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diff --git a/25110.txt b/25110.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f4107c --- /dev/null +++ b/25110.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11951 @@ +Project Gutenberg's The Approach to Philosophy, by Ralph Barton Perry + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Approach to Philosophy + +Author: Ralph Barton Perry + +Release Date: April 19, 2008 [EBook #25110] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY *** + + + + +Produced by Stephen Hope, Fox in the Stars, Lisa Reigel, +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + +Transcriber's Notes: Some typographical errors have been corrected. A +complete list follows the text. Words in Greek in the original are +transliterated and placed between +plus signs+. In the transliterations +e: and o: represent the vowel with a circumflex. Words italicized in +the original are surrounded by _underscores_. + + + + +THE +APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY + + +BY PROF. RALPH BARTON PERRY + + THE FREE MAN AND THE SOLDIER + THE MORAL ECONOMY + THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY + + +CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS + + + + +THE APPROACH TO +PHILOSOPHY + + +BY + +RALPH BARTON PERRY, PH.D. + ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY + + +CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS + NEW YORK CHICAGO BOSTON + + +COPYRIGHT, 1905, BY +CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS + +Printed in the United States of America +F + + + + +THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED TO + +MY FATHER + +AS A TOKEN OF MY LOVE AND ESTEEM + + + + +PREFACE + + +In an essay on "The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time," +Professor Edward Caird says that "philosophy is not a first venture into +a new field of thought, but the rethinking of a secular and religious +consciousness which has been developed, in the main, independently of +philosophy."[vii:A] If there be any inspiration and originality in this +book, they are due to my great desire that philosophy should appear in +its vital relations to more familiar experiences. If philosophy is, as +is commonly assumed, appropriate to a phase in the development of every +individual, it should _grow out_ of interests to which he is already +alive. And if the great philosophers are indeed never dead, this fact +should manifest itself in their classic or historical representation of +a perennial outlook upon the world. I am not seeking to attach to +philosophy a fictitious liveliness, wherewith to insinuate it into the +good graces of the student. I hope rather to be true to the meaning of +philosophy. For there is that in its stand-point and its problem which +makes it universally significant entirely apart from dialectic and +erudition. These are derived interests, indispensable to the scholar, +but quite separable from that modicum of philosophy which helps to make +the man. The present book is written for the sake of elucidating the +inevitable philosophy. It seeks to make the reader more solicitously +aware of the philosophy that is in him, or to provoke him to philosophy +in his own interests. To this end I have sacrificed all else to the task +of mediating between the tradition and technicalities of the academic +discipline and the more common terms of life. + +The purpose of the book will in part account for those shortcomings that +immediately reveal themselves to the eye of the scholar. In Part I +various great human interests have been selected as points of departure. +I have sought to introduce the general stand-point and problem of +philosophy through its implication in practical life, poetry, religion, +and science. But in so doing it has been necessary for me to deal +shortly with topics of great independent importance, and so risk the +disfavor of those better skilled in these several matters. This is +evidently true of the chapter which deals with natural science. But the +problem which I there faced differed radically from those of the +foregoing chapters, and the method of treatment is correspondingly +different. In the case of natural science one has to deal with a body of +knowledge which is frequently regarded as the only knowledge. To write a +chapter about science from a philosophical stand-point is, in the +present state of opinion, to undertake a polemic against exclusive +naturalism, an attitude which is itself philosophical, and as such is +well known in the history of philosophy as _positivism_ or +_agnosticism_. I have avoided the polemical spirit and method so far as +possible, but have, nevertheless, here taken sides against a definite +philosophical position. This chapter, together with the Conclusion, is +therefore an exception to the purely introductory and expository +representation which I have, on the whole, sought to give. The +relatively great space accorded to the discussion of religion is, in my +own belief, fair to the general interest in this topic, and to the +intrinsic significance of its relation to philosophy. + +I have in Part II undertaken to furnish the reader with a map of the +country to which he has been led. To this end I have attempted a brief +survey of the entire programme of philosophy. An accurate and full +account of philosophical terms can be found in such books as Kuelpe's +"Introduction to Philosophy" and Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy," +and an attempt to emulate their thoroughness would be superfluous, even +if it were conformable to the general spirit of this book. The scope of +Part II is due in part to a desire for brevity, but chiefly to the hope +of furnishing an epitome that shall follow the course of the _natural +and historical differentiation_ of the general philosophical problem. + +Finally, I have in Part III sought to present the tradition of +philosophy in the form of general types. My purpose in undertaking so +difficult a task is to acquaint the reader with philosophy in the +concrete; to show how certain underlying principles may determine the +whole circle of philosophical ideas, and give them unity and distinctive +flavor. Part II offers a general classification of philosophical +problems and conceptions independently of any special point of view. But +I have in Part III sought to emphasize the point of view, or the +internal consistency that makes a _system of philosophy_ out of certain +answers to the special problems of philosophy. In such a division into +types, lines are of necessity drawn too sharply. There will be many +historical philosophies that refuse to fit, and many possibilities +unprovided for. I must leave it to the individual reader to overcome +this abstractness through his own reflection upon the intermediate and +variant stand-points. + +Although the order is on the whole that of progressive complexity, I +have sought to treat each chapter with independence enough to make it +possible for it to be read separately; and I have provided a carefully +selected bibliography in the hope that this book may serve as a stimulus +and guide to the reading of other books. + +The earlier chapters have already appeared as articles: Chapter I in the +_International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. XIII, No. 4; Chapter II in the +_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, No. 6; Chapter III in the _Monist_, +Vol. XIV, No. 5; Chapter IV in the _International Journal of Ethics_, +Vol. XV, No. 1; and some paragraphs of Chapter V in the _Journal of +Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol. I, No. 7. I am +indebted to the editors of these periodicals for permission to reprint +with minor changes. + +In the writing of this, my first book, I have been often reminded that +a higher critic, skilled in the study of internal evidence, could +probably trace all of its ideas to suggestions that have come to me from +my teachers and colleagues of the Department of Philosophy in Harvard +University. I have unscrupulously forgotten what of their definite ideas +I have adapted to my own use, but not that I received from them the +major portion of my original philosophical capital. I am especially +indebted to Professor William James for the inspiration and resources +which I have received from his instruction and personal friendship. + + RALPH BARTON PERRY. + +CAMBRIDGE, March, 1905. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[vii:A] Edw. Caird: _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 207. + + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + + +PART I + +APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY + PAGE + +CHAPTER I. THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER 3 + + Sect. 1. Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest? 3 + Sect. 2. Life as a Starting-point for Thought 4 + Sect. 3. The Practical Knowledge of Means 8 + Sect. 4. The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose 10 + Sect. 5. The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and + the Voluptuary 12 + Sect. 6. The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life 17 + +CHAPTER II. POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY 24 + + Sect. 7. Who is the Philosopher-Poet? 24 + Sect. 8. Poetry as Appreciation 25 + Sect. 9. Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman 27 + Sect. 10. Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare 30 + Sect. 11. Philosophy in Poetry. The World-view. Omar Khayyam 36 + Sect. 12. Wordsworth 38 + Sect. 13. Dante 42 + Sect. 14. The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy 48 + +CHAPTER III. THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 53 + + Sect. 15. The Possibility of Defining Religion 53 + Sect. 16. The Profitableness of Defining Religion 54 + Sect. 17. The True Method of Defining Religion 56 + Sect. 18. Religion as Belief 59 + Sect. 19. Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude 62 + Sect. 20. Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual + Environment, or Universe 64 + Sect. 21. Examples of Religious Belief 66 + Sect. 22. Typical Religious Phenomena. Conversion 69 + Sect. 23. Piety 72 + Sect. 24. Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of + Conveyance 74 + Sect. 25. Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions 77 + Sect. 26. Buddhism 78 + Sect. 27. Critical Religion 79 + +CHAPTER IV. THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION 82 + + Sect. 28. Resume of Psychology of Religion 82 + Sect. 29. Religion Means to be True 82 + Sect. 30. Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a + Disposition from which Consequences May Rationally + be Expected 85 + Sect. 31. Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The + Religion of Baal 88 + Sect. 32. Greek Religion 89 + Sect. 33. Judaism and Christianity 92 + Sect. 34. The Cognitive Factor in Religion 96 + Sect. 35. The Place of Imagination in Religion 97 + Sect. 36. The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination 101 + Sect. 37. The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion 105 + Sect. 38. The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions 108 + +CHAPTER V. NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 114 + + Sect. 39. The True Relations of Philosophy and Science. + Misconceptions and Antagonisms 114 + Sect. 40. The Spheres of Philosophy and Science 117 + Sect. 41. The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science 120 + Sect. 42. The Origin of the Scientific Interest 123 + Sect. 43. Skill as Free 123 + Sect. 44. Skill as Social 126 + Sect. 45. Science for Accommodation and Construction 127 + Sect. 46. Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. + The Descriptive Method 128 + Sect. 47. Space, Time, and Prediction 130 + Sect. 48. The Quantitative Method 132 + Sect. 49. The General Development of Science 134 + Sect. 50. The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science 135 + Sect. 51. Natural Science is Abstract 136 + Sect. 52. The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth 139 + Sect. 53. But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality 142 + Sect. 54. Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy 143 + + +PART II + +THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY + +CHAPTER VI. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 149 + + Sect. 55. The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the + Problem of Philosophy 149 + Sect. 56. The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems + upon the Initial Interest 152 + Sect. 57. Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life 152 + Sect. 58. Philosophy as the Extension of Science 154 + Sect. 59. The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical + Problem 155 + Sect. 60. Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception 157 + Sect. 61. Monism and Pluralism 159 + Sect. 62. Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process 159 + Sect. 63. Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies 160 + Sect. 64. Dualism 162 + Sect. 65. The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism 163 + Sect. 66. Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of + Knowledge 164 + Sect. 67. Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism 166 + Sect. 68. The Source and Criterion of Knowledge according to + Empiricism and Rationalism. Mysticism 168 + Sect. 69. The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to + Realism, and the Representative Theory 172 + Sect. 70. The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to + Idealism 175 + Sect. 71. Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism 176 + Sect. 72. Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism 177 + +CHAPTER VII. THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION 180 + + Sect. 73. The Normative Sciences 180 + Sect. 74. The Affiliations of Logic 182 + Sect. 75. Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth + in Belief 183 + Sect. 76. The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence, + Inference, and Observation 184 + Sect. 77. Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment 187 + Sect. 78. Priority of Concepts 188 + Sect. 79. Aesthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of + Beauty. Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies 189 + Sect. 80. Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral + Goodness 191 + Sect. 81. Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism 191 + Sect. 82. Rationalism 193 + Sect. 83. Eudaemonism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism 194 + Sect. 84. Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics 196 + Sect. 85. The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions 198 + Sect. 86. The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of + Faith 199 + Sect. 87. Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God 200 + Sect. 88. The Ontological Proof of God 200 + Sect. 89. The Cosmological Proof of God 203 + Sect. 90. The Teleological Proof of God 204 + Sect. 91. God and the World. Theism and Pantheism 205 + Sect. 92. Deism 206 + Sect. 93. Metaphysics and Theology 207 + Sect. 94. Psychology is the Theory of the Soul 208 + Sect. 95. Spiritual Substance 209 + Sect. 96. Intellectualism and Voluntarism 210 + Sect. 97. Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, + and Indeterminism 211 + Sect. 98. Immortality. Survival and Eternalism 212 + Sect. 99. The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and + Method 213 + Sect. 100. Psychology and Philosophy 216 + Sect. 101. Transition from Classification by Problems to + Classification by Doctrines. Naturalism. + Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute Realism 217 + + +PART III + +SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY + +CHAPTER VIII. NATURALISM 223 + + Sect. 102. The General Meaning of Materialism 223 + Sect. 103. Corporeal Being 224 + Sect. 104. Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism 225 + Sect. 105. Materialism and Physical Science 228 + Sect. 106. The Development of the Conceptions of Physical + Science. Space and Matter 228 + Sect. 107. Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the + Conception of Force 231 + Sect. 108. The Development and Extension of the Conception of + Energy 236 + Sect. 109. The Claims of Naturalism 239 + Sect. 110. The Task of Naturalism 241 + Sect. 111. The Origin of the Cosmos 242 + Sect. 112. Life. Natural Selection 244 + Sect. 113. Mechanical Physiology 246 + Sect. 114. Mind. The Reduction to Sensation 247 + Sect. 115. Automatism 248 + Sect. 116. Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon 250 + Sect. 117. Knowledge. Positivism and Agnosticism 252 + Sect. 118. Experimentalism 255 + Sect. 119. Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic 256 + Sect. 120. General Ethical Stand-point 258 + Sect. 121. Cynicism and Cyrenaicism 259 + Sect. 122. Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception + of Social Relations 260 + Sect. 123. Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic 262 + Sect. 124. Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion 263 + Sect. 125. Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, + Wonder, and Renunciation 265 + +CHAPTER IX. SUBJECTIVISM 267 + + Sect. 126. Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and + Scepticism 267 + Sect. 127. Phenomenalism and Spiritualism 271 + Sect. 128. Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem + Inherited from Descartes and Locke 272 + Sect. 129. The Refutation of Material Substance 275 + Sect. 130. The Application of the Epistemological Principle 277 + Sect. 131. The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World 278 + Sect. 132. The Transition to Spiritualism 280 + Sect. 133. Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism 281 + Sect. 134. Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the + Perceiver 284 + Sect. 135. Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate + Knowledge of the Will 285 + Sect. 136. Panpsychism 287 + Sect. 137. The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision + for Objective Knowledge 288 + Sect. 138. Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism. + Mysticism 290 + Sect. 139. Objective Spiritualism 292 + Sect. 140. Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness, and + Order 293 + Sect. 141. The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend + Itself 297 + Sect. 142. Ethical Theories. Relativism 298 + Sect. 143. Pessimism and Self-denial 299 + Sect. 144. The Ethics of Welfare 300 + Sect. 145. The Ethical Community 302 + Sect. 146. The Religion of Mysticism 303 + Sect. 147. The Religion of Individual Cooperation with God 304 + +CHAPTER X. ABSOLUTE REALISM 306 + + Sect. 148. The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, + or the Absolute 306 + Sect. 149. The Eleatic Conception of Being 309 + Sect. 150. Spinoza's Conception of Substance 311 + Sect. 151. Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The + Modes and the Attributes 312 + Sect. 152. The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God 315 + Sect. 153. Spinoza's Provision for the Finite 317 + Sect. 154. Transition to Teleological Conceptions 317 + Sect. 155. Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical 319 + Sect. 156. Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists 319 + Sect. 157. Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher 321 + Sect. 158. Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth 323 + Sect. 159. The Historical Preparation for Plato 324 + Sect. 160. Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good 326 + Sect. 161. The Progression of Experience toward God 329 + Sect. 162. Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to + Platonism 332 + Sect. 163. The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of + Platonism and Spinozism 335 + Sect. 164. Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development + to the Problem of Imperfection 336 + Sect. 165. The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved 338 + Sect. 166. Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism 339 + Sect. 167. The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute + Realism 340 + Sect. 168. The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity 342 + Sect. 169. The Platonic Ethics of Perfection 344 + Sect. 170. The Religion of Fulfilment and the Religion of + Renunciation 346 + +CHAPTER XI. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 349 + + Sect. 171. General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism 349 + Sect. 172. The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism 351 + Sect. 173. The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The + Task of the New Absolutism 352 + Sect. 174. The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis + of Experience 354 + Sect. 175. Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which + they Set in Order 356 + Sect. 176. The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of + the Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed + by Kant. The Absolute Spirit 358 + Sect. 177. Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity 360 + Sect. 178. Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment 361 + Sect. 179. Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic 361 + Sect. 180. The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History 363 + Sect. 181. Resume. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the + Problem of Evil 365 + Sect. 182. The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is + Based upon the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge 368 + Sect. 183. The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason 371 + Sect. 184. Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian + Philosophy 372 + Sect. 185. Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the + Thinking Self 374 + Sect. 186. Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers 376 + Sect. 187. To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind 377 + Sect. 188. The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general + into an Absolute Mind 380 + Sect. 189. The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite + Mind to the Infinite Mind 382 + Sect. 190. The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism 385 + Sect. 191. The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the + Ethics of Absolute Idealism. Kant 386 + Sect. 192. Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of + Universal and Objective Spirit 388 + Sect. 193. The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute + Idealism 390 + Sect. 194. The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality 393 + +CHAPTER XII. CONCLUSION 395 + + Sect. 195. Liability of Philosophy to Revision Due to its + Systematic Character 395 + Sect. 196. The One Science and the Many Philosophies 396 + Sect. 197. Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or + Eclecticism of the Present Age 398 + Sect. 198. Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism + and Absolutism 399 + Sect. 199. Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition + of Nature. The Neo-Fichteans 401 + Sect. 200. The Neo-Kantians 403 + Sect. 201. Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism 404 + Sect. 202. Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of + Fundamental Principles 405 + Sect. 203. Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism 407 + Sect. 204. Summary and Transition to Epistemology 408 + Sect. 205. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism. + Realistic Tendency in Empirical Idealism 409 + Sect. 206. Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception + of Experience 410 + Sect. 207. Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence + Philosophy 412 + Sect. 208. The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New + Construction 413 + Sect. 209. The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of + Attempt to Reduce all Experience to it 414 + Sect. 210. Truth of Psychical Relations but Impossibility of + General Reduction to them 415 + Sect. 211. Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of + Ideal of Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing + the Whole of Experience from it 415 + Sect. 212. Error and Evil cannot be Reduced to the Ideal 417 + Sect. 213. Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole 419 + Sect. 214. Moral Implications of Such Pluralistic Philosophy. + Purity of the Good 420 + Sect. 215. The Incentive to Goodness 422 + Sect. 216. The Justification of Faith 423 + Sect. 217. The Worship and Service of God 425 + Sect. 218. The Philosopher and the Standards of the Market-Place 425 + Sect. 219. The Secularism of the Present Age 427 + Sect. 220. The Value of Contemplation for Life 428 + +BIBLIOGRAPHY 431 + +INDEX 441 + + + + +PART I + +APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF +PHILOSOPHY + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER + + +[Sidenote: Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?] + +Sect. 1. Philosophy suffers the distinction of being regarded as +essentially an academic pursuit. The term _philosophy_, to be sure, is +used in common speech to denote a stoical manner of accepting the +vicissitudes of life; but this conception sheds little or no light upon +the meaning of philosophy as a branch of scholarship. The men who write +the books on "Epistemology" or "Ontology," are regarded by the average +man of affairs, even though he may have enjoyed a "higher education," +with little sympathy and less intelligence. Not even philology seems +less concerned with the real business of life. The pursuit of philosophy +appears to be a phenomenon of extreme and somewhat effete culture, with +its own peculiar traditions, problems, and aims, and with little or +nothing to contribute to the real enterprises of society. It is easy to +prove to the satisfaction of the philosopher that such a view is +radically mistaken. But it is another and more serious matter to bridge +over the very real gap that separates philosophy and common-sense. Such +an aim is realized only when philosophy is seen to issue from some +special interest that is humanly important; or when, after starting in +thought at a point where one deals with ideas and interests common to +all, one is led by the inevitableness of consistent thinking into the +sphere of philosophy. + +[Sidenote: Life as a Starting-point for Thought.] + +Sect. 2. There is but one starting-point for reflection when all men are +invited to share in it. Though there be a great many special platforms +where special groups of men may take their stand together, there is only +one platform broad enough for all. This universal stand-point, or common +platform, is _life_. It is our more definite thesis, then, that +philosophy, even to its most abstruse technicality, is rooted in life; +and that it is inseparably bound up with the satisfaction of practical +needs, and the solution of practical problems. + +Every man knows what it is to live, and his immediate experience will +verify those features of the adventure that stand out conspicuously. To +begin with, life is our birthright. We did not ask for it, but when we +grew old enough to be self-conscious we found ourselves in possession +of it. Nor is it a gift to be neglected, even if we had the will. As is +true of no other gift of nature, we must use it, or cease to be. There +is a unique urgency about life. But we have already implied more, in so +far as we have said that it must be _used_, and have thereby referred to +some form of movement or activity as its inseparable attribute. To +live is to find one's self compelled to do something. To do +_something_--there is another implication of life: some outer +expression, some medium in which to register the degree and form of its +activity. Such we recognize as the environment of life, the real objects +among which it is placed; which it may change, or from which it may +suffer change. Not only do we find our lives as unsolicited active +powers, but find, as well, an arena prescribed for their exercise. That +we shall act, and in a certain time and place, and with reference to +certain other realities, this is the general condition of things that is +encountered when each one of us discovers life. In short, to live means +to be compelled to do something under certain circumstances. + +There is another very common aspect of life that would not at first +glance seem worthy of mention. Not only does life, as we have just +described it, mean opportunity, but it means self-conscious opportunity. +The facts are such as we have found them to be, and as each one of us +has previously found them for himself. But when we discover life for +ourselves, we who make the discovery, and we who live, are identical. +From that moment we both live, and know that we live. Moreover, such is +the essential unity of our natures that our living must now express our +knowing, and our knowing guide and illuminate our living. Consider the +allegory of the centipede. From the beginning of time he had manipulated +his countless legs with exquisite precision. Men had regarded him with +wonder and amazement. But he was innocent of his own art, being a +contrivance of nature, perfectly constructed to do her bidding. One day +the centipede discovered life. He discovered himself as one who walks, +and the newly awakened intelligence, first observing, then foreseeing, +at length began to direct the process. And from that moment the +centipede, because he could not remember the proper order of his going, +lost all his former skill, and became the poor clumsy victim of his own +self-consciousness. This same self-consciousness is the inconvenience +and the great glory of human life. We must stumble along as best we +can, guided by the feeble light of our own little intelligence. If +nature starts us on our way, she soon hands over the torch, and bids us +find the trail for ourselves. Most men are brave enough to regard this +as the best thing of all; some despair on account of it. In either case +it is admittedly the true story of human life. We must live as separate +selves, observing, foreseeing, and planning. There are two things that +we can do about it. We can repudiate our natures, decline the +responsibility, and degenerate to the level of those animals that never +had our chance; or we can leap joyously to the helm, and with all the +strength and wisdom in us guide our lives to their destination. But if +we do the former, we shall be unable to forget what might have been, and +shall be haunted by a sense of ignominy; and if we do the second, we +shall experience the unique happiness of fulfilment and +self-realization. + +Life, then, is a situation that appeals to intelligent activity. Humanly +speaking, there is no such thing as a situation that is not at the same +time a theory. As we live we are all theorists. Whoever has any +misgivings as to the practical value of theory, let him remember that, +speaking generally of human life, it is true to say that there is no +practice that does not issue at length from reflection. That which is +the commonest experience of mankind is the conjunction of these two, the +thought and the deed. And as surely as we are all practical theorists, +so surely is philosophy the outcome of the broadening and deepening of +practical theory. But to understand how the practical man becomes the +philosopher, we must inquire somewhat more carefully into the manner of +his thought about life. + +[Sidenote: The Practical Knowledge of Means.] + +Sect. 3. Let anyone inspect the last moment in his life, and in all +probability he will find that his mind was employed to discover the +means to some end. He was already bent upon some definite achievement, +and was thoughtful for the sake of selecting the economical and +effectual way. His theory made his practice skilful. So through life his +knowledge shows him how to work his will. Example, experience, and books +have taught him the uses of nature and society, and in his thoughtful +living he is enabled to reach the goal he has set for the next hour, +day, or year of his activity. The long periods of human life are spent +in elaborating the means to some unquestioned end. Here one meets the +curious truth that we wake up in the middle of life, already making +headway, and under the guidance of some invisible steersman. When first +we take the business of life seriously, there is a considerable stock in +trade in the shape of habits, and inclinations to all sorts of things +that we never consciously elected to pursue. Since we do not begin at +the beginning, our first problem is to accommodate ourselves to +ourselves, and our first deliberate acts are in fulfilment of plans +outlined by some predecessor that has already spoken for us. The same +thing is true of the race of men. At a certain stage in their +development men found themselves engaged in all manner of ritual and +custom, and burdened with concerns that were not of their own choosing. +They were burning incense, keeping festivals, and naming names, all of +which they must now proceed to justify with myth and legend, in order to +render intelligible to themselves the deliberate and self-conscious +repetition of them. Even so much justification was left to the few, and +the great majority continued to seek that good which social usage +countenanced and individual predisposition confirmed. So every man of us +acts from day to day for love's sake, or wealth's sake, or power's +sake, or for the sake of some near and tangible object; reflecting only +for the greater efficiency of his endeavor. + +[Sidenote: The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose.] + +Sect. 4. But if this be the common manner of thinking about life, it +does not represent the whole of such thought. Nor does it follow that +because it occupies us so much, it is therefore correspondingly +fundamental. Like the myth makers of old, we all want more or less to +know the _reason of our ends_. Here, then, we meet with a somewhat +different type of reflection upon life, the reflection that underlies +the adoption of a life purpose. It is obvious that most ends are +selected for the sake of other ends, and so are virtually means. Thus +one may struggle for years to secure a college education. This definite +end has been adopted for the sake of a somewhat more indefinite end of +self-advancement, and from it there issues a whole series of minor ends, +which form a hierarchy of steps ascending to the highest goal of +aspiration. Now upon the face of things we live very unsystematic lives, +and yet were we to examine ourselves in this fashion, we should all find +our lives to be marvels of organization. Their growth, as we have seen, +began before we were conscious of it; and we are commonly so absorbed +in some particular flower or fruit that we forget the roots, and the +design of the whole. But a little reflection reveals a remarkable +unitary adjustment of parts. The unity is due to the dominance of a +group of central purposes. Judged from the stand-point of experience, it +seems bitter irony to say that everyone gets from life just what he +wishes. But a candid searching of our own hearts will incline us to +admit that, after all, the way we go and the length we go is determined +pretty much by the kind and the intensity of our secret longing. That +for which in the time of choice we are willing to sacrifice all else, is +the formula that defines the law of each individual life. All this is +not intended to mean that we have each named a clear and definite ideal +which is our chosen goal. On the contrary, such a conception may be +almost meaningless to some of us. In general the higher the ideal the +vaguer and less vivid is its presentation to our consciousness. But, +named or unnamed, sharp or blurred, vivid or half-forgotten, there may +be found in the heart of every man that which of all things he wants to +be, that which of all deeds he wants to do. If he has had the normal +youth of dreaming, he has seen it, and warmed to the picture of his +imagination; if he has been somewhat more thoughtful than the ordinary, +his reason has defined it, and adopted it for his vocation; if neither, +it has been present as an undertone throughout the rendering of his more +inevitable life. He will recognize it when it is named as the desire to +do the will of God, or to have as good a time as possible, or to make +other people as happy as possible, or to be equal to his +responsibilities, or to fulfil the expectation of his mother, or to be +distinguished, wealthy, or influential. This list of ideals is +miscellaneous, and ethically reducible to more fundamental concepts, but +these are the terms in which men are ordinarily conscious of their most +intimate purposes. We must now inquire respecting the nature of the +thought that determines the selection of such a purpose, or justifies it +when it has been unconsciously accepted. + +[Sidenote: The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and the +Voluptuary.] + +Sect. 5. What is most worth while? So far as human action is concerned +this obviously depends upon what is possible, upon what is expected of +us by our own natures, and upon what interests and concerns are +conserved by the trend of events in our environment. What I had best +do, presupposes what I have the strength and the skill to do, what I +feel called upon to do, and what are the great causes that are entitled +to promotion at my hands. It seems that practically we cannot separate +the ideal from the real. We may feel that the highest ideal is an +immediate utterance of conscience, as mysterious in origin as it is +authoritative in expression. We may be willing to defy the universe, and +expatriate ourselves from our natural and social environment, for the +sake of the holy law of duty. Such men as Count Tolstoi have little to +say of the possible, or the expedient, or the actual, and are satisfied +to stand almost alone against the brutal facts of usage and economy. We +all have a secret sense of chivalry, that prompts, however +ineffectually, to a like devotion. But that which in such moral purposes +appears to indicate a severance of the ideal and the real, is, if we +will but stop to consider, only a severance of the ideal and the +apparent. The martyr is more sure of reality than the adventurer. He is +convinced that though his contemporaries and his environment be against +him; the fundamental or eventual order of things is for him. He believes +in a spiritual world more abiding, albeit less obvious, than the +material world. Though every temporal event contradict him, he lives in +the certainty that eternity is his. Such an one may have found his ideal +in the voice of God and His prophets, or he may have been led to God as +the justification of his irresistible ideal; but in either case the +selection of his ideal is reasonable to him in so far as it is +harmonious with the ultimate nature of things, or stands for the promise +of reality. In this wise, thought about life expands into some +conception of the deeper forces of the world, and life itself, in +respect of its fundamental attachment to an ideal, implies some belief +concerning the fundamental nature of its environment. + +But lest in this account life be credited with too much gravity and +import, or it seem to be assumed that life is all knight-errantry, let +us turn to our less quixotic, and perhaps more effectual, man of +affairs. He works for his daily bread, and for success in his vocation. +He has selected his vocation for its promise of return in the form of +wealth, comfort, fame, or influence. He likewise performs such +additional service to his family and his community as is demanded of him +by public opinion and his own sense of responsibility. He may have a +certain contempt for the man who sees visions. This may be his manner of +testifying to his own preference for the ideal of usefulness and +immediate efficiency. But even so he would never for an instant admit +that he was pursuing a merely conventional good. He may be largely +imitative in his standards of value, recognizing such aims as are common +to some time or race; nevertheless none would be more sure than he of +the truth of his ideal. Question him, and he will maintain that his is +the reasonable life under the conditions of human existence. He may +maintain that if there be a God, he can best serve Him by promoting the +tangible welfare of himself and those dependent upon him. He may +maintain that, since there is no God, he must win such rewards as the +world can give. If he have something of the heroic in him, he may tell +you that, since there is no God, he will labor to the uttermost for his +fellow-men. Where he has not solved the problem of life for himself, he +may believe himself to be obeying the insight of some one wiser than +himself, or of society as expressed in its customs and institutions. But +no man ever admitted that his life was purely a matter of expediency, or +that in his dominant ideal he was the victim of chance. In the +background of the busiest and most preoccupied life of affairs, there +dwells the conviction that such living is appropriate to the universe; +that it is called for by the circumstances of its origin, opportunities, +and destiny. + +Finally, the man who makes light of life has of all men the most +transparent inner consciousness. In him may be clearly observed the +relation between the ideal and the reflection that is assumed to justify +it. + + "A Moment's Halt--a momentary taste + Of Being from the Well amid the Waste-- + And Lo!--the phantom Caravan has reach'd + The Nothing it set out from-- . . ." + + "We are no other than a moving row + Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go + Round with the Sun-illumin'd Lantern held + In Midnight by the Master of the Show." + +Where the setting of life is construed in these terms, there is but one +natural and appropriate manner of life. Once believing in the isolation +and insignificance of life, one is sceptical of all worth save such as +may be tasted in the moment of its purchase. If one's ideas and +experiences are no concern of the world's, but incidents of a purely +local and transient interest, they will realize most when they realize +an immediate gratification. Where one does not believe that he is a +member of the universe, and a contributor to its ends, he does well to +minimize the friction that arises from its accidental propinquity, and +to kindle some little fire of enjoyment in his own lonely heart. This is +the life of abandonment to pleasure, accompanied by the conviction that +the conditions of life warrant no more strenuous or heroic plan. + +[Sidenote: The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life.] + +Sect. 6. In such wise do we adopt the life purpose, or justify it when +unconsciously adopted. The pursuit of an ideal implies a belief in its +effectuality. Such a belief will invariably appear when the groundwork +of the daily living is laid bare by a little reflection. And if our +analysis has not been in error, there is something more definite to be +obtained from it. We all believe in the practical wisdom of our +fundamental ideals; but we believe, besides, that such wisdom involves +the sanction of the universe as a whole. The momentousness of an +individual's life will be satisfied with nothing less final than an +absolutely wise disposition of it. For every individual, his life is all +his power and riches, and is not to be spent save for the _greatest good +that he can reasonably pursue_. But the solution of such a problem is +not to be obtained short of a searching of entire reality. Every life +will represent more or less of such wisdom and enlightenment; and in the +end the best selection of ideal will denote the greatest wealth of +experience. It is not always true that he who has seen more will live +more wisely, for in an individual case instinct or authority may be +better sources of aspiration than experience. But we trust instinct and +authority because we believe them to represent a comprehensive +experience on the part of the race as a whole, or on the part of God. He +whose knowledge is broadest and truest would know best what is finally +worth living for. On this account, most men can see no more reasonable +plan of life than obedience to God's will, for God in the abundance of +his wisdom, and since all eternity is plain before him, must see with +certainty that which is supremely worthy. + +We mean, then, that the selection of our ideals shall be determined by +the largest possible knowledge of the facts pertaining to life. We mean +to select as one would select who knew all about the antecedents and +surroundings and remote consequences of life. In our own weakness and +finitude we may go but a little way in the direction of such an +insight, and may prefer to accept the judgment of tradition or +authority, but we recognize a distinct type of knowledge as alone worthy +to justify an individual's adoption of an ideal. That type of knowledge +is the knowledge that comprehends the universe in its totality. Such +knowledge does not involve completeness of information respecting all +parts of reality. This, humanly speaking, is both unattainable and +inconceivable. It involves rather a conception of the _kind_ of reality +that is fundamental. For a wise purpose it is unnecessary that we should +know many matters of fact, or even specific laws, provided we are +convinced of the inner and essential character of the universe. Some of +the alternatives are matters of every-day thought and speech. One cannot +tell the simplest story of human life without disclosing them. To live +the human life means to pursue ideals, that is, to have a thing in mind, +and then to try to accomplish it. Here is one kind of reality and power. +The planetary system, on the other hand, does not pursue ideals, but +moves unconscious of itself, with a mechanical precision that can be +expressed in a mathematical formula; and is representative of another +kind of reality and power. Hence a very common and a very practical +question: Is there an underlying law, like the law of gravitation, +fundamentally and permanently governing life, in spite of its apparent +direction by ideal and aspiration? Or is there an underlying power, like +purpose, fundamentally and permanently governing the planetary system +and all celestial worlds, in spite of the apparent control of blind and +irresistible forces? This is a practical question because nothing could +be more pertinent to our choice of ideals. Nothing could make more +difference to life than a belief in the life or lifelessness of its +environment. The faiths that generate or confirm our ideals always refer +to this great issue. And this is but one, albeit the most profound, of +the many issues that arise from the desire to obtain some conviction of +the inner and essential character of life. Though so intimately +connected with practical concerns, these issues are primarily the +business of thought. In grappling with them, thought is called upon for +its greatest comprehensiveness, penetration, and self-consistency. By +the necessity of concentration, thought is sometimes led to forget its +origin and the source of its problems. But in naming itself philosophy, +thought has only recognized the definiteness and earnestness of its +largest task. Philosophy is still thought about life, representing but +the deepening and broadening of the common practical thoughtfulness. + +We who began together at the starting-point of _life_, have now entered +together the haven of _philosophy_. It is not a final haven, but only +the point of departure for the field of philosophy proper. Nevertheless +that field is now in the plain view of the man who occupies the +practical stand-point. He must recognize in philosophy a kind of +reflection that differs only in extent and persistence from the +reflection that guides and justifies his life. He may not consciously +identify himself with any one of the three general groups which have +been characterized. But if he is neither an idealist, nor a philistine, +nor a pleasure lover, surely he is compounded of such elements, and does +not escape their implications. He desires something most of all, even +though his highest ideal be only an inference from the gradation of his +immediate purposes. This highest ideal represents what he conceives to +be the greatest worth or value attainable in the universe, and its +adoption is based upon the largest generalization that he can make or +borrow. The complete justification of his ideal would involve a true +knowledge of the essential character of the universe. For such knowledge +he substitutes either authority or his own imperfect insight. But in +either case his life is naturally and organically correlated with a +_thought about the universe in its totality, or in its deepest and +essential character_. Such thought, the activity and its results, is +philosophy. Hence he who lives is, _ipso facto_, a philosopher. He is +not only a potential philosopher, but a partial philosopher. He has +already begun to be a philosopher. Between the fitful or prudential +thinking of some little man of affairs, and the sustained thought of the +devoted lover of truth, there is indeed a long journey, but it is a +straight journey along the same road. Philosophy is neither accidental +nor supernatural, but inevitable and normal. Philosophy is not properly +a vocation, but the ground and inspiration of all vocations. In the +hands of its devotees it grows technical and complex, as do all efforts +of thought, and to pursue philosophy bravely and faithfully is to +encounter obstacles and labyrinths innumerable. The general problem of +philosophy is mother of a whole brood of problems, little and great. But +whether we be numbered among its devotees, or their beneficiaries, an +equal significance attaches to the truth that philosophy is continuous +with life. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY + + +[Sidenote: Who is the Philosopher-Poet?] + +Sect. 7. As the ultimate criticism of all human interests, philosophy +may be approached by avenues as various as these interests. Only when +philosophy is discovered as the implication of well-recognized special +interests, is the significance of its function fully appreciated. For +the sake of such a further understanding of philosophy, those who find +either inspiration or entertainment in poetry are invited in the present +chapter to consider certain of the relations between poetry and +philosophy. + +We must at the very outset decline to accept unqualifiedly the poet's +opinion in the matter, for he would not think it presumptuous to +incorporate philosophy in poetry. "No man," said Coleridge, "was ever +yet a great poet without being at the same time a great philosopher." +This would seem to mean that a great poet is a great philosopher, and +more too. We shall do better to begin with the prosaic and matter of +fact minimum of truth: some poetry is philosophical. This will enable +us to search for the portion of philosophy that is in some poetry, +without finally defining their respective boundaries. It may be that all +true poetry is philosophical, as it may be that all true philosophy is +poetical; but it is much more certain that much actual poetry is far +from philosophical, and that most actual philosophy was not conceived or +written by a poet. The mere poet and the mere philosopher must be +tolerated, if it be only for the purpose of shedding light upon the +philosopher-poet and the poet-philosopher. And it is to the +philosopher-poet that we turn, in the hope that under the genial spell +of poetry we may be brought with understanding to the more forbidding +land of philosophy. + +[Sidenote: Poetry as Appreciation.] + +Sect. 8. Poetry is well characterized, though not defined, as an +interpretation of life. The term "life" here signifies the human +purposive consciousness, and active pursuit of ends. An interpretation +of life is, then, a selection and account of such values in human +experience as are actually sought or are worth the seeking. For the poet +all things are good or bad, and never only matters of fact. He is +neither an annalist nor a statistician, and is even an observer only +for the sake of a higher design. He is one who appreciates, and +expresses his appreciation so fittingly that it becomes a kind of truth, +and a permanently communicable object. That "unbodied joy," the +skylark's song and flight, is through the genius of Shelley so +faithfully embodied, that it may enter as a definite joy into the lives +of countless human beings. The sensuous or suggestive values of nature +are caught by the poet's quick feeling for beauty, and fixed by his +creative activity. Or with his ready sympathy he may perceive the value +of some human ideal or mastering passion, and make it a reality for our +common feeling. Where the poet has to do with the base and hateful, his +attitude is still appreciative. The evil is apprehended as part of a +dramatic whole having positive moral or aesthetic value. Moral ideas may +appear in both poetry and life as the inspiration and justification of +struggle. Where there is no conception of its moral significance, the +repulsive possesses for the poet's consciousness the aesthetic value of +diversity and contrast. Even where the evil and ugly is isolated, as in +certain of Browning's dramatic monologues, it forms, both for the poet +and the reader, but a part of some larger perception of life or +character, which is sublime or beautiful or good. Poetry involves, +then, the discovery and presentation of human experiences that are +satisfying and appealing. It is a language for human pleasures and +ideals. Poetry is without doubt a great deal more than this, and only +after a careful analysis of its peculiar language could one distinguish +it from kindred arts; but it will suffice for our purposes to +characterize and not differentiate. Starting from this most general +truth respecting poetry, we may now look for that aspect of it whereby +it may be a witness of philosophical truth. + +[Sidenote: Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman.] + +Sect. 9. For the answer to our question, we must turn to an examination +of the intellectual elements of poetry. In the first place, the common +demand that the poet shall be accurate in his representations is +suggestive of an indispensable intellectual factor in his genius. As we +have seen, he is not to reproduce nature, but the human appreciative +experience of nature. Nevertheless, he must even here be true to his +object. His art involves his ability to express genuinely and sincerely +what he himself experiences in the presence of nature, or what he can +catch of the inner lives of others by virtue of his intelligent +sympathy. No amount of emotion or even of imagination will profit a +poet, unless he can render a true account of them. To be sure, he need +not define, or even explain; for it is his function to transfer the +immediate qualities of experience: but he must be able to speak the +truth, and, in order to speak it, he must have known it. In all this, +however, we have made no demand that the poet should see more than one +thing at a time. Sincerity of expression does not require what is +distinctly another mode of intelligence, _comprehensiveness of view_. It +is easier, and accordingly more usual, to render an account of the +moments and casual units of experience, than of its totality. There are +poets, little and great, who possess the intellectual virtue of +sincerity, without the intellectual power of synthesis and +reconciliation. This distinction will enable us to separate the +intelligence exhibited in all poetry, from that distinct form of +intelligence exhibited in such poetry as is properly to be called +philosophical. + +The "barbarian" in poetry has recently been defined as "the man who +regards his passions as their own excuse for being; who does not +domesticate them either by understanding their cause or by conceiving +their ideal goal."[28:1] One will readily appreciate the application of +this definition to Walt Whitman. What little unity there is in this +poet's world, is the composition of a purely sensuous experience, + + "The earth expending right hand and left hand, + The picture alive, every part in its best light, + The music falling in where it is wanted, and stopping where + it is not wanted." + +In many passages Whitman manifests a marvellous ability to discover and +communicate a fresh gladness about the commonest experiences. We cannot +but rejoice with him in all sights and sounds. But though we cannot deny +him truth, his truth is honesty and not understanding. The experiences +in which he discovers so much worth, are random and capricious, and do +not constitute a universe. To the solution of ultimate questions he +contributes a sense of mystery, and the conviction + + "That you are here--that life exists and identity, + That the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse." + +His world is justly described by the writer just quoted as "a +phantasmagoria of continuous visions, vivid, impressive, but monotonous +and hard to distinguish in memory, like the waves of the sea or the +decorations of some barbarous temple, sublime only by the infinite +aggregation of parts."[30:2] + +As is Walt Whitman, so are many poets greater and less. Some who have +seen the world-view, exhibit the same particularism in their lyric +moods; although, generally speaking, a poet who once has comprehended +the world, will see the parts of it in the light of that wisdom. But +Walt Whitman is peculiarly representative of the poetry that can be +true, without being wise in the manner that we shall come shortly to +understand as the manner of philosophy. He is as desultory in his poet +raptures as is the common man when he lives in his immediate +experiences. The truth won by each is the clear vision of one thing, or +of a limited collection of things, and not the broad inclusive vision of +all things. + +[Sidenote: Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare.] + +Sect. 10. The transition from Whitman to Shakespeare may seem somewhat +abrupt, but the very differences between these poets serve to mark out +an interesting affinity. Neither has put any unitary construction upon +human life and its environment. Neither, as poet, is the witness of any +world-view; which will mean for us that neither is a philosopher-poet. +As respects Shakespeare, this is a hard saying. We are accustomed to the +critical judgment that finds in the Shakespearian dramas an apprehension +of the universal in human life. But though this judgment is true, it is +by no means conclusive as respects Shakespeare's relation to the +philosophical type of thought. For there can be universality without +philosophy. Thus, to know the groups and the marks of the vertebrates is +to know a truth which possesses generality, in contradistinction to the +particularism of Whitman's poetic consciousness. Even so to know well +the groups and marks of human character, vertebrate and invertebrate, is +to know that of which the average man, in his hand to hand struggle with +life, is ignorant. Such a wisdom Shakespeare possessed to a unique +degree, and it enabled him to reconstruct human life. He did not merely +perceive human states and motives, but he understood human nature so +well that he could create consistent men and women. Moreover, +Shakespeare's knowledge was not only thus universal in being a knowledge +of general groups and laws, but also in respect of its extensity. His +understanding was as rich as it was acute. It is true, then, that +Shakespeare read human life as an open book, knowing certainly the +manner of human thinking and feeling, and the power and interplay of +human motives. But it is equally true, on the other hand, that he +possessed no unitary conception of the meaning and larger relations of +human life. Such a conception might have been expressed either by means +of the outlook of some dominating and persistent type of personality, or +by a pervading suggestion of some constant world-setting for the +variable enterprise of mankind. It could appear only provided the poet's +appreciation of life in detail were determined by an interpretation of +the meaning of life as a whole. Shakespeare apparently possessed no such +interpretation. Even when Hamlet is groping after some larger truth that +may bear upon the definite problems of life, he represents but one, and +that a strange and unusual, type of human nature. And Hamlet's +reflections, it should be noted, have no outcome. There is no +Shakespearian answer to the riddles that Hamlet propounds. The poet's +genius is not less amazing for this fact; indeed, his peculiar +distinction can only be comprehended upon this basis. Shakespeare put no +construction upon life, and by virtue of this very reserve accomplished +an art of surpassing fidelity and vividness. The absence of philosophy +in Shakespeare, and the presence of the most characteristic quality of +his genius, may both be imputed by the one affirmation, that _there is +no Shakespearian point of view_. + +This truth signifies both gain and loss. The philosophical criticism of +life may vary from the ideal objectivity of absolute truth, to the +subjectivity of a personal religion. Philosophy aims to correct the +partiality of particular points of view by means of a point of view that +shall comprehend their relations, and effect such reconciliations or +transformations as shall enable them to constitute a universe. +Philosophy always assumes the hypothetical view of omniscience. The +necessity of such a final criticism is implicit in every scientific item +of knowledge, and in every judgment that is passed upon life. Philosophy +makes a distinct and peculiar contribution to human knowledge by its +heroic effort to measure all knowledges and all ideals by the standard +of totality. Nevertheless it is significant that no human individual can +possibly possess the range of omniscience. The most adequate knowledge +of which any generation of men is capable, will always be that which is +conceived by the most synthetic and vigorously metaphysical minds; but +every individual philosophy will nevertheless be a premature synthesis. +The effort to complete knowledge is the indispensable test of the +adequacy of prevailing conceptions, but the completed knowledge of any +individual mind will shortly become an historical monument. It will +belong primarily to the personal life of its creator, as the +articulation of his personal covenant with the universe. There is a +sound justification for such a conclusion of things in the case of the +individual, for the conditions of human life make it inevitable; but it +will always possess a felt unity, and many distinct features, that are +private and subjective. Now such a projection of personality, with its +coloring and its selection, Shakespeare has avoided; and very largely as +a consequence, his dramas are a storehouse of genuine human nature. +Ambition, mercy, hate, madness, guilelessness, conventionality, mirth, +bravery, deceit, purity--these, and all human states and attributes save +piety, are upon his pages as real, and as mysterious withal, as they are +in the great historical society. For an ordinary reader, these states +and attributes are more real in Hamlet or Lear than in his own direct +experience, because in Hamlet and Lear he can see them with the eye and +intelligence of genius. But Shakespeare is the world all over again, +and there is loss as well as gain in such realism. Here is human life, +no doubt, and a brilliant pageantry it is; but human life as varied and +as problematic as it is in the living. Shakespeare's fundamental +intellectual resource is the historical and psychological knowledge of +such principles as govern the construction of human natures. The goods +for which men undertake, and live or die, are any goods, justified only +by the actual human striving for them. The virtues are the old winning +virtues of the secular life, and the heroisms of the common conscience. +Beyond its empirical generality, his knowledge is universal only in the +sense that space and time are universal. His consciousness _contains_ +its representative creations, and expresses them unspoiled by any +transforming thought. His poetic consciousness is like the very stage to +which he likens all the world: men and women meet there, and things +happen there. The stage itself creates no unity save the occasion and +the place. Shakespeare's consciousness is universal because it is a fair +field with no favors. But even so it is particular, because, though each +may enter and depart in peace, when all enter together there is anarchy +and a babel of voices. All Shakespeare is like all the world seen +through the eyes of each of its inhabitants. Human experience in +Shakespeare is human experience as everyone feels it, as comprehensive +as the aggregate of innumerable lives. But human experience in +philosophy is the experience of all as thought by a synthetic mind. +Hence the wealth of life depicted by Shakespeare serves only to point +out the philosopher's problem, and to challenge his powers. Here he will +find material, and not results; much to philosophize about, but no +philosophy. + +[Sidenote: Philosophy in Poetry. The World-View. Omar Khayyam.] + +Sect. 11. The discussion up to this point has attributed to poetry very +definite intellectual factors that nevertheless do not constitute +philosophy. Walt Whitman speaks his feeling with truth, but in general +manifests no comprehensive insight. Shakespeare has not only sincerity +of expression but an understanding mind. He has a knowledge not only of +particular experiences, but of human nature; and a consciousness full +and varied like society itself. But there is a kind of knowledge +possessed by neither, the knowledge sought by coordinating all aspects +of human experience, both particular and general. Not even Shakespeare +is wise as one who, having seen the whole, can fundamentally interpret a +part. But though the philosopher-poet may not yet be found, we cannot +longer be ignorant of his nature. He will be, like all poets, one who +appreciates experiences or finds things good, and he will faithfully +reproduce the values which he discovers. But he must _justify himself in +view of the fundamental nature of the universe_. The values which he +apprehends must be harmonious, and so far above the plurality of goods +as to transcend and unify them. The philosopher-poet will find reality +as a whole to be something that accredits the order of values in his +inner life. He will not only find certain things to be most worthy +objects of action or contemplation, but he will see why they are worthy, +because he will have construed the judgment of the universe in their +favor. + +In this general sense, Omar Khayyam is a philosopher-poet. To be sure +his universe is quite the opposite of that which most poets conceive, +and is perhaps profoundly antagonistic to the very spirit of poetry; but +it is none the less true that the joys to which Omar invites us are such +as his universe prescribes for human life. + + "Some for the Glories of This World; and some + Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come; + Ah, take the Cash, and let the Credit go, + Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum." + +Herein is both poetry and philosophy, albeit but a poor brand of each. +We are invited to occupy ourselves only with spiritual cash, because the +universe is spiritually insolvent. The immediately gratifying feelings +are the only feelings that the world can guarantee. Omar Khayyam is a +philosopher-poet, because his immediate delight in "youth's +sweet-scented manuscript" is part of a consciousness that vaguely sees, +though it cannot grasp, "this sorry scheme of things entire." + + "Drink for you know not whence you come, nor why; + Drink for you know not why you go, nor where." + +[Sidenote: Wordsworth.] + +Sect. 12. But the poet in his world-view ordinarily sees other than +darkness. The same innate spiritual enterprise that sustains religious +faith leads the poet more often to find the universe positively +congenial to his ideals, and to ideals in general. He interprets human +experience in the light of the spirituality of all the world. It is to +Wordsworth that we of the present age are chiefly indebted for such +imagery, and it will profit us to consider somewhat carefully the +philosophical quality of his poetry. + +Walter Pater, in introducing his appreciation of Wordsworth, writes that +"an intimate consciousness of the expression of natural things, which +weighs, listens, penetrates, where the earlier mind passed roughly by, +is a large element in the complexion of modern poetry." We recognize at +once the truth of this characterization as applied to Wordsworth. But +there is something more distinguished about this poet's sensibility even +than its extreme fineness and delicacy; a quality that is suggested, +though not made explicit, by Shelley's allusion to Wordsworth's +experience as "a sort of thought in sense." Nature possessed for him not +merely enjoyable and describable characters of great variety and +minuteness, but an immediately apprehended unity and meaning. It would +be a great mistake to construe this meaning in sense as analogous to the +crude symbolism of the educator Froebel, to whom, as he said, "the world +of crystals proclaimed, in distinct and univocal terms, the laws of +human life." Wordsworth did not attach ideas to sense, but regarded +sense itself as a communication of truth. We readily call to mind his +unique capacity for apprehending the characteristic flavor of a certain +place in a certain moment of time, the individuality of a situation. Now +in such moments he felt that he was receiving intelligences, none the +less direct and significant for their inarticulate form. Like the boy +on Windermere, whom he himself describes, + + "while he hung + Loitering, a gentle shock of mild surprise + Has carried far into his heart the voice + Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene + Would enter unawares into his mind, + With all its solemn imagery, its rocks, + Its woods, and that uncertain heaven received + Into the bosom of the steady lake." + +For our purpose it is essential that we should recognize in this +appreciation of nature, expressed in almost every poem that Wordsworth +wrote, a consciousness respecting the fundamental nature of the world. +Conversation, as we know, denotes an interchange of commensurable +meanings. Whatever the code may be, whether words or the most subtle +form of suggestion, communication is impossible without community of +nature. Hence, in believing himself to be holding converse with the +so-called physical world, Wordsworth conceives that world as +fundamentally like himself. He finds the most profound thing in all the +world to be the universal spiritual life. In nature this life manifests +itself most directly, clothed in its own proper dignity and peace. But +it may be discovered in the humanity that is most close to nature, in +the avocations of plain and simple people, and the unsophisticated +delights of children; and, with the perspective of contemplation, even +"among the multitudes of that huge city." + +So Wordsworth is rendering a true account of his own experience of +reality when, as in "The Prelude," he says unequivocally: + + "A gracious spirit o'er this earth presides, + And in the heart of man; invisibly + It comes to works of unreproved delight, + And tendency benign; directing those + Who care not, know not, think not, what they do." + +Wordsworth is not a philosopher-poet because by searching his pages we +can find an explicit philosophical creed such as this, but because all +the joys of which his poet-soul compels him to sing have their peculiar +note, and compose their peculiar harmony, by virtue of such an +indwelling consciousness. Here is one who is a philosopher in and +through his poetry. He is a philosopher in so far as the detail of his +appreciation finds fundamental justification in a world-view. From the +immanence of "the universal heart" there follows, not through any +mediate reasoning, but by the immediate experience of its propriety, a +conception of that which is of supreme worth in life. The highest and +best of which life is capable is contemplation, or the consciousness of +the universal indwelling of God. Of those who fail to live thus +fittingly in the midst of the divine life, Walter Pater speaks for +Wordsworth as follows: + + "To higher or lower ends they move too often with something of + a sad countenance, with hurried and ignoble gait, becoming, + unconsciously, something like thorns, in their anxiety to bear + grapes; it being possible for people, in the pursuit of even + great ends, to become themselves thin and impoverished in + spirit and temper, thus diminishing the sum of perfection in + the world at its very sources."[42:3] + +The quiet and worshipful spirit, won by the cultivation of the emotions +appropriate to the presence of nature and society, is the mark of the +completest life and the most acceptable service. Thus for Wordsworth the +meaning of life is inseparable from the meaning of the universe. In +apprehending that which is good and beautiful in human experience, he +was attended by a vision of the totality of things. Herein he has had to +do, if not with the form, at any rate with the very substance of +philosophy. + +[Sidenote: Dante.] + +Sect. 13. Unquestionably the supreme philosopher-poet is Dante. He is +not only philosophical in the temper of his mind, but his greatest poem +is the incarnation of a definite system of philosophy, the most +definite that the world has seen. That conception of the world which in +the thirteenth century found argumentative and orderly expression in the +"Summa Theologiae" of Thomas of Aquino, and constituted the faith of the +church, is visualized by Dante, and made the basis of an interpretation +of life. + +The "Divina Commedia" deals with all the heavens to the Empyrean itself, +and with all spiritual life to the very presence of God. It derives its +imagery from the cosmology of the day, its dramatic motive from the +Christian and Greek conceptions of God and his dealings with the world. +Sin is punished because of the justice of God; knowledge, virtue, and +faith lead, through God's grace and mercy manifested in Christ, to a +perpetual union with Him. Hell, purgatory, and paradise give place and +setting to the events of the drama. But the deeper meaning of the poem +is allegorical. In a letter quoted by Lowell, Dante writes: + + "The literal subject of the whole work is the state of the + soul after death, simply considered. But if the work be taken + allegorically the subject is man, as by merit or demerit, + through freedom of the will, he renders himself liable to the + reward or punishment of justice."[43:4] + +In other words, the inner and essential meaning of the poem has to do +not with external retribution, but with character, and the laws which +determine its own proper ruin or perfection. The punishments described +in the "Inferno" are accounts of the state of guilt itself, implications +of the will that has chosen the part of brutishness. Sin itself is +damnable and deadening, but the knowledge that the soul that sinneth +shall die is the first way of emancipation from sin. The guidance of +Virgil through hell and purgatory signifies the knowledge of good and +evil, or moral insight, as the guide of man through this life of +struggle and progress. The earthly paradise, at the close of the +"Purgatorio," represents the highest state to which human character can +attain when choice is determined by ordinary experience, intelligence, +and understanding. Here man stands alone, endowed with an enlightened +conscience. Here are uttered the last words of Virgil to Dante, the +explorer of the spiritual country: + + "Expect no more or word or sign from me. Free, upright, and + sane is thine own free will, and it would be wrong not to act + according to its pleasure; wherefore thee over thyself I crown + and mitre."[44:5] + +But moral self-reliance is not the last word. As Beatrice, the image of +tenderness and holiness, comes to Dante in the earthly paradise, and +leads him from the summit of purgatory into the heaven of heavens, and +even to the eternal light; so there is added to the mere human, +intellectual, and moral resources of the soul, the sustaining power of +the divine grace, the illuminating power of divine truth, and the +transforming power of divine love. Through the aid of this higher +wisdom, the journey of life becomes the way to God. Thus the allegorical +truth of the "Divina Commedia" is not merely an analysis of the moral +nature of man, but the revelation of a universal spiritual order, +manifesting itself in the moral evolution of the individual, and above +all in his ultimate community with the eternal goodness. + + "Thou shouldst not, if I deem aright, wonder more at thy + ascent, than at a stream if from a high mountain it descends + to the base. A marvel it would be in thee, if, deprived of + hindrance, thou hadst sat below, even as quiet by living fire + in earth would be."