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diff --git a/24765.txt b/24765.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b345ec --- /dev/null +++ b/24765.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3545 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the Three +Arms: Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry, by Francis J. Lippitt + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the Three Arms: Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry + +Author: Francis J. Lippitt + +Release Date: March 6, 2008 [EBook #24765] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TACTICAL USE OF THE THREE ARMS *** + + + + +Produced by Graeme Mackreth and The Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + + + + + + +A TREATISE + +ON THE + +TACTICAL USE OF THE THREE ARMS: + +INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AND CAVALRY. + +BY + +FRANCIS J. LIPPITT, + +EX-COLONEL SECOND INFANTRY, CALIFORNIA VOLUNTEERS. + + +NEW YORK: +D. VAN NOSTRAND, PUBLISHER, +192 BROADWAY. +1865. + + + + +Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, + +By D. VAN NOSTRAND, + +In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the +Southern District of New York. + + +ALVORD, PRINTER. + + + + +TO THE MILITARY PUBLIC. + + +The Author would feel obliged for any facts or suggestions which might +enable him to render a future edition of this work more valuable. + +PROVIDENCE, R.I., _July, 1865_. + + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS. + + + PAGE + +Tactical Use of Infantry 3 + + I. ITS ATTACK, GENERALLY 4 + II. FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK 8 + III. THE ATTACK, HOW MADE 19 + IV. BAYONET CHARGES 24 + V. DEFENCE AGAINST INFANTRY 27 + VI. DEFENCE AGAINST ARTILLERY 34 + VII. DEFENCE AGAINST CAVALRY 36 +VIII. SQUARES 40 + IX. SKIRMISHERS 49 + A. THEIR USE 50 + B. HOW POSTED 53 + C. HOW HANDLED 55 + D. RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISHERS 56 + +Tactical Use of Artillery 59 + + I. HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE GROUND 59 + II. HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO OUR OWN TROOPS 63 + III. HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE ENEMY 66 + IV. POSTING OF BATTERIES AND OF PIECES AS BETWEEN THEMSELVES 68 + V. HOW USED 70 + A. GENERALLY 70 + B. IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT 72 + C. IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT 75 + D. AGAINST INFANTRY 78 + E. AGAINST CAVALRY 82 + F. AGAINST ARTILLERY 83 + VI. ITS FIRE 85 + VII. ITS SUPPORTS 89 + +Tactical Use of Cavalry 93 + + I. ITS FORMATIONS 93 + II. ITS STRONG AND ITS WEAK POINTS 98 + III. HOW POSTED 99 + IV. ITS SUPPORTS 104 + V. HOW USED 106 + VI. HOW IT FIGHTS 109 + VII. ITS CHARGE 113 +VIII. ITS ATTACK ON INFANTRY 122 + A. GENERALLY 122 + B. ON SQUARES 124 + IX. GENERAL REMARKS 127 + + + + +TACTICAL USE OF THE THREE ARMS. + + +Every complete military force consists of three arms,--INFANTRY, +ARTILLERY, and CAVALRY. + +In battle, these three arms are united; and, other things being equal, +that commander will prove victorious who is best acquainted with their +combined use in the field. + +In order thoroughly to understand the proper use of the three arms +combined, we must obviously begin by learning the proper use of each of +them separately. + +Hence the importance of the subject of the present treatise. In +discussing it, we shall commence with the + + + + +TACTICAL USE OF INFