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authorRoger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org>2025-10-15 02:14:16 -0700
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the Three
+Arms: Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry, by Francis J. Lippitt
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the Three Arms: Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry
+
+Author: Francis J. Lippitt
+
+Release Date: March 6, 2008 [EBook #24765]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TACTICAL USE OF THE THREE ARMS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Graeme Mackreth and The Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+A TREATISE
+
+ON THE
+
+TACTICAL USE OF THE THREE ARMS:
+
+INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AND CAVALRY.
+
+BY
+
+FRANCIS J. LIPPITT,
+
+EX-COLONEL SECOND INFANTRY, CALIFORNIA VOLUNTEERS.
+
+
+NEW YORK:
+D. VAN NOSTRAND, PUBLISHER,
+192 BROADWAY.
+1865.
+
+
+
+
+Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865,
+
+By D. VAN NOSTRAND,
+
+In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the
+Southern District of New York.
+
+
+ALVORD, PRINTER.
+
+
+
+
+TO THE MILITARY PUBLIC.
+
+
+The Author would feel obliged for any facts or suggestions which might
+enable him to render a future edition of this work more valuable.
+
+PROVIDENCE, R.I., _July, 1865_.
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS.
+
+
+ PAGE
+
+Tactical Use of Infantry 3
+
+ I. ITS ATTACK, GENERALLY 4
+ II. FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK 8
+ III. THE ATTACK, HOW MADE 19
+ IV. BAYONET CHARGES 24
+ V. DEFENCE AGAINST INFANTRY 27
+ VI. DEFENCE AGAINST ARTILLERY 34
+ VII. DEFENCE AGAINST CAVALRY 36
+VIII. SQUARES 40
+ IX. SKIRMISHERS 49
+ A. THEIR USE 50
+ B. HOW POSTED 53
+ C. HOW HANDLED 55
+ D. RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISHERS 56
+
+Tactical Use of Artillery 59
+
+ I. HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE GROUND 59
+ II. HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO OUR OWN TROOPS 63
+ III. HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE ENEMY 66
+ IV. POSTING OF BATTERIES AND OF PIECES AS BETWEEN THEMSELVES 68
+ V. HOW USED 70
+ A. GENERALLY 70
+ B. IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT 72
+ C. IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT 75
+ D. AGAINST INFANTRY 78
+ E. AGAINST CAVALRY 82
+ F. AGAINST ARTILLERY 83
+ VI. ITS FIRE 85
+ VII. ITS SUPPORTS 89
+
+Tactical Use of Cavalry 93
+
+ I. ITS FORMATIONS 93
+ II. ITS STRONG AND ITS WEAK POINTS 98
+ III. HOW POSTED 99
+ IV. ITS SUPPORTS 104
+ V. HOW USED 106
+ VI. HOW IT FIGHTS 109
+ VII. ITS CHARGE 113
+VIII. ITS ATTACK ON INFANTRY 122
+ A. GENERALLY 122
+ B. ON SQUARES 124
+ IX. GENERAL REMARKS 127
+
+
+
+
+TACTICAL USE OF THE THREE ARMS.
+
+
+Every complete military force consists of three arms,--INFANTRY,
+ARTILLERY, and CAVALRY.
+
+In battle, these three arms are united; and, other things being equal,
+that commander will prove victorious who is best acquainted with their
+combined use in the field.
+
+In order thoroughly to understand the proper use of the three arms
+combined, we must obviously begin by learning the proper use of each of
+them separately.
+
+Hence the importance of the subject of the present treatise. In
+discussing it, we shall commence with the
+
+
+
+
+TACTICAL USE OF INFANTRY.
+
+
+The subject will be considered under the following heads:--
+
+ I.--ITS ATTACK, GENERALLY.
+ II.--FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK.
+ III.--THE ATTACK, HOW MADE.
+ IV.--BAYONET CHARGES.
+ V.--DEFENCE AGAINST INFANTRY.
+ VI.--DEFENCE AGAINST ARTILLERY.
+ VII.--DEFENCE AGAINST CAVALRY.
+VIII.--SQUARES.
+ IX.--SKIRMISHERS.
+
+
+I.--Its Attack, generally.
+
+Infantry attacks with its fire, or with the bayonet. Which of these is
+the more effective?
+
+1. The _object_ of an attack is to destroy or capture the hostile force,
+or, at least, to drive it from the field.
+
+Capturing the enemy, or driving him from the field, cannot usually be
+effected by merely firing upon him.
+
+True, a mere fire at a distance may finally destroy him. But an
+insuperable objection to this mode of attack is, that while we are
+killing or disabling his men, he is killing or disabling as many of our
+own.
+
+2. If we fire from _behind cover_, our loss may be comparatively small.
+But, in that case, the enemy will never remain for any length of time
+exposed to our fire. He will either attack and rout us from our cover,
+or retire. And even if he did neither, his actual and complete
+destruction, capture, or rout, would still require an attack with the
+bayonet.
+
+3. It follows that the proper mode of attack by infantry on infantry is
+with the _bayonet_.
+
+The Russian Suwarrow's victories and reputation were won chiefly by his
+fierce bayonet attacks, which often effected great results, in spite of
+his ignorance of the art of war.
+
+4. But there are _exceptional cases_ where infantry may properly use
+only its fire; as--
+
+(1.) When acting as a support to artillery, it should rarely, if ever,
+leave its position to use the bayonet; thereby endangering the safety of
+the guns which it is its first duty to guard. Its function, in this
+case, being purely defensive, it should act by its fire alone.
+
+(2.) Against a line of skirmishers deployed, a well-directed fire will
+usually be sufficiently effective.
+
+(3.) In mountain warfare, its only practicable mode of attack will
+sometimes be by its fire.
+
+5. When both sides are _equally exposed_, the actual attack with the
+bayonet should not be preceded by a distant musketry fire; for, as in
+that case, our loss will generally be equal to the enemy's, this fire
+will give us no superiority in the charge, and the loss we have
+sustained will be therefore entirely thrown away.
+
+6. Nevertheless, our actual attack should be _prepared_, when possible,
+by the infliction of such a loss on the enemy as will make him inferior
+to us at the decisive moment. In war, the object is not to test the
+comparative courage of the combatants, but to beat the enemy. We must
+never, therefore, when it can be avoided, fight him on equal terms; and
+so, never close with him without such a superiority in numbers,
+position, or spirit, as will make the chances decidedly in our favor.
+If, without exposing ourselves to much loss, we can inflict a
+considerable loss upon him, we shall render him inferior to us, both by
+the number of his men we have disabled, and by the demoralization
+thereby caused in his ranks.
+
+7. This preparatory loss can be most effectually inflicted by the _fire
+of artillery_; as, from its great superiority of range, it can suffer
+but little, meanwhile, from the enemy's infantry fire. Our attacking
+infantry are thus enabled to keep out of the range of the fire of the
+infantry they are to attack, till the moment of advancing to close.
+
+8. When we have no artillery disposable for the purpose, the preparatory
+effect may be produced by a _well-sustained fire of infantry_, provided
+it can find a sheltered position to deliver it from; or, by the fire of
+a heavy line of skirmishers.
+
+9. If we can make the infantry we wish to attack _engage in a prolonged
+fire_, this will exhaust them, and thus render them inferior to us in
+strength and in spirit, even if we inflict on them but little loss. But
+as our attacking infantry should, in the mean time, be kept fresh, the
+preparatory fire, in such case, should not devolve on the troops that
+are to close with the enemy.
+
+10. One cause of the _indecisiveness of the results_ obtained in many of
+the battles of the late war, as compared with the great loss of life on
+both sides, has been, that the opposing battalions were too often kept
+firing at each other at a distance, both sustaining nearly equal loss,
+until the ranks were so weakened as to disable either party from making
+a vigorous and decisive charge. Or else, charges were made on the
+enemy's battalions before they had been shattered by artillery; so that
+the attacking troops were easily repulsed, sometimes with great
+slaughter.
+
+
+II.--Formations for Attack.
+
+1. Infantry may advance to attack in either of _three ways_: in column;
+in line, marching by the front; and by the flank; that is, in line, but
+faced to a flank.
+
+2. Of these three formations, the last is undoubtedly the _worst
+possible_; for--
+
+(1.) On arriving at the enemy, the troops are not concentrated at the
+point where the struggle is to be. As they must come up successively,
+they will be crushed in detail by superior numbers.
+
+(2.) Advancing in such a formation, they would be exposed to a
+destructive raking fire from the enemy's guns; especially since the
+adoption of the new flank march by fours, which gives to rifled
+artillery a tolerable mark.
+
+3. The question is, then, between an attack in column and an attack in
+line. _Which is the better_ of the two?
+
+The decisive effect of infantry is produced by a rush on the enemy with
+the bayonet. The chief elements of success in this attack at close
+quarters are, the physical momentum of the charge, and the powerful
+moral effect caused by the swift approach of a compact and orderly
+hostile mass. A charge in line does not admit of both these elements.
+The advance of a line of one or more battalions, to be united and
+orderly, cannot be rapid, and thus has no impetus. Such a line,
+advancing swiftly, especially over uneven ground, would soon become so
+broken and disunited as to destroy, in a great measure, the effect, both
+moral and physical, of its charge, and, at the same time, to deprive the
+attacking troops of that confidence which is inspired by the
+consciousness of moving together in one compact, formidable mass, in
+which every soldier feels himself fortified by the support of his
+comrades.
+
+4. On the other hand, _a column_ can move rapidly without losing its
+compactness and order.
+
+In attacking the enemy's line, a close column concentrates successively,
+but rapidly, a force superior to the enemy at the decisive point, and
+can hardly fail to pierce the line attacked, if it arrive with its
+momentum unchecked.
+
+In a close column, there is a real force created by the pressure of the
+mass behind on the leading subdivision, pushing it on the enemy, and
+preventing it from drawing back or stopping; thus imparting to it
+somewhat of the actual physical momentum of a mechanical engine.
+
+A close column shelters raw troops, and carries them irresistibly along
+with it.
+
+A close column, in case of need, can rapidly extend its front by
+deploying.
+
+It can promptly make itself impenetrable to cavalry.
+
+Finally, in a column, the officers being seen by the men, the benefit of
+their example is not lost.
+
+The close column would, therefore, seem to be the best formation for
+attack.
+
+5. Movements in line requiring that high degree of perfection in drill
+which can rarely be attained by any but regular troops, they were
+accordingly abandoned by the raw and undisciplined masses of French
+soldiers that so successfully defended the French Republic from invasion
+against the veteran armies of Europe; some of which were led by generals
+who had served under Frederick the Great. Conscious of their military
+inferiority to the enemy, they instinctively clustered together in
+close and heavy columns; then rushed down on the enemy's line with the
+force of an avalanche, often carrying every thing before them. Thus was
+inaugurated that system of attack in _deep and solid columns_, which was
+afterwards so successfully used by Napoleon.
+
+6. Close columns have two defects. One is, that they are _oppressive and
+exhausting_ to the men, especially in hot weather.
+
+But this is not a very serious objection; for they are, or should be,
+formed only when about to be used, and then their work is generally soon
+over.
+
+7. The other defect, however, is of so grave a nature as, in the opinion
+of some, to more than outweigh their advantages; and this is, the
+_terribly destructive effect_ upon them of the enemy's artillery fire,
+or of that of his sharpshooters; for the solid mass is an easy target,
+into which every shot is sure to penetrate. Many of the missiles which
+would fly over an advancing line, are sure to fall, somewhere or other,
+in a deep column.
+
+This destructive effect was strikingly illustrated in Macdonald's charge
+on the Allied centre at Wagram. The eleven thousand men (some accounts
+say fifteen thousand) composing that famous column, advanced under the
+fire of one hundred and eighty hostile guns. After being driven back
+twice, they succeeded, in a third attack, in breaking the enemy's
+centre. But of the entire column, only eleven hundred men, it is said,
+were left standing.
+
+8. The recent improvements in fire-arms must render the fire on a close
+column of infantry, both by artillery and sharpshooters, still more
+destructive than it was before. But this sacrifice of life can be
+prevented, to a great extent, by using the columns at a proper time and
+in a proper manner. They should, like storming parties (which they
+really are), never be launched against the enemy's line till the fire by
+which they would suffer has been _quite or nearly silenced_ by our
+batteries. Sometimes this may be impracticable; but this precaution has
+often been neglected when it was perfectly feasible, thus causing a
+great and useless slaughter.
+
+9. But destructive as may be artillery fire on close columns, on troops
+advancing in line grape and canister _begin to be equally so_ on their
+arriving within four hundred yards of the enemy's batteries; and are
+certainly quite as destructive, and more so, at the distance of two
+hundred yards. So that, within this distance, at least, the superiority
+of lines over columns ceases; and, probably, much sooner.
+
+10. The _desideratum_ is to preserve the advantages of the column, while
+saving the attacking troops from the almost total destruction which
+would now seem to threaten them, when marching in such a formation, from
+the new rifled artillery, which is said to fire with accuracy at two
+thousand yards, and from the new infantry rifles, said to be reliable,
+in the hands of sharpshooters, at five hundred yards.
+
+11. Perhaps this object might be attained by the advance of the
+attacking troops in line, but _in loose order_, and at double quick, to
+about two hundred paces from the enemy, a halt, a prompt alignment on
+the colors, a rapid ployment into close column doubled on the centre,
+followed by a swift and resolute charge with the bayonet.
+
+This method, while giving the rapid clearing of the intervening ground,
+to within two hundred paces of the enemy, and afterwards the impetus,
+and other advantages of the column, would, at the same time, afford that
+comparative immunity from a destructive fire which is the chief
+advantage of an advance in line.
+
+To guard against the danger, in the use of this method, of the troops
+stopping to fire, instead of ploying into a column of attack, they
+should commence their advance with pieces unloaded. Their boxes might
+even be previously emptied of their ammunition. Why should not a battle,
+as well as an assault on a fortress, have its "forlorn hope?"
+
+12. This mode of attack would be open, it is true, to _two
+objections_:--
+
+First. It would require for its successful execution under fire great
+coolness, and much previous instruction in the manoeuvre, to enable
+the troops to perform it promptly and accurately.
+
+Secondly. In presence of a bold and active enemy, it would expose the
+attacking troops to the danger of being charged and routed while
+manoeuvring.
+
+13. In the late War of the Rebellion, in lieu of close columns, attacks
+have been sometimes made in _several lines_, following each other at
+distances of three hundred paces or more. Although these attacks have
+sometimes succeeded, they are objectionable in principle; for each line
+is in danger of being repulsed successively, before the arrival of the
+one in its rear; and there is wanting that great superiority of force at
+the decisive point which is the most important element of success in a
+battle.
+
+Such formations are essentially defensive in their nature, and not
+suitable for attack. A line in position, against which the enemy is
+advancing, is strong in its fire, which will usually preserve it from
+absolute defeat till a second line, posted at one hundred and fifty, or
+even three hundred paces in its rear, has had time to come up in
+support. But even these distances Napoleon's experience appears to have
+taught him to be much too great; for in his last battle, at Waterloo, he
+posted his second line, both infantry and cavalry, at only sixty paces
+behind the first; thus sacrificing, to a great extent, the advantage of
+keeping the second line out of fire, in order to secure the more
+important one of concentration of force. But this was only his formation
+for defence; for, in the same battle, his formations for attack were
+always in close columns.
+
+14. Our present Infantry Tactics have adopted two new expedients to
+accelerate the advance of battalions, and diminish the loss to which
+columns of attack are liable--Division Columns and Advancing by the
+Flank of Subdivisions.
+
+As _Division Columns_ break the battalion line into several columns,
+each of two or three subdivisions deep, as a substitute for a single
+column four or five subdivisions deep, they undoubtedly diminish the
+loss from the enemy's artillery fire in corresponding proportion. But in
+compensation for this partial advantage, they have three defects:--
+
+(1.) In moving rapidly for any distance, especially over broken or
+obstructed ground, both the alignment and the proper intervals between
+the columns will usually be lost; thus causing, in the deployment, a
+dangerous loss of time in re-establishing the alignment and the correct
+intervals.
+
+(2.) In advancing in line of division columns, there is no means of
+forming square, except by passing through an intermediate formation.
+
+(3.) The intervals between the columns are so many gaps, through which
+cavalry could easily penetrate, and take the columns in rear.
+
+The line of division columns appears to have been first suggested by
+Marshal Marmont, who was a good artillery commander, but not
+necessarily, for that reason, a weighty authority on a point of
+Infantry Tactics.
+
+15. The manoeuvre of _Advancing by the Flank of Subdivisions_ is
+obnoxious to all the objections just pointed out in regard to Division
+Columns. On being threatened by cavalry, though the troops would have no
+intermediate formation to pass through to prepare for forming square,
+they would have to face into column and close to half distance, which
+there would often not be time to do.
+
+In addition to this, the flank march being habitually by fours, the
+subdivisions would offer a tolerable mark for the enemy's artillery, and
+thus be exposed to a destructive enfilade.
+
+And in forming into line, where the leading guides have not accurately
+preserved both their alignment and their intervals, which must be the
+usual case in the field, there must be more or less delay and confusion,
+of which a prompt and active enemy would not fail to take fatal
+advantage.
+
+The mode prescribed by the Tactics (Par. 150, School of the Battalion),
+for executing the manoeuvre of forming line while advancing by
+subdivision flanks, seems also to call for remark; it being "by company
+(or division) into line." In other words, each individual soldier
+brings a shoulder forward, breaks off from his comrades, and hurries up,
+not on a line with them, but detached from them, and moving
+independently, to find his proper place. This destroys for the time
+being, and at a critical moment, the unity of the subdivisions, and so
+impairs the confidence soldiers derive from realizing that they form
+part of a compact mass. In thus executing this manoeuvre under fire,
+and near the enemy, there is danger of the men becoming confused and
+bewildered. For this reason, a better method of forming line would seem
+to be to re-form the column by a simple facing, and then to _wheel_ into
+line by subdivisions.
+
+16. The worst possible _order of marching_ in battle, for any
+considerable number of men, as a battalion, for instance, is by the
+flank. Such a line, advancing in what is really a column of fours, would
+be rolled up and crushed, on the enemy's attacking its head; and would,
+meanwhile, be exposed to enfilade. Marching _to_ a flank, it would be
+running the gauntlet of the enemy's batteries and musketry fire. In
+forming into line in either case, much time would be lost; as in flank
+marching in the field, especially when the ground is ragged or
+obstructed, distances cannot be preserved.
+
+It may be here remarked, that marching to a flank in column also,
+whether by division, company, or platoon, is highly objectionable, as it
+constantly exposes the column to an enfilading fire, as well as to be
+suddenly charged in flank by cavalry.
+
+
+III.--The Attack, how made.
+
+1. The speed of a column of attack must _never be checked_ for a moment,
+to enable it to reply to the enemy's fire. The fire of the column will
+be ineffective, for it will be the fire of excited men, and very limited
+in extent, as it can proceed from the leading division only; and the
+fire once begun, it will be hard to stop it. If, in order to fire, we
+halt the column, re-forming it under the excitement of the fire will be
+very difficult; and the enemy's least forward movement may then cause a
+rout.
+
+At Maida, in Calabria, in 1806, the French columns attacked the English
+under General Stuart. When within thirty paces, the English gave them a
+volley. The French, stunned, as it were, began, at once, to deploy. The
+English fired again, and the French retreated.
+
+At Waterloo, in the last grand attack by the French, the advance column
+of the Imperial Guard was decisively repulsed by the British Guards.
+These had been lying on the ground behind the crest of the slope until
+the French appeared, when they suddenly rose up and poured in a
+murderous volley at short range. Instead of instantly charging with the
+bayonet, the French hesitated, then began to deploy. The British charged
+at once, and drove them down the hill.
+
+2. This dangerous halt and deployment is apt also to occur when the
+column finds _sheltering objects by the way_. Therefore, hurry by these,
+and hasten the step.
+
+3. It will also tend to prevent such an untoward accident, if we furnish
+the columns of attack, where several are employed, with _skirmishers_ in
+their intervals, as well as on their outer flanks, to draw the enemy's
+fire. Otherwise, the column fired into will be apt, in order to return
+the fire, to halt instinctively and deploy into line, which breaks up
+the attack.
+
+4. From this it appears that the limited fire of a column of attack is,
+in fact, _no defect_, the highest offensive power of infantry being in
+the bayonet. Fire, in the attack, is generally ineffective, and
+sometimes injurious. It should rarely be used till the enemy has turned
+his back.
+
+5. As to attacking _cavalry_:
+
+Infantry may advance in line and attack cavalry safely, provided its
+flanks are protected. Before a long line of infantry, cavalry must
+retreat, or be destroyed by its fire. In the Austrian service it is said
+to be a received maxim, that horses will not stand before the steady
+approach of a mass of infantry, with bayonets at the charge, but will
+always retire before the infantry closes on them.
+
+6. So, infantry _in column_, either closed in mass, or at half distance,
+may attack cavalry successfully; taking care to be ready to form square,
+or "column against cavalry," at the first symptom of their preparing to
+charge.
+
+7. As to attacking _artillery_:
+
+Before charging, the infantry sometimes first seeks the shelter of
+ground, using its sharpshooters to annoy it, and, if possible, to
+silence its fire.
+
+Or, when circumstances are favorable, as when it can get a position near
+its flank, it attacks it vigorously, at once, with fire and bayonet.
+
+But when infantry has to advance to the attack of a battery in front, it
+should never be in any compact formation, but always deployed as
+skirmishers. Otherwise, it would usually meet with a bloody repulse;
+especially where any considerable space of ground is to be cleared.
+
+At the battle of Malvern Hill, the rebel General Magruder's division was
+sent, either in column or in line, to charge a powerful Union battery
+just beyond an open field a mile and three-quarters in length. The
+rebels rushed into the field at a full run, but encountered a murderous
+fire from the guns they were sent to attack, which mowed them down by
+hundreds. By the time they had cleared two-thirds of the ground, the
+carnage was so dreadful as to drive them back to the woods from which
+they had started. Twice more they were sent forward in the same manner,
+but with the same result; when the undertaking was abandoned.
+
+8. In attacking a battery, we may often secure its capture by a volley
+_aimed at the horses_; the effect of which may prevent the enemy from
+carrying it off. But this should be avoided when there is a good
+prospect of capturing the battery without disabling the horses; since
+then, if we succeed, we shall be able to immediately use the battery
+against the enemy ourselves.
+
+9. In the French Revolution, the Chouans of La Vendee attacked the
+Republican batteries in _several single files_, of one or two hundred
+men each, at intervals of fifty paces. Such a formation protects the
+attacking columns, to a great extent, from the enemy's fire, but exposes
+them to destruction by a charge from the battery supports. In the
+absence of these, it would often be very advantageous; since, by proper
+drilling, these columns in one rank could be made, on arriving near the
+enemy, to rapidly double in two or four ranks, without halting, and
+then, by filing to a flank and facing, to advance by the front in a
+compact line.
+
+The same formation would be useful for troops advancing to assault an
+intrenchment; but, as in the case of a battery, subject to the risk of
+being destroyed by a sudden sortie from the work.
+
+10. Artillery is never without _supports_. One part of the infantry,
+therefore, deployed as skirmishers, should attack the guns, circling
+round them, and opening fire on the men and horses; while the other part
+attacks the support in flank. On getting sufficiently near, the
+assailants should try to draw the fire of the guns, and then rush on
+them before they have time to reload.
+
+If a battery gets into confusion, or there is any delay in unlimbering
+or limbering up, then is the most favorable time to capture it by a
+vigorous charge with the bayonet.
+
+
+IV.--Bayonet Charges.
+
+1. When made resolutely, and _without slackening the gait_, bayonet
+charges have succeeded in nine cases out of ten.
+
+2. The bayonet is usually more effective than _grape_, _canister_, or
+_bullets_.
+
+At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Kleist's Prussian division was sent
+to carry the position of Probstheyda. For this purpose it was necessary
+to advance up a long slope, the crest of which was occupied by Drouot's
+artillery. The French allowed the Prussians to approach to within a
+short distance, and then poured into them a most destructive shower of
+grape, which drove them back for a moment in confusion. But they
+immediately rallied, and rushed desperately on again. Marshal Victor
+then charged them with the bayonet, and completely repulsed them.
+
+Afterwards, having been re-enforced by Wittgenstein's Russian division,
+they again advanced, under a constant shower of grape from Drouot. They,
+nevertheless, kept advancing; and, in spite of the great loss they
+suffered, were about carrying the position, when the French again
+charged with the bayonet, forcing them down to the very foot of the
+declivity; where, being once more covered with grape, their repulse was
+complete and final.
+
+So, at the battle of Mill Springs, in January, 1862, after the
+combatants had been exchanging musketry fires for several hours without
+any decisive result, the rebels' left was vigorously charged by the
+Ninth Ohio with the bayonet. This charge broke the enemy's flank. His
+whole line gave way in confusion, and the battle was won.
+
+So, at Malvern Hill, in 1862, in several instances, columns of rebels
+whom a storm of canister and shell had failed to repulse, were driven
+back and routed by a dash with the bayonet, after a volley poured in at
+a few yards from the muzzles of the guns.
+
+So, at the battle of Seven Pines, according to General Heintzelman's
+report, whenever our troops used the bayonet, their loss was
+comparatively light, and the enemy was driven back, suffering heavily.
+
+3. The bayonet charge, when made from any considerable distance, should
+be _in column_; the only formation in which order can be combined with
+sufficient speed. But, at a short distance, a bayonet charge by a line,
+instantly after firing a volley to repel an attack, will be very
+effective, and usually successful.
+
+4. In ordinary cases, the charge should be _prepared_ by first
+shattering the hostile masses, or, at least, wearying and demoralizing
+them by artillery, or by skirmishers' fire.
+
+5. The more _vigorous and resolute_ the charge, the greater the chance
+of success. The enemy never retires before a moderate advance.
+
+6. Where the enemy is _forced into a defile_, a charge with the bayonet,
+preceded by a few rounds of grape, will complete his destruction.
+
+7. When the enemy is _behind cover_, the best way to drive him from it
+is with the bayonet. This will cause less loss of life than to attempt
+to return his fire. But, in such case, the charge should be prepared,
+when possible, by a few shells, or rounds of canister.
+
+8. Shots up or down a declivity usually miss. A _height_ should,
+therefore, be carried with the bayonet, without firing.
+
+The moral effect, moreover, of a steady charge of infantry up a hill,
+without stopping to fire, is very great; and such a charge is usually
+successful. Prince Czartoryski, Alexander's most experienced general at
+Austerlitz, admitted that he lost all confidence in the result on seeing
+the French infantry ascending the plateau of Pratzen, the key to the
+Allies' position, with a firm and decided step, without once stopping to
+fire.
+
+So, at Chattanooga, in November, 1863, Thomas's troops carried the
+height of Missionary Ridge by a similar steady and determined ascent, in
+spite of the volleys of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces of
+artillery, and of musketry from the rebels' rifle-pits at the summit.
+General Grant attributed the small number of casualties our troops
+sustained in the attack to the rebels' surprise at its audacity, causing
+"confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces."
+
+
+V.--Defence against Infantry.
+
+1. The defence of infantry is by its fire, and therefore its proper
+defensive formation is in _deployed lines_.
+
+2. Avoid a _premature commencement_ of the fire. Long firing exhausts
+the men's energy, expends the ammunition, fouls the pieces, destroys the
+soldier's confidence in his weapon, and emboldens the enemy.
+
+3. So, a fire upon an enemy while _under cover_, as in a wood, would be
+virtually thrown away. If his fire from such a position causes us any
+loss, he had better be shelled, or driven away by skirmishers, according
+to circumstances.
+
+4. The practice of hostile regiments exchanging for a considerable time
+a _musketry fire at a distance_, is highly objectionable, as it causes a
+great sacrifice of life without corresponding results. Instead of
+standing in line for ten minutes, receiving and returning fire at a
+distance of three hundred yards, it would be much better to clear this
+space at double quick in two or three minutes, and close with the enemy;
+for, in returning his fire, we can do him no more harm than we receive,
+while nothing decisive is accomplished. The case is, of course,
+different where our own troops are behind cover, while the enemy's are
+exposed.
+
+5. But in _special cases_, as where we have to cover a flank movement of
+our second line, or of the reserve, or to await a force coming to our
+support, it may be necessary to keep up an incessant fusillade, without
+regard to losses received.
+
+6. Fire in action is of two kinds: the fire at will, and the fire by
+volleys; the former kind being the rule, the latter the exception.
+Although the fire at will is the one principally used, there are _very
+strong objections_ to it.
+
+(1.) The men load and fire as individuals, and generally with great
+rapidity, and under more or less excitement, rarely stopping to take a
+deliberate aim. The consequence is, that very few shots take effect, and
+the fire is, for the greater part, wasted, as is shown by the
+well-established fact that, in every engagement, for every man killed or
+disabled, there have been from three to ten thousand musket or rifle
+bullets fired.
+
+(2.) Except on windy days, a cloud of smoke soon collects in front of a
+line firing at will, hiding, more or less completely, the enemy from
+view. The fire being then at random, it is, of course, unreliable.
+
+(3.) The fire at will leads to a rapid and enormous consumption of
+ammunition. To show how serious is this objection also, it is only
+necessary to consider in how many instances victory has been turned into
+defeat by the premature exhaustion, by one or more regiments, of their
+ammunition.
+
+(4.) As a necessary consequence of this rapid consumption of ammunition,
+the pieces soon become fouled, and thus, to a great extent, useless.
+
+(5.) Troops under a musketry fire at will, soon become accustomed to it,
+and its incessant din produces on them a stunning effect, which deadens,
+in no small degree, their sensibility to danger.
+
+7. On the other hand, _volley firing_ has often been attended with
+decisive results, especially when it has been reserved to the proper
+moment, and delivered at short range. Instances of this have occurred in
+almost every great battle we read of in history, as also in the late War
+of the Rebellion. For example: at the battle of South Mountain,
+Doubleday's brigade was engaged with a heavy force of rebels at some
+thirty or forty paces in its front. Our men were behind a fence, firing
+at will; but their fire made little or no impression on the enemy, who
+attempted to charge at the least cessation of the fire. Our troops were
+then made to cease firing, to lie down behind the fence, and, on the
+enemy's approach to within fifteen paces, to spring up and pour in a
+volley. This was so deadly, that the rebels fled in disorder, leaving
+their dead and wounded, and could not be rallied again.
+
+At Chickamauga, in 1863, the regiments of Hazen's brigade fired only by
+volleys; every one of which, it is officially reported, was powerfully
+effective in checking the enemy's attacks.
+
+8. Nevertheless, it has been a common military saying, and supported
+even by high authority, that the fire at will is _the only one possible
+in action_. This assertion implies that the rank and file are not
+sufficiently cool to reserve their fire, and that they must be kept
+constantly occupied by the excitement, noise, and smoke of their own
+fire, in order to make them remain steady in their ranks under that of
+the enemy.
+
+As applied to raw, undisciplined, or demoralized troops, the proposition
+may be, to a great extent, true. But in reference to disciplined or
+veteran troops, whose _morale_ has not been impaired, it will be found
+disproved on almost every page of military history; from which a few
+examples will be cited hereafter. For the present, one instance will
+suffice; that of Colonel Willich's regiment of Thirty-second Indiana
+Volunteers, at the battle of Shiloh, in April, 1862. While under fire,
+their commander, perceiving their own fire to have become "a little
+wild," caused them to cease firing, and then drilled them in the manual
+of arms, which they went through as if on parade; after which, they
+again opened on the enemy a fire, which is reported to have been
+"deliberate, steady, and effective."
+
+It may be here observed that, whenever troops lose their presence of
+mind, there is no surer way of restoring it than by the repetition, by
+their officers, in their usual tone, of any words of command they have
+learned instinctively to obey on the drill-ground.
+
+9. Infantry, when charged in position, should reserve its fire till it
+can be made _with deadly effect_, as at the distance of fifty paces; and
+the volleys should be instantly followed up by a countercharge with the
+bayonet on the charging enemy. For, if our fire has staggered him, a
+vigorous charge will complete his repulse; and if it has not, our only
+chance of success is in suddenly taking the offensive ourselves.
+
+Whilst awaiting his charge, we shall incur but little, if any, loss
+from the enemy's fire; for the fire of troops advancing to attack is
+usually of very little account.
+
+The only disadvantage attending a volley just before we charge is, that,
+as the smoke veils us from the enemy's view, it will rob us, to some
+extent, of the moral effect of our swift advance.
+
+But, in many cases, if the enemy see us awaiting his bayonet attack, and
+reserving our fire to the very last, he loses resolution, relaxes his
+speed, and then stops short, or retires.