[45:6] + +Such, in brief, is Dante's world-view, so suggestive of the freer +idealistic conceptions of later thought as to justify a recent +characterization of him as one who, "accepting without a shadow of a +doubt or hesitation all the constitutive ideas of mediaeval thought and +life, grasped them so firmly and gave them such luminous expression that +the spirit in them broke away from the form."[46:7] + +But it must be added, as in the case of Wordsworth, that Dante is a +philosopher-poet not because St. Thomas Aquinas appears and speaks with +authority in the Thirteenth Canto of the "Paradiso," nor even because a +philosophical doctrine can be consistently formulated from his writings, +but because his consciousness of life is informed with a sense of its +universal bearings. There is a famous passage in the Twenty-second Canto +of the "Paradiso," in which Dante describes himself as looking down upon +the earth from the starry heaven. + + "'Thou art so near the ultimate salvation,' began Beatrice, + 'that thou oughtest to have thine eyes clear and sharp. And + therefore ere thou further enterest it, look back downward, + and see how great a world I have already set beneath thy feet, + in order that thy heart, so far as it is able, may present + itself joyous to the triumphant crowd which comes glad through + this round ether.' With my sight I returned through each and + all the seven spheres, and saw this globe such that I smiled + at its mean semblance; and that counsel I approve as the best + which holds it of least account; and he who thinks of other + things maybe called truly worthy." + +Dante's scale of values is that which appears from the starry heaven. +His austere piety, his invincible courage, and his uncompromising hatred +of wrong, are neither accidents of temperament nor blind reactions, but +compose the proper character of one who has both seen the world from +God, and returned to see God from the world. He was, as Lowell has said, +"a man of genius who could hold heartbreak at bay for twenty years, and +would not let himself die till he had done his task"; and his power was +not obstinacy, but a vision of the ways of God. He knew a truth that +justified him in his sacrifices, and made a great glory of his defeat +and exile. Even so his poetry or appreciation of life is the expression +of an inward contemplation of the world in its unity or essence. It is +but an elaboration of the piety which he attributes to the lesser saints +of paradise, when he has them say: + + "Nay, it is essential to this blessed existence to hold + ourselves within the divine will, whereby our very wills are + made one. So that as we are from stage to stage throughout + this realm, to all the realm is pleasing, as to the King who + inwills us with His will. And His will is our peace; it is + that sea whereunto is moving all that which It creates and + which nature makes."[47:8] + +[Sidenote: The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy.] + +Sect. 14. There now remains the brief task of distinguishing the +philosopher-poet from the philosopher himself. The philosopher-poet is +one who, having made the philosophical point of view his own, expresses +himself in the form of poetry. The philosophical point of view is that +from which the universe is comprehended in its totality. The wisdom of +the philosopher is the knowledge of each through the knowledge of all. +Wherein, then, does the poet, when possessed of such wisdom, differ from +the philosopher proper? To this question one can give readily enough the +general answer, that the difference lies in the mode of utterance. +Furthermore, we have already given some account of the peculiar manner +of the poet. He invites us to experience with him the beautiful and +moving in nature and life. That which the poet has to express, and that +which he aims to arouse in others, is an appreciative experience. He +requires what Wordsworth calls "an atmosphere of sensation in which to +move his wings." Therefore if he is to be philosophical in intelligence, +and yet essentially a poet, he must find his universal truth in +immediate experience. He must be one who, in seeing the many, sees the +one. The philosopher-poet is he who visualizes a fundamental +interpretation of the world. "A poem," says one poet, "is the very image +of life expressed in its eternal truth." + +The philosopher proper, on the other hand, has the sterner and less +inviting task of rendering such an interpretation articulate to thought. +That which the poet sees, the philosopher must define. That which the +poet divines, the philosopher must calculate. The philosopher must dig +for that which the poet sees shining through. As the poet transcends +thought for the sake of experience, the philosopher must transcend +experience for the sake of thought. As the poet sees all, and all in +each, so the philosopher, knowing each, must think all consistently +together, and then know each again. It is the part of philosophy to +collect and criticise evidence, to formulate and coordinate conceptions, +and finally to define in exact terms. The reanimation of the structure +of thought is accomplished primarily in religion, which is a general +conception of the world made the basis of daily living. + +For religion there is no subjective correlative less than life itself. +Poetry is another and more circumscribed means of restoring thought to +life. By the poet's imagination, and through the art of his expression, +thought may be sensuously perceived. "If the time should ever come," +says Wordsworth, "when what is now called Science, thus familiarized to +men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh, and blood, +the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and +will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of +the household of man."[50:9] As respects truth, philosophy has an +indubitable priority. The very sternness of the philosopher's task is +due to his supreme dedication to truth. But if validity be the merit of +philosophy, it can well be supplemented by immediacy, which is the merit +of poetry. Presuppose in the poet conviction of a sound philosophy, and +we may say with Shelley, of his handiwork, that "it is the perfect and +consummate surface and bloom of all things; it is as the odor and the +color of the rose to the texture of the elements which compose it, as +the form and splendor of unfaded beauty to the secrets of anatomy and +corruption." "Indeed," as he adds, "what were our consolations on this +side of the grave--and our aspirations beyond it--if poetry did not +ascend to bring light and fire from those eternal regions where the +owl-winged faculty of calculation dare not ever soar?"[51:10] + +The unity in outlook, attended by differences of method and form, which +may exist between poet and philosopher, is signally illustrated by the +relation between Goethe and Spinoza. What Goethe saw and felt, Spinoza +proved and defined. The universal and eternal substance was to Spinoza, +as philosopher, a theorem, and to Goethe, as poet, a perception and an +emotion. Goethe writes to Jacobi that when philosophy "lays itself out +for division," he cannot get on with it, but when it "confirms our +original feeling as though we were one with nature," it is welcome to +him. In the same letter Goethe expresses his appreciation of Spinoza as +the complement of his own nature: + + "His all-reconciling peace contrasted with my all-agitating + endeavor; his intellectual method was the opposite counterpart + of my poetic way of feeling and expressing myself; and even + the inflexible regularity of his logical procedure, which + might be considered ill-adapted to moral subjects, made me his + most passionate scholar and his devoted adherent. Mind and + heart, understanding and sense, were drawn together with an + inevitable elective affinity, and this at the same time + produced an intimate union between individuals of the most + different types."[51:11] + +It appears, then, that some poets share with all philosophers that +point of view from which the horizon line is the boundary of all the +world. Poetry is not always or essentially philosophical, but may be so; +and when the poetic imagination restores philosophy to immediacy, human +experience reaches its most exalted state, excepting only religion +itself, wherein God is both seen and also served. Nor is the part of +philosophy in poetry and religion either ignoble or presumptuous, for, +humanly speaking, "the owl-winged faculty of calculation" is the only +safe and sure means of access to that place on high, + + "Where the nightingale doth sing + Not a senseless, tranced thing, + But a divine melodious truth; + Philosophic numbers smooth; + Tales and golden histories + Of heaven and its mysteries." + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[28:1] George Santayana, in his _Poetry and Religion_, p. 176. + +[30:2] Santayana: _op. cit._, p. 180. + +[42:3] _Appreciations_, p. 59. + +[43:4] Letter to Can Grande. See Lowell's _Essay on Dante_, p. 34. + +[44:5] _Purgatorio_, Canto XXVII. Translation by Norton. + +[45:6] _Paradiso_, Canto I. + +[46:7] Edward Caird, in his _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 24. + +[47:8] _Paradiso_, Canto III. + +[50:9] Observations prefixed to the second edition of _Lyrical Ballads_. + +[51:10] _A Defence of Poetry._ + +[51:11] Quoted by Caird in his _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. +60. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE + + +[Sidenote: The Possibility of Defining Religion.] + +Sect. 15. The least religious experience is so mysterious and so complex +that a moderate degree of reflection upon it tends to a sense of +intellectual impotence. "If I speak," says Emerson, "I define and +confine, and am less." One would gladly set down religion among the +unspeakable things and avoid the imputation of degrading it. It is +certain that the enterprise of defining religion is at present in +disrepute. It has been undertaken so often and so unsuccessfully that +contemporary students for the most part prefer to supply a list of +historical definitions of religion, and let their variety demonstrate +their futility. Metaphysicians and psychologists agree that in view of +the differences of creed, ritual, organization, conduct, and temperament +that have been true of different religions in different times and +places, one may as well abandon the idea that there is a constant +element. + +But on the other hand we have the testimony afforded by the name +religion; and the ordinary judgments of men to the effect that it +signifies something to be religious, and to be more or less religious. +There is an elementary logical principle to the effect that a group name +implies certain common group characters. Impatience with abstract or +euphemistic definitions should not blind us to the truth. Even the +psychologist tends in his description of religious phenomena to single +out and emphasize what he calls a _typical_ religious experience. And +the same applies to the idealist's treatment of the matter.[54:1] +Religion, he reasons, is essentially a development of which the true +meaning can be seen only in the higher stages. The primitive religion is +therefore only implicit religion. But lower stages cannot be regarded as +belonging to a single development with higher stages, if there be not +some actual promise of the later in the earlier, or some element which +endures throughout. It is unavoidable, then, to assume that in dealing +with religion we are dealing with a specific and definable experience. + +[Sidenote: The Profitableness of Defining Religion.] + +Sect. 16. The profitableness of undertaking such a definition is another +matter. It may well be that in so human and practical an affair as +religion, definition is peculiarly inappropriate. But is there not a +human and practical value in the very defining of religion? Is there not +a demand for it in the peculiar relation that exists between religion +and the progress of enlightenment? Religion associates itself with the +habits of society. The progress of enlightenment means that more or less +all the time, and very profoundly at certain critical times, society +must change its habits. The consequence is that religion is likely to be +abandoned with the old habits. The need of a new religion is therefore a +chronic one. The reformer in religion, or the man who wishes to be both +enlightened and religious, is chiefly occupied with the problem of +disentangling religion pure and undefiled from definite discredited +practices and opinions. And the solution of the problem turns upon some +apprehension of the essence of religion. There is a large amount of +necessary and unnecessary tragedy due to the extrinsic connection +between ideas and certain modes of their expression. There can be no +more serious and urgent duty than that of expressing as directly, and so +as truly as possible, the great permanent human concerns. The men to +whom educational reform has been largely due have been the men who have +remembered for their fellows what this whole business of education is +after all for. Comenius and Pestalozzi served society by stripping +educational activity of its historical and institutional accessories, +and laying bare the genuine human need that these are designed to +satisfy. There is a similar virtue in the insistent attempt to +distinguish between the essential and the accessory in religion. + +[Sidenote: The True Method of Defining Religion.] + +Sect. 17. Although declining to be discouraged by the conspicuousness of +past failures in this connection, one may well profit by them. The +amazing complexity of religious phenomena must somehow be seen to be +consistent with their common nature. The religious experience must not +only be found, but must also be reconciled with "the varieties of +religious experience." The inadequacy of the well-known definitions of +religion may be attributed to several causes. The commonest fallacy is +to define religion in terms of a religion. My definition of religion +must include my brother's religion, even though he live on the other +side of the globe, and my ancestor's religion, in spite of his +prehistoric remoteness. Error may easily arise through the attempt to +define religion in terms of my own religion, or what I conceive to be +the true religion. Whatever the relation between ideal religion and +actual religion, the field of religion contains by common consent cults +that must on their own grounds condemn one another; religions that are +bad religions, and yet religions. + +A more enlightened fallacy, and a more dangerous one, is due to the +supposition that religion can be defined exclusively in terms of some +department of human nature. There have been descriptions of religion in +terms of feeling, intellect, and conduct respectively. But it is always +easy to overthrow such a description, by raising the question of its +application to evidently religious experiences that belong to some other +aspect of life. Religion is not feeling, because there are many +phlegmatic, God-fearing men whose religion consists in good works. +Religion is not conduct, for there are many mystics whose very religion +is withdrawal from the field of action. Religion is not intellection, +for no one has ever been able to formulate a creed that is common to all +religions. Yet without a doubt one must look for the essence of religion +in human nature. The present psychological interest in religion has +emphasized this truth. How, then, may we describe it in terms of +certain constant conditions of human life, and yet escape the +abstractness of the facultative method? Modern psychology suggests an +answer in demonstrating the interdependence of knowledge, feeling, and +volition.[58:2] The perfect case of this unity is _belief_. The +believing experience is cognitive in intent, but practical and emotional +as well in content. I believe what I take for granted; and the object of +my belief is not merely known, but also felt and acted upon. _What I +believe expresses itself in my total experience._ + +There is some hope, then, of an adequate definition of the religious +experience, if it be regarded as belonging to the psychological type of +belief.[58:3] Belief, however, is a broader category than religion. +There must be some _religious type_ of believing. An account of religion +in terms of believing, and the particular type of it here in question, +would, then, constitute the central stem of a psychology of religion, +and affords the proper conceptions for a description of the religious +experience. Even here the reservation must be made that belief is always +more than the believing _state_, in that it means to be _true_.[59:4] +Hence to complete an account of religion one should consider its object, +or its cognitive implications. But this direct treatment of the relation +between religion and philosophy must be deferred until in the present +chapter we shall have come to appreciate the inwardness of the religious +consciousness. To this end we must permit ourselves to be enlightened by +the experience of religious people as viewed from within. It is not our +opinion of a man's religion that is here in question, but the content +and meaning which it has for him. + + "I would have you," says Fielding, in his "Hearts of Men," "go + and kneel beside the Mahommedan as he prays at the sunset + hour, and put your heart to his and wait for the echo that + will surely come. . . . I would have you go to the hillman + smearing the stone with butter that his god may be pleased, to + the woman crying to the forest god for her sick child, to the + boy before his monks learning to be good. No matter where you + go, no matter what the faith is called, if you have the + hearing ear, if your heart is in unison with the heart of the + world, you will hear always the same song."[59:5] + +[Sidenote: Religion as Belief.] + +Sect. 18. The general identification of religion with belief is made +without serious difficulty. The essential factor in belief, is, as we +have seen, the reaction of the whole personality to a fixed object or +accepted situation. A similar principle underlies common judgments about +a man's religion. He is accounted most religious whose religion +penetrates his life most intimately. In the man whose religion consists +in the outer exercise of attendance upon church, we recognize the sham. +He _appears_ to be religious. He does one of the things which a +religious man would do; but an object of religious faith is not the +constant environment of his life. He may or may not feel sure of God +from his pew, but God is not among the things that count in his daily +life. God does not enter into his calculations or determine his scale of +values. Again, discursive thinking is regarded as an interruption of +religion. When I am at pains to justify my religion, I am already +doubting; and for common opinion doubt is identical with irreligion. In +so far as I am religious, my religion stands in no need of +justification, even though I regard it as justifiable. In my religious +experience I am taking something for granted; in other words I act about +it and feel about it in a manner that is going to be determined by the +special conditions of my mood and temperament. The mechanical and +prosaic man acknowledges God in his mechanical and prosaic way. He +believes in divine retribution as he believes in commercial or social +retribution. He is as careful to prepare for the next world as he is to +be respectable in this. The poet, on the other hand, believes in God +after the manner of his genius. Though he worship God in spirit he may +conduct his life in an irregular manner peculiar to himself. Difference +of mood in the same individual may be judged by the same measure. When +God is most real to him, brought home to him most vividly, or +consciously obeyed, in these moments he is most religious. When, on the +other hand, God is merely a name to him, and church a routine, or when +both are forgotten in the daily occupations, he is least religious. His +life on the whole is said to be religious in so far as periods of the +second type are subordinated to periods of the first type. Further +well-known elements of belief, corollaries of the above, are evidently +present in religion. A certain _imagery remains constant_ throughout an +individual's experience. He comes back to it as to a physical object in +space. And although religion is sporadically an exclusive and isolated +affair, it tends strongly to be social. The religious object, or God, is +a social object, common to me and to my neighbor, and presupposed in +our collective undertakings. This reduction of religion to the type of +the believing state should thus provide us with an answer to that old +and fundamental question concerning the relative priority of faith and +works. The test of the faith is in the works, and the works are +religious in so far as they are the expression of the faith. Religion is +not the doing of anything nor the feeling of anything nor the thinking +of anything, but the reacting as a whole, in terms of all possible +activities of human life, to some accepted situation. + +[Sidenote: Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude.] + +Sect. 19. We may now face the more interesting but difficult question of +the special character of religious belief. In spite of the fact that in +these days the personality of God is often regarded as a transient +feature of religion, that type of belief which throws most light upon +the religious experience is the _belief in persons_. Our belief in +persons consists in the practical recognition of a more or less +persistent disposition toward ourselves. The outward behavior of our +fellow-men is construed in terms of the practical bearing of the +attitude which it implies. The extraordinary feature of such belief is +the disproportion between its vividness and the direct evidence for it. +Of this we are most aware in connection with those personalities which +we regard as distinctly friendly or hostile to ourselves. We are always +more or less clearly in the presence of our friends and enemies. Their +well-wishing or their ill-wishing haunts the scene of our living. There +is no more important constituent of what the psychologists call our +"general feeling tone." There are times when we are entirely possessed +by a state that is either exuberance in the presence of those who love +us, or awkwardness and stupidity in the presence of those whom we +believe to suspect and dislike us. The latter state may easily become +chronic. Many men live permanently in the presence of an accusing +audience. The inner life which expresses itself in the words, "Everybody +hates me!" is perhaps the most common form of morbid self-consciousness. +On the other hand, buoyancy of spirits springs largely from a constant +faith in the good-will of one's fellows. In this case one is filled with +a sense of security, and is conscious of a sympathetic reinforcement +that adds to private joys and compensates for private sorrows. And this +sense of attitude is wonderfully discriminating. We can feel the +presence of a "great man," a "formidable person," a superior or +inferior, one who is interested or indifferent to our talk, and all the +subtlest degrees of approval and disapproval. + +A similar sensibility may quicken us even in situations where no direct +individual attitude to ourselves is implied. We regard places and +communities as congenial when we are in sympathy with the prevailing +purposes or standards of value. We may feel ill at ease or thoroughly at +home in cities where we know no single human soul. Indeed, in a +misanthrope like Rousseau (and who has not his Rousseau moods!) the mere +absence of social repression arouses a most intoxicating sense of +tunefulness and security. Nature plays the part of an indulgent parent +who permits all sorts of personal liberties. + + "The view of a fine country, a succession of agreeable + prospects, a free air, a good appetite, and the health I gain + by walking; the freedom of inns, and the distance from + everything that can make me recollect the dependence of my + situation, conspire to free my soul, and give boldness to my + thoughts, throwing me, in a manner, into the immensity of + things, where I combine, choose, and appropriate them to my + fancy, without restraint or fear. I dispose of all nature as I + please."[64:6] + +[Sidenote: Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual +Environment, or Universe.] + +Sect. 20. In such confidence or distrust, inspired originally by the +social environment, and similarly suggested by other surroundings of +life, we have the key to the religious consciousness. But it is now time +to add that in the case of religion these attitudes are concerned with +the universal or supernatural rather than with present and normal human +relationships. Religious reactions are "total reactions." + + "To get at them," says William James, "you must go behind the + foreground of existence and reach down to that curious _sense + of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence_, + intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious, + which in some degree everyone possesses. This _sense of the + world's presence_, appealing as it does to our peculiar + individual temperament, makes us either strenuous or careless, + devout or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant about life at large; + and our reaction, involuntary and inarticulate and often half + unconscious as it is, is the completest of all our answers to + the question, 'What is the character of this universe in which + we dwell?'"[65:7] + +This _residual environment_, or profounder realm of tradition and +nature, may have any degree of unity from chaos to cosmos. For religion +its significance lies in the idea of original and far-reaching power +rather than in the idea of totality. But that which is at first only +"beyond," is _practically_ the same object as that which comes in the +development of thought to be conceived as the "world" or the "universe." +We may therefore use these latter terms to indicate the object of +religion, until the treatment of special instances shall define it more +precisely. Religion is, then, _man's sense of the disposition of the +universe to himself_. We shall expect to find, as in the social +phenomena with which we have just dealt, that the manifestation of this +sense consists in a general reaction appropriate to the disposition so +attributed. He will be fundamentally ill at ease, profoundly confident, +or will habitually take precautions to be safe. The ultimate nature of +the world is here no speculative problem. The savage who could feel some +joy at living in the universe would be more religious than the sublimest +dialectician. It is in the vividness of the sense of this presence that +the acuteness of religion consists. I am religious in so far as the +whole tone and temper of my living reflects a belief as to what the +universe thinks of such as me. + +[Sidenote: Examples of Religious Belief.] + +Sect. 21. The examples that follow are selected because their +differences in personal flavor serve to throw into relief their common +religious character. Theodore Parker, in describing his own boyhood, +writes as follows: + + "I can hardly think without a shudder of the terrible effect + the doctrine of eternal damnation had on me. How many, many + hours have I wept with terror as I lay on my bed, till, + between praying and weeping, sleep gave me repose. But before + I was nine years old this fear went away, and I saw clearer + light in the goodness of God. But for years, say from seven + till ten, I said my prayers with much devotion, I think, and + then continued to repeat, 'Lord, forgive my sins,' till sleep + came on me."[67:8] + +Compare with this Stevenson's Christmas letter to his mother, in which +he says: + + "The whole necessary morality is kindness; and it should + spring, of itself, from the one fundamental doctrine, Faith. + If you are sure that God, in the long run, means kindness by + you, you should be happy; and if happy, surely you should be + kind."[67:9] + +Here is destiny frowning and destiny smiling, but in each case so real, +so present, as to be immediately responded to with helpless terror and +with grateful warm-heartedness. + +The author of the "Imitatio Christi" speaks thus of the daily living of +the Christian: + + "The life of a Christian who has dedicated himself to the + service of God should abound with eminent virtues of all + kinds, that he may be really the same person which he is by + outward appearance and profession. Indeed, he ought not only + to be the same, but much more, in his inward disposition of + soul; because he professes to serve a God who sees the inward + parts, a searcher of the heart and reins, a God and Father of + spirits: and therefore, since we are always in His sight, we + should be exceedingly careful to avoid all impurity, all that + may give offence to Him whose eyes cannot behold iniquity. We + should, in a word, so far as mortal and frail nature can, + imitate the blessed angels in all manner of holiness, since + we, as well as they, are always in His presence. . . . And good + men have always this notion of the thing. For they depend upon + God for the success of all they do, even of their best and + wisest undertakings."[68:10] + +Such is to be the practical acknowledgment of God in the routine of +life. The more direct response to this presence appears abundantly in +St. Augustine's conversation and reminiscence with God. + + "How evil have not my deeds been; or if not my deeds my words; + or if not my words my will? But Thou, O Lord, art good and + merciful, and Thy right hand had respect unto the profoundness + of my death, and removed from the bottom of my heart that + abyss of corruption. And this was the result, that I willed + not to do what I willed, and willed to do what thou + willedst. . . . How sweet did it suddenly become to me to be + without the delights of trifles! And what at one time I + feared to lose, it was now a joy to me to put away. For Thou + didst cast them away from me, Thou true and highest sweetness. + Thou didst cast them away, and instead of them didst enter in + Thyself--sweeter than all pleasure, though not to flesh and + blood; brighter than all light, but more veiled than all + mysteries; more exalted than all honor, but not to the exalted + in their own conceits. Now was my soul free from the gnawing + cares of seeking and getting. . . . And I babbled unto Thee my + brightness, my riches, and my health, the Lord my God."[69:11] + +In these two passages we meet with religious conduct and with the +supreme religious experience, the direct worship of God. In each case +the heart of the matter is an individual's indubitable conviction of the +world's favorable concern for him. The deeper order of things +constitutes the real and the profoundly congenial community in which he +lives. + +[Sidenote: Typical Religious Phenomena: Conversion.] + +Sect. 22. Let us now apply this general account of the religious +experience to certain typical religious phenomena: _conversion_; +_piety_; and religious _instruments_, _symbolisms_, _and_ modes of +_conveyance_. Although recent study of the phenomenon of _conversion_ +has brought to light a considerable amount of interesting material, +there is some danger of misconceiving its importance. The psychology of +conversion is primarily the psychology of crisis or radical alteration, +rather than the psychology of religion. For the majority of religious +men and women conversion is an insignificant event, and in very many +cases it never occurs at all. Religion is more purely present where it +is normal and monotonous. But this phenomenon is nevertheless highly +significant in that religion and irreligion are placed in close +juxtaposition, and the contribution of religion at its inception thereby +emphasized. In general it is found that conversion takes place during +the period of adolescence. But this is the time of the most sudden +expansion of the environment of life; a time when there is the awakening +consciousness of many a new presence. This is sometimes expressed by +saying that it is a period of acute self-consciousness. Life is +conscious of itself as over against its inheritance; the whole setting +of life sweeps into view. Some solution of the life problem, some coming +to terms with the universe, is the normal issue of it. Religious +conversion signifies, then, that in this fundamental adjustment a man +defines and accepts for his life a certain attitude on the part of the +universe. The examples cited by the psychologists, as well as the +generalizations which they derive, bear out this interpretation. + + "General Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, considers + that the first vital step in saving outcasts consists in + making them feel that some decent human being cares enough for + them to take an interest in the question whether they are to + rise or sink."[71:12] + +The new state is here one of courage and hope stimulated by the glow of +friendly interest. The convert is no longer "out in the cold." He is +told that the world wishes him well, and this is brought home to him +through representations of the tenderness of Christ, and through the +direct ministerings of those who mediate it. But somehow the convert +must be persuaded to realize all this. He must _believe_ it before it +can mean anything to him. He is therefore urged to pray--a proceeding +that is at first ridiculous to him, since it involves taking for granted +what he disbelieves. But therein lies the critical point. It is peculiar +to the object in this case that it can exist only for one who already +believes in it. The psychologists call this the element of +"self-surrender." To be converted a man must somehow suffer his +surroundings to put into him a new heart, which may thereupon confirm +its object. Such belief is tremendously tenacious because it so largely +creates its own evidence. Once believe that "God, in the long run, means +kindness by you," and you are likely to stand by it to the end--the more +so in this case because the external evidence either way is to the +average man so insufficient. Such a belief as this is inspired in the +convert, not by reasoning, but by all the powers of suggestion that +personality and social contagion can afford. + +[Sidenote: Piety.] + +Sect. 23. The psychologists describe _piety_ as a sense of unity. One +feels after reading their accounts that they are too abstract. For there +are many kinds of unity, characteristic of widely varying moods and +states. Any state of rapt attention is a state of unity, and this occurs +in the most secular and humdrum moments of life. Nor does it help +matters to say that in the case of religion this unity must have been +preceded by a state of division; for we cannot properly characterize any +state of mind in terms of another state unless the latter be retained in +the former. And that which is characteristic of the religious sense of +unity would seem to be just such an overcoming of difference. There is a +recognition of two distinct attitudes, which may be more or less in +sympathy with one another, but which are both present even in their +fullest harmony. Were I to be taken out of myself so completely as to +forget myself, I should inevitably lose that sense of sympathy from +which arises the peculiar exultation of religious faith, a heightened +experience of the same type with the freedom and spontaneity that I +experience in the presence of those with whom I feel most in accord. The +further graces and powers of religion readily submit to a similar +description. My sense of positive sympathy expresses itself in an +attitude of well-wishing; living in an atmosphere of kindness I +instinctively endeavor to propagate it. My buoyancy is distinctly of +that quality which to a lesser degree is due to any sense of social +security; my power is that of one who works in an environment that +reenforces him. I experience the objective or even cosmical character of +my enterprises. They have a momentum which makes me their instrument +rather than their perpetrator. A paradoxical relation between religion +and morality has always interested observers of custom and history. +Religion is apparently as capable of the most fiendish malevolence as of +the most saintly gentleness. Fielding writes that, + + "When religion is brought out or into daily life and used as + a guide or a weapon in the world it has no effect either for + good or evil. Its effect is simply in strengthening the heart, + in blinding the eyes, in deafening the ears. It is an + intensive force, an intoxicant. It doubles or trebles a man's + powers. It is an impulsive force sending him headlong down the + path of emotion, whether that path lead to glory or to infamy. + It is a tremendous stimulant, that is all."[74:13] + +Religion does not originate life purposes or define their meaning, but +stimulates them by the same means that works in all corporate and social +activity. To work with the universe is the most tremendous incentive +that can appeal to the individual will. Hence in highly ethical +religions the power for good exceeds that of any other social and +spiritual agency. Such religion makes present, actual, and real, that +good on the whole which the individual otherwise tends to distinguish +from that which is good for _him_. In daily life the morally valid and +the practically urgent are commonly arrayed against one another; but the +ethical religion makes the valid urgent. + +[Sidenote: Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance.] + +Sect. 24. The _instruments_ of religion are legion, and it is in order +here only to mention certain prominent cases in which their selection +would seem to have direct reference to the provocation and perpetuation +of such a sense of attitude as we have been describing. This is true in +a general way of all _symbolism_. There is no essential difference +between the religious symbol and such symbols as serve to remind us of +human relationships. In both cases the perceptual absence of will is +compensated for by the presence of some object associated with that +will. The function of this object is due to its power to revive and +perpetuate a certain special social atmosphere. But the most important +vehicle of religion has always been personality. It is, after all, to +priests, prophets, and believers that religious cults have owed their +long life. The traits that mark the prophet are both curious and +sublime. He is most remarkable for the confidence with which he speaks +for the universe. Whether it be due to lack of a sense of humor or to a +profound conviction of truth, is indifferent to our purpose. The power +of such men is undoubtedly in their suggestion of a force greater than +they, whose designs they bring directly and socially to the attention of +men. The prophet in his prophesying is indeed not altogether +distinguished from God, and it is through the mediation of a directly +perceptible human attitude that a divine attitude gets itself fixed in +the imagination of the believer. What is true of the prophet is equally +true of the preacher whose function it is not to represent God in his +own person, but to depict him with his tongue. It is generally +recognized that the preacher is neither a moralizer nor a theologian. +But it is less perfectly understood that it is his function to suggest +the presence of God. His proper language is that of the imagination, and +the picture which he portrays is that of a reciprocal social +relationship between man and the Supreme Master of the situation of +life. He will not define God or prove God, but introduce Him and talk +about Him. And at the same time the association of prayer and worship +with his sermon, and the atmosphere created by the meeting together of a +body of disciples, will act as the confirmation of his suggestions of +such a living presence. + +The _conveyance_ of any single religious cult from generation to +generation affords a signal illustration of the importance in religion +of the recognition of attitude. Religions manage somehow to survive any +amount of transformation of creed and ritual. It is not what is done, or +what is thought, that identifies the faith of the first Christians with +that of the last, but a certain reckoning with the disposition of God. +The successive generations of Christians are introduced into the +spiritual world of their fathers, with its furnishing of hopes and fears +remaining substantially the same; and their Christianity consists in +their continuing to live in it with only a slight and gradual +renovation. To any given individual God is more or less completely +represented by his elders in the faith in their exhortations and +ministerings; and through them he fixes as the centre of his system an +image of God his accuser or redeemer. + +[Sidenote: Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions.] + +Sect. 25. The complete verification of this interpretation of the +religious experience would require the application of it to the +different historical cults. In general the examination of such instances +is entirely beyond the scope of this chapter; but a brief consideration +may be given to those which seem to afford reasonable grounds for +objection. + +First, it may be said that in _primitive religions_, notably in +fetichism, tabooism, and totemism, there is no recognition of a cosmical +unity. It is quite evident that there is no conception of a universe. +But it is equally evident that the natural and historical environment in +its generality has a very specific practical significance for the +primitive believer. It is often said with truth that these earliest +religions are more profoundly pantheistic than polytheistic. Man +recognizes an all-pervading interest that is capable of being directed +to himself. The selection of a deity is not due to any special +qualification for deification possessed by the individual object itself, +but to the tacit presumption that, as Thales said, "all things are full +of gods." The disposition of residual reality manifests to the believer +no consistency or unity, but it is nevertheless the most constant object +of his will. He lives in the midst of a capriciousness which he must +appease if he is to establish himself at all. + +[Sidenote: Buddhism.] + +Sect. 26. Secondly, in the case of _Buddhism_ we are said to meet with a +religion that is essentially atheistic. + + "Whether Buddhas arise, O priests, or whether Buddhas do not + arise, it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary + constitution of being, that all its constituents are + transitory."[78:14] + +The secret of life lies in the application of this truth: + + "O builder! I've discovered thee! + This fabric thou shalt ne'er rebuild! + Thy rafters all are broken now, + And pointed roof demolished lies! + This mind has demolition reached, + And seen the last of all desire!"[78:15] + +The case of Buddha himself and of the exponents of his purely esoteric +doctrine, belong to the reflective type which will presently be given +special consideration. But with the ordinary believer, even where an +extraneous but almost inevitable polytheism is least in evidence, the +religious experience consists in substantially the same elements that +appear in theistic religions. The individual is here living +appropriately to the ultimate nature of things, with the ceaseless +periods of time in full view. That which is brought home to him is the +illusoriness and hollowness of things when taken in the spirit of active +endeavor. The only profound and abiding good is nothingness. While +nature and society conspire to mock him, Nirvana invites him to its +peace. The religious course of his life consists in the use of such +means as can win him this end. From the stand-point of the universe he +has the sympathy only of that wisdom whose essence is self-destruction. +And this truth is mediated by the imagination of divine sympathy, for +the Blessed One remains as the perpetual incarnation of his own +blessedness. + +[Sidenote: Critical Religion.] + +Sect. 27. Finally there remains the consideration of the bearing of this +interpretation upon the more refined and disciplined religions. The +religion of the critically enlightened man is less naive and credulous +in its imagery. God tends to vanish into an ideal or a universal, into +some object of theoretical definition. Here we are on that borderland +where an assignment of individual cases can never be made with any +certainty of correctness. We can generalize only by describing the +conditions that such cases must fulfil if they are properly to be +denominated religious. And there can be no question of the justice of +deriving such a description from the reports of historical and +institutional religions. An idealistic philosophy will, then, be a +religion just in so far as it is rendered practically vivid by the +imagination. Such imagination must create and sustain a social +relationship. The question of the legitimacy of this imagination is +another matter. It raises the issue concerning the judgment of truth +implied in religion, and this is the topic of the next chapter. At any +rate the religious experience _may be_ realized by virtue of the +metaphorical or poetical representation of a situation as one of +intercommunication between persons, where reflective definition at the +same time denies it. The human worshipper may supply the personality of +God from himself, viewing himself as from the divine stand-point. But +whatever faculty supplies this indispensable social quality of religion, +he who defines God as the ultimate goodness or the ultimate truth, has +certainly not yet worshipped Him. He begins to be religious only when +such an ideal determines the atmosphere of his daily living; when he +regards the immanence of such an ideal in nature and history as the +object of his will; and when he responds to its presence in the spirit +of his conduct and his contemplation. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[54:1] Cf. Caird: _The Evolution of Religion_, Lectures II, III. + +[58:2] Cf. Leuba: _Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion_, +_Monist_, Vol. XI, p. 195. + +[58:3] Cf. Leuba: _Ibid._ + +[59:4] Cf. Sect. 29. + +[59:5] P. 322. + +[64:6] Rousseau: _Confessions_, Book IV, p. 125. + +[65:7] William James: _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 35. +The italics are mine. I am in the present chapter under constant +obligation to this wonderfully sympathetic and stimulating book. + +[67:8] Chadwick: _Theodore Parker_, p. 18. + +[67:9] Stevenson: _Letters_, Vol. I, p. 229. + +[68:10] Thomas a Kempis: _Imitation of Christ_, Chap. XIX. Translation +by Stanhope, p. 44. + +[69:11] St. Augustine: _Confessions_, Book I, Chap. I. Translation in +Schaff: _Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers_, Vol. I, p. 129. + +[71:12] James: _Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 203. + +[74:13] Fielding: _op. cit._, p. 152. + +[78:14] Warren: _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 14. + +[78:15] _Ibid._, p. 83. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION + + +[Sidenote: Resume of Psychology of Religion.] + +Sect. 28. It has been maintained that religion is closely analogous to +one's belief in the disposition toward one's self of men or communities. +In the case of religion this disposition is attributed to the more or +less vaguely conceived residual environment that is recognized as lying +outside of the more familiar natural and social relations. After the +rise of science this residual environment tends to be conceived as a +unity which is ultimate or fundamental, but for the religious +consciousness it is more commonly regarded as a general source of +influence practically worthy of consideration. Such a belief, like all +belief, is vitally manifested, with such emphasis upon action, feeling, +or intellection as temperament and mood may determine. + +[Sidenote: Religion Means to be True.] + +Sect. 29. But if the psychology of belief is the proper starting-point +for a description of the religious experience, it is none the less +suggestive of the fact that religion, just because it _is_ belief, is +not wholly a matter for psychology. For religion _means to be true_, and +thus submits itself to valuation as a case of knowledge. The +psychological study of religion is misleading when accepted as a +substitute for philosophical criticism. The religious man takes his +religion not as a narcotic, but as an enlightenment. Its subjective +worth is due at any rate in part to the supposition of its objective +worth. As in any case of insight, that which warms the heart must have +satisfied the mind. The religious experience purports to be the part of +wisdom, and to afford only such happiness as increasing wisdom would +confirm. And the charm of truth cannot survive its truthfulness. Hence, +though religion may be described, it cannot be justified, from the +stand-point of therapeutics. Were such the case it would be the real +problem of religious leaders to find a drug capable of giving a +constantly pleasant tone to their patient's experience.[83:1] There +would be no difference between priests and physicians who make a +specialty of nervous diseases, except that the former would aim at a +more fundamental and perpetual suggestion of serenity. Now no man wants +to be even a blessed fool. He does not want to dwell constantly in a +fictitious world, even if it be after his own heart. He may from the +cynical point of view actually do so, but if he be religious he thinks +it is reality, and is satisfied only in so far as he thinks so. He +regards the man who has said in his heart that there is no God as the +fool, and not because he may have to suffer for it, but because he is +cognitively blind to the real nature of things. Piety, on the other +hand, he regards as the standard experience, the most veracious life. +Hence, it is not an accident that religion has had its creeds and its +controversies, its wars with science and its appeals to philosophy. The +history of these affairs shows that religion commonly fails to +understand the scope of its own demand for truth; but they have issued +from the deep conviction that one's religion is, implicitly, at least, +in the field of truth; that there are theoretical judgments whose truth +would justify or contradict it. + +This general fact being admitted, there remains the task to which the +present discussion addresses itself, that of defining the kind of +_theoretical judgment_ implied in religion, and the relation to this +central cognitive stem of its efflorescences of myth, theology, and +ritual. It is impossible to separate the stem and the efflorescence, or +to determine the precise spot at which destruction of the tissue would +prove fatal to the plant, but it is possible to obtain some idea of the +relative vitality of the parts. + +[Sidenote: Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a Disposition +from which Consequences May Rationally be Expected.] + +Sect. 30. The difficulty of reaching a definite statement in this matter +is due to the fact that the truth in which any religious experience +centres is a practical and not a scientific truth. A practical truth +does not commit itself to any single scientific statement, and can often +survive the overthrow of that scientific statement in which at any given +time it has found expression. In other words, an indefinite number of +scientific truths are compatible with a single practical truth. An +instance of this is the consistency with my expectation of the +alternation of day and night, of either the Ptolemaic or Copernican +formulation of the solar system. Now expectation that the sun will rise +to-morrow is an excellent analogue of my religious belief. Celestial +mechanics is as relevant to the one as metaphysics to the other. Neither +is overthrown until a central practical judgment is discredited, and +either could remain true through a very considerable alteration of +logical definition; but neither is on this account exempt from +theoretical responsibility. In so far as religion deliberately enters +the field of science, and defines its formularies with the historical or +metaphysical method, this difficulty does not, of course, exist. Grant +that the years of Methuselah's life, or the precise place and manner of +the temptation of Jesus, or the definition of Christ in the terms of the +Athanasian Creed, are constitutive of Christianity, and the survival of +that religion will be determined by the solution of ordinary problems of +historical or metaphysical research. But the Christian will very +properly claim that his religion is only externally and accidentally +related to such propositions, since they are never or very rarely +intended in his experience. As religious he is occupied with Christ as +his saviour or with God as his protector and judge. The history of Jesus +or the metaphysics of God essentially concern him only in so far as they +may or may not invalidate this relationship. He cares only for the power +and disposition of the divine, and these are affected by history and +metaphysics only in so far as he has definitely put them to such proof. + +For my religion is my sense of a practical situation, and only when +that has been proved to be folly has my religion become untrue. My God +is my practical faith, my plan of salvation. My religion is overthrown +if I am convinced that I have misconceived the situation and mistaken +what I should do to be saved. The conception of God is very simple +practically, and very complex theoretically, a fact that confirms its +practical genesis. My conception of God contains _an idea of my own +interests_, _an idea of the disposition of the universe toward my +interests_, and _some working plan for the reconciliation of these two +terms_. These three elements form a practical unity, but each is capable +of emphasis, and a religion may be transformed through the modification +of any one of them. It appears, then, as has always been somewhat +vaguely recognized, that the truth of religion is ethical as well as +metaphysical or scientific. My religion will be altered by a change in +my conception of what constitutes my real interest, a change in my +conception of the fundamental causes of reality, or a change in my +conception of the manner in which my will may or may not affect these +causes. God is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always a relation of +entity to ideal: _reality regarded from the stand-point of its +favorableness or unfavorableness to human life, and prescribing for the +latter the propriety of a certain attitude_. + +[Sidenote: Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The +Religion of Baal.] + +Sect. 31. The range of historical examples is limitless, but certain of +these are especially calculated to emphasize the application of a +criterion to religion. Such is the case with Elijah's encounter with the +prophets of Baal, as narrated in the Old Testament. + + "And Elijah came near unto all the people, and said, How long + halt ye between two opinions? If Yahweh be God, follow him: + but if Baal, then follow him. . . . And call ye on the name of + your god, and I will call on the name of Yahweh: and the God + that answereth by fire, let him be God. . . . And Elijah said + unto the prophets of Baal, Choose you one bullock for + yourselves, and dress it first; for ye are many; and call on + the name of your god, but put no fire under. And they took the + bullock which was given them, and they dressed it, and called + on the name of Baal from morning even until noon, saying, O + Baal, hear us. But there was no voice, nor any that + answered. . . . And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah + mocked them, and said, Cry aloud: for he is a god; either he + is musing, or he is gone aside, or he is in a journey, or + peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked. And they cried + aloud, and cut themselves after their manner with knives and + lances, till the blood gushed out upon them. . . . But there + was neither voice, nor any to answer, nor any that + regarded."[88:2] + +The religion of the followers of Baal here consists in a belief in the +practical virtue of a mode of address and form of ritual associated with +the traditions and customs of a certain social group. The prophets of +this cult agree to regard the experiment proposed by Elijah as a crucial +test, and that which is disproved from its failure is a plan of action. +These prophets relied upon the presence of a certain motivity, from +which a definite response could be evoked by an appeal which they were +peculiarly able to make; but though "they prophesied until the time of +the offering of the evening oblation," there was none that regarded. + +[Sidenote: Greek Religion.] + +Sect. 32. An equally familiar and more instructive example is the +refutation of the Greek national religion by Lucretius. The conception +of life which Lucretius finds unwarranted is best depicted in Homer. +There we hear of a society composed of gods and men. Though the gods, on +the one hand, have their own history, their affairs are never sharply +sundered from those of men, who, on the other hand, must constantly +reckon with them, gauge their attitude, and seek their favor by paying +tribute to their individual humors and preferences. In the Ninth Book of +the "Iliad," Phoenix addresses himself to the recalcitrant Achilles as +follows: + + "It fits not one that moves + The hearts of all, to live unmov'd, and succor hates for loves. + The Gods themselves are flexible; whose virtues, honors, pow'rs, + Are more than thine, yet they will bend their breasts as we bend + ours. + Perfumes, benign devotions, savors of offerings burn'd, + And holy rites, the engines are with which their hearts are turn'd, + By men that pray to them."[90:3] + +Here is a general recognition of that which makes sacrifice rational. It +is because he conceives this presupposition to be mistaken, that +Lucretius declares the practices and fears which are founded upon it to +be folly. It is the same with all that is practically based upon the +expectation of a life beyond the grave. The correction of the popular +religion is due in his opinion to that true view of the world taught by +Epicurus, whose memory Lucretius thus invokes at the opening of the +Third Book of the "De Rerum Natura": + + "Thee, who first wast able amid such thick darkness to raise + on high so bright a beacon and shed a light on the true + interests of life, thee I follow, glory of the Greek race, + and plant now my footsteps firmly fixed in thy imprinted + marks. . . . For soon as thy philosophy issuing from a + godlike intellect has begun with loud voice, to proclaim the + nature of things, the terrors of the mind are dispelled, the + walls of the world part asunder, I see things in operation + throughout the whole void: the divinity of the gods is + revealed and their tranquil abodes which neither winds do + shake nor clouds drench with rains nor snow congealed by sharp + frost harms with hoary fall: an ever cloudless ether + o'ercanopies them, and they laugh with light shed largely + round. Nature too supplies all their wants and nothing ever + impairs their peace of mind. But on the other hand the + Acherusian quarters[91:4] are nowhere to be seen, though earth + is no bar to all things being descried, which are in operation + underneath our feet throughout the void."[91:5] + +In another passage, after describing the Phrygian worship of Cybele, he +comments as follows: + + "All which, well and beautifully as it is set forth and told, + is yet widely removed from true reason. For the nature of gods + must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together + with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our + concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all + dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, + it is neither gained by favors nor moved by anger. . . . The + earth however is at all time without feeling, and because it + receives into it the first-beginnings of many things, it + brings them forth in many ways into the light of the + sun."[91:6] + +If the teaching of Epicurus be true it is evident that those who +offered hecatombs with the idea that they were thereby mitigating anger, +or securing special dispensation, were playing the fool. They were +appealing to a fictitious motivity, one not grounded in "the nature of +things." To one for whom the walls of the world had parted asunder, such +a procedure was no longer possible; though he might choose to "call the +sea Neptune" and reverence the earth as "mother of the gods."[92:7] + +[Sidenote: Judaism and Christianity.] + +Sect. 33. The history of religion contains no more impressive and +dramatic chapter than that which records the development of the religion +of the Jews. Passing over its obscure beginnings in the primitive +Semitic cult, we find this religion first clearly defined as tribal +self-interest sanctioned by Yahweh.[92:8] God's interest in his chosen +people determines the prosperity of him who practices the social +virtues. + + "The name of Yahweh is a strong tower: the righteous runneth + into it, and is safe." + + "He that is steadfast in righteousness shall attain unto + life." + + "To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to Yahweh than + sacrifice."[93:9] + +But in time it is evident to the believer that his experience does not +bear out this expectation. Neither as a Jew nor as a righteous man does +he prosper more than his neighbor. He comes, therefore, to distrust the +virtue of his wisdom. + + "Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light + excelleth darkness. The wise man's eyes are in his head, and + the fool walketh in darkness: and yet I perceived that one + event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, As it + happeneth to the fool, so will it happen even to me; and why + was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also + was vanity. For of the wise man, even as of the fool, there is + no remembrance forever; seeing that in the days to come all + will have been already forgotten. And how doth the wise man + die even as the fool! So I hated life; because the work that + is wrought under the sun was grievous unto me: for all is + vanity and a striving after wind."[93:10] + +It is evident that he who expects the favor of fortune in return for +his observance of precept is mistaken. The "work that is wrought under +the sun" makes no special provision for him during his lifetime. Unless +the cry of vanity is to be the last word there must be a +reinterpretation of the promise of God. This appears in the new ideal of +patient submission, and the chastened faith that expects only the love +of God. And those whom God loves He will not forsake. They will come to +their own, if not here, then beyond, according to His inscrutable but +unswerving plan. + + "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a + contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise." + + "For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth + eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and holy + place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, + to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of + the contrite ones."[94:11] + +In this faith Judaism merges into Christianity.[94:12] In the whole +course of this evolution God is regarded as the friend of his people, +but his people learn to find a new significance in his friendship. That +which is altered is the conduct which that friendship requires and the +expectation which it determines. The practical ideal which the +relationship sanctions, changes gradually from that of prudence to that +of goodness for its own sake. God, once an instrument relevant to human +temporal welfare, has come to be an object of disinterested service. + +No such transformation as this was absolutely realized during the period +covered by the writings of the Old Testament, nor has it even yet been +realized in the development of Christianity. But the evolution of both +Judaism and Christianity has taken this direction. The criterion of this +evolution is manifestly both ethical and metaphysical. A Christian avows +that he rates purity of character above worldly prosperity, so that the +former cannot properly be prized for the sake of the latter. +Furthermore, he shares more or less unconsciously such philosophical and +scientific opinions as deny truth to the conception of special +interferences and dispensations from a supernatural agency. Therefore he +looks for no fire from heaven to consume his sacrifice. But his religion +is nevertheless a practical expectation. He believes that God is good, +and that God loves him and sustains him. He believes that there obtains +between himself, in so far as good, and the universe _sub specie +eternitatis_, a real sympathy and reciprocal reenforcement. He believes +that he secures through the profoundly potent forces of the universe +that which he regards as of most worth; and that somewhat is added to +these forces by virtue of his consecration. The God of the Christians +cannot be defined short of some such account as this, inclusive of an +ideal, an attitude, and an expectation. In other words the God of the +Christians is to be known only in terms of the Christlike outlook upon +life, in which the disciple is taught to emulate the master. When moral +and intellectual development shall have discredited either its scale of +values, or its conviction that cosmical events are in the end determined +in accordance with that scale of values, then Christianity must either +be transformed, or be untenable for the wise man. If we have conceived +the essence of Christianity too broadly or vaguely, it does not much +matter for our present purposes. Its essence is, at any rate, some such +inwardness of life resolving ideality and reality into one, and drawing +upon objective truth only to the extent required for the confirming of +that relation. + +[Sidenote: The Cognitive Factor in Religion.] + +Sect. 34. We conclude, then, our attempt to emphasize the cognitive +factor in religion, with the thesis that every religion centres in a +practical secret of the universe. _To be religious is to believe that a +certain correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality +operative, and that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a +certain type of living. Whatever demonstrates the futility, vanity, or +self-deception of this living, discredits the religion. And, per contra, +except as they define or refute such practical truth, religion is not +essentially concerned with theoretical judgments._ + +[Sidenote: The Place of Imagination in Religion.] + +Sect. 35. But neither religion nor any other human interest consists in +essentials. Such a practical conviction as that which has been defined +inevitably flowers into a marvelous complexity, and taps for its +nourishment every spontaneity of human nature. If it be said that only +the practical conviction is essential, this is not the same as to say +that all else is superfluous. There may be no single utterance that my +religion could not have spared, and yet were I to be altogether dumb my +religion would, indeed, be as nothing. For if I believe, I accept a +presence in my world, which as I live will figure in my dreams, or in my +thoughts, or in my habits. And each of these expressions of myself will +have a truth if it do but bear out my practical acceptance of that +presence. The language of religion, like that of daily life, is not the +language of science except it take it upon itself to be so. There is +scarcely a sentence which I utter in my daily intercourse with men which +is not guilty of transgressions against the canons of accurate and +definite thinking. Yet if I deceive neither myself nor another, I am +held to be truthful, even though my language deal with chance and +accident, material purposes and spiritual causes, and though I vow that +the sun smiles or the moon lets down her hair into the sea. Science is a +special interest in the discovery of unequivocal and fixed conceptions, +and employs its terms with an unalterable connotation. But no such +algebra of thought is indispensable to life or conversation, and its +lack is no proof of error. Such is the case also with that eminently +living affair, religion. I may if I choose, and I will if my reasoning +powers be at all awakened, be a theologian. But theology, like science, +is a special intellectual spontaneity. St. Thomas, the master +theologian, did not glide unwittingly from prayer into the _quaestiones_ +of the "Summa Theologiae," but turned to them as to a fresh adventure. +Theology is inevitable, because humanly speaking adventure is +inevitable. For man, with his intellectual spontaneity, every object is +a problem; and did he not seek sooner or later to define salvation, +there would be good reason to believe that he did not practically reckon +with any. But this is _similarly_ and _independently_ true of the +imagination, the most familiar means with which man clothes and vivifies +his convictions, the exuberance with which he plays about them and +delights to confess them. The imagination of religion, contributing what +Matthew Arnold called its "poetry and eloquence," does not submit itself +to such canons as are binding upon theology or science, but exists and +flourishes in its own right. + +The indispensableness to religion of the imagination is due to that +faculty's power of realizing what is not perceptually present. Religion +is not interested in the apparent, but in the secret essence or the +transcendent universal. And yet this interest is a practical one. +Imagination may introduce one into the vivid presence of the secret or +the transcendent. It is evident that the religious imagination here +coincides with poetry. For it is at least one of the interests of poetry +to cultivate and satisfy a sense for the universal; to obtain an +immediate experience or appreciation that shall have the vividness +without the particularism of ordinary perception. And where a poet +elects so to view the world, we allow him as a poet the privilege, and +judge him by the standards to which he submits himself. That upon which +we pass judgment is the _fitness of his expression_. This expression is +not, except in the case of the theoretical mystic, regarded as +constituting the most valid form of the idea, but is appreciated +expressly for its fulfilment of the condition of immediacy. The same +sort of critical attitude is in order with the fruits of the religious +imagination. These may or may not fulfil enough of the requirements of +that art to be properly denominated poetry; but like poetry they are the +translation of ideas into a specific language. They must not, therefore, +be judged as though they claimed to excel in point of validity, but only +in point of consistency with the context of that language. And _the +language of religion is the language of the practical life_. Such +translation is as essential to an idea that is to enter into the +religious experience, as translation into terms of immediacy is +essential to an idea that is to enter into the appreciative +consciousness of the poet. No object can find a place in my religion +until it is conjoined with my purposes and hopes; until it is taken for +granted and acted upon, like the love of my friends, or the courses of +the stars, or the stretches of the sea. + +[Sidenote: The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination.] + +Sect. 36. The religious imagination, then, is to be understood and +justified as that which brings the objects of religion within the range +of living. The central religious object, as has been seen, is an +_attitude_ of the residuum or totality of things. To be religious one +must have a sense for the _presence of an attitude_, like his sense for +the presence of his human fellows, with all the added appreciation that +is proper in the case of an object that is unique in its mystery or in +its majesty. It follows that the religious imagination fulfils its +function in so far as it provides the object of religion with properties +similar to those which lend vividness and reality to the normal social +relations. + +The presence of one's fellows is in part the perceptual experience of +their bodies. To this there corresponds in religion some extraordinary +or subtle appearance. The gods may in visions or dreams be met with in +their own proper embodiments; or, as is more common, they may be +regarded as present for practical purposes: in some inanimate object, +as in the case of the fetish; in some animal species, as in the case of +the totem; in some place, as in the case of the shrine; or even in some +human being, as in the case of the inspired prophet and miracle worker. +In more refined and highly developed religions the medium of God's +presence is less specific. He is perceived with + + "--a sense sublime + Of something far more deeply interfused, + Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, + And the round ocean and the living air, + And the blue sky, and in the mind of man." + +God is here found in an interpretation of the common and the natural, +rather than in any individual and peculiar embodiment. And here the +poet's appreciation, if not his art, is peculiarly indispensable. + +But, furthermore, his fellows are inmates of "the household of man" in +that he knows their history. They belong to the temporal context of +actions and events. Similarly, the gods must be historical. The sacred +traditions or books of religion are largely occupied with this history. +The more individual and anthropomorphic the gods, the more local and +episodic will be the account of their affairs. In the higher religions +the acts of God are few and momentous, such as creation or special +providence; or they are identical with the events of nature and human +history when these are _construed_ as divine. To find God in this latter +way requires an interpretation of the course of events in terms of some +moral consistency, a faith that sees some purpose in their evident +destination. + +There is still another and a more significant way in which men recognize +one another: the way of address and conversation. And men have +invariably held a similar intercourse with their gods. To this category +belong communion and prayer, with all their varieties of expression. I +have no god until I address him. This will be the most direct evidence +of what is at least from my point of view a social relation. There can +be no general definition of the form which this address will take. There +may be as many special languages, as many attitudes, and as much +playfulness and subtlety of symbolism as in human intercourse. But, on +the other hand, there are certain utterances that are peculiarly +appropriate to religion. In so far as he regards his object as endowed +with both power and goodness the worshipper will use the language of +adoration; and the sense of his dependence will speak in terms of +consecration and thanksgiving. + + "O God, thou art my God; early will I seek thee: + My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee, + In a dry and weary land, where no water is. + So have I looked upon thee in the sanctuary, + To see thy power and thy glory. + For thy loving-kindness is better than life; + My lips shall praise thee." + +These are expressions of a hopeful faith; but, on the other hand, God +may be addressed in terms of hatred and distrust. + + "Who is most wretched in this dolorous place? + I think myself; yet I would rather be + My miserable self than He, than He + Who formed such creatures to his own disgrace. + + "The vilest thing must be less vile than Thou + From whom it had its being, God and Lord! + Creator of all woe and sin! abhorred, + Malignant and implacable."[104:13] + +In either case there may be an indefinite degree of hyperbole. The +language of love and hate, of confidence and despair, is not the +language of description. In this train of the religious consciousness +there is occasion for whatever eloquence man can feel, and whatever +rhetorical luxuriance he can utter. + +[Sidenote: The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion.] + +Sect. 37. Such considerations as these serve to account for the exercise +and certain of the fruits of the religious imagination, and to designate +the general criterion governing its propriety. But _how is one to +determine the boundary between the imaginative and the cognitive_? It is +commonly agreed that what religion says and does is not all intended +literally. But when is expression of religion only poetry and eloquence, +and when is it matter of conviction? If we revert again to the cognitive +aspect of religion, it is evident that there is but one test to apply: +_whatever either fortifies or misleads the will is literal conviction_. +This test cannot be applied absolutely, because it can properly be +applied only to the intention of an individual experience. However I may +express my religion, that which I express, is, we have seen, an +expectation. The degree to which I literally mean what I say is then the +degree to which it determines my expectations. Whatever adds no item to +these expectations, but only recognizes and vitalizes them, is pure +imagination. But it follows that it is entirely impossible from direct +inspection to define any given _expression_ of religious experience as +myth, or to define the degree to which it is myth. It submits to such +distinctions only when viewed from the stand-point of the concrete +religious experience which it expresses. Any such given expression could +easily be all imagination to one, and all conviction to another. +Consider the passage which follows: + + "And I saw the heaven opened; and behold, a white horse, and + he that sat thereon, called Faithful and True; and in + righteousness he doth judge and make war. And his eyes are a + flame of fire, and upon his head are many diadems; and he hath + a name written, which no one knoweth but he himself. And he is + arrayed in a garment sprinkled with blood: and his name is + called The Word of God."[106:14] + +Is this all rhapsody, or is it in part true report? There is evidently +no answer to the question so conceived. But if it were to express my own +religious feeling it would have some specific proportion of literal and +metaphorical significance, according to the degree to which its detail +contributes different practical values to me. It might then be my +guide-book to the heavens, or only my testimony to the dignity and +mystery of the function of Christ. + +The development of religion bears in a very important way upon this last +problem. The factor of imagination has undoubtedly come to have a more +clearly recognized role in religion. There can be no doubt that what we +now call myths were once beliefs, and that what we now call poetry was +once history. If we go back sufficiently far we come to a time when the +literal and the metaphorical were scarcely distinguishable, and this +because science had not emerged from the early animistic extension of +social relations. Men _meant_ to address their gods as they addressed +their fellows, and expected them to hear and respond, as they looked for +such reactions within the narrower circle of ordinary intercourse. The +advance of science has brought into vogue a description of nature that +inhibits such expectations. The result has been that men, continuing to +use the same terms, essentially expressive as they are of a practical +relationship, have come to regard them as only a general expression of +their attitude. The differences of content that are in excess of factors +of expectation remain as poetry and myth. On the other hand, it is +equally possible, if not equally common, for that which was once +imagined to come to be believed. Such a transformation is, perhaps, +normally the case when the inspired utterance passes from its author to +the cult. The prophets and sweet singers are likely to possess an +exuberance of imagination not appreciated by their followers; and for +this reason almost certainly misunderstood. For these reasons it is +manifestly absurd to fasten the name of myth or the name of creed upon +any religious utterance whatsoever, unless it be so regarded from the +stand-point of the personal religion which it originally expressed, or +unless one means by so doing to define it as an expression of his own +religion. He who defines "the myth of creation," or "the poetical story +of Samson," as parts of the pre-Christian Judaic religion, exhibits a +total loss of historical sense. The distinction between cognition and +fancy does not exist among objects, but only in the _intending_ +experience; hence, for me to attach my own distinction to any individual +case of belief, viewed apart from the believer, is an utterly confusing +projection of my own personality into the field of my study. + +[Sidenote: The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions.] + +Sect. 38. Only after such considerations as these are we qualified to +attack that much-vexed question as to whether religion deals invariably +with a personal god. It is often assumed in discussion of this question +that "personal god," as well as "god," is a distinct and familiar kind +of entity, like a dragon or centaur; its existence alone being +problematical. This is doubly false to the religious employment of such +an object. If it be true that in religion we mean by God a practical +interpretation of the world, _whatsoever be its nature_, then the +personality of God must be a derivative of the attitude, and not of the +nature of the world. Given the practical outlook upon life, there is no +definable world that cannot be construed under the form of God. My god +is my world practically recognized in respect of its fundamental or +ultimate attitude to my ideals. In the sense, then, conveyed by this +term _attitude_ my god will invariably possess the characters of +personality. But the degree to which these characters will coincide with +the characters which I assign to human persons, or the terms of any +logical conception of personality, cannot be absolutely defined. +Anthropomorphisms may be imagination or they may be literal conviction. +This will depend, as above maintained, upon the degree to which they +determine my expectations. Suppose the world to be theoretically +conceived as governed by laws that are indifferent to all human +interests. The practical expression of this conception appears in the +naturalism of Lucretius, or Diogenes, or Omar Khayyam. Living in the +vivid presence of an indifferent world, I may picture my gods as leading +their own lives in some remote realm which is inaccessible to my +petitions, or as regarding me with sinister and contemptuous cruelty. In +the latter case I may shrink and cower, or return them contempt for +contempt. I mean this literally only if I look for consequences +following directly from the emotional coloring which I have bestowed +upon them. It may well be that I mean merely to regard myself _sub +specie eternitatis_, in which case I am _personifying_ in the sense of +free imagination. In the religion of enlightenment the divine attitude +tends to belong to the poetry and eloquence of religion rather than to +its cognitive intent. This is true even of optimistic and idealistic +religion. The love and providence of God are less commonly supposed to +warrant an expectation of special and arbitrary favors, and have come +more and more to mean the play of my own feeling about the general +central conviction of the favorableness of the cosmos to my deeper or +moral concerns. But the factor of personality cannot possibly be +entirely eliminated, for the religious consciousness _creates_ a social +relationship between man and the universe. Such an interpretation of +life is not a case of the pathetic fallacy, unless it incorrectly +_reckons with_ the inner feeling which it attributes to the universe. It +is an obvious practical truth that the total or residual environment is +significant for life. Grant this and you make rational a recognition of +that significance, or a more or less constant sense of coincidence or +conflict with cosmical forces. Permit this consciousness to stand, and +you make some expression of it inevitable. Such an expression may, +furthermore, with perfect propriety and in fulfilment of human nature, +set forth and transfigure this central belief until it may enter into +the context of immediacy. + +Thus any conception of the universe whatsoever may afford a basis for +religion. But there is no religion that does not virtually make a more +definite claim upon the nature of things, and this entirely +independently of its theology, or explicit attempt to define itself. +Every religion, even in the very living of it, is naturalistic, or +dualistic, or pluralistic, or optimistic, or idealistic, or pessimistic. +And there is in the realm of truth that which justifies or refutes these +definite practical ways of construing the universe. But no historical +religion is ever so vague even as this in its philosophical +implications. Indeed, we shall always be brought eventually to the +inner meaning of some individual religious experience, where no general +criticism can be certainly valid. + +There is, then, a place in religion for that which is not directly +answerable to philosophical or scientific standards. But there is +always, on the other hand, an element of hope which conceives the nature +of the world, and means to be grounded in reality. In respect of that +element, philosophy is indispensable to religion. The meaning of +religion is, in fact, the central problem of philosophy. There is a +virtue in religion like that which Emerson ascribes to poetry. "The poet +is in the right attitude; he is believing; the philosopher, after some +struggle, having only reasons for believing." But whatever may be said +to the disparagement of its dialectic, philosophy is the justification +of religion, and the criticism of religions. To it must be assigned the +task of so refining positive religion as to contribute to the perpetual +establishment of true religion. And to philosophy, with religion, +belongs the task of holding fast to the idea of the universe. There is +no religion except before you begin, or after you have rested from, your +philosophical speculation. But in the universe these interests have a +common object. As philosophy is the articulation and vindication of +religion, so is religion the realization of philosophy. In philosophy +thought is brought up to the elevation of life, and in religion +philosophy, as the sum of wisdom, enters into life. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[83:1] As Plato interprets the scepticism of Protagoras to mean that one +state of mind cannot be more _true_ than another, but only _better_ or +worse. Cf. _Theaetetus_, 167. + +[88:2] Quoted with some omissions from _I Kings_, 18:21-29. The Hebrew +term _Yahweh_, the name of the national deity, has been substituted for +the English translation, "the Lord." + +[90:3] _Iliad_, Book IX, lines 467 _sq._ Translation by Chapman. + +[91:4] The supposed abode of departed spirits. + +[91:5] Lucretius: _De Rerum Natura_, Book III, lines 1 _sq._ Translated +by Munro. + +[91:6] _Ibid._, Book II, lines 644 _sq._ + +[92:7] It would be interesting to compare the equally famous criticism +of Greek religion in Plato's _Republic_, Book II, 377 _sq._ + +[92:8] Cf. W. Robertson Smith's admirable account of the Semitic +religions: + +"What is requisite to religion is a practical acquaintance with the +rules on which the deity acts and on which he expects his worshippers to +frame their conduct--what in II Kings, 17:26 is called the 'manner,' or +rather the 'customary law' (_mishpat_), of the god of the land. This is +true even of the religion of Israel. When the prophets speak of the +knowledge of God, they always mean a practical knowledge of the laws and +principles of His government in Israel, and a summary expression for +religion as a whole is 'the knowledge and fear of Jehovah,' _i. e._, the +knowledge of what Jehovah prescribes, combined with a reverent +obedience." _The Religion of the Semites_, p. 23. + +[93:9] _Proverbs_, 18:10; 11:19; 21:3. + +[93:10] _Ecclesiastes_, 2:13 _sq._ + +[94:11] _Psalms_, 51:17; _Isaiah_, 57:15. + +[94:12] In this discussion of Judaism I am much indebted to Matthew +Arnold's _Literature and Dogma_, especially Chapters I and II. + +[104:13] James Thomson: _The City of Dreadful Night_. Quoted by James, +in _The Will to Believe, etc._, p. 45. + +[106:14] _Revelation_, 19:11-13. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY + + +[Sidenote: The True Relations of Philosophy and Science. Misconceptions +and Antagonisms.] + +Sect. 39. In the case of natural science we meet not only with a special +human interest, but with a theoretical discipline. We are confronted, +therefore, with a new question: that of the relation within the body of +human knowledge of two of its constituent members. Owing to the militant +temper of the representatives of both science and philosophy, this has +long since ceased to be an academic question, and has frequently been +met in the spirit of rivalry and partisanship. But the true order of +knowledge is only temporarily distorted by the brilliant success of a +special type of investigation; and the conquests of science are now so +old a story that critical thought shows a disposition to judge of the +issue with sobriety and logical highmindedness. + +In the seventeenth century a newly emancipated and too sanguine reason +proposed to know the whole of nature at once in terms of mathematics +and mechanics. Thus the system of the Englishman Hobbes was science +swelled to world-proportions, simple, compact, conclusive, and +all-comprehensive. Philosophy proposed to do the work of science, but in +its own grand manner. The last twenty years of Hobbes's life, spent in +repeated discomfiture at the hands of Seth Ward, Wallis, Boyle, and +other scientific experts of the new Royal Society, certified +conclusively to the failure of this enterprise, and the experimental +specialist thereupon took exclusive possession of the field of natural +law. But the idealist, on the other hand, reconstructed nature to meet +the demands of philosophical knowledge and religious faith. There +issued, together with little mutual understanding and less sympathy, on +the one hand _positivism_, or exclusive experimentalism, and on the +other hand a rabid and unsympathetic transcendentalism. Hume, who +consigned to the flames all thought save "abstract reasoning concerning +quantity or number," and "experimental reasoning concerning matter of +fact and existence"; Comte, who assigned metaphysics to an immature +stage in the development of human intelligence; and Tyndall, who reduced +the religious consciousness to an emotional experience of mystery, are +typical of the one attitude. The other is well exhibited in Schelling's +reference to "the blind and thoughtless mode of investigating nature +which has become generally established since the corruption of +philosophy by Bacon, and of physics by Boyle." Dogmatic experimentalism +and dogmatic idealism signify more or less consistently the abstract +isolation of the scientific and philosophical motives. + +There is already a touch of quaintness in both of these attitudes. We of +the present are in the habit of acknowledging the autonomy of science, +and the unimpeachable validity of the results of experimental research +in so far as they are sanctioned by the consensus of experts. But at the +same time we recognize the definiteness of the task of science, and the +validity of such reservations as may be made from a higher critical +point of view. Science is to be transcended in so far as it is +understood as a whole. Philosophy is critically empirical; empirical, +because it regards all _bona fide_ descriptions of experience as +knowledge; critical, because attentive to the conditions of both general +and special knowledge. And in terms of a critical empiricism so defined, +it is one of the problems of philosophy _to define and appraise the +generating problem of science_, and so to determine the value +assignable to natural laws in the whole system of knowledge. + +[Sidenote: The Spheres of Philosophy and Science.] + +Sect. 40. If this be the true function of philosophy with reference to +science, several current notions of the relations of the spheres of +these disciplines may be disproved. In the first place, philosophy will +not be all the sciences regarded as one science. Science tends to unify +without any higher criticism. The various sciences already regard the +one nature as their common object, and the one system of interdependent +laws as their common achievement. The philosopher who tries to be all +science at once fails ignominiously because he tries to replace the work +of a specialist with the work of a dilettante; and if philosophy be +identical with that body of truth accumulated and organized by the +cooperative activity of scientific men, then philosophy is a name and +there is no occasion for the existence of the philosopher as such. +Secondly, philosophy will not be the assembling of the sciences; for +such would be a merely clerical work, and the philosopher would much +better be regarded as non-existent than as a book-keeper. Nor, thirdly, +is philosophy an auxiliary discipline that may be called upon in +emergencies for the solution of some baffling problem of science. A +problem defined by science must be solved in the scientific manner. +Science will accept no aid from the gods when engaged in her own +campaign, but will fight it out according to her own principles of +warfare. And as long as science moves in her own plane, she can +acknowledge no permanent barriers. There is then no need of any +superscientific research that shall replace, or piece together, or +extend the work of science. But the savant is not on this account in +possession of the entire field of knowledge. It is true that he is not +infrequently moved to such a conviction when he takes us about to view +his estates. Together we ascend up into heaven, or make our beds in +sheol, or take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts +of the sea--and look in vain for anything that is not work done, or work +projected, by natural science. Persuade him, however, to _define_ his +estates, and he has circumscribed them. In his definition he must employ +conceptions more fundamental than the working conceptions that he +employs within his field of study. Indeed, in viewing his task as +definite and specific he has undertaken the solution of the problem of +philosophy. The logical self-consciousness has been awakened, and there +is no honorable way of putting it to sleep again. This is precisely +what takes place in any account of the generating problem of science. To +define science is to define at least one realm that is other than +science, the realm of active intellectual endeavor with its own proper +categories. One cannot reflect upon science and assign it an end, and a +method proper to that end, without bringing into the field of knowledge +a broader field of experience than the field proper to science, broader +at any rate by the presence in it of the scientific activity itself. + +Here, then, is the field proper to philosophy. The scientist _qua_ +scientist is intent upon his own determinate enterprise. The philosopher +comes into being as one who is interested in observing what it is that +the scientist is so intently doing. In taking this interest he has +accepted as a field for investigation that which he would designate as +the totality of interests or the inclusive experience. He can carry out +his intention of defining the scientific attitude only by standing +outside it, and determining it by means of nothing less than an +exhaustive searching out of all attitudes. Philosophy is, to be sure, +itself a definite activity and an attitude, but an attitude required by +definition to be conscious of itself, and, if you please, conscious of +its own consciousness, until its attitude shall have embraced in its +object the very principle of attitudes. Philosophy defines itself and +all other human tasks and interests. None have furnished a clearer +justification of philosophy than those men of scientific predilections +who have claimed the title of agnostics. A good instance is furnished by +a contemporary physicist, who has chosen to call his reflections +"antimetaphysical." + + "Physical science does not pretend to be a _complete_ view of + the world; it simply claims that it is working toward such a + complete view in the future. The highest philosophy of the + scientific investigator is precisely this _toleration_ of an + incomplete conception of the world and the preference for it, + rather than an apparently perfect, but inadequate + conception."[120:1] + +It is apparent that if one were to challenge such a statement, the issue +raised would at once be philosophical and not scientific. The problem +here stated and answered, requires for its solution the widest +inclusiveness of view, and a peculiar interest in critical reflection +and logical coordination. + +[Sidenote: The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science.] + +Sect. 41. One may be prepared for a knowledge of the economic and social +significance of the railway even if one does not know a throttle from a +piston-rod, provided one has broad and well-balanced knowledge of the +interplay of human social interests. One's proficiency here requires one +to stand off from society, and to obtain a perspective that shall be as +little distorted as possible. The reflection of the philosopher of +science requires a similar quality of perspective. All knowledges, +together with the knowing of them, must be his object yonder, standing +apart in its wholeness and symmetry. Philosophy is the least dogmatic, +the most empirical, of all disciplines, since it is the only +investigation that can permit itself to be forgetful of nothing. + +But the most comprehensive view may be the most distorted and false. The +true order of knowledge is the difficult task of logical analysis, +requiring as its chief essential some determination of the scope of the +working conceptions of the different independent branches of knowledge. +In the case of natural science this would mean an examination of the +method and results characteristic of this field, for the sake of +defining the kind of truth which attaches to the laws which are being +gradually formulated. But one must immediately reach either the one or +the other of two very general conclusions. If the laws of natural +science cover all possible knowledge of reality, then there is left to +philosophy only the logical function of justifying this statement. Logic +and natural science will then constitute the sum of knowledge. If, on +the other hand, it be found that the aim of natural science is such as +to exclude certain aspects of reality, then philosophy will not be +restricted to logical criticism, but will have a cognitive field of its +own. The great majority of philosophers have assumed the latter of these +alternatives to be true, while most aggressive scientists have intended +the former in their somewhat blind attacks upon "metaphysics." Although +the selection of either of these alternatives involves us in the defence +of a specific answer to a philosophical question, the issue is +inevitable in any introduction to philosophy because of its bearing upon +the extent of the field of that study. Furthermore there can be no +better exposition of the meaning of philosophy of science than an +illustration of its exercise. The following, then, is to be regarded as +on the one hand a tentative refutation of _positivism_, or the _claim of +natural science to be coextensive with knowable reality_; and on the +other hand a programme for the procedure of philosophy with reference +to natural science. + +[Sidenote: The Origin of the Scientific Interest.] + +Sect. 42. Science issues through imperceptible stages from organic +habits and instincts which signify the possession by living creatures of +a power to meet the environment on its own terms. Every organism +possesses such a working knowledge of nature, and among men the first +science consists in those habitual adjustments common to men and +infra-human organisms. Man is already practising science before he +recognizes it. As _skill_ it distinguishes itself early in his history +from lore, or untested tradition. Skill is familiarity with general +kinds of events, together with ability to identify an individual with +reference to a kind, and so be prepared for the outcome. Thus man is +inwardly prepared for the alternation of day and night, and the periods +of the seasons. He practically anticipates the procession of natural +events in the countless emergencies of his daily life. But science in +the stricter sense begins when skill becomes _free_ and _social_. + +[Sidenote: Skill as Free.] + +Sect. 43. Skill may be said to be _free_ when the essential terms of the +action have been abstracted from the circumstances attending them in +individual experiences, and are retained as ideal plans applicable to +any practical occasion. The monkey who swings with a trapeze from his +perch on the side of the cage, counts upon swinging back again without +any further effort on his own part. His act and its successful issue +signify his practical familiarity with the natural motions of bodies. We +can conceive such a performance to be accompanied by an almost entire +failure to grasp its essentials. It would then be necessary for nearly +the whole situation to be repeated in order to induce in the monkey the +same action and expectation. He would require a similar form, color, and +distance. But he might, on the other hand, regard as practically +identical all suspended and freely swinging bodies capable of affording +him support, and quite independently of their shape, size, time, or +place. In this latter case his skill would be applicable to the widest +possible number of cases that could present themselves. Having a +discerning eye for essentials, he would lose no chance of a swing +through looking for more than the bare necessities. When the +physicist describes the pendulum in terms of a formula such as +t = 2pi[squareroot(l/g)] he exhibits a similar discernment. He has +found that the time occupied by an oscillation of any pendulum may be +calculated exclusively in terms of its length and the acceleration due +to gravity. The monkey's higher proficiency and the formula alike +represent a knowledge that is free in the sense that it is contained in +terms that require no single fixed context in immediacy. The knowledge +is valid wherever these essential terms are present; and calculations +may be based upon these essential terms, while attendant circumstances +vary _ad infinitum_. Such knowledge is said to be _general_ or +_universal_. + +There is another element of freedom, however, which so far has not been +attributed to the monkey's knowledge, but which is evidently present in +that of the physicist. The former has a practical ability to deal with a +pendulum when he sees it. The latter, on the other hand, knows about a +pendulum whether one be present or not. His knowledge is so retained as +always to be available, even though it be not always applicable. His +knowledge is not merely skill in treating a situation, but the +possession of resources which he may employ at whatever time, and in +whatever manner, may suit his interests. Knowing what he does about the +pendulum, he may act from the idea of such a contrivance, and with the +aid of it construct some more complex mechanism. His formulas are his +instruments, which he may use on any occasion. Suppose that a situation +with factors _a_, _b_, and _c_ requires factor _d_ in order to become +_M_, as desired. Such a situation might easily be hopeless for an +organism reacting directly to the stimulus _abc_, and yet be easily met +by a free knowledge of _d_. One who knows that _l_, _m_, and _n_ will +produce _d_, may by these means provide the missing factor, complete the +sum of required conditions, _abcd_, and so obtain the end _M_. Such +indirection might be used to obtain any required factor of the end, or +of any near or remote means to the end. There is, in fact, no limit to +the complexity of action made possible upon this basis; for since it is +available in idea, the whole range of such knowledge may be brought to +bear upon any individual problem. + +[Sidenote: Skill as Social.] + +Sect. 44. But knowledge of this free type becomes at the same time +_social_ or _institutional_. It consists no longer in a skilful +adaptation of the individual organism, but in a system of terms common +to all intelligence, and preserved in those books and other monuments +which serve as the articulate memory of the race. A knowledge that is +social must be composed of unequivocal conceptions and fixed symbols. +The mathematical laws of the exact sciences represent the most +successful attainment of this end so far as form is concerned. +Furthermore, the amount of knowledge may now be increased from +generation to generation through the service of those who make a +vocation of its pursuit. Natural science is thus a cumulative racial +proficiency, which any individual may bring to bear upon any emergency +of his life. + +[Sidenote: Science for Accommodation and Construction.] + +Sect. 45. Such proficiency as science affords is in every case the +anticipation of experience. This has a twofold value for mankind, that +of _accommodation_, and that of _construction_. Primitively, where mere +survival is the function of the organism as a whole, the value of +accommodation is relatively fundamental. The knowledge of what may be +expected enables the organism to save itself by means of its own +counter-arrangement of natural processes. Construction is here for the +sake of accommodation. But with the growth of civilization construction +becomes a positive interest, and man tends to save himself for definite +ends. Accommodation comes to take place for the sake of construction. +Science then supplies the individual with the ways and means wherewith +to execute life purposes which themselves tend to assume an absolute +value that cannot be justified merely on the ground of science. + +[Sidenote: Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. The +Descriptive Method.] + +Sect. 46. If natural science be animated by any special cognitive +interest, this motive should appear in the development of its method and +fundamental conceptions. If that interest has been truly defined, it +should now enable us to understand the progressive and permanent in +scientific investigation as directly related to it. For the aim of any +discipline exercises a gradual selection from among possible methods, +and gives to its laws their determinate and final form. + +The _descriptive method_ is at the present day fully established. A +leading moral of the history of science is the superior usefulness of an +exact account of the workings of nature to an explanation in terms of +some qualitative potency. Explanation has been postponed by enlightened +science until after a more careful observation of actual processes shall +have been made; and at length it has been admitted that there is no need +of any explanation but perfect description. Now the practical use of +science defined above, requires no knowledge beyond the actual order of +events. For such a purpose sufficient reason signifies only sufficient +conditions. All other considerations are irrelevant, and it is proper +to ignore them. Such has actually been the fate of the so-called +metaphysical solution of special problems of nature. The case of Kepler +is the classic instance. This great scientist supplemented his laws of +planetary motion with the following speculation concerning the agencies +at work: + + "We must suppose one of two things: either that the moving + spirits, in proportion as they are more removed from the sun, + are more feeble; or that there is one moving spirit in the + centre of all the orbits, namely, in the sun, which urges each + body the more vehemently in proportion as it is nearer; but in + more distant spaces languishes in consequence of the + remoteness and attenuation of its virtue."[129:2] + +The following passage from Hegel affords an interesting analogy: + + "The moon is the waterless crystal which seeks to complete + itself by means of our sea, to quench the thirst of its arid + rigidity, and therefore produces ebb and flow."[129:3] + +No scientist has ever sought to refute either of these theories. They +have merely been neglected. + +They were advanced in obedience to a demand for the ultimate +explanation of the phenomena in question, and were obtained by applying +such general conceptions as were most satisfying to the reasons of their +respective authors. But they contributed nothing whatsoever to a +practical familiarity with the natural course of events, in this case +the times and places of the planets and the tides. Hence they have not +been used in the building of science. In our own day investigators have +become conscious of their motive, and do not wait for historical +selection to exclude powers and reasons from their province. They +deliberately seek to formulate exact descriptions. To this end they +employ symbols that shall serve to identify the terms of nature, and +formulas that shall define their systematic relationship. These systems +must be exact, or deductions cannot be made from them. Hence they tend +ultimately to assume a mathematical form of expression. + +[Sidenote: Space, Time, and Prediction.] + +Sect. 47. But science tends to employ for these systems only such +conceptions as relate to _prediction_; and of these the most fundamental +are _space_ and _time_. The first science to establish its method was +the science of astronomy, where measurement and computation in terms of +space and time were the most obvious means of description; and the +general application of the method of astronomy by Galileo and Newton, or +the development of mechanics, is the most important factor in the +establishment of modern science upon a permanent working basis. The +persistence of the term _cause_, testifies to the fact that science is +primarily concerned with the determination of _events_. Its definitions +of objects are means of identification, while its laws are dynamical, +_i. e._, have reference to the conditions under which these objects +arise. Thus the chemist may know less about the properties of water than +the poet; but he is pre-eminently skilled in its production from +elements, and understands similarly the compounds into which it may +enter. Now the general conditions of all anticipation, whereby it +becomes exact and verifiable, are spacial and temporal. A predictable +event must be assigned to what is here now, or there now; or what is +here then, or there then. An experimentally verifiable system must +contain space-time variables, for which can be substituted the here and +now of the experimenter's immediate experience. Hence science deals +primarily with calculable places and moments. The mechanical theory of +nature owes its success to a union of space and time through its +conceptions of _matter_ and _motion_.[132:4] And the projected theory of +energetics must satisfy the same conditions. + +[Sidenote: The Quantitative Method.] + +Sect. 48. But, furthermore, science has, as we have seen, an interest in +freeing its descriptions from the peculiar angle and relativity of an +individual's experience, for the sake of affording him knowledge of that +with which he must meet. Science enlightens the will by acquainting it +with that which takes place in spite of it, and for which it must hold +itself in readiness. To this end the individual benefits himself in so +far as he eliminates himself from the objects which he investigates. His +knowledge is useful in so far as it is valid for his own indefinitely +varying stand-points, and those of other wills recognized by him in his +practical relations. But in attempting to describe objects in terms +other than those of a specific experience, science is compelled to +describe them in terms of one another. For this purpose _the +quantitative method_ is peculiarly serviceable. With its aid objects +permit themselves to be described as multiples of one another, and as +occupying positions in relation to one another. When all objects are +described strictly in terms of one another, they are expressed in terms +of arbitrary units, and located in terms of arbitrary spacial or +temporal axes of reference. Thus there arises the universe of the +scientific imagination, a vast complexity of material displacements and +transformations, without color, music, pleasure, or any of all that rich +variety of qualities that the least of human experiences contains. It +does not completely rationalize or even completely describe such +experiences, but formulates their succession. To this end they are +reduced to terms that correspond to no specific experience, and for this +very reason may be translated again into all definable hypothetical +experiences. The solar system for astronomy is not a bird's-eye view of +elliptical orbits, with the planets and satellites in definite phases. +Nor is it this group of objects from any such point of view, or from any +number of such points of view; but a formulation of their motions that +will serve as the key to an infinite number of their appearances. Or, +consider the picture of the ichthysauria romping in the mesozoic sea, +that commonly accompanies a text-book of geology. Any such picture, and +all such pictures, with their coloring and their temporal and spacial +perspective, are imaginary. No such special and exclusive manifolds can +be defined as having been then and there realized. But we have a +geological knowledge of this period, that fulfils the formal demands of +natural science, in so far as we can construct this and countless other +specific experiences with reference to it. + +[Sidenote: The General Development of Science.] + +Sect. 49. Science, then, is to be understood as springing from the +practical necessity of anticipating the environment. This anticipation +appears first as congenital or acquired reactions on the part of the +organism. Such reactions imply a fixed coordination or system in the +environment whereby a given circumstance determines other circumstances; +and science proper arises as the formulation of such systems. The +requirement that they shall apply to the phenomena that _confront_ the +will, determines their spacial, temporal, and quantitative form. The +progress of science is marked by the growth of these conceptions in the +direction of comprehensiveness on the one hand, and of refinement and +delicacy on the other. Man lives in an environment that is growing at +the same time richer and more extended, but with a compensatory +simplification in the ever closer systematization of scientific +conceptions under the form of the order of nature. + +[Sidenote: The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science.] + +Sect. 50. At the opening of this chapter it was maintained that it is a +function of philosophy to criticise science through its generating +problem, or its self-imposed task viewed as determining its province and +selecting its categories. The above account of the origin and method of +science must suffice as a definition of its generating problem, and +afford the basis of our answer to the question of its limits. Enough has +been said to make it clear that philosophy is not in the field of +science, and is therefore not entitled to contest its result in detail +or even to take sides within the province of its special problems. +Furthermore, philosophy should not aim to restrain science by the +imposition of external barriers. Whatever may be said of the sufficiency +of its categories in any region of the world, that body of truth of +which mathematics, mechanics, and physics are the foundations, must be +regarded as a whole that tends to be all-comprehensive in its own terms. +There remains for philosophy, then, the critical examination of these +terms, and the appraisal as a whole of the truth that they may express. + +[Sidenote: Natural Science is Abstract.] + +Sect. 51. The impossibility of embracing the whole of knowledge within +natural science is due to the fact that the latter is _abstract_. This +follows from the fact that natural science is governed by a selective +interest. The formulation of definitions and laws in exclusively +mechanical terms is not due to the exhaustive or even pre-eminent +reality of these properties, but to their peculiar serviceableness in a +verifiable description of events. Natural science does not affirm that +reality is essentially constituted of matter, or essentially +characterized by motion; but is _interested_ in the mechanical aspect of +reality, and describes it quite regardless of other evident aspects and +without meaning to prejudice them. It is unfortunately true that the +scientist has rarely been clear in his own mind on this point. It is +only recently that he has partially freed himself from the habit of +construing his terms as final and exhaustive.[137:5] This he was able +to do even to his own satisfaction, only by allowing loose rein to the +imagination. Consider the example of the atomic theory. In order to +describe such occurrences as chemical combination, or changes in volume +and density, the scientist has employed as a unit the least particle, +physically indivisible and qualitatively homogeneous. Look for the atom +in the body of science, and you will find it in physical laws governing +expansion and contraction, and in chemical formulas. There the real +responsibility of science ends. But whether through the need of popular +exposition, or the undisciplined imagination of the investigator +himself, atoms have figured in the history of thought as round +corpuscles of a grayish hue scurrying hither and thither, and armed with +special appliances wherewith to lock in molecular embrace. Although this +is nonsense, we need not on that account conclude that there are no +atoms. There are atoms in precisely the sense intended by scientific +law, in that the formulas computed with the aid of this concept are true +of certain natural processes. The conception of ether furnishes a +similar case. Science is not responsible for the notion of a quivering +gelatinous substance pervading space, but only for certain laws that, +_e. g._, describe the velocity of light in terms of the vibration. It is +true that there is such a thing as ether, not as gratuitously rounded +out by the imagination, with various attributes of immediate experience, +but just in so far as this concept is employed in verified descriptions +of radiation, magnetism, or electricity. Strictly speaking science +asserts nothing about the existence of ether, but only about the +behavior, _e. g._, of light. If true descriptions of this and other +phenomena are reached by employing units of wave propagation in an +elastic medium, then ether is proved to exist in precisely the same +sense that linear feet are proved to exist, if it be admitted that there +are 90,000,000 x 5,280 of them between the earth and the sun. And to +imagine in the one case a jelly with all the qualities of texture, +color, and the like, that an individual object of sense would possess, +is much the same as in the other to imagine the heavens filled with +foot-rules and tape-measures. There is but one safe procedure in dealing +with scientific concepts: to regard them as true so far as they +describe, and no whit further. To supplement the strict meaning which +has been verified and is contained in the formularies of science, with +such vague predicates as will suffice to make entities of them, is mere +ineptness and confusion of thought. And it is only such a +supplementation that obscures their abstractness. For a mechanical +description of things, true as it doubtless is, is even more indubitably +incomplete. + +[Sidenote: The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth.] + +Sect. 52. But though the abstractness involved in scientific description +is open and deliberate, we must come to a more precise understanding of +it, if we are to draw any conclusion as to what it involves. In his +"Principles of Human Knowledge," the English philosopher Bishop Berkeley +raises the question as to the universal validity of mathematical +demonstrations. If we prove from the image or figure of an isosceles +right triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles, +how can we know that this proposition holds of all triangles? + + "To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view + whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an + isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a + determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends + to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness + soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the + equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all + concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have + in view includes all these particulars; but then there is not + the least mention made of them in the proof of the + proposition."[140:6] + +Of the total conditions present in the concrete picture of a triangle, +one may in one's calculations neglect as many as one sees fit, and work +with the remainder. Then, if one has clearly distinguished the +conditions used, one may confidently assert that whatever has been found +true of them holds regardless of the neglected conditions. These may be +missing or replaced by others, provided the selected or (for any given +investigation) essential conditions are not affected. That which is true +once is true always, provided time is not one of its conditions; that +which is true in one place is true everywhere, provided location is not +one of its conditions. But, given any concrete situation, the more +numerous the conditions one ignores in one's calculations, the less +adequate are one's calculations to that situation. The number of its +inhabitants, and any mathematical operation made with that number, is +true, but only very abstractly true of a nation. A similar though less +radical abstractness appertains to natural science. Simple qualities of +sound or color, and distinctions of beauty or moral worth, together with +many other ingredients of actual experience attributed therein to the +objects of nature, are ignored in the mechanical scheme. There is a +substitution of certain mechanical arrangements in the case of the first +group of properties, the simple qualities of sense, so that they may be +assimilated to the general scheme of events, and their occurrence +predicted. But their intrinsic qualitative character is not reckoned +with, even in psychology, where the physiological method finally +replaces them with brain states. Over and above these neglected +properties of things there remain the purposive activities of thought. +It is equally preposterous to deny them and to describe them in +mechanical terms. It is plain, then, that natural science calculates +upon the basis of only a fraction of the conditions that present +themselves in actual experience. Its conclusions, therefore, though true +so far as they go, and they may be abstractly true of everything, are +completely true of nothing. + +[Sidenote: But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality.] + +Sect. 53. Such, in brief, is the general charge of inadequacy which may +be urged against natural science, not in the spirit of detraction, but +for the sake of a more sound belief concerning reality. The philosopher +falls into error no less radical than that of the dogmatic scientist, +when he charges the scientist with untruth, and attaches to his concepts +the predicate of unreality. The fact that the concepts of science are +selected, and only inadequately true of reality, should not be taken to +mean that they are sportive or arbitrary. They are not "devices" or +abbreviations, in any sense that does not attach to such symbolism as +all thought involves. Nor are they merely "hypothetical," though like +all thought they are subject to correction.[142:7] The scientist does +not merely assert that the equation for energy is true if nature's +capacity for work be measurable, but _that such is actually the case_. +The statistician does not arrive at results contingent upon the +supposition that men are numerable, but declares his sums and averages +to be categorically true. Similarly scientific laws are true; only, to +be sure, so far as they go, but with no condition save the condition +that attaches to all knowledge, viz., that it shall not need correction. +The philosophy of science, therefore, is not the adversary of science, +but supervenes upon science in the interests of the ideal of final +truth. No philosophy of science is sound which does not primarily seek +by an analysis of scientific concepts to understand science on its own +grounds. Philosophy may understand science better than science +understands itself, but only by holding fast to the conviction of its +truth, and including it within whatever account of reality it may be +able to formulate. + +[Sidenote: Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy.] + +Sect. 54. Though philosophy be the most ancient and most exalted of +human disciplines, it is not infrequently charged with being the most +unprofitable. Science has amassed a fortune of information, which has +facilitated life and advanced civilization. Is not philosophy, on the +other hand, all programme and idle questioning? In the first place, no +questioning is idle that is logically possible. It is true that +philosophy shows her skill rather in the asking than in the answering of +questions. But the formal pertinence of a question is of the greatest +significance. No valid though unanswered question can have a purely +negative value, and especially as respects the consistency or +completeness of truth. But, in the second place, philosophy with all its +limitations serves mankind as indispensably as science. If science +supplies the individual with means of self-preservation, and the +instruments of achievement, philosophy supplies the ideals, or the +objects of deliberate construction. Such reflection as justifies the +adoption of a fundamental life purpose is always philosophical. For +every judgment respecting final worth is a judgment _sub specie +eternitatis_. And the urgency of life requires the individual to pass +such judgments. It is true that however persistently reflective he may +be in the matter, his conclusion will be premature in consideration of +the amount of evidence logically demanded for such a judgment. But he +must be as wise as he can, or he will be as foolish as conventionality +and blind impulse may impel him to be. Philosophy determines for society +what every individual must practically determine upon for himself, the +most reasonable plan of reality as a whole which the data and reflection +of an epoch can afford. It is philosophy's service to mankind to +compensate for the enthusiasm and concentration of the specialist, a +service needed in every "present day." Apart from the philosopher, +public opinion is the victim of sensationalism, and individual opinion +is further warped by accidental propinquity. It is the function of +philosophy to interpret knowledge for the sake of a sober and wise +belief. The philosopher is the true prophet, appearing before men in +behalf of that which is finally the truth. He is the spokesman of the +most considerate and comprehensive reflection possible at any stage in +the development of human thought. Owing to a radical misconception of +function, the man of science has in these later days begun to regard +himself as the wise man, and to teach the people. Popular materialism is +the logical outcome of this determination of belief by natural science. +It may be that this is due as much to the indifference of the +philosopher as to the forwardness of the scientist, but in any case the +result is worse than conservative loyalty to religious tradition. For +religion is corrected surely though slowly by the whole order of +advancing truth. Its very inflexibility makes it proof against an +over-emphasis upon new truth. It has generally turned out in time that +the obstinate man of religion was more nearly right than the adaptable +intellectual man of fashion. But philosophy, as a critique of science +for the sake of faith, should provide the individual religious believer +with intellectual enlightenment and gentleness. The quality, +orderliness, and inclusiveness of knowledge, finally determine its +value; and the philosopher, premature as his synthesis may some day +prove to be, is the wisest man of his own generation. From him the man +of faith should obtain such discipline of judgment as shall enable him +to be fearless of advancing knowledge, because acquainted with its +scope, and so intellectually candid with all his visions and his +inspirations. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[120:1] Ernst Mach: _Science of Mechanics_. Translation by McCormack, p. +464. No one has made more important contributions than Professor Mach to +a certain definite modern philosophical movement. Cf. Sect. 207. + +[129:2] Whewell: _History of the Inductive Sciences_, Vol. I, p. 289. +Quoted from Kepler: _Mysterium Cosmographicum_. + +[129:3] Quoted by Sidgwick in his _Philosophy, its Scope and Relations_, +p. 89. + +[132:4] The reader is referred to Mr. Bertrand Russell's chapters on +_matter_ and _motion_ in his _Principles of Mathematics_, Vol. I. +Material particles he defines as "many-one relations of all times to +some places, or of all terms of a continuous one-dimensional series _t_ +to some terms of a continuous three-dimensional series _s_." Similarly, +"when different times, throughout any period however short, are +correlated with different places, there is motion; when different times, +throughout some period however short, are all correlated with the same +place, there is rest." _Op. cit._, p. 473. + +[137:5] That the scientist still permits himself to teach the people a +loose exoteric theory of reality, is proven by Professor Ward's citation +of instances in his _Naturalism and Agnosticism_. So eminent a physicist +as Lord Kelvin is quoted as follows: "You can imagine particles of +something, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This thing we call +the luminiferous ether. That is the only substance we are confident of +in dynamics. One thing we are sure of, and that is the reality and +substantiality of the luminiferous ether." Vol. I, p. 113. + +[140:6] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Introduction. Edition +of Fraser, p. 248. + +[142:7] The reader who cares to pursue this topic further is referred to +the writer's discussion of "_Professor Ward's Philosophy of Science_" in +the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods_, Vol. I, +No. 13. + + + + +PART II + +THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF +PHILOSOPHY + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY + + +[Sidenote: The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem of +Philosophy.] + +Sect. 55. The stand-point and purpose of the philosopher define his +task, but they do not necessarily prearrange the division of it. That +the task is a complex one, embracing many subordinate problems which +must be treated _seriatim_, is attested both by the breadth of its scope +and the variety of the interests from which it may be approached. But +this complexity is qualified by the peculiar importance which here +attaches to unity. That which lends philosophical quality to any +reflection is a steadfast adherence to the ideals of inclusiveness and +consistency. Hence, though the philosopher must of necessity occupy +himself with subordinate problems, these cannot be completely isolated +from one another, and solved successively. Perspective is his most +indispensable requisite, and he has solved no problem finally until he +has provided for the solution of all. His own peculiar conceptions are +those which _order_ experience, and reconcile such aspects of it as +other interests have distinguished. Hence the compatibility of any idea +with all other ideas is the prime test of its philosophical sufficiency. +On these grounds it may confidently be asserted that the work of +philosophy cannot be assigned by the piece to different specialists, and +then assembled. There are no special philosophical problems which can be +finally solved upon their own merits. Indeed, such problems could never +even be named, for in their discreteness they would cease to be +philosophical. + +The case of _metaphysics_ and _epistemology_ affords an excellent +illustration. The former of these is commonly defined as the theory of +reality or of first principles, the latter as the theory of knowledge. +But the most distinctive philosophical movement of the nineteenth +century issues from the idea that knowing and being are +identical.[150:1] The prime reality is defined as a knowing mind, and +the terms of reality are interpreted as terms of a cognitive process. +Ideas and logical principles _constitute_ the world. It is evident that +in this Hegelian philosophy epistemology embraces metaphysics. In +defining the relations of knowledge to its object, one has already +defined one's fundamental philosophical conception, while _logic_, as +the science of the universal necessities of thought, will embrace the +first principles of reality. Now, were one to divide and arrange the +problems of philosophy upon this basis, it is evident that one would not +have deduced the arrangement from the general problem of philosophy, but +from a single attempted solution of that problem. It might serve as an +exposition of Hegel, but not as a general philosophical programme. + +Another case in point is provided by the present-day interest in what is +called "_pragmatism_."[151:2] This doctrine is historically connected +with Kant's principle of the "primacy of the practical reason," in which +he maintained that the consciousness of duty is a profounder though less +scientific insight than the knowledge of objects. The current doctrine +maintains that thought with its fruits is an expression of interest, and +that the will which evinces and realizes such an interest is more +original and significant than that which the thinking defines. Such a +view attaches a peculiar importance to the springs of conduct, and in +its more systematic development[152:3] has regarded _ethics_ as the +true propaedeutic and proof of philosophy. But to make ethics the +key-stone of the arch, is to define a special philosophical system; for +it is the very problem of philosophy to dispose the parts of knowledge +with a view to systematic construction. The relation of the provinces of +metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics cannot, then, be defined +without entering these provinces and answering the questions proper to +them. + +[Sidenote: The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon +the Initial Interest.] + +Sect. 56. Since the above terms exist, however, there can be no doubt +but that important divisions within the general aim of philosophy have +actually been made. The inevitableness of it appears in the variety of +the sources from which that aim may spring. The point of departure will +always determine the emphasis and the application which the philosophy +receives. If philosophy be needed to supplement more special interests, +it will receive a particular character from whatever interest it so +supplements. He who approaches it from a definite stand-point will find +in it primarily an interpretation of that stand-point. + +[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life.] + +Sect. 57. There are two sources of the philosophical aim, which are +perennial in their human significance. He, firstly, who begins with the +demands of life and its ideals, looks to philosophy for a reconciliation +of these with the orderly procedure of nature. His philosophy will +receive its form from its illumination of life, and it will be an +ethical or religious philosophy. Spinoza, the great seventeenth-century +philosopher who justified mysticism after the manner of +mathematics,[153:4] displays this temper in his philosophy: + + "After experience had taught me that all the usual + surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that + none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves + anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is + affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there + might be some real good having power to communicate itself, + which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all + else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the + discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, + supreme, and unending happiness."[153:5] + +In pursuance of this aim, though he deals with the problem of being in +the rigorous logical fashion of his day, the final words of his great +work are, "Of Human Freedom": + + "Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is + scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of + himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal + necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true + acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed + out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may + nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is + so seldom found. How would it be possible if salvation were + ready to our hand, and could without great labor be found, + that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things + excellent are as difficult as they are rare."[154:6] + +[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Extension of Science.] + +Sect. 58. On the other hand, one who looks to philosophy for the +extension and correction of scientific knowledge will be primarily +interested in the philosophical definition of ultimate conceptions, and +in the method wherewith such a definition is obtained. Thus the +philosophy of the scientist will tend to be logical and metaphysical. +Such is the case with Descartes and Leibniz, who are nevertheless +intimately related to Spinoza in the historical development of +philosophy. + + "Several years have now elapsed," says the former, "since I + first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, + many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I + afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and + from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking + once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had + adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the + foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding + superstructure in the sciences."[155:7] + +Leibniz's mind was more predominantly logical even than Descartes's. He +sought in philosophy a supreme intellectual synthesis, a science of the +universe. + + "Although," he says retrospectively, "I am one of those who + have worked much at mathematics, I have none the less + meditated upon philosophy from my youth up; for it always + seemed to me that there was a possibility of establishing + something solid in philosophy by clear demonstrations. . . . + I perceived, after much meditation, that it is impossible to + find the _principles of a real unity_ in matter alone, or in + that which is only passive, since it is nothing but a + collection or aggregation of parts _ad infinitum_."[155:8] + +[Sidenote: The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical Problem.] + +Sect. 59. Though these types are peculiarly representative, they are by +no means exhaustive. There are as many possibilities of emphasis as +there are incentives to philosophical reflection. It is not possible to +exhaust the aspects of experience which may serve as bases from which +such thought may issue, and to which, after its synthetic insight, it +may return. But it is evident that such divisions of philosophy +represent in their order, and in the sharpness with which they are +sundered, the intellectual autobiography of the individual philosopher. +There is but one method by which that which is peculiar either to the +individual, or to the special position which he adopts, may be +eliminated. Though it is impossible to tabulate the empty programme of +philosophy, we may name certain special problems that have appeared _in +its history_. Since this history comprehends the activities of many +individuals, a general validity attaches to it. There has been, +moreover, a certain periodicity in the emergence of these problems, so +that it may fairly be claimed for them that they indicate inevitable +phases in the development of human reflection upon experience. They +represent a normal differentiation of interest which the individual +mind, in the course of its own thinking, tends to follow. It is true +that it can never be said with assurance that any age is utterly blind +to any aspect of experience. This is obviously the case with the +practical and theoretical interests which have just been distinguished. +There is no age that does not have some practical consciousness of the +world as a whole, nor any which does not seek more or less earnestly to +universalize its science. But though it compel us to deal abstractly +with historical epochs, there is abundant compensation in the +possibility which this method affords of finding the divisions of +philosophy in the manifestation of the living philosophical spirit. + +[Sidenote: Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception.] + +Sect. 60. To Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, is commonly +awarded the honor of being the founder of European philosophy. If he +deserve this distinction, it is on account of the question which he +raised, and not on account of the answer which he gave to it. Aristotle +informs us that Thales held "water" to be "the material cause of all +things."[157:9] This crude theory is evidently due to an interest in the +totality of things, an interest which is therefore philosophical. But +the interest of this first philosopher has a more definite character. It +looks toward the definition in terms of some single conception, of _the +constitution_ of the world. As a child might conceivably think the moon +to be made of green cheese, so philosophy in its childhood thinks here +of all things as made of water. Water was a well-known substance, +possessing well-known predicates. To define all nature in terms of it, +was to maintain that in spite of superficial differences, all things +have these predicates in common. They are the predicates which qualify +for reality, and compose a community of nature from which all the +individual objects and events of nature arise. The successors of Thales +were evidently dissatisfied with his fundamental conception, because of +its lack of generality. They seized upon vaguer substances like air and +fire, for the very definiteness of the nature of water forbids the +identification of other substances with it. But what is so obviously +true of water is scarcely less true of air and fire; and it appeared at +length that only a substance possessing the most general characters of +body, such as shape, size, and mobility, could be thought as truly +primeval and universal. In this wise a conception like our modern +physical conception of matter came at length into vogue. Now the problem +of which these were all tentative solutions is, in general, the problem +of _metaphysics_; although this term belongs to a later era, arising +only from the accidental place of the discussion of first principles +_after physics_ in the system of Aristotle. _The attempt to secure a +most fundamental conception which attaches some definite meaning to the +reality including and informing every particular thing, is metaphysics._ + +[Sidenote: Monism and Pluralism.] + +Sect. 61. It must not be supposed that metaphysics is dogmatically +committed to the reduction of all reality to a unity of nature. It is +quite consistent with its purpose that the parts of reality should be +found to compose a group, or an indefinite multitude of irreducibly +different entities. But it is clear that even such an account of things +deals with what is true of all reality, and even in acknowledging the +variety of its constituents, attributes to them some kind of +relationship. The degree to which such a relationship is regarded as +intimate and essential, determines the degree to which any metaphysical +system is _monistic_,[159:10] rather than _pluralistic_. But the +significance of this difference will be better appreciated after a +further differentiation of the metaphysical problem has been noted. + +[Sidenote: Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process.] + +Sect. 62. It has already been suggested that the test of Thales's +conception lay in the possibility of deriving nature from it. A world +principle must be fruitful. Now an abstract distinction has prevailed +more or less persistently in metaphysics, between _the general +definition of being_, called _ontology_, and the study of the processes +wherewith being is divided into things and events. This latter study has +to do primarily with the details of experience enumerated and +systematized by the natural sciences. _To reconcile_ these, _or the +course of nature, with the fundamental definition of being_, is the +problem of _cosmology_. Cosmology is the construing of the _prima facie_ +reality in terms of the essential reality. It is the proof and the +explanation of ontology. Since the most familiar part of the _prima +facie_ reality, the part almost exclusively noticed by the naive mind, +is embraced within the field of the physical sciences, the term +cosmology has come more definitely to signify the _philosophy of +nature_. It embraces such an examination of space, time, matter, +causality, etc., as seeks to answer the most general questions about +them, and provide for them in the world thought of as most profoundly +real. Such a study receives its philosophical character from its +affiliation with ontology, as the latter would find its application in +cosmology. + +[Sidenote: Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies.] + +Sect. 63. But in addition to the consideration of the various parts of +nature, cosmology has commonly dealt with a radical and far-reaching +alternative that appeared at the very dawn of metaphysics. Differences +may arise within a world constituted of a single substance or a small +group of ultimate substances, by changes in the relative position and +grouping of the parts. Hence the virtue of the conception of motion. The +theory which explains all differences by motions of the parts of a +qualitatively simple world, is called _mechanism_. Another source of +change familiar to naive experience is _will_, or the action of living +creatures. According to the mechanical theory, _changes occur on account +of the natural motions of the parts of matter_; according to the latter +or _teleological_ conception, _changes are made by a formative agency +directed to some end_. Among the early Greek philosophers, Leucippus was +an exponent of mechanism. + + "He says that the worlds arise when many bodies are collected + together into the mighty void from the surrounding space and + rush together. They come into collision, and those which are + of similar shape and like form become entangled, and from + their entanglement the heavenly bodies arise."[161:11] + +Anaxagoras, on the other hand, was famed for his doctrine of the Nous, +or Intelligence, to whose direction he attributed the whole process of +the world. The following is translated from extant fragments of his +book, "+peri physeo:s+": + + "And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it + began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve + first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends + over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And + all the things that are mingled together and separated off and + distinguished are all known by the Nous. And Nous set in order + all things that were to be and that were, and all things that + are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now + revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and + the ether that are separated off."[162:12] + +[Sidenote: Dualism.] + +Sect. 64. It is clear, furthermore, that the doctrine of Anaxagoras not +only names a distinct kind of cause, but also ascribes to it an +independence and intrinsic importance that do not belong to motion. +Whereas motion is a property of matter, intelligence is an originative +power working out purposes of its own choosing. Hence we have here to do +with a new ontology. If we construe ultimate being in terms of mind, we +have a definite substitute for the physical theories outlined above. +Such a theory is scarcely to be attributed to any Greek philosopher of +the early period; it belongs to a more sophisticated stage in the +development of thought, after the rise of the problem of epistemology. +But Anaxagoras's sharp distinction between the material of the world on +the one hand, and the author of its order and evolution on the other, is +in itself worthy of notice. It contains the germ of a recurrent +philosophical _dualism_, which differs from pluralism in that it finds +two and only two fundamental divisions of being, the physical, material, +or potential on the one hand, and the mental, formal, or ideal on the +other. + +[Sidenote: The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism.] + +Sect. 65. Finally, the alternative possibilities which these +cosmological considerations introduce, bear directly upon the general +question of the interdependence of the parts of the world, a question +which has already appeared as pertinent in ontology. Monism and +pluralism now obtain a new meaning. Where the world process is informed +with some singleness of plan, as teleology proposes, the parts are +reciprocally necessary, and inseparable from the unity. Where, on the +other hand, the processes are random and reciprocally fortuitous, as +Leucippus proposes, the world as a whole is an aggregate rather than a +unity. In this way uniformity in kind of being may prevail in a world +the relations of whose parts are due to chance, while diversity in kind +of being may prevail in a world knit together by some thorough-going +plan of organization. Thus monism and pluralism are conceptions as +proper to cosmology as to ontology. + +But enough has been said to demonstrate the interdependence of ontology +and cosmology, of the theory of being and the theory of differentiation +and process. Such problems can be only abstractly sundered, and the +distinctive character of any metaphysical system will usually consist in +some theory determining their relation. Philosophy returns to these +metaphysical problems with its thought enriched and its method +complicated, after becoming thoroughly alive to the problems of +epistemology, logic, and ethics. + +[Sidenote: Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of +Knowledge.] + +Sect. 66. _Epistemology is the theory of the possibility of knowledge_, +and issues from criticism and scepticism. If we revert again to the +history of Greek philosophy, we find a first period of enterprising +speculation giving place to a second period of hesitancy and doubt. This +phase of thought occurs simultaneously with the brilliantly humanistic +age of Pericles, and it is undoubtedly true that energy is withdrawn +from speculation largely for the sake of expending it in the more lively +and engaging pursuits of politics and art. But there are patent reasons +within the sphere of philosophy itself for entailment of activity and +taking of stock. For three centuries men have taken their philosophical +powers for granted, and used them without questioning them. Repeated +attacks upon the problem of reality have resulted in no consensus of +opinion, but only in a disagreement among the wise men themselves. A +great variety of mere theories has been substituted for the old +unanimity of religious tradition and practical life. It is natural under +these circumstances to infer that in philosophy man has overreached +himself. He would more profitably busy himself with affairs that belong +to his own sphere, and find a basis for life in his immediate relations +with his fellows. The sophists, learned in tradition, and skilled in +disputation, but for the most part entirely lacking in originality, are +the new prophets. As teachers of rhetoric and morals, they represent the +practical and secular spirit of their age; while in their avoidance of +speculation, and their critical justification of that course, they +express its sceptical philosophy. + +[Sidenote: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism.] + +Sect. 67. In their self-justification certain of the sophists attached +themselves to a definite doctrine maintained by those of their +predecessors and contemporaries who were atomists, or followers of that +same Leucippus whom we have quoted. This doctrine was the result of an +attempt to construe perception in terms of the motion of atoms. Outer +objects were said to give off fine particles which, through the +mediation of the sense organs, impinged upon the soul-atom. But it was +evident even to the early exponents of this theory that according to +such an account, each perceiver is relegated to a world peculiar to his +own stand-point. His perception informs him concerning his own states as +affected by things, rather than concerning the things themselves. Upon +this ground the great sophist Protagoras is said to have based his +dictum: +Panto:n chre:mato:n metron anthro:pos+,--"Man is the measure of +all things." This is the classic statement of the doctrine of +relativity. But we have now entered into the province of epistemology, +and various alternatives confront us. Reduce thought to perception, +define perception as relative to each individual, and you arrive at +_scepticism_, or _the denial of the possibility of valid knowledge_. +Plato expounds this consequence in the well-known discussion of +Protagoras that occurs in the "Theaetetus." + + "I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each + one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with + a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other + yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of + all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt + for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that + while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom, he + was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his + fellow-men--would not this have produced an overpowering + effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern + another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right + to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, + as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole + judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why, + my friend, should Protagoras be preferred to the place of + wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we + poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure + of his own wisdom? . . . The attempt to supervise or refute + the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and + enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and + this must be the case if Protagoras's Truth is the real truth, + and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving + oracles out of the shrine of his book."