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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Approach to Philosophy + +Author: Ralph Barton Perry + +Release Date: April 19, 2008 [EBook #25110] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY *** + + + + +Produced by Stephen Hope, Fox in the Stars, Lisa Reigel, +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + + + +<div class = "notebox"><p>Transcriber's Notes:<br /><br /> +Greek words that may not display correctly in all browsers are +transliterated in the text using popups like this: +<ins class="greek" title="biblos">βιβλος</ins>. +Position your mouse over the line to see the transliteration.</p> + +<p>A few typographical errors have been corrected. A complete list follows +the text.</p> + +<p>Click on the page number to see an image of the page.</p> +</div> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i"></a>[<a href="./images/i.png">i</a>]</span></p> +<p class="gap"> </p> +<h1>THE</h1> +<h1>APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY</h1> + +<p class="gap"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii"></a>[<a href="./images/ii.png">ii</a>]</span></p> +<h2>BY PROF. RALPH BARTON PERRY</h2> + +<p class="p4">THE FREE MAN AND THE SOLDIER<br /> +THE MORAL ECONOMY<br /> +THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY</p> + +<p class="gap"> </p> +<p class="p3">CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS</p> + + + +<p class="biggap"> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii"></a>[<a href="./images/iii.png">iii</a>]</span></p> +<h1>THE APPROACH TO<br /> +PHILOSOPHY</h1> + +<p class="gap"> </p> +<p class="p3">BY</p> + + +<h2>RALPH BARTON PERRY, <span class="smcap">Ph.D.</span></h2> +<h3>ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY</h3> + +<p class="gap"> </p> +<p class="p2">CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS</p> +<p class="p4">NEW YORK CHICAGO BOSTON</p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv"></a>[<a href="./images/iv.png">iv</a>]</span></p> +<p class="p4"><span class="smcap">Copyright, 1905, by</span></p> +<p class="p3">CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS</p> +<p class="p4">Printed in the United States of America<br /> +F</p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v"></a>[<a href="./images/v.png">v</a>]</span></p> +<p class="p3">THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED TO</p> + +<p class="p2">MY FATHER</p> + +<p class="p3">AS A TOKEN OF MY LOVE AND ESTEEM</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi"></a>[<a href="./images/vi.png">vi</a>]</span></p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii"></a>[<a href="./images/vii.png">vii</a>]</span></p> +<h2>PREFACE</h2> + + +<p>In an essay on "The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time," +Professor Edward Caird says that "philosophy is not a first venture into +a new field of thought, but the rethinking of a secular and religious +consciousness which has been developed, in the main, independently of +philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_VII:A_1" id="FNanchor_VII:A_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_VII:A_1" class="fnanchor">[vii:A]</a> If there be any inspiration and originality in this +book, they are due to my great desire that philosophy should appear in +its vital relations to more familiar experiences. If philosophy is, as +is commonly assumed, appropriate to a phase in the development of every +individual, it should <i>grow out</i> of interests to which he is already +alive. And if the great philosophers are indeed never dead, this fact +should manifest itself in their classic or historical representation of +a perennial outlook upon the world. I am not seeking to attach to +philosophy a fictitious liveliness, wherewith to insinuate it into the +good graces of the student. I hope <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii"></a>[<a href="./images/viii.png">viii</a>]</span>rather to be true to the meaning of +philosophy. For there is that in its stand-point and its problem which +makes it universally significant entirely apart from dialectic and +erudition. These are derived interests, indispensable to the scholar, +but quite separable from that modicum of philosophy which helps to make +the man. The present book is written for the sake of elucidating the +inevitable philosophy. It seeks to make the reader more solicitously +aware of the philosophy that is in him, or to provoke him to philosophy +in his own interests. To this end I have sacrificed all else to the task +of mediating between the tradition and technicalities of the academic +discipline and the more common terms of life.</p> + +<p>The purpose of the book will in part account for those shortcomings that +immediately reveal themselves to the eye of the scholar. In Part I +various great human interests have been selected as points of departure. +I have sought to introduce the general stand-point and problem of +philosophy through its implication in practical life, poetry, religion, +and science. But in so doing it has been necessary for me to deal +shortly with topics of great independent importance, and so risk the +disfavor of those better skilled in these several <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix"></a>[<a href="./images/ix.png">ix</a>]</span>matters. This is +evidently true of the chapter which deals with natural science. But the +problem which I there faced differed radically from those of the +foregoing chapters, and the method of treatment is correspondingly +different. In the case of natural science one has to deal with a body of +knowledge which is frequently regarded as the only knowledge. To write a +chapter about science from a philosophical stand-point is, in the +present state of opinion, to undertake a polemic against exclusive +naturalism, an attitude which is itself philosophical, and as such is +well known in the history of philosophy as <i>positivism</i> or +<i>agnosticism</i>. I have avoided the polemical spirit and method so far as +possible, but have, nevertheless, here taken sides against a definite +philosophical position. This chapter, together with the Conclusion, is +therefore an exception to the purely introductory and expository +representation which I have, on the whole, sought to give. The +relatively great space accorded to the discussion of religion is, in my +own belief, fair to the general interest in this topic, and to the +intrinsic significance of its relation to philosophy.</p> + +<p>I have in Part II undertaken to furnish the reader with a map of the +country to which he has <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x"></a>[<a href="./images/x.png">x</a>]</span>been led. To this end I have attempted a brief +survey of the entire programme of philosophy. An accurate and full +account of philosophical terms can be found in such books as Külpe's +"Introduction to Philosophy" and Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy," +and an attempt to emulate their thoroughness would be superfluous, even +if it were conformable to the general spirit of this book. The scope of +Part II is due in part to a desire for brevity, but chiefly to the hope +of furnishing an epitome that shall follow the course of the <i>natural +and historical differentiation</i> of the general philosophical problem.</p> + +<p>Finally, I have in Part III sought to present the tradition of +philosophy in the form of general types. My purpose in undertaking so +difficult a task is to acquaint the reader with philosophy in the +concrete; to show how certain underlying principles may determine the +whole circle of philosophical ideas, and give them unity and distinctive +flavor. Part II offers a general classification of philosophical +problems and conceptions independently of any special point of view. But +I have in Part III sought to emphasize the point of view, or the +internal consistency that makes a <i>system of philosophy</i> out of certain +answers to the special <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi"></a>[<a href="./images/xi.png">xi</a>]</span>problems of philosophy. In such a division into +types, lines are of necessity drawn too sharply. There will be many +historical philosophies that refuse to fit, and many possibilities +unprovided for. I must leave it to the individual reader to overcome +this abstractness through his own reflection upon the intermediate and +variant stand-points.</p> + +<p>Although the order is on the whole that of progressive complexity, I +have sought to treat each chapter with independence enough to make it +possible for it to be read separately; and I have provided a carefully +selected bibliography in the hope that this book may serve as a stimulus +and guide to the reading of other books.</p> + +<p>The earlier chapters have already appeared as articles: Chapter I in the +<i>International Journal of Ethics</i>, Vol. XIII, No. 4; Chapter II in the +<i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol. XI, No. 6; Chapter III in the <i>Monist</i>, +Vol. XIV, No. 5; Chapter IV in the <i>International Journal of Ethics</i>, +Vol. XV, No. 1; and some paragraphs of Chapter V in the <i>Journal of +Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods</i>, Vol. I, No. 7. I am +indebted to the editors of these periodicals for permission to reprint +with minor changes.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii"></a>[<a href="./images/xii.png">xii</a>]</span>In the writing of this, my first book, I have been often reminded that +a higher critic, skilled in the study of internal evidence, could +probably trace all of its ideas to suggestions that have come to me from +my teachers and colleagues of the Department of Philosophy in Harvard +University. I have unscrupulously forgotten what of their definite ideas +I have adapted to my own use, but not that I received from them the +major portion of my original philosophical capital. I am especially +indebted to Professor William James for the inspiration and resources +which I have received from his instruction and personal friendship.</p> + +<p class="authorsc">Ralph Barton Perry.</p> + +<p style="margin-left: 1em;"><span class="smcap">Cambridge</span>, March, 1905.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_VII:A_1" id="Footnote_VII:A_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_VII:A_1"><span class="label">[vii:A]</span></a> Edw. Caird: <i>Literature and Philosophy</i>, Vol. I, p. +207.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii"></a>[<a href="./images/xiii.png">xiii</a>]</span></p> +<h2>TABLE OF CONTENTS</h2> + + +<div class="centered"> +<table summary="Table of Contents" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0"> +<tr> +<td class="tdcenter" colspan="4">PART I</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdcenter" colspan="4">APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdright" colspan="4"><span style="font-size:x-small">PAGE</span></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter I. The Practical Man and the Philosopher</span></td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_1">1</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_2">2</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Life as a Starting-point for Thought</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_4">4</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_3">3</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Practical Knowledge of Means</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_8">8</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_4">4</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_10">10</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_5">5</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and the Voluptuary</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_12">12</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_6">6</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_17">17</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter II. Poetry and Philosophy</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_24">24</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_7">7</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Who is the Philosopher-Poet?</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_24">24</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_8">8</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Poetry as Appreciation</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_25">25</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_9">9</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_27">27</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_10">10</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_30">30</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_11">11</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Philosophy in Poetry. The World-view. Omar Khayyam</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_12">12</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Wordsworth</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_38">38</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_13">13</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Dante</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_42">42</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_14">14</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_48">48</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv"></a>[<a href="./images/xiv.png">xiv</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Chapter III. The Religious Experience</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_53">53</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_15">15</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Possibility of Defining Religion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_53">53</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_16">16</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Profitableness of Defining Religion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_54">54</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_17">17</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The True Method of Defining Religion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_56">56</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_18">18</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Religion as Belief</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_59">59</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_19">19</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_62">62</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_20">20</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual Environment, or Universe</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_64">64</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_21">21</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Examples of Religious Belief</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_66">66</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_22">22</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Typical Religious Phenomena. Conversion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_69">69</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_23">23</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Piety</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_72">72</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_24">24</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_74">74</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_25">25</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_77">77</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_26">26</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Buddhism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_78">78</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_27">27</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Critical Religion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_79">79</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter IV. The Philosophical Implications of Religion</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_82">82</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_28">28</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Résumé of Psychology of Religion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_82">82</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_29">29</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Religion Means to be True</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_82">82</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_30">30</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a Disposition from which Consequences May Rationally be Expected</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_85">85</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_31">31</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The Religion of Baal</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_88">88</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_32">32</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Greek Religion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_89">89</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_33">33</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Judaism and Christianity</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_92">92</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_34">34</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Cognitive Factor in Religion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_96">96</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_35">35</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Place of Imagination in Religion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_97">97</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_36">36</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_101">101</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_37">37</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_105">105</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv"></a>[<a href="./images/xv.png">xv</a>]</span>§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_38">38</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_108">108</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter V. Natural Science and Philosophy</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_114">114</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_39">39</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The True Relations of Philosophy and Science. Misconceptions and Antagonisms</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_114">114</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_40">40</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Spheres of Philosophy and Science</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_117">117</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_41">41</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_120">120</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_42">42</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Origin of the Scientific Interest</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_123">123</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_43">43</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Skill as Free</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_123">123</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_44">44</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Skill as Social</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_126">126</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_45">45</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Science for Accommodation and Construction</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_127">127</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_46">46</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. The Descriptive Method</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_47">47</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Space, Time, and Prediction</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_130">130</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_48">48</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Quantitative Method</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_132">132</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_49">49</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The General Development of Science</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_134">134</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_50">50</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_135">135</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_51">51</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Natural Science is Abstract</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_136">136</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_52">52</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_139">139</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_53">53</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_142">142</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_54">54</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_143">143</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdcenter" colspan="4">PART II</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdcenter" colspan="4">THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY</td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter VI. Metaphysics and Epistemology</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_149">149</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_55">55</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem of Philosophy</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_149">149</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_56">56</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon the Initial Interest</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_152">152</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi"></a>[<a href="./images/xvi.png">xvi</a>]</span>§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_57">57</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_152">152</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_58">58</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Philosophy as the Extension of Science</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_154">154</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_59">59</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical Problem</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_155">155</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_60">60</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_157">157</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_61">61</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Monism and Pluralism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_159">159</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_62">62</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_159">159</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_63">63</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_160">160</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_64">64</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Dualism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_162">162</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_65">65</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_163">163</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_66">66</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of Knowledge</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_164">164</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_67">67</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_166">166</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_68">68</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Source and Criterion of Knowledge according to Empiricism and Rationalism. Mysticism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_168">168</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_69">69</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to Realism, and the Representative Theory</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_172">172</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_70">70</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Relation of Knowledge to its Object according to Idealism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_175">175</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_71">71</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_176">176</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_72">72</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_177">177</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter VII. The Normative Sciences and the Problems of Religion</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_180">180</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_73">73</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Normative Sciences</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_180">180</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_74">74</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Affiliations of Logic</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_182">182</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_75">75</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in Belief</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_183">183</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_76">76</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence, Inference, and Observation</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_184">184</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_77">77</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_187">187</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii"></a>[<a href="./images/xvii.png">xvii</a>]</span>§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_78">78</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Priority of Concepts</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_188">188</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_79">79</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Æsthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Beauty. Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_189">189</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_80">80</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral Goodness</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_191">191</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_81">81</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_191">191</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_82">82</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Rationalism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_193">193</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_83">83</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Eudæmonism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_194">194</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_84">84</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_196">196</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_85">85</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_198">198</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_86">86</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of Faith</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_199">199</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_87">87</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_200">200</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_88">88</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Ontological Proof of God</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_200">200</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_89">89</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Cosmological Proof of God</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_203">203</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_90">90</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Teleological Proof of God</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_204">204</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_91">91</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">God and the World. Theism and Pantheism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_205">205</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_92">92</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Deism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_206">206</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_93">93</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Metaphysics and Theology</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_207">207</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_94">94</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Psychology is the Theory of the Soul</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_208">208</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_95">95</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Spiritual Substance</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_209">209</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_96">96</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Intellectualism and Voluntarism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_210">210</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_97">97</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, and Indeterminism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_211">211</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_98">98</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Immortality. Survival and Eternalism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_212">212</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_99">99</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and Method</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_213">213</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_100">100</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Psychology and Philosophy</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_216">216</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_101">101</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Transition from Classification by Problems to Classification by Doctrines. Naturalism. Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute Realism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_217">217</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdcenter" colspan="4"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii"></a>[<a href="./images/xviii.png">xviii</a>]</span>PART III</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdcenter" colspan="4">SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY</td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII. Naturalism</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_223">223</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_102">102</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The General Meaning of Materialism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_223">223</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_103">103</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Corporeal Being</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_224">224</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_104">104</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_225">225</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_105">105</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Materialism and Physical Science</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_228">228</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_106">106</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Development of the Conceptions of Physical Science. Space and Matter</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_228">228</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_107">107</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the Conception of Force</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_231">231</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_108">108</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Development and Extension of the Conception of Energy</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_236">236</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_109">109</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Claims of Naturalism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_239">239</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_110">110</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Task of Naturalism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_241">241</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_111">111</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Origin of the Cosmos</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_242">242</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_112">112</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Life. Natural Selection</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_244">244</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_113">113</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Mechanical Physiology</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_246">246</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_114">114</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Mind. The Reduction to Sensation</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_247">247</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_115">115</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Automatism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_248">248</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_116">116</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_250">250</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_117">117</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Knowledge. Positivism and Agnosticism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_252">252</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_118">118</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Experimentalism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_255">255</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_119">119</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_256">256</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_120">120</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">General Ethical Stand-point</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_258">258</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_121">121</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Cynicism and Cyrenaicism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_259">259</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_122">122</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception of Social Relations</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_260">260</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_123">123</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_262">262</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix"></a>[<a href="./images/xix.png">xix</a>]</span>§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_124">124</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_263">263</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_125">125</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, Wonder, and Renunciation</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_265">265</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter IX. Subjectivism</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_267">267</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_126">126</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and Scepticism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_267">267</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_127">127</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Phenomenalism and Spiritualism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_271">271</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_128">128</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem Inherited from Descartes and Locke</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_272">272</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_129">129</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Refutation of Material Substance</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_275">275</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_130">130</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Application of the Epistemological Principle</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_277">277</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_131">131</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_278">278</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_132">132</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Transition to Spiritualism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_280">280</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_133">133</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_281">281</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_134">134</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the Perceiver</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_284">284</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_135">135</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate Knowledge of the Will</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_285">285</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_136">136</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Panpsychism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_287">287</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_137">137</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for Objective Knowledge</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_288">288</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_138">138</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism. Mysticism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_290">290</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_139">139</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Objective Spiritualism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_292">292</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_140">140</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness, and Order</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_293">293</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_141">141</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_297">297</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_142">142</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Ethical Theories. Relativism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_298">298</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_143">143</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Pessimism and Self-denial</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_299">299</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx"></a>[<a href="./images/xx.png">xx</a>]</span>§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_144">144</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Ethics of Welfare</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_300">300</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_145">145</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Ethical Community</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_302">302</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_146">146</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Religion of Mysticism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_303">303</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_147">147</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Religion of Individual Coöperation with God</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_304">304</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter X. Absolute Realism</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_306">306</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_148">148</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, or the Absolute</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_306">306</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_149">149</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Eleatic Conception of Being</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_309">309</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_150">150</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Spinoza's Conception of Substance</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_311">311</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_151">151</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The Modes and the Attributes</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_312">312</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_152">152</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_315">315</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_153">153</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Spinoza's Provision for the Finite</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_317">317</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_154">154</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Transition to Teleological Conceptions</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_317">317</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_155">155</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_319">319</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_156">156</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_319">319</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_157">157</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_321">321</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_158">158</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_323">323</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_159">159</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Historical Preparation for Plato</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_324">324</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_160">160</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_326">326</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_161">161</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Progression of Experience toward God</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_329">329</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_162">162</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to Platonism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_332">332</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_163">163</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of Platonism and Spinozism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_335">335</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_164">164</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development to the Problem of Imperfection</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_336">336</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_165">165</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_338">338</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi"></a>[<a href="./images/xxi.png">xxi</a>]</span>§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_166">166</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_339">339</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_167">167</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute Realism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_340">340</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_168">168</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_342">342</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_169">169</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Platonic Ethics of Perfection</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_344">344</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_170">170</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Religion of Fulfilment and the Religion of Renunciation</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_346">346</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter XI. Absolute Idealism</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_349">349</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_171">171</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_349">349</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_172">172</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_351">351</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_173">173</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The Task of the New Absolutism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_352">352</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_174">174</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis of Experience</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_354">354</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_175">175</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which they Set in Order</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_356">356</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_176">176</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant. The Absolute Spirit</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_358">358</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_177">177</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_360">360</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_178">178</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_361">361</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_179">179</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_361">361</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_180">180</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_363">363</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_181">181</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Résumé. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the Problem of Evil</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_365">365</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii"></a>[<a href="./images/xxii.png">xxii</a>]</span>§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_182">182</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is Based upon the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_368">368</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_183">183</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_371">371</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_184">184</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian Philosophy</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_372">372</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_185">185</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the Thinking Self</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_374">374</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_186">186</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_376">376</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_187">187</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_377">377</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_188">188</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general into an Absolute Mind</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_380">380</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_189">189</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite Mind to the Infinite Mind</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_382">382</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_190">190</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_385">385</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_191">191</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics of Absolute Idealism. Kant</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_386">386</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_192">192</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of Universal and Objective Spirit</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_388">388</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_193">193</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute Idealism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_390">390</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_194">194</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_393">393</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Chapter XII. Conclusion</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_395">395</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_195">195</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Liability of Philosophy to Revision Due to its Systematic Character</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_395">395</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_196">196</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The One Science and the Many Philosophies</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_396">396</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_197">197</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or Eclecticism of the Present Age</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_398">398</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_198">198</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism and Absolutism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_399">399</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii"></a>[<a href="./images/xxiii.png">xxiii</a>]</span>§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_199">199</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of Nature. The Neo-Fichteans</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_401">401</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_200">200</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Neo-Kantians</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_403">403</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_201">201</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_404">404</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_202">202</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of Fundamental Principles</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_405">405</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_203">203</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_407">407</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_204">204</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Summary and Transition to Epistemology</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_408">408</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_205">205</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism. Realistic Tendency in Empirical Idealism</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_409">409</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_206">206</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception of Experience</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_410">410</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_207">207</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence Philosophy</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_412">412</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_208">208</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New Construction</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_413">413</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_209">209</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of Attempt to Reduce all Experience to it</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_414">414</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_210">210</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Truth of Psychical Relations but Impossibility of General Reduction to them</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_415">415</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_211">211</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of Ideal of Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing the Whole of Experience from it</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_415">415</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_212">212</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Error and Evil cannot be Reduced to the Ideal</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_417">417</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_213">213</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_419">419</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_214">214</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">Moral Implications of Such Pluralistic Philosophy. Purity of the Good</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_420">420</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_215">215</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Incentive to Goodness</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_422">422</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_216">216</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Justification of Faith</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_423">423</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv"></a>[<a href="./images/xxiv.png">xxiv</a>]</span>§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_217">217</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Worship and Service of God</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_425">425</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_218">218</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Philosopher and the Standards of the Market-Place</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_425">425</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_219">219</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Secularism of the Present Age</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_427">427</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="sectdr">§</td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Section_220">220</a>.</td> + <td class="tdleft">The Value of Contemplation for Life</td> + <td class="pgtdr"><a href="#Page_428">428</a></td> +</tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Bibliography</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_431">431</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Index</span></td> + <td class="sectdr"><a href="#Page_441">441</a></td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1"></a>[<a href="./images/1.png">1</a>]</span></p> +<h2>PART I</h2> + +<h3>APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF<br /> +PHILOSOPHY</h3> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2"></a>[<a href="./images/2.png">2</a>]</span></p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3"></a>[<a href="./images/3.png">3</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_I" id="Chap_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<h3>THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER</h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest?</div> + +<p class="section"><a name="Section_1" id="Section_1">§ 1</a>. Philosophy suffers the distinction of being regarded as essentially +an academic pursuit. The term <i>philosophy</i>, to be sure, is used in +common speech to denote a stoical manner of accepting the vicissitudes +of life; but this conception sheds little or no light upon the meaning +of philosophy as a branch of scholarship. The men who write the books on +"Epistemology" or "Ontology," are regarded by the average man of +affairs, even though he may have enjoyed a "higher education," with +little sympathy and less intelligence. Not even philology seems less +concerned with the real business of life. The pursuit of philosophy +appears to be a phenomenon of extreme and somewhat effete culture, with +its own peculiar traditions, problems, and aims, and with little or +nothing to contribute to the real enterprises of society. It is easy to +prove to the satisfaction of the philosopher that such a view is +radically <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4"></a>[<a href="./images/4.png">4</a>]</span>mistaken. But it is another and more serious matter to bridge +over the very real gap that separates philosophy and common-sense. Such +an aim is realized only when philosophy is seen to issue from some +special interest that is humanly important; or when, after starting in +thought at a point where one deals with ideas and interests common to +all, one is led by the inevitableness of consistent thinking into the +sphere of philosophy.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Life as a Starting-point for Thought.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_2" id="Section_2">2</a>. There is but one starting-point for reflection when all men are +invited to share in it. Though there be a great many special platforms +where special groups of men may take their stand together, there is only +one platform broad enough for all. This universal stand-point, or common +platform, is <i>life</i>. It is our more definite thesis, then, that +philosophy, even to its most abstruse technicality, is rooted in life; +and that it is inseparably bound up with the satisfaction of practical +needs, and the solution of practical problems.</p> + +<p>Every man knows what it is to live, and his immediate experience will +verify those features of the adventure that stand out conspicuously. To +begin with, life is our birthright. We did not ask for it, but when we +grew old enough to be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5"></a>[<a href="./images/5.png">5</a>]</span>self-conscious we found ourselves in possession +of it. Nor is it a gift to be neglected, even if we had the will. As is +true of no other gift of nature, we must use it, or cease to be. There +is a unique urgency about life. But we have already implied more, in so +far as we have said that it must be <i>used</i>, and have thereby referred to +some form of movement or activity as its inseparable attribute. To live +is to find one's self compelled to do something. To do +<i>something</i>—there is another implication of life: some outer +expression, some medium in which to register the degree and form of its +activity. Such we recognize as the environment of life, the real objects +among which it is placed; which it may change, or from which it may +suffer change. Not only do we find our lives as unsolicited active +powers, but find, as well, an arena prescribed for their exercise. That +we shall act, and in a certain time and place, and with reference to +certain other realities, this is the general condition of things that is +encountered when each one of us discovers life. In short, to live means +to be compelled to do something under certain circumstances.</p> + +<p>There is another very common aspect of life that would not at first +glance seem worthy of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6"></a>[<a href="./images/6.png">6</a>]</span>mention. Not only does life, as we have just +described it, mean opportunity, but it means self-conscious opportunity. +The facts are such as we have found them to be, and as each one of us +has previously found them for himself. But when we discover life for +ourselves, we who make the discovery, and we who live, are identical. +From that moment we both live, and know that we live. Moreover, such is +the essential unity of our natures that our living must now express our +knowing, and our knowing guide and illuminate our living. Consider the +allegory of the centipede. From the beginning of time he had manipulated +his countless legs with exquisite precision. Men had regarded him with +wonder and amazement. But he was innocent of his own art, being a +contrivance of nature, perfectly constructed to do her bidding. One day +the centipede discovered life. He discovered himself as one who walks, +and the newly awakened intelligence, first observing, then foreseeing, +at length began to direct the process. And from that moment the +centipede, because he could not remember the proper order of his going, +lost all his former skill, and became the poor clumsy victim of his own +self-consciousness. This same self-consciousness is the inconvenience +and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7"></a>[<a href="./images/7.png">7</a>]</span>great glory of human life. We must stumble along as best we +can, guided by the feeble light of our own little intelligence. If +nature starts us on our way, she soon hands over the torch, and bids us +find the trail for ourselves. Most men are brave enough to regard this +as the best thing of all; some despair on account of it. In either case +it is admittedly the true story of human life. We must live as separate +selves, observing, foreseeing, and planning. There are two things that +we can do about it. We can repudiate our natures, decline the +responsibility, and degenerate to the level of those animals that never +had our chance; or we can leap joyously to the helm, and with all the +strength and wisdom in us guide our lives to their destination. But if +we do the former, we shall be unable to forget what might have been, and +shall be haunted by a sense of ignominy; and if we do the second, we +shall experience the unique happiness of fulfilment and +self-realization.</p> + +<p>Life, then, is a situation that appeals to intelligent activity. Humanly +speaking, there is no such thing as a situation that is not at the same +time a theory. As we live we are all theorists. Whoever has any +misgivings as to the practical <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8"></a>[<a href="./images/8.png">8</a>]</span>value of theory, let him remember that, +speaking generally of human life, it is true to say that there is no +practice that does not issue at length from reflection. That which is +the commonest experience of mankind is the conjunction of these two, the +thought and the deed. And as surely as we are all practical theorists, +so surely is philosophy the outcome of the broadening and deepening of +practical theory. But to understand how the practical man becomes the +philosopher, we must inquire somewhat more carefully into the manner of +his thought about life.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Practical Knowledge of Means.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_3" id="Section_3">3</a>. Let anyone inspect the last moment in his life, and in all +probability he will find that his mind was employed to discover the +means to some end. He was already bent upon some definite achievement, +and was thoughtful for the sake of selecting the economical and +effectual way. His theory made his practice skilful. So through life his +knowledge shows him how to work his will. Example, experience, and books +have taught him the uses of nature and society, and in his thoughtful +living he is enabled to reach the goal he has set for the next hour, +day, or year of his activity. The long periods of human life are spent +in elaborating the means to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9"></a>[<a href="./images/9.png">9</a>]</span>some unquestioned end. Here one meets the +curious truth that we wake up in the middle of life, already making +headway, and under the guidance of some invisible steersman. When first +we take the business of life seriously, there is a considerable stock in +trade in the shape of habits, and inclinations to all sorts of things +that we never consciously elected to pursue. Since we do not begin at +the beginning, our first problem is to accommodate ourselves to +ourselves, and our first deliberate acts are in fulfilment of plans +outlined by some predecessor that has already spoken for us. The same +thing is true of the race of men. At a certain stage in their +development men found themselves engaged in all manner of ritual and +custom, and burdened with concerns that were not of their own choosing. +They were burning incense, keeping festivals, and naming names, all of +which they must now proceed to justify with myth and legend, in order to +render intelligible to themselves the deliberate and self-conscious +repetition of them. Even so much justification was left to the few, and +the great majority continued to seek that good which social usage +countenanced and individual predisposition confirmed. So every man of us +acts from day to day for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10"></a>[<a href="./images/10.png">10</a>]</span>love's sake, or wealth's sake, or power's +sake, or for the sake of some near and tangible object; reflecting only +for the greater efficiency of his endeavor.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_4" id="Section_4">4</a>. But if this be the common manner of thinking about life, it does +not represent the whole of such thought. Nor does it follow that because +it occupies us so much, it is therefore correspondingly fundamental. +Like the myth makers of old, we all want more or less to know the +<i>reason of our ends</i>. Here, then, we meet with a somewhat different type +of reflection upon life, the reflection that underlies the adoption of a +life purpose. It is obvious that most ends are selected for the sake of +other ends, and so are virtually means. Thus one may struggle for years +to secure a college education. This definite end has been adopted for +the sake of a somewhat more indefinite end of self-advancement, and from +it there issues a whole series of minor ends, which form a hierarchy of +steps ascending to the highest goal of aspiration. Now upon the face of +things we live very unsystematic lives, and yet were we to examine +ourselves in this fashion, we should all find our lives to be marvels of +organization. Their growth, as we have seen, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11"></a>[<a href="./images/11.png">11</a>]</span>began before we were +conscious of it; and we are commonly so absorbed in some particular +flower or fruit that we forget the roots, and the design of the whole. +But a little reflection reveals a remarkable unitary adjustment of +parts. The unity is due to the dominance of a group of central purposes. +Judged from the stand-point of experience, it seems bitter irony to say +that everyone gets from life just what he wishes. But a candid searching +of our own hearts will incline us to admit that, after all, the way we +go and the length we go is determined pretty much by the kind and the +intensity of our secret longing. That for which in the time of choice we +are willing to sacrifice all else, is the formula that defines the law +of each individual life. All this is not intended to mean that we have +each named a clear and definite ideal which is our chosen goal. On the +contrary, such a conception may be almost meaningless to some of us. In +general the higher the ideal the vaguer and less vivid is its +presentation to our consciousness. But, named or unnamed, sharp or +blurred, vivid or half-forgotten, there may be found in the heart of +every man that which of all things he wants to be, that which of all +deeds he wants to do. If he has had the normal youth <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12"></a>[<a href="./images/12.png">12</a>]</span>of dreaming, he +has seen it, and warmed to the picture of his imagination; if he has +been somewhat more thoughtful than the ordinary, his reason has defined +it, and adopted it for his vocation; if neither, it has been present as +an undertone throughout the rendering of his more inevitable life. He +will recognize it when it is named as the desire to do the will of God, +or to have as good a time as possible, or to make other people as happy +as possible, or to be equal to his responsibilities, or to fulfil the +expectation of his mother, or to be distinguished, wealthy, or +influential. This list of ideals is miscellaneous, and ethically +reducible to more fundamental concepts, but these are the terms in which +men are ordinarily conscious of their most intimate purposes. We must +now inquire respecting the nature of the thought that determines the +selection of such a purpose, or justifies it when it has been +unconsciously accepted.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Affairs, and the +Voluptuary.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_5" id="Section_5">5</a>. What is most worth while? So far as human action is concerned this +obviously depends upon what is possible, upon what is expected of us by +our own natures, and upon what interests and concerns are conserved by +the trend of events in our <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13"></a>[<a href="./images/13.png">13</a>]</span>environment. What I had best do, presupposes +what I have the strength and the skill to do, what I feel called upon to +do, and what are the great causes that are entitled to promotion at my +hands. It seems that practically we cannot separate the ideal from the +real. We may feel that the highest ideal is an immediate utterance of +conscience, as mysterious in origin as it is authoritative in +expression. We may be willing to defy the universe, and expatriate +ourselves from our natural and social environment, for the sake of the +holy law of duty. Such men as Count Tolstoi have little to say of the +possible, or the expedient, or the actual, and are satisfied to stand +almost alone against the brutal facts of usage and economy. We all have +a secret sense of chivalry, that prompts, however ineffectually, to a +like devotion. But that which in such moral purposes appears to indicate +a severance of the ideal and the real, is, if we will but stop to +consider, only a severance of the ideal and the apparent. The martyr is +more sure of reality than the adventurer. He is convinced that though +his contemporaries and his environment be against him; the fundamental +or eventual order of things is for him. He believes in a spiritual world +more abiding, albeit less <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14"></a>[<a href="./images/14.png">14</a>]</span>obvious, than the material world. Though +every temporal event contradict him, he lives in the certainty that +eternity is his. Such an one may have found his ideal in the voice of +God and His prophets, or he may have been led to God as the +justification of his irresistible ideal; but in either case the +selection of his ideal is reasonable to him in so far as it is +harmonious with the ultimate nature of things, or stands for the promise +of reality. In this wise, thought about life expands into some +conception of the deeper forces of the world, and life itself, in +respect of its fundamental attachment to an ideal, implies some belief +concerning the fundamental nature of its environment.</p> + +<p>But lest in this account life be credited with too much gravity and +import, or it seem to be assumed that life is all knight-errantry, let +us turn to our less quixotic, and perhaps more effectual, man of +affairs. He works for his daily bread, and for success in his vocation. +He has selected his vocation for its promise of return in the form of +wealth, comfort, fame, or influence. He likewise performs such +additional service to his family and his community as is demanded of him +by public opinion and his own sense of responsibility. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15"></a>[<a href="./images/15.png">15</a>]</span>He may have a +certain contempt for the man who sees visions. This may be his manner of +testifying to his own preference for the ideal of usefulness and +immediate efficiency. But even so he would never for an instant admit +that he was pursuing a merely conventional good. He may be largely +imitative in his standards of value, recognizing such aims as are common +to some time or race; nevertheless none would be more sure than he of +the truth of his ideal. Question him, and he will maintain that his is +the reasonable life under the conditions of human existence. He may +maintain that if there be a God, he can best serve Him by promoting the +tangible welfare of himself and those dependent upon him. He may +maintain that, since there is no God, he must win such rewards as the +world can give. If he have something of the heroic in him, he may tell +you that, since there is no God, he will labor to the uttermost for his +fellow-men. Where he has not solved the problem of life for himself, he +may believe himself to be obeying the insight of some one wiser than +himself, or of society as expressed in its customs and institutions. But +no man ever admitted that his life was purely a matter of expediency, or +that in his dominant ideal he was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16"></a>[<a href="./images/16.png">16</a>]</span>the victim of chance. In the +background of the busiest and most preoccupied life of affairs, there +dwells the conviction that such living is appropriate to the universe; +that it is called for by the circumstances of its origin, opportunities, +and destiny.</p> + +<p>Finally, the man who makes light of life has of all men the most +transparent inner consciousness. In him may be clearly observed the +relation between the ideal and the reflection that is assumed to justify +it.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"A Moment's Halt—a momentary taste<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Of Being from the Well amid the Waste—<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">And Lo!—the phantom Caravan has reach'd<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">The Nothing it set out from— . . ."<br /></span> +</div><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"We are no other than a moving row<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Round with the Sun-illumin'd Lantern held<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">In Midnight by the Master of the Show."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>Where the setting of life is construed in these terms, there is but one +natural and appropriate manner of life. Once believing in the isolation +and insignificance of life, one is sceptical of all worth save such as +may be tasted in the moment of its purchase. If one's ideas and +experiences are no concern of the world's, but incidents of a purely +local and transient interest, they will realize <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17"></a>[<a href="./images/17.png">17</a>]</span>most when they realize +an immediate gratification. Where one does not believe that he is a +member of the universe, and a contributor to its ends, he does well to +minimize the friction that arises from its accidental propinquity, and +to kindle some little fire of enjoyment in his own lonely heart. This is +the life of abandonment to pleasure, accompanied by the conviction that +the conditions of life warrant no more strenuous or heroic plan.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy of Life.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_6" id="Section_6">6</a>. In such wise do we adopt the life purpose, or justify it when +unconsciously adopted. The pursuit of an ideal implies a belief in its +effectuality. Such a belief will invariably appear when the groundwork +of the daily living is laid bare by a little reflection. And if our +analysis has not been in error, there is something more definite to be +obtained from it. We all believe in the practical wisdom of our +fundamental ideals; but we believe, besides, that such wisdom involves +the sanction of the universe as a whole. The momentousness of an +individual's life will be satisfied with nothing less final than an +absolutely wise disposition of it. For every individual, his life is all +his power and riches, and is not to be spent save for the <i>greatest good +that <span class='pagenum' style="font-style: normal"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18"></a>[<a href="./images/18.png">18</a>]</span>he can reasonably pursue</i>. But the solution of such a problem is +not to be obtained short of a searching of entire reality. Every life +will represent more or less of such wisdom and enlightenment; and in the +end the best selection of ideal will denote the greatest wealth of +experience. It is not always true that he who has seen more will live +more wisely, for in an individual case instinct or authority may be +better sources of aspiration than experience. But we trust instinct and +authority because we believe them to represent a comprehensive +experience on the part of the race as a whole, or on the part of God. He +whose knowledge is broadest and truest would know best what is finally +worth living for. On this account, most men can see no more reasonable +plan of life than obedience to God's will, for God in the abundance of +his wisdom, and since all eternity is plain before him, must see with +certainty that which is supremely worthy.</p> + +<p>We mean, then, that the selection of our ideals shall be determined by +the largest possible knowledge of the facts pertaining to life. We mean +to select as one would select who knew all about the antecedents and +surroundings and remote consequences of life. In our own weakness and +finitude <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19"></a>[<a href="./images/19.png">19</a>]</span>we may go but a little way in the direction of such an +insight, and may prefer to accept the judgment of tradition or +authority, but we recognize a distinct type of knowledge as alone worthy +to justify an individual's adoption of an ideal. That type of knowledge +is the knowledge that comprehends the universe in its totality. Such +knowledge does not involve completeness of information respecting all +parts of reality. This, humanly speaking, is both unattainable and +inconceivable. It involves rather a conception of the <i>kind</i> of reality +that is fundamental. For a wise purpose it is unnecessary that we should +know many matters of fact, or even specific laws, provided we are +convinced of the inner and essential character of the universe. Some of +the alternatives are matters of every-day thought and speech. One cannot +tell the simplest story of human life without disclosing them. To live +the human life means to pursue ideals, that is, to have a thing in mind, +and then to try to accomplish it. Here is one kind of reality and power. +The planetary system, on the other hand, does not pursue ideals, but +moves unconscious of itself, with a mechanical precision that can be +expressed in a mathematical formula; and is representative of another +kind of reality <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20"></a>[<a href="./images/20.png">20</a>]</span>and power. Hence a very common and a very practical +question: Is there an underlying law, like the law of gravitation, +fundamentally and permanently governing life, in spite of its apparent +direction by ideal and aspiration? Or is there an underlying power, like +purpose, fundamentally and permanently governing the planetary system +and all celestial worlds, in spite of the apparent control of blind and +irresistible forces? This is a practical question because nothing could +be more pertinent to our choice of ideals. Nothing could make more +difference to life than a belief in the life or lifelessness of its +environment. The faiths that generate or confirm our ideals always refer +to this great issue. And this is but one, albeit the most profound, of +the many issues that arise from the desire to obtain some conviction of +the inner and essential character of life. Though so intimately +connected with practical concerns, these issues are primarily the +business of thought. In grappling with them, thought is called upon for +its greatest comprehensiveness, penetration, and self-consistency. By +the necessity of concentration, thought is sometimes led to forget its +origin and the source of its problems. But in naming itself philosophy, +thought has only recognized the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21"></a>[<a href="./images/21.png">21</a>]</span>definiteness and earnestness of its +largest task. Philosophy is still thought about life, representing but +the deepening and broadening of the common practical thoughtfulness.</p> + +<p>We who began together at the starting-point of <i>life</i>, have now entered +together the haven of <i>philosophy</i>. It is not a final haven, but only +the point of departure for the field of philosophy proper. Nevertheless +that field is now in the plain view of the man who occupies the +practical stand-point. He must recognize in philosophy a kind of +reflection that differs only in extent and persistence from the +reflection that guides and justifies his life. He may not consciously +identify himself with any one of the three general groups which have +been characterized. But if he is neither an idealist, nor a philistine, +nor a pleasure lover, surely he is compounded of such elements, and does +not escape their implications. He desires something most of all, even +though his highest ideal be only an inference from the gradation of his +immediate purposes. This highest ideal represents what he conceives to +be the greatest worth or value attainable in the universe, and its +adoption is based upon the largest generalization that he can make or +borrow. The complete <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22"></a>[<a href="./images/22.png">22</a>]</span>justification of his ideal would involve a true +knowledge of the essential character of the universe. For such knowledge +he substitutes either authority or his own imperfect insight. But in +either case his life is naturally and organically correlated with a +<i>thought about the universe in its totality, or in its deepest and +essential character</i>. Such thought, the activity and its results, is +philosophy. Hence he who lives is, <i>ipso facto</i>, a philosopher. He is +not only a potential philosopher, but a partial philosopher. He has +already begun to be a philosopher. Between the fitful or prudential +thinking of some little man of affairs, and the sustained thought of the +devoted lover of truth, there is indeed a long journey, but it is a +straight journey along the same road. Philosophy is neither accidental +nor supernatural, but inevitable and normal. Philosophy is not properly +a vocation, but the ground and inspiration of all vocations. In the +hands of its devotees it grows technical and complex, as do all efforts +of thought, and to pursue philosophy bravely and faithfully is to +encounter obstacles and labyrinths innumerable. The general problem of +philosophy is mother of a whole brood of problems, little and great. But +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23"></a>[<a href="./images/23.png">23</a>]</span>whether we be numbered among its devotees, or their beneficiaries, an +equal significance attaches to the truth that philosophy is continuous +with life.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24"></a>[<a href="./images/24.png">24</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_II" id="Chap_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<h3>POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY</h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">Who is the Philosopher-Poet?</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_7" id="Section_7">7</a>. As the ultimate criticism of all human interests, philosophy may be +approached by avenues as various as these interests. Only when +philosophy is discovered as the implication of well-recognized special +interests, is the significance of its function fully appreciated. For +the sake of such a further understanding of philosophy, those who find +either inspiration or entertainment in poetry are invited in the present +chapter to consider certain of the relations between poetry and +philosophy.</p> + +<p>We must at the very outset decline to accept unqualifiedly the poet's +opinion in the matter, for he would not think it presumptuous to +incorporate philosophy in poetry. "No man," said Coleridge, "was ever +yet a great poet without being at the same time a great philosopher." +This would seem to mean that a great poet is a great philosopher, and +more too. We shall do better to begin with the prosaic and matter of +fact minimum of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25"></a>[<a href="./images/25.png">25</a>]</span>truth: some poetry is philosophical. This will enable +us to search for the portion of philosophy that is in some poetry, +without finally defining their respective boundaries. It may be that all +true poetry is philosophical, as it may be that all true philosophy is +poetical; but it is much more certain that much actual poetry is far +from philosophical, and that most actual philosophy was not conceived or +written by a poet. The mere poet and the mere philosopher must be +tolerated, if it be only for the purpose of shedding light upon the +philosopher-poet and the poet-philosopher. And it is to the +philosopher-poet that we turn, in the hope that under the genial spell +of poetry we may be brought with understanding to the more forbidding +land of philosophy.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Poetry as Appreciation.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_8" id="Section_8">8</a>. Poetry is well characterized, though not defined, as an +interpretation of life. The term "life" here signifies the human +purposive consciousness, and active pursuit of ends. An interpretation +of life is, then, a selection and account of such values in human +experience as are actually sought or are worth the seeking. For the poet +all things are good or bad, and never only matters of fact. He is +neither an annalist nor a statistician, and is even an observer <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26"></a>[<a href="./images/26.png">26</a>]</span>only +for the sake of a higher design. He is one who appreciates, and +expresses his appreciation so fittingly that it becomes a kind of truth, +and a permanently communicable object. That "unbodied joy," the +skylark's song and flight, is through the genius of Shelley so +faithfully embodied, that it may enter as a definite joy into the lives +of countless human beings. The sensuous or suggestive values of nature +are caught by the poet's quick feeling for beauty, and fixed by his +creative activity. Or with his ready sympathy he may perceive the value +of some human ideal or mastering passion, and make it a reality for our +common feeling. Where the poet has to do with the base and hateful, his +attitude is still appreciative. The evil is apprehended as part of a +dramatic whole having positive moral or æsthetic value. Moral ideas may +appear in both poetry and life as the inspiration and justification of +struggle. Where there is no conception of its moral significance, the +repulsive possesses for the poet's consciousness the æsthetic value of +diversity and contrast. Even where the evil and ugly is isolated, as in +certain of Browning's dramatic monologues, it forms, both for the poet +and the reader, but a part of some larger perception of life or +character, which is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27"></a>[<a href="./images/27.png">27</a>]</span>sublime or beautiful or good. Poetry involves, +then, the discovery and presentation of human experiences that are +satisfying and appealing. It is a language for human pleasures and +ideals. Poetry is without doubt a great deal more than this, and only +after a careful analysis of its peculiar language could one distinguish +it from kindred arts; but it will suffice for our purposes to +characterize and not differentiate. Starting from this most general +truth respecting poetry, we may now look for that aspect of it whereby +it may be a witness of philosophical truth.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_9" id="Section_9">9</a>. For the answer to our question, we must turn to an examination of +the intellectual elements of poetry. In the first place, the common +demand that the poet shall be accurate in his representations is +suggestive of an indispensable intellectual factor in his genius. As we +have seen, he is not to reproduce nature, but the human appreciative +experience of nature. Nevertheless, he must even here be true to his +object. His art involves his ability to express genuinely and sincerely +what he himself experiences in the presence of nature, or what he can +catch of the inner lives of others by virtue of his intelligent +sympathy. No amount of emotion or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28"></a>[<a href="./images/28.png">28</a>]</span>even of imagination will profit a +poet, unless he can render a true account of them. To be sure, he need +not define, or even explain; for it is his function to transfer the +immediate qualities of experience: but he must be able to speak the +truth, and, in order to speak it, he must have known it. In all this, +however, we have made no demand that the poet should see more than one +thing at a time. Sincerity of expression does not require what is +distinctly another mode of intelligence, <i>comprehensiveness of view</i>. It +is easier, and accordingly more usual, to render an account of the +moments and casual units of experience, than of its totality. There are +poets, little and great, who possess the intellectual virtue of +sincerity, without the intellectual power of synthesis and +reconciliation. This distinction will enable us to separate the +intelligence exhibited in all poetry, from that distinct form of +intelligence exhibited in such poetry as is properly to be called +philosophical.</p> + +<p>The "barbarian" in poetry has recently been defined as "the man who +regards his passions as their own excuse for being; who does not +domesticate them either by understanding their cause or by conceiving +their ideal goal."<a name="FNanchor_28:1_2" id="FNanchor_28:1_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_28:1_2" class="fnanchor">[28:1]</a> One will readily <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29"></a>[<a href="./images/29.png">29</a>]</span>appreciate the application of +this definition to Walt Whitman. What little unity there is in this +poet's world, is the composition of a purely sensuous experience,</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"The earth expending right hand and left hand,<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">The picture alive, every part in its best light,<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">The music falling in where it is wanted, and stopping where it is not wanted."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>In many passages Whitman manifests a marvellous ability to discover and +communicate a fresh gladness about the commonest experiences. We cannot +but rejoice with him in all sights and sounds. But though we cannot deny +him truth, his truth is honesty and not understanding. The experiences +in which he discovers so much worth, are random and capricious, and do +not constitute a universe. To the solution of ultimate questions he +contributes a sense of mystery, and the conviction</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"That you are here—that life exists and identity,<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">That the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>His world is justly described by the writer just quoted as "a +phantasmagoria of continuous visions, vivid, impressive, but monotonous +and hard to distinguish in memory, like the waves of the sea <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30"></a>[<a href="./images/30.png">30</a>]</span>or the +decorations of some barbarous temple, sublime only by the infinite +aggregation of parts."<a name="FNanchor_30:2_3" id="FNanchor_30:2_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_30:2_3" class="fnanchor">[30:2]</a></p> + +<p>As is Walt Whitman, so are many poets greater and less. Some who have +seen the world-view, exhibit the same particularism in their lyric +moods; although, generally speaking, a poet who once has comprehended +the world, will see the parts of it in the light of that wisdom. But +Walt Whitman is peculiarly representative of the poetry that can be +true, without being wise in the manner that we shall come shortly to +understand as the manner of philosophy. He is as desultory in his poet +raptures as is the common man when he lives in his immediate +experiences. The truth won by each is the clear vision of one thing, or +of a limited collection of things, and not the broad inclusive vision of +all things.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shakespeare.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_10" id="Section_10">10</a>. The transition from Whitman to Shakespeare may seem somewhat +abrupt, but the very differences between these poets serve to mark out +an interesting affinity. Neither has put any unitary construction upon +human life and its environment. Neither, as poet, is the witness of any +world-view; which will mean for us that neither is a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31"></a>[<a href="./images/31.png">31</a>]</span>philosopher-poet. +As respects Shakespeare, this is a hard saying. We are accustomed to the +critical judgment that finds in the Shakespearian dramas an apprehension +of the universal in human life. But though this judgment is true, it is +by no means conclusive as respects Shakespeare's relation to the +philosophical type of thought. For there can be universality without +philosophy. Thus, to know the groups and the marks of the vertebrates is +to know a truth which possesses generality, in contradistinction to the +particularism of Whitman's poetic consciousness. Even so to know well +the groups and marks of human character, vertebrate and invertebrate, is +to know that of which the average man, in his hand to hand struggle with +life, is ignorant. Such a wisdom Shakespeare possessed to a unique +degree, and it enabled him to reconstruct human life. He did not merely +perceive human states and motives, but he understood human nature so +well that he could create consistent men and women. Moreover, +Shakespeare's knowledge was not only thus universal in being a knowledge +of general groups and laws, but also in respect of its extensity. His +understanding was as rich as it was acute. It is true, then, that +Shakespeare read human life as an open book, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32"></a>[<a href="./images/32.png">32</a>]</span>knowing certainly the +manner of human thinking and feeling, and the power and interplay of +human motives. But it is equally true, on the other hand, that he +possessed no unitary conception of the meaning and larger relations of +human life. Such a conception might have been expressed either by means +of the outlook of some dominating and persistent type of personality, or +by a pervading suggestion of some constant world-setting for the +variable enterprise of mankind. It could appear only provided the poet's +appreciation of life in detail were determined by an interpretation of +the meaning of life as a whole. Shakespeare apparently possessed no such +interpretation. Even when Hamlet is groping after some larger truth that +may bear upon the definite problems of life, he represents but one, and +that a strange and unusual, type of human nature. And Hamlet's +reflections, it should be noted, have no outcome. There is no +Shakespearian answer to the riddles that Hamlet propounds. The poet's +genius is not less amazing for this fact; indeed, his peculiar +distinction can only be comprehended upon this basis. Shakespeare put no +construction upon life, and by virtue of this very reserve accomplished +an art of surpassing fidelity and vividness. The absence of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33"></a>[<a href="./images/33.png">33</a>]</span>philosophy +in Shakespeare, and the presence of the most characteristic quality of +his genius, may both be imputed by the one affirmation, that <i>there is +no Shakespearian point of view</i>.</p> + +<p>This truth signifies both gain and loss. The philosophical criticism of +life may vary from the ideal objectivity of absolute truth, to the +subjectivity of a personal religion. Philosophy aims to correct the +partiality of particular points of view by means of a point of view that +shall comprehend their relations, and effect such reconciliations or +transformations as shall enable them to constitute a universe. +Philosophy always assumes the hypothetical view of omniscience. The +necessity of such a final criticism is implicit in every scientific item +of knowledge, and in every judgment that is passed upon life. Philosophy +makes a distinct and peculiar contribution to human knowledge by its +heroic effort to measure all knowledges and all ideals by the standard +of totality. Nevertheless it is significant that no human individual can +possibly possess the range of omniscience. The most adequate knowledge +of which any generation of men is capable, will always be that which is +conceived by the most synthetic and vigorously metaphysical minds; but +every individual philosophy <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34"></a>[<a href="./images/34.png">34</a>]</span>will nevertheless be a premature synthesis. +The effort to complete knowledge is the indispensable test of the +adequacy of prevailing conceptions, but the completed knowledge of any +individual mind will shortly become an historical monument. It will +belong primarily to the personal life of its creator, as the +articulation of his personal covenant with the universe. There is a +sound justification for such a conclusion of things in the case of the +individual, for the conditions of human life make it inevitable; but it +will always possess a felt unity, and many distinct features, that are +private and subjective. Now such a projection of personality, with its +coloring and its selection, Shakespeare has avoided; and very largely as +a consequence, his dramas are a storehouse of genuine human nature. +Ambition, mercy, hate, madness, guilelessness, conventionality, mirth, +bravery, deceit, purity—these, and all human states and attributes save +piety, are upon his pages as real, and as mysterious withal, as they are +in the great historical society. For an ordinary reader, these states +and attributes are more real in Hamlet or Lear than in his own direct +experience, because in Hamlet and Lear he can see them with the eye and +intelligence of genius. But Shakespeare is the world all over again, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35"></a>[<a href="./images/35.png">35</a>]</span>and there is loss as well as gain in such realism. Here is human life, +no doubt, and a brilliant pageantry it is; but human life as varied and +as problematic as it is in the living. Shakespeare's fundamental +intellectual resource is the historical and psychological knowledge of +such principles as govern the construction of human natures. The goods +for which men undertake, and live or die, are any goods, justified only +by the actual human striving for them. The virtues are the old winning +virtues of the secular life, and the heroisms of the common conscience. +Beyond its empirical generality, his knowledge is universal only in the +sense that space and time are universal. His consciousness <i>contains</i> +its representative creations, and expresses them unspoiled by any +transforming thought. His poetic consciousness is like the very stage to +which he likens all the world: men and women meet there, and things +happen there. The stage itself creates no unity save the occasion and +the place. Shakespeare's consciousness is universal because it is a fair +field with no favors. But even so it is particular, because, though each +may enter and depart in peace, when all enter together there is anarchy +and a babel of voices. All Shakespeare is like all the world seen +through the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36"></a>[<a href="./images/36.png">36</a>]</span>eyes of each of its inhabitants. Human experience in +Shakespeare is human experience as everyone feels it, as comprehensive +as the aggregate of innumerable lives. But human experience in +philosophy is the experience of all as thought by a synthetic mind. +Hence the wealth of life depicted by Shakespeare serves only to point +out the philosopher's problem, and to challenge his powers. Here he will +find material, and not results; much to philosophize about, but no +philosophy.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Philosophy in Poetry. The World-View. Omar Khayyam.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_11" id="Section_11">11</a>. The discussion up to this point has attributed to poetry very +definite intellectual factors that nevertheless do not constitute +philosophy. Walt Whitman speaks his feeling with truth, but in general +manifests no comprehensive insight. Shakespeare has not only sincerity +of expression but an understanding mind. He has a knowledge not only of +particular experiences, but of human nature; and a consciousness full +and varied like society itself. But there is a kind of knowledge +possessed by neither, the knowledge sought by coördinating all aspects +of human experience, both particular and general. Not even Shakespeare +is wise as one who, having seen the whole, can fundamentally interpret a +part. But though the philosopher-poet <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37"></a>[<a href="./images/37.png">37</a>]</span>may not yet be found, we cannot +longer be ignorant of his nature. He will be, like all poets, one who +appreciates experiences or finds things good, and he will faithfully +reproduce the values which he discovers. But he must <i>justify himself in +view of the fundamental nature of the universe</i>. The values which he +apprehends must be harmonious, and so far above the plurality of goods +as to transcend and unify them. The philosopher-poet will find reality +as a whole to be something that accredits the order of values in his +inner life. He will not only find certain things to be most worthy +objects of action or contemplation, but he will see why they are worthy, +because he will have construed the judgment of the universe in their +favor.</p> + +<p>In this general sense, Omar Khayyam is a philosopher-poet. To be sure +his universe is quite the opposite of that which most poets conceive, +and is perhaps profoundly antagonistic to the very spirit of poetry; but +it is none the less true that the joys to which Omar invites us are such +as his universe prescribes for human life.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"Some for the Glories of This World; and some<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come;<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Ah, take the Cash, and let the Credit go,<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38"></a>[<a href="./images/38.png">38</a>]</span>Herein is both poetry and philosophy, albeit but a poor brand of each. +We are invited to occupy ourselves only with spiritual cash, because the +universe is spiritually insolvent. The immediately gratifying feelings +are the only feelings that the world can guarantee. Omar Khayyam is a +philosopher-poet, because his immediate delight in "youth's +sweet-scented manuscript" is part of a consciousness that vaguely sees, +though it cannot grasp, "this sorry scheme of things entire."