+
+At Cowpens, Colonel Howard broke and routed the British line which was
+advancing to attack him, by reserving his fire to within thirty yards,
+and then charging with the bayonet.
+
+At the battle of Friedland, the Russian Imperial Guard charged on
+Dupont's division with the bayonet. The French did not wait for them to
+close, but rushed on with the bayonet themselves, and completely routed
+them.
+
+10. A volley concentrated upon the enemy's _regimental colors_ will
+usually disable the color-guard and the men near it; and, if promptly
+followed up by a charge, may enable us to capture the colors. This is
+always an important advantage; for, by the loss of its colors, a
+regiment is not only dispirited, but in danger of disorganization;
+these being its proper rallying-point.
+
+11. When infantry is acting as a _support to artillery_ which is
+attacked, it should throw out sharpshooters to reply to the enemy's
+skirmishers that are firing at the gunners and horses, whilst it engages
+the compact mass by which it is itself attacked.
+
+If the enemy should commit the blunder of attacking the battery with his
+entire force, without detaching to engage the support, we should profit
+by it by instantly charging him in flank; but taking care not to be led
+away to any distance from the battery we are protecting.
+
+12. Infantry, surrounded by the enemy, will often be able to _cut its
+way through_ and escape. For this purpose, as the highest degree of
+concentration is required, its formation should be in close column.
+
+
+VI.--Defence against Artillery.
+
+1. The best defence of infantry against artillery is by the fire of
+_sharpshooters_ deployed as skirmishers, to pick off the gunners and the
+horses; the main body, meanwhile, occupying the most sheltered locality
+it can find.
+
+2. Where no shelter is afforded by any natural obstacles, or by
+irregularities of ground, it may be sometimes necessary to make the men
+_lie down_.
+
+But this expedient should be used as rarely as possible, on account of
+its demoralizing tendency. Troops that have become accustomed to it
+cannot be expected to bravely face the enemy; and the habit is very
+rapidly formed. At Bull Run, in July, 1861, a whole company was seen to
+grovel in the dust at the mere snapping of a percussion-cap of one of
+their own muskets.
+
+This demoralizing tendency does not exist, however, where troops lie
+down only to enable their own artillery to fire over them. This was
+shown at the battle of Pea Ridge, where several of our regiments lay on
+the ground for two hours or more, while thirty of our guns were firing
+over them. When, at last, this fire had silenced the enemy's guns, our
+infantry then rose, charged him in a compact line, and drove him from
+the field.
+
+3. A line of infantry may _avoid_ cannon-shot by advancing or retiring
+fifty paces. A column or a square would have to move this distance, or
+more, according to its depth.
+
+Ricochet shots may be avoided by moving fifty paces to the right or
+left.
+
+This shifting of position is but a temporary expedient, it is true, for
+the enemy's guns will soon obtain the exact range again. But for this,
+several trial-shots will be requisite, thus making the enemy lose time;
+and, in battle, a few minutes lost or gained have often decided between
+victory and defeat.
+
+4. When the enemy opens an artillery fire on a square, _preparatory to a
+cavalry charge_, his fire must cease when his cavalry approaches the
+square; say, on its arriving within one hundred and fifty yards. To
+avoid the artillery fire, the square may safely remain lying down until
+the hostile cavalry has reached this point. For, as they will require
+about half a minute to clear the intervening ground, the square will
+still have time enough left to rise, align its ranks, and deliver a
+volley before the cavalry reaches it.
+
+
+VII.--Defence against Cavalry.
+
+1. The discipline of infantry is never put to a severer test than when
+it is required to resist a _charge of cavalry_, properly made. The moral
+effect of a charge of a body of horse at full speed, on the troops
+waiting to receive it, is like that caused by the swift approach of a
+locomotive under full steam, seeming quite as irresistible. It would be
+so in reality, but for the counter effect produced both on the horses
+and their riders by the sight of the infantry standing firm and
+reserving its fire. I have been told by an old cuirassier officer, who
+served through the campaigns of Napoleon with distinguished bravery,
+that there was no operation that his regiment so much dreaded as a
+charge upon well-disciplined infantry.
+
+2. This counter moral effect on the charging cavalry is the greater,
+_the longer the infantry reserve their fire_; since, the less the
+distance at which it is delivered, the more fatal will be its effects. A
+volley at long range is not destructive enough to check the cavalry's
+advance; while this effect has often been produced by the infantry
+merely withholding its fire till the cavalry has approached very near;
+and a volley delivered at the very last moment has, in by far the
+greater number of instances, effectually repulsed the charge.
+
+Infantry should, therefore, let cavalry approach to within forty paces,
+or nearer still, and then give them a general volley.
+
+At the battle of Neerwinden, in 1793, the Austrian cavalry was repulsed
+by the French infantry under Dumouriez, by a volley poured in at the
+very muzzles of the pieces.
+
+At Austerlitz, a Russian cavalry charge on French infantry in line was
+repulsed by a volley delivered so near, that it stretched four hundred
+troopers on the ground. The rest dispersed in disorder to the right and
+left.
+
+3. The armor of cuirassiers is bullet-proof. To repel a charge of these
+troops, therefore, it will be necessary to _aim at the horses_. Their
+armor is so heavy, that the mere fall of the riders on the ground is
+usually sufficient to disable them, as was the case with the French
+cuirassiers at Waterloo.
+
+4. Infantry in line, in two ranks even, may withstand cavalry, if in
+compact order, and attacked _in front_. But the slightest cavalry charge
+on the flank of a line will rout it.
+
+At Quatre Bras, a French infantry line, advancing, repulsed a charge of
+the Brunswicker Lancers under the Duke of Brunswick, by receiving it in
+steadiness and good order, and then pouring in a destructive fire.
+
+But, in the same battle, the Sixty-ninth British Regiment was instantly
+rolled up and destroyed by a charge of French cuirassiers on its flank.
+
+5. Where infantry is well disciplined, and its commander is cool and
+prompt, it may sometimes _avoid the effect_ of a cavalry charge by other
+means than its fire, or formation in square. At Talavera, a French
+infantry division, drawn up in close column, seeing an English cavalry
+regiment charging down upon them, avoided the shock by simply stepping
+aside, thus allowing the cavalry to pass by them. A portion of the
+charging troops wheeled round to follow them; but, by the cross-fire of
+another division, and the charge of other cavalry, which fell upon it in
+its confusion, it was completely annihilated.
+
+6. A line of infantry charged by cavalry in flank, and so suddenly as to
+allow no time to form square, could hardly escape destruction. It would
+seem that the best course to be adopted in such a case would be to _open
+the ranks_ by a rapid and simultaneous movement of both of them, thus
+compelling the charging cavalry to ride between them. If the front rank
+should then face about, this would bring the cavalry between two fires,
+which might be poured in with most destructive effect.
+
+But where the cavalry charges with a very wide front, or in line, this
+manoeuvre might be difficult, or impossible.
+
+7. Whenever an infantry line is charged by cavalry in front, and it is
+doubtful whether it will stand the shock, the wisest course would seem
+to be to make the men lie down, and let the charging cavalry _leap over
+them_. This the horses will instinctively do, with but little risk of
+injury to the men, provided they lie in a position parallel to the line
+of battle, thus presenting the least possible depth. It is said that the
+British infantry has sometimes done this, and risen up again immediately
+after the cavalry had passed. The cavalry could thus be promptly taken
+in rear.
+
+8. In retreating, when threatened by cavalry, if there be a _long plain_
+in our rear, we must retire slowly. But if cover, or ground unfavorable
+to cavalry, be near, we must reach it as soon as possible.
+
+
+VIII.--Squares.
+
+1. In 1813, France was nearly exhausted of soldiers, so that Napoleon,
+on hastily preparing for his campaign of that year, was obliged to
+incorporate into his army a large number of raw conscripts, who had
+scarcely begun their elementary drill. On the route to their respective
+points of concentration, he accordingly ordered his columns to halt each
+day, to practise _the three movements_ which he considered to be the
+most important for infantry to be familiar with. These were, forming
+battalions in square, deploying in line, and re-forming in column of
+attack.
+
+2. In the Austrian service, squares formed by a _column in mass_ are
+considered preferable to hollow ones, on the supposition that though
+horses will recoil from a dense mass, they may be easily brought to
+break through a shallow formation, over which they can see the open
+ground. But this theory seems to be refuted by numerous facts. A large
+proportion of the formations that have successfully repulsed cavalry,
+since the beginning of this century, have been hollow squares.
+
+3. The rule laid down in the Tactics (Par. 143, Skirmishers), directing
+the skirmishers, in rallying on the square, to "come to a ready without
+command, and fire upon the enemy; which will also be done by the
+reserve, as soon as it is unmasked by the skirmishers," is an unsound
+one, for a compliance with it would be dangerous. A square cannot expect
+to repulse cavalry by an irregular fire at will, but only by
+well-directed _volleys_. If cavalry charge a square firing irregularly,
+it will probably rout it. On the other hand, if a square wait coolly
+till the cavalry is at twenty paces, its volley will be murderous. At
+Waterloo, the Allied squares that reserved their fire till the French
+cavalry had arrived at from twenty to forty paces, invariably repulsed
+it. At that battle, Ney led eleven cavalry charges against the British
+squares, every one of which failed.
+
+At the opening of the campaign of 1813, Napoleon had, comparatively, but
+a handful of cavalry; so few, that they had to keep close to their
+infantry for protection. In crossing the plains of Lutzen, a large and
+splendid cavalry force of the Allies, supported by infantry and by
+horse-artillery, made an attack on Ney's corps, which consisted chiefly
+of young and raw recruits, who saw an enemy for the first time. The
+situation was extremely dangerous, and Ney and his principal generals
+threw themselves into the squares to encourage them. By volleys
+delivered at a signal, the enemy's charges were all repulsed, and the
+conscripts acquired great confidence from the ease with which this was
+done. Ney then broke up his squares, and, pursuing the enemy in columns,
+completed their repulse.
+
+At Auerstadt, in 1806, Davoust's French squares had to sustain a long
+succession of charges from ten thousand Prussian horse. By reserving
+their fire, each time, to within thirty or forty paces, its effect was
+so deadly, that a rampart of dead and disabled men and horses was soon
+formed around the squares, and the charges were all repulsed.
+
+So, at Jena, on the same day, Ney, posted in a square, allowed the
+Prussian cuirassiers to charge up to within fifteen or twenty paces,
+when the front attacked, at his word of command, poured in a fire which
+completely repulsed the charge, strewing the whole ground with dead and
+wounded. The Prussian cavalry, in that battle, are said to have been
+"terrified at the sight of a motionless infantry reserving its fire."
+
+Again, at Mount Tabor, in 1798, General Kleber, marching with an
+infantry division of only three thousand men, over an immense sandy
+plain, was attacked by twelve thousand Turkish horse. The French squares
+resisted their successive charges for six hours, by means of volleys
+reserved till the enemy were at the very muzzles of their guns; which
+soon built up a rampart around them of men and horses. Bonaparte then
+arrived with another division. Dividing it into two squares, he rapidly
+advanced them in such a manner as to enclose the Turks in a kind of
+triangle; when, by a sudden fire upon them from three points at once, he
+drove them upon each other in confusion, making them flee in every
+direction.
+
+It may be observed, that advancing or manoeuvring in squares is
+practicable only on open and level plains, like the sandy deserts of
+Egypt and Syria.
+
+4. The best reliance of an infantry square being, therefore, on its fire
+by volleys, the men should be instructed to come to a _charge bayonet_,
+instead of a "ready," immediately on forming square. From this latter
+position, there would be much greater danger of the volley being
+prematurely delivered. The fire of a single excited man will usually be
+followed by a general discharge.
+
+5. It may be often advisable that the volley should be delivered by
+_both ranks_ at once, and not by a single one. Par. 1191, School of the
+Battalion, directing that "a battalion, in square, will never use any
+other than the fire by file, or by rank," should therefore be amended.
+
+6. Moreover, in view of what has been said as to volley-firing, and of
+the examples that have been cited in confirmation, there is reason to
+doubt the wisdom of the direction contained in Par. 67, School of the
+Company: "The fire by file being that which is most frequently used
+against an enemy, it is highly important that it be rendered perfectly
+familiar to the troops. The instructor will, therefore, give it _almost
+exclusive preference_."
+
+The fire by file, after its commencement, becomes a mere individual fire
+at will. Independently of the general ineffectiveness of this kind of
+fire, one would have supposed that the instructor's attention should be
+rather directed to accustoming the men to the more difficult reserved
+fire by volleys, instead of practising them almost exclusively in a fire
+which, once learned, they will use instinctively, and without any
+practice at all.
+
+7. Infantry _breech-loading weapons_ would be very useful to troops in
+square, when charged by cavalry; since, being rapidly reloaded, they
+would enable the square to repulse, with a volley, each subdivision
+successively, where the charging column is formed at the usual
+distances. But it is doubtful whether, on the whole, these weapons are
+preferable to muzzle-loaders. Certain it is, that they exhaust the
+ammunition much more rapidly, and so cause a suspension of fire, and a
+withdrawal from the line of battle, till a new supply can arrive. And,
+to obtain this new supply, a long time is generally required; infantry
+ammunition being usually carried in the second, or more distant
+ammunition train, instead of the first, or nearest one, as it ought to
+be.
+
+8. Although a reserved fire is much the most reliable in repulsing
+cavalry, the men may sometimes be ordered to commence the fire at a
+_considerable distance_. In such case, they should be instructed to aim
+at the horses, instead of their riders, as affording a better mark.
+
+9. European cavalry is often practised, on arriving within four hundred
+yards, or effective grape-shot distance, of an infantry square, to halt,
+and then open at the centre, unmasking a battery of horse-artillery,
+which plays for a certain time on the square, when the cavalry closes
+again, and charges.
+
+A square, however, attacked in this manner, is _not in so much danger_
+of being broken as might be imagined. The enemy's guns, after being
+unmasked, would usually require several trial rounds to get the exact
+range; and our sharpshooters, who could safely be thrown forward one
+hundred yards, with the new rifled arms, ought, in the mean time, to
+inflict such loss on the cavalry, as well as on the battery, as to cause
+it either to retire, or to charge feebly, and, therefore, ineffectively.
+At the very worst, the square would have ample time to re-form its
+ranks, and deliver a deadly volley before the cavalry could reach it, as
+it also would if this operation were attempted much nearer, say at two
+hundred yards. In this last case, a few volleys from the square itself,
+with the new arms, would probably be destructive enough to prevent the
+charge altogether.
+
+10. It is hardly necessary to observe, that troops formed in square,
+when charged by cavalry, can secure their safety only by _standing
+firm_. A single opening will suffice to let in the enemy, who will then
+easily ride over the square, and cut it in pieces. Whereas, if the
+square remain unbroken, cavalry can inflict upon it no loss, or but a
+trifling one.
+
+11. In repulsing a cavalry charge, coolness and presence of mind will
+sometimes enable troops to accomplish _extraordinary results_.
+
+At Quatre Bras, the square of the Forty-second Highlanders was not
+completed, the companies still running in to form the rear face, when
+the enemy's leading troop entered. But the square, nevertheless,
+finished its formation; and the French cavalry, caught, as it were, in a
+net, was soon destroyed by the concentrated fire of all the fronts,
+which had faced inward.
+
+In the same battle, the Forty-fourth British Regiment, standing in line
+in two ranks, was suddenly charged in rear by the French Lancers, who
+had dashed round one of their flanks for that purpose. The rear rank
+suddenly faced about, and, at a very short distance, poured in a deadly
+fire, which put them into confusion. On their way back to re-form, the
+front rank, in its turn, gave them a volley, which destroyed great
+numbers of them, and completed their rout.
+
+12. Even when a square has been actually broken, it is _not necessarily
+lost_. If the troops are brave and well disciplined, it may sometimes be
+rallied again, re-formed, and made to repulse the attacking cavalry, as
+was the case with some of the Allied squares at Waterloo.
+
+So, at the battle of Pultusk, in 1806, a French battalion that had been
+broken and overthrown by Russian cavalry, immediately rallied, fell on
+the troopers floundering in the mud, and dispatched them.
+
+So, at the battle of Krasnoe, in 1812, a large Russian square was
+retreating before the French cavalry masses. Occasionally, in order to
+pass a narrow defile, it was obliged, temporarily, to break the square.
+At these times the French made furious charges, penetrated into the
+column, and captured men and guns. But as soon as the defile was passed,
+the Russians instantly re-formed the square, and continued their
+retreat. They finally succeeded in reaching Korytnia, after killing and
+wounding some four hundred or five hundred of the French; though with
+the loss of eight guns, one thousand prisoners, and seven hundred or
+eight hundred _hors de combat_, out of five thousand or six thousand
+men.
