for
+     God."[382:10]
+
+The further argument of absolute idealism differs from that of Plato in
+that the dependence of truth upon the mind is accepted as a first
+principle. The ideal with which experience is informed is now _the state
+of perfect knowledge_, rather than the system of absolute truth. The
+content of the state of perfect knowledge will indeed be the system of
+absolute truth, but none the less _content_, precisely as finite
+knowledge is the content of a finite mind. In pursuing the truth, I who
+pursue, aim to realize in myself a certain highest state of knowledge.
+Were I to know all truth I should indeed have ceased to be the finite
+individual who began the quest, but the evolution would be continuous
+and the character of self-consciousness would never have been lost. I
+may say, in short, that God or being, is my perfect cognitive self.
+
+The argument for absolute idealism is a constructive interpretation of
+the subjectivistic contention that knowledge can never escape the circle
+of its own activity and states. To meet the demand for a final and
+standard truth, a demand which realism meets with its doctrine of a
+being independent of any mind, this philosophy defines a _standard
+mind_. The impossibility of defining objects in terms of relativity to a
+finite self, conducts dialectically to the conception of the _absolute
+self_. The sequel to my error or exclusiveness, is truth or
+inclusiveness. The outcome of the dialectic is determined by the
+symmetry of the antithesis. Thus, corrected experience implies a last
+correcting experience; partial cognition, complete cognition; empirical
+subject, transcendental subject; finite mind, an absolute mind. The
+following statement is taken from a contemporary exponent of the
+philosophy:
+
+     "What you and I lack, when we lament our human ignorance, is
+     simply a certain desirable and logically possible state of
+     mind, or type of experience; to wit, a state of mind in which
+     we should wisely be able to say that we had fulfilled in
+     experience what we now have merely in idea, namely, the
+     knowledge, the immediate and felt presence, of what we now
+     call the Absolute Reality. . . . There is an Absolute
+     Experience for which the conception of an absolute reality,
+     _i. e._, the conception of a system of ideal truth, is
+     fulfilled by the very contents that get presented to this
+     experience. This Absolute Experience is related to our
+     experience as an organic whole to its own fragments. It is an
+     experience which finds fulfilled all that the completest
+     thought can conceive as genuinely possible. Herein lies its
+     definition as an Absolute. For the Absolute Experience, as for
+     ours, there are data, contents, facts. But these data, these
+     contents, express, for the Absolute Experience, its own
+     meaning, its thought, its ideas. Contents beyond these that it
+     possesses, the Absolute Experience knows to be, in genuine
+     truth, impossible. Hence its contents are indeed
+     particular,--a selection from the world of bare or merely
+     conceptual possibilities,--but they form a self-determined
+     whole, than which nothing completer, more organic, more
+     fulfilled, more transparent, or more complete in meaning, is
+     concretely or genuinely possible. On the other hand, these
+     contents are not foreign to those of our finite experience,
+     but are inclusive of them in the unity of one life."[385:11]
+
+[Sidenote: The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism.]
+
+Sect. 190. As has been already intimated, at the opening of this
+chapter, the inclusion of the whole of reality within a single self is
+clearly a questionable proceeding. The need of avoiding the relativism
+of empirical idealism is evident. But if the very meaning of the
+self-consciousness be due to a certain selection and exclusion within
+the general field of experience, it is equally evident that the
+relativity of self-consciousness can never be overcome through appealing
+to a higher self. One must appeal _from_ the self to the realm of things
+as they are. Indeed, although the exponents of this philosophy use the
+language of spiritualism, and accept the idealistic epistemology, their
+absolute being tends ever to escape the special characters of the self.
+And inasmuch as the absolute self is commonly set over against the
+finite or empirical self, as the standard and test of truth, it is the
+less distinguishable from the realist's order of independent beings.
+
+[Sidenote: The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics of
+Absolute Idealism. Kant.]
+
+Sect. 191. But however much absolute idealism may tend to abandon its
+idealism for the sake of its absolutism within the field of metaphysics,
+such is not the case within the field of ethics and religion. The
+conception of the self here receives a new emphasis. The same
+self-consciousness which admits to the highest truth is the evidence of
+man's practical dignity. In virtue of his immediate apprehension of the
+principles of selfhood, and his direct participation in the life of
+spirit, man may be said to possess the innermost secret of the universe.
+In order to achieve goodness he must therefore recognize and express
+_himself_. The Kantian philosophy is here again the starting-point. It
+was Kant who first gave adequate expression to the Christian idea of the
+moral self-consciousness.
+
+     "_Duty!_ Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace
+     nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and
+     yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that
+     would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest
+     forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind,
+     . . . a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even
+     though they secretly counterwork it; what origin is there
+     worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble
+     descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the
+     inclinations . . . ? It can be nothing less than a power which
+     elevates man above himself, . . . a power which connects him
+     with an order of things that only the understanding can
+     conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the
+     whole sensible world, and with it the empirically determinable
+     existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all
+     ends."[387:12]
+
+With Kant there can be no morality except conduct be attended by the
+consciousness of this duty imposed by the higher nature upon the lower.
+It is this very recognition of a deeper self, of a personality that
+belongs to the sources and not to the consequences of nature, that
+constitutes man as a moral being, and only such action as is inspired
+with a reverence for it can be morally good. Kant does little more than
+to establish the uncompromising dignity of the moral will. In moral
+action man submits to a law that issues from himself in virtue of his
+rational nature. Here he yields nothing, as he owes nothing, to that
+appetency which binds him to the natural world. As a rational being he
+himself affirms the very principles which determine the organization of
+nature. This is his _freedom_, at once the ground and the implication
+of his duty. Man is free from nature to serve the higher law of his
+personality.
+
+[Sidenote: Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of
+Universal and Objective Spirit.]
+
+Sect. 192. There are two respects in which Kant's ethics has been
+regarded as inadequate by those who draw from it their fundamental
+principles. It is said that Kant is too rigoristic, that he makes too
+stern a business of morality, in speaking so much of law and so little
+of love and spontaneity. There are good reasons for this. Kant seeks to
+isolate the moral consciousness, and dwell upon it in its purity, in
+order that he may demonstrate its incommensurability with the values of
+inclination and sensibility. Furthermore, Kant may speak of the
+principle of the absolute, and recognize the deeper eternal order as a
+law, but he may not, if he is to be consistent with his own critical
+principles, affirm the metaphysical being of such an order. With his
+idealistic followers it is possible to define the spiritual setting of
+the moral life, but with Kant it is only possible to define the
+antagonism of principles. Hence the greater optimism of the
+post-Kantians. They know that the higher law is the reality, and that he
+who obeys it thus unites himself with the absolute self. That which for
+Kant is only a resolute obedience to more valid principles, to
+rationally superior rules for action, is for idealism man's
+appropriation of his spiritual birthright. Since the law is the deeper
+nature, man may respect and obey it as valid, and at the same time act
+upon it gladly in the sure knowledge that it will enhance his eternal
+welfare. Indeed, the knowledge that the very universe is founded upon
+this law will make him less suspicious of nature and less exclusive in
+his adherence to any single law. He will be more confident of the
+essential goodness of all manifestations of a universe which he knows to
+be fundamentally spiritual.
+
+But it has been urged, secondly, that the Kantian ethics is too formal,
+too little pertinent to the issues of life. Kant's moral law imposes
+only obedience to the law, or conduct conceived as suitable to a
+universal moral community. But what is the nature of such conduct in
+particular? It may be answered that to maintain the moral
+self-consciousness, to act dutifully and dutifully only, to be
+self-reliant and unswerving in the doing of what one ought to do, is to
+obtain a very specific character. But does this not leave the
+individual's conduct to his own interpretation of his duty? It was just
+this element of individualism which Hegel sought to eliminate through
+the application of his larger philosophical conception. If that which
+expresses itself within the individual consciousness as the moral law be
+indeed the law of that self in which the universe is grounded, it will
+appear as _objective spirit_ in the evolution of society. For Hegel,
+then, the most valid standard of goodness is to be found in that
+customary morality which bespeaks the moral leadings of the general
+humanity, and in those institutions, such as the family and the state,
+which are the moral acts of the absolute idea itself. Finally, in the
+realm of _absolute spirit_, in art, in revealed religion, and in
+philosophy, the individual may approach to the self-consciousness which
+is the perfect truth and goodness in and for itself.
+
+[Sidenote: The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute Idealism.]
+
+Sect. 193. Where the law of life is the implication in the finite
+self-consciousness of the eternal and divine self-consciousness, there
+can be no division between morality and religion, as there can be none
+between thought and will. Whatever man seeks is in the end God. As the
+perfect fulfilment of the thinking self, God is the truth; as the
+perfect fulfilment of the willing self, God is the good. The finite
+self-consciousness finds facts that are not understood, and so seeks to
+resolve itself into the perfect self wherein all that is given has
+meaning. On the other hand, the finite self-consciousness finds ideals
+that are not realized, and so seeks to resolve itself into that perfect
+self wherein all that is significant is given. All interests thus
+converge toward
+
+     "some state of conscious spirit in which the opposition of
+     cognition and volition is overcome--in which we neither judge
+     our ideas by the world, nor the world by our ideas, but are
+     aware that inner and outer are in such close and necessary
+     harmony that even the thought of possible discord has become
+     impossible. In its unity not only cognition and volition, but
+     feeling also, must be blended and united. In some way or
+     another it must have overcome the rift in discursive
+     knowledge, and the immediate must for it be no longer the
+     alien. It must be as direct as art, as certain and universal
+     as philosophy."[391:13]
+
+The religious consciousness proper to absolute idealism is both
+pantheistic and mystical, but with distinction. Platonism is pantheistic
+in that nature is resolved into God. All that is not perfect is esteemed
+only for its promise of perfection. And Platonism is mystical in that
+the purification and universalization of the affections brings one in
+the end to a perfection that exceeds all modes of thought and speech.
+With Spinoza, on the other hand, God may be said to be resolved into
+nature. Nature is made divine, but is none the less nature, for its
+divinity consists in its absolute necessity. Spinoza's pantheism passes
+over into mysticism because the absolute necessity exceeds in both unity
+and richness the laws known to the human understanding. In absolute
+idealism, finally, both God and nature are resolved into the self. For
+that which is divine in experience is self-consciousness, and this is at
+the same time the ground of nature. Thus in the highest knowledge the
+self is expanded and enriched without being left behind. The mystical
+experience proper to this philosophy is the consciousness of identity,
+together with the sense of universal immanence. The individual self may
+be directly sensible of the absolute self, for these are one spiritual
+life. Thus Emerson says:
+
+     "It is a secret which every intellectual man quickly learns,
+     that beyond the energy of his possessed and conscious
+     intellect he is capable of a new energy (as of an intellect
+     doubled on itself), by abandonment to the nature of things;
+     that beside his privacy of power as an individual man, there
+     is a great public power upon which he can draw, by unlocking,
+     at all risks, his human doors, and suffering the ethereal
+     tides to roll and circulate through him; then he is caught up
+     into the life of the Universe, his speech is thunder, his
+     thought is law, and his words are universally intelligible as
+     the plants and animals. The poet knows that he speaks
+     adequately then only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or 'with
+     the flower of the mind'; not with the intellect used as an
+     organ, but with the intellect released from all service and
+     suffered to take its direction from its celestial
+     life."[393:14]
+
+[Sidenote: The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality.]
+
+Sect. 194. But the distinguishing flavor and quality of this religion
+arises from its spiritual hospitality. It is not, like Platonism, a
+contemplation of the best; nor, like pluralistic idealisms, a moral
+knight-errantry. It is neither a religion of exclusion, nor a religion
+of reconstruction, but a profound willingness that things should be as
+they really are. For this reason its devotees have recognized in Spinoza
+their true forerunner. But idealism is not Spinozism, though it may
+contain this as one of its strains. For it is not the worship of
+necessity, Emerson's "beautiful necessity, which makes man brave in
+believing that he cannot shun a danger that is appointed, nor incur one
+that is not"; but the worship of _that which is_ necessary.
+
+Not only must one understand that every effort, however despairing, is
+an element of sense in the universal significance;
+
+     "that the whole would not be what it is were not precisely
+     this finite purpose left in its own uniqueness to speak
+     precisely its own word--a word which no other purpose can
+     speak in the language of the divine will";[394:15]
+
+but one must have a zest for such participation, and a heart for the
+divine will which it profits. Indeed, so much is this religion a love of
+life, that it may, as in the case of the Romanticists, be a love of
+caprice. Battle and death, pain and joy, error and truth--all that
+belongs to the story of this mortal world, are to be felt as the thrill
+of health, and relished as the essences of God. Religion is an exuberant
+spirituality, a fearless sensibility, a knowledge of both good and evil,
+and a will to serve the good, while exulting that the evil will not
+yield without a battle.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[349:1] By _Absolute Idealism_ is meant that system of philosophy which
+defines the universe as the _absolute spirit_, which is the human
+_moral_, _cognitive_, or _appreciative consciousness_ universalized; or
+as the _absolute, transcendental mind_, whose state of _complete
+knowledge_ is implied in all finite thinking.
+
+[352:2] Plato: _Timaeus_, 29. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[359:3] Plato: _Symposium_, 202. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[359:4] Emerson: _Essays, Second Series_, pp. 65-66.
+
+[364:5] Emerson: _Op. cit._, p. 25.
+
+The possibility of conflict between this method of nature study and the
+empirical method of science is significantly attested by the
+circumstance that in the year 1801 Hegel published a paper in which he
+maintained, on the ground of certain numerical harmonies, that there
+could be no planet between Mars and Jupiter, while at almost exactly the
+same time Piazzi discovered Ceres, the first of the asteroids.
+
+[368:6] McTaggart: _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic_, p. 181.
+
+[369:7] Green: _Prolegomena to Ethics_, p. 15.
+
+[370:8] Plato: _The Sophist_, 248. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[382:9] Hegel: _Encyclopaedie_, Sect. 45, lecture note. Quoted by
+McTaggart: _Op. cit._, p. 69.
+
+[382:10] Hegel: _Encyclopaedie_, Sect. 50. Quoted by McTaggart: _Op.
+cit._, p. 70.
+
+[385:11] Royce: _Conception of God_, pp. 19, 43-44.
+
+This argument is well summarized in Green's statement that "the
+existence of one connected world, which is the presupposition of
+knowledge, implies the action of one self-conditioning and
+self-determining mind." _Prolegomena to Ethics_, p. 181.
+
+[387:12] Kant: _Critical Examination of Practical Reason_. Translated by
+Abbott in _Kant's Theory of Ethics_, p. 180.
+
+[391:13] Quoted from McTaggart: _Op. cit._, pp. 231-232.
+
+[393:14] Emerson: _Op. cit._, pp. 30-31.
+
+[394:15] Royce: _The World and the Individual, First Series_, p. 465.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+
+[Sidenote: Liability of Philosophy to Revision, Due to its Systematic
+Character.]
+
+Sect. 195. One who consults a book of philosophy in the hope of finding
+there a definite body of truth, sanctioned by the consensus of experts,
+cannot fail to be disappointed. And it should now be plain that this is
+due not to the frailties of philosophers, but to the meaning of
+philosophy. Philosophy is not additive, but reconstructive. Natural
+science may advance step by step without ever losing ground; its
+empirical discoveries are in their severalty as true as they can ever
+be. Thus the stars and the species of animals may be recorded
+successively, and each generation of astronomers and zoologists may take
+up the work at the point reached by its forerunners. The formulation of
+results does, it is true, require constant correction and revision--but
+there is a central body of data which is little affected, and which
+accumulates from age to age. Now the finality of scientific truth is
+proportional to the modesty of its claims. Items of truth persist,
+while the interpretation of them is subject to alteration with the
+general advance of knowledge; and, relatively speaking, science consists
+in items of truth, and philosophy in their interpretation. The liability
+to revision in science itself increases as that body of knowledge
+becomes more highly unified and systematic. Thus the present age, with
+its attempt to construct a single comprehensive system of mechanical
+science, is peculiarly an age when fundamental conceptions are subjected
+to a thorough re-examination--when, for example, so ancient a conception
+as that of matter is threatened with displacement by that of energy. But
+philosophy is _essentially unitary and systematic_--and thus
+_superlatively liable to revision_.
+
+[Sidenote: The One Science and the Many Philosophies.]
+
+Sect. 196. It is noteworthy that it is only in this age of a highly
+systematic natural science that _different_ systems are projected, as in
+the case just noted of the rivalry between the strictly mechanical, or
+corpuscular, theory and the newer theory of energetics. It has
+heretofore been taken for granted that although there may be many
+philosophies, there is but one body of science. And it is still taken
+for granted that the experimental detail of the individual science is a
+common fund, to the progressive increase of which the individual
+scientist contributes the results of his special research; there being
+_rival_ schools of mechanics, physics, or chemistry, only in so far as
+_fundamental conceptions_ or _principles of orderly arrangement_ are in
+question. But philosophy deals exclusively with the most fundamental
+conceptions and the most general principles of orderly arrangement.
+Hence it is significant of the very task of philosophy that there should
+be many tentative systems of philosophy, even that each philosopher
+should project and construct his own philosophy. Philosophy as the truth
+of synthesis and reconciliation, of comprehensiveness and coordination,
+must be a living unity. It is a thinking of entire experience, and can
+be sufficient only through being all-sufficient. The heart of every
+philosophy is a harmonizing insight, an intellectual prospect within
+which all human interests and studies compose themselves. Such knowledge
+cannot be delegated to isolated co-laborers, but will be altogether
+missed if not loved and sought in its indivisible unity. There is no
+modest home-keeping philosophy; no safe and conservative philosophy,
+that can make sure of a part through renouncing the whole. There is no
+philosophy without intellectual temerity, as there is no religion
+without moral temerity. And the one is the supreme interest of thought,
+as the other is the supreme interest of life.
+
+[Sidenote: Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or Eclecticism of
+the Present Age.]
+
+Sect. 197. Though the many philosophies be inevitable, it must not be
+concluded that there is therefore no progress in philosophy. The
+solution from which every great philosophy is precipitated is the
+mingled wisdom of some latest age, with all of its inheritance. The
+"positive" knowledge furnished by the sciences, the refinements and
+distinctions of the philosophers, the ideals of society--these and the
+whole sum of civilization are its ingredients. Where there is no single
+system of philosophy significant enough to express the age, as did the
+systems of Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, and the
+others who belong to the roll of the great philosophers, there exists a
+_general sophistication_, which is more elusive but not less
+significant. The present age--at any rate from its own stand-point--is
+not an age of great philosophical systems. Such systems may indeed be
+living in our midst unrecognized; but historical perspective cannot
+safely be anticipated. It is certain that no living voice is known to
+speak for this generation as did Hegel, and even Spencer, for the last.
+There is, however, a significance in this very passing of Hegel and
+Spencer,--an enlightenment peculiar to an age which knows them, but has
+philosophically outlived them. There is a moral in the history of
+thought which just now no philosophy, whether naturalism, or
+transcendentalism, realism or idealism, can fail to draw. The
+characterization of this contemporary eclecticism or sophistication,
+difficult and uncertain as it must needs be, affords the best summary
+and interpretation with which to conclude this brief survey of the
+fortunes of philosophy.
+
+[Sidenote: Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism and
+Absolutism.]
+
+Sect. 198. Since the problem of metaphysics is the crucial problem of
+philosophy, the question of its present status is fundamental in any
+characterization of the age. It will appear from the foregoing account
+of the course of metaphysical development that two fundamental
+tendencies have exhibited themselves from the beginning. The one of
+these is naturalistic and empirical, representing the claims of what
+common sense calls "matters of fact"; the other is transcendental and
+rational, representing the claims of the standards and ideals which are
+immanent in experience, and directly manifested in the great human
+interests of thought and action. These tendencies have on the whole been
+antagonistic; and the clear-cut and momentous systems of philosophy have
+been fundamentally determined by either the one or the other.
+
+Thus materialism is due to the attempt to reduce all of experience to
+the elements and principles of connection which are employed by the
+physical sciences to set in order the actual motions, or changes of
+place, which the parts of experience undergo. Materialism maintains that
+the motions of bodies are indifferent to considerations of worth, and
+denies that they issue from a deeper cause of another order. The very
+ideas of such non-mechanical elements or principles are here provided
+with a mechanical origin. Similarly a phenomenalism, like that of Hume,
+takes immediate presence to sense as the norm of being and knowledge.
+Individual items, directly verified in the moment of their occurrence,
+are held to be at once the content of all real truth, and the source of
+those abstract ideas which the misguided rationalists mistake for real
+truth.
+
+But the absolutist, on the other hand, contends that the thinker must
+_mean_ something by the reality which he seeks. If he had it for the
+looking, thought would not be, as it so evidently is, a purposive
+endeavor. And that which is meant by reality can be nothing short of the
+fulfilment or final realization of this endeavor of thought. To find out
+what thought seeks, to anticipate the consummation of thought and posit
+it as real, is therefore the first and fundamental procedure of
+philosophy. The mechanism of nature, and all matters of fact, must come
+to terms with this absolute reality, or be condemned as mere appearance.
+Thus Plato distinguishes the world of "generation" in which we
+participate by perception, from the "true essence" in which we
+participate by thought; and Schelling speaks of the modern experimental
+method as the "corruption" of philosophy and physics, in that it fails
+to construe nature in terms of spirit.
+
+[Sidenote: Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of
+Nature. The Neo-Fichteans.]
+
+Sect. 199. Now it would never occur to a sophisticated philosopher of
+the present, to one who has thought out to the end the whole tradition
+of philosophy, and felt the gravity of the great historical issues, to
+suffer either of these motives to dominate him to the exclusion of the
+other. Absolutism has long since ceased to speak slightingly of physical
+science, and of the world of perception. It is conceded that motions
+must be known in the mechanical way, and matters of fact in the
+matter-of-fact way. Furthermore, the prestige which science enjoyed in
+the nineteenth century, and the prestige which the empirical and secular
+world of action has enjoyed to a degree that has steadily increased
+since the Renaissance, have convinced the absolutist of the intrinsic
+significance of these parts of experience. They are no longer reduced,
+but are permitted to flourish in their own right. From the very councils
+of absolute idealism there has issued a distinction which is fast
+becoming current, between the World of Appreciation, or the realm of
+moral and logical principles, and the World of Description, or the realm
+of empirical generalizations and mechanical causes.[402:1] It is indeed
+maintained that the former of these is metaphysically superior; but the
+latter is ranked without the disparagement of its own proper categories.
+
+With the Fichteans this distinction corresponds to the distinction in
+the system of Fichte between the active moral ego, and the nature which
+it posits to act upon. But the _neo-Fichteans_ are concerned to show
+that the nature so posited, or the World of Description, is the _realm
+of mechanical science_, and that the entire system of mathematical and
+physical truth is therefore morally necessary.[403:2]
+
+[Sidenote: The Neo-Kantians.]
+
+Sect. 200. A more pronounced tendency in the same direction marks the
+work of the _neo-Kantians_. These philosophers repudiate the
+spiritualistic metaphysics of Schopenhauer, Fichte, and Hegel, believing
+the real significance of Kant to lie in his critical method, in his
+examination of the first principles of the different systems of
+knowledge, and especially in his analysis of the foundations of
+mathematics and physics.[403:3] In approaching mathematics and physics
+from a general logical stand-point, these neo-Kantians become scarcely
+distinguishable in interest and temper from those scientists who
+approach logic from the mathematical and physical stand-point.
+
+[Sidenote: Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism.]
+
+Sect. 201. The finite, moral individual, with his peculiar spiritual
+perspective, has long since been recognized as essential to the meaning
+of the universe rationally conceived. But in its first movement absolute
+idealism proposed to absorb him in the indivisible absolute self. It is
+now pointed out that Fichte, and even Hegel himself, means the absolute
+to be a plurality or society of persons.[404:4] It is commonly conceded
+that the will of the absolute must coincide with the wills of all finite
+creatures in their severalty, that God wills in and through men.[404:5]
+Corresponding to this individualistic tendency on the part of absolute
+idealism, there has been recently projected a _personal idealism_, or
+_humanism_, which springs freshly and directly from the same motive.
+This philosophy attributes ultimate importance to the human person with
+his freedom, his interests, his control over nature, and his hope of the
+advancement of the spiritual kingdom through cooperation with his
+fellows.[405:6]
+
+[Sidenote: Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of
+Fundamental Principles.]
+
+Sect. 202. Naturalism exhibits a moderation and liberality that is not
+less striking than that of absolutism. This abatement of its claims
+began in the last century with agnosticism. It was then conceded that
+there is an order other than that of natural science; but this order was
+held to be inaccessible to human knowledge. Such a theory is essentially
+unstable because it employs principles which define a non-natural order,
+but refuses to credit them or call them knowledge. The agnostic is in
+the paradoxical position of one who knows of an unknowable world.
+Present-day naturalism is more circumspect. It has interested itself in
+bringing to light that in the very procedure of science which, because
+it predetermines what nature shall be, cannot be included within nature.
+To this interest is due the rediscovery of the rational foundations of
+science. It was already known in the seventeenth century that exact
+science does not differ radically from mathematics, as mathematics does
+not differ radically from logic. Mathematics and mechanics are now being
+submitted to a critical examination which reveals the definitions and
+implications upon which they rest, and the general relation of these to
+the fundamental elements and necessities of thought.[406:7]
+
+[Sidenote: Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism.]
+
+Sect. 203. This rationalistic tendency in naturalism is balanced by a
+tendency which is more empirical, but equally subversive of the old
+ultra-naturalism. Goethe once wrote:
+
+     "I have observed that I hold that thought to be true which is
+     _fruitful for me_. . . . When I know my relation to myself and
+     to the outer world, I say that I possess the truth."
+
+Similarly, it is now frequently observed that all knowledge is _humanly
+fruitful_, and it is proposed that this shall be regarded as the very
+criterion of truth. According to this principle science as a whole, even
+knowledge as a whole, is primarily a human utility. The nature which
+science defines is an artifact or construct. It is designed to express
+briefly and conveniently what man may practically expect from his
+environment. This tendency is known as _pragmatism_. It ranges
+from systematic doctrines, reminiscent of Fichte, which seek to
+define practical needs and deduce knowledge from them, to the
+more irresponsible utterances of those who liken science to
+"shorthand,"[407:8] and mathematics to a game of chess. In any case
+pragmatism attributes to nature a certain dependence on will, and
+therefore implies, even when it does not avow, that will with its
+peculiar principles or values cannot be reduced to the terms of nature.
+In short, it would be more true to say that nature expresses will, than
+that will expresses nature.[408:9]
+
+[Sidenote: Summary, and Transition to Epistemology.]
+
+Sect. 204. Such, then, is the contemporary eclecticism as respects the
+central problem of metaphysics. There are _naturalistic_ and
+_individualistic_ tendencies in _absolutism_; _rationalistic_ and
+_ethical_ tendencies in _naturalism_; and finally the independent and
+spontaneous movements of _personal idealism_ and _pragmatism_.
+
+Since the rise of the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, metaphysics
+and epistemology have maintained relations so intimate that the present
+state of the former cannot be characterized without some reference to
+the present state of the latter. Indeed, the very issues upon which
+metaphysicians divide are most commonly those provoked by the problem
+of knowledge. The counter-tendencies of naturalism and absolutism are
+always connected, and often coincide with, the epistemological
+opposition between empiricism, which proclaims perception, and
+rationalism, which proclaims reason, to be the proper organ of
+knowledge. The other great epistemological controversy does not bear so
+direct and simple a relation to the central metaphysical issues, and
+must be examined on its own account.
+
+[Sidenote: The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism. Realistic
+Tendency in Empirical Idealism.]
+
+Sect. 205. The point of controversy is the dependence or independence of
+the object of knowledge on the state of knowledge; idealism maintaining
+that reality _is_ the knower or his content of mind, realism, that being
+known is a circumstance which appertains to some reality, without being
+the indispensable condition of reality as such. Now the sophisticated
+thought of the present age exhibits a tendency on the part of these
+opposite doctrines to approach and converge. It has been already
+remarked that the empirical idealism of the Berkeleyan type could not
+avoid transcending itself. Hume, who omitted Berkeley's active spirits,
+no longer had any subjective seat or locus for the perceptions to which
+Berkeley had reduced the outer world. And perceptions which are not the
+states of any subject, retain only their intrinsic character and become
+a series of elements. When there is nothing beyond, which appears, and
+nothing within to which it appears, there ceases to be any sense in
+using such terms as appearance, phenomenon, or impression. The term
+sensation is at present employed in the same ill-considered manner. But
+empirical idealism has come gradually to insist upon the importance of
+the content of perception, rather than the relation of perception to a
+self as its state. The terms _element_ and _experience_, which are
+replacing the subjectivistic terms, are frankly realistic.[410:10]
+
+[Sidenote: Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception of
+Experience.]
+
+Sect. 206. There is a similar realistic trend in the development of
+absolute idealism. The pure Hegelian philosophy was notably objective.
+The principles of development in which it centres were conceived by
+Hegel himself to manifest themselves most clearly in the progressions of
+nature and history. Many of Hegel's followers have been led by moral and
+religious interests to emphasize consciousness, and, upon
+epistemological grounds, to lay great stress upon the necessity of the
+union of the parts of experience within an enveloping self. But absolute
+idealism has much at heart the overcoming of relativism, and the
+absolute is defined in order to meet the demand for a being that shall
+not have the cognitive deficiencies of an object of finite thought. So
+it is quite possible for this philosophy, while maintaining its
+traditions on the whole, to abandon the term _self_ to the finite
+subject, and regard its absolute as a system of rational and universal
+principles--self-sufficient because externally independent and
+internally necessary. Hence the renewed study of categories as logical,
+mathematical, or mechanical principles, and entirely apart from their
+being the acts of a thinking self.
+
+Furthermore, it has been recognized that the general demand of idealism
+is met when reality is regarded as not outside of or other than
+knowledge, whatever be true of the question of dependence. Thus the
+conception of _experience_ is equally convenient here, in that it
+signifies what is immediately present in knowledge, without affirming it
+to _consist in_ being so presented.[411:11]
+
+[Sidenote: Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence Philosophy.]
+
+Sect. 207. And at this point idealism is met by a latter-day realism.
+The traditional modern realism springing from Descartes was dualistic.
+It was supposed that reality in itself was essentially extra-mental, and
+thus under the necessity of being either represented or misrepresented
+in thought. But the one of these alternatives is dogmatic, in that
+thought can never test the validity of its relation to that which is
+perpetually outside of it; while the other is agnostic, providing only
+for the knowledge of a world of appearance, an improper knowledge that
+is in fact not knowledge at all.
+
+But realism is not necessarily dualistic, since it requires only that
+being shall not be dependent upon being known. Furthermore, since
+empiricism is congenial to naturalism, it is an easy step to say that
+nature is directly known in perception. This first takes the form of
+positivism, or the theory that only such nature as can be directly known
+can be really known. But this agnostic provision for an unknown world
+beyond, inevitably falls away and leaves _reality as that which is
+directly known, but not conditioned by knowledge_. Again the term
+_experience_ is the most useful, and provides a common ground for
+_idealistic realism_ with _realistic idealism_. A new epistemological
+movement makes this conception of experience its starting-point. What is
+known as the _immanence philosophy_ defines reality as experience, and
+means by experience the subject matter of all knowledge--not defined as
+such, but regarded as capable of being such. Experience is conceived to
+be _both in and out_ of selves, cognition being but one of the special
+systems into which experience may enter.[413:12]
+
+[Sidenote: The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New
+Construction.]
+
+Sect. 208. Does this eclecticism of the age open any philosophical
+prospect? Is it more than a general compromise--a confession of failure
+on the part of each and every radical and clear-cut doctrine of
+metaphysics and epistemology? There is no final answer to such a
+question short of an independent construction, and such procedure would
+exceed the scope of the present discussion. But there is an evident
+interpretation of tradition that suggests a possible basis for such
+construction.
+
+[Sidenote: The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of Attempt to
+Reduce All Experience to it.]
+
+Sect. 209. Suppose it to be granted that the categories of nature are
+quite self-sufficient. This would mean that there might conceivably be a
+strictly physical order, governed only by mechanical principles, and by
+the more general logical and mathematical principles. The body of
+physical science so extended as to include such general conceptions as
+identity, difference, number, quality, space, and time, is the account
+of such an order. This order need have no value, and need not be known.
+But reality as a whole is evidently not such a strictly physical order,
+for the definition of the physical order involves the rejection of many
+of the most familiar aspects of experience, such as its value and its
+being known in conscious selves. Materialism, in that it proposes to
+conceive the whole of reality as physical, must attempt to reduce the
+residuum to physical terms, and with no hope of success. Goodness and
+knowledge cannot be explained as mass and force, or shown to be
+mechanical necessities.
+
+[Sidenote: Truth of Psychical Relations, but Impossibility of General
+Reduction to Them.]
+
+Sect. 210. Are we then to conclude that reality is not physical, and
+look for other terms to which we may reduce physical terms? There is no
+lack of such other terms. Indeed, we could as fairly have _begun_
+elsewhere. Thus some parts of experience compose the consciousness of
+the individual, and are said to be known by him. Experience so contained
+is connected by the special relation of being known together. But this
+relation is quite indifferent to physical, moral, and logical relations.
+Thus we may be conscious of things which are physically disconnected,
+morally repugnant, and logically contradictory, or in all of these
+respects utterly irrelevant. Subjectivism, in that it proposes to
+conceive the whole of reality as consciousness, must attempt to reduce
+physical, moral, and logical relations to that co-presence in
+consciousness from which they are so sharply distinguished in their very
+definition. The historical failure of this attempt was inevitable.
+
+[Sidenote: Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of Ideal of
+Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing the Whole of Experience from
+it.]
+
+Sect. 211. But there is at least one further starting-point, the one
+adopted by the most subtle and elaborate of all reconstructive
+philosophies. Logical necessities are as evidently real as bodies or
+selves. It is possible to define general types of inference, as well as
+compact and internally necessary systems such as those of mathematics.
+There is a perfectly distinguishable strain of pure rationality in the
+universe. Whether or not it be possible to conceive a pure rationality
+as self-subsistent, inasmuch as there are degrees it is at any rate
+possible to conceive of a maximum of rationality. But similarly there
+are degrees of moral goodness. It is possible to define with more or
+less exactness a morally perfect person, or an ideal moral community.
+Here again it may be impossible that pure and unalloyed goodness should
+constitute a universe of itself. But that a maximum of goodness, with
+all of the accessories which it might involve, should be thus
+self-subsistent, is quite conceivable. It is thus possible to define an
+absolute and perfect order, in which logical necessity, the interest of
+thought, or moral goodness, the interest of will, or both together,
+should be realized to the maximum. Absolutism conceives reality under
+the form of this ideal, and attempts to reconstruct experience
+accordingly. But is the prospect of success any better than in the cases
+of materialism and subjectivism? It is evident that the ideal of logical
+necessity is due to the fact that certain parts of knowledge approach it
+more closely than others. Thus mechanics contains more that is arbitrary
+than mathematics, and mathematics more than logic. Similarly, the theory
+of the evolution of the planetary system, in that it requires the
+assumption of particular distances and particular masses for the parts
+of the primeval nebula, is more arbitrary than rational dynamics. It is
+impossible, then, in view of the parts of knowledge which belong to the
+lower end of the scale of rationality, to regard reality as a whole as
+the maximum of rationality; for either a purely dynamical, a purely
+mathematical, or a purely logical, realm would be more rational. The
+similar disproof of the moral perfection of reality is so unmistakable
+as to require no elucidation. It is evident that even where natural
+necessities are not antagonistic to moral proprieties, they are at any
+rate indifferent to them.
+
+[Sidenote: Error and Evil Cannot be Reduced to the Ideal.]
+
+Sect. 212. But thus far no reference has been made to error and to evil.
+These are the terms which the ideals of rationality and goodness must
+repudiate if they are to retain their meaning. Nevertheless experience
+contains them and psychology describes them. We have already followed
+the efforts which absolute idealism has made to show that logical
+perfection requires error, and that moral perfection requires evil. Is
+it conceivable that such efforts should be successful? Suppose a higher
+logic to make the principle of contradiction the very bond of
+rationality. What was formerly error is now indispensable to truth. But
+what of the new error--the unbalanced and mistaken thesis, the
+unresolved antithesis, the scattered and disconnected terms of thought?
+These fall outside the new truth as surely as the old error fell outside
+the old truth. And the case of moral goodness is precisely parallel. The
+higher goodness may be so defined as to require failure and sin. Thus it
+may be maintained that there can be no true success without struggle,
+and no true spiritual exaltation except through repentance. But what of
+failure unredeemed, sin unrepented, evil uncompensated and unresolved?
+Nothing has been gained after all but a new definition of goodness--and
+a new definition of evil. And this is an ethical, not a metaphysical
+question. The problem of evil, like the problem of error, is as far from
+solution as ever. Indeed, the very urgency of these problems is due to
+metaphysical absolutism. For this philosophy defines the universe as a
+perfect unity. Measured by the standard of such an ideal universe, the
+parts of finite experience take on a fragmentary and baffling character
+which they would not otherwise possess. The absolute perfection must by
+definition both determine and exclude the imperfect. Thus absolutism
+bankrupts the universe by holding it accountable for what it can never
+pay.
+
+[Sidenote: Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole.]
+
+Sect. 213. If the attempt to construct experience in the special terms
+of some part of experience be abandoned, how is reality to be defined?