</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"Drink for you know not whence you come, nor why;<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Drink for you know not why you go, nor where."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<div class="sidenote">Wordsworth.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_12" id="Section_12">12</a>. But the poet in his world-view ordinarily sees other than +darkness. The same innate spiritual enterprise that sustains religious +faith leads the poet more often to find the universe positively +congenial to his ideals, and to ideals in general. He interprets human +experience in the light of the spirituality of all the world. It is to +Wordsworth that we of the present age are chiefly indebted for such +imagery, and it will profit us to consider somewhat carefully the +philosophical quality of his poetry.</p> + +<p>Walter Pater, in introducing his appreciation of Wordsworth, writes that +"an intimate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39"></a>[<a href="./images/39.png">39</a>]</span>consciousness of the expression of natural things, which +weighs, listens, penetrates, where the earlier mind passed roughly by, +is a large element in the complexion of modern poetry." We recognize at +once the truth of this characterization as applied to Wordsworth. But +there is something more distinguished about this poet's sensibility even +than its extreme fineness and delicacy; a quality that is suggested, +though not made explicit, by Shelley's allusion to Wordsworth's +experience as "a sort of thought in sense." Nature possessed for him not +merely enjoyable and describable characters of great variety and +minuteness, but an immediately apprehended unity and meaning. It would +be a great mistake to construe this meaning in sense as analogous to the +crude symbolism of the educator Froebel, to whom, as he said, "the world +of crystals proclaimed, in distinct and univocal terms, the laws of +human life." Wordsworth did not attach ideas to sense, but regarded +sense itself as a communication of truth. We readily call to mind his +unique capacity for apprehending the characteristic flavor of a certain +place in a certain moment of time, the individuality of a situation. Now +in such moments he felt that he was receiving intelligences, none the +less direct and significant <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40"></a>[<a href="./images/40.png">40</a>]</span>for their inarticulate form. Like the boy +on Windermere, whom he himself describes,</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i7half">"while he hung<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Loitering, a gentle shock of mild surprise<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Has carried far into his heart the voice<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Would enter unawares into his mind,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Its woods, and that uncertain heaven received<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Into the bosom of the steady lake."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>For our purpose it is essential that we should recognize in this +appreciation of nature, expressed in almost every poem that Wordsworth +wrote, a consciousness respecting the fundamental nature of the world. +Conversation, as we know, denotes an interchange of commensurable +meanings. Whatever the code may be, whether words or the most subtle +form of suggestion, communication is impossible without community of +nature. Hence, in believing himself to be holding converse with the +so-called physical world, Wordsworth conceives that world as +fundamentally like himself. He finds the most profound thing in all the +world to be the universal spiritual life. In nature this life manifests +itself most directly, clothed in its own proper dignity and peace. But +it may be discovered in the humanity that is most close to nature, in +the avocations of plain and simple people, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41"></a>[<a href="./images/41.png">41</a>]</span>the unsophisticated +delights of children; and, with the perspective of contemplation, even +"among the multitudes of that huge city."</p> + +<p>So Wordsworth is rendering a true account of his own experience of +reality when, as in "The Prelude," he says unequivocally:</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"A gracious spirit o'er this earth presides,<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">And in the heart of man; invisibly<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">It comes to works of unreproved delight,<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">And tendency benign; directing those<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Who care not, know not, think not, what they do."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>Wordsworth is not a philosopher-poet because by searching his pages we +can find an explicit philosophical creed such as this, but because all +the joys of which his poet-soul compels him to sing have their peculiar +note, and compose their peculiar harmony, by virtue of such an +indwelling consciousness. Here is one who is a philosopher in and +through his poetry. He is a philosopher in so far as the detail of his +appreciation finds fundamental justification in a world-view. From the +immanence of "the universal heart" there follows, not through any +mediate reasoning, but by the immediate experience of its propriety, a +conception of that which is of supreme worth in life. The highest and +best of which life is capable is contemplation, or the consciousness of +the universal indwelling of God. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42"></a>[<a href="./images/42.png">42</a>]</span>Of those who fail to live thus +fittingly in the midst of the divine life, Walter Pater speaks for +Wordsworth as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"To higher or lower ends they move too often with something of +a sad countenance, with hurried and ignoble gait, becoming, +unconsciously, something like thorns, in their anxiety to bear +grapes; it being possible for people, in the pursuit of even +great ends, to become themselves thin and impoverished in +spirit and temper, thus diminishing the sum of perfection in +the world at its very sources."<a name="FNanchor_42:3_4" id="FNanchor_42:3_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_42:3_4" class="fnanchor">[42:3]</a></p></div> + +<p>The quiet and worshipful spirit, won by the cultivation of the emotions +appropriate to the presence of nature and society, is the mark of the +completest life and the most acceptable service. Thus for Wordsworth the +meaning of life is inseparable from the meaning of the universe. In +apprehending that which is good and beautiful in human experience, he +was attended by a vision of the totality of things. Herein he has had to +do, if not with the form, at any rate with the very substance of +philosophy.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Dante.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_13" id="Section_13">13</a>. Unquestionably the supreme philosopher-poet is Dante. He is not +only philosophical in the temper of his mind, but his greatest poem is +the incarnation of a definite system of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43"></a>[<a href="./images/43.png">43</a>]</span>philosophy, the most definite +that the world has seen. That conception of the world which in the +thirteenth century found argumentative and orderly expression in the +"Summa Theologiæ" of Thomas of Aquino, and constituted the faith of the +church, is visualized by Dante, and made the basis of an interpretation +of life.</p> + +<p>The "Divina Commedia" deals with all the heavens to the Empyrean itself, +and with all spiritual life to the very presence of God. It derives its +imagery from the cosmology of the day, its dramatic motive from the +Christian and Greek conceptions of God and his dealings with the world. +Sin is punished because of the justice of God; knowledge, virtue, and +faith lead, through God's grace and mercy manifested in Christ, to a +perpetual union with Him. Hell, purgatory, and paradise give place and +setting to the events of the drama. But the deeper meaning of the poem +is allegorical. In a letter quoted by Lowell, Dante writes:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The literal subject of the whole work is the state of the +soul after death, simply considered. But if the work be taken +allegorically the subject is man, as by merit or demerit, +through freedom of the will, he renders himself liable to the +reward or punishment of justice."<a name="FNanchor_43:4_5" id="FNanchor_43:4_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_43:4_5" class="fnanchor">[43:4]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44"></a>[<a href="./images/44.png">44</a>]</span>In other words, the inner and essential meaning of the poem has to do +not with external retribution, but with character, and the laws which +determine its own proper ruin or perfection. The punishments described +in the "Inferno" are accounts of the state of guilt itself, implications +of the will that has chosen the part of brutishness. Sin itself is +damnable and deadening, but the knowledge that the soul that sinneth +shall die is the first way of emancipation from sin. The guidance of +Virgil through hell and purgatory signifies the knowledge of good and +evil, or moral insight, as the guide of man through this life of +struggle and progress. The earthly paradise, at the close of the +"Purgatorio," represents the highest state to which human character can +attain when choice is determined by ordinary experience, intelligence, +and understanding. Here man stands alone, endowed with an enlightened +conscience. Here are uttered the last words of Virgil to Dante, the +explorer of the spiritual country:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Expect no more or word or sign from me. Free, upright, and +sane is thine own free will, and it would be wrong not to act +according to its pleasure; wherefore thee over thyself I crown +and mitre."<a name="FNanchor_44:5_6" id="FNanchor_44:5_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_44:5_6" class="fnanchor">[44:5]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45"></a>[<a href="./images/45.png">45</a>]</span>But moral self-reliance is not the last word. As Beatrice, the image of +tenderness and holiness, comes to Dante in the earthly paradise, and +leads him from the summit of purgatory into the heaven of heavens, and +even to the eternal light; so there is added to the mere human, +intellectual, and moral resources of the soul, the sustaining power of +the divine grace, the illuminating power of divine truth, and the +transforming power of divine love. Through the aid of this higher +wisdom, the journey of life becomes the way to God. Thus the allegorical +truth of the "Divina Commedia" is not merely an analysis of the moral +nature of man, but the revelation of a universal spiritual order, +manifesting itself in the moral evolution of the individual, and above +all in his ultimate community with the eternal goodness.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Thou shouldst not, if I deem aright, wonder more at thy +ascent, than at a stream if from a high mountain it descends +to the base. A marvel it would be in thee, if, deprived of +hindrance, thou hadst sat below, even as quiet by living fire +in earth would be."<a name="FNanchor_45:6_7" id="FNanchor_45:6_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_45:6_7" class="fnanchor">[45:6]</a></p></div> + +<p>Such, in brief, is Dante's world-view, so suggestive of the freer +idealistic conceptions of later thought as to justify a recent +characterization of him as one who, "accepting without a shadow of a +doubt <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46"></a>[<a href="./images/46.png">46</a>]</span>or hesitation all the constitutive ideas of mediæval thought and +life, grasped them so firmly and gave them such luminous expression that +the spirit in them broke away from the form."<a name="FNanchor_46:7_8" id="FNanchor_46:7_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_46:7_8" class="fnanchor">[46:7]</a></p> + +<p>But it must be added, as in the case of Wordsworth, that Dante is a +philosopher-poet not because St. Thomas Aquinas appears and speaks with +authority in the Thirteenth Canto of the "Paradiso," nor even because a +philosophical doctrine can be consistently formulated from his writings, +but because his consciousness of life is informed with a sense of its +universal bearings. There is a famous passage in the Twenty-second Canto +of the "Paradiso," in which Dante describes himself as looking down upon +the earth from the starry heaven.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"'Thou art so near the ultimate salvation,' began Beatrice, +'that thou oughtest to have thine eyes clear and sharp. And +therefore ere thou further enterest it, look back downward, +and see how great a world I have already set beneath thy feet, +in order that thy heart, so far as it is able, may present +itself joyous to the triumphant crowd which comes glad through +this round ether.' With my sight I returned through each and +all the seven spheres, and saw this globe such that I smiled +at its mean semblance; and that counsel I approve as the best +which holds it of least account; and he who thinks of other +things maybe called truly worthy."</p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47"></a>[<a href="./images/47.png">47</a>]</span>Dante's scale of values is that which appears from the starry heaven. +His austere piety, his invincible courage, and his uncompromising hatred +of wrong, are neither accidents of temperament nor blind reactions, but +compose the proper character of one who has both seen the world from +God, and returned to see God from the world. He was, as Lowell has said, +"a man of genius who could hold heartbreak at bay for twenty years, and +would not let himself die till he had done his task"; and his power was +not obstinacy, but a vision of the ways of God. He knew a truth that +justified him in his sacrifices, and made a great glory of his defeat +and exile. Even so his poetry or appreciation of life is the expression +of an inward contemplation of the world in its unity or essence. It is +but an elaboration of the piety which he attributes to the lesser saints +of paradise, when he has them say:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Nay, it is essential to this blessed existence to hold +ourselves within the divine will, whereby our very wills are +made one. So that as we are from stage to stage throughout +this realm, to all the realm is pleasing, as to the King who +inwills us with His will. And His will is our peace; it is +that sea whereunto is moving all that which It creates and +which nature makes."<a name="FNanchor_47:8_9" id="FNanchor_47:8_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_47:8_9" class="fnanchor">[47:8]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48"></a>[<a href="./images/48.png">48</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_14" id="Section_14">14</a>. There now remains the brief task of distinguishing the +philosopher-poet from the philosopher himself. The philosopher-poet is +one who, having made the philosophical point of view his own, expresses +himself in the form of poetry. The philosophical point of view is that +from which the universe is comprehended in its totality. The wisdom of +the philosopher is the knowledge of each through the knowledge of all. +Wherein, then, does the poet, when possessed of such wisdom, differ from +the philosopher proper? To this question one can give readily enough the +general answer, that the difference lies in the mode of utterance. +Furthermore, we have already given some account of the peculiar manner +of the poet. He invites us to experience with him the beautiful and +moving in nature and life. That which the poet has to express, and that +which he aims to arouse in others, is an appreciative experience. He +requires what Wordsworth calls "an atmosphere of sensation in which to +move his wings." Therefore if he is to be philosophical in intelligence, +and yet essentially a poet, he must find his universal truth in +immediate experience. He must be one who, in seeing the many, sees the +one. The philosopher-poet is he <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49"></a>[<a href="./images/49.png">49</a>]</span>who visualizes a fundamental +interpretation of the world. "A poem," says one poet, "is the very image +of life expressed in its eternal truth."</p> + +<p>The philosopher proper, on the other hand, has the sterner and less +inviting task of rendering such an interpretation articulate to thought. +That which the poet sees, the philosopher must define. That which the +poet divines, the philosopher must calculate. The philosopher must dig +for that which the poet sees shining through. As the poet transcends +thought for the sake of experience, the philosopher must transcend +experience for the sake of thought. As the poet sees all, and all in +each, so the philosopher, knowing each, must think all consistently +together, and then know each again. It is the part of philosophy to +collect and criticise evidence, to formulate and coördinate conceptions, +and finally to define in exact terms. The reanimation of the structure +of thought is accomplished primarily in religion, which is a general +conception of the world made the basis of daily living.</p> + +<p>For religion there is no subjective correlative less than life itself. +Poetry is another and more circumscribed means of restoring thought to +life. By the poet's imagination, and through the art of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50"></a>[<a href="./images/50.png">50</a>]</span>his expression, +thought may be sensuously perceived. "If the time should ever come," +says Wordsworth, "when what is now called Science, thus familiarized to +men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh, and blood, +the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and +will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of +the household of man."<a name="FNanchor_50:9_10" id="FNanchor_50:9_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_50:9_10" class="fnanchor">[50:9]</a> As respects truth, philosophy has an +indubitable priority. The very sternness of the philosopher's task is +due to his supreme dedication to truth. But if validity be the merit of +philosophy, it can well be supplemented by immediacy, which is the merit +of poetry. Presuppose in the poet conviction of a sound philosophy, and +we may say with Shelley, of his handiwork, that "it is the perfect and +consummate surface and bloom of all things; it is as the odor and the +color of the rose to the texture of the elements which compose it, as +the form and splendor of unfaded beauty to the secrets of anatomy and +corruption." "Indeed," as he adds, "what were our consolations on this +side of the grave—and our aspirations beyond it—if poetry did not +ascend to bring light and fire <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51"></a>[<a href="./images/51.png">51</a>]</span>from those eternal regions where the +owl-winged faculty of calculation dare not ever soar?"<a name="FNanchor_51:10_11" id="FNanchor_51:10_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_51:10_11" class="fnanchor">[51:10]</a></p> + +<p>The unity in outlook, attended by differences of method and form, which +may exist between poet and philosopher, is signally illustrated by the +relation between Goethe and Spinoza. What Goethe saw and felt, Spinoza +proved and defined. The universal and eternal substance was to Spinoza, +as philosopher, a theorem, and to Goethe, as poet, a perception and an +emotion. Goethe writes to Jacobi that when philosophy "lays itself out +for division," he cannot get on with it, but when it "confirms our +original feeling as though we were one with nature," it is welcome to +him. In the same letter Goethe expresses his appreciation of Spinoza as +the complement of his own nature:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"His all-reconciling peace contrasted with my all-agitating +endeavor; his intellectual method was the opposite counterpart +of my poetic way of feeling and expressing myself; and even +the inflexible regularity of his logical procedure, which +might be considered ill-adapted to moral subjects, made me his +most passionate scholar and his devoted adherent. Mind and +heart, understanding and sense, were drawn together with an +inevitable elective affinity, and this at the same time +produced an intimate union between individuals of the most +different types."<a name="FNanchor_51:11_12" id="FNanchor_51:11_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_51:11_12" class="fnanchor">[51:11]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52"></a>[<a href="./images/52.png">52</a>]</span>It appears, then, that some poets share with all philosophers that +point of view from which the horizon line is the boundary of all the +world. Poetry is not always or essentially philosophical, but may be so; +and when the poetic imagination restores philosophy to immediacy, human +experience reaches its most exalted state, excepting only religion +itself, wherein God is both seen and also served. Nor is the part of +philosophy in poetry and religion either ignoble or presumptuous, for, +humanly speaking, "the owl-winged faculty of calculation" is the only +safe and sure means of access to that place on high,</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"Where the nightingale doth sing<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Not a senseless, trancèd thing,<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">But a divine melodious truth;<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Philosophic numbers smooth;<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Tales and golden histories<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Of heaven and its mysteries."<br /></span> +</div></div> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28:1_2" id="Footnote_28:1_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28:1_2"><span class="label">[28:1]</span></a> George Santayana, in his <i>Poetry and Religion</i>, p. 176.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30:2_3" id="Footnote_30:2_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30:2_3"><span class="label">[30:2]</span></a> Santayana: <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 180.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42:3_4" id="Footnote_42:3_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42:3_4"><span class="label">[42:3]</span></a> <i>Appreciations</i>, p. 59.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43:4_5" id="Footnote_43:4_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43:4_5"><span class="label">[43:4]</span></a> Letter to Can Grande. See Lowell's <i>Essay on Dante</i>, p. +34.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44:5_6" id="Footnote_44:5_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44:5_6"><span class="label">[44:5]</span></a> <i>Purgatorio</i>, Canto XXVII. Translation by Norton.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45:6_7" id="Footnote_45:6_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45:6_7"><span class="label">[45:6]</span></a> <i>Paradiso</i>, Canto I.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46:7_8" id="Footnote_46:7_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46:7_8"><span class="label">[46:7]</span></a> Edward Caird, in his <i>Literature and Philosophy</i>, Vol. +I, p. 24.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47:8_9" id="Footnote_47:8_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47:8_9"><span class="label">[47:8]</span></a> <i>Paradiso</i>, Canto III.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50:9_10" id="Footnote_50:9_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50:9_10"><span class="label">[50:9]</span></a> Observations prefixed to the second edition of <i>Lyrical +Ballads</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51:10_11" id="Footnote_51:10_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51:10_11"><span class="label">[51:10]</span></a> <i>A Defence of Poetry.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51:11_12" id="Footnote_51:11_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51:11_12"><span class="label">[51:11]</span></a> Quoted by Caird in his <i>Literature and Philosophy</i>, +Vol. I, p. 60.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53"></a>[<a href="./images/53.png">53</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_III" id="Chap_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<h3>THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE</h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">The Possibility of Defining Religion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_15" id="Section_15">15</a>. The least religious experience is so mysterious and so complex +that a moderate degree of reflection upon it tends to a sense of +intellectual impotence. "If I speak," says Emerson, "I define and +confine, and am less." One would gladly set down religion among the +unspeakable things and avoid the imputation of degrading it. It is +certain that the enterprise of defining religion is at present in +disrepute. It has been undertaken so often and so unsuccessfully that +contemporary students for the most part prefer to supply a list of +historical definitions of religion, and let their variety demonstrate +their futility. Metaphysicians and psychologists agree that in view of +the differences of creed, ritual, organization, conduct, and temperament +that have been true of different religions in different times and +places, one may as well abandon the idea that there is a constant +element.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54"></a>[<a href="./images/54.png">54</a>]</span>But on the other hand we have the testimony afforded by the name +religion; and the ordinary judgments of men to the effect that it +signifies something to be religious, and to be more or less religious. +There is an elementary logical principle to the effect that a group name +implies certain common group characters. Impatience with abstract or +euphemistic definitions should not blind us to the truth. Even the +psychologist tends in his description of religious phenomena to single +out and emphasize what he calls a <i>typical</i> religious experience. And +the same applies to the idealist's treatment of the matter.<a name="FNanchor_54:1_13" id="FNanchor_54:1_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_54:1_13" class="fnanchor">[54:1]</a> +Religion, he reasons, is essentially a development of which the true +meaning can be seen only in the higher stages. The primitive religion is +therefore only implicit religion. But lower stages cannot be regarded as +belonging to a single development with higher stages, if there be not +some actual promise of the later in the earlier, or some element which +endures throughout. It is unavoidable, then, to assume that in dealing +with religion we are dealing with a specific and definable experience.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Profitableness of Defining Religion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_16" id="Section_16">16</a>. The profitableness of undertaking such a definition is another +matter. It may well be that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55"></a>[<a href="./images/55.png">55</a>]</span>in so human and practical an affair as +religion, definition is peculiarly inappropriate. But is there not a +human and practical value in the very defining of religion? Is there not +a demand for it in the peculiar relation that exists between religion +and the progress of enlightenment? Religion associates itself with the +habits of society. The progress of enlightenment means that more or less +all the time, and very profoundly at certain critical times, society +must change its habits. The consequence is that religion is likely to be +abandoned with the old habits. The need of a new religion is therefore a +chronic one. The reformer in religion, or the man who wishes to be both +enlightened and religious, is chiefly occupied with the problem of +disentangling religion pure and undefiled from definite discredited +practices and opinions. And the solution of the problem turns upon some +apprehension of the essence of religion. There is a large amount of +necessary and unnecessary tragedy due to the extrinsic connection +between ideas and certain modes of their expression. There can be no +more serious and urgent duty than that of expressing as directly, and so +as truly as possible, the great permanent human concerns. The men to +whom educational <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56"></a>[<a href="./images/56.png">56</a>]</span>reform has been largely due have been the men who have +remembered for their fellows what this whole business of education is +after all for. Comenius and Pestalozzi served society by stripping +educational activity of its historical and institutional accessories, +and laying bare the genuine human need that these are designed to +satisfy. There is a similar virtue in the insistent attempt to +distinguish between the essential and the accessory in religion.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The True Method of Defining Religion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_17" id="Section_17">17</a>. Although declining to be discouraged by the conspicuousness of +past failures in this connection, one may well profit by them. The +amazing complexity of religious phenomena must somehow be seen to be +consistent with their common nature. The religious experience must not +only be found, but must also be reconciled with "the varieties of +religious experience." The inadequacy of the well-known definitions of +religion may be attributed to several causes. The commonest fallacy is +to define religion in terms of a religion. My definition of religion +must include my brother's religion, even though he live on the other +side of the globe, and my ancestor's religion, in spite of his +prehistoric remoteness. Error may easily arise through the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57"></a>[<a href="./images/57.png">57</a>]</span>attempt to +define religion in terms of my own religion, or what I conceive to be +the true religion. Whatever the relation between ideal religion and +actual religion, the field of religion contains by common consent cults +that must on their own grounds condemn one another; religions that are +bad religions, and yet religions.</p> + +<p>A more enlightened fallacy, and a more dangerous one, is due to the +supposition that religion can be defined exclusively in terms of some +department of human nature. There have been descriptions of religion in +terms of feeling, intellect, and conduct respectively. But it is always +easy to overthrow such a description, by raising the question of its +application to evidently religious experiences that belong to some other +aspect of life. Religion is not feeling, because there are many +phlegmatic, God-fearing men whose religion consists in good works. +Religion is not conduct, for there are many mystics whose very religion +is withdrawal from the field of action. Religion is not intellection, +for no one has ever been able to formulate a creed that is common to all +religions. Yet without a doubt one must look for the essence of religion +in human nature. The present psychological interest in religion has +emphasized this truth. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58"></a>[<a href="./images/58.png">58</a>]</span>How, then, may we describe it in terms of +certain constant conditions of human life, and yet escape the +abstractness of the facultative method? Modern psychology suggests an +answer in demonstrating the interdependence of knowledge, feeling, and +volition.<a name="FNanchor_58:2_14" id="FNanchor_58:2_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_58:2_14" class="fnanchor">[58:2]</a> The perfect case of this unity is <i>belief</i>. The +believing experience is cognitive in intent, but practical and emotional +as well in content. I believe what I take for granted; and the object of +my belief is not merely known, but also felt and acted upon. <i>What I +believe expresses itself in my total experience.</i></p> + +<p>There is some hope, then, of an adequate definition of the religious +experience, if it be regarded as belonging to the psychological type of +belief.<a name="FNanchor_58:3_15" id="FNanchor_58:3_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_58:3_15" class="fnanchor">[58:3]</a> Belief, however, is a broader category than religion. +There must be some <i>religious type</i> of believing. An account of religion +in terms of believing, and the particular type of it here in question, +would, then, constitute the central stem of a psychology of religion, +and affords the proper conceptions for a description of the religious +experience. Even here the reservation must be made that belief is always +more than the believing <i>state</i>, in that it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59"></a>[<a href="./images/59.png">59</a>]</span>means to be <i>true</i>.<a name="FNanchor_59:4_16" id="FNanchor_59:4_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_59:4_16" class="fnanchor">[59:4]</a> +Hence to complete an account of religion one should consider its object, +or its cognitive implications. But this direct treatment of the relation +between religion and philosophy must be deferred until in the present +chapter we shall have come to appreciate the inwardness of the religious +consciousness. To this end we must permit ourselves to be enlightened by +the experience of religious people as viewed from within. It is not our +opinion of a man's religion that is here in question, but the content +and meaning which it has for him.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I would have you," says Fielding, in his "Hearts of Men," "go +and kneel beside the Mahommedan as he prays at the sunset +hour, and put your heart to his and wait for the echo that +will surely come. . . . I would have you go to the hillman +smearing the stone with butter that his god may be pleased, to +the woman crying to the forest god for her sick child, to the +boy before his monks learning to be good. No matter where you +go, no matter what the faith is called, if you have the +hearing ear, if your heart is in unison with the heart of the +world, you will hear always the same song."<a name="FNanchor_59:5_17" id="FNanchor_59:5_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_59:5_17" class="fnanchor">[59:5]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">Religion as Belief.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_18" id="Section_18">18</a>. The general identification of religion with belief is made without +serious difficulty. The essential factor in belief, is, as we have seen, +the reaction of the whole personality <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60"></a>[<a href="./images/60.png">60</a>]</span>to a fixed object or accepted +situation. A similar principle underlies common judgments about a man's +religion. He is accounted most religious whose religion penetrates his +life most intimately. In the man whose religion consists in the outer +exercise of attendance upon church, we recognize the sham. He <i>appears</i> +to be religious. He does one of the things which a religious man would +do; but an object of religious faith is not the constant environment of +his life. He may or may not feel sure of God from his pew, but God is +not among the things that count in his daily life. God does not enter +into his calculations or determine his scale of values. Again, +discursive thinking is regarded as an interruption of religion. When I +am at pains to justify my religion, I am already doubting; and for +common opinion doubt is identical with irreligion. In so far as I am +religious, my religion stands in no need of justification, even though I +regard it as justifiable. In my religious experience I am taking +something for granted; in other words I act about it and feel about it +in a manner that is going to be determined by the special conditions of +my mood and temperament. The mechanical and prosaic man acknowledges God +in his mechanical and prosaic <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61"></a>[<a href="./images/61.png">61</a>]</span>way. He believes in divine retribution as +he believes in commercial or social retribution. He is as careful to +prepare for the next world as he is to be respectable in this. The poet, +on the other hand, believes in God after the manner of his genius. +Though he worship God in spirit he may conduct his life in an irregular +manner peculiar to himself. Difference of mood in the same individual +may be judged by the same measure. When God is most real to him, brought +home to him most vividly, or consciously obeyed, in these moments he is +most religious. When, on the other hand, God is merely a name to him, +and church a routine, or when both are forgotten in the daily +occupations, he is least religious. His life on the whole is said to be +religious in so far as periods of the second type are subordinated to +periods of the first type. Further well-known elements of belief, +corollaries of the above, are evidently present in religion. A certain +<i>imagery remains constant</i> throughout an individual's experience. He +comes back to it as to a physical object in space. And although religion +is sporadically an exclusive and isolated affair, it tends strongly to +be social. The religious object, or God, is a social object, common to +me and to my neighbor, and presupposed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62"></a>[<a href="./images/62.png">62</a>]</span>in our collective undertakings. +This reduction of religion to the type of the believing state should +thus provide us with an answer to that old and fundamental question +concerning the relative priority of faith and works. The test of the +faith is in the works, and the works are religious in so far as they are +the expression of the faith. Religion is not the doing of anything nor +the feeling of anything nor the thinking of anything, but the reacting +as a whole, in terms of all possible activities of human life, to some +accepted situation.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_19" id="Section_19">19</a>. We may now face the more interesting but difficult question of the +special character of religious belief. In spite of the fact that in +these days the personality of God is often regarded as a transient +feature of religion, that type of belief which throws most light upon +the religious experience is the <i>belief in persons</i>. Our belief in +persons consists in the practical recognition of a more or less +persistent disposition toward ourselves. The outward behavior of our +fellow-men is construed in terms of the practical bearing of the +attitude which it implies. The extraordinary feature of such belief is +the disproportion between its vividness and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63"></a>[<a href="./images/63.png">63</a>]</span>direct evidence for it. +Of this we are most aware in connection with those personalities which +we regard as distinctly friendly or hostile to ourselves. We are always +more or less clearly in the presence of our friends and enemies. Their +well-wishing or their ill-wishing haunts the scene of our living. There +is no more important constituent of what the psychologists call our +"general feeling tone." There are times when we are entirely possessed +by a state that is either exuberance in the presence of those who love +us, or awkwardness and stupidity in the presence of those whom we +believe to suspect and dislike us. The latter state may easily become +chronic. Many men live permanently in the presence of an accusing +audience. The inner life which expresses itself in the words, "Everybody +hates me!" is perhaps the most common form of morbid self-consciousness. +On the other hand, buoyancy of spirits springs largely from a constant +faith in the good-will of one's fellows. In this case one is filled with +a sense of security, and is conscious of a sympathetic reinforcement +that adds to private joys and compensates for private sorrows. And this +sense of attitude is wonderfully discriminating. We can feel the +presence of a "great man," a "formidable person," a superior <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64"></a>[<a href="./images/64.png">64</a>]</span>or +inferior, one who is interested or indifferent to our talk, and all the +subtlest degrees of approval and disapproval.</p> + +<p>A similar sensibility may quicken us even in situations where no direct +individual attitude to ourselves is implied. We regard places and +communities as congenial when we are in sympathy with the prevailing +purposes or standards of value. We may feel ill at ease or thoroughly at +home in cities where we know no single human soul. Indeed, in a +misanthrope like Rousseau (and who has not his Rousseau moods!) the mere +absence of social repression arouses a most intoxicating sense of +tunefulness and security. Nature plays the part of an indulgent parent +who permits all sorts of personal liberties.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The view of a fine country, a succession of agreeable +prospects, a free air, a good appetite, and the health I gain +by walking; the freedom of inns, and the distance from +everything that can make me recollect the dependence of my +situation, conspire to free my soul, and give boldness to my +thoughts, throwing me, in a manner, into the immensity of +things, where I combine, choose, and appropriate them to my +fancy, without restraint or fear. I dispose of all nature as I +please."<a name="FNanchor_64:6_18" id="FNanchor_64:6_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_64:6_18" class="fnanchor">[64:6]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual +Environment, or Universe.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_20" id="Section_20">20</a>. In such confidence or distrust, inspired <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65"></a>[<a href="./images/65.png">65</a>]</span>originally by the social +environment, and similarly suggested by other surroundings of life, we +have the key to the religious consciousness. But it is now time to add +that in the case of religion these attitudes are concerned with the +universal or supernatural rather than with present and normal human +relationships. Religious reactions are "total reactions."</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"To get at them," says William James, "you must go behind the +foreground of existence and reach down to that curious <i>sense +of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence</i>, +intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious, +which in some degree everyone possesses. This <i>sense of the +world's presence</i>, appealing as it does to our peculiar +individual temperament, makes us either strenuous or careless, +devout or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant about life at large; +and our reaction, involuntary and inarticulate and often half +unconscious as it is, is the completest of all our answers to +the question, 'What is the character of this universe in which +we dwell?'"<a name="FNanchor_65:7_19" id="FNanchor_65:7_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_65:7_19" class="fnanchor">[65:7]</a></p></div> + +<p>This <i>residual environment</i>, or profounder realm of tradition and +nature, may have any degree of unity from chaos to cosmos. For religion +its <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66"></a>[<a href="./images/66.png">66</a>]</span>significance lies in the idea of original and far-reaching power +rather than in the idea of totality. But that which is at first only +"beyond," is <i>practically</i> the same object as that which comes in the +development of thought to be conceived as the "world" or the "universe." +We may therefore use these latter terms to indicate the object of +religion, until the treatment of special instances shall define it more +precisely. Religion is, then, <i>man's sense of the disposition of the +universe to himself</i>. We shall expect to find, as in the social +phenomena with which we have just dealt, that the manifestation of this +sense consists in a general reaction appropriate to the disposition so +attributed. He will be fundamentally ill at ease, profoundly confident, +or will habitually take precautions to be safe. The ultimate nature of +the world is here no speculative problem. The savage who could feel some +joy at living in the universe would be more religious than the sublimest +dialectician. It is in the vividness of the sense of this presence that +the acuteness of religion consists. I am religious in so far as the +whole tone and temper of my living reflects a belief as to what the +universe thinks of such as me.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Examples of Religious Belief.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_21" id="Section_21">21</a>. The examples that follow are selected <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67"></a>[<a href="./images/67.png">67</a>]</span>because their differences +in personal flavor serve to throw into relief their common religious +character. Theodore Parker, in describing his own boyhood, writes as +follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I can hardly think without a shudder of the terrible effect +the doctrine of eternal damnation had on me. How many, many +hours have I wept with terror as I lay on my bed, till, +between praying and weeping, sleep gave me repose. But before +I was nine years old this fear went away, and I saw clearer +light in the goodness of God. But for years, say from seven +till ten, I said my prayers with much devotion, I think, and +then continued to repeat, 'Lord, forgive my sins,' till sleep +came on me."<a name="FNanchor_67:8_20" id="FNanchor_67:8_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_67:8_20" class="fnanchor">[67:8]</a></p></div> + +<p>Compare with this Stevenson's Christmas letter to his mother, in which +he says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The whole necessary morality is kindness; and it should +spring, of itself, from the one fundamental doctrine, Faith. +If you are sure that God, in the long run, means kindness by +you, you should be happy; and if happy, surely you should be +kind."<a name="FNanchor_67:9_21" id="FNanchor_67:9_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_67:9_21" class="fnanchor">[67:9]</a></p></div> + +<p>Here is destiny frowning and destiny smiling, but in each case so real, +so present, as to be immediately responded to with helpless terror and +with grateful warm-heartedness.</p> + +<p>The author of the "Imitatio Christi" speaks thus of the daily living of +the Christian:</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68"></a>[<a href="./images/68.png">68</a>]</span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"The life of a Christian who has dedicated himself to the +service of God should abound with eminent virtues of all +kinds, that he may be really the same person which he is by +outward appearance and profession. Indeed, he ought not only +to be the same, but much more, in his inward disposition of +soul; because he professes to serve a God who sees the inward +parts, a searcher of the heart and reins, a God and Father of +spirits: and therefore, since we are always in His sight, we +should be exceedingly careful to avoid all impurity, all that +may give offence to Him whose eyes cannot behold iniquity. We +should, in a word, so far as mortal and frail nature can, +imitate the blessed angels in all manner of holiness, since +we, as well as they, are always in His presence. . . . And good +men have always this notion of the thing. For they depend upon +God for the success of all they do, even of their best and +wisest undertakings."<a name="FNanchor_68:10_22" id="FNanchor_68:10_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_68:10_22" class="fnanchor">[68:10]</a></p></div> + +<p>Such is to be the practical acknowledgment of God in the routine of +life. The more direct response to this presence appears abundantly in +St. Augustine's conversation and reminiscence with God.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"How evil have not my deeds been; or if not my deeds my words; +or if not my words my will? But Thou, O Lord, art good and +merciful, and Thy right hand had respect unto the profoundness +of my death, and removed from the bottom of my heart that +abyss of corruption. And this was the result, that I willed +not to do what I willed, and willed to do what thou +willedst. . . . How sweet did it suddenly become to me to be +without the delights of trifles! And what at one time I +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69"></a>[<a href="./images/69.png">69</a>]</span>feared to lose, it was now a joy to me to put away. For Thou +didst cast them away from me, Thou true and highest sweetness. +Thou didst cast them away, and instead of them didst enter in +Thyself—sweeter than all pleasure, though not to flesh and +blood; brighter than all light, but more veiled than all +mysteries; more exalted than all honor, but not to the exalted +in their own conceits. Now was my soul free from the gnawing +cares of seeking and getting. . . . And I babbled unto Thee my +brightness, my riches, and my health, the Lord my God."<a name="FNanchor_69:11_23" id="FNanchor_69:11_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_69:11_23" class="fnanchor">[69:11]</a></p></div> + +<p>In these two passages we meet with religious conduct and with the +supreme religious experience, the direct worship of God. In each case +the heart of the matter is an individual's indubitable conviction of the +world's favorable concern for him. The deeper order of things +constitutes the real and the profoundly congenial community in which he +lives.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Typical Religious Phenomena: Conversion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_22" id="Section_22">22</a>. Let us now apply this general account of the religious experience +to certain typical religious phenomena: <i>conversion</i>; <i>piety</i>; and +religious <i>instruments</i>, <i>symbolisms</i>, <i>and</i> modes of <i>conveyance</i>. +Although recent study of the phenomenon of <i>conversion</i> has brought to +light a considerable amount of interesting <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70"></a>[<a href="./images/70.png">70</a>]</span>material, there is some +danger of misconceiving its importance. The psychology of conversion is +primarily the psychology of crisis or radical alteration, rather than +the psychology of religion. For the majority of religious men and women +conversion is an insignificant event, and in very many cases it never +occurs at all. Religion is more purely present where it is normal and +monotonous. But this phenomenon is nevertheless highly significant in +that religion and irreligion are placed in close juxtaposition, and the +contribution of religion at its inception thereby emphasized. In general +it is found that conversion takes place during the period of +adolescence. But this is the time of the most sudden expansion of the +environment of life; a time when there is the awakening consciousness of +many a new presence. This is sometimes expressed by saying that it is a +period of acute self-consciousness. Life is conscious of itself as over +against its inheritance; the whole setting of life sweeps into view. +Some solution of the life problem, some coming to terms with the +universe, is the normal issue of it. Religious conversion signifies, +then, that in this fundamental adjustment a man defines and accepts for +his life a certain attitude on the part of the universe. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71"></a>[<a href="./images/71.png">71</a>]</span>examples +cited by the psychologists, as well as the generalizations which they +derive, bear out this interpretation.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"General Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, considers +that the first vital step in saving outcasts consists in +making them feel that some decent human being cares enough for +them to take an interest in the question whether they are to +rise or sink."<a name="FNanchor_71:12_24" id="FNanchor_71:12_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_71:12_24" class="fnanchor">[71:12]</a></p></div> + +<p>The new state is here one of courage and hope stimulated by the glow of +friendly interest. The convert is no longer "out in the cold." He is +told that the world wishes him well, and this is brought home to him +through representations of the tenderness of Christ, and through the +direct ministerings of those who mediate it. But somehow the convert +must be persuaded to realize all this. He must <i>believe</i> it before it +can mean anything to him. He is therefore urged to pray—a proceeding +that is at first ridiculous to him, since it involves taking for granted +what he disbelieves. But therein lies the critical point. It is peculiar +to the object in this case that it can exist only for one who already +believes in it. The psychologists call this the element of +"self-surrender." To be converted a man must somehow suffer his +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72"></a>[<a href="./images/72.png">72</a>]</span>surroundings to put into him a new heart, which may thereupon confirm +its object. Such belief is tremendously tenacious because it so largely +creates its own evidence. Once believe that "God, in the long run, means +kindness by you," and you are likely to stand by it to the end—the more +so in this case because the external evidence either way is to the +average man so insufficient. Such a belief as this is inspired in the +convert, not by reasoning, but by all the powers of suggestion that +personality and social contagion can afford.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Piety.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_23" id="Section_23">23</a>. The psychologists describe <i>piety</i> as a sense of unity. One feels +after reading their accounts that they are too abstract. For there are +many kinds of unity, characteristic of widely varying moods and states. +Any state of rapt attention is a state of unity, and this occurs in the +most secular and humdrum moments of life. Nor does it help matters to +say that in the case of religion this unity must have been preceded by a +state of division; for we cannot properly characterize any state of mind +in terms of another state unless the latter be retained in the former. +And that which is characteristic of the religious sense of unity would +seem to be just such an overcoming of difference. There is a recognition +of two distinct <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73"></a>[<a href="./images/73.png">73</a>]</span>attitudes, which may be more or less in sympathy with +one another, but which are both present even in their fullest harmony. +Were I to be taken out of myself so completely as to forget myself, I +should inevitably lose that sense of sympathy from which arises the +peculiar exultation of religious faith, a heightened experience of the +same type with the freedom and spontaneity that I experience in the +presence of those with whom I feel most in accord. The further graces +and powers of religion readily submit to a similar description. My sense +of positive sympathy expresses itself in an attitude of well-wishing; +living in an atmosphere of kindness I instinctively endeavor to +propagate it. My buoyancy is distinctly of that quality which to a +lesser degree is due to any sense of social security; my power is that +of one who works in an environment that reënforces him. I experience the +objective or even cosmical character of my enterprises. They have a +momentum which makes me their instrument rather than their perpetrator. +A paradoxical relation between religion and morality has always +interested observers of custom and history. Religion is apparently as +capable of the most fiendish malevolence as of the most saintly +gentleness. Fielding writes that,</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74"></a>[<a href="./images/74.png">74</a>]</span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"When religion is brought out or into daily life and used as +a guide or a weapon in the world it has no effect either for +good or evil. Its effect is simply in strengthening the heart, +in blinding the eyes, in deafening the ears. It is an +intensive force, an intoxicant. It doubles or trebles a man's +powers. It is an impulsive force sending him headlong down the +path of emotion, whether that path lead to glory or to infamy. +It is a tremendous stimulant, that is all."<a name="FNanchor_74:13_25" id="FNanchor_74:13_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_74:13_25" class="fnanchor">[74:13]</a></p></div> + +<p>Religion does not originate life purposes or define their meaning, but +stimulates them by the same means that works in all corporate and social +activity. To work with the universe is the most tremendous incentive +that can appeal to the individual will. Hence in highly ethical +religions the power for good exceeds that of any other social and +spiritual agency. Such religion makes present, actual, and real, that +good on the whole which the individual otherwise tends to distinguish +from that which is good for <i>him</i>. In daily life the morally valid and +the practically urgent are commonly arrayed against one another; but the +ethical religion makes the valid urgent.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_24" id="Section_24">24</a>. The <i>instruments</i> of religion are legion, and it is in order here +only to mention certain prominent cases in which their selection would +seem to have direct reference to the provocation and perpetuation of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75"></a>[<a href="./images/75.png">75</a>]</span>such a sense of attitude as we have been describing. This is true in a +general way of all <i>symbolism</i>. There is no essential difference between +the religious symbol and such symbols as serve to remind us of human +relationships. In both cases the perceptual absence of will is +compensated for by the presence of some object associated with that +will. The function of this object is due to its power to revive and +perpetuate a certain special social atmosphere. But the most important +vehicle of religion has always been personality. It is, after all, to +priests, prophets, and believers that religious cults have owed their +long life. The traits that mark the prophet are both curious and +sublime. He is most remarkable for the confidence with which he speaks +for the universe. Whether it be due to lack of a sense of humor or to a +profound conviction of truth, is indifferent to our purpose. The power +of such men is undoubtedly in their suggestion of a force greater than +they, whose designs they bring directly and socially to the attention of +men. The prophet in his prophesying is indeed not altogether +distinguished from God, and it is through the mediation of a directly +perceptible human attitude that a divine attitude gets itself fixed in +the imagination of the believer. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76"></a>[<a href="./images/76.png">76</a>]</span>What is true of the prophet is equally +true of the preacher whose function it is not to represent God in his +own person, but to depict him with his tongue. It is generally +recognized that the preacher is neither a moralizer nor a theologian. +But it is less perfectly understood that it is his function to suggest +the presence of God. His proper language is that of the imagination, and +the picture which he portrays is that of a reciprocal social +relationship between man and the Supreme Master of the situation of +life. He will not define God or prove God, but introduce Him and talk +about Him. And at the same time the association of prayer and worship +with his sermon, and the atmosphere created by the meeting together of a +body of disciples, will act as the confirmation of his suggestions of +such a living presence.</p> + +<p>The <i>conveyance</i> of any single religious cult from generation to +generation affords a signal illustration of the importance in religion +of the recognition of attitude. Religions manage somehow to survive any +amount of transformation of creed and ritual. It is not what is done, or +what is thought, that identifies the faith of the first Christians with +that of the last, but a certain reckoning with the disposition of God. +The successive <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77"></a>[<a href="./images/77.png">77</a>]</span>generations of Christians are introduced into the +spiritual world of their fathers, with its furnishing of hopes and fears +remaining substantially the same; and their Christianity consists in +their continuing to live in it with only a slight and gradual +renovation. To any given individual God is more or less completely +represented by his elders in the faith in their exhortations and +ministerings; and through them he fixes as the centre of his system an +image of God his accuser or redeemer.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_25" id="Section_25">25</a>. The complete verification of this interpretation of the religious +experience would require the application of it to the different +historical cults. In general the examination of such instances is +entirely beyond the scope of this chapter; but a brief consideration may +be given to those which seem to afford reasonable grounds for objection.</p> + +<p>First, it may be said that in <i>primitive religions</i>, notably in +fetichism, tabooism, and totemism, there is no recognition of a cosmical +unity. It is quite evident that there is no conception of a universe. +But it is equally evident that the natural and historical environment in +its generality has a very specific practical significance for the +primitive believer. It is often said with truth that these <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78"></a>[<a href="./images/78.png">78</a>]</span>earliest +religions are more profoundly pantheistic than polytheistic. Man +recognizes an all-pervading interest that is capable of being directed +to himself. The selection of a deity is not due to any special +qualification for deification possessed by the individual object itself, +but to the tacit presumption that, as Thales said, "all things are full +of gods." The disposition of residual reality manifests to the believer +no consistency or unity, but it is nevertheless the most constant object +of his will. He lives in the midst of a capriciousness which he must +appease if he is to establish himself at all.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Buddhism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_26" id="Section_26">26</a>. Secondly, in the case of <i>Buddhism</i> we are said to meet with a +religion that is essentially atheistic.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Whether Buddhas arise, O priests, or whether Buddhas do not +arise, it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary +constitution of being, that all its constituents are +transitory."<a name="FNanchor_78:14_26" id="FNanchor_78:14_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_78:14_26" class="fnanchor">[78:14]</a></p></div> + +<p>The secret of life lies in the application of this truth:</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i1">"O builder! I've discovered thee!<br /></span> +<span class="i0">This fabric thou shalt ne'er rebuild!<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Thy rafters all are broken now,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">And pointed roof demolished lies!<br /></span> +<span class="i0">This mind has demolition reached,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">And seen the last of all desire!"<a name="FNanchor_78:15_27" id="FNanchor_78:15_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_78:15_27" class="fnanchor">[78:15]</a><br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79"></a>[<a href="./images/79.png">79</a>]</span>The case of Buddha himself and of the exponents of his purely esoteric +doctrine, belong to the reflective type which will presently be given +special consideration. But with the ordinary believer, even where an +extraneous but almost inevitable polytheism is least in evidence, the +religious experience consists in substantially the same elements that +appear in theistic religions. The individual is here living +appropriately to the ultimate nature of things, with the ceaseless +periods of time in full view. That which is brought home to him is the +illusoriness and hollowness of things when taken in the spirit of active +endeavor. The only profound and abiding good is nothingness. While +nature and society conspire to mock him, Nirvana invites him to its +peace. The religious course of his life consists in the use of such +means as can win him this end. From the stand-point of the universe he +has the sympathy only of that wisdom whose essence is self-destruction. +And this truth is mediated by the imagination of divine sympathy, for +the Blessed One remains as the perpetual incarnation of his own +blessedness.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Critical Religion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_27" id="Section_27">27</a>. Finally there remains the consideration of the bearing of this +interpretation upon the more <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80"></a>[<a href="./images/80.png">80</a>]</span>refined and disciplined religions. The +religion of the critically enlightened man is less naive and credulous +in its imagery. God tends to vanish into an ideal or a universal, into +some object of theoretical definition. Here we are on that borderland +where an assignment of individual cases can never be made with any +certainty of correctness. We can generalize only by describing the +conditions that such cases must fulfil if they are properly to be +denominated religious. And there can be no question of the justice of +deriving such a description from the reports of historical and +institutional religions. An idealistic philosophy will, then, be a +religion just in so far as it is rendered practically vivid by the +imagination. Such imagination must create and sustain a social +relationship. The question of the legitimacy of this imagination is +another matter. It raises the issue concerning the judgment of truth +implied in religion, and this is the topic of the next chapter. At any +rate the religious experience <i>may be</i> realized by virtue of the +metaphorical or poetical representation of a situation as one of +intercommunication between persons, where reflective definition at the +same time denies it. The human worshipper <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81"></a>[<a href="./images/81.png">81</a>]</span>may supply the personality of +God from himself, viewing himself as from the divine stand-point. But +whatever faculty supplies this indispensable social quality of religion, +he who defines God as the ultimate goodness or the ultimate truth, has +certainly not yet worshipped Him. He begins to be religious only when +such an ideal determines the atmosphere of his daily living; when he +regards the immanence of such an ideal in nature and history as the +object of his will; and when he responds to its presence in the spirit +of his conduct and his contemplation.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54:1_13" id="Footnote_54:1_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54:1_13"><span class="label">[54:1]</span></a> Cf. Caird: <i>The Evolution of Religion</i>, Lectures II, +III.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58:2_14" id="Footnote_58:2_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58:2_14"><span class="label">[58:2]</span></a> Cf. Leuba: <i>Introduction to a Psychological Study of +Religion</i>, <i>Monist</i>, Vol. XI, p. 195.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58:3_15" id="Footnote_58:3_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58:3_15"><span class="label">[58:3]</span></a> Cf. Leuba: <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59:4_16" id="Footnote_59:4_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59:4_16"><span class="label">[59:4]</span></a> Cf. § <a href="#Section_29">29</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59:5_17" id="Footnote_59:5_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59:5_17"><span class="label">[59:5]</span></a> P. 322.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64:6_18" id="Footnote_64:6_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64:6_18"><span class="label">[64:6]</span></a> Rousseau: <i>Confessions</i>, Book IV, p. 125.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65:7_19" id="Footnote_65:7_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65:7_19"><span class="label">[65:7]</span></a> William James: <i>The Varieties of Religious Experience</i>, +p. 35. The italics are mine. I am in the present chapter under constant +obligation to this wonderfully sympathetic and stimulating book.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67:8_20" id="Footnote_67:8_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67:8_20"><span class="label">[67:8]</span></a> Chadwick: <i>Theodore Parker</i>, p. 18.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67:9_21" id="Footnote_67:9_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67:9_21"><span class="label">[67:9]</span></a> Stevenson: <i>Letters</i>, Vol. I, p. 229.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68:10_22" id="Footnote_68:10_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68:10_22"><span class="label">[68:10]</span></a> Thomas à Kempis: <i>Imitation of Christ</i>, Chap. XIX. +Translation by Stanhope, p. 44.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69:11_23" id="Footnote_69:11_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69:11_23"><span class="label">[69:11]</span></a> St. Augustine: <i>Confessions</i>, Book I, Chap. I. +Translation in Schaff: <i>Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers</i>, Vol. I, p. +129.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71:12_24" id="Footnote_71:12_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71:12_24"><span class="label">[71:12]</span></a> James: <i>Varieties of Religious Experience</i>, p. 203.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74:13_25" id="Footnote_74:13_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74:13_25"><span class="label">[74:13]</span></a> Fielding: <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 152.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78:14_26" id="Footnote_78:14_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78:14_26"><span class="label">[78:14]</span></a> Warren: <i>Buddhism in Translations</i>, p. 14.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78:15_27" id="Footnote_78:15_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78:15_27"><span class="label">[78:15]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 83.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82"></a>[<a href="./images/82.png">82</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_IV" id="Chap_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<h3>THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION</h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">Résumé of Psychology of Religion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_28" id="Section_28">28</a>. It has been maintained that religion is closely analogous to one's +belief in the disposition toward one's self of men or communities. In +the case of religion this disposition is attributed to the more or less +vaguely conceived residual environment that is recognized as lying +outside of the more familiar natural and social relations. After the +rise of science this residual environment tends to be conceived as a +unity which is ultimate or fundamental, but for the religious +consciousness it is more commonly regarded as a general source of +influence practically worthy of consideration. Such a belief, like all +belief, is vitally manifested, with such emphasis upon action, feeling, +or intellection as temperament and mood may determine.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Religion Means to be True.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_29" id="Section_29">29</a>. But if the psychology of belief is the proper starting-point for a +description of the religious experience, it is none the less suggestive +of the fact that religion, just <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83"></a>[<a href="./images/83.png">83</a>]</span>because it <i>is</i> belief, is not wholly a +matter for psychology. For religion <i>means to be true</i>, and thus submits +itself to valuation as a case of knowledge. The psychological study of +religion is misleading when accepted as a substitute for philosophical +criticism. The religious man takes his religion not as a narcotic, but +as an enlightenment. Its subjective worth is due at any rate in part to +the supposition of its objective worth. As in any case of insight, that +which warms the heart must have satisfied the mind. The religious +experience purports to be the part of wisdom, and to afford only such +happiness as increasing wisdom would confirm. And the charm of truth +cannot survive its truthfulness. Hence, though religion may be +described, it cannot be justified, from the stand-point of therapeutics. +Were such the case it would be the real problem of religious leaders to +find a drug capable of giving a constantly pleasant tone to their +patient's experience.<a name="FNanchor_83:1_28" id="FNanchor_83:1_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_83:1_28" class="fnanchor">[83:1]</a> There would be no difference between priests +and physicians who make a specialty of nervous diseases, except that the +former would aim at a more fundamental and perpetual <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84"></a>[<a href="./images/84.png">84</a>]</span>suggestion of +serenity. Now no man wants to be even a blessed fool. He does not want +to dwell constantly in a fictitious world, even if it be after his own +heart. He may from the cynical point of view actually do so, but if he +be religious he thinks it is reality, and is satisfied only in so far as +he thinks so. He regards the man who has said in his heart that there is +no God as the fool, and not because he may have to suffer for it, but +because he is cognitively blind to the real nature of things. Piety, on +the other hand, he regards as the standard experience, the most +veracious life. Hence, it is not an accident that religion has had its +creeds and its controversies, its wars with science and its appeals to +philosophy. The history of these affairs shows that religion commonly +fails to understand the scope of its own demand for truth; but they have +issued from the deep conviction that one's religion is, implicitly, at +least, in the field of truth; that there are theoretical judgments whose +truth would justify or contradict it.</p> + +<p>This general fact being admitted, there remains the task to which the +present discussion addresses itself, that of defining the kind of +<i>theoretical judgment</i> implied in religion, and the relation to this +central cognitive stem of its efflorescences of myth, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85"></a>[<a href="./images/85.png">85</a>]</span>theology, and +ritual. It is impossible to separate the stem and the efflorescence, or +to determine the precise spot at which destruction of the tissue would +prove fatal to the plant, but it is possible to obtain some idea of the +relative vitality of the parts.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Religion Means to be Practically True. God is a Disposition +from which Consequences May Rationally be Expected.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_30" id="Section_30">30</a>. The difficulty of reaching a definite statement in this matter is +due to the fact that the truth in which any religious experience centres +is a practical and not a scientific truth. A practical truth does not +commit itself to any single scientific statement, and can often survive +the overthrow of that scientific statement in which at any given time it +has found expression. In other words, an indefinite number of scientific +truths are compatible with a single practical truth. An instance of this +is the consistency with my expectation of the alternation of day and +night, of either the Ptolemaic or Copernican formulation of the solar +system. Now expectation that the sun will rise to-morrow is an excellent +analogue of my religious belief. Celestial mechanics is as relevant to +the one as metaphysics to the other. Neither is overthrown until a +central practical judgment is discredited, and either could remain true +through <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86"></a>[<a href="./images/86.png">86</a>]</span>a very considerable alteration of logical definition; but +neither is on this account exempt from theoretical responsibility. In so +far as religion deliberately enters the field of science, and defines +its formularies with the historical or metaphysical method, this +difficulty does not, of course, exist. Grant that the years of +Methuselah's life, or the precise place and manner of the temptation of +Jesus, or the definition of Christ in the terms of the Athanasian Creed, +are constitutive of Christianity, and the survival of that religion will +be determined by the solution of ordinary problems of historical or +metaphysical research. But the Christian will very properly claim that +his religion is only externally and accidentally related to such +propositions, since they are never or very rarely intended in his +experience. As religious he is occupied with Christ as his saviour or +with God as his protector and judge. The history of Jesus or the +metaphysics of God essentially concern him only in so far as they may or +may not invalidate this relationship. He cares only for the power and +disposition of the divine, and these are affected by history and +metaphysics only in so far as he has definitely put them to such proof.</p> + +<p>For my religion is my sense of a practical situation, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87"></a>[<a href="./images/87.png">87</a>]</span>and only when +that has been proved to be folly has my religion become untrue. My God +is my practical faith, my plan of salvation. My religion is overthrown +if I am convinced that I have misconceived the situation and mistaken +what I should do to be saved. The conception of God is very simple +practically, and very complex theoretically, a fact that confirms its +practical genesis. My conception of God contains <i>an idea of my own +interests</i>, <i>an idea of the disposition of the universe toward my +interests</i>, and <i>some working plan for the reconciliation of these two +terms</i>. These three elements form a practical unity, but each is capable +of emphasis, and a religion may be transformed through the modification +of any one of them. It appears, then, as has always been somewhat +vaguely recognized, that the truth of religion is ethical as well as +metaphysical or scientific. My religion will be altered by a change in +my conception of what constitutes my real interest, a change in my +conception of the fundamental causes of reality, or a change in my +conception of the manner in which my will may or may not affect these +causes. God is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always a relation of +entity to ideal: <i>reality regarded from the stand-point of its +favorableness or unfavorableness <span class='pagenum' style="font-style: normal;"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88"></a>[<a href="./images/88.png">88</a>]</span>to human life, and prescribing for the +latter the propriety of a certain attitude</i>.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Historical Examples of Religious Truth and Error. The +Religion of Baal.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_31" id="Section_31">31</a>. The range of historical examples is limitless, but certain of +these are especially calculated to emphasize the application of a +criterion to religion. Such is the case with Elijah's encounter with the +prophets of Baal, as narrated in the Old Testament.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And Elijah came near unto all the people, and said, How long +halt ye between two opinions? If Yahweh be God, follow him: +but if Baal, then follow him. . . . And call ye on the name of +your god, and I will call on the name of Yahweh: and the God +that answereth by fire, let him be God. . . . And Elijah said +unto the prophets of Baal, Choose you one bullock for +yourselves, and dress it first; for ye are many; and call on +the name of your god, but put no fire under. And they took the +bullock which was given them, and they dressed it, and called +on the name of Baal from morning even until noon, saying, O +Baal, hear us. But there was no voice, nor any that +answered. . . . And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah mocked +them, and said, Cry aloud: for he is a god; either he is +musing, or he is gone aside, or he is in a journey, or +peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked. And they cried +aloud, and cut themselves after their manner with knives and +lances, till the blood gushed out upon them. . . . But there was +neither voice, nor any to answer, nor any that +regarded."<a name="FNanchor_88:2_29" id="FNanchor_88:2_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_88:2_29" class="fnanchor">[88:2]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89"></a>[<a href="./images/89.png">89</a>]</span>The religion of the followers of Baal here consists in a belief in the +practical virtue of a mode of address and form of ritual associated with +the traditions and customs of a certain social group. The prophets of +this cult agree to regard the experiment proposed by Elijah as a crucial +test, and that which is disproved from its failure is a plan of action. +These prophets relied upon the presence of a certain motivity, from +which a definite response could be evoked by an appeal which they were +peculiarly able to make; but though "they prophesied until the time of +the offering of the evening oblation," there was none that regarded.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Greek Religion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_32" id="Section_32">32</a>. An equally familiar and more instructive example is the refutation +of the Greek national religion by Lucretius. The conception of life +which Lucretius finds unwarranted is best depicted in Homer. There we +hear of a society composed of gods and men. Though the gods, on the one +hand, have their own history, their affairs are never sharply sundered +from those of men, who, on the other hand, must constantly reckon with +them, gauge their attitude, and seek their favor by paying tribute to +their individual humors and preferences. In the Ninth Book of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90"></a>[<a href="./images/90.png">90</a>]</span>the +"Iliad," Phœnix addresses himself to the recalcitrant Achilles as +follows:</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i7">"It fits not one that moves<br /></span> +<span class="i0">The hearts of all, to live unmov'd, and succor hates for loves.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">The Gods themselves are flexible; whose virtues, honors, pow'rs,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Are more than thine, yet they will bend their breasts as we bend ours.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Perfumes, benign devotions, savors of offerings burn'd,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">And holy rites, the engines are with which their hearts are turn'd,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">By men that pray to them."<a name="FNanchor_90:3_30" id="FNanchor_90:3_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_90:3_30" class="fnanchor">[90:3]</a><br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>Here is a general recognition of that which makes sacrifice rational. It +is because he conceives this presupposition to be mistaken, that +Lucretius declares the practices and fears which are founded upon it to +be folly. It is the same with all that is practically based upon the +expectation of a life beyond the grave. The correction of the popular +religion is due in his opinion to that true view of the world taught by +Epicurus, whose memory Lucretius thus invokes at the opening of the +Third Book of the "De Rerum Natura":</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Thee, who first wast able amid such thick darkness to raise +on high so bright a beacon and shed a light on the true +interests of life, thee I follow, glory of the Greek race, and +plant now my footsteps firmly fixed in thy imprinted marks. . . . +For soon as thy philosophy <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91"></a>[<a href="./images/91.png">91</a>]</span>issuing from a godlike intellect +has begun with loud voice, to proclaim the nature of things, +the terrors of the mind are dispelled, the walls of the world +part asunder, I see things in operation throughout the whole +void: the divinity of the gods is revealed and their tranquil +abodes which neither winds do shake nor clouds drench with +rains nor snow congealed by sharp frost harms with hoary fall: +an ever cloudless ether o'ercanopies them, and they laugh with +light shed largely round. Nature too supplies all their wants +and nothing ever impairs their peace of mind. But on the other +hand the Acherusian quarters<a name="FNanchor_91:4_31" id="FNanchor_91:4_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_91:4_31" class="fnanchor">[91:4]</a> are nowhere to be seen, +though earth is no bar to all things being descried, which are +in operation underneath our feet throughout the void."<a name="FNanchor_91:5_32" id="FNanchor_91:5_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_91:5_32" class="fnanchor">[91:5]</a></p></div> + +<p>In another passage, after describing the Phrygian worship of Cybele, he +comments as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"All which, well and beautifully as it is set forth and told, +is yet widely removed from true reason. For the nature of gods +must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together +with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our +concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all +dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, +it is neither gained by favors nor moved by anger. . . . The +earth however is at all time without feeling, and because it +receives into it the first-beginnings of many things, it +brings them forth in many ways into the light of the +sun."<a name="FNanchor_91:6_33" id="FNanchor_91:6_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_91:6_33" class="fnanchor">[91:6]</a></p></div> + +<p>If the teaching of Epicurus be true it is evident <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92"></a>[<a href="./images/92.png">92</a>]</span>that those who +offered hecatombs with the idea that they were thereby mitigating anger, +or securing special dispensation, were playing the fool. They were +appealing to a fictitious motivity, one not grounded in "the nature of +things." To one for whom the walls of the world had parted asunder, such +a procedure was no longer possible; though he might choose to "call the +sea Neptune" and reverence the earth as "mother of the gods."<a name="FNanchor_92:7_34" id="FNanchor_92:7_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_92:7_34" class="fnanchor">[92:7]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">Judaism and Christianity.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_33" id="Section_33">33</a>. The history of religion contains no more impressive and dramatic +chapter than that which records the development of the religion of the +Jews. Passing over its obscure beginnings in the primitive Semitic cult, +we find this religion first clearly defined as tribal self-interest +sanctioned by Yahweh.<a name="FNanchor_92:8_35" id="FNanchor_92:8_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_92:8_35" class="fnanchor">[92:8]</a> God's interest <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93"></a>[<a href="./images/93.png">93</a>]</span>in his chosen people +determines the prosperity of him who practices the social virtues.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The name of Yahweh is a strong tower: the righteous runneth +into it, and is safe."</p> + +<p>"He that is steadfast in righteousness shall attain unto +life."</p> + +<p>"To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to Yahweh than +sacrifice."<a name="FNanchor_93:9_36" id="FNanchor_93:9_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_93:9_36" class="fnanchor">[93:9]</a></p></div> + +<p>But in time it is evident to the believer that his experience does not +bear out this expectation. Neither as a Jew nor as a righteous man does +he prosper more than his neighbor. He comes, therefore, to distrust the +virtue of his wisdom.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light +excelleth darkness. The wise man's eyes are in his head, and +the fool walketh in darkness: and yet I perceived that one +event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, As it +happeneth to the fool, so will it happen even to me; and why +was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also +was vanity. For of the wise man, even as of the fool, there is +no remembrance forever; seeing that in the days to come all +will have been already forgotten. And how doth the wise man +die even as the fool! So I hated life; because the work that +is wrought under the sun was grievous unto me: for all is +vanity and a striving after wind."<a name="FNanchor_93:10_37" id="FNanchor_93:10_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_93:10_37" class="fnanchor">[93:10]</a></p></div> + +<p>It is evident that he who expects the favor of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94"></a>[<a href="./images/94.png">94</a>]</span>fortune in return for +his observance of precept is mistaken. The "work that is wrought under +the sun" makes no special provision for him during his lifetime. Unless +the cry of vanity is to be the last word there must be a +reinterpretation of the promise of God. This appears in the new ideal of +patient submission, and the chastened faith that expects only the love +of God. And those whom God loves He will not forsake. They will come to +their own, if not here, then beyond, according to His inscrutable but +unswerving plan.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a +contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."</p> + +<p>"For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth +eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and holy +place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, +to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of +the contrite ones."<a name="FNanchor_94:11_38" id="FNanchor_94:11_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_94:11_38" class="fnanchor">[94:11]</a></p></div> + +<p>In this faith Judaism merges into Christianity.<a name="FNanchor_94:12_39" id="FNanchor_94:12_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_94:12_39" class="fnanchor">[94:12]</a> In the whole +course of this evolution God is regarded as the friend of his people, +but his people learn to find a new significance in his friendship. That +which is altered is the conduct which that friendship requires and the +expectation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95"></a>[<a href="./images/95.png">95</a>]</span>which it determines. The practical ideal which the +relationship sanctions, changes gradually from that of prudence to that +of goodness for its own sake. God, once an instrument relevant to human +temporal welfare, has come to be an object of disinterested service.</p> + +<p>No such transformation as this was absolutely realized during the period +covered by the writings of the Old Testament, nor has it even yet been +realized in the development of Christianity. But the evolution of both +Judaism and Christianity has taken this direction. The criterion of this +evolution is manifestly both ethical and metaphysical. A Christian avows +that he rates purity of character above worldly prosperity, so that the +former cannot properly be prized for the sake of the latter. +Furthermore, he shares more or less unconsciously such philosophical and +scientific opinions as deny truth to the conception of special +interferences and dispensations from a supernatural agency. Therefore he +looks for no fire from heaven to consume his sacrifice. But his religion +is nevertheless a practical expectation. He believes that God is good, +and that God loves him and sustains him. He believes that there obtains +between himself, in so far as good, and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96"></a>[<a href="./images/96.png">96</a>]</span>universe <i>sub specie +eternitatis</i>, a real sympathy and reciprocal reenforcement. He believes +that he secures through the profoundly potent forces of the universe +that which he regards as of most worth; and that somewhat is added to +these forces by virtue of his consecration. The God of the Christians +cannot be defined short of some such account as this, inclusive of an +ideal, an attitude, and an expectation. In other words the God of the +Christians is to be known only in terms of the Christlike outlook upon +life, in which the disciple is taught to emulate the master. When moral +and intellectual development shall have discredited either its scale of +values, or its conviction that cosmical events are in the end determined +in accordance with that scale of values, then Christianity must either +be transformed, or be untenable for the wise man. If we have conceived +the essence of Christianity too broadly or vaguely, it does not much +matter for our present purposes. Its essence is, at any rate, some such +inwardness of life resolving ideality and reality into one, and drawing +upon objective truth only to the extent required for the confirming of +that relation.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Cognitive Factor in Religion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_34" id="Section_34">34</a>. We conclude, then, our attempt to emphasize the cognitive factor +in religion, with the thesis <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97"></a>[<a href="./images/97.png">97</a>]</span>that every religion centres in a practical +secret of the universe. <i>To be religious is to believe that a certain +correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality operative, and +that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a certain type of +living. Whatever demonstrates the futility, vanity, or self-deception of +this living, discredits the religion. And, per contra, except as they +define or refute such practical truth, religion is not essentially +concerned with theoretical judgments.</i></p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Place of Imagination in Religion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_35" id="Section_35">35</a>. But neither religion nor any other human interest consists in +essentials. Such a practical conviction as that which has been defined +inevitably flowers into a marvelous complexity, and taps for its +nourishment every spontaneity of human nature. If it be said that only +the practical conviction is essential, this is not the same as to say +that all else is superfluous. There may be no single utterance that my +religion could not have spared, and yet were I to be altogether dumb my +religion would, indeed, be as nothing. For if I believe, I accept a +presence in my world, which as I live will figure in my dreams, or in my +thoughts, or in my habits. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98"></a>[<a href="./images/98.png">98</a>]</span>And each of these expressions of myself will +have a truth if it do but bear out my practical acceptance of that +presence. The language of religion, like that of daily life, is not the +language of science except it take it upon itself to be so. There is +scarcely a sentence which I utter in my daily intercourse with men which +is not guilty of transgressions against the canons of accurate and +definite thinking. Yet if I deceive neither myself nor another, I am +held to be truthful, even though my language deal with chance and +accident, material purposes and spiritual causes, and though I vow that +the sun smiles or the moon lets down her hair into the sea. Science is a +special interest in the discovery of unequivocal and fixed conceptions, +and employs its terms with an unalterable connotation. But no such +algebra of thought is indispensable to life or conversation, and its +lack is no proof of error. Such is the case also with that eminently +living affair, religion. I may if I choose, and I will if my reasoning +powers be at all awakened, be a theologian. But theology, like science, +is a special intellectual spontaneity. St. Thomas, the master +theologian, did not glide unwittingly from prayer into the <i>quæstiones</i> +of the "Summa Theologiæ," but turned to them as to a fresh adventure. +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99"></a>[<a href="./images/99.png">99</a>]</span>Theology is inevitable, because humanly speaking adventure is +inevitable. For man, with his intellectual spontaneity, every object is +a problem; and did he not seek sooner or later to define salvation, +there would be good reason to believe that he did not practically reckon +with any. But this is <i>similarly</i> and <i>independently</i> true of the +imagination, the most familiar means with which man clothes and vivifies +his convictions, the exuberance with which he plays about them and +delights to confess them. The imagination of religion, contributing what +Matthew Arnold called its "poetry and eloquence," does not submit itself +to such canons as are binding upon theology or science, but exists and +flourishes in its own right.</p> + +<p>The indispensableness to religion of the imagination is due to that +faculty's power of realizing what is not perceptually present. Religion +is not interested in the apparent, but in the secret essence or the +transcendent universal. And yet this interest is a practical one. +Imagination may introduce one into the vivid presence of the secret or +the transcendent. It is evident that the religious imagination here +coincides with poetry. For it is at least one of the interests of poetry +to cultivate and satisfy a sense for the universal; to obtain an +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100"></a>[<a href="./images/100.png">100</a>]</span>immediate experience or appreciation that shall have the vividness +without the particularism of ordinary perception. And where a poet +elects so to view the world, we allow him as a poet the privilege, and +judge him by the standards to which he submits himself. That upon which +we pass judgment is the <i>fitness of his expression</i>. This expression is +not, except in the case of the theoretical mystic, regarded as +constituting the most valid form of the idea, but is appreciated +expressly for its fulfilment of the condition of immediacy. The same +sort of critical attitude is in order with the fruits of the religious +imagination. These may or may not fulfil enough of the requirements of +that art to be properly denominated poetry; but like poetry they are the +translation of ideas into a specific language. They must not, therefore, +be judged as though they claimed to excel in point of validity, but only +in point of consistency with the context of that language. And <i>the +language of religion is the language of the practical life</i>. Such +translation is as essential to an idea that is to enter into the +religious experience, as translation into terms of immediacy is +essential to an idea that is to enter into the appreciative +consciousness of the poet. No object can <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101"></a>[<a href="./images/101.png">101</a>]</span>find a place in my religion +until it is conjoined with my purposes and hopes; until it is taken for +granted and acted upon, like the love of my friends, or the courses of +the stars, or the stretches of the sea.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Special Functions of the Religious Imagination.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_36" id="Section_36">36</a>. The religious imagination, then, is to be understood and justified +as that which brings the objects of religion within the range of living. +The central religious object, as has been seen, is an <i>attitude</i> of the +residuum or totality of things. To be religious one must have a sense +for the <i>presence of an attitude</i>, like his sense for the presence of +his human fellows, with all the added appreciation that is proper in the +case of an object that is unique in its mystery or in its majesty. It +follows that the religious imagination fulfils its function in so far as +it provides the object of religion with properties similar to those +which lend vividness and reality to the normal social relations.</p> + +<p>The presence of one's fellows is in part the perceptual experience of +their bodies. To this there corresponds in religion some extraordinary +or subtle appearance. The gods may in visions or dreams be met with in +their own proper embodiments; or, as is more common, they may be +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102"></a>[<a href="./images/102.png">102</a>]</span>regarded as present for practical purposes: in some inanimate object, +as in the case of the fetish; in some animal species, as in the case of +the totem; in some place, as in the case of the shrine; or even in some +human being, as in the case of the inspired prophet and miracle worker. +In more refined and highly developed religions the medium of God's +presence is less specific. He is perceived with</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i8">"—a sense sublime<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Of something far more deeply interfused,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">And the round ocean and the living air,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">And the blue sky, and in the mind of man."