[167:13] + +This is the full swing of the pendulum from _dogmatism_, or the +uncritical conviction of truth. A modified form of scepticism has been +developed in these later days under the influence of natural science, +and is called _agnosticism_ or _positivism_. It accepts the Protagorean +doctrine only in the sense of attributing to human knowledge as a whole +an incapacity for exceeding the range of perception. Beyond this realm +of natural science, where theories can be sensibly verified, lies the +unknowable realm, more real, but forever inaccessible. + +[Sidenote: The Source and Criterion of Knowledge According to Empiricism +and Rationalism. Mysticism.] + +Sect. 68. It is important to note that both scepticism and agnosticism +agree in regarding _perception as the essential factor in knowledge_. So +far at any rate as our knowledge is concerned, the certification of +being consists in perceivability. Knowledge is coextensive with actual +and possible human experience. This account of the source and criterion +of knowledge is called _empiricism_, in distinction from the +counter-theory of _rationalism_. + +The rationalistic motive was a quickening influence in Greek philosophy +long before it became deliberate and conspicuous in Socrates and Plato. +Parmenides, founder of the Eleatic School, has left behind him a poem +divided into two parts: "The Way of Truth" and "The Way of +Opinion."[168:14] In the first of these he expounds his esoteric +philosophy, which is a definition of being established by dialectical +reasoning. He finds that being must be single, eternal, and changeless, +because otherwise it cannot be thought and defined without +contradiction. The method which Parmenides here employs presupposes that +knowledge consists in understanding rather than perception. Indeed, he +regards the fact that the world of the senses is manifold and mutable as +of little consequence to the wise man. The world of sense is the +province of vulgar opinion, while that of reason is the absolute truth +revealed only to the philosopher. The truth has no concern with +appearance, but is answerable only to the test of rationality. _That +world is real which one is able by thinking to make intelligible._ The +world is what a world must be in order to be possible at all, and the +philosopher can deduce it directly from the very conditions of thought +which it must satisfy. He who would know reality may disregard what +seems to be, provided he can by reflective analysis discover certain +general necessities to which being must conform. This is rationalism in +its extreme form. + +The rationalism of Socrates was more moderate, as it was more fruitful +than that of Parmenides. As is well known, Socrates composed no +philosophical books, but sought to inculcate wisdom in his teaching and +conversation. His method of inculcating wisdom was to evoke it in his +interlocutor by making him considerate of the meaning of his speech. +Through his own questions he sought to arouse the questioning spirit, +which should weigh the import of words, and be satisfied with nothing +short of a definite and consistent judgment. In the Platonic dialogues +the Socratic method obtains a place in literature. In the "Theaetetus," +which is, perhaps, the greatest of all epistemological treatises, +Socrates is represented as likening his vocation to that of the midwife. + + "Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs, + but differs in that I attend men, and not women, and I look + after their souls when they are in labor, and not after their + bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining + whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings + forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And, like the + midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made + against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the + wit to answer them myself, is very just; the reason is that + the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to + bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor + have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my + own soul, but those who converse with me profit. . . . It is + quite clear that they never learned anything from me; the + many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own + making."[171:15] + +The principle underlying this method is the insistence that a +proposition, to be true of reality, must at least bespeak a mind that is +true to itself, internally luminous, and free from contradiction. That +which is to me nothing that I can express in form that will convey +precise meaning and bear analysis, is so far nothing at all. Being is +not, as the empiricist would have it, ready at hand, ours for the +looking, but is the fruit of critical reflection. Only reason, +overcoming the relativity of perception, and the chaos of popular +opinion, can lay hold on the universal truth. + +A very interesting tendency to clothe the articulations of thought with +the immediacy of perception is exhibited in _mysticism_, which +attributes the highest cognitive power to an experience that transcends +thought, an ineffable insight that is the occasional reward of thought +and virtuous living. This theory would seem to owe its great vigor to +the fact that it promises to unite the universality of the rational +object with the vivid presence of the empirical object, though it +sacrifices the definite content of both. The mystic, empiricist, and +rationalist are in these several ways led to revise their metaphysics +upon the basis of their epistemology, or to define reality in terms +dictated by the means of knowing it. + +[Sidenote: The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to Realism, +and the Representative Theory.] + +Sect. 69. But within the general field of epistemology there has arisen +another issue of even greater significance in its bearing upon +metaphysics. The first issue, as we have seen, has reference to the +criterion of knowledge, to the possibility of arriving at certainty +about reality, and the choice of means to that end. A second question +arises, concerning _the relation between the knowledge and its object or +that which is known_. This problem does not at first appear as an +epistemological difficulty, but is due to the emphasis which the moral +and religious interests of men give to the conception of the self. My +knowing is a part of me, a function of that soul whose welfare and +eternal happiness I am seeking to secure. Indeed, my knowing is, so the +wise men have always taught, the greatest of my prerogatives. Wisdom +appertains to the philosopher, as folly to the fool. But though my +knowledge be a part of me, and in me, the same cannot, lightly at any +rate, be said of what I know. It would seem that I must distinguish +between the knowledge, which is my act or state, an event in my life, +and the known, which is object, and belongs to the context of the outer +world. _The object of knowledge_ would then be quite _independent of the +circumstance that I know it_. This theory has acquired the name of +_realism_,[173:16] and is evidently as close to common sense as any +epistemological doctrine can be said to be. If the knowledge consists in +some sign or symbol which in my mind stands for the object, but is +quite other than the object, realism is given the form known as the +_representative theory_. This theory is due to a radical distinction +between the inner world of consciousness and the outer world of things, +whereby in knowledge the outer object requires a substitute that is +qualified to belong to the inner world. Where, on the other hand, no +specific and exclusive nature is attributed to the inner world, realism +may flourish without the representative theory. In such a case the +object would be regarded as itself capable of entering into any number +of individual experiences or of remaining outside them all, and without +on either account forfeiting its identity. This view was taken for +granted by Plato, but is elaborately defended in our own day. During the +intervening period epistemology has been largely occupied with +difficulties inherent in the representative theory, and from that +discussion there has emerged the theory of _idealism_,[175:17] the great +rival theory to that of realism. + +[Sidenote: The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to +Idealism.] + +Sect. 70. The representative theory contains at least one obvious +difficulty. If the thinker be confined to his ideas, and if the reality +be at the same time beyond these ideas, how can he ever verify their +report? Indeed, what can it mean that an idea should be true of that +which belongs to a wholly different category? How under such +circumstances can that which is a part of the idea be attributed with +any certainty to the object? Once grant that you know only your ideas, +and the object reduces to an unknown _x_, which you retain to account +for the outward pointing or reference of the ideas, but which is not +missed if neglected. The obvious though radical theory of idealism is +almost inevitably the next step. Why assume that there is any object +other than the state of mind, since all positive content belongs to that +realm? The eighteenth century English philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, was +accused by his contemporaries of wilful eccentricity, and even madness, +for his boldness in accepting this argument and drawing this conclusion: + + "The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel + it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed; + meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, + or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was + an odor--that is, it was smelt; there was a sound--that is, it + was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or + touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like + expressions. For as to what is said of the _absolute_ + existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their + being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their + _esse_ is _percipi_; nor is it possible that they should have + any existence out of the minds or thinking thing which + perceives them."[176:18] + +[Sidenote: Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism.] + +Sect. 71. In this paragraph Berkeley maintains that it is essential to +things, or at any rate to their qualities, that they _be perceived_. +This principle when expressed as an epistemological or metaphysical +generalization, is called _phenomenalism_. But in another phase of his +thought Berkeley emphasizes the _perceiver_, or _spirit_. The theory +which maintains that the only real substances are these active selves, +with their powers and their states, has been called somewhat vaguely by +the name of _spiritualism_.[176:19] Philosophically it shows a strong +tendency to develop into either _panpsychism_ or _transcendentalism_. +The former is radically empirical. Its classic representative is the +German pessimist Schopenhauer, who defined reality in terms of will +because that term signified to him most eloquently _the directly felt +nature of the self_. This immediate revelation of the true inwardness of +being serves as the key to an "intuitive interpretation" of the +gradations of nature, and will finally awaken a sense of the presence of +the universal Will. + +[Sidenote: Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism.] + +Sect. 72. _Transcendentalism_, or _absolute idealism_, on the other +hand, emphasizes the _rational activity_, rather than the bare +subjectivity, _of the self_. The term "transcendental" has become +associated with this type of idealism through Kant, whose favorite form +of argument, the "transcendental deduction," was an analysis of +experience with a view to discovering the categories, or formal +principles of thought, implied in its meaning. From the Kantian method +arose the conception of a standard or _absolute mind_ for the standard +experience. This mind is transcendental not in the sense of being alien, +but in the sense of exceeding the human mind in the direction of what +this means and strives to be. It is the ideal or normal mind, in which +the true reality is contained, with all the chaos of finite experience +compounded and redeemed. There is no being but the absolute, the one +all-inclusive spiritual life, in whom all things are inherent, and whose +perfection is the virtual implication of all purposive activities. + + "God's life . . . sees the one plan fulfilled through all the + manifold lives, the single consciousness winning its purpose + by virtue of all the ideas, of all the individual selves, and + of all the lives. No finite view is wholly illusory. Every + finite intent taken precisely in its wholeness is fulfilled in + the Absolute. The least life is not neglected, the most + fleeting act is a recognized part of the world's meaning. You + are for the divine view all that you know yourself at this + instant to be. But you are also infinitely more. The + preciousness of your present purposes to yourself is only a + hint of that preciousness which in the end links their meaning + to the entire realm of Being."[178:20] + +The fruitfulness of the philosopher's reflective doubt concerning his +own powers is now evident. Problems are raised which are not merely +urgent in themselves, but which present wholly new alternatives to the +metaphysician. Rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, are +doctrines which, though springing from the epistemological query +concerning the possibility of knowledge, may determine an entire +philosophical system. They bear upon every question of metaphysics, +whether the fundamental conception of being, or the problems of the +world's unity, origin, and significance for human life. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[150:1] The post-Kantian movement in Germany--especially in so far as +influenced by Hegel. See Chap. XII. + +[151:2] Cf. Sect. 203. + +[152:3] _E. g._, the system of Fichte. Cf. Sect. 177. + +[153:4] See Chap. XI. + +[153:5] Spinoza: _On the Improvement of the Understanding_. Translation +by Elwes, p. 3. + +[154:6] Spinoza: _Ethics_, Part V, Proposition XLII. Translation by +Elwes, p. 270. + +[155:7] Descartes: _Meditations_, I. Translation by Veitch, p. 97. + +[155:8] Leibniz: _New System of the Nature of Substances_. Translation +by Latta, pp. 299, 300. + +[157:9] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 42. + +[159:10] No little ambiguity attaches to the term "monism" in current +usage, because of its appropriation by those who maintain that the +universe is unitary and homogeneous in _physical terms_ (cf. Sect. 108). +It should properly be used to emphasize the unity of the world in any +terms. + +[161:11] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 358. + +[162:12] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 284. + +[167:13] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 161. Translation by Jowett. References to +Plato are to the marginal paging. + +[168:14] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, pp. 184, 187. + +[171:15] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 150 B. Translation by Jowett. + +[173:16] Much ambiguity attaches to the terms "realism" and "idealism" +in current usage. The first had at one time in the history of philosophy +a much narrower meaning than that which it now possesses. It was used to +apply to those who, after Plato, believed in the independent reality of +ideas, universals, or general natures. _Realists_ in this sense were +opposed to _nominalists_ and _conceptualists_. Nominalism maintained the +exclusive reality of individual substances, and reduced ideas to +particular signs having, like the _name_, a purely symbolical or +descriptive value. Conceptualism sought to unite realism and nominalism +through the conception of mind, or an individual substance whose +meanings may possess universal validity. Though this dispute was of +fundamental importance throughout the mediaeval period, the issues +involved have now been restated. Realism in the old sense will, if held, +come within the scope of the broader epistemological realism defined +above. Nominalism is covered by empirical tendencies, and conceptualism +by modern idealism. + +The term _idealism_ is sometimes applied to Plato on account of his +designation of ideas as the ultimate realities. This would be a natural +use of the term, but in our own day it has become inseparably associated +with the doctrine which attributes to being a dependence upon the +activity of mind. It is of the utmost importance to keep these two +meanings clear. In the preferred sense Plato is a realist, and so +opposed to idealism. + +The term _idealism_ is further confused on account of its employment in +literature and common speech to denote the control of ideals. Although +this is a kindred meaning, the student of philosophy will gain little or +no help from it, and will avoid confusion if he distinguishes the term +in its technical use and permits it in that capacity to acquire an +independent meaning. + +[175:17] See _note_, p. 173. + +[176:18] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Part I, Fraser's +edition, p. 259. + +[176:19] To be distinguished from the religious sect which bears the +same name. + +[178:20] Quoted from Professor Josiah Royce's _The World and the +Individual, First Series_, pp. 426-427. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION + + +[Sidenote: The Normative Sciences.] + +Sect. 73. There are three sets of problems whose general philosophical +importance depends upon the place which metaphysics assigns to the +_human critical faculties_. Man passes judgment upon that which claims +to be _true_, _beautiful_, or _good_, thus referring to ideals and +standards that define these values. Attempts to make these ideals +explicit, and to formulate principles which regulate their attainment, +have resulted in the development of the three so-called _normative +sciences_: _logic_, _aesthetics_, and _ethics_. These sciences are said +to owe their origin to the Socratic method, and it is indeed certain +that their problem is closely related to the general rationalistic +attitude.[180:1] In Plato's dialogue, "Protagoras," one may observe the +manner of the inception of both ethics and logic. The question at issue +between Socrates and the master sophist Protagoras, is concerning the +possibility of teaching virtue. Protagoras conducts his side of the +discussion with the customary rhetorical flourish, expounding in set +speeches the tradition and usage in which such a possibility is +accepted. Socrates, on the other hand, conceives the issue quite +differently. One can neither affirm nor deny anything of virtue unless +one knows _what is meant by it_. Even the possession of such a meaning +was scarcely recognized by Protagoras, who was led by Socrates's +questions to attribute to the various virtues an external grouping +analogous to that of the parts of the face. But Socrates shows that +since justice, temperance, courage, and the like, are admittedly similar +in that they are all virtues, they must have in common some essence, +which is virtue in general. This he seeks to define in the terms, +_virtue is knowledge_. The interest which Socrates here shows in the +reduction of the ordinary moral judgments to a system centering in some +single fundamental principle, is the ethical interest. But this is at +the same time a particular application of the general rationalistic +method of definition, and of the general rationalistic postulate that +one knows nothing until one can form unitary and determinate +conceptions. The recognition which Socrates thus gives to criteria of +knowledge is an expression of the logical interest. In a certain sense, +indeed, the whole labor of Socrates was in the cause of the logical +interest. For he sought to demonstrate that belief is not necessarily +knowledge; that belief may or may not be true. In order that it shall be +true, and constitute knowledge, it must be well-grounded, and +accompanied by an understanding of its object. Socrates thus set the +problem of logic, the discovery, namely, of those characters by virtue +of the possession of which belief is knowledge. + +[Sidenote: The Affiliations of Logic.] + +Sect. 74. Logic deals with the ground of belief, and thus distinguishes +itself from the psychological account of the elements of the believing +state.[182:2] But it is not possible sharply to sunder psychology and +logic. This is due to the fact that the general principles which make +belief true, may be regarded quite independently of this fact. They then +become the _most general truth_, belonging to the absolute, archetypal +realm, or to the mind of God.[182:3] When the general principles of +certainty are so regarded, logic can be distinguished from metaphysics +only by adding to the study of the general principles themselves, the +study of the special conditions (mainly psychological) under which they +may be realized among men. In the history of human thought the name of +logic belongs to the study of this _attainment_ of truth, as the terms +aesthetics and ethics belong to the studies of the attainment of beauty +and goodness.[183:4] It is evident that logic will have a peculiar +importance for the rationalist. For the empiricist, proposing to report +upon things as they are given, will tend on the whole to maintain that +knowledge has no properties save those which are given to it by its +special subject-matter. One cannot, in short, define any absolute +relationship between the normative sciences and the other branches of +philosophy. + +[Sidenote: Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in +Belief.] + +Sect. 75. _Logic is the formulation, as independently as possible of +special subject-matter, of that which conditions truth in belief._ Since +logic is concerned with truth only in so far as it is predicated of +belief, and since belief in so far as true is knowledge, logic can be +defined as the formulation of the most general principles of knowledge. +The principles so formulated would be those virtually used to _justify_ +belief or to disprove the imputation of error. + +[Sidenote: The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence, +Inference, and Observation.] + +Sect. 76. What is called _formal logic_ is animated with the hope of +extracting these formulations directly from an analysis of the procedure +of thought. The most general logical principles which have appeared in +the historical development of formal logic are _definition_, +_self-evidence_, _inference_, and _observation_. Each of these has been +given special study, and each has given rise to special issues. + +_Definition_ has to do with the _formation of concepts_, or determinate +and unequivocal meanings. The universality of such concepts, and their +consequent relation to particular things, was, as we have seen, +investigated at a very early date, and gave rise to the great +realistic-nominalistic controversy.[184:5] A large part of the logical +discussion in the Platonic dialogues is an outgrowth of the earlier +"eristic," a form of disputation in favor with the sophists, and +consisting in the adroit use of ambiguity.[184:6] It is natural that in +its first conscious self-criticism thought should discover the need of +definite terms. The perpetual importance of definition has been largely +due to the great prestige in modern philosophy of the method of +geometry, which was regarded by Descartes and Spinoza as the model for +systems of necessary truth. + +_Self-evidence_ is the principle according to which _conviction of truth +follows directly from an understanding of meaning_. In the practice of +his intellectual midwifery, Socrates presupposed that thought is capable +of bringing forth its own certainties. And rationalism has at all times +regarded truth as ultimately accredited by internal marks recognizable +by reason. Such truth arrived at antecedent to acquaintance with +instances is called _a priori_, as distinguished from _a posteriori_ +knowledge, or observation after the fact. There can be no principles of +self-evidence, but logicians have always been more or less concerned +with the enumeration of alleged self-evident principles, notably those +of _contradiction_ and _identity_. A philosophical interest in the +mathematical method has led to a logical study of axioms, but with a +view rather to their fruitfulness than their intrinsic truth. Indeed, +the interest in self-evident truth has always been subordinate to the +interest in systematic truth, and the discovery of first principles most +commonly serves to determine the relative priority of definite +concepts, or the correct point of departure for a series of inferences. + +The greater part of the famous Aristotelian logic consists in a study of +_inference_, or _the derivation of new knowledge from old knowledge_. +Aristotle sought to set down and classify every method of advancing from +premises. The most important form of inference which he defined was the +_syllogism_, a scheme of reasoning to a conclusion by means of two +premises having one term in common. From the premises "all men are +mortal" and "Socrates is a man," one may conclude that "Socrates is +mortal." This is an instance not only of the syllogism in general, but +of its most important "mood," the subsumption of a particular case under +a general rule. Since the decline of Aristotle's influence in philosophy +there has been a notable decrease of interest in the different forms of +inference; though its fundamental importance as the very bone and sinew +of _reasoning_ or _deductive thinking_ has never been challenged. Its +loss of pre-eminence is in part due to the growth of empiricism, +stimulated by the writings of Lord Bacon in the seventeenth century, and +fostered by the subsequent development of experimental science. + +_Observation_ is the fundamental logical principle of empiricism. For a +radical empiricism, knowledge would consist of descriptive +generalizations based upon the summation of instances. That branch of +logic which deals with _the advance from individual instances to general +principles_, is called _inductive logic_. It has resulted in the +announcement of canons of accuracy and freedom from preconception, and +in the methodological study of hypothesis, experiment, and verification. +Rules for observation directed to the end of discovering causes, +constitute the most famous part of the epoch-making logic of J. S. +Mills.[187:7] + +[Sidenote: Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment.] + +Sect. 77. There are two significant tendencies in contemporary logic. +_Theories of the judgment_ have arisen in the course of an attempt to +define the least complexity that must be present in order that thought +shall come within the range of truth and error. It is evident that no +one either knows or is in error until he takes some attitude which lays +claim to knowledge. Denoting by the term _judgment_ this minimum of +complexity in knowledge, an important question arises as to the sense in +which the judgment involves the subject, predicate, and copula that are +commonly present in its propositional form. + +[Sidenote: Priority of Concepts.] + +Sect. 78. But a more important logical development has been due to the +recent analysis of definite accredited systems of knowledge. The study +of the fundamental conceptions of mathematics and mechanics, together +with an examination of the systematic structure of these sciences, +furnishes the most notable cases. There are two senses in which such +studies may be regarded as logical. In the first place, in so far as +they bring to light the inner coherence of any body of truth, the kind +of evidence upon which it rests, and the type of formal perfection which +it seeks, they differ from formal logic only in that they derive their +criteria from cases, rather than from the direct analysis of the +procedure of thought. And since formal logic must itself make +experiments, this difference is not a radical one. The study of cases +tends chiefly to enrich _methodology_, or the knowledge of the special +criteria of special sciences. In the second place, such studies serve to +define the relatively few simple truths which are common to the +relatively many complex truths. A study of the foundations of arithmetic +reveals more elementary conceptions, such as _class_ and _order_, that +must be employed in the very definition of number itself, and so are +implied in every numerical calculation. It appears similarly that the +axioms of geometry are special axioms which involve the acceptance of +more general axioms or indefinables.[189:8] Logic in this sense, then, +is the enumeration of conceptions and principles in the order of their +indispensableness to knowledge. And while it must be observed that the +most general conceptions and principles of knowledge are not necessarily +those most significant for the existent world, nevertheless the careful +analysis which such an enumeration involves is scarcely less fruitful +for metaphysics than for logic. + +[Sidenote: Aesthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Beauty. +Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies.] + +Sect. 79. _Aesthetics is the formulation, as independently as possible +of special subject-matter, of that which conditions beauty._ As logic +commonly refers to a judgment of truth, so aesthetics at any rate +_refers_ to a judgment implied in appreciation. But while it is +generally admitted that truth itself is by no means limited to the form +of the judgment, the contrary is frequently maintained with reference +to beauty. The aphorism, _De gustibus non est disputandum_, expresses a +common opinion to the effect that beauty is not a property belonging to +the object of which it is predicated, but a property generated by the +appreciative consciousness. According to this opinion there can be no +beauty except in the case of an object's presence in an individual +experience. Investigators must of necessity refuse to leave individual +caprice in complete possession of the field, but they have in many cases +occupied themselves entirely with the _state of aesthetic enjoyment_ in +the hope of discovering its constant factors. The opposing tendency +defines certain _formal characters which the beautiful object must +possess_. Evidently the latter school will attribute a more profound +philosophical importance to the conception of beauty, since for them it +is a principle that obtains in the world of being. This was the first +notable contention, that of Plato. But even with the emphasis laid upon +the subjective aspect of the aesthetic experience, great metaphysical +importance may be attached to it, where, as in the case of the German +Romanticists, reality is deliberately construed as a spiritual life +which is to be appreciated rather than understood. + +As in the case of logic, a strong impulse has manifested itself in +aesthetics to deal with groups of objects that lie within its province, +rather than directly with its concepts and principles. The first special +treatise on aesthetics, the "Poetics" of Aristotle, belongs to this type +of inquiry, as does all criticism of art in so far as it aims at the +formulation of general principles. + +[Sidenote: Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral +Goodness.] + +Sect. 80. _Ethics_, the oldest and most popular of the normative +sciences, _is the formulation, as independently as possible of special +subject-matter, of that which conditions goodness of conduct_. Ethics is +commonly concerned with goodness only in so far as it is predicated of +conduct, or of character, which is a more or less permanent disposition +to conduct. Since conduct, in so far as good, is said to constitute +moral goodness, ethics may be defined as the formulation of the general +principles of _morality_. The principles so formulated would be those +virtually employed to _justify_ conduct, or to disprove the imputation +of immorality. + +[Sidenote: Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism.] + +Sect. 81. The student of this science is confronted with a very +considerable diversity of method and differentiation of problems. The +earliest and most profound opposition of doctrine in ethics arose from +the differences of interpretation of which the teaching of Socrates is +capable. His doctrine is, as we have seen, verbally expressed in the +proposition, _virtue is knowledge_. Socrates was primarily concerned to +show that there is no real living without an understanding of the +significance of life. To live well is to know the end of life, the good +of it all, and to govern action with reference to that end. Virtue is +therefore the practical wisdom that enables one to live consistently +with his real intention. But what is the real intention, the end or good +of life? In the "Protagoras," where Plato represents Socrates as +expounding his position, virtue is interpreted to mean prudence, or +foresight of pleasurable and painful consequences. He who knows, +possesses all virtue in that he is qualified to adapt himself to the +real situation and to gain the end of pleasure. All men, indeed, seek +pleasure, but only virtuous men seek it wisely and well. + + "And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some + pleasant things evil and some painful things good?--for I am + rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they + are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort, + and in as far as they are painful they are bad."[192:9] + +According to this view painful things are good only when they lead +eventually to pleasure, and pleasant things evil only when their painful +consequences outweigh their pleasantness. Hence moral differences reduce +to differences of skill in the universal quest for pleasure, and +_sensible gratification is the ultimate standard of moral value_. This +ancient doctrine, known as _hedonism_, expressing as it does a part of +life that will not suffer itself for long to be denied, is one of the +great perennial tendencies of ethical thought. In the course of many +centuries it has passed through a number of phases, varying its +conception of pleasure from the tranquillity of the wise man to the +sensuous titillations of the sybarite, and from the individualism of the +latter to the universalism of the humanitarian. But in every case it +shows a respect for the natural man, praising morality for its +disciplinary and instrumental value in the service of such human wants +as are the outgrowth of the animal instinct of self-preservation. + +[Sidenote: Rationalism.] + +Sect. 82. But if a man's life be regarded as a truer representation of +his ideals than is his spoken theory, there is little to identify +Socrates with the hedonists. At the conclusion of the defence of his own +life, which Plato puts into his mouth in the well-known "Apology," he +speaks thus: + + "When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to + punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have + troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, + more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something + when they are really nothing,--then reprove them, as I have + reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought + to care, and thinking that they are something when they are + really nothing."[194:10] + +It is plain that the man Socrates cared little for the pleasurable or +painful consequences of his acts, provided they were worthy of the high +calling of human nature. A man's virtue would now seem to possess an +intrinsic nobility. If knowledge be virtue, then on this basis it must +be because knowledge is itself excellent. Virtue as knowledge +contributes to the good by constituting it. We meet here with the +_rationalistic_ strain in ethics. It praises conduct for the _inherent +worth which it may possess if it express that reason_ which the Stoics +called "_the ruling part_." The riches of wisdom consist for the +hedonist in their purchase of pleasure. For the rationalist, on the +other hand, wisdom is not coin, but itself the very substance of value. + +[Sidenote: Eudaemonism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism.] + +Sect. 83. Rationalism has undergone modifications even more significant +than those of hedonism, and involving at least one radically new group +of conceptions. Among the Greeks rationalism and hedonism alike are +_eudaemonistic_. They aim to portray _the fulness of life_ that makes +"the happy man." In the ethics of Aristotle, whose synthetic mind weaves +together these different strands, the Greek ideal finds its most +complete expression as "the high-minded man," with all his powers and +trappings. But the great spiritual transformation which accompanied the +decline of Greek culture and the rise of Christianity, brought with it a +new moral sensibility, which finds in man no virtue of himself, but only +through the grace of God. + + "And the virtues themselves," says St. Augustine, "if they + bear no relation to God, are in truth vices rather than + virtues; for although they are regarded by many as truly moral + when they are desired as ends in themselves and not for the + sake of something else, they are, nevertheless, inflated and + arrogant, and therefore not to be viewed as virtues but as + vices."[195:11] + +The new ideal is that of renunciation, obedience, and resignation. +Ethically this expresses itself in _pietism_. Virtue is good neither in +itself nor on account of its consequences, but because it is +conformable to the will of God. The extreme inwardness of this ideal is +characteristic of an age that despaired of attainment, whether of +pleasure or knowledge. To all, even the persecuted, it is permitted to +obey, and so gain entrance into the kingdom of the children of God. But +as every special study tends to rely upon its own conceptions, pietism, +involving as it does a relation to God, is replaced by _rigorism_ and +_intuitionism_. The former doctrine defines virtue in terms of the inner +attitude which it expresses. It must be done in the spirit of +dutifulness, _because one ought_, and through sheer respect for the law +which one's moral nature affirms. _Intuitionism_ has attempted to deal +with the source of the moral law by defining conscience as a _special +faculty_ or sense, qualified to pass directly upon moral questions, and +deserving of implicit obediences. It is characteristic of this whole +tendency to look for the spring of virtuous living, not in a good which +such living obtains, but in a law to which it owes obedience. + +[Sidenote: Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics.] + +Sect. 84. This third general ethical tendency has thus been of the +greatest importance in emphasizing the _consciousness of duty_, and has +brought both hedonism and rationalism to a recognition of its +fundamental importance. Ethics must deal not only with the moral ideal, +but also with the ground of its appeal to the individual, and his +obligation to pursue it. In connection with this recognition of moral +responsibility, the problem of human _freedom_ has come to be regarded +in the light of an inevitable point of contact between ethics and +metaphysics. That which is absolutely binding upon the human will can be +determined only in view of some theory of its ultimate nature. On this +account the rationalistic and hedonistic motives are no longer +abstractly sundered, as in the days of the Stoics and Epicureans, but +tend to be absorbed in broader philosophical tendencies. Hedonism +appears as the sequel to naturalism; or, more rarely, as part of a +theistic system whose morality is divine legislation enforced by an +appeal to motives of pleasure and pain. Rationalism, on the other hand, +tends to be absorbed in rationalistic or idealistic philosophies, where +man's rational nature is construed as his bond of kinship with the +universe. + +Ethics has exhibited from the beginning a tendency to universalize its +conceptions and take the central place in metaphysics. Thus with Plato +good conduct was but a special case of goodness, the good being the most +general principle of reality.[198:12] In modern times Fichte and his +school have founded an ethical metaphysics upon the conception of +duty.[198:13] In these cases ethics can be distinguished from +metaphysics only by adding to the study of the good or of duty, a study +of the special physical, psychological, and social conditions under +which goodness and dutifulness may obtain in human life. It is possible +to attach the name of ethics, and we have seen the same to be true of +logic, either to a realm of ideal truth or to that realm wherein the +ideal is realized in humanity. + +[Sidenote: The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions.] + +Sect. 85. A systematic study of ethics requires that the _virtues_, or +types of moral practice, shall be interpreted in the light of the +central conception of good, or of conscience. _Justice_, _temperance_, +_wisdom_, and _courage_ were praised by the Greeks. Christianity added +_self-sacrifice_, _humility_, _purity_, and _benevolence_. These and +other virtues have been defined, justified, and co-ordinated with the +aid of a standard of moral value or a canon of duty. + +There is in modern ethics a pronounced tendency, parallel to those +already noted in logic and aesthetics, to study such phenomena belonging +to its field as have become historically established. A very +considerable investigation of _custom_, _institutions_, and other social +forces has led to a contact of ethics with anthropology and sociology +scarcely less significant than that with metaphysics. + + * * * * * + +[Sidenote: The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of Faith.] + +Sect. 86. In that part of his philosophy in which he deals with faith, +the great German philosopher Kant mentions God, Freedom, and Immortality +as the three pre-eminent religious interests. Religion, as we have seen, +sets up a social relationship between man and that massive drift of +things which determines his destiny. Of the two terms of this relation, +God signifies the latter, while freedom and immortality are prerogatives +which religion bestows upon the former. Man, viewed from the stand-point +of religion as an object of special interest to the universe, is said to +have a soul; and by virtue of this soul he is said to be free and +immortal, when thought of as having a life in certain senses independent +of its immediate natural environment. The attempt to make this faith +theoretically intelligible has led to the philosophical disciplines +known as _theology_ and _psychology_.[199:14] + +[Sidenote: Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God.] + +Sect. 87. _Theology_, as a branch of philosophy, deals with _the proof +and the nature of God_. Since "God" is not primarily a theoretical +conception, the proof of God is not properly a philosophical problem. +Historically, this task has been assumed as a legacy from Christian +apologetics; and it has involved, at any rate so far as European +philosophy is concerned, the definition of ultimate being in such +spiritual terms as make possible the relation with man postulated in +Christianity. For this it has been regarded as sufficient to ascribe to +the world an underlying unity capable of bearing the predicates of +perfection, omnipotence, and omniscience. Each proof of God has defined +him pre-eminently in terms of some one of these his attributes. + +[Sidenote: The Ontological Proof of God.] + +Sect. 88. The _ontological_ proof of God held the foremost place in +philosophy's contribution to Christianity up to the eighteenth century. +This proof _infers the existence from the ideal_ of God, and so +approaches the nature of God through the attribute of perfection. It +owes the form in which it was accepted in the Middle Ages and +Renaissance to St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury at the close of the +eleventh century. He argued from the idea of a most perfect being to its +existence, on the ground that non-existence, or existence only in idea, +would contradict its perfection. It is evident that the force of this +argument depends upon the necessity of the idea of God. The argument was +accepted in Scholastic Philosophy[201:15] largely because of the virtual +acceptance of this necessity. Mediaeval thought was under the dominance +of the philosophical ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and through them +rationalism had come to be the unquestioned starting-point for all +thought. For Plato reality and rationality meant one and the same thing, +so that the ultimate reality was the highest principle of rationality, +which he conceived to be the idea of the good. In the case of Aristotle +the ideal of rationality was conceived to determine the course of the +cosmical evolution as its immanent final cause. But in itself it was +beyond the world, or transcendent. For Plato perfection itself is +reality, whereas for Aristotle perfection determines the hierarchical +order of natural substances. The latter theory, more suitable to the +uses of Christianity, because it distinguished between God and the +world, was incorporated into the great school systems. But both theories +contain the essence of the ontological proof of God. In thought one +seeks the perfect truth, and posits it as at once the culmination of +insight and the meaning of life. The ideal of God is therefore a +necessary idea, because implied in all the effort of thought as the +object capable of finally satisfying it. St. Anselm adds little to the +force of this argument, and does much to obscure its real significance. + +In stating the ontological argument the term perfection has been +expressly emphasized, because it may be taken to embrace both truth and +goodness. Owing to a habit of thought, due in the main to Plato, it was +long customary to regard degrees of truth and goodness as +interchangeable, and as equivalent to degrees of reality. The _ens +realissimum_ was in its completeness the highest object both of the +faculty of cognition and of the moral will. But even in the scholastic +period these two different aspects of the ideal were clearly recognized, +and led to sharply divergent tendencies. More recently they have been +divided and embodied in separate arguments. _The epistemological_ +argument _defines God in terms of that absolute truth which is referred +to in every judgment_. Under the influence of idealism this absolute +truth has taken the form of a universal mind, or all-embracing standard +experience, called more briefly the absolute. The _ethical_ argument, on +the other hand, conceives God as _the perfect goodness implied in the +moral struggle, or the power through which goodness is made to triumph +in the universe_ to the justification of moral faith. While the former +of these arguments identifies God with being, the latter defines God in +terms of the intent or outcome of being. Thus, while the epistemological +argument does not distinguish God and the world, the latter does so, +assuming that independent reality can be attributed to the stages of a +process and to the purpose that dominates it. + +[Sidenote: The Cosmological Proof of God.] + +Sect. 89. The _cosmological_ proof of God approaches him through the +attribute of creative omnipotence. The common principle of causal +explanation refers the origin of natural events to similar antecedent +events. But there must be some _first cause_ from which the whole series +is derived, a cause which is ultimate, sufficient to itself, and the +responsible author of the world. Because God's function as creator was a +part of the Christian teaching, and because explanation by causes is +habitual with common sense, this argument has had great vogue. But in +philosophy it has declined in importance, chiefly because it has been +absorbed in arguments which deal with the _kind_ of causality proper to +a first cause or world-ground. The argument that follows is a case in +point. + +[Sidenote: The Teleological Proof of God.] + +Sect. 90. The _teleological_ proof argues that the world can owe its +origin only to an _intelligent first cause_. The evidence for this is +furnished by the cunning contrivances and beneficent adaptations of +nature. These could not have come about through chance or the working of +mechanical forces, but only through the foresight of a rational will. +This argument originally infers God from the character of nature and +history; and the extension of mechanical principles to organic and +social phenomena, especially as stimulated by Darwin's principle of +natural selection, has tended greatly to diminish its importance. When, +on the other hand, for nature and history there are substituted the +intellectual and moral activities themselves, and the inference is made +to the ideal which they imply, the teleological argument merges into the +ontological. But the old-fashioned statement of it remains in the form +of religious faith, and in this capacity it has had the approval even +of Hume and Kant, the philosophers who have contributed most forcibly to +its overthrow as a demonstration of God. They agree that the +_acknowledgment_ of God in nature and history is the sequel to a +theistic belief, and an inevitable attitude on the part of the religious +consciousness. + +[Sidenote: God and the World. Theism and Pantheism.] + +Sect. 91. Another group of ideas belonging to philosophical theology +consists of three generalizations respecting God's relation to the +world, known as _theism_, _pantheism_, and _deism_. Although, +theoretically, these are corollaries of the different arguments for God, +two of them, theism and pantheism, owe their importance to their rivalry +as religious tendencies. _Theism_ emphasizes that attitude to God which +recognizes in him an historical personage, in some sense distinct from +both the world and man, which are his works and yet stand in an external +relationship to him. It expresses the spirit of ethical and monotheistic +religion, and is therefore the natural belief of the Christian. +_Pantheism_ appears in primitive religion as an animistic or +polytheistic sense of the presence of a divine principle diffused +throughout nature. But it figures most notably in the history of +religions, in the highly reflective Brahmanism of India. In sharp +opposition to Christianity, this religion preaches the indivisible unity +of the world and the illusoriness of the individual's sense of his own +independent reality. In spite of the fact that such a doctrine is alien +to the spirit of Christianity, it enters into Christian theology through +the influence of philosophy. The theoretical idea of God tends, as we +have seen, to the identification of him with the world as its most real +principle. Or it bestows upon him a nature so logical and formal, and so +far removed from the characters of humanity, as to forbid his entering +into personal or social relations. Such reflections concerning God find +their religious expression in a mystical sense of unity, which has in +many cases either entirely replaced or profoundly modified the theistic +strain in Christianity. In current philosophy pantheism appears in the +epistemological argument which identifies God with being; while the +chief bulwark of theism is the ethical argument, with its provision for +a distinction between the actual world and ideal principle of evolution. + +[Sidenote: Deism.] + +Sect. 92. While theism and pantheism appear to be permanent phases in +the philosophy of religion, _deism_ is the peculiar product of the +eighteenth century. It is based upon a repudiation of supernaturalism +and "enthusiasm," on the one hand, and a literal acceptance of the +cosmological and teleological proofs on the other. Religions, like all +else, were required, in this epoch of clear thinking, to submit to the +canons of experimental observation and practical common sense. These +authorize only a _natural religion_, the acknowledgment in pious living +of a God who, having contrived this natural world, has given it over to +the rule, not of priests and prophets, but of natural law. The +artificiality of its conception of God, and the calculating spirit of +its piety, make deism a much less genuine expression of the religious +experience than either the moral chivalry of theism or the intellectual +and mystical exaltation of pantheism. + +[Sidenote: Metaphysics and Theology.] + +Sect. 93. The systematic development of philosophy leads to the +inclusion of conceptions of God within the problem of metaphysics, and +the subordination of the proof of God to the determination of the +fundamental principle of reality. There will always remain, however, an +outstanding theological discipline, whose function it is to interpret +worship, or the living religious attitude, in terms of the theoretical +principles of philosophy. + +[Sidenote: Psychology is the Theory of the Soul.] + +Sect. 94. _Psychology is the theory of the soul._ As we have already +seen, the rise of scepticism directs attention from the object of +thought to the thinker, and so emphasizes the self as a field for +theoretical investigation. But the original and the dominating interest +in the self is a practical one. The precept, +gno:thi seauton+, has its +deepest justification in the concern for the salvation of one's soul. In +primitive and half-instinctive belief the self is recognized in +practical relations. In its animistic phase this belief admitted of such +relations with all living creatures, and extended the conception of life +very generally to natural processes. Thus in the beginning the self was +doubtless indistinguishable from the vital principle. In the first +treatise on psychology, the "+peri Psyche:s+" of Aristotle, this +interpretation finds a place in theoretical philosophy. For Aristotle +the soul is the _entelechy_ of the body--that function or activity which +makes a man of it. He recognized, furthermore, three stages in this +activity: the nutritive, sensitive, and rational souls, or the +vegetable, animal, and distinctively human natures, respectively. The +rational soul, in its own proper activity, is man's highest +prerogative, the soul to be saved. By virtue of it man rises above +bodily conditions, and lays hold on the divine and eternal. But Plato, +who, as we have seen, was ever ready to grant reality to the ideal apart +from the circumstances of its particular embodiment, had already +undertaken to demonstrate the immortality of the soul on the ground of +its distinctive nature.[209:16] According to his way of thinking, the +soul's essentially moral nature made it incapable of destruction through +the operation of natural causes. It is evident, then, that there were +already ideas in vogue capable of interpreting the Christian teaching +concerning the existence of a soul, or of an inner essence of man +capable of being made an object of divine interest. + +[Sidenote: Spiritual Substance] + +Sect. 95. The immediate effect of Christianity was to introduce into +philosophy as one of its cardinal doctrines the theory of a spiritual +being, constituting the true self of the individual, and separable from +the body. The difference recognized in Plato and Aristotle between the +divine spark and the appetitive and perceptual parts of human nature was +now emphasized. The former (frequently called the "spirit," to +distinguish it from the lower soul) was defined as a _substance_ having +the attributes of thought and will. The fundamental argument for its +existence was the immediate appeal to self-consciousness; and it was +further defined as indestructible on the ground of its being utterly +discontinuous and incommensurable with its material environment. This +theory survives at the present day in the conception of pure activity, +but on the whole the attributes of the soul have superseded its +substance. + +[Sidenote: Intellectualism and Voluntarism.] + +Sect. 96. _Intellectualism and voluntarism_ are the two rival +possibilities of emphasis when the soul is defined in terms of its known +activities. Wherever the essence of personality is in question, as also +occurs in the case of theology, thought and will present their +respective claims to the place of first importance. _Intellectualism +would make will merely the concluding phase of thought, while +voluntarism would reduce thought to one of the interests of a general +appetency._ It is evident that idealistic theories will be much +concerned with this question of priority. It is also true, though less +evident, that intellectualism, since it emphasizes the general and +objective features of the mind, tends to subordinate the individual to +the universal; while voluntarism, emphasizing desire and action, is +relatively individualistic, and so, since there are many individuals, +also pluralistic.[211:17] + +[Sidenote: Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, and +Indeterminism.] + +Sect. 97. The question of the _freedom of the will_ furnishes a favorite +controversial topic in philosophy. For the interest at stake is no less +than the individual's responsibility before man and God for his good or +bad works. It bears alike upon science, religion, and philosophy, and is +at the same time a question of most fundamental practical importance. +But this diffusion of the problem has led to so considerable a +complication of it that it becomes necessary in outlining it to define +two issues. In the first place, the concept of freedom is designed to +express generally the distinction between man and the rest of nature. To +make man in all respects _the product and creature of his natural +environment_ would be to deny freedom and accept the radically +_necessitarian_ doctrine. The question still remains, however, as to the +causes which dominate man. He may be free from nature, and yet be ruled +by God, or by distinctively spiritual causes, such as ideas or +character. Where in general the will is regarded as submitting only to a +_spiritual causation_ proper to its own realm, the conception is best +named _determinism_; though in the tradition of philosophy it is held to +be a doctrine of freedom, because contrasted with the necessitarianism +above defined. There remains _indeterminism_, which attributes to the +will a spontaneity that makes possible the _direct presence to it of +genuine alternatives_. The issue may here coincide with that between +intellectualism and voluntarism. If, _e.g._, in God's act of creation, +his ideals and standards are prior to his fiat, his conduct is +determined; whereas it is free in the radical or indeterministic sense +if his ideals themselves are due to his sheer will. This theory involves +at a certain point in action the absence of cause. On this account the +free will is often identified with _chance_, in which case it loses its +distinction from nature, and we have swung round the circle. + +[Sidenote: Immortality. Survival and Eternalism.] + +Sect. 98. There is similar complexity in the problem concerning +_immortality_. Were the extreme claims of naturalism to be established, +there would be no ground whatsoever upon which to maintain the +immortality of man, mere dust returning unto dust. The philosophical +concept of immortality is due to the supposition that the quintessence +of the individual's nature is divine.[213:18] But several possibilities +are at this point open to us. The first would maintain the survival +after death of a recognizable and discrete personality. Another would +suppose a preservation after death, through being taken up into the life +of God. Still another, the theory commonly maintained on the ground of +rationalistic and idealistic metaphysics, would deny that immortality +has to do with life after death, and affirm that it signifies the +perpetual membership of the human individual in a realm of eternity +through the truth or virtue that is in him. But this interpretation +evidently leaves open the question of the immortality of that which is +distinctive and personal in human nature. + +[Sidenote: The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and Method.] + +Sect. 99. So far we have followed the fortunes only of the "spirit" of +man. What of that lower soul through which he is identified with the +fortunes of his body? When philosophy gradually ceased, in the sixteenth +and seventeenth centuries, to be "the handmaid of religion," there arose +a renewed interest in that part of human nature lying between the +strictly physiological functions, on the one hand, and thought and will +on the other. Descartes and Spinoza analyzed what they called the +"passions," meaning such states of mind as are conditioned by a concern +for the interests of the body. At a later period, certain English +philosophers, following Locke, traced the dependence of ideas upon the +senses. Their method was that of _introspection_, or the direct +examination by the individual of his own ideas, and for the sake of +noting their origin and composition from simple factors. The lineal +descendants of these same English philosophers defined more carefully +the process of _association_, whereby the complexity and sequence of +ideas are brought about, and made certain conjectures as to its +dependence upon properties and transactions in the physical brain. These +are the three main philosophical sources of what has now grown to be the +separate _natural science of psychology_. It will be noted that there +are two characteristics which all of these studies have in common. They +deal with the experience of the individual as composing his own private +history, and tend to attribute the specific course which this private +history takes to bodily conditions. It is only recently that these +investigations have acquired sufficient unity and exclusiveness of aim +to warrant their being regarded as a special science. But such is now so +far the case that the psychologist of this type pursues his way quite +independently of philosophy. It is true his research has advanced +considerably beyond his understanding of its province. But it is +generally recognized that he must examine those very _factors of +subjectivity_ which the natural scientist otherwise seeks to evade, and, +furthermore, that he must seek to _provide for them in nature_. He +treats the inner life in what Locke called "the plain historical +method," that is to say, instead of interpreting and defining its ideas, +he analyzes and reports upon its content. He would not seek to justify a +moral judgment, as would ethics, or to criticise the cogency of thought, +as would logic; but only to describe the actual state as he found it. In +order to make his data commensurable with the phenomena of nature, he +discovers or defines bodily conditions for the subjective content which +he analyzes. His fundamental principle of method is the postulate of +_psycho-physical parallelism_, according to which he assumes a _state of +brain or nervous system for every state of mind_. But in adopting a +province and a method the psychologist foregoes finality of truth after +the manner of all natural science. He deals admittedly with an aspect of +experience, and his conclusions are no more adequate to the nature of +the self than they are to the nature of outer objects. An admirable +reference to this abstract division of experience occurs in Kuelpe's +"Introduction to Philosophy": + + "For the developed consciousness, as for the naive, every + experience is an unitary whole; and it is only the habit of + abstract reflection upon experience that makes the objective + and subjective worlds seem to fall apart as originally + different forms of existence. Just as a plane curve can be + represented in analytical geometry as the function of two + variables, the abscissae and the ordinates, without prejudice + to the unitary course of the curve itself, so the world of + human experience may be reduced to a subjective and an + objective factor, without prejudice to its real + coherence."[215:19] + +[Sidenote: Psychology and Philosophy.] + +Sect. 100. The problems of psychology, like those of theology, tend to +disappear as independent philosophical topics. The ultimate nature of +the self will continue to interest philosophers--more deeply, perhaps, +than any aspect of experience--but their conception of it will be a +corollary of their metaphysics and epistemology. The remainder of the +field of the old philosophical psychology, the introspective and +experimental analysis of special states of mind, is already the +province of a natural science which is becoming more and more free from +the stand-point and method of philosophy. + +[Sidenote: Transition from Classification by Problems to Classification +by Doctrines. Naturalism. Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute +Realism.] + +Sect. 101. Reminding ourselves anew that philosophical problems cannot +be treated in isolation from one another, we shall hereinafter seek to +become acquainted with general stand-points that give systematic unity +to the issues which have been enumerated. Such stand-points are not +clearly defined by those who occupy them, and they afford no clear-cut +classification of all historical philosophical philosophies. But +system-making in philosophy is commonly due to the moving in an +individual mind of some most significant idea; and certain of these +ideas have reappeared so frequently as to define more or less clearly +marked tendencies, or continuous strands, out of which the history of +thought is forever weaving itself. Such is clearly the case with +_naturalism_. From the beginning until now there have been men whose +philosophy is a summation of the natural sciences, whose entire thought +is based upon an acceptance of the methods and the fundamental +conceptions of these disciplines. This tendency stands in the history +of thought for the conviction that the visible and tangible world which +interacts with the body is veritable reality. This philosophy is +realistic and empirical to an extent entirely determined by its belief +concerning being. But while naturalism is only secondarily +epistemological, _subjectivism_ and _absolute idealism_ have their very +source in the self-examination and the self-criticism of thought. +Subjectivism signifies the conviction that the knower cannot escape +himself. If reality is to be kept within the range of possible +knowledge, it must be defined in terms of the processes or states of +selves. _Absolute idealism_ arises from a union of this epistemological +motive with a recognition of what are regarded as the logical +necessities to which reality must submit. Reality must be both knowledge +and rational knowledge; the object, in short, of an absolute mind, which +shall be at once all-containing and systematic. This rationalistic +motive was, however, not originally associated with an idealistic +epistemology, but with the common-sense principle that being is +discovered and not constituted by thought. Such an _absolute realism_ +is, like naturalism, primarily metaphysical rather than +epistemological; but, unlike naturalism, it seeks to define reality as +a logical or ethical necessity. + +Under these several divisions, then, we shall meet once more with the +special problems of philosophy, but this time they will be ranged in an +order that is determined by some central doctrine. They will appear as +parts not of the general problem of philosophy, but of some definite +system of philosophy. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[180:1] Cf. Sect. 68. + +[182:2] The Socratic distinction between the logical and the +psychological treatment of belief finds its best expression in Plato's +_Gorgias_, especially, 454, 455. Cf. also Sect. 29. + +[182:3] Thus, e. g. Hegel. See Sect. 179. Cf. also Sects. 199, 200. + +[183:4] Cf. Sect. 84. + +[184:5] See Sect. 69, _note_. + +[184:6] The reader will find a good illustration of eristic in Plato's +_Euthydemus_, 275. + +[187:7] The reader can find these rules, and the detail of the +traditional formal logic, in any elementary text-book, such as, e. g., +Jevons: _Elements of Logic_. + +[189:8] What is called "the algebra of logic" seeks to obtain an +unequivocal symbolic expression for these truths. + +[192:9] Plato: _Protagoras_, 351. Translation by Jowett. + +[194:10] Plato: _Apology_, 41. Translation by Jowett. + +[195:11] Quoted by Paulsen in his _System of Ethics_. Translation by +Thilly, p. 69. + +[198:12] Cf. Sect. 160. + +[198:13] Cf. Sect. 177. + +[199:14] Concerning the duty of philosophy to religion in these matters, +cf. Descartes: _Meditations_, _Dedication_. Translation by Veitch, p. +81. + +[201:15] The school-philosophy that flourished from the eleventh to the +fifteenth century, under the authority of the church. + +[209:16] Especially in the _Phaedo_. + +[211:17] Schopenhauer is a notable exception. Cf. Sects. 135, 138. + +[213:18] It is interesting, however, to observe that current +spiritualistic theories maintain a naturalistic theory of immortality, +verifiable, it is alleged, in certain extraordinary empirical +observations. + +[215:19] Translation by Pillsbury and Titchener, p. 59. + + + + +PART III + +SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +NATURALISM[223:1] + + +[Sidenote: The General Meaning of Materialism.] + +Sect. 102. The meaning conveyed by any philosophical term consists +largely of the distinctions which it suggests. Its peculiar quality, +like the physiognomy of the battle-scarred veteran, is a composite of +the controversies which it has survived. There is, therefore, an almost +unavoidable confusion attendant upon the denomination of any early phase +of philosophy as _materialism_. But in the historical beginnings of +thought, as also in the common-sense of all ages, there is at any rate +present a very essential strand of this theory. The naive habit of mind +which, in the sixth century before Christ, prompted successive Greek +thinkers to define reality in terms of water, air, and fire, is in this +respect one with that exhibited in Dr. Samuel Johnson's smiting the +ground with his stick in curt refutation of Bishop Berkeley's +idea-philosophy. There is a theoretical instinct, not accidental or +perverse, but springing from the very life-preserving equipment of the +organism, which attributes reality to _tangible space-filling things +encountered by the body_. For obvious reasons of self-interest the +organism is first of all endowed with a sense of contact, and the more +delicate senses enter into its practical economy as means of +anticipating or avoiding contact. From such practical expectations +concerning the proximity of that which may press upon, injure, or +displace the body, arise the first crude judgments of reality. And these +are at the same time the nucleus of naive philosophy and the germinal +phase of materialism. + +[Sidenote: Corporeal Being.] + +Sect. 103. The first philosophical movement among the Greeks was a +series of attempts to reduce the tangible world to unity, and of these +the conception offered by Anaximander is of marked interest in its +bearing upon the development of materialism. This philosopher is +remarkable for having _defined_ his first principle, instead of having +chosen it from among the different elements already distinguished by +common-sense. He thought the unity of nature to consist in its periodic +evolution from and return into one infinite sum of material (+to +apeiron+), which, much in the manner of the "nebula" of modern science, +is conceived as both indeterminate in its actual state and infinitely +rich in its potentiality. The conception of matter, the most familiar +commonplace of science, begins to be recognizable. It has here reached +the point of signifying a common substance for all tangible things, a +substance that in its own general and omnipresent nature is without the +special marks that distinguish these tangible things from one another. +And in so far the philosophy of Anaximander is materialistic. + +[Sidenote: Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism.] + +Sect. 104. But the earliest thinkers are said to be _hylozoists_, rather +than strict materialists, because of their failure to make certain +distinctions in connection with the _processes_ of matter. The term +hylozoism unites with the conception of the formless material of the +world (+hyle:+), that of an animating power to which its formations and +transformations are due. Hylozoism itself was not a deliberate synthesis +of these two conceptions, but a primitive practical tendency to +universalize the conception, of life. Such "animism" instinctively +associates with an object's bulk and hardness a capacity for locomotion +and general initiative. And the material principles defined by the +philosophers retain this vague and comprehensive attribute as a matter +of course, until it is distinguished and separated through attempts to +understand it. + +That aspect of natural process which was most impressive to Greek minds +of the reflective type was the alternation of "generation and decay." In +full accord with his more ancient master, Epicurus, the Latin poet +Lucretius writes: + + "Thus neither can death-dealing motions keep the mastery + always, nor entomb existence forevermore; nor, on the other + hand, can the birth and increase giving motions of things + preserve them always after they are born. Thus the war of + first beginnings waged from eternity is carried on with + dubious issue: now here, now there, the life-bringing elements + of things get the mastery and are o'ermastered in turn: with + the funeral wail blends the cry which babies raise when they + enter the borders of light; and no night ever followed day, + nor morning night, that heard not, mingling with the sickly + infant's cries, wailings of the attendants on death and black + funeral."[226:2] + +In a similar vein, the earliest conceptions of natural evolution +attributed it to the coworking of two principles, that of Love or union +and that of Hate or dissolution. The process is here distinguished from +the material of nature, but is still described in the language of +practical life. A distinction between two aspects of vital phenomena is +the next step. These may be regarded in respect either of the motion and +change which attend them, or the rationality which informs them. Life is +both effective and significant. Although neither of these ideas ever +wholly ceases to be animistic, they may nevertheless be applied quite +independently of one another. The one reduces the primitive animistic +world to the lower end of its scale, the other construes it in terms of +a purposive utility commensurable with that of human action. Now it is +with _mechanism_, the former of these diverging ways, that the +development of materialism is identified. For this philosophy a thing +need have no value to justify its existence, nor any acting intelligence +to which it may owe its origin. Its bulk and position are sufficient for +its being, and the operation of forces capable of integrating, dividing, +or moving it is sufficient for its derivation and history. In short, +there is no rhyme or reason at the heart of things, but only actual +matter distributed by sheer force. With this elimination of the element +of purposiveness from the hylozoistic world, the content and process of +nature are fitted to one another. Matter is that which is moved by +force, and force is the determining principle of the motions of matter. +Materialism is now definitely equipped with its fundamental conceptions. + +[Sidenote: Materialism and Physical Science.] + +Sect. 105. The central conceptions of materialism as a philosophical +theory differ from those employed in the physical sciences only in what +is demanded of them. The scientist reports upon physical phenomena +without accepting any further responsibility, while those who like +Lucretius maintain a physical metaphysics, must, like him, prove that +"the minute bodies of matter from everlasting continually uphold the sum +of things." But, though they employ them in their own way, materialists +and all other exponents of naturalism derive their central conceptions +from the physical sciences, and so reflect the historical development +through which these sciences have passed. To certain historical phases +of physical science, in so far as these bear directly upon the meaning +of naturalism, we now turn. + +[Sidenote: The Development of the Conceptions of Physical Science. Space +and Matter.] + +Sect. 106. From the earliest times down to the present day the +groundwork of materialism has most commonly been cast in the form of an +_atomic theory_. Democritus, the first system-builder of this school, +adopted the conception of indivisible particles (+atomoi+), impenetrable +in their occupancy of space, and varying among themselves only in form, +order, and position. To provide for the motion that distributes them he +conceived them as separated from one another by empty space. From this +it follows that the void is as real as matter, or, as Democritus himself +is reputed to have said, "thing is not more real than no-thing." + +But atomism has not been by any means universally regarded as the most +satisfactory conception of the relation between space and matter. Not +only does it require two kinds of being, with the different attributes +of extension and hardness, respectively,[229:3] but it would also seem +to be experimentally inadequate in the case of the more subtle physical +processes, such as light. The former of these is a speculative +consideration, and as such had no little weight with the French +philosopher Descartes, whose divisions and definitions so profoundly +affected the course of thought in these matters after the sixteenth +century. Holding also "that a vacuum or space in which there is +absolutely no body is repugnant to reason," and that an indivisible +space-filling particle is self-contradictory, he was led to _identify +space and matter_; that is, to make matter as indispensable to space as +space to matter. There is, then, but one kind of corporeal being, whose +attribute is extension, and whose modes are motion and rest. The most +famous application of the mechanical conceptions which he bases upon +this first principle, is his theory of the planets, which are conceived +to be embedded in a transparent medium, and to move with it, vortex +fashion, about the sun.