+
+
+IX.--Skirmishers.
+
+We shall consider--
+
+First, THEIR USE.
+
+Secondly, HOW THEY ARE POSTED.
+
+Thirdly, HOW THEY ARE HANDLED.
+
+Fourthly, RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISHERS.
+
+
+A. THEIR USE.
+
+1. In approaching the enemy through a wooded or broken country,
+skirmishers thrown out in advance, and on the flanks of the leading
+column, are absolutely indispensable, in order to _reconnoitre the
+ground_, and prevent a surprise.
+
+2. Skirmishers _protect_ the main body, or any particular portion of it,
+from attack while manoeuvring.
+
+A regiment, or a brigade, in covered ground, whether the enemy be
+visible or not, should never change its position in battle, or
+manoeuvre, without the protection of a skirmishing line.
+
+3. They furnish a screen, behind which the main body may _hide its
+movements_, and be enabled to attack at an unexpected point.
+
+4. Where a ravine, a wood, or other similar obstacle causes _a break in
+our line of battle_, by occupying it with skirmishers we guard it
+against penetration by the enemy, and connect the separated corps with
+each other.
+
+5. Skirmishers may be used to alarm the enemy at a point where he
+expected no attack, and thus _create a diversion_.
+
+6. By their attack at various points, they serve to _unmask the enemy's
+position_.
+
+7. They may be employed to _open the way for a charge_ with the bayonet.
+
+At the battle of Stone River, the rebels, on one occasion, advanced in
+line, with a double column in rear of each wing, preceded by a double
+line of skirmishers, who reserved their fire till close to our line,
+when they halted, poured in a murderous fire, and fell back on their
+main body, which then rushed forward. Both our first and second lines,
+staggered by this sudden and destructive fire, were swept from the
+ground.
+
+8. Skirmishers have been sometimes thrown forward to _test the spirit
+and disposition_ of the enemy.
+
+At Biberach, in 1800, the French general St. Cyr, after having carried
+the place, and driven the Austrians through the defile in rear of it
+back upon their main body, posted on the heights of Wittenburg, sent
+forward a strong line of skirmishers to open fire on them, with the view
+of ascertaining their temper and disposition after their vanguard had
+been defeated and driven in. This drew forth a general and continued
+discharge, like that which demoralized troops are apt to indulge in to
+keep up their spirits by their own noise. Seeing this, St. Cyr instantly
+prepared to charge, although he had with him but twenty thousand men,
+and the Austrians numbered sixty thousand, and were in a strong
+position. The result justified his decision; for, on the near approach
+of the French, the Austrians fired a volley or two and then retreated in
+confusion.
+
+9. Skirmishers should _accompany columns of attack_; for--
+
+(1.) They increase the confidence of the troops they accompany. Placed
+between the columns, they advance boldly because the columns advance,
+and the columns advance boldly because the skirmishers do.
+
+(2.) Preceding the columns, by driving back the enemy's skirmishers, and
+diverting his fire to themselves, they keep the attacking columns as
+free from loss as possible till the shock.
+
+They, moreover, serve to annoy the troops we are about to attack, by the
+incessant sharp buzzing of their deadly bullets among them, like so many
+bees, killing some and disabling others; and this, sometimes, to such a
+degree as to demoralize them.
+
+It is said that, at Waterloo, the swarms of skirmishers that covered the
+French attacking columns so galled and excited the stationary columns
+and squares of some of the Allies, as to nearly drive them from the
+field.
+
+(3.) On the flanks of a column, they cover them from attack.
+
+(4.) They draw the enemy's fire prematurely, and thus render it
+comparatively ineffective.
+
+(5.) They prevent the columns from halting to deploy and fire.
+
+(6.) They may sometimes conceal the direction of the march of the
+attacking column, and even seize the guns that have been playing on it.
+
+10. In defence, if they can _encircle the enemy's advancing column_,
+they may destroy it by their concentric fire.
+
+11. In a retreat, skirmishers _cover the rear_, so long as the enemy
+attacks without cavalry.
+
+12. The NEW RIFLED ARMS have obviously much increased the effectiveness
+of skirmishers.
+
+
+B. HOW POSTED.
+
+1. They should be always _near enough to the main body to be supported
+by it_, if hard pressed, and also to enable the main body to profit at
+once of any advantage that may have been gained by them.
+
+2. They should _cover the main body_, both in front and in flank, except
+where the ground may render this impracticable or unnecessary; and, in
+defensive positions, they should occupy every point from which the
+enemy's skirmishers might annoy us.
+
+3. In a defensive combat, they should be so posted as to take the
+enemy's attack _in flank_:
+
+(1.) Because their fire will be thus the more destructive; and--
+
+(2.) They will not be exposed to be driven back by the enemy's fire, or
+by his advance.
+
+4. If thrown into an enclosure, they must have _an easy exit_.
+Skirmishers feeling themselves in danger of being cut off, will lose
+somewhat of that coolness which is so essential to their efficiency.
+
+5. They should not be kept stationary _behind a straight line_, as a
+wall, a fence, or a hedge; for this would expose them to enfilade.
+
+6. Skirmishers are only auxiliary to the main force, and are not
+capable, by themselves, of effecting any decisive result. Therefore, in
+order not to exhaust the men, _heavy_ skirmishing lines should not be
+used, except to lead a decided advance, or to repel one.
+
+7. The principle is, to post skirmishers so as to give them the _maximum
+of shelter_, whilst inflicting the _maximum of loss_ on the enemy. This
+applies to the placing of the whole line, and to the separate groups.
+The way skirmishers produce their effect is by sharpshooting, which
+requires calmness; and the more completely sheltered they are, the
+calmer they will be, and the more deadly will be their aim.
+
+
+C. HOW HANDLED.
+
+1. Deploy them _before coming within range of musketry_; for infantry in
+compact order is a good target for the enemy.
+
+2. They should be kept _well in hand_; especially at the moment of
+success, when they are in danger of rushing headlong to destruction.
+
+3. Coming upon the enemy's main body, they should _occupy him in front
+and flank_ till our own main body gets up.
+
+4. Except in urgent cases, never deploy a line of skirmishers _on a
+run_; for this makes them lose breath and calmness, and, with their
+calmness, their accuracy of aim.
+
+So, after deployment, avoid all rapid and violent movements.
+
+5. Skirmishers become exhausted after long firing. The longer they
+continue out, the worse they shoot. Therefore, _relieve them often_.
+
+6. Skirmishers should be accustomed to _lie down_ at a given signal; as
+it is sometimes very important that both our artillery and infantry
+should be able to fire over them.
+
+7. In retreat, skirmishers occupy every favorable point for _holding the
+enemy in check_.
+
+
+D. RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISHERS.
+
+1. In advancing, in retreat, or at a halt, use _every cover_ that
+presents itself.
+
+2. Preserve _the alignment and the intervals_, so far as possible. On
+open ground, this may be done perfectly. In woods, skirmishers should
+never, for a moment, lose sight of each other.
+
+3. The security of the _flanks_ should be looked out for by the men near
+them.
+
+4. Run over _exposed ground_ as quickly as possible.
+
+5. Approach the _crest of a hill_ with great caution.
+
+6. If threatened by _artillery alone_, advance and kill off the men and
+horses before they get into battery. When the pieces have got into
+battery, lie down, if on exposed ground, till they limber up again, and
+then recommence the fire.
+
+7. A skirmisher, with the new rifled arms, ought, at five hundred yards,
+to be _more than a match for a gun_; for, in men and horses, he has a
+much larger target than the gun has in him.
+
+Again, with the new rifle shells, he may be able to blow up a caisson.
+
+8. Neither should a skirmisher have much to fear from a _single
+horseman_. With his bayonet fixed, he would usually be able to defend
+himself successfully against the trooper, whose sabre is the shorter
+weapon of the two; more especially, if he will take care to keep on the
+trooper's left, which is his exposed side.
+
+9. Never lose your calmness. Your power consists, not in rapid firing,
+but in the _accuracy of your aim_. Avoid all hurried and violent
+movements; and never raise your gun till sure of a shot.
+
+10. The aim, according to the Tactics, is made by bringing the gun down,
+instead of raising it up. However little the soldier may be excited, he
+will be apt to pull the trigger more or less too soon; that is, while
+the muzzle is yet too elevated. This is the reason why infantry missiles
+usually _fly too high_. The difficulty would not be obviated by causing
+the aim to be made by raising the piece; for then the same disturbing
+cause already mentioned, the soldier's excitement, would make the shots
+fly as much too low, as they now fly too high.
+
+Rapid firing is another cause of this incompleteness of aim. Infantry
+firing is already too rapid to be effective; so that what is claimed for
+the new breech-loading weapons as an advantage, that they increase the
+rapidity of fire, furnishes, on the contrary, a strong objection to
+them. The effectiveness of the fire of a sharp-shooter, especially, will
+be usually in inverse, instead of direct proportion to the number of
+shots he delivers in a given time.
+
+In view of this, and of the tendency to pull the trigger before the
+muzzle is sufficiently depressed, it has become an established maxim, to
+
+ "Aim low,
+ Fire slow"
+
+
+
+
+TACTICAL USE OF ARTILLERY.
+
+
+The subject will be treated under the following heads:--
+
+ I.--HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE GROUND.
+ II.--HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO OUR OWN TROOPS.
+ III.--HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE ENEMY.
+ IV.--POSTING OF BATTERIES AND PIECES AS BETWEEN THEMSELVES.
+ V.--HOW USED.
+ VI.--ITS FIRE.
+ VII.--ITS SUPPORTS.
+
+
+I.--How posted with respect to the Ground.
+
+1. Artillery has a much longer range than musketry. In order to avail
+ourselves of this advantage, we must so post it as to overlook all the
+ground to which its utmost range extends. It therefore requires _an
+elevated position_.
+
+2. It has been considered an additional advantage of a commanding
+position for artillery, that it enables our guns to cover our infantry,
+attacking or attacked, by _firing over their heads_.
+
+This was done by the French at Waterloo, apparently with great effect.
+But the advantage is a doubtful one; for firing over our own troops,
+especially with cast-shot or shell, is very dangerous to them, and is
+apt to intimidate them. It moreover furnishes to the enemy a double
+target. The shot which miss our troops will be apt to fall among the
+guns behind them; and some of those which do not reach the guns, will
+probably take effect among the troops in front of them.
+
+3. But _very high_ points are unfavorable positions for batteries.
+Batteries so placed would not command the ground immediately below them;
+as guns cannot be depressed to fire below a certain angle without soon
+destroying their carriages. And this would facilitate their capture;
+for, once arrived on the ground near them, the assailants could not be
+injured by their fire. It has been estimated that the slope in front of
+a battery should not exceed one perpendicular to fifteen base.
+
+4. When guns have to be used as a support to other parts of the line,
+which is often the case, their capture might lead to serious
+consequences. They should therefore have the ground clear of all
+obstacles which may _mask their fire_, not only in front, but to their
+right and left.
+
+5. Although the most favorable position for guns is an eminence sloping
+gradually towards the enemy, an _open and level plain_ is by no means an
+unfavorable one; for, on such ground, the enemy will be visible at a
+great distance, and our shot may act by ricochet, which causes more
+destruction than ordinary point-blank firing.
+
+For ricochet, firm and even ground is requisite; on soft or rough ground
+it is not attainable.
+
+6. In enfilading the enemy's position, or in raking his advancing
+columns from head to rear, a _grazing fire_ is the most destructive that
+can be used. This consists of a long succession of ricochets at low
+heights. Where the ground is level and firm, we can obtain this fire at
+a short distance from the enemy; as, on such ground, ricochet shots do
+not rise much. But where the ground is uneven, to obtain such a fire, a
+more distant position will be requisite.
+
+7. _Muddy_ ground is unfavorable for artillery. Over such ground, its
+carriages move slowly, and its fire is less effective. Balls cannot
+ricochet; and shells often sink into the mud, and thus are either
+extinguished or explode with but little effect.
+
+Napoleon depended so much on his artillery at Waterloo that, although
+every moment was precious, he delayed commencing the battle till his
+chief of artillery had reported the ground, which had been covered by a
+soaking rain, to be sufficiently dry for the movements and effectiveness
+of that arm. The three hours' delay thus caused, would have sufficed him
+to crush Wellington's army before the arrival of the Prussians.
+
+8. _Stony_ ground is a bad location for a battery; for the enemy's shot
+will scatter the stones around it with more or less fatal effect.
+
+9. _Rough_ or _uneven_ ground immediately in front of a battery is not
+objectionable, as it will stop the enemy's shot.
+
+10. A battery, when it is possible to avoid it, should not be posted
+within musket range of _woods_, _bushes_, _ravines_, _hedges_,
+_ditches_, or other cover from which the enemy's sharpshooters might
+kill off the gunners, or, by a sudden dash, capture the guns.
+
+11. To prevent the enemy from approaching a battery under cover, it
+should be so placed as to be able to sweep all _villages_, _hollows_,
+and _woods_, in front and in flank.
+
+12. In taking up a position, a battery should avail itself of all
+_inequalities of the ground_, for the shelter of its pieces and gunners,
+or of its limbers and caissons, at least.
+
+For the same purpose, a battery posted on an eminence should have its
+pieces some ten paces behind its crest.
+
+13. Where the ground affords no shelter, and where the position of the
+guns is not likely to be changed, it may be worth while to cover them by
+an _epaulement_ or breastwork, some three feet, or more, high.
+
+
+II.--How posted with respect to our own Troops.
+
+1. In order to be ready to support the flanks of our attacking columns,
+and to aid in the defence in every part of the field, batteries should
+be placed at _several different points_ in the line of battle.
+
+2. In a defensive battle especially, as it is uncertain on what point
+the enemy will mass his principal attack, the artillery should usually
+be distributed _through the whole line_.
+
+3. A line of battle has been compared to the _front of a fortification_,
+of which the infantry is the curtain, and the artillery batteries the
+bastions.
+
+4. The _lighter_ guns should be placed on the _salient_ points of our
+line, from which they can be more easily withdrawn; the heavier guns,
+constituting the stationary batteries, on the more retired points.
+
+5. Pieces should not be placed _in prolongation with troops_; for this
+would be giving the enemy a double mark. Artillery posted in front of
+other troops will draw a fire on them. When a battery must be placed in
+front of the line, let the infantry in rear of it clear the ground by
+ploying into double columns.
+
+6. Never place artillery so as to _impede the movements of the other two
+arms_. A battery posted in front of the centre would often hamper the
+movements of the infantry; besides being peculiarly exposed to a
+converging fire from the enemy's batteries.
+
+7. The safest position for a battery is on that wing which is most
+secure from a flank attack.
+
+But guns should re-enforce the weaker points, thus making the enemy
+attack the strongest ones.
+
+Therefore, _where a wing is weak_, place the largest number of guns
+there, to support it. If we have one wing entirely uncovered, of four
+batteries, for instance, we should give three to the uncovered wing.
+
+8. Of the heavy batteries, one, at least, should be placed in the first
+line, so that we may be able to open an effective fire on the enemy at
+the _earliest possible moment_.
+
+9. The prompt use, at the proper moment, of the reserve, may decide the
+battle. The movements of heavy artillery, therefore, are too slow for
+the reserve, which should have most of the light pieces. _Horse
+artillery_ is especially suitable for it.
+
+10. Guns near an infantry square should be posted at its _angles_. If
+the square is charged by cavalry, the gunners run into the square, after
+filling their ammunition pouches, which they take in with them, as well
+as their sponges and other equipments. The limbers and caissons are sent
+to the rear; or, if there is no time to do this, they may be brought
+into the square. If this is impossible, they may be formed into a
+barricade.
+
+At Waterloo, on the French cavalry's retiring from their charges on the
+enemy's squares, the British gunners rushed out from the squares in
+which they had taken refuge, and plied their guns on the retiring
+squadrons.
+
+
+III.--How posted with respect to the Enemy.
+
+1. If the enemy's batteries are concentrated in one position, by placing
+our own batteries properly we may obtain a powerful _cross-fire_ on
+them.
+
+2. It is always advantageous to so dispose our batteries as to take
+those of the enemy _in enfilade_, or obliquely (_en echarpe_, as it is
+called).
+
+At the battle of Murfreesboro', in December, 1862, a rebel battery,
+being taken in enfilade by one of our own, was silenced in about five
+minutes.
+
+3. So, also, if we can obtain an oblique or enfilading fire _on his
+troops_, it will be very destructive. A flanking battery, raking the
+enemy's position, is often enough, of itself, to decide a battle.
+
+Thus, the battle of Chippewa was finally decided by our getting a gun or
+two in a flanking position, enabling us to enfilade the British line.
+
+So, at the battle of Shiloh, the rebels' triumphant advance on the
+evening of the first day was effectually checked by the fire of our
+gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, which had taken an enfilading position
+opposite their right flank.
+
+4. For this reason, we must never post one of our own batteries so that
+the enemy's guns will take it _obliquely_, or _in flank_; unless,
+indeed, by doing so, we may probably obtain some important and decisive
+effect before it can be destroyed, or made unserviceable.
+
+5. Batteries should be so placed as to _command the whole ground in our
+front_, even almost up to our bayonets, and so as to be able to direct
+their fire towards every point; at all events, so that a fire can be
+kept up on the enemy till he is within short musket-range.
+
+It is manifest that the best position for a battery, to enable it to
+effectually cover the entire ground in our front, would not be in our
+line of battle, but in advance of one of its flanks, from which it could
+take the enemy's troops advancing over it, in enfilade.
+
+6. Artillery fire from _an unexpected quarter_ always has a powerful
+moral effect. Two guns, even, hoisted up to a place where the enemy does
+not dream of there being any, may have a decisive effect.
+
+
+IV.--Posting of Batteries and of Pieces as between themselves.
+
+1. The best mode of posting batteries is in the form of a crescent, its
+horns pointing towards the enemy, or forming the sides of a re-entering
+angle; for this gives a _convergent fire_ to the enemy's divergent one.
+
+Its inconvenience is, the exposure of its flanks to attack, or to
+enfilade. Therefore, when such a position is adopted, its flanks must be
+protected by natural obstacles or by artificial defences.
+
+2. Batteries, or parts of batteries, should be at _supporting distances_
+from each other; that is, not over six hundred yards apart, so as to
+effectually cover the whole ground between them, in case of need, with
+grape and canister. When rifled guns are used, this distance may be
+increased.
+
+3. _A long line of guns_ in our line of battle is objectionable; for, if
+it should become necessary to withdraw them, they would leave a
+dangerous interval.
+
+4. It is dangerous to collect _a great many pieces in one battery_,
+especially in the beginning of an action, when the enemy is fresh, for
+it strongly tempts him to capture it. When used, such a battery should
+have powerful supports to protect it, or should be sheltered by a
+village, a defile, or other cover, occupied beforehand.
+
+5. Although, to be used offensively, guns should be in strong masses, in
+order to strike a decisive blow on some single point; this is by no
+means the case when _used defensively_; for,
+
+(1.) It is only when guns are more or less scattered over different
+parts of the field, that they can be made to give a cross-fire on the
+enemy's advancing columns, or on any part of his line.
+
+(2.) If the position where they are massed does not happen to be
+attacked, they become useless, while stripping the rest of the line.
+
+(3.) If they are captured, all the artillery is lost at once, as
+happened to the Austrians at the battle of Leuthen, causing their
+defeat.
+
+6. A certain number of pieces of horse-artillery must always be _kept in
+reserve_, so that, if an artillery fire at any point should be suddenly
+wanted, it may be furnished with the least possible delay.
+
+7. Guns of _various calibres_ should never be in the same battery, to
+prevent confusion as to the respective ranges, and in the supply of
+their ammunition.
+
+8. An independent section or battery should never consist of _howitzers
+alone_, for the proper fire of these pieces is too slow to be effective
+in repulsing an attack on them.
+
+9. There should always be _wide intervals_ between the pieces; otherwise
+the battery would offer too good a mark to the enemy.
+
+
+V.--How used.
+
+First, GENERALLY.
+Secondly, IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT.
+Thirdly, IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT.
+Fourthly, AGAINST INFANTRY.
+Fifthly, AGAINST CAVALRY.
+Lastly, AGAINST ARTILLERY.
+
+
+A. GENERALLY.
+
+1. So far as is possible, guns should be kept _hidden from the enemy_
+till the moment of opening on him. They may be masked by the ground, or
+other cover, natural or artificial, or by troops placed in front of
+them. The surprise will add much to their effect. Moreover, concealed,
+they will be less exposed to be taken. Nothing discourages troops more
+than the loss of a battery at the beginning of an action.
+
+2. A desultory and indiscriminate artillery fire will accomplish
+nothing. To effect any thing important, it must be _concentrated on some
+object_; and the fire must be persevered in till the desired effect has
+been produced.
+
+3. It is a general principle that artillery should not reply to the
+enemy's batteries, unless compelled to by their effect on our own
+troops. To obtain the most decisive effects from artillery fire, it
+should be directed _on the enemy's troops_, instead of his guns.
+
+4. If it should become advisable to silence one of his batteries, it
+will be done more promptly and effectually by the employment, for this
+purpose, of _two_ of our own batteries, than of a single one.
+
+5. There is usually great advantage in keeping our batteries constantly
+_shifting their position_; for then--
+
+(1.) They have the effect of a surprise, by opening on the enemy at
+some unexpected point.
+
+(2.) They make the enemy believe our guns to be more numerous than they
+really are.
+
+(3.) They are in less danger of being captured.
+
+But these changes of position are attended with this inconvenience, that
+they expose the horses to be taken in flank by the enemy's batteries and
+sharpshooters.
+
+6. The movements of a battery in the field should be _as rapid as
+possible_; for, while moving, it is helpless and exposed.
+
+Moreover, celerity of movement and accuracy of fire will often more than
+compensate for inferiority in the number of guns; as was the case at the
+battle of Palo Alto, in the Mexican War, where the enemy's guns
+outnumbered ours two to one.
+
+
+B. IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT.
+
+1. When used to _prepare for an attack_ of infantry or cavalry,
+artillery concentrates as much fire as possible on the point where the
+attack is to be made, in order to overcome the resistance there, and
+thus make success easy.
+
+2. When there are several points on which our fire should be directed,
+we must not batter them all at once, but concentrate our whole fire on
+them _in succession_.
+
+3. In attack, artillery should _not be split up_ among different
+brigades or divisions; else no decisive result can be expected from it.
+Whole batteries, used together, will have a more telling effect than if
+scattered over the field in separate sections.
+
+In no case should less than two pieces be used together; for, while one
+piece is being loaded, the piece and its gunners need the protection of
+another one ready to be discharged.
+
+4. Pieces in support of an infantry column of attack should never be in
+its rear, but _on its flanks_, near its head, in which position it will
+best encourage the infantry. But if a battery have already a position
+from which it can afford to the attack effective assistance, it should
+remain in it; sending a few pieces to accompany the infantry, which
+always greatly values artillery support.
+
+5. Powerful effects may be produced by the _sudden assemblage of a great
+number of guns_ on some particular point. This was a favorite
+manoeuvre of Napoleon; who, by his rapid concentration of immense
+batteries of light artillery on the important point, usually obtained
+the most decisive results. At Wagram, for instance, when Macdonald's
+column was ready to make its great charge on the Austrian centre,
+Napoleon suddenly massed one hundred guns in front of his own centre,
+and made it advance in double column at a trot, then deploy into line on
+the leading section, and concentrate its fire on the villages forming
+the keys to the enemy's position, in front of his right and left wings
+respectively; each battery opening its fire on arriving at half-range
+distance. The effect was overwhelming.
+
+6. The _nearer_ artillery delivers its fire, the more powerful, of
+course, are its effects. Horse artillery, in sufficient strength,
+attacking the enemy at short grape-shot distance, say within three
+hundred or four hundred yards, may lose half its pieces, but with the
+other half it will probably decide the battle at that point.
+
+At Palo Alto, Duncan's rapid closing with his guns to less than half
+range, drove back the Mexican right wing, which could not stand the
+destructive fire.
+
+7. _Horse artillery_ does not usually attempt to follow up cavalry in
+its attack; but takes a position to cover its retreat, if repulsed, or
+to push forward in support, in case of success.
+
+8. When cavalry has to _debouch from a defile_, horse artillery may
+render it most effectual assistance, by taking a position that will
+enable the cavalry to form without fear of being charged and destroyed
+while forming.
+
+
+C. IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT.
+
+1. Artillery should always reserve its fire till the enemy's _real
+attack_.
+
+2. It should play on that portion of the hostile force that _threatens
+us most_.
+
+3. It should wait till the enemy has come within _destructive distance_,
+and then open on his columns with a concentrated fire.
+
+4. It should protect our troops _while manoeuvring_, and accompany
+them in retreat.
+
+5. We must _subdivide our batteries_ whenever we wish to obtain
+cross-fires on a _debouche_, or on the head of an advancing column, or
+on the ground in front of a weak part of our line. By so doing, we
+compel the enemy to divide his own artillery in order to reply to our
+fire.
+
+6. A _sudden concentration_ of a great number of guns at some particular
+point may be used with the same decisive effect in a defensive, as in
+an offensive battle; though in this case, artillery plays, for the time
+being, a part strictly offensive.
+
+At the battle of Friedland, where the French were attacked by the
+Russians in overwhelming numbers, Ney's corps was driven back by a
+terrific concentrated fire, in front and in flank, from the Russian
+batteries on the opposite side of the river; its own artillery being too
+feeble to stand before them. Seeing this, Napoleon instantly ordered all
+the guns of the different divisions of the corps next to Ney's, on the
+left, to be united and thrown in one mass in front of Ney's corps.
+Taking post at some hundred paces in front, these batteries, by their
+powerful fire, soon silenced the Russian batteries; then advancing on
+the Russian troops that had crossed the river to within grape-shot
+range, they made frightful havoc in their deep masses. The French
+infantry, profiting by this, rushed forward and captured the village of
+Friedland, driving the enemy in their front over the bridges, which they
+then burned. This was decisive of the battle; for the whole Russian army
+was then driven into the river.
+
+So, at the battle of Kunersdorff, in 1759, after Frederick's left and
+centre had driven the Russians, and captured seventy guns and many
+prisoners, Soltikoff promptly massed the whole artillery of his right
+wing at a single point behind a ravine, which, by its concentrated fire,
+swept away the flower of the Prussian army in their efforts to force its
+passage; and Frederick was badly defeated.
+
+7. When compelled to retreat, guns should _retire successively_, in
+echelons of batteries, half-batteries, or sections, in order that the
+fire of one may cover the limbering up and retreat of another.
+
+Besides the mutual support thereby afforded, these successive
+face-abouts of artillery have a powerful moral effect on the pursuing
+enemy, already more or less disorganized by success.
+
+It would be well for some pieces in each echelon to be kept loaded with
+canister, so as to drive the enemy back if he should press very close.
+
+8. The protection afforded by artillery in retreat is very powerful, as
+it keeps the enemy constantly _at a distance_.
+
+A fine example of the use of it for this purpose occurred just before
+the battle of Pea Ridge, in March, 1862. A rear-guard of six hundred
+men, under General Sigel, was retreating before a force of four
+regiments of infantry and cavalry, that followed and attacked it on
+every side. Sigel disposed his guns in echelons, the one of which
+nearest the enemy played on his attacking squadrons with grape and
+shell, which suddenly checked them. Instantly profiting by their
+temporary hesitation, the echelon limbered up and galloped away to
+another position, while the next echelon, again checking the enemy by
+its fire, followed its example. By this means, Sigel, cutting his way
+through a vastly superior force, succeeded, after a retreat of ten
+miles, in rejoining the main body with but trifling loss.
+
+9. If driven to the last extremity, the gunners should try, at least, to
+_save the horses_, and to blow up the caissons they have to abandon.
+
+At the battle of La Rothiere, in 1814, where Napoleon, with thirty-two
+thousand men, was overwhelmed by one hundred thousand Allies, and was
+obliged to leave fifty guns on the field, he succeeded in bringing off
+all his gunners and horses.
+
+
+D. AGAINST INFANTRY.
+
+1. It is an important rule that artillery should play on the enemy's
+_troops_, without attending to his batteries, except in urgent cases.
+
+2. Against a _deployed line_, whether marching by the front or by a
+flank, case-shot, that is, grape, canister, and spherical case
+(sometimes called _shrapnel_), are most suitable; as these all scatter,
+right and left, to a considerable distance.
+
+The best effect of canister is within two hundred yards. Beyond three
+hundred and fifty yards, it should not be used.
+
+The best effect of grape is within four hundred yards. Over six hundred
+yards, it is not very effective.
+
+Spherical case is effective at much greater distances, its range being
+nearly equal to that of solid shot.
+
+Against a line of infantry at a greater distance than six hundred yards,
+spherical case should be used, chiefly, if not exclusively; as being
+more likely to be effective than ball.
+
+3. But case-shot are _unsuitable against a column_, as they consist of a
+number of small balls which have not momentum enough to penetrate into
+it to any depth. When the enemy advances in columns, solid shot should
+plough through them from head to rear, a cross-fire being obtained upon
+them when possible.
+
+4. Especially should _round-shot_ be used against a close column rushing
+to attack us through a defile. Grape and canister might sweep down the
+leading ranks, but the mass of the column sees not the destructive
+effect; and being carried forward by the pressure of the ranks behind,
+continues to rush on till the battery is carried, though with more or
+less loss.
+
+At the battle of Seven Pines, on one occasion, when the rebels were
+advancing in close columns, they were plied with grape and canister from
+two of our batteries with but little effect. Every discharge made wide
+gaps in their leading ranks, but these were instantly filled again, and
+the columns pressed on.
+
+A round-shot, on the other hand, comes shrieking and tearing its way
+through the entire column, carrying destruction to the very rear-most
+ranks. The hesitation produced is not limited to the leading ranks, but
+extends throughout the column. Thus both the actual and the moral effect
+of ball on a close column is much superior to that of grape or canister.
+
+At the bridge of Lodi, the Austrian gunners plied the French column
+with grape. If they had used round-shot instead, it is doubtful whether
+Bonaparte would have succeeded in carrying the bridge.
+
+5. But a direct fire with ball on the head of a column of attack would
+be much assisted by the fire of a few light pieces taking it _in flank_.
+And, for this fire in flank, case-shot would be powerfully effective;
+for, from their wide scattering, both their actual and their moral
+effects would extend through the whole column, from front to rear.
+
+6. A battery with _guns enough to keep up a continuous fire_ has little
+to fear from an open attack on it by infantry alone. Napoleon observed
+that no infantry, without artillery, can march one thousand yards on a
+battery of sixteen guns, well directed and served; for, before clearing
+two-thirds of the way, they will have been all killed, wounded, or
+dispersed.
+
+This remark was made in reference to smooth-bore guns; the new rifled
+guns should be still more destructive.
+
+7. _Against skirmishers_, as they offer but a poor mark for ball, grape
+and canister should alone be used.
+
+E. AGAINST CAVALRY.
+
+1. The ground round a battery should be so obstructed as to _prevent the
+enemy's cavalry from closing on it_; but in the case of a light battery,
+intended for manoeuvre, so far only as this can be done without
+impeding the movements of the battery itself.
+
+2. On being threatened by cavalry, a light battery may sometimes
+promptly change its position to one where the cavalry would attack it
+_at great disadvantage_. For instance, if posted on an eminence, and
+cavalry should attempt to carry it by charging up the slope, instead of
+awaiting the charge in a position which would allow the cavalry to
+recover breath, and form on the height, it might run its pieces forward
+to the very brow of the slope, where the cavalry, having lost their
+impetus, and with their horses blown, would be nearly helpless and
+easily repulsed.
+
+3. At a distance, the most effective fire on cavalry is with
+_howitzers_, on account of the terror and confusion caused among the
+horses by the bursting of the shells.
+
+On the cavalry's flanks, when within four hundred or five hundred
+yards, the fire with grape would be most effective.
+
+4. The _last discharge_ should be of canister alone, and made by all the
+pieces at once, when the battery should be swiftly withdrawn.
+
+5. If the cavalry succeed in reaching the pieces before their
+withdrawal, the gunners may find temporary refuge _under the carriages_.
+
+
+F. AGAINST ARTILLERY.
+
+1. As guns in the field should generally play on troops instead of
+batteries, there should be a _reserve of horse artillery_ to take the
+enemy's batteries in flank, in case of need, as well as for other
+purposes.
+
+2. Though the ordinary use of artillery is against infantry and cavalry
+only, special circumstances may render it expedient that a certain
+portion of it should _respond to the enemy's batteries_. In this case,
+not over one-third should be used for that purpose.