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>God is here found in an interpretation of the common and the natural, +rather than in any individual and peculiar embodiment. And here the +poet's appreciation, if not his art, is peculiarly indispensable.</p> + +<p>But, furthermore, his fellows are inmates of "the household of man" in +that he knows their history. They belong to the temporal context of +actions and events. Similarly, the gods must be historical. The sacred +traditions or books of religion are largely occupied with this history. +The more individual and anthropomorphic the gods, the more local and +episodic will be the account of their affairs. In the higher religions +the acts of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103"></a>[<a href="./images/103.png">103</a>]</span>God are few and momentous, such as creation or special +providence; or they are identical with the events of nature and human +history when these are <i>construed</i> as divine. To find God in this latter +way requires an interpretation of the course of events in terms of some +moral consistency, a faith that sees some purpose in their evident +destination.</p> + +<p>There is still another and a more significant way in which men recognize +one another: the way of address and conversation. And men have +invariably held a similar intercourse with their gods. To this category +belong communion and prayer, with all their varieties of expression. I +have no god until I address him. This will be the most direct evidence +of what is at least from my point of view a social relation. There can +be no general definition of the form which this address will take. There +may be as many special languages, as many attitudes, and as much +playfulness and subtlety of symbolism as in human intercourse. But, on +the other hand, there are certain utterances that are peculiarly +appropriate to religion. In so far as he regards his object as endowed +with both power and goodness the worshipper will use the language of +adoration; and the sense of his dependence <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104"></a>[<a href="./images/104.png">104</a>]</span>will speak in terms of +consecration and thanksgiving.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"O God, thou art my God; early will I seek thee:<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee,<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">In a dry and weary land, where no water is.<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">So have I looked upon thee in the sanctuary,<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">To see thy power and thy glory.<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">For thy loving-kindness is better than life;<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">My lips shall praise thee."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>These are expressions of a hopeful faith; but, on the other hand, God +may be addressed in terms of hatred and distrust.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"Who is most wretched in this dolorous place?<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">I think myself; yet I would rather be<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">My miserable self than He, than He<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Who formed such creatures to his own disgrace.<br /></span> +</div><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"The vilest thing must be less vile than Thou<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">From whom it had its being, God and Lord!<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Creator of all woe and sin! abhorred,<br /></span> +<span class="i0i">Malignant and implacable."<a name="FNanchor_104:13_40" id="FNanchor_104:13_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_104:13_40" class="fnanchor">[104:13]</a><br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>In either case there may be an indefinite degree of hyperbole. The +language of love and hate, of confidence and despair, is not the +language of description. In this train of the religious consciousness +there is occasion for whatever eloquence man can feel, and whatever +rhetorical luxuriance he can utter.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105"></a>[<a href="./images/105.png">105</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Relation between Imagination and Truth in Religion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_37" id="Section_37">37</a>. Such considerations as these serve to account for the exercise and +certain of the fruits of the religious imagination, and to designate the +general criterion governing its propriety. But <i>how is one to determine +the boundary between the imaginative and the cognitive</i>? It is commonly +agreed that what religion says and does is not all intended literally. +But when is expression of religion only poetry and eloquence, and when +is it matter of conviction? If we revert again to the cognitive aspect +of religion, it is evident that there is but one test to apply: +<i>whatever either fortifies or misleads the will is literal conviction</i>. +This test cannot be applied absolutely, because it can properly be +applied only to the intention of an individual experience. However I may +express my religion, that which I express, is, we have seen, an +expectation. The degree to which I literally mean what I say is then the +degree to which it determines my expectations. Whatever adds no item to +these expectations, but only recognizes and vitalizes them, is pure +imagination. But it follows that it is entirely impossible from direct +inspection to define any given <i>expression</i> of religious experience as +myth, or to define the degree to which it is myth. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106"></a>[<a href="./images/106.png">106</a>]</span>It submits to such +distinctions only when viewed from the stand-point of the concrete +religious experience which it expresses. Any such given expression could +easily be all imagination to one, and all conviction to another. +Consider the passage which follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And I saw the heaven opened; and behold, a white horse, and +he that sat thereon, called Faithful and True; and in +righteousness he doth judge and make war. And his eyes are a +flame of fire, and upon his head are many diadems; and he hath +a name written, which no one knoweth but he himself. And he is +arrayed in a garment sprinkled with blood: and his name is +called The Word of God."<a name="FNanchor_106:14_41" id="FNanchor_106:14_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_106:14_41" class="fnanchor">[106:14]</a></p></div> + +<p>Is this all rhapsody, or is it in part true report? There is evidently +no answer to the question so conceived. But if it were to express my own +religious feeling it would have some specific proportion of literal and +metaphorical significance, according to the degree to which its detail +contributes different practical values to me. It might then be my +guide-book to the heavens, or only my testimony to the dignity and +mystery of the function of Christ.</p> + +<p>The development of religion bears in a very important way upon this last +problem. The factor <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107"></a>[<a href="./images/107.png">107</a>]</span>of imagination has undoubtedly come to have a more +clearly recognized role in religion. There can be no doubt that what we +now call myths were once beliefs, and that what we now call poetry was +once history. If we go back sufficiently far we come to a time when the +literal and the metaphorical were scarcely distinguishable, and this +because science had not emerged from the early animistic extension of +social relations. Men <i>meant</i> to address their gods as they addressed +their fellows, and expected them to hear and respond, as they looked for +such reactions within the narrower circle of ordinary intercourse. The +advance of science has brought into vogue a description of nature that +inhibits such expectations. The result has been that men, continuing to +use the same terms, essentially expressive as they are of a practical +relationship, have come to regard them as only a general expression of +their attitude. The differences of content that are in excess of factors +of expectation remain as poetry and myth. On the other hand, it is +equally possible, if not equally common, for that which was once +imagined to come to be believed. Such a transformation is, perhaps, +normally the case when the inspired utterance passes from its author to +the cult. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108"></a>[<a href="./images/108.png">108</a>]</span>prophets and sweet singers are likely to possess an +exuberance of imagination not appreciated by their followers; and for +this reason almost certainly misunderstood. For these reasons it is +manifestly absurd to fasten the name of myth or the name of creed upon +any religious utterance whatsoever, unless it be so regarded from the +stand-point of the personal religion which it originally expressed, or +unless one means by so doing to define it as an expression of his own +religion. He who defines "the myth of creation," or "the poetical story +of Samson," as parts of the pre-Christian Judaic religion, exhibits a +total loss of historical sense. The distinction between cognition and +fancy does not exist among objects, but only in the <i>intending</i> +experience; hence, for me to attach my own distinction to any individual +case of belief, viewed apart from the believer, is an utterly confusing +projection of my own personality into the field of my study.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Religions.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_38" id="Section_38">38</a>. Only after such considerations as these are we qualified to attack +that much-vexed question as to whether religion deals invariably with a +personal god. It is often assumed in discussion of this question that +"personal god," as well as "god," is a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109"></a>[<a href="./images/109.png">109</a>]</span>distinct and familiar kind of +entity, like a dragon or centaur; its existence alone being +problematical. This is doubly false to the religious employment of such +an object. If it be true that in religion we mean by God a practical +interpretation of the world, <i>whatsoever be its nature</i>, then the +personality of God must be a derivative of the attitude, and not of the +nature of the world. Given the practical outlook upon life, there is no +definable world that cannot be construed under the form of God. My god +is my world practically recognized in respect of its fundamental or +ultimate attitude to my ideals. In the sense, then, conveyed by this +term <i>attitude</i> my god will invariably possess the characters of +personality. But the degree to which these characters will coincide with +the characters which I assign to human persons, or the terms of any +logical conception of personality, cannot be absolutely defined. +Anthropomorphisms may be imagination or they may be literal conviction. +This will depend, as above maintained, upon the degree to which they +determine my expectations. Suppose the world to be theoretically +conceived as governed by laws that are indifferent to all human +interests. The practical expression of this conception appears in the +naturalism of Lucretius, or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110"></a>[<a href="./images/110.png">110</a>]</span>Diogenes, or Omar Khayyam. Living in the +vivid presence of an indifferent world, I may picture my gods as leading +their own lives in some remote realm which is inaccessible to my +petitions, or as regarding me with sinister and contemptuous cruelty. In +the latter case I may shrink and cower, or return them contempt for +contempt. I mean this literally only if I look for consequences +following directly from the emotional coloring which I have bestowed +upon them. It may well be that I mean merely to regard myself <i>sub +specie eternitatis</i>, in which case I am <i>personifying</i> in the sense of +free imagination. In the religion of enlightenment the divine attitude +tends to belong to the poetry and eloquence of religion rather than to +its cognitive intent. This is true even of optimistic and idealistic +religion. The love and providence of God are less commonly supposed to +warrant an expectation of special and arbitrary favors, and have come +more and more to mean the play of my own feeling about the general +central conviction of the favorableness of the cosmos to my deeper or +moral concerns. But the factor of personality cannot possibly be +entirely eliminated, for the religious consciousness <i>creates</i> a social +relationship between man and the universe. Such an interpretation of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111"></a>[<a href="./images/111.png">111</a>]</span>life is not a case of the pathetic fallacy, unless it incorrectly +<i>reckons with</i> the inner feeling which it attributes to the universe. It +is an obvious practical truth that the total or residual environment is +significant for life. Grant this and you make rational a recognition of +that significance, or a more or less constant sense of coincidence or +conflict with cosmical forces. Permit this consciousness to stand, and +you make some expression of it inevitable. Such an expression may, +furthermore, with perfect propriety and in fulfilment of human nature, +set forth and transfigure this central belief until it may enter into +the context of immediacy.</p> + +<p>Thus any conception of the universe whatsoever may afford a basis for +religion. But there is no religion that does not virtually make a more +definite claim upon the nature of things, and this entirely +independently of its theology, or explicit attempt to define itself. +Every religion, even in the very living of it, is naturalistic, or +dualistic, or pluralistic, or optimistic, or idealistic, or pessimistic. +And there is in the realm of truth that which justifies or refutes these +definite practical ways of construing the universe. But no historical +religion is ever so vague even as this in its philosophical +implications. Indeed, we shall always <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112"></a>[<a href="./images/112.png">112</a>]</span>be brought eventually to the +inner meaning of some individual religious experience, where no general +criticism can be certainly valid.</p> + +<p>There is, then, a place in religion for that which is not directly +answerable to philosophical or scientific standards. But there is +always, on the other hand, an element of hope which conceives the nature +of the world, and means to be grounded in reality. In respect of that +element, philosophy is indispensable to religion. The meaning of +religion is, in fact, the central problem of philosophy. There is a +virtue in religion like that which Emerson ascribes to poetry. "The poet +is in the right attitude; he is believing; the philosopher, after some +struggle, having only reasons for believing." But whatever may be said +to the disparagement of its dialectic, philosophy is the justification +of religion, and the criticism of religions. To it must be assigned the +task of so refining positive religion as to contribute to the perpetual +establishment of true religion. And to philosophy, with religion, +belongs the task of holding fast to the idea of the universe. There is +no religion except before you begin, or after you have rested from, your +philosophical speculation. But in the universe these interests have a +common object. As <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113"></a>[<a href="./images/113.png">113</a>]</span>philosophy is the articulation and vindication of +religion, so is religion the realization of philosophy. In philosophy +thought is brought up to the elevation of life, and in religion +philosophy, as the sum of wisdom, enters into life.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83:1_28" id="Footnote_83:1_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83:1_28"><span class="label">[83:1]</span></a> As Plato interprets the scepticism of Protagoras to mean +that one state of mind cannot be more <i>true</i> than another, but only +<i>better</i> or worse. Cf. <i>Theætetus</i>, 167.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88:2_29" id="Footnote_88:2_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88:2_29"><span class="label">[88:2]</span></a> Quoted with some omissions from <i>I Kings</i>, 18:21-29. The +Hebrew term <i>Yahweh</i>, the name of the national deity, has been +substituted for the English translation, "the Lord."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_90:3_30" id="Footnote_90:3_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90:3_30"><span class="label">[90:3]</span></a> <i>Iliad</i>, Book IX, lines 467 <i>sq.</i> Translation by +Chapman.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91:4_31" id="Footnote_91:4_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91:4_31"><span class="label">[91:4]</span></a> The supposed abode of departed spirits.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91:5_32" id="Footnote_91:5_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91:5_32"><span class="label">[91:5]</span></a> Lucretius: <i>De Rerum Natura</i>, Book III, lines 1 <i>sq.</i> +Translated by Munro.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91:6_33" id="Footnote_91:6_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91:6_33"><span class="label">[91:6]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Book II, lines 644 <i>sq.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92:7_34" id="Footnote_92:7_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92:7_34"><span class="label">[92:7]</span></a> It would be interesting to compare the equally famous +criticism of Greek religion in Plato's <i>Republic</i>, Book II, 377 <i>sq.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92:8_35" id="Footnote_92:8_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92:8_35"><span class="label">[92:8]</span></a> Cf. W. Robertson Smith's admirable account of the +Semitic religions:</p> + +<p>"What is requisite to religion is a practical acquaintance with the +rules on which the deity acts and on which he expects his worshippers to +frame their conduct—what in II Kings, 17:26 is called the 'manner,' or +rather the 'customary law' (<i>mishpat</i>), of the god of the land. This is +true even of the religion of Israel. When the prophets speak of the +knowledge of God, they always mean a practical knowledge of the laws and +principles of His government in Israel, and a summary expression for +religion as a whole is 'the knowledge and fear of Jehovah,' <i>i. e.</i>, the +knowledge of what Jehovah prescribes, combined with a reverent +obedience." <i>The Religion of the Semites</i>, p. 23.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93:9_36" id="Footnote_93:9_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93:9_36"><span class="label">[93:9]</span></a> <i>Proverbs</i>, 18:10; 11:19; 21:3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93:10_37" id="Footnote_93:10_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93:10_37"><span class="label">[93:10]</span></a> <i>Ecclesiastes</i>, 2:13 <i>sq.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94:11_38" id="Footnote_94:11_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94:11_38"><span class="label">[94:11]</span></a> <i>Psalms</i>, 51:17; <i>Isaiah</i>, 57:15.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94:12_39" id="Footnote_94:12_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94:12_39"><span class="label">[94:12]</span></a> In this discussion of Judaism I am much indebted to +Matthew Arnold's <i>Literature and Dogma</i>, especially Chapters I and II.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_104:13_40" id="Footnote_104:13_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104:13_40"><span class="label">[104:13]</span></a> James Thomson: <i>The City of Dreadful Night</i>. Quoted by +James, in <i>The Will to Believe, etc.</i>, p. 45.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_106:14_41" id="Footnote_106:14_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106:14_41"><span class="label">[106:14]</span></a> <i>Revelation</i>, 19:11-13.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114"></a>[<a href="./images/114.png">114</a>]</span></p> +<h2>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<h3>NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY</h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">The True Relations of Philosophy and Science. Misconceptions +and Antagonisms.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_39" id="Section_39">39</a>. In the case of natural science we meet not only with a special +human interest, but with a theoretical discipline. We are confronted, +therefore, with a new question: that of the relation within the body of +human knowledge of two of its constituent members. Owing to the militant +temper of the representatives of both science and philosophy, this has +long since ceased to be an academic question, and has frequently been +met in the spirit of rivalry and partisanship. But the true order of +knowledge is only temporarily distorted by the brilliant success of a +special type of investigation; and the conquests of science are now so +old a story that critical thought shows a disposition to judge of the +issue with sobriety and logical highmindedness.</p> + +<p>In the seventeenth century a newly emancipated and too sanguine reason +proposed to know the whole of nature at once in terms of mathematics +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115"></a>[<a href="./images/115.png">115</a>]</span>and mechanics. Thus the system of the Englishman Hobbes was science +swelled to world-proportions, simple, compact, conclusive, and +all-comprehensive. Philosophy proposed to do the work of science, but in +its own grand manner. The last twenty years of Hobbes's life, spent in +repeated discomfiture at the hands of Seth Ward, Wallis, Boyle, and +other scientific experts of the new Royal Society, certified +conclusively to the failure of this enterprise, and the experimental +specialist thereupon took exclusive possession of the field of natural +law. But the idealist, on the other hand, reconstructed nature to meet +the demands of philosophical knowledge and religious faith. There +issued, together with little mutual understanding and less sympathy, on +the one hand <i>positivism</i>, or exclusive experimentalism, and on the +other hand a rabid and unsympathetic transcendentalism. Hume, who +consigned to the flames all thought save "abstract reasoning concerning +quantity or number," and "experimental reasoning concerning matter of +fact and existence"; Comte, who assigned metaphysics to an immature +stage in the development of human intelligence; and Tyndall, who reduced +the religious consciousness to an emotional experience of mystery, are +typical of the one <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116"></a>[<a href="./images/116.png">116</a>]</span>attitude. The other is well exhibited in Schelling's +reference to "the blind and thoughtless mode of investigating nature +which has become generally established since the corruption of +philosophy by Bacon, and of physics by Boyle." Dogmatic experimentalism +and dogmatic idealism signify more or less consistently the abstract +isolation of the scientific and philosophical motives.</p> + +<p>There is already a touch of quaintness in both of these attitudes. We of +the present are in the habit of acknowledging the autonomy of science, +and the unimpeachable validity of the results of experimental research +in so far as they are sanctioned by the consensus of experts. But at the +same time we recognize the definiteness of the task of science, and the +validity of such reservations as may be made from a higher critical +point of view. Science is to be transcended in so far as it is +understood as a whole. Philosophy is critically empirical; empirical, +because it regards all <i>bona fide</i> descriptions of experience as +knowledge; critical, because attentive to the conditions of both general +and special knowledge. And in terms of a critical empiricism so defined, +it is one of the problems of philosophy <i>to define and appraise the +generating problem of science</i>, and so to determine the value +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117"></a>[<a href="./images/117.png">117</a>]</span>assignable to natural laws in the whole system of knowledge.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Spheres of Philosophy and Science.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_40" id="Section_40">40</a>. If this be the true function of philosophy with reference to +science, several current notions of the relations of the spheres of +these disciplines may be disproved. In the first place, philosophy will +not be all the sciences regarded as one science. Science tends to unify +without any higher criticism. The various sciences already regard the +one nature as their common object, and the one system of interdependent +laws as their common achievement. The philosopher who tries to be all +science at once fails ignominiously because he tries to replace the work +of a specialist with the work of a dilettante; and if philosophy be +identical with that body of truth accumulated and organized by the +coöperative activity of scientific men, then philosophy is a name and +there is no occasion for the existence of the philosopher as such. +Secondly, philosophy will not be the assembling of the sciences; for +such would be a merely clerical work, and the philosopher would much +better be regarded as non-existent than as a book-keeper. Nor, thirdly, +is philosophy an auxiliary discipline that may be called upon in +emergencies for the solution of some baffling problem <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118"></a>[<a href="./images/118.png">118</a>]</span>of science. A +problem defined by science must be solved in the scientific manner. +Science will accept no aid from the gods when engaged in her own +campaign, but will fight it out according to her own principles of +warfare. And as long as science moves in her own plane, she can +acknowledge no permanent barriers. There is then no need of any +superscientific research that shall replace, or piece together, or +extend the work of science. But the savant is not on this account in +possession of the entire field of knowledge. It is true that he is not +infrequently moved to such a conviction when he takes us about to view +his estates. Together we ascend up into heaven, or make our beds in +sheol, or take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts +of the sea—and look in vain for anything that is not work done, or work +projected, by natural science. Persuade him, however, to <i>define</i> his +estates, and he has circumscribed them. In his definition he must employ +conceptions more fundamental than the working conceptions that he +employs within his field of study. Indeed, in viewing his task as +definite and specific he has undertaken the solution of the problem of +philosophy. The logical self-consciousness has been awakened, and there +is no honorable <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119"></a>[<a href="./images/119.png">119</a>]</span>way of putting it to sleep again. This is precisely +what takes place in any account of the generating problem of science. To +define science is to define at least one realm that is other than +science, the realm of active intellectual endeavor with its own proper +categories. One cannot reflect upon science and assign it an end, and a +method proper to that end, without bringing into the field of knowledge +a broader field of experience than the field proper to science, broader +at any rate by the presence in it of the scientific activity itself.</p> + +<p>Here, then, is the field proper to philosophy. The scientist <i>qua</i> +scientist is intent upon his own determinate enterprise. The philosopher +comes into being as one who is interested in observing what it is that +the scientist is so intently doing. In taking this interest he has +accepted as a field for investigation that which he would designate as +the totality of interests or the inclusive experience. He can carry out +his intention of defining the scientific attitude only by standing +outside it, and determining it by means of nothing less than an +exhaustive searching out of all attitudes. Philosophy is, to be sure, +itself a definite activity and an attitude, but an attitude required by +definition to be conscious of itself, and, if you please, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120"></a>[<a href="./images/120.png">120</a>]</span>conscious of +its own consciousness, until its attitude shall have embraced in its +object the very principle of attitudes. Philosophy defines itself and +all other human tasks and interests. None have furnished a clearer +justification of philosophy than those men of scientific predilections +who have claimed the title of agnostics. A good instance is furnished by +a contemporary physicist, who has chosen to call his reflections +"antimetaphysical."</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Physical science does not pretend to be a <i>complete</i> view of +the world; it simply claims that it is working toward such a +complete view in the future. The highest philosophy of the +scientific investigator is precisely this <i>toleration</i> of an +incomplete conception of the world and the preference for it, +rather than an apparently perfect, but inadequate +conception."<a name="FNanchor_120:1_42" id="FNanchor_120:1_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_120:1_42" class="fnanchor">[120:1]</a></p></div> + +<p>It is apparent that if one were to challenge such a statement, the issue +raised would at once be philosophical and not scientific. The problem +here stated and answered, requires for its solution the widest +inclusiveness of view, and a peculiar interest in critical reflection +and logical coördination.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_41" id="Section_41">41</a>. One may be prepared for a knowledge of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121"></a>[<a href="./images/121.png">121</a>]</span>the economic and social +significance of the railway even if one does not know a throttle from a +piston-rod, provided one has broad and well-balanced knowledge of the +interplay of human social interests. One's proficiency here requires one +to stand off from society, and to obtain a perspective that shall be as +little distorted as possible. The reflection of the philosopher of +science requires a similar quality of perspective. All knowledges, +together with the knowing of them, must be his object yonder, standing +apart in its wholeness and symmetry. Philosophy is the least dogmatic, +the most empirical, of all disciplines, since it is the only +investigation that can permit itself to be forgetful of nothing.</p> + +<p>But the most comprehensive view may be the most distorted and false. The +true order of knowledge is the difficult task of logical analysis, +requiring as its chief essential some determination of the scope of the +working conceptions of the different independent branches of knowledge. +In the case of natural science this would mean an examination of the +method and results characteristic of this field, for the sake of +defining the kind of truth which attaches to the laws which are being +gradually formulated. But one must immediately <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122"></a>[<a href="./images/122.png">122</a>]</span>reach either the one or +the other of two very general conclusions. If the laws of natural +science cover all possible knowledge of reality, then there is left to +philosophy only the logical function of justifying this statement. Logic +and natural science will then constitute the sum of knowledge. If, on +the other hand, it be found that the aim of natural science is such as +to exclude certain aspects of reality, then philosophy will not be +restricted to logical criticism, but will have a cognitive field of its +own. The great majority of philosophers have assumed the latter of these +alternatives to be true, while most aggressive scientists have intended +the former in their somewhat blind attacks upon "metaphysics." Although +the selection of either of these alternatives involves us in the defence +of a specific answer to a philosophical question, the issue is +inevitable in any introduction to philosophy because of its bearing upon +the extent of the field of that study. Furthermore there can be no +better exposition of the meaning of philosophy of science than an +illustration of its exercise. The following, then, is to be regarded as +on the one hand a tentative refutation of <i>positivism</i>, or the <i>claim of +natural science to be coextensive with knowable reality</i>; and on the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123"></a>[<a href="./images/123.png">123</a>]</span>other hand a programme for the procedure of philosophy with reference +to natural science.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Origin of the Scientific Interest.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_42" id="Section_42">42</a>. Science issues through imperceptible stages from organic habits +and instincts which signify the possession by living creatures of a +power to meet the environment on its own terms. Every organism possesses +such a working knowledge of nature, and among men the first science +consists in those habitual adjustments common to men and infra-human +organisms. Man is already practising science before he recognizes it. As +<i>skill</i> it distinguishes itself early in his history from lore, or +untested tradition. Skill is familiarity with general kinds of events, +together with ability to identify an individual with reference to a +kind, and so be prepared for the outcome. Thus man is inwardly prepared +for the alternation of day and night, and the periods of the seasons. He +practically anticipates the procession of natural events in the +countless emergencies of his daily life. But science in the stricter +sense begins when skill becomes <i>free</i> and <i>social</i>.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Skill as Free.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_43" id="Section_43">43</a>. Skill may be said to be <i>free</i> when the essential terms of the +action have been abstracted from the circumstances attending them in +individual <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124"></a>[<a href="./images/124.png">124</a>]</span>experiences, and are retained as ideal plans applicable to +any practical occasion. The monkey who swings with a trapeze from his +perch on the side of the cage, counts upon swinging back again without +any further effort on his own part. His act and its successful issue +signify his practical familiarity with the natural motions of bodies. We +can conceive such a performance to be accompanied by an almost entire +failure to grasp its essentials. It would then be necessary for nearly +the whole situation to be repeated in order to induce in the monkey the +same action and expectation. He would require a similar form, color, and +distance. But he might, on the other hand, regard as practically +identical all suspended and freely swinging bodies capable of affording +him support, and quite independently of their shape, size, time, or +place. In this latter case his skill would be applicable to the widest +possible number of cases that could present themselves. Having a +discerning eye for essentials, he would lose no chance of a swing +through looking for more than the bare necessities. When the physicist +describes the pendulum in terms of a formula such as t = 2π√l/g he exhibits a similar discernment. He has found +that the time occupied by an oscillation of any <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125"></a>[<a href="./images/125.png">125</a>]</span>pendulum may be +calculated exclusively in terms of its length and the acceleration due +to gravity. The monkey's higher proficiency and the formula alike +represent a knowledge that is free in the sense that it is contained in +terms that require no single fixed context in immediacy. The knowledge +is valid wherever these essential terms are present; and calculations +may be based upon these essential terms, while attendant circumstances +vary <i>ad infinitum</i>. Such knowledge is said to be <i>general</i> or +<i>universal</i>.</p> + +<p>There is another element of freedom, however, which so far has not been +attributed to the monkey's knowledge, but which is evidently present in +that of the physicist. The former has a practical ability to deal with a +pendulum when he sees it. The latter, on the other hand, knows about a +pendulum whether one be present or not. His knowledge is so retained as +always to be available, even though it be not always applicable. His +knowledge is not merely skill in treating a situation, but the +possession of resources which he may employ at whatever time, and in +whatever manner, may suit his interests. Knowing what he does about the +pendulum, he may act from the idea of such a contrivance, and with the +aid of it construct <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126"></a>[<a href="./images/126.png">126</a>]</span>some more complex mechanism. His formulas are his +instruments, which he may use on any occasion. Suppose that a situation +with factors <i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, and <i>c</i> requires factor <i>d</i> in order to become +<i>M</i>, as desired. Such a situation might easily be hopeless for an +organism reacting directly to the stimulus <i>abc</i>, and yet be easily met +by a free knowledge of <i>d</i>. One who knows that <i>l</i>, <i>m</i>, and <i>n</i> will +produce <i>d</i>, may by these means provide the missing factor, complete the +sum of required conditions, <i>abcd</i>, and so obtain the end <i>M</i>. Such +indirection might be used to obtain any required factor of the end, or +of any near or remote means to the end. There is, in fact, no limit to +the complexity of action made possible upon this basis; for since it is +available in idea, the whole range of such knowledge may be brought to +bear upon any individual problem.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Skill as Social.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_44" id="Section_44">44</a>. But knowledge of this free type becomes at the same time <i>social</i> +or <i>institutional</i>. It consists no longer in a skilful adaptation of the +individual organism, but in a system of terms common to all +intelligence, and preserved in those books and other monuments which +serve as the articulate memory of the race. A knowledge that is social +must be composed of unequivocal conceptions and fixed symbols. The +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127"></a>[<a href="./images/127.png">127</a>]</span>mathematical laws of the exact sciences represent the most successful +attainment of this end so far as form is concerned. Furthermore, the +amount of knowledge may now be increased from generation to generation +through the service of those who make a vocation of its pursuit. Natural +science is thus a cumulative racial proficiency, which any individual +may bring to bear upon any emergency of his life.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Science for Accommodation and Construction.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_45" id="Section_45">45</a>. Such proficiency as science affords is in every case the +anticipation of experience. This has a twofold value for mankind, that +of <i>accommodation</i>, and that of <i>construction</i>. Primitively, where mere +survival is the function of the organism as a whole, the value of +accommodation is relatively fundamental. The knowledge of what may be +expected enables the organism to save itself by means of its own +counter-arrangement of natural processes. Construction is here for the +sake of accommodation. But with the growth of civilization construction +becomes a positive interest, and man tends to save himself for definite +ends. Accommodation comes to take place for the sake of construction. +Science then supplies the individual with the ways and means wherewith +to execute life purposes which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128"></a>[<a href="./images/128.png">128</a>]</span>themselves tend to assume an absolute +value that cannot be justified merely on the ground of science.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Method and Fundamental Conceptions of Natural Science. The +Descriptive Method.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_46" id="Section_46">46</a>. If natural science be animated by any special cognitive interest, +this motive should appear in the development of its method and +fundamental conceptions. If that interest has been truly defined, it +should now enable us to understand the progressive and permanent in +scientific investigation as directly related to it. For the aim of any +discipline exercises a gradual selection from among possible methods, +and gives to its laws their determinate and final form.</p> + +<p>The <i>descriptive method</i> is at the present day fully established. A +leading moral of the history of science is the superior usefulness of an +exact account of the workings of nature to an explanation in terms of +some qualitative potency. Explanation has been postponed by enlightened +science until after a more careful observation of actual processes shall +have been made; and at length it has been admitted that there is no need +of any explanation but perfect description. Now the practical use of +science defined above, requires no knowledge beyond the actual order of +events. For such a purpose sufficient reason signifies only sufficient +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129"></a>[<a href="./images/129.png">129</a>]</span>conditions. All other considerations are irrelevant, and it is proper +to ignore them. Such has actually been the fate of the so-called +metaphysical solution of special problems of nature. The case of Kepler +is the classic instance. This great scientist supplemented his laws of +planetary motion with the following speculation concerning the agencies +at work:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"We must suppose one of two things: either that the moving +spirits, in proportion as they are more removed from the sun, +are more feeble; or that there is one moving spirit in the +centre of all the orbits, namely, in the sun, which urges each +body the more vehemently in proportion as it is nearer; but in +more distant spaces languishes in consequence of the +remoteness and attenuation of its virtue."<a name="FNanchor_129:2_43" id="FNanchor_129:2_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_129:2_43" class="fnanchor">[129:2]</a></p></div> + +<p>The following passage from Hegel affords an interesting analogy:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The moon is the waterless crystal which seeks to complete +itself by means of our sea, to quench the thirst of its arid +rigidity, and therefore produces ebb and flow."<a name="FNanchor_129:3_44" id="FNanchor_129:3_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_129:3_44" class="fnanchor">[129:3]</a></p></div> + +<p>No scientist has ever sought to refute either of these theories. They +have merely been neglected.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130"></a>[<a href="./images/130.png">130</a>]</span>They were advanced in obedience to a demand for the ultimate +explanation of the phenomena in question, and were obtained by applying +such general conceptions as were most satisfying to the reasons of their +respective authors. But they contributed nothing whatsoever to a +practical familiarity with the natural course of events, in this case +the times and places of the planets and the tides. Hence they have not +been used in the building of science. In our own day investigators have +become conscious of their motive, and do not wait for historical +selection to exclude powers and reasons from their province. They +deliberately seek to formulate exact descriptions. To this end they +employ symbols that shall serve to identify the terms of nature, and +formulas that shall define their systematic relationship. These systems +must be exact, or deductions cannot be made from them. Hence they tend +ultimately to assume a mathematical form of expression.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Space, Time, and Prediction.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_47" id="Section_47">47</a>. But science tends to employ for these systems only such +conceptions as relate to <i>prediction</i>; and of these the most fundamental +are <i>space</i> and <i>time</i>. The first science to establish its method was +the science of astronomy, where measurement and computation in terms of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131"></a>[<a href="./images/131.png">131</a>]</span>space and time were the most obvious means of description; and the +general application of the method of astronomy by Galileo and Newton, or +the development of mechanics, is the most important factor in the +establishment of modern science upon a permanent working basis. The +persistence of the term <i>cause</i>, testifies to the fact that science is +primarily concerned with the determination of <i>events</i>. Its definitions +of objects are means of identification, while its laws are dynamical, +<i>i. e.</i>, have reference to the conditions under which these objects +arise. Thus the chemist may know less about the properties of water than +the poet; but he is preëminently skilled in its production from +elements, and understands similarly the compounds into which it may +enter. Now the general conditions of all anticipation, whereby it +becomes exact and verifiable, are spacial and temporal. A predictable +event must be assigned to what is here now, or there now; or what is +here then, or there then. An experimentally verifiable system must +contain space-time variables, for which can be substituted the here and +now of the experimenter's immediate experience. Hence science deals +primarily with calculable places and moments. The mechanical theory of +nature owes its <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132"></a>[<a href="./images/132.png">132</a>]</span>success to a union of space and time through its +conceptions of <i>matter</i> and <i>motion</i>.<a name="FNanchor_132:4_45" id="FNanchor_132:4_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_132:4_45" class="fnanchor">[132:4]</a> And the projected theory of +energetics must satisfy the same conditions.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Quantitative Method.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_48" id="Section_48">48</a>. But, furthermore, science has, as we have seen, an interest in +freeing its descriptions from the peculiar angle and relativity of an +individual's experience, for the sake of affording him knowledge of that +with which he must meet. Science enlightens the will by acquainting it +with that which takes place in spite of it, and for which it must hold +itself in readiness. To this end the individual benefits himself in so +far as he eliminates himself from the objects which he investigates. His +knowledge is useful in so far as it is valid for his own indefinitely +varying stand-points, and those of other wills recognized by him in his +practical relations. But in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133"></a>[<a href="./images/133.png">133</a>]</span>attempting to describe objects in terms +other than those of a specific experience, science is compelled to +describe them in terms of one another. For this purpose <i>the +quantitative method</i> is peculiarly serviceable. With its aid objects +permit themselves to be described as multiples of one another, and as +occupying positions in relation to one another. When all objects are +described strictly in terms of one another, they are expressed in terms +of arbitrary units, and located in terms of arbitrary spacial or +temporal axes of reference. Thus there arises the universe of the +scientific imagination, a vast complexity of material displacements and +transformations, without color, music, pleasure, or any of all that rich +variety of qualities that the least of human experiences contains. It +does not completely rationalize or even completely describe such +experiences, but formulates their succession. To this end they are +reduced to terms that correspond to no specific experience, and for this +very reason may be translated again into all definable hypothetical +experiences. The solar system for astronomy is not a bird's-eye view of +elliptical orbits, with the planets and satellites in definite phases. +Nor is it this group of objects from any such point of view, or from any +number <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134"></a>[<a href="./images/134.png">134</a>]</span>of such points of view; but a formulation of their motions that +will serve as the key to an infinite number of their appearances. Or, +consider the picture of the ichthysauria romping in the mesozoic sea, +that commonly accompanies a text-book of geology. Any such picture, and +all such pictures, with their coloring and their temporal and spacial +perspective, are imaginary. No such special and exclusive manifolds can +be defined as having been then and there realized. But we have a +geological knowledge of this period, that fulfils the formal demands of +natural science, in so far as we can construct this and countless other +specific experiences with reference to it.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The General Development of Science.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_49" id="Section_49">49</a>. Science, then, is to be understood as springing from the practical +necessity of anticipating the environment. This anticipation appears +first as congenital or acquired reactions on the part of the organism. +Such reactions imply a fixed coördination or system in the environment +whereby a given circumstance determines other circumstances; and science +proper arises as the formulation of such systems. The requirement that +they shall apply to the phenomena that <i>confront</i> the will, determines +their spacial, temporal, and quantitative form. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135"></a>[<a href="./images/135.png">135</a>]</span>progress of science +is marked by the growth of these conceptions in the direction of +comprehensiveness on the one hand, and of refinement and delicacy on the +other. Man lives in an environment that is growing at the same time +richer and more extended, but with a compensatory simplification in the +ever closer systematization of scientific conceptions under the form of +the order of nature.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Determination of the Limits of Natural Science.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_50" id="Section_50">50</a>. At the opening of this chapter it was maintained that it is a +function of philosophy to criticise science through its generating +problem, or its self-imposed task viewed as determining its province and +selecting its categories. The above account of the origin and method of +science must suffice as a definition of its generating problem, and +afford the basis of our answer to the question of its limits. Enough has +been said to make it clear that philosophy is not in the field of +science, and is therefore not entitled to contest its result in detail +or even to take sides within the province of its special problems. +Furthermore, philosophy should not aim to restrain science by the +imposition of external barriers. Whatever may be said of the sufficiency +of its categories in any region of the world, that body <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136"></a>[<a href="./images/136.png">136</a>]</span>of truth of +which mathematics, mechanics, and physics are the foundations, must be +regarded as a whole that tends to be all-comprehensive in its own terms. +There remains for philosophy, then, the critical examination of these +terms, and the appraisal as a whole of the truth that they may express.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Natural Science is Abstract.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_51" id="Section_51">51</a>. The impossibility of embracing the whole of knowledge within +natural science is due to the fact that the latter is <i>abstract</i>. This +follows from the fact that natural science is governed by a selective +interest. The formulation of definitions and laws in exclusively +mechanical terms is not due to the exhaustive or even preëminent reality +of these properties, but to their peculiar serviceableness in a +verifiable description of events. Natural science does not affirm that +reality is essentially constituted of matter, or essentially +characterized by motion; but is <i>interested</i> in the mechanical aspect of +reality, and describes it quite regardless of other evident aspects and +without meaning to prejudice them. It is unfortunately true that the +scientist has rarely been clear in his own mind on this point. It is +only recently that he has partially freed himself from the habit of +construing his terms as final and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137"></a>[<a href="./images/137.png">137</a>]</span>exhaustive.<a name="FNanchor_137:5_46" id="FNanchor_137:5_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_137:5_46" class="fnanchor">[137:5]</a> This he was able +to do even to his own satisfaction, only by allowing loose rein to the +imagination. Consider the example of the atomic theory. In order to +describe such occurrences as chemical combination, or changes in volume +and density, the scientist has employed as a unit the least particle, +physically indivisible and qualitatively homogeneous. Look for the atom +in the body of science, and you will find it in physical laws governing +expansion and contraction, and in chemical formulas. There the real +responsibility of science ends. But whether through the need of popular +exposition, or the undisciplined imagination of the investigator +himself, atoms have figured in the history of thought as round +corpuscles of a grayish hue scurrying hither and thither, and armed with +special appliances wherewith to lock in molecular embrace. Although this +is nonsense, we need not on that account conclude that there <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138"></a>[<a href="./images/138.png">138</a>]</span>are no +atoms. There are atoms in precisely the sense intended by scientific +law, in that the formulas computed with the aid of this concept are true +of certain natural processes. The conception of ether furnishes a +similar case. Science is not responsible for the notion of a quivering +gelatinous substance pervading space, but only for certain laws that, +<i>e. g.</i>, describe the velocity of light in terms of the vibration. It is +true that there is such a thing as ether, not as gratuitously rounded +out by the imagination, with various attributes of immediate experience, +but just in so far as this concept is employed in verified descriptions +of radiation, magnetism, or electricity. Strictly speaking science +asserts nothing about the existence of ether, but only about the +behavior, <i>e. g.</i>, of light. If true descriptions of this and other +phenomena are reached by employing units of wave propagation in an +elastic medium, then ether is proved to exist in precisely the same +sense that linear feet are proved to exist, if it be admitted that there +are 90,000,000 × 5,280 of them between the earth and the sun. And to +imagine in the one case a jelly with all the qualities of texture, +color, and the like, that an individual object of sense would possess, +is much the same as in the other to imagine <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139"></a>[<a href="./images/139.png">139</a>]</span>the heavens filled with +foot-rules and tape-measures. There is but one safe procedure in dealing +with scientific concepts: to regard them as true so far as they +describe, and no whit further. To supplement the strict meaning which +has been verified and is contained in the formularies of science, with +such vague predicates as will suffice to make entities of them, is mere +ineptness and confusion of thought. And it is only such a +supplementation that obscures their abstractness. For a mechanical +description of things, true as it doubtless is, is even more indubitably +incomplete.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_52" id="Section_52">52</a>. But though the abstractness involved in scientific description is +open and deliberate, we must come to a more precise understanding of it, +if we are to draw any conclusion as to what it involves. In his +"Principles of Human Knowledge," the English philosopher Bishop Berkeley +raises the question as to the universal validity of mathematical +demonstrations. If we prove from the image or figure of an isosceles +right triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles, +how can we know that this proposition holds of all triangles?</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view +whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140"></a>[<a href="./images/140.png">140</a>]</span>that of an +isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a +determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends +to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness +soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the +equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all +concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have +in view includes all these particulars; but then there is not +the least mention made of them in the proof of the +proposition."<a name="FNanchor_140:6_47" id="FNanchor_140:6_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_140:6_47" class="fnanchor">[140:6]</a></p></div> + +<p>Of the total conditions present in the concrete picture of a triangle, +one may in one's calculations neglect as many as one sees fit, and work +with the remainder. Then, if one has clearly distinguished the +conditions used, one may confidently assert that whatever has been found +true of them holds regardless of the neglected conditions. These may be +missing or replaced by others, provided the selected or (for any given +investigation) essential conditions are not affected. That which is true +once is true always, provided time is not one of its conditions; that +which is true in one place is true everywhere, provided location is not +one of its conditions. But, given any concrete situation, the more +numerous the conditions one ignores in one's calculations, the less +adequate are one's calculations to that situation. The number of its +inhabitants, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141"></a>[<a href="./images/141.png">141</a>]</span>and any mathematical operation made with that number, is +true, but only very abstractly true of a nation. A similar though less +radical abstractness appertains to natural science. Simple qualities of +sound or color, and distinctions of beauty or moral worth, together with +many other ingredients of actual experience attributed therein to the +objects of nature, are ignored in the mechanical scheme. There is a +substitution of certain mechanical arrangements in the case of the first +group of properties, the simple qualities of sense, so that they may be +assimilated to the general scheme of events, and their occurrence +predicted. But their intrinsic qualitative character is not reckoned +with, even in psychology, where the physiological method finally +replaces them with brain states. Over and above these neglected +properties of things there remain the purposive activities of thought. +It is equally preposterous to deny them and to describe them in +mechanical terms. It is plain, then, that natural science calculates +upon the basis of only a fraction of the conditions that present +themselves in actual experience. Its conclusions, therefore, though true +so far as they go, and they may be abstractly true of everything, are +completely true of nothing.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142"></a>[<a href="./images/142.png">142</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_53" id="Section_53">53</a>. Such, in brief, is the general charge of inadequacy which may be +urged against natural science, not in the spirit of detraction, but for +the sake of a more sound belief concerning reality. The philosopher +falls into error no less radical than that of the dogmatic scientist, +when he charges the scientist with untruth, and attaches to his concepts +the predicate of unreality. The fact that the concepts of science are +selected, and only inadequately true of reality, should not be taken to +mean that they are sportive or arbitrary. They are not "devices" or +abbreviations, in any sense that does not attach to such symbolism as +all thought involves. Nor are they merely "hypothetical," though like +all thought they are subject to correction.<a name="FNanchor_142:7_48" id="FNanchor_142:7_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_142:7_48" class="fnanchor">[142:7]</a> The scientist does +not merely assert that the equation for energy is true if nature's +capacity for work be measurable, but <i>that such is actually the case</i>. +The statistician does not arrive at results contingent upon the +supposition that men are numerable, but declares his sums and averages +to be categorically true. Similarly scientific laws are true; only, to +be sure, so <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143"></a>[<a href="./images/143.png">143</a>]</span>far as they go, but with no condition save the condition +that attaches to all knowledge, viz., that it shall not need correction. +The philosophy of science, therefore, is not the adversary of science, +but supervenes upon science in the interests of the ideal of final +truth. No philosophy of science is sound which does not primarily seek +by an analysis of scientific concepts to understand science on its own +grounds. Philosophy may understand science better than science +understands itself, but only by holding fast to the conviction of its +truth, and including it within whatever account of reality it may be +able to formulate.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_54" id="Section_54">54</a>. Though philosophy be the most ancient and most exalted of human +disciplines, it is not infrequently charged with being the most +unprofitable. Science has amassed a fortune of information, which has +facilitated life and advanced civilization. Is not philosophy, on the +other hand, all programme and idle questioning? In the first place, no +questioning is idle that is logically possible. It is true that +philosophy shows her skill rather in the asking than in the answering of +questions. But the formal pertinence of a question is of the greatest +significance. No valid though unanswered question <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144"></a>[<a href="./images/144.png">144</a>]</span>can have a purely +negative value, and especially as respects the consistency or +completeness of truth. But, in the second place, philosophy with all its +limitations serves mankind as indispensably as science. If science +supplies the individual with means of self-preservation, and the +instruments of achievement, philosophy supplies the ideals, or the +objects of deliberate construction. Such reflection as justifies the +adoption of a fundamental life purpose is always philosophical. For +every judgment respecting final worth is a judgment <i>sub specie +eternitatis</i>. And the urgency of life requires the individual to pass +such judgments. It is true that however persistently reflective he may +be in the matter, his conclusion will be premature in consideration of +the amount of evidence logically demanded for such a judgment. But he +must be as wise as he can, or he will be as foolish as conventionality +and blind impulse may impel him to be. Philosophy determines for society +what every individual must practically determine upon for himself, the +most reasonable plan of reality as a whole which the data and reflection +of an epoch can afford. It is philosophy's service to mankind to +compensate for the enthusiasm and concentration of the specialist, a +service needed in every "present <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145"></a>[<a href="./images/145.png">145</a>]</span>day." Apart from the philosopher, +public opinion is the victim of sensationalism, and individual opinion +is further warped by accidental propinquity. It is the function of +philosophy to interpret knowledge for the sake of a sober and wise +belief. The philosopher is the true prophet, appearing before men in +behalf of that which is finally the truth. He is the spokesman of the +most considerate and comprehensive reflection possible at any stage in +the development of human thought. Owing to a radical misconception of +function, the man of science has in these later days begun to regard +himself as the wise man, and to teach the people. Popular materialism is +the logical outcome of this determination of belief by natural science. +It may be that this is due as much to the indifference of the +philosopher as to the forwardness of the scientist, but in any case the +result is worse than conservative loyalty to religious tradition. For +religion is corrected surely though slowly by the whole order of +advancing truth. Its very inflexibility makes it proof against an +over-emphasis upon new truth. It has generally turned out in time that +the obstinate man of religion was more nearly right than the adaptable +intellectual man of fashion. But <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146"></a>[<a href="./images/146.png">146</a>]</span>philosophy, as a critique of science +for the sake of faith, should provide the individual religious believer +with intellectual enlightenment and gentleness. The quality, +orderliness, and inclusiveness of knowledge, finally determine its +value; and the philosopher, premature as his synthesis may some day +prove to be, is the wisest man of his own generation. From him the man +of faith should obtain such discipline of judgment as shall enable him +to be fearless of advancing knowledge, because acquainted with its +scope, and so intellectually candid with all his visions and his +inspirations.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_120:1_42" id="Footnote_120:1_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120:1_42"><span class="label">[120:1]</span></a> Ernst Mach: <i>Science of Mechanics</i>. Translation by +McCormack, p. 464. No one has made more important contributions than +Professor Mach to a certain definite modern philosophical movement. Cf. +§ <a href="#Section_207">207</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_129:2_43" id="Footnote_129:2_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129:2_43"><span class="label">[129:2]</span></a> Whewell: <i>History of the Inductive Sciences</i>, Vol. I, +p. 289. Quoted from Kepler: <i>Mysterium Cosmographicum</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_129:3_44" id="Footnote_129:3_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129:3_44"><span class="label">[129:3]</span></a> Quoted by Sidgwick in his <i>Philosophy, its Scope and +Relations</i>, p. 89.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_132:4_45" id="Footnote_132:4_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132:4_45"><span class="label">[132:4]</span></a> The reader is referred to Mr. Bertrand Russell's +chapters on <i>matter</i> and <i>motion</i> in his <i>Principles of Mathematics</i>, +Vol. I. Material particles he defines as "many-one relations of all +times to some places, or of all terms of a continuous one-dimensional +series <i>t</i> to some terms of a continuous three-dimensional series <i>s</i>." +Similarly, "when different times, throughout any period however short, +are correlated with different places, there is motion; when different +times, throughout some period however short, are all correlated with the +same place, there is rest." <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 473.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_137:5_46" id="Footnote_137:5_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137:5_46"><span class="label">[137:5]</span></a> That the scientist still permits himself to teach the +people a loose exoteric theory of reality, is proven by Professor Ward's +citation of instances in his <i>Naturalism and Agnosticism</i>. So eminent a +physicist as Lord Kelvin is quoted as follows: "You can imagine +particles of something, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This +thing we call the luminiferous ether. That is the only substance we are +confident of in dynamics. One thing we are sure of, and that is the +reality and substantiality of the luminiferous ether." Vol. I, p. 113.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_140:6_47" id="Footnote_140:6_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140:6_47"><span class="label">[140:6]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Principles of Human Knowledge</i>, +Introduction. Edition of Fraser, p. 248.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_142:7_48" id="Footnote_142:7_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142:7_48"><span class="label">[142:7]</span></a> The reader who cares to pursue this topic further is +referred to the writer's discussion of "<i>Professor Ward's Philosophy of +Science</i>" in the <i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific +Methods</i>, Vol. I, No. 13.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147"></a>[<a href="./images/147.png">147</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="PART_II" id="PART_II"></a>PART II</h2> + +<h3>THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF<br /> +PHILOSOPHY</h3> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148"></a>[<a href="./images/148.png">148</a>]</span></p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149"></a>[<a href="./images/149.png">149</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_VI" id="Chap_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<h3>METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY</h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem of +Philosophy.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_55" id="Section_55">55</a>. The stand-point and purpose of the philosopher define his task, +but they do not necessarily prearrange the division of it. That the task +is a complex one, embracing many subordinate problems which must be +treated <i>seriatim</i>, is attested both by the breadth of its scope and the +variety of the interests from which it may be approached. But this +complexity is qualified by the peculiar importance which here attaches +to unity. That which lends philosophical quality to any reflection is a +steadfast adherence to the ideals of inclusiveness and consistency. +Hence, though the philosopher must of necessity occupy himself with +subordinate problems, these cannot be completely isolated from one +another, and solved successively. Perspective is his most indispensable +requisite, and he has solved no problem finally until he has provided +for the solution of all. His own peculiar conceptions are <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150"></a>[<a href="./images/150.png">150</a>]</span>those which +<i>order</i> experience, and reconcile such aspects of it as other interests +have distinguished. Hence the compatibility of any idea with all other +ideas is the prime test of its philosophical sufficiency. On these +grounds it may confidently be asserted that the work of philosophy +cannot be assigned by the piece to different specialists, and then +assembled. There are no special philosophical problems which can be +finally solved upon their own merits. Indeed, such problems could never +even be named, for in their discreteness they would cease to be +philosophical.</p> + +<p>The case of <i>metaphysics</i> and <i>epistemology</i> affords an excellent +illustration. The former of these is commonly defined as the theory of +reality or of first principles, the latter as the theory of knowledge. +But the most distinctive philosophical movement of the nineteenth +century issues from the idea that knowing and being are +identical.<a name="FNanchor_150:1_49" id="FNanchor_150:1_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_150:1_49" class="fnanchor">[150:1]</a> The prime reality is defined as a knowing mind, and +the terms of reality are interpreted as terms of a cognitive process. +Ideas and logical principles <i>constitute</i> the world. It is evident that +in this Hegelian philosophy epistemology embraces <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151"></a>[<a href="./images/151.png">151</a>]</span>metaphysics. In +defining the relations of knowledge to its object, one has already +defined one's fundamental philosophical conception, while <i>logic</i>, as +the science of the universal necessities of thought, will embrace the +first principles of reality. Now, were one to divide and arrange the +problems of philosophy upon this basis, it is evident that one would not +have deduced the arrangement from the general problem of philosophy, but +from a single attempted solution of that problem. It might serve as an +exposition of Hegel, but not as a general philosophical programme.</p> + +<p>Another case in point is provided by the present-day interest in what is +called "<i>pragmatism</i>."<a name="FNanchor_151:2_50" id="FNanchor_151:2_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_151:2_50" class="fnanchor">[151:2]</a> This doctrine is historically connected +with Kant's principle of the "primacy of the practical reason," in which +he maintained that the consciousness of duty is a profounder though less +scientific insight than the knowledge of objects. The current doctrine +maintains that thought with its fruits is an expression of interest, and +that the will which evinces and realizes such an interest is more +original and significant than that which the thinking defines. Such a +view attaches a peculiar importance to the springs of conduct, and in +its more <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152"></a>[<a href="./images/152.png">152</a>]</span>systematic development<a name="FNanchor_152:3_51" id="FNanchor_152:3_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_152:3_51" class="fnanchor">[152:3]</a> has regarded <i>ethics</i> as the +true propædeutic and proof of philosophy. But to make ethics the +key-stone of the arch, is to define a special philosophical system; for +it is the very problem of philosophy to dispose the parts of knowledge +with a view to systematic construction. The relation of the provinces of +metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics cannot, then, be defined +without entering these provinces and answering the questions proper to +them.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon +the Initial Interest.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_56" id="Section_56">56</a>. Since the above terms exist, however, there can be no doubt but +that important divisions within the general aim of philosophy have +actually been made. The inevitableness of it appears in the variety of +the sources from which that aim may spring. The point of departure will +always determine the emphasis and the application which the philosophy +receives. If philosophy be needed to supplement more special interests, +it will receive a particular character from whatever interest it so +supplements. He who approaches it from a definite stand-point will find +in it primarily an interpretation of that stand-point.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_57" id="Section_57">57</a>. There are two sources of the philosophical <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153"></a>[<a href="./images/153.png">153</a>]</span>aim, which are +perennial in their human significance. He, firstly, who begins with the +demands of life and its ideals, looks to philosophy for a reconciliation +of these with the orderly procedure of nature. His philosophy will +receive its form from its illumination of life, and it will be an +ethical or religious philosophy. Spinoza, the great seventeenth-century +philosopher who justified mysticism after the manner of +mathematics,<a name="FNanchor_153:4_52" id="FNanchor_153:4_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_153:4_52" class="fnanchor">[153:4]</a> displays this temper in his philosophy:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"After experience had taught me that all the usual +surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that +none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves +anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is +affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there +might be some real good having power to communicate itself, +which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all +else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the +discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, +supreme, and unending happiness."<a name="FNanchor_153:5_53" id="FNanchor_153:5_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_153:5_53" class="fnanchor">[153:5]</a></p></div> + +<p>In pursuance of this aim, though he deals with the problem of being in +the rigorous logical fashion of his day, the final words of his great +work are, "Of Human Freedom":</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is +scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154"></a>[<a href="./images/154.png">154</a>]</span>conscious of +himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal +necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true +acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed +out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may +nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is +so seldom found. How would it be possible if salvation were +ready to our hand, and could without great labor be found, +that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things +excellent are as difficult as they are rare."<a name="FNanchor_154:6_54" id="FNanchor_154:6_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_154:6_54" class="fnanchor">[154:6]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">Philosophy as the Extension of Science.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_58" id="Section_58">58</a>. On the other hand, one who looks to philosophy for the extension +and correction of scientific knowledge will be primarily interested in +the philosophical definition of ultimate conceptions, and in the method +wherewith such a definition is obtained. Thus the philosophy of the +scientist will tend to be logical and metaphysical. Such is the case +with Descartes and Leibniz, who are nevertheless intimately related to +Spinoza in the historical development of philosophy.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Several years have now elapsed," says the former, "since I +first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, +many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I +afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and +from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking +once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had +adopted, and of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155"></a>[<a href="./images/155.png">155</a>]</span>commencing anew the work of building from the +foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding +superstructure in the sciences."<a name="FNanchor_155:7_55" id="FNanchor_155:7_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_155:7_55" class="fnanchor">[155:7]</a></p></div> + +<p>Leibniz's mind was more predominantly logical even than Descartes's. He +sought in philosophy a supreme intellectual synthesis, a science of the +universe.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Although," he says retrospectively, "I am one of those who +have worked much at mathematics, I have none the less +meditated upon philosophy from my youth up; for it always +seemed to me that there was a possibility of establishing +something solid in philosophy by clear demonstrations. . . . I +perceived, after much meditation, that it is impossible to +find the <i>principles of a real unity</i> in matter alone, or in +that which is only passive, since it is nothing but a +collection or aggregation of parts <i>ad infinitum</i>."<a name="FNanchor_155:8_56" id="FNanchor_155:8_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_155:8_56" class="fnanchor">[155:8]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical Problem.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_59" id="Section_59">59</a>. Though these types are peculiarly representative, they are by no +means exhaustive. There are as many possibilities of emphasis as there +are incentives to philosophical reflection. It is not possible to +exhaust the aspects of experience which may serve as bases from which +such thought may issue, and to which, after its synthetic insight, it +may return. But it is evident that such divisions of philosophy +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156"></a>[<a href="./images/156.png">156</a>]</span>represent in their order, and in the sharpness with which they are +sundered, the intellectual autobiography of the individual philosopher. +There is but one method by which that which is peculiar either to the +individual, or to the special position which he adopts, may be +eliminated. Though it is impossible to tabulate the empty programme of +philosophy, we may name certain special problems that have appeared <i>in +its history</i>. Since this history comprehends the activities of many +individuals, a general validity attaches to it. There has been, +moreover, a certain periodicity in the emergence of these problems, so +that it may fairly be claimed for them that they indicate inevitable +phases in the development of human reflection upon experience. They +represent a normal differentiation of interest which the individual +mind, in the course of its own thinking, tends to follow. It is true +that it can never be said with assurance that any age is utterly blind +to any aspect of experience. This is obviously the case with the +practical and theoretical interests which have just been distinguished. +There is no age that does not have some practical consciousness of the +world as a whole, nor any which does not seek more or less earnestly to +universalize its science. But though it compel us to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157"></a>[<a href="./images/157.png">157</a>]</span>deal abstractly +with historical epochs, there is abundant compensation in the +possibility which this method affords of finding the divisions of +philosophy in the manifestation of the living philosophical spirit.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_60" id="Section_60">60</a>. To Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, is commonly +awarded the honor of being the founder of European philosophy. If he +deserve this distinction, it is on account of the question which he +raised, and not on account of the answer which he gave to it. Aristotle +informs us that Thales held "water" to be "the material cause of all +things."<a name="FNanchor_157:9_57" id="FNanchor_157:9_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_157:9_57" class="fnanchor">[157:9]</a> This crude theory is evidently due to an interest in the +totality of things, an interest which is therefore philosophical. But +the interest of this first philosopher has a more definite character. It +looks toward the definition in terms of some single conception, of <i>the +constitution</i> of the world. As a child might conceivably think the moon +to be made of green cheese, so philosophy in its childhood thinks here +of all things as made of water. Water was a well-known substance, +possessing well-known predicates. To define all nature in terms of it, +was to maintain that in spite of superficial <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158"></a>[<a href="./images/158.png">158</a>]</span>differences, all things +have these predicates in common. They are the predicates which qualify +for reality, and compose a community of nature from which all the +individual objects and events of nature arise. The successors of Thales +were evidently dissatisfied with his fundamental conception, because of +its lack of generality. They seized upon vaguer substances like air and +fire, for the very definiteness of the nature of water forbids the +identification of other substances with it. But what is so obviously +true of water is scarcely less true of air and fire; and it appeared at +length that only a substance possessing the most general characters of +body, such as shape, size, and mobility, could be thought as truly +primeval and universal. In this wise a conception like our modern +physical conception of matter came at length into vogue. Now the problem +of which these were all tentative solutions is, in general, the problem +of <i>metaphysics</i>; although this term belongs to a later era, arising +only from the accidental place of the discussion of first principles +<i>after physics</i> in the system of Aristotle. <i>The attempt to secure a +most fundamental conception which attaches some definite meaning to the +reality including and informing every particular thing, is metaphysics.</i></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159"></a>[<a href="./images/159.png">159</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Monism and Pluralism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_61" id="Section_61">61</a>. It must not be supposed that metaphysics is dogmatically committed +to the reduction of all reality to a unity of nature. It is quite +consistent with its purpose that the parts of reality should be found to +compose a group, or an indefinite multitude of irreducibly different +entities. But it is clear that even such an account of things deals with +what is true of all reality, and even in acknowledging the variety of +its constituents, attributes to them some kind of relationship. The +degree to which such a relationship is regarded as intimate and +essential, determines the degree to which any metaphysical system is +<i>monistic</i>,<a name="FNanchor_159:10_58" id="FNanchor_159:10_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_159:10_58" class="fnanchor">[159:10]</a> rather than <i>pluralistic</i>. But the significance of +this difference will be better appreciated after a further +differentiation of the metaphysical problem has been noted.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Ontology and Cosmology Concern Being and Process.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_62" id="Section_62">62</a>. It has already been suggested that the test of Thales's conception +lay in the possibility of deriving nature from it. A world principle +must be fruitful. Now an abstract distinction has prevailed more or less +persistently in metaphysics, between <i>the general definition of being</i>, +called <i>ontology</i>, and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160"></a>[<a href="./images/160.png">160</a>]</span>study of the processes wherewith being is +divided into things and events. This latter study has to do primarily +with the details of experience enumerated and systematized by the +natural sciences. <i>To reconcile</i> these, <i>or the course of nature, with +the fundamental definition of being</i>, is the problem of <i>cosmology</i>. +Cosmology is the construing of the <i>prima facie</i> reality in terms of the +essential reality. It is the proof and the explanation of ontology. +Since the most familiar part of the <i>prima facie</i> reality, the part +almost exclusively noticed by the naive mind, is embraced within the +field of the physical sciences, the term cosmology has come more +definitely to signify the <i>philosophy of nature</i>. It embraces such an +examination of space, time, matter, causality, etc., as seeks to answer +the most general questions about them, and provide for them in the world +thought of as most profoundly real. Such a study receives its +philosophical character from its affiliation with ontology, as the +latter would find its application in cosmology.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Mechanical and Teleological Cosmologies.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_63" id="Section_63">63</a>. But in addition to the consideration of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161"></a>[<a href="./images/161.png">161</a>]</span>the various parts of +nature, cosmology has commonly dealt with a radical and far-reaching +alternative that appeared at the very dawn of metaphysics. Differences +may arise within a world constituted of a single substance or a small +group of ultimate substances, by changes in the relative position and +grouping of the parts. Hence the virtue of the conception of motion. The +theory which explains all differences by motions of the parts of a +qualitatively simple world, is called <i>mechanism</i>. Another source of +change familiar to naive experience is <i>will</i>, or the action of living +creatures. According to the mechanical theory, <i>changes occur on account +of the natural motions of the parts of matter</i>; according to the latter +or <i>teleological</i> conception, <i>changes are made by a formative agency +directed to some end</i>. Among the early Greek philosophers, Leucippus was +an exponent of mechanism.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"He says that the worlds arise when many bodies are collected +together into the mighty void from the surrounding space and +rush together. They come into collision, and those which are +of similar shape and like form become entangled, and from +their entanglement the heavenly bodies arise."<a name="FNanchor_161:11_59" id="FNanchor_161:11_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_161:11_59" class="fnanchor">[161:11]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162"></a>[<a href="./images/162.png">162</a>]</span>Anaxagoras, on the other hand, was famed for his doctrine of the Nous, +or Intelligence, to whose direction he attributed the whole process of +the world. The following is translated from extant fragments of his +book, "<ins class="greek" title="peri physeôs">περὶ φύσεως</ins>":</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it +began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve +first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends +over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And +all the things that are mingled together and separated off and +distinguished are all known by the Nous. And Nous set in order +all things that were to be and that were, and all things that +are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now +revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and +the ether that are separated off."<a name="FNanchor_162:12_60" id="FNanchor_162:12_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_162:12_60" class="fnanchor">[162:12]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">Dualism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_64" id="Section_64">64</a>. It is clear, furthermore, that the doctrine of Anaxagoras not only +names a distinct kind of cause, but also ascribes to it an independence +and intrinsic importance that do not belong to motion. Whereas motion is +a property of matter, intelligence is an originative power working out +purposes of its own choosing. Hence we have here to do with a new +ontology. If we construe ultimate being in terms of mind, we have a +definite substitute for the physical theories outlined above. Such a +theory is scarcely to be attributed to any Greek philosopher of the +early <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163"></a>[<a href="./images/163.png">163</a>]</span>period; it belongs to a more sophisticated stage in the +development of thought, after the rise of the problem of epistemology. +But Anaxagoras's sharp distinction between the material of the world on +the one hand, and the author of its order and evolution on the other, is +in itself worthy of notice. It contains the germ of a recurrent +philosophical <i>dualism</i>, which differs from pluralism in that it finds +two and only two fundamental divisions of being, the physical, material, +or potential on the one hand, and the mental, formal, or ideal on the +other.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_65" id="Section_65">65</a>. Finally, the alternative possibilities which these cosmological +considerations introduce, bear directly upon the general question of the +interdependence of the parts of the world, a question which has already +appeared as pertinent in ontology. Monism and pluralism now obtain a new +meaning. Where the world process is informed with some singleness of +plan, as teleology proposes, the parts are reciprocally necessary, and +inseparable from the unity. Where, on the other hand, the processes are +random and reciprocally fortuitous, as Leucippus proposes, the world as +a whole is an aggregate rather than a unity. In this way uniformity in +kind of being <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164"></a>[<a href="./images/164.png">164</a>]</span>may prevail in a world the relations of whose parts are +due to chance, while diversity in kind of being may prevail in a world +knit together by some thorough-going plan of organization. Thus monism +and pluralism are conceptions as proper to cosmology as to ontology.</p> + +<p>But enough has been said to demonstrate the interdependence of ontology +and cosmology, of the theory of being and the theory of differentiation +and process. Such problems can be only abstractly sundered, and the +distinctive character of any metaphysical system will usually consist in +some theory determining their relation. Philosophy returns to these +metaphysical problems with its thought enriched and its method +complicated, after becoming thoroughly alive to the problems of +epistemology, logic, and ethics.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Epistemology Seeks to Understand the Possibility of +Knowledge.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_66" id="Section_66">66</a>. <i>Epistemology is the theory of the possibility of knowledge</i>, and +issues from criticism and scepticism. If we revert again to the history +of Greek philosophy, we find a first period of enterprising speculation +giving place to a second period of hesitancy and doubt. This phase of +thought occurs simultaneously with the brilliantly humanistic age of +Pericles, and it is undoubtedly true that energy is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165"></a>[<a href="./images/165.png">165</a>]</span>withdrawn from +speculation largely for the sake of expending it in the more lively and +engaging pursuits of politics and art. But there are patent reasons +within the sphere of philosophy itself for entailment of activity and +taking of stock. For three centuries men have taken their philosophical +powers for granted, and used them without questioning them. Repeated +attacks upon the problem of reality have resulted in no consensus of +opinion, but only in a disagreement among the wise men themselves. A +great variety of mere theories has been substituted for the old +unanimity of religious tradition and practical life. It is natural under +these circumstances to infer that in philosophy man has overreached +himself. He would more profitably busy himself with affairs that belong +to his own sphere, and find a basis for life in his immediate relations +with his fellows. The sophists, learned in tradition, and skilled in +disputation, but for the most part entirely lacking in originality, are +the new prophets. As teachers of rhetoric and morals, they represent the +practical and secular spirit of their age; while in their avoidance of +speculation, and their critical justification of that course, they +express its sceptical philosophy.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166"></a>[<a href="./images/166.png">166</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Agnosticism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_67" id="Section_67">67</a>. In their self-justification certain of the sophists attached +themselves to a definite doctrine maintained by those of their +predecessors and contemporaries who were atomists, or followers of that +same Leucippus whom we have quoted. This doctrine was the result of an +attempt to construe perception in terms of the motion of atoms. Outer +objects were said to give off fine particles which, through the +mediation of the sense organs, impinged upon the soul-atom. But it was +evident even to the early exponents of this theory that according to +such an account, each perceiver is relegated to a world peculiar to his +own stand-point. His perception informs him concerning his own states as +affected by things, rather than concerning the things themselves. Upon +this ground the great sophist Protagoras is said to have based his +dictum: <ins class="greek" title="Pantôn chrêmatôn metron anthrôpos">Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος</ins>,—"Man is the measure +of all things." This is the classic statement of the doctrine of +relativity. But we have now entered into the province of epistemology, +and various alternatives confront us. Reduce thought to perception, +define perception as relative to each individual, and you arrive at +<i>scepticism</i>, or <i>the denial of the possibility of valid knowledge</i>. +Plato <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167"></a>[<a href="./images/167.png">167</a>]</span>expounds this consequence in the well-known discussion of +Protagoras that occurs in the "Theætetus."</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each +one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with +a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other +yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of +all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt +for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that +while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom, he +was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his +fellow-men—would not this have produced an overpowering +effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern +another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right +to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, +as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole +judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why, +my friend, should Protagoras be preferred to the place of +wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we +poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure +of his own wisdom? . . . The attempt to supervise or refute the +notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous +piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and this +must be the case if Protagoras's Truth is the real truth, and +the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving +oracles out of the shrine of his book."<a name="FNanchor_167:13_61" id="FNanchor_167:13_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_167:13_61" class="fnanchor">[167:13]</a></p></div> + +<p>This is the full swing of the pendulum from <i>dogmatism</i>, or the +uncritical conviction of truth. A modified form of scepticism has been +developed in these later days under the influence of natural <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168"></a>[<a href="./images/168.png">168</a>]</span>science, +and is called <i>agnosticism</i> or <i>positivism</i>. It accepts the Protagorean +doctrine only in the sense of attributing to human knowledge as a whole +an incapacity for exceeding the range of perception. Beyond this realm +of natural science, where theories can be sensibly verified, lies the +unknowable realm, more real, but forever inaccessible.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Source and Criterion of Knowledge According to Empiricism +and Rationalism. Mysticism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_68" id="Section_68">68</a>. It is important to note that both scepticism and agnosticism agree +in regarding <i>perception as the essential factor in knowledge</i>. So far +at any rate as our knowledge is concerned, the certification of being +consists in perceivability. Knowledge is coextensive with actual and +possible human experience. This account of the source and criterion of +knowledge is called <i>empiricism</i>, in distinction from the counter-theory +of <i>rationalism</i>.</p> + +<p>The rationalistic motive was a quickening influence in Greek philosophy +long before it became deliberate and conspicuous in Socrates and Plato. +Parmenides, founder of the Eleatic School, has left behind him a poem +divided into two parts: "The Way of Truth" and "The Way of +Opinion."<a name="FNanchor_168:14_62" id="FNanchor_168:14_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_168:14_62" class="fnanchor">[168:14]</a> In the first of these he expounds his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169"></a>[<a href="./images/169.png">169</a>]</span>esoteric +philosophy, which is a definition of being established by dialectical +reasoning. He finds that being must be single, eternal, and changeless, +because otherwise it cannot be thought and defined without +contradiction. The method which Parmenides here employs presupposes that +knowledge consists in understanding rather than perception. Indeed, he +regards the fact that the world of the senses is manifold and mutable as +of little consequence to the wise man. The world of sense is the +province of vulgar opinion, while that of reason is the absolute truth +revealed only to the philosopher. The truth has no concern with +appearance, but is answerable only to the test of rationality. <i>That +world is real which one is able by thinking to make intelligible.</i> The +world is what a world must be in order to be possible at all, and the +philosopher can deduce it directly from the very conditions of thought +which it must satisfy. He who would know reality may disregard what +seems to be, provided he can by reflective analysis discover certain +general necessities to which being must conform. This is rationalism in +its extreme form.</p> + +<p>The rationalism of Socrates was more moderate, as it was more fruitful +than that of Parmenides. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170"></a>[<a href="./images/170.png">170</a>]</span>As is well known, Socrates composed no +philosophical books, but sought to inculcate wisdom in his teaching and +conversation. His method of inculcating wisdom was to evoke it in his +interlocutor by making him considerate of the meaning of his speech. +Through his own questions he sought to arouse the questioning spirit, +which should weigh the import of words, and be satisfied with nothing +short of a definite and consistent judgment. In the Platonic dialogues +the Socratic method obtains a place in literature. In the "Theætetus," +which is, perhaps, the greatest of all epistemological treatises, +Socrates is represented as likening his vocation to that of the midwife.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs, +but differs in that I attend men, and not women, and I look +after their souls when they are in labor, and not after their +bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining +whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings +forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And, like the +midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made +against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the +wit to answer them myself, is very just; the reason is that +the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to +bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor +have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my +own soul, but those who converse with me profit. . . . It is +quite clear that they never <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171"></a>[<a href="./images/171.png">171</a>]</span>learned anything from me; the +many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own +making."<a name="FNanchor_171:15_63" id="FNanchor_171:15_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_171:15_63" class="fnanchor">[171:15]</a></p></div> + +<p>The principle underlying this method is the insistence that a +proposition, to be true of reality, must at least bespeak a mind that is +true to itself, internally luminous, and free from contradiction. That +which is to me nothing that I can express in form that will convey +precise meaning and bear analysis, is so far nothing at all. Being is +not, as the empiricist would have it, ready at hand, ours for the +looking, but is the fruit of critical reflection. Only reason, +overcoming the relativity of perception, and the chaos of popular +opinion, can lay hold on the universal truth.</p> + +<p>A very interesting tendency to clothe the articulations of thought with +the immediacy of perception is exhibited in <i>mysticism</i>, which +attributes the highest cognitive power to an experience that transcends +thought, an ineffable insight that is the occasional reward of thought +and virtuous living. This theory would seem to owe its great vigor to +the fact that it promises to unite the universality of the rational +object with the vivid presence of the empirical object, though it +sacrifices the definite content of both. The mystic, empiricist, and +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172"></a>[<a href="./images/172.png">172</a>]</span>rationalist are in these several ways led to revise their metaphysics +upon the basis of their epistemology, or to define reality in terms +dictated by the means of knowing it.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to Realism, +and the Representative Theory.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_69" id="Section_69">69</a>. But within the general field of epistemology there has arisen +another issue of even greater significance in its bearing upon +metaphysics. The first issue, as we have seen, has reference to the +criterion of knowledge, to the possibility of arriving at certainty +about reality, and the choice of means to that end. A second question +arises, concerning <i>the relation between the knowledge and its object or +that which is known</i>. This problem does not at first appear as an +epistemological difficulty, but is due to the emphasis which the moral +and religious interests of men give to the conception of the self. My +knowing is a part of me, a function of that soul whose welfare and +eternal happiness I am seeking to secure. Indeed, my knowing is, so the +wise men have always taught, the greatest of my prerogatives. Wisdom +appertains to the philosopher, as folly to the fool. But though my +knowledge be a part of me, and in me, the same cannot, lightly at any +rate, be said of what I know. It would seem that I must <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173"></a>[<a href="./images/173.png">173</a>]</span>distinguish +between the knowledge, which is my act or state, an event in my life, +and the known, which is object, and belongs to the context of the outer +world. <i>The object of knowledge</i> would then be quite <i>independent of the +circumstance that I know it</i>. This theory has acquired the name of +<i>realism</i>,<a name="FNanchor_173:16_64" id="FNanchor_173:16_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_173:16_64" class="fnanchor">[173:16]</a> and is evidently as close to common sense as any +epistemological doctrine can be said to be. If the knowledge consists in +some sign or symbol which in my mind stands for the object, but is +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174"></a>[<a href="./images/174.png">174</a>]</span>quite other than the object, realism is given the form known as the +<i>representative theory</i>. This theory is due to a radical distinction +between the inner world of consciousness and the outer world of things, +whereby in knowledge the outer object requires a substitute that is +qualified to belong to the inner world. Where, on the other hand, no +specific and exclusive nature is attributed to the inner world, realism +may flourish without the representative theory. In such a case the +object would be regarded as itself capable of entering into any number +of individual experiences or of remaining outside them all, and without +on either account forfeiting its identity. This view was taken for +granted by Plato, but is elaborately defended in our own day. During the +intervening period epistemology has been largely occupied with +difficulties inherent in the representative theory, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175"></a>[<a href="./images/175.png">175</a>]</span>from that +discussion there has emerged the theory of <i>idealism</i>,<a name="FNanchor_175:17_65" id="FNanchor_175:17_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_175:17_65" class="fnanchor">[175:17]</a> the great +rival theory to that of realism.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to +Idealism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_70" id="Section_70">70</a>. The representative theory contains at least one obvious +difficulty. If the thinker be confined to his ideas, and if the reality +be at the same time beyond these ideas, how can he ever verify their +report? Indeed, what can it mean that an idea should be true of that +which belongs to a wholly different category? How under such +circumstances can that which is a part of the idea be attributed with +any certainty to the object? Once grant that you know only your ideas, +and the object reduces to an unknown <i>x</i>, which you retain to account +for the outward pointing or reference of the ideas, but which is not +missed if neglected. The obvious though radical theory of idealism is +almost inevitably the next step. Why assume that there is any object +other than the state of mind, since all positive content belongs to that +realm? The eighteenth century English philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, was +accused by his contemporaries of wilful eccentricity, and even madness, +for his boldness in accepting this argument and drawing this conclusion:</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176"></a>[<a href="./images/176.png">176</a>]</span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel +it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed; +meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, +or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was +an odor—that is, it was smelt; there was a sound—that is, it +was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or +touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like +expressions. For as to what is said of the <i>absolute</i> +existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their +being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their +<i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i>; nor is it possible that they should have +any existence out of the minds or thinking thing which +perceives them."<a name="FNanchor_176:18_66" id="FNanchor_176:18_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_176:18_66" class="fnanchor">[176:18]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">Phenomenalism, Spiritualism, and Panpsychism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_71" id="Section_71">71</a>. In this paragraph Berkeley maintains that it is essential to +things, or at any rate to their qualities, that they <i>be perceived</i>. +This principle when expressed as an epistemological or metaphysical +generalization, is called <i>phenomenalism</i>. But in another phase of his +thought Berkeley emphasizes the <i>perceiver</i>, or <i>spirit</i>. The theory +which maintains that the only real substances are these active selves, +with their powers and their states, has been called somewhat vaguely by +the name of <i>spiritualism</i>.<a name="FNanchor_176:19_67" id="FNanchor_176:19_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_176:19_67" class="fnanchor">[176:19]</a> Philosophically it shows a strong +tendency to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177"></a>[<a href="./images/177.png">177</a>]</span>develop into either <i>panpsychism</i> or <i>transcendentalism</i>. +The former is radically empirical. Its classic representative is the +German pessimist Schopenhauer, who defined reality in terms of will +because that term signified to him most eloquently <i>the directly felt +nature of the self</i>. This immediate revelation of the true inwardness of +being serves as the key to an "intuitive interpretation" of the +gradations of nature, and will finally awaken a sense of the presence of +the universal Will.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Transcendentalism, or Absolute Idealism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_72" id="Section_72">72</a>. <i>Transcendentalism</i>, or <i>absolute idealism</i>, on the other hand, +emphasizes the <i>rational activity</i>, rather than the bare subjectivity, +<i>of the self</i>. The term "transcendental" has become associated with this +type of idealism through Kant, whose favorite form of argument, the +"transcendental deduction," was an analysis of experience with a view to +discovering the categories, or formal principles of thought, implied in +its meaning. From the Kantian method arose the conception of a standard +or <i>absolute mind</i> for the standard experience. This mind is +transcendental not in the sense of being alien, but in the sense of +exceeding the human mind in the direction of what this means and strives +to be. It is the ideal or normal mind, in which the true <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178"></a>[<a href="./images/178.png">178</a>]</span>reality is +contained, with all the chaos of finite experience compounded and +redeemed. There is no being but the absolute, the one all-inclusive +spiritual life, in whom all things are inherent, and whose perfection is +the virtual implication of all purposive activities.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"God's life . . . sees the one plan fulfilled through all the +manifold lives, the single consciousness winning its purpose +by virtue of all the ideas, of all the individual selves, and +of all the lives. No finite view is wholly illusory. Every +finite intent taken precisely in its wholeness is fulfilled in +the Absolute. The least life is not neglected, the most +fleeting act is a recognized part of the world's meaning. You +are for the divine view all that you know yourself at this +instant to be. But you are also infinitely more. The +preciousness of your present purposes to yourself is only a +hint of that preciousness which in the end links their meaning +to the entire realm of Being."<a name="FNanchor_178:20_68" id="FNanchor_178:20_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_178:20_68" class="fnanchor">[178:20]</a></p></div> + +<p>The fruitfulness of the philosopher's reflective doubt concerning his +own powers is now evident. Problems are raised which are not merely +urgent in themselves, but which present wholly new alternatives to the +metaphysician. Rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, are +doctrines which, though springing from the epistemological query +concerning the possibility of knowledge, may <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179"></a>[<a href="./images/179.png">179</a>]</span>determine an entire +philosophical system. They bear upon every question of metaphysics, +whether the fundamental conception of being, or the problems of the +world's unity, origin, and significance for human life.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_150:1_49" id="Footnote_150:1_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150:1_49"><span class="label">[150:1]</span></a> The post-Kantian movement in Germany—especially in so +far as influenced by Hegel. See <a href="#Chap_XII">Chap. XII</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_151:2_50" id="Footnote_151:2_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151:2_50"><span class="label">[151:2]</span></a> Cf. § <a href="#Section_203">203</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_152:3_51" id="Footnote_152:3_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152:3_51"><span class="label">[152:3]</span></a> <i>E. g.</i>, the system of Fichte. Cf. § <a href="#Section_177">177</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_153:4_52" id="Footnote_153:4_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153:4_52"><span class="label">[153:4]</span></a> See <a href="#Chap_XI">Chap. XI</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_153:5_53" id="Footnote_153:5_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153:5_53"><span class="label">[153:5]</span></a> Spinoza: <i>On the Improvement of the Understanding</i>. +Translation by Elwes, p. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_154:6_54" id="Footnote_154:6_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154:6_54"><span class="label">[154:6]</span></a> Spinoza: <i>Ethics</i>, Part V, Proposition XLII. +Translation by Elwes, p. 270.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_155:7_55" id="Footnote_155:7_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155:7_55"><span class="label">[155:7]</span></a> Descartes: <i>Meditations</i>, I. Translation by Veitch, p. +97.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_155:8_56" id="Footnote_155:8_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155:8_56"><span class="label">[155:8]</span></a> Leibniz: <i>New System of the Nature of Substances</i>. +Translation by Latta, pp. 299, 300.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_157:9_57" id="Footnote_157:9_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157:9_57"><span class="label">[157:9]</span></a> Burnet: <i>Early Greek Philosophy</i>, p. 42.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_159:10_58" id="Footnote_159:10_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159:10_58"><span class="label">[159:10]</span></a> No little ambiguity attaches to the term "monism" in +current usage, because of its appropriation by those who maintain that +the universe is unitary and homogeneous in <i>physical terms</i> (cf. § <a href="#Section_108">108</a>). +It should properly be used to emphasize the unity of the world in any +terms.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_161:11_59" id="Footnote_161:11_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161:11_59"><span class="label">[161:11]</span></a> Burnet: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 358.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_162:12_60" id="Footnote_162:12_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162:12_60"><span class="label">[162:12]</span></a> Burnet: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 284.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_167:13_61" id="Footnote_167:13_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167:13_61"><span class="label">[167:13]</span></a> Plato: <i>Theætetus</i>, 161. Translation by Jowett. +References to Plato are to the marginal paging.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_168:14_62" id="Footnote_168:14_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168:14_62"><span class="label">[168:14]</span></a> Burnet: <i>Early Greek Philosophy</i>, pp. 184, 187.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_171:15_63" id="Footnote_171:15_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_171:15_63"><span class="label">[171:15]</span></a> Plato: <i>Theætetus</i>, 150 B. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_173:16_64" id="Footnote_173:16_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_173:16_64"><span class="label">[173:16]</span></a> Much ambiguity attaches to the terms "realism" and +"idealism" in current usage. The first had at one time in the history of +philosophy a much narrower meaning than that which it now possesses. It +was used to apply to those who, after Plato, believed in the independent +reality of ideas, universals, or general natures. <i>Realists</i> in this +sense were opposed to <i>nominalists</i> and <i>conceptualists</i>. Nominalism +maintained the exclusive reality of individual substances, and reduced +ideas to particular signs having, like the <i>name</i>, a purely symbolical +or descriptive value. Conceptualism sought to unite realism and +nominalism through the conception of mind, or an individual substance +whose meanings may possess universal validity. Though this dispute was +of fundamental importance throughout the mediæval period, the issues +involved have now been restated. Realism in the old sense will, if held, +come within the scope of the broader epistemological realism defined +above. Nominalism is covered by empirical tendencies, and conceptualism +by modern idealism.</p> + +<p>The term <i>idealism</i> is sometimes applied to Plato on account of his +designation of ideas as the ultimate realities. This would be a natural +use of the term, but in our own day it has become inseparably associated +with the doctrine which attributes to being a dependence upon the +activity of mind. It is of the utmost importance to keep these two +meanings clear. In the preferred sense Plato is a realist, and so +opposed to idealism.</p> + +<p>The term <i>idealism</i> is further confused on account of its employment in +literature and common speech to denote the control of ideals. Although +this is a kindred meaning, the student of philosophy will gain little or +no help from it, and will avoid confusion if he distinguishes the term +in its technical use and permits it in that capacity to acquire an +independent meaning.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_175:17_65" id="Footnote_175:17_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_175:17_65"><span class="label">[175:17]</span></a> See <a href="#Footnote_173:16_64"><i>note</i></a>, p. 173.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_176:18_66" id="Footnote_176:18_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176:18_66"><span class="label">[176:18]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Principles of Human Knowledge</i>, Part I, +Fraser's edition, p. 259.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_176:19_67" id="Footnote_176:19_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176:19_67"><span class="label">[176:19]</span></a> To be distinguished from the religious sect which +bears the same name.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_178:20_68" id="Footnote_178:20_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_178:20_68"><span class="label">[178:20]</span></a> Quoted from Professor Josiah Royce's <i>The World and +the Individual, First Series</i>, pp. 426-427.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180"></a>[<a href="./images/180.png">180</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_VII" id="Chap_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<h3>THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION</h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">The Normative Sciences.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_73" id="Section_73">73</a>. There are three sets of problems whose general philosophical +importance depends upon the place which metaphysics assigns to the +<i>human critical faculties</i>. Man passes judgment upon that which claims +to be <i>true</i>, <i>beautiful</i>, or <i>good</i>, thus referring to ideals and +standards that define these values. Attempts to make these ideals +explicit, and to formulate principles which regulate their attainment, +have resulted in the development of the three so-called <i>normative +sciences</i>: <i>logic</i>, <i>æsthetics</i>, and <i>ethics</i>. These sciences are said +to owe their origin to the Socratic method, and it is indeed certain +that their problem is closely related to the general rationalistic +attitude.<a name="FNanchor_180:1_69" id="FNanchor_180:1_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_180:1_69" class="fnanchor">[180:1]</a> In Plato's dialogue, "Protagoras," one may observe the +manner of the inception of both ethics and logic. The question at issue +between Socrates and the master sophist <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181"></a>[<a href="./images/181.png">181</a>]</span>Protagoras, is concerning the +possibility of teaching virtue. Protagoras conducts his side of the +discussion with the customary rhetorical flourish, expounding in set +speeches the tradition and usage in which such a possibility is +accepted. Socrates, on the other hand, conceives the issue quite +differently. One can neither affirm nor deny anything of virtue unless +one knows <i>what is meant by it</i>. Even the possession of such a meaning +was scarcely recognized by Protagoras, who was led by Socrates's +questions to attribute to the various virtues an external grouping +analogous to that of the parts of the face. But Socrates shows that +since justice, temperance, courage, and the like, are admittedly similar +in that they are all virtues, they must have in common some essence, +which is virtue in general. This he seeks to define in the terms, +<i>virtue is knowledge</i>. The interest which Socrates here shows in the +reduction of the ordinary moral judgments to a system centering in some +single fundamental principle, is the ethical interest. But this is at +the same time a particular application of the general rationalistic +method of definition, and of the general rationalistic postulate that +one knows nothing until one can form unitary and determinate +conceptions. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182"></a>[<a href="./images/182.png">182</a>]</span>recognition which Socrates thus gives to criteria of +knowledge is an expression of the logical interest. In a certain sense, +indeed, the whole labor of Socrates was in the cause of the logical +interest. For he sought to demonstrate that belief is not necessarily +knowledge; that belief may or may not be true. In order that it shall be +true, and constitute knowledge, it must be well-grounded, and +accompanied by an understanding of its object. Socrates thus set the +problem of logic, the discovery, namely, of those characters by virtue +of the possession of which belief is knowledge.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Affiliations of Logic.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_74" id="Section_74">74</a>. Logic deals with the ground of belief, and thus distinguishes +itself from the psychological account of the elements of the believing +state.<a name="FNanchor_182:2_70" id="FNanchor_182:2_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_182:2_70" class="fnanchor">[182:2]</a> But it is not possible sharply to sunder psychology and +logic. This is due to the fact that the general principles which make +belief true, may be regarded quite independently of this fact. They then +become the <i>most general truth</i>, belonging to the absolute, archetypal +realm, or to the mind of God.<a name="FNanchor_182:3_71" id="FNanchor_182:3_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_182:3_71" class="fnanchor">[182:3]</a> When the general principles of +certainty are so regarded, logic can be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183"></a>[<a href="./images/183.png">183</a>]</span>distinguished from metaphysics +only by adding to the study of the general principles themselves, the +study of the special conditions (mainly psychological) under which they +may be realized among men. In the history of human thought the name of +logic belongs to the study of this <i>attainment</i> of truth, as the terms +æsthetics and ethics belong to the studies of the attainment of beauty +and goodness.<a name="FNanchor_183:4_72" id="FNanchor_183:4_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_183:4_72" class="fnanchor">[183:4]</a> It is evident that logic will have a peculiar +importance for the rationalist. For the empiricist, proposing to report +upon things as they are given, will tend on the whole to maintain that +knowledge has no properties save those which are given to it by its +special subject-matter. One cannot, in short, define any absolute +relationship between the normative sciences and the other branches of +philosophy.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in +Belief.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_75" id="Section_75">75</a>. <i>Logic is the formulation, as independently as possible of special +subject-matter, of that which conditions truth in belief.</i> Since logic +is concerned with truth only in so far as it is predicated of belief, +and since belief in so far as true is knowledge, logic can be defined as +the formulation of the most general principles of knowledge. The +principles so <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184"></a>[<a href="./images/184.png">184</a>]</span>formulated would be those virtually used to <i>justify</i> +belief or to disprove the imputation of error.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence, +Inference, and Observation.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_76" id="Section_76">76</a>. What is called <i>formal logic</i> is animated with the hope of +extracting these formulations directly from an analysis of the procedure +of thought. The most general logical principles which have appeared in +the historical development of formal logic are <i>definition</i>, +<i>self-evidence</i>, <i>inference</i>, and <i>observation</i>. Each of these has been +given special study, and each has given rise to special issues.</p> + +<p><i>Definition</i> has to do with the <i>formation of concepts</i>, or determinate +and unequivocal meanings. The universality of such concepts, and their +consequent relation to particular things, was, as we have seen, +investigated at a very early date, and gave rise to the great +realistic-nominalistic controversy.<a name="FNanchor_184:5_73" id="FNanchor_184:5_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_184:5_73" class="fnanchor">[184:5]</a> A large part of the logical +discussion in the Platonic dialogues is an outgrowth of the earlier +"eristic," a form of disputation in favor with the sophists, and +consisting in the adroit use of ambiguity.<a name="FNanchor_184:6_74" id="FNanchor_184:6_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_184:6_74" class="fnanchor">[184:6]</a> It is natural that in +its first conscious self-criticism thought should discover the need of +definite terms. The perpetual importance of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185"></a>[<a href="./images/185.png">185</a>]</span>definition has been largely +due to the great prestige in modern philosophy of the method of +geometry, which was regarded by Descartes and Spinoza as the model for +systems of necessary truth.</p> + +<p><i>Self-evidence</i> is the principle according to which <i>conviction of truth +follows directly from an understanding of meaning</i>. In the practice of +his intellectual midwifery, Socrates presupposed that thought is capable +of bringing forth its own certainties. And rationalism has at all times +regarded truth as ultimately accredited by internal marks recognizable +by reason. Such truth arrived at antecedent to acquaintance with +instances is called <i>a priori</i>, as distinguished from <i>a posteriori</i> +knowledge, or observation after the fact. There can be no principles of +self-evidence, but logicians have always been more or less concerned +with the enumeration of alleged self-evident principles, notably those +of <i>contradiction</i> and <i>identity</i>. A philosophical interest in the +mathematical method has led to a logical study of axioms, but with a +view rather to their fruitfulness than their intrinsic truth. Indeed, +the interest in self-evident truth has always been subordinate to the +interest in systematic truth, and the discovery of first principles most +commonly serves to determine the relative <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186"></a>[<a href="./images/186.png">186</a>]</span>priority of definite +concepts, or the correct point of departure for a series of inferences.</p> + +<p>The greater part of the famous Aristotelian logic consists in a study of +<i>inference</i>, or <i>the derivation of new knowledge from old knowledge</i>. +Aristotle sought to set down and classify every method of advancing from +premises. The most important form of inference which he defined was the +<i>syllogism</i>, a scheme of reasoning to a conclusion by means of two +premises having one term in common. From the premises "all men are +mortal" and "Socrates is a man," one may conclude that "Socrates is +mortal." This is an instance not only of the syllogism in general, but +of its most important "mood," the subsumption of a particular case under +a general rule. Since the decline of Aristotle's influence in philosophy +there has been a notable decrease of interest in the different forms of +inference; though its fundamental importance as the very bone and sinew +of <i>reasoning</i> or <i>deductive thinking</i> has never been challenged. Its +loss of preëminence is in part due to the growth of empiricism, +stimulated by the writings of Lord Bacon in the seventeenth century, and +fostered by the subsequent development of experimental science.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187"></a>[<a href="./images/187.png">187</a>]</span><i>Observation</i> is the fundamental logical principle of empiricism. For a +radical empiricism, knowledge would consist of descriptive +generalizations based upon the summation of instances. That branch of +logic which deals with <i>the advance from individual instances to general +principles</i>, is called <i>inductive logic</i>. It has resulted in the +announcement of canons of accuracy and freedom from preconception, and +in the methodological study of hypothesis, experiment, and verification. +Rules for observation directed to the end of discovering causes, +constitute the most famous part of the epoch-making logic of J. S. +Mills.<a name="FNanchor_187:7_75" id="FNanchor_187:7_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_187:7_75" class="fnanchor">[187:7]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_77" id="Section_77">77</a>. There are two significant tendencies in contemporary logic. +<i>Theories of the judgment</i> have arisen in the course of an attempt to +define the least complexity that must be present in order that thought +shall come within the range of truth and error. It is evident that no +one either knows or is in error until he takes some attitude which lays +claim to knowledge. Denoting by the term <i>judgment</i> this minimum of +complexity in knowledge, an important question arises as to the sense in +which the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188"></a>[<a href="./images/188.png">188</a>]</span>judgment involves the subject, predicate, and copula that are +commonly present in its propositional form.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Priority of Concepts.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_78" id="Section_78">78</a>. But a more important logical development has been due to the +recent analysis of definite accredited systems of knowledge. The study +of the fundamental conceptions of mathematics and mechanics, together +with an examination of the systematic structure of these sciences, +furnishes the most notable cases. There are two senses in which such +studies may be regarded as logical. In the first place, in so far as +they bring to light the inner coherence of any body of truth, the kind +of evidence upon which it rests, and the type of formal perfection which +it seeks, they differ from formal logic only in that they derive their +criteria from cases, rather than from the direct analysis of the +procedure of thought. And since formal logic must itself make +experiments, this difference is not a radical one. The study of cases +tends chiefly to enrich <i>methodology</i>, or the knowledge of the special +criteria of special sciences. In the second place, such studies serve to +define the relatively few simple truths which are common to the +relatively many complex truths. A study of the foundations of arithmetic +reveals <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189"></a>[<a href="./images/189.png">189</a>]</span>more elementary conceptions, such as <i>class</i> and <i>order</i>, that +must be employed in the very definition of number itself, and so are +implied in every numerical calculation. It appears similarly that the +axioms of geometry are special axioms which involve the acceptance of +more general axioms or indefinables.<a name="FNanchor_189:8_76" id="FNanchor_189:8_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_189:8_76" class="fnanchor">[189:8]</a> Logic in this sense, then, +is the enumeration of conceptions and principles in the order of their +indispensableness to knowledge. And while it must be observed that the +most general conceptions and principles of knowledge are not necessarily +those most significant for the existent world, nevertheless the careful +analysis which such an enumeration involves is scarcely less fruitful +for metaphysics than for logic.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Æsthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Beauty. +Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_79" id="Section_79">79</a>. <i>Æsthetics is the formulation, as independently as possible of +special subject-matter, of that which conditions beauty.</i> As logic +commonly refers to a judgment of truth, so æsthetics at any rate +<i>refers</i> to a judgment implied in appreciation. But while it is +generally admitted that truth itself is by no means limited to the form +of the judgment, the contrary is frequently <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190"></a>[<a href="./images/190.png">190</a>]</span>maintained with reference +to beauty. The aphorism, <i>De gustibus non est disputandum</i>, expresses a +common opinion to the effect that beauty is not a property belonging to +the object of which it is predicated, but a property generated by the +appreciative consciousness. According to this opinion there can be no +beauty except in the case of an object's presence in an individual +experience. Investigators must of necessity refuse to leave individual +caprice in complete possession of the field, but they have in many cases +occupied themselves entirely with the <i>state of æsthetic enjoyment</i> in +the hope of discovering its constant factors. The opposing tendency +defines certain <i>formal characters which the beautiful object must +possess</i>. Evidently the latter school will attribute a more profound +philosophical importance to the conception of beauty, since for them it +is a principle that obtains in the world of being. This was the first +notable contention, that of Plato. But even with the emphasis laid upon +the subjective aspect of the æsthetic experience, great metaphysical +importance may be attached to it, where, as in the case of the German +Romanticists, reality is deliberately construed as a spiritual life +which is to be appreciated rather than understood.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191"></a>[<a href="./images/191.png">191</a>]</span>As in the case of logic, a strong impulse has manifested itself in +æsthetics to deal with groups of objects that lie within its province, +rather than directly with its concepts and principles. The first special +treatise on æsthetics, the "Poetics" of Aristotle, belongs to this type +of inquiry, as does all criticism of art in so far as it aims at the +formulation of general principles.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral +Goodness.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_80" id="Section_80">80</a>. <i>Ethics</i>, the oldest and most popular of the normative sciences, +<i>is the formulation, as independently as possible of special +subject-matter, of that which conditions goodness of conduct</i>. Ethics is +commonly concerned with goodness only in so far as it is predicated of +conduct, or of character, which is a more or less permanent disposition +to conduct. Since conduct, in so far as good, is said to constitute +moral goodness, ethics may be defined as the formulation of the general +principles of <i>morality</i>. The principles so formulated would be those +virtually employed to <i>justify</i> conduct, or to disprove the imputation +of immorality.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_81" id="Section_81">81</a>. The student of this science is confronted with a very considerable +diversity of method and differentiation of problems. The earliest and +most profound opposition of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192"></a>[<a href="./images/192.png">192</a>]</span>doctrine in ethics arose from the +differences of interpretation of which the teaching of Socrates is +capable. His doctrine is, as we have seen, verbally expressed in the +proposition, <i>virtue is knowledge</i>. Socrates was primarily concerned to +show that there is no real living without an understanding of the +significance of life. To live well is to know the end of life, the good +of it all, and to govern action with reference to that end. Virtue is +therefore the practical wisdom that enables one to live consistently +with his real intention. But what is the real intention, the end or good +of life? In the "Protagoras," where Plato represents Socrates as +expounding his position, virtue is interpreted to mean prudence, or +foresight of pleasurable and painful consequences. He who knows, +possesses all virtue in that he is qualified to adapt himself to the +real situation and to gain the end of pleasure. All men, indeed, seek +pleasure, but only virtuous men seek it wisely and well.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some +pleasant things evil and some painful things good?—for I am +rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they +are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort, +and in as far as they are painful they are bad."<a name="FNanchor_192:9_77" id="FNanchor_192:9_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_192:9_77" class="fnanchor">[192:9]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193"></a>[<a href="./images/193.png">193</a>]</span>According to this view painful things are good only when they lead +eventually to pleasure, and pleasant things evil only when their painful +consequences outweigh their pleasantness. Hence moral differences reduce +to differences of skill in the universal quest for pleasure, and +<i>sensible gratification is the ultimate standard of moral value</i>. This +ancient doctrine, known as <i>hedonism</i>, expressing as it does a part of +life that will not suffer itself for long to be denied, is one of the +great perennial tendencies of ethical thought. In the course of many +centuries it has passed through a number of phases, varying its +conception of pleasure from the tranquillity of the wise man to the +sensuous titillations of the sybarite, and from the individualism of the +latter to the universalism of the humanitarian. But in every case it +shows a respect for the natural man, praising morality for its +disciplinary and instrumental value in the service of such human wants +as are the outgrowth of the animal instinct of self-preservation.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Rationalism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_82" id="Section_82">82</a>. But if a man's life be regarded as a truer representation of his +ideals than is his spoken theory, there is little to identify Socrates +with the hedonists. At the conclusion of the defence of his own life, +which Plato puts into his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194"></a>[<a href="./images/194.png">194</a>]</span>mouth in the well-known "Apology," he speaks +thus:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to +punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have +troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, +more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something +when they are really nothing,—then reprove them, as I have +reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought +to care, and thinking that they are something when they are +really nothing."<a name="FNanchor_194:10_78" id="FNanchor_194:10_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_194:10_78" class="fnanchor">[194:10]</a></p></div> + +<p>It is plain that the man Socrates cared little for the pleasurable or +painful consequences of his acts, provided they were worthy of the high +calling of human nature. A man's virtue would now seem to possess an +intrinsic nobility. If knowledge be virtue, then on this basis it must +be because knowledge is itself excellent. Virtue as knowledge +contributes to the good by constituting it. We meet here with the +<i>rationalistic</i> strain in ethics. It praises conduct for the <i>inherent +worth which it may possess if it express that reason</i> which the Stoics +called "<i>the ruling part</i>." The riches of wisdom consist for the +hedonist in their purchase of pleasure. For the rationalist, on the +other hand, wisdom is not coin, but itself the very substance of value.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Eudæmonism and Pietism. Rigorism and Intuitionism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_83" id="Section_83">83</a>. Rationalism has undergone modifications <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195"></a>[<a href="./images/195.png">195</a>]</span>even more significant +than those of hedonism, and involving at least one radically new group +of conceptions. Among the Greeks rationalism and hedonism alike are +<i>eudæmonistic</i>. They aim to portray <i>the fulness of life</i> that makes +"the happy man." In the ethics of Aristotle, whose synthetic mind weaves +together these different strands, the Greek ideal finds its most +complete expression as "the high-minded man," with all his powers and +trappings. But the great spiritual transformation which accompanied the +decline of Greek culture and the rise of Christianity, brought with it a +new moral sensibility, which finds in man no virtue of himself, but only +through the grace of God.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And the virtues themselves," says St. Augustine, "if they +bear no relation to God, are in truth vices rather than +virtues; for although they are regarded by many as truly moral +when they are desired as ends in themselves and not for the +sake of something else, they are, nevertheless, inflated and +arrogant, and therefore not to be viewed as virtues but as +vices."<a name="FNanchor_195:11_79" id="FNanchor_195:11_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_195:11_79" class="fnanchor">[195:11]</a></p></div> + +<p>The new ideal is that of renunciation, obedience, and resignation. +Ethically this expresses itself in <i>pietism</i>. Virtue is good neither in +itself nor on account of its consequences, but because it is +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196"></a>[<a href="./images/196.png">196</a>]</span>conformable to the will of God. The extreme inwardness of this ideal is +characteristic of an age that despaired of attainment, whether of +pleasure or knowledge. To all, even the persecuted, it is permitted to +obey, and so gain entrance into the kingdom of the children of God. But +as every special study tends to rely upon its own conceptions, pietism, +involving as it does a relation to God, is replaced by <i>rigorism</i> and +<i>intuitionism</i>. The former doctrine defines virtue in terms of the inner +attitude which it expresses. It must be done in the spirit of +dutifulness, <i>because one ought</i>, and through sheer respect for the law +which one's moral nature affirms. <i>Intuitionism</i> has attempted to deal +with the source of the moral law by defining conscience as a <i>special +faculty</i> or sense, qualified to pass directly upon moral questions, and +deserving of implicit obediences. It is characteristic of this whole +tendency to look for the spring of virtuous living, not in a good which +such living obtains, but in a law to which it owes obedience.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_84" id="Section_84">84</a>. This third general ethical tendency has thus been of the greatest +importance in emphasizing the <i>consciousness of duty</i>, and has brought +both hedonism and rationalism to a recognition of its fundamental +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197"></a>[<a href="./images/197.png">197</a>]</span>importance. Ethics must deal not only with the moral ideal, but also +with the ground of its appeal to the individual, and his obligation to +pursue it. In connection with this recognition of moral responsibility, +the problem of human <i>freedom</i> has come to be regarded in the light of +an inevitable point of contact between ethics and metaphysics. That +which is absolutely binding upon the human will can be determined only +in view of some theory of its ultimate nature. On this account the +rationalistic and hedonistic motives are no longer abstractly sundered, +as in the days of the Stoics and Epicureans, but tend to be absorbed in +broader philosophical tendencies. Hedonism appears as the sequel to +naturalism; or, more rarely, as part of a theistic system whose morality +is divine legislation enforced by an appeal to motives of pleasure and +pain. Rationalism, on the other hand, tends to be absorbed in +rationalistic or idealistic philosophies, where man's rational nature is +construed as his bond of kinship with the universe.</p> + +<p>Ethics has exhibited from the beginning a tendency to universalize its +conceptions and take the central place in metaphysics. Thus with Plato +good conduct was but a special case of goodness, the good being the most +general principle of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198"></a>[<a href="./images/198.png">198</a>]</span>reality.<a name="FNanchor_198:12_80" id="FNanchor_198:12_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_198:12_80" class="fnanchor">[198:12]</a> In modern times Fichte and his +school have founded an ethical metaphysics upon the conception of +duty.<a name="FNanchor_198:13_81" id="FNanchor_198:13_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_198:13_81" class="fnanchor">[198:13]</a> In these cases ethics can be distinguished from +metaphysics only by adding to the study of the good or of duty, a study +of the special physical, psychological, and social conditions under +which goodness and dutifulness may obtain in human life. It is possible +to attach the name of ethics, and we have seen the same to be true of +logic, either to a realm of ideal truth or to that realm wherein the +ideal is realized in humanity.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_85" id="Section_85">85</a>. A systematic study of ethics requires that the <i>virtues</i>, or types +of moral practice, shall be interpreted in the light of the central +conception of good, or of conscience. <i>Justice</i>, <i>temperance</i>, <i>wisdom</i>, +and <i>courage</i> were praised by the Greeks. Christianity added +<i>self-sacrifice</i>, <i>humility</i>, <i>purity</i>, and <i>benevolence</i>. These and +other virtues have been defined, justified, and co-ordinated with the +aid of a standard of moral value or a canon of duty.</p> + +<p>There is in modern ethics a pronounced tendency, parallel to those +already noted in logic and æsthetics, to study such phenomena belonging +to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199"></a>[<a href="./images/199.png">199</a>]</span>its field as have become historically established. A very +considerable investigation of <i>custom</i>, <i>institutions</i>, and other social +forces has led to a contact of ethics with anthropology and sociology +scarcely less significant than that with metaphysics.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<div class="sidenote">The Problems of Religion. The Special Interests of Faith.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_86" id="Section_86">86</a>. In that part of his philosophy in which he deals with faith, the +great German philosopher Kant mentions God, Freedom, and Immortality as +the three pre-eminent religious interests. Religion, as we have seen, +sets up a social relationship between man and that massive drift of +things which determines his destiny. Of the two terms of this relation, +God signifies the latter, while freedom and immortality are prerogatives +which religion bestows upon the former. Man, viewed from the stand-point +of religion as an object of special interest to the universe, is said to +have a soul; and by virtue of this soul he is said to be free and +immortal, when thought of as having a life in certain senses independent +of its immediate natural environment. The attempt to make this faith +theoretically intelligible has led to the philosophical disciplines +known as <i>theology</i> and <i>psychology</i>.<a name="FNanchor_199:14_82" id="FNanchor_199:14_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_199:14_82" class="fnanchor">[199:14]</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200"></a>[<a href="./images/200.png">200</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of God.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_87" id="Section_87">87</a>. <i>Theology</i>, as a branch of philosophy, deals with <i>the proof and +the nature of God</i>. Since "God" is not primarily a theoretical +conception, the proof of God is not properly a philosophical problem. +Historically, this task has been assumed as a legacy from Christian +apologetics; and it has involved, at any rate so far as European +philosophy is concerned, the definition of ultimate being in such +spiritual terms as make possible the relation with man postulated in +Christianity. For this it has been regarded as sufficient to ascribe to +the world an underlying unity capable of bearing the predicates of +perfection, omnipotence, and omniscience. Each proof of God has defined +him pre-eminently in terms of some one of these his attributes.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Ontological Proof of God.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_88" id="Section_88">88</a>. The <i>ontological</i> proof of God held the foremost place in +philosophy's contribution to Christianity up to the eighteenth century. +This proof <i>infers the existence from the ideal</i> of God, and so +approaches the nature of God through the attribute of perfection. It +owes the form in which it was accepted in the Middle Ages and +Renaissance to St. Anselm, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201"></a>[<a href="./images/201.png">201</a>]</span>Archbishop of Canterbury at the close of the +eleventh century. He argued from the idea of a most perfect being to its +existence, on the ground that non-existence, or existence only in idea, +would contradict its perfection. It is evident that the force of this +argument depends upon the necessity of the idea of God. The argument was +accepted in Scholastic Philosophy<a name="FNanchor_201:15_83" id="FNanchor_201:15_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_201:15_83" class="fnanchor">[201:15]</a> largely because of the virtual +acceptance of this necessity. Mediæval thought was under the dominance +of the philosophical ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and through them +rationalism had come to be the unquestioned starting-point for all +thought. For Plato reality and rationality meant one and the same thing, +so that the ultimate reality was the highest principle of rationality, +which he conceived to be the idea of the good. In the case of Aristotle +the ideal of rationality was conceived to determine the course of the +cosmical evolution as its immanent final cause. But in itself it was +beyond the world, or transcendent. For Plato perfection itself is +reality, whereas for Aristotle perfection determines the hierarchical +order of natural substances. The latter theory, more suitable to the +uses of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202"></a>[<a href="./images/202.png">202</a>]</span>Christianity, because it distinguished between God and the +world, was incorporated into the great school systems. But both theories +contain the essence of the ontological proof of God. In thought one +seeks the perfect truth, and posits it as at once the culmination of +insight and the meaning of life. The ideal of God is therefore a +necessary idea, because implied in all the effort of thought as the +object capable of finally satisfying it. St. Anselm adds little to the +force of this argument, and does much to obscure its real significance.</p> + +<p>In stating the ontological argument the term perfection has been +expressly emphasized, because it may be taken to embrace both truth and +goodness. Owing to a habit of thought, due in the main to Plato, it was +long customary to regard degrees of truth and goodness as +interchangeable, and as equivalent to degrees of reality. The <i>ens +realissimum</i> was in its completeness the highest object both of the +faculty of cognition and of the moral will. But even in the scholastic +period these two different aspects of the ideal were clearly recognized, +and led to sharply divergent tendencies. More recently they have been +divided and embodied in separate arguments. <i>The epistemological</i> +argument <i>defines God in terms of that absolute <span class='pagenum' style="font-style: normal;"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203"></a>[<a href="./images/203.png">203</a>]</span>truth which is referred +to in every judgment</i>. Under the influence of idealism this absolute +truth has taken the form of a universal mind, or all-embracing standard +experience, called more briefly the absolute. The <i>ethical</i> argument, on +the other hand, conceives God as <i>the perfect goodness implied in the +moral struggle, or the power through which goodness is made to triumph +in the universe</i> to the justification of moral faith. While the former +of these arguments identifies God with being, the latter defines God in +terms of the intent or outcome of being. Thus, while the epistemological +argument does not distinguish God and the world, the latter does so, +assuming that independent reality can be attributed to the stages of a +process and to the purpose that dominates it.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Cosmological Proof of God.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_89" id="Section_89">89</a>. The <i>cosmological</i> proof of God approaches him through the +attribute of creative omnipotence. The common principle of causal +explanation refers the origin of natural events to similar antecedent +events. But there must be some <i>first cause</i> from which the whole series +is derived, a cause which is ultimate, sufficient to itself, and the +responsible author of the world. Because God's function as creator was a +part of the Christian teaching, and because <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204"></a>[<a href="./images/204.png">204</a>]</span>explanation by causes is +habitual with common sense, this argument has had great vogue. But in +philosophy it has declined in importance, chiefly because it has been +absorbed in arguments which deal with the <i>kind</i> of causality proper to +a first cause or world-ground. The argument that follows is a case in +point.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Teleological Proof of God.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_90" id="Section_90">90</a>. The <i>teleological</i> proof argues that the world can owe its origin +only to an <i>intelligent first cause</i>. The evidence for this is furnished +by the cunning contrivances and beneficent adaptations of nature. These +could not have come about through chance or the working of mechanical +forces, but only through the foresight of a rational will. This argument +originally infers God from the character of nature and history; and the +extension of mechanical principles to organic and social phenomena, +especially as stimulated by Darwin's principle of natural selection, has +tended greatly to diminish its importance. When, on the other hand, for +nature and history there are substituted the intellectual and moral +activities themselves, and the inference is made to the ideal which they +imply, the teleological argument merges into the ontological. But the +old-fashioned statement of it remains in the form of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205"></a>[<a href="./images/205.png">205</a>]</span>religious faith, +and in this capacity it has had the approval even of Hume and Kant, the +philosophers who have contributed most forcibly to its overthrow as a +demonstration of God. They agree that the <i>acknowledgment</i> of God in +nature and history is the sequel to a theistic belief, and an inevitable +attitude on the part of the religious consciousness.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">God and the World. Theism and Pantheism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_91" id="Section_91">91</a>. Another group of ideas belonging to philosophical theology +consists of three generalizations respecting God's relation to the +world, known as <i>theism</i>, <i>pantheism</i>, and <i>deism</i>. Although, +theoretically, these are corollaries of the different arguments for God, +two of them, theism and pantheism, owe their importance to their rivalry +as religious tendencies. <i>Theism</i> emphasizes that attitude to God which +recognizes in him an historical personage, in some sense distinct from +both the world and man, which are his works and yet stand in an external +relationship to him. It expresses the spirit of ethical and monotheistic +religion, and is therefore the natural belief of the Christian. +<i>Pantheism</i> appears in primitive religion as an animistic or +polytheistic sense of the presence of a divine principle diffused +throughout nature. But it figures most notably <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206"></a>[<a href="./images/206.png">206</a>]</span>in the history of +religions, in the highly reflective Brahmanism of India. In sharp +opposition to Christianity, this religion preaches the indivisible unity +of the world and the illusoriness of the individual's sense of his own +independent reality. In spite of the fact that such a doctrine is alien +to the spirit of Christianity, it enters into Christian theology through +the influence of philosophy. The theoretical idea of God tends, as we +have seen, to the identification of him with the world as its most real +principle. Or it bestows upon him a nature so logical and formal, and so +far removed from the characters of humanity, as to forbid his entering +into personal or social relations. Such reflections concerning God find +their religious expression in a mystical sense of unity, which has in +many cases either entirely replaced or profoundly modified the theistic +strain in Christianity. In current philosophy pantheism appears in the +epistemological argument which identifies God with being; while the +chief bulwark of theism is the ethical argument, with its provision for +a distinction between the actual world and ideal principle of evolution.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Deism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_92" id="Section_92">92</a>. While theism and pantheism appear to be permanent phases in the +philosophy of religion, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207"></a>[<a href="./images/207.png">207</a>]</span><i>deism</i> is the peculiar product of the +eighteenth century. It is based upon a repudiation of supernaturalism +and "enthusiasm," on the one hand, and a literal acceptance of the +cosmological and teleological proofs on the other. Religions, like all +else, were required, in this epoch of clear thinking, to submit to the +canons of experimental observation and practical common sense. These +authorize only a <i>natural religion</i>, the acknowledgment in pious living +of a God who, having contrived this natural world, has given it over to +the rule, not of priests and prophets, but of natural law. The +artificiality of its conception of God, and the calculating spirit of +its piety, make deism a much less genuine expression of the religious +experience than either the moral chivalry of theism or the intellectual +and mystical exaltation of pantheism.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Metaphysics and Theology.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_93" id="Section_93">93</a>. The systematic development of philosophy leads to the inclusion of +conceptions of God within the problem of metaphysics, and the +subordination of the proof of God to the determination of the +fundamental principle of reality. There will always remain, however, an +outstanding theological discipline, whose function it is to interpret +worship, or the living religious <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208"></a>[<a href="./images/208.png">208</a>]</span>attitude, in terms of the theoretical +principles of philosophy.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Psychology is the Theory of the Soul.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_94" id="Section_94">94</a>. <i>Psychology is the theory of the soul.</i> As we have already seen, +the rise of scepticism directs attention from the object of thought to +the thinker, and so emphasizes the self as a field for theoretical +investigation. But the original and the dominating interest in the self +is a practical one. The precept, <ins class="greek" title="gnôthi seauton">γνῶθι σεαυτόν</ins>, has its +deepest justification in the concern for the salvation of one's soul. In +primitive and half-instinctive belief the self is recognized in +practical relations. In its animistic phase this belief admitted of such +relations with all living creatures, and extended the conception of life +very generally to natural processes. Thus in the beginning the self was +doubtless indistinguishable from the vital principle. In the first +treatise on psychology, the "<ins class="greek" title="peri Psychês">περὶ Ψυχῆς</ins>" of Aristotle, this +interpretation finds a place in theoretical philosophy. For Aristotle +the soul is the <i>entelechy</i> of the body—that function or activity which +makes a man of it. He recognized, furthermore, three stages in this +activity: the nutritive, sensitive, and rational souls, or the +vegetable, animal, and distinctively human natures, respectively. The +rational soul, in its <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209"></a>[<a href="./images/209.png">209</a>]</span>own proper activity, is man's highest +prerogative, the soul to be saved. By virtue of it man rises above +bodily conditions, and lays hold on the divine and eternal. But Plato, +who, as we have seen, was ever ready to grant reality to the ideal apart +from the circumstances of its particular embodiment, had already +undertaken to demonstrate the immortality of the soul on the ground of +its distinctive nature.<a name="FNanchor_209:16_84" id="FNanchor_209:16_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_209:16_84" class="fnanchor">[209:16]</a> According to his way of thinking, the +soul's essentially moral nature made it incapable of destruction through +the operation of natural causes. It is evident, then, that there were +already ideas in vogue capable of interpreting the Christian teaching +concerning the existence of a soul, or of an inner essence of man +capable of being made an object of divine interest.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Spiritual Substance</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_95" id="Section_95">95</a>. The immediate effect of Christianity was to introduce into +philosophy as one of its cardinal doctrines the theory of a spiritual +being, constituting the true self of the individual, and separable from +the body. The difference recognized in Plato and Aristotle between the +divine spark and the appetitive and perceptual parts of human nature was +now emphasized. The former (frequently called the "spirit," to +distinguish <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210"></a>[<a href="./images/210.png">210</a>]</span>it from the lower soul) was defined as a <i>substance</i> having +the attributes of thought and will. The fundamental argument for its +existence was the immediate appeal to self-consciousness; and it was +further defined as indestructible on the ground of its being utterly +discontinuous and incommensurable with its material environment. This +theory survives at the present day in the conception of pure activity, +but on the whole the attributes of the soul have superseded its +substance.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Intellectualism and Voluntarism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_96" id="Section_96">96</a>. <i>Intellectualism and voluntarism</i> are the two rival possibilities +of emphasis when the soul is defined in terms of its known activities. +Wherever the essence of personality is in question, as also occurs in +the case of theology, thought and will present their respective claims +to the place of first importance. <i>Intellectualism would make will +merely the concluding phase of thought, while voluntarism would reduce +thought to one of the interests of a general appetency.</i> It is evident +that idealistic theories will be much concerned with this question of +priority. It is also true, though less evident, that intellectualism, +since it emphasizes the general and objective features of the mind, +tends to subordinate the individual to the universal; while voluntarism, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211"></a>[<a href="./images/211.png">211</a>]</span>emphasizing desire and action, is relatively individualistic, and so, +since there are many individuals, also pluralistic.<a name="FNanchor_211:17_85" id="FNanchor_211:17_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_211:17_85" class="fnanchor">[211:17]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, Determinism, and +Indeterminism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_97" id="Section_97">97</a>. The question of the <i>freedom of the will</i> furnishes a favorite +controversial topic in philosophy. For the interest at stake is no less +than the individual's responsibility before man and God for his good or +bad works. It bears alike upon science, religion, and philosophy, and is +at the same time a question of most fundamental practical importance. +But this diffusion of the problem has led to so considerable a +complication of it that it becomes necessary in outlining it to define +two issues. In the first place, the concept of freedom is designed to +express generally the distinction between man and the rest of nature. To +make man in all respects <i>the product and creature of his natural +environment</i> would be to deny freedom and accept the radically +<i>necessitarian</i> doctrine. The question still remains, however, as to the +causes which dominate man. He may be free from nature, and yet be ruled +by God, or by distinctively spiritual causes, such as ideas or +character. Where in general the will is regarded as submitting only to a +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212"></a>[<a href="./images/212.png">212</a>]</span><i>spiritual causation</i> proper to its own realm, the conception is best +named <i>determinism</i>; though in the tradition of philosophy it is held to +be a doctrine of freedom, because contrasted with the necessitarianism +above defined. There remains <i>indeterminism</i>, which attributes to the +will a spontaneity that makes possible the <i>direct presence to it of +genuine alternatives</i>. The issue may here coincide with that between +intellectualism and voluntarism. If, <i>e.g.</i>, in God's act of creation, +his ideals and standards are prior to his fiat, his conduct is +determined; whereas it is free in the radical or indeterministic sense +if his ideals themselves are due to his sheer will. This theory involves +at a certain point in action the absence of cause. On this account the +free will is often identified with <i>chance</i>, in which case it loses its +distinction from nature, and we have swung round the circle.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Immortality. Survival and Eternalism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_98" id="Section_98">98</a>. There is similar complexity in the problem concerning +<i>immortality</i>. Were the extreme claims of naturalism to be established, +there would be no ground whatsoever upon which to maintain the +immortality of man, mere dust returning unto dust. The philosophical +concept of immortality is due to the supposition that the quintessence +of the individual's nature is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213"></a>[<a href="./images/213.png">213</a>]</span>divine.<a name="FNanchor_213:18_86" id="FNanchor_213:18_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_213:18_86" class="fnanchor">[213:18]</a> But several possibilities +are at this point open to us. The first would maintain the survival +after death of a recognizable and discrete personality. Another would +suppose a preservation after death, through being taken up into the life +of God. Still another, the theory commonly maintained on the ground of +rationalistic and idealistic metaphysics, would deny that immortality +has to do with life after death, and affirm that it signifies the +perpetual membership of the human individual in a realm of eternity +through the truth or virtue that is in him. But this interpretation +evidently leaves open the question of the immortality of that which is +distinctive and personal in human nature.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Problems and Method.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_99" id="Section_99">99</a>. So far we have followed the fortunes only of the "spirit" of man. +What of that lower soul through which he is identified with the fortunes +of his body? When philosophy gradually ceased, in the sixteenth and +seventeenth centuries, to be "the handmaid of religion," there arose a +renewed interest in that part of human nature lying between the strictly +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214"></a>[<a href="./images/214.png">214</a>]</span>physiological functions, on the one hand, and thought and will on the +other. Descartes and Spinoza analyzed what they called the "passions," +meaning such states of mind as are conditioned by a concern for the +interests of the body. At a later period, certain English philosophers, +following Locke, traced the dependence of ideas upon the senses. Their +method was that of <i>introspection</i>, or the direct examination by the +individual of his own ideas, and for the sake of noting their origin and +composition from simple factors. The lineal descendants of these same +English philosophers defined more carefully the process of +<i>association</i>, whereby the complexity and sequence of ideas are brought +about, and made certain conjectures as to its dependence upon properties +and transactions in the physical brain. These are the three main +philosophical sources of what has now grown to be the separate <i>natural +science of psychology</i>. It will be noted that there are two +characteristics which all of these studies have in common. They deal +with the experience of the individual as composing his own private +history, and tend to attribute the specific course which this private +history takes to bodily conditions. It is only recently that these +investigations have <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215"></a>[<a href="./images/215.png">215</a>]</span>acquired sufficient unity and exclusiveness of aim +to warrant their being regarded as a special science. But such is now so +far the case that the psychologist of this type pursues his way quite +independently of philosophy. It is true his research has advanced +considerably beyond his understanding of its province. But it is +generally recognized that he must examine those very <i>factors of +subjectivity</i> which the natural scientist otherwise seeks to evade, and, +furthermore, that he must seek to <i>provide for them in nature</i>. He +treats the inner life in what Locke called "the plain historical +method," that is to say, instead of interpreting and defining its ideas, +he analyzes and reports upon its content. He would not seek to justify a +moral judgment, as would ethics, or to criticise the cogency of thought, +as would logic; but only to describe the actual state as he found it. In +order to make his data commensurable with the phenomena of nature, he +discovers or defines bodily conditions for the subjective content which +he analyzes. His fundamental principle of method is the postulate of +<i>psycho-physical parallelism</i>, according to which he assumes a <i>state of +brain or nervous system for every state of mind</i>. But in adopting a +province and a method the psychologist <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216"></a>[<a href="./images/216.png">216</a>]</span>foregoes finality of truth after +the manner of all natural science. He deals admittedly with an aspect of +experience, and his conclusions are no more adequate to the nature of +the self than they are to the nature of outer objects. An admirable +reference to this abstract division of experience occurs in Külpe's +"Introduction to Philosophy":</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"For the developed consciousness, as for the naive, every +experience is an unitary whole; and it is only the habit of +abstract reflection upon experience that makes the objective +and subjective worlds seem to fall apart as originally +different forms of existence. Just as a plane curve can be +represented in analytical geometry as the function of two +variables, the abscissæ and the ordinates, without prejudice +to the unitary course of the curve itself, so the world of +human experience may be reduced to a subjective and an +objective factor, without prejudice to its real +coherence."<a name="FNanchor_215:19_87" id="FNanchor_215:19_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_215:19_87" class="fnanchor">[215:19]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">Psychology and Philosophy.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_100" id="Section_100">100</a>. The problems of psychology, like those of theology, tend to +disappear as independent philosophical topics. The ultimate nature of +the self will continue to interest philosophers—more deeply, perhaps, +than any aspect of experience—but their conception of it will be a +corollary of their metaphysics and epistemology. The remainder of the +field of the old philosophical psychology, the introspective and +experimental <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217"></a>[<a href="./images/217.png">217</a>]</span>analysis of special states of mind, is already the +province of a natural science which is becoming more and more free from +the stand-point and method of philosophy.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Transition from Classification by Problems to Classification +by Doctrines. Naturalism. Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute +Realism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_101" id="Section_101">101</a>. Reminding ourselves anew that philosophical problems cannot be +treated in isolation from one another, we shall hereinafter seek to +become acquainted with general stand-points that give systematic unity +to the issues which have been enumerated. Such stand-points are not +clearly defined by those who occupy them, and they afford no clear-cut +classification of all historical philosophical philosophies. But +system-making in philosophy is commonly due to the moving in an +individual mind of some most significant idea; and certain of these +ideas have reappeared so frequently as to define more or less clearly +marked tendencies, or continuous strands, out of which the history of +thought is forever weaving itself. Such is clearly the case with +<i>naturalism</i>. From the beginning until now there have been men whose +philosophy is a summation of the natural sciences, whose entire thought +is based upon an acceptance of the methods and the fundamental +conceptions <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218"></a>[<a href="./images/218.png">218</a>]</span>of these disciplines. This tendency stands in the history +of thought for the conviction that the visible and tangible world which +interacts with the body is veritable reality. This philosophy is +realistic and empirical to an extent entirely determined by its belief +concerning being. But while naturalism is only secondarily +epistemological, <i>subjectivism</i> and <i>absolute idealism</i> have their very +source in the self-examination and the self-criticism of thought. +Subjectivism signifies the conviction that the knower cannot escape +himself. If reality is to be kept within the range of possible +knowledge, it must be defined in terms of the processes or states of +selves. <i>Absolute idealism</i> arises from a union of this epistemological +motive with a recognition of what are regarded as the logical +necessities to which reality must submit. Reality must be both knowledge +and rational knowledge; the object, in short, of an absolute mind, which +shall be at once all-containing and systematic. This rationalistic +motive was, however, not originally associated with an idealistic +epistemology, but with the common-sense principle that being is +discovered and not constituted by thought. Such an <i>absolute realism</i> +is, like naturalism, primarily metaphysical rather than +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219"></a>[<a href="./images/219.png">219</a>]</span>epistemological; but, unlike naturalism, it seeks to define reality as +a logical or ethical necessity.</p> + +<p>Under these several divisions, then, we shall meet once more with the +special problems of philosophy, but this time they will be ranged in an +order that is determined by some central doctrine. They will appear as +parts not of the general problem of philosophy, but of some definite +system of philosophy.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_180:1_69" id="Footnote_180:1_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_180:1_69"><span class="label">[180:1]</span></a> Cf. § <a href="#Section_68">68</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_182:2_70" id="Footnote_182:2_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182:2_70"><span class="label">[182:2]</span></a> The Socratic distinction between the logical and the +psychological treatment of belief finds its best expression in Plato's +<i>Gorgias</i>, especially, 454, 455. Cf. also § <a href="#Section_29">29</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_182:3_71" id="Footnote_182:3_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182:3_71"><span class="label">[182:3]</span></a> Thus, e. g. Hegel. See § <a href="#Section_179">179</a>. Cf. also §§ <a href="#Section_199">199</a>, <a href="#Section_200">200</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_183:4_72" id="Footnote_183:4_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_183:4_72"><span class="label">[183:4]</span></a> Cf. § <a href="#Section_84">84</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_184:5_73" id="Footnote_184:5_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184:5_73"><span class="label">[184:5]</span></a> See § 69, <a href="#Footnote_173:16_64"><i>note</i></a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_184:6_74" id="Footnote_184:6_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184:6_74"><span class="label">[184:6]</span></a> The reader will find a good illustration of eristic in +Plato's <i>Euthydemus</i>, 275.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_187:7_75" id="Footnote_187:7_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_187:7_75"><span class="label">[187:7]</span></a> The reader can find these rules, and the detail of the +traditional formal logic, in any elementary text-book, such as, e. g., +Jevons: <i>Elements of Logic</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_189:8_76" id="Footnote_189:8_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_189:8_76"><span class="label">[189:8]</span></a> What is called "the algebra of logic" seeks to obtain +an unequivocal symbolic expression for these truths.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_192:9_77" id="Footnote_192:9_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_192:9_77"><span class="label">[192:9]</span></a> Plato: <i>Protagoras</i>, 351. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_194:10_78" id="Footnote_194:10_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_194:10_78"><span class="label">[194:10]</span></a> Plato: <i>Apology</i>, 41. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_195:11_79" id="Footnote_195:11_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_195:11_79"><span class="label">[195:11]</span></a> Quoted by Paulsen in his <i>System of Ethics</i>. +Translation by Thilly, p. 69.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_198:12_80" id="Footnote_198:12_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198:12_80"><span class="label">[198:12]</span></a> Cf. § <a href="#Section_160">160</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_198:13_81" id="Footnote_198:13_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198:13_81"><span class="label">[198:13]</span></a> Cf. § <a href="#Section_177">177</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_199:14_82" id="Footnote_199:14_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_199:14_82"><span class="label">[199:14]</span></a> Concerning the duty of philosophy to religion in these +matters, cf. Descartes: <i>Meditations</i>, <i>Dedication</i>. Translation by +Veitch, p. 81.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_201:15_83" id="Footnote_201:15_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_201:15_83"><span class="label">[201:15]</span></a> The school-philosophy that flourished from the +eleventh to the fifteenth century, under the authority of the church.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_209:16_84" id="Footnote_209:16_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_209:16_84"><span class="label">[209:16]</span></a> Especially in the <i>Phædo</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_211:17_85" id="Footnote_211:17_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_211:17_85"><span class="label">[211:17]</span></a> Schopenhauer is a notable exception. Cf. §§ <a href="#Section_135">135</a>, <a href="#Section_138">138</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_213:18_86" id="Footnote_213:18_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_213:18_86"><span class="label">[213:18]</span></a> It is interesting, however, to observe that current +spiritualistic theories maintain a naturalistic theory of immortality, +verifiable, it is alleged, in certain extraordinary empirical +observations.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_215:19_87" id="Footnote_215:19_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_215:19_87"><span class="label">[215:19]</span></a> Translation by Pillsbury and Titchener, p. 59.</p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220"></a>[<a href="./images/220.png">220</a>]</span></p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221"></a>[<a href="./images/221.png">221</a>]</span></p> +<h2>PART III</h2> + +<h3>SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY</h3> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222"></a>[<a href="./images/222.png">222</a>]</span></p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223"></a>[<a href="./images/223.png">223</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_VIII" id="Chap_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<h3>NATURALISM<a name="FNanchor_223:1_88" id="FNanchor_223:1_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_223:1_88" class="fnanchor" style="font-weight: normal; font-size: 80%">[223:1]</a></h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">The General Meaning of Materialism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_102" id="Section_102">102</a>. The meaning conveyed by any philosophical term consists largely +of the distinctions which it suggests. Its peculiar quality, like the +physiognomy of the battle-scarred veteran, is a composite of the +controversies which it has survived. There is, therefore, an almost +unavoidable confusion attendant upon the denomination of any early phase +of philosophy as <i>materialism</i>. But in the historical beginnings of +thought, as also in the common-sense of all ages, there is at any rate +present a very essential strand of this theory. The naive habit of mind +which, in the sixth century before Christ, prompted successive Greek +thinkers to define reality in terms <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224"></a>[<a href="./images/224.png">224</a>]</span>of water, air, and fire, is in this +respect one with that exhibited in Dr. Samuel Johnson's smiting the +ground with his stick in curt refutation of Bishop Berkeley's +idea-philosophy. There is a theoretical instinct, not accidental or +perverse, but springing from the very life-preserving equipment of the +organism, which attributes reality to <i>tangible space-filling things +encountered by the body</i>. For obvious reasons of self-interest the +organism is first of all endowed with a sense of contact, and the more +delicate senses enter into its practical economy as means of +anticipating or avoiding contact. From such practical expectations +concerning the proximity of that which may press upon, injure, or +displace the body, arise the first crude judgments of reality. And these +are at the same time the nucleus of naive philosophy and the germinal +phase of materialism.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Corporeal Being.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_103" id="Section_103">103</a>. The first philosophical movement among the Greeks was a series of +attempts to reduce the tangible world to unity, and of these the +conception offered by Anaximander is of marked interest in its bearing +upon the development of materialism. This philosopher is remarkable for +having <i>defined</i> his first principle, instead of having chosen it from +among the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225"></a>[<a href="./images/225.png">225</a>]</span>different elements already distinguished by common-sense. He +thought the unity of nature to consist in its periodic evolution from +and return into one infinite sum of material (<ins class="greek" title="to apeiron">τὸ ἄπειρον</ins>), +which, much in the manner of the "nebula" of modern science, is +conceived as both indeterminate in its actual state and infinitely rich +in its potentiality. The conception of matter, the most familiar +commonplace of science, begins to be recognizable. It has here reached +the point of signifying a common substance for all tangible things, a +substance that in its own general and omnipresent nature is without the +special marks that distinguish these tangible things from one another. +And in so far the philosophy of Anaximander is materialistic.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Corporeal Processes. Hylozoism and Mechanism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_104" id="Section_104">104</a>. But the earliest thinkers are said to be <i>hylozoists</i>, rather +than strict materialists, because of their failure to make certain +distinctions in connection with the <i>processes</i> of matter. The term +hylozoism unites with the conception of the formless material of the +world (<ins class="greek" title="hylê">ὕλη</ins>), that of an animating power to which its +formations and transformations are due. Hylozoism itself was not a +deliberate synthesis of these two conceptions, but a primitive practical +tendency to universalize the conception, of life. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226"></a>[<a href="./images/226.png">226</a>]</span>Such "animism" +instinctively associates with an object's bulk and hardness a capacity +for locomotion and general initiative. And the material principles +defined by the philosophers retain this vague and comprehensive +attribute as a matter of course, until it is distinguished and separated +through attempts to understand it.</p> + +<p>That aspect of natural process which was most impressive to Greek minds +of the reflective type was the alternation of "generation and decay." In +full accord with his more ancient master, Epicurus, the Latin poet +Lucretius writes:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Thus neither can death-dealing motions keep the mastery +always, nor entomb existence forevermore; nor, on the other +hand, can the birth and increase giving motions of things +preserve them always after they are born. Thus the war of +first beginnings waged from eternity is carried on with +dubious issue: now here, now there, the life-bringing elements +of things get the mastery and are o'ermastered in turn: with +the funeral wail blends the cry which babies raise when they +enter the borders of light; and no night ever followed day, +nor morning night, that heard not, mingling with the sickly +infant's cries, wailings of the attendants on death and black +funeral."<a name="FNanchor_226:2_89" id="FNanchor_226:2_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_226:2_89" class="fnanchor">[226:2]</a></p></div> + +<p>In a similar vein, the earliest conceptions of natural evolution +attributed it to the coworking of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227"></a>[<a href="./images/227.png">227</a>]</span>two principles, that of Love or union +and that of Hate or dissolution. The process is here distinguished from +the material of nature, but is still described in the language of +practical life. A distinction between two aspects of vital phenomena is +the next step. These may be regarded in respect either of the motion and +change which attend them, or the rationality which informs them. Life is +both effective and significant. Although neither of these ideas ever +wholly ceases to be animistic, they may nevertheless be applied quite +independently of one another. The one reduces the primitive animistic +world to the lower end of its scale, the other construes it in terms of +a purposive utility commensurable with that of human action. Now it is +with <i>mechanism</i>, the former of these diverging ways, that the +development of materialism is identified. For this philosophy a thing +need have no value to justify its existence, nor any acting intelligence +to which it may owe its origin. Its bulk and position are sufficient for +its being, and the operation of forces capable of integrating, dividing, +or moving it is sufficient for its derivation and history. In short, +there is no rhyme or reason at the heart of things, but only actual +matter distributed by sheer force. With this elimination <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228"></a>[<a href="./images/228.png">228</a>]</span>of the element +of purposiveness from the hylozoistic world, the content and process of +nature are fitted to one another. Matter is that which is moved by +force, and force is the determining principle of the motions of matter. +Materialism is now definitely equipped with its fundamental conceptions.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Materialism and Physical Science.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_105" id="Section_105">105</a>. The central conceptions of materialism as a philosophical theory +differ from those employed in the physical sciences only in what is +demanded of them. The scientist reports upon physical phenomena without +accepting any further responsibility, while those who like Lucretius +maintain a physical metaphysics, must, like him, prove that "the minute +bodies of matter from everlasting continually uphold the sum of things." +But, though they employ them in their own way, materialists and all +other exponents of naturalism derive their central conceptions from the +physical sciences, and so reflect the historical development through +which these sciences have passed. To certain historical phases of +physical science, in so far as these bear directly upon the meaning of +naturalism, we now turn.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Development of the Conceptions of Physical Science. Space +and Matter.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_106" id="Section_106">106</a>. From the earliest times down to the present day the groundwork of +materialism has <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229"></a>[<a href="./images/229.png">229</a>]</span>most commonly been cast in the form of an <i>atomic +theory</i>. Democritus, the first system-builder of this school, adopted +the conception of indivisible particles (<ins class="greek" title="atomoi">ἄτομοι</ins>), impenetrable +in their occupancy of space, and varying among themselves only in form, +order, and position. To provide for the motion that distributes them he +conceived them as separated from one another by empty space. From this +it follows that the void is as real as matter, or, as Democritus himself +is reputed to have said, "thing is not more real than no-thing."</p> + +<p>But atomism has not been by any means universally regarded as the most +satisfactory conception of the relation between space and matter. Not +only does it require two kinds of being, with the different attributes +of extension and hardness, respectively,<a name="FNanchor_229:3_90" id="FNanchor_229:3_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_229:3_90" class="fnanchor">[229:3]</a> but it would also seem +to be experimentally inadequate in the case of the more subtle physical +processes, such as light. The former of these is a speculative +consideration, and as such had no little weight with the French +philosopher Descartes, whose divisions and definitions so profoundly +affected the course of thought in these <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230"></a>[<a href="./images/230.png">230</a>]</span>matters after the sixteenth +century. Holding also "that a vacuum or space in which there is +absolutely no body is repugnant to reason," and that an indivisible +space-filling particle is self-contradictory, he was led to <i>identify +space and matter</i>; that is, to make matter as indispensable to space as +space to matter. There is, then, but one kind of corporeal being, whose +attribute is extension, and whose modes are motion and rest. The most +famous application of the mechanical conceptions which he bases upon +this first principle, is his theory of the planets, which are conceived +to be embedded in a transparent medium, and to move with it, vortex +fashion, about the sun.<a name="FNanchor_230:4_91" id="FNanchor_230:4_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_230:4_91" class="fnanchor">[230:4]</a></p> + +<p>But the conception of the space-filling continuity of material substance +owes its prominence at the present time to the experimental hypothesis +of <i>ether</i>. This substance, originally conceived to occupy the +intermolecular spaces and to serve as a medium for the propagation of +undulations, is now regarded by many physicists as replacing matter. "It +is the great hope of science at the present day," says a contemporary +exponent of naturalism, "that hard and heavy matter will be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231"></a>[<a href="./images/231.png">231</a>]</span>shown to be +ether in motion."<a name="FNanchor_231:5_92" id="FNanchor_231:5_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_231:5_92" class="fnanchor">[231:5]</a> Such a theory would reduce bodies to the +relative displacements of parts of a continuous substance, which would +be first of all defined as spacial, and would possess such further +properties as special scientific hypotheses might require.</p> + +<p>Two broadly contrasting theories thus appear: that which defines matter +as a continuous substance coextensive with space; and that which defines +it as a discrete substance divided by empty space. But both theories are +seriously affected by the peculiarly significant development of the +conception of force.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Motion and its Cause. Development and Extension of the +Conception of Force.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_107" id="Section_107">107</a>. In the Cartesian system the cause of motion was pressure within a +plenum. But in the seventeenth century this notion encountered the +system of Newton, a system which seemed to involve action at a distance. +In the year 1728 Voltaire wrote from London:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When a Frenchman arrives in London, he finds a very great +change, in philosophy as well as in most other things. In +Paris he left the world all full of matter; here he finds +absolute vacua. At Paris the universe is seen filled up with +ethereal vortices, while here the same <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232"></a>[<a href="./images/232.png">232</a>]</span>space is occupied with +the play of the invisible forces of gravitation. In Paris the +earth is painted for us longish like an egg, and in London it +is oblate like a melon. At Paris the pressure of the moon +causes the ebb and flow of tides; in England, on the other +hand, the sea gravitates toward the moon, so that at the same +time when the Parisians demand high water of the moon, the +gentlemen of London require an ebb."<a name="FNanchor_232:6_93" id="FNanchor_232:6_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_232:6_93" class="fnanchor">[232:6]</a></p></div> + +<p>But these differences are not matters of taste, nor even rival +hypotheses upon an equal footing. The Newtonian system of mechanics, the +consummation of a development initiated by Galileo, differed from the +vortex theory of Descartes as exact science differs from speculation and +unverified conjecture. And this difference of method carried with it +eventually certain profound differences of content, distinguishing the +Newtonian theory even from that of Democritus, with which it had so much +in common. Although Democritus had sought to avoid the element of +purposiveness in the older hylozoism by referring the motions of bodies +as far as possible to the impact of other bodies, he nevertheless +attributed these motions ultimately to <i>weight</i>, signifying thereby a +certain <i>downward disposition</i>. Now it is true that in his general +belief Newton himself is not free from hylozoism. He thought of the +motions of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233"></a>[<a href="./images/233.png">233</a>]</span>planets themselves as initiated and quickened by a power +emanating ultimately from God. They are "impressed by an intelligent +Agent," and</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"can be the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and skill +of a powerful ever-living Agent who, being in all places, is +more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless +uniform <i>sensorium</i>, and thereby to form and reform the parts +of the universe, than we are by our will to move the parts of +our own bodies."<a name="FNanchor_233:7_94" id="FNanchor_233:7_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_233:7_94" class="fnanchor">[233:7]</a></p></div> + +<p>But by the side of these statements must be set his famous disclaimer, +"<i>hypotheses non fingo</i>." In his capacity of natural philosopher he did +not seek to explain motions, but only to describe them. Disbelieving as +he did in action at a distance, he saw no possibility of explanation +short of a reference of them to God; but such "hypotheses" he thought to +be no proper concern of science. As a consequence, the mathematical +formulation of motions came, through him, to be regarded as the entire +content of mechanics. The notion of an efficient cause of motion is +still suggested by the term <i>force</i>, but even this term within the +system of mechanics refers always to a definite amount of motion, or +measurement of relative motion. And the same is true of <i>attraction</i>, +<i>action</i>, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234"></a>[<a href="./images/234.png">234</a>]</span><i>reaction</i>, and the like. The further explanation of motion, +the definition of a virtue or potency that produces it, first a +neglected problem, then an irrelevant problem, is finally, for a +naturalistic philosophy in which this progression is completed, an +insoluble problem. For the sequel to this purely descriptive procedure +on the part of science is the disavowal of "metaphysics" by those who +will have no philosophy but science. Thus the scientific conservatism of +Newton has led to the positivistic and agnostic phase of naturalism. But +a further treatment of this development must be reserved until the issue +of epistemology shall have been definitely raised.