+It is evident that in that case there can be no definition of reality as
+such. It must be regarded as a collection of all elements, relations,
+principles, systems, that compose it. All truths will be true of it, and
+it will be the subject of all truths. Reality is at least physical,
+psychical, moral, and rational. That which is physical is not
+necessarily moral or psychical, but may be either or both of these. Thus
+it is a commonplace of experience that what has bulk and weight may or
+may not be good, and may or may not be known. Similarly, that which is
+psychical may or may not be physical, moral, or rational; and that which
+is moral or rational may or may not be physical and psychical. There is,
+then, an indeterminism in the universe, a mere coincidence of
+principles, in that it contains physical, psychical, moral, logical
+orders, without being in all respects either a physical, a psychical, a
+moral, or a logical necessity.[420:13] Reality or experience itself is
+neutral in the sense of being exclusively predetermined by no one of the
+several systems it contains. But the different systems of experience
+retain their specific and proper natures, without the compromise which
+is involved in all attempts to extend some one until it shall embrace
+them all. If such a universe seems inconceivably desultory and chaotic,
+one may always remind one's self by directly consulting experience that
+it is not only found immediately and unreflectively, but returned to and
+lived in after every theoretical excursion.
+
+[Sidenote: Moral Implications of such a Pluralistic Philosophy. Purity
+of the Good.]
+
+Sect. 214. But what implications for life would be contained in such a
+philosophy? Even if it be theoretically clarifying, through being
+hospitable to all differences and adequate to the multifarious demands
+of experience, is it not on that very account morally dreary and
+stultifying? Is not its refusal to establish the universe upon moral
+foundations destructive both of the validity of goodness, and of the
+incentive to its attainment? Certainly not--if the validity of goodness
+be determined by criteria of worth, and if the incentive to goodness be
+the possibility of making that which merely exists, or is necessary,
+also good.
+
+This philosophy does not, it is true, define the good, but it makes
+ethics autonomous, thus distinguishing the good which it defines, and
+saving it from compromise with matter-of-fact, and logical or mechanical
+necessity. The criticism of life is founded upon an independent basis,
+and affords justification, of a selective and exclusive moral idealism.
+Just because it is not required that the good shall be held accountable
+for whatever is real, the ideal can be kept pure and intrinsically
+worthy. The analogy of logic is most illuminating. If it be insisted
+that whatever exists is logically necessary, logical necessity must be
+made to embrace that from which it is distinguished by definition, such
+as contradiction, mere empirical existence, and error. The consequence
+is a logical chaos which has in truth forfeited the name of logic.
+Similarly a goodness defined to make possible the deduction from it of
+moral evil or moral indifference loses the very distinguishing
+properties of goodness. The consequence is an ethical neutrality which
+invalidates the moral will. A metaphysical neutrality, on the other
+hand, although denying that reality as such is predestined to
+morality--and thus affording no possibility of an ethical
+absolutism--becomes the true ground for an ethical purism.
+
+[Sidenote: The Incentive to Goodness.]
+
+Sect. 215. But, secondly, there can be no lack of incentive to goodness
+in a universe which, though not all-good, is in no respect incapable of
+becoming good. That which is mechanically or logically necessary, and
+that which is psychically present, _may be good_. And what can the
+realization of goodness mean if not that what is natural and necessary,
+actual and real, shall be also good. The world is not good, will not be
+good, merely through being what it is, but is or shall be made good
+through the accession of goodness. It is this belief that the real is
+not necessarily, but may be, good; that the ideal is not necessarily,
+but may be, realized; which has inspired every faith in action.
+Philosophically it is only a question of permitting such faith to be
+sincere, or condemning it as shallow. If the world be made good through
+good-will, then the faith of moral action is rational; but if the world
+be good because whatever is must be good, then moral action is a
+tread-mill, and its attendant and animating faith only self-deception.
+Moral endeavor is the elevation of physical and psychical existence to
+the level of goodness.
+
+     "Relate the inheritance to life, convert the tradition into a
+     servant of character, draw upon the history for support in the
+     struggles of the spirit, declare a war of extermination
+     against the total evil of the world; and then raise new armies
+     and organize into fighting force every belief available in the
+     faith that has descended to you."[423:14]
+
+Evil is here a practical, not a theoretical, problem. It is not to be
+solved by thinking it good, for to think it good is to deaden the very
+nerve of action; but by destroying it and replacing it with good.
+
+[Sidenote: The Justification of Faith.]
+
+Sect. 216. The justification of faith is in the promise of reality. For
+what, after all, would be the meaning of a faith which declares that all
+things, good, bad, and indifferent, are everlastingly and necessarily
+what they are--even if it were concluded on philosophical grounds to
+call that ultimate necessity good. Faith has interests; faith is faith
+_in_ goodness or beauty. Then what more just and potent cause of despair
+than the thought that the ideal must be held accountable for error,
+ugliness, and evil, or for the indifferent necessities of
+nature?[424:15] Are ideals to be prized the less, or believed in the
+less, when there is no ground for their impeachment? How much more
+hopeful for what is worth the hoping, that nature should discern ideals
+and take some steps toward realizing them, than that ideals should have
+created nature--such as it is! How much better a report can we give of
+nature for its ideals, than of the ideals for their handiwork, if it be
+nature! Emerson writes:
+
+     "Suffice it for the joy of the universe that we have not
+     arrived at a wall, but at interminable oceans. Our life seems
+     not present so much as prospective; not for the affairs on
+     which it is wasted, but as a hint of this vast-flowing vigor.
+     Most of life seems to be mere advertisement of faculty;
+     information is given us not to sell ourselves cheap; that we
+     are very great. So, in particulars, our greatness is always in
+     a tendency or direction, not in an action. It is for us to
+     believe in the rule, not in the exception. The noble are thus
+     known from the ignoble. So in accepting the leading of the
+     sentiments, it is not what we believe concerning the
+     immortality of the soul or the like, but _the universal
+     impulse to believe_, that is the material circumstance and is
+     the principal fact in the history of the globe."[425:16]
+
+[Sidenote: The Worship and Service of God.]
+
+Sect. 217. If God be rid of the imputation of moral evil and
+indifference, he may be _intrinsically worshipful_, because regarded
+under the form of the highest ideals. And if the great cause of goodness
+be in fact at stake, God may both command the adoration of men through
+his purity, and reenforce their virtuous living through representing to
+them that realization of goodness in the universe at large which both
+contains and exceeds their individual endeavor.
+
+[Sidenote: The Philosopher and the Standards of the Marketplace.]
+
+Sect. 218. Bishop Berkeley wrote in his "Commonplace Book":
+
+     "My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign
+     countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my
+     heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction."
+
+If it be essential to the meaning of philosophy that it should issue
+from life, it is equally essential that it should return to life. But
+this connection of philosophy with life does not mean its reduction to
+the terms of life as conceived in the market-place. Philosophy cannot
+emanate from life, and quicken life, without elevating and ennobling it,
+and will therefore always be incommensurable with life narrowly
+conceived. Hence the philosopher must always be as little understood by
+men of the street as was Thales by the Thracian handmaiden. He has an
+innocence and a wisdom peculiar to his perspective.
+
+     "When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer
+     to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals
+     of anyone, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is
+     laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being
+     praised and glorified, he cannot help laughing very sincerely
+     in the simplicity of his heart; and this again makes him look
+     like a fool. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he
+     fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of
+     cattle--a swineherd, or shepherd, or cowherd, who is being
+     praised for the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them;
+     and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of
+     whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more
+     insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man
+     is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any
+     shepherd, for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a
+     wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed
+     proprietors of ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher
+     deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to
+     think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of
+     family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he has
+     had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that
+     their sentiments only betray the dulness and narrowness of
+     vision of those who utter them, and who are not educated
+     enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man
+     has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them
+     have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and
+     barbarians, many times over."[427:17]
+
+It is not to be expected that the opinion of the "narrow, keen, little,
+legal mind" should appreciate the philosophy which has acquired the
+"music of speech," and hymns "the true life which is lived by immortals
+or men blessed of heaven." Complacency cannot understand reverence, nor
+secularism, religion.
+
+[Sidenote: The Secularism of the Present Age.]
+
+Sect. 219. If we may believe the report of a contemporary philosopher,
+the present age is made insensible to the meaning of life through
+preoccupation with its very achievements:
+
+     "The world of finite interests and objects has rounded itself,
+     as it were, into a separate whole, within which the mind of
+     man can fortify itself, and live _securus adversus deos_, in
+     independence of the infinite. In the sphere of _thought_,
+     there has been forming itself an ever-increasing body of
+     science, which, tracing out the relation of finite things to
+     finite things, never finds it necessary to seek for a
+     beginning or an end to its infinite series of phenomena, and
+     which meets the claims of theology with the saying of the
+     astronomer, 'I do not need that hypothesis.' In the sphere of
+     _action_, again, the complexity of modern life presents a
+     thousand isolated interests, crossing each other in ways too
+     subtle to trace out--interests commercial, social, and
+     political--in pursuing one or other of which the individual
+     may find ample occupation for his existence, without ever
+     feeling the need of any return upon himself, or seeing any
+     reason to ask himself whether this endless striving has any
+     meaning or object beyond itself."[428:18]
+
+[Sidenote: The Value of Contemplation for Life.]
+
+Sect. 220. There is no dignity in living except it be in the solemn
+presence of the universe; and only contemplation can summon such a
+presence. Moreover, the sessions must be not infrequent, for memory is
+short and visions fade. Truth does not require, however, to be followed
+out of the world. There is a speculative detachment from life which is
+less courageous, even if more noble, than worldliness. Such is Dante's
+exalted but mediaeval intellectualism.
+
+     "And it may be said that (as true friendship between men
+     consists in each wholly loving the other) the true philosopher
+     loves every part of wisdom, and wisdom every part of the
+     philosopher, inasmuch as she draws all to herself, and allows
+     no one of his thoughts to wander to other things."
+
+Even though, as Aristotle thought, pure contemplation be alone proper to
+the gods in their perfection and blessedness, for the sublunary world
+this is less worthy than that balance and unity of faculty which
+distinguished the humanity of the Greek.
+
+     "Then," writes Thucydides, "we are lovers of the beautiful,
+     yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without
+     loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and
+     ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avoid
+     poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing
+     nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the
+     State because he takes care of his own household; and even
+     those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea
+     of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in
+     public affairs not as a harmless, but as a useless character;
+     and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges, of
+     a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion,
+     not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained
+     by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar
+     power of thinking before we act, and of acting too, whereas
+     other men are courageous from ignorance, but hesitate upon
+     reflection."[429:19]
+
+Thus life may be broadened and deepened without being made thin and
+ineffectual. As the civil community is related to the individual's
+private interests, so the community of the universe is related to the
+civil community. There is a citizenship in this larger community which
+requires a wider and more generous interest, rooted in a deeper and more
+quiet reflection. The world, however, is not to be left behind, but
+served with a new sense of proportion, with the peculiar fortitude and
+reverence which are the proper fruits of philosophy.
+
+     "This is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge,
+     if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly
+     conjoined and united together than they have been; a
+     conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets: Saturn,
+     the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet
+     of civil society and action."[430:20]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[402:1] Cf. Josiah Royce: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, Lecture
+XII; _The World and the Individual, Second Series_.
+
+[403:2] Cf. Hugo Muensterberg: _Psychology and Life_. The more important
+writings of this school are: _Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten
+Jahrhunderts_, edited by Wilhelm Windelband, and contributed to by
+Windelband, H. Rickert, O. Liebmann, E. Troeltsch, B. Bauch, and others.
+This book contains an excellent bibliography. Also, Rickert: _Der
+Gegenstand der Erkenntnis_; _Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen
+Begriffsbildung_, and other works. Windelband: _Praeludien_; _Geschichte
+und Naturwissenschaft_. Muensterberg: _Grundzuege der Psychologie_.
+Eucken: _Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart_.
+
+[403:3] Cf. F. A. Lange: _History of Materialism_, Book II, Chap. I, on
+_Kant and Materialism_; also Alois Riehl: _Introduction to the Theory of
+Science and Metaphysics_. Translation by Fairbanks. The more important
+writings of this school are: Hermann Cohen: _Kant's Theorie der
+Erfahrung_; _Die Logik der reinen Erkenntniss_, and other works. Paul
+Natorp: _Sozialpaedagogik_; _Einleitung in die Psychologie nach
+kritischer Methode_, and other works. E. Cassirer: _Leibniz' System in
+seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen_. Riehl: _Der philosophische
+Kriticismus, und seine Bedeutung fur die Positive Wissenschaft_. Cf.
+also E. Husserl: _Logische Untersuchungen_.
+
+[404:4] Cf. J. M. E. McTaggart: _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_, Chap.
+III.
+
+[404:5] Cf. Royce: _The Conception of God, Supplementary Essay_, pp.
+135-322; _The World and the Individual, First Series_.