[230:4] + +But the conception of the space-filling continuity of material substance +owes its prominence at the present time to the experimental hypothesis +of _ether_. This substance, originally conceived to occupy the +intermolecular spaces and to serve as a medium for the propagation of +undulations, is now regarded by many physicists as replacing matter. "It +is the great hope of science at the present day," says a contemporary +exponent of naturalism, "that hard and heavy matter will be shown to be +ether in motion."[231:5] Such a theory would reduce bodies to the +relative displacements of parts of a continuous substance, which would +be first of all defined as spacial, and would possess such further +properties as special scientific hypotheses might require. + +Two broadly contrasting theories thus appear: that which defines matter +as a continuous substance coextensive with space; and that which defines +it as a discrete substance divided by empty space. But both theories are +seriously affected by the peculiarly significant development of the +conception of force. + +[Sidenote: Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the +Conception of Force.] + +Sect. 107. In the Cartesian system the cause of motion was pressure +within a plenum. But in the seventeenth century this notion encountered +the system of Newton, a system which seemed to involve action at a +distance. In the year 1728 Voltaire wrote from London: + + "When a Frenchman arrives in London, he finds a very great + change, in philosophy as well as in most other things. In + Paris he left the world all full of matter; here he finds + absolute vacua. At Paris the universe is seen filled up with + ethereal vortices, while here the same space is occupied with + the play of the invisible forces of gravitation. In Paris the + earth is painted for us longish like an egg, and in London it + is oblate like a melon. At Paris the pressure of the moon + causes the ebb and flow of tides; in England, on the other + hand, the sea gravitates toward the moon, so that at the same + time when the Parisians demand high water of the moon, the + gentlemen of London require an ebb."[232:6] + +But these differences are not matters of taste, nor even rival +hypotheses upon an equal footing. The Newtonian system of mechanics, the +consummation of a development initiated by Galileo, differed from the +vortex theory of Descartes as exact science differs from speculation and +unverified conjecture. And this difference of method carried with it +eventually certain profound differences of content, distinguishing the +Newtonian theory even from that of Democritus, with which it had so much +in common. Although Democritus had sought to avoid the element of +purposiveness in the older hylozoism by referring the motions of bodies +as far as possible to the impact of other bodies, he nevertheless +attributed these motions ultimately to _weight_, signifying thereby a +certain _downward disposition_. Now it is true that in his general +belief Newton himself is not free from hylozoism. He thought of the +motions of the planets themselves as initiated and quickened by a power +emanating ultimately from God. They are "impressed by an intelligent +Agent," and + + "can be the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and skill + of a powerful ever-living Agent who, being in all places, is + more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless + uniform _sensorium_, and thereby to form and reform the parts + of the universe, than we are by our will to move the parts of + our own bodies."[233:7] + +But by the side of these statements must be set his famous disclaimer, +"_hypotheses non fingo_." In his capacity of natural philosopher he did +not seek to explain motions, but only to describe them. Disbelieving as +he did in action at a distance, he saw no possibility of explanation +short of a reference of them to God; but such "hypotheses" he thought to +be no proper concern of science. As a consequence, the mathematical +formulation of motions came, through him, to be regarded as the entire +content of mechanics. The notion of an efficient cause of motion is +still suggested by the term _force_, but even this term within the +system of mechanics refers always to a definite amount of motion, or +measurement of relative motion. And the same is true of _attraction_, +_action_, _reaction_, and the like. The further explanation of motion, +the definition of a virtue or potency that produces it, first a +neglected problem, then an irrelevant problem, is finally, for a +naturalistic philosophy in which this progression is completed, an +insoluble problem. For the sequel to this purely descriptive procedure +on the part of science is the disavowal of "metaphysics" by those who +will have no philosophy but science. Thus the scientific conservatism of +Newton has led to the positivistic and agnostic phase of naturalism. But +a further treatment of this development must be reserved until the issue +of epistemology shall have been definitely raised. + +A different emphasis within the general mechanical scheme, attaching +especial importance to the conceptions of force and energy, has led to a +rival tendency in science and a contrasting type of naturalism. The +mechanical hypotheses hitherto described are all of a simple and readily +depicted type. They suggest an imagery quite in accord with common-sense +and with observation of the motions of great masses like the planets. +Material particles are conceived to move within a containing space; the +motions of corpuscles, atoms, or the minute parts of ether, differing +only in degree from those of visible bodies. The whole physical +universe may be represented in the imagination as an aggregate of bodies +participating in motions of extraordinary complexity, but of one type. +But now let the emphasis be placed upon the determining causes rather +than upon the moving bodies themselves. In other words, let the bodies +be regarded as attributive and the forces as substantive. The result is +a radical alteration of the mechanical scheme and the transcendence of +common-sense imagery. This was one direction of outgrowth from the work +of Newton. His force of gravitation prevailed between bodies separated +by spaces of great magnitude. Certain of the followers of Newton, +notably Cotes, accepting the formulas of the master but neglecting his +allusions to the agency of God, accepted the principle of action at a +distance. _Force_, in short, _was conceived to pervade space of itself_. +But if force be granted this substantial and self-dependent character, +what further need is there of matter as a separate form of entity? For +does not the presence of matter consist essentially in resistance, +itself a case of force? Such reflections as these led Boscovich and +others to the radical departure of defining material particles _as +centres of force_. + +[Sidenote: The Development and Extension of the Conception of Energy.] + +Sect. 108. But a more fruitful hypothesis of the same general order is +due to the attention directed to the conception of _energy_, or capacity +for work, by experimental discoveries of the possibility of reciprocal +transformations without loss, of motion, heat, electricity, and other +processes. The principle of the conservation of energy affirms the +quantitative constancy of that which is so transformed, measured, for +example, in terms of capacity to move units of mass against gravity. The +exponents of what is called "energetics" have in many cases come to +regard that the quantity of which is so conserved, as a substantial +reality whose forms and distributions compose nature. A contemporary +scientist, whose synthetic and dogmatic habit of mind has made him +eminent in the ranks of popular philosophy, writes as follows: + + "Mechanical and chemical energy, sound and heat, light and + electricity, are mutually convertible; they seem to be but + different modes of one and the same fundamental force or + _energy_. Thence follows the important thesis of the unity of + all natural forces, or, as it may also be expressed, the + 'monism of energy.'"[236:8] + +The conception of energy seems, indeed, to afford an exceptional +opportunity to naturalism. We have seen that the matter-motion theory +was satisfied to ignore, or regard as insoluble, problems concerning the +ultimate causes of things. Furthermore, as we shall presently see to +better advantage, the more strictly materialistic type of naturalism +must regard thought as an anomaly, and has no little difficulty with +life. But the conception of energy is more adaptable, and hence better +qualified to serve as a common denominator for various aspects of +experience. The very readiness with which we can picture the corpuscular +scheme is a source of embarrassment to the seeker after unity. That +which is so distinct is bristling with incompatibilities. The most +aggressive materialist hesitates to describe thought as a motion of +bodies in space. Energy, on the other hand, exacts little if anything +beyond the character of measurable power. Thought is at any rate in some +sense a power, and to some degree measurable. Recent discoveries of the +dependence of capacity for mental exertion upon physical vitality and +measurements of chemical energy received into the system as food, and +somehow exhausted by the activities of thought, have lent plausibility +to the hypothesis of a universal energy of which physical and +"psychical" processes are alike manifestations. And the conception of +energy seems capable not only of unifying nature, but also of satisfying +the metaphysical demand for an efficient and moving cause. This term, +like "force" and "power," is endowed with such a significance by common +sense. Indeed, naturalism would seem here to have swung round toward its +hylozoistic starting-point. The exponent of energetics, like the naive +animistic thinker, attributes to nature a power like that which he feels +welling up within himself. When he acts upon the environment, like meets +like. Energetics, it is true, may obtain a definite meaning for its +central conception from the measurable behavior of external bodies, and +a meaning that may be quite free from vitalism or teleology. But in his +extension of the conception the author of a philosophical energetics +abandons this strict meaning, and blends his thought even with a phase +of subjectivism, known as _panpsychism_.[238:9] This theory regards the +inward life of all nature as homogeneous with an immediately felt +activity or appetency, as energetics finds the inner life to be +homogeneous with the forces of nature. Both owe their philosophical +appeal to their apparent success in unifying the world upon a direct +empirical basis, and to their provision for the practical sense of +reality. + +Such, in brief, are the main alternatives available for a naturalistic +theory of being, in consequence of the historical development of the +fundamental conceptions of natural science. + +[Sidenote: The Claims of Naturalism.] + +Sect. 109. We turn now to an examination of the manner in which +naturalism, equipped with working principles, seeks to meet the special +requirements of philosophy. The conception of the unity of nature is +directly in the line of a purely scientific development, but naturalism +takes the bold and radical step of regarding nature so unified as +coextensive with the real, or at any rate knowable, universe. It will be +remembered that among the early Greeks Anaxagoras had referred the +creative and formative processes of nature to a non-natural or rational +agency, which he called the _Nous_. The adventitious character of this +principle, the external and almost purely nominal part which it played +in the actual cosmology of Anaxagoras, betrayed it into the hands of +the atomists, with their more consistently naturalistic creed. Better, +these maintain, the somewhat dogmatic extension of conceptions proved to +be successful in the description of nature, than a vague dualism which +can serve only to distract the scientific attention and people the world +with obscurities. There is a remarkable passage in Lucretius in which +atomism is thus written large and inspired with cosmical eloquence: + + "For verily not by design did the first-beginnings of things + station themselves each in its right place guided by keen + intelligence, nor did they bargain sooth to say what motions + each should assume, but because many in number and shifting + about in many ways throughout the universe, they are driven + and tormented by blows during infinite time past, after trying + motions and unions of every kind at length they fall into + arrangements such as those out of which our sum of things has + been formed, and by which too it is preserved through many + great years, when once it has been thrown into the appropriate + motions, and causes the streams to replenish the greedy sea + with copious river waters, and the earth, fostered by the heat + of the sun, to renew its produce, and the race of living + things to come up and flourish, and the gliding fires of ether + to live: all which these several things could in no wise bring + to pass, unless a store of matter could rise up from infinite + space, out of which store they are wont to make up in due + season whatever has been lost."[240:10] + +The prophecy of La Place, the great French mathematician, voices the +similar faith of the eighteenth century in a mechanical understanding +of the universe: + + "The human mind, in the perfection it has been able to give to + astronomy, affords a feeble outline of such an intelligence. + Its discoveries in mechanics and in geometry, joined to that + of universal gravitation, have brought it within reach of + comprehending in the same analytical expressions the past and + future states of the system of the world."[241:11] + +As for God, the creative and presiding intelligence, La Place had "no +need of any such hypothesis." + +[Sidenote: The Task of Naturalism.] + +Sect. 110. But these are the boasts of Homeric heroes before going into +battle. The moment such a general position is assumed there arise sundry +difficulties in the application of naturalistic principles to special +interests and groups of facts. It is one thing to project a mechanical +scheme in the large, but quite another to make explicit provision within +it for the origin of nature, for life, for the human self with its +ideals, and for society with its institutions. The naturalistic method +of meeting these problems involves a reduction all along the line in the +direction of such categories as are derived from the infra-organic +world. That which is not like the planetary system must be construed as +mechanical by indirection and subtlety. + +[Sidenote: The Origin of the Cosmos.] + +Sect. 111. The origin of the present known natural world was the first +philosophical question to be definitely met by science. The general form +of solution which naturalism offers is anticipated in the most ancient +theories of nature. These already suppose that the observed mechanical +processes of the circular or periodic type, like the revolutions and +rotations of the stars, are incidents in a historical mechanical process +of a larger scale. Prior to the present fixed motions of the celestial +bodies, the whole mass of cosmic matter participated in irregular +motions analogous to present terrestrial redistributions. Such motions +may be understood to have resulted in the integration of separate +bodies, to which they at the same time imparted a rotary motion. It is +such a hypothesis that Lucretius paints in his bold, impressionistic +colors. + +But the development of mechanics paved the way for a definite scientific +theory, the so-called "nebular hypothesis," announced by La Place in +1796, and by the philosopher Kant at a still earlier date. Largely +through the Newtonian principle of the parallelogram of forces, the +present masses, orbits, and velocities were analyzed into a more +primitive process of concentration within a nebulous or highly diffused +aggregate of matter. And with the aid of the principle of the +conservation of energy this theory appears to make possible the +derivation of heat, light, and other apparently non-mechanical processes +from the same original energy of motion. + +But a persistently philosophical mind at once raises the question of the +origin of this primeval nebula itself, with a definite organization and +a vast potential energy that must, after all, be regarded as a part of +nature rather than its source. Several courses are here open to +naturalism. It may maintain that the question of ultimate origin is +unanswerable; it may regard such a process of concentration as extending +back through an infinitely long past;[243:12] or, and this is the +favorite alternative for more constructive minds, the historical +cosmical process may be included within a still higher type of periodic +process, which is regarded as eternal. This last course has been +followed in the well-known synthetic naturalism of Herbert Spencer. +"Evolution," he says, "is the progressive integration of matter and +dissipation of motion." But such a process eventually runs down, and may +be conceived as giving place to a counter-process of devolution which +scatters the parts of matter and gathers another store of potential +motion. The two processes in alternation will then constitute a cosmical +system without beginning or end. + +In such wise a sweeping survey of the physical universe may be thought +in the terms of natural science. The uniformitarian method in geology, +resolving the history of the crust of the earth into known processes, +such as erosion and igneous fusion;[244:13] and spectral analysis, with +its discoveries concerning the chemical constituents of distant bodies +through the study of their light, have powerfully reenforced this effort +of thought, and apparently completed an outline sketch of the universe +in terms of infra-organic processes. + +[Sidenote: Life. Natural Selection.] + +Sect. 112. But the cosmos must be made internally homogeneous in these +same terms. There awaits solution, in the first place, the serious +problem of the genesis and maintenance of life within a nature that is +originally and ultimately inorganic. The assimilation of the field of +biology and physiology to the mechanical cosmos had made little real +progress prior to the nineteenth century. Mechanical theories had, +indeed, been projected in the earliest age of philosophy, and proposed +anew in the seventeenth century.[245:14] Nevertheless, the structural +and functional teleology of the organism remained as apparently +irrefutable testimony to the inworking of some principle other than that +of mechanical necessity. Indeed, the only fruitful method applicable to +organic phenomena was that which explained them in terms of purposive +adaptation. And it was its provision for a mechanical interpretation of +this very principle that gave to the Darwinian _law of natural +selection_, promulgated in 1859 in the "Origin of Species," so profound +a significance for naturalism. It threatened to reduce the last +stronghold of teleology, and completely to dispense with the intelligent +Author of nature. + +Darwin's hypothesis sought to explain the origin of animal species by +survival under competitive conditions of existence through the +possession of a structure suited to the environment. Only the most +elementary organism need be presupposed, together with slight variations +in the course of subsequent generations, and both may be conceived to +arise mechanically. There will then result in surviving organisms a +gradual accumulation of such variations as promote survival under the +special conditions of the environment. Such a principle had been +suggested as early as the time of Empedocles, but it remained for Darwin +to establish it with an unanswerable array of observation and +experimentation. If any organism whatsoever endowed with the power of +generation be allowed to have somehow come to be, naturalism now +promises to account for the whole subsequent history of organic +phenomena and the origin of any known species. + +[Sidenote: Mechanical Physiology.] + +Sect. 113. But what of life itself? The question of the derivation of +organic from inorganic matter has proved insoluble by direct means, and +the case of naturalism must here rest upon such facts as the chemical +homogeneity of these two kinds of matter, and the conformity of +physiological processes to more general physical laws. Organic matter +differs from inorganic only through the presence of proteid, a peculiar +product of known elements, which cannot be artificially produced, but +which is by natural means perpetually dissolved into these elements +without any discoverable residuum. Respiration may be studied as a case +of aerodynamics, the circulation of the blood as a case of +hydrodynamics, and the heat given off in the course of work done by the +body as a case of thermodynamics. And although vitalistic theories still +retain a place in physiology, as do teleological theories in biology, on +the whole the naturalistic programme of a reduction of organic processes +to the type of the inorganic tends to prevail. + +[Sidenote: Mind. The Reduction to Sensation.] + +Sect. 114. The history of naturalism shows that, as in the case of life, +so also in the case of _mind_, its hypotheses were projected by the +Greeks, but precisely formulated and verified only in the modern period +of science. In the philosophy of Democritus the soul was itself an atom, +finer, rounder, and smoother than the ordinary, but thoroughly a part of +the mechanism of nature. The processes of the soul are construed as +interactions between the soul and surrounding objects. In sensation, the +thing perceived produces images by means of effluxes which impinge upon +the soul-atom. These images are not true reports of the outer world, but +must be revised by thought before its real atomic structure emerges. +For this higher critical exercise of thought Democritus devised no +special atomic genesis. The result may be expressed either as the +invalidity of such operations of mind as he could provide for in his +universe, or the irreducibility to his chosen first principles of the +very thought which defined them. Later naturalism has generally +sacrificed epistemology to cosmology, and reduced thought to sensation. +Similarly, will has been regarded as a highly developed case of +instinct. Knowledge and will, construed as sensation and instinct, may +thus be interpreted in the naturalistic manner within the field of +biology. + +[Sidenote: Automatism.] + +Sect. 115. But the actual content of sensation, and the actual feelings +which attend upon the promptings of instinct, still stubbornly testify +to the presence in the universe of something belonging to a wholly +different category from matter and motion. The attitude of naturalism in +this crucial issue has never been fixed and unwavering, but there has +gradually come to predominate a method of denying to the inner life all +efficacy and real significance in the cosmos, while admitting its +presence on the scene. It is a strange fact of history that Descartes, +the French philosopher who prided himself on having rid the soul of all +dependence on nature, should have greatly contributed to this method. +But it is perhaps not so strange when we consider that every dualism is, +after all, symmetrical, and that consequently whatever rids the soul of +nature at the same time rids nature of the soul. It was Descartes who +first conceived the body and soul to be utterly distinct substances. The +corollary to this doctrine was his _automatism_, applied in his own +system to animals other than man, but which those less concerned with +religious tradition and less firmly convinced of the soul's originating +activity were not slow to apply universally. This theory conceived the +vital processes to take place quite regardless of any inner +consciousness, or even without its attendance. To this radical theory +the French materialists of the eighteenth century were especially +attracted. With them the active soul of Descartes, the distinct +spiritual entity, disappeared. This latter author had himself admitted a +department of the self, which he called the "passions," in which the +course and content of mind is determined by bodily conditions. Extending +this conception to the whole province of mind, they employed it to +demonstrate the thorough-going subordination of mind to body. La +Mettrie, a physician and the author of a book entitled "L'Homme +Machine," was first interested in this thesis by a fever delirium, and +afterward adduced anatomical and pathological data in support of it. The +angle from which he views human life is well illustrated in the +following: + + "What would have sufficed in the case of Julius Caesar, of + Seneca, of Petronius, to turn their fearlessness into timidity + or braggartry? An obstruction in the spleen, the liver, or the + _vena portae_. For the imagination is intimately connected + with these viscera, and from them arise all the curious + phenomena of hypochondria and hysteria. . . . 'A mere nothing, + a little fibre, some trifling thing that the most subtle + anatomy cannot discover, would have made two idiots out of + Erasmus and Fontenelle.'"[250:15] + +[Sidenote: Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon.] + +Sect. 116. The extreme claim that the soul is a physical organ of the +body, identical with the brain, marked the culmination of this militant +materialism, so good an instance of that over-simplification and +whole-hearted conviction characteristic of the doctrinaire propagandism +of France. Locke, the Englishman, had admitted that possibly the +substance which thinks is corporeal. In the letters of Voltaire this +thought has already found a more positive expression: + + "I am body, and I think; more I do not know. Shall I then + attribute to an unknown cause what I can so easily attribute + to the only fruitful cause I am acquainted with? In fact, + where is the man who, without an absurd godlessness, dare + assert that it is impossible for the Creator to endow matter + with thought and feeling?"[251:16] + +Finally, Holbach, the great systematizer of this movement, takes the +affair out of the hands of the Creator and definitively announces that +"a sensitive soul is nothing but a human brain so constituted that it +easily receives the motions communicated to it."[251:17] + +This theory has been considerably tempered since the age of Holbach. +Naturalism has latterly been less interested in identifying the soul +with the body, and more interested in demonstrating its dependence upon +specific bodily conditions, after the manner of La Mettrie. The +so-called higher faculties, such as thought and will, have been related +to central or _cortical_ processes of the nervous system, processes of +connection and complication which within the brain itself supplement the +impulses and sensations congenitally and externally stimulated. The +term "epiphenomenon" has been adopted to express the distinctness but +entire dependence of the mind. Man is "a conscious automaton." The real +course of nature passes through his nervous system, while consciousness +attends upon its functions like a shadow, present but not +efficient.[252:18] + +[Sidenote: Knowledge, Positivism and Agnosticism.] + +Sect. 117. Holbach's "Systeme de la Nature," published in 1770, marks +the culmination of the unequivocally materialistic form of naturalism. +Its epistemological difficulties, always more or less in evidence, have +since that day sufficed to discredit materialism, and to foster the +growth of a critical and apologetic form of naturalism known as +_positivism_ or _agnosticism_. The modesty of this doctrine does not, it +is true, strike very deep. For, although it disclaims knowledge of +ultimate reality, it also forbids anyone else to have any. Knowledge, it +affirms, can be of but one type, that which comprises the verifiable +laws governing nature. All questions concerning first causes are +futile, a stimulus only to excursions of fancy popularly mistaken for +knowledge. The superior certainty and stability which attaches to +natural science is to be permanently secured by the savant's steadfast +refusal to be led away after the false gods of metaphysics. + +But though this is sufficient ground for an agnostic policy, it does +prove an agnostic theory. The latter has sprung from a closer analysis +of knowledge, though it fails to make a very brave showing for +thoroughness and consistency. The crucial point has already been brought +within our view. The general principles of naturalism require that +knowledge shall be reduced to sensations, or impressions of the +environment upon the organism. But the environment and the sensations do +not correspond. The environment is matter and motion, force and energy; +the sensations are of motions, to be sure, but much more conspicuously +of colors, sounds, odors, pleasures, and pains. Critically, this may be +expressed by saying that since the larger part of sense-perception is so +unmistakably subjective, and since all knowledge alike must be derived +from this source, knowledge as a whole must be regarded as dealing only +with appearances. There are at least three agnostic methods progressing +from this point. All agree that the inner or essential reality is +unfathomable. But, in the first place, those most close to the tradition +of materialism maintain that the most significant appearances, the +primary qualities, are those which compose a purely quantitative and +corporeal world. The inner essence of things may at any rate be +_approached_ by a monism of matter or of energy. This theory is +epistemological only to the extent of moderating its claims in the hope +of lessening its responsibility. Another agnosticism places all sense +qualities on a par, but would regard physics and psychology as +complementary reports upon the two distinct series of phenomena in which +the underlying reality expresses itself. This theory is epistemological +to the extent of granting knowledge, viewed as perception, as good a +standing in the universe as that which is accorded to its object. But +such a dualism tends almost irresistibly to relapse into materialistic +monism, because of the fundamental place of physical conceptions in the +system of the sciences. Finally, in another and a more radical phase of +agnosticism, we find an attempt to make full provision for the +legitimate problems of epistemology. The only datum, the only existent +accessible to knowledge, is said to be the sensation, or state of +consciousness. In the words of Huxley: + + "What, after all, do we know of this terrible 'matter' except + as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of + our own consciousness? And what do we know of that 'spirit' + over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation + is arising, . . . except that it is also a name for an unknown + and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of + consciousness?"[255:19] + +The physical world is now to be regarded as a construction which does +not assimilate to itself the content of sensations, but enables one to +anticipate them. The sensation signifies a contact to which science can +provide a key for practical guidance. + +[Sidenote: Experimentalism.] + +Sect. 118. This last phase of naturalism is an attempt to state a pure +and consistent experimentalism, a workable theory of the routine of +sensations. But it commonly falls into the error of the vicious circle. +The hypothetical cause of sensations is said to be matter. From this +point of view the sensation is a complex, comprising elaborate physical +and physiological processes. But these processes themselves, on the +other hand, are said to be analyzable into sensations. Now two such +methods of analysis cannot be equally ultimate. If all of reality is +finally reducible to sensations, then the term sensation must be used +in a new sense to connote a self-subsistent being, and can no longer +refer merely to a function of certain physiological processes. The issue +of this would be some form of idealism or of the experience-philosophy +that is now coming so rapidly to the front.[256:20] But while it is true +that idealism has sometimes been intended, and that a radically new +philosophy of experience has sometimes been closely approached, those, +nevertheless, who have developed experimentalism from the naturalistic +stand-point have in reality achieved only a thinly disguised +materialism. For _the very ground of their agnosticism is +materialistic_.[256:21] Knowledge of reality itself is said to be +unattainable, because knowledge, in order to come within the order of +nature, must be regarded as reducible to sensation; and because +sensation itself, when regarded as a part of nature, is only a +physiological process, a special phenomenon, in no way qualified to be +knowledge that is true of reality. + +[Sidenote: Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic.] + +Sect. 119. Perhaps, after all, it would be as fair to the spirit of +naturalism to relieve it of responsibility for an epistemology. It has +never thoroughly reckoned with this problem. It has deliberately +selected from among the elements of experience, and been so highly +constructive in its method as to forfeit its claim to pure empiricism; +and, on the other hand, has, in this same selection of categories and in +its insistence upon the test of experiment, fallen short of a +thorough-going rationalism. While, on the one hand, it defines and +constructs, it does so, on the other hand, within the field of +perception and with constant reference to the test of perception. The +explanation and justification of this procedure is to be found in the +aim of natural science rather than in that of philosophy. It is this +special interest, rather than the general problem of being, that +determines the order of its categories. Naturalism as an account of +reality is acceptable only so far as its success in satisfying specific +demands obtains for it a certain logical immunity. These demands are +unquestionably valid and fundamental, but they are not coextensive with +the demand for truth. They coincide rather with the immediate practical +need of a formulation of the spacial and temporal changes that confront +the will. Hence naturalism is acceptable to common-sense as an account +of what the every-day attitude to the environment treats as its object. +Naturalism is common-sense about the "outer world," revised and brought +up to date with the aid of the results of science. Its deepest spring is +the organic instinct for the reality of the tangible, the vital +recognition of the significance of that which is on the plane of +interaction with the body. + + * * * * * + +[Sidenote: General Ethical Stand-point.] + +Sect. 120. Oddly enough, although common-sense is ready to intrust to +naturalism the description of the situation of life, it prefers to deal +otherwise with its ideals. Indeed, common-sense is not without a certain +suspicion that naturalism is the advocate of moral reversion. It is +recognized as the prophecy of the brute majority of life, of those +considerations of expediency and pleasure that are the warrant for its +secular moods rather than for its sustaining ideals. And that strand of +life is indeed its special province. For the naturalistic method of +reduction must find the key to human action among those practical +conditions that are common to man and his inferiors in the scale of +being. In short, human life, like all life, must be construed as the +adjustment of the organism to its natural environment for the sake of +preservation and economic advancement. + +[Sidenote: Cynicism and Cyrenaicism.] + +Sect. 121. Early in Greek philosophy this general idea of life was +picturesquely interpreted in two contrasting ways, those of the Cynic +and the Cyrenaic. Both of these wise men postulated the spiritual +indifference of the universe at large, and looked only to the _contact_ +of life with its immediate environment. But while the one hoped only to +hedge himself about, the other sought confidently the gratification of +his sensibilities. The figure of the Cynic is the more familiar. +Diogenes of the tub practised self-mortification until his dermal and +spiritual callousness were alike impervious. From behind his protective +sheath he could without affectation despise both nature and society. He +could reckon himself more blessed than Alexander, because, with demand +reduced to the minimum, he could be sure of a surplus of supply. Having +renounced all goods save the bare necessities of life, he could neglect +both promises and threats and be played upon by no one. He was securely +intrenched within himself, an unfurnished habitation, but the citadel of +a king. The Cyrenaic, on the other hand, did not seek to make impervious +the surface of contact with nature and society, but sought to heighten +its sensibility, that it might become a medium of pleasurable feeling. +For the inspiration with which it may be pursued this ideal has nowhere +been more eloquently set forth than in the pages of Walter Pater, who +styles himself "the new Cyrenaic." + + "Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the + end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a + variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is + to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass + most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the + focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their + purest energy? + + To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this + ecstacy, is success in life. . . . While all melts under our + feet, we may well catch at any exquisite passion, or any + contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to + set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the + senses, strange dyes, strange colors, and curious odors, or + work of the artist's hands, or the face of one's friend. Not + to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those + about us, and in the brilliancy of their gifts some tragic + dividing of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of + frost and sun, to sleep before evening."[261:22] + +[Sidenote: Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception of +Social Relations.] + +Sect. 122. In the course of modern philosophy the ethics of naturalism +has undergone a transformation and development that equip it much more +formidably for its competition with rival theories. If the Cynic and +Cyrenaic philosophies of life seem too egoistic and narrow in outlook, +this inadequacy has been largely overcome through the modern conception +of the relation of the individual to society. Man is regarded as so +dependent upon social relations that it is both natural and rational for +him to govern his actions with a concern for the community. There was a +time when this relation of dependence was viewed as external, a barter +of goods between the individual and society, sanctioned by an implied +contract. Thomas Hobbes, whose unblushing materialism and egoism +stimulated by opposition the whole development of English ethics, +conceived morality to consist in rules of action which condition the +stability of the state, and so secure for the individual that "peace" +which self-interest teaches him is essential to his welfare. + + "And therefore so long a man is in the condition of mere + nature, which is a condition of war, as private appetite is + the measure of good and evil: and consequently all men agree + on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the ways or + means of peace, which, as I have showed before, are 'justice,' + 'gratitude,' 'modesty,' 'equity,' 'mercy,' and the rest of + the laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, 'moral virtues'; + and their contrary 'vices,' evil."[262:23] + +Jeremy Bentham, the apostle of utilitarianism in the eighteenth century, +defined political and social sanctions through which the individual +could purchase security and good repute with action conducive to the +common welfare. But the nineteenth century has understood the matter +better--and the idea of an evolution under conditions that select and +reject, is here again the illuminating thought. No individual, +evolutionary naturalism maintains, has survived the perils of life +without possessing as an inalienable part of his nature, congenital like +his egoism, certain impulses and instinctive desires in the interest of +the community as a whole. The latest generation of a race whose +perpetuation has been conditioned by a capacity to sustain social +relations and make common cause against a more external environment, +_is_ moral, and does not adopt morality in the course of a calculating +egoism. Conscience is the racial instinct of self-preservation uttering +itself in the individual member, who draws his very life-blood from the +greater organism. + +[Sidenote: Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic.] + +Sect. 123. This latest word of naturalistic ethics has not won +acceptance as the last word in ethics, and this in spite of its +indubitable truth within its scope. For the deeper ethical interest +seeks not so much to account for the moral nature as to construe and +justify its promptings. The evolutionary theory reveals the genesis of +conscience, and demonstrates its continuity with nature, but this falls +as far short of realizing the purpose of ethical study as a history of +the natural genesis of thought would fall short of logic. Indeed, +naturalism shows here, as in the realm of epistemology, a persistent +failure to appreciate the central problem. Its acceptance as a +philosophy, we are again reminded, can be accounted for only on the +score of its genuinely rudimentary character. As a rudimentary phase of +thought it is both indispensable and inadequate. It is the philosophy of +instinct, which should in normal development precede a philosophy of +reason, in which it is eventually assimilated and supplemented. + +[Sidenote: Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion.] + +Sect. 124. There is, finally, an inspiration for life which this +philosophy of naturalism may convey--atheism, its detractors would call +it, but none the less a faith and a spiritual exaltation that spring +from its summing up of truth. It is well first to realize that which is +dispiriting in it, its failure to provide for the freedom, immortality, +and moral providence of the more sanguine faith. + + "For what is man looked at from this point of view? . . . Man, + so far as natural science by itself is able to teach us, is no + longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaven-descended + heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his + story a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the + meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which + first converted a dead organic compound into the living + progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows + nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine, + disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords + of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a + race with conscience enough to feel that it is vile, and + intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant. . . . We + sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared + with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the + divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of + our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, + and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the + race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will + go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The + uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a + brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will + be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. 'Imperishable + monuments' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself, and love + stronger than death, will be as though they had never been. + Nor will anything that _is_ be better or be worse for all that + the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have + striven through countless generations to effect."[265:24] + +[Sidenote: Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, Wonder, +and Renunciation.] + +Sect. 125. But though our philosopher must accept the truth of this +terrible picture, he is not left without spiritual resources. The +abstract religion provided for the agnostic faithful by Herbert Spencer +does not, it is true, afford any nourishment to the religious nature. He +would have men look for a deep spring of life in the negative idea of +mystery, the apotheosis of ignorance, while religious faith to live at +all must lay hold upon reality. But there does spring from naturalism a +positive religion, whose fundamental motives are those of service, +wonder, and renunciation: service of humanity in the present, wonder at +the natural truth, and renunciation of a universe keyed to vibrate with +human ideals. + + "Have you," writes Charles Ferguson, "had dreams of Nirvana + and sickly visions and raptures? Have you imagined that the + end of your life is to be absorbed back into the life of God, + and to flee the earth and forget all? Or do you want to walk + on air, or fly on wings, or build a heavenly city in the + clouds? Come, let us take our kit on our shoulders, and go out + and build the city _here_."[265:25] + +For Haeckel "natural religion" is such as + + "the astonishment with which we gaze upon the starry heavens + and the microscopic life in a drop of water, the awe with + which we trace the marvellous working of energy in the motion + of matter, the reverence with which we grasp the universal + dominance of the law of substance throughout the + universe."[266:26] + +There is a deeper and a sincerer note in the stout, forlorn humanism of +Huxley: + + "That which lies before the human race is a constant struggle + to maintain and improve, in opposition to the State of Nature, + the State of Art of an organized polity; in which, and by + which, man may develop a worthy civilization, capable of + maintaining and constantly improving itself, until the + evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its + downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway; and, + once more, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of + our planet."[266:27] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[223:1] PRELIMINARY NOTE.--By _naturalism_ is meant that system of +philosophy which defines the universe in the terms of _natural science_. +In its dogmatic phase, wherein it maintains that _being is corporeal_, +it is called _materialism_. In its critical phase, wherein it makes the +general assertion that the natural sciences constitute the only +_possible knowledge_, whatever be the nature of reality itself, it is +called _positivism_, _agnosticism_, or simply _naturalism_. + +[226:2] Lucretius: _De Rerum Natura_, Bk. II, lines 569-580. Translation +by Munro. + +[229:3] The reader will find an interesting account of these opposing +views in Locke's chapter on _Space_, in his _Essay Concerning Human +Understanding_. + +[230:4] Descartes distinguished his theory from that of Democritus in +the _Principles of Philosophy_, Part IV, Sect. ccii. + +[231:5] Pearson: _Grammar of Science_, pp. 259-260. Cf. _ibid._, Chap. +VII, entire. + +[232:6] Quoted in Ueberweg: _History of Philosophy_, II, p. 124. + +[233:7] Quoted from the _Opticks_ of Newton by James Ward, in his +_Naturalism and Agnosticism_, I, p. 43. + +[236:8] Haeckel: _Riddle of the Universe_. Translation by McCabe, p. +254. + +The best systematic presentation of "energetics" is to be found in +Ostwald's _Vorlesungen ueber Natur-Philosophie_. Herbert Spencer, in his +well-known _First Principles_, makes philosophical use of both "force" +and "energy." + +[238:9] Cf. Chap. IX. + +[240:10] Lucretius: _Op. cit._, Bk. I, lines 1021-1237. + +[241:11] Quoted from La Place's essay on _Probability_ by Ward: _Op. +cit._, I, p. 41. + +[243:12] An interesting account and criticism of such a theory +(Clifford's) is to be found in Royce's _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, +Lecture X. + +[244:13] This method replaced the old theory of "catastrophes" through +the efforts of the English geologists, Hutton (1726-1797) and Lyell +(1767-1849). + +[245:14] Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, published +in 1628, was regarded as a step in this direction. + +[250:15] From the account of La Mettrie in Lange: _History of +Materialism_. Translation by Thomas, II, pp. 67-68. + +[251:16] Quoted from Voltaire's London _Letter on the English_, by +Lange: _Op. cit._, II, p. 18. + +[251:17] Quoted by Lange: _Op. cit._, II, p. 113. + +[252:18] The phrase "psycho-physical parallelism," current in +psychology, may mean automatism of the kind expounded above, and may +also mean dualism. It is used commonly as a methodological principle to +signify that no causal relationship between mind and body, but one of +_correspondence_, is to be looked for in empirical psychology. Cf. Sect. +99. + +[255:19] Quoted by Ward: _Op. cit._, I, p. 18. + +[256:20] There are times when Huxley, _e. g._, would seem to be on the +verge of the Berkeleyan idealism. Cf. Chap. IX. + +[256:21] For the case of Karl Pearson, read his _Grammar of Science_, +Chap. II. + +[261:22] Pater: _The Renaissance_, pp. 249-250. + +[262:23] Hobbes: _Leviathan,_ Chap. XV. + +[265:24] Quoted from Balfour: _Foundations of Belief_, pp. 29-31. + +[265:25] Ferguson: _Religion of Democracy_, p. 10. + +[266:26] Haeckel: _Op. cit._, p. 344. + +[266:27] Huxley: _Evolution and Ethics_, p. 45. _Collected Essays_, Vol. +IX. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +SUBJECTIVISM[267:1] + + +[Sidenote: Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and +Scepticism.] + +Sect. 126. When, in the year 1710, Bishop Berkeley maintained the thesis +of empirical idealism, having rediscovered it and announced it with a +justifiable sense of originality, he provoked a kind of critical +judgment that was keenly annoying if not entirely surprising to him. In +refuting the conception of material substance and demonstrating the +dependence of being upon mind, he at once sought, as he did repeatedly +in later years, to establish the world of practical belief, and so to +reconcile metaphysics and common-sense. Yet he found himself hailed as a +fool and a sceptic. In answer to an inquiry concerning the reception of +his book in London, his friend Sir John Percival wrote as follows: + + "I did but name the subject matter of your book of + _Principles_ to some ingenious friends of mine and they + immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time + refusing to read it, which I have not yet got one to do. A + physician of my acquaintance undertook to discover your + person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought + to take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire of + starting something new should put you upon such an + undertaking. Another told me that you are not gone so far as + another gentleman in town, who asserts not only that there is + no such thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no being + at all."[268:2] + +There can be no doubt but that the idea of the dependence of real things +upon their appearance to the individual is a paradox to common-sense. It +is a paradox because it seems to reverse the theoretical instinct +itself, and to define the real in those very terms which disciplined +thought learns to neglect. In the early history of thought the nature of +the thinker himself is recognized as that which is likely to distort +truth rather than that which conditions it. When the wise man, the +devotee of truth, first makes his appearance, his authority is +acknowledged because he has renounced himself. As witness of the +universal being he purges himself of whatever is peculiar to his own +individuality, or even to his human nature. In the aloofness of his +meditation he escapes the cloud of opinion and prejudice that obscures +the vision of the common man. In short, the element of belief dependent +upon the thinker himself is the dross which must be refined away in +order to obtain the pure truth. When, then, in the critical epoch of the +Greek sophists, Protagoras declares that there is no belief that is not +of this character, his philosophy is promptly recognized as scepticism. +Protagoras argues that sense qualities are clearly dependent upon the +actual operations of the senses, and that all knowledge reduces +ultimately to these terms. + + "The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; + there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, + fear, and many more which are named, as well as innumerable + others which have no name; _with each of them there is born an + object of sense_,--all sorts of colors born with all sorts of + sight and sounds in like manner with hearing, and other + objects with the other senses."[269:3] + +If the objects are "born with" the senses, it follows that they are born +with and appertain to the individual perceiver. + + "Either show, if you can, that our sensations are not + relative and individual, or, if you admit that they are + individual, prove that this does not involve the consequence + that the appearance becomes, or, if you like to say, is to the + individual only."[270:4] + +The same motif is thus rendered by Walter Pater in the Conclusion of his +"Renaissance": + + "At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of + external objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and + importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand + forms of action. But when reflexion begins to act upon those + objects they are dissipated under its influence; the cohesive + force seems suspended like a trick of magic; each object is + loosed into a group of impressions--color, odor, texture--in + the mind of the observer. . . . Experience, already reduced to + a swarm of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by + that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has + ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can + only conjecture to be without. Every one of these impressions + is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each + mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world." + +The Protagorean generalization is due to the reflection that all +experience is some individual experience, that no subject of discourse +escapes the imputation of belonging to some individual's private +history. The individual must start with his own experiences and ideas, +and he can never get beyond them, for he cannot see outside his own +vision, or even think outside his own mind. The scepticism of this +theory is explicit, and the formulas of Protagoras--the famous "_Man is +the measure of all things_," and the more exact formula, "_The truth is +what appears to each man at each time_"[271:5]--have been the articles +of scepticism throughout the history of thought. + +[Sidenote: Phenomenalism and Spiritualism.] + +Sect. 127. There is, therefore, nothing really surprising in the +reception accorded the "new philosophy" of Bishop Berkeley. A sceptical +relativism is the earliest phase of subjectivism, and its avoidance at +once becomes the most urgent problem of any philosophy which proposes to +proceed forth from this principle. And this problem Berkeley meets with +great adroitness and a wise recognition of difficulties. But his +sanguine temperament and speculative interest impel him to what he +regards as the extension of his first principle, the reintroduction of +the conception of substance under the form of spirit, and of the +objective order of nature under the form of the mind of God. In short, +there are two motives at work in him, side by side: the epistemological +motive, restricting reality to perceptions and thoughts, and the +metaphysical-religious motive, leading him eventually to the definition +of reality in terms of perceiving and thinking spirits. And from the +time of Berkeley these two principles, _phenomenalism_ and +_spiritualism_, have remained as distinct and alternating phases of +subjectivism. The former is its critical and dialectical conception, the +latter its constructive and practical conception. + +[Sidenote: Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem +Inherited from Descartes and Locke.] + +Sect. 128. As _phenomenalism_ has its classic statement and proof in the +writings of Berkeley, we shall do well to return to these. The fact that +this philosopher wished to be regarded as the prophet of common-sense +has already been mentioned. This purpose reveals itself explicitly in +the series of "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." The form in which +Berkeley here advances his thesis is further determined by the manner in +which the lines were drawn in his day of thought. The world of +enlightened public opinion was then threefold, consisting of God, +physical nature, and the soul. In the early years of the seventeenth +century Descartes had sharply distinguished between the two +substances--mind, with its attribute of thought; and body, with its +attribute of extension--and divided the finite world between them. God +was regarded as the infinite and sustaining cause of both. Stated in the +terms of epistemology, the object of clear thinking is the physical +cosmos, the subject of clear thinking the immortal soul. The realm of +perception, wherein the mind is subjected to the body, embarrasses the +Cartesian system, and has no clear title to any place in it. And without +attaching cognitive importance to this realm, the system is utterly +dogmatic in its epistemology.[273:6] For what one substance thinks, must +be assumed to be somehow true of another quite independent substance +without any medium of communication. Now between Descartes and Berkeley +appeared the sober and questioning "Essay Concerning Human +Understanding," by John Locke. This is an interesting combination (they +cannot be said to blend) of traditional metaphysics and revolutionary +epistemology. The universe still consists of God, the immortal thinking +soul, and a corporeal nature, the object of its thought. But, except for +certain proofs of God and self, knowledge is entirely reduced to the +perceptual type, to sensations, or ideas directly imparted to the mind +by the objects themselves. To escape dogmatism it is maintained that +the real is what is _observed to be present_. But Locke thinks the +qualities so discovered belong in part to the perceiver and in part to +the substance outside the mind. Color is a case of the former, a +"secondary quality"; and extension a case of the latter, a "primary +quality." And evidently the above empirical test of knowledge is not +equally well met in these two cases. When I see a red object I know that +red exists, for it is observed to be present, and I make no claim for it +beyond the present. But when I note that the red object is square, I am +supposed to know a property that will continue to exist in the object +after I have closed my eyes or turned to something else. Here my claim +exceeds my observation, and the empirical principle adopted at the +outset would seem to be violated. Berkeley develops his philosophy from +this criticism. His refutation of material substance is intended as a +full acceptance of the implications of the new empirical epistemology. +Knowledge is to be all of the perceptual type, where what is known is +directly presented; and, in conformity with this principle, being is to +be restricted to the content of the living pulses of experience. + +[Sidenote: The Refutation of Material Substance.] + +Sect. 129. Berkeley, then, beginning with the threefold world of +Descartes and of common-sense, proposes to apply Locke's theory of +knowledge to the discomfiture of corporeal nature. It was a radical +doctrine, because it meant for him and for his contemporaries the denial +of all finite objects outside the mind. But at the same time it meant a +restoration of the homogeneity of experience, the re-establishment of +the qualitative world of every-day living, and so had its basis of +appeal to common-sense. The encounter between Hylas, the advocate of the +traditional philosophy, and Philonous, who represents the author +himself, begins with an exchange of the charge of innovation. + + _Hyl._ I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I + heard of you. + + _Phil._ Pray, what were those? + + _Hyl._ You were represented, in last night's conversation, as + one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever + entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such + thing as _material substance_ in the world. + + _Phil._ That there is no such thing as what _philosophers_ + call _material substance_, I am seriously persuaded: but if I + were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I + should then have the same reason to renounce this that I + imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion. + + _Hyl._ What! can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant + to Common-Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than + to believe there is no such thing as _matter_? + + _Phil._ Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, + who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater + sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to + Common-Sense, than I who believe no such thing?[276:7] + +Philonous now proceeds with his case. Beginning by obtaining from Hylas +the admission that pleasure and pain are essentially relative and +subjective, he argues that sensations such as heat, since they are +inseparable from these feelings, must be similarly regarded. And he is +about to annex other qualities in turn to this core of subjectivity, +when Hylas enters a general demurrer: + + "Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this + time. You asked me whether heat and cold, sweetness and + bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to + which I answered simply that they were. Whereas I should have + thus distinguished:--those qualities as perceived by us, are + pleasures or pains; but not as existing in the external + objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there + is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only + that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the + fire or sugar."[276:8] + +[Sidenote: The Application of the Epistemological Principle.] + +Sect. 130. Here the argument touches upon profound issues. Philonous now +assumes the extreme empirical contention _that knowledge applies only to +its own psychological moment, that its object in no way extends beyond +that individual situation which we call the state of knowing_. The full +import of such an epistemology Berkeley never recognized, but he is +clearly employing it here, and the overthrow of Hylas is inevitable so +long as he does not challenge it or turn it against his opponent. This, +however, as a protagonist of Berkeley's own making, he fails to do, and +he plays into Philonous's hands by admitting that what is known only in +perception must for that reason _consist_ in perception. He frankly owns +"that it is vain to stand out any longer," that "colors, sounds, tastes, +in a word, all those termed _secondary qualities_, have certainly no +existence without the mind."[277:9] + +Hylas has now arrived at the distinction between primary and secondary +qualities. "Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest" are +the attributes of an external substance which is the cause of +sensations. But the same epistemological principle readily reduces these +also to dependence on mind, for, like the secondary qualities, their +content is given only in perception. Hylas is then driven to defend a +general material substratum, which is the cause of ideas, but to which +none of the definite content of these ideas can be attributed. In short, +he has put all the content of knowledge on the one side, and admitted +its inseparability from the perceiving spirit, and left the being of +things standing empty and forlorn on the other. This amounts, as +Philonous reminds him, to the denial of the reality of the known world. + + "You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the + _reality_ of sensible things; since you made it to consist in + an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say, + you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which + was to show your principles led to Scepticism."[278:10] + +[Sidenote: The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World.] + +Sect. 131. Having advanced the direct empiricist argument for +phenomenalism, Berkeley now gives the rationalistic motive an +opportunity to express itself in the queries of Hylas as to whether +there be not an "absolute extension," somehow abstracted by thought from +the relativities of perception. Is there not at least a _conceivable_ +world independent of perception? + +The answers of Philonous throw much light upon the Berkeleyan position. +He admits that thought is capable of separating the primary from the +secondary qualities in certain _operations_, but at the same time denies +that this is forming an idea of them as separate. + + "I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general + propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without + mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat + of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I + can pronounce the word _motion_ by itself, I can form the idea + of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may + be made of extension and figures, without any mention of + _great_ or _small_, or any other sensible mode or quality, + that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of + extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible + quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the + mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what + other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being + altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when + laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I + believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas + of extension."[279:11] + +Berkeley denies that we have ideas of pure extension or motion, because, +although we do actually _deal_ with these and find them intelligible, we +can never obtain a state of mind in which they appear as the content. He +applies this psychological test because of his adherence to the general +empirical postulate that knowledge is limited to the individual content +of its own individual states. "It is a universally received maxim," he +says, "that _everything which exists is particular_." Now the truth of +mathematical reckoning is not particular, but is valid wherever the +conditions to which it refers are fulfilled. Mathematical reckoning, if +it is to be particular, must be regarded as a particular act or state of +some thinker. Its truth must then be construed as relative to the +interests of the thinker, as a symbolism which has an instrumental +rather than a purely cognitive value. This conclusion cannot be disputed +short of a radical stand against the general epistemological principle +to which Berkeley is so far true, the principle that the reality which +is known in any state of thinking or perceiving is the state itself. + +[Sidenote: The Transition to Spiritualism.] + +Sect. 132. This concludes the purely phenomenalistic strain of +Berkeley's thought. He has taken the immediate apprehension of sensible +objects in a state of mind centring about the pleasure and pain of an +individual, to be the norm of knowledge. He has further maintained that +knowledge cannot escape the particularity of its own states. The result +is that the universe is composed of private perceptions and ideas. +Strictly on the basis of what has preceded, Hylas is justified in +regarding this conclusion as no less sceptical than that to which his +own position had been reduced; for while he had been compelled to admit +that the real is unknowable, Philonous has apparently defined the +knowable as relative to the individual. But the supplementary +metaphysics which had hitherto been kept in the background is now +revealed. It is maintained that though perceptions know no external +world, they do nevertheless reveal a spiritual substance of which they +are the states. Although it has hitherto been argued that the _esse_ of +things is in their _percipi_, this is now replaced by the more +fundamental principle that the _esse_ of things is in their _percipere_ +or _velle_. The real world consists not in perceptions, but in +perceivers. + +[Sidenote: Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism.] + +Sect. 133. Now it is at once evident that the epistemological theory +which has been Berkeley's dialectical weapon in the foregoing argument +is no longer available. And those who have cared more for this theory +than for metaphysical speculation have attempted to stop at this point, +and so to construe phenomenalism as to make it self-sufficient on its +own grounds. Such attempts are so instructive as to make it worth our +while to review them before proceeding with the development of the +spiritualistic motive in subjectivism. + +The world is to be regarded as made up of sense-perceptions, ideas, or +phenomena. What is to be accepted as the fundamental category which +gives to all of these terms their subjectivistic significance? So far +there seems to be nothing in view save the principle of relativity. The +type to which these were reduced was that of the peculiar or unsharable +experience best represented by an individual's pleasure and pain. But +relativity will not work as a general principle of being. It consigns +the individual to his private mind, and cannot provide for the validity +of knowledge enough even to maintain itself. Some other course, then, +must be followed. Perception may be given a psycho-physical definition, +which employs physical terms as fundamental;[282:12] but this flagrantly +contradicts the phenomenalistic first principle. Or, reality may be +regarded as so stamped with its marks as to insure the proprietorship of +thought. But this definition of certain objective entities of mind, of +beings attributed to intelligence because of their intrinsic +intelligibility, is inconsistent with empiricism, if indeed it does not +lead eventually to a realism of the Platonic type.[283:13] Finally, and +most commonly, the terms of phenomenalism have been retained after their +original meaning has been suffered to lapse. The "impressions" of Hume, +_e. g._, are the remnant of the Berkeleyan world with the spirit +stricken out. There is no longer any point in calling them impressions, +for they now mean only elements or qualities. As a consequence this +outgrowth of the Berkeleyanism epistemology is at present merging into a +realistic philosophy of experience.[283:14] Any one, then, of these +three may be the last state of one who undertakes to remain exclusively +faithful to the phenomenalistic aspect of Berkeleyanism, embodied in the +principle _esse est percipi_. + +[Sidenote: Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the +Perceiver.] + +Sect. 134. Let us now follow the fortunes of the other phase of +subjectivism--that which develops the conception of the perceiver rather +than the perceived. When Berkeley holds that + + "all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in a + word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the + world, have not any subsistence without a Mind," + +his thought has transcended the epistemology with which he overthrew the +conception of material substance, in two directions. For neither mind of +the finite type nor mind of the divine type is perceived. But the first +of these may yet be regarded as a direct empirical datum, even though +sharply distinguished from an object of perception. In the third +dialogue, Philonous thus expounds this new kind of knowledge: + + "I own I have properly no _idea_, either of God or any other + spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by + things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless + know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as + certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I + mean by the terms _I_ and _myself_; and I know this + immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I + perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound."[284:15] + +The knowledge here provided for may be regarded as empirical because +the reality in question is an individual present in the moment of the +knowledge. Particular acts of perception are said directly to reveal not +only perceptual objects, but perceiving subjects. And the conception of +spiritual substance, once accredited, may then be extended to account +for social relations and to fill in the nature of God. The latter +extension, in so far as it attributes such further predicates as +universality and infinity, implies still a third epistemology, and +threatens to pass over into rationalism. But the knowledge of one's +fellow-men may, it is claimed, be regarded as immediate, like the +knowledge of one's self. Perceptual and volitional activity has a sense +for itself and also a sense for other like activity. The self is both +self-conscious and socially conscious in an immediate experience of the +same type. + +[Sidenote: Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate +Knowledge of the Will.] + +Sect. 135. But this general spiritualistic conception is developed with +less singleness of purpose in Berkeley than among the _voluntarists_ and +_panpsychists_ who spring from Schopenhauer, the orientalist, pessimist, +and mystic among the German Kantians of the early nineteenth century. +His great book, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," opens with the +phenomenalistic contention that "the world is my idea." It soon appears, +however, that the "my" is more profoundly significant than the "idea." +Nature is my creation, due to the working within me of certain fixed +principles of thought, such as space, time, and causality. But nature, +just because it is my creation, is less than me: is but a manifestation +of the true being for which I must look _within_ myself. But this inner +self cannot be made an object of thought, for that would be only to +create another term of nature. The will itself, from which such creation +springs, is "that which is most immediate" in one's consciousness, and +"makes itself known in a direct manner in its particular acts." The term +_will_ is used by Schopenhauer as a general term covering the whole +dynamics of life, instinct and desire, as well as volition. It is that +sense of life-preserving and life-enhancing appetency which is the +conscious accompaniment of struggle. With its aid the inwardness of the +whole world may now be apprehended. + + "Whoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge + _in abstracto_, and therefore clear and certain, of what + everyone knows directly _in concreto_, _i. e._, as feeling, a + knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his + phenomenal being, . . . and that his will is that which is + most immediate in his consciousness, . . . will find that of + itself it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost + being of the whole of nature; for he now transfers it to all + those phenomena which are not given to him, like his own + phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge, + but only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as _idea_ + alone."[287:16] + +The heart of reality is thus known by an "intuitive interpretation," +which begins at home in the individual's own heart. + +[Sidenote: Panpsychism.] + +Sect. 136. The panpsychist follows the same course of reflection. There +is an outwardness and an inwardness of nature, corresponding to the +knower's body on the one hand, and his feeling or will on the other. +With this principle in hand one may pass down the whole scale of being +and discover no breach of continuity. Such an interpretation of nature +has been well set forth by a contemporary writer, who quotes the +following from the botanist, C. v. Naegeli: + + "Sensation is clearly connected with the reflex actions of + higher animals. We are obliged to concede it to the other + animals also, and we have no grounds for denying it to plants + and inorganic bodies. The sensation arouses in us a condition + of comfort and discomfort. In general, the feeling of + pleasure arises when the natural impulses are satisfied, the + feeling of pain when they are not satisfied. Since all + material processes are composed of movements of molecules and + elementary atoms, pleasure and pain must have their seat in + these particles. . . . Thus the same mental thread runs + through all material phenomena. The human mind is nothing but + the highest development on our earth of the mental processes + which universally animate and move nature."[288:17] + +According to panpsychism, then, physical nature is the manifestation of +an _appetency or bare consciousness generalized from the thinker's +awareness of his most intimate self_. Such appetency or bare +consciousness is the essential or substantial state of that which +appears as physical nature. + +[Sidenote: The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for +Objective Knowledge.] + +Sect. 137. We must now turn to the efforts which this doctrine has made +to maintain itself against the sceptical trend of its own epistemology. +For precisely as in the case of phenomenalism its dialectical principle +threatens to be self-destructive. Immediate presence is still the test +of knowledge. But does not immediate presence connote relativity and +inadequacy, at best; an initial phase of knowledge that must be +supplemented and corrected before objective reality and valid truth are +apprehended? Does not the individuality of the individual thinker +connote the very maximum of error? Indeed, spiritualism would seem to +have exceeded even Protagoreanism itself, and to have passed from +scepticism to deliberate nihilism. The object of knowledge is no longer +even, as with the phenomenalist, the thinker's thought, but only his +_thinking_. And if the thinker's thought is relative to him, then the +thinker's act of thinking is the very vanishing-point of relativity, the +negative term of a negating relation. How is a real, a self-subsistent +world to be composed of such? Impelled by a half-conscious realization +of the hopelessness of this situation, the exponent of spiritualism has +sought to universalize his conception; to define an _absolute or +ultimate spirit_ other than the individual thinker, though known in and +through him. But it is clear that this development of spiritualism, like +all of the speculative procedure of subjectivism, threatens to exceed +the scope of the original principle of knowledge. There is a strong +presumption against the possibility of introducing a knowledge of God by +the way of the particular presentations of an individual consciousness. + +[Sidenote: Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism. +Mysticism.] + +Sect. 138. Schopenhauer must be credited with a genuine effort to accept +the metaphysical consequences of his epistemology. His epistemology, as +we have seen, defined knowledge as centripetal. The object of real +knowledge is identical with the subject of knowledge. If I am to know +the universal will, therefore, I must in knowing become that will. And +this Schopenhauer maintains. The innermost heart of the individual into +which he may retreat, even from his private will, is--the universal. But +there is another way of arriving at the same knowledge. In contemplation +I may become absorbed in principles and laws, rather than be diverted by +the particular spacial and temporal objects, until (and this is +peculiarly true of the aesthetic experience) my interest no longer +distinguishes itself, but coincides with truth. In other words, abstract +thinking and pure willing are not opposite extremes, but adjacent points +on the deeper or transcendent circle of experience. One may reach this +part of the circle by moving in either of two directions that at the +start are directly opposite: by turning in upon the subject or by +utterly giving one's self up to the object. Reality obtains no +definition by this means. Philosophy, for Schopenhauer, is rather a +programme for realizing the state in which I will the universal and know +the universal will. The final theory of knowledge, then, is mysticism, +reality directly apprehended in a supreme and incommunicable experience, +direct and vivid, like perception, and at the same time universal, like +thought. But the empiricism with which Schopenhauer began, the appeal to +a familiar experience of self as will, has meanwhile been forgotten. The +idea as object of my perception, and the will as its subject were in the +beginning regarded as common and verifiable items of experience. But +who, save the occasional philosopher, knows a universal will? Nor have +attempts to avoid mysticism, while retaining Schopenhauer's first +principle, been successful. Certain voluntarists and panpsychists have +attempted to do without the universal will, and define the world solely +in terms of the many individual wills. But, as Schopenhauer himself +pointed out, individual wills cannot be distinguished except in terms of +something other than will, such as space and time. The same is true if +for will there be substituted inner feeling or consciousness. Within +this category individuals can be distinguished only as points of view, +which to be comparable at all must contain common objects, or be +defined in terms of a system of relations like that of the physical +world or that of an ethical community. The conception of pure will or +pure feeling inevitably attaches to itself that of an undivided unity, +if for no other reason because there is no ground for distinction. And +such a unity, a will or consciousness that is no particular act or idea, +can be known only in the unique experience which mysticism provides. + +[Sidenote: Objective Spiritualism.] + +Sect. 139. The way of Schopenhauer is the way of one who adheres to the +belief that what the thinker knows must always be a part of himself, his +state or his activity. From this point of view the important element of +being, its very essence or substance, is not any definable nature but an +immediate relation to the knower. The consequence is that the universe +in the last analysis can only be defined as a supreme state or activity +into which the individual's consciousness may develop. Spiritualism has, +however, other interests, interests which may be quite independent of +epistemology. It is speculatively interested in a kind of being which it +defines as spiritual, and in terms of which it proposes to define the +universe. Such procedure is radically different from the +epistemological criticism which led Berkeley to maintain that the +_esse_ of objects is in their _percipi_, or Schopenhauer to maintain +that "the world is my idea," or that led both of these philosophers to +find a deeper reality in immediately intuited self-activity. For now it +is proposed to _understand_ spirit, discover its properties, and to +acknowledge it only where these properties appear. I may now know spirit +as an object; which in its properties, to be sure, is quite different +from matter, but which like matter is capable of subsisting quite +independently of my knowledge. This is a metaphysical spiritualism quite +distinct from epistemological spiritualism, and by no means easily made +consistent therewith. Indeed, it exhibits an almost irrepressible +tendency to overstep the bounds both of empiricism and subjectivism, an +historical connection with which alone justifies its introduction in the +present chapter. + +[Sidenote: Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness and Order.] + +Sect. 140. To return again to the instructive example of Bishop +Berkeley, we find him proving God from the evidence of him in +experience, or the need of him to support the claims of experience. + + "But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find + the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like + dependence on _my_ will. When in broad daylight I open my + eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or + no, or to determine what particular objects shall present + themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and + other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of + _my_ will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that + produces them. + + The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than + those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, + order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those + which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a + regular train or series--the admirable connection whereof + sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its + Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the + Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called + _the laws of nature_."[294:18] + +Of the attributes of experience here in question, independence or +"steadiness" is not regarded as _prima facie_ evidence of spirit, but +rather as an aspect of experience for which some cause is necessary. But +it is assumed that the power to "produce," with which such a cause must +be endowed, is the peculiar prerogative of spirit, and that this cause +gives further evidence of its spiritual nature, of its eminently +spiritual nature, in the orderliness and the goodness of its effects. + + "The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the + goodness that perfects all things is the Supreme + Being."[294:19] + +That spirit is possessed of causal efficacy, Berkeley has in an earlier +passage proved by a direct appeal to the individual's sense of power. + + "I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary + and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than + _willing_, and straightway this or that idea arises in my + fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way + for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very + properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and + grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents, + or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse + ourselves with words."[295:20] + +Although Berkeley is here in general agreement with a very considerable +variety of philosophical views, it will be readily observed that this +doctrine tends to lapse into mysticism whenever it is retained in its +purity. Berkeley himself admitted that there was no "idea" of such +power. And philosophers will as a rule either obtain an idea +corresponding to a term or amend the term--always excepting the mystical +appeal to an inarticulate and indefinable experience. Hence pure power +revealed in an ineffable immediate experience tends to give place to +kinds of power to which some definite meaning may be attached. The +energy of physics, defined by measurable quantitative equivalence, is a +case in point. The idealistic trend is in another direction, power +coming to signify ethical or logical connection. Similarly, in the later +philosophy of Berkeley himself, God is known by the nature of his +activity rather than by the fact of his activity; and we are said "to +account for a thing, when we show that it is so best." God's power, in +short, becomes indistinguishable from his universality attended with the +attributes of goodness and orderliness. But this means that the analogy +of the human spirit, conscious of its own activity, is no longer the +basis of the argument. By the divine will is now meant ethical +principles, rather than the "here am I willing" of the empirical +consciousness. Similarly the divine mind is defined in terms of logical +principles, such as coherence and order, rather than in terms of the +"here am I thinking" of the finite knower himself. But enough has been +said to make it plain that this is no longer the stand-point of +empirio-idealism. Indeed, in his last philosophical writing, the +"Siris," Berkeley is so far removed from the principles of knowledge +which made him at once the disciple and the critic of Locke, as to +pronounce himself the devotee of Platonism and the prophet of +transcendentalism. The former strain appears in his conclusion that +"the _principles_ of science are neither objects of sense nor +imagination; and that intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to +truth."[297:21] His transcendentalism appears in his belief that such +principles, participating in the vital unity of the Individual Purpose, +constitute the meaning and so the substantial essence of the universe. + +[Sidenote: The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself.] + +Sect. 141. Such then are the various paths which lead from subjectivism +to other types of philosophy, demonstrating the peculiar aptitude of the +former for departing from its first principle. Beginning with the +relativity of all knowable reality to the individual knower, it +undertakes to conceive reality in one or the other of the terms of this +relation, as particular state of knowledge or as individual subject of +knowledge. But these terms develop an intrinsic nature of their own, and +become respectively _empirical datum_, and _logical_ or _ethical +principle_. In either case the subjectivistic principle of knowledge has +been abandoned. Those whose speculative interest in a definable +objective world has been less strong than their attachment to this +principle, have either accepted the imputation of scepticism, or had +recourse to the radical epistemological doctrine of mysticism. + +[Sidenote: Ethical Theories. Relativism.] + +Sect. 142. Since the essence of subjectivism is epistemological rather +than metaphysical, its practical and religious implications are various. +The ethical theories which are corollary to the tendencies expounded +above, range from extreme egoism to a mystical universalism. The close +connection between the former and relativism is evident, and the form of +egoism most consistent with epistemological relativism is to be found +among those same Sophists who first maintained this latter doctrine. If +we may believe Plato, the Sophists sought to create for their individual +pupils an _appearance_ of good. In the "Theaetetus," Socrates is +represented as speaking thus on behalf of Protagoras: + + "And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no + existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the + evils which are and appear to a man, into goods which are and + appear to him. . . . I say that they (the wise men) are the + physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of + plants--for the husbandmen also take away the evil and + disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and + healthy sensations as well as true ones; and the wise and good + rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil seem just to + states; for whatever appears to be just and fair to a state, + while sanctioned by a state, is just and fair to it; but the + teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the + evil, both in appearance and in reality."[299:22] + +As truth is indistinguishable from the appearance of truth to the +individual, so good is indistinguishable from a particular seeming good. +The supreme moral value according to this plan of life is the agreeable +feeling tone of that dream world to which the individual is forever +consigned. The possible perfection of an experience which is "reduced to +a swarm of impressions," and "ringed round" for each one of us by a +"thick wall of personality" has been brilliantly depicted in the passage +already quoted from Walter Pater, in whom the naturalistic and +subjectivistic motives unite.[299:23] If all my experience is strictly +my own, then my good must likewise be my own. And if all of my +experience is valid only in its instants of immediacy, then my best good +must likewise consist in some "exquisite passion," or stirring of the +senses. + +[Sidenote: Pessimism and Self-denial.] + +Sect. 143. But for Schopenhauer the internal world opens out into the +boundless and unfathomable sea of the universal will. If I retire from +the world upon my own private feelings, I am still short of the true +life, for I am asserting myself against the world. I should seek a sense +of unison with a world whose deeper heart-beats I may learn to feel and +adopt as the rhythm of my own. The folly of willing for one's private +self is the ground of Schopenhauer's pessimism. + + "All _willing_ arises from want, therefore from deficiency, + and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends + it; yet for one wish that is satisfied there remain at least + ten which are denied. Further, the desire lasts long, the + demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily + measured out. But even the final satisfaction is itself only + apparent; every satisfied wish at once makes room for a new + one, both are illusions; the one is known to be so, the other + not yet. No attained object of desire can give lasting + satisfaction, but merely a fleeting gratification; it is like + the alms thrown to the beggar, that keeps him alive to-day + that his misery may be prolonged till the morrow. . . . The + subject of willing is thus constantly stretched on the + revolving wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the + Danaids, is the ever-longing Tantalus."[300:24] + +The escape from this torture and self-deception is possible through the +same mystical experience, the same blending with the universe that +conditions knowledge. + +[Sidenote: The Ethics of Welfare.] + +Sect. 144. But though pleasant dreaming be the most consistent practical +sequel to a subjectivistic epistemology, its _individualism_ presents +another basis for life with quite different possibilities of emphasis. +It may develop into an aggressive egoism of the type represented by the +sophist Thrasymachus, in his proclamation that "might is right, justice +the interest of the stronger."[301:25] But more commonly it is tempered +by a conception of social interest, and serves as the champion of action +against contemplation. The gospel of action is always individualistic. +It requires of the individual a sense of his independence, and of the +real virtue of his initiative. Hence those voluntarists who emphasize +the many individual wills and decline to reduce them, after the manner +of Schopenhauer, to a universal, may be said to afford a direct +justification of it. It is true that this practical realism threatens +the tenability of an epistemological idealism, but the two have been +united, and because of their common emphasis upon the individual such +procedure is not entirely inconsequential. Friedrich Paulsen, whose +panpsychism has already been cited, is an excellent case in point. The +only good, he maintains, is "welfare," the fulfilment of those natural +desires which both distinguish the individual and signify his +continuity with all grades of being. + + "The goal at which the will aims does not consist in a maximum + of pleasurable feelings, but in the normal exercise of the + vital functions for which the species is predisposed. In the + case of man the mode of life is on the whole determined by the + nature of the historical unity from which the individual + evolves as a member. Here the objective content of life, after + which the will strives, also enters into consciousness with + the progressive evolution of presentation; the type of life + becomes a conscious ideal of life."[302:26] + +Here, contrary to the teaching of Schopenhauer, the good consists in +individual attainment, the extension and fulfilment of the _distinct_ +interests that arise from the common fund of nature. To be and to do to +the uttermost, to realize the maximum from nature's investment in one's +special capacities and powers--this is indeed the first principle of a +morality of action. + +[Sidenote: The Ethical Community.] + +Sect. 145. But a type of ethics still further removed from the initial +relativism has been adopted and more or less successfully assimilated by +subjectivistic philosophies. Accepting Berkeley's spirits, with their +indefinite capacities, and likewise the stability of the ideal +principles that underlie a God-administered world, and morality becomes +the obedience which the individual renders to the law. The individual, +free to act in his own right, cooperates with the purposes of the +general spiritual community, whose laws are worthy of obedience though +not coercive. The recognition of such a spiritual citizenship, entailing +opportunities, duties, and obligations, rather than thraldom, partakes +of the truth as well as the inadequacy of common-sense. + +[Sidenote: The Religion of Mysticism.] + +Sect. 146. As for religion, at least two distinct practical +appreciations of the universe have been historically associated with +this chapter in philosophy. The one of these is the mysticism of +Schopenhauer, the religious sequel to a universalistic voluntarism. +Schopenhauer's ethics, his very philosophy, is religion. For the good +and the true are alike attainable only through identification with the +Absolute Will. This consummation of life, transcending practical and +theoretical differences, engulfing and effacing all qualities and all +values, is like the Nirvana of the Orient--a positive ideal only for one +who has appraised the apparent world at its real value. + + "Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the + entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full + of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom + the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, + which is so real, with all it's suns and milky-ways--is + nothing."[304:27] + +[Sidenote: The Religion of Individual Cooperation with God.] + +Sect. 147. From the union of the two motives of voluntarism and +individualism springs another and a more familiar type of religion, that +of cooperative spiritual endeavor. In the religion of Schopenhauer the +soul must utterly lose itself for the sake of peace; here the soul must +persist in its own being and activity for the sake of the progressive +goodness of the world. For Schopenhauer God is the universal solution, +in which all motions cease and all differences disappear; here God is +the General of moral forces. The deeper and more significant universe is + + "a society of rational agents, acting under the eye of + Providence, concurring in one design to promote the common + benefit of the whole, and conforming their actions to the + established laws and order of the Divine parental wisdom: + wherein each particular agent shall not consider himself + apart, but as the member of a great City, whose author and + founder is God: in which the civil laws are no other than the + rules of virtue and the duties of religion: and where + everyone's true interest is combined with his duty."[304:28] + +But so uncompromising an optimism is not essential to this religion. +Its distinction lies rather in its acceptance of the manifest plurality +of souls, and its appeal to the faith that is engendered by +service.[305:29] As William James has said: + + "Even God's being is sacred from ours. To cooperate with his + creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants + of us. In such cooperation with his purposes, not in any + chimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretical + drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our + destiny."[305:30] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[267:1] PRELIMINARY NOTE. By _Subjectivism_ is meant that system of +philosophy which construes the universe in accordance with the +epistemological principle that _all knowledge is of its own states or +activities_. In so far as subjectivism reduces reality to _states of +knowledge_, such as _perceptions_ or _ideas_, it is _phenomenalism_. In +so far as it reduces reality to a more _internal active principle_ such +as _spirit_ or _will_, it is _spiritualism_. + +[268:2] Berkeley: _Complete Works_, Vol. I, p. 352. Fraser's edition. + +[269:3] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 156. Translation by Jowett. The italics are +mine. + +[270:4] Plato: _Op. cit._, 166. + +[271:5] +ale:thes ho hekasto: hekastote dokei.+ + +[273:6] For another issue out of this situation, cf. Sects. 185-187. + +[276:7] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 380-381. + +[276:8] _Ibid._, p. 389. + +[277:9] _Ibid._, p. 397. + +[278:10] _Ibid._, p. 418. + +[279:11] _Ibid._, pp. 403-404. + +[282:12] Cf. Pearson: _Grammar of Science_, Chap. II. See above, Sect. +118. + +[283:13] See Chap. XI. Cf. also Sect. 140. + +[283:14] The same may be said of the "permanent possibilities of +sensation," proposed by J. S. Mill. Such possibilities outside of actual +perception are either nothing or things such as they are known to be +_in_ perception. In either case they are not perceptions. + +In Ernst Mach's _Analysis of Sensations_, the reader will find an +interesting transition from sensationalism to realism through the +substitution of the term _Bestandtheil_ for _Empfindung_. (See +Translation by Williams, pp. 18-20.) See below, Sect. 207. + +[284:15] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, p. 447. + +[287:16] Schopenhauer: _The World as Will and Idea_. Translation by +Haldane and Kemp, Vol. I, p. 141. + +[288:17] Quoted from Naegeli: _Die Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der +Abstammungslehre_, by Friedrich Paulsen, in his _Introduction to +Philosophy_. Translation by Thilly, p. 103. + +[294:18] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, p. 273. + +[294:19] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 272-273. + +[295:20] _Op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 278. + +[297:21] _Op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 249. + +[299:22] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 167. Translation by Jowett. + +[299:23] See Sect. 121. + +[300:24] Schopenhauer: _Op. cit._ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, Vol. +I, pp. 253-254. + +[301:25] See Plato: _Republic_, Bk. I, 338. + +[302:26] Paulsen: _Op. cit._, p. 423. + +[304:27] Schopenhauer: _Op. cit._ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, p. +532. + +[304:28] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 138. + +[305:29] For an interesting characterization of this type of religion, +cf. Royce: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, p. 46. + +[305:30] James: _The Will to Believe_, p. 141. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +ABSOLUTE REALISM[306:1] + + +[Sidenote: The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, or the +Absolute.] + +Sect. 148. No one has understood better than the philosopher himself +that he cannot hope to be popular with men of practical common-sense. +Indeed, it has commonly been a matter of pride with him. The classic +representation of the philosopher's faith in himself is to be found in +Plato's "Republic." The philosopher is there portrayed in the famous +cave simile as one who having seen the light itself can no longer +distinguish the shadows which are apparent to those who sit perpetually +in the twilight. Within the cave of shadows he is indeed less at his +ease than those who have never seen the sun. But since he knows the +source of the shadows, his knowledge surrounds that of the shadow +connoisseurs. And his equanimity need not suffer from the contempt of +those whom he understands better than they understand themselves. The +history of philosophy is due to the dogged persistence with which the +philosopher has taken himself seriously and endured the poor opinion of +the world. But the pride of the philosopher has done more than +perpetuate the philosophical outlook and problem; it has led to the +formulation of a definite philosophical conception, and of two great +philosophical doctrines. The conception is that of the _absolute_; and +the doctrines are that of the _absolute being_, and that of the +_absolute self_ or _mind_. The former of these doctrines is the topic of +the present chapter. + +Among the early Greeks the role of the philosopher was one of +superlative dignity. In point of knowledge he was less easily satisfied +than other men. He thought beyond immediate practical problems, devoting +himself to a profounder reflection, that could not but induce in him a +sense of superior intellectual worth. The familiar was not binding upon +him, for his thought was emancipated from routine and superficiality. +Furthermore his intellectual courage and resolution did not permit him +to indulge in triviality, doubt, or paradox. He sought his own with a +faith that could not be denied. Even Heraclitus the Dark, who was also +called "the Weeping Philosopher," because he found at the very heart of +nature that transiency which the philosophical mind seeks to escape, +felt himself to be exalted as well as isolated by that insight. But this +sentiment of personal aloofness led at once to a division of experience. +He who knows truly belongs to another and more abiding world. As there +is a philosophical way of thought, there is a philosophical way of life, +and _a philosophical object_. Since the philosopher and the common man +do not see alike, the terms of their experience are incommensurable. In +Parmenides the Eleatic this motive is most strikingly exhibited. There +is a _Way of Truth_ which diverges from the _Way of Opinion_. The +philosopher walks the former way alone. And there is an object of truth, +accessible only to one who takes this way of truth. Parmenides finds +this object to be the content of pure affirmation. + + "One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that _It + is_. In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and + indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end. + Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now _it is_, all at once, + a continuous one."[308:2] + +The philosophy of Parmenides, commonly called the Eleatic Philosophy, +is notable for this emergence of the pure concept of _absolute being_ as +the final object of knowledge. The philosopher aims to discover that +which is, and so turns away from that which is not or that which ceases +to be. The negative and transient aspects of experience only hinder him +in his search for the eternal. It was the great Eleatic insight to +realize that the outcome of thought is thus predetermined; that the +answer to philosophy is contained in the question of philosophy. The +philosopher, in that he resolutely avoids all partiality, relativity, +and superficiality, must affirm a complete, universal, and ultimate +being as the very object of that perfect knowledge which he means to +possess. This object is known in the history of these philosophies as +the _infinite_ or _absolute_.[309:3] + +[Sidenote: The Eleatic Conception of Being.] + +Sect. 149. The Eleatic reasons somewhat as follows. The philosopher +seeks to know what is. The object of his knowledge will then contain as +its primary and essential predicate, that of being. It is a step further +to _define_ being in terms of this essential predicate. + +Parmenides thinks of being as a power or strength, a positive +self-maintenance to which all affirmations refer. The remainder of the +Eleatic philosophy is the analysis of this concept and the proof of its +implications. Being must persist through all change, and span all +chasms. Before being there can be only nothing, which is the same as to +say that so far as being is concerned there is no before. Similarly +there can be no after or beyond. There can be no motion, change, or +division of being, because being will be in all parts of every division, +and in all stages of every process. Hence being is "uncreated and +indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end." + +The argument turns upon the application to being as a whole of the +meaning and the implications of _only being_. Being is the affirmative +or positive. From that _alone_, one can derive only such properties as +eternity or unity. For generation and decay and plurality may belong to +that which is _also_ affirmative and positive, but not to that which is +affirmative and positive _only_. The Eleatic philosophy is due, then, to +the determination to derive the whole of reality from the bare necessity +of being, to cut down reality to what flows entirely from the assertion +of its only known necessary aspect, that of being. We meet here in its +simplest form a persistent rationalistic motive, the attempt to derive +the universe from the isolation and analysis of its most universal +character. As in the case of every well-defined philosophy, this motive +is always attended by a "besetting" problem. Here it is the accounting +for what, empirically at least, is alien to that universal character. +And this difficulty is emphasized rather than resolved by Parmenides in +his designation of a limbo of opinion, "in which is no true belief at +all," to which the manifold of common experience with all its +irrelevancies can be relegated. + +[Sidenote: Spinoza's Conception of Substance.] + +Sect. 150. The Eleatic philosophy, enriched and supplemented, appears +many centuries later in the rigorous rationalism of Spinoza.[311:4] With +Spinoza philosophy is a demonstration of necessities after the manner of +geometry. Reality is to be set forth in theorems derived from +fundamental axioms and definitions. As in the case of Parmenides, these +necessities are the implications of the very problem of being. The +philosopher's problem is made to solve itself. But for Spinoza that +problem is more definite and more pregnant. The problematic being must +not only be, but must be _sufficient to itself_. What the philosopher +seeks to know is primarily an intrinsic entity. Its nature must be +independent of other natures, and my knowledge of it independent of my +knowledge of anything else. Reality is something which need not be +sought further. So construed, being is in Spinoza's philosophy termed +_substance_. It will be seen that to define substance is to affirm the +existence of it, for substance is so defined as to embody the very +qualification for existence. Whatever exists exists under the form of +substance, as that "which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: +in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently +of any other conception."[312:5] + +[Sidenote: Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The Modes and +the Attributes.] + +Sect. 151. There remains but one further fundamental thesis for the +establishment of the Spinozistic philosophy, the thesis which maintains +the exclusive existence of the one "absolutely infinite being," or God. +The exclusive existence of God follows from his existence, because of +the exhaustiveness of his nature. His is the nature "consisting in +infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite +essentiality." He will contain all meaning, and all possible meaning, +within his fixed and necessary constitution. It is evident that if such +a God exist, nothing can fall outside of him. One such substance must be +the only substance. But upon what grounds are we to assert God's +existence? + +To proceed further with Spinoza's philosophy we must introduce two terms +which are scarcely less fundamental in his system than that of +substance. The one of these is "attribute," by which he means _kind_ or +general property; the other is "mode," by which he means _case_ or +individual thing. Spinoza's proof of God consists in showing that no +single mode, single attribute, or finite group of modes or attributes, +can be a substance; but only an infinite system of all modes of all +attributes. Translated into common speech this means that neither kinds +nor cases, nor special groups of either, can stand alone and be of +themselves, but only the unity of all possible cases of all possible +kinds. + +The argument concerning the possible substantiality of the case or +individual thing is relatively simple. Suppose an attribute or kind, +_A_, of which there are cases _am_{1}, _am_{2}, _am_{3}, etc. The +number of cases is never involved in the nature of the kind, as is seen +for example in the fact that the definition of triangle prescribes no +special number of individual triangles. Hence _am_{1}, _am_{2}, +_am_{3}, etc., must be explained by something outside of their nature. +Their being cases of _A_ does not account for their existing severally. +This is Spinoza's statement of the argument that individual events, such +as motions or sensations, are not self-dependent, but belong to a +context of like events which are mutually dependent. + +The question of the attribute is more difficult. Why may not an +attribute as a complete domain of interdependent events, itself be +independent or substantial? Spinoza's predecessor, Descartes, had +maintained precisely that thesis in behalf of the domain of thought and +the domain of space. Spinoza's answer rests upon the famous ontological +argument, inherited from scholasticism and generally accepted in the +first period of modern philosophy. The evidence of existence, he +declares, is clear and distinct conceivability. + + "For a person to say that he has a clear and distinct--that + is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is not sure + whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said + that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was + false."[314:6] + +Now we can form a clear and distinct idea of an absolutely infinite +being that shall have all possible attributes. This idea is a +well-recognized standard and object of reference for thought. But it is +a conception which is highly qualified, not only through its clearness +and distinctness, but also through its abundance of content. It affirms +itself therefore with a certainty that surpasses any other certainty, +because it is supported by each and every other certainty, and even by +the residuum of possibility. If any intelligible meaning be permitted to +affirm itself, so much the more irresistible is the claim of this +infinitely rich meaning. Since every attribute contributes to its +validity, the being with infinite attributes is infinitely or absolutely +valid. The conclusion of the argument is now obvious. If the being +constituted by the infinite attributes exists, it swallows up all +possibilities and exists exclusively. + +[Sidenote: The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God.] + +Sect. 152. The vulnerable point in Spinoza's argument can thus be +expressed: that which is important is questionable, and that which is +unquestionable is of doubtful importance. Have I indeed a clear and +distinct idea of an absolutely infinite being? The answer turns upon the +meaning of the phrase "idea of." It is true I can add to such meaning +as I apprehend the thought of possible other meaning, and suppose the +whole to have a definiteness and systematic unity like that of the +triangle. But such an idea is problematic. I am compelled to use the +term "possible," and so to confess the failure of definite content to +measure up to my idea. My idea of an absolutely infinite being is like +my idea of a universal language: I can think _of_ it, but I cannot +_think it out_, for lack of data or because of the conflicting testimony +of other data. If I mean the infinity of my being to be a term of +inclusiveness, and to insist that the all must be, and that there can be +nothing not included in the all, I can scarcely be denied. But it is +reasonable to doubt the importance of such a truth. If, on the other +hand, I mean that my infinite being shall have the compactness and +organic unity of a triangle, I must admit that such a being is indeed +problematic. The degree to which the meaning of the part is dependent +upon the meaning of the whole, or the degree to which the geometrical +analogy is to be preferred to the analogy of aggregates, like the events +within a year, is a problem that falls quite outside Spinoza's +fundamental arguments. + +[Sidenote: Spinoza's Provision for the Finite.] + +Sect. 153. But the advance of Spinoza over the Eleatics must not be lost +sight of. The modern philosopher has so conceived being as to provide +for parts within an individual unity. The geometrical analogy is a most +illuminating one, for it enables us to understand how manyness may be +indispensable to a being that is essentially unitary. The triangle as +triangle is one. But it could not be such without sides and angles. The +unity is equally necessary to the parts, for sides and angles of a +triangle could not be such without an arrangement governed by the nature +triangle. The whole of nature may be similarly conceived: as the +reciprocal necessity of _natura naturans_, or nature defined in respect +of its unity, and _natura naturata_, or nature specified in detail. +There is some promise here of a reconciliation of the _Way of Opinion_ +with the _Way of Truth_. Opinion would be a gathering of detail, truth a +comprehension of the intelligible unity. Both would be provided for +through the consideration that whatever is complete and necessary must +be made up of incompletenesses that are necessary to it. + +[Sidenote: Transition to Teleological Conceptions.] + +Sect. 154. This consideration, however, does not receive its most +effective formulation in Spinoza. The isolation of the parts, the +actual severalty and irrelevance of the modes, still presents a grave +problem. Is there a kind of whole to which not only parts but fragments, +or parts in their very incompleteness, are indispensable? This would +seem to be true of a _progression_ or _development_, since that would +require both perfection as its end, and degrees of imperfection as its +stages. Spinoza was prevented from making much of this idea by his +rejection of the principle of _teleology_. He regarded appreciation or +valuation as a projection of personal bias. "Nature has no particular +goal in view," and "final causes are mere human figments." "The +perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and +power."[318:7] The philosophical method which Spinoza here repudiates, +the interpretation of the world in moral terms, is _Platonism_, an +independent and profoundly important movement, belonging to the same +general realistic type with Eleaticism and Spinozism. Absolute being is +again the fundamental conception. Here, however, it is conceived that +being is primarily not affirmation or self-sufficiency, but the _good_ +or _ideal_. There are few great metaphysical systems that have not been +deeply influenced by Platonism; hence the importance of understanding it +in its purity. To this end we must return again to the early Greek +conception of the philosopher; for Platonism, like Eleaticism, is a +sequel to the philosopher's self-consciousness. + +[Sidenote: Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical.] + +Sect. 155. Although the first Greek philosophers, such men as Thales, +Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, were clearly aware of their +distinction and high calling, it by no means follows that they were good +judges of themselves. Their sense of intellectual power was +unsuspecting; and they praised philosophy without definitely raising the +question of its meaning. They were like unskilled players who try all +the stops and scales of an organ, and know that somehow they can make a +music that exceeds the noises, monotones or simple melodies of those who +play upon lesser instruments. They knew their power rather than their +instrument or their art. The first philosophers, in short, were +self-conscious but not self-critical. + +[Sidenote: Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists.] + +Sect. 156. The immediately succeeding phase in the history of Greek +philosophy was a curtailment, but only in the most superficial sense a +criticism, of the activity of the philosopher. In the Periclean Age +philosophy suffered more from inattention than from refutation. The +scepticism of the sophists, who were the knowing men of this age, was +not so much conviction as indisposition. They failed to recognize the +old philosophical problem; it did not _appeal_ to them as a genuine +problem. The sophists were the intellectual men of an age of _humanism_, +_individualism_, and _secularism_. These were years in which the circle +of human society, the state with its institutions, citizenship with its +manifold activities and interests, bounded the horizon of thought. What +need to look beyond? Life was not a problem, but an abundant opportunity +and a sense of capacity. The world was not a mystery, but a place of +entertainment and a sphere of action. Of this the sophists were faithful +witnesses. In their love of novelty, irreverence, impressionism, +elegance of speech, and above all in their praise of individual +efficiency, they preached and pandered to their age. Their public, +though it loved to abuse them, was the greatest sophist of them +all--brilliant and capricious, incomparably rich in all but wisdom. The +majority belonged to what Plato called "the sight-loving, art-loving, +busy class." This is an age, then, when the man of practical +common-sense is pre-eminent, and the philosopher with his dark sayings +has passed away. The pride of wisdom has given way to the pride of power +and the pride of cleverness. The many men pursue the many goods of life, +and there is no spirit among them all who, sitting apart in +contemplation, wonders at the meaning of the whole. + +[Sidenote: Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher.] + +Sect. 157. But in their midst there moved a strange prophet, whom they +mistook for one of themselves. Socrates was not one who prayed in the +wilderness, but a man of the streets and the market-place, who talked +rather more incessantly than the rest, and apparently with less right. +He did not testify to the truth, but pleaded ignorance in extenuation of +an exasperating habit of asking questions. There was, however, a humor +and a method in his innocence that arrested attention. He was a +formidable adversary in discussion from his very irresponsibility; and +he was especially successful with the more rhetorical sophists because +he chose his own weapons, and substituted critical analysis, question +and answer, for the long speeches to which these teachers were +habituated by their profession. He appeared to be governed by an +insatiable inquisitiveness, and a somewhat malicious desire to discredit +those who spoke with authority. + +But to those who knew him better, and especially to Plato, who knew him +best, Socrates was at once the sweetest and most compelling spirit of +his age. There was a kind of truth in the quality of his character. He +was perhaps _the first of all reverent men_. In the presence of conceit +his self-depreciation was ironical, but in another presence it was most +genuine, and his deepest spring of thought and action. This other +presence was his own ideal. Socrates was sincerely humble because, +expecting so much of philosophy, he saw his own deficiency. Unlike the +unskilled player, he did not seek to _make_ music; but he loved music, +and knew that such music as is indeed music was beyond his power. On the +other hand he was well aware of his superiority to those in whom +self-satisfaction was possible because they had no conception of the +ideal. Of such he could say in truth that they did not know enough even +to realize the extent of their ignorance. The world has long been +familiar with the vivid portrayal of the Socratic consciousness which is +contained in Plato's "Apology." Socrates had set out in life with the +opinion that his was an age of exceptional enlightenment. But as he +came to know men he found that after all no one of them really knew what +he was about. Each "sight-loving, art-loving, busy" man was quite blind +to the meaning of life. While he was capable of practical achievement, +his judgments concerning the real virtue of his achievements were +conventional and ungrounded, a mere reflection of tradition and opinion. +When asked concerning the meaning of life, or the ground of his +opinions, he was thrown into confusion or aggravated to meaningless +reiteration. Such men, Socrates reflected, were both unwise and +confirmed in their folly through being unconscious of it. Because he +knew that vanity is vanity, that opinion is indeed mere opinion, +Socrates felt himself to be the wisest man in a generation of dogged +unwisdom. + +[Sidenote: Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth.] + +Sect. 158. It is scarcely necessary to point out that this insight, +however negatively it be used, is a revelation of positive knowledge. +Heraclitus and Parmenides claimed to know; Socrates disclaimed knowledge +_for reasons_. Like all real criticism this is at once a confounding of +error and a prophecy of truth. The truth so discovered is indeed not +ordinary truth concerning historical or physical things, but not on +that account less significant and necessary. This truth, it will also be +admitted, is virtually rather than actually set forth by Socrates +himself. He knew that life has some meaning which those who live with +conviction desire at heart to realize, and that knowledge has principles +with which those who speak with conviction intend to be consistent. +There is, in short, a rational life and a rational discourse. +Furthermore, a rational life will be a life wisely directed to the end +of the good; and a rational discourse one constructed with reference to +the real natures of things, and the necessities which flow from these +natures. But Socrates did not conclusively define either the meaning of +life or the form of perfect knowledge. He testified to the necessity of +some such truths, and his testimony demonstrated both the blindness of +his contemporaries and also his own deficiency. + +[Sidenote: The Historical Preparation for Plato.] + +Sect. 159. The character and method of Socrates have their best foil in +the sophists, but their bearing on the earlier philosophers is for our +purposes even more instructive. Unlike Socrates these philosophers had +not made a study of the task of the philosopher. They _were_ +philosophers--"spectators of all time and all existence"; but they were +precritical or dogmatic philosophers, to whom it had not occurred to +define the requirements of philosophy. They knew no perfect knowledge +other than their own actual knowledge. They defined being and +interpreted life without reflecting upon the quality of the knowledge +whose object is being, or the quality of insight that would indeed be +practical wisdom. But when through Socrates the whole philosophical +prospect is again revealed after the period of humanistic concentration, +it is as an ideal whose possibilities, whose necessities, are conceived +before they are realized. Socrates celebrates the role of the +philosopher without assigning it to himself. The new philosophical +object is the philosopher himself; and the new insight a knowledge of +knowledge itself. These three types of intellectual procedure, dogmatic +speculation concerning being, humanistic interest in life, and the +self-criticism of thought, form the historical preparation for Plato, +the philosopher who defined being as the ideal of thought, and upon this +ground interpreted life. + +There is no more striking case in history of the subtle continuity of +thought than the relation between Plato and his master Socrates. The +wonder of it is due to the absence of any formulation of doctrine on +the part of Socrates himself. He only lived and talked; and yet Plato +created a system of philosophy in which he is faithfully embodied. The +form of embodiment is the dialogue, in which the talking of Socrates is +perpetuated and conducted to profounder issues, and in which his life is +both rendered and interpreted. But as the vehicle of Plato's thought +preserves and makes perfect the Socratic method, so the thought itself +begins with the Socratic motive and remains to the end an expression of +it. The presentiment of perfect knowledge which distinguished Socrates +from his contemporaries becomes in Plato the clear vision of a realm of +ideal truth. + +[Sidenote: Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good.] + +Sect. 160. Plato begins his philosophy with the philosopher and the +philosopher's interest. The philosopher is a lover, who like all lovers +longs for the beautiful. But he is the supreme lover, for he loves not +the individual beautiful object but the Absolute Beauty itself. He is a +lover too in that he does not possess, but somehow apprehends his object +from afar. Though imperfect, he seeks perfection; though standing like +all his fellows in the twilight of half-reality, he faces toward the +sun. Now it is the fundamental proposition of the Platonic philosophy +that reality is the sun itself, or the perfection whose possession every +wise thinker covets, whose presence would satisfy every longing of +experience. The real is that beloved object which is "truly beautiful, +delicate, perfect, and blessed." There is both a serious ground for such +an affirmation and an important truth in its meaning. The ground is the +evident incompleteness of every special judgment concerning experience. +We understand only in part, and we know that we understand only in part. +What we discover is real enough for practical purposes, but even +common-sense questions the true reality of its objects. Special +judgments seem to terminate our thought abruptly and arbitrarily. We +give "the best answer we can," but such answers do not come as the +completion of our thinking. Our thought is in some sense surely a +seeking, and it would appear that we are not permitted to rest and be +satisfied at any stage of it. If we do so we are like the +sophists--blind to our own ignorance. But it is equally true that our +thought is straightforward and progressive. We are not permitted to +return to earlier stages, but must push on to that which is not less, +but more, than what we have as yet found. There is good hope, then, of +understanding what the ideal may be from our knowledge of the direction +which it impels us to follow. + +But to understand Plato's conception of the progression of experience we +must again catch up the Socratic strain which he weaves into every +theme. For Socrates, student of life and mankind, all objects were +objects of interest, and all interests practical interests. One is +ignorant when one does not know the good of things; opinionative when +one rates things by conventional standards; wise when one knows their +real good. In Platonism this practical interpretation of experience +appears in the principle that the object of perfect knowledge is _the +good_. The nature of things which one seeks to know better is the good +of things, the absolute being which is the goal of all thinking is the +very good itself. Plato does not use the term good in any merely +utilitarian sense. Indeed it is very significant that for Plato there is +no cleavage between theoretical and practical interests. To be morally +good is to know the good, to set one's heart on the true object of +affection; and to be theoretically sound is to understand perfection. +The good itself is the end of every aim, that in which all interests +converge. Hence it cannot be defined, as might a special good, in terms +of the fulfilment of a set of concrete conditions, but only in terms of +the sense or direction of all purposes. The following passage occurs in +the "Symposium": + + "The true order of going or being led by others to the things + of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which + he mounts upward for the sake of that other beauty, going from + one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair + forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, + until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute + beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty + is."[329:8] + +[Sidenote: The Progression of Experience toward God.] + +Sect. 161. There is, then, a "true order of going," and an order that +leads from one to many, from thence to forms, from thence to morality, +and from thence to the general objects of thought or _the ideas_. In the +"Republic," where the proper education of the philosopher is in +question, it is proposed that he shall study arithmetic, geometry, +astronomy, and dialectic. Thus in each case mathematics is the first +advance in knowledge, and dialectic the nearest to perfection. Most of +Plato's examples are drawn from mathematics. This science replaces the +variety and vagueness of the forms of experience with _clear_, +_unitary_, _definite_, and _eternal_ natures, such as the number and +the geometrical figure. Thus certain individual things are approximately +triangular, but subject to alteration, and indefinitely many. On the +other hand the triangle as defined by geometry is the fixed and +unequivocal nature or idea which such experiences suggest; and the +philosophical mind will at once pass to it from these. But the +mathematical objects are themselves not thoroughly understood when +understood only in mathematical terms, for the foundations of +mathematics are arbitrary. And the same is true of all the so-called +special sciences. Even the scientists themselves, says Plato, + + "only dream about being, but never can behold the waking + reality so long as they leave the hypotheses they use + unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For + when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the + conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of + he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a conventional + statement will ever become science?"[330:9] + +Within the science of dialectics we are to understand the connections +and sequences of ideas themselves, in the hope of eliminating every +arbitrariness and conventionality within a system of truth that is pure +and self-luminous rationality. To this science, which is the great +interest of his later years, Plato contributes only incomplete studies +and experiments. We must be satisfied with the playful answer with +which, in the "Republic," he replies to Glaucon's entreaty that "he +proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain, and +describe that in like manner": "Dear Glaucon, you will not be able to +follow me here, though I would do my best." + +But a philosophical system has been projected. The real is that perfect +significance or meaning which thought and every interest suggests, and +toward which there is in experience an appreciable movement. It is this +significance which makes things what they really are, and which +constitutes our understanding of them. In itself it transcends the steps +which lead to it; "for God," says Plato, "mingles not with men." But it +is nevertheless the meaning of human life. And this we can readily +conceive. The last word may transform the sentence from nonsense into +sense, and it would be true to say that its sense mingles not with +nonsense. Similarly the last touch of the brush may transform an +inchoate mass of color into a picture, disarray into an object of +beauty; and its beauty mingles not with ugliness. So life, when it +finally realizes itself, obtains a new and incommensurable quality of +perfection in which humanity is transformed into deity. There is frankly +no provision for imperfection in such a world. In his later writings +Plato sounds his characteristic note less frequently, and permits the +ideal to create a cosmos through the admixture of matter. But in his +moment of inspiration, the Platonist will have no sense for the +imperfect. It is the darkness behind his back, or the twilight through +which he passes on his way to the light. He will use even the beauties +of earth only "as steps along which he mounts upward for the sake of +that other beauty." + +[Sidenote: Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to +Platonism.] + +Sect. 162. We have met, then, with two distinct philosophical doctrines +which arise from the conception of the _absolute_, or the philosopher's +peculiar object: the doctrine of the _absolute being_ or _substance_, +and that of the _absolute ideal_ or _good_. Both doctrines are realistic +in that they assume reality to be demonstrated or revealed, rather than +created, by knowledge. Both are rationalistic in that they develop a +system of philosophy from the problem of philosophy, or deduce a +definition of reality from the conception, of reality. There remains a +third doctrine of the same type--the philosophy of Aristotle, the most +elaborately constructed system of Greek antiquity, and the most potent +influence exerted upon the Scholastic Philosophy of the long mediaeval +period. This philosophy was rehabilitated in the eighteenth century by +Leibniz, the brilliant librarian of the court of Hanover. The +extraordinary comprehensiveness of Aristotle's philosophy makes it quite +impossible to render here even a general account of it. There is +scarcely any human discipline that does not to some extent draw upon it. +We are concerned only with the central principles of the metaphysics. + +Upon the common ground of rationalism and realism, Plato and Aristotle +are complementary in temper, method, and principle. Plato's is the +genius of inspiration and fertility, Aristotle's the genius of +erudition, mastery, and synthesis. In form, Plato's is the gift of +expression, Aristotle's the gift of arrangement. Plato was born and bred +an aristocrat, and became the lover of the best--the uncompromising +purist; Aristotle is middle-class, and limitlessly wide, hospitable, and +patient in his interests. Thus while both are speculative and acute, +Plato's mind is intensive and profound, Aristotle's extensive and +orderly. It was inevitable, then, that Aristotle should find Plato +one-sided. The philosophy of the ideal is not worldly enough to be true. +It is a religion rather than a theory of reality. Aristotle, however, +would not renounce it, but construe it that it may better provide for +nature and history. This is the significance of his new terminology. +Matter, to which Plato reluctantly concedes some room as a principle of +degradation in the universe, is now admitted to good standing. _Matter_ +or material is indispensable to being as its potentiality or that out of +which it is constituted. The ideal, on the other hand, loses its +exclusive title to the predicate of reality, and becomes the _form_, or +the determinate nature which exists only in its particular embodiments. +The being or _substance_ is the concrete individual, of which these are +the abstracted aspects. Aristotle's "form," like Plato's "idea," is a +teleological principle. The essential nature of the object is its +perfection. It is furthermore essential to the object that it should +strive after a higher perfection. With Aristotle, however, the reality +is not the consummation of the process, the highest perfection in and +for itself, but the very hierarchy of objects that ascends toward it. +The highest perfection, or God, is not itself coextensive with being, +but the final cause of being--that on account of which the whole +progression of events takes place. Reality is the development with all +of its ascending stages from the maximum of potentiality, or matter, to +the maximum of actuality, or God the pure form. + +[Sidenote: The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of Platonism +and Spinozism.] + +Sect. 163. To understand the virtue of this philosophy as a basis for +the reconciliation of different interests, we must recall the relation +between Plato and Spinoza. Their characteristic difference appears to +the best advantage in connection with mathematical truth. Both regarded +geometry as the best model for philosophical thinking, but for different +reasons. Spinoza prized geometry for its necessity, and proposed to +extend it. His philosophy is the attempt to formulate a geometry of +being, which shall set forth the inevitable certainties of the universe. +Plato, on the other hand, prized geometry rather for its definition of +types, for its knowledge of pure or perfect natures such as the circle +and triangle, which in immediate experience are only approximated. His +philosophy defines reality similarly as the absolute perfection. +Applied to nature Spinozism is mechanical, and looks for necessary laws, +while Platonism is teleological, and looks for adaptation and +significance. Aristotle's position is intermediate. With Plato he +affirms that the good is the ultimate principle. But this very principle +is conceived to govern a universe of substances, each of which maintains +its own proper being, and all of which are reciprocally determined in +their changes. Final causes dominate nature, but work through efficient +causes. Reality is not pure perfection, as in Platonism, nor the +indifferent necessity, as in Spinozism, but the system of beings +necessary to the complete progression toward the highest perfection. The +Aristotelian philosophy promises, then, to overcome both the hard +realism of Parmenides and Spinoza, and also the supernaturalism of +Plato. + +[Sidenote: Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development to the +Problem of Imperfection.] + +Sect. 164. But it promises, furthermore, to remedy the defect common to +these two doctrines, the very besetting problem of this whole type of +philosophy. That problem, as has been seen, is to provide for the +imperfect within the perfect, for the temporal incidents of nature and +history within the eternal being. Many absolutist philosophers have +declared the explanation of this realm to be impossible, and have +contented themselves with calling it the realm of opinion or appearance. +And this realm of opinion or appearance has been used as a proof of the +absolute. Zeno, the pupil of Parmenides, was the first to elaborate what +have since come to be known as the paradoxes of the empirical world. +Most of these paradoxes turn upon the infinite extension and +divisibility of space and time. Zeno was especially interested in the +difficulty of conceiving motion, which involves both space and time, +and thought himself to have demonstrated its absurdity and +impossibility.[337:10] His argument is thus the complement of +Parmenides's argument for the indivisible and unchanging substance. Now +the method which Zeno here adopts may be extended to cover the whole +realm of nature and history. We should then be dialectically driven from +this realm to take refuge in absolute being. But the empirical world is +not destroyed by disparagement, and cannot long lack champions even +among the absolutists themselves. The reconciliation of nature and +history with the absolute being became the special interest of Leibniz, +the great modern Aristotelian. As a scientist and man of affairs, he +was profoundly dissatisfied with Spinoza's resolution of nature, the +human individual, and the human society into the universal being. He +became an advocate of individualism while retaining the general aim and +method of rationalism. + +Like Aristotle, Leibniz attributes reality to individual substances, +which he calls "monads"; and like Aristotle he conceives these monads to +compose an ascending order, with God, the monad of monads, as its +dominating goal. + + "Furthermore, every substance is like an entire world and like + a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole world which it + portrays, each one in its own fashion; almost as the same city + is variously represented according to the various situations + of him who is regarding it. Thus the universe is multiplied in + some sort as many times as there are substances, and the glory + of God is multiplied in the same way by as many wholly + different representations of his works."[338:11] + +The very "glory of God," then, requires the innumerable finite +individuals with all their characteristic imperfections, that the +universe may lack no possible shade or quality of perspective. + +[Sidenote: The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved.] + +Sect. 165. But the besetting problem is in fact not solved, and is one +of the chief incentives to that other philosophy of absolutism which +defines an absolute spirit or mind. Both Aristotle and Leibniz undertake +to make the perfection which determines the order of the hierarchy of +substances, at the same time the responsible author of the whole +hierarchy. In this case the dilemma is plain. If the divine form or the +divine monad be other than the stages that lead up to it, these latter +cannot be essential to it, for God is by definition absolutely +self-sufficient. If, on the other hand, God is identical with the +development in its entirety, then two quite incommensurable standards of +perfection determine the supremacy of the divine nature, that of the +whole and that of the highest parts of the whole. The union of these two +and the definition of a perfection which may be at once the development +and its goal, is the task of absolute idealism. + +[Sidenote: Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism.] + +Sect. 166. Of the two fundamental questions of epistemology, absolute +realism answers the one explicitly, the other implicitly. As respects +_the source of the most valid knowledge_, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, +Spinoza are all agreed: true knowledge is the work of reason, of pure +intellection. Plato is the great exponent of dialectic, or the +reciprocal affinities and necessities of ideas. Aristotle is the founder +of deductive logic. Spinoza proposes to consider even "human actions and +desires" as though he were "concerned with lines, planes, and solids." +Empirical data may be the occasion, but cannot be the ground of the +highest knowledge. According to Leibniz, + + "it seems that necessary truths, such as we find in pure + mathematics, and especially in arithmetic and geometry, must + have principles whose proof does not depend upon instances, + nor, consequently, upon the witness of the senses, although + without the senses it would never have come into our heads to + think of them."[340:12] + +[Sidenote: The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute Realism.] + +Sect. 167. The answers which these philosophies give to the question of +_the relation between the state of knowledge and its object_, divide +them into two groups. Among the ancients reason is regarded as the means +of emancipation from the limitations of the private mind. "The sleeping +turn aside each into a world of his own," but "the waking"--the wise +men--"have one and the same world." What the individual knows belongs to +himself only in so far as it is inadequate. Hence for Plato the ideas +are not the attributes of a mind, but that self-subsistent truth to +which, in its moments of insight, a mind may have access. Opinion is "my +own," the truth is being. The position of Aristotle is equally clear. +"Actual knowledge," he maintains, "is identical with its object." + +Spinoza and Leibniz belong to another age. Modern philosophy began with +a new emphasis upon self-consciousness. In his celebrated argument--"I +think, hence I am" (_cogito ergo sum_)--Descartes established the +independent and substantial reality of the thinking activity. The "I +think" is recognized as in itself a fundamental being, known intuitively +to the thinker himself. Now although Spinoza and Leibniz are finally +determined by the same motives that obtain in the cases of Plato and +Aristotle, they must reckon with this new distinction between the +thinker and his object. The result in the case of Spinoza is the +doctrine of "parallelism," in which mind is defined as an "infinite +attribute" of substance, an aspect or phase coextensive with the whole +of being. The result in the case of Leibniz is his doctrine of +"representation" and "pre-established harmony," whereby each monadic +substance is in itself an active spiritual entity, and belongs to the +universe through its knowledge of a specific stage of the development of +the universe. But both Spinoza and Leibniz subordinate such conceptions +as these to the fundamental identity that pervades the whole. With +Spinoza the attributes belong to the same absolute substance, and with +Leibniz the monads represent the one universe. And with both, finally, +the perfection of knowledge, or the knowledge of God, is +indistinguishable from its object, God himself. The epistemological +subtleties peculiar to these philosophers are not stable doctrines, but +render inevitable either a return to the simpler and bolder realism of +the Greeks, or a passing over into the more radical and systematic +doctrine of absolute idealism. + +[Sidenote: The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity.] + +Sect. 168. We have met with two general motives, both of which are +subordinated to the doctrine of an absolute being postulated and sought +by philosophy. The one of these motives leads to the conception of the +absolutely necessary and immutable substance, the other to the +conception of a consummate perfection. There is an _interpretation of +life_ appropriate to each of these conceptions. Both agree in regarding +life seriously, in defining reason or philosophy as the highest human +activity, and in emphasizing the identity of the individual's good with +the good of the universe. But there are striking differences of tone and +spirit. + +Although the metaphysics of the Stoics have various affiliations, the +Stoic code of morality is the true practical sequel to the +Eleatic-Spinozistic view of the world. The Stoic is one who has set his +affections on the eternal being. He asks nothing of it for himself, but +identifies himself with it. The saving grace is a sense of reality. The +virtuous man is not one who remakes the world, or draws upon it for his +private uses; even less one who rails against it, or complains that it +has used him ill. He is rather one who recognizes that there is but one +really valid claim, that of the universe itself. But he not only submits +to this claim on account of its superiority; he makes it his own. The +discipline of Stoicism is the regulation of the individual will to the +end that it may coincide with the universal will. There is a part of man +by virtue of which he is satisfied with what things are, whatever they +be. That part, designated by the Stoics as "the ruling part," is the +reason. In so far as man seeks to understand the laws and natures which +actually prevail, he cannot be discontented with anything whatsoever +that may be known to him. + + "For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire + anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute + acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true: + wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these + things, the endeavor of the better part of ourselves is in + harmony with the order of nature as a whole."[344:13] + +In agreement with this teaching of Spinoza's is the famous Stoic formula +to the effect that "nothing can happen contrary to the will of the wise +man," who is free through his very acquiescence. If reason be the proper +"ruling part," the first step in the moral life is the subordination of +the appetitive nature and the enthronement of reason. One who is himself +rational will then recognize the fellowship of all rational beings, and +the unitary and beneficent rationality of the entire universe. The +highest morality is thus already upon the plane of religion. + +[Sidenote: The Platonic Ethics of Perfection.] + +Sect. 169. With Spinoza and the Stoics, the perfection of the individual +is reduced to what the universe requires of him. The good man is willing +to be whatever he must be, for the sake of the whole with which through +reason he is enabled to identify himself. With Plato and Aristotle the +perfection of the individual himself is commended, that the universe may +abound in perfection. The good man is the ideal man--the expression of +the type. And how different the quality of a morality in keeping with +this principle! The virtues which Plato enumerates--temperance, courage, +wisdom, and justice--compose a consummate human nature. He is thinking +not of the necessities but of the possibilities of life. Knowledge of +the truth will indeed be the best of human living, but knowledge is not +prized because it can reconcile man to his limitations; it is the very +overflowing of his cup of life. The youth are to + + "dwell in the land of health, amid fair sights and sounds; and + beauty, the effluence of fair works, will visit the eye and + ear, like a healthful breeze from a purer region, and + insensibly draw the soul even in childhood into harmony with + the beauty of reason."