</p> + +<p>A different emphasis within the general mechanical scheme, attaching +especial importance to the conceptions of force and energy, has led to a +rival tendency in science and a contrasting type of naturalism. The +mechanical hypotheses hitherto described are all of a simple and readily +depicted type. They suggest an imagery quite in accord with common-sense +and with observation of the motions of great masses like the planets. +Material particles are conceived to move within a containing space; the +motions of corpuscles, atoms, or the minute parts of ether, differing +only in degree <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235"></a>[<a href="./images/235.png">235</a>]</span>from those of visible bodies. The whole physical +universe may be represented in the imagination as an aggregate of bodies +participating in motions of extraordinary complexity, but of one type. +But now let the emphasis be placed upon the determining causes rather +than upon the moving bodies themselves. In other words, let the bodies +be regarded as attributive and the forces as substantive. The result is +a radical alteration of the mechanical scheme and the transcendence of +common-sense imagery. This was one direction of outgrowth from the work +of Newton. His force of gravitation prevailed between bodies separated +by spaces of great magnitude. Certain of the followers of Newton, +notably Cotes, accepting the formulas of the master but neglecting his +allusions to the agency of God, accepted the principle of action at a +distance. <i>Force</i>, in short, <i>was conceived to pervade space of itself</i>. +But if force be granted this substantial and self-dependent character, +what further need is there of matter as a separate form of entity? For +does not the presence of matter consist essentially in resistance, +itself a case of force? Such reflections as these led Boscovich and +others to the radical departure of defining material particles <i>as +centres of force</i>.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236"></a>[<a href="./images/236.png">236</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Development and Extension of the Conception of Energy.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_108" id="Section_108">108</a>. But a more fruitful hypothesis of the same general order is due +to the attention directed to the conception of <i>energy</i>, or capacity for +work, by experimental discoveries of the possibility of reciprocal +transformations without loss, of motion, heat, electricity, and other +processes. The principle of the conservation of energy affirms the +quantitative constancy of that which is so transformed, measured, for +example, in terms of capacity to move units of mass against gravity. The +exponents of what is called "energetics" have in many cases come to +regard that the quantity of which is so conserved, as a substantial +reality whose forms and distributions compose nature. A contemporary +scientist, whose synthetic and dogmatic habit of mind has made him +eminent in the ranks of popular philosophy, writes as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Mechanical and chemical energy, sound and heat, light and +electricity, are mutually convertible; they seem to be but +different modes of one and the same fundamental force or +<i>energy</i>. Thence follows the important thesis of the unity of +all natural forces, or, as it may also be expressed, the +'monism of energy.'"<a name="FNanchor_236:8_95" id="FNanchor_236:8_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_236:8_95" class="fnanchor">[236:8]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237"></a>[<a href="./images/237.png">237</a>]</span>The conception of energy seems, indeed, to afford an exceptional +opportunity to naturalism. We have seen that the matter-motion theory +was satisfied to ignore, or regard as insoluble, problems concerning the +ultimate causes of things. Furthermore, as we shall presently see to +better advantage, the more strictly materialistic type of naturalism +must regard thought as an anomaly, and has no little difficulty with +life. But the conception of energy is more adaptable, and hence better +qualified to serve as a common denominator for various aspects of +experience. The very readiness with which we can picture the corpuscular +scheme is a source of embarrassment to the seeker after unity. That +which is so distinct is bristling with incompatibilities. The most +aggressive materialist hesitates to describe thought as a motion of +bodies in space. Energy, on the other hand, exacts little if anything +beyond the character of measurable power. Thought is at any rate in some +sense a power, and to some degree measurable. Recent discoveries of the +dependence of capacity for mental exertion upon physical vitality and +measurements of chemical energy received into the system <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238"></a>[<a href="./images/238.png">238</a>]</span>as food, and +somehow exhausted by the activities of thought, have lent plausibility +to the hypothesis of a universal energy of which physical and +"psychical" processes are alike manifestations. And the conception of +energy seems capable not only of unifying nature, but also of satisfying +the metaphysical demand for an efficient and moving cause. This term, +like "force" and "power," is endowed with such a significance by common +sense. Indeed, naturalism would seem here to have swung round toward its +hylozoistic starting-point. The exponent of energetics, like the naive +animistic thinker, attributes to nature a power like that which he feels +welling up within himself. When he acts upon the environment, like meets +like. Energetics, it is true, may obtain a definite meaning for its +central conception from the measurable behavior of external bodies, and +a meaning that may be quite free from vitalism or teleology. But in his +extension of the conception the author of a philosophical energetics +abandons this strict meaning, and blends his thought even with a phase +of subjectivism, known as <i>panpsychism</i>.<a name="FNanchor_238:9_96" id="FNanchor_238:9_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_238:9_96" class="fnanchor">[238:9]</a> This theory regards the +inward life of all nature as homogeneous with an immediately felt +activity or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239"></a>[<a href="./images/239.png">239</a>]</span>appetency, as energetics finds the inner life to be +homogeneous with the forces of nature. Both owe their philosophical +appeal to their apparent success in unifying the world upon a direct +empirical basis, and to their provision for the practical sense of +reality.</p> + +<p>Such, in brief, are the main alternatives available for a naturalistic +theory of being, in consequence of the historical development of the +fundamental conceptions of natural science.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Claims of Naturalism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_109" id="Section_109">109</a>. We turn now to an examination of the manner in which naturalism, +equipped with working principles, seeks to meet the special requirements +of philosophy. The conception of the unity of nature is directly in the +line of a purely scientific development, but naturalism takes the bold +and radical step of regarding nature so unified as coextensive with the +real, or at any rate knowable, universe. It will be remembered that +among the early Greeks Anaxagoras had referred the creative and +formative processes of nature to a non-natural or rational agency, which +he called the <i>Nous</i>. The adventitious character of this principle, the +external and almost purely nominal part which it played in the actual +cosmology of Anaxagoras, betrayed it into the hands <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240"></a>[<a href="./images/240.png">240</a>]</span>of the atomists, +with their more consistently naturalistic creed. Better, these maintain, +the somewhat dogmatic extension of conceptions proved to be successful +in the description of nature, than a vague dualism which can serve only +to distract the scientific attention and people the world with +obscurities. There is a remarkable passage in Lucretius in which atomism +is thus written large and inspired with cosmical eloquence:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"For verily not by design did the first-beginnings of things +station themselves each in its right place guided by keen +intelligence, nor did they bargain sooth to say what motions +each should assume, but because many in number and shifting +about in many ways throughout the universe, they are driven +and tormented by blows during infinite time past, after trying +motions and unions of every kind at length they fall into +arrangements such as those out of which our sum of things has +been formed, and by which too it is preserved through many +great years, when once it has been thrown into the appropriate +motions, and causes the streams to replenish the greedy sea +with copious river waters, and the earth, fostered by the heat +of the sun, to renew its produce, and the race of living +things to come up and flourish, and the gliding fires of ether +to live: all which these several things could in no wise bring +to pass, unless a store of matter could rise up from infinite +space, out of which store they are wont to make up in due +season whatever has been lost."<a name="FNanchor_240:10_97" id="FNanchor_240:10_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_240:10_97" class="fnanchor">[240:10]</a></p></div> + +<p>The prophecy of La Place, the great French mathematician, voices the +similar faith of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241"></a>[<a href="./images/241.png">241</a>]</span>eighteenth century in a mechanical understanding +of the universe:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The human mind, in the perfection it has been able to give to +astronomy, affords a feeble outline of such an intelligence. +Its discoveries in mechanics and in geometry, joined to that +of universal gravitation, have brought it within reach of +comprehending in the same analytical expressions the past and +future states of the system of the world."<a name="FNanchor_241:11_98" id="FNanchor_241:11_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_241:11_98" class="fnanchor">[241:11]</a></p></div> + +<p>As for God, the creative and presiding intelligence, La Place had "no +need of any such hypothesis."</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Task of Naturalism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_110" id="Section_110">110</a>. But these are the boasts of Homeric heroes before going into +battle. The moment such a general position is assumed there arise sundry +difficulties in the application of naturalistic principles to special +interests and groups of facts. It is one thing to project a mechanical +scheme in the large, but quite another to make explicit provision within +it for the origin of nature, for life, for the human self with its +ideals, and for society with its institutions. The naturalistic method +of meeting these problems involves a reduction all along the line in the +direction of such categories as are derived from the infra-organic +world. That which is not like the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242"></a>[<a href="./images/242.png">242</a>]</span>planetary system must be construed as +mechanical by indirection and subtlety.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Origin of the Cosmos.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_111" id="Section_111">111</a>. The origin of the present known natural world was the first +philosophical question to be definitely met by science. The general form +of solution which naturalism offers is anticipated in the most ancient +theories of nature. These already suppose that the observed mechanical +processes of the circular or periodic type, like the revolutions and +rotations of the stars, are incidents in a historical mechanical process +of a larger scale. Prior to the present fixed motions of the celestial +bodies, the whole mass of cosmic matter participated in irregular +motions analogous to present terrestrial redistributions. Such motions +may be understood to have resulted in the integration of separate +bodies, to which they at the same time imparted a rotary motion. It is +such a hypothesis that Lucretius paints in his bold, impressionistic +colors.</p> + +<p>But the development of mechanics paved the way for a definite scientific +theory, the so-called "nebular hypothesis," announced by La Place in +1796, and by the philosopher Kant at a still earlier date. Largely +through the Newtonian principle of the parallelogram of forces, the +present masses, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243"></a>[<a href="./images/243.png">243</a>]</span>orbits, and velocities were analyzed into a more +primitive process of concentration within a nebulous or highly diffused +aggregate of matter. And with the aid of the principle of the +conservation of energy this theory appears to make possible the +derivation of heat, light, and other apparently non-mechanical processes +from the same original energy of motion.</p> + +<p>But a persistently philosophical mind at once raises the question of the +origin of this primeval nebula itself, with a definite organization and +a vast potential energy that must, after all, be regarded as a part of +nature rather than its source. Several courses are here open to +naturalism. It may maintain that the question of ultimate origin is +unanswerable; it may regard such a process of concentration as extending +back through an infinitely long past;<a name="FNanchor_243:12_99" id="FNanchor_243:12_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_243:12_99" class="fnanchor">[243:12]</a> or, and this is the +favorite alternative for more constructive minds, the historical +cosmical process may be included within a still higher type of periodic +process, which is regarded as eternal. This last course has been +followed in the well-known synthetic naturalism of Herbert Spencer. +"Evolution," he says, "is the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244"></a>[<a href="./images/244.png">244</a>]</span>progressive integration of matter and +dissipation of motion." But such a process eventually runs down, and may +be conceived as giving place to a counter-process of devolution which +scatters the parts of matter and gathers another store of potential +motion. The two processes in alternation will then constitute a cosmical +system without beginning or end.</p> + +<p>In such wise a sweeping survey of the physical universe may be thought +in the terms of natural science. The uniformitarian method in geology, +resolving the history of the crust of the earth into known processes, +such as erosion and igneous fusion;<a name="FNanchor_244:13_100" id="FNanchor_244:13_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_244:13_100" class="fnanchor">[244:13]</a> and spectral analysis, with +its discoveries concerning the chemical constituents of distant bodies +through the study of their light, have powerfully reënforced this effort +of thought, and apparently completed an outline sketch of the universe +in terms of infra-organic processes.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Life. Natural Selection.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_112" id="Section_112">112</a>. But the cosmos must be made internally homogeneous in these same +terms. There awaits solution, in the first place, the serious problem of +the genesis and maintenance of life within a nature that is originally +and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245"></a>[<a href="./images/245.png">245</a>]</span>ultimately inorganic. The assimilation of the field of biology and +physiology to the mechanical cosmos had made little real progress prior +to the nineteenth century. Mechanical theories had, indeed, been +projected in the earliest age of philosophy, and proposed anew in the +seventeenth century.<a name="FNanchor_245:14_101" id="FNanchor_245:14_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_245:14_101" class="fnanchor">[245:14]</a> Nevertheless, the structural and functional +teleology of the organism remained as apparently irrefutable testimony +to the inworking of some principle other than that of mechanical +necessity. Indeed, the only fruitful method applicable to organic +phenomena was that which explained them in terms of purposive +adaptation. And it was its provision for a mechanical interpretation of +this very principle that gave to the Darwinian <i>law of natural +selection</i>, promulgated in 1859 in the "Origin of Species," so profound +a significance for naturalism. It threatened to reduce the last +stronghold of teleology, and completely to dispense with the intelligent +Author of nature.</p> + +<p>Darwin's hypothesis sought to explain the origin of animal species by +survival under competitive conditions of existence through the +possession of a structure suited to the environment. Only the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246"></a>[<a href="./images/246.png">246</a>]</span>most +elementary organism need be presupposed, together with slight variations +in the course of subsequent generations, and both may be conceived to +arise mechanically. There will then result in surviving organisms a +gradual accumulation of such variations as promote survival under the +special conditions of the environment. Such a principle had been +suggested as early as the time of Empedocles, but it remained for Darwin +to establish it with an unanswerable array of observation and +experimentation. If any organism whatsoever endowed with the power of +generation be allowed to have somehow come to be, naturalism now +promises to account for the whole subsequent history of organic +phenomena and the origin of any known species.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Mechanical Physiology.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_113" id="Section_113">113</a>. But what of life itself? The question of the derivation of +organic from inorganic matter has proved insoluble by direct means, and +the case of naturalism must here rest upon such facts as the chemical +homogeneity of these two kinds of matter, and the conformity of +physiological processes to more general physical laws. Organic matter +differs from inorganic only through the presence of proteid, a peculiar +product of known elements, which cannot be artificially <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247"></a>[<a href="./images/247.png">247</a>]</span>produced, but +which is by natural means perpetually dissolved into these elements +without any discoverable residuum. Respiration may be studied as a case +of aerodynamics, the circulation of the blood as a case of +hydrodynamics, and the heat given off in the course of work done by the +body as a case of thermodynamics. And although vitalistic theories still +retain a place in physiology, as do teleological theories in biology, on +the whole the naturalistic programme of a reduction of organic processes +to the type of the inorganic tends to prevail.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Mind. The Reduction to Sensation.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_114" id="Section_114">114</a>. The history of naturalism shows that, as in the case of life, so +also in the case of <i>mind</i>, its hypotheses were projected by the Greeks, +but precisely formulated and verified only in the modern period of +science. In the philosophy of Democritus the soul was itself an atom, +finer, rounder, and smoother than the ordinary, but thoroughly a part of +the mechanism of nature. The processes of the soul are construed as +interactions between the soul and surrounding objects. In sensation, the +thing perceived produces images by means of effluxes which impinge upon +the soul-atom. These images are not true reports of the outer world, but +must be revised by <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248"></a>[<a href="./images/248.png">248</a>]</span>thought before its real atomic structure emerges. +For this higher critical exercise of thought Democritus devised no +special atomic genesis. The result may be expressed either as the +invalidity of such operations of mind as he could provide for in his +universe, or the irreducibility to his chosen first principles of the +very thought which defined them. Later naturalism has generally +sacrificed epistemology to cosmology, and reduced thought to sensation. +Similarly, will has been regarded as a highly developed case of +instinct. Knowledge and will, construed as sensation and instinct, may +thus be interpreted in the naturalistic manner within the field of +biology.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Automatism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_115" id="Section_115">115</a>. But the actual content of sensation, and the actual feelings +which attend upon the promptings of instinct, still stubbornly testify +to the presence in the universe of something belonging to a wholly +different category from matter and motion. The attitude of naturalism in +this crucial issue has never been fixed and unwavering, but there has +gradually come to predominate a method of denying to the inner life all +efficacy and real significance in the cosmos, while admitting its +presence on the scene. It is a strange fact of history that Descartes, +the French philosopher who <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249"></a>[<a href="./images/249.png">249</a>]</span>prided himself on having rid the soul of all +dependence on nature, should have greatly contributed to this method. +But it is perhaps not so strange when we consider that every dualism is, +after all, symmetrical, and that consequently whatever rids the soul of +nature at the same time rids nature of the soul. It was Descartes who +first conceived the body and soul to be utterly distinct substances. The +corollary to this doctrine was his <i>automatism</i>, applied in his own +system to animals other than man, but which those less concerned with +religious tradition and less firmly convinced of the soul's originating +activity were not slow to apply universally. This theory conceived the +vital processes to take place quite regardless of any inner +consciousness, or even without its attendance. To this radical theory +the French materialists of the eighteenth century were especially +attracted. With them the active soul of Descartes, the distinct +spiritual entity, disappeared. This latter author had himself admitted a +department of the self, which he called the "passions," in which the +course and content of mind is determined by bodily conditions. Extending +this conception to the whole province of mind, they employed it to +demonstrate the thorough-going subordination of mind <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250"></a>[<a href="./images/250.png">250</a>]</span>to body. La +Mettrie, a physician and the author of a book entitled "L'Homme +Machine," was first interested in this thesis by a fever delirium, and +afterward adduced anatomical and pathological data in support of it. The +angle from which he views human life is well illustrated in the +following:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"What would have sufficed in the case of Julius Cæsar, of +Seneca, of Petronius, to turn their fearlessness into timidity +or braggartry? An obstruction in the spleen, the liver, or the +<i>vena portae</i>. For the imagination is intimately connected +with these viscera, and from them arise all the curious +phenomena of hypochondria and hysteria. . . . 'A mere nothing, a +little fibre, some trifling thing that the most subtle anatomy +cannot discover, would have made two idiots out of Erasmus and +Fontenelle.'"<a name="FNanchor_250:15_102" id="FNanchor_250:15_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_250:15_102" class="fnanchor">[250:15]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">Radical Materialism. Mind as an Epiphenomenon.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_116" id="Section_116">116</a>. The extreme claim that the soul is a physical organ of the body, +identical with the brain, marked the culmination of this militant +materialism, so good an instance of that over-simplification and +whole-hearted conviction characteristic of the doctrinaire propagandism +of France. Locke, the Englishman, had admitted that possibly the +substance which thinks is corporeal. In the letters of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251"></a>[<a href="./images/251.png">251</a>]</span>Voltaire this +thought has already found a more positive expression:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I am body, and I think; more I do not know. Shall I then +attribute to an unknown cause what I can so easily attribute +to the only fruitful cause I am acquainted with? In fact, +where is the man who, without an absurd godlessness, dare +assert that it is impossible for the Creator to endow matter +with thought and feeling?"<a name="FNanchor_251:16_103" id="FNanchor_251:16_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_251:16_103" class="fnanchor">[251:16]</a></p></div> + +<p>Finally, Holbach, the great systematizer of this movement, takes the +affair out of the hands of the Creator and definitively announces that +"a sensitive soul is nothing but a human brain so constituted that it +easily receives the motions communicated to it."<a name="FNanchor_251:17_104" id="FNanchor_251:17_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_251:17_104" class="fnanchor">[251:17]</a></p> + +<p>This theory has been considerably tempered since the age of Holbach. +Naturalism has latterly been less interested in identifying the soul +with the body, and more interested in demonstrating its dependence upon +specific bodily conditions, after the manner of La Mettrie. The +so-called higher faculties, such as thought and will, have been related +to central or <i>cortical</i> processes of the nervous system, processes of +connection and complication which within the brain itself supplement the +impulses and sensations congenitally and externally <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252"></a>[<a href="./images/252.png">252</a>]</span>stimulated. The +term "epiphenomenon" has been adopted to express the distinctness but +entire dependence of the mind. Man is "a conscious automaton." The real +course of nature passes through his nervous system, while consciousness +attends upon its functions like a shadow, present but not +efficient.<a name="FNanchor_252:18_105" id="FNanchor_252:18_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_252:18_105" class="fnanchor">[252:18]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">Knowledge, Positivism and Agnosticism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_117" id="Section_117">117</a>. Holbach's "Système de la Nature," published in 1770, marks the +culmination of the unequivocally materialistic form of naturalism. Its +epistemological difficulties, always more or less in evidence, have +since that day sufficed to discredit materialism, and to foster the +growth of a critical and apologetic form of naturalism known as +<i>positivism</i> or <i>agnosticism</i>. The modesty of this doctrine does not, it +is true, strike very deep. For, although it disclaims knowledge of +ultimate reality, it also forbids anyone else to have any. Knowledge, it +affirms, can be of but one type, that which comprises the verifiable +laws governing nature. All questions concerning <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253"></a>[<a href="./images/253.png">253</a>]</span>first causes are +futile, a stimulus only to excursions of fancy popularly mistaken for +knowledge. The superior certainty and stability which attaches to +natural science is to be permanently secured by the savant's steadfast +refusal to be led away after the false gods of metaphysics.</p> + +<p>But though this is sufficient ground for an agnostic policy, it does +prove an agnostic theory. The latter has sprung from a closer analysis +of knowledge, though it fails to make a very brave showing for +thoroughness and consistency. The crucial point has already been brought +within our view. The general principles of naturalism require that +knowledge shall be reduced to sensations, or impressions of the +environment upon the organism. But the environment and the sensations do +not correspond. The environment is matter and motion, force and energy; +the sensations are of motions, to be sure, but much more conspicuously +of colors, sounds, odors, pleasures, and pains. Critically, this may be +expressed by saying that since the larger part of sense-perception is so +unmistakably subjective, and since all knowledge alike must be derived +from this source, knowledge as a whole must be regarded as dealing only +with appearances. There are at least three agnostic <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254"></a>[<a href="./images/254.png">254</a>]</span>methods progressing +from this point. All agree that the inner or essential reality is +unfathomable. But, in the first place, those most close to the tradition +of materialism maintain that the most significant appearances, the +primary qualities, are those which compose a purely quantitative and +corporeal world. The inner essence of things may at any rate be +<i>approached</i> by a monism of matter or of energy. This theory is +epistemological only to the extent of moderating its claims in the hope +of lessening its responsibility. Another agnosticism places all sense +qualities on a par, but would regard physics and psychology as +complementary reports upon the two distinct series of phenomena in which +the underlying reality expresses itself. This theory is epistemological +to the extent of granting knowledge, viewed as perception, as good a +standing in the universe as that which is accorded to its object. But +such a dualism tends almost irresistibly to relapse into materialistic +monism, because of the fundamental place of physical conceptions in the +system of the sciences. Finally, in another and a more radical phase of +agnosticism, we find an attempt to make full provision for the +legitimate problems of epistemology. The only datum, the only existent +accessible to knowledge, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255"></a>[<a href="./images/255.png">255</a>]</span>is said to be the sensation, or state of +consciousness. In the words of Huxley:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"What, after all, do we know of this terrible 'matter' except +as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of +our own consciousness? And what do we know of that 'spirit' +over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation +is arising, . . . except that it is also a name for an unknown +and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of +consciousness?"<a name="FNanchor_255:19_106" id="FNanchor_255:19_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_255:19_106" class="fnanchor">[255:19]</a></p></div> + +<p>The physical world is now to be regarded as a construction which does +not assimilate to itself the content of sensations, but enables one to +anticipate them. The sensation signifies a contact to which science can +provide a key for practical guidance.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Experimentalism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_118" id="Section_118">118</a>. This last phase of naturalism is an attempt to state a pure and +consistent experimentalism, a workable theory of the routine of +sensations. But it commonly falls into the error of the vicious circle. +The hypothetical cause of sensations is said to be matter. From this +point of view the sensation is a complex, comprising elaborate physical +and physiological processes. But these processes themselves, on the +other hand, are said to be analyzable into sensations. Now two such +methods of analysis cannot be equally ultimate. If all of reality is +finally reducible to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256"></a>[<a href="./images/256.png">256</a>]</span>sensations, then the term sensation must be used +in a new sense to connote a self-subsistent being, and can no longer +refer merely to a function of certain physiological processes. The issue +of this would be some form of idealism or of the experience-philosophy +that is now coming so rapidly to the front.<a name="FNanchor_256:20_107" id="FNanchor_256:20_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_256:20_107" class="fnanchor">[256:20]</a> But while it is true +that idealism has sometimes been intended, and that a radically new +philosophy of experience has sometimes been closely approached, those, +nevertheless, who have developed experimentalism from the naturalistic +stand-point have in reality achieved only a thinly disguised +materialism. For <i>the very ground of their agnosticism is +materialistic</i>.<a name="FNanchor_256:21_108" id="FNanchor_256:21_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_256:21_108" class="fnanchor">[256:21]</a> Knowledge of reality itself is said to be +unattainable, because knowledge, in order to come within the order of +nature, must be regarded as reducible to sensation; and because +sensation itself, when regarded as a part of nature, is only a +physiological process, a special phenomenon, in no way qualified to be +knowledge that is true of reality.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Naturalistic Epistemology not Systematic.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_119" id="Section_119">119</a>. Perhaps, after all, it would be as fair to the spirit of +naturalism to relieve it of responsibility <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257"></a>[<a href="./images/257.png">257</a>]</span>for an epistemology. It has +never thoroughly reckoned with this problem. It has deliberately +selected from among the elements of experience, and been so highly +constructive in its method as to forfeit its claim to pure empiricism; +and, on the other hand, has, in this same selection of categories and in +its insistence upon the test of experiment, fallen short of a +thorough-going rationalism. While, on the one hand, it defines and +constructs, it does so, on the other hand, within the field of +perception and with constant reference to the test of perception. The +explanation and justification of this procedure is to be found in the +aim of natural science rather than in that of philosophy. It is this +special interest, rather than the general problem of being, that +determines the order of its categories. Naturalism as an account of +reality is acceptable only so far as its success in satisfying specific +demands obtains for it a certain logical immunity. These demands are +unquestionably valid and fundamental, but they are not coextensive with +the demand for truth. They coincide rather with the immediate practical +need of a formulation of the spacial and temporal changes that confront +the will. Hence naturalism is acceptable to common-sense as an account +of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258"></a>[<a href="./images/258.png">258</a>]</span>what the every-day attitude to the environment treats as its object. +Naturalism is common-sense about the "outer world," revised and brought +up to date with the aid of the results of science. Its deepest spring is +the organic instinct for the reality of the tangible, the vital +recognition of the significance of that which is on the plane of +interaction with the body.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<div class="sidenote">General Ethical Stand-point.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_120" id="Section_120">120</a>. Oddly enough, although common-sense is ready to intrust to +naturalism the description of the situation of life, it prefers to deal +otherwise with its ideals. Indeed, common-sense is not without a certain +suspicion that naturalism is the advocate of moral reversion. It is +recognized as the prophecy of the brute majority of life, of those +considerations of expediency and pleasure that are the warrant for its +secular moods rather than for its sustaining ideals. And that strand of +life is indeed its special province. For the naturalistic method of +reduction must find the key to human action among those practical +conditions that are common to man and his inferiors in the scale of +being. In short, human life, like all life, must be construed as the +adjustment of the organism to its natural environment for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259"></a>[<a href="./images/259.png">259</a>]</span>the sake of +preservation and economic advancement.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Cynicism and Cyrenaicism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_121" id="Section_121">121</a>. Early in Greek philosophy this general idea of life was +picturesquely interpreted in two contrasting ways, those of the Cynic +and the Cyrenaic. Both of these wise men postulated the spiritual +indifference of the universe at large, and looked only to the <i>contact</i> +of life with its immediate environment. But while the one hoped only to +hedge himself about, the other sought confidently the gratification of +his sensibilities. The figure of the Cynic is the more familiar. +Diogenes of the tub practised self-mortification until his dermal and +spiritual callousness were alike impervious. From behind his protective +sheath he could without affectation despise both nature and society. He +could reckon himself more blessed than Alexander, because, with demand +reduced to the minimum, he could be sure of a surplus of supply. Having +renounced all goods save the bare necessities of life, he could neglect +both promises and threats and be played upon by no one. He was securely +intrenched within himself, an unfurnished habitation, but the citadel of +a king. The Cyrenaic, on the other hand, did not seek to make impervious +the surface <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260"></a>[<a href="./images/260.png">260</a>]</span>of contact with nature and society, but sought to heighten +its sensibility, that it might become a medium of pleasurable feeling. +For the inspiration with which it may be pursued this ideal has nowhere +been more eloquently set forth than in the pages of Walter Pater, who +styles himself "the new Cyrenaic."</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the +end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a +variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is +to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass +most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the +focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their +purest energy?</p> + +<p>To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this +ecstacy, is success in life. . . . While all melts under our +feet, we may well catch at any exquisite passion, or any +contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to +set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the +senses, strange dyes, strange colors, and curious odors, or +work of the artist's hands, or the face of one's friend. Not +to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those +about us, and in the brilliancy of their gifts some tragic +dividing of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of +frost and sun, to sleep before evening."<a name="FNanchor_261:22_109" id="FNanchor_261:22_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_261:22_109" class="fnanchor">[261:22]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">Development of Utilitarianism. Evolutionary Conception of +Social Relations.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_122" id="Section_122">122</a>. In the course of modern philosophy the ethics of naturalism has +undergone a transformation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261"></a>[<a href="./images/261.png">261</a>]</span>and development that equip it much more +formidably for its competition with rival theories. If the Cynic and +Cyrenaic philosophies of life seem too egoistic and narrow in outlook, +this inadequacy has been largely overcome through the modern conception +of the relation of the individual to society. Man is regarded as so +dependent upon social relations that it is both natural and rational for +him to govern his actions with a concern for the community. There was a +time when this relation of dependence was viewed as external, a barter +of goods between the individual and society, sanctioned by an implied +contract. Thomas Hobbes, whose unblushing materialism and egoism +stimulated by opposition the whole development of English ethics, +conceived morality to consist in rules of action which condition the +stability of the state, and so secure for the individual that "peace" +which self-interest teaches him is essential to his welfare.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And therefore so long a man is in the condition of mere +nature, which is a condition of war, as private appetite is +the measure of good and evil: and consequently all men agree +on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the ways or +means of peace, which, as I have showed before, are 'justice,' +'gratitude,' 'modesty,' <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262"></a>[<a href="./images/262.png">262</a>]</span>'equity,' 'mercy,' and the rest of +the laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, 'moral virtues'; +and their contrary 'vices,' evil."<a name="FNanchor_262:23_110" id="FNanchor_262:23_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_262:23_110" class="fnanchor">[262:23]</a></p></div> + +<p>Jeremy Bentham, the apostle of utilitarianism in the eighteenth century, +defined political and social sanctions through which the individual +could purchase security and good repute with action conducive to the +common welfare. But the nineteenth century has understood the matter +better—and the idea of an evolution under conditions that select and +reject, is here again the illuminating thought. No individual, +evolutionary naturalism maintains, has survived the perils of life +without possessing as an inalienable part of his nature, congenital like +his egoism, certain impulses and instinctive desires in the interest of +the community as a whole. The latest generation of a race whose +perpetuation has been conditioned by a capacity to sustain social +relations and make common cause against a more external environment, +<i>is</i> moral, and does not adopt morality in the course of a calculating +egoism. Conscience is the racial instinct of self-preservation uttering +itself in the individual member, who draws his very life-blood from the +greater organism.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Naturalistic Ethics not Systematic.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_123" id="Section_123">123</a>. This latest word of naturalistic ethics has <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263"></a>[<a href="./images/263.png">263</a>]</span>not won acceptance +as the last word in ethics, and this in spite of its indubitable truth +within its scope. For the deeper ethical interest seeks not so much to +account for the moral nature as to construe and justify its promptings. +The evolutionary theory reveals the genesis of conscience, and +demonstrates its continuity with nature, but this falls as far short of +realizing the purpose of ethical study as a history of the natural +genesis of thought would fall short of logic. Indeed, naturalism shows +here, as in the realm of epistemology, a persistent failure to +appreciate the central problem. Its acceptance as a philosophy, we are +again reminded, can be accounted for only on the score of its genuinely +rudimentary character. As a rudimentary phase of thought it is both +indispensable and inadequate. It is the philosophy of instinct, which +should in normal development precede a philosophy of reason, in which it +is eventually assimilated and supplemented.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Naturalism as Antagonistic to Religion.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_124" id="Section_124">124</a>. There is, finally, an inspiration for life which this philosophy +of naturalism may convey—atheism, its detractors would call it, but +none the less a faith and a spiritual exaltation that spring from its +summing up of truth. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264"></a>[<a href="./images/264.png">264</a>]</span>It is well first to realize that which is +dispiriting in it, its failure to provide for the freedom, immortality, +and moral providence of the more sanguine faith.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"For what is man looked at from this point of view? . . . Man, so +far as natural science by itself is able to teach us, is no +longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaven-descended +heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his +story a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the +meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which +first converted a dead organic compound into the living +progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows +nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine, +disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords +of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a +race with conscience enough to feel that it is vile, and +intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant. . . . We +sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared +with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the +divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of +our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, +and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the +race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will +go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The +uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a +brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will +be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. 'Imperishable +monuments' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself, and love +stronger than death, will be as though they had never been. +Nor will anything that <i>is</i> be better or be worse for all that +the labor, genius, devotion, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265"></a>[<a href="./images/265.png">265</a>]</span>and suffering of man have +striven through countless generations to effect."<a name="FNanchor_265:24_111" id="FNanchor_265:24_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_265:24_111" class="fnanchor">[265:24]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">Naturalism as the Basis for a Religion of Service, Wonder, +and Renunciation.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_125" id="Section_125">125</a>. But though our philosopher must accept the truth of this terrible +picture, he is not left without spiritual resources. The abstract +religion provided for the agnostic faithful by Herbert Spencer does not, +it is true, afford any nourishment to the religious nature. He would +have men look for a deep spring of life in the negative idea of mystery, +the apotheosis of ignorance, while religious faith to live at all must +lay hold upon reality. But there does spring from naturalism a positive +religion, whose fundamental motives are those of service, wonder, and +renunciation: service of humanity in the present, wonder at the natural +truth, and renunciation of a universe keyed to vibrate with human +ideals.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Have you," writes Charles Ferguson, "had dreams of Nirvana +and sickly visions and raptures? Have you imagined that the +end of your life is to be absorbed back into the life of God, +and to flee the earth and forget all? Or do you want to walk +on air, or fly on wings, or build a heavenly city in the +clouds? Come, let us take our kit on our shoulders, and go out +and build the city <i>here</i>."<a name="FNanchor_265:25_112" id="FNanchor_265:25_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_265:25_112" class="fnanchor">[265:25]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266"></a>[<a href="./images/266.png">266</a>]</span>For Haeckel "natural religion" is such as</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"the astonishment with which we gaze upon the starry heavens +and the microscopic life in a drop of water, the awe with +which we trace the marvellous working of energy in the motion +of matter, the reverence with which we grasp the universal +dominance of the law of substance throughout the +universe."<a name="FNanchor_266:26_113" id="FNanchor_266:26_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_266:26_113" class="fnanchor">[266:26]</a></p></div> + +<p>There is a deeper and a sincerer note in the stout, forlorn humanism of +Huxley:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"That which lies before the human race is a constant struggle +to maintain and improve, in opposition to the State of Nature, +the State of Art of an organized polity; in which, and by +which, man may develop a worthy civilization, capable of +maintaining and constantly improving itself, until the +evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its +downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway; and, +once more, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of +our planet."<a name="FNanchor_266:27_114" id="FNanchor_266:27_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_266:27_114" class="fnanchor">[266:27]</a></p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_223:1_88" id="Footnote_223:1_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_223:1_88"><span class="label">[223:1]</span></a> <span class="smcap">Preliminary Note.</span>—By <i>naturalism</i> is meant that system +of philosophy which defines the universe in the terms of <i>natural +science</i>. In its dogmatic phase, wherein it maintains that <i>being is +corporeal</i>, it is called <i>materialism</i>. In its critical phase, wherein +it makes the general assertion that the natural sciences constitute the +only <i>possible knowledge</i>, whatever be the nature of reality itself, it +is called <i>positivism</i>, <i>agnosticism</i>, or simply <i>naturalism</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_226:2_89" id="Footnote_226:2_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_226:2_89"><span class="label">[226:2]</span></a> Lucretius: <i>De Rerum Natura</i>, Bk. II, lines 569-580. +Translation by Munro.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_229:3_90" id="Footnote_229:3_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_229:3_90"><span class="label">[229:3]</span></a> The reader will find an interesting account of these +opposing views in Locke's chapter on <i>Space</i>, in his <i>Essay Concerning +Human Understanding</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_230:4_91" id="Footnote_230:4_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_230:4_91"><span class="label">[230:4]</span></a> Descartes distinguished his theory from that of +Democritus in the <i>Principles of Philosophy</i>, Part IV, § ccii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_231:5_92" id="Footnote_231:5_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_231:5_92"><span class="label">[231:5]</span></a> Pearson: <i>Grammar of Science</i>, pp. 259-260. Cf. +<i>ibid.</i>, Chap. VII, entire.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_232:6_93" id="Footnote_232:6_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_232:6_93"><span class="label">[232:6]</span></a> Quoted in Ueberweg: <i>History of Philosophy</i>, II, p. +124.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_233:7_94" id="Footnote_233:7_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_233:7_94"><span class="label">[233:7]</span></a> Quoted from the <i>Opticks</i> of Newton by James Ward, in +his <i>Naturalism and Agnosticism</i>, I, p. 43.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_236:8_95" id="Footnote_236:8_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_236:8_95"><span class="label">[236:8]</span></a> Haeckel: <i>Riddle of the Universe</i>. Translation by +McCabe, p. 254.</p> + +<p>The best systematic presentation of "energetics" is to be found in +Ostwald's <i>Vorlesungen über Natur-Philosophie</i>. Herbert Spencer, in his +well-known <i>First Principles</i>, makes philosophical use of both "force" +and "energy."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_238:9_96" id="Footnote_238:9_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_238:9_96"><span class="label">[238:9]</span></a> Cf. <a href="#Chap_IX">Chap. IX</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_240:10_97" id="Footnote_240:10_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_240:10_97"><span class="label">[240:10]</span></a> Lucretius: <i>Op. cit.</i>, Bk. I, lines 1021-1237.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_241:11_98" id="Footnote_241:11_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_241:11_98"><span class="label">[241:11]</span></a> Quoted from La Place's essay on <i>Probability</i> by Ward: +<i>Op. cit.</i>, I, p. 41.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_243:12_99" id="Footnote_243:12_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_243:12_99"><span class="label">[243:12]</span></a> An interesting account and criticism of such a theory +(Clifford's) is to be found in Royce's <i>Spirit of Modern Philosophy</i>, +Lecture X.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_244:13_100" id="Footnote_244:13_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_244:13_100"><span class="label">[244:13]</span></a> This method replaced the old theory of "catastrophes" +through the efforts of the English geologists, Hutton (1726-1797) and +Lyell (1767-1849).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_245:14_101" id="Footnote_245:14_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_245:14_101"><span class="label">[245:14]</span></a> Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, +published in 1628, was regarded as a step in this direction.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_250:15_102" id="Footnote_250:15_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_250:15_102"><span class="label">[250:15]</span></a> From the account of La Mettrie in Lange: <i>History of +Materialism</i>. Translation by Thomas, II, pp. 67-68.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_251:16_103" id="Footnote_251:16_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251:16_103"><span class="label">[251:16]</span></a> Quoted from Voltaire's London <i>Letter on the English</i>, +by Lange: <i>Op. cit.</i>, II, p. 18.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_251:17_104" id="Footnote_251:17_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251:17_104"><span class="label">[251:17]</span></a> Quoted by Lange: <i>Op. cit.</i>, II, p. 113.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_252:18_105" id="Footnote_252:18_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_252:18_105"><span class="label">[252:18]</span></a> The phrase "psycho-physical parallelism," current in +psychology, may mean automatism of the kind expounded above, and may +also mean dualism. It is used commonly as a methodological principle to +signify that no causal relationship between mind and body, but one of +<i>correspondence</i>, is to be looked for in empirical psychology. Cf. § +<a href="#Section_99">99</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_255:19_106" id="Footnote_255:19_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_255:19_106"><span class="label">[255:19]</span></a> Quoted by Ward: <i>Op. cit.</i>, I, p. 18.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_256:20_107" id="Footnote_256:20_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256:20_107"><span class="label">[256:20]</span></a> There are times when Huxley, <i>e. g.</i>, would seem to be +on the verge of the Berkeleyan idealism. Cf. <a href="#Chap_IX">Chap. IX</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_256:21_108" id="Footnote_256:21_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256:21_108"><span class="label">[256:21]</span></a> For the case of Karl Pearson, read his <i>Grammar of +Science</i>, Chap. II.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_261:22_109" id="Footnote_261:22_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_261:22_109"><span class="label">[261:22]</span></a> Pater: <i>The Renaissance</i>, pp. 249-250.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_262:23_110" id="Footnote_262:23_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_262:23_110"><span class="label">[262:23]</span></a> Hobbes: <i>Leviathan,</i> Chap. XV.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_265:24_111" id="Footnote_265:24_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265:24_111"><span class="label">[265:24]</span></a> Quoted from Balfour: <i>Foundations of Belief</i>, pp. +29-31.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_265:25_112" id="Footnote_265:25_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265:25_112"><span class="label">[265:25]</span></a> Ferguson: <i>Religion of Democracy</i>, p. 10.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_266:26_113" id="Footnote_266:26_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266:26_113"><span class="label">[266:26]</span></a> Haeckel: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 344.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_266:27_114" id="Footnote_266:27_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266:27_114"><span class="label">[266:27]</span></a> Huxley: <i>Evolution and Ethics</i>, p. 45. <i>Collected +Essays</i>, Vol. IX.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267"></a>[<a href="./images/267.png">267</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_IX" id="Chap_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<h3>SUBJECTIVISM<a name="FNanchor_267:1_115" id="FNanchor_267:1_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_267:1_115" class="fnanchor" style="font-weight: normal; font-size: 80%;">[267:1]</a></h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">Subjectivism Originally Associated with Relativism and +Scepticism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_126" id="Section_126">126</a>. When, in the year 1710, Bishop Berkeley maintained the thesis of +empirical idealism, having rediscovered it and announced it with a +justifiable sense of originality, he provoked a kind of critical +judgment that was keenly annoying if not entirely surprising to him. In +refuting the conception of material substance and demonstrating the +dependence of being upon mind, he at once sought, as he did repeatedly +in later years, to establish the world of practical belief, and so to +reconcile metaphysics and common-sense. Yet he found himself hailed as a +fool and a sceptic. In answer to an inquiry <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268"></a>[<a href="./images/268.png">268</a>]</span>concerning the reception of +his book in London, his friend Sir John Percival wrote as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I did but name the subject matter of your book of +<i>Principles</i> to some ingenious friends of mine and they +immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time +refusing to read it, which I have not yet got one to do. A +physician of my acquaintance undertook to discover your +person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought +to take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire of +starting something new should put you upon such an +undertaking. Another told me that you are not gone so far as +another gentleman in town, who asserts not only that there is +no such thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no being +at all."<a name="FNanchor_268:2_116" id="FNanchor_268:2_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_268:2_116" class="fnanchor">[268:2]</a></p></div> + +<p>There can be no doubt but that the idea of the dependence of real things +upon their appearance to the individual is a paradox to common-sense. It +is a paradox because it seems to reverse the theoretical instinct +itself, and to define the real in those very terms which disciplined +thought learns to neglect. In the early history of thought the nature of +the thinker himself is recognized as that which is likely to distort +truth rather than that which conditions it. When the wise man, the +devotee of truth, first makes his appearance, his authority is +acknowledged because he has renounced himself. As witness of the +universal <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269"></a>[<a href="./images/269.png">269</a>]</span>being he purges himself of whatever is peculiar to his own +individuality, or even to his human nature. In the aloofness of his +meditation he escapes the cloud of opinion and prejudice that obscures +the vision of the common man. In short, the element of belief dependent +upon the thinker himself is the dross which must be refined away in +order to obtain the pure truth. When, then, in the critical epoch of the +Greek sophists, Protagoras declares that there is no belief that is not +of this character, his philosophy is promptly recognized as scepticism. +Protagoras argues that sense qualities are clearly dependent upon the +actual operations of the senses, and that all knowledge reduces +ultimately to these terms.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; +there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, +fear, and many more which are named, as well as innumerable +others which have no name; <i>with each of them there is born an +object of sense</i>,—all sorts of colors born with all sorts of +sight and sounds in like manner with hearing, and other +objects with the other senses."<a name="FNanchor_269:3_117" id="FNanchor_269:3_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_269:3_117" class="fnanchor">[269:3]</a></p></div> + +<p>If the objects are "born with" the senses, it follows that they are born +with and appertain to the individual perceiver.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270"></a>[<a href="./images/270.png">270</a>]</span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"Either show, if you can, that our sensations are not +relative and individual, or, if you admit that they are +individual, prove that this does not involve the consequence +that the appearance becomes, or, if you like to say, is to the +individual only."<a name="FNanchor_270:4_118" id="FNanchor_270:4_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_270:4_118" class="fnanchor">[270:4]</a></p></div> + +<p>The same motif is thus rendered by Walter Pater in the Conclusion of his +"Renaissance":</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of +external objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and +importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand +forms of action. But when reflexion begins to act upon those +objects they are dissipated under its influence; the cohesive +force seems suspended like a trick of magic; each object is +loosed into a group of impressions—color, odor, texture—in +the mind of the observer. . . . Experience, already reduced to a +swarm of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by +that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has +ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can +only conjecture to be without. Every one of these impressions +is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each +mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world."</p></div> + +<p>The Protagorean generalization is due to the reflection that all +experience is some individual experience, that no subject of discourse +escapes the imputation of belonging to some individual's private +history. The individual must start with his own experiences and ideas, +and he can never get <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271"></a>[<a href="./images/271.png">271</a>]</span>beyond them, for he cannot see outside his own +vision, or even think outside his own mind. The scepticism of this +theory is explicit, and the formulas of Protagoras—the famous "<i>Man is +the measure of all things</i>," and the more exact formula, "<i>The truth is +what appears to each man at each time</i>"<a name="FNanchor_271:5_119" id="FNanchor_271:5_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_271:5_119" class="fnanchor">[271:5]</a>—have been the articles +of scepticism throughout the history of thought.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Phenomenalism and Spiritualism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_127" id="Section_127">127</a>. There is, therefore, nothing really surprising in the reception +accorded the "new philosophy" of Bishop Berkeley. A sceptical relativism +is the earliest phase of subjectivism, and its avoidance at once becomes +the most urgent problem of any philosophy which proposes to proceed +forth from this principle. And this problem Berkeley meets with great +adroitness and a wise recognition of difficulties. But his sanguine +temperament and speculative interest impel him to what he regards as the +extension of his first principle, the reintroduction of the conception +of substance under the form of spirit, and of the objective order of +nature under the form of the mind of God. In short, there are two +motives at work in him, side by side: the epistemological motive, +restricting reality to perceptions <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272"></a>[<a href="./images/272.png">272</a>]</span>and thoughts, and the +metaphysical-religious motive, leading him eventually to the definition +of reality in terms of perceiving and thinking spirits. And from the +time of Berkeley these two principles, <i>phenomenalism</i> and +<i>spiritualism</i>, have remained as distinct and alternating phases of +subjectivism. The former is its critical and dialectical conception, the +latter its constructive and practical conception.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Phenomenalism as Maintained by Berkeley. The Problem +Inherited from Descartes and Locke.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_128" id="Section_128">128</a>. As <i>phenomenalism</i> has its classic statement and proof in the +writings of Berkeley, we shall do well to return to these. The fact that +this philosopher wished to be regarded as the prophet of common-sense +has already been mentioned. This purpose reveals itself explicitly in +the series of "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." The form in which +Berkeley here advances his thesis is further determined by the manner in +which the lines were drawn in his day of thought. The world of +enlightened public opinion was then threefold, consisting of God, +physical nature, and the soul. In the early years of the seventeenth +century Descartes had sharply distinguished between the two +substances—mind, with its attribute of thought; and body, with its +attribute of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273"></a>[<a href="./images/273.png">273</a>]</span>extension—and divided the finite world between them. God +was regarded as the infinite and sustaining cause of both. Stated in the +terms of epistemology, the object of clear thinking is the physical +cosmos, the subject of clear thinking the immortal soul. The realm of +perception, wherein the mind is subjected to the body, embarrasses the +Cartesian system, and has no clear title to any place in it. And without +attaching cognitive importance to this realm, the system is utterly +dogmatic in its epistemology.<a name="FNanchor_273:6_120" id="FNanchor_273:6_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_273:6_120" class="fnanchor">[273:6]</a> For what one substance thinks, must +be assumed to be somehow true of another quite independent substance +without any medium of communication. Now between Descartes and Berkeley +appeared the sober and questioning "Essay Concerning Human +Understanding," by John Locke. This is an interesting combination (they +cannot be said to blend) of traditional metaphysics and revolutionary +epistemology. The universe still consists of God, the immortal thinking +soul, and a corporeal nature, the object of its thought. But, except for +certain proofs of God and self, knowledge is entirely reduced to the +perceptual type, to sensations, or ideas directly imparted to the mind +by the objects <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274"></a>[<a href="./images/274.png">274</a>]</span>themselves. To escape dogmatism it is maintained that +the real is what is <i>observed to be present</i>. But Locke thinks the +qualities so discovered belong in part to the perceiver and in part to +the substance outside the mind. Color is a case of the former, a +"secondary quality"; and extension a case of the latter, a "primary +quality." And evidently the above empirical test of knowledge is not +equally well met in these two cases. When I see a red object I know that +red exists, for it is observed to be present, and I make no claim for it +beyond the present. But when I note that the red object is square, I am +supposed to know a property that will continue to exist in the object +after I have closed my eyes or turned to something else. Here my claim +exceeds my observation, and the empirical principle adopted at the +outset would seem to be violated. Berkeley develops his philosophy from +this criticism. His refutation of material substance is intended as a +full acceptance of the implications of the new empirical epistemology. +Knowledge is to be all of the perceptual type, where what is known is +directly presented; and, in conformity with this principle, being is to +be restricted to the content of the living pulses of experience.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275"></a>[<a href="./images/275.png">275</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Refutation of Material Substance.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_129" id="Section_129">129</a>. Berkeley, then, beginning with the threefold world of Descartes +and of common-sense, proposes to apply Locke's theory of knowledge to +the discomfiture of corporeal nature. It was a radical doctrine, because +it meant for him and for his contemporaries the denial of all finite +objects outside the mind. But at the same time it meant a restoration of +the homogeneity of experience, the reëstablishment of the qualitative +world of every-day living, and so had its basis of appeal to +common-sense. The encounter between Hylas, the advocate of the +traditional philosophy, and Philonous, who represents the author +himself, begins with an exchange of the charge of innovation.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p><i>Hyl.</i> I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I +heard of you.</p> + +<p><i>Phil.</i> Pray, what were those?</p> + +<p><i>Hyl.</i> You were represented, in last night's conversation, as +one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever +entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such +thing as <i>material substance</i> in the world.</p> + +<p><i>Phil.</i> That there is no such thing as what <i>philosophers</i> +call <i>material substance</i>, I am seriously persuaded: but if I +were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I +should then have the same reason to renounce this that I +imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.</p> + +<p><i>Hyl.</i> What! can anything be more fantastical, more <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276"></a>[<a href="./images/276.png">276</a>]</span>repugnant +to Common-Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than +to believe there is no such thing as <i>matter</i>?</p> + +<p><i>Phil.</i> Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, +who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater +sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to +Common-Sense, than I who believe no such thing?<a name="FNanchor_276:7_121" id="FNanchor_276:7_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_276:7_121" class="fnanchor">[276:7]</a></p></div> + +<p>Philonous now proceeds with his case. Beginning by obtaining from Hylas +the admission that pleasure and pain are essentially relative and +subjective, he argues that sensations such as heat, since they are +inseparable from these feelings, must be similarly regarded. And he is +about to annex other qualities in turn to this core of subjectivity, +when Hylas enters a general demurrer:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this +time. You asked me whether heat and cold, sweetness and +bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to +which I answered simply that they were. Whereas I should have +thus distinguished:—those qualities as perceived by us, are +pleasures or pains; but not as existing in the external +objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there +is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only +that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the +fire or sugar."<a name="FNanchor_276:8_122" id="FNanchor_276:8_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_276:8_122" class="fnanchor">[276:8]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277"></a>[<a href="./images/277.png">277</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Application of the Epistemological Principle.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_130" id="Section_130">130</a>. Here the argument touches upon profound issues. Philonous now +assumes the extreme empirical contention <i>that knowledge applies only to +its own psychological moment, that its object in no way extends beyond +that individual situation which we call the state of knowing</i>. The full +import of such an epistemology Berkeley never recognized, but he is +clearly employing it here, and the overthrow of Hylas is inevitable so +long as he does not challenge it or turn it against his opponent. This, +however, as a protagonist of Berkeley's own making, he fails to do, and +he plays into Philonous's hands by admitting that what is known only in +perception must for that reason <i>consist</i> in perception. He frankly owns +"that it is vain to stand out any longer," that "colors, sounds, tastes, +in a word, all those termed <i>secondary qualities</i>, have certainly no +existence without the mind."<a name="FNanchor_277:9_123" id="FNanchor_277:9_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_277:9_123" class="fnanchor">[277:9]</a></p> + +<p>Hylas has now arrived at the distinction between primary and secondary +qualities. "Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest" are +the attributes of an external substance which is the cause of +sensations. But the same epistemological principle readily reduces these +also to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278"></a>[<a href="./images/278.png">278</a>]</span>dependence on mind, for, like the secondary qualities, their +content is given only in perception. Hylas is then driven to defend a +general material substratum, which is the cause of ideas, but to which +none of the definite content of these ideas can be attributed. In short, +he has put all the content of knowledge on the one side, and admitted +its inseparability from the perceiving spirit, and left the being of +things standing empty and forlorn on the other. This amounts, as +Philonous reminds him, to the denial of the reality of the known world.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the +<i>reality</i> of sensible things; since you made it to consist in +an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say, +you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which +was to show your principles led to Scepticism."<a name="FNanchor_278:10_124" id="FNanchor_278:10_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_278:10_124" class="fnanchor">[278:10]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">The Refutation of a Conceived Corporeal World.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_131" id="Section_131">131</a>. Having advanced the direct empiricist argument for phenomenalism, +Berkeley now gives the rationalistic motive an opportunity to express +itself in the queries of Hylas as to whether there be not an "absolute +extension," somehow abstracted by thought from the relativities of +perception. Is there not at least a <i>conceivable</i> world independent of +perception?</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279"></a>[<a href="./images/279.png">279</a>]</span>The answers of Philonous throw much light upon the Berkeleyan position. +He admits that thought is capable of separating the primary from the +secondary qualities in certain <i>operations</i>, but at the same time denies +that this is forming an idea of them as separate.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general +propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without +mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat +of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I +can pronounce the word <i>motion</i> by itself, I can form the idea +of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may +be made of extension and figures, without any mention of +<i>great</i> or <i>small</i>, or any other sensible mode or quality, +that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of +extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible +quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the +mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what +other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being +altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when +laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I +believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas +of extension."<a name="FNanchor_279:11_125" id="FNanchor_279:11_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_279:11_125" class="fnanchor">[279:11]</a></p></div> + +<p>Berkeley denies that we have ideas of pure extension or motion, because, +although we do actually <i>deal</i> with these and find them intelligible, we +can never obtain a state of mind in which they appear as the content. He +applies this psychological test <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280"></a>[<a href="./images/280.png">280</a>]</span>because of his adherence to the general +empirical postulate that knowledge is limited to the individual content +of its own individual states. "It is a universally received maxim," he +says, "that <i>everything which exists is particular</i>." Now the truth of +mathematical reckoning is not particular, but is valid wherever the +conditions to which it refers are fulfilled. Mathematical reckoning, if +it is to be particular, must be regarded as a particular act or state of +some thinker. Its truth must then be construed as relative to the +interests of the thinker, as a symbolism which has an instrumental +rather than a purely cognitive value. This conclusion cannot be disputed +short of a radical stand against the general epistemological principle +to which Berkeley is so far true, the principle that the reality which +is known in any state of thinking or perceiving is the state itself.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Transition to Spiritualism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_132" id="Section_132">132</a>. This concludes the purely phenomenalistic strain of Berkeley's +thought. He has taken the immediate apprehension of sensible objects in +a state of mind centring about the pleasure and pain of an individual, +to be the norm of knowledge. He has further maintained that knowledge +cannot escape the particularity of its own states. The result is that +the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281"></a>[<a href="./images/281.png">281</a>]</span>universe is composed of private perceptions and ideas. Strictly on +the basis of what has preceded, Hylas is justified in regarding this +conclusion as no less sceptical than that to which his own position had +been reduced; for while he had been compelled to admit that the real is +unknowable, Philonous has apparently defined the knowable as relative to +the individual. But the supplementary metaphysics which had hitherto +been kept in the background is now revealed. It is maintained that +though perceptions know no external world, they do nevertheless reveal a +spiritual substance of which they are the states. Although it has +hitherto been argued that the <i>esse</i> of things is in their <i>percipi</i>, +this is now replaced by the more fundamental principle that the <i>esse</i> +of things is in their <i>percipere</i> or <i>velle</i>. The real world consists +not in perceptions, but in perceivers.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_133" id="Section_133">133</a>. Now it is at once evident that the epistemological theory which +has been Berkeley's dialectical weapon in the foregoing argument is no +longer available. And those who have cared more for this theory than for +metaphysical speculation have attempted to stop at this point, and so to +construe phenomenalism as to make it self-sufficient on its own +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282"></a>[<a href="./images/282.png">282</a>]</span>grounds. Such attempts are so instructive as to make it worth our while +to review them before proceeding with the development of the +spiritualistic motive in subjectivism.</p> + +<p>The world is to be regarded as made up of sense-perceptions, ideas, or +phenomena. What is to be accepted as the fundamental category which +gives to all of these terms their subjectivistic significance? So far +there seems to be nothing in view save the principle of relativity. The +type to which these were reduced was that of the peculiar or unsharable +experience best represented by an individual's pleasure and pain. But +relativity will not work as a general principle of being. It consigns +the individual to his private mind, and cannot provide for the validity +of knowledge enough even to maintain itself. Some other course, then, +must be followed. Perception may be given a psycho-physical definition, +which employs physical terms as fundamental;<a name="FNanchor_282:12_126" id="FNanchor_282:12_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_282:12_126" class="fnanchor">[282:12]</a> but this flagrantly +contradicts the phenomenalistic first principle. Or, reality may be +regarded as so stamped with its marks as to insure the proprietorship of +thought. But this definition of certain objective entities of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283"></a>[<a href="./images/283.png">283</a>]</span>mind, of +beings attributed to intelligence because of their intrinsic +intelligibility, is inconsistent with empiricism, if indeed it does not +lead eventually to a realism of the Platonic type.<a name="FNanchor_283:13_127" id="FNanchor_283:13_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_283:13_127" class="fnanchor">[283:13]</a> Finally, and +most commonly, the terms of phenomenalism have been retained after their +original meaning has been suffered to lapse. The "impressions" of Hume, +<i>e. g.</i>, are the remnant of the Berkeleyan world with the spirit +stricken out. There is no longer any point in calling them impressions, +for they now mean only elements or qualities. As a consequence this +outgrowth of the Berkeleyanism epistemology is at present merging into a +realistic philosophy of experience.<a name="FNanchor_283:14_128" id="FNanchor_283:14_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_283:14_128" class="fnanchor">[283:14]</a> Any one, then, of these +three may be the last state of one who undertakes to remain exclusively +faithful to the phenomenalistic aspect of Berkeleyanism, embodied in the +principle <i>esse est percipi</i>.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284"></a>[<a href="./images/284.png">284</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Berkeley's Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the +Perceiver.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_134" id="Section_134">134</a>. Let us now follow the fortunes of the other phase of +subjectivism—that which develops the conception of the perceiver rather +than the perceived. When Berkeley holds that</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in a +word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the +world, have not any subsistence without a Mind,"</p></div> + +<p>his thought has transcended the epistemology with which he overthrew the +conception of material substance, in two directions. For neither mind of +the finite type nor mind of the divine type is perceived. But the first +of these may yet be regarded as a direct empirical datum, even though +sharply distinguished from an object of perception. In the third +dialogue, Philonous thus expounds this new kind of knowledge:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I own I have properly no <i>idea</i>, either of God or any other +spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by +things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless +know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as +certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I +mean by the terms <i>I</i> and <i>myself</i>; and I know this +immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I +perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound."<a name="FNanchor_284:15_129" id="FNanchor_284:15_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_284:15_129" class="fnanchor">[284:15]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285"></a>[<a href="./images/285.png">285</a>]</span>The knowledge here provided for may be regarded as empirical because +the reality in question is an individual present in the moment of the +knowledge. Particular acts of perception are said directly to reveal not +only perceptual objects, but perceiving subjects. And the conception of +spiritual substance, once accredited, may then be extended to account +for social relations and to fill in the nature of God. The latter +extension, in so far as it attributes such further predicates as +universality and infinity, implies still a third epistemology, and +threatens to pass over into rationalism. But the knowledge of one's +fellow-men may, it is claimed, be regarded as immediate, like the +knowledge of one's self. Perceptual and volitional activity has a sense +for itself and also a sense for other like activity. The self is both +self-conscious and socially conscious in an immediate experience of the +same type.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Schopenhauer's Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate +Knowledge of the Will.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_135" id="Section_135">135</a>. But this general spiritualistic conception is developed with less +singleness of purpose in Berkeley than among the <i>voluntarists</i> and +<i>panpsychists</i> who spring from Schopenhauer, the orientalist, pessimist, +and mystic among the German Kantians of the early nineteenth century. +His great <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286"></a>[<a href="./images/286.png">286</a>]</span>book, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," opens with the +phenomenalistic contention that "the world is my idea." It soon appears, +however, that the "my" is more profoundly significant than the "idea." +Nature is my creation, due to the working within me of certain fixed +principles of thought, such as space, time, and causality. But nature, +just because it is my creation, is less than me: is but a manifestation +of the true being for which I must look <i>within</i> myself. But this inner +self cannot be made an object of thought, for that would be only to +create another term of nature. The will itself, from which such creation +springs, is "that which is most immediate" in one's consciousness, and +"makes itself known in a direct manner in its particular acts." The term +<i>will</i> is used by Schopenhauer as a general term covering the whole +dynamics of life, instinct and desire, as well as volition. It is that +sense of life-preserving and life-enhancing appetency which is the +conscious accompaniment of struggle. With its aid the inwardness of the +whole world may now be apprehended.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Whoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge +<i>in abstracto</i>, and therefore clear and certain, of what +everyone knows directly <i>in concreto</i>, <i>i. e.</i>, as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287"></a>[<a href="./images/287.png">287</a>]</span>feeling, a +knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his +phenomenal being, . . . and that his will is that which is most +immediate in his consciousness, . . . will find that of itself +it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost being of +the whole of nature; for he now transfers it to all those +phenomena which are not given to him, like his own phenomenal +existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge, but only in +the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as <i>idea</i> alone."<a name="FNanchor_287:16_130" id="FNanchor_287:16_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_287:16_130" class="fnanchor">[287:16]</a></p></div> + +<p>The heart of reality is thus known by an "intuitive interpretation," +which begins at home in the individual's own heart.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Panpsychism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_136" id="Section_136">136</a>. The panpsychist follows the same course of reflection. There is +an outwardness and an inwardness of nature, corresponding to the +knower's body on the one hand, and his feeling or will on the other. +With this principle in hand one may pass down the whole scale of being +and discover no breach of continuity. Such an interpretation of nature +has been well set forth by a contemporary writer, who quotes the +following from the botanist, C. v. Naegeli:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Sensation is clearly connected with the reflex actions of +higher animals. We are obliged to concede it to the other +animals also, and we have no grounds for denying it to plants +and inorganic bodies. The sensation arouses in us a condition +of comfort and discomfort. In general, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288"></a>[<a href="./images/288.png">288</a>]</span>the feeling of +pleasure arises when the natural impulses are satisfied, the +feeling of pain when they are not satisfied. Since all +material processes are composed of movements of molecules and +elementary atoms, pleasure and pain must have their seat in +these particles. . . . Thus the same mental thread runs through +all material phenomena. The human mind is nothing but the +highest development on our earth of the mental processes which +universally animate and move nature."<a name="FNanchor_288:17_131" id="FNanchor_288:17_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_288:17_131" class="fnanchor">[288:17]</a></p></div> + +<p>According to panpsychism, then, physical nature is the manifestation of +an <i>appetency or bare consciousness generalized from the thinker's +awareness of his most intimate self</i>. Such appetency or bare +consciousness is the essential or substantial state of that which +appears as physical nature.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for +Objective Knowledge.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_137" id="Section_137">137</a>. We must now turn to the efforts which this doctrine has made to +maintain itself against the sceptical trend of its own epistemology. For +precisely as in the case of phenomenalism its dialectical principle +threatens to be self-destructive. Immediate presence is still the test +of knowledge. But does not immediate presence connote relativity and +inadequacy, at best; an initial phase of knowledge that must be +supplemented and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289"></a>[<a href="./images/289.png">289</a>]</span>corrected before objective reality and valid truth are +apprehended? Does not the individuality of the individual thinker +connote the very maximum of error? Indeed, spiritualism would seem to +have exceeded even Protagoreanism itself, and to have passed from +scepticism to deliberate nihilism. The object of knowledge is no longer +even, as with the phenomenalist, the thinker's thought, but only his +<i>thinking</i>. And if the thinker's thought is relative to him, then the +thinker's act of thinking is the very vanishing-point of relativity, the +negative term of a negating relation. How is a real, a self-subsistent +world to be composed of such? Impelled by a half-conscious realization +of the hopelessness of this situation, the exponent of spiritualism has +sought to universalize his conception; to define an <i>absolute or +ultimate spirit</i> other than the individual thinker, though known in and +through him. But it is clear that this development of spiritualism, like +all of the speculative procedure of subjectivism, threatens to exceed +the scope of the original principle of knowledge. There is a strong +presumption against the possibility of introducing a knowledge of God by +the way of the particular presentations of an individual consciousness.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290"></a>[<a href="./images/290.png">290</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Schopenhauer's Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism. +Mysticism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_138" id="Section_138">138</a>. Schopenhauer must be credited with a genuine effort to accept the +metaphysical consequences of his epistemology. His epistemology, as we +have seen, defined knowledge as centripetal. The object of real +knowledge is identical with the subject of knowledge. If I am to know +the universal will, therefore, I must in knowing become that will. And +this Schopenhauer maintains. The innermost heart of the individual into +which he may retreat, even from his private will, is—the universal. But +there is another way of arriving at the same knowledge. In contemplation +I may become absorbed in principles and laws, rather than be diverted by +the particular spacial and temporal objects, until (and this is +peculiarly true of the æsthetic experience) my interest no longer +distinguishes itself, but coincides with truth. In other words, abstract +thinking and pure willing are not opposite extremes, but adjacent points +on the deeper or transcendent circle of experience. One may reach this +part of the circle by moving in either of two directions that at the +start are directly opposite: by turning in upon the subject or by +utterly giving one's self up to the object. Reality obtains no +definition by this means. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291"></a>[<a href="./images/291.png">291</a>]</span>Philosophy, for Schopenhauer, is rather a +programme for realizing the state in which I will the universal and know +the universal will. The final theory of knowledge, then, is mysticism, +reality directly apprehended in a supreme and incommunicable experience, +direct and vivid, like perception, and at the same time universal, like +thought. But the empiricism with which Schopenhauer began, the appeal to +a familiar experience of self as will, has meanwhile been forgotten. The +idea as object of my perception, and the will as its subject were in the +beginning regarded as common and verifiable items of experience. But +who, save the occasional philosopher, knows a universal will? Nor have +attempts to avoid mysticism, while retaining Schopenhauer's first +principle, been successful. Certain voluntarists and panpsychists have +attempted to do without the universal will, and define the world solely +in terms of the many individual wills. But, as Schopenhauer himself +pointed out, individual wills cannot be distinguished except in terms of +something other than will, such as space and time. The same is true if +for will there be substituted inner feeling or consciousness. Within +this category individuals can be distinguished only as points of view, +which to be comparable at all must <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292"></a>[<a href="./images/292.png">292</a>]</span>contain common objects, or be +defined in terms of a system of relations like that of the physical +world or that of an ethical community. The conception of pure will or +pure feeling inevitably attaches to itself that of an undivided unity, +if for no other reason because there is no ground for distinction. And +such a unity, a will or consciousness that is no particular act or idea, +can be known only in the unique experience which mysticism provides.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Objective Spiritualism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_139" id="Section_139">139</a>. The way of Schopenhauer is the way of one who adheres to the +belief that what the thinker knows must always be a part of himself, his +state or his activity. From this point of view the important element of +being, its very essence or substance, is not any definable nature but an +immediate relation to the knower. The consequence is that the universe +in the last analysis can only be defined as a supreme state or activity +into which the individual's consciousness may develop. Spiritualism has, +however, other interests, interests which may be quite independent of +epistemology. It is speculatively interested in a kind of being which it +defines as spiritual, and in terms of which it proposes to define the +universe. Such procedure is radically different from the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293"></a>[<a href="./images/293.png">293</a>]</span>epistemological criticism which led Berkeley to maintain that the +<i>esse</i> of objects is in their <i>percipi</i>, or Schopenhauer to maintain +that "the world is my idea," or that led both of these philosophers to +find a deeper reality in immediately intuited self-activity. For now it +is proposed to <i>understand</i> spirit, discover its properties, and to +acknowledge it only where these properties appear. I may now know spirit +as an object; which in its properties, to be sure, is quite different +from matter, but which like matter is capable of subsisting quite +independently of my knowledge. This is a metaphysical spiritualism quite +distinct from epistemological spiritualism, and by no means easily made +consistent therewith. Indeed, it exhibits an almost irrepressible +tendency to overstep the bounds both of empiricism and subjectivism, an +historical connection with which alone justifies its introduction in the +present chapter.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Berkeley's Conception of God as Cause, Goodness and Order.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_140" id="Section_140">140</a>. To return again to the instructive example of Bishop Berkeley, we +find him proving God from the evidence of him in experience, or the need +of him to support the claims of experience.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find +the ideas actually perceived by Sense <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294"></a>[<a href="./images/294.png">294</a>]</span>have not a like +dependence on <i>my</i> will. When in broad daylight I open my +eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or +no, or to determine what particular objects shall present +themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and +other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of +<i>my</i> will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that +produces them.</p> + +<p>The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than +those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, +order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those +which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a +regular train or series—the admirable connection whereof +sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its +Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the +Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called +<i>the laws of nature</i>."<a name="FNanchor_294:18_132" id="FNanchor_294:18_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_294:18_132" class="fnanchor">[294:18]</a></p></div> + +<p>Of the attributes of experience here in question, independence or +"steadiness" is not regarded as <i>prima facie</i> evidence of spirit, but +rather as an aspect of experience for which some cause is necessary. But +it is assumed that the power to "produce," with which such a cause must +be endowed, is the peculiar prerogative of spirit, and that this cause +gives further evidence of its spiritual nature, of its eminently +spiritual nature, in the orderliness and the goodness of its effects.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the +goodness that perfects all things is the Supreme +Being."<a name="FNanchor_294:19_133" id="FNanchor_294:19_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_294:19_133" class="fnanchor">[294:19]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295"></a>[<a href="./images/295.png">295</a>]</span>That spirit is possessed of causal efficacy, Berkeley has in an earlier +passage proved by a direct appeal to the individual's sense of power.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary +and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than +<i>willing</i>, and straightway this or that idea arises in my +fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way +for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very +properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and +grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents, +or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse +ourselves with words."<a name="FNanchor_295:20_134" id="FNanchor_295:20_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_295:20_134" class="fnanchor">[295:20]</a></p></div> + +<p>Although Berkeley is here in general agreement with a very considerable +variety of philosophical views, it will be readily observed that this +doctrine tends to lapse into mysticism whenever it is retained in its +purity. Berkeley himself admitted that there was no "idea" of such +power. And philosophers will as a rule either obtain an idea +corresponding to a term or amend the term—always excepting the mystical +appeal to an inarticulate and indefinable experience. Hence pure power +revealed in an ineffable immediate experience tends to give place to +kinds of power to which some definite meaning may be attached. The +energy of physics, defined by measurable <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296"></a>[<a href="./images/296.png">296</a>]</span>quantitative equivalence, is a +case in point. The idealistic trend is in another direction, power +coming to signify ethical or logical connection. Similarly, in the later +philosophy of Berkeley himself, God is known by the nature of his +activity rather than by the fact of his activity; and we are said "to +account for a thing, when we show that it is so best." God's power, in +short, becomes indistinguishable from his universality attended with the +attributes of goodness and orderliness. But this means that the analogy +of the human spirit, conscious of its own activity, is no longer the +basis of the argument. By the divine will is now meant ethical +principles, rather than the "here am I willing" of the empirical +consciousness. Similarly the divine mind is defined in terms of logical +principles, such as coherence and order, rather than in terms of the +"here am I thinking" of the finite knower himself. But enough has been +said to make it plain that this is no longer the stand-point of +empirio-idealism. Indeed, in his last philosophical writing, the +"Siris," Berkeley is so far removed from the principles of knowledge +which made him at once the disciple and the critic of Locke, as to +pronounce himself the devotee of Platonism and the prophet of +transcendentalism. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297"></a>[<a href="./images/297.png">297</a>]</span>The former strain appears in his conclusion that +"the <i>principles</i> of science are neither objects of sense nor +imagination; and that intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to +truth."<a name="FNanchor_297:21_135" id="FNanchor_297:21_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_297:21_135" class="fnanchor">[297:21]</a> His transcendentalism appears in his belief that such +principles, participating in the vital unity of the Individual Purpose, +constitute the meaning and so the substantial essence of the universe.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_141" id="Section_141">141</a>. Such then are the various paths which lead from subjectivism to +other types of philosophy, demonstrating the peculiar aptitude of the +former for departing from its first principle. Beginning with the +relativity of all knowable reality to the individual knower, it +undertakes to conceive reality in one or the other of the terms of this +relation, as particular state of knowledge or as individual subject of +knowledge. But these terms develop an intrinsic nature of their own, and +become respectively <i>empirical datum</i>, and <i>logical</i> or <i>ethical +principle</i>. In either case the subjectivistic principle of knowledge has +been abandoned. Those whose speculative interest in a definable +objective world has been less strong than their attachment to this +principle, have either accepted the imputation of scepticism, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298"></a>[<a href="./images/298.png">298</a>]</span>or had +recourse to the radical epistemological doctrine of mysticism.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Ethical Theories. Relativism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_142" id="Section_142">142</a>. Since the essence of subjectivism is epistemological rather than +metaphysical, its practical and religious implications are various. The +ethical theories which are corollary to the tendencies expounded above, +range from extreme egoism to a mystical universalism. The close +connection between the former and relativism is evident, and the form of +egoism most consistent with epistemological relativism is to be found +among those same Sophists who first maintained this latter doctrine. If +we may believe Plato, the Sophists sought to create for their individual +pupils an <i>appearance</i> of good. In the "Theaetetus," Socrates is +represented as speaking thus on behalf of Protagoras:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no +existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the +evils which are and appear to a man, into goods which are and +appear to him. . . . I say that they (the wise men) are the +physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of +plants—for the husbandmen also take away the evil and +disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and +healthy sensations as well as true ones; and the wise and good +rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil seem just to +states; for whatever appears to be just and fair to a state, +while <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299"></a>[<a href="./images/299.png">299</a>]</span>sanctioned by a state, is just and fair to it; but the +teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the +evil, both in appearance and in reality."<a name="FNanchor_299:22_136" id="FNanchor_299:22_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_299:22_136" class="fnanchor">[299:22]</a></p></div> + +<p>As truth is indistinguishable from the appearance of truth to the +individual, so good is indistinguishable from a particular seeming good. +The supreme moral value according to this plan of life is the agreeable +feeling tone of that dream world to which the individual is forever +consigned. The possible perfection of an experience which is "reduced to +a swarm of impressions," and "ringed round" for each one of us by a +"thick wall of personality" has been brilliantly depicted in the passage +already quoted from Walter Pater, in whom the naturalistic and +subjectivistic motives unite.<a name="FNanchor_299:23_137" id="FNanchor_299:23_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_299:23_137" class="fnanchor">[299:23]</a> If all my experience is strictly +my own, then my good must likewise be my own. And if all of my +experience is valid only in its instants of immediacy, then my best good +must likewise consist in some "exquisite passion," or stirring of the +senses.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Pessimism and Self-denial.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_143" id="Section_143">143</a>. But for Schopenhauer the internal world opens out into the +boundless and unfathomable sea of the universal will. If I retire from +the world upon my own <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300"></a>[<a href="./images/300.png">300</a>]</span>private feelings, I am still short of the true +life, for I am asserting myself against the world. I should seek a sense +of unison with a world whose deeper heart-beats I may learn to feel and +adopt as the rhythm of my own. The folly of willing for one's private +self is the ground of Schopenhauer's pessimism.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"All <i>willing</i> arises from want, therefore from deficiency, +and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends +it; yet for one wish that is satisfied there remain at least +ten which are denied. Further, the desire lasts long, the +demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily +measured out. But even the final satisfaction is itself only +apparent; every satisfied wish at once makes room for a new +one, both are illusions; the one is known to be so, the other +not yet. No attained object of desire can give lasting +satisfaction, but merely a fleeting gratification; it is like +the alms thrown to the beggar, that keeps him alive to-day +that his misery may be prolonged till the morrow. . . . The +subject of willing is thus constantly stretched on the +revolving wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the +Danaids, is the ever-longing Tantalus."<a name="FNanchor_300:24_138" id="FNanchor_300:24_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_300:24_138" class="fnanchor">[300:24]</a></p></div> + +<p>The escape from this torture and self-deception is possible through the +same mystical experience, the same blending with the universe that +conditions knowledge.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Ethics of Welfare.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_144" id="Section_144">144</a>. But though pleasant dreaming be the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301"></a>[<a href="./images/301.png">301</a>]</span>most consistent practical +sequel to a subjectivistic epistemology, its <i>individualism</i> presents +another basis for life with quite different possibilities of emphasis. +It may develop into an aggressive egoism of the type represented by the +sophist Thrasymachus, in his proclamation that "might is right, justice +the interest of the stronger."<a name="FNanchor_301:25_139" id="FNanchor_301:25_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_301:25_139" class="fnanchor">[301:25]</a> But more commonly it is tempered +by a conception of social interest, and serves as the champion of action +against contemplation. The gospel of action is always individualistic. +It requires of the individual a sense of his independence, and of the +real virtue of his initiative. Hence those voluntarists who emphasize +the many individual wills and decline to reduce them, after the manner +of Schopenhauer, to a universal, may be said to afford a direct +justification of it. It is true that this practical realism threatens +the tenability of an epistemological idealism, but the two have been +united, and because of their common emphasis upon the individual such +procedure is not entirely inconsequential. Friedrich Paulsen, whose +panpsychism has already been cited, is an excellent case in point. The +only good, he maintains, is "welfare," the fulfilment of those natural +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302"></a>[<a href="./images/302.png">302</a>]</span>desires which both distinguish the individual and signify his +continuity with all grades of being.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The goal at which the will aims does not consist in a maximum +of pleasurable feelings, but in the normal exercise of the +vital functions for which the species is predisposed. In the +case of man the mode of life is on the whole determined by the +nature of the historical unity from which the individual +evolves as a member. Here the objective content of life, after +which the will strives, also enters into consciousness with +the progressive evolution of presentation; the type of life +becomes a conscious ideal of life."<a name="FNanchor_302:26_140" id="FNanchor_302:26_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_302:26_140" class="fnanchor">[302:26]</a></p></div> + +<p>Here, contrary to the teaching of Schopenhauer, the good consists in +individual attainment, the extension and fulfilment of the <i>distinct</i> +interests that arise from the common fund of nature. To be and to do to +the uttermost, to realize the maximum from nature's investment in one's +special capacities and powers—this is indeed the first principle of a +morality of action.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Ethical Community.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_145" id="Section_145">145</a>. But a type of ethics still further removed from the initial +relativism has been adopted and more or less successfully assimilated by +subjectivistic philosophies. Accepting Berkeley's spirits, with their +indefinite capacities, and likewise the stability of the ideal +principles that underlie a God-administered world, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303"></a>[<a href="./images/303.png">303</a>]</span>and morality becomes +the obedience which the individual renders to the law. The individual, +free to act in his own right, coöperates with the purposes of the +general spiritual community, whose laws are worthy of obedience though +not coercive. The recognition of such a spiritual citizenship, entailing +opportunities, duties, and obligations, rather than thraldom, partakes +of the truth as well as the inadequacy of common-sense.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Religion of Mysticism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_146" id="Section_146">146</a>. As for religion, at least two distinct practical appreciations of +the universe have been historically associated with this chapter in +philosophy. The one of these is the mysticism of Schopenhauer, the +religious sequel to a universalistic voluntarism. Schopenhauer's ethics, +his very philosophy, is religion. For the good and the true are alike +attainable only through identification with the Absolute Will. This +consummation of life, transcending practical and theoretical +differences, engulfing and effacing all qualities and all values, is +like the Nirvâna of the Orient—a positive ideal only for one who has +appraised the apparent world at its real value.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the +entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full +of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304"></a>[<a href="./images/304.png">304</a>]</span>those in whom +the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, +which is so real, with all it's suns and milky-ways—is +nothing."<a name="FNanchor_304:27_141" id="FNanchor_304:27_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_304:27_141" class="fnanchor">[304:27]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">The Religion of Individual Coöperation with God.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_147" id="Section_147">147</a>. From the union of the two motives of voluntarism and +individualism springs another and a more familiar type of religion, that +of coöperative spiritual endeavor. In the religion of Schopenhauer the +soul must utterly lose itself for the sake of peace; here the soul must +persist in its own being and activity for the sake of the progressive +goodness of the world. For Schopenhauer God is the universal solution, +in which all motions cease and all differences disappear; here God is +the General of moral forces. The deeper and more significant universe is</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"a society of rational agents, acting under the eye of +Providence, concurring in one design to promote the common +benefit of the whole, and conforming their actions to the +established laws and order of the Divine parental wisdom: +wherein each particular agent shall not consider himself +apart, but as the member of a great City, whose author and +founder is God: in which the civil laws are no other than the +rules of virtue and the duties of religion: and where +everyone's true interest is combined with his duty."<a name="FNanchor_304:28_142" id="FNanchor_304:28_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_304:28_142" class="fnanchor">[304:28]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305"></a>[<a href="./images/305.png">305</a>]</span>But so uncompromising an optimism is not essential to this religion. +Its distinction lies rather in its acceptance of the manifest plurality +of souls, and its appeal to the faith that is engendered by +service.<a name="FNanchor_305:29_143" id="FNanchor_305:29_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_305:29_143" class="fnanchor">[305:29]</a> As William James has said:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Even God's being is sacred from ours. To coöperate with his +creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants +of us. In such coöperation with his purposes, not in any +chimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretical +drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our +destiny."<a name="FNanchor_305:30_144" id="FNanchor_305:30_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_305:30_144" class="fnanchor">[305:30]</a></p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_267:1_115" id="Footnote_267:1_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_267:1_115"><span class="label">[267:1]</span></a> <span class="smcap">Preliminary Note.</span> By <i>Subjectivism</i> is meant that +system of philosophy which construes the universe in accordance with the +epistemological principle that <i>all knowledge is of its own states or +activities</i>. In so far as subjectivism reduces reality to <i>states of +knowledge</i>, such as <i>perceptions</i> or <i>ideas</i>, it is <i>phenomenalism</i>. In +so far as it reduces reality to a more <i>internal active principle</i> such +as <i>spirit</i> or <i>will</i>, it is <i>spiritualism</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_268:2_116" id="Footnote_268:2_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_268:2_116"><span class="label">[268:2]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Complete Works</i>, Vol. I, p. 352. Fraser's +edition.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_269:3_117" id="Footnote_269:3_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_269:3_117"><span class="label">[269:3]</span></a> Plato: <i>Theaetetus</i>, 156. Translation by Jowett. The +italics are mine.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_270:4_118" id="Footnote_270:4_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_270:4_118"><span class="label">[270:4]</span></a> Plato: <i>Op. cit.</i>, 166.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_271:5_119" id="Footnote_271:5_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_271:5_119"><span class="label">[271:5]</span></a> <ins class="greek" title="alêthes ho hekastô hekastote dokei">ἀληθὲς ὃ ἑκάστῳ ἑκάστοτε δοκεῖ</ins>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_273:6_120" id="Footnote_273:6_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_273:6_120"><span class="label">[273:6]</span></a> For another issue out of this situation, cf. §§ +<a href="#Section_185">185-187</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_276:7_121" id="Footnote_276:7_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276:7_121"><span class="label">[276:7]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Op. cit.</i>, Vol. I, pp. 380-381.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_276:8_122" id="Footnote_276:8_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276:8_122"><span class="label">[276:8]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 389.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_277:9_123" id="Footnote_277:9_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_277:9_123"><span class="label">[277:9]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 397.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_278:10_124" id="Footnote_278:10_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_278:10_124"><span class="label">[278:10]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 418.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_279:11_125" id="Footnote_279:11_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_279:11_125"><span class="label">[279:11]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 403-404.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_282:12_126" id="Footnote_282:12_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_282:12_126"><span class="label">[282:12]</span></a> Cf. Pearson: <i>Grammar of Science</i>, Chap. II. See +above, § <a href="#Section_118">118</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_283:13_127" id="Footnote_283:13_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283:13_127"><span class="label">[283:13]</span></a> See <a href="#Chap_XI">Chap. XI</a>. Cf. also § <a href="#Section_140">140</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_283:14_128" id="Footnote_283:14_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283:14_128"><span class="label">[283:14]</span></a> The same may be said of the "permanent possibilities +of sensation," proposed by J. S. Mill. Such possibilities outside of +actual perception are either nothing or things such as they are known to +be <i>in</i> perception. In either case they are not perceptions.</p> + +<p>In Ernst Mach's <i>Analysis of Sensations</i>, the reader will find an +interesting transition from sensationalism to realism through the +substitution of the term <i>Bestandtheil</i> for <i>Empfindung</i>. (See +Translation by Williams, pp. 18-20.) See below, § <a href="#Section_207">207</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_284:15_129" id="Footnote_284:15_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_284:15_129"><span class="label">[284:15]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 447.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_287:16_130" id="Footnote_287:16_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_287:16_130"><span class="label">[287:16]</span></a> Schopenhauer: <i>The World as Will and Idea</i>. +Translation by Haldane and Kemp, Vol. I, p. 141.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_288:17_131" id="Footnote_288:17_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_288:17_131"><span class="label">[288:17]</span></a> Quoted from Naegeli: <i>Die Mechanisch-physiologische +Theorie der Abstammungslehre</i>, by Friedrich Paulsen, in his +<i>Introduction to Philosophy</i>. Translation by Thilly, p. 103.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_294:18_132" id="Footnote_294:18_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_294:18_132"><span class="label">[294:18]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 273.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_294:19_133" id="Footnote_294:19_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_294:19_133"><span class="label">[294:19]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, Vol. I, pp. 272-273.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_295:20_134" id="Footnote_295:20_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_295:20_134"><span class="label">[295:20]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, Vol. III, p. 278.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_297:21_135" id="Footnote_297:21_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_297:21_135"><span class="label">[297:21]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, Vol. III, p. 249.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_299:22_136" id="Footnote_299:22_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_299:22_136"><span class="label">[299:22]</span></a> Plato: <i>Theaetetus</i>, 167. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_299:23_137" id="Footnote_299:23_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_299:23_137"><span class="label">[299:23]</span></a> See § <a href="#Section_121">121</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_300:24_138" id="Footnote_300:24_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_300:24_138"><span class="label">[300:24]</span></a> Schopenhauer: <i>Op. cit.</i> Translation by Haldane and +Kemp, Vol. I, pp. 253-254.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_301:25_139" id="Footnote_301:25_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_301:25_139"><span class="label">[301:25]</span></a> See Plato: <i>Republic</i>, Bk. I, 338.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_302:26_140" id="Footnote_302:26_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_302:26_140"><span class="label">[302:26]</span></a> Paulsen: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 423.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_304:27_141" id="Footnote_304:27_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_304:27_141"><span class="label">[304:27]</span></a> Schopenhauer: <i>Op. cit.</i> Translation by Haldane and +Kemp, p. 532.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_304:28_142" id="Footnote_304:28_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_304:28_142"><span class="label">[304:28]</span></a> Berkeley: <i>Op. cit.</i>, Vol. II, p. 138.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_305:29_143" id="Footnote_305:29_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_305:29_143"><span class="label">[305:29]</span></a> For an interesting characterization of this type of +religion, cf. Royce: <i>Spirit of Modern Philosophy</i>, p. 46.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_305:30_144" id="Footnote_305:30_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_305:30_144"><span class="label">[305:30]</span></a> James: <i>The Will to Believe</i>, p. 141.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306"></a>[<a href="./images/306.png">306</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_X" id="Chap_X"></a>CHAPTER X</h2> + +<h3>ABSOLUTE REALISM<a name="FNanchor_306:1_145" id="FNanchor_306:1_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_306:1_145" class="fnanchor" style="font-weight: normal; font-size: 80%;">[306:1]</a></h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">The Philosopher's Task, and the Philosopher's Object, or the +Absolute.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_148" id="Section_148">148</a>. No one has understood better than the philosopher himself that he +cannot hope to be popular with men of practical common-sense. Indeed, it +has commonly been a matter of pride with him. The classic representation +of the philosopher's faith in himself is to be found in Plato's +"Republic." The philosopher is there portrayed in the famous cave simile +as one who having seen the light itself can no longer distinguish the +shadows which are apparent to those who sit perpetually in the twilight. +Within the cave of shadows he is indeed less at his ease than those who +have never seen the sun. But since he knows the source of the shadows, +his knowledge surrounds <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307"></a>[<a href="./images/307.png">307</a>]</span>that of the shadow connoisseurs. And his +equanimity need not suffer from the contempt of those whom he +understands better than they understand themselves. The history of +philosophy is due to the dogged persistence with which the philosopher +has taken himself seriously and endured the poor opinion of the world. +But the pride of the philosopher has done more than perpetuate the +philosophical outlook and problem; it has led to the formulation of a +definite philosophical conception, and of two great philosophical +doctrines. The conception is that of the <i>absolute</i>; and the doctrines +are that of the <i>absolute being</i>, and that of the <i>absolute self</i> or +<i>mind</i>. The former of these doctrines is the topic of the present +chapter.</p> + +<p>Among the early Greeks the rôle of the philosopher was one of +superlative dignity. In point of knowledge he was less easily satisfied +than other men. He thought beyond immediate practical problems, devoting +himself to a profounder reflection, that could not but induce in him a +sense of superior intellectual worth. The familiar was not binding upon +him, for his thought was emancipated from routine and superficiality. +Furthermore his intellectual courage and resolution did not permit him +to indulge in triviality, doubt, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308"></a>[<a href="./images/308.png">308</a>]</span>or paradox. He sought his own with a +faith that could not be denied. Even Heraclitus the Dark, who was also +called "the Weeping Philosopher," because he found at the very heart of +nature that transiency which the philosophical mind seeks to escape, +felt himself to be exalted as well as isolated by that insight. But this +sentiment of personal aloofness led at once to a division of experience. +He who knows truly belongs to another and more abiding world. As there +is a philosophical way of thought, there is a philosophical way of life, +and <i>a philosophical object</i>. Since the philosopher and the common man +do not see alike, the terms of their experience are incommensurable. In +Parmenides the Eleatic this motive is most strikingly exhibited. There +is a <i>Way of Truth</i> which diverges from the <i>Way of Opinion</i>. The +philosopher walks the former way alone. And there is an object of truth, +accessible only to one who takes this way of truth. Parmenides finds +this object to be the content of pure affirmation.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that <i>It +is</i>. In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and +indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end. +Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now <i>it is</i>, all at once, +a continuous one."<a name="FNanchor_308:2_146" id="FNanchor_308:2_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_308:2_146" class="fnanchor">[308:2]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309"></a>[<a href="./images/309.png">309</a>]</span>The philosophy of Parmenides, commonly called the Eleatic Philosophy, +is notable for this emergence of the pure concept of <i>absolute being</i> as +the final object of knowledge. The philosopher aims to discover that +which is, and so turns away from that which is not or that which ceases +to be. The negative and transient aspects of experience only hinder him +in his search for the eternal. It was the great Eleatic insight to +realize that the outcome of thought is thus predetermined; that the +answer to philosophy is contained in the question of philosophy. The +philosopher, in that he resolutely avoids all partiality, relativity, +and superficiality, must affirm a complete, universal, and ultimate +being as the very object of that perfect knowledge which he means to +possess. This object is known in the history of these philosophies as +the <i>infinite</i> or <i>absolute</i>.<a name="FNanchor_309:3_147" id="FNanchor_309:3_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_309:3_147" class="fnanchor">[309:3]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Eleatic Conception of Being.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_149" id="Section_149">149</a>. The Eleatic reasons somewhat as follows. The philosopher seeks to +know what is. The object of his knowledge will then contain as its +primary and essential predicate, that of being. It is a step further to +<i>define</i> being in terms of this essential predicate.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310"></a>[<a href="./images/310.png">310</a>]</span>Parmenides thinks of being as a power or strength, a positive +self-maintenance to which all affirmations refer. The remainder of the +Eleatic philosophy is the analysis of this concept and the proof of its +implications. Being must persist through all change, and span all +chasms. Before being there can be only nothing, which is the same as to +say that so far as being is concerned there is no before. Similarly +there can be no after or beyond. There can be no motion, change, or +division of being, because being will be in all parts of every division, +and in all stages of every process. Hence being is "uncreated and +indestructible, alone, complete, immovable, and without end."</p> + +<p>The argument turns upon the application to being as a whole of the +meaning and the implications of <i>only being</i>. Being is the affirmative +or positive. From that <i>alone</i>, one can derive only such properties as +eternity or unity. For generation and decay and plurality may belong to +that which is <i>also</i> affirmative and positive, but not to that which is +affirmative and positive <i>only</i>. The Eleatic philosophy is due, then, to +the determination to derive the whole of reality from the bare necessity +of being, to cut down reality to what flows entirely from the assertion +of its only known <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311"></a>[<a href="./images/311.png">311</a>]</span>necessary aspect, that of being. We meet here in its +simplest form a persistent rationalistic motive, the attempt to derive +the universe from the isolation and analysis of its most universal +character. As in the case of every well-defined philosophy, this motive +is always attended by a "besetting" problem. Here it is the accounting +for what, empirically at least, is alien to that universal character. +And this difficulty is emphasized rather than resolved by Parmenides in +his designation of a limbo of opinion, "in which is no true belief at +all," to which the manifold of common experience with all its +irrelevancies can be relegated.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Spinoza's Conception of Substance.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_150" id="Section_150">150</a>. The Eleatic philosophy, enriched and supplemented, appears many +centuries later in the rigorous rationalism of Spinoza.<a name="FNanchor_311:4_148" id="FNanchor_311:4_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_311:4_148" class="fnanchor">[311:4]</a> With +Spinoza philosophy is a demonstration of necessities after the manner of +geometry. Reality is to be set forth in theorems derived from +fundamental axioms and definitions. As in the case of Parmenides, these +necessities are the implications of the very problem of being. The +philosopher's problem is made to solve itself. But for Spinoza that +problem is more definite and more pregnant. The problematic being must +not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312"></a>[<a href="./images/312.png">312</a>]</span>only be, but must be <i>sufficient to itself</i>. What the philosopher +seeks to know is primarily an intrinsic entity. Its nature must be +independent of other natures, and my knowledge of it independent of my +knowledge of anything else. Reality is something which need not be +sought further. So construed, being is in Spinoza's philosophy termed +<i>substance</i>. It will be seen that to define substance is to affirm the +existence of it, for substance is so defined as to embody the very +qualification for existence. Whatever exists exists under the form of +substance, as that "which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: +in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently +of any other conception."<a name="FNanchor_312:5_149" id="FNanchor_312:5_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_312:5_149" class="fnanchor">[312:5]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">Spinoza's Proof of God, the Infinite Substance. The Modes and +the Attributes.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_151" id="Section_151">151</a>. There remains but one further fundamental thesis for the +establishment of the Spinozistic philosophy, the thesis which maintains +the exclusive existence of the one "absolutely infinite being," or God. +The exclusive existence of God follows from his existence, because of +the exhaustiveness of his nature. His is the nature "consisting in +infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite +essentiality." He will contain all <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313"></a>[<a href="./images/313.png">313</a>]</span>meaning, and all possible meaning, +within his fixed and necessary constitution. It is evident that if such +a God exist, nothing can fall outside of him. One such substance must be +the only substance. But upon what grounds are we to assert God's +existence?</p> + +<p>To proceed further with Spinoza's philosophy we must introduce two terms +which are scarcely less fundamental in his system than that of +substance. The one of these is "attribute," by which he means <i>kind</i> or +general property; the other is "mode," by which he means <i>case</i> or +individual thing. Spinoza's proof of God consists in showing that no +single mode, single attribute, or finite group of modes or attributes, +can be a substance; but only an infinite system of all modes of all +attributes. Translated into common speech this means that neither kinds +nor cases, nor special groups of either, can stand alone and be of +themselves, but only the unity of all possible cases of all possible +kinds.</p> + +<p>The argument concerning the possible substantiality of the case or +individual thing is relatively simple. Suppose an attribute or kind, +<i>A</i>, of which there are cases <i>am</i><sub>1</sub>, <i>am</i><sub>2</sub>, <i>am</i><sub>3</sub>, etc. The +number of cases is never involved in the nature of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314"></a>[<a href="./images/314.png">314</a>]</span>kind, as is seen +for example in the fact that the definition of triangle prescribes no +special number of individual triangles. Hence <i>am</i><sub>1</sub>, <i>am</i><sub>2</sub>, +<i>am</i><sub>3</sub>, etc., must be explained by something outside of their nature. +Their being cases of <i>A</i> does not account for their existing severally. +This is Spinoza's statement of the argument that individual events, such +as motions or sensations, are not self-dependent, but belong to a +context of like events which are mutually dependent.</p> + +<p>The question of the attribute is more difficult. Why may not an +attribute as a complete domain of interdependent events, itself be +independent or substantial? Spinoza's predecessor, Descartes, had +maintained precisely that thesis in behalf of the domain of thought and +the domain of space. Spinoza's answer rests upon the famous ontological +argument, inherited from scholasticism and generally accepted in the +first period of modern philosophy. The evidence of existence, he +declares, is clear and distinct conceivability.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"For a person to say that he has a clear and distinct—that +is, a true—idea of a substance, but that he is not sure +whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said +that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was +false."<a name="FNanchor_314:6_150" id="FNanchor_314:6_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_314:6_150" class="fnanchor">[314:6]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315"></a>[<a href="./images/315.png">315</a>]</span>Now we can form a clear and distinct idea of an absolutely infinite +being that shall have all possible attributes. This idea is a +well-recognized standard and object of reference for thought. But it is +a conception which is highly qualified, not only through its clearness +and distinctness, but also through its abundance of content. It affirms +itself therefore with a certainty that surpasses any other certainty, +because it is supported by each and every other certainty, and even by +the residuum of possibility. If any intelligible meaning be permitted to +affirm itself, so much the more irresistible is the claim of this +infinitely rich meaning. Since every attribute contributes to its +validity, the being with infinite attributes is infinitely or absolutely +valid. The conclusion of the argument is now obvious. If the being +constituted by the infinite attributes exists, it swallows up all +possibilities and exists exclusively.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Limits of Spinoza's Argument for God.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_152" id="Section_152">152</a>. The vulnerable point in Spinoza's argument can thus be expressed: +that which is important is questionable, and that which is +unquestionable is of doubtful importance. Have I indeed a clear and +distinct idea of an absolutely infinite being? The answer turns upon the +meaning of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316"></a>[<a href="./images/316.png">316</a>]</span>phrase "idea of." It is true I can add to such meaning +as I apprehend the thought of possible other meaning, and suppose the +whole to have a definiteness and systematic unity like that of the +triangle. But such an idea is problematic. I am compelled to use the +term "possible," and so to confess the failure of definite content to +measure up to my idea. My idea of an absolutely infinite being is like +my idea of a universal language: I can think <i>of</i> it, but I cannot +<i>think it out</i>, for lack of data or because of the conflicting testimony +of other data. If I mean the infinity of my being to be a term of +inclusiveness, and to insist that the all must be, and that there can be +nothing not included in the all, I can scarcely be denied. But it is +reasonable to doubt the importance of such a truth. If, on the other +hand, I mean that my infinite being shall have the compactness and +organic unity of a triangle, I must admit that such a being is indeed +problematic. The degree to which the meaning of the part is dependent +upon the meaning of the whole, or the degree to which the geometrical +analogy is to be preferred to the analogy of aggregates, like the events +within a year, is a problem that falls quite outside Spinoza's +fundamental arguments.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317"></a>[<a href="./images/317.png">317</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Spinoza's Provision for the Finite.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_153" id="Section_153">153</a>. But the advance of Spinoza over the Eleatics must not be lost +sight of. The modern philosopher has so conceived being as to provide +for parts within an individual unity. The geometrical analogy is a most +illuminating one, for it enables us to understand how manyness may be +indispensable to a being that is essentially unitary. The triangle as +triangle is one. But it could not be such without sides and angles. The +unity is equally necessary to the parts, for sides and angles of a +triangle could not be such without an arrangement governed by the nature +triangle. The whole of nature may be similarly conceived: as the +reciprocal necessity of <i>natura naturans</i>, or nature defined in respect +of its unity, and <i>natura naturata</i>, or nature specified in detail. +There is some promise here of a reconciliation of the <i>Way of Opinion</i> +with the <i>Way of Truth</i>. Opinion would be a gathering of detail, truth a +comprehension of the intelligible unity. Both would be provided for +through the consideration that whatever is complete and necessary must +be made up of incompletenesses that are necessary to it.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Transition to Teleological Conceptions.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_154" id="Section_154">154</a>. This consideration, however, does not receive its most effective +formulation in Spinoza. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318"></a>[<a href="./images/318.png">318</a>]</span>The isolation of the parts, the actual +severalty and irrelevance of the modes, still presents a grave problem. +Is there a kind of whole to which not only parts but fragments, or parts +in their very incompleteness, are indispensable? This would seem to be +true of a <i>progression</i> or <i>development</i>, since that would require both +perfection as its end, and degrees of imperfection as its stages. +Spinoza was prevented from making much of this idea by his rejection of +the principle of <i>teleology</i>. He regarded appreciation or valuation as a +projection of personal bias. "Nature has no particular goal in view," +and "final causes are mere human figments." "The perfection of things is +to be reckoned only from their own nature and power."<a name="FNanchor_318:7_151" id="FNanchor_318:7_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_318:7_151" class="fnanchor">[318:7]</a> The +philosophical method which Spinoza here repudiates, the interpretation +of the world in moral terms, is <i>Platonism</i>, an independent and +profoundly important movement, belonging to the same general realistic +type with Eleaticism and Spinozism. Absolute being is again the +fundamental conception. Here, however, it is conceived that being is +primarily not affirmation or self-sufficiency, but the <i>good</i> or +<i>ideal</i>. There are few great metaphysical systems that have not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319"></a>[<a href="./images/319.png">319</a>]</span>been +deeply influenced by Platonism; hence the importance of understanding it +in its purity. To this end we must return again to the early Greek +conception of the philosopher; for Platonism, like Eleaticism, is a +sequel to the philosopher's self-consciousness.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Early Greek Philosophers not Self-critical.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_155" id="Section_155">155</a>. Although the first Greek philosophers, such men as Thales, +Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, were clearly aware of their +distinction and high calling, it by no means follows that they were good +judges of themselves. Their sense of intellectual power was +unsuspecting; and they praised philosophy without definitely raising the +question of its meaning. They were like unskilled players who try all +the stops and scales of an organ, and know that somehow they can make a +music that exceeds the noises, monotones or simple melodies of those who +play upon lesser instruments. They knew their power rather than their +instrument or their art. The first philosophers, in short, were +self-conscious but not self-critical.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Curtailment of Philosophy in the Age of the Sophists.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_156" id="Section_156">156</a>. The immediately succeeding phase in the history of Greek +philosophy was a curtailment, but <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320"></a>[<a href="./images/320.png">320</a>]</span>only in the most superficial sense a +criticism, of the activity of the philosopher. In the Periclean Age +philosophy suffered more from inattention than from refutation. The +scepticism of the sophists, who were the knowing men of this age, was +not so much conviction as indisposition. They failed to recognize the +old philosophical problem; it did not <i>appeal</i> to them as a genuine +problem. The sophists were the intellectual men of an age of <i>humanism</i>, +<i>individualism</i>, and <i>secularism</i>. These were years in which the circle +of human society, the state with its institutions, citizenship with its +manifold activities and interests, bounded the horizon of thought. What +need to look beyond? Life was not a problem, but an abundant opportunity +and a sense of capacity. The world was not a mystery, but a place of +entertainment and a sphere of action. Of this the sophists were faithful +witnesses. In their love of novelty, irreverence, impressionism, +elegance of speech, and above all in their praise of individual +efficiency, they preached and pandered to their age. Their public, +though it loved to abuse them, was the greatest sophist of them +all—brilliant and capricious, incomparably rich in all but wisdom. The +majority belonged to what <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321"></a>[<a href="./images/321.png">321</a>]</span>Plato called "the sight-loving, art-loving, +busy class." This is an age, then, when the man of practical +common-sense is preëminent, and the philosopher with his dark sayings +has passed away. The pride of wisdom has given way to the pride of power +and the pride of cleverness. The many men pursue the many goods of life, +and there is no spirit among them all who, sitting apart in +contemplation, wonders at the meaning of the whole.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Socrates and the Self-criticism of the Philosopher.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_157" id="Section_157">157</a>. But in their midst there moved a strange prophet, whom they +mistook for one of themselves. Socrates was not one who prayed in the +wilderness, but a man of the streets and the market-place, who talked +rather more incessantly than the rest, and apparently with less right. +He did not testify to the truth, but pleaded ignorance in extenuation of +an exasperating habit of asking questions. There was, however, a humor +and a method in his innocence that arrested attention. He was a +formidable adversary in discussion from his very irresponsibility; and +he was especially successful with the more rhetorical sophists because +he chose his own weapons, and substituted critical analysis, question +and answer, for the long speeches to which these teachers were +habituated by their profession. He appeared to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322"></a>[<a href="./images/322.png">322</a>]</span>be governed by an +insatiable inquisitiveness, and a somewhat malicious desire to discredit +those who spoke with authority.</p> + +<p>But to those who knew him better, and especially to Plato, who knew him +best, Socrates was at once the sweetest and most compelling spirit of +his age. There was a kind of truth in the quality of his character. He +was perhaps <i>the first of all reverent men</i>. In the presence of conceit +his self-depreciation was ironical, but in another presence it was most +genuine, and his deepest spring of thought and action. This other +presence was his own ideal. Socrates was sincerely humble because, +expecting so much of philosophy, he saw his own deficiency. Unlike the +unskilled player, he did not seek to <i>make</i> music; but he loved music, +and knew that such music as is indeed music was beyond his power. On the +other hand he was well aware of his superiority to those in whom +self-satisfaction was possible because they had no conception of the +ideal. Of such he could say in truth that they did not know enough even +to realize the extent of their ignorance. The world has long been +familiar with the vivid portrayal of the Socratic consciousness which is +contained in Plato's "Apology." Socrates had set out in life with the +opinion <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323"></a>[<a href="./images/323.png">323</a>]</span>that his was an age of exceptional enlightenment. But as he +came to know men he found that after all no one of them really knew what +he was about. Each "sight-loving, art-loving, busy" man was quite blind +to the meaning of life. While he was capable of practical achievement, +his judgments concerning the real virtue of his achievements were +conventional and ungrounded, a mere reflection of tradition and opinion. +When asked concerning the meaning of life, or the ground of his +opinions, he was thrown into confusion or aggravated to meaningless +reiteration. Such men, Socrates reflected, were both unwise and +confirmed in their folly through being unconscious of it. Because he +knew that vanity is vanity, that opinion is indeed mere opinion, +Socrates felt himself to be the wisest man in a generation of dogged +unwisdom.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Socrates's Self-criticism a Prophecy of Truth.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_158" id="Section_158">158</a>. It is scarcely necessary to point out that this insight, however +negatively it be used, is a revelation of positive knowledge. Heraclitus +and Parmenides claimed to know; Socrates disclaimed knowledge <i>for +reasons</i>. Like all real criticism this is at once a confounding of error +and a prophecy of truth. The truth so discovered is indeed not ordinary +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324"></a>[<a href="./images/324.png">324</a>]</span>truth concerning historical or physical things, but not on that account +less significant and necessary. This truth, it will also be admitted, is +virtually rather than actually set forth by Socrates himself. He knew +that life has some meaning which those who live with conviction desire +at heart to realize, and that knowledge has principles with which those +who speak with conviction intend to be consistent. There is, in short, a +rational life and a rational discourse. Furthermore, a rational life +will be a life wisely directed to the end of the good; and a rational +discourse one constructed with reference to the real natures of things, +and the necessities which flow from these natures. But Socrates did not +conclusively define either the meaning of life or the form of perfect +knowledge. He testified to the necessity of some such truths, and his +testimony demonstrated both the blindness of his contemporaries and also +his own deficiency.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Historical Preparation for Plato.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_159" id="Section_159">159</a>. The character and method of Socrates have their best foil in the +sophists, but their bearing on the earlier philosophers is for our +purposes even more instructive. Unlike Socrates these philosophers had +not made a study of the task of the philosopher. They <i>were</i> +philosophers—"spectators of all time and all <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325"></a>[<a href="./images/325.png">325</a>]</span>existence"; but they were +precritical or dogmatic philosophers, to whom it had not occurred to +define the requirements of philosophy. They knew no perfect knowledge +other than their own actual knowledge. They defined being and +interpreted life without reflecting upon the quality of the knowledge +whose object is being, or the quality of insight that would indeed be +practical wisdom. But when through Socrates the whole philosophical +prospect is again revealed after the period of humanistic concentration, +it is as an ideal whose possibilities, whose necessities, are conceived +before they are realized. Socrates celebrates the rôle of the +philosopher without assigning it to himself. The new philosophical +object is the philosopher himself; and the new insight a knowledge of +knowledge itself. These three types of intellectual procedure, dogmatic +speculation concerning being, humanistic interest in life, and the +self-criticism of thought, form the historical preparation for Plato, +the philosopher who defined being as the ideal of thought, and upon this +ground interpreted life.</p> + +<p>There is no more striking case in history of the subtle continuity of +thought than the relation between Plato and his master Socrates. The +wonder of it is due to the absence of any formulation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326"></a>[<a href="./images/326.png">326</a>]</span>of doctrine on +the part of Socrates himself. He only lived and talked; and yet Plato +created a system of philosophy in which he is faithfully embodied. The +form of embodiment is the dialogue, in which the talking of Socrates is +perpetuated and conducted to profounder issues, and in which his life is +both rendered and interpreted. But as the vehicle of Plato's thought +preserves and makes perfect the Socratic method, so the thought itself +begins with the Socratic motive and remains to the end an expression of +it. The presentiment of perfect knowledge which distinguished Socrates +from his contemporaries becomes in Plato the clear vision of a realm of +ideal truth.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Platonism: Reality as the Absolute Ideal or Good.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_160" id="Section_160">160</a>. Plato begins his philosophy with the philosopher and the +philosopher's interest. The philosopher is a lover, who like all lovers +longs for the beautiful. But he is the supreme lover, for he loves not +the individual beautiful object but the Absolute Beauty itself. He is a +lover too in that he does not possess, but somehow apprehends his object +from afar. Though imperfect, he seeks perfection; though standing like +all his fellows in the twilight of half-reality, he faces toward the +sun. Now it is the fundamental proposition of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327"></a>[<a href="./images/327.png">327</a>]</span>Platonic philosophy +that reality is the sun itself, or the perfection whose possession every +wise thinker covets, whose presence would satisfy every longing of +experience. The real is that beloved object which is "truly beautiful, +delicate, perfect, and blessed." There is both a serious ground for such +an affirmation and an important truth in its meaning. The ground is the +evident incompleteness of every special judgment concerning experience. +We understand only in part, and we know that we understand only in part. +What we discover is real enough for practical purposes, but even +common-sense questions the true reality of its objects. Special +judgments seem to terminate our thought abruptly and arbitrarily. We +give "the best answer we can," but such answers do not come as the +completion of our thinking. Our thought is in some sense surely a +seeking, and it would appear that we are not permitted to rest and be +satisfied at any stage of it. If we do so we are like the +sophists—blind to our own ignorance. But it is equally true that our +thought is straightforward and progressive. We are not permitted to +return to earlier stages, but must push on to that which is not less, +but more, than what we have as yet found. There is good hope, then, of +understanding what <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328"></a>[<a href="./images/328.png">328</a>]</span>the ideal may be from our knowledge of the direction +which it impels us to follow.</p> + +<p>But to understand Plato's conception of the progression of experience we +must again catch up the Socratic strain which he weaves into every +theme. For Socrates, student of life and mankind, all objects were +objects of interest, and all interests practical interests. One is +ignorant when one does not know the good of things; opinionative when +one rates things by conventional standards; wise when one knows their +real good. In Platonism this practical interpretation of experience +appears in the principle that the object of perfect knowledge is <i>the +good</i>. The nature of things which one seeks to know better is the good +of things, the absolute being which is the goal of all thinking is the +very good itself. Plato does not use the term good in any merely +utilitarian sense. Indeed it is very significant that for Plato there is +no cleavage between theoretical and practical interests. To be morally +good is to know the good, to set one's heart on the true object of +affection; and to be theoretically sound is to understand perfection. +The good itself is the end of every aim, that in which all interests +converge. Hence it cannot be defined, as might a special good, in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329"></a>[<a href="./images/329.png">329</a>]</span>terms +of the fulfilment of a set of concrete conditions, but only in terms of +the sense or direction of all purposes. The following passage occurs in +the "Symposium":</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The true order of going or being led by others to the things +of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which +he mounts upward for the sake of that other beauty, going from +one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair +forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, +until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute +beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty +is."<a name="FNanchor_329:8_152" id="FNanchor_329:8_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_329:8_152" class="fnanchor">[329:8]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">The Progression of Experience toward God.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_161" id="Section_161">161</a>. There is, then, a "true order of going," and an order that leads +from one to many, from thence to forms, from thence to morality, and +from thence to the general objects of thought or <i>the ideas</i>. In the +"Republic," where the proper education of the philosopher is in +question, it is proposed that he shall study arithmetic, geometry, +astronomy, and dialectic. Thus in each case mathematics is the first +advance in knowledge, and dialectic the nearest to perfection. Most of +Plato's examples are drawn from mathematics. This science replaces the +variety and vagueness of the forms of experience with <i>clear</i>, +<i>unitary</i>, <i>definite</i>, and <i>eternal</i> natures, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330"></a>[<a href="./images/330.png">330</a>]</span>such as the number and +the geometrical figure. Thus certain individual things are approximately +triangular, but subject to alteration, and indefinitely many. On the +other hand the triangle as defined by geometry is the fixed and +unequivocal nature or idea which such experiences suggest; and the +philosophical mind will at once pass to it from these. But the +mathematical objects are themselves not thoroughly understood when +understood only in mathematical terms, for the foundations of +mathematics are arbitrary. And the same is true of all the so-called +special sciences. Even the scientists themselves, says Plato,</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"only dream about being, but never can behold the waking +reality so long as they leave the hypotheses they use +unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For +when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the +conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of +he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a conventional +statement will ever become science?"<a name="FNanchor_330:9_153" id="FNanchor_330:9_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_330:9_153" class="fnanchor">[330:9]</a></p></div> + +<p>Within the science of dialectics we are to understand the connections +and sequences of ideas themselves, in the hope of eliminating every +arbitrariness and conventionality within a system of truth that is pure +and self-luminous rationality. To <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331"></a>[<a href="./images/331.png">331</a>]</span>this science, which is the great +interest of his later years, Plato contributes only incomplete studies +and experiments. We must be satisfied with the playful answer with +which, in the "Republic," he replies to Glaucon's entreaty that "he +proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain, and +describe that in like manner": "Dear Glaucon, you will not be able to +follow me here, though I would do my best."</p> + +<p>But a philosophical system has been projected. The real is that perfect +significance or meaning which thought and every interest suggests, and +toward which there is in experience an appreciable movement. It is this +significance which makes things what they really are, and which +constitutes our understanding of them. In itself it transcends the steps +which lead to it; "for God," says Plato, "mingles not with men." But it +is nevertheless the meaning of human life. And this we can readily +conceive. The last word may transform the sentence from nonsense into +sense, and it would be true to say that its sense mingles not with +nonsense. Similarly the last touch of the brush may transform an +inchoate mass of color into a picture, disarray into an object of +beauty; and its beauty mingles not with ugliness. So life, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332"></a>[<a href="./images/332.png">332</a>]</span>when it +finally realizes itself, obtains a new and incommensurable quality of +perfection in which humanity is transformed into deity. There is frankly +no provision for imperfection in such a world. In his later writings +Plato sounds his characteristic note less frequently, and permits the +ideal to create a cosmos through the admixture of matter. But in his +moment of inspiration, the Platonist will have no sense for the +imperfect. It is the darkness behind his back, or the twilight through +which he passes on his way to the light. He will use even the beauties +of earth only "as steps along which he mounts upward for the sake of +that other beauty."</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Aristotle's Hierarchy of Substances in Relation to +Platonism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_162" id="Section_162">162</a>. We have met, then, with two distinct philosophical doctrines +which arise from the conception of the <i>absolute</i>, or the philosopher's +peculiar object: the doctrine of the <i>absolute being</i> or <i>substance</i>, +and that of the <i>absolute ideal</i> or <i>good</i>. Both doctrines are realistic +in that they assume reality to be demonstrated or revealed, rather than +created, by knowledge. Both are rationalistic in that they develop a +system of philosophy from the problem of philosophy, or deduce a +definition of reality <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333"></a>[<a href="./images/333.png">333</a>]</span>from the conception, of reality. There remains a +third doctrine of the same type—the philosophy of Aristotle, the most +elaborately constructed system of Greek antiquity, and the most potent +influence exerted upon the Scholastic Philosophy of the long mediæval +period. This philosophy was rehabilitated in the eighteenth century by +Leibniz, the brilliant librarian of the court of Hanover. The +extraordinary comprehensiveness of Aristotle's philosophy makes it quite +impossible to render here even a general account of it. There is +scarcely any human discipline that does not to some extent draw upon it. +We are concerned only with the central principles of the metaphysics.</p> + +<p>Upon the common ground of rationalism and realism, Plato and Aristotle +are complementary in temper, method, and principle. Plato's is the +genius of inspiration and fertility, Aristotle's the genius of +erudition, mastery, and synthesis. In form, Plato's is the gift of +expression, Aristotle's the gift of arrangement. Plato was born and bred +an aristocrat, and became the lover of the best—the uncompromising +purist; Aristotle is middle-class, and limitlessly wide, hospitable, and +patient in his interests. Thus while both are speculative and acute, +Plato's mind is intensive <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334"></a>[<a href="./images/334.png">334</a>]</span>and profound, Aristotle's extensive and +orderly. It was inevitable, then, that Aristotle should find Plato +one-sided. The philosophy of the ideal is not worldly enough to be true. +It is a religion rather than a theory of reality. Aristotle, however, +would not renounce it, but construe it that it may better provide for +nature and history. This is the significance of his new terminology. +Matter, to which Plato reluctantly concedes some room as a principle of +degradation in the universe, is now admitted to good standing. <i>Matter</i> +or material is indispensable to being as its potentiality or that out of +which it is constituted. The ideal, on the other hand, loses its +exclusive title to the predicate of reality, and becomes the <i>form</i>, or +the determinate nature which exists only in its particular embodiments. +The being or <i>substance</i> is the concrete individual, of which these are +the abstracted aspects. Aristotle's "form," like Plato's "idea," is a +teleological principle. The essential nature of the object is its +perfection. It is furthermore essential to the object that it should +strive after a higher perfection. With Aristotle, however, the reality +is not the consummation of the process, the highest perfection in and +for itself, but the very hierarchy of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335"></a>[<a href="./images/335.png">335</a>]</span>objects that ascends toward it. +The highest perfection, or God, is not itself coextensive with being, +but the final cause of being—that on account of which the whole +progression of events takes place. Reality is the development with all +of its ascending stages from the maximum of potentiality, or matter, to +the maximum of actuality, or God the pure form.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Aristotelian Philosophy as a Reconciliation of Platonism +and Spinozism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_163" id="Section_163">163</a>. To understand the virtue of this philosophy as a basis for the +reconciliation of different interests, we must recall the relation +between Plato and Spinoza. Their characteristic difference appears to +the best advantage in connection with mathematical truth. Both regarded +geometry as the best model for philosophical thinking, but for different +reasons. Spinoza prized geometry for its necessity, and proposed to +extend it. His philosophy is the attempt to formulate a geometry of +being, which shall set forth the inevitable certainties of the universe. +Plato, on the other hand, prized geometry rather for its definition of +types, for its knowledge of pure or perfect natures such as the circle +and triangle, which in immediate experience are only approximated. His +philosophy defines reality similarly as the absolute <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336"></a>[<a href="./images/336.png">336</a>]</span>perfection. +Applied to nature Spinozism is mechanical, and looks for necessary laws, +while Platonism is teleological, and looks for adaptation and +significance. Aristotle's position is intermediate. With Plato he +affirms that the good is the ultimate principle. But this very principle +is conceived to govern a universe of substances, each of which maintains +its own proper being, and all of which are reciprocally determined in +their changes. Final causes dominate nature, but work through efficient +causes. Reality is not pure perfection, as in Platonism, nor the +indifferent necessity, as in Spinozism, but the system of beings +necessary to the complete progression toward the highest perfection. The +Aristotelian philosophy promises, then, to overcome both the hard +realism of Parmenides and Spinoza, and also the supernaturalism of +Plato.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Leibniz's Application of the Conception of Development to the +Problem of Imperfection.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_164" id="Section_164">164</a>. But it promises, furthermore, to remedy the defect common to +these two doctrines, the very besetting problem of this whole type of +philosophy. That problem, as has been seen, is to provide for the +imperfect within the perfect, for the temporal incidents of nature and +history within the eternal being. Many absolutist philosophers have +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337"></a>[<a href="./images/337.png">337</a>]</span>declared the explanation of this realm to be impossible, and have +contented themselves with calling it the realm of opinion or appearance. +And this realm of opinion or appearance has been used as a proof of the +absolute. Zeno, the pupil of Parmenides, was the first to elaborate what +have since come to be known as the paradoxes of the empirical world. +Most of these paradoxes turn upon the infinite extension and +divisibility of space and time. Zeno was especially interested in the +difficulty of conceiving motion, which involves both space and time, and +thought himself to have demonstrated its absurdity and +impossibility.<a name="FNanchor_337:10_154" id="FNanchor_337:10_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_337:10_154" class="fnanchor">[337:10]</a> His argument is thus the complement of +Parmenides's argument for the indivisible and unchanging substance. Now +the method which Zeno here adopts may be extended to cover the whole +realm of nature and history. We should then be dialectically driven from +this realm to take refuge in absolute being. But the empirical world is +not destroyed by disparagement, and cannot long lack champions even +among the absolutists themselves. The reconciliation of nature and +history with the absolute being became the special interest of Leibniz, +the great modern Aristotelian. As a scientist and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338"></a>[<a href="./images/338.png">338</a>]</span>man of affairs, he +was profoundly dissatisfied with Spinoza's resolution of nature, the +human individual, and the human society into the universal being. He +became an advocate of individualism while retaining the general aim and +method of rationalism.</p> + +<p>Like Aristotle, Leibniz attributes reality to individual substances, +which he calls "monads"; and like Aristotle he conceives these monads to +compose an ascending order, with God, the monad of monads, as its +dominating goal.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Furthermore, every substance is like an entire world and like +a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole world which it +portrays, each one in its own fashion; almost as the same city +is variously represented according to the various situations +of him who is regarding it. Thus the universe is multiplied in +some sort as many times as there are substances, and the glory +of God is multiplied in the same way by as many wholly +different representations of his works."<a name="FNanchor_338:11_155" id="FNanchor_338:11_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_338:11_155" class="fnanchor">[338:11]</a></p></div> + +<p>The very "glory of God," then, requires the innumerable finite +individuals with all their characteristic imperfections, that the +universe may lack no possible shade or quality of perspective.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Problem of Imperfection Remains Unsolved.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_165" id="Section_165">165</a>. But the besetting problem is in fact not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339"></a>[<a href="./images/339.png">339</a>]</span>solved, and is one of +the chief incentives to that other philosophy of absolutism which +defines an absolute spirit or mind. Both Aristotle and Leibniz undertake +to make the perfection which determines the order of the hierarchy of +substances, at the same time the responsible author of the whole +hierarchy. In this case the dilemma is plain. If the divine form or the +divine monad be other than the stages that lead up to it, these latter +cannot be essential to it, for God is by definition absolutely +self-sufficient. If, on the other hand, God is identical with the +development in its entirety, then two quite incommensurable standards of +perfection determine the supremacy of the divine nature, that of the +whole and that of the highest parts of the whole. The union of these two +and the definition of a perfection which may be at once the development +and its goal, is the task of absolute idealism.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Absolute Realism in Epistemology. Rationalism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_166" id="Section_166">166</a>. Of the two fundamental questions of epistemology, absolute +realism answers the one explicitly, the other implicitly. As respects +<i>the source of the most valid knowledge</i>, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, +Spinoza are all agreed: true knowledge is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340"></a>[<a href="./images/340.png">340</a>]</span>the work of reason, of pure +intellection. Plato is the great exponent of dialectic, or the +reciprocal affinities and necessities of ideas. Aristotle is the founder +of deductive logic. Spinoza proposes to consider even "human actions and +desires" as though he were "concerned with lines, planes, and solids." +Empirical data may be the occasion, but cannot be the ground of the +highest knowledge. According to Leibniz,</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"it seems that necessary truths, such as we find in pure +mathematics, and especially in arithmetic and geometry, must +have principles whose proof does not depend upon instances, +nor, consequently, upon the witness of the senses, although +without the senses it would never have come into our heads to +think of them."<a name="FNanchor_340:12_156" id="FNanchor_340:12_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_340:12_156" class="fnanchor">[340:12]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">The Relation of Thought and its Object in Absolute Realism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_167" id="Section_167">167</a>. The answers which these philosophies give to the question of <i>the +relation between the state of knowledge and its object</i>, divide them +into two groups. Among the ancients reason is regarded as the means of +emancipation from the limitations of the private mind. "The sleeping +turn aside each into a world of his own," but "the waking"—the wise +men—"have one and the same world." What the individual knows belongs to +himself only in so <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341"></a>[<a href="./images/341.png">341</a>]</span>far as it is inadequate. Hence for Plato the ideas +are not the attributes of a mind, but that self-subsistent truth to +which, in its moments of insight, a mind may have access. Opinion is "my +own," the truth is being. The position of Aristotle is equally clear. +"Actual knowledge," he maintains, "is identical with its object."</p> + +<p>Spinoza and Leibniz belong to another age. Modern philosophy began with +a new emphasis upon self-consciousness. In his celebrated argument—"I +think, hence I am" (<i>cogito ergo sum</i>)—Descartes established the +independent and substantial reality of the thinking activity. The "I +think" is recognized as in itself a fundamental being, known intuitively +to the thinker himself. Now although Spinoza and Leibniz are finally +determined by the same motives that obtain in the cases of Plato and +Aristotle, they must reckon with this new distinction between the +thinker and his object. The result in the case of Spinoza is the +doctrine of "parallelism," in which mind is defined as an "infinite +attribute" of substance, an aspect or phase coextensive with the whole +of being. The result in the case of Leibniz is his doctrine of +"representation" and "preëstablished harmony," whereby each monadic +substance is in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342"></a>[<a href="./images/342.png">342</a>]</span>itself an active spiritual entity, and belongs to the +universe through its knowledge of a specific stage of the development of +the universe. But both Spinoza and Leibniz subordinate such conceptions +as these to the fundamental identity that pervades the whole. With +Spinoza the attributes belong to the same absolute substance, and with +Leibniz the monads represent the one universe. And with both, finally, +the perfection of knowledge, or the knowledge of God, is +indistinguishable from its object, God himself. The epistemological +subtleties peculiar to these philosophers are not stable doctrines, but +render inevitable either a return to the simpler and bolder realism of +the Greeks, or a passing over into the more radical and systematic +doctrine of absolute idealism.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_168" id="Section_168">168</a>. We have met with two general motives, both of which are +subordinated to the doctrine of an absolute being postulated and sought +by philosophy. The one of these motives leads to the conception of the +absolutely necessary and immutable substance, the other to the +conception of a consummate perfection. There is an <i>interpretation of +life</i> appropriate to each of these conceptions. Both agree in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343"></a>[<a href="./images/343.png">343</a>]</span>regarding +life seriously, in defining reason or philosophy as the highest human +activity, and in emphasizing the identity of the individual's good with +the good of the universe. But there are striking differences of tone and +spirit.</p> + +<p>Although the metaphysics of the Stoics have various affiliations, the +Stoic code of morality is the true practical sequel to the +Eleatic-Spinozistic view of the world. The Stoic is one who has set his +affections on the eternal being. He asks nothing of it for himself, but +identifies himself with it. The saving grace is a sense of reality. The +virtuous man is not one who remakes the world, or draws upon it for his +private uses; even less one who rails against it, or complains that it +has used him ill. He is rather one who recognizes that there is but one +really valid claim, that of the universe itself. But he not only submits +to this claim on account of its superiority; he makes it his own. The +discipline of Stoicism is the regulation of the individual will to the +end that it may coincide with the universal will. There is a part of man +by virtue of which he is satisfied with what things are, whatever they +be. That part, designated by the Stoics as "the ruling part," is the +reason. In so far as man seeks to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344"></a>[<a href="./images/344.png">344</a>]</span>understand the laws and natures which +actually prevail, he cannot be discontented with anything whatsoever +that may be known to him.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire +anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute +acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true: +wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these +things, the endeavor of the better part of ourselves is in +harmony with the order of nature as a whole."<a name="FNanchor_344:13_157" id="FNanchor_344:13_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_344:13_157" class="fnanchor">[344:13]</a></p></div> + +<p>In agreement with this teaching of Spinoza's is the famous Stoic formula +to the effect that "nothing can happen contrary to the will of the wise +man," who is free through his very acquiescence. If reason be the proper +"ruling part," the first step in the moral life is the subordination of +the appetitive nature and the enthronement of reason. One who is himself +rational will then recognize the fellowship of all rational beings, and +the unitary and beneficent rationality of the entire universe. The +highest morality is thus already upon the plane of religion.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Platonic Ethics of Perfection.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_169" id="Section_169">169</a>. With Spinoza and the Stoics, the perfection of the individual is +reduced to what the universe requires of him. The good man is willing to +be whatever he must <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345"></a>[<a href="./images/345.png">345</a>]</span>be, for the sake of the whole with which through +reason he is enabled to identify himself. With Plato and Aristotle the +perfection of the individual himself is commended, that the universe may +abound in perfection. The good man is the ideal man—the expression of +the type. And how different the quality of a morality in keeping with +this principle! The virtues which Plato enumerates—temperance, courage, +wisdom, and justice—compose a consummate human nature. He is thinking +not of the necessities but of the possibilities of life. Knowledge of +the truth will indeed be the best of human living, but knowledge is not +prized because it can reconcile man to his limitations; it is the very +overflowing of his cup of life. The youth are to</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"dwell in the land of health, amid fair sights and sounds; and +beauty, the effluence of fair works, will visit the eye and +ear, like a healthful breeze from a purer region, and +insensibly draw the soul even in childhood into harmony with +the beauty of reason."<a name="FNanchor_345:14_158" id="FNanchor_345:14_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_345:14_158" class="fnanchor">[345:14]</a></p></div> + +<p>Aristotle's account of human perfection is more circumstantial and more +prosaic. "The function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with +reason," and his happiness or well-being will <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346"></a>[<a href="./images/346.png">346</a>]</span>consist in the fulness of +rational living. But such fulness requires a sphere of life that will +call forth and exercise the highest human capacities. Aristotle frankly +pronounces "external goods" to be indispensable, and happiness to be +therefore "a gift of the gods." The rational man will acquire a certain +exquisiteness or finesse of action, a "mean" of conduct; and this virtue +will be diversified through the various relations into which he must +enter, and the different situations which he must meet. He will be not +merely brave, temperate, and just, as Plato would have him, but liberal, +magnificent, gentle, truthful, witty, friendly, and in all +self-respecting or high-minded. In addition to these strictly moral +virtues, he will possess the intellectual virtues of prudence and +wisdom, the resources of art and science; and will finally possess the +gift of insight, or intuitive reason. Speculation will be his highest +activity, and the mark of his kinship with the gods who dwell in the +perpetual contemplation of the truth.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Religion of Fulfilment, and the Religion of +Renunciation.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_170" id="Section_170">170</a>. Aristotle's ethics expresses the buoyancy of the ancient world, +when the individual does not feel himself oppressed by the eternal +reality, but rejoices in it. He is not too conscious of his sufferings +to be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347"></a>[<a href="./images/347.png">347</a>]</span>disinterested in his admiration and wonder. It is this which +distinguishes the religion of Plato and Aristotle from that of the +Stoics and Spinoza. With both alike, religion consists not in making the +world, but in contemplating it; not in coöperating with God, but in +worshipping him. Plato and Aristotle, however, do not find any +antagonism between the ways of God and the natural interests of men. God +does not differ from men save in his exalted perfection. The +contemplation and worship of him comes as the final and highest stage of +a life which is organic and continuous throughout. The love of God is +the natural love when it has found its true object.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"For he who has been instructed thus far in the things of +love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order +and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly +perceive a nature of wondrous beauty—and this, Socrates, is +that final cause of all our former toils, which in the first +place is everlasting—not growing and decaying, or waxing and +waning; in the next place not fair in one point of view and +foul in another, . . . or in the likeness of a face or hands or +any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech +or knowledge, nor existing in any other being; . . . but beauty +only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which +without diminution and without increase, or any change, is +imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all +other things."<a name="FNanchor_347:15_159" id="FNanchor_347:15_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_347:15_159" class="fnanchor">[347:15]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348"></a>[<a href="./images/348.png">348</a>]</span>The religion of Spinoza is the religion of one who has renounced the +favor of the universe. He was deprived early in life of every benefit of +fortune, and set out to find the good which required no special +dispensation but only the common lot and the common human endowment. He +found that good to consist in the conviction of the necessity, made +acceptable through the supremacy of the understanding. The like faith of +the Stoics makes of no account the difference of fortune between Marcus +the emperor and Epictetus the slave.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"For two reasons, then, it is right to be content with that +which happens to thee; the one because it was done for thee +and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to +thee, originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy +destiny; and the other because even that which comes severally +to every man is to the power which administers the universe a +cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its very +continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if +thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and +the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou +dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art +dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of +the way."<a name="FNanchor_348:16_160" id="FNanchor_348:16_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_348:16_160" class="fnanchor">[348:16]</a></p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_306:1_145" id="Footnote_306:1_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_306:1_145"><span class="label">[306:1]</span></a> By <i>Absolute Realism</i> is meant that system of +philosophy which defines the universe as the <i>absolute being</i>, implied +in knowledge as its final object, but assumed to be independent of +knowledge. In the <i>Spinozistic</i> system this absolute being is conceived +under the form of <i>substance</i>, or self-sufficiency; in <i>Platonism</i> under +the form of <i>perfection</i>; and in the <i>Aristotelian</i> system under the +form of a <i>hierarchy of substances</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_308:2_146" id="Footnote_308:2_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_308:2_146"><span class="label">[308:2]</span></a> Burnet: <i>Early Greek Philosophy</i>, p. 185.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_309:3_147" id="Footnote_309:3_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_309:3_147"><span class="label">[309:3]</span></a> When contrasted with the temporal realm of "generation +and decay," this ultimate object is often called the <i>eternal</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_311:4_148" id="Footnote_311:4_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_311:4_148"><span class="label">[311:4]</span></a> Holland, 1632-1677.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_312:5_149" id="Footnote_312:5_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_312:5_149"><span class="label">[312:5]</span></a> Spinoza: <i>Ethics</i>, Part I. Translation by Elwes, p. +45.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_314:6_150" id="Footnote_314:6_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_314:6_150"><span class="label">[314:6]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 49.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_318:7_151" id="Footnote_318:7_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_318:7_151"><span class="label">[318:7]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 77, 81.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_329:8_152" id="Footnote_329:8_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_329:8_152"><span class="label">[329:8]</span></a> Plato: <i>Symposium</i>, 211. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_330:9_153" id="Footnote_330:9_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_330:9_153"><span class="label">[330:9]</span></a> Plato: <i>Republic</i>, 533. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_337:10_154" id="Footnote_337:10_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_337:10_154"><span class="label">[337:10]</span></a> See Burnet: <i>Op. cit.</i>, pp. 322-333.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_338:11_155" id="Footnote_338:11_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_338:11_155"><span class="label">[338:11]</span></a> Leibniz: <i>Discourse on Metaphysics</i>. Translation by +Montgomery, p. 15. + +In so far as the monads are spiritual this doctrine tends to be +subjectivistic. Cf. <a href="#Chap_IX">Chap. IX</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_340:12_156" id="Footnote_340:12_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_340:12_156"><span class="label">[340:12]</span></a> Leibniz: <i>New Essays on the Human Understanding</i>. +Translation by Latta, p. 363.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_344:13_157" id="Footnote_344:13_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_344:13_157"><span class="label">[344:13]</span></a> Spinoza: <i>Op. cit.</i>, Part IV. Translation by Elwes, p. +243.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_345:14_158" id="Footnote_345:14_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_345:14_158"><span class="label">[345:14]</span></a> Plato: <i>Op. cit.</i>, 401.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_347:15_159" id="Footnote_347:15_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_347:15_159"><span class="label">[347:15]</span></a> Plato: <i>Symposium</i>, 210-211. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_348:16_160" id="Footnote_348:16_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_348:16_160"><span class="label">[348:16]</span></a> Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: <i>Thoughts</i>. Translation by +Long, p. 141.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349"></a>[<a href="./images/349.png">349</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_XI" id="Chap_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI</h2> + +<h3>ABSOLUTE IDEALISM<a name="FNanchor_349:1_161" id="FNanchor_349:1_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_349:1_161" class="fnanchor" style="font-weight: normal; font-size: 80%;">[349:1]</a></h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_171" id="Section_171">171</a>. Absolute idealism is the most elaborately constructive of all the +historical types of philosophy. Though it may have overlooked elementary +truths, and have sought to combine irreconcilable principles, it cannot +be charged with lack of sophistication or subtlety. Its great virtue is +its recognition of problems—its exceeding circumspection; while its +great promise is due to its comprehensiveness—its generous provision +for all interests and points of view. But its very breadth and +complexity render this philosophy peculiarly liable to the equivocal use +of conceptions. This may be readily understood from the nature of the +central doctrine of absolute idealism. According to this doctrine it is +proposed to define the universe as an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350"></a>[<a href="./images/350.png">350</a>]</span><i>absolute spirit</i>; or a being +infinite, ultimate, eternal, and self-sufficient, like the being of +Plato and Spinoza, but possessing at the same time the distinguishing +properties of spirit. Such conceptions as self-consciousness, will, +knowledge, and moral goodness are carried over from the realm of human +endeavor and social relations to the unitary and all-inclusive reality. +Now it has been objected that this procedure is either meaningless, in +that it so applies the term spirit as to contradict its meaning; or +prejudicial to spiritual interests, in that it neutralizes the +properties of spirit through so extending their use. Thus one may +contend that to affirm that the universe as a whole is spirit is +meaningless, since moral goodness requires special conditions and +relations that cannot be attributed to the universe as a whole; or one +may contend that such doctrine is prejudicial to moral interests because +by attributing spiritual perfection to the totality of being it +discredits all moral loyalties and antagonisms. The difficulties that +lie in the way of absolute idealism are due, then, to the complexity of +its synthesis, to its complementary recognition of differences and +resolution of them into unity. But this synthesis is due to the urgency +of certain great problems which the first <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351"></a>[<a href="./images/351.png">351</a>]</span>or realistic expression of +the absolutist motive left undiscovered and unsolved.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Great Outstanding Problems of Absolutism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_172" id="Section_172">172</a>. It is natural to approach so deliberate and calculating a +philosophy from the stand-point of the problems which it proposes to +solve. One of these is the epistemological problem of the relation +between the state of knowledge and its object. Naturalism and absolute +realism side with common-sense in its assumption that although the real +object is essential to the valid state of knowledge, its being known is +not essential to the real object. Subjectivism, on the other hand, +maintains that being is essentially the content of a knowing state, or +an activity of the knower himself. Absolute idealism proposes to accept +the general epistemological principle of subjectivism; but to satisfy +the realistic demand for a standard, compelling object, by setting up an +<i>absolute knower</i>, with whom all valid knowledge must be in agreement. +This epistemological statement of absolute idealism is its most mature +phase; and the culminating phase, in which it shows unmistakable signs +of passing over into another doctrine. We must look for its pristine +inspiration in its solution of another fundamental problem: that of the +relation between the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352"></a>[<a href="./images/352.png">352</a>]</span>absolute and the empirical. Like absolute realism, +this philosophy regards the universe as a unitary and internally +necessary being, and undertakes to hold that being accountable for every +item of experience. But we have found that absolute realism is beset +with the difficulty of thus accounting for the fragmentariness and +isolation of the individual. The contention that the universe must +really be a rational or perfect unity is disputed by the evident +multiplicity, irrelevance, and imperfection in the foreground of +experience. The inference to perfection and the confession of +imperfection seem equally unavoidable. Rational necessities and +empirical facts are out of joint.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Greek Philosophers and the Problem of Evil. The Task of +the New Absolutism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_173" id="Section_173">173</a>. Even Plato had been conscious of a certain responsibility for +matters of fact. Inasmuch as he attached the predicate of reality to the +absolute perfection, he made that being the only source to which they +could be referred. Perhaps, then, he suggests, they are due to the very +bounteousness of God.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"He was good, and no goodness can ever have any jealousy of +anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all +things should be as like himself as possible."<a name="FNanchor_352:2_162" id="FNanchor_352:2_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_352:2_162" class="fnanchor">[352:2]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353"></a>[<a href="./images/353.png">353</a>]</span>Plotinus, in whom Platonism is leavened by the spirit of an age which +is convinced of sin, and which is therefore more keenly aware of the +positive existence of the imperfect, follows out this suggestion. +Creation is "emanation"—the overflow of God's excess of goodness. But +one does not readily understand how goodness, desiring all things to be +like itself, should thereupon create evil—even to make it good. The +Aristotelian philosophy, with its conception of the gradation of +substances, would seem to be better equipped to meet the difficulty. A +development requires stages; and every finite thing may thus be perfect +in its way and perfect in its place, while in the absolute truth or God +there is realized the meaning of the whole order. But if so, there is +evidently something that escapes God, to wit, the meaningless and +unfitness, the error and evil, of the stages in their successive +isolation. Nor is it of any avail to insist (as did Plato, Aristotle, +and Spinoza alike) that these are only privation, and therefore not to +be counted in the sum of reality. For privation is itself an experience, +with a great variety of implications, moral and psychological; and these +cannot be attributed to God or deduced from him, in consideration of his +absolute perfection.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354"></a>[<a href="./images/354.png">354</a>]</span>The task of the new absolutism is now in clear view. The perfect must +be amended to admit the imperfect. The absolute significance must be so +construed as to provide for the evident facts; for the unmeaning things +and changes of the natural order; for ignorance, sin, despair, and every +human deficiency. The new philosophy is to solve this problem by +defining a <i>spiritual absolute</i>, and by so construing the life or +dynamics of spirit, as to demonstrate the necessity of the very +imperfection and opposition which is so baffling to the realist.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Beginning of Absolute Idealism in Kant's Analysis of +Experience.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_174" id="Section_174">174</a>. Absolute idealism, which is essentially a modern doctrine, does +not begin with rhapsodies, but with a very sober analysis of familiar +truths, conducted by the most sober of all philosophers, Immanuel Kant. +This philosopher lived in Königsberg, Germany, at the close of the +eighteenth century. He is related to absolute idealism much as Socrates +is related to Platonism: he was not himself speculative, but employed a +critical method which was transformed by his followers into a +metaphysical construction. It is essential to the understanding both of +Kant and of his more speculative successors, to observe that he begins +with the recognition of certain non-philosophical truths<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355"></a>[<a href="./images/355.png">355</a>]</span>—those of +<i>natural science</i> and <i>the moral consciousness</i>. He accepts the order of +nature formulated in the Newtonian dynamics, and the moral order +acknowledged in the common human conviction of duty. And he is +interested in discovering the ground upon which these common +affirmations rest, the structure which virtually supports them as types +of knowledge. But a general importance attaches to the analysis because +these two types of knowledge (together with the æsthetic judgment, which +is similarly analyzed) are regarded by Kant as coextensive with +experience itself. The <i>very least experience</i> that can be reported upon +at all is an experience of nature or duty, and as such will be informed +with their characteristic principles. Let us consider the former type. +The simplest instance of nature is the experience of the single +perceived object. In the first place, such an object will be perceived +as in space and time. These Kant calls the <i>forms of intuition</i>. An +object cannot even be presented or given without them. But, furthermore, +it will be regarded as substance, that is, as having a substratum that +persists through changes of position or quality. It will also be +regarded as causally dependent upon other objects like itself. +Causality, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356"></a>[<a href="./images/356.png">356</a>]</span>substance, and like principles to the number of twelve, Kant +calls the <i>categories of the understanding</i>. Both intuition and +understanding are indispensable to the experience of any object +whatsoever. They may be said to condition the object in general. Their +principles condition the process of making something out of the manifold +of sensation. But similarly, every moral experience recognizes what Kant +calls <i>the categorical imperative</i>. The categorical imperative is the +law of reasonableness or impartiality in conduct, requiring the +individual to act on a maxim which he can "will to be law universal." No +state of desire or situation calling for action means anything morally +except in the light of this obligation. Thus certain principles of +thought and action are said to be implicit in all experience. They are +universal and necessary in the sense that they are discovered as the +conditions not of any particular experience, but of experience in +general. This implicit or virtual presence in experience in general, +Kant calls their transcendental character, and the process of +explicating them is his famous <i>Transcendental Deduction</i>.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Kant's Principles Restricted to the Experiences which they +Set in Order.