+
+[405:6] This movement began as a criticism of Hegelianism in behalf of
+the human personality. Cf. Andrew Seth: _Hegelianism and Personality_;
+_Man and the Cosmos_; _Two Lectures on Theism_. G. H. Howison: _The
+Limits of Evolution_. The important writings of the more independent
+movement are: William James: _The Will to Believe_. H. Sturt, editor:
+_Personal Idealism, Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of Oxford
+University_. F. C. S. Schiller: _Humanism_. Henri Bergson: _Essai sur
+les donnees immediates de la conscience_; _Matiere et memoire_. This
+movement is closely related to that of _Pragmatism_. See under Sect.
+203.
+
+[406:7] Cf. Bertrand Russell: _Principles of Mathematics_, Vol. I. Among
+the more important writings of this movement are the following:
+Giuseppi Peano: _Formulaire de Mathematique_, published by the _Rivista
+di matematica_, Tom. I-IV. Richard Dedekind: _Was sind und was
+sollen die Zahlen?_ Georg Cantor: _Grundlagen einer allgemeinen
+Mannigfaltigkeitslehre_. Louis Couturat: _De l'Infini Mathematique_, and
+articles in _Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale_. A. N. Whitehead: _A
+Treatise on Universal Algebra_. Heinrich Hertz: _Die Prinzipien der
+Mechanik_. Henri Poincare: _La Science et l'Hypothese_. For the bearing
+of these investigations on philosophy, see Royce: _The Sciences of the
+Ideal_, in _Science_, Vol. XX, No. 510.
+
+[407:8] The term used by Karl Pearson in his _Grammar of Science_.
+
+[408:9] The important English writings of the recent independent
+movement known as _pragmatism_ are: C. S. Peirce: _Illustrations of the
+Logic of Science_, in _Popular Science Monthly_, Vol. XII. W. James:
+_The Pragmatic Method_, in _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
+Scientific Methods_, Vol. I; _Humanism and Truth_, in _Mind_, Vol. XIII,
+N. S.; _The Essence of Humanism_, in _Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc.
+Meth._, Vol. II (with bibliography); _The Will to Believe_. John Dewey:
+_Studies in Logical Theory_. W. Caldwell: _Pragmatism_, in _Mind_, Vol.
+XXV., N. S. See also literature on _personal idealism_, Sect. 201. A
+similar tendency has appeared in France in Bergson, LeRoy, Milhaud, and
+in Germany in Simmel.
+
+[410:10] Cf. Ernst Mach: _Analysis of Sensation_. Translation by
+Williams.
+
+[411:11] Cf. F. H. Bradley: _Appearance and Reality_.
+
+[413:12] Cf. Carstanjen: _Richard Avenarius, and his General Theory of
+Knowledge, Empiriocriticism_. Translation by H. Bosanquet, in _Mind_,
+Vol. VI, N. S. Also James: _Does Consciousness Exist?_ and _A World of
+Pure Experience_, in _Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth_., Vol. I;
+_The Thing and its Relations_, _ibid._, Vol. II.
+
+The standard literature of this movement is unfortunately not available
+in English. Among the more important writings are: R. Avenarius: _Kritik
+der reinen Erfahrung_; _Der menschliche Weltbegriff_, and other works.
+Joseph Petzoldt: _Einfuehrung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung_.
+Ernst Mach: _Die Analyse der Empfindung und das Verhaeltniss des
+Physischen zum Psychischen, 2. Auff._ Wilhelm Schuppe: _Grundriss der
+Erkenntnisstheorie und Logik_. Friedrich Carstanjen: _Einfuehrung in die
+"Kritik der reinen Erfahrung"_--an exposition of Avenarius. Also
+articles by the above, R. Willy, R. v. Schubert-Soldern, and others, in
+the _Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie_.
+
+[420:13] It is not, of course, denied that there may be other orders,
+such as, _e. g._, an aesthetic order; or that there may be definite
+relations between these orders, such as, _e. g._, the psycho-physical
+relation.
+
+[423:14] Quoted from George A. Gordon: _The New Epoch for Faith_, p. 27.
+
+[424:15] Cf. James: _The Will to Believe_, essay on _The Dilemma of
+Determinism, passim_.
+
+[425:16] _Essays, Second Series_, p. 75.
+
+[427:17] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 174-175. Translation by Jowett.
+
+[428:18] E. Caird: _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, pp. 218-219.
+
+[429:19] Translation by Jowett. Quoted by Laurie in his _Pre-Christian
+Education_, p. 213.
+
+[430:20] Bacon: _Advancement of Learning_, Book I.
+
+
+
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+
+The references contained in this bibliography have been selected on the
+score of availability in English for the general reader and beginning
+student of philosophy. But I have sought wherever possible to include
+passages from the great philosophers and men of letters. These are
+placed first in the list, followed by references to contemporary writers
+and secondary sources.
+
+
+CHAPTER I, THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, especially Book VII. Translations by Jowett and
+Vaughan. _Theaetetus_, 172 ff. Translation by Jowett.
+
+ARISTOTLE: _Ethics_, Book X. Translation by Welldon.
+
+MARCUS AURELIUS: _Thoughts._ Translation by Long.
+
+EPICTETUS: _Discourses._ Translation by Long.
+
+BACON: _The Advancement of Learning._
+
+EMERSON: _Representative Men--Plato; or the Philosopher._ _Conduct of
+Life--Culture._ _Essays, Second Series--Experience._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ROYCE, JOSIAH: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ Introduction.
+
+HIBBEN, J. G.: _Problems of Philosophy._ Introduction.
+
+
+CHAPTER II, POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Books II and III. Translation by Jowett. (Criticism
+of the poets as demoralizing.)
+
+WORDSWORTH: _Observations Prefixed to the Second Edition of the Lyrical
+Ballads._
+
+SHELLEY: _Defence of Poetry._
+
+EVERETT, C. C.: _Poetry, Comedy, and Duty._ (discussion of the
+Philosophy of Poetry.) _Essays, Theological and Literary._ (On the
+Poetry of Emerson, Goethe, Tennyson, Browning.)
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _Literature and Philosophy._ (Wordsworth, Dante, Goethe,
+etc.)
+
+ROYCE, JOSIAH: _Studies of Good and Evil._ Essay on _Tennyson and
+Pessimism_.
+
+SANTAYANA, GEORGE: _Poetry and Religion._ (Philosophy of poetry; Greek
+Poetry, Shakespeare, etc.)
+
+SNEATH, E. H.: _Philosophy in Poetry: A Study of Sir John Davies's Poem,
+"Nosce Teipsum."_
+
+
+CHAPTERS III AND IV, RELIGION.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Book III. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+(Criticism of religion from the stand-point of morality and politics.)
+
+ST. AUGUSTINE: _Confessions._ Translation by Pusey. (Document of
+religious experience.)
+
+THOMAS A KEMPIS: _Imitation of Christ._ Translation by Stanhope.
+(Mediaeval programme of personal religion.)
+
+SPINOZA: _Theological-political Treatise._ Translation by Elwes. (One of
+the first great pleas for religious liberty and one of the first
+attempts to define the _essential_ in religion.)
+
+KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason--the Canon of Pure Reason_. Translation
+by Max Mueller. _Critique of Practical Reason._ Translation by Abbott in
+_Theory of Ethics_. (Defines religion as the province of faith,
+distinguishes it from knowledge, and relates it to morality.)
+
+SCHLEIERMACHER: _On Religion._ _Speeches to its Cultured Despisers._
+Translation by Oman. (Ponderous, dogmatic in its philosophy, but
+profound and sympathetic in its understanding of religion.)
+
+ARNOLD: _Literature and Dogma._ (On the essence of religion as
+exemplified in Judaism and Christianity.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+SABATIER, A.: _Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based on Psychology
+and History._ Translation by Seed. _Religions of Authority and the
+Religion of the Spirit._ Translation by Houghton. (These books emphasize
+the essential importance of the believer's attitude to God.)
+
+JAMES, WILLIAM: _The Varieties of Religious Experience._ (A rich
+storehouse of religion, sympathetically interpreted.)
+
+EVERETT, C. C.: _The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith._ (A
+study in the definition and meaning of religion.)
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _Evolution of Religion._ (Indoctrinated with the author's
+idealistic philosophy.)
+
+FIELDING, H.: _The Hearts of Men._ (A plea for the universal religion.
+Special feeling for Indian religions.)
+
+HARNACK, A.: _What is Christianity?_ Translation by Saunders. (Attempt
+to define the _essence_ of Christianity.)
+
+PALMER, G. H.: _The Field of Ethics_, Chapters V and VI. (On the
+relation of ethics and religion.)
+
+BROWN, W. A.: _The Essence of Christianity._ (Special study of the
+definition of religion.)
+
+JASTROW, M.: _The Study of Religion._ (Method of history and psychology
+of religion.)
+
+SMITH, W. ROBERTSON: _The Religion of the Semites._ (Excellent study of
+tribal religions.)
+
+CLARKE, W. N.: _What Shall We Think of Christianity?_ (An interpretation
+of Christianity.)
+
+LEUBA, J. H.: _Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion._ In
+_The Monist_, Vol. XI, p. 195.
+
+STARBUCK, E. D.: _The Psychology of Religion._
+
+
+CHAPTER V, THE PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM OF SCIENCE.[434:A]
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Book VII, 526 ff. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+_Phaedo_, 96 ff. Translation by Jowett.
+
+BERKELEY: _Alciphron_, the Fourth Dialogue. _Siris_, especially 234-264.
+(On the failure of the scientist to grasp the deeper truth respecting
+causes and substances.)
+
+DESCARTES: _Discourse on Method._ Translation by Veitch.
+
+SPINOZA: _On the Improvement of the Understanding._ Translation by
+Elwes.
+
+KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason--Transcendental Aesthetic_ and
+_Transcendental Analytic._ Translation by Max Mueller. (Studies of the
+Method of Science.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+WARD, JAMES: _Naturalism and Agnosticism._ (Full but clear account of
+recent development of natural science, and criticism of its use as
+philosophy.)
+
+MACH, ERNST: _Science of Mechanics._ (Historical and methodological.)
+
+JAMES, WILLIAM: _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II, Chap. xxviii.
+(Emphasizes the practical interest underlying science.)
+
+ROYCE, JOSIAH: _The World and the Individual, Second Series, Man and
+Nature._ (Interpretation of the province of natural science from the
+stand-point of absolute idealism.)
+
+PEARSON, KARL: _The Grammar of Science._ (The limits of science from the
+scientific stand-point.)
+
+CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: On the Aims and Instruments of
+Scientific Thought; The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences; On the Ethics
+of Belief._
+
+HUXLEY, T. H.: _Method and Results._ (The positivistic position.)
+
+MUENSTERBERG, HUGO: _Psychology and Life._ (Epistemological limitations
+of natural science applied to psychology, from idealistic stand-point.)
+
+FULLERTON, G. E.: _A System of Metaphysics_, Part II.
+
+TAYLOR, A. E.: _Elements of Metaphysics_, Book III.
+
+
+CHAPTERS VI AND VII, THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
+
+PLATO: _Dialogues_, especially _Protagoras_ and _Theaetetus_.
+Translation by Jowett. (The actual genesis of special problems.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+KUELPE, OSWALD: _Introduction to Philosophy._ Translation by Pillsbury
+and Titchener. (Full and accurate account of the traditional terms and
+doctrines of philosophy.)
+
+HIBBEN, J. G.: _Problems of Philosophy._ (Brief and elementary.)
+
+SIDGWICK, HENRY: _Philosophy, its Scope and Relations._
+
+PAULSEN, FRIEDRICH: _Introduction to Philosophy._ Translation by Thilly.
+
+BALDWIN, J. M.: _Dictionary of Philosophy._ (Full, and convenient for
+reference.)
+
+FERRIER, J. F.: _Lectures on Greek Philosophy._ (Interpretation of the
+beginning and early development of philosophy.)
+
+BURNET, J.: _Early Greek Philosophy._ Translation of the sources.
+
+FAIRBANKS, A.: _The First Philosophers of Greece._
+
+GOMPERZ, TH.: _Greek Thinkers_, Vol. I. Translation by Magnus. (On the
+first development of philosophical problems.)
+
+PALMER, G. H.: _The Field of Ethics._ (On the relations of the ethical
+problem.)
+
+PUFFER, ETHEL: _The Psychology of Beauty._ (On the relations of the
+aesthetical problem.)
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII, NATURALISM.[436:A]
+
+LUCRETIUS: _On the Nature of Things._ Translation by Munro. (Early
+materialism.)
+
+HOBBES: _Metaphysical System._ Edited by Calkins. _Leviathan_, Part I.
+(Modern materialism.)
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+BUECHNER, LOUIS: _Force and Matter._ Translation by Collingwood.
+(Nineteenth century materialism.)
+
+JANET, PAUL: _Materialism of the Present Day._ Translation by Masson.
+
+LANGE, F. A.: _History of Materialism._ Translation by Thomas.
+
+HAECKEL, ERNST: _The Riddle of the Universe._ Translation by McCabe.
+("Monism of Energy.")
+
+CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: The Ethics of Belief; Cosmic
+Emotion; Body and Mind._ (Positivism.)
+
+HUXLEY, T. H.: _Evolution and Ethics; Prolegomena._ (Distinguishes
+between the moral and natural.) _Science and Hebrew Tradition_; _Science
+and Christian Tradition_. (Controversies of the naturalist with
+Gladstone and Duke of Argyle.)
+
+SPENCER, HERBERT: _First Principles._ (The systematic evolutionary
+philosophy.) _Principles of Ethics._ (Ethics of naturalism.) _The Nature
+and Reality of Religion._ (Controversy with Frederick Harrison.)
+
+BALFOUR, A. J.: _Foundations of Belief_, Part I. (On the religious,
+moral, and aesthetic consequences of naturalism.)
+
+PATER, WALTER: _Marius the Epicurean._ (Refined hedonism.)
+
+ROMANES, G. J.: _Thoughts on Religion._ (Approached from stand-point of
+science.)
+
+BENTHAM, J.: _Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
+Legislation._ (Utilitarian.)
+
+STEPHEN, L.: _Science of Ethics._ (Evolutionary and social.)
+
+
+CHAPTER IX, SUBJECTIVISM.
+
+PLATO: _Theaetetus._ Translation by Jowett. (Exposition and criticism of
+Protagoras.)
+
+BERKELEY: _Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_; _Principles of
+Human Knowledge_.
+
+HUME: _An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding._
+
+SCHOPENHAUER: _The World as Will and Idea._ Translation by Haldane and
+Kemp.
+
+MILL, J. S.: _An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_,
+X-XIII.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: On the Nature of Things in
+Themselves._ (Panpsychism.)
+
+DEUSSEN, PAUL: _Elements of Metaphysics._ Translation by Duff.
+(Following Schopenhauer and Oriental philosophy.)
+
+PAULSEN, FR.: _Introduction to Philosophy._ (Panpsychism.)
+
+STRONG, C. A.: _Why the Mind Has a Body._ (Panpsychism.)
+
+JAMES, WILLIAM: _Reflex Action and Theism_, in _The Will to Believe_.
+(Morality and religion of individualism.)
+
+
+CHAPTER X, ABSOLUTE REALISM.
+
+PARMENIDES: _Fragments._ Arrangement and translation by Burnet or
+Fairbanks.
+
+PLATO: _Republic_, Books VI and VII. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan.
+_Symposium_, _Phaedrus_, _Phaedo_, _Philebus_. Translation by Jowett.
+
+ARISTOTLE[437:A]: _Psychology._ Translations by Hammond and Wallace.
+_Ethics._ Translation by Welldon.
+
+SPINOZA: _Ethics_, especially Parts I and V. Translations by Elwes and
+Willis.
+
+LEIBNIZ: _Monadology_, and Selections. Translation by Latta. _Discourse
+on Metaphysics._ Translation by Montgomery.
+
+MARCUS AURELIUS: _Thoughts._ Translation by Long.
+
+EPICTETUS: _Discourses._ Translation by Long.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers._
+(The central conceptions of Plato and Aristotle.)
+
+JOACHIM: _A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza._
+
+
+CHAPTER XI, ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.
+
+DESCARTES: _Meditations._ Translation by Veitch.
+
+KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason._ Translation by Max Mueller. _Critique
+of Practical Reason._ Translation by Abbott, in Kant's _Theory of
+Ethics_.
+
+FICHTE[437:A]: _Science of Ethics._ Translation by Kroeger. _Popular
+Works: The Nature of the Scholar_; _The Vocation of Man_; _The Doctrine
+of Religion_. Translation by Smith.
+
+SCHILLER: _Aesthetic Letters, Essays, and Philosophical Letters._
+Translation by Weiss. (Romanticism.)
+
+HEGEL[437:A]: _Ethics._ Translation by Sterrett. _Logic._ Translation,
+with Introduction, by Wallace. _Philosophy of Mind._ Translation, with
+Introduction, by Wallace. _Philosophy of Religion._ Translation by
+Spiers and Sanderson. _Philosophy of Right._ Translation by Dyde.
+
+GREEN, T. H.: _Prolegomena to Ethics._
+
+EMERSON: _The Conduct of Life--Fate._ _Essays, First Series--The
+Over-Soul; Circles._ _Essays, Second Series--The Poet; Experience;
+Nature._ (The appreciation of life consistent with absolute idealism.)
+
+WORDSWORTH: _Poems_, _passim_.
+
+COLERIDGE: _Aids to Reflection._ _The Friend._
+
+ROYCE, J.: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ (Sympathetic exposition of
+Kant, Fichte, Romanticism, and Hegel.) _The Conception of God._ (The
+epistemological argument.) _The World and the Individual, First Series._
+(Systematic development of absolute idealism; its moral and religious
+aspects.)
+
+CAIRD, EDWARD: _The Critical Philosophy of Kant._ (Exposition and
+interpretation from stand-point of later idealism.)
+
+EVERETT, C. C.: _Fichte's Science of Knowledge._
+
+MCTAGGART, J. M. E.: _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic._ Studies in
+Hegelian Cosmology.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[434:A] For further contemporary writings on this topic, see foot-notes
+under Sects. 199, 200, 203.
+
+[436:A] For histories of philosophy, see supplementary bibliography at
+end.
+
+[437:A] The Metaphysics of Aristotle, Fichte, and Hegel must be found by
+the English reader mainly in the secondary sources.
+
+
+
+
+SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
+
+
+I.--GENERAL.
+
+ROGERS: _Student's History of Philosophy._ (Elementary and clear;
+copious quotations.)
+
+WEBER: _History of Philosophy._ Translation by Thilly. (Comprehensive
+and compact.)
+
+WINDELBAND: _A History of Philosophy._ Translation by Tufts. (Emphasis
+upon the problems and their development.)
+
+ERDMANN: _History of Philosophy._ Translation edited by Hough; in three
+volumes. (Detailed and accurate exposition.)
+
+UEBERWEG: _A History of Philosophy._ Translation by Morris and Porter,
+in two volumes. (Very complete; excellent account of the literature.)
+
+
+II.--SPECIAL PERIODS.
+
+FERRIER: _Lectures on Greek Philosophy._ (Excellent introduction.)
+
+MARSHALL: _Short History of Greek Philosophy._ (Brief and clear.)
+
+WINDELBAND: _History of Ancient Philosophy._ Translation by Cushman.
+(Very accurate and scholarly; also brief.)
+
+ZELLER: _Pre-Socratic Philosophy._ Translation by Alleyne. _Socrates and
+the Socratic Schools._ Translation by Reichel. (Full and accurate.)
+
+GOMPERZ: _Greek Thinkers._ Translated by Magnus, in four volumes. (Very
+full; especially on Plato. Goes no further than Plato.)
+
+BURNET: _Early Greek Philosophy._ (Translations of fragments, with
+commentary.)
+
+FAIRBANKS: _The First Philosophers of Greece._ (Translations of
+fragments, with commentary.)
+
+TURNER: _History of Philosophy._ (Excellent account of Scholastic
+philosophy.)
+
+ROYCE: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ (Very illuminating
+introductory exposition of modern idealism.)
+
+FALCKENBERG: _History of Modern Philosophy._
+
+HOEFFDING: _History of Modern Philosophy._ Translation by Meyer, in two
+volumes. (Full and good.)
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+  ABSOLUTE, the, 307, 309, 332, 391, 392, 400, 404;
+    being, 308;
+    substance, 312;
+    ideal, 326;
+    spirit, 349 (_note_), 358 ff.;
+    mind, 349 (_note_), 358, 380, 322 ff.
+
+  ABSOLUTE IDEALISM, chap. xi;
+    general meaning, 177, 349 (_note_), 400;
+    criticism of, 349, 365, 385, 411, 416;
+    epistemology of, 368 ff.;
+    as related to Kant, 380;
+    direct argument for, 383;
+    ethics of, 386 ff.;
+    religion of, 390 ff.;
+    of present day, 402 ff., 410.
+
+  ABSOLUTE REALISM, chap. x;
+    general meaning, 306 (_note_), 400;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 346;
+    criticism of, 338, 416.
+
+  ABSTRACT, the, 139.
+
+  ACTIVITY, 209, 285, 295.
+
+  AESTHETICS, 189.
+
+  AGNOSTICISM, 168, 252 ff.
+
+  ANAXAGORAS, 239;
+    quoted, 162.
+
+  ANAXIMANDER, 224.
+
+  ANSELM, SAINT, 200.
+
+  ANTHROPOMORPHISM, 109.
+
+  APPRECIATION, 25, 402.
+
+  ARISTOTLE, in formal logic, 186;
+    ethics of, 195, 345;
+    psychology of, 208;
+    philosophy of, 306, 332 ff.;
+    and Plato, 333, 336;
+    and Spinoza, 336;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    religion of, 346, 429;
+    on evil, 353.
+
+  ATOMISM, 166, 229.
+    Also see under LEUCIPPUS, and DEMOCRITUS.
+
+  ATTITUDE, 62.
+
+  ATTRIBUTE, in Spinoza, 312 ff.
+
+  AUGUSTINE, SAINT,
+    on communion with God, 68;
+    on pietism, 195;
+    his conception of self, 372.
+
+  AUTOMATISM, 248.
+
+
+  BAAL, religion of, 88.
+
+  BACON, FRANCIS, on thought and action, 430.
+
+  BALFOUR, A. J., on materialism, 264.
+
+  BEAUTY, in aesthetics, 189;
+    in Plato, 327, 332.
+
+  BEING, Eleatic conception of, 308 ff.
+
+  BELIEF, key to definition of religion, 58;
+    general characters applied to religion, 59 ff.;
+    in persons and dispositions, 62;
+    examples of religions, 66 ff.;
+    object of religions, 65, 82, 97;
+    relation to logic, 182, 183.
+
+  BENTHAM, 262.
+
+  BERKELEY, on idealism, 176;
+    relation to common-sense, 267;
+    his refutation of material substance, 275 ff.;
+    epistemology of, 277, 296, 369;
+    theory of mathematics, 279;
+    his spiritualism, 280, 284, 292;
+    his conception of God, 284, 293;
+    ethics of, 302;
+    religion of, 304.
+
+  BUDDHISM, 78.
+
+
+  CAUSE, in science, 131;
+    God as first, 203;
+    of motion, 231 ff.;
+    spirit as, 293 ff.
+
+  CHRISTIANITY, persistence of, 76;
+    essence of, 86;
+    development from Judaism, 94;
+    ethics of, 195, 198, 386;
+    idea of God in, 200 ff., 205;
+    emphasis on self-consciousness in, 372.
+
+  COMTE, 115.
+
+  CONTEMPLATION, 428.
+
+  CONVERSION, 69 ff.
+
+  CORPOREAL BEING, 224;
+    processes of, 225;
+    Berkeley's critique of, 278;
+    historical conceptions of, 229.
+
+  COSMOLOGICAL PROOF, the, of God, 203.
+
+  COSMOLOGY, general meaning of, 159;
+    mechanism in, 161, 225;
+    teleology in, 161.
+
+  COSMOS, origin of, 242.
+
+  CRITICAL METHOD, 319 ff.
+
+  CYNICISM, 259.
+
+  CYRENAICISM, 259.
+
+
+  DANTE, as philosopher-poet, 42 ff.;
+    general meaning of the _Divine Comedy_, 43;
+    and Thomas Aquinas, 43, 46;
+    his vision of the ways of God, 46;
+    on contemplation, 428.
+
+  DARWIN, 204.
+
+  DEISM, 207.
+
+  DEMOCRITUS, 247.
+    Also see ATOMISM.
+
+  DESCARTES, on function of philosophy, 154;
+    dualism of, 272, 412;
+    his theory of space and matter, 229;
+    automatism of, 248;
+    epistemology of, 341, 375;
+    his conception of self, 374.
+
+  DESCRIPTION, as method of science, 128.
+
+  DIALECTIC, in Plato, 320;
+    in Hegel, 361.
+
+  DIOGENES, 259.
+
+  DOGMATISM, 167.
+
+  DUALISM, general meaning, 162;
+    of Descartes, 272, 412.
+
+  DUTY, 196, 356, 360, 386.
+
+
+  ECLECTICISM, contemporary, 398 ff., 413.
+
+  ELEATICS.
+    See under PARMENIDES, and ZENO.
+
+  EMERSON, on spirit, 359;
+    on nature, 364;
+    on absolute, 392;
+    on necessity, 393;
+    on faith, 424.
+
+  EMPIRICISM, general meaning, 168;
+    in logic, 187;
+    in naturalism, 252 ff.;
+    of Locke, 274;
+    of Berkeley, 274 ff.