+
+3. When we have _guns in abundance_, it might be sometimes advisable, by
+using several batteries at once, to silence the enemy's guns, before
+beginning to play on his troops.
+
+4. Artillery properly plays on the enemy's _guns_--
+
+(1.) At the moment of their coming into action, for then they are so
+exposed that our fire will be peculiarly effective, and perhaps to such
+a degree as to prevent their opening on us.
+
+(2.) When our troops move forward to attack, in order to draw away from
+them the fire of the enemy's batteries, or, at least, to render it
+unsteady, inaccurate, and ineffective; and
+
+(3.) Generally, when his guns are causing us very great damage.
+
+5. _Against guns_, solid shot or shells only should be used, since they
+alone are capable of inflicting any serious injury on either guns or
+their carriages: solid shot, by their great weight and momentum; shells,
+by their bursting.
+
+But within three hundred or four hundred yards, grape and canister would
+soon destroy the gunners and the horses.
+
+6. Our fire on a hostile battery would not only be very effective when
+it is coming into action, but at all other times _when its flanks are
+exposed_; as in limbering up to move off, or in a flank march. On these
+occasions we should use grape, if near enough; otherwise, spherical case
+would be generally the best.
+
+7. When possible to avoid it, _a field battery should not be opposed to
+a battery of position_, or, generally, a battery of light guns to one
+of heavy guns. For even when the numbers of pieces on the two sides are
+equal, the enemy's superiority in range and in weight of metal would
+give him such advantage in the duel that our own battery would soon be
+destroyed or silenced.
+
+
+VI.--Its Fire.
+
+1. It is important not to commence the fire till our guns are in _sure
+range_--
+
+(1.) Because a harmless fire serves but to embolden the enemy and
+discourage our own troops.
+
+(2.) Because artillery ammunition should never be wasted. The fate of a
+battle will sometimes depend on there being a sufficient supply of it at
+a particular moment.
+
+2. The usual maximum distances at which smooth-bore field guns may open
+fire _with any considerable effect_, are--
+
+ For 12-pounders 1100 yards.
+ For 6 " 750 "
+
+What these distances are in respect to rifled guns, it does not appear
+to be yet definitively settled. The extreme range of the new rifled
+six-pounders is said to be three thousand yards; of the twelve-pounders,
+four thousand five hundred yards.
+
+3. Guns are usually fired _by order_, and not by salvos, or volleys; and
+never as soon as loaded, unless delay be dangerous. Artillery fire is
+formidable only in proportion to its accuracy; and this is attainable
+only by a cool and calculated aim.
+
+4. Artillery fire should never cease _through the whole line at once_.
+This would have a discouraging effect on our own troops, and an
+inspiriting one on the enemy's. Especially must this not be done when we
+are about to execute any manoeuvre; for it would be sure to call the
+enemy's attention to it.
+
+Therefore, if a particular battery has to change its position, it must
+not cease the fire of all its pieces at once; for, besides its
+disquieting effect on our troops, it would notify the enemy of the
+movement.
+
+5. In _covering an attack_, our guns should keep up their fire till the
+moment it would begin to endanger our advancing columns.
+
+6. By a _ricochet_ fire, artillery is said to increase its effect, from
+one-fourth to one-half. It is especially effective in enfilading a line
+of troops, a battery, or the face of a work taken in flank.
+
+Ricochet shots have also great moral effect.
+
+7. When used against _breastworks of rails or logs of wood_, guns should
+be fired with moderate or shattering charges; so as more surely to
+demolish them, and, at the same time, to increase the destructive effect
+of the fire by scattering the splinters.
+
+In view of the frequent necessity of battering such defences, and of
+using a ricochet fire, which also requires small charges of powder, it
+would be an improvement in our artillery service to make a certain
+proportion of the ammunition in each gun limber to consist of cartridges
+of half the usual size.
+
+8. In _bombarding a village_ during a battle, if our object be to set
+fire to and destroy it, this will be best accomplished with shells. If
+we wish merely to drive the enemy from it, solid shot from heavy
+calibres will be necessary, which will more surely reach and destroy his
+troops, wherever they may show themselves.
+
+9. The _moral effect_, both of solid shot and of shells, is much greater
+than that of grape or other case-shot, from their more fearful effects
+on the human frame, and from the great number of men that a single ball
+or shell will kill or fatally wound. One twelve-pound solid shot has
+been known to kill forty-two men, who happened to be exactly in its
+range.
+
+10. _Ball and shell_ should be used--
+
+(1.) When the enemy is at a distance.
+(2.) When he is in mass.
+(3.) When he is in several lines.
+(4.) When his line may be enfiladed.
+
+11. In _silencing a battery_, our fire should be concentrated on one
+piece at a time, while some of our guns throw spherical case, from a
+raking position, if possible, on the gunners.
+
+12. Though grape has a much less range than ball, yet _within four
+hundred yards_, on account of its scattering, its effect is superior to
+it.
+
+The fire of guns double shotted with ball and a stand of grape, is
+fearfully destructive when used at a short distance to repel a charge.
+
+13. It is artillerymen's point of honor _not to abandon their pieces
+till the last extremity_. They should always remember that when the
+enemy is closing on them, the last discharge will be the most
+destructive of all, and may suffice to repulse the attack and turn the
+tide of battle.
+
+In our attack on Quebec, in our War of Independence, on the near
+approach of our assaulting column, the British gunners fled from their
+pieces; but the one who fled last, before leaving, discharged his gun,
+which was loaded with grape. The discharge killed and wounded several of
+our men; among them the brave General Montgomery, who was leading the
+column in person. The effect was decisive. The assailants fell back,
+panic-struck at the loss of their commander; and our attack failed.
+
+14. To prevent our own captured pieces from being turned on us by the
+enemy, it is the artillerymen's last duty, when it has become evident
+that the guns cannot be saved, to _spike_ them. The operation requiring
+but a few moments, it can rarely be omitted without disgrace.
+
+
+VII.--Its Supports.
+
+1. Artillery must always be protected from the _melee_, in which it is
+helpless whether against infantry or cavalry; and should therefore have
+a strong _support_.
+
+2. A portion, at least, of every artillery support, should consist of
+_sharpshooters_, whose fire will be the most effective in driving off
+skirmishers sent forward to threaten or attack the guns, or to pick off
+the gunners.
+
+3. Batteries must be secured _on both flanks_, and their supports will
+be posted with that view; on one or on both flanks, according to
+circumstances, and more or less retired.
+
+4. A support should never be directly _in rear_ of the battery, where it
+would be in danger, not only of receiving the shots aimed at the
+battery, but also of killing the gunners belonging to it, as has
+repeatedly happened during the late war.
+
+5. A battery and its support owe each other _mutual protection_.
+Therefore, when an infantry support, after holding the enemy in check,
+to enable the battery to limber up and retire, is obliged, in its turn,
+to retreat, the battery should take such a position as will enable it to
+cover the retreat by its fire.
+
+6. A battery consisting of any considerable number of pieces may be
+able, sometimes, to _dispense with a support_.
+
+During the battle of Ucles, in Spain, in 1809, the French artillery,
+under General Senarmont, had been left behind, owing to the badness of
+the roads. The Spaniards came down upon it in large force. On their
+approach, the guns were formed in square, and, by their fire on every
+side, defended themselves successfully, and finally repulsed the enemy.
+
+So, at Leipsic, in 1813, when the grand battery of the Guard, which had
+been left temporarily without a support, was charged by the Russian
+hussars and Cossacks, Drouot, its commander, rapidly drew back its
+flanks till they nearly met; and the cavalry were soon repulsed by its
+fire.
+
+7. At the battle of Hanau, in 1813, Drouot's eighty guns were charged by
+the Allied cavalry. Having no supports, he placed his gunners in front
+of them with their carbines. This checked the cavalry, who were then
+covered with grape, which drove them back to their lines.
+
+Ought not our gunners also to have _carbines slung on their backs_ for
+such emergencies? Against infantry, our guns would often need no other
+support. The carbines could be used to reply to the enemy's skirmishers;
+and the example just cited shows that, thus equipped, artillerymen may
+sometimes successfully defend their pieces even against cavalry.
+
+
+
+
+TACTICAL USE OF CAVALRY.
+
+
+We shall consider--
+
+ I.--ITS FORMATIONS.
+ II.--ITS STRONG AND ITS WEAK POINTS.
+ III.--HOW IT IS POSTED.
+ IV.--ITS SUPPORTS.
+ V.--HOW IT IS USED.
+ VI.--HOW IT FIGHTS.
+ VII.--ITS CHARGE.
+VIII.--ITS ATTACK ON INFANTRY.
+
+And shall conclude with some--
+
+IX.--GENERAL REMARKS.
+
+
+I.--Its Formations.
+
+1. The _formations_ of cavalry for battle are either--
+
+(1.) In deployed lines.
+(2.) Lines of regiments, in columns of attack doubled on the centre.
+(3.) A mixed formation of lines and columns.
+(4.) Echelons of lines or columns; or--
+(5.) Deep columns.
+
+2. _Deployed lines_ are not objectionable in principle. They are often
+not advisable; but are sometimes necessary.
+
+But long, continuous lines should always be avoided; being unfavorable
+to rapid manoeuvring, which cavalry is constantly called upon to
+execute in the field.
+
+3. Cavalry has, in its horses, an unreasoning element, which is not
+controllable, like men; and is therefore much more easily thrown into
+disorder than infantry. For this reason, when deployed, it should always
+be _in two lines_; the second behind the first; the first line deployed,
+and the second in columns of squadrons by platoons. There should be also
+a reserve at a few hundred paces behind the second line.
+
+The second line should be near enough to the first to be able to support
+it, if checked; but not so near as to partake in its disorder, if
+repulsed.
+
+4. Cavalry should be always _in column_ when expecting to manoeuvre,
+or to be called on to make any rapid movement; this being the formation
+best adapted for celerity.
+
+5. Cavalry deploys _in lines_--
+
+(1.) When preparing for a charge in line.
+
+(2.) When preparing for any attack requiring the utmost possible width
+of front; as where the enemy is to be suddenly surrounded.
+
+(3.) When it becomes necessary in order to prevent our troops from being
+outflanked by the enemy's.
+
+(4.) When exposed to continued artillery fire, which is much less
+destructive on a line than on a column.
+
+6. Cavalry should always present _a front at least equal to the
+enemy's_; otherwise, its flank, which is cavalry's weak point, will be
+exposed to attack. When inferior in numbers, we may extend our line by
+leaving intervals, more or less wide, between its different corps. Any
+hostile squadrons that may attempt to pass through these intervals to
+take the line in rear, could be taken care of by the second line.
+
+7. The best formation in respect to _mobility_ is a line of regiments in
+columns by squadrons, doubled on the centre; corresponding to infantry
+double columns.
+
+8. The _mixed formation_ of lines and columns is more manageable than
+simple lines. Which of these two is preferable depends upon the ground,
+and upon all the other circumstances of the case.
+
+9. The order _in echelons_ is as good in attack as in retreat; since the
+echelons mutually support each other.
+
+10. Decidedly the most objectionable of all cavalry formations is that
+in _deep columns_:
+
+(1.) From the almost entire loss which it involves of its sabres, which
+are cavalry's peculiar and most effective weapon.
+
+(2.) From the long flanks which it exposes to attack.
+
+11. The formation in _one rank_, instead of two, has been introduced by
+the new Cavalry Tactics, though it has been as yet but partially adopted
+in the field.
+
+This innovation has two advantages. It doubles the number of sabres to
+be used against the enemy; and it enables the cavalry to cover double
+the ground; thus doubling, also, its power to outflank, which is a
+valuable advantage, especially when opposed to cavalry.
+
+Its disadvantage is, that it must, more or less seriously, impair the
+solidity and vigor of the cavalry charge proper; in which a whole line,
+with "boot to boot" compactness, comes at once to the shock, like some
+terrific mechanical engine; and in which the riders in the front rank
+are compelled to dash on with full speed to the last; knowing that if
+they slacken rein, even for a moment, they would be ridden over by the
+rear-rank men one yard behind them. From there being no rear-rank to
+fill up the gaps caused, during the charge, by the enemy's missiles, or
+by casualties occasioned by obstacles of the ground, the charging line
+must generally arrive on the enemy broken and disunited, or as foragers.
+The moral effect of such a charge on our own men will be unfavorable, as
+they will not realize the certainty of mutual support at the critical
+moment; and its moral effect on the enemy must be decidedly inferior to
+that produced by a charge that is at once swift, solid, and compact.
+
+But the force of this objection is somewhat weakened, by the
+consideration that the compact charge of "cavalry of the line" must
+hereafter be comparatively rare, in consequence of the introduction of
+rifled artillery and infantry weapons, with their greatly increased
+accuracy and range; which ought to cause such slaughter in a line or
+column of charging cavalry, that, if it arrive at all to the shock, it
+would generally be only in scattered groups.
+
+12. In advancing over wooded, or other obstructed ground, it may be
+necessary to break the line into _company columns of fours_, as in the
+infantry manoeuvre of advancing by the flanks of companies.
+
+As the cavalry column of fours corresponds to the march of infantry by
+the flank, the use of this formation in action is open to the same
+objections that have been already pointed out as applying to flank
+marches by infantry.
+
+
+II.--Its Strong and its Weak Points.
+
+1. The value of cavalry on the battle-field consists chiefly in its
+velocity and mobility. Its strength is in the _sabre-point and spurs_.
+
+2. Its charge is accompanied with a _powerful moral effect_, especially
+upon inexperienced troops. But,
+
+3. Cavalry has but _little solidity_, and cannot defend a position
+against good infantry. For, if it remain passive on the ground it is to
+hold, the infantry will soon destroy it by its fire, to which it cannot,
+with any effect, reply; and if it attack at close quarters, the
+infantry, by means of its defensive formations, will be able, at least,
+to hold its ground, and probably repulse its charges by a reserved
+fire. So that the cavalry will finally have no alternative but to
+retire.
+
+4. It is exposed and helpless _during a change of formation_; like
+artillery limbering up, or coming into action.
+
+5. _On its flanks_, it is the weakest of all arms. A single squadron
+attacking it suddenly in flank, will break and rout cavalry of ten times
+its number.
+
+At the battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon kept a few squadrons in rear of
+either flank, which, on his line being charged by a formidable body of
+Mamelukes, vastly superior to his own cavalry in numbers, horses, and
+equipments, nevertheless suddenly fell on their flanks and destroyed
+them.
+
+6. Cavalry is never so weak as directly _after a successful charge_;
+being then exhausted, and in more or less disorder.
+
+
+III.--How Posted.
+
+1. A part of our cavalry must be so posted as to _secure our flanks_;
+remaining in column behind the wings, till the enemy's movements require
+its deployment.
+
+If one wing is covered by natural obstacles, give the cavalry to the
+uncovered wing; posting it in rear of the flank battalion of the second
+line.
+
+2. When cavalry is posted on the flanks, it should _not usually be on
+the first line of infantry_. If it is to be used for attack, it is
+better to keep it retired from view till the last moment, in order to
+strengthen its attack by the powerful moral effect of a surprise. And,
+used defensively, it will be best posted on the flanks of the second
+line; since, in advancing to charge, it must have a clear space in its
+front of at least two hundred or three hundred yards, to enable it to
+act with freedom and vigor.
+
+3. But if a position can be found for cavalry in front, where it would
+not be too much exposed, this may sometimes enable it to exercise an
+important moral effect, by _threatening the flank_ of such of the
+enemy's troops as may be sent forward to attack.
+
+At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, the Wurtemburg cavalry was launched
+against Blucher's Prussian cavalry. But, seeing the Prussians drawn up
+not only in front, but opposite their flank, they lost confidence,
+charged feebly, and too late. They were consequently repulsed and
+driven back on the Marine Battalion, which they threw into confusion.
+
+So, at the battle of Prairie Grove, in December, 1862, the First Iowa
+Cavalry, which was held in reserve, by its mere presence, caused every
+attempt of the rebels' flanking regiments to be abandoned.
+
+4. In order not to impede the manoeuvres of the infantry, cavalry
+should not _fill intervals_ in the lines, or be placed between the
+lines.
+
+It is dangerous when the ground is such as to require the cavalry in the
+centre of the first line; for, if it is beaten, a gap is left through
+which the enemy may penetrate. At the battle of Blenheim, in 1704,
+Marlborough owed his victory, in great measure, to the Allies' forcing
+back the cavalry forming the centre of the French army; thus turning the
+whole of its right wing, and compelling the infantry posted at Blenheim
+to surrender.