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_175" id="Section_175">175</a>. The restriction which Kant puts upon his method is quite +essential to its meaning. I <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357"></a>[<a href="./images/357.png">357</a>]</span>deduce the categories, for example, just in +so far as I find them to be necessary to perception. Without them my +perception is blind, I make nothing of it; with them my experience +becomes systematic and rational. But categories which I so deduce must +be forever limited to the rôle for which they are defined. Categories +without perceptions are "empty"; they have validity solely with +reference to the experience which they set in order. Indeed, I cannot +even complete that order. The orderly arrangement of parts of experience +suggests, and suggests irresistibly, a perfect system. I can even define +the ideas and ideals through which such a perfect system might be +realized. But I cannot in the Kantian sense attach reality to it because +it is not indispensable to experience. It must remain an ideal which +regulates my thinking of such parts of it as fall within the range of my +perception; or it may through my moral nature become the realm of my +living and an object of faith. In short, Kant's is essentially a +"critical philosophy," a logical and analytical study of the special +terms and relations of human knowledge. He denies the validity of these +terms and relations beyond this realm. His critiques are an inventory +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358"></a>[<a href="./images/358.png">358</a>]</span>of the conditions, principles, and prospects of that cognition which, +although not alone ideally conceivable, is alone possible.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the +Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant. The Absolute +Spirit.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_176" id="Section_176">176</a>. With the successors of Kant, as with the successors of Socrates, +a criticism becomes a system of metaphysics. This transformation is +effected in the post-Kantians by <i>a generalization of the human +cognitive consciousness</i>. According to Kant's analysis it contains a +manifold of sense which must be organized by categories in obedience to +the ideal of a rational universe. The whole enterprise, with its +problems given in perception, its instruments available in the +activities of the understanding, and its ideals revealed in the reason, +is an organic spiritual unity, manifesting itself in the +self-consciousness of the thinker. Now in absolute idealism this very +enterprise of knowledge, made universal and called the <i>absolute spirit</i> +or <i>mind</i>, is taken to be the ultimate reality. And here at length would +seem to be afforded the conception of a being to which the problematic +and the rational, the data and the principles, the natural and the +ideal, are alike indispensable. We are now to seek the real not in the +ideal itself, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359"></a>[<a href="./images/359.png">359</a>]</span>but in that spiritual unity in which appearance is the +incentive to truth, and natural imperfection the spring to goodness. +This may be translated into the language which Plato uses in the +"Symposium," when Diotima is revealing to Socrates the meaning of love. +The new reality will be not the loved one, but love itself.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"What then is Love? Is he mortal?"</p> + +<p>"No."</p> + +<p>"What then?"</p> + +<p>"As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, +but is a mean between them."</p> + +<p>"What is he then, Diotima?"</p> + +<p>"He is a great spirit, and like all that is spiritual he is +intermediate between the divine and the mortal."<a name="FNanchor_359:3_163" id="FNanchor_359:3_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_359:3_163" class="fnanchor">[359:3]</a></p></div> + +<p>Reality is no longer the God who mingles not with men, but that power +which, as Diotima further says, "interprets and conveys to the gods the +prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and rewards of +the gods."</p> + +<p>In speaking for such an idealism, Emerson says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Everything good is on the highway. The middle region of our +being is the temperate zone. We may climb into the thin and +cold realm of pure geometry and lifeless science, or sink into +that of sensation. Between these extremes is the equator of +life, of thought, of spirit, of poetry. . . . The mid-world is +best."<a name="FNanchor_359:4_164" id="FNanchor_359:4_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_359:4_164" class="fnanchor">[359:4]</a></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360"></a>[<a href="./images/360.png">360</a>]</span>The new reality is this highway of the spirit, the very course and +raceway of self-consciousness. It is traversed in the movement and +self-correction of thought, in the interest in ideals, or in the +submission of the will to the control of the moral law.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Fichteanism, or the Absolute Spirit as Moral Activity.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_177" id="Section_177">177</a>. It is the last of these phases of self-consciousness that Fichte, +who was Kant's immediate successor, regards as of paramount importance. +As Platonism began with the ideal of the good or the object of life, so +the new idealism begins with the conviction of duty, or <i>the story of +life</i>. Being is the living moral nature compelled to build itself a +natural order wherein it may obey the moral law, and to divide itself +into a community of moral selves through which the moral virtues may be +realized. Nature and society flow from the conception of an absolute +moral activity, or ego. Such an ego could not be pure and isolated and +yet be moral. The evidence of this is the common moral consciousness. My +duty compels me to act upon the not-self or environment, and to respect +and coöperate with other selves. Fichte's absolute is this moral +consciousness universalized and made eternal. Moral value being its +fundamental principle the universe must on that very account <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361"></a>[<a href="./images/361.png">361</a>]</span>embrace +both nature, or moral indifference, and humanity, or moral limitation.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Romanticism, or the Absolute Spirit as Sentiment.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_178" id="Section_178">178</a>. But the Romanticists, who followed close upon Fichte, were +dissatisfied with so hard and exclusive a conception of spiritual being. +Life, they said, is not all duty. Indeed, the true spiritual life is +quite other, not harsh and constrained, but free and spontaneous—a +wealth of feeling playing about a constantly shifting centre. Spirit is +not consecutive and law-abiding, but capricious and wanton, seeking the +beautiful in no orderly progression, but in a refined and versatile +sensibility. If this be the nature of spirit, and if spirit be the +nature of reality, then he is most wise who is most rich in sentiment. +The Romanticists were the exponents of an absolute sentimentalism. And +they did not prove it, but like good sentimentalists they felt it.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Hegelianism, or the Absolute Spirit as Dialectic.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_179" id="Section_179">179</a>. Hegel, the master of the new idealism, set himself the task of +construing spirit in terms as consecutive as those of Fichte, and as +comprehensive as those of the Romanticists. Like Plato, he found in +dialectic the supreme manifestation of the spiritual life. There is a +certain flow of ideas which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362"></a>[<a href="./images/362.png">362</a>]</span>determines the meaning of experience, and +is the truth of truths. But the mark of the new prophet is this: the +flow of ideas itself is <i>a process of self-correction due to a sense of +error</i>. Thus bare sensation is abstract and bare thought is abstract. +The real, however, is not merely the concrete in which they are united, +but the very process in the course of which through knowledge of +abstraction thought arrives at the concrete. The principle of negation +is the very life of thought, and it is <i>the life of thought</i>, rather +than the outcome of thought, which is reality. The most general form of +the dialectical process contains three moments: the moment of <i>thesis</i>, +in which affirmation is made; the moment of <i>antithesis</i>, in which the +opposite asserts itself; and the moment of <i>synthesis</i>, in which a +reconciliation is effected in a new thesis. Thus thought is the +progressive overcoming of contradiction; not the state of freedom from +contradiction, but the act of escaping it. Such processes are more +familiar in the moral life. Morality consists, so even common-sense +asserts, in the overcoming of evil. Character is the resistance of +temptation; goodness, a growth in grace through discipline. Of such, for +Hegel, is the very kingdom of heaven. It is the task of the philosopher, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363"></a>[<a href="./images/363.png">363</a>]</span>a task to which Hegel applies himself most assiduously, to analyze the +battle and the victory upon which spiritual being nourishes itself. And +since the deeper processes are those of thought, the Hegelian philosophy +centres in an ordering of notions, a demonstration of that necessary +progression of thought which, in its whole dynamical logical history, +constitutes the <i>absolute idea</i>.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature and History.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_180" id="Section_180">180</a>. The Hegelian philosophy, with its emphasis upon difference, +antagonism, and development, is peculiarly qualified to be a philosophy +of nature and history. Those principles of spiritual development which +logic defines are conceived as incarnate in the evolution of the world. +Nature, as the very antithesis to spirit, is now understood to be the +foil of spirit. In nature spirit alienates itself in order to return +enriched. The stages of nature are the preparation for the reviving of a +spirituality that has been deliberately forfeited. The Romanticists, +whether philosophers like Schelling or poets like Goethe and Wordsworth, +were led by their feeling for the beauty of nature to attribute to it a +much deeper and more direct spiritual significance. But Hegel and the +Romanticists alike are truly expressed in Emerson's belief that the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364"></a>[<a href="./images/364.png">364</a>]</span>spiritual interpretation of nature is the "true science."</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The poet alone knows astronomy, chemistry, vegetation, and +animation, for he does not stop at these facts, but employs +them as signs. He knows why the plain or meadow of space was +strown with these flowers we call suns and moons and stars; +why the great deep is adorned with animals, with men, and +gods; for in every word he speaks he rides on them as the +horses of thought."<a name="FNanchor_364:5_165" id="FNanchor_364:5_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_364:5_165" class="fnanchor">[364:5]</a></p></div> + +<p>The new awakening of spirit which is for Hegel the consummation of the +natural evolution, begins with the individual or <i>subjective</i> spirit, +and develops into the social or <i>objective</i> spirit, which is morality +and history. History is a veritable dialectic of nations, in the course +of which the consciousness of individual liberty is developed, and +coördinated with the unity of the state. The highest stage of spirit +incarnate is that of <i>absolute</i> spirit, embracing art, religion, and +philosophy. In art the absolute idea obtains expression in sensuous +existence, more perfectly in classical than in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365"></a>[<a href="./images/365.png">365</a>]</span>the symbolic art of the +Orient, but most perfectly in the romantic art of the modern period. In +religion the absolute idea is expressed in the imagination through +worship. In Oriental pantheism, the individual is overwhelmed by his +sense of the universal; in Greek religion, God is but a higher man; +while in Christianity God and man are perfectly united in Christ. +Finally, in philosophy the absolute idea reaches its highest possible +expression in articulate thought.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Résumé. Failure of Absolute Idealism to Solve the Problem of +Evil.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_181" id="Section_181">181</a>. Such is absolute idealism approached from the stand-point of +antecedent metaphysics. It is the most elaborate and subtle provision +for antagonistic differences within unity that the speculative mind of +man has as yet been able to make. It is the last and most thorough +attempt to resolve individual and universal, temporal and eternal, +natural and ideal, good and evil, into an absolute unity in which the +universal, eternal, ideal, and good shall dominate, and in which all +terms shall be related with such necessity as obtains in the definitions +and theorems of geometry. There is to be some absolute meaning which is +rational to the uttermost and the necessary ground of all the incidents +of existence. Thought could undertake no <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366"></a>[<a href="./images/366.png">366</a>]</span>more ambitious and exacting +task. Nor is it evident after all that absolute idealism enjoys any +better success in this task than absolute realism. The difference +between them becomes much less marked when we reflect that the former, +like the latter, must reserve the predicate of being for the unity of +the whole. Even though evil and contradiction belong to the essence of +things, move in the secret heart of a spiritual universe, the reality is +not these in their severalty, but that life within which they fall, the +story within which they "earn a place." And if absolute idealism has +defined a new perfection, it has at the same time defined a new +imperfection. The perfection is rich in contrast, and thus inclusive of +both the lights and shades of experience; but the perfection belongs +only to the composition of these elements within a single view. It is +not necessary to such perfection that the evil should ever be viewed in +isolation. The idealist employs the analogy of the drama or the picture +whose very significance requires the balance of opposing forces; or the +analogy of the symphony in which a higher musical quality is realized +through the resolution of discord into harmony. But none of these +unities requires any element whatsoever that does not partake of its +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367"></a>[<a href="./images/367.png">367</a>]</span>beauty. It is quite irrelevant to the drama that the hero should +himself have his own view of events with no understanding of their +dramatic value, as it is irrelevant to the picture that an unbalanced +fragment of it should dwell apart, or to the symphony that the discord +should be heard without the harmony. One may multiply without end the +internal differences and antagonisms that contribute to the internal +meaning, and be as far as ever from understanding the external +detachment of experiences that are not rational or good in themselves. +And it is precisely this kind of fact that precipitates the whole +problem. We do not judge of sin and error from experiences in which they +conduct to goodness and truth, but from experiences in which they are +stark and unresolved.</p> + +<p>In view of such considerations many idealists have been willing to +confess their inability to solve this problem. To quote a recent +expositor of Hegel,</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"We need not, after all, be surprised at the apparently +insoluble problem which confronts us. For the question has +developed into the old difficulty of the origin of evil, which +has always baffled both theologians and philosophers. An +idealism which declares that the universe is in reality +perfect, can find, as most forms of popular <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368"></a>[<a href="./images/368.png">368</a>]</span>idealism do, an +escape from the difficulties of the existence of evil, by +declaring that the universe is as yet only growing towards its +ideal perfection. But this refuge disappears with the reality +of time, and we are left with an awkward difference between +what philosophy tells us must be, and what our life tells us +actually is."<a name="FNanchor_368:6_166" id="FNanchor_368:6_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_368:6_166" class="fnanchor">[368:6]</a></p></div> + +<p>If the philosophy of eternal perfection persists in its fundamental +doctrine in spite of this irreconcilable conflict with life, it is +because it is believed that that doctrine <i>must</i> be true. Let us turn, +then, to its more constructive and compelling argument.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Constructive Argument for Absolute Idealism is Based upon +the Subjectivistic Theory of Knowledge.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_182" id="Section_182">182</a>. The proof of absolute idealism is supposed by the majority of its +exponents to follow from the problem of epistemology, and more +particularly from the manifest dependence of truth upon the knowing +mind. In its initial phase absolute idealism is indistinguishable from +subjectivism. Like that philosophy it finds that the object of knowledge +is inseparable from the state of knowledge throughout the whole range of +experience. Since the knower can never escape himself, it may be set +down as an elementary fact that reality (at any rate whatever reality +can be known or even talked about) owes its being to mind.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369"></a>[<a href="./images/369.png">369</a>]</span>Thus Green, the English neo-Hegelian, maintains that "an object which +no consciousness presented to itself would not be an object at all," and +wonders that this principle is not generally taken for granted and made +the starting-point for philosophy.<a name="FNanchor_369:7_167" id="FNanchor_369:7_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_369:7_167" class="fnanchor">[369:7]</a> However, unless the very term +"object" is intended to imply presence to a subject, this principle is +by no means self-evident, and must be traced to its sources.</p> + +<p>We have already followed the fortunes of that empirical subjectivism +which issues from the relativity of perception. At the very dawn of +philosophy it was observed that what is seen, heard, or otherwise +experienced through the senses, depends not only upon the use of +sense-organs, but upon the special point of view occupied by each +individual sentient being. It was therefore concluded that the +perceptual world belonged to the human knower with his limitations and +perspective, rather than to being itself. It was this epistemological +principle upon which Berkeley founded his empirical idealism. Believing +knowledge to consist essentially in perception, and believing perception +to be subjective, he had to choose between the relegation of being to a +region <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370"></a>[<a href="./images/370.png">370</a>]</span>inaccessible to knowledge, and the definition of being in terms +of subjectivity. To avoid scepticism he accepted the latter alternative. +But among the Greeks with whom this theory of perception originated, it +drew its meaning in large part from the distinction between perception +and reason. Thus we read in Plato's "Sophist":</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And you would allow that we participate in generation with +the body, and by perception; but we participate with the soul +by thought in true essence, and essence you would affirm to be +always the same and immutable, whereas generation +varies."<a name="FNanchor_370:8_168" id="FNanchor_370:8_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_370:8_168" class="fnanchor">[370:8]</a></p></div> + +<p>It is conceived that although in perception man is condemned to a +knowledge conditioned by the affections and station of his body, he may +nevertheless escape himself and lay hold on the "true essence" of +things, by virtue of thought. In other words, knowledge, in +contradistinction to "opinion," is not made by the subject, but is the +soul's participation in the eternal natures of things. In the moment of +insight the varying course of the individual thinker coincides with the +unvarying truth; but in that moment the individual thinker is ennobled +through being assimilated to the truth, while the truth is no more, no +less, the truth than before.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371"></a>[<a href="./images/371.png">371</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">The Principle of Subjectivism Extended to Reason.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_183" id="Section_183">183</a>. In absolute idealism, the principle of subjectivism is extended +to reason itself. This extension seems to have been originally due to +moral and religious interests. From the moral stand-point the +contemplation of the truth is a <i>state</i>, and the highest state of the +individual life. The religious interest unifies the individual life and +directs attention to its spiritual development. Among the Greeks of the +middle period life was as yet viewed objectively as the fulfilment of +capacities, and knowledge was regarded as perfection of function, the +exercise of the highest of human prerogatives. But as moral and +religious interests became more absorbing, the individual lived more and +more in his own self-consciousness. Even before the Christian era the +Greek philosophers themselves were preoccupied with the task of winning +a state of inner serenity. Thus the Stoics and Epicureans came to look +upon knowledge as a means to the attainment of an inner freedom from +distress and bondage to the world. In other words, the very reason was +regarded as an activity of the self, and its fruits were valued for +their enhancement of the welfare of the self. And if this be true of the +Stoics and the Epicureans, it is still more clearly true of the +neo-Platonists of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372"></a>[<a href="./images/372.png">372</a>]</span>the Christian era, who mediate between the ancient +and mediæval worlds.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Emphasis on Self-consciousness in Early Christian +Philosophy.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_184" id="Section_184">184</a>. It is well known that the early period of Christianity was a +period of the most vivid self-consciousness. The individual believed +that his natural and social environment was alien to his deeper +spiritual interests. He therefore withdrew into himself. He believed +himself to have but one duty, the salvation of his soul; and that duty +required him to search his innermost springs of action in order to +uproot any that might compromise him with the world and turn him from +God. The drama of life was enacted within the circle of his own +self-consciousness. Citizenship, bodily health, all forms of +appreciation and knowledge, were identified in the parts they played +here. In short the Christian consciousness, although renunciation was +its deepest motive, was reflexive and centripetal to a degree hitherto +unknown among the European peoples. And when with St. Augustine +theoretical interests once more vigorously asserted themselves, this new +emphasis was in the very foreground. St. Augustine wished to begin his +system of thought with a first indubitable certainty, and selected +neither being nor ideas, but <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373"></a>[<a href="./images/373.png">373</a>]</span><i>self</i>. St. Augustine's genius was +primarily religious, and the "Confessions," in which he records the +story of his hard winning of peace and right relations with God, is his +most intimate book. How faithfully does he represent himself, and the +blend of paganism and Christianity which was distinctive of his age, +when in his systematic writings he draws upon religion for his knowledge +of truth! In all my living, he argues, whether I sin or turn to God, +whether I doubt or believe, whether I know or am ignorant, in all <i>I +know that I am I</i>. Each and every state of my consciousness is a state +of my self, and as such, sure evidence of my self's existence. If one +were to follow St. Augustine's reflections further, one would find him +reasoning from his own finite and evil self to an infinite and perfect +Self, which centres like his in the conviction that I am I, but is +endowed with all power and all worth. One would find him reflecting upon +the possible union with God through the exaltation of the human +self-consciousness. But this conception of God as the perfect self is so +much a prophecy of things to come, that more than a dozen centuries +elapsed before it was explicitly formulated by the post-Kantians. We +must follow its more gradual <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374"></a>[<a href="./images/374.png">374</a>]</span>development in the philosophies of +Descartes and Kant.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Descartes's Argument for the Independence of the Thinking +Self.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_185" id="Section_185">185</a>. When at the close of the sixteenth century the Frenchman, René +Descartes, sought to construct philosophy anew and upon secure +foundations, he too selected as the initial certainty of thought the +thinker's knowledge of himself. This principle now received its classic +formulation in the proposition, <i>Cogito ergo sum</i>—"I think, hence I +am." The argument does not differ essentially from that of St. +Augustine, but it now finds a place in a systematic and critical +metaphysics. In that my thinking is certain of itself, says Descartes, +in that I know myself before I know aught else, my self can never be +dependent for its being upon anything else that I may come to know. A +thinking self, with its knowledge and its volition, is quite capable of +subsisting of itself. Such is, indeed, not the case with a finite self, +for all finitude is significant of limitation, and in recognizing my +limitations I postulate the infinite being or God. But the relation of +my self to a physical world is quite without necessity. Human nature, +with soul and body conjoined, is a combination of two substances, +neither of which is a necessary consequence of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375"></a>[<a href="./images/375.png">375</a>]</span>other. As a result +of this combination the soul is to some extent affected by the body, and +the body is to some extent directed by the soul; but the body could +conceivably be an automaton, as the soul could conceivably be, and will +in another life become, a free spirit. The consequences of this dualism +for epistemology are very grave. If knowledge be the activity of a +self-subsistent thinking spirit, how can it reveal the nature of an +external world? The natural order is now literally "external." It is +true that the whole body of exact science, that mechanical system to +which Descartes attached so much importance, falls within the range of +the soul's own thinking. But what assurance is there that it refers to a +province of its own—a physical world in space? Descartes can only +suppose that "clear and distinct" ideas must be trusted as faithful +representations. It is true the external world makes its presence known +directly, when it breaks in upon the soul in sense-perception. But +Descartes's rationalism and love of mathematics forbade his attaching +importance to this criterion. Real nature, that exactly definable and +predictable order of moving bodies defined in physics, is not known +through sense-perception, but through thought. Its necessities <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376"></a>[<a href="./images/376.png">376</a>]</span>are the +necessities of reason. Descartes finds himself, then, in the perplexing +position of seeking an internal criterion for an external world. The +problem of knowledge so stated sets going the whole epistemological +movement of the eighteenth century, from Locke through Berkeley and Hume +to Kant. And the issue of this development is the absolute idealism of +Kant's successors.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Empirical Reaction of the English Philosophers.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_186" id="Section_186">186</a>. Of the English philosophers who prepare the way for the +epistemology of Kant, Hume is the most radical and momentous. It was he +who roused Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers" to the task of the +"Critical Philosophy." Hume is one of the two possible consequences of +Descartes. One who attaches greater importance to the rational +necessities of science than to its external reference, is not unwilling +that nature should be swallowed up in mind. With Malebranche, +Descartes's immediate successor in France, nature is thus provided for +within the archetypal mind of God. With the English philosophers, on the +other hand, externality is made the very mark of nature, and as a +consequence sense-perception becomes the criterion of scientific truth. +This empirical theory of knowledge, inaugurated and developed by Locke +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377"></a>[<a href="./images/377.png">377</a>]</span>and Berkeley, culminates in Hume's designation of the <i>impression</i> as +the distinguishing element of nature, at once making up its content and +certifying to its externality. The processes of nature are successions +of impressions; and the laws of nature are their uniformities, or the +expectations of uniformity which their repetitions engender. Hume does +not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion. If the final mark of truth +is the presence to sense of the individual element, then science can +consist only of items of information and probable generalizations +concerning their sequences. The effect is observed to follow upon the +cause in fact, but there is no understanding of its necessity; therefore +no absolute certainty attaches to the future effects of any cause.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">To Save Exact Science Kant Makes it Dependent on Mind.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_187" id="Section_187">187</a>. But what has become of the dream of the mathematical physicist? +Is the whole system of Newton, that brilliant triumph of the mechanical +method, unfounded and dogmatic? It is the logical instability of this +body of knowledge, made manifest in the well-founded scepticism of Hume, +that rouses Kant to a reëxamination of the whole foundation of natural +science. The general outline of his analysis has been developed above. +It is of importance here <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378"></a>[<a href="./images/378.png">378</a>]</span>to understand its relations to the problem of +Descartes. Contrary to the view of the English philosophers, natural +science is, says Kant, the work of the mind. The certainty of the causal +relation is due to the human inability to think otherwise. Hume is +mistaken in supposing that mere sensation gives us any knowledge of +nature. The very least experience of objects involves the employment of +principles which are furnished by the mind. Without the employment of +such principles, or in bare sensation, there is no intelligible meaning +whatsoever. But once admit the employment of such principles and +formulate them systematically, and the whole Newtonian order of nature +is seen to follow from them. Furthermore, since these principles or +categories are the conditions of human experience, are the very +instruments of knowledge, they are valid wherever there is any +experience or knowledge. There is but one way to make anything at all +out of nature, and that is to conceive it as an order of necessary +events in space and time. Newtonian science is part of such a general +conception, and is therefore necessary if knowledge is to be possible at +all, even the least. Thus Kant turns upon Hume, and shuts him up to the +choice between the utter abnegation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379"></a>[<a href="./images/379.png">379</a>]</span>of all knowledge, including the +knowledge of his own scepticism, and the acceptance of the whole body of +exact science.</p> + +<p>But with nature thus conditioned by the necessities of thought, what has +become of its externality? That, Kant admits, has indeed vanished. Kant +does not attempt, as did Descartes, to hold that the nature which mind +constructs and controls, exists also outside of mind. The nature that is +known is on that very account phenomenal, anthropocentric—created by +its cognitive conditions. Descartes was right in maintaining that +sense-perception certifies to the existence of a world outside the mind, +but mistaken in calling it nature and identifying it with the realm of +science. In short, Kant acknowledges the external world, and names it +the <i>thing-in-itself</i>; but insists that because it is outside of mind it +is outside of knowledge. Thus is the certainty of science saved at the +cost of its metaphysical validity. It is necessarily true, but only of a +conditioned or dependent world. And in saving science Kant has at the +same time prejudiced metaphysics in general. For the human or +naturalistic way of knowing is left in sole possession of the field, +with the higher interest of reasons in the ultimate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380"></a>[<a href="./images/380.png">380</a>]</span>nature of being, +degraded to the rank of practical faith.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Post-Kantians Transform Kant's Mind-in-general into an +Absolute Mind.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_188" id="Section_188">188</a>. The transformation of this critical and agnostic doctrine into +absolute idealism is inevitable. The metaphysical interest was bound to +avail itself of the speculative suggestiveness with which the Kantian +philosophy abounds. The transformation turns upon Kant's assumption that +whatever is constructed by the mind is on that account phenomenon or +appearance. Kant has carried along the presumption that whatever is act +or content of mind is on that account not <i>real</i> object or +<i>thing-in-itself</i>. We have seen that this is generally accepted as true +of the relativities of sense-perception. But is it true of thought? The +post-Kantian idealist maintains that <i>that depends upon the thought</i>. +The content of private individual thinking is in so far not real object; +but it does not follow that this is true of such thinking as is +universally valid. Now Kant has deduced his categories for thought in +general. There are no empirical cases of thinking except the human +thinkers; but the categories are not the property of any one human +individual or any group of such individuals. They are the conditions of +<i>experience <span class='pagenum' style="font-style: normal;"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381"></a>[<a href="./images/381.png">381</a>]</span>in general</i>, and of every possibility of experience. The +transition to absolute idealism is now readily made. <i>Thought in +general</i> becomes the <i>absolute mind</i>, and experience in general its +content. The thing-in-itself drops out as having no meaning. The +objectivity to which it testified is provided for in the completeness +and self-sufficiency which is attributed to the absolute experience. +Indeed, an altogether new definition of subjective and objective +replaces the old. The subjective is that which is only insufficiently +thought, as in the case of relativity and error; the objective is that +which is completely thought. Thus the natural order is indeed +phenomenal; but only because the principles of science are not the +highest principles of thought, and not because nature is the fruit of +thought. Thus Hegel expresses his relation to Kant as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"According to Kant, the things that we know about are <i>to us</i> +appearances only, and we can never know their essential +nature, which belongs to another world, which we cannot +approach. . . . The true statement of the case is as follows. The +things of which we have direct consciousness are mere +phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the +true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is +to have their existence founded not in themselves, but in the +universal divine idea. This view of things, it is true, is as +idealist <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382"></a>[<a href="./images/382.png">382</a>]</span>as Kant's, but in contradistinction to the +subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy should be +termed Absolute Idealism."<a name="FNanchor_382:9_169" id="FNanchor_382:9_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_382:9_169" class="fnanchor">[382:9]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">The Direct Argument. The Inference from the Finite Mind to +the Infinite Mind.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_189" id="Section_189">189</a>. Absolute idealism is thus reached after a long and devious course +of development. But the argument may be stated much more briefly. Plato, +it will be remembered, found that experience tends ever to transcend +itself. The thinker finds himself compelled to pursue the ideal of +immutable and universal truth, and must identify the ultimate being with +that ideal. Similarly Hegel says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"That upward spring of the mind signifies that the being which +the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute +truth; it signifies that beyond and above that appearance, +truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for +God."<a name="FNanchor_382:10_170" id="FNanchor_382:10_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_382:10_170" class="fnanchor">[382:10]</a></p></div> + +<p>The further argument of absolute idealism differs from that of Plato in +that the dependence of truth upon the mind is accepted as a first +principle. The ideal with which experience is informed is now <i>the state +of perfect knowledge</i>, rather than the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383"></a>[<a href="./images/383.png">383</a>]</span>system of absolute truth. The +content of the state of perfect knowledge will indeed be the system of +absolute truth, but none the less <i>content</i>, precisely as finite +knowledge is the content of a finite mind. In pursuing the truth, I who +pursue, aim to realize in myself a certain highest state of knowledge. +Were I to know all truth I should indeed have ceased to be the finite +individual who began the quest, but the evolution would be continuous +and the character of self-consciousness would never have been lost. I +may say, in short, that God or being, is my perfect cognitive self.</p> + +<p>The argument for absolute idealism is a constructive interpretation of +the subjectivistic contention that knowledge can never escape the circle +of its own activity and states. To meet the demand for a final and +standard truth, a demand which realism meets with its doctrine of a +being independent of any mind, this philosophy defines a <i>standard +mind</i>. The impossibility of defining objects in terms of relativity to a +finite self, conducts dialectically to the conception of the <i>absolute +self</i>. The sequel to my error or exclusiveness, is truth or +inclusiveness. The outcome of the dialectic is determined by the +symmetry of the antithesis. Thus, corrected experience implies a last +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384"></a>[<a href="./images/384.png">384</a>]</span>correcting experience; partial cognition, complete cognition; empirical +subject, transcendental subject; finite mind, an absolute mind. The +following statement is taken from a contemporary exponent of the +philosophy:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"What you and I lack, when we lament our human ignorance, is +simply a certain desirable and logically possible state of +mind, or type of experience; to wit, a state of mind in which +we should wisely be able to say that we had fulfilled in +experience what we now have merely in idea, namely, the +knowledge, the immediate and felt presence, of what we now +call the Absolute Reality. . . . There is an Absolute Experience +for which the conception of an absolute reality, <i>i. e.</i>, the +conception of a system of ideal truth, is fulfilled by the +very contents that get presented to this experience. This +Absolute Experience is related to our experience as an organic +whole to its own fragments. It is an experience which finds +fulfilled all that the completest thought can conceive as +genuinely possible. Herein lies its definition as an Absolute. +For the Absolute Experience, as for ours, there are data, +contents, facts. But these data, these contents, express, for +the Absolute Experience, its own meaning, its thought, its +ideas. Contents beyond these that it possesses, the Absolute +Experience knows to be, in genuine truth, impossible. Hence +its contents are indeed particular,—a selection from the +world of bare or merely conceptual possibilities,—but they +form a self-determined whole, than which nothing completer, +more organic, more fulfilled, more transparent, or more +complete in meaning, is concretely or genuinely possible. On +the other hand, these contents are not foreign to those of our +finite <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385"></a>[<a href="./images/385.png">385</a>]</span>experience, but are inclusive of them in the unity of +one life."<a name="FNanchor_385:11_171" id="FNanchor_385:11_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_385:11_171" class="fnanchor">[385:11]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_190" id="Section_190">190</a>. As has been already intimated, at the opening of this chapter, +the inclusion of the whole of reality within a single self is clearly a +questionable proceeding. The need of avoiding the relativism of +empirical idealism is evident. But if the very meaning of the +self-consciousness be due to a certain selection and exclusion within +the general field of experience, it is equally evident that the +relativity of self-consciousness can never be overcome through appealing +to a higher self. One must appeal <i>from</i> the self to the realm of things +as they are. Indeed, although the exponents of this philosophy use the +language of spiritualism, and accept the idealistic epistemology, their +absolute being tends ever to escape the special characters of the self. +And inasmuch as the absolute self is commonly set over against the +finite or empirical self, as the standard and test of truth, it is the +less <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386"></a>[<a href="./images/386.png">386</a>]</span>distinguishable from the realist's order of independent beings.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics of +Absolute Idealism. Kant.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_191" id="Section_191">191</a>. But however much absolute idealism may tend to abandon its +idealism for the sake of its absolutism within the field of metaphysics, +such is not the case within the field of ethics and religion. The +conception of the self here receives a new emphasis. The same +self-consciousness which admits to the highest truth is the evidence of +man's practical dignity. In virtue of his immediate apprehension of the +principles of selfhood, and his direct participation in the life of +spirit, man may be said to possess the innermost secret of the universe. +In order to achieve goodness he must therefore recognize and express +<i>himself</i>. The Kantian philosophy is here again the starting-point. It +was Kant who first gave adequate expression to the Christian idea of the +moral self-consciousness.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"<i>Duty!</i> Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace +nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and +yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that +would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest +forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind, . . . +a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387"></a>[<a href="./images/387.png">387</a>]</span>secretly counterwork it; what origin is there worthy of thee, +and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which +proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations . . . ? It can +be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself, +. . . a power which connects him with an order of things that +only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the +same time commands the whole sensible world, and with it the +empirically determinable existence of man in time, as well as +the sum total of all ends."<a name="FNanchor_387:12_172" id="FNanchor_387:12_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_387:12_172" class="fnanchor">[387:12]</a></p></div> + +<p>With Kant there can be no morality except conduct be attended by the +consciousness of this duty imposed by the higher nature upon the lower. +It is this very recognition of a deeper self, of a personality that +belongs to the sources and not to the consequences of nature, that +constitutes man as a moral being, and only such action as is inspired +with a reverence for it can be morally good. Kant does little more than +to establish the uncompromising dignity of the moral will. In moral +action man submits to a law that issues from himself in virtue of his +rational nature. Here he yields nothing, as he owes nothing, to that +appetency which binds him to the natural world. As a rational being he +himself affirms the very principles which determine the organization of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388"></a>[<a href="./images/388.png">388</a>]</span>nature. This is his <i>freedom</i>, at once the ground and the implication +of his duty. Man is free from nature to serve the higher law of his +personality.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of +Universal and Objective Spirit.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_192" id="Section_192">192</a>. There are two respects in which Kant's ethics has been regarded +as inadequate by those who draw from it their fundamental principles. It +is said that Kant is too rigoristic, that he makes too stern a business +of morality, in speaking so much of law and so little of love and +spontaneity. There are good reasons for this. Kant seeks to isolate the +moral consciousness, and dwell upon it in its purity, in order that he +may demonstrate its incommensurability with the values of inclination +and sensibility. Furthermore, Kant may speak of the principle of the +absolute, and recognize the deeper eternal order as a law, but he may +not, if he is to be consistent with his own critical principles, affirm +the metaphysical being of such an order. With his idealistic followers +it is possible to define the spiritual setting of the moral life, but +with Kant it is only possible to define the antagonism of principles. +Hence the greater optimism of the post-Kantians. They know that the +higher law is the reality, and that he who obeys it thus unites himself +with the absolute self. That <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389"></a>[<a href="./images/389.png">389</a>]</span>which for Kant is only a resolute +obedience to more valid principles, to rationally superior rules for +action, is for idealism man's appropriation of his spiritual birthright. +Since the law is the deeper nature, man may respect and obey it as +valid, and at the same time act upon it gladly in the sure knowledge +that it will enhance his eternal welfare. Indeed, the knowledge that the +very universe is founded upon this law will make him less suspicious of +nature and less exclusive in his adherence to any single law. He will be +more confident of the essential goodness of all manifestations of a +universe which he knows to be fundamentally spiritual.</p> + +<p>But it has been urged, secondly, that the Kantian ethics is too formal, +too little pertinent to the issues of life. Kant's moral law imposes +only obedience to the law, or conduct conceived as suitable to a +universal moral community. But what is the nature of such conduct in +particular? It may be answered that to maintain the moral +self-consciousness, to act dutifully and dutifully only, to be +self-reliant and unswerving in the doing of what one ought to do, is to +obtain a very specific character. But does this not leave the +individual's conduct to his own interpretation of his duty? <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390"></a>[<a href="./images/390.png">390</a>]</span>It was just +this element of individualism which Hegel sought to eliminate through +the application of his larger philosophical conception. If that which +expresses itself within the individual consciousness as the moral law be +indeed the law of that self in which the universe is grounded, it will +appear as <i>objective spirit</i> in the evolution of society. For Hegel, +then, the most valid standard of goodness is to be found in that +customary morality which bespeaks the moral leadings of the general +humanity, and in those institutions, such as the family and the state, +which are the moral acts of the absolute idea itself. Finally, in the +realm of <i>absolute spirit</i>, in art, in revealed religion, and in +philosophy, the individual may approach to the self-consciousness which +is the perfect truth and goodness in and for itself.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Peculiar Pantheism and Mysticism of Absolute Idealism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_193" id="Section_193">193</a>. Where the law of life is the implication in the finite +self-consciousness of the eternal and divine self-consciousness, there +can be no division between morality and religion, as there can be none +between thought and will. Whatever man seeks is in the end God. As the +perfect fulfilment of the thinking self, God is the truth; as the +perfect fulfilment of the willing self, God is the good. The finite +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391"></a>[<a href="./images/391.png">391</a>]</span>self-consciousness finds facts that are not understood, and so seeks to +resolve itself into the perfect self wherein all that is given has +meaning. On the other hand, the finite self-consciousness finds ideals +that are not realized, and so seeks to resolve itself into that perfect +self wherein all that is significant is given. All interests thus +converge toward</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"some state of conscious spirit in which the opposition of +cognition and volition is overcome—in which we neither judge +our ideas by the world, nor the world by our ideas, but are +aware that inner and outer are in such close and necessary +harmony that even the thought of possible discord has become +impossible. In its unity not only cognition and volition, but +feeling also, must be blended and united. In some way or +another it must have overcome the rift in discursive +knowledge, and the immediate must for it be no longer the +alien. It must be as direct as art, as certain and universal +as philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_391:13_173" id="FNanchor_391:13_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_391:13_173" class="fnanchor">[391:13]</a></p></div> + +<p>The religious consciousness proper to absolute idealism is both +pantheistic and mystical, but with distinction. Platonism is pantheistic +in that nature is resolved into God. All that is not perfect is esteemed +only for its promise of perfection. And Platonism is mystical in that +the purification and universalization of the affections brings one <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392"></a>[<a href="./images/392.png">392</a>]</span>in +the end to a perfection that exceeds all modes of thought and speech. +With Spinoza, on the other hand, God may be said to be resolved into +nature. Nature is made divine, but is none the less nature, for its +divinity consists in its absolute necessity. Spinoza's pantheism passes +over into mysticism because the absolute necessity exceeds in both unity +and richness the laws known to the human understanding. In absolute +idealism, finally, both God and nature are resolved into the self. For +that which is divine in experience is self-consciousness, and this is at +the same time the ground of nature. Thus in the highest knowledge the +self is expanded and enriched without being left behind. The mystical +experience proper to this philosophy is the consciousness of identity, +together with the sense of universal immanence. The individual self may +be directly sensible of the absolute self, for these are one spiritual +life. Thus Emerson says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"It is a secret which every intellectual man quickly learns, +that beyond the energy of his possessed and conscious +intellect he is capable of a new energy (as of an intellect +doubled on itself), by abandonment to the nature of things; +that beside his privacy of power as an individual man, there +is a great public power upon which he can draw, by unlocking, +at all risks, his human doors, and suffering the ethereal +tides to roll and circulate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393"></a>[<a href="./images/393.png">393</a>]</span>through him; then he is caught up +into the life of the Universe, his speech is thunder, his +thought is law, and his words are universally intelligible as +the plants and animals. The poet knows that he speaks +adequately then only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or 'with +the flower of the mind'; not with the intellect used as an +organ, but with the intellect released from all service and +suffered to take its direction from its celestial +life."<a name="FNanchor_393:14_174" id="FNanchor_393:14_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_393:14_174" class="fnanchor">[393:14]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">The Religion of Exuberant Spirituality.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_194" id="Section_194">194</a>. But the distinguishing flavor and quality of this religion arises +from its spiritual hospitality. It is not, like Platonism, a +contemplation of the best; nor, like pluralistic idealisms, a moral +knight-errantry. It is neither a religion of exclusion, nor a religion +of reconstruction, but a profound willingness that things should be as +they really are. For this reason its devotees have recognized in Spinoza +their true forerunner. But idealism is not Spinozism, though it may +contain this as one of its strains. For it is not the worship of +necessity, Emerson's "beautiful necessity, which makes man brave in +believing that he cannot shun a danger that is appointed, nor incur one +that is not"; but the worship of <i>that which is</i> necessary.</p> + +<p>Not only must one understand that every effort, however despairing, is +an element of sense in the universal significance;</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394"></a>[<a href="./images/394.png">394</a>]</span></p><div class="blockquot"><p>"that the whole would not be what it is were not precisely +this finite purpose left in its own uniqueness to speak +precisely its own word—a word which no other purpose can +speak in the language of the divine will";<a name="FNanchor_394:15_175" id="FNanchor_394:15_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_394:15_175" class="fnanchor">[394:15]</a></p></div> + +<p>but one must have a zest for such participation, and a heart for the +divine will which it profits. Indeed, so much is this religion a love of +life, that it may, as in the case of the Romanticists, be a love of +caprice. Battle and death, pain and joy, error and truth—all that +belongs to the story of this mortal world, are to be felt as the thrill +of health, and relished as the essences of God. Religion is an exuberant +spirituality, a fearless sensibility, a knowledge of both good and evil, +and a will to serve the good, while exulting that the evil will not +yield without a battle.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_349:1_161" id="Footnote_349:1_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_349:1_161"><span class="label">[349:1]</span></a> By <i>Absolute Idealism</i> is meant that system of +philosophy which defines the universe as the <i>absolute spirit</i>, which is +the human <i>moral</i>, <i>cognitive</i>, or <i>appreciative consciousness</i> +universalized; or as the <i>absolute, transcendental mind</i>, whose state of +<i>complete knowledge</i> is implied in all finite thinking.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_352:2_162" id="Footnote_352:2_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_352:2_162"><span class="label">[352:2]</span></a> Plato: <i>Timæus</i>, 29. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_359:3_163" id="Footnote_359:3_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_359:3_163"><span class="label">[359:3]</span></a> Plato: <i>Symposium</i>, 202. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_359:4_164" id="Footnote_359:4_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_359:4_164"><span class="label">[359:4]</span></a> Emerson: <i>Essays, Second Series</i>, pp. 65-66.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_364:5_165" id="Footnote_364:5_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_364:5_165"><span class="label">[364:5]</span></a> Emerson: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 25.</p> + +<p>The possibility of conflict between this method of nature study and the +empirical method of science is significantly attested by the +circumstance that in the year 1801 Hegel published a paper in which he +maintained, on the ground of certain numerical harmonies, that there +could be no planet between Mars and Jupiter, while at almost exactly the +same time Piazzi discovered Ceres, the first of the asteroids.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_368:6_166" id="Footnote_368:6_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_368:6_166"><span class="label">[368:6]</span></a> McTaggart: <i>Studies in Hegelian Dialectic</i>, p. 181.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_369:7_167" id="Footnote_369:7_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_369:7_167"><span class="label">[369:7]</span></a> Green: <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>, p. 15.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_370:8_168" id="Footnote_370:8_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_370:8_168"><span class="label">[370:8]</span></a> Plato: <i>The Sophist</i>, 248. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_382:9_169" id="Footnote_382:9_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_382:9_169"><span class="label">[382:9]</span></a> Hegel: <i>Encyclopädie</i>, § 45, lecture note. Quoted by +McTaggart: <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 69.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_382:10_170" id="Footnote_382:10_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_382:10_170"><span class="label">[382:10]</span></a> Hegel: <i>Encyclopädie</i>, § 50. Quoted by McTaggart: <i>Op. +cit.</i>, p. 70.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_385:11_171" id="Footnote_385:11_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_385:11_171"><span class="label">[385:11]</span></a> Royce: <i>Conception of God</i>, pp. 19, 43-44. + +This argument is well summarized in Green's statement that "the +existence of one connected world, which is the presupposition of +knowledge, implies the action of one self-conditioning and +self-determining mind." <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>, p. 181.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_387:12_172" id="Footnote_387:12_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_387:12_172"><span class="label">[387:12]</span></a> Kant: <i>Critical Examination of Practical Reason</i>. +Translated by Abbott in <i>Kant's Theory of Ethics</i>, p. 180.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_391:13_173" id="Footnote_391:13_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_391:13_173"><span class="label">[391:13]</span></a> Quoted from McTaggart: <i>Op. cit.</i>, pp. 231-232.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_393:14_174" id="Footnote_393:14_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_393:14_174"><span class="label">[393:14]</span></a> Emerson: <i>Op. cit.</i>, pp. 30-31.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_394:15_175" id="Footnote_394:15_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_394:15_175"><span class="label">[394:15]</span></a> Royce: <i>The World and the Individual, First Series</i>, +p. 465.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395"></a>[<a href="./images/395.png">395</a>]</span></p> +<h2><a name="Chap_XII" id="Chap_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII</h2> + +<h3>CONCLUSION</h3> + + +<div class="sidenote">Liability of Philosophy to Revision, Due to its Systematic +Character.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_195" id="Section_195">195</a>. One who consults a book of philosophy in the hope of finding +there a definite body of truth, sanctioned by the consensus of experts, +cannot fail to be disappointed. And it should now be plain that this is +due not to the frailties of philosophers, but to the meaning of +philosophy. Philosophy is not additive, but reconstructive. Natural +science may advance step by step without ever losing ground; its +empirical discoveries are in their severalty as true as they can ever +be. Thus the stars and the species of animals may be recorded +successively, and each generation of astronomers and zoölogists may take +up the work at the point reached by its forerunners. The formulation of +results does, it is true, require constant correction and revision—but +there is a central body of data which is little affected, and which +accumulates from age to age. Now the finality of scientific truth is +proportional to the modesty of its claims. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396"></a>[<a href="./images/396.png">396</a>]</span>Items of truth persist, +while the interpretation of them is subject to alteration with the +general advance of knowledge; and, relatively speaking, science consists +in items of truth, and philosophy in their interpretation. The liability +to revision in science itself increases as that body of knowledge +becomes more highly unified and systematic. Thus the present age, with +its attempt to construct a single comprehensive system of mechanical +science, is peculiarly an age when fundamental conceptions are subjected +to a thorough reëxamination—when, for example, so ancient a conception +as that of matter is threatened with displacement by that of energy. But +philosophy is <i>essentially unitary and systematic</i>—and thus +<i>superlatively liable to revision</i>.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The One Science and the Many Philosophies.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_196" id="Section_196">196</a>. It is noteworthy that it is only in this age of a highly +systematic natural science that <i>different</i> systems are projected, as in +the case just noted of the rivalry between the strictly mechanical, or +corpuscular, theory and the newer theory of energetics. It has +heretofore been taken for granted that although there may be many +philosophies, there is but one body of science. And it is still taken +for granted that the experimental detail of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397"></a>[<a href="./images/397.png">397</a>]</span>the individual science is a +common fund, to the progressive increase of which the individual +scientist contributes the results of his special research; there being +<i>rival</i> schools of mechanics, physics, or chemistry, only in so far as +<i>fundamental conceptions</i> or <i>principles of orderly arrangement</i> are in +question. But philosophy deals exclusively with the most fundamental +conceptions and the most general principles of orderly arrangement. +Hence it is significant of the very task of philosophy that there should +be many tentative systems of philosophy, even that each philosopher +should project and construct his own philosophy. Philosophy as the truth +of synthesis and reconciliation, of comprehensiveness and coördination, +must be a living unity. It is a thinking of entire experience, and can +be sufficient only through being all-sufficient. The heart of every +philosophy is a harmonizing insight, an intellectual prospect within +which all human interests and studies compose themselves. Such knowledge +cannot be delegated to isolated co-laborers, but will be altogether +missed if not loved and sought in its indivisible unity. There is no +modest home-keeping philosophy; no safe and conservative philosophy, +that can make sure of a part through renouncing the whole. There is no +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398"></a>[<a href="./images/398.png">398</a>]</span>philosophy without intellectual temerity, as there is no religion +without moral temerity. And the one is the supreme interest of thought, +as the other is the supreme interest of life.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Progress in Philosophy. The Sophistication or Eclecticism of +the Present Age.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_197" id="Section_197">197</a>. Though the many philosophies be inevitable, it must not be +concluded that there is therefore no progress in philosophy. The +solution from which every great philosophy is precipitated is the +mingled wisdom of some latest age, with all of its inheritance. The +"positive" knowledge furnished by the sciences, the refinements and +distinctions of the philosophers, the ideals of society—these and the +whole sum of civilization are its ingredients. Where there is no single +system of philosophy significant enough to express the age, as did the +systems of Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, and the +others who belong to the roll of the great philosophers, there exists a +<i>general sophistication</i>, which is more elusive but not less +significant. The present age—at any rate from its own stand-point—is +not an age of great philosophical systems. Such systems may indeed be +living in our midst unrecognized; but historical perspective cannot +safely be anticipated. It is certain that no living voice is known to +speak <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399"></a>[<a href="./images/399.png">399</a>]</span>for this generation as did Hegel, and even Spencer, for the last. +There is, however, a significance in this very passing of Hegel and +Spencer,—an enlightenment peculiar to an age which knows them, but has +philosophically outlived them. There is a moral in the history of +thought which just now no philosophy, whether naturalism, or +transcendentalism, realism or idealism, can fail to draw. The +characterization of this contemporary eclecticism or sophistication, +difficult and uncertain as it must needs be, affords the best summary +and interpretation with which to conclude this brief survey of the +fortunes of philosophy.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Metaphysics. The Antagonistic Doctrines of Naturalism and +Absolutism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_198" id="Section_198">198</a>. Since the problem of metaphysics is the crucial problem of +philosophy, the question of its present status is fundamental in any +characterization of the age. It will appear from the foregoing account +of the course of metaphysical development that two fundamental +tendencies have exhibited themselves from the beginning. The one of +these is naturalistic and empirical, representing the claims of what +common sense calls "matters of fact"; the other is transcendental and +rational, representing the claims of the standards and ideals which are +immanent in experience, and directly manifested in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400"></a>[<a href="./images/400.png">400</a>]</span>the great human +interests of thought and action. These tendencies have on the whole been +antagonistic; and the clear-cut and momentous systems of philosophy have +been fundamentally determined by either the one or the other.</p> + +<p>Thus materialism is due to the attempt to reduce all of experience to +the elements and principles of connection which are employed by the +physical sciences to set in order the actual motions, or changes of +place, which the parts of experience undergo. Materialism maintains that +the motions of bodies are indifferent to considerations of worth, and +denies that they issue from a deeper cause of another order. The very +ideas of such non-mechanical elements or principles are here provided +with a mechanical origin. Similarly a phenomenalism, like that of Hume, +takes immediate presence to sense as the norm of being and knowledge. +Individual items, directly verified in the moment of their occurrence, +are held to be at once the content of all real truth, and the source of +those abstract ideas which the misguided rationalists mistake for real +truth.</p> + +<p>But the absolutist, on the other hand, contends that the thinker must +<i>mean</i> something by the reality which he seeks. If he had it for the +looking, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401"></a>[<a href="./images/401.png">401</a>]</span>thought would not be, as it so evidently is, a purposive +endeavor. And that which is meant by reality can be nothing short of the +fulfilment or final realization of this endeavor of thought. To find out +what thought seeks, to anticipate the consummation of thought and posit +it as real, is therefore the first and fundamental procedure of +philosophy. The mechanism of nature, and all matters of fact, must come +to terms with this absolute reality, or be condemned as mere appearance. +Thus Plato distinguishes the world of "generation" in which we +participate by perception, from the "true essence" in which we +participate by thought; and Schelling speaks of the modern experimental +method as the "corruption" of philosophy and physics, in that it fails +to construe nature in terms of spirit.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of +Nature. The Neo-Fichteans.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_199" id="Section_199">199</a>. Now it would never occur to a sophisticated philosopher of the +present, to one who has thought out to the end the whole tradition of +philosophy, and felt the gravity of the great historical issues, to +suffer either of these motives to dominate him to the exclusion of the +other. Absolutism has long since ceased to speak slightingly of physical +science, and of the world of perception. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402"></a>[<a href="./images/402.png">402</a>]</span>It is conceded that motions +must be known in the mechanical way, and matters of fact in the +matter-of-fact way. Furthermore, the prestige which science enjoyed in +the nineteenth century, and the prestige which the empirical and secular +world of action has enjoyed to a degree that has steadily increased +since the Renaissance, have convinced the absolutist of the intrinsic +significance of these parts of experience. They are no longer reduced, +but are permitted to flourish in their own right. From the very councils +of absolute idealism there has issued a distinction which is fast +becoming current, between the World of Appreciation, or the realm of +moral and logical principles, and the World of Description, or the realm +of empirical generalizations and mechanical causes.<a name="FNanchor_402:1_176" id="FNanchor_402:1_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_402:1_176" class="fnanchor">[402:1]</a> It is indeed +maintained that the former of these is metaphysically superior; but the +latter is ranked without the disparagement of its own proper categories.</p> + +<p>With the Fichteans this distinction corresponds to the distinction in +the system of Fichte between the active moral ego, and the nature which +it posits to act upon. But the <i>neo-Fichteans</i> are <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403"></a>[<a href="./images/403.png">403</a>]</span>concerned to show +that the nature so posited, or the World of Description, is the <i>realm +of mechanical science</i>, and that the entire system of mathematical and +physical truth is therefore morally necessary.<a name="FNanchor_403:2_177" id="FNanchor_403:2_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_403:2_177" class="fnanchor">[403:2]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Neo-Kantians.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_200" id="Section_200">200</a>. A more pronounced tendency in the same direction marks the work +of the <i>neo-Kantians</i>. These philosophers repudiate the spiritualistic +metaphysics of Schopenhauer, Fichte, and Hegel, believing the real +significance of Kant to lie in his critical method, in his examination +of the first principles of the different systems of knowledge, and +especially in his analysis of the foundations of mathematics and +physics.<a name="FNanchor_403:3_178" id="FNanchor_403:3_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_403:3_178" class="fnanchor">[403:3]</a> In approaching mathematics and physics <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404"></a>[<a href="./images/404.png">404</a>]</span>from a general +logical stand-point, these neo-Kantians become scarcely distinguishable +in interest and temper from those scientists who approach logic from the +mathematical and physical stand-point.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Recognition of the Individual. Personal Idealism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_201" id="Section_201">201</a>. The finite, moral individual, with his peculiar spiritual +perspective, has long since been recognized as essential to the meaning +of the universe rationally conceived. But in its first movement absolute +idealism proposed to absorb him in the indivisible absolute self. It is +now pointed out that Fichte, and even Hegel himself, means the absolute +to be a plurality or society of persons.<a name="FNanchor_404:4_179" id="FNanchor_404:4_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_404:4_179" class="fnanchor">[404:4]</a> It is commonly conceded +that the will of the absolute must coincide with the wills of all finite +creatures in their severalty, that God wills in and through men.<a name="FNanchor_404:5_180" id="FNanchor_404:5_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_404:5_180" class="fnanchor">[404:5]</a> +Corresponding to this individualistic tendency on the part of absolute +idealism, there has been recently <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405"></a>[<a href="./images/405.png">405</a>]</span>projected a <i>personal idealism</i>, or +<i>humanism</i>, which springs freshly and directly from the same motive. +This philosophy attributes ultimate importance to the human person with +his freedom, his interests, his control over nature, and his hope of the +advancement of the spiritual kingdom through coöperation with his +fellows.<a name="FNanchor_405:6_181" id="FNanchor_405:6_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_405:6_181" class="fnanchor">[405:6]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">Concessions from the Side of Naturalism. Recognition of +Fundamental Principles.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_202" id="Section_202">202</a>. Naturalism exhibits a moderation and liberality that is not less +striking than that of absolutism. This abatement of its claims began in +the last century with agnosticism. It was then conceded that there is an +order other than that of natural science; but this order was held to be +inaccessible to human knowledge. Such a theory is essentially unstable +because it employs principles which define a non-natural order, but +refuses to credit them or call them knowledge. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406"></a>[<a href="./images/406.png">406</a>]</span>agnostic is in the +paradoxical position of one who knows of an unknowable world. +Present-day naturalism is more circumspect. It has interested itself in +bringing to light that in the very procedure of science which, because +it predetermines what nature shall be, cannot be included within nature. +To this interest is due the rediscovery of the rational foundations of +science. It was already known in the seventeenth century that exact +science does not differ radically from mathematics, as mathematics does +not differ radically from logic. Mathematics and mechanics are now being +submitted to a critical examination which reveals the definitions and +implications upon which they rest, and the general relation of these to +the fundamental elements and necessities of thought.<a name="FNanchor_406:7_182" id="FNanchor_406:7_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_406:7_182" class="fnanchor">[406:7]</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407"></a>[<a href="./images/407.png">407</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Recognition of the Will. Pragmatism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_203" id="Section_203">203</a>. This rationalistic tendency in naturalism is balanced by a +tendency which is more empirical, but equally subversive of the old +ultra-naturalism. Goethe once wrote:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I have observed that I hold that thought to be true which is +<i>fruitful for me</i>. . . . When I know my relation to myself and to +the outer world, I say that I possess the truth."</p></div> + +<p>Similarly, it is now frequently observed that all knowledge is <i>humanly +fruitful</i>, and it is proposed that this shall be regarded as the very +criterion of truth. According to this principle science as a whole, even +knowledge as a whole, is primarily a human utility. The nature which +science defines is an artifact or construct. It is designed to express +briefly and conveniently what man may practically expect from his +environment. This tendency is known as <i>pragmatism</i>. It ranges from +systematic doctrines, reminiscent of Fichte, which seek to define +practical needs and deduce knowledge from them, to the more +irresponsible utterances of those who liken science to +"shorthand,"<a name="FNanchor_407:8_183" id="FNanchor_407:8_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_407:8_183" class="fnanchor">[407:8]</a> and mathematics to a game of chess. In any case +pragmatism attributes to nature a certain dependence on will, and +therefore implies, even when it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408"></a>[<a href="./images/408.png">408</a>]</span>does not avow, that will with its +peculiar principles or values cannot be reduced to the terms of nature. +In short, it would be more true to say that nature expresses will, than +that will expresses nature.<a name="FNanchor_408:9_184" id="FNanchor_408:9_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_408:9_184" class="fnanchor">[408:9]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">Summary, and Transition to Epistemology.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_204" id="Section_204">204</a>. Such, then, is the contemporary eclecticism as respects the +central problem of metaphysics. There are <i>naturalistic</i> and +<i>individualistic</i> tendencies in <i>absolutism</i>; <i>rationalistic</i> and +<i>ethical</i> tendencies in <i>naturalism</i>; and finally the independent and +spontaneous movements of <i>personal idealism</i> and <i>pragmatism</i>.</p> + +<p>Since the rise of the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, metaphysics +and epistemology have maintained relations so intimate that the present +state of the former cannot be characterized without some reference to +the present state of the latter. Indeed, the very issues upon which +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409"></a>[<a href="./images/409.png">409</a>]</span>metaphysicians divide are most commonly those provoked by the problem +of knowledge. The counter-tendencies of naturalism and absolutism are +always connected, and often coincide with, the epistemological +opposition between empiricism, which proclaims perception, and +rationalism, which proclaims reason, to be the proper organ of +knowledge. The other great epistemological controversy does not bear so +direct and simple a relation to the central metaphysical issues, and +must be examined on its own account.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Antagonistic Doctrines of Realism and Idealism. Realistic +Tendency in Empirical Idealism.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_205" id="Section_205">205</a>. The point of controversy is the dependence or independence of the +object of knowledge on the state of knowledge; idealism maintaining that +reality <i>is</i> the knower or his content of mind, realism, that being +known is a circumstance which appertains to some reality, without being +the indispensable condition of reality as such. Now the sophisticated +thought of the present age exhibits a tendency on the part of these +opposite doctrines to approach and converge. It has been already +remarked that the empirical idealism of the Berkeleyan type could not +avoid transcending itself. Hume, who omitted Berkeley's active spirits, +no longer had any subjective seat or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410"></a>[<a href="./images/410.png">410</a>]</span>locus for the perceptions to which +Berkeley had reduced the outer world. And perceptions which are not the +states of any subject, retain only their intrinsic character and become +a series of elements. When there is nothing beyond, which appears, and +nothing within to which it appears, there ceases to be any sense in +using such terms as appearance, phenomenon, or impression. The term +sensation is at present employed in the same ill-considered manner. But +empirical idealism has come gradually to insist upon the importance of +the content of perception, rather than the relation of perception to a +self as its state. The terms <i>element</i> and <i>experience</i>, which are +replacing the subjectivistic terms, are frankly realistic.<a name="FNanchor_410:10_185" id="FNanchor_410:10_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_410:10_185" class="fnanchor">[410:10]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism. The Conception of +Experience.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_206" id="Section_206">206</a>. There is a similar realistic trend in the development of absolute +idealism. The pure Hegelian philosophy was notably objective. The +principles of development in which it centres were conceived by Hegel +himself to manifest themselves most clearly in the progressions of +nature and history. Many of Hegel's followers have been led by moral and +religious interests to emphasize <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411"></a>[<a href="./images/411.png">411</a>]</span>consciousness, and, upon +epistemological grounds, to lay great stress upon the necessity of the +union of the parts of experience within an enveloping self. But absolute +idealism has much at heart the overcoming of relativism, and the +absolute is defined in order to meet the demand for a being that shall +not have the cognitive deficiencies of an object of finite thought. So +it is quite possible for this philosophy, while maintaining its +traditions on the whole, to abandon the term <i>self</i> to the finite +subject, and regard its absolute as a system of rational and universal +principles—self-sufficient because externally independent and +internally necessary. Hence the renewed study of categories as logical, +mathematical, or mechanical principles, and entirely apart from their +being the acts of a thinking self.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, it has been recognized that the general demand of idealism +is met when reality is regarded as not outside of or other than +knowledge, whatever be true of the question of dependence. Thus the +conception of <i>experience</i> is equally convenient here, in that it +signifies what is immediately present in knowledge, without affirming it +to <i>consist in</i> being so presented.<a name="FNanchor_411:11_186" id="FNanchor_411:11_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_411:11_186" class="fnanchor">[411:11]</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412"></a>[<a href="./images/412.png">412</a>]</span></p><div class="sidenote">Idealistic Tendencies in Realism. The Immanence Philosophy.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_207" id="Section_207">207</a>. And at this point idealism is met by a latter-day realism. The +traditional modern realism springing from Descartes was dualistic. It +was supposed that reality in itself was essentially extra-mental, and +thus under the necessity of being either represented or misrepresented +in thought. But the one of these alternatives is dogmatic, in that +thought can never test the validity of its relation to that which is +perpetually outside of it; while the other is agnostic, providing only +for the knowledge of a world of appearance, an improper knowledge that +is in fact not knowledge at all.</p> + +<p>But realism is not necessarily dualistic, since it requires only that +being shall not be dependent upon being known. Furthermore, since +empiricism is congenial to naturalism, it is an easy step to say that +nature is directly known in perception. This first takes the form of +positivism, or the theory that only such nature as can be directly known +can be really known. But this agnostic provision for an unknown world +beyond, inevitably falls away and leaves <i>reality as that which is +directly known, but not conditioned by knowledge</i>. Again the term +<i>experience</i> is the most useful, and provides a common ground for +<i>idealistic realism</i> <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413"></a>[<a href="./images/413.png">413</a>]</span>with <i>realistic idealism</i>. A new epistemological +movement makes this conception of experience its starting-point. What is +known as the <i>immanence philosophy</i> defines reality as experience, and +means by experience the subject matter of all knowledge—not defined as +such, but regarded as capable of being such. Experience is conceived to +be <i>both in and out</i> of selves, cognition being but one of the special +systems into which experience may enter.<a name="FNanchor_413:12_187" id="FNanchor_413:12_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_413:12_187" class="fnanchor">[413:12]</a></p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Interpretation of Tradition as the Basis for a New +Construction.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_208" id="Section_208">208</a>. Does this eclecticism of the age open any philosophical prospect? +Is it more than a general compromise—a confession of failure on the +part of each and every radical and clear-cut doctrine of metaphysics and +epistemology? There is no final answer to such a question short of an +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414"></a>[<a href="./images/414.png">414</a>]</span>independent construction, and such procedure would exceed the scope of +the present discussion. But there is an evident interpretation of +tradition that suggests a possible basis for such construction.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Truth of the Physical System, but Failure of Attempt to +Reduce All Experience to it.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_209" id="Section_209">209</a>. Suppose it to be granted that the categories of nature are quite +self-sufficient. This would mean that there might conceivably be a +strictly physical order, governed only by mechanical principles, and by +the more general logical and mathematical principles. The body of +physical science so extended as to include such general conceptions as +identity, difference, number, quality, space, and time, is the account +of such an order. This order need have no value, and need not be known. +But reality as a whole is evidently not such a strictly physical order, +for the definition of the physical order involves the rejection of many +of the most familiar aspects of experience, such as its value and its +being known in conscious selves. Materialism, in that it proposes to +conceive the whole of reality as physical, must attempt to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415"></a>[<a href="./images/415.png">415</a>]</span>reduce the +residuum to physical terms, and with no hope of success. Goodness and +knowledge cannot be explained as mass and force, or shown to be +mechanical necessities.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Truth of Psychical Relations, but Impossibility of General +Reduction to Them.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_210" id="Section_210">210</a>. Are we then to conclude that reality is not physical, and look +for other terms to which we may reduce physical terms? There is no lack +of such other terms. Indeed, we could as fairly have <i>begun</i> elsewhere. +Thus some parts of experience compose the consciousness of the +individual, and are said to be known by him. Experience so contained is +connected by the special relation of being known together. But this +relation is quite indifferent to physical, moral, and logical relations. +Thus we may be conscious of things which are physically disconnected, +morally repugnant, and logically contradictory, or in all of these +respects utterly irrelevant. Subjectivism, in that it proposes to +conceive the whole of reality as consciousness, must attempt to reduce +physical, moral, and logical relations to that co-presence in +consciousness from which they are so sharply distinguished in their very +definition. The historical failure of this attempt was inevitable.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Truth of Logical and Ethical Principles. Validity of Ideal of +Perfection, but Impossibility of Deducing the Whole of Experience from +it.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_211" id="Section_211">211</a>. But there is at least one further <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416"></a>[<a href="./images/416.png">416</a>]</span>starting-point, the one +adopted by the most subtle and elaborate of all reconstructive +philosophies. Logical necessities are as evidently real as bodies or +selves. It is possible to define general types of inference, as well as +compact and internally necessary systems such as those of mathematics. +There is a perfectly distinguishable strain of pure rationality in the +universe. Whether or not it be possible to conceive a pure rationality +as self-subsistent, inasmuch as there are degrees it is at any rate +possible to conceive of a maximum of rationality. But similarly there +are degrees of moral goodness. It is possible to define with more or +less exactness a morally perfect person, or an ideal moral community. +Here again it may be impossible that pure and unalloyed goodness should +constitute a universe of itself. But that a maximum of goodness, with +all of the accessories which it might involve, should be thus +self-subsistent, is quite conceivable. It is thus possible to define an +absolute and perfect order, in which logical necessity, the interest of +thought, or moral goodness, the interest of will, or both together, +should be realized to the maximum. Absolutism conceives reality <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417"></a>[<a href="./images/417.png">417</a>]</span>under +the form of this ideal, and attempts to reconstruct experience +accordingly. But is the prospect of success any better than in the cases +of materialism and subjectivism? It is evident that the ideal of logical +necessity is due to the fact that certain parts of knowledge approach it +more closely than others. Thus mechanics contains more that is arbitrary +than mathematics, and mathematics more than logic. Similarly, the theory +of the evolution of the planetary system, in that it requires the +assumption of particular distances and particular masses for the parts +of the primeval nebula, is more arbitrary than rational dynamics. It is +impossible, then, in view of the parts of knowledge which belong to the +lower end of the scale of rationality, to regard reality as a whole as +the maximum of rationality; for either a purely dynamical, a purely +mathematical, or a purely logical, realm would be more rational. The +similar disproof of the moral perfection of reality is so unmistakable +as to require no elucidation. It is evident that even where natural +necessities are not antagonistic to moral proprieties, they are at any +rate indifferent to them.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Error and Evil Cannot be Reduced to the Ideal.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_212" id="Section_212">212</a>. But thus far no reference has been made to error and to evil. +These are the terms which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418"></a>[<a href="./images/418.png">418</a>]</span>the ideals of rationality and goodness must +repudiate if they are to retain their meaning. Nevertheless experience +contains them and psychology describes them. We have already followed +the efforts which absolute idealism has made to show that logical +perfection requires error, and that moral perfection requires evil. Is +it conceivable that such efforts should be successful? Suppose a higher +logic to make the principle of contradiction the very bond of +rationality. What was formerly error is now indispensable to truth. But +what of the new error—the unbalanced and mistaken thesis, the +unresolved antithesis, the scattered and disconnected terms of thought? +These fall outside the new truth as surely as the old error fell outside +the old truth. And the case of moral goodness is precisely parallel. The +higher goodness may be so defined as to require failure and sin. Thus it +may be maintained that there can be no true success without struggle, +and no true spiritual exaltation except through repentance. But what of +failure unredeemed, sin unrepented, evil uncompensated and unresolved? +Nothing has been gained after all but a new definition of goodness—and +a new definition of evil. And this is an ethical, not a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419"></a>[<a href="./images/419.png">419</a>]</span>metaphysical +question. The problem of evil, like the problem of error, is as far from +solution as ever. Indeed, the very urgency of these problems is due to +metaphysical absolutism. For this philosophy defines the universe as a +perfect unity. Measured by the standard of such an ideal universe, the +parts of finite experience take on a fragmentary and baffling character +which they would not otherwise possess. The absolute perfection must by +definition both determine and exclude the imperfect. Thus absolutism +bankrupts the universe by holding it accountable for what it can never +pay.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Collective Character of the Universe as a Whole.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_213" id="Section_213">213</a>. If the attempt to construct experience in the special terms of +some part of experience be abandoned, how is reality to be defined? It +is evident that in that case there can be no definition of reality as +such. It must be regarded as a collection of all elements, relations, +principles, systems, that compose it. All truths will be true of it, and +it will be the subject of all truths. Reality is at least physical, +psychical, moral, and rational. That which is physical is not +necessarily moral or psychical, but may be either or both of these. Thus +it is a commonplace of experience that what has bulk and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420"></a>[<a href="./images/420.png">420</a>]</span>weight may or +may not be good, and may or may not be known. Similarly, that which is +psychical may or may not be physical, moral, or rational; and that which +is moral or rational may or may not be physical and psychical. There is, +then, an indeterminism in the universe, a mere coincidence of +principles, in that it contains physical, psychical, moral, logical +orders, without being in all respects either a physical, a psychical, a +moral, or a logical necessity.<a name="FNanchor_420:13_188" id="FNanchor_420:13_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_420:13_188" class="fnanchor">[420:13]</a> Reality or experience itself is +neutral in the sense of being exclusively predetermined by no one of the +several systems it contains. But the different systems of experience +retain their specific and proper natures, without the compromise which +is involved in all attempts to extend some one until it shall embrace +them all. If such a universe seems inconceivably desultory and chaotic, +one may always remind one's self by directly consulting experience that +it is not only found immediately and unreflectively, but returned to and +lived in after every theoretical excursion.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">Moral Implications of such a Pluralistic Philosophy. Purity +of the Good.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_214" id="Section_214">214</a>. But what implications for life would be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421"></a>[<a href="./images/421.png">421</a>]</span>contained in such a +philosophy? Even if it be theoretically clarifying, through being +hospitable to all differences and adequate to the multifarious demands +of experience, is it not on that very account morally dreary and +stultifying? Is not its refusal to establish the universe upon moral +foundations destructive both of the validity of goodness, and of the +incentive to its attainment? Certainly not—if the validity of goodness +be determined by criteria of worth, and if the incentive to goodness be +the possibility of making that which merely exists, or is necessary, +also good.</p> + +<p>This philosophy does not, it is true, define the good, but it makes +ethics autonomous, thus distinguishing the good which it defines, and +saving it from compromise with matter-of-fact, and logical or mechanical +necessity. The criticism of life is founded upon an independent basis, +and affords justification, of a selective and exclusive moral idealism. +Just because it is not required that the good shall be held accountable +for whatever is real, the ideal can be kept pure and intrinsically +worthy. The analogy of logic is most illuminating. If it be insisted +that whatever exists is logically necessary, logical necessity must be +made to embrace <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422"></a>[<a href="./images/422.png">422</a>]</span>that from which it is distinguished by definition, such +as contradiction, mere empirical existence, and error. The consequence +is a logical chaos which has in truth forfeited the name of logic. +Similarly a goodness defined to make possible the deduction from it of +moral evil or moral indifference loses the very distinguishing +properties of goodness. The consequence is an ethical neutrality which +invalidates the moral will. A metaphysical neutrality, on the other +hand, although denying that reality as such is predestined to +morality—and thus affording no possibility of an ethical +absolutism—becomes the true ground for an ethical purism.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Incentive to Goodness.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_215" id="Section_215">215</a>. But, secondly, there can be no lack of incentive to goodness in a +universe which, though not all-good, is in no respect incapable of +becoming good. That which is mechanically or logically necessary, and +that which is psychically present, <i>may be good</i>. And what can the +realization of goodness mean if not that what is natural and necessary, +actual and real, shall be also good. The world is not good, will not be +good, merely through being what it is, but is or shall be made good +through the accession of goodness. It is this belief that the real is +not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423"></a>[<a href="./images/423.png">423</a>]</span>necessarily, but may be, good; that the ideal is not necessarily, +but may be, realized; which has inspired every faith in action. +Philosophically it is only a question of permitting such faith to be +sincere, or condemning it as shallow. If the world be made good through +good-will, then the faith of moral action is rational; but if the world +be good because whatever is must be good, then moral action is a +tread-mill, and its attendant and animating faith only self-deception. +Moral endeavor is the elevation of physical and psychical existence to +the level of goodness.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Relate the inheritance to life, convert the tradition into a +servant of character, draw upon the history for support in the +struggles of the spirit, declare a war of extermination +against the total evil of the world; and then raise new armies +and organize into fighting force every belief available in the +faith that has descended to you."<a name="FNanchor_423:14_189" id="FNanchor_423:14_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_423:14_189" class="fnanchor">[423:14]</a></p></div> + +<p>Evil is here a practical, not a theoretical, problem. It is not to be +solved by thinking it good, for to think it good is to deaden the very +nerve of action; but by destroying it and replacing it with good.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Justification of Faith.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_216" id="Section_216">216</a>. The justification of faith is in the promise <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424"></a>[<a href="./images/424.png">424</a>]</span>of reality. For +what, after all, would be the meaning of a faith which declares that all +things, good, bad, and indifferent, are everlastingly and necessarily +what they are—even if it were concluded on philosophical grounds to +call that ultimate necessity good. Faith has interests; faith is faith +<i>in</i> goodness or beauty. Then what more just and potent cause of despair +than the thought that the ideal must be held accountable for error, +ugliness, and evil, or for the indifferent necessities of +nature?