[345:14] + +Aristotle's account of human perfection is more circumstantial and more +prosaic. "The function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with +reason," and his happiness or well-being will consist in the fulness of +rational living. But such fulness requires a sphere of life that will +call forth and exercise the highest human capacities. Aristotle frankly +pronounces "external goods" to be indispensable, and happiness to be +therefore "a gift of the gods." The rational man will acquire a certain +exquisiteness or finesse of action, a "mean" of conduct; and this virtue +will be diversified through the various relations into which he must +enter, and the different situations which he must meet. He will be not +merely brave, temperate, and just, as Plato would have him, but liberal, +magnificent, gentle, truthful, witty, friendly, and in all +self-respecting or high-minded. In addition to these strictly moral +virtues, he will possess the intellectual virtues of prudence and +wisdom, the resources of art and science; and will finally possess the +gift of insight, or intuitive reason. Speculation will be his highest +activity, and the mark of his kinship with the gods who dwell in the +perpetual contemplation of the truth. + +[Sidenote: The Religion of Fulfilment, and the Religion of +Renunciation.] + +Sect. 170. Aristotle's ethics expresses the buoyancy of the ancient +world, when the individual does not feel himself oppressed by the +eternal reality, but rejoices in it. He is not too conscious of his +sufferings to be disinterested in his admiration and wonder. It is this +which distinguishes the religion of Plato and Aristotle from that of the +Stoics and Spinoza. With both alike, religion consists not in making the +world, but in contemplating it; not in cooperating with God, but in +worshipping him. Plato and Aristotle, however, do not find any +antagonism between the ways of God and the natural interests of men. +God does not differ from men save in his exalted perfection. The +contemplation and worship of him comes as the final and highest stage of +a life which is organic and continuous throughout. The love of God is +the natural love when it has found its true object. + + "For he who has been instructed thus far in the things of + love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order + and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly + perceive a nature of wondrous beauty--and this, Socrates, is + that final cause of all our former toils, which in the first + place is everlasting--not growing and decaying, or waxing and + waning; in the next place not fair in one point of view and + foul in another, . . . or in the likeness of a face or hands + or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of + speech or knowledge, nor existing in any other being; . . . + but beauty only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, + which without diminution and without increase, or any change, + is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all + other things."[347:15] + +The religion of Spinoza is the religion of one who has renounced the +favor of the universe. He was deprived early in life of every benefit of +fortune, and set out to find the good which required no special +dispensation but only the common lot and the common human endowment. He +found that good to consist in the conviction of the necessity, made +acceptable through the supremacy of the understanding. The like faith of +the Stoics makes of no account the difference of fortune between Marcus +the emperor and Epictetus the slave. + + "For two reasons, then, it is right to be content with that + which happens to thee; the one because it was done for thee + and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to + thee, originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy + destiny; and the other because even that which comes severally + to every man is to the power which administers the universe a + cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its very + continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if + thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and + the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou + dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art + dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of + the way."[348:16] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[306:1] By _Absolute Realism_ is meant that system of philosophy which +defines the universe as the _absolute being_, implied in knowledge as +its final object, but assumed to be independent of knowledge. In the +_Spinozistic_ system this absolute being is conceived under the form of +_substance_, or self-sufficiency; in _Platonism_ under the form of +_perfection_; and in the _Aristotelian_ system under the form of a +_hierarchy of substances_. + +[308:2] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 185. + +[309:3] When contrasted with the temporal realm of "generation and +decay," this ultimate object is often called the _eternal_. + +[311:4] Holland, 1632-1677. + +[312:5] Spinoza: _Ethics_, Part I. Translation by Elwes, p. 45. + +[314:6] _Ibid._, p. 49. + +[318:7] _Ibid._, pp. 77, 81. + +[329:8] Plato: _Symposium_, 211. Translation by Jowett. + +[330:9] Plato: _Republic_, 533. Translation by Jowett. + +[337:10] See Burnet: _Op. cit._, pp. 322-333. + +[338:11] Leibniz: _Discourse on Metaphysics_. Translation by Montgomery, +p. 15. + +In so far as the monads are spiritual this doctrine tends to be +subjectivistic. Cf. Chap. IX. + +[340:12] Leibniz: _New Essays on the Human Understanding_. Translation +by Latta, p. 363. + +[344:13] Spinoza: _Op. cit._, Part IV. Translation by Elwes, p. 243. + +[345:14] Plato: _Op. cit._, 401. + +[347:15] Plato: _Symposium_, 210-211. Translation by Jowett. + +[348:16] Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: _Thoughts_. Translation by Long, p. +141. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +ABSOLUTE IDEALISM[349:1] + + +[Sidenote: General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism.] + +Sect. 171. Absolute idealism is the most elaborately constructive of all +the historical types of philosophy. Though it may have overlooked +elementary truths, and have sought to combine irreconcilable principles, +it cannot be charged with lack of sophistication or subtlety. Its great +virtue is its recognition of problems--its exceeding circumspection; +while its great promise is due to its comprehensiveness--its generous +provision for all interests and points of view. But its very breadth and +complexity render this philosophy peculiarly liable to the equivocal use +of conceptions. This may be readily understood from the nature of the +central doctrine of absolute idealism. According to this doctrine it is +proposed to define the universe as an _absolute spirit_; or a being +infinite, ultimate, eternal, and self-sufficient, like the being of +Plato and Spinoza, but possessing at the same time the distinguishing +properties of spirit. Such conceptions as self-consciousness, will, +knowledge, and moral goodness are carried over from the realm of human +endeavor and social relations to the unitary and all-inclusive reality. +Now it has been objected that this procedure is either meaningless, in +that it so applies the term spirit as to contradict its meaning; or +prejudicial to spiritual interests, in that it neutralizes the +properties of spirit through so extending their use. Thus one may +contend that to affirm that the universe as a whole is spirit is +meaningless, since moral goodness requires special conditions and +relations that cannot be attributed to the universe as a whole; or one +may contend that such doctrine is prejudicial to moral interests because +by attributing spiritual perfection to the totality of being it +discredits all moral loyalties and antagonisms. The difficulties that +lie in the way of absolute idealism are due, then, to the complexity of +its synthesis, to its complementary recognition of differences and +resolution of them into unity. But this synthesis is due to the urgency +of certain great problems which the first or realistic expression of +the absolutist motive left undiscovered and unsolved. + +[Sidenote: The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism.] + +Sect. 172. It is natural to approach so deliberate and calculating a +philosophy from the stand-point of the problems which it proposes to +solve. One of these is the epistemological problem of the relation +between the state of knowledge and its object. Naturalism and absolute +realism side with common-sense in its assumption that although the real +object is essential to the valid state of knowledge, its being known is +not essential to the real object. Subjectivism, on the other hand, +maintains that being is essentially the content of a knowing state, or +an activity of the knower himself. Absolute idealism proposes to accept +the general epistemological principle of subjectivism; but to satisfy +the realistic demand for a standard, compelling object, by setting up an +_absolute knower_, with whom all valid knowledge must be in agreement. +This epistemological statement of absolute idealism is its most mature +phase; and the culminating phase, in which it shows unmistakable signs +of passing over into another doctrine. We must look for its pristine +inspiration in its solution of another fundamental problem: that of the +relation between the absolute and the empirical. Like absolute realism, +this philosophy regards the universe as a unitary and internally +necessary being, and undertakes to hold that being accountable for every +item of experience. But we have found that absolute realism is beset +with the difficulty of thus accounting for the fragmentariness and +isolation of the individual. The contention that the universe must +really be a rational or perfect unity is disputed by the evident +multiplicity, irrelevance, and imperfection in the foreground of +experience. The inference to perfection and the confession of +imperfection seem equally unavoidable. Rational necessities and +empirical facts are out of joint. + +[Sidenote: The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The Task of +the New Absolutism.] + +Sect. 173. Even Plato had been conscious of a certain responsibility for +matters of fact. Inasmuch as he attached the predicate of reality to the +absolute perfection, he made that being the only source to which they +could be referred. Perhaps, then, he suggests, they are due to the very +bounteousness of God. + + "He was good, and no goodness can ever have any jealousy of + anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all + things should be as like himself as possible."[352:2] + +Plotinus, in whom Platonism is leavened by the spirit of an age which +is convinced of sin, and which is therefore more keenly aware of the +positive existence of the imperfect, follows out this suggestion. +Creation is "emanation"--the overflow of God's excess of goodness. But +one does not readily understand how goodness, desiring all things to be +like itself, should thereupon create evil--even to make it good. The +Aristotelian philosophy, with its conception of the gradation of +substances, would seem to be better equipped to meet the difficulty. A +development requires stages; and every finite thing may thus be perfect +in its way and perfect in its place, while in the absolute truth or God +there is realized the meaning of the whole order. But if so, there is +evidently something that escapes God, to wit, the meaningless and +unfitness, the error and evil, of the stages in their successive +isolation. Nor is it of any avail to insist (as did Plato, Aristotle, +and Spinoza alike) that these are only privation, and therefore not to +be counted in the sum of reality. For privation is itself an experience, +with a great variety of implications, moral and psychological; and these +cannot be attributed to God or deduced from him, in consideration of his +absolute perfection. + +The task of the new absolutism is now in clear view. The perfect must +be amended to admit the imperfect. The absolute significance must be so +construed as to provide for the evident facts; for the unmeaning things +and changes of the natural order; for ignorance, sin, despair, and every +human deficiency. The new philosophy is to solve this problem by +defining a _spiritual absolute_, and by so construing the life or +dynamics of spirit, as to demonstrate the necessity of the very +imperfection and opposition which is so baffling to the realist. + +[Sidenote: The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis of +Experience.] + +Sect. 174. Absolute idealism, which is essentially a modern doctrine, +does not begin with rhapsodies, but with a very sober analysis of +familiar truths, conducted by the most sober of all philosophers, +Immanuel Kant. This philosopher lived in Konigsberg, Germany, at the +close of the eighteenth century. He is related to absolute idealism much +as Socrates is related to Platonism: he was not himself speculative, but +employed a critical method which was transformed by his followers into a +metaphysical construction. It is essential to the understanding both of +Kant and of his more speculative successors, to observe that he begins +with the recognition of certain non-philosophical truths--those of +_natural science_ and _the moral consciousness_. He accepts the order of +nature formulated in the Newtonian dynamics, and the moral order +acknowledged in the common human conviction of duty. And he is +interested in discovering the ground upon which these common +affirmations rest, the structure which virtually supports them as types +of knowledge. But a general importance attaches to the analysis because +these two types of knowledge (together with the aesthetic judgment, +which is similarly analyzed) are regarded by Kant as coextensive with +experience itself. The _very least experience_ that can be reported upon +at all is an experience of nature or duty, and as such will be informed +with their characteristic principles. Let us consider the former type. +The simplest instance of nature is the experience of the single +perceived object. In the first place, such an object will be perceived +as in space and time. These Kant calls the _forms of intuition_. An +object cannot even be presented or given without them. But, furthermore, +it will be regarded as substance, that is, as having a substratum that +persists through changes of position or quality. It will also be +regarded as causally dependent upon other objects like itself. +Causality, substance, and like principles to the number of twelve, Kant +calls the _categories of the understanding_. Both intuition and +understanding are indispensable to the experience of any object +whatsoever. They may be said to condition the object in general. Their +principles condition the process of making something out of the manifold +of sensation. But similarly, every moral experience recognizes what Kant +calls _the categorical imperative_. The categorical imperative is the +law of reasonableness or impartiality in conduct, requiring the +individual to act on a maxim which he can "will to be law universal." No +state of desire or situation calling for action means anything morally +except in the light of this obligation. Thus certain principles of +thought and action are said to be implicit in all experience. They are +universal and necessary in the sense that they are discovered as the +conditions not of any particular experience, but of experience in +general. This implicit or virtual presence in experience in general, +Kant calls their transcendental character, and the process of +explicating them is his famous _Transcendental Deduction_. + +[Sidenote: Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which they +Set in Order.] + +Sect. 175. The restriction which Kant puts upon his method is quite +essential to its meaning. I deduce the categories, for example, just in +so far as I find them to be necessary to perception. Without them my +perception is blind, I make nothing of it; with them my experience +becomes systematic and rational. But categories which I so deduce must +be forever limited to the role for which they are defined. Categories +without perceptions are "empty"; they have validity solely with +reference to the experience which they set in order. Indeed, I cannot +even complete that order. The orderly arrangement of parts of experience +suggests, and suggests irresistibly, a perfect system. I can even define +the ideas and ideals through which such a perfect system might be +realized. But I cannot in the Kantian sense attach reality to it because +it is not indispensable to experience. It must remain an ideal which +regulates my thinking of such parts of it as fall within the range of my +perception; or it may through my moral nature become the realm of my +living and an object of faith. In short, Kant's is essentially a +"critical philosophy," a logical and analytical study of the special +terms and relations of human knowledge. He denies the validity of these +terms and relations beyond this realm. His critiques are an inventory +of the conditions, principles, and prospects of that cognition which, +although not alone ideally conceivable, is alone possible. + +[Sidenote: The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the +Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant. The Absolute +Spirit.] + +Sect. 176. With the successors of Kant, as with the successors of +Socrates, a criticism becomes a system of metaphysics. This +transformation is effected in the post-Kantians by _a generalization of +the human cognitive consciousness_. According to Kant's analysis it +contains a manifold of sense which must be organized by categories in +obedience to the ideal of a rational universe. The whole enterprise, +with its problems given in perception, its instruments available in the +activities of the understanding, and its ideals revealed in the reason, +is an organic spiritual unity, manifesting itself in the +self-consciousness of the thinker. Now in absolute idealism this very +enterprise of knowledge, made universal and called the _absolute spirit_ +or _mind_, is taken to be the ultimate reality. And here at length would +seem to be afforded the conception of a being to which the problematic +and the rational, the data and the principles, the natural and the +ideal, are alike indispensable. We are now to seek the real not in the +ideal itself, but in that spiritual unity in which appearance is the +incentive to truth, and natural imperfection the spring to goodness. +This may be translated into the language which Plato uses in the +"Symposium," when Diotima is revealing to Socrates the meaning of love. +The new reality will be not the loved one, but love itself. + + "What then is Love? Is he mortal?" + + "No." + + "What then?" + + "As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, + but is a mean between them." + + "What is he then, Diotima?" + + "He is a great spirit, and like all that is spiritual he is + intermediate between the divine and the mortal."[359:3] + +Reality is no longer the God who mingles not with men, but that power +which, as Diotima further says, "interprets and conveys to the gods the +prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and rewards of +the gods." + +In speaking for such an idealism, Emerson says: + + "Everything good is on the highway. The middle region of our + being is the temperate zone. We may climb into the thin and + cold realm of pure geometry and lifeless science, or sink into + that of sensation. Between these extremes is the equator of + life, of thought, of spirit, of poetry. . . . The mid-world is + best."[359:4] + +The new reality is this highway of the spirit, the very course and +raceway of self-consciousness. It is traversed in the movement and +self-correction of thought, in the interest in ideals, or in the +submission of the will to the control of the moral law. + +[Sidenote: Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity.] + +Sect. 177. It is the last of these phases of self-consciousness that +Fichte, who was Kant's immediate successor, regards as of paramount +importance. As Platonism began with the ideal of the good or the object +of life, so the new idealism begins with the conviction of duty, or _the +story of life_. Being is the living moral nature compelled to build +itself a natural order wherein it may obey the moral law, and to divide +itself into a community of moral selves through which the moral virtues +may be realized. Nature and society flow from the conception of an +absolute moral activity, or ego. Such an ego could not be pure and +isolated and yet be moral. The evidence of this is the common moral +consciousness. My duty compels me to act upon the not-self or +environment, and to respect and cooperate with other selves. Fichte's +absolute is this moral consciousness universalized and made eternal. +Moral value being its fundamental principle the universe must on that +very account embrace both nature, or moral indifference, and humanity, +or moral limitation. + +[Sidenote: Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment.] + +Sect. 178. But the Romanticists, who followed close upon Fichte, were +dissatisfied with so hard and exclusive a conception of spiritual being. +Life, they said, is not all duty. Indeed, the true spiritual life is +quite other, not harsh and constrained, but free and spontaneous--a +wealth of feeling playing about a constantly shifting centre. Spirit is +not consecutive and law-abiding, but capricious and wanton, seeking the +beautiful in no orderly progression, but in a refined and versatile +sensibility. If this be the nature of spirit, and if spirit be the +nature of reality, then he is most wise who is most rich in sentiment. +The Romanticists were the exponents of an absolute sentimentalism. And +they did not prove it, but like good sentimentalists they felt it. + +[Sidenote: Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic.] + +Sect. 179. Hegel, the master of the new idealism, set himself the task +of construing spirit in terms as consecutive as those of Fichte, and as +comprehensive as those of the Romanticists. Like Plato, he found in +dialectic the supreme manifestation of the spiritual life. There is a +certain flow of ideas which determines the meaning of experience, and +is the truth of truths. But the mark of the new prophet is this: the +flow of ideas itself is _a process of self-correction due to a sense of +error_. Thus bare sensation is abstract and bare thought is abstract. +The real, however, is not merely the concrete in which they are united, +but the very process in the course of which through knowledge of +abstraction thought arrives at the concrete. The principle of negation +is the very life of thought, and it is _the life of thought_, rather +than the outcome of thought, which is reality. The most general form of +the dialectical process contains three moments: the moment of _thesis_, +in which affirmation is made; the moment of _antithesis_, in which the +opposite asserts itself; and the moment of _synthesis_, in which a +reconciliation is effected in a new thesis. Thus thought is the +progressive overcoming of contradiction; not the state of freedom from +contradiction, but the act of escaping it. Such processes are more +familiar in the moral life. Morality consists, so even common-sense +asserts, in the overcoming of evil. Character is the resistance of +temptation; goodness, a growth in grace through discipline. Of such, for +Hegel, is the very kingdom of heaven. It is the task of the philosopher, +a task to which Hegel applies himself most assiduously, to analyze the +battle and the victory upon which spiritual being nourishes itself. And +since the deeper processes are those of thought, the Hegelian philosophy +centres in an ordering of notions, a demonstration of that necessary +progression of thought which, in its whole dynamical logical history, +constitutes the _absolute idea_. + +[Sidenote: The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History.] + +Sect. 180. The Hegelian philosophy, with its emphasis upon difference, +antagonism, and development, is peculiarly qualified to be a philosophy +of nature and history. Those principles of spiritual development which +logic defines are conceived as incarnate in the evolution of the world. +Nature, as the very antithesis to spirit, is now understood to be the +foil of spirit. In nature spirit alienates itself in order to return +enriched. The stages of nature are the preparation for the reviving of a +spirituality that has been deliberately forfeited. The Romanticists, +whether philosophers like Schelling or poets like Goethe and Wordsworth, +were led by their feeling for the beauty of nature to attribute to it a +much deeper and more direct spiritual significance. But Hegel and the +Romanticists alike are truly expressed in Emerson's belief that the +spiritual interpretation of nature is the "true science." + + "The poet alone knows astronomy, chemistry, vegetation, and + animation, for he does not stop at these facts, but employs + them as signs. He knows why the plain or meadow of space was + strown with these flowers we call suns and moons and stars; + why the great deep is adorned with animals, with men, and + gods; for in every word he speaks he rides on them as the + horses of thought."[364:5] + +The new awakening of spirit which is for Hegel the consummation of the +natural evolution, begins with the individual or _subjective_ spirit, +and develops into the social or _objective_ spirit, which is morality +and history. History is a veritable dialectic of nations, in the course +of which the consciousness of individual liberty is developed, and +coordinated with the unity of the state. The highest stage of spirit +incarnate is that of _absolute_ spirit, embracing art, religion, and +philosophy. In art the absolute idea obtains expression in sensuous +existence, more perfectly in classical than in the symbolic art of the +Orient, but most perfectly in the romantic art of the modern period. In +religion the absolute idea is expressed in the imagination through +worship. In Oriental pantheism, the individual is overwhelmed by his +sense of the universal; in Greek religion, God is but a higher man; +while in Christianity God and man are perfectly united in Christ. +Finally, in philosophy the absolute idea reaches its highest possible +expression in articulate thought. + +[Sidenote: Resume. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the Problem of +Evil.] + +Sect. 181. Such is absolute idealism approached from the stand-point of +antecedent metaphysics. It is the most elaborate and subtle provision +for antagonistic differences within unity that the speculative mind of +man has as yet been able to make. It is the last and most thorough +attempt to resolve individual and universal, temporal and eternal, +natural and ideal, good and evil, into an absolute unity in which the +universal, eternal, ideal, and good shall dominate, and in which all +terms shall be related with such necessity as obtains in the definitions +and theorems of geometry. There is to be some absolute meaning which is +rational to the uttermost and the necessary ground of all the incidents +of existence. Thought could undertake no more ambitious and exacting +task. Nor is it evident after all that absolute idealism enjoys any +better success in this task than absolute realism. The difference +between them becomes much less marked when we reflect that the former, +like the latter, must reserve the predicate of being for the unity of +the whole. Even though evil and contradiction belong to the essence of +things, move in the secret heart of a spiritual universe, the reality is +not these in their severalty, but that life within which they fall, the +story within which they "earn a place." And if absolute idealism has +defined a new perfection, it has at the same time defined a new +imperfection. The perfection is rich in contrast, and thus inclusive of +both the lights and shades of experience; but the perfection belongs +only to the composition of these elements within a single view. It is +not necessary to such perfection that the evil should ever be viewed in +isolation. The idealist employs the analogy of the drama or the picture +whose very significance requires the balance of opposing forces; or the +analogy of the symphony in which a higher musical quality is realized +through the resolution of discord into harmony. But none of these +unities requires any element whatsoever that does not partake of its +beauty. It is quite irrelevant to the drama that the hero should +himself have his own view of events with no understanding of their +dramatic value, as it is irrelevant to the picture that an unbalanced +fragment of it should dwell apart, or to the symphony that the discord +should be heard without the harmony. One may multiply without end the +internal differences and antagonisms that contribute to the internal +meaning, and be as far as ever from understanding the external +detachment of experiences that are not rational or good in themselves. +And it is precisely this kind of fact that precipitates the whole +problem. We do not judge of sin and error from experiences in which they +conduct to goodness and truth, but from experiences in which they are +stark and unresolved. + +In view of such considerations many idealists have been willing to +confess their inability to solve this problem. To quote a recent +expositor of Hegel, + + "We need not, after all, be surprised at the apparently + insoluble problem which confronts us. For the question has + developed into the old difficulty of the origin of evil, which + has always baffled both theologians and philosophers. An + idealism which declares that the universe is in reality + perfect, can find, as most forms of popular idealism do, an + escape from the difficulties of the existence of evil, by + declaring that the universe is as yet only growing towards its + ideal perfection. But this refuge disappears with the reality + of time, and we are left with an awkward difference between + what philosophy tells us must be, and what our life tells us + actually is."[368:6] + +If the philosophy of eternal perfection persists in its fundamental +doctrine in spite of this irreconcilable conflict with life, it is +because it is believed that that doctrine _must_ be true. Let us turn, +then, to its more constructive and compelling argument. + +[Sidenote: The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is Based upon +the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge.] + +Sect. 182. The proof of absolute idealism is supposed by the majority of +its exponents to follow from the problem of epistemology, and more +particularly from the manifest dependence of truth upon the knowing +mind. In its initial phase absolute idealism is indistinguishable from +subjectivism. Like that philosophy it finds that the object of knowledge +is inseparable from the state of knowledge throughout the whole range of +experience. Since the knower can never escape himself, it may be set +down as an elementary fact that reality (at any rate whatever reality +can be known or even talked about) owes its being to mind. + +Thus Green, the English neo-Hegelian, maintains that "an object which +no consciousness presented to itself would not be an object at all," and +wonders that this principle is not generally taken for granted and made +the starting-point for philosophy.[369:7] However, unless the very term +"object" is intended to imply presence to a subject, this principle is +by no means self-evident, and must be traced to its sources. + +We have already followed the fortunes of that empirical subjectivism +which issues from the relativity of perception. At the very dawn of +philosophy it was observed that what is seen, heard, or otherwise +experienced through the senses, depends not only upon the use of +sense-organs, but upon the special point of view occupied by each +individual sentient being. It was therefore concluded that the +perceptual world belonged to the human knower with his limitations and +perspective, rather than to being itself. It was this epistemological +principle upon which Berkeley founded his empirical idealism. Believing +knowledge to consist essentially in perception, and believing perception +to be subjective, he had to choose between the relegation of being to a +region inaccessible to knowledge, and the definition of being in terms +of subjectivity. To avoid scepticism he accepted the latter alternative. +But among the Greeks with whom this theory of perception originated, it +drew its meaning in large part from the distinction between perception +and reason. Thus we read in Plato's "Sophist": + + "And you would allow that we participate in generation with + the body, and by perception; but we participate with the soul + by thought in true essence, and essence you would affirm to be + always the same and immutable, whereas generation + varies."[370:8] + +It is conceived that although in perception man is condemned to a +knowledge conditioned by the affections and station of his body, he may +nevertheless escape himself and lay hold on the "true essence" of +things, by virtue of thought. In other words, knowledge, in +contradistinction to "opinion," is not made by the subject, but is the +soul's participation in the eternal natures of things. In the moment of +insight the varying course of the individual thinker coincides with the +unvarying truth; but in that moment the individual thinker is ennobled +through being assimilated to the truth, while the truth is no more, no +less, the truth than before. + +[Sidenote: The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason.] + +Sect. 183. In absolute idealism, the principle of subjectivism is +extended to reason itself. This extension seems to have been originally +due to moral and religious interests. From the moral stand-point the +contemplation of the truth is a _state_, and the highest state of the +individual life. The religious interest unifies the individual life and +directs attention to its spiritual development. Among the Greeks of the +middle period life was as yet viewed objectively as the fulfilment of +capacities, and knowledge was regarded as perfection of function, the +exercise of the highest of human prerogatives. But as moral and +religious interests became more absorbing, the individual lived more and +more in his own self-consciousness. Even before the Christian era the +Greek philosophers themselves were preoccupied with the task of winning +a state of inner serenity. Thus the Stoics and Epicureans came to look +upon knowledge as a means to the attainment of an inner freedom from +distress and bondage to the world. In other words, the very reason was +regarded as an activity of the self, and its fruits were valued for +their enhancement of the welfare of the self. And if this be true of the +Stoics and the Epicureans, it is still more clearly true of the +neo-Platonists of the Christian era, who mediate between the ancient +and mediaeval worlds. + +[Sidenote: Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian +Philosophy.] + +Sect. 184. It is well known that the early period of Christianity was a +period of the most vivid self-consciousness. The individual believed +that his natural and social environment was alien to his deeper +spiritual interests. He therefore withdrew into himself. He believed +himself to have but one duty, the salvation of his soul; and that duty +required him to search his innermost springs of action in order to +uproot any that might compromise him with the world and turn him from +God. The drama of life was enacted within the circle of his own +self-consciousness. Citizenship, bodily health, all forms of +appreciation and knowledge, were identified in the parts they played +here. In short the Christian consciousness, although renunciation was +its deepest motive, was reflexive and centripetal to a degree hitherto +unknown among the European peoples. And when with St. Augustine +theoretical interests once more vigorously asserted themselves, this new +emphasis was in the very foreground. St. Augustine wished to begin his +system of thought with a first indubitable certainty, and selected +neither being nor ideas, but _self_. St. Augustine's genius was +primarily religious, and the "Confessions," in which he records the +story of his hard winning of peace and right relations with God, is his +most intimate book. How faithfully does he represent himself, and the +blend of paganism and Christianity which was distinctive of his age, +when in his systematic writings he draws upon religion for his knowledge +of truth! In all my living, he argues, whether I sin or turn to God, +whether I doubt or believe, whether I know or am ignorant, in all _I +know that I am I_. Each and every state of my consciousness is a state +of my self, and as such, sure evidence of my self's existence. If one +were to follow St. Augustine's reflections further, one would find him +reasoning from his own finite and evil self to an infinite and perfect +Self, which centres like his in the conviction that I am I, but is +endowed with all power and all worth. One would find him reflecting upon +the possible union with God through the exaltation of the human +self-consciousness. But this conception of God as the perfect self is so +much a prophecy of things to come, that more than a dozen centuries +elapsed before it was explicitly formulated by the post-Kantians. We +must follow its more gradual development in the philosophies of +Descartes and Kant. + +[Sidenote: Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the Thinking +Self.] + +Sect. 185. When at the close of the sixteenth century the Frenchman, +Rene Descartes, sought to construct philosophy anew and upon secure +foundations, he too selected as the initial certainty of thought the +thinker's knowledge of himself. This principle now received its classic +formulation in the proposition, _Cogito ergo sum_--"I think, hence I +am." The argument does not differ essentially from that of St. +Augustine, but it now finds a place in a systematic and critical +metaphysics. In that my thinking is certain of itself, says Descartes, +in that I know myself before I know aught else, my self can never be +dependent for its being upon anything else that I may come to know. A +thinking self, with its knowledge and its volition, is quite capable of +subsisting of itself. Such is, indeed, not the case with a finite self, +for all finitude is significant of limitation, and in recognizing my +limitations I postulate the infinite being or God. But the relation of +my self to a physical world is quite without necessity. Human nature, +with soul and body conjoined, is a combination of two substances, +neither of which is a necessary consequence of the other. As a result +of this combination the soul is to some extent affected by the body, and +the body is to some extent directed by the soul; but the body could +conceivably be an automaton, as the soul could conceivably be, and will +in another life become, a free spirit. The consequences of this dualism +for epistemology are very grave. If knowledge be the activity of a +self-subsistent thinking spirit, how can it reveal the nature of an +external world? The natural order is now literally "external." It is +true that the whole body of exact science, that mechanical system to +which Descartes attached so much importance, falls within the range of +the soul's own thinking. But what assurance is there that it refers to a +province of its own--a physical world in space? Descartes can only +suppose that "clear and distinct" ideas must be trusted as faithful +representations. It is true the external world makes its presence known +directly, when it breaks in upon the soul in sense-perception. But +Descartes's rationalism and love of mathematics forbade his attaching +importance to this criterion. Real nature, that exactly definable and +predictable order of moving bodies defined in physics, is not known +through sense-perception, but through thought. Its necessities are the +necessities of reason. Descartes finds himself, then, in the perplexing +position of seeking an internal criterion for an external world. The +problem of knowledge so stated sets going the whole epistemological +movement of the eighteenth century, from Locke through Berkeley and Hume +to Kant. And the issue of this development is the absolute idealism of +Kant's successors. + +[Sidenote: Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers.] + +Sect. 186. Of the English philosophers who prepare the way for the +epistemology of Kant, Hume is the most radical and momentous. It was he +who roused Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers" to the task of the +"Critical Philosophy." Hume is one of the two possible consequences of +Descartes. One who attaches greater importance to the rational +necessities of science than to its external reference, is not unwilling +that nature should be swallowed up in mind. With Malebranche, +Descartes's immediate successor in France, nature is thus provided for +within the archetypal mind of God. With the English philosophers, on the +other hand, externality is made the very mark of nature, and as a +consequence sense-perception becomes the criterion of scientific truth. +This empirical theory of knowledge, inaugurated and developed by Locke +and Berkeley, culminates in Hume's designation of the _impression_ as +the distinguishing element of nature, at once making up its content and +certifying to its externality. The processes of nature are successions +of impressions; and the laws of nature are their uniformities, or the +expectations of uniformity which their repetitions engender. Hume does +not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion. If the final mark of truth +is the presence to sense of the individual element, then science can +consist only of items of information and probable generalizations +concerning their sequences. The effect is observed to follow upon the +cause in fact, but there is no understanding of its necessity; therefore +no absolute certainty attaches to the future effects of any cause. + +[Sidenote: To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind.] + +Sect. 187. But what has become of the dream of the mathematical +physicist? Is the whole system of Newton, that brilliant triumph of the +mechanical method, unfounded and dogmatic? It is the logical instability +of this body of knowledge, made manifest in the well-founded scepticism +of Hume, that rouses Kant to a re-examination of the whole foundation of +natural science. The general outline of his analysis has been developed +above. It is of importance here to understand its relations to the +problem of Descartes. Contrary to the view of the English philosophers, +natural science is, says Kant, the work of the mind. The certainty of +the causal relation is due to the human inability to think otherwise. +Hume is mistaken in supposing that mere sensation gives us any knowledge +of nature. The very least experience of objects involves the employment +of principles which are furnished by the mind. Without the employment of +such principles, or in bare sensation, there is no intelligible meaning +whatsoever. But once admit the employment of such principles and +formulate them systematically, and the whole Newtonian order of nature +is seen to follow from them. Furthermore, since these principles or +categories are the conditions of human experience, are the very +instruments of knowledge, they are valid wherever there is any +experience or knowledge. There is but one way to make anything at all +out of nature, and that is to conceive it as an order of necessary +events in space and time. Newtonian science is part of such a general +conception, and is therefore necessary if knowledge is to be possible at +all, even the least. Thus Kant turns upon Hume, and shuts him up to the +choice between the utter abnegation of all knowledge, including the +knowledge of his own scepticism, and the acceptance of the whole body of +exact science. + +But with nature thus conditioned by the necessities of thought, what has +become of its externality? That, Kant admits, has indeed vanished. Kant +does not attempt, as did Descartes, to hold that the nature which mind +constructs and controls, exists also outside of mind. The nature that is +known is on that very account phenomenal, anthropocentric--created by +its cognitive conditions. Descartes was right in maintaining that +sense-perception certifies to the existence of a world outside the mind, +but mistaken in calling it nature and identifying it with the realm of +science. In short, Kant acknowledges the external world, and names it +the _thing-in-itself_; but insists that because it is outside of mind it +is outside of knowledge. Thus is the certainty of science saved at the +cost of its metaphysical validity. It is necessarily true, but only of a +conditioned or dependent world. And in saving science Kant has at the +same time prejudiced metaphysics in general. For the human or +naturalistic way of knowing is left in sole possession of the field, +with the higher interest of reasons in the ultimate nature of being, +degraded to the rank of practical faith. + +[Sidenote: The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general into an +Absolute Mind.] + +Sect. 188. The transformation of this critical and agnostic doctrine +into absolute idealism is inevitable. The metaphysical interest was +bound to avail itself of the speculative suggestiveness with which the +Kantian philosophy abounds. The transformation turns upon Kant's +assumption that whatever is constructed by the mind is on that account +phenomenon or appearance. Kant has carried along the presumption that +whatever is act or content of mind is on that account not _real_ object +or _thing-in-itself_. We have seen that this is generally accepted as +true of the relativities of sense-perception. But is it true of thought? +The post-Kantian idealist maintains that _that depends upon the +thought_. The content of private individual thinking is in so far not +real object; but it does not follow that this is true of such thinking +as is universally valid. Now Kant has deduced his categories for thought +in general. There are no empirical cases of thinking except the human +thinkers; but the categories are not the property of any one human +individual or any group of such individuals. They are the conditions of +_experience in general_, and of every possibility of experience. The +transition to absolute idealism is now readily made. _Thought in +general_ becomes the _absolute mind_, and experience in general its +content. The thing-in-itself drops out as having no meaning. The +objectivity to which it testified is provided for in the completeness +and self-sufficiency which is attributed to the absolute experience. +Indeed, an altogether new definition of subjective and objective +replaces the old. The subjective is that which is only insufficiently +thought, as in the case of relativity and error; the objective is that +which is completely thought. Thus the natural order is indeed +phenomenal; but only because the principles of science are not the +highest principles of thought, and not because nature is the fruit of +thought. Thus Hegel expresses his relation to Kant as follows: + + "According to Kant, the things that we know about are _to us_ + appearances only, and we can never know their essential + nature, which belongs to another world, which we cannot + approach. . . . The true statement of the case is as follows. + The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere + phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the + true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is + to have their existence founded not in themselves, but in the + universal divine idea. This view of things, it is true, is as + idealist as Kant's, but in contradistinction to the + subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy should be + termed Absolute Idealism."[382:9] + +[Sidenote: The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite Mind to +the Infinite Mind.] + +Sect. 189. Absolute idealism is thus reached after a long and devious +course of development. But the argument may be stated much more briefly. +Plato, it will be remembered, found that experience tends ever to +transcend itself. The thinker finds himself compelled to pursue the +ideal of immutable and universal truth, and must identify the ultimate +being with that ideal. Similarly Hegel says: + + "That upward spring of the mind signifies that the being which + the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute + truth; it signifies that beyond and above that appearance, + truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for + God."[382:10] + +The further argument of absolute idealism differs from that of Plato in +that the dependence of truth upon the mind is accepted as a first +principle. The ideal with which experience is informed is now _the state +of perfect knowledge_, rather than the system of absolute truth. The +content of the state of perfect knowledge will indeed be the system of +absolute truth, but none the less _content_, precisely as finite +knowledge is the content of a finite mind. In pursuing the truth, I who +pursue, aim to realize in myself a certain highest state of knowledge. +Were I to know all truth I should indeed have ceased to be the finite +individual who began the quest, but the evolution would be continuous +and the character of self-consciousness would never have been lost. I +may say, in short, that God or being, is my perfect cognitive self. + +The argument for absolute idealism is a constructive interpretation of +the subjectivistic contention that knowledge can never escape the circle +of its own activity and states. To meet the demand for a final and +standard truth, a demand which realism meets with its doctrine of a +being independent of any mind, this philosophy defines a _standard +mind_. The impossibility of defining objects in terms of relativity to a +finite self, conducts dialectically to the conception of the _absolute +self_. The sequel to my error or exclusiveness, is truth or +inclusiveness. The outcome of the dialectic is determined by the +symmetry of the antithesis. Thus, corrected experience implies a last +correcting experience; partial cognition, complete cognition; empirical +subject, transcendental subject; finite mind, an absolute mind. The +following statement is taken from a contemporary exponent of the +philosophy: + + "What you and I lack, when we lament our human ignorance, is + simply a certain desirable and logically possible state of + mind, or type of experience; to wit, a state of mind in which + we should wisely be able to say that we had fulfilled in + experience what we now have merely in idea, namely, the + knowledge, the immediate and felt presence, of what we now + call the Absolute Reality. . . . There is an Absolute + Experience for which the conception of an absolute reality, + _i. e._, the conception of a system of ideal truth, is + fulfilled by the very contents that get presented to this + experience. This Absolute Experience is related to our + experience as an organic whole to its own fragments. It is an + experience which finds fulfilled all that the completest + thought can conceive as genuinely possible. Herein lies its + definition as an Absolute. For the Absolute Experience, as for + ours, there are data, contents, facts. But these data, these + contents, express, for the Absolute Experience, its own + meaning, its thought, its ideas. Contents beyond these that it + possesses, the Absolute Experience knows to be, in genuine + truth, impossible. Hence its contents are indeed + particular,--a selection from the world of bare or merely + conceptual possibilities,--but they form a self-determined + whole, than which nothing completer, more organic, more + fulfilled, more transparent, or more complete in meaning, is + concretely or genuinely possible. On the other hand, these + contents are not foreign to those of our finite experience, + but are inclusive of them in the unity of one life."[385:11] + +[Sidenote: The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism.] + +Sect. 190. As has been already intimated, at the opening of this +chapter, the inclusion of the whole of reality within a single self is +clearly a questionable proceeding. The need of avoiding the relativism +of empirical idealism is evident. But if the very meaning of the +self-consciousness be due to a certain selection and exclusion within +the general field of experience, it is equally evident that the +relativity of self-consciousness can never be overcome through appealing +to a higher self. One must appeal _from_ the self to the realm of things +as they are. Indeed, although the exponents of this philosophy use the +language of spiritualism, and accept the idealistic epistemology, their +absolute being tends ever to escape the special characters of the self. +And inasmuch as the absolute self is commonly set over against the +finite or empirical self, as the standard and test of truth, it is the +less distinguishable from the realist's order of independent beings. + +[Sidenote: The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics of +Absolute Idealism. Kant.] + +Sect. 191. But however much absolute idealism may tend to abandon its +idealism for the sake of its absolutism within the field of metaphysics, +such is not the case within the field of ethics and religion. The +conception of the self here receives a new emphasis. The same +self-consciousness which admits to the highest truth is the evidence of +man's practical dignity. In virtue of his immediate apprehension of the +principles of selfhood, and his direct participation in the life of +spirit, man may be said to possess the innermost secret of the universe. +In order to achieve goodness he must therefore recognize and express +_himself_. The Kantian philosophy is here again the starting-point. It +was Kant who first gave adequate expression to the Christian idea of the +moral self-consciousness. + + "_Duty!_ Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace + nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and + yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that + would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest + forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind, + . . . a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even + though they secretly counterwork it; what origin is there + worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble + descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the + inclinations . . . ? It can be nothing less than a power which + elevates man above himself, . . . a power which connects him + with an order of things that only the understanding can + conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the + whole sensible world, and with it the empirically determinable + existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all + ends."[387:12] + +With Kant there can be no morality except conduct be attended by the +consciousness of this duty imposed by the higher nature upon the lower. +It is this very recognition of a deeper self, of a personality that +belongs to the sources and not to the consequences of nature, that +constitutes man as a moral being, and only such action as is inspired +with a reverence for it can be morally good. Kant does little more than +to establish the uncompromising dignity of the moral will. In moral +action man submits to a law that issues from himself in virtue of his +rational nature. Here he yields nothing, as he owes nothing, to that +appetency which binds him to the natural world. As a rational being he +himself affirms the very principles which determine the organization of +nature. This is his _freedom_, at once the ground and the implication +of his duty. Man is free from nature to serve the higher law of his +personality. + +[Sidenote: Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of +Universal and Objective Spirit.] + +Sect. 192. There are two respects in which Kant's ethics has been +regarded as inadequate by those who draw from it their fundamental +principles. It is said that Kant is too rigoristic, that he makes too +stern a business of morality, in speaking so much of law and so little +of love and spontaneity. There are good reasons for this. Kant seeks to +isolate the moral consciousness, and dwell upon it in its purity, in +order that he may demonstrate its incommensurability with the values of +inclination and sensibility. Furthermore, Kant may speak of the +principle of the absolute, and recognize the deeper eternal order as a +law, but he may not, if he is to be consistent with his own critical +principles, affirm the metaphysical being of such an order. With his +idealistic followers it is possible to define the spiritual setting of +the moral life, but with Kant it is only possible to define the +antagonism of principles. Hence the greater optimism of the +post-Kantians. They know that the higher law is the reality, and that he +who obeys it thus unites himself with the absolute self. That which for +Kant is only a resolute obedience to more valid principles, to +rationally superior rules for action, is for idealism man's +appropriation of his spiritual birthright. Since the law is the deeper +nature, man may respect and obey it as valid, and at the same time act +upon it gladly in the sure knowledge that it will enhance his eternal +welfare. Indeed, the knowledge that the very universe is founded upon +this law will make him less suspicious of nature and less exclusive in +his adherence to any single law. He will be more confident of the +essential goodness of all manifestations of a universe which he knows to +be fundamentally spiritual. + +But it has been urged, secondly, that the Kantian ethics is too formal, +too little pertinent to the issues of life. Kant's moral law imposes +only obedience to the law, or conduct conceived as suitable to a +universal moral community. But what is the nature of such conduct in +particular? It may be answered that to maintain the moral +self-consciousness, to act dutifully and dutifully only, to be +self-reliant and unswerving in the doing of what one ought to do, is to +obtain a very specific character. But does this not leave the +individual's conduct to his own interpretation of his duty? It was just +this element of individualism which Hegel sought to eliminate through +the application of his larger philosophical conception. If that which +expresses itself within the individual consciousness as the moral law be +indeed the law of that self in which the universe is grounded, it will +appear as _objective spirit_ in the evolution of society. For Hegel, +then, the most valid standard of goodness is to be found in that +customary morality which bespeaks the moral leadings of the general +humanity, and in those institutions, such as the family and the state, +which are the moral acts of the absolute idea itself. Finally, in the +realm of _absolute spirit_, in art, in revealed religion, and in +philosophy, the individual may approach to the self-consciousness which +is the perfect truth and goodness in and for itself. + +[Sidenote: The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute Idealism.] + +Sect. 193. Where the law of life is the implication in the finite +self-consciousness of the eternal and divine self-consciousness, there +can be no division between morality and religion, as there can be none +between thought and will. Whatever man seeks is in the end God. As the +perfect fulfilment of the thinking self, God is the truth; as the +perfect fulfilment of the willing self, God is the good. The finite +self-consciousness finds facts that are not understood, and so seeks to +resolve itself into the perfect self wherein all that is given has +meaning. On the other hand, the finite self-consciousness finds ideals +that are not realized, and so seeks to resolve itself into that perfect +self wherein all that is significant is given. All interests thus +converge toward + + "some state of conscious spirit in which the opposition of + cognition and volition is overcome--in which we neither judge + our ideas by the world, nor the world by our ideas, but are + aware that inner and outer are in such close and necessary + harmony that even the thought of possible discord has become + impossible. In its unity not only cognition and volition, but + feeling also, must be blended and united. In some way or + another it must have overcome the rift in discursive + knowledge, and the immediate must for it be no longer the + alien. It must be as direct as art, as certain and universal + as philosophy."[391:13] + +The religious consciousness proper to absolute idealism is both +pantheistic and mystical, but with distinction. Platonism is pantheistic +in that nature is resolved into God. All that is not perfect is esteemed +only for its promise of perfection. And Platonism is mystical in that +the purification and universalization of the affections brings one in +the end to a perfection that exceeds all modes of thought and speech. +With Spinoza, on the other hand, God may be said to be resolved into +nature. Nature is made divine, but is none the less nature, for its +divinity consists in its absolute necessity. Spinoza's pantheism passes +over into mysticism because the absolute necessity exceeds in both unity +and richness the laws known to the human understanding. In absolute +idealism, finally, both God and nature are resolved into the self. For +that which is divine in experience is self-consciousness, and this is at +the same time the ground of nature. Thus in the highest knowledge the +self is expanded and enriched without being left behind. The mystical +experience proper to this philosophy is the consciousness of identity, +together with the sense of universal immanence. The individual self may +be directly sensible of the absolute self, for these are one spiritual +life. Thus Emerson says: + + "It is a secret which every intellectual man quickly learns, + that beyond the energy of his possessed and conscious + intellect he is capable of a new energy (as of an intellect + doubled on itself), by abandonment to the nature of things; + that beside his privacy of power as an individual man, there + is a great public power upon which he can draw, by unlocking, + at all risks, his human doors, and suffering the ethereal + tides to roll and circulate through him; then he is caught up + into the life of the Universe, his speech is thunder, his + thought is law, and his words are universally intelligible as + the plants and animals. The poet knows that he speaks + adequately then only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or 'with + the flower of the mind'; not with the intellect used as an + organ, but with the intellect released from all service and + suffered to take its direction from its celestial + life."[393:14] + +[Sidenote: The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality.] + +Sect. 194. But the distinguishing flavor and quality of this religion +arises from its spiritual hospitality. It is not, like Platonism, a +contemplation of the best; nor, like pluralistic idealisms, a moral +knight-errantry. It is neither a religion of exclusion, nor a religion +of reconstruction, but a profound willingness that things should be as +they really are. For this reason its devotees have recognized in Spinoza +their true forerunner. But idealism is not Spinozism, though it may +contain this as one of its strains. For it is not the worship of +necessity, Emerson's "beautiful necessity, which makes man brave in +believing that he cannot shun a danger that is appointed, nor incur one +that is not"; but the worship of _that which is_ necessary. + +Not only must one understand that every effort, however despairing, is +an element of sense in the universal significance; + + "that the whole would not be what it is were not precisely + this finite purpose left in its own uniqueness to speak + precisely its own word--a word which no other purpose can + speak in the language of the divine will";[394:15] + +but one must have a zest for such participation, and a heart for the +divine will which it profits. Indeed, so much is this religion a love of +life, that it may, as in the case of the Romanticists, be a love of +caprice. Battle and death, pain and joy, error and truth--all that +belongs to the story of this mortal world, are to be felt as the thrill +of health, and relished as the essences of God. Religion is an exuberant +spirituality, a fearless sensibility, a knowledge of both good and evil, +and a will to serve the good, while exulting that the evil will not +yield without a battle. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[349:1] By _Absolute Idealism_ is meant that system of philosophy which +defines the universe as the _absolute spirit_, which is the human +_moral_, _cognitive_, or _appreciative consciousness_ universalized; or +as the _absolute, transcendental mind_, whose state of _complete +knowledge_ is implied in all finite thinking. + +[352:2] Plato: _Timaeus_, 29. Translation by Jowett. + +[359:3] Plato: _Symposium_, 202. Translation by Jowett. + +[359:4] Emerson: _Essays, Second Series_, pp. 65-66. + +[364:5] Emerson: _Op. cit._, p. 25. + +The possibility of conflict between this method of nature study and the +empirical method of science is significantly attested by the +circumstance that in the year 1801 Hegel published a paper in which he +maintained, on the ground of certain numerical harmonies, that there +could be no planet between Mars and Jupiter, while at almost exactly the +same time Piazzi discovered Ceres, the first of the asteroids. + +[368:6] McTaggart: _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic_, p. 181. + +[369:7] Green: _Prolegomena to Ethics_, p. 15. + +[370:8] Plato: _The Sophist_, 248. Translation by Jowett. + +[382:9] Hegel: _Encyclopaedie_, Sect. 45, lecture note. Quoted by +McTaggart: _Op. cit._, p. 69. + +[382:10] Hegel: _Encyclopaedie_, Sect. 50. Quoted by McTaggart: _Op. +cit._, p. 70. + +[385:11] Royce: _Conception of God_, pp. 19, 43-44. + +This argument is well summarized in Green's statement that "the +existence of one connected world, which is the presupposition of +knowledge, implies the action of one self-conditioning and +self-determining mind." _Prolegomena to Ethics_, p. 181. + +[387:12] Kant: _Critical Examination of Practical Reason_. Translated by +Abbott in _Kant's Theory of Ethics_, p. 180. + +[391:13] Quoted from McTaggart: _Op. cit._, pp. 231-232. + +[393:14] Emerson: _Op. cit._, pp. 30-31. + +[394:15] Royce: _The World and the Individual, First Series_, p. 465. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +CONCLUSION + + +[Sidenote: Liability of Philosophy to Revision, Due to its Systematic +Character.] + +Sect. 195. One who consults a book of philosophy in the hope of finding +there a definite body of truth, sanctioned by the consensus of experts, +cannot fail to be disappointed. And it should now be plain that this is +due not to the frailties of philosophers, but to the meaning of +philosophy. Philosophy is not additive, but reconstructive. Natural +science may advance step by step without ever losing ground; its +empirical discoveries are in their severalty as true as they can ever +be. Thus the stars and the species of animals may be recorded +successively, and each generation of astronomers and zoologists may take +up the work at the point reached by its forerunners. The formulation of +results does, it is true, require constant correction and revision--but +there is a central body of data which is little affected, and which +accumulates from age to age. Now the finality of scientific truth is +proportional to the modesty of its claims. Items of truth persist, +while the interpretation of them is subject to alteration with the +general advance of knowledge; and, relatively speaking, science consists +in items of truth, and philosophy in their interpretation. The liability +to revision in science itself increases as that body of knowledge +becomes more highly unified and systematic. Thus the present age, with +its attempt to construct a single comprehensive system of mechanical +science, is peculiarly an age when fundamental conceptions are subjected +to a thorough re-examination--when, for example, so ancient a conception +as that of matter is threatened with displacement by that of energy. But +philosophy is _essentially unitary and systematic_--and thus +_superlatively liable to revision_. + +[Sidenote: The One Science and the Many Philosophies.] + +Sect. 196. It is noteworthy that it is only in this age of a highly +systematic natural science that _different_ systems are projected, as in +the case just noted of the rivalry between the strictly mechanical, or +corpuscular, theory and the newer theory of energetics. It has +heretofore been taken for granted that although there may be many +philosophies, there is but one body of science. And it is still taken +for granted that the experimental detail of the individual science is a +common fund, to the progressive increase of which the individual +scientist contributes the results of his special research; there being +_rival_ schools of mechanics, physics, or chemistry, only in so far as +_fundamental conceptions_ or _principles of orderly arrangement_ are in +question. But philosophy deals exclusively with the most fundamental +conceptions and the most general principles of orderly arrangement. +Hence it is significant of the very task of philosophy that there should +be many tentative systems of philosophy, even that each philosopher +should project and construct his own philosophy. Philosophy as the truth +of synthesis and reconciliation, of comprehensiveness and coordination, +must be a living unity. It is a thinking of entire experience, and can +be sufficient only through being all-sufficient. The heart of every +philosophy is a harmonizing insight, an intellectual prospect within +which all human interests and studies compose themselves. Such knowledge +cannot be delegated to isolated co-laborers, but will be altogether +missed if not loved and sought in its indivisible unity. There is no +modest home-keeping philosophy; no safe and conservative philosophy, +that can make sure of a part through renouncing the whole. There is no +philosophy without intellectual temerity, as there is no religion +without moral temerity. And the one is the supreme interest of thought, +as the other is the supreme interest of life. + +[Sidenote: Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or Eclecticism of +the Present Age.] + +Sect. 197. Though the many philosophies be inevitable, it must not be +concluded that there is therefore no progress in philosophy. The +solution from which every great philosophy is precipitated is the +mingled wisdom of some latest age, with all of its inheritance. The +"positive" knowledge furnished by the sciences, the refinements and +distinctions of the philosophers, the ideals of society--these and the +whole sum of civilization are its ingredients. Where there is no single +system of philosophy significant enough to express the age, as did the +systems of Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, and the +others who belong to the roll of the great philosophers, there exists a +_general sophistication_, which is more elusive but not less +significant. The present age--at any rate from its own stand-point--is +not an age of great philosophical systems. Such systems may indeed be +living in our midst unrecognized; but historical perspective cannot +safely be anticipated. It is certain that no living voice is known to +speak for this generation as did Hegel, and even Spencer, for the last. +There is, however, a significance in this very passing of Hegel and +Spencer,--an enlightenment peculiar to an age which knows them, but has +philosophically outlived them. There is a moral in the history of +thought which just now no philosophy, whether naturalism, or +transcendentalism, realism or idealism, can fail to draw. The +characterization of this contemporary eclecticism or sophistication, +difficult and uncertain as it must needs be, affords the best summary +and interpretation with which to conclude this brief survey of the +fortunes of philosophy. + +[Sidenote: Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism and +Absolutism.] + +Sect. 198. Since the problem of metaphysics is the crucial problem of +philosophy, the question of its present status is fundamental in any +characterization of the age. It will appear from the foregoing account +of the course of metaphysical development that two fundamental +tendencies have exhibited themselves from the beginning. The one of +these is naturalistic and empirical, representing the claims of what +common sense calls "matters of fact"; the other is transcendental and +rational, representing the claims of the standards and ideals which are +immanent in experience, and directly manifested in the great human +interests of thought and action. These tendencies have on the whole been +antagonistic; and the clear-cut and momentous systems of philosophy have +been fundamentally determined by either the one or the other. + +Thus materialism is due to the attempt to reduce all of experience to +the elements and principles of connection which are employed by the +physical sciences to set in order the actual motions, or changes of +place, which the parts of experience undergo. Materialism maintains that +the motions of bodies are indifferent to considerations of worth, and +denies that they issue from a deeper cause of another order. The very +ideas of such non-mechanical elements or principles are here provided +with a mechanical origin. Similarly a phenomenalism, like that of Hume, +takes immediate presence to sense as the norm of being and knowledge. +Individual items, directly verified in the moment of their occurrence, +are held to be at once the content of all real truth, and the source of +those abstract ideas which the misguided rationalists mistake for real +truth. + +But the absolutist, on the other hand, contends that the thinker must +_mean_ something by the reality which he seeks. If he had it for the +looking, thought would not be, as it so evidently is, a purposive +endeavor. And that which is meant by reality can be nothing short of the +fulfilment or final realization of this endeavor of thought. To find out +what thought seeks, to anticipate the consummation of thought and posit +it as real, is therefore the first and fundamental procedure of +philosophy. The mechanism of nature, and all matters of fact, must come +to terms with this absolute reality, or be condemned as mere appearance. +Thus Plato distinguishes the world of "generation" in which we +participate by perception, from the "true essence" in which we +participate by thought; and Schelling speaks of the modern experimental +method as the "corruption" of philosophy and physics, in that it fails +to construe nature in terms of spirit. + +[Sidenote: Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of +Nature. The Neo-Fichteans.] + +Sect. 199. Now it would never occur to a sophisticated philosopher of +the present, to one who has thought out to the end the whole tradition +of philosophy, and felt the gravity of the great historical issues, to +suffer either of these motives to dominate him to the exclusion of the +other. Absolutism has long since ceased to speak slightingly of physical +science, and of the world of perception. It is conceded that motions +must be known in the mechanical way, and matters of fact in the +matter-of-fact way. Furthermore, the prestige which science enjoyed in +the nineteenth century, and the prestige which the empirical and secular +world of action has enjoyed to a degree that has steadily increased +since the Renaissance, have convinced the absolutist of the intrinsic +significance of these parts of experience. They are no longer reduced, +but are permitted to flourish in their own right. From the very councils +of absolute idealism there has issued a distinction which is fast +becoming current, between the World of Appreciation, or the realm of +moral and logical principles, and the World of Description, or the realm +of empirical generalizations and mechanical causes.[402:1] It is indeed +maintained that the former of these is metaphysically superior; but the +latter is ranked without the disparagement of its own proper categories. + +With the Fichteans this distinction corresponds to the distinction in +the system of Fichte between the active moral ego, and the nature which +it posits to act upon. But the _neo-Fichteans_ are concerned to show +that the nature so posited, or the World of Description, is the _realm +of mechanical science_, and that the entire system of mathematical and +physical truth is therefore morally necessary.