+
+5. Yet cavalry should always be near enough to the infantry to take
+immediate part in the combat; and although it should not be posted in
+the intervals between infantry corps, it may _debouch through them_, in
+order to attack more promptly.
+
+At the battle of Friedland, the Russian cavalry charged a French
+infantry division. Latour Maubourg's dragoons and the Dutch cuirassiers,
+riding through the battalion intervals, charged the Russians in turn,
+and drove them back on their infantry, throwing many of them into the
+river.
+
+6. When _both wings are uncovered_, the best place for the cavalry will
+usually be in rear of the centre of the second line; whence it can be
+sent in the shortest time to either wing.
+
+7. Cavalry should not be _scattered over the field_ in small
+detachments, but be kept massed at one or more suitable points; as
+behind the centre, or behind one wing, or both wings. A small cavalry
+force should be kept entire; or it will have very little chance of
+effecting any thing whatever.
+
+Cavalry of the line, to produce its decisive effects, must be used in
+heavy masses. In the beginning of the Napoleonic wars, the French
+cavalry was distributed among the divisions. Napoleon's subsequent
+experience led him to give it more concentration, by uniting in one mass
+all the cavalry belonging to each army corps; and, finally, these masses
+were again concentrated into independent cavalry corps; leaving to each
+army corps only cavalry enough to guard it.
+
+8. For tactical operations in the field, cavalry insufficient in number
+is _scarcely better than none at all_, as it can never show itself in
+presence of the enemy's cavalry, which would immediately outflank and
+destroy it, and must keep close behind its infantry.
+
+At the opening of Napoleon's campaign of 1813, he had but very little
+cavalry to oppose to the overwhelming masses of this arm possessed by
+the Allies. In consequence of this, he could make no use of it whatever;
+and the tactical results of the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen were far
+inferior to those habitually obtained in his former victories, and were
+purchased with much greater loss.
+
+9. Small bodies of cavalry threatened by the enemy's cavalry in greatly
+superior force, may sometimes be saved by taking refuge _in an infantry
+square_, as practised by Napoleon at the battle of the Pyramids.
+
+10. Cavalry should _remain masked_ as long as possible; for it produces
+most effect when its position and movements are hidden, so that a strong
+force may suddenly be brought upon a weak point.
+
+For this reason, a flat, open country is less favorable for this arm
+than plains with undulations, hills with gentle slopes, woods,
+villages, and farms; all these being so many facilities for screening
+cavalry from view.
+
+11. Cavalry should never be brought to the front, _except to engage_. It
+is unfortunate when the ground is such as to prevent this; for cavalry,
+compelled to remain inactive under fire, is in great danger of becoming
+demoralized.
+
+12. As to the _ground_:
+
+(1.) Cavalry must not rest its flank on a wood, a village, or other
+cover for an enemy, till it has been occupied by our own troops. If
+compelled to do so, it should send out patrols to reconnoitre and
+observe. Its position is no longer tenable from the moment the enemy
+appears within striking distance on its flank.
+
+(2.) It must not be posted on the very ground it is to defend, but in
+rear of it; as it acts effectively only by its charge.
+
+Attacking cavalry must have favorable ground in front; defending
+cavalry, in rear. An obstacle in either case may be fatal.
+
+
+IV.--Its Supports.
+
+1. The flanks of cavalry lines or columns are always exposed. They
+should, therefore, be protected by _supports_ of light cavalry, which
+can act promptly and swiftly. When behind a line, these supports should
+be usually in open column, so as to be able to wheel, without a moment's
+delay, into line.
+
+2. The _most effectual_ mode of protecting the flank of a line or column
+of cavalry is by means of squadrons in rear, formed in echelons
+extending outwards; as this exposes the enemy's cavalry that may attempt
+to charge the main body in flank to be immediately charged in flank
+themselves; which would be destruction. For this purpose, irregular
+cavalry may be as effective as any other.
+
+3. This cavalry support or reserve behind the flanks may sometimes play
+_an important offensive_ part. The enemy's first line, the instant after
+either making or receiving a charge, is always in greater or less
+disorder; and a vigorous charge then made on it in flank by our own
+flank reserve, would have a decisive effect.
+
+4. Cavalry should never engage without a support or _reserve in rear_,
+not only to guard its flanks, but also to support it when disorganized
+by a successful charge.
+
+5. So, when engaged in _skirmishing order_, being then very much
+exposed, it must always be protected, like infantry skirmishers, by
+supports in close order.
+
+6. It has been already seen that, although cavalry may carry a position,
+it cannot hold it, if attacked by infantry. When used for such a
+purpose, therefore, it should always be accompanied by _an infantry
+support_.
+
+The French cavalry succeeded in carrying the plateau of Quatre Bras;
+but, having no infantry with it to reply to the terrible fire of the
+Allied infantry from the surrounding houses, it was compelled to retire,
+and yield it again to the enemy.
+
+According to Wellington, Napoleon frequently used his cavalry in seizing
+positions, which were then immediately occupied by infantry or
+artillery.
+
+
+V.--How Used.
+
+1. Cavalry generally manoeuvres _at a trot_. At a gallop, disorder is
+apt to take place, and exhaustion of strength that will be needed in the
+charge.
+
+2. The ordinary use of cavalry is to follow up infantry attacks and
+complete their success. It should never be sent _against fresh
+infantry_; and should generally, therefore, be reserved until towards
+the last of the action.
+
+Napoleon, who, by concentrating his cavalry into considerable masses,
+had enabled himself to use it on the battle-field as a principal arm,
+sometimes produced great effects by heavy cavalry charges at the very
+beginning of the action.
+
+But, though Napoleon's splendidly trained heavy cavalry might sometimes
+break a well-disciplined infantry without any preparatory artillery
+fire, it would be dangerous to attempt this with cavalry inferior to it
+in solidity; and the new rifled weapons would seem to render the cavalry
+charges of his day no longer practicable.
+
+3. Cavalry _may_ be hurled against the enemy's infantry--
+
+(1.) When it has been a long time engaged, and therefore exhausted.
+
+(2.) When it has been shattered by artillery.
+
+And _always should_ be--
+
+(1.) When it is manoeuvring.
+
+(2.) When the attack would be a surprise.
+
+(3.) When its ranks begin to waver, or when it manifests any unequivocal
+symptom of hesitation or intimidation.
+
+In the three latter cases, success will usually be certain; in the two
+former ones, quite probable: but, in most other cases, a cavalry charge
+will succeed, perhaps, only one time in ten.
+
+4. The chief duties of cavalry in a _defensive_ battle are--
+
+(1.) To watch the enemy's cavalry, to prevent its surprising our
+infantry.
+
+(2.) To guard our troops from being outflanked.
+
+(3.) To defend our infantry and artillery while manoeuvring.
+
+(4.) To be ready to charge the enemy the instant his attack on our
+troops is repulsed.
+
+5. _Used offensively_, it must promptly attack--
+
+(1.) The enemy's flanks, if uncovered.
+
+(2.) His infantry, when, from any cause, its attack would probably
+succeed.
+
+(3.) All detachments thrown forward without support.
+
+6. When cavalry has routed cavalry, the victorious squadrons should at
+once charge in flank _the infantry protected by the cavalry just
+beaten_. The great Conde, when only twenty-two years of age, by this
+means, won the victory of Rocroi.
+
+7. Deployed as skirmishers, by their noise, dust, and smoke, cavalry may
+furnish a good _screen_ for our movements.
+
+8. Cavalry skirmishers _scout their corps_, to prevent the enemy
+reconnoitring it too closely.
+
+9. When a cavalry rear-guard has to defend, temporarily, a defile, a
+bridge, or a barricade, a part should _dismount_, and use their carbines
+till the rest are safe.
+
+So, a cavalry vanguard, by its fire, dismounted, may prevent the enemy
+from destroying a bridge.
+
+In these, and in similar cases, the cavalrymen should habitually
+dismount, in order to render their fire effective; acting and
+manoeuvring as skirmishers.
+
+
+VI.--How it Fights.
+
+1. The success of cavalry in battle depends on the _impetuosity of its
+charge_, and its _use of the sabre_. When deployed as skirmishers,
+mounted or dismounted, its proper weapon is the carbine or pistol; and
+in individual combats, these weapons may occasionally be very useful.
+But when acting as cavalry proper, in any compact formation, it must
+rely on the sabre. The aim with a pistol or carbine in the hands of a
+mounted man is so unsteady, that the fire of a line of cavalry is
+generally ineffective; and there are few occasions where it should be
+resorted to. When cavalry has learned to realize that these are not its
+true arms, and that it is never really formidable but when it closes
+with the enemy at full speed and with uplifted sabre, it has acquired
+the most important element of its efficiency.
+
+2. Cavalry should, therefore, not fight _in columns_, as most of its
+sabres would thereby become useless. But if a facing about to retreat is
+feared, an attack in column would prevent it. It is said, also, that a
+column is more imposing than a line. If so, it might have a greater
+moral effect on the enemy.
+
+3. When cavalry are deployed as skirmishers, as a curtain to hide our
+movements, they should be _in considerable number_, with small
+intervals, and should make as much noise, and smoke, and dust as
+possible. When the charge is sounded, the skirmishers wait and fall in
+with the rest.
+
+4. The great rule in cavalry combats is to _cover our own flanks_, and
+_gain the enemy's_; for these are his and our weakest points.
+
+5. When the enemy's cavalry is already in full charge on our infantry,
+it is too late for our cavalry to charge it with much prospect of
+success. In such a case, it would be better to defer our own charge till
+the moment that the enemy's _is completed_; for our success then would
+be certain.
+
+6. Cavalry attacks cavalry _in line_, in order to have the more sabres,
+and, if possible, to outflank the enemy.
+
+7. If we can manoeuvre so as to attack the enemy's cavalry _in flank_,
+our success will be certain.
+
+Military history affords hundreds of instances in proof of this
+proposition. At one of the battles in Spain, for example, in 1809,
+fifteen hundred French horse, by charging four thousand Spanish cavalry
+in flank, completely cut it in pieces.
+
+8. Cavalry _never waits in position_ to be charged by cavalry. Its only
+safety is in meeting the charge with a violent gallop; it would
+otherwise be sure to be overthrown.
+
+When hostile cavalries thus meet each other, there is usually but small
+loss on either side. A certain number of troopers are usually
+dismounted; but the colliding masses somehow ride through each other,
+allowing but little time for the exchange of points and cuts.
+
+Thus cavalry can defend itself against cavalry only by attacking; which
+it must do even when inferior to the enemy in number.
+
+9. To attack artillery, cavalry should be in _three detachments_;
+one-fourth to seize the guns; one-half to charge the supports; and the
+other fourth as a reserve.
+
+The first party attacks in dispersed order, as foragers, trying to gain
+the flanks of the battery. The second party should manoeuvre to gain
+the flanks of the supports.
+
+10. Where a cavalry attack can be masked, so as to operate _as a
+surprise_, a battery may be taken by charging it in front. The
+formidable Spanish battery in the Pass of Somosierra, was finally
+carried by a dash of Napoleon's Polish Lancers upon it, suddenly
+profiting of a temporary fog or mist. But, in ordinary cases, when
+cavalry has to charge a battery in front, its fire should be drawn by
+our own guns or infantry, immediately before the charge begins.
+
+11. In an attack on an _intrenchment_, the office of cavalry can rarely
+be any thing else than to repulse sorties from the work, and to cut off
+the enemy's retreat from it.
+
+
+VII.--Its Charge.
+
+1. As cavalry acts effectively on the field of battle only by its
+charge, good cavalry of the line can be formed in no other way than by
+being _exercised in this_, its special and peculiar function.
+
+On taking command of the Army of Italy in 1796, Bonaparte found the
+French cavalry to be entirely worthless. They had never been accustomed
+to charge, and he had the greatest difficulty in making them engage.
+Seeing the great importance of this arm, he determined to make good
+cavalry of them by compelling them to fight. So, in his attack on
+Borghetto, he sent his cavalry forward, with his grenadiers on their
+flanks, and his artillery close behind them. Thus enclosed, and led on
+by Murat to the charge, they attacked and routed that famous Austrian
+cavalry whose superiority they had so much dreaded. This was the first
+step in the formation of the splendid French cavalry to which Napoleon
+afterwards owed so many of his victories. And, at the battle of
+Hochstedt, on the Danube, in 1801, its superiority over the Austrian
+cavalry was, at last, completely established.
+
+2. Cavalry _charges_--
+
+(1.) In line; but this only on even ground, and at short distances;
+
+(2.) In column; and
+
+(3.) As foragers, or in dispersed order. But this kind of charge is
+exceptional. It can rarely be used with safety against any but an
+uncivilized or an undisciplined foe.
+
+3. A charge in _one long continuous line_ should never be attempted.
+Such a charge will be usually indecisive, as it cannot be made with the
+necessary _ensemble_ or unity. The success of a charge in line depends
+on the preservation of a well-regulated speed and of a perfect
+alignment; by means of which the whole line reaches the enemy at once.
+At the charging gait, this is rarely attainable; so that the charge in
+line, except at short distances, and over very even ground, usually
+degenerates into a charge by groups, or individual troopers, arriving
+successively. The most dashing riders, or those mounted on the swiftest
+horses, will naturally arrive first, and be overpowered by numbers.
+
+4. A charge _in deep column_ is also objectionable; its long flank
+exposing it too much to artillery fire and to the enemy's cavalry.
+
+But when cavalry is surprised, it must charge at once, in whatever order
+it happens to be, rather than hesitate or attempt to manoeuvre, for
+this would expose it to destruction.
+
+5. A prompt and unhesitating obedience to the command to charge, without
+regard to the circumstances under which it is given, may sometimes lead
+to results _unexpected even to the charging troops themselves_.
+
+One instance of this was related to me by an old officer of Napoleon's
+favorite Fifth Cuirassiers. The regiment was on the left of the line of
+battle. Directly in front of it was an extensive marsh; beyond which
+rose an eminence, abrupt in front, but sloping gently towards the rear,
+the crest of which was crowned by formidable Austrian batteries. For two
+hours the cuirassiers had been standing in line, listening to the roar
+of battle on the right, and eagerly expecting a summons to go
+_somewhere_ to engage the enemy. The very horses were neighing and
+pawing the ground, in their impatience to be off. Just then galloped up
+one of the Emperor's aids, saying, "Colonel, the Emperor desires you to
+charge directly on the enemy's batteries opposite your position." The
+brave colonel, who was one of Napoleon's personal favorites, though
+chafing at the prolonged inaction of his command, pointed to the marsh,
+and requested the officer to inform the Emperor of the obstacle in his
+front, with the existence of which his majesty, he said, was probably
+unacquainted. In a few minutes the officer came riding furiously back
+with a message to the colonel, that "if he did not immediately charge,
+the Emperor would come and lead the regiment himself." Stung by this
+reproof, the colonel plunged his spurs into his horse's flanks, and
+giving the command "Forward," led his regiment, at full gallop, directly
+through the marsh upon the point that had been indicated.
+
+The charge itself was, of course, a failure. The regiment finally
+struggled its way through the marsh to the opposite side, but leaving
+behind it a large number of gallant officers and men, who had sunk to
+rise no more; my informant being of the number who escaped.
+
+But the result of this demonstration was most decisive. Seeing that the
+height on which the Austrians had planted their heavy batteries, and
+which commanded the entire ground, was the key of the battle, Napoleon
+had determined to wrest it from them, together with the batteries which
+crowned it. Accordingly, the evening before, he had dispatched a body of
+light infantry by a very circuitous route, to turn the position and
+attack the batteries in rear. He had accurately calculated the time the
+detachment would require to reach its destination; and when the moment
+arrived at which it should be ready to commence its attack, he ordered
+the cuirassiers to charge directly upon the position in front. The
+Austrian artillery, suddenly attacked in rear, and, at the same time,
+threatened with a cavalry charge in front, where it had deemed itself
+perfectly secure, tried to change the position of its pieces, so as to
+get a fire on its assailants from both directions. But it was too late;
+the temporary confusion into which it was thrown enabled the French
+infantry to carry all before it, and the height was won, with all its
+batteries.
+
+So, at Waterloo, Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade of Light Cavalry, which was
+marching in column by half squadrons, left in front, had begun to form
+up into line on the leading half squadron, when an order arrived from
+Wellington to charge. Instantly the charge was made, and, of course, in
+echelons of half squadrons, extending to the right. The effect of this
+was that a body of French cavalry on its right, then attacking the
+British line, was suddenly taken in flank and completely routed.