<a name="FNanchor_424:15_190" id="FNanchor_424:15_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_424:15_190" class="fnanchor">[424:15]</a> Are ideals to be prized the less, or believed in the +less, when there is no ground for their impeachment? How much more +hopeful for what is worth the hoping, that nature should discern ideals +and take some steps toward realizing them, than that ideals should have +created nature—such as it is! How much better a report can we give of +nature for its ideals, than of the ideals for their handiwork, if it be +nature! Emerson writes:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Suffice it for the joy of the universe that we have not +arrived at a wall, but at interminable oceans. Our life seems +not present so much as prospective; not for the affairs on +which it is wasted, but as a hint of this vast-flowing vigor. +Most of life seems to be mere <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425"></a>[<a href="./images/425.png">425</a>]</span>advertisement of faculty; +information is given us not to sell ourselves cheap; that we +are very great. So, in particulars, our greatness is always in +a tendency or direction, not in an action. It is for us to +believe in the rule, not in the exception. The noble are thus +known from the ignoble. So in accepting the leading of the +sentiments, it is not what we believe concerning the +immortality of the soul or the like, but <i>the universal +impulse to believe</i>, that is the material circumstance and is +the principal fact in the history of the globe."<a name="FNanchor_425:16_191" id="FNanchor_425:16_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_425:16_191" class="fnanchor">[425:16]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">The Worship and Service of God.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_217" id="Section_217">217</a>. If God be rid of the imputation of moral evil and indifference, +he may be <i>intrinsically worshipful</i>, because regarded under the form of +the highest ideals. And if the great cause of goodness be in fact at +stake, God may both command the adoration of men through his purity, and +reënforce their virtuous living through representing to them that +realization of goodness in the universe at large which both contains and +exceeds their individual endeavor.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Philosopher and the Standards of the Marketplace.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_218" id="Section_218">218</a>. Bishop Berkeley wrote in his "Commonplace Book":</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign +countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my +heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction."</p></div> + +<p>If it be essential to the meaning of philosophy that it should issue +from life, it is equally essential <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426"></a>[<a href="./images/426.png">426</a>]</span>that it should return to life. But +this connection of philosophy with life does not mean its reduction to +the terms of life as conceived in the market-place. Philosophy cannot +emanate from life, and quicken life, without elevating and ennobling it, +and will therefore always be incommensurable with life narrowly +conceived. Hence the philosopher must always be as little understood by +men of the street as was Thales by the Thracian handmaiden. He has an +innocence and a wisdom peculiar to his perspective.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer +to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals +of anyone, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is +laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being +praised and glorified, he cannot help laughing very sincerely +in the simplicity of his heart; and this again makes him look +like a fool. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he +fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of +cattle—a swineherd, or shepherd, or cowherd, who is being +praised for the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; +and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of +whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more +insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man +is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any +shepherd, for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a +wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed +proprietors of ten thousand <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427"></a>[<a href="./images/427.png">427</a>]</span>acres and more, our philosopher +deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to +think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of +family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he has +had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that +their sentiments only betray the dulness and narrowness of +vision of those who utter them, and who are not educated +enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man +has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them +have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and +barbarians, many times over."<a name="FNanchor_427:17_192" id="FNanchor_427:17_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_427:17_192" class="fnanchor">[427:17]</a></p></div> + +<p>It is not to be expected that the opinion of the "narrow, keen, little, +legal mind" should appreciate the philosophy which has acquired the +"music of speech," and hymns "the true life which is lived by immortals +or men blessed of heaven." Complacency cannot understand reverence, nor +secularism, religion.</p> + +<div class="sidenote">The Secularism of the Present Age.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_219" id="Section_219">219</a>. If we may believe the report of a contemporary philosopher, the +present age is made insensible to the meaning of life through +preoccupation with its very achievements:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The world of finite interests and objects has rounded itself, +as it were, into a separate whole, within which the mind of +man can fortify itself, and live <i>securus adversus deos</i>, in +independence of the infinite. In the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428"></a>[<a href="./images/428.png">428</a>]</span>sphere of <i>thought</i>, +there has been forming itself an ever-increasing body of +science, which, tracing out the relation of finite things to +finite things, never finds it necessary to seek for a +beginning or an end to its infinite series of phenomena, and +which meets the claims of theology with the saying of the +astronomer, 'I do not need that hypothesis.' In the sphere of +<i>action</i>, again, the complexity of modern life presents a +thousand isolated interests, crossing each other in ways too +subtle to trace out—interests commercial, social, and +political—in pursuing one or other of which the individual +may find ample occupation for his existence, without ever +feeling the need of any return upon himself, or seeing any +reason to ask himself whether this endless striving has any +meaning or object beyond itself."<a name="FNanchor_428:18_193" id="FNanchor_428:18_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_428:18_193" class="fnanchor">[428:18]</a></p></div> + +<div class="sidenote">The Value of Contemplation for Life.</div> + +<p class="section">§ <a name="Section_220" id="Section_220">220</a>. There is no dignity in living except it be in the solemn presence +of the universe; and only contemplation can summon such a presence. +Moreover, the sessions must be not infrequent, for memory is short and +visions fade. Truth does not require, however, to be followed out of the +world. There is a speculative detachment from life which is less +courageous, even if more noble, than worldliness. Such is Dante's +exalted but mediæval intellectualism.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"And it may be said that (as true friendship between men +consists in each wholly loving the other) the true philosopher +loves every part of wisdom, and wisdom <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429"></a>[<a href="./images/429.png">429</a>]</span>every part of the +philosopher, inasmuch as she draws all to herself, and allows +no one of his thoughts to wander to other things."</p></div> + +<p>Even though, as Aristotle thought, pure contemplation be alone proper to +the gods in their perfection and blessedness, for the sublunary world +this is less worthy than that balance and unity of faculty which +distinguished the humanity of the Greek.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Then," writes Thucydides, "we are lovers of the beautiful, +yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without +loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and +ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avoid +poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing +nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the +State because he takes care of his own household; and even +those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea +of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in +public affairs not as a harmless, but as a useless character; +and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges, of +a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, +not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained +by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar +power of thinking before we act, and of acting too, whereas +other men are courageous from ignorance, but hesitate upon +reflection."<a name="FNanchor_429:19_194" id="FNanchor_429:19_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_429:19_194" class="fnanchor">[429:19]</a></p></div> + +<p>Thus life may be broadened and deepened without being made thin and +ineffectual. As the civil <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430"></a>[<a href="./images/430.png">430</a>]</span>community is related to the individual's +private interests, so the community of the universe is related to the +civil community. There is a citizenship in this larger community which +requires a wider and more generous interest, rooted in a deeper and more +quiet reflection. The world, however, is not to be left behind, but +served with a new sense of proportion, with the peculiar fortitude and +reverence which are the proper fruits of philosophy.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"This is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, +if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly +conjoined and united together than they have been; a +conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets: Saturn, +the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet +of civil society and action."<a name="FNanchor_430:20_195" id="FNanchor_430:20_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_430:20_195" class="fnanchor">[430:20]</a></p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_402:1_176" id="Footnote_402:1_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_402:1_176"><span class="label">[402:1]</span></a> Cf. Josiah Royce: <i>The Spirit of Modern Philosophy</i>, +Lecture XII; <i>The World and the Individual, Second Series</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_403:2_177" id="Footnote_403:2_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_403:2_177"><span class="label">[403:2]</span></a> Cf. Hugo Münsterberg: <i>Psychology and Life</i>. The more +important writings of this school are: <i>Die Philosophie im Beginn des +zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts</i>, edited by Wilhelm Windelband, and contributed +to by Windelband, H. Rickert, O. Liebmann, E. Troeltsch, B. Bauch, and +others. This book contains an excellent bibliography. Also, Rickert: +<i>Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis</i>; <i>Die Grenzen der +naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung</i>, and other works. Windelband: +<i>Präludien</i>; <i>Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft</i>. Münsterberg: <i>Grundzüge +der Psychologie</i>. Eucken: <i>Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_403:3_178" id="Footnote_403:3_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_403:3_178"><span class="label">[403:3]</span></a> Cf. F. A. Lange: <i>History of Materialism</i>, Book II, +Chap. I, on <i>Kant and Materialism</i>; also Alois Riehl: <i>Introduction to +the Theory of Science and Metaphysics</i>. Translation by Fairbanks. The +more important writings of this school are: Hermann Cohen: <i>Kant's +Theorie der Erfahrung</i>; <i>Die Logik der reinen Erkenntniss</i>, and other +works. Paul Natorp: <i>Sozialpädagogik</i>; <i>Einleitung in die Psychologie +nach kritischer Methode</i>, and other works. E. Cassirer: <i>Leibniz' System +in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen</i>. Riehl: <i>Der philosophische +Kriticismus, und seine Bedeutung für die Positive Wissenschaft</i>. Cf. +also E. Husserl: <i>Logische Untersuchungen</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_404:4_179" id="Footnote_404:4_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_404:4_179"><span class="label">[404:4]</span></a> Cf. J. M. E. McTaggart: <i>Studies in Hegelian +Cosmology</i>, Chap. III.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_404:5_180" id="Footnote_404:5_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_404:5_180"><span class="label">[404:5]</span></a> Cf. Royce: <i>The Conception of God, Supplementary +Essay</i>, pp. 135-322; <i>The World and the Individual, First Series</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_405:6_181" id="Footnote_405:6_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_405:6_181"><span class="label">[405:6]</span></a> This movement began as a criticism of Hegelianism in +behalf of the human personality. Cf. Andrew Seth: <i>Hegelianism and +Personality</i>; <i>Man and the Cosmos</i>; <i>Two Lectures on Theism</i>. G. H. +Howison: <i>The Limits of Evolution</i>. The important writings of the more +independent movement are: William James: <i>The Will to Believe</i>. H. +Sturt, editor: <i>Personal Idealism, Philosophical Essays by Eight Members +of Oxford University</i>. F. C. S. Schiller: <i>Humanism</i>. Henri Bergson: +<i>Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience</i>; <i>Matière et +mémoire</i>. This movement is closely related to that of <i>Pragmatism</i>. See +under § <a href="#Section_203">203</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_406:7_182" id="Footnote_406:7_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_406:7_182"><span class="label">[406:7]</span></a> Cf. Bertrand Russell: <i>Principles of Mathematics</i>, Vol. +I. Among the more important writings of this movement are the following: +Giuseppi Peano: <i>Formulaire de Mathématique</i>, published by the <i>Rivista +di matematica</i>, Tom. I-IV. Richard Dedekind: <i>Was sind und was sollen +die Zahlen?</i> Georg Cantor: <i>Grundlagen einer allgemeinen +Mannigfaltigkeitslehre</i>. Louis Couturat: <i>De l'Infini Mathématique</i>, and +articles in <i>Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale</i>. A. N. Whitehead: <i>A +Treatise on Universal Algebra</i>. Heinrich Hertz: <i>Die Prinzipien der +Mechanik</i>. Henri Poincaré: <i>La Science et l'Hypothèse</i>. For the bearing +of these investigations on philosophy, see Royce: <i>The Sciences of the +Ideal</i>, in <i>Science</i>, Vol. XX, No. 510.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_407:8_183" id="Footnote_407:8_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_407:8_183"><span class="label">[407:8]</span></a> The term used by Karl Pearson in his <i>Grammar of +Science</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_408:9_184" id="Footnote_408:9_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_408:9_184"><span class="label">[408:9]</span></a> The important English writings of the recent +independent movement known as <i>pragmatism</i> are: C. S. Peirce: +<i>Illustrations of the Logic of Science</i>, in <i>Popular Science Monthly</i>, +Vol. XII. W. James: <i>The Pragmatic Method</i>, in <i>Journal of Philosophy, +Psychology, and Scientific Methods</i>, Vol. I; <i>Humanism and Truth</i>, in +<i>Mind</i>, Vol. XIII, N. S.; <i>The Essence of Humanism</i>, in <i>Jour. of Phil., +Psych., and Sc. Meth.</i>, Vol. II (with bibliography); <i>The Will to +Believe</i>. John Dewey: <i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>. W. Caldwell: +<i>Pragmatism</i>, in <i>Mind</i>, Vol. XXV., N. S. See also literature on +<i>personal idealism</i>, § <a href="#Section_201">201</a>. A similar tendency has appeared in France in +Bergson, LeRoy, Milhaud, and in Germany in Simmel.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_410:10_185" id="Footnote_410:10_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_410:10_185"><span class="label">[410:10]</span></a> Cf. Ernst Mach: <i>Analysis of Sensation</i>. Translation +by Williams.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_411:11_186" id="Footnote_411:11_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_411:11_186"><span class="label">[411:11]</span></a> Cf. F. H. Bradley: <i>Appearance and Reality</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_413:12_187" id="Footnote_413:12_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_413:12_187"><span class="label">[413:12]</span></a> Cf. Carstanjen: <i>Richard Avenarius, and his General +Theory of Knowledge, Empiriocriticism</i>. Translation by H. Bosanquet, in +<i>Mind</i>, Vol. VI, N. S. Also James: <i>Does Consciousness Exist?</i> and <i>A +World of Pure Experience</i>, in <i>Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth</i>., +Vol. I; <i>The Thing and its Relations</i>, <i>ibid.</i>, Vol. II.</p> + +<p>The standard literature of this movement is unfortunately not available +in English. Among the more important writings are: R. Avenarius: <i>Kritik +der reinen Erfahrung</i>; <i>Der menschliche Weltbegriff</i>, and other works. +Joseph Petzoldt: <i>Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung</i>. +Ernst Mach: <i>Die Analyse der Empfindung und das Verhältniss des +Physischen zum Psychischen, 2. Auff.</i> Wilhelm Schuppe: <i>Grundriss der +Erkenntnisstheorie und Logik</i>. Friedrich Carstanjen: <i>Einführung in die +"Kritik der reinen Erfahrung"</i>—an exposition of Avenarius. Also +articles by the above, R. Willy, R. v. Schubert-Soldern, and others, in +the <i>Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_420:13_188" id="Footnote_420:13_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_420:13_188"><span class="label">[420:13]</span></a> It is not, of course, denied that there may be other +orders, such as, <i>e. g.</i>, an æsthetic order; or that there may be +definite relations between these orders, such as, <i>e. g.</i>, the +psycho-physical relation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_423:14_189" id="Footnote_423:14_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_423:14_189"><span class="label">[423:14]</span></a> Quoted from George A. Gordon: <i>The New Epoch for +Faith</i>, p. 27.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_424:15_190" id="Footnote_424:15_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_424:15_190"><span class="label">[424:15]</span></a> Cf. James: <i>The Will to Believe</i>, essay on <i>The +Dilemma of Determinism, passim</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_425:16_191" id="Footnote_425:16_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_425:16_191"><span class="label">[425:16]</span></a> <i>Essays, Second Series</i>, p. 75.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_427:17_192" id="Footnote_427:17_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_427:17_192"><span class="label">[427:17]</span></a> Plato: <i>Theætetus</i>, 174-175. Translation by Jowett.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_428:18_193" id="Footnote_428:18_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_428:18_193"><span class="label">[428:18]</span></a> E. Caird: <i>Literature and Philosophy</i>, Vol. I, pp. +218-219.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_429:19_194" id="Footnote_429:19_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_429:19_194"><span class="label">[429:19]</span></a> Translation by Jowett. Quoted by Laurie in his +<i>Pre-Christian Education</i>, p. 213.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_430:20_195" id="Footnote_430:20_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_430:20_195"><span class="label">[430:20]</span></a> Bacon: <i>Advancement of Learning</i>, Book I.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431"></a>[<a href="./images/431.png">431</a>]</span></p> +<h2>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h2> + + +<p>The references contained in this bibliography have been selected on the +score of availability in English for the general reader and beginning +student of philosophy. But I have sought wherever possible to include +passages from the great philosophers and men of letters. These are +placed first in the list, followed by references to contemporary writers +and secondary sources.</p> + + +<p class="sectctr">CHAPTER I, THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Republic</i>, especially Book VII. Translations by Jowett and +Vaughan. <i>Theaetetus</i>, 172 ff. Translation by Jowett.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Aristotle</span>: <i>Ethics</i>, Book X. Translation by Welldon.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Marcus Aurelius</span>: <i>Thoughts.</i> Translation by Long.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Epictetus</span>: <i>Discourses.</i> Translation by Long.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Bacon</span>: <i>The Advancement of Learning.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Emerson</span>: <i>Representative Men—Plato; or the Philosopher.</i> <i>Conduct of +Life—Culture.</i> <i>Essays, Second Series—Experience.</i></p> + +<hr style='width: 30%;' /> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Royce, Josiah</span>: <i>Spirit of Modern Philosophy.</i> Introduction.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hibben, J. G.</span>: <i>Problems of Philosophy.</i> Introduction.</p> + + +<p class="sectctr">CHAPTER II, POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Republic</i>, Books II and III. Translation by Jowett. (Criticism +of the poets as demoralizing.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Wordsworth</span>: <i>Observations Prefixed to the Second Edition of the Lyrical +Ballads.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Shelley</span>: <i>Defence of Poetry.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432"></a>[<a href="./images/432.png">432</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Everett, C. C.</span>: <i>Poetry, Comedy, and Duty.</i> (discussion of the +Philosophy of Poetry.) <i>Essays, Theological and Literary.</i> (On the +Poetry of Emerson, Goethe, Tennyson, Browning.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Caird, Edward</span>: <i>Literature and Philosophy.</i> (Wordsworth, Dante, Goethe, +etc.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Royce, Josiah</span>: <i>Studies of Good and Evil.</i> Essay on <i>Tennyson and +Pessimism</i>.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Santayana, George</span>: <i>Poetry and Religion.</i> (Philosophy of poetry; Greek +Poetry, Shakespeare, etc.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Sneath, E. H.</span>: <i>Philosophy in Poetry: A Study of Sir John Davies's Poem, +"Nosce Teipsum."</i></p> + + +<p class="sectctr"><span class="smcap">Chapters III and IV, Religion.</span></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Republic</i>, Book III. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan. +(Criticism of religion from the stand-point of morality and politics.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">St. Augustine</span>: <i>Confessions.</i> Translation by Pusey. (Document of +religious experience.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Thomas à Kempis</span>: <i>Imitation of Christ.</i> Translation by Stanhope. +(Mediæval programme of personal religion.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Spinoza</span>: <i>Theological-political Treatise.</i> Translation by Elwes. (One of +the first great pleas for religious liberty and one of the first +attempts to define the <i>essential</i> in religion.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Kant</span>: <i>Critique of Pure Reason—the Canon of Pure Reason</i>. Translation +by Max Müller. <i>Critique of Practical Reason.</i> Translation by Abbott in +<i>Theory of Ethics</i>. (Defines religion as the province of faith, +distinguishes it from knowledge, and relates it to morality.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Schleiermacher</span>: <i>On Religion.</i> <i>Speeches to its Cultured Despisers.</i> +Translation by Oman. (Ponderous, dogmatic in its philosophy, but +profound and sympathetic in its understanding of religion.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433"></a>[<a href="./images/433.png">433</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Arnold</span>: <i>Literature and Dogma.</i> (On the essence of religion as +exemplified in Judaism and Christianity.)</p> + +<hr style='width: 30%;' /> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Sabatier, A.</span>: <i>Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based on Psychology +and History.</i> Translation by Seed. <i>Religions of Authority and the +Religion of the Spirit.</i> Translation by Houghton. (These books emphasize +the essential importance of the believer's attitude to God.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">James, William</span>: <i>The Varieties of Religious Experience.</i> (A rich +storehouse of religion, sympathetically interpreted.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Everett, C. C.</span>: <i>The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith.</i> (A +study in the definition and meaning of religion.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Caird, Edward</span>: <i>Evolution of Religion.</i> (Indoctrinated with the author's +idealistic philosophy.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Fielding, H.</span>: <i>The Hearts of Men.</i> (A plea for the universal religion. +Special feeling for Indian religions.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Harnack, A.</span>: <i>What is Christianity?</i> Translation by Saunders. (Attempt +to define the <i>essence</i> of Christianity.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Palmer, G. H.</span>: <i>The Field of Ethics</i>, Chapters V and VI. (On the +relation of ethics and religion.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Brown, W. A.</span>: <i>The Essence of Christianity.</i> (Special study of the +definition of religion.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Jastrow, M.</span>: <i>The Study of Religion.</i> (Method of history and psychology +of religion.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Smith, W. Robertson</span>: <i>The Religion of the Semites.</i> (Excellent study of +tribal religions.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Clarke, W. N.</span>: <i>What Shall We Think of Christianity?</i> (An interpretation +of Christianity.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Leuba, J. H.</span>: <i>Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion.</i> In +<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. XI, p. 195.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Starbuck, E. D.</span>: <i>The Psychology of Religion.</i></p> + + +<p class="sectctr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434"></a>[<a href="./images/434.png">434</a>]</span> +CHAPTER V, THE PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM OF SCIENCE.<a name="FNanchor_434:A_196" id="FNanchor_434:A_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_434:A_196" class="fnanchor">[434:A]</a></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Republic</i>, Book VII, 526 ff. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan. +<i>Phaedo</i>, 96 ff. Translation by Jowett.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Berkeley</span>: <i>Alciphron</i>, the Fourth Dialogue. <i>Siris</i>, especially 234-264. +(On the failure of the scientist to grasp the deeper truth respecting +causes and substances.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Descartes</span>: <i>Discourse on Method.</i> Translation by Veitch.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Spinoza</span>: <i>On the Improvement of the Understanding.</i> Translation by +Elwes.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Kant</span>: <i>Critique of Pure Reason—Transcendental Æsthetic</i> and +<i>Transcendental Analytic.</i> Translation by Max Müller. (Studies of the +Method of Science.)</p> + +<hr style='width: 30%;' /> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Ward, James</span>: <i>Naturalism and Agnosticism.</i> (Full but clear account of +recent development of natural science, and criticism of its use as +philosophy.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Mach, Ernst</span>: <i>Science of Mechanics.</i> (Historical and methodological.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">James, William</span>: <i>Principles of Psychology</i>, Vol. II, Chap. xxviii. +(Emphasizes the practical interest underlying science.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Royce, Josiah</span>: <i>The World and the Individual, Second Series, Man and +Nature.</i> (Interpretation of the province of natural science from the +stand-point of absolute idealism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Pearson, Karl</span>: <i>The Grammar of Science.</i> (The limits of science from the +scientific stand-point.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Clifford, W. K.</span>: <i>Lectures and Essays: On the Aims and Instruments of +Scientific Thought; The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences; On the Ethics +of Belief.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435"></a>[<a href="./images/435.png">435</a>]</span> +<span class="smcap">Huxley, T. H.</span>: <i>Method and Results.</i> (The positivistic position.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Muensterberg, Hugo</span>: <i>Psychology and Life.</i> (Epistemological limitations +of natural science applied to psychology, from idealistic stand-point.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Fullerton, G. E.</span>: <i>A System of Metaphysics</i>, Part II.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Taylor, A. E.</span>: <i>Elements of Metaphysics</i>, Book III.</p> + + +<p class="sectctr">CHAPTERS VI AND VII, THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Dialogues</i>, especially <i>Protagoras</i> and <i>Theaetetus</i>. +Translation by Jowett. (The actual genesis of special problems.)</p> + +<hr style='width: 30%;' /> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Kuelpe, Oswald</span>: <i>Introduction to Philosophy.</i> Translation by Pillsbury +and Titchener. (Full and accurate account of the traditional terms and +doctrines of philosophy.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hibben, J. G.</span>: <i>Problems of Philosophy.</i> (Brief and elementary.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Sidgwick, Henry</span>: <i>Philosophy, its Scope and Relations.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Paulsen, Friedrich</span>: <i>Introduction to Philosophy.</i> Translation by Thilly.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Baldwin, J. M.</span>: <i>Dictionary of Philosophy.</i> (Full, and convenient for +reference.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Ferrier, J. F.</span>: <i>Lectures on Greek Philosophy.</i> (Interpretation of the +beginning and early development of philosophy.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Burnet, J.</span>: <i>Early Greek Philosophy.</i> Translation of the sources.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Fairbanks, A.</span>: <i>The First Philosophers of Greece.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Gomperz, Th.</span>: <i>Greek Thinkers</i>, Vol. I. Translation by Magnus. (On the +first development of philosophical problems.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Palmer, G. H.</span>: <i>The Field of Ethics.</i> (On the relations of the ethical +problem.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Puffer, Ethel</span>: <i>The Psychology of Beauty.</i> (On the relations of the +æsthetical problem.)</p> + + +<p class="sectctr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436"></a>[<a href="./images/436.png">436</a>]</span> +CHAPTER VIII, NATURALISM.<a name="FNanchor_436:A_197" id="FNanchor_436:A_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_436:A_197" class="fnanchor">[436:A]</a></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Lucretius</span>: <i>On the Nature of Things.</i> Translation by Munro. (Early +materialism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hobbes</span>: <i>Metaphysical System.</i> Edited by Calkins. <i>Leviathan</i>, Part I. +(Modern materialism.)</p> + +<hr style='width: 30%;' /> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Buechner, Louis</span>: <i>Force and Matter.</i> Translation by Collingwood. +(Nineteenth century materialism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Janet, Paul</span>: <i>Materialism of the Present Day.</i> Translation by Masson.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Lange, F. A.</span>: <i>History of Materialism.</i> Translation by Thomas.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Haeckel, Ernst</span>: <i>The Riddle of the Universe.</i> Translation by McCabe. +("Monism of Energy.")</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Clifford, W. K.</span>: <i>Lectures and Essays: The Ethics of Belief; Cosmic +Emotion; Body and Mind.</i> (Positivism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Huxley, T. H.</span>: <i>Evolution and Ethics; Prolegomena.</i> (Distinguishes +between the moral and natural.) <i>Science and Hebrew Tradition</i>; <i>Science +and Christian Tradition</i>. (Controversies of the naturalist with +Gladstone and Duke of Argyle.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Spencer, Herbert</span>: <i>First Principles.</i> (The systematic evolutionary +philosophy.) <i>Principles of Ethics.</i> (Ethics of naturalism.) <i>The Nature +and Reality of Religion.</i> (Controversy with Frederick Harrison.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Balfour, A. J.</span>: <i>Foundations of Belief</i>, Part I. (On the religious, +moral, and æsthetic consequences of naturalism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Pater, Walter</span>: <i>Marius the Epicurean.</i> (Refined hedonism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Romanes, G. J.</span>: <i>Thoughts on Religion.</i> (Approached from stand-point of +science.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437"></a>[<a href="./images/437.png">437</a>]</span> +<span class="smcap">Bentham, J.</span>: <i>Introduction to the Principles of Morals and +Legislation.</i> (Utilitarian.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Stephen, L.</span>: <i>Science of Ethics.</i> (Evolutionary and social.)</p> + + +<p class="sectctr">CHAPTER IX, SUBJECTIVISM.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Theaetetus.</i> Translation by Jowett. (Exposition and criticism of +Protagoras.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Berkeley</span>: <i>Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous</i>; <i>Principles of +Human Knowledge</i>.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hume</span>: <i>An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Schopenhauer</span>: <i>The World as Will and Idea.</i> Translation by Haldane and +Kemp.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Mill, J. S.</span>: <i>An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy</i>, +X-XIII.</p> + +<hr style='width: 30%;' /> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Clifford, W. K.</span>: <i>Lectures and Essays: On the Nature of Things in +Themselves.</i> (Panpsychism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Deussen, Paul</span>: <i>Elements of Metaphysics.</i> Translation by Duff. +(Following Schopenhauer and Oriental philosophy.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Paulsen, Fr.</span>: <i>Introduction to Philosophy.</i> (Panpsychism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Strong, C. A.</span>: <i>Why the Mind Has a Body.</i> (Panpsychism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">James, William</span>: <i>Reflex Action and Theism</i>, in <i>The Will to Believe</i>. +(Morality and religion of individualism.)</p> + + +<p class="sectctr">CHAPTER X, ABSOLUTE REALISM.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Parmenides</span>: <i>Fragments.</i> Arrangement and translation by Burnet or +Fairbanks.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Plato</span>: <i>Republic</i>, Books VI and VII. Translations by Jowett and Vaughan. +<i>Symposium</i>, <i>Phædrus</i>, <i>Phædo</i>, <i>Philebus</i>. Translation by Jowett.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Aristotle</span><a name="FNanchor_437:A_198" id="FNanchor_437:A_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_437:A_198" class="fnanchor">[437:A]</a>: <i>Psychology.</i> Translations by Hammond and Wallace. +<i>Ethics.</i> Translation by Welldon.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438"></a>[<a href="./images/438.png">438</a>]</span> +<span class="smcap">Spinoza</span>: <i>Ethics</i>, especially Parts I and V. Translations by Elwes and +Willis.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Leibniz</span>: <i>Monadology</i>, and Selections. Translation by Latta. <i>Discourse +on Metaphysics.</i> Translation by Montgomery.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Marcus Aurelius</span>: <i>Thoughts.</i> Translation by Long.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Epictetus</span>: <i>Discourses.</i> Translation by Long.</p> + +<hr style='width: 30%;' /> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Caird, Edward</span>: <i>The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers.</i> +(The central conceptions of Plato and Aristotle.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Joachim</span>: <i>A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza.</i></p> + + +<p class="sectctr">CHAPTER XI, ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Descartes</span>: <i>Meditations.</i> Translation by Veitch.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Kant</span>: <i>Critique of Pure Reason.</i> Translation by Max Müller. <i>Critique of +Practical Reason.</i> Translation by Abbott, in Kant's <i>Theory of Ethics</i>.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Fichte</span><a href="#Footnote_437:A_198" class="fnanchor">[437:A]</a>: <i>Science of Ethics.</i> Translation by Kroeger. <i>Popular +Works: The Nature of the Scholar</i>; <i>The Vocation of Man</i>; <i>The Doctrine +of Religion</i>. Translation by Smith.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Schiller</span>: <i>Æsthetic Letters, Essays, and Philosophical Letters.</i> +Translation by Weiss. (Romanticism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hegel</span><a href="#Footnote_437:A_198" class="fnanchor">[437:A]</a>: <i>Ethics.</i> Translation by Sterrett. <i>Logic.</i> Translation, +with Introduction, by Wallace. <i>Philosophy of Mind.</i> Translation, with +Introduction, by Wallace. <i>Philosophy of Religion.</i> Translation by +Spiers and Sanderson. <i>Philosophy of Right.</i> Translation by Dyde.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Green, T. H.</span>: <i>Prolegomena to Ethics.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Emerson</span>: <i>The Conduct of Life—Fate.</i> <i>Essays, First Series—The +Over-Soul; Circles.</i> <i>Essays, Second Series—The Poet; Experience; +Nature.</i> (The appreciation of life consistent with absolute idealism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Wordsworth</span>: <i>Poems</i>, <i>passim</i>.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Coleridge</span>: <i>Aids to Reflection.</i> <i>The Friend.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439"></a>[<a href="./images/439.png">439</a>]</span> +<span class="smcap">Royce, J.</span>: <i>Spirit of Modern Philosophy.</i> (Sympathetic exposition of +Kant, Fichte, Romanticism, and Hegel.) <i>The Conception of God.</i> (The +epistemological argument.) <i>The World and the Individual, First Series.</i> +(Systematic development of absolute idealism; its moral and religious +aspects.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Caird, Edward</span>: <i>The Critical Philosophy of Kant.</i> (Exposition and +interpretation from stand-point of later idealism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Everett, C. C.</span>: <i>Fichte's Science of Knowledge.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">McTaggart, J. M. E.</span>: <i>Studies in Hegelian Dialectic.</i> Studies in +Hegelian Cosmology.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 90%;" /> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_434:A_196" id="Footnote_434:A_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_434:A_196"><span class="label">[434:A]</span></a> For further contemporary writings on this topic, see +foot-notes under §§ <a href="#Footnote_403:2_177">199</a>, <a href="#Footnote_403:3_178">200</a>, <a href="#Footnote_408:9_184">203</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_436:A_197" id="Footnote_436:A_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_436:A_197"><span class="label">[436:A]</span></a> For histories of philosophy, see <a href="#Supplementary_Bibliography">supplementary +bibliography</a> at end.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_437:A_198" id="Footnote_437:A_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_437:A_198"><span class="label">[437:A]</span></a> The Metaphysics of Aristotle, Fichte, and Hegel must be +found by the English reader mainly in the secondary sources.</p></div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="Supplementary_Bibliography" id="Supplementary_Bibliography"></a>SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.</h2> + + +<p class="center">I.—GENERAL.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Rogers</span>: <i>Student's History of Philosophy.</i> (Elementary and clear; +copious quotations.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Weber</span>: <i>History of Philosophy.</i> Translation by Thilly. (Comprehensive +and compact.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Windelband</span>: <i>A History of Philosophy.</i> Translation by Tufts. (Emphasis +upon the problems and their development.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Erdmann</span>: <i>History of Philosophy.</i> Translation edited by Hough; in three +volumes. (Detailed and accurate exposition.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Ueberweg</span>: <i>A History of Philosophy.</i> Translation by Morris and Porter, +in two volumes. (Very complete; excellent account of the literature.)</p> + + +<p class="center">II.—SPECIAL PERIODS.</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Ferrier</span>: <i>Lectures on Greek Philosophy.</i> (Excellent introduction.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Marshall</span>: <i>Short History of Greek Philosophy.</i> (Brief and clear.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440"></a>[<a href="./images/440.png">440</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Windelband</span>: <i>History of Ancient Philosophy.</i> Translation by Cushman. +(Very accurate and scholarly; also brief.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Zeller</span>: <i>Pre-Socratic Philosophy.</i> Translation by Alleyne. <i>Socrates and +the Socratic Schools.</i> Translation by Reichel. (Full and accurate.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Gomperz</span>: <i>Greek Thinkers.</i> Translated by Magnus, in four volumes. (Very +full; especially on Plato. Goes no further than Plato.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Burnet</span>: <i>Early Greek Philosophy.</i> (Translations of fragments, with +commentary.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Fairbanks</span>: <i>The First Philosophers of Greece.</i> (Translations of +fragments, with commentary.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Turner</span>: <i>History of Philosophy.</i> (Excellent account of Scholastic +philosophy.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Royce</span>: <i>The Spirit of Modern Philosophy.</i> (Very illuminating +introductory exposition of modern idealism.)</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Falckenberg</span>: <i>History of Modern Philosophy.</i></p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="smcap">Hoeffding</span>: <i>History of Modern Philosophy.</i> Translation by Meyer, in two +volumes. (Full and good.)</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441"></a>[<a href="./images/441.png">441</a>]</span></p> +<h2>INDEX</h2> + + +<ul class="list"> + <li><a name="Absolute" id="Absolute"></a><span class="smcap">Absolute</span>, the, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">being, <a href="#Page_309">308</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">substance, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ideal, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">spirit, <a href="#Footnote_349:1_161">349 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">mind, <a href="#Footnote_349:1_161">349 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322 ff.</a></li> + + <li><a name="Absolute_Idealism" id="Absolute_Idealism"></a><span class="smcap">Absolute Idealism</span>, <a href="#Chap_XI">chap. xi</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Footnote_349:1_161">349 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_368">368 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as related to Kant, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">direct argument for, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_386">386 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_390">390 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_402">402 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Absolute Realism</span>, <a href="#Chap_X">chap. x</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Footnote_306:1_145">306 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Abstract</span>, the, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Activity</span>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Æsthetics</span>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Agnosticism" id="Agnosticism"></a><span class="smcap">Agnosticism</span>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Anaxagoras</span>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">quoted, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Anaximander</span>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Anselm, Saint</span>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Anthropomorphism</span>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Appreciation</span>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Aristotle</span>, in formal logic, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">psychology of, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and Plato, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and Spinoza, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on evil, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap"><a name="Atomism" id="Atomism"></a>Atomism</span>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">Also see under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Leucippus">Leucippus</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Democritus">Democritus</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Attitude</span>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Attribute</span>, in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_312">312 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Augustine, Saint</span>, on communion with God, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on pietism, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his conception of self, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Automatism</span>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Baal</span>, religion of, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Bacon, Francis</span>, on thought and action, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Balfour, A. J.</span>, on materialism, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Beauty</span>, in æsthetics, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Plato, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Being</span>, Eleatic conception of, <a href="#Page_309">308 ff.</a></li> + + <li><a name="Belief" id="Belief"></a><span class="smcap">Belief</span>, key to definition of religion, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general characters applied to religion, <a href="#Page_59">59 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in persons and dispositions, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">examples of religions, <a href="#Page_66">66 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">object of religions, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation to logic, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Bentham</span>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Berkeley</span>, on idealism, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation to common-sense, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his refutation of material substance, <a href="#Page_275">275 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">theory of mathematics, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his spiritualism, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his conception of God, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Buddhism</span>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Cause</span>, in science, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">God as first, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of motion, <a href="#Page_231">231 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">spirit as, <a href="#Page_293">293 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Christianity</span>, persistence of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">essence of, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">development from Judaism, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">idea of God in, <a href="#Page_200">200 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">emphasis on self-consciousness in, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Comte</span>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Contemplation</span>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Conversion</span>, <a href="#Page_69">69 ff.</a></li> + + <li><a name="Corporeal_Being" id="Corporeal_Being"></a><span class="smcap">Corporeal Being</span>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">processes of, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Berkeley's critique of, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">historical conceptions of, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</li> + + <li><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442"></a>[<a href="./images/442.png">442</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Cosmological Proof</span>, the, of God, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Cosmology</span>, general meaning of, <a href="#Page_160">159</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">mechanism in, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">teleology in, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Cosmos</span>, origin of, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Critical Method</span>, <a href="#Page_319">319 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Cynicism</span>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Cyrenaicism</span>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Dante</span>, as philosopher-poet, <a href="#Page_42">42 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general meaning of the <i>Divine Comedy</i>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and Thomas Aquinas, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his vision of the ways of God, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on contemplation, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Darwin</span>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Deism</span>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap"><a name="Democritus" id="Democritus"></a>Democritus</span>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Atomism">Atomism</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Descartes</span>, on function of philosophy, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">dualism of, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his theory of space and matter, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">automatism of, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his conception of self, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Description</span>, as method of science, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Dialectic</span>, in Plato, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Hegel, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Diogenes</span>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Dogmatism</span>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Dualism</span>, general meaning, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Descartes, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Duty</span>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Eclecticism</span>, contemporary, <a href="#Page_398">398 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Eleatics.</span></li> + <li class="subitem">See under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Parmenides">Parmenides</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Zeno">Zeno</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Emerson</span>, on spirit, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on nature, <a href="#Page_364">364</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on absolute, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on necessity, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on faith, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Empiricism</span>, general meaning, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in logic, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in naturalism, <a href="#Page_252">252 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Locke, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Berkeley, <a href="#Page_274">274 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Energy</span>, development of, conception of, <a href="#Page_236">236 ff.</a></li> + + <li><a name="Epistemology" id="Epistemology"></a><span class="smcap">Epistemology</span>, relation to metaphysics, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">definition of, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">fundamental problems of, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">argument for God from, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of naturalism, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Descartes, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Berkeley, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of absolute realism, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Leibniz, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Plato, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Hume, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Aristotle, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_408">408 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Eternal</span>, the, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Ether</span>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Ethics</span>, relation to metaphysics, <a href="#Page_152">151</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">its origin in Socratic method, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">definition of, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">special problems and theories in, <a href="#Page_191">191 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Socrates, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Aristotle, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of naturalism, <a href="#Page_258">258 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of subjectivism, <a href="#Page_298">298 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">argument for God from, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">individualism in, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">pluralism in, <a href="#Page_305">302</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Stoics and Spinoza, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Platonic, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Kant, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Eudæmonism</span>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Evil, Problem of</span>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Greek philosophy, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Evolution</span>, of cosmos, <a href="#Page_242">242 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of morality, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Experience</span>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">analysis of, by Kant, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Faith</span>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">special interests of, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">See also <span class="smcap"><a href="#Religion">Religion</a></span> and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Belief">Belief</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Ferguson, Chas.</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Fichte</span>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Fielding, H.</span>, quoted on religion, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Force</span>, development of conception of, <a href="#Page_231">231 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Form</span>, in Aristotle, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Freedom</span>, in ethics, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">meanings and theories, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">God</span>, as guarantee of ideals, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">personality of, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">St. Augustine's communion with, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">presence of, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443"></a>[<a href="./images/443.png">443</a>]</span> as a disposition from which consequences may be expected, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">meaning of, in religion, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">idea of, in Judaism and Christianity, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">why historical, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">social relation with, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">the ontological proof of, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethical and epistemological arguments for, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">cosmological proof of, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">teleological proof of, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation to the world, in theism, pantheism and deism, <a href="#Page_205">205 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">will of, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">conception of, in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">conception and proof of, in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_312">312 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">conception of, in Plato, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">conception of, in Leibniz, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Absolute">Absolute</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Goethe</span>, on Spinoza, and on philosophy, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on pragmatism, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Good</span>, the, theories of, in ethics, <a href="#Page_191">191 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and the real, <a href="#Page_326">326 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Greek</span>, religion, in Homer and Lucretius, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ideals, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Green, T. H.</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Footnote_385:11_171">385 (<i>note</i>)</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Haeckel</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Hedonism</span>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Hegel</span>, on science, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation to Kant, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on the absolute, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_390">390</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Heraclitus</span>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">History</span>, philosophy of, in Hegel, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Hobbes</span>, his misconception of relations of philosophy and science, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">quoted on ethics, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Holbach</span>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Homer</span>, on Greek religion, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Humanism</span>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Hume</span>, positivism of, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">phenomenalism of, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and Descartes, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Huxley</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Hylozoism</span>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><a name="Ideal" id="Ideal"></a><span class="smcap">Ideal</span>, the, in Plato, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">validity of, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Idealism</span>, various meanings of term, <a href="#Footnote_173:16_64">173 (<i>note</i>)</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">meaning of, as theory of knowledge, <a href="#Page_175">175 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_409">409</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_409">409 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">empirical, see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Subjectivism">Subjectivism</a>, <a href="#Phenomenalism">Phenomenalism</a>, <a href="#Spiritualism">Spiritualism</a></span>;</li> + <li class="subitem">absolute, see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Absolute_Idealism">Absolute Idealism</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Ideals</span>, in life, <a href="#Page_10">10 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">adoption of, <a href="#Page_17">17 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Ideas</span>, the, in Plato, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Imagination</span>, in poetry, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">place of, in religion, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">special functions of, in religion, <a href="#Page_101">101 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">scope of, in religion, <a href="#Page_105">105 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and the personality of God, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Imitatio Christi</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Immanence Theory</span>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Immortality</span>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Individualism</span>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Intuitionism</span>, in ethics, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">James, William</span>, quoted on religion, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Judaism</span>, development of, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and Christianity, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Kant</span>, his transcendentalism, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his critique of knowledge, <a href="#Page_354">354 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Kepler</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Knowledge</span>, of the means in life, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of the end, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in poetry, <a href="#Page_27">27 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in religion, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general theory of, on epistemology, <a href="#Page_164">164 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">problem of source and criterion of, <a href="#Page_168">168 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">problem of relation to its object, <a href="#Page_172">172 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation of logic to, <a href="#Page_183">183 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">account of, in naturalism, <a href="#Page_253">253 ff.</a></li> + <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Epistemology">Epistemology</a></span>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">La Mettrie</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">La Place</span>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">quoted, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Leibniz</span>, on function of philosophy, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>.</li> + + <li><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444"></a>[<a href="./images/444.png">444</a>]</span><span class="smcap"><a name="Leucippus" id="Leucippus"></a>Leucippus</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Life</span>, as a starting-point for thought, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">definition of, <a href="#Page_5">5 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and self-consciousness, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy of <a href="#Page_17">17 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">mechanical theory of, <a href="#Page_245">244 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">return of philosophy to, <a href="#Page_427">427 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">contemplation in, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Locke</span>, epistemology of, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Logic</span>, origin in Socratic method, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">affiliations of, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">definition of, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">parts of formal, <a href="#Page_184">184 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">present tendencies in, <a href="#Page_187">187 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">algebra of, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Lucretius</span>, his criticism of Greek religion, quoted, <a href="#Page_89">89 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on mechanism, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">McTaggart, J. M. E.</span>, on Hegel, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on the absolute, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Mach, E.</span>, <a href="#Footnote_283:14_128">283</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on philosophy and science, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Malebranche</span>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Marcus Aurelius</span>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Materialism" id="Materialism"></a><span class="smcap">Materialism</span>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">development, <a href="#Page_224">224 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and science, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">French, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">theory of mind in, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Mathematics</span>, importance in science, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">logic in, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Berkeley's conception of, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Plato's conception of, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Spinoza's conception of, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Matter</span>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and space, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Berkeley's refutation of, <a href="#Page_275">275 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Plato and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Mechanical Theory</span>, practical significance of its extension to the world at large, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in cosmology, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Descartes, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Newton <a href="#Page_232">232</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of origin of cosmos, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of life, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Metaphysics</span>, relation to epistemology, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation to ethics, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">definition of, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation to logic, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation to theology, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">present tendencies in, <a href="#Page_399">399 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Mill</span>, J. S., <a href="#Footnote_283:14_128">283 (<i>note</i>)</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Mind" id="Mind"></a><span class="smcap">Mind</span>, explanation of in naturalism, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of God, in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">absolute, <a href="#Footnote_349:1_161">349 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382 ff.</a></li> + <li class="subitem">Also see under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Self">Self</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Soul">Soul</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Mode</span>, in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Monads</span>, in Leibniz, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Monism</span>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Morality</span>, and religion, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">grounds of, according to Kant, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">incentive to, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Mysticism</span>, general account, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Schopenhauer's, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">types of religions, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Naegeli</span>, C. v., quoted, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Natural_Science" id="Natural_Science"></a><span class="smcap">Natural Science</span>, true relations of, with philosophy, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">sphere of, with reference to philosophy, <a href="#Page_117">117 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy of, its procedure, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">origin of, as special interest, <a href="#Page_123">123 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">human value of, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">method and fundamental conceptions of, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general development of, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">limits of, because abstract, <a href="#Page_136">136 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">validity of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">logic and, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">development of conceptions in, <a href="#Page_229">229 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">grounds of, according to Kant, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Hume on, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">permanence and progress in, <a href="#Page_395">395 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Natural Selection</span>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Naturalism" id="Naturalism"></a><span class="smcap">Naturalism</span>, <a href="#Chap_VIII">chap. viii</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Footnote_223:1_88">223 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">claims of, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">task of, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">Also see under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Materialism">Materialism</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Positivism">Positivism</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Nature</span>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Hegel, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Kant, <a href="#Page_377">377 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in contemporary philosophy, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Natural_Science">Natural Science</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Naturalism">Naturalism</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Nebular Hypothesis</span>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Necessity</span>, of will, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>.</li> + + <li><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445"></a>[<a href="./images/445.png">445</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Neo-Fichteans</span>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Footnote_403:2_177">403 (<i>note</i>)</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Neo-Kantians</span>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Newton</span>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Normative_Sciences" id="Normative_Sciences"></a><span class="smcap">Normative Sciences</span>, the, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Omar Khayyam</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as a philosopher-poet, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Ontological Proof</span>, of God, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Ontology</span>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Optimism</span>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Panpsychism</span>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Pantheism</span>, in primitive religion, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">types of, <a href="#Page_390">390</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Parker, Theodore</span>, quoted on religion, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Parmenides" id="Parmenides"></a><span class="smcap">Parmenides</span>, and rationalism, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_308">308 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Pater, Walter</span>, on Wordsworth, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on Cyrenaicism, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on subjectivism, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Paulsen, Friedrich</span>, ethics of, quoted, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Pearson, Karl</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Perception.</span> See <span class="smcap"><a href="#Sense_perception">Sense-perception</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Personal Idealism</span>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Personality</span>, of God, important in understanding of religion, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">essential to religion? <a href="#Page_108">108 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Persons</span>, description of belief in, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">imagination of, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Pessimism</span>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Phenomenalism" id="Phenomenalism"></a><span class="smcap">Phenomenalism</span>, general meaning, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Footnote_267:1_115">267 (<i>note</i>)</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Berkeley, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Hume, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">various tendencies in, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Philosopher</span>, the practical man and the, <a href="#Chap_I">chap. i</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">the rôle of the, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Philosophy</span>, commonly misconceived, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of the devotee, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of the man of affairs, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of the voluptuary, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of life, its general meaning, <a href="#Page_17">17 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">its relations with poetry, <a href="#Chap_II">chap. ii</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">lack of, in Shakespeare, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as expression of personality, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as premature, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in poetry of Omar Khayyam, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in poetry of Wordsworth, <a href="#Page_38">38 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in poetry of Dante, <a href="#Page_42">42 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">difference between philosophy and poetry, <a href="#Page_48">48 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in religion, <a href="#Page_108">108 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">compared with religion, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">true attitude of, toward science, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">sphere of, in relation to science, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">procedure of, with reference to science, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">human value of, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">can its problem be divided? <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">origin of, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">special problems of, <a href="#Chap_VI">chap. vi</a>, <a href="#Chap_VII">vii</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and psychology, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">peculiar object of, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">self-criticism in, <a href="#Page_319">319 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">permanence and progress in, <a href="#Page_395">395 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">contemporary, <a href="#Page_398">398 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Physical.</span></li> + <li class="subitem">See <span class="smcap"><a href="#Corporeal_Being">Corporeal Being</a>, <a href="#Materialism">Materialism</a></span>, etc.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Physiology</span>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Piety</span>, description and interpretation of, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in ethics, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Plato</span>, on Protagoras, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">quoted, on Socrates, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">historical preparation for, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">psychology of, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and Spinoza, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on evil, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on spirit, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on reason and perception, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">on the philosopher, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Pluralism</span>, general meaning of, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in ethics, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in religion, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Poetry</span>, relations with philosophy, <a href="#Chap_II">chap. ii</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as appreciation, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">virtue of sincerity in, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">the "barbarian" in, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">constructive knowledge in, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">difference between philosophy and, <a href="#Page_48">48 ff.</a></li> + + <li><a name="Positivism" id="Positivism"></a><span class="smcap">Positivism</span>, on relation of philosophy and science, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446"></a>[<a href="./images/446.png">446</a>]</span> <a href="#Page_122">122</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general meaning of, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Practical Knowledge</span>, of means, <a href="#Page_8">8 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of end or purpose, <a href="#Page_10">10 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">implied in religion, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy as, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Practical Man</span>, the, and the philosopher, <a href="#Chap_I">chap. i</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his failure to understand philosophy, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his ideal, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">virtually a philosopher, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Pragmatism</span>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Prayer</span>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Prediction</span>, in science, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Present Day</span>, philosophy of the, <a href="#Page_398">398 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Protagoras</span>, scepticism of, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">subjectivism of, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Psychology</span>, of religion, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">inadequate to religion, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as branch of philosophy, <a href="#Page_208">208 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as natural science, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">affiliations of, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">limits of, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Psycho-physical Parallelism</span>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Footnote_252:18_105">252</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Purpose</span>, in life, <a href="#Page_10">10 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">adoption of life-purpose, <a href="#Page_17">17 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">practical significance of, in the world at large, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Teleology">Teleology</a>, <a href="#Ideal">Ideal</a></span>, etc.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Qualities</span>, primary and secondary, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><a name="Rationalism" id="Rationalism"></a><span class="smcap">Rationalism</span>, general meaning, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in logic, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in ethics, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of eleatics, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Spinoza, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in absolute realism, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Realism</span>, various meanings of term, <a href="#Footnote_173:16_64">173 (<i>note</i>)</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">meaning of, as theory of knowledge, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Parmenides, <a href="#Page_308">308 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Plato and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_409">409 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Reason</span>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">See <span class="smcap"><a href="#Rationalism">Rationalism</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Relativism</span>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in ethics, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Religion" id="Religion"></a><span class="smcap">Religion</span>, chaps. <a href="#Chap_III">iii</a>, <a href="#Chap_IV">iv</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation to poetry and philosophy, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">difficulty of defining, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">possibility of defining, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">profitableness of defining, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">true method of defining, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">misconceptions of, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as possessing the psychological character of belief, <a href="#Page_59">59 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">degree of, in individuals and moods, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">definition of, as belief in disposition of universe, <a href="#Page_65">64 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and morality, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">symbolism in, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">prophet and preacher of, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">conveyance of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">primitive, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Buddhism, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">the critical or enlightened type of, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">means to be true, <a href="#Page_82">82 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">implies a practical truth, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">cases of truth and error in, <a href="#Page_88">88 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Baal, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Greek, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Jews, its development, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Christian, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">definition of cognitive factor in, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">place of imagination in, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">special functions of imagination in, <a href="#Page_101">101 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation of imagination and truth in, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy implied in, <a href="#Page_108">108 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">is personal god essential to, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">compared with philosophy, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">compared with science, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">special philosophical problems of, <a href="#Page_199">199 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of naturalism, <a href="#Page_263">263 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of subjectivism and spiritualism, <a href="#Page_302">302 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Plato and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Stoics and Spinoza, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy of, in Hegel, <a href="#Page_367">365</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_390">390 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Religious Phenomena</span>, interpretation of, <a href="#Page_69">69 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Representative Theory</span>, of knowledge, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Romanticism</span>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Rousseau</span>, quoted on nature, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Royce, Josiah</span>, quoted on absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Santayana, George</span>, quoted on poetry <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.</li> + + <li><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447"></a>[<a href="./images/447.png">447</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Scepticism</span>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267 ff.</a></li> + <li class="subitem">See under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Positivism">Positivism</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Agnosticism">Agnosticism</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Schelling</span>, misconception of science, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Scholasticism</span>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">idea of God in, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Schopenhauer</span>, his panpsychism or voluntarism, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">universalizes subjectivism, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">mysticism of, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Science</span>.</li> + <li class="subitem">Also see under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Natural_Science">Natural Science</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Normative_Sciences">Normative Science</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Secularism</span>, of Shakespeare, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Periclean Age, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of present age, <a href="#Page_427">427</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Self" id="Self"></a><span class="smcap">Self</span>, problem of, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">proof of, in St. Augustine, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">proof of, in Descartes, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">deeper moral of, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in contemporary philosophy, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">Also see <span class="smcap"><a href="#Soul">Soul</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Mind">Mind</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Self-consciousness</span>, essential to human life, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">development of conception of, <a href="#Page_371">371 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in idealistic ethics, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Sensationalism</span>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Sense_perception" id="Sense_perception"></a><span class="smcap">Sense-perception</span>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">being as, in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Shakespeare</span>, general criticism of, <a href="#Page_30">30 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his universality, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">lack of philosophy in, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Shelley</span>, quoted on poetry, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Social Relations</span>, belief inspired by, analogue of religion, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">imagination of, extended to God, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Socrates</span>, rationalism of, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and normative science, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">method of, <a href="#Page_321">321 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Sophists</span>, the, epistemology of, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">scepticism of, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">age of, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Soul" id="Soul"></a><span class="smcap">Soul</span>, the, in Aristotle, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Plato, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as substance, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">intellectualism and voluntarism in theory of, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">immortality of, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Berkeley's theory of, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">Also see under <span class="smcap"><a href="#Mind">Mind</a></span>, and <span class="smcap"><a href="#Self">Self</a></span>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Space</span>, importance in science, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and matter, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Spencer</span>, <a href="#Footnote_236:8_95">236 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Spinoza</span>, and Goethe, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">quoted on philosophy and life, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">criticism and estimate of, <a href="#Page_315">315 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and Plato, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">and Aristotle, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">epistemology of, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Spirit</span>, the absolute, <a href="#Page_358">358 ff.</a></li> + + <li><a name="Spiritualism" id="Spiritualism"></a><span class="smcap">Spiritualism</span>, general meaning, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Footnote_267:1_115">267 (<i>note</i>)</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">objective, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Stevenson</span>, R. L., quoted on religion, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Stoicism</span>, ethics of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">religion of, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>.</li> + + <li><a name="Subjectivism" id="Subjectivism"></a><span class="smcap">Subjectivism</span>, <a href="#Chap_IX">chap. ix</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">general meaning, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Footnote_267:1_115">267 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in æsthetics, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of Berkeley, <a href="#Page_275">275 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">universalization of, in Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">criticism of, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">ethics of, <a href="#Page_298">298 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in absolute idealism, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">of present day, <a href="#Page_409">409</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Substance</span>, spiritual, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">material, Berkeley's refutation of, <a href="#Page_275">275 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Spinoza's conception of, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">the infinite, in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Aristotle's conception of, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Leibniz's conception of, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Symbolism</span>, in religion, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><a name="Teleology" id="Teleology"></a><span class="smcap">Teleology</span>, in cosmology, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">proof of God from, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">Spinoza on, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Plato, <a href="#Page_326">326 ff.</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Aristotle, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Theism</span>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Theology</span>, relation to religion, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in philosophy, <a href="#Page_199">199 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">relation to metaphysics, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Thomson, J.</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Thought</span>, and life, <a href="#Page_6">6 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as being, in Hegel, <a href="#Page_361">361 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448"></a>[<a href="./images/448.png">448</a>]</span><span class="smcap">Thucydides</span>, on thought and action, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Time</span>, importance in science, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Transcendentalism</span>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Footnote_349:1_161">349 (<i>note</i>)</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>.</li> + <li class="subitem">See <a href="#Absolute_Idealism"><span class="smcap">Idealism</span>, absolute</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Tyndall</span>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Universal</span>, scientific knowledge as, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Universe</span>, the, as object of religious reaction, <a href="#Page_65">64</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">common object of philosophy and religion, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as collective, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Utilitarianism</span>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Virtue</span>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Voltaire</span>, quoted, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Voluntarism</span>, in psychology, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Whitman, Walt</span>, <a href="#Page_27">27 ff.</a></li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Will</span>, in psychology, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">freedom and determination of, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">as cause, in Berkeley, <a href="#Page_293">293 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">in pragmatism, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>.</li> + + <li><span class="smcap">Wordsworth</span>, as philosopher-poet, <a href="#Page_38">38 ff.</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">his sense for the universal, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> + <li class="subitem">quoted on poetry and philosophy, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>.</li> + + <li> </li> + + <li><a name="Zeno" id="Zeno"></a><span class="smcap">Zeno</span>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>.</li> +</ul> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<div class="notebox"> +<h2>TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:</h2> + +<p>Pages vi, 2, 148, 220, and 222 are blank in the original.</p> + +<p>Ellipses match the original.</p> + +<p>Variations in spelling have been left as in the original. Examples +include the following:</p> + +<table summary="spelling variants in original" style="margin-left: 10%" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="3"> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft">co-ordinated</td> + <td class="tdleft">coördinated</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft">Kuelpe</td> + <td class="tdleft">Külpe's</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft">Muensterberg</td> + <td class="tdleft">Münsterberg</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft">Nirvana</td> + <td class="tdleft">Nirvâna</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft">Phaedo</td> + <td class="tdleft">Phædo</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft">pre-eminent</td> + <td class="tdleft">preëminent</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft">pre-eminently</td> + <td class="tdleft">preëminently</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft" style="padding-right: 5em;">reenforcement</td> + <td class="tdleft">reënforce</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft">role</td> + <td class="tdleft">rôle</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdleft">Theaetetus</td> + <td class="tdleft">Theætetus</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p>The following corrections have been made to the text:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Page xv: <span class="smcap">Chapter VI. Metaphysics and Epistemology</span>{original has +<span class="smcap">Epistomology</span>}</p> + +<p>Page 70: The psychology{original has pyschology} of conversion</p> + +<p>Page 93: him who practices{original has practises} the social +virtues</p> + +<p>Page 165: reality have resulted in no consensus{original has +concensus} of opinion</p> + +<p>Page 196: but in a law to which it{original has its} owes +obedience</p> + +<p>Page 261: 'justice,' 'gratitude,' '{quotation mark missing in +original}modesty,'</p> + +<p>Page 283: retained after their original{original has orignal} +meaning</p> + +<p>Page 288: nothing but the highest development{original has +devolpment} on our earth</p> + +<p>Page 325: philosopher who defined being as{original has a} the +ideal</p> + +<p>Page 405: Henri Bergson: <i>Essai</i>{original has <i>Essoi</i>} <i>sur les +données immédiates de la conscience</i></p> + +<p>Page 434: <span class="smcap">Thomas</span> à{original has á} <span class="smcap">Kempis</span>: <i>Imitation of +Christ.</i></p> + +<p>Page 436: <span class="smcap">Huxley, T. H.</span>: <i>Evolution and Ethics; +Prolegomena.</i>{original has Prologomena}</p> + +<p>[51:11] Vol. I, p. 60.{period is missing in original}</p> + +<p>[199:14] religion in these matters, cf.{original has Cf.} +Descartes:</p> + +<p>[287:16] Translation by Haldane and Kemp{original has Komp}</p></div> +</div> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Approach to Philosophy, by Ralph Barton Perry + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY *** + +***** This file should be named 25110-h.htm or 25110-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/5/1/1/25110/ + +Produced by Stephen Hope, Fox in the Stars, Lisa Reigel, +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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