[403:2] + +[Sidenote: The Neo-Kantians.] + +Sect. 200. A more pronounced tendency in the same direction marks the +work of the _neo-Kantians_. These philosophers repudiate the +spiritualistic metaphysics of Schopenhauer, Fichte, and Hegel, believing +the real significance of Kant to lie in his critical method, in his +examination of the first principles of the different systems of +knowledge, and especially in his analysis of the foundations of +mathematics and physics.[403:3] In approaching mathematics and physics +from a general logical stand-point, these neo-Kantians become scarcely +distinguishable in interest and temper from those scientists who +approach logic from the mathematical and physical stand-point. + +[Sidenote: Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism.] + +Sect. 201. The finite, moral individual, with his peculiar spiritual +perspective, has long since been recognized as essential to the meaning +of the universe rationally conceived. But in its first movement absolute +idealism proposed to absorb him in the indivisible absolute self. It is +now pointed out that Fichte, and even Hegel himself, means the absolute +to be a plurality or society of persons.[404:4] It is commonly conceded +that the will of the absolute must coincide with the wills of all finite +creatures in their severalty, that God wills in and through men.[404:5] +Corresponding to this individualistic tendency on the part of absolute +idealism, there has been recently projected a _personal idealism_, or +_humanism_, which springs freshly and directly from the same motive. +This philosophy attributes ultimate importance to the human person with +his freedom, his interests, his control over nature, and his hope of the +advancement of the spiritual kingdom through cooperation with his +fellows.[405:6] + +[Sidenote: Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of +Fundamental Principles.] + +Sect. 202. Naturalism exhibits a moderation and liberality that is not +less striking than that of absolutism. This abatement of its claims +began in the last century with agnosticism. It was then conceded that +there is an order other than that of natural science; but this order was +held to be inaccessible to human knowledge. Such a theory is essentially +unstable because it employs principles which define a non-natural order, +but refuses to credit them or call them knowledge. The agnostic is in +the paradoxical position of one who knows of an unknowable world. +Present-day naturalism is more circumspect. It has interested itself in +bringing to light that in the very procedure of science which, because +it predetermines what nature shall be, cannot be included within nature. +To this interest is due the rediscovery of the rational foundations of +science. It was already known in the seventeenth century that exact +science does not differ radically from mathematics, as mathematics does +not differ radically from logic. Mathematics and mechanics are now being +submitted to a critical examination which reveals the definitions and +implications upon which they rest, and the general relation of these to +the fundamental elements and necessities of thought.[406:7] + +[Sidenote: Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism.] + +Sect. 203. This rationalistic tendency in naturalism is balanced by a +tendency which is more empirical, but equally subversive of the old +ultra-naturalism. Goethe once wrote: + + "I have observed that I hold that thought to be true which is + _fruitful for me_. . . . When I know my relation to myself and + to the outer world, I say that I possess the truth." + +Similarly, it is now frequently observed that all knowledge is _humanly +fruitful_, and it is proposed that this shall be regarded as the very +criterion of truth. According to this principle science as a whole, even +knowledge as a whole, is primarily a human utility. The nature which +science defines is an artifact or construct. It is designed to express +briefly and conveniently what man may practically expect from his +environment. This tendency is known as _pragmatism_. It ranges +from systematic doctrines, reminiscent of Fichte, which seek to +define practical needs and deduce knowledge from them, to the +more irresponsible utterances of those who liken science to +"shorthand,"[407:8] and mathematics to a game of chess. In any case +pragmatism attributes to nature a certain dependence on will, and +therefore implies, even when it does not avow, that will with its +peculiar principles or values cannot be reduced to the terms of nature. +In short, it would be more true to say that nature expresses will, than +that will expresses nature.[408:9] + +[Sidenote: Summary, and Transition to Epistemology.] + +Sect. 204. Such, then, is the contemporary eclecticism as respects the +central problem of metaphysics. There are _naturalistic_ and +_individualistic_ tendencies in _absolutism_; _rationalistic_ and +_ethical_ tendencies in _naturalism_; and finally the independent and +spontaneous movements of _personal idealism_ and _pragmatism_. + +Since the rise of the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, metaphysics +and epistemology have maintained relations so intimate that the present +state of the former cannot be characterized without some reference to +the present state of the latter. Indeed, the very issues upon which +metaphysicians divide are most commonly those provoked by the problem +of knowledge. The counter-tendencies of naturalism and absolutism are +always connected, and often coincide with, the epistemological +opposition between empiricism, which proclaims perception, and +rationalism, which proclaims reason, to be the proper organ of +knowledge. The other great epistemological controversy does not bear so +direct and simple a relation to the central metaphysical issues, and +must be examined on its own account. + +[Sidenote: The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism. Realistic +Tendency in Empirical Idealism.] + +Sect. 205. The point of controversy is the dependence or independence of +the object of knowledge on the state of knowledge; idealism maintaining +that reality _is_ the knower or his content of mind, realism, that being +known is a circumstance which appertains to some reality, without being +the indispensable condition of reality as such. Now the sophisticated +thought of the present age exhibits a tendency on the part of these +opposite doctrines to approach and converge. It has been already +remarked that the empirical idealism of the Berkeleyan type could not +avoid transcending itself. Hume, who omitted Berkeley's active spirits, +no longer had any subjective seat or locus for the perceptions to which +Berkeley had reduced the outer world. And perceptions which are not the +states of any subject, retain only their intrinsic character and become +a series of elements. When there is nothing beyond, which appears, and +nothing within to which it appears, there ceases to be any sense in +using such terms as appearance, phenomenon, or impression. The term +sensation is at present employed in the same ill-considered manner. But +empirical idealism has come gradually to insist upon the importance of +the content of perception, rather than the relation of perception to a +self as its state. The terms _element_ and _experience_, which are +replacing the subjectivistic terms, are frankly realistic.[410:10] + +[Sidenote: Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception of +Experience.] + +Sect. 206. There is a similar realistic trend in the development of +absolute idealism. The pure Hegelian philosophy was notably objective. +The principles of development in which it centres were conceived by +Hegel himself to manifest themselves most clearly in the progressions of +nature and history. Many of Hegel's followers have been led by moral and +religious interests to emphasize consciousness, and, upon +epistemological grounds, to lay great stress upon the necessity of the +union of the parts of experience within an enveloping self. But absolute +idealism has much at heart the overcoming of relativism, and the +absolute is defined in order to meet the demand for a being that shall +not have the cognitive deficiencies of an object of finite thought. So +it is quite possible for this philosophy, while maintaining its +traditions on the whole, to abandon the term _self_ to the finite +subject, and regard its absolute as a system of rational and universal +principles--self-sufficient because externally independent and +internally necessary. Hence the renewed study of categories as logical, +mathematical, or mechanical principles, and entirely apart from their +being the acts of a thinking self. + +Furthermore, it has been recognized that the general demand of idealism +is met when reality is regarded as not outside of or other than +knowledge, whatever be true of the question of dependence. Thus the +conception of _experience_ is equally convenient here, in that it +signifies what is immediately present in knowledge, without affirming it +to _consist in_ being so presented.[411:11] + +[Sidenote: Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence Philosophy.] + +Sect. 207. And at this point idealism is met by a latter-day realism. +The traditional modern realism springing from Descartes was dualistic. +It was supposed that reality in itself was essentially extra-mental, and +thus under the necessity of being either represented or misrepresented +in thought. But the one of these alternatives is dogmatic, in that +thought can never test the validity of its relation to that which is +perpetually outside of it; while the other is agnostic, providing only +for the knowledge of a world of appearance, an improper knowledge that +is in fact not knowledge at all. + +But realism is not necessarily dualistic, since it requires only that +being shall not be dependent upon being known. Furthermore, since +empiricism is congenial to naturalism, it is an easy step to say that +nature is directly known in perception. This first takes the form of +positivism, or the theory that only such nature as can be directly known +can be really known. But this agnostic provision for an unknown world +beyond, inevitably falls away and leaves _reality as that which is +directly known, but not conditioned by knowledge_. Again the term +_experience_ is the most useful, and provides a common ground for +_idealistic realism_ with _realistic idealism_. A new epistemological +movement makes this conception of experience its starting-point. What is +known as the _immanence philosophy_ defines reality as experience, and +means by experience the subject matter of all knowledge--not defined as +such, but regarded as capable of being such. Experience is conceived to +be _both in and out_ of selves, cognition being but one of the special +systems into which experience may enter.[413:12] + +[Sidenote: The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New +Construction.] + +Sect. 208. Does this eclecticism of the age open any philosophical +prospect? Is it more than a general compromise--a confession of failure +on the part of each and every radical and clear-cut doctrine of +metaphysics and epistemology? There is no final answer to such a +question short of an independent construction, and such procedure would +exceed the scope of the present discussion. But there is an evident +interpretation of tradition that suggests a possible basis for such +construction. + +[Sidenote: The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of Attempt to +Reduce All Experience to it.] + +Sect. 209. Suppose it to be granted that the categories of nature are +quite self-sufficient. This would mean that there might conceivably be a +strictly physical order, governed only by mechanical principles, and by +the more general logical and mathematical principles. The body of +physical science so extended as to include such general conceptions as +identity, difference, number, quality, space, and time, is the account +of such an order. This order need have no value, and need not be known. +But reality as a whole is evidently not such a strictly physical order, +for the definition of the physical order involves the rejection of many +of the most familiar aspects of experience, such as its value and its +being known in conscious selves. Materialism, in that it proposes to +conceive the whole of reality as physical, must attempt to reduce the +residuum to physical terms, and with no hope of success. Goodness and +knowledge cannot be explained as mass and force, or shown to be +mechanical necessities. + +[Sidenote: Truth of Psychical Relations, but Impossibility of General +Reduction to Them.] + +Sect. 210. Are we then to conclude that reality is not physical, and +look for other terms to which we may reduce physical terms? There is no +lack of such other terms. Indeed, we could as fairly have _begun_ +elsewhere. Thus some parts of experience compose the consciousness of +the individual, and are said to be known by him. Experience so contained +is connected by the special relation of being known together. But this +relation is quite indifferent to physical, moral, and logical relations. +Thus we may be conscious of things which are physically disconnected, +morally repugnant, and logically contradictory, or in all of these +respects utterly irrelevant. Subjectivism, in that it proposes to +conceive the whole of reality as consciousness, must attempt to reduce +physical, moral, and logical relations to that co-presence in +consciousness from which they are so sharply distinguished in their very +definition. The historical failure of this attempt was inevitable. + +[Sidenote: Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of Ideal of +Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing the Whole of Experience from +it.] + +Sect. 211. But there is at least one further starting-point, the one +adopted by the most subtle and elaborate of all reconstructive +philosophies. Logical necessities are as evidently real as bodies or +selves. It is possible to define general types of inference, as well as +compact and internally necessary systems such as those of mathematics. +There is a perfectly distinguishable strain of pure rationality in the +universe. Whether or not it be possible to conceive a pure rationality +as self-subsistent, inasmuch as there are degrees it is at any rate +possible to conceive of a maximum of rationality. But similarly there +are degrees of moral goodness. It is possible to define with more or +less exactness a morally perfect person, or an ideal moral community. +Here again it may be impossible that pure and unalloyed goodness should +constitute a universe of itself. But that a maximum of goodness, with +all of the accessories which it might involve, should be thus +self-subsistent, is quite conceivable. It is thus possible to define an +absolute and perfect order, in which logical necessity, the interest of +thought, or moral goodness, the interest of will, or both together, +should be realized to the maximum. Absolutism conceives reality under +the form of this ideal, and attempts to reconstruct experience +accordingly. But is the prospect of success any better than in the cases +of materialism and subjectivism? It is evident that the ideal of logical +necessity is due to the fact that certain parts of knowledge approach it +more closely than others. Thus mechanics contains more that is arbitrary +than mathematics, and mathematics more than logic. Similarly, the theory +of the evolution of the planetary system, in that it requires the +assumption of particular distances and particular masses for the parts +of the primeval nebula, is more arbitrary than rational dynamics. It is +impossible, then, in view of the parts of knowledge which belong to the +lower end of the scale of rationality, to regard reality as a whole as +the maximum of rationality; for either a purely dynamical, a purely +mathematical, or a purely logical, realm would be more rational. The +similar disproof of the moral perfection of reality is so unmistakable +as to require no elucidation. It is evident that even where natural +necessities are not antagonistic to moral proprieties, they are at any +rate indifferent to them. + +[Sidenote: Error and Evil Cannot be Reduced to the Ideal.] + +Sect. 212. But thus far no reference has been made to error and to evil. +These are the terms which the ideals of rationality and goodness must +repudiate if they are to retain their meaning. Nevertheless experience +contains them and psychology describes them. We have already followed +the efforts which absolute idealism has made to show that logical +perfection requires error, and that moral perfection requires evil. Is +it conceivable that such efforts should be successful? Suppose a higher +logic to make the principle of contradiction the very bond of +rationality. What was formerly error is now indispensable to truth. But +what of the new error--the unbalanced and mistaken thesis, the +unresolved antithesis, the scattered and disconnected terms of thought? +These fall outside the new truth as surely as the old error fell outside +the old truth. And the case of moral goodness is precisely parallel. The +higher goodness may be so defined as to require failure and sin. Thus it +may be maintained that there can be no true success without struggle, +and no true spiritual exaltation except through repentance. But what of +failure unredeemed, sin unrepented, evil uncompensated and unresolved? +Nothing has been gained after all but a new definition of goodness--and +a new definition of evil. And this is an ethical, not a metaphysical +question. The problem of evil, like the problem of error, is as far from +solution as ever. Indeed, the very urgency of these problems is due to +metaphysical absolutism. For this philosophy defines the universe as a +perfect unity. Measured by the standard of such an ideal universe, the +parts of finite experience take on a fragmentary and baffling character +which they would not otherwise possess. The absolute perfection must by +definition both determine and exclude the imperfect. Thus absolutism +bankrupts the universe by holding it accountable for what it can never +pay. + +[Sidenote: Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole.] + +Sect. 213. If the attempt to construct experience in the special terms +of some part of experience be abandoned, how is reality to be defined? +It is evident that in that case there can be no definition of reality as +such. It must be regarded as a collection of all elements, relations, +principles, systems, that compose it. All truths will be true of it, and +it will be the subject of all truths. Reality is at least physical, +psychical, moral, and rational. That which is physical is not +necessarily moral or psychical, but may be either or both of these. Thus +it is a commonplace of experience that what has bulk and weight may or +may not be good, and may or may not be known. Similarly, that which is +psychical may or may not be physical, moral, or rational; and that which +is moral or rational may or may not be physical and psychical. There is, +then, an indeterminism in the universe, a mere coincidence of +principles, in that it contains physical, psychical, moral, logical +orders, without being in all respects either a physical, a psychical, a +moral, or a logical necessity.[420:13] Reality or experience itself is +neutral in the sense of being exclusively predetermined by no one of the +several systems it contains. But the different systems of experience +retain their specific and proper natures, without the compromise which +is involved in all attempts to extend some one until it shall embrace +them all. If such a universe seems inconceivably desultory and chaotic, +one may always remind one's self by directly consulting experience that +it is not only found immediately and unreflectively, but returned to and +lived in after every theoretical excursion. + +[Sidenote: Moral Implications of such a Pluralistic Philosophy. Purity +of the Good.] + +Sect. 214. But what implications for life would be contained in such a +philosophy? Even if it be theoretically clarifying, through being +hospitable to all differences and adequate to the multifarious demands +of experience, is it not on that very account morally dreary and +stultifying? Is not its refusal to establish the universe upon moral +foundations destructive both of the validity of goodness, and of the +incentive to its attainment? Certainly not--if the validity of goodness +be determined by criteria of worth, and if the incentive to goodness be +the possibility of making that which merely exists, or is necessary, +also good. + +This philosophy does not, it is true, define the good, but it makes +ethics autonomous, thus distinguishing the good which it defines, and +saving it from compromise with matter-of-fact, and logical or mechanical +necessity. The criticism of life is founded upon an independent basis, +and affords justification, of a selective and exclusive moral idealism. +Just because it is not required that the good shall be held accountable +for whatever is real, the ideal can be kept pure and intrinsically +worthy. The analogy of logic is most illuminating. If it be insisted +that whatever exists is logically necessary, logical necessity must be +made to embrace that from which it is distinguished by definition, such +as contradiction, mere empirical existence, and error. The consequence +is a logical chaos which has in truth forfeited the name of logic. +Similarly a goodness defined to make possible the deduction from it of +moral evil or moral indifference loses the very distinguishing +properties of goodness. The consequence is an ethical neutrality which +invalidates the moral will. A metaphysical neutrality, on the other +hand, although denying that reality as such is predestined to +morality--and thus affording no possibility of an ethical +absolutism--becomes the true ground for an ethical purism. + +[Sidenote: The Incentive to Goodness.] + +Sect. 215. But, secondly, there can be no lack of incentive to goodness +in a universe which, though not all-good, is in no respect incapable of +becoming good. That which is mechanically or logically necessary, and +that which is psychically present, _may be good_. And what can the +realization of goodness mean if not that what is natural and necessary, +actual and real, shall be also good. The world is not good, will not be +good, merely through being what it is, but is or shall be made good +through the accession of goodness. It is this belief that the real is +not necessarily, but may be, good; that the ideal is not necessarily, +but may be, realized; which has inspired every faith in action. +Philosophically it is only a question of permitting such faith to be +sincere, or condemning it as shallow. If the world be made good through +good-will, then the faith of moral action is rational; but if the world +be good because whatever is must be good, then moral action is a +tread-mill, and its attendant and animating faith only self-deception. +Moral endeavor is the elevation of physical and psychical existence to +the level of goodness. + + "Relate the inheritance to life, convert the tradition into a + servant of character, draw upon the history for support in the + struggles of the spirit, declare a war of extermination + against the total evil of the world; and then raise new armies + and organize into fighting force every belief available in the + faith that has descended to you."[423:14] + +Evil is here a practical, not a theoretical, problem. It is not to be +solved by thinking it good, for to think it good is to deaden the very +nerve of action; but by destroying it and replacing it with good. + +[Sidenote: The Justification of Faith.] + +Sect. 216. The justification of faith is in the promise of reality. For +what, after all, would be the meaning of a faith which declares that all +things, good, bad, and indifferent, are everlastingly and necessarily +what they are--even if it were concluded on philosophical grounds to +call that ultimate necessity good. Faith has interests; faith is faith +_in_ goodness or beauty. Then what more just and potent cause of despair +than the thought that the ideal must be held accountable for error, +ugliness, and evil, or for the indifferent necessities of +nature?[424:15] Are ideals to be prized the less, or believed in the +less, when there is no ground for their impeachment? How much more +hopeful for what is worth the hoping, that nature should discern ideals +and take some steps toward realizing them, than that ideals should have +created nature--such as it is! How much better a report can we give of +nature for its ideals, than of the ideals for their handiwork, if it be +nature! Emerson writes: + + "Suffice it for the joy of the universe that we have not + arrived at a wall, but at interminable oceans. Our life seems + not present so much as prospective; not for the affairs on + which it is wasted, but as a hint of this vast-flowing vigor. + Most of life seems to be mere advertisement of faculty; + information is given us not to sell ourselves cheap; that we + are very great. So, in particulars, our greatness is always in + a tendency or direction, not in an action. It is for us to + believe in the rule, not in the exception. The noble are thus + known from the ignoble. So in accepting the leading of the + sentiments, it is not what we believe concerning the + immortality of the soul or the like, but _the universal + impulse to believe_, that is the material circumstance and is + the principal fact in the history of the globe."[425:16] + +[Sidenote: The Worship and Service of God.] + +Sect. 217. If God be rid of the imputation of moral evil and +indifference, he may be _intrinsically worshipful_, because regarded +under the form of the highest ideals. And if the great cause of goodness +be in fact at stake, God may both command the adoration of men through +his purity, and reenforce their virtuous living through representing to +them that realization of goodness in the universe at large which both +contains and exceeds their individual endeavor. + +[Sidenote: The Philosopher and the Standards of the Marketplace.] + +Sect. 218. Bishop Berkeley wrote in his "Commonplace Book": + + "My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign + countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my + heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction." + +If it be essential to the meaning of philosophy that it should issue +from life, it is equally essential that it should return to life. But +this connection of philosophy with life does not mean its reduction to +the terms of life as conceived in the market-place. Philosophy cannot +emanate from life, and quicken life, without elevating and ennobling it, +and will therefore always be incommensurable with life narrowly +conceived. Hence the philosopher must always be as little understood by +men of the street as was Thales by the Thracian handmaiden. He has an +innocence and a wisdom peculiar to his perspective. + + "When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer + to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals + of anyone, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is + laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being + praised and glorified, he cannot help laughing very sincerely + in the simplicity of his heart; and this again makes him look + like a fool. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he + fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of + cattle--a swineherd, or shepherd, or cowherd, who is being + praised for the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; + and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of + whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more + insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man + is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any + shepherd, for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a + wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed + proprietors of ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher + deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to + think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of + family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he has + had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that + their sentiments only betray the dulness and narrowness of + vision of those who utter them, and who are not educated + enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man + has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them + have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and + barbarians, many times over."[427:17] + +It is not to be expected that the opinion of the "narrow, keen, little, +legal mind" should appreciate the philosophy which has acquired the +"music of speech," and hymns "the true life which is lived by immortals +or men blessed of heaven." Complacency cannot understand reverence, nor +secularism, religion. + +[Sidenote: The Secularism of the Present Age.] + +Sect. 219. If we may believe the report of a contemporary philosopher, +the present age is made insensible to the meaning of life through +preoccupation with its very achievements: + + "The world of finite interests and objects has rounded itself, + as it were, into a separate whole, within which the mind of + man can fortify itself, and live _securus adversus deos_, in + independence of the infinite. In the sphere of _thought_, + there has been forming itself an ever-increasing body of + science, which, tracing out the relation of finite things to + finite things, never finds it necessary to seek for a + beginning or an end to its infinite series of phenomena, and + which meets the claims of theology with the saying of the + astronomer, 'I do not need that hypothesis.' In the sphere of + _action_, again, the complexity of modern life presents a + thousand isolated interests, crossing each other in ways too + subtle to trace out--interests commercial, social, and + political--in pursuing one or other of which the individual + may find ample occupation for his existence, without ever + feeling the need of any return upon himself, or seeing any + reason to ask himself whether this endless striving has any + meaning or object beyond itself."[428:18] + +[Sidenote: The Value of Contemplation for Life.] + +Sect. 220. There is no dignity in living except it be in the solemn +presence of the universe; and only contemplation can summon such a +presence. Moreover, the sessions must be not infrequent, for memory is +short and visions fade. Truth does not require, however, to be followed +out of the world. There is a speculative detachment from life which is +less courageous, even if more noble, than worldliness. Such is Dante's +exalted but mediaeval intellectualism. + + "And it may be said that (as true friendship between men + consists in each wholly loving the other) the true philosopher + loves every part of wisdom, and wisdom every part of the + philosopher, inasmuch as she draws all to herself, and allows + no one of his thoughts to wander to other things." + +Even though, as Aristotle thought, pure contemplation be alone proper to +the gods in their perfection and blessedness, for the sublunary world +this is less worthy than that balance and unity of faculty which +distinguished the humanity of the Greek. + + "Then," writes Thucydides, "we are lovers of the beautiful, + yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without + loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and + ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avoid + poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing + nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the + State because he takes care of his own household; and even + those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea + of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in + public affairs not as a harmless, but as a useless character; + and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges, of + a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, + not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained + by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar + power of thinking before we act, and of acting too, whereas + other men are courageous from ignorance, but hesitate upon + reflection."[429:19] + +Thus life may be broadened and deepened without being made thin and +ineffectual. As the civil community is related to the individual's +private interests, so the community of the universe is related to the +civil community. There is a citizenship in this larger community which +requires a wider and more generous interest, rooted in a deeper and more +quiet reflection. The world, however, is not to be left behind, but +served with a new sense of proportion, with the peculiar fortitude and +reverence which are the proper fruits of philosophy. + + "This is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, + if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly + conjoined and united together than they have been; a + conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets: Saturn, + the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet + of civil society and action."[430:20] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[402:1] Cf. Josiah Royce: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, Lecture +XII; _The World and the Individual, Second Series_. + +[403:2] Cf. Hugo Muensterberg: _Psychology and Life_. The more important +writings of this school are: _Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten +Jahrhunderts_, edited by Wilhelm Windelband, and contributed to by +Windelband, H. Rickert, O. Liebmann, E. Troeltsch, B. Bauch, and others. +This book contains an excellent bibliography. Also, Rickert: _Der +Gegenstand der Erkenntnis_; _Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen +Begriffsbildung_, and other works. Windelband: _Praeludien_; _Geschichte +und Naturwissenschaft_. Muensterberg: _Grundzuege der Psychologie_. +Eucken: _Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart_. + +[403:3] Cf. F. A. Lange: _History of Materialism_, Book II, Chap. I, on +_Kant and Materialism_; also Alois Riehl: _Introduction to the Theory of +Science and Metaphysics_. Translation by Fairbanks. The more important +writings of this school are: Hermann Cohen: _Kant's Theorie der +Erfahrung_; _Die Logik der reinen Erkenntniss_, and other works. Paul +Natorp: _Sozialpaedagogik_; _Einleitung in die Psychologie nach +kritischer Methode_, and other works. E. Cassirer: _Leibniz' System in +seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen_. Riehl: _Der philosophische +Kriticismus, und seine Bedeutung fur die Positive Wissenschaft_. Cf. +also E. Husserl: _Logische Untersuchungen_. + +[404:4] Cf. J. M. E. McTaggart: _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_, Chap. +III. + +[404:5] Cf. Royce: _The Conception of God, Supplementary Essay_, pp. +135-322; _The World and the Individual, First Series_. + +[405:6] This movement began as a criticism of Hegelianism in behalf of +the human personality. Cf. Andrew Seth: _Hegelianism and Personality_; +_Man and the Cosmos_; _Two Lectures on Theism_. G. H. Howison: _The +Limits of Evolution_. The important writings of the more independent +movement are: William James: _The Will to Believe_. H. Sturt, editor: +_Personal Idealism, Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of Oxford +University_. F. C. S. Schiller: _Humanism_. Henri Bergson: _Essai sur +les donnees immediates de la conscience_; _Matiere et memoire_. This +movement is closely related to that of _Pragmatism_. See under Sect. +203. + +[406:7] Cf. Bertrand Russell: _Principles of Mathematics_, Vol. I. Among +the more important writings of this movement are the following: +Giuseppi Peano: _Formulaire de Mathematique_, published by the _Rivista +di matematica_, Tom. I-IV. Richard Dedekind: _Was sind und was +sollen die Zahlen?_ Georg Cantor: _Grundlagen einer allgemeinen +Mannigfaltigkeitslehre_. Louis Couturat: _De l'Infini Mathematique_, and +articles in _Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale_. A. N. Whitehead: _A +Treatise on Universal Algebra_. Heinrich Hertz: _Die Prinzipien der +Mechanik_. Henri Poincare: _La Science et l'Hypothese_. For the bearing +of these investigations on philosophy, see Royce: _The Sciences of the +Ideal_, in _Science_, Vol. XX, No. 510. + +[407:8] The term used by Karl Pearson in his _Grammar of Science_. + +[408:9] The important English writings of the recent independent +movement known as _pragmatism_ are: C. S. Peirce: _Illustrations of the +Logic of Science_, in _Popular Science Monthly_, Vol. XII. W. James: +_The Pragmatic Method_, in _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and +Scientific Methods_, Vol. I; _Humanism and Truth_, in _Mind_, Vol. XIII, +N. S.; _The Essence of Humanism_, in _Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. +Meth._, Vol. II (with bibliography); _The Will to Believe_. John Dewey: +_Studies in Logical Theory_. W. Caldwell: _Pragmatism_, in _Mind_, Vol. +XXV., N. S. See also literature on _personal idealism_, Sect. 201. A +similar tendency has appeared in France in Bergson, LeRoy, Milhaud, and +in Germany in Simmel. + +[410:10] Cf. Ernst Mach: _Analysis of Sensation_. Translation by +Williams. + +[411:11] Cf. F. H. Bradley: _Appearance and Reality_. + +[413:12] Cf. Carstanjen: _Richard Avenarius, and his General Theory of +Knowledge, Empiriocriticism_. Translation by H. Bosanquet, in _Mind_, +Vol. VI, N. S. Also James: _Does Consciousness Exist?_ and _A World of +Pure Experience_, in _Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth_., Vol. I; +_The Thing and its Relations_, _ibid._, Vol. II. + +The standard literature of this movement is unfortunately not available +in English. Among the more important writings are: R. Avenarius: _Kritik +der reinen Erfahrung_; _Der menschliche Weltbegriff_, and other works. +Joseph Petzoldt: _Einfuehrung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung_. +Ernst Mach: _Die Analyse der Empfindung und das Verhaeltniss des +Physischen zum Psychischen, 2. Auff._ Wilhelm Schuppe: _Grundriss der +Erkenntnisstheorie und Logik_. Friedrich Carstanjen: _Einfuehrung in die +"Kritik der reinen Erfahrung"_--an exposition of Avenarius. Also +articles by the above, R. Willy, R. v. Schubert-Soldern, and others, in +the _Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie_. + +[420:13] It is not, of course, denied that there may be other orders, +such as, _e. g._, an aesthetic order; or that there may be definite +relations between these orders, such as, _e. g._, the psycho-physical +relation. + +[423:14] Quoted from George A. Gordon: _The New Epoch for Faith_, p. 27. + +[424:15] Cf. James: _The Will to Believe_, essay on _The Dilemma of +Determinism, passim_. + +[425:16] _Essays, Second Series_, p. 75. + +[427:17] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 174-175. Translation by Jowett. + +[428:18] E. Caird: _Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I, pp. 218-219. + +[429:19] Translation by Jowett. Quoted by Laurie in his _Pre-Christian +Education_, p. 213. + +[430:20] Bacon: _Advancement of Learning_, Book I. + + + + +BIBLIOGRAPHY + + +The references contained in this bibliography have been selected on the +score of availability in English for the general reader and beginning +student of philosophy. But I have sought wherever possible to include +passages from the great philosophers and men of letters. These are +placed first in the list, followed by references to contemporary writers +and secondary sources. + + +CHAPTER I, THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER. + +PLATO: _Republic_, especially Book VII. Translations by Jowett and +Vaughan. _Theaetetus_, 172 ff. Translation by Jowett. + +ARISTOTLE: _Ethics_, Book X. Translation by Welldon. + +MARCUS AURELIUS: _Thoughts._ Translation by Long. + +EPICTETUS: _Discourses._ Translation by Long. + +BACON: _The Advancement of Learning._ + +EMERSON: _Representative Men--Plato; or the Philosopher._ _Conduct of +Life--Culture._ _Essays, Second Series--Experience._ + + * * * * * + +ROYCE, JOSIAH: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ Introduction. + +HIBBEN, J. G.: _Problems of Philosophy._ Introduction. + + +CHAPTER II, POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY. + +PLATO: _Republic_, Books II and III. Translation by Jowett. (Criticism +of the poets as demoralizing.) + +WORDSWORTH: _Observations Prefixed to the Second Edition of the Lyrical +Ballads._ + +SHELLEY: _Defence of Poetry._ + +EVERETT, C. C.: _Poetry, Comedy, and Duty._ (discussion of the +Philosophy of Poetry.) _Essays, Theological and Literary._ (On the +Poetry of Emerson, Goethe, Tennyson, Browning.) + +CAIRD, EDWARD: _Literature and Philosophy._ (Wordsworth, Dante, Goethe, +etc.) + +ROYCE, JOSIAH: _Studies of Good and Evil._ Essay on _Tennyson and +Pessimism_. + +SANTAYANA, GEORGE: _Poetry and Religion._ (Philosophy of poetry; Greek +Poetry, Shakespeare, etc.) + +SNEATH, E. H.: _Philosophy in Poetry: A Study of Sir John Davies's Poem, +"Nosce Teipsum."_ + + +CHAPTERS III AND IV, RELIGION. + +PLATO: _Republic_, Book III. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan. +(Criticism of religion from the stand-point of morality and politics.) + +ST. AUGUSTINE: _Confessions._ Translation by Pusey. (Document of +religious experience.) + +THOMAS A KEMPIS: _Imitation of Christ._ Translation by Stanhope. +(Mediaeval programme of personal religion.) + +SPINOZA: _Theological-political Treatise._ Translation by Elwes. (One of +the first great pleas for religious liberty and one of the first +attempts to define the _essential_ in religion.) + +KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason--the Canon of Pure Reason_. Translation +by Max Mueller. _Critique of Practical Reason._ Translation by Abbott in +_Theory of Ethics_. (Defines religion as the province of faith, +distinguishes it from knowledge, and relates it to morality.) + +SCHLEIERMACHER: _On Religion._ _Speeches to its Cultured Despisers._ +Translation by Oman. (Ponderous, dogmatic in its philosophy, but +profound and sympathetic in its understanding of religion.) + +ARNOLD: _Literature and Dogma._ (On the essence of religion as +exemplified in Judaism and Christianity.) + + * * * * * + +SABATIER, A.: _Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based on Psychology +and History._ Translation by Seed. _Religions of Authority and the +Religion of the Spirit._ Translation by Houghton. (These books emphasize +the essential importance of the believer's attitude to God.) + +JAMES, WILLIAM: _The Varieties of Religious Experience._ (A rich +storehouse of religion, sympathetically interpreted.) + +EVERETT, C. C.: _The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith._ (A +study in the definition and meaning of religion.) + +CAIRD, EDWARD: _Evolution of Religion._ (Indoctrinated with the author's +idealistic philosophy.) + +FIELDING, H.: _The Hearts of Men._ (A plea for the universal religion. +Special feeling for Indian religions.) + +HARNACK, A.: _What is Christianity?_ Translation by Saunders. (Attempt +to define the _essence_ of Christianity.) + +PALMER, G. H.: _The Field of Ethics_, Chapters V and VI. (On the +relation of ethics and religion.) + +BROWN, W. A.: _The Essence of Christianity._ (Special study of the +definition of religion.) + +JASTROW, M.: _The Study of Religion._ (Method of history and psychology +of religion.) + +SMITH, W. ROBERTSON: _The Religion of the Semites._ (Excellent study of +tribal religions.) + +CLARKE, W. N.: _What Shall We Think of Christianity?_ (An interpretation +of Christianity.) + +LEUBA, J. H.: _Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion._ In +_The Monist_, Vol. XI, p. 195. + +STARBUCK, E. D.: _The Psychology of Religion._ + + +CHAPTER V, THE PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM OF SCIENCE.[434:A] + +PLATO: _Republic_, Book VII, 526 ff. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan. +_Phaedo_, 96 ff. Translation by Jowett. + +BERKELEY: _Alciphron_, the Fourth Dialogue. _Siris_, especially 234-264. +(On the failure of the scientist to grasp the deeper truth respecting +causes and substances.) + +DESCARTES: _Discourse on Method._ Translation by Veitch. + +SPINOZA: _On the Improvement of the Understanding._ Translation by +Elwes. + +KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason--Transcendental Aesthetic_ and +_Transcendental Analytic._ Translation by Max Mueller. (Studies of the +Method of Science.) + + * * * * * + +WARD, JAMES: _Naturalism and Agnosticism._ (Full but clear account of +recent development of natural science, and criticism of its use as +philosophy.) + +MACH, ERNST: _Science of Mechanics._ (Historical and methodological.) + +JAMES, WILLIAM: _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II, Chap. xxviii. +(Emphasizes the practical interest underlying science.) + +ROYCE, JOSIAH: _The World and the Individual, Second Series, Man and +Nature._ (Interpretation of the province of natural science from the +stand-point of absolute idealism.) + +PEARSON, KARL: _The Grammar of Science._ (The limits of science from the +scientific stand-point.) + +CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: On the Aims and Instruments of +Scientific Thought; The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences; On the Ethics +of Belief._ + +HUXLEY, T. H.: _Method and Results._ (The positivistic position.) + +MUENSTERBERG, HUGO: _Psychology and Life._ (Epistemological limitations +of natural science applied to psychology, from idealistic stand-point.) + +FULLERTON, G. E.: _A System of Metaphysics_, Part II. + +TAYLOR, A. E.: _Elements of Metaphysics_, Book III. + + +CHAPTERS VI AND VII, THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. + +PLATO: _Dialogues_, especially _Protagoras_ and _Theaetetus_. +Translation by Jowett. (The actual genesis of special problems.) + + * * * * * + +KUELPE, OSWALD: _Introduction to Philosophy._ Translation by Pillsbury +and Titchener. (Full and accurate account of the traditional terms and +doctrines of philosophy.) + +HIBBEN, J. G.: _Problems of Philosophy._ (Brief and elementary.) + +SIDGWICK, HENRY: _Philosophy, its Scope and Relations._ + +PAULSEN, FRIEDRICH: _Introduction to Philosophy._ Translation by Thilly. + +BALDWIN, J. M.: _Dictionary of Philosophy._ (Full, and convenient for +reference.) + +FERRIER, J. F.: _Lectures on Greek Philosophy._ (Interpretation of the +beginning and early development of philosophy.) + +BURNET, J.: _Early Greek Philosophy._ Translation of the sources. + +FAIRBANKS, A.: _The First Philosophers of Greece._ + +GOMPERZ, TH.: _Greek Thinkers_, Vol. I. Translation by Magnus. (On the +first development of philosophical problems.) + +PALMER, G. H.: _The Field of Ethics._ (On the relations of the ethical +problem.) + +PUFFER, ETHEL: _The Psychology of Beauty._ (On the relations of the +aesthetical problem.) + + +CHAPTER VIII, NATURALISM.[436:A] + +LUCRETIUS: _On the Nature of Things._ Translation by Munro. (Early +materialism.) + +HOBBES: _Metaphysical System._ Edited by Calkins. _Leviathan_, Part I. +(Modern materialism.) + + * * * * * + +BUECHNER, LOUIS: _Force and Matter._ Translation by Collingwood. +(Nineteenth century materialism.) + +JANET, PAUL: _Materialism of the Present Day._ Translation by Masson. + +LANGE, F. A.: _History of Materialism._ Translation by Thomas. + +HAECKEL, ERNST: _The Riddle of the Universe._ Translation by McCabe. +("Monism of Energy.") + +CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: The Ethics of Belief; Cosmic +Emotion; Body and Mind._ (Positivism.) + +HUXLEY, T. H.: _Evolution and Ethics; Prolegomena._ (Distinguishes +between the moral and natural.) _Science and Hebrew Tradition_; _Science +and Christian Tradition_. (Controversies of the naturalist with +Gladstone and Duke of Argyle.) + +SPENCER, HERBERT: _First Principles._ (The systematic evolutionary +philosophy.) _Principles of Ethics._ (Ethics of naturalism.) _The Nature +and Reality of Religion._ (Controversy with Frederick Harrison.) + +BALFOUR, A. J.: _Foundations of Belief_, Part I. (On the religious, +moral, and aesthetic consequences of naturalism.) + +PATER, WALTER: _Marius the Epicurean._ (Refined hedonism.) + +ROMANES, G. J.: _Thoughts on Religion._ (Approached from stand-point of +science.) + +BENTHAM, J.: _Introduction to the Principles of Morals and +Legislation._ (Utilitarian.) + +STEPHEN, L.: _Science of Ethics._ (Evolutionary and social.) + + +CHAPTER IX, SUBJECTIVISM. + +PLATO: _Theaetetus._ Translation by Jowett. (Exposition and criticism of +Protagoras.) + +BERKELEY: _Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_; _Principles of +Human Knowledge_. + +HUME: _An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding._ + +SCHOPENHAUER: _The World as Will and Idea._ Translation by Haldane and +Kemp. + +MILL, J. S.: _An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_, +X-XIII. + + * * * * * + +CLIFFORD, W. K.: _Lectures and Essays: On the Nature of Things in +Themselves._ (Panpsychism.) + +DEUSSEN, PAUL: _Elements of Metaphysics._ Translation by Duff. +(Following Schopenhauer and Oriental philosophy.) + +PAULSEN, FR.: _Introduction to Philosophy._ (Panpsychism.) + +STRONG, C. A.: _Why the Mind Has a Body._ (Panpsychism.) + +JAMES, WILLIAM: _Reflex Action and Theism_, in _The Will to Believe_. +(Morality and religion of individualism.) + + +CHAPTER X, ABSOLUTE REALISM. + +PARMENIDES: _Fragments._ Arrangement and translation by Burnet or +Fairbanks. + +PLATO: _Republic_, Books VI and VII. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan. +_Symposium_, _Phaedrus_, _Phaedo_, _Philebus_. Translation by Jowett. + +ARISTOTLE[437:A]: _Psychology._ Translations by Hammond and Wallace. +_Ethics._ Translation by Welldon. + +SPINOZA: _Ethics_, especially Parts I and V. Translations by Elwes and +Willis. + +LEIBNIZ: _Monadology_, and Selections. Translation by Latta. _Discourse +on Metaphysics._ Translation by Montgomery. + +MARCUS AURELIUS: _Thoughts._ Translation by Long. + +EPICTETUS: _Discourses._ Translation by Long. + + * * * * * + +CAIRD, EDWARD: _The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers._ +(The central conceptions of Plato and Aristotle.) + +JOACHIM: _A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza._ + + +CHAPTER XI, ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. + +DESCARTES: _Meditations._ Translation by Veitch. + +KANT: _Critique of Pure Reason._ Translation by Max Mueller. _Critique +of Practical Reason._ Translation by Abbott, in Kant's _Theory of +Ethics_. + +FICHTE[437:A]: _Science of Ethics._ Translation by Kroeger. _Popular +Works: The Nature of the Scholar_; _The Vocation of Man_; _The Doctrine +of Religion_. Translation by Smith. + +SCHILLER: _Aesthetic Letters, Essays, and Philosophical Letters._ +Translation by Weiss. (Romanticism.) + +HEGEL[437:A]: _Ethics._ Translation by Sterrett. _Logic._ Translation, +with Introduction, by Wallace. _Philosophy of Mind._ Translation, with +Introduction, by Wallace. _Philosophy of Religion._ Translation by +Spiers and Sanderson. _Philosophy of Right._ Translation by Dyde. + +GREEN, T. H.: _Prolegomena to Ethics._ + +EMERSON: _The Conduct of Life--Fate._ _Essays, First Series--The +Over-Soul; Circles._ _Essays, Second Series--The Poet; Experience; +Nature._ (The appreciation of life consistent with absolute idealism.) + +WORDSWORTH: _Poems_, _passim_. + +COLERIDGE: _Aids to Reflection._ _The Friend._ + +ROYCE, J.: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ (Sympathetic exposition of +Kant, Fichte, Romanticism, and Hegel.) _The Conception of God._ (The +epistemological argument.) _The World and the Individual, First Series._ +(Systematic development of absolute idealism; its moral and religious +aspects.) + +CAIRD, EDWARD: _The Critical Philosophy of Kant._ (Exposition and +interpretation from stand-point of later idealism.) + +EVERETT, C. C.: _Fichte's Science of Knowledge._ + +MCTAGGART, J. M. E.: _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic._ Studies in +Hegelian Cosmology. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[434:A] For further contemporary writings on this topic, see foot-notes +under Sects. 199, 200, 203. + +[436:A] For histories of philosophy, see supplementary bibliography at +end. + +[437:A] The Metaphysics of Aristotle, Fichte, and Hegel must be found by +the English reader mainly in the secondary sources. + + + + +SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. + + +I.--GENERAL. + +ROGERS: _Student's History of Philosophy._ (Elementary and clear; +copious quotations.) + +WEBER: _History of Philosophy._ Translation by Thilly. (Comprehensive +and compact.) + +WINDELBAND: _A History of Philosophy._ Translation by Tufts. (Emphasis +upon the problems and their development.) + +ERDMANN: _History of Philosophy._ Translation edited by Hough; in three +volumes. (Detailed and accurate exposition.) + +UEBERWEG: _A History of Philosophy._ Translation by Morris and Porter, +in two volumes. (Very complete; excellent account of the literature.) + + +II.--SPECIAL PERIODS. + +FERRIER: _Lectures on Greek Philosophy._ (Excellent introduction.) + +MARSHALL: _Short History of Greek Philosophy._ (Brief and clear.) + +WINDELBAND: _History of Ancient Philosophy._ Translation by Cushman. +(Very accurate and scholarly; also brief.) + +ZELLER: _Pre-Socratic Philosophy._ Translation by Alleyne. _Socrates and +the Socratic Schools._ Translation by Reichel. (Full and accurate.) + +GOMPERZ: _Greek Thinkers._ Translated by Magnus, in four volumes. (Very +full; especially on Plato. Goes no further than Plato.) + +BURNET: _Early Greek Philosophy._ (Translations of fragments, with +commentary.) + +FAIRBANKS: _The First Philosophers of Greece._ (Translations of +fragments, with commentary.) + +TURNER: _History of Philosophy._ (Excellent account of Scholastic +philosophy.) + +ROYCE: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy._ (Very illuminating +introductory exposition of modern idealism.) + +FALCKENBERG: _History of Modern Philosophy._ + +HOEFFDING: _History of Modern Philosophy._ Translation by Meyer, in two +volumes. (Full and good.) + + + + +INDEX + + + ABSOLUTE, the, 307, 309, 332, 391, 392, 400, 404; + being, 308; + substance, 312; + ideal, 326; + spirit, 349 (_note_), 358 ff.; + mind, 349 (_note_), 358, 380, 322 ff. + + ABSOLUTE IDEALISM, chap. xi; + general meaning, 177, 349 (_note_), 400; + criticism of, 349, 365, 385, 411, 416; + epistemology of, 368 ff.; + as related to Kant, 380; + direct argument for, 383; + ethics of, 386 ff.; + religion of, 390 ff.; + of present day, 402 ff., 410. + + ABSOLUTE REALISM, chap. x; + general meaning, 306 (_note_), 400; + epistemology of, 339; + ethics of, 342; + religion of, 346; + criticism of, 338, 416. + + ABSTRACT, the, 139. + + ACTIVITY, 209, 285, 295. + + AESTHETICS, 189. + + AGNOSTICISM, 168, 252 ff. + + ANAXAGORAS, 239; + quoted, 162. + + ANAXIMANDER, 224. + + ANSELM, SAINT, 200. + + ANTHROPOMORPHISM, 109. + + APPRECIATION, 25, 402. + + ARISTOTLE, in formal logic, 186; + ethics of, 195, 345; + psychology of, 208; + philosophy of, 306, 332 ff.; + and Plato, 333, 336; + and Spinoza, 336; + epistemology of, 339; + religion of, 346, 429; + on evil, 353. + + ATOMISM, 166, 229. + Also see under LEUCIPPUS, and DEMOCRITUS. + + ATTITUDE, 62. + + ATTRIBUTE, in Spinoza, 312 ff. + + AUGUSTINE, SAINT, + on communion with God, 68; + on pietism, 195; + his conception of self, 372. + + AUTOMATISM, 248. + + + BAAL, religion of, 88. + + BACON, FRANCIS, on thought and action, 430. + + BALFOUR, A. J., on materialism, 264. + + BEAUTY, in aesthetics, 189; + in Plato, 327, 332. + + BEING, Eleatic conception of, 308 ff. + + BELIEF, key to definition of religion, 58; + general characters applied to religion, 59 ff.; + in persons and dispositions, 62; + examples of religions, 66 ff.; + object of religions, 65, 82, 97; + relation to logic, 182, 183. + + BENTHAM, 262. + + BERKELEY, on idealism, 176; + relation to common-sense, 267; + his refutation of material substance, 275 ff.; + epistemology of, 277, 296, 369; + theory of mathematics, 279; + his spiritualism, 280, 284, 292; + his conception of God, 284, 293; + ethics of, 302; + religion of, 304. + + BUDDHISM, 78. + + + CAUSE, in science, 131; + God as first, 203; + of motion, 231 ff.; + spirit as, 293 ff. + + CHRISTIANITY, persistence of, 76; + essence of, 86; + development from Judaism, 94; + ethics of, 195, 198, 386; + idea of God in, 200 ff., 205; + emphasis on self-consciousness in, 372. + + COMTE, 115. + + CONTEMPLATION, 428. + + CONVERSION, 69 ff. + + CORPOREAL BEING, 224; + processes of, 225; + Berkeley's critique of, 278; + historical conceptions of, 229. + + COSMOLOGICAL PROOF, the, of God, 203. + + COSMOLOGY, general meaning of, 159; + mechanism in, 161, 225; + teleology in, 161. + + COSMOS, origin of, 242. + + CRITICAL METHOD, 319 ff. + + CYNICISM, 259. + + CYRENAICISM, 259. + + + DANTE, as philosopher-poet, 42 ff.; + general meaning of the _Divine Comedy_, 43; + and Thomas Aquinas, 43, 46; + his vision of the ways of God, 46; + on contemplation, 428. + + DARWIN, 204. + + DEISM, 207. + + DEMOCRITUS, 247. + Also see ATOMISM. + + DESCARTES, on function of philosophy, 154; + dualism of, 272, 412; + his theory of space and matter, 229; + automatism of, 248; + epistemology of, 341, 375; + his conception of self, 374. + + DESCRIPTION, as method of science, 128. + + DIALECTIC, in Plato, 320; + in Hegel, 361. + + DIOGENES, 259. + + DOGMATISM, 167. + + DUALISM, general meaning, 162; + of Descartes, 272, 412. + + DUTY, 196, 356, 360, 386. + + + ECLECTICISM, contemporary, 398 ff., 413. + + ELEATICS. + See under PARMENIDES, and ZENO. + + EMERSON, on spirit, 359; + on nature, 364; + on absolute, 392; + on necessity, 393; + on faith, 424. + + EMPIRICISM, general meaning, 168; + in logic, 187; + in naturalism, 252 ff.; + of Locke, 274; + of Berkeley, 274 ff. + + ENERGY, development of, conception of, 236 ff. + + EPISTEMOLOGY, relation to metaphysics, 150; + definition of, 164; + fundamental problems of, 168, 172; + argument for God from, 202; + of naturalism, 248, 252 ff., 257; + of Descartes, 273, 341, 375; + of Berkeley, 277, 296; + of absolute realism, 339, 351; + of Leibniz, 340, 341; + of Plato, 340, 341; + of Hume, 376; + of Aristotle, 340, 341; + of absolute idealism, 351, 368 ff.; + of present day, 408 ff. + + ETERNAL, the, 309. + + ETHER, 230. + + ETHICS, relation to metaphysics, 151, 196 ff., 360; + its origin in Socratic method, 181; + definition of, 191; + special problems and theories in, 191 ff.; + of Socrates, 192, 194; + of Aristotle, 195, 345; + of naturalism, 258 ff.; + of subjectivism, 298 ff.; + of Schopenhauer, 299; + argument for God from, 203; + individualism in, 301; + pluralism in, 302, 421; + of Stoics and Spinoza, 342; + Platonic, 342; + of Kant, 386; + of absolute idealism, 388. + + EUDAEMONISM, 195. + + EVIL, PROBLEM OF, 317, 336, 339, 352, 365 ff.; + in Greek philosophy, 352; + in absolute idealism, 367, 418. + + EVOLUTION, of cosmos, 242 ff.; + of morality, 262. + + EXPERIENCE, 410, 411, 412; + analysis of, by Kant, 354. + + + FAITH, 424; + special interests of, 199. + See also RELIGION and BELIEF. + + FERGUSON, CHAS., quoted, 265. + + FICHTE, 360, 402. + + FIELDING, H., quoted on religion, 59, 74. + + FORCE, development of conception of, 231 ff. + + FORM, in Aristotle, 334. + + FREEDOM, in ethics, 196, 388; + meanings and theories, 211. + + + GOD, as guarantee of ideals, 18, 425; + personality of, 62, 108 ff.; + St. Augustine's communion with, 68; + presence of, 68; + as a disposition from which consequences may be expected, 85; + meaning of, in religion, 87; + idea of, in Judaism and Christianity, 92; + why historical, 102; + social relation with, 103; + the ontological proof of, 200; + ethical and epistemological arguments for, 202; + cosmological proof of, 203; + teleological proof of, 204; + relation to the world, in theism, pantheism and deism, 205 ff.; + will of, 212; + conception of, in Berkeley, 284, 293 ff.; + conception and proof of, in Spinoza, 312 ff., 392, 393; + conception of, in Plato, 331, 352, 391, 393; + conception of, in Leibniz, 338, 353. + Also see ABSOLUTE. + + GOETHE, on Spinoza, and on philosophy, 51; + on pragmatism, 407. + + GOOD, the, theories of, in ethics, 191 ff.; + and the real, 326 ff., 421 ff. + + GREEK, religion, in Homer and Lucretius, 89; + ideals, 195, 198, 429. + + GREEN, T. H., quoted, 369, 385 (_note_). + + + HAECKEL, quoted, 236, 266. + + HEDONISM, 192. + + HEGEL, on science, 129; + philosophy of, 150, 361 ff.; + relation to Kant, 381; + on the absolute, 382; + ethics of, 390. + + HERACLITUS, 308. + + HISTORY, philosophy of, in Hegel, 363. + + HOBBES, his misconception of relations of philosophy and science, 115; + quoted on ethics, 261. + + Holbach, 251, 252. + + HOMER, on Greek religion, 90. + + HUMANISM, 320, 404, 405. + + HUME, positivism of, 115, 377; + phenomenalism of, 283; + and Descartes, 376. + + HUXLEY, quoted, 255, 266. + + HYLOZOISM, 225. + + + IDEAL, the, in Plato, 326; + validity of, 416. + + IDEALISM, various meanings of term, 173 (_note_); + meaning of, as theory of knowledge, 175 ff., 409; + of present day, 409 ff.; + empirical, see SUBJECTIVISM, PHENOMENALISM, SPIRITUALISM; + absolute, see ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. + + IDEALS, in life, 10 ff.; + adoption of, 17 ff. + + IDEAS, the, in Plato, 329. + + IMAGINATION, in poetry, 99; + place of, in religion, 80, 97 ff.; + special functions of, in religion, 101 ff.; + scope of, in religion, 105 ff.; + and the personality of God, 110. + + IMITATIO CHRISTI, quoted, 68. + + IMMANENCE THEORY, 412, 413. + + IMMORTALITY, 212. + + INDIVIDUALISM, 301, 320, 338, 404. + + INTUITIONISM, in ethics, 196. + + + JAMES, WILLIAM, quoted on religion, 65, 71, 305. + + JUDAISM, development of, 92; + and Christianity, 94. + + + KANT, his transcendentalism, 177, 356; + his critique of knowledge, 354 ff., 377 ff.; + and absolute idealism, 380; + ethics of, 386. + + KEPLER, quoted, 129. + + KNOWLEDGE, of the means in life, 8; + of the end, 10; + in poetry, 27 ff.; + in religion, 82, 85, 97, 105; + general theory of, on epistemology, 164 ff.; + problem of source and criterion of, 168 ff.; + problem of relation to its object, 172 ff., 277, 340, 351, 368 ff.; + relation of logic to, 183 ff.; + account of, in naturalism, 253 ff. + Also see EPISTEMOLOGY. + + + LA METTRIE, quoted, 250. + + LA PLACE, 242; quoted, 241. + + LEIBNIZ, on function of philosophy, 155; + philosophy of, 333, 336 ff.; + epistemology of, 339. + + LEUCIPPUS, quoted, 161. + + LIFE, as a starting-point for thought, 3; + definition of, 5 ff.; + and self-consciousness, 6; + philosophy of 17 ff., 153; + mechanical theory of, 244 ff.; + return of philosophy to, 427 ff.; + contemplation in, 428. + + LOCKE, epistemology of, 273. + + LOGIC, origin in Socratic method, 181; + affiliations of, 182, 188; + definition of, 183; + parts of formal, 184 ff.; + present tendencies in, 187 ff.; + algebra of, 189. + + LUCRETIUS, his criticism of Greek religion, quoted, 89 ff.; + on mechanism, 226, 240. + + + MCTAGGART, J. M. E., on Hegel, 367; + on the absolute, 391. + + MACH, E., 283; + on philosophy and science, 120. + + MALEBRANCHE, 376. + + MARCUS AURELIUS, 348. + + MATERIALISM, 254, 256; + general meaning, 223, 414; + development, 224 ff.; + and science, 228; + French, 249; + theory of mind in, 250. + + MATHEMATICS, importance in science, 132; + logic in, 188; + Berkeley's conception of, 279; + Plato's conception of, 329, 335; + Spinoza's conception of, 311, 335. + + MATTER, 225, 228; + and space, 229; + Berkeley's refutation of, 275 ff.; + in Plato and Aristotle, 334. + + MECHANICAL THEORY, practical significance of its extension to the + world at large, 20; + in cosmology, 161, 225; + of Descartes, 231; + of Newton 232; + of origin of cosmos, 242; + of life, 244; + in Spinoza, 336. + + METAPHYSICS, relation to epistemology, 150; + relation to ethics, 151, 196 ff.; + definition of, 158; + relation to logic, 188; + relation to theology, 207; + present tendencies in, 399 ff., 408. + + MILL, J. S., 283 (_note_). + + MIND, explanation of in naturalism, 237, 247 ff.; + of God, in Berkeley, 284, 294, 296; + absolute, 349 (_note_), 358, 382 ff. + Also see under SELF, and SOUL. + + MODE, in Spinoza, 313. + + MONADS, in Leibniz, 338. + + MONISM, 159, 163. + + MORALITY, and religion, 73; + grounds of, according to Kant, 356; + incentive to, 422. + + MYSTICISM, general account, 171; + Schopenhauer's, 290; + types of religions, 391. + + + NAEGELI, C. v., quoted, 287. + + NATURAL SCIENCE, true relations of, with philosophy, 116; + sphere of, with reference to philosophy, 117 ff.; + philosophy of, its procedure, 121, 135, 142, 154, 401; + origin of, as special interest, 123 ff.; + human value of, 126, 127, 143; + method and fundamental conceptions of, 406, 128 ff.; + general development of, 134; + limits of, because abstract, 136 ff., 414; + validity of, 142; + logic and, 188; + development of conceptions in, 229 ff.; + grounds of, according to Kant, 355, 377; + Hume on, 377; + permanence and progress in, 395 ff. + + NATURAL SELECTION, 204, 245. + + NATURALISM, chap. viii; + general meaning, 217, 223 (_note_), 399; + claims of, 239; + task of, 241; + criticism of, 117, 257, 263; + of present day, 405, 412. + Also see under MATERIALISM, and POSITIVISM. + + NATURE, 160, 244, 337; + in Berkeley, 294; + in Spinoza, 317, 338; + in Hegel, 363; + in Kant, 377 ff.; + in contemporary philosophy, 401. + Also see NATURAL SCIENCE, and NATURALISM. + + NEBULAR HYPOTHESIS, 242. + + NECESSITY, of will, 211; + ethics of, 342; + religion of, 393. + + NEO-FICHTEANS, 402, 403 (_note_). + + NEO-KANTIANS, 403. + + NEWTON, 232, 235, 242, 355, 377. + + NORMATIVE SCIENCES, the, 180. + + + OMAR KHAYYAM, quoted, 16; + as a philosopher-poet, 36. + + ONTOLOGICAL PROOF, of God, 200. + + ONTOLOGY, 159. + + OPTIMISM, 104, 388, 422, 424. + + + PANPSYCHISM, 176, 238, 285 ff. + + PANTHEISM, in primitive religion, 78; + general meaning, 205; + types of, 390. + + PARKER, THEODORE, quoted on religion, 67. + + PARMENIDES, and rationalism, 168; + philosophy of, 308 ff., 337; + and Aristotle, 336. + + PATER, WALTER, on Wordsworth, 38; + on Cyrenaicism, 260; + on subjectivism, 270. + + PAULSEN, FRIEDRICH, ethics of, quoted, 302. + + PEARSON, KARL, quoted, 230. + + PERCEPTION. See SENSE-PERCEPTION. + + PERSONAL IDEALISM, 404, 405. + + PERSONALITY, of God, important in understanding of religion, 62; + essential to religion? 108 ff. + + PERSONS, description of belief in, 62; + imagination of, 101, 110. + + PESSIMISM, 104, 299, 424. + + PHENOMENALISM, general meaning, 176, 267 (_note_); + of Berkeley, 272, 275 ff.; + of Hume, 283; + various tendencies in, 281. + + PHILOSOPHER, the practical man and the, chap. i; + the role of the, 306, 426. + + PHILOSOPHY, commonly misconceived, 3; + of the devotee, 13; + of the man of affairs, 14; + of the voluptuary, 16; + of life, its general meaning, 17 ff., 153; + its relations with poetry, chap. ii, 112; + lack of, in Shakespeare, 33; + as expression of personality, 33; + as premature, 33; + in poetry of Omar Khayyam, 36; + in poetry of Wordsworth, 38 ff.; + in poetry of Dante, 42 ff.; + difference between philosophy and poetry, 48 ff.; + in religion, 108 ff.; + compared with religion, 112; + true attitude of, toward science, 116; + sphere of, in relation to science, 117, 395 ff.; + procedure of, with reference to science, 121, 135, 142, 154, 160; + human value of, 143, 426 ff.; + can its problem be divided? 149, 155; + origin of, 157; + special problems of, chap. vi, vii; + and psychology, 216; + peculiar object of, 308; + self-criticism in, 319 ff., 325; + permanence and progress in, 395 ff.; + contemporary, 398 ff. + + PHYSICAL. + See CORPOREAL BEING, MATERIALISM, etc. + + PHYSIOLOGY, 246. + + PIETY, description and interpretation of, 72; + in ethics, 195. + + PLATO, on Protagoras, 167, 269, 270, 298; + quoted, on Socrates, 170, 192, 194; + historical preparation for, 324; + psychology of, 209; + philosophy of, 306, 318, 326 ff., 382; + and Aristotle, 333; + and Spinoza, 318, 335; + epistemology of, 339; + ethics of, 342; + religion of, 346, 391, 393; + on evil, 352; + on spirit, 359; + on reason and perception, 370; + on the philosopher, 426. + + PLURALISM, general meaning of, 159, 163, 419; + in ethics, 302, 421 ff.; + in religion, 304. + + POETRY, relations with philosophy, chap. ii; + as appreciation, 25; + virtue of sincerity in, 27; + the "barbarian" in, 28; + constructive knowledge in, 30; + difference between philosophy and, 48 ff. + + POSITIVISM, on relation of philosophy and science, 115, 122; + general meaning of, 168, 234, 252 ff., 412. + + PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE, of means, 8 ff.; + of end or purpose, 10 ff.; + implied in religion, 85, 97; + philosophy as, 153. + + PRACTICAL MAN, the, and the philosopher, chap. i; + his failure to understand philosophy, 3; + his ideal, 14; + virtually a philosopher, 22. + + PRAGMATISM, 151, 407, 408. + + PRAYER, 103. + + PREDICTION, in science, 130. + + PRESENT DAY, philosophy of the, 398 ff. + + PROTAGORAS, scepticism of, 166, 271; + subjectivism of, 269; + ethics of, 298. + + PSYCHOLOGY, of religion, 58, 82; + inadequate to religion, 82; + as branch of philosophy, 208 ff., 216; + as natural science, 213; + affiliations of, 215; + limits of, 415. + + PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM, 215, 252. + + PURPOSE, in life, 10 ff.; + adoption of life-purpose, 17 ff.; + practical significance of, in the world at large, 20. + Also see TELEOLOGY, IDEAL, etc. + + + QUALITIES, primary and secondary, 254, 274, 277. + + + RATIONALISM, general meaning, 168, 416; + in logic, 180, 184; + in ethics, 193; + of eleatics, 310; + of Spinoza, 311; + in absolute realism, 339; + criticism of, 418. + + REALISM, various meanings of term, 173 (_note_); + meaning of, as theory of knowledge, 172; + of Parmenides, 308 ff.; + of Plato and Aristotle, 341; + of present day, 409 ff. + + REASON, 370. + See RATIONALISM. + + RELATIVISM, 166, 267 ff.; + in ethics, 298. + + RELIGION, chaps. iii, iv; + relation to poetry and philosophy, 49, 52; + difficulty of defining, 53; + possibility of defining, 54; + profitableness of defining, 54; + true method of defining, 56; + misconceptions of, 56; + as possessing the psychological character of belief, 59 ff.; + degree of, in individuals and moods, 60, 61; + definition of, as belief in disposition of universe, 64 ff., 82; + and morality, 73; + symbolism in, 75; + prophet and preacher of, 75; + conveyance of, 76; + primitive, 77; + Buddhism, 78; + the critical or enlightened type of, 80; + means to be true, 82 ff.; + implies a practical truth, 85; + cases of truth and error in, 88 ff.; + of Baal, 88; + Greek, 89; + of Jews, its development, 92; + Christian, 94; + definition of cognitive factor in, 97; + place of imagination in, 80, 97 ff.; + special functions of imagination in, 101 ff.; + relation of imagination and truth in, 105; + philosophy implied in, 108 ff.; + is personal god essential to, 108; + compared with philosophy, 112; + compared with science, 145; + special philosophical problems of, 199 ff.; + of naturalism, 263 ff.; + of subjectivism and spiritualism, 302 ff.; + of Plato and Aristotle, 346, 393; + of Stoics and Spinoza, 348, 393; + philosophy of, in Hegel, 365; + of absolute idealism, 390 ff. + + RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA, interpretation of, 69 ff. + + REPRESENTATIVE THEORY, of knowledge, 174, 412. + + ROMANTICISM, 361. + + ROUSSEAU, quoted on nature, 64. + + ROYCE, JOSIAH, quoted on absolute idealism, 178, 384, 394. + + + SANTAYANA, GEORGE, quoted on poetry 28, 29. + + SCEPTICISM, 166, 267 ff. + See under POSITIVISM, and AGNOSTICISM. + + SCHELLING, misconception of science, 116. + + SCHOLASTICISM, 333; + idea of God in, 201. + + SCHOPENHAUER, his panpsychism or voluntarism, 177, 285 ff.; + universalizes subjectivism, 290; + mysticism of, 290; + ethics of, 299; + religion of, 303. + + SCIENCE. + Also see under NATURAL SCIENCE, and NORMATIVE SCIENCE. + + SECULARISM, of Shakespeare, 34; + of Periclean Age, 320; + of present age, 427. + + SELF, problem of, 216; + proof of, in St. Augustine, 372; + proof of, in Descartes, 374; + deeper moral of, 387; + in contemporary philosophy, 411, 413. + Also see SOUL, and MIND. + + SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, essential to human life, 6; + development of conception of, 371 ff.; + in absolute idealism, 383; + in idealistic ethics, 386. + + SENSATIONALISM, 247, 255, 269. + + SENSE-PERCEPTION, 168, 247, 269, 370; + being as, in Berkeley, 281. + + SHAKESPEARE, general criticism of, 30 ff.; + his universality, 31; + lack of philosophy in, 33. + + SHELLEY, quoted on poetry, 50. + + SOCIAL RELATIONS, belief inspired by, analogue of religion, 62; + imagination of, extended to God, 101. + + SOCRATES, rationalism of, 169; + and normative science, 180; + ethics of, 192, 194; + method of, 321 ff. + + SOPHISTS, the, epistemology of, 165; + scepticism of, 271, 320; + ethics of, 298, 301; + age of, 320. + + SOUL, the, in Aristotle, 208; + in Plato, 209; + as substance, 209; + intellectualism and voluntarism in theory of, 210; + immortality of, 212; + Berkeley's theory of, 284. + Also see under MIND, and SELF. + + SPACE, importance in science, 130; + and matter, 229. + + SPENCER, 236 (_note_), 243, 265. + + SPINOZA, and Goethe, 51; + quoted on philosophy and life, 153; + philosophy of, 306, 311 ff.; + criticism and estimate of, 315 ff.; + and Plato, 318, 335; + and Aristotle, 336; + epistemology of, 339; + ethics of, 342; + religion of, 348, 392, 393. + + SPIRIT, the absolute, 358 ff. + + SPIRITUALISM, general meaning, 176, 267 (_note_); + in Berkeley, 280, 292; + in Schopenhauer, 285; + criticism of, 288; + objective, 292. + + STEVENSON, R. L., quoted on religion, 67. + + STOICISM, ethics of, 342; + religion of, 348. + + SUBJECTIVISM, chap. ix; + general meaning, 175, 218, 267 (_note_), 415; + in aesthetics, 190; + of Berkeley, 275 ff.; + universalization of, in Schopenhauer, 290; + criticism of, 297, 415; + ethics of, 298 ff.; + in absolute idealism, 368; + of present day, 409. + + SUBSTANCE, spiritual, 209, 284; + material, Berkeley's refutation of, 275 ff.; + Spinoza's conception of, 311; + the infinite, in Spinoza, 312; + Aristotle's conception of, 334; + Leibniz's conception of, 338. + + SYMBOLISM, in religion, 75. + + + TELEOLOGY, in cosmology, 161; + proof of God from, 204; + Spinoza on, 318; + in Plato, 326 ff., 336; + in Aristotle, 336. + + THEISM, 205. + + THEOLOGY, relation to religion, 98; + in philosophy, 199 ff.; + relation to metaphysics, 207. + + THOMSON, J., quoted, 104. + + THOUGHT, and life, 6 ff.; + as being, in Hegel, 361 ff. + + THUCYDIDES, on thought and action, 429. + + TIME, importance in science, 130. + + TRANSCENDENTALISM, 177, 349 (_note_), 356. + See IDEALISM, absolute. + + TYNDALL, 115. + + + UNIVERSAL, scientific knowledge as, 125, 139. + + UNIVERSE, the, as object of religious reaction, 64; + common object of philosophy and religion, 112; + as collective, 419. + + UTILITARIANISM, 261. + + + VIRTUE, 198, 345. + + VOLTAIRE, quoted, 231, 251. + + VOLUNTARISM, in psychology, 210; + in Schopenhauer, 285. + + + WHITMAN, WALT, 27 ff. + + WILL, in psychology, 210; + freedom and determination of, 211; + in Schopenhauer, 177; + as cause, in Berkeley, 293 ff.; + in pragmatism, 407. + + WORDSWORTH, as philosopher-poet, 38 ff.; + his sense for the universal, 40; + quoted on poetry and philosophy, 48, 50. + + + ZENO, 337. + + + + +TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES: + + +Ellipses match the original. + +Numbers in {braces} are subscripted in the original. + +The symbol for section has been replaced by "Sect." + +Variations in spelling have been left as in the original. + +The word Phoenix uses an oe ligature in the original. + +The following corrections have been made to the text: + + Page xv: CHAPTER VI. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY{original has + EPISTOMOLOGY} + + Page 70: The psychology{original has pyschology} of conversion + + Page 93: him who practices{original has practises} the social + virtues + + Page 165: reality have resulted in no consensus{original has + concensus} of opinion + + Page 196: but in a law to which it{original has its} owes + obedience + + Page 261: 'justice,' 'gratitude,' '{quotation mark missing in + original}modesty,' + + Page 283: retained after their original{original has orignal} + meaning + + Page 288: nothing but the highest development{original has + devolpment} on our earth + + Page 325: philosopher who defined being as{original has a} the + ideal + + Page 405: Henri Bergson: _Essai{original has Essoi} sur les + donnees immediates de la conscience_ + + Page 434: THOMAS A{original has acute accent which should be + grave accent} KEMPIS: _Imitation of Christ._ + + Page 436: HUXLEY, T. H.: _Evolution and Ethics; + Prolegomena._{original has Prologomena} + + [51:11] Vol. I, p. 60.{period is missing in original} + + [199:14] religion in these matters, cf.{original has Cf.} + Descartes: + + [287:16] Translation by Haldane and Kemp{original has Komp} + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Approach to Philosophy, by Ralph Barton Perry + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY *** + +***** This file should be named 25110.txt or 25110.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/5/1/1/25110/ + +Produced by Stephen Hope, Fox in the Stars, Lisa Reigel, +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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