+
+  ENERGY, development of, conception of, 236 ff.
+
+  EPISTEMOLOGY, relation to metaphysics, 150;
+    definition of, 164;
+    fundamental problems of, 168, 172;
+    argument for God from, 202;
+    of naturalism, 248, 252 ff., 257;
+    of Descartes, 273, 341, 375;
+    of Berkeley, 277, 296;
+    of absolute realism, 339, 351;
+    of Leibniz, 340, 341;
+    of Plato, 340, 341;
+    of Hume, 376;
+    of Aristotle, 340, 341;
+    of absolute idealism, 351, 368 ff.;
+    of present day, 408 ff.
+
+  ETERNAL, the, 309.
+
+  ETHER, 230.
+
+  ETHICS, relation to metaphysics, 151, 196 ff., 360;
+    its origin in Socratic method, 181;
+    definition of, 191;
+    special problems and theories in, 191 ff.;
+    of Socrates, 192, 194;
+    of Aristotle, 195, 345;
+    of naturalism, 258 ff.;
+    of subjectivism, 298 ff.;
+    of Schopenhauer, 299;
+    argument for God from, 203;
+    individualism in, 301;
+    pluralism in, 302, 421;
+    of Stoics and Spinoza, 342;
+    Platonic, 342;
+    of Kant, 386;
+    of absolute idealism, 388.
+
+  EUDAEMONISM, 195.
+
+  EVIL, PROBLEM OF, 317, 336, 339, 352, 365 ff.;
+    in Greek philosophy, 352;
+    in absolute idealism, 367, 418.
+
+  EVOLUTION, of cosmos, 242 ff.;
+    of morality, 262.
+
+  EXPERIENCE, 410, 411, 412;
+    analysis of, by Kant, 354.
+
+
+  FAITH, 424;
+    special interests of, 199.
+    See also RELIGION and BELIEF.
+
+  FERGUSON, CHAS., quoted, 265.
+
+  FICHTE, 360, 402.
+
+  FIELDING, H., quoted on religion, 59, 74.
+
+  FORCE, development of conception of, 231 ff.
+
+  FORM, in Aristotle, 334.
+
+  FREEDOM, in ethics, 196, 388;
+    meanings and theories, 211.
+
+
+  GOD, as guarantee of ideals, 18, 425;
+    personality of, 62, 108 ff.;
+    St. Augustine's communion with, 68;
+    presence of, 68;
+    as a disposition from which consequences may be expected, 85;
+    meaning of, in religion, 87;
+    idea of, in Judaism and Christianity, 92;
+    why historical, 102;
+    social relation with, 103;
+    the ontological proof of, 200;
+    ethical and epistemological arguments for, 202;
+    cosmological proof of, 203;
+    teleological proof of, 204;
+    relation to the world, in theism, pantheism and deism, 205 ff.;
+    will of, 212;
+    conception of, in Berkeley, 284, 293 ff.;
+    conception and proof of, in Spinoza, 312 ff., 392, 393;
+    conception of, in Plato, 331, 352, 391, 393;
+    conception of, in Leibniz, 338, 353.
+    Also see ABSOLUTE.
+
+  GOETHE, on Spinoza, and on philosophy, 51;
+    on pragmatism, 407.
+
+  GOOD, the, theories of, in ethics, 191 ff.;
+    and the real, 326 ff., 421 ff.
+
+  GREEK, religion, in Homer and Lucretius, 89;
+    ideals, 195, 198, 429.
+
+  GREEN, T. H., quoted, 369, 385 (_note_).
+
+
+  HAECKEL, quoted, 236, 266.
+
+  HEDONISM, 192.
+
+  HEGEL, on science, 129;
+    philosophy of, 150, 361 ff.;
+    relation to Kant, 381;
+    on the absolute, 382;
+    ethics of, 390.
+
+  HERACLITUS, 308.
+
+  HISTORY, philosophy of, in Hegel, 363.
+
+  HOBBES, his misconception of relations of philosophy and science, 115;
+    quoted on ethics, 261.
+
+  Holbach, 251, 252.
+
+  HOMER, on Greek religion, 90.
+
+  HUMANISM, 320, 404, 405.
+
+  HUME, positivism of, 115, 377;
+    phenomenalism of, 283;
+    and Descartes, 376.
+
+  HUXLEY, quoted, 255, 266.
+
+  HYLOZOISM, 225.
+
+
+  IDEAL, the, in Plato, 326;
+    validity of, 416.
+
+  IDEALISM, various meanings of term, 173 (_note_);
+    meaning of, as theory of knowledge, 175 ff., 409;
+    of present day, 409 ff.;
+    empirical, see SUBJECTIVISM, PHENOMENALISM, SPIRITUALISM;
+    absolute, see ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.
+
+  IDEALS, in life, 10 ff.;
+    adoption of, 17 ff.
+
+  IDEAS, the, in Plato, 329.
+
+  IMAGINATION, in poetry, 99;
+    place of, in religion, 80, 97 ff.;
+    special functions of, in religion, 101 ff.;
+    scope of, in religion, 105 ff.;
+    and the personality of God, 110.
+
+  IMITATIO CHRISTI, quoted, 68.
+
+  IMMANENCE THEORY, 412, 413.
+
+  IMMORTALITY, 212.
+
+  INDIVIDUALISM, 301, 320, 338, 404.
+
+  INTUITIONISM, in ethics, 196.
+
+
+  JAMES, WILLIAM, quoted on religion, 65, 71, 305.
+
+  JUDAISM, development of, 92;
+    and Christianity, 94.
+
+
+  KANT, his transcendentalism, 177, 356;
+    his critique of knowledge, 354 ff., 377 ff.;
+    and absolute idealism, 380;
+    ethics of, 386.
+
+  KEPLER, quoted, 129.
+
+  KNOWLEDGE, of the means in life, 8;
+    of the end, 10;
+    in poetry, 27 ff.;
+    in religion, 82, 85, 97, 105;
+    general theory of, on epistemology, 164 ff.;
+    problem of source and criterion of, 168 ff.;
+    problem of relation to its object, 172 ff., 277, 340, 351, 368 ff.;
+    relation of logic to, 183 ff.;
+    account of, in naturalism, 253 ff.
+    Also see EPISTEMOLOGY.
+
+
+  LA METTRIE, quoted, 250.
+
+  LA PLACE, 242; quoted, 241.
+
+  LEIBNIZ, on function of philosophy, 155;
+    philosophy of, 333, 336 ff.;
+    epistemology of, 339.
+
+  LEUCIPPUS, quoted, 161.
+
+  LIFE, as a starting-point for thought, 3;
+    definition of, 5 ff.;
+    and self-consciousness, 6;
+    philosophy of 17 ff., 153;
+    mechanical theory of, 244 ff.;
+    return of philosophy to, 427 ff.;
+    contemplation in, 428.
+
+  LOCKE, epistemology of, 273.
+
+  LOGIC, origin in Socratic method, 181;
+    affiliations of, 182, 188;
+    definition of, 183;
+    parts of formal, 184 ff.;
+    present tendencies in, 187 ff.;
+    algebra of, 189.
+
+  LUCRETIUS, his criticism of Greek religion, quoted, 89 ff.;
+    on mechanism, 226, 240.
+
+
+  MCTAGGART, J. M. E., on Hegel, 367;
+    on the absolute, 391.
+
+  MACH, E., 283;
+    on philosophy and science, 120.
+
+  MALEBRANCHE, 376.
+
+  MARCUS AURELIUS, 348.
+
+  MATERIALISM, 254, 256;
+    general meaning, 223, 414;
+    development, 224 ff.;
+    and science, 228;
+    French, 249;
+    theory of mind in, 250.
+
+  MATHEMATICS, importance in science, 132;
+    logic in, 188;
+    Berkeley's conception of, 279;
+    Plato's conception of, 329, 335;
+    Spinoza's conception of, 311, 335.
+
+  MATTER, 225, 228;
+    and space, 229;
+    Berkeley's refutation of, 275 ff.;
+    in Plato and Aristotle, 334.
+
+  MECHANICAL THEORY, practical significance of its extension to the
+      world at large, 20;
+    in cosmology, 161, 225;
+    of Descartes, 231;
+    of Newton 232;
+    of origin of cosmos, 242;
+    of life, 244;
+    in Spinoza, 336.
+
+  METAPHYSICS, relation to epistemology, 150;
+    relation to ethics, 151, 196 ff.;
+    definition of, 158;
+    relation to logic, 188;
+    relation to theology, 207;
+    present tendencies in, 399 ff., 408.
+
+  MILL, J. S., 283 (_note_).
+
+  MIND, explanation of in naturalism, 237, 247 ff.;
+    of God, in Berkeley, 284, 294, 296;
+    absolute, 349 (_note_), 358, 382 ff.
+    Also see under SELF, and SOUL.
+
+  MODE, in Spinoza, 313.
+
+  MONADS, in Leibniz, 338.
+
+  MONISM, 159, 163.
+
+  MORALITY, and religion, 73;
+    grounds of, according to Kant, 356;
+    incentive to, 422.
+
+  MYSTICISM, general account, 171;
+    Schopenhauer's, 290;
+    types of religions, 391.
+
+
+  NAEGELI, C. v., quoted, 287.
+
+  NATURAL SCIENCE, true relations of, with philosophy, 116;
+    sphere of, with reference to philosophy, 117 ff.;
+    philosophy of, its procedure, 121, 135, 142, 154, 401;
+    origin of, as special interest, 123 ff.;
+    human value of, 126, 127, 143;
+    method and fundamental conceptions of, 406, 128 ff.;
+    general development of, 134;
+    limits of, because abstract, 136 ff., 414;
+    validity of, 142;
+    logic and, 188;
+    development of conceptions in, 229 ff.;
+    grounds of, according to Kant, 355, 377;
+    Hume on, 377;
+    permanence and progress in, 395 ff.
+
+  NATURAL SELECTION, 204, 245.
+
+  NATURALISM, chap. viii;
+    general meaning, 217, 223 (_note_), 399;
+    claims of, 239;
+    task of, 241;
+    criticism of, 117, 257, 263;
+    of present day, 405, 412.
+    Also see under MATERIALISM, and POSITIVISM.
+
+  NATURE, 160, 244, 337;
+    in Berkeley, 294;
+    in Spinoza, 317, 338;
+    in Hegel, 363;
+    in Kant, 377 ff.;
+    in contemporary philosophy, 401.
+    Also see NATURAL SCIENCE, and NATURALISM.
+
+  NEBULAR HYPOTHESIS, 242.
+
+  NECESSITY, of will, 211;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 393.
+
+  NEO-FICHTEANS, 402, 403 (_note_).
+
+  NEO-KANTIANS, 403.
+
+  NEWTON, 232, 235, 242, 355, 377.
+
+  NORMATIVE SCIENCES, the, 180.
+
+
+  OMAR KHAYYAM, quoted, 16;
+    as a philosopher-poet, 36.
+
+  ONTOLOGICAL PROOF, of God, 200.
+
+  ONTOLOGY, 159.
+
+  OPTIMISM, 104, 388, 422, 424.
+
+
+  PANPSYCHISM, 176, 238, 285 ff.
+
+  PANTHEISM, in primitive religion, 78;
+    general meaning, 205;
+    types of, 390.
+
+  PARKER, THEODORE, quoted on religion, 67.
+
+  PARMENIDES, and rationalism, 168;
+    philosophy of, 308 ff., 337;
+    and Aristotle, 336.
+
+  PATER, WALTER, on Wordsworth, 38;
+    on Cyrenaicism, 260;
+    on subjectivism, 270.
+
+  PAULSEN, FRIEDRICH, ethics of, quoted, 302.
+
+  PEARSON, KARL, quoted, 230.
+
+  PERCEPTION. See SENSE-PERCEPTION.
+
+  PERSONAL IDEALISM, 404, 405.
+
+  PERSONALITY, of God, important in understanding of religion, 62;
+    essential to religion? 108 ff.
+
+  PERSONS, description of belief in, 62;
+    imagination of, 101, 110.
+
+  PESSIMISM, 104, 299, 424.
+
+  PHENOMENALISM, general meaning, 176, 267 (_note_);
+    of Berkeley, 272, 275 ff.;
+    of Hume, 283;
+    various tendencies in, 281.
+
+  PHILOSOPHER, the practical man and the, chap. i;
+    the role of the, 306, 426.
+
+  PHILOSOPHY, commonly misconceived, 3;
+    of the devotee, 13;
+    of the man of affairs, 14;
+    of the voluptuary, 16;
+    of life, its general meaning, 17 ff., 153;
+    its relations with poetry, chap. ii, 112;
+    lack of, in Shakespeare, 33;
+    as expression of personality, 33;
+    as premature, 33;
+    in poetry of Omar Khayyam, 36;
+    in poetry of Wordsworth, 38 ff.;
+    in poetry of Dante, 42 ff.;
+    difference between philosophy and poetry, 48 ff.;
+    in religion, 108 ff.;
+    compared with religion, 112;
+    true attitude of, toward science, 116;
+    sphere of, in relation to science, 117, 395 ff.;
+    procedure of, with reference to science, 121, 135, 142, 154, 160;
+    human value of, 143, 426 ff.;
+    can its problem be divided? 149, 155;
+    origin of, 157;
+    special problems of, chap. vi, vii;
+    and psychology, 216;
+    peculiar object of, 308;
+    self-criticism in, 319 ff., 325;
+    permanence and progress in, 395 ff.;
+    contemporary, 398 ff.
+
+  PHYSICAL.
+    See CORPOREAL BEING, MATERIALISM, etc.
+
+  PHYSIOLOGY, 246.
+
+  PIETY, description and interpretation of, 72;
+    in ethics, 195.
+
+  PLATO, on Protagoras, 167, 269, 270, 298;
+    quoted, on Socrates, 170, 192, 194;
+    historical preparation for, 324;
+    psychology of, 209;
+    philosophy of, 306, 318, 326 ff., 382;
+    and Aristotle, 333;
+    and Spinoza, 318, 335;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 346, 391, 393;
+    on evil, 352;
+    on spirit, 359;
+    on reason and perception, 370;
+    on the philosopher, 426.
+
+  PLURALISM, general meaning of, 159, 163, 419;
+    in ethics, 302, 421 ff.;
+    in religion, 304.
+
+  POETRY, relations with philosophy, chap. ii;
+    as appreciation, 25;
+    virtue of sincerity in, 27;
+    the "barbarian" in, 28;
+    constructive knowledge in, 30;
+    difference between philosophy and, 48 ff.
+
+  POSITIVISM, on relation of philosophy and science, 115, 122;
+    general meaning of, 168, 234, 252 ff., 412.
+
+  PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE, of means, 8 ff.;
+    of end or purpose, 10 ff.;
+    implied in religion, 85, 97;
+    philosophy as, 153.
+
+  PRACTICAL MAN, the, and the philosopher, chap. i;
+    his failure to understand philosophy, 3;
+    his ideal, 14;
+    virtually a philosopher, 22.
+
+  PRAGMATISM, 151, 407, 408.
+
+  PRAYER, 103.
+
+  PREDICTION, in science, 130.
+
+  PRESENT DAY, philosophy of the, 398 ff.
+
+  PROTAGORAS, scepticism of, 166, 271;
+    subjectivism of, 269;
+    ethics of, 298.
+
+  PSYCHOLOGY, of religion, 58, 82;
+    inadequate to religion, 82;
+    as branch of philosophy, 208 ff., 216;
+    as natural science, 213;
+    affiliations of, 215;
+    limits of, 415.
+
+  PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM, 215, 252.
+
+  PURPOSE, in life, 10 ff.;
+    adoption of life-purpose, 17 ff.;
+    practical significance of, in the world at large, 20.
+    Also see TELEOLOGY, IDEAL, etc.
+
+
+  QUALITIES, primary and secondary, 254, 274, 277.
+
+
+  RATIONALISM, general meaning, 168, 416;
+    in logic, 180, 184;
+    in ethics, 193;
+    of eleatics, 310;
+    of Spinoza, 311;
+    in absolute realism, 339;
+    criticism of, 418.
+
+  REALISM, various meanings of term, 173 (_note_);
+    meaning of, as theory of knowledge, 172;
+    of Parmenides, 308 ff.;
+    of Plato and Aristotle, 341;
+    of present day, 409 ff.
+
+  REASON, 370.
+    See RATIONALISM.
+
+  RELATIVISM, 166, 267 ff.;
+    in ethics, 298.
+
+  RELIGION, chaps. iii, iv;
+    relation to poetry and philosophy, 49, 52;
+    difficulty of defining, 53;
+    possibility of defining, 54;
+    profitableness of defining, 54;
+    true method of defining, 56;
+    misconceptions of, 56;
+    as possessing the psychological character of belief, 59 ff.;
+    degree of, in individuals and moods, 60, 61;
+    definition of, as belief in disposition of universe, 64 ff., 82;
+    and morality, 73;
+    symbolism in, 75;
+    prophet and preacher of, 75;
+    conveyance of, 76;
+    primitive, 77;
+    Buddhism, 78;
+    the critical or enlightened type of, 80;
+    means to be true, 82 ff.;
+    implies a practical truth, 85;
+    cases of truth and error in, 88 ff.;
+    of Baal, 88;
+    Greek, 89;
+    of Jews, its development, 92;
+    Christian, 94;
+    definition of cognitive factor in, 97;
+    place of imagination in, 80, 97 ff.;
+    special functions of imagination in, 101 ff.;
+    relation of imagination and truth in, 105;
+    philosophy implied in, 108 ff.;
+    is personal god essential to, 108;
+    compared with philosophy, 112;
+    compared with science, 145;
+    special philosophical problems of, 199 ff.;
+    of naturalism, 263 ff.;
+    of subjectivism and spiritualism, 302 ff.;
+    of Plato and Aristotle, 346, 393;
+    of Stoics and Spinoza, 348, 393;
+    philosophy of, in Hegel, 365;
+    of absolute idealism, 390 ff.
+
+  RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA, interpretation of, 69 ff.
+
+  REPRESENTATIVE THEORY, of knowledge, 174, 412.
+
+  ROMANTICISM, 361.
+
+  ROUSSEAU, quoted on nature, 64.
+
+  ROYCE, JOSIAH, quoted on absolute idealism, 178, 384, 394.
+
+
+  SANTAYANA, GEORGE, quoted on poetry 28, 29.
+
+  SCEPTICISM, 166, 267 ff.
+    See under POSITIVISM, and AGNOSTICISM.
+
+  SCHELLING, misconception of science, 116.
+
+  SCHOLASTICISM, 333;
+    idea of God in, 201.
+
+  SCHOPENHAUER, his panpsychism or voluntarism, 177, 285 ff.;
+    universalizes subjectivism, 290;
+    mysticism of, 290;
+    ethics of, 299;
+    religion of, 303.
+
+  SCIENCE.
+    Also see under NATURAL SCIENCE, and NORMATIVE SCIENCE.
+
+  SECULARISM, of Shakespeare, 34;
+    of Periclean Age, 320;
+    of present age, 427.
+
+  SELF, problem of, 216;
+    proof of, in St. Augustine, 372;
+    proof of, in Descartes, 374;
+    deeper moral of, 387;
+    in contemporary philosophy, 411, 413.
+    Also see SOUL, and MIND.
+
+  SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, essential to human life, 6;
+    development of conception of, 371 ff.;
+    in absolute idealism, 383;
+    in idealistic ethics, 386.
+
+  SENSATIONALISM, 247, 255, 269.
+
+  SENSE-PERCEPTION, 168, 247, 269, 370;
+    being as, in Berkeley, 281.
+
+  SHAKESPEARE, general criticism of, 30 ff.;
+    his universality, 31;
+    lack of philosophy in, 33.
+
+  SHELLEY, quoted on poetry, 50.
+
+  SOCIAL RELATIONS, belief inspired by, analogue of religion, 62;
+    imagination of, extended to God, 101.
+
+  SOCRATES, rationalism of, 169;
+    and normative science, 180;
+    ethics of, 192, 194;
+    method of, 321 ff.
+
+  SOPHISTS, the, epistemology of, 165;
+    scepticism of, 271, 320;
+    ethics of, 298, 301;
+    age of, 320.
+
+  SOUL, the, in Aristotle, 208;
+    in Plato, 209;
+    as substance, 209;
+    intellectualism and voluntarism in theory of, 210;
+    immortality of, 212;
+    Berkeley's theory of, 284.
+    Also see under MIND, and SELF.
+
+  SPACE, importance in science, 130;
+    and matter, 229.
+
+  SPENCER, 236 (_note_), 243, 265.
+
+  SPINOZA, and Goethe, 51;
+    quoted on philosophy and life, 153;
+    philosophy of, 306, 311 ff.;
+    criticism and estimate of, 315 ff.;
+    and Plato, 318, 335;
+    and Aristotle, 336;
+    epistemology of, 339;
+    ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 348, 392, 393.
+
+  SPIRIT, the absolute, 358 ff.
+
+  SPIRITUALISM, general meaning, 176, 267 (_note_);
+    in Berkeley, 280, 292;
+    in Schopenhauer, 285;
+    criticism of, 288;
+    objective, 292.
+
+  STEVENSON, R. L., quoted on religion, 67.
+
+  STOICISM, ethics of, 342;
+    religion of, 348.
+
+  SUBJECTIVISM, chap. ix;
+    general meaning, 175, 218, 267 (_note_), 415;
+    in aesthetics, 190;
+    of Berkeley, 275 ff.;
+    universalization of, in Schopenhauer, 290;
+    criticism of, 297, 415;
+    ethics of, 298 ff.;
+    in absolute idealism, 368;
+    of present day, 409.
+
+  SUBSTANCE, spiritual, 209, 284;
+    material, Berkeley's refutation of, 275 ff.;
+    Spinoza's conception of, 311;
+    the infinite, in Spinoza, 312;
+    Aristotle's conception of, 334;
+    Leibniz's conception of, 338.
+
+  SYMBOLISM, in religion, 75.
+
+
+  TELEOLOGY, in cosmology, 161;
+    proof of God from, 204;
+    Spinoza on, 318;
+    in Plato, 326 ff., 336;
+    in Aristotle, 336.
+
+  THEISM, 205.
+
+  THEOLOGY, relation to religion, 98;
+    in philosophy, 199 ff.;
+    relation to metaphysics, 207.
+
+  THOMSON, J., quoted, 104.
+
+  THOUGHT, and life, 6 ff.;
+    as being, in Hegel, 361 ff.
+
+  THUCYDIDES, on thought and action, 429.
+
+  TIME, importance in science, 130.
+
+  TRANSCENDENTALISM, 177, 349 (_note_), 356.
+    See IDEALISM, absolute.
+
+  TYNDALL, 115.
+
+
+  UNIVERSAL, scientific knowledge as, 125, 139.
+
+  UNIVERSE, the, as object of religious reaction, 64;
+    common object of philosophy and religion, 112;
+    as collective, 419.
+
+  UTILITARIANISM, 261.
+
+
+  VIRTUE, 198, 345.
+
+  VOLTAIRE, quoted, 231, 251.
+
+  VOLUNTARISM, in psychology, 210;
+    in Schopenhauer, 285.
+
+
+  WHITMAN, WALT, 27 ff.
+
+  WILL, in psychology, 210;
+    freedom and determination of, 211;
+    in Schopenhauer, 177;
+    as cause, in Berkeley, 293 ff.;
+    in pragmatism, 407.
+
+  WORDSWORTH, as philosopher-poet, 38 ff.;
+    his sense for the universal, 40;
+    quoted on poetry and philosophy, 48, 50.
+
+
+  ZENO, 337.
+
+
+
+
+TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:
+
+
+Ellipses match the original.
+
+Numbers in {braces} are subscripted in the original.
+
+The symbol for section has been replaced by "Sect."
+
+Variations in spelling have been left as in the original.
+
+The word Phoenix uses an oe ligature in the original.
+
+The following corrections have been made to the text:
+
+     Page xv: CHAPTER VI. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY{original has
+     EPISTOMOLOGY}
+
+     Page 70: The psychology{original has pyschology} of conversion
+
+     Page 93: him who practices{original has practises} the social
+     virtues
+
+     Page 165: reality have resulted in no consensus{original has
+     concensus} of opinion
+
+     Page 196: but in a law to which it{original has its} owes
+     obedience
+
+     Page 261: 'justice,' 'gratitude,' '{quotation mark missing in
+     original}modesty,'
+
+     Page 283: retained after their original{original has orignal}
+     meaning
+
+     Page 288: nothing but the highest development{original has
+     devolpment} on our earth
+
+     Page 325: philosopher who defined being as{original has a} the
+     ideal
+
+     Page 405: Henri Bergson: _Essai{original has Essoi} sur les
+     donnees immediates de la conscience_
+
+     Page 434: THOMAS A{original has acute accent which should be
+     grave accent} KEMPIS: _Imitation of Christ._
+
+     Page 436: HUXLEY, T. H.: _Evolution and Ethics;
+     Prolegomena._{original has Prologomena}
+
+     [51:11] Vol. I, p. 60.{period is missing in original}
+
+     [199:14] religion in these matters, cf.{original has Cf.}
+     Descartes:
+
+     [287:16] Translation by Haldane and Kemp{original has Komp}
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's The Approach to Philosophy, by Ralph Barton Perry
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