+
+6. A charge in deep column may sometimes be made necessary by _the
+nature of the ground_, which, at the same time, protects its long
+flanks: as where, in our pursuit of the rebels after the battle of
+Nashville, in 1864, the Fourth United States Cavalry, approaching them
+over a narrow turnpike, made a vigorous charge in column of fours, which
+broke their centre, and, with the help of infantry skirmishers on the
+flanks, drove them from the ground.
+
+7. When the ground is rugged, in order to lessen the number of falls,
+the rear-rank, in the charge, should _open out six paces_, closing up
+again at the last moment.
+
+8. Cavalry advances to charge at a _trot_, or at a _gallop_. A fast trot
+is better than a gallop, as alignments are not easily kept at great
+speed. Experience has shown that the best distance from the enemy to
+begin the gallop, is about two hundred and sixty yards; thence steadily
+increasing to the maximum of speed. This gradual increase of speed is
+very important, to prevent the horses from being completely blown on
+reaching the enemy.
+
+9. Cavalry should not charge by _a wood_, till it has been carried by
+our own infantry, if it can possibly be avoided.
+
+At the battle of Kollin, in 1756, Frederick's cavalry, pursuing the
+Austrians, was taken in flank by some Austrian infantry posted in a
+wood, and made to retire with great loss.
+
+10. When cavalry is required to charge over unknown ground, it should be
+preceded by a few men thrown out to the front as skirmishers, in order
+to _scout the ground_ to be passed over. The neglect of this precaution
+has sometimes led to great disaster.
+
+At Talavera, two cavalry regiments, the First German Hussars and the
+Twenty-third Light Dragoons, were ordered to charge the head of some
+French infantry columns. When near the top of their speed they came
+suddenly upon a deep ravine, with steep sides. Colonel Arentschild
+commanding the Hussars, who was in front, at once reined up, and halted
+his regiment, saying: "I vill not kill my young mensch!" But the other
+regiment, commanded by Colonel Seymour, which was on its left, not
+seeing the obstacle in time, plunged down it, men and horses rolling
+over on each other in frightful confusion. Of the survivors, who
+arrived on the other side by twos and threes, many were killed or
+taken; and only one-half of the regiment ever returned.
+
+So, at the battle of Courtrai, in 1302, from the French cavalry's
+omitting to scout the ground they charged over, the Flemings won a great
+victory. All the _elite_ of the French nobility and chivalry was
+destroyed, and gold spurs were collected by bushels on the field. It was
+the French Cannae. The Flemings were drawn up behind a canal, flowing
+between high banks, and hidden from view. The French rushing on at full
+gallop, all the leading ranks were plunged into the canal. The entire
+cavalry was thereby checked and thrown into irretrievable disorder,
+which extended to the infantry, in their rear. The Flemings, profiting
+by their confusion, crossed the canal at two points simultaneously,
+attacked them in flank, and completed their rout.
+
+So, at the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Murat, in his great cavalry
+charge on the Allied centre, had captured twenty-six guns, and was
+carrying all before him, when he pushed on to the village of Gulden
+Gossa, where the ground had not been reconnoitred, and could not be
+distinctly seen from a distance. Here the French found their career
+suddenly checked by a great hollow, full of buildings, pools of water,
+and clusters of trees; while the Allied infantry, from behind the
+various covers afforded by the ground, opened upon them a destructive
+fire. Being then suddenly charged in flank by the Russian cavalry, they
+were driven back with heavy loss; the Allies recapturing twenty of the
+twenty-six guns they had lost.
+
+The troopers employed to scout the ground before a charge would not be
+in much danger from the enemy, who would hardly fire on a horseman or
+two, especially when expecting a charge.
+
+11. Cavalry must never pursue, unless its supports are _close at hand_.
+
+In pursuing, it must be circumspect, and not go too far. Union and order
+are indispensable; for, without them, a slight resistance may suffice to
+cause a repulse.
+
+
+VIII.--Its Attack on Infantry.
+
+First, as to its ATTACK GENERALLY.
+Secondly, its attack ON SQUARES.
+
+
+A. GENERALLY.
+
+1. Cavalry must avoid _distant engagements_ with infantry; in which the
+latter must always have the advantage.
+
+2. The slightest cavalry charge on the _flank_ of infantry will rout it.
+
+3. As to a cavalry attack _in front_: If the infantry stand firm, the
+chances are against its success. If the infantry cannot be attacked in
+flank, the cavalry should therefore wait till it has been shattered by
+artillery, or has become exhausted, or demoralized, or till it begins to
+manoeuvre.
+
+4. If the infantry be _in line_, or _in column_, cavalry should attack
+it in flank; if _in square_, at one of its angles; if _in several
+squares_, at one of its flank ones, so as to avoid a cross-fire from the
+other squares. If a flank square be broken, the next one to it, being no
+longer protected by the fire of any other square, may be attacked with
+the same prospect of success; and so on successively.
+
+5. But if the hostile infantry have _supporting cavalry_, we must not
+charge in such a manner as to enable it to take us in flank.
+
+6. To _test the infantry_ about to be attacked, cavalry may pass a few
+hundred paces in its front, to threaten it, sending forward a few
+horsemen to fire, gallop forward, and raise a dust. If the infantry,
+instead of disregarding these movements, begin to fire, it will probably
+be broken, on the cavalry's charging it at once and vigorously, whether
+in column or in line. But otherwise, if the infantry reserve its fire,
+and only sends out a few sharpshooters.
+
+7. _Ascending slopes_, if not too steep, are not unfavorable to attacks
+on infantry; for their shots, as experience shows, will then mostly fly
+too high.
+
+8. On a _descending slope_, cavalry charges down on infantry with
+terrible effect; as it then arrives with an impetus which nothing can
+stop.
+
+At Waterloo, a column of French infantry was ascending a steep slope.
+Suddenly the Scotch Greys cavalry regiment dashed down upon it from
+above, rode over, and destroyed it.
+
+B. ON SQUARES.
+
+1. Infantry squares are usually charged in _open column_; the distance
+between the subdivisions being a subdivision front and a few yards over;
+in order that each subdivision may have time to break into the square,
+or, if unsuccessful, to disengage itself and retire.
+
+But the distances should never be so great as to allow the square to
+reload after firing a volley at the next preceding subdivision.
+
+2. The leading subdivision will usually _draw the fire_ of the square.
+If this is delivered at very short range, say at twenty paces, it will
+raise up a rampart of dead and wounded men and horses which will
+probably suffice to check the following subdivisions, and so repulse the
+charge. But an infantry square rarely reserves its fire so long; and if
+the fire is delivered at any considerable distance, no such effect will
+be produced.
+
+3. A _good formation_ to attack a square is said to be a column of three
+squadrons, with squadron front, at double distance; followed by a fourth
+squadron, in column of divisions or platoons, to surround the square,
+and make prisoners, if it is broken.
+
+4. Before cavalry charges a square, it should be first shattered or
+demoralized by _artillery fire_, when this is practicable. In the
+absence of artillery, sharpshooting infantry skirmishers may, to a
+certain extent, supply its place.
+
+5. A square should be attacked at one of its angles, which are obviously
+its weakest and most vulnerable points. But to cover a real attack on an
+angle, cavalry sometimes makes a _false attack_ on the front of a
+square.
+
+6. When squares are formed checkerwise, cavalry must attack _a flank
+square_, and not expose itself to a cross-fire by charging an interior
+one.
+
+7. Cavalry charging a square firing irregularly will usually break it.
+But when the square reserves its fire, and pours in well-aimed volleys
+at short range, the charge will rarely succeed. The cavalry should,
+therefore, before charging, use every effort to _draw the fire_ of the
+square, or of the fronts which threaten it. This is sometimes
+accomplished by sending forward a few skirmishers to fire on the square.
+
+8. When one square fires to assist another, the firing square should be
+_instantly charged_, before it has time to reload.
+
+9. To succeed, a cavalry charge should be made with a _desperate,
+forlorn-hope recklessness_, and with reiterated attacks on one point. If
+the fire has been delivered at very close range, though its effect has
+probably been destructive, the smoke will momentarily shut out the line
+of infantry from the horses' view, thus removing the chief obstacle to
+their breaking through it. The survivors of the fire should therefore
+rush desperately on.
+
+If the French attacks on the British squares at Quatre Bras had been
+made in this manner, instead of opening to the right and left, and
+diverging to a flank at the moment of closing, they would probably have
+succeeded.
+
+But this sudden divergence is often the fault of the horses, which
+instinctively recoil before a serried line of infantry, with bayonets at
+the charge. Cavalry should, therefore, never be practised on the
+drill-ground in charging a square, as the horses would thereby acquire
+the habit of suddenly checking their course, or of diverging to a flank,
+on arriving at the enemy. This would so strengthen their natural
+instinct that they could never be got to break a square. Or, at least,
+when this manoeuvre is practised for the purpose of instruction, the
+horses used should never afterwards be taken into the field.
+
+10. The cavalry most formidable to an infantry square are _Lancers_.
+Their lances, which are from eleven to sixteen feet long, easily reach
+and transfix the infantry soldier, while the sabres of the other cavalry
+are too short to reach him over the horse's neck, and over the musket,
+lengthened by the bayonet. But Lancers are usually no match against
+other cavalry, who can parry and ripost before the lance can resume the
+guard.
+
+11. When cavalry has succeeded in completely breaking a body of
+infantry, it may often inflict _fearful slaughter_ upon them.
+
+At the battle of Rio Seco, in Spain, after Lasalle's twelve hundred
+horse had broken the Spanish infantry, they galloped at will among
+twenty-five thousand soldiers, some five thousand of whom they slew.
+
+
+IX.--General Remarks.
+
+1. Besides its uses on the field of battle, cavalry may render most
+important service in completing the destruction of beaten corps, or
+compelling their surrender, and so enable us to secure the great
+strategic objects of the campaign. Thus, after the battle of Waterloo,
+it was the Prussian cavalry that completed the dispersion of the French
+army, and prevented it from rallying. And, but for Napoleon's ill
+fortune in respect to Grouchy, in that battle, he would, to all
+appearance, have succeeded in accomplishing his plan of campaign, which
+was, to separate the English from the Prussians, beat them in detail,
+and complete their destruction with his twenty thousand cavalry.
+
+2. The battles of the late War of the Rebellion, the earlier ones, at
+least, were mostly indecisive. One chief cause of this was, that neither
+side had a sufficient force of true cavalry to enable it to complete a
+victory, to turn a defeat into a rout, and drive the enemy effectually
+from the field. The cavalry charges were generally such as mounted
+infantry could have just as well made; charges in which the pistol and
+carbine played the principal part, instead of the spur and sabre. It was
+not until the fight at Brandy Station, in June, 1863, that sabres were
+used, to any extent, at close quarters. Thus, neither of the contending
+armies was able to break up and disperse, destroy, or capture its
+enemy's infantry masses, in the manner practised in Napoleon's great
+wars, not having, to any considerable extent, that description of force
+called Cavalry of the Line, which alone is capable of effecting these
+results by its solid and compact formations, its skilful, yet rapid
+manoeuvring, and its crashing charges.
+
+3. European cavalry of the line is divided into Heavy and Light. Heavy
+cavalry is heavily armed; that is, their weapons are larger and heavier
+than those of light cavalry, and to these weapons, carbines, in most of
+the corps, are added. Some of the corps wear steel or brass cuirasses;
+and the men and horses are of the largest size.
+
+In Light cavalry, the only weapons are the sabre and pistol; and the men
+and horses are light and active, rather than strong and large.
+
+Lancers are considered a medium between Heavy and Light cavalry.
+
+4. Great as may be the advantages of a large force of regular cavalry of
+the line, there were serious objections to its being raised at the
+opening of the late war.
+
+(1.) The theatre of war presented nowhere any of those wide and level
+plains so common in Europe, and on which cavalry masses are able to
+produce such decisive effects in battle. On the contrary, the ground was
+almost everywhere so rugged and mountainous, or else so densely wooded,
+as to be extremely unfavorable to the movements of cavalry of this
+description.
+
+(2.) Since the introduction of the new rifled arms, exposing cavalry
+masses to a deadly fire at far greater distances than ever before known,
+a fire often reaching to the reserves, it seemed doubtful whether the
+manoeuvring and charging in heavy, compact masses, which formerly
+rendered cavalry of the line so formidable, would any longer be
+practicable.
+
+(3.) The comparative cost of this kind of force is so great, that, if it
+had been raised and kept up on the scale required, the expense of this
+war, enormous as it has been, would have been vastly augmented. Three
+years are required for the thorough training and instruction of the men
+and horses; so that it would not have been until the fourth year of the
+war that we could begin, even, to reap the fruits of so enormous an
+outlay.
+
+5. But to carry on any war successfully, what is needed, and is, in
+fact, indispensable, is an ample force of light cavalry, of a kind
+requiring comparatively but little time and training to fit it for the
+various and important duties devolving upon it in the field, and
+therefore far less expensive than cavalry of the line; and having all
+the discipline of this latter kind of force, though wanting its
+perfection of manoeuvre. Every army, or considerable detachment, must
+have enough of this kind of force with it to furnish what is requisite
+for Outpost duty, Patrols offensive and defensive, Escorts to trains,
+Foraging parties, Reconnoissances, and the various other purposes
+necessarily incidental to operations in the field; and in marches, all
+Advanced, Rear, and Flank guards should consist, in part, at least, of
+cavalry. Finally, this description of force is needed for the
+performance of those arduous, but most valuable, services often rendered
+by the quasi-independent bodies called Partisan Corps; services usually
+requiring great celerity of movement.
+
+6. This kind of force being "the eyes and ears of an army," it often
+contributes powerfully to the success of strategic operations.
+
+In the campaign of 1813, Napoleon complained that, for want of light
+cavalry, he could get no intelligence of the enemy's movements.
+
+So, in the rebel campaign of 1863, culminating at Gettysburg, General
+Lee attributed his ignorance of our position and movements, which led to
+the failure of his operations, to his being destitute of this arm;
+Stuart's cavalry, on which he depended for information, having got too
+far away from him.
+
+In Pope's campaign in 1862, the rebels, by their cavalry raid on
+Catlett's Station, obtained possession of the commanding general's
+correspondence, plans, and orders from Washington.
+
+On the other hand, whilst keeping us informed of the enemy's movements,
+an abundant light cavalry, active and well commanded, may be so used as
+to constitute an impenetrable screen of our own movements from the
+enemy, as effectual as would be a lofty and impassable mountain range.
+
+Again, if we are greatly inferior to the enemy in cavalry, our own
+cavalry will have to keep itself within our infantry lines; and the
+consequence will be that the enemy will obtain control of the entire
+country around us, and so deprive us of all the supplies it contains.
+
+As, besides this, cavalry is absolutely necessary for the protection of
+convoys, and, from its celerity of movement, is the kind of force best
+fitted for guarding our communications, it is evident that the
+subsistence of an army is dependent, to a great extent, upon this arm.
+
+From what has been said in relation to the three arms, it is evident--
+
+1. That ARTILLERY, within the range of its fire, is powerful in
+preventing the enemy's approach to it; but, only to a limited extent,
+can pursue and drive the enemy from his position; and that its function
+is, therefore, mainly DEFENSIVE.
+
+2. That CAVALRY, by the impetuosity of its charge, is peculiarly fit for
+driving the enemy from his position; but, remaining in position itself,
+has but feeble power to prevent the enemy's approaching it; and this,
+only by its carbine and pistol fire, which is far from effective; and
+that its function is, therefore, mainly OFFENSIVE.
+
+3. That INFANTRY has great power, both in keeping the enemy at a
+distance by its fire and in driving him from his position with the
+bayonet; and that this arm is, therefore, both OFFENSIVE and DEFENSIVE.
+
+4. That although artillery is mainly a defensive arm, it plays an
+important offensive part in the powerful assistance it renders to
+infantry, in shattering and disorganizing the enemy's masses; thereby
+opening the way for our attacking columns.
+
+5. That although cavalry is mainly an offensive arm, its defensive value
+is also very great in the protection it affords, in various emergencies,
+to the other arms, by its actual charge, or by its threatening position.
+
+The special parts usually played in battle by the three arms
+respectively, may be briefly stated thus:--
+
+Artillery prepares the victory; Infantry achieves it; Cavalry completes
+it, and secures its fruits.
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the
+Three Arms: Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry, by Francis J. Lippitt
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TACTICAL USE OF THE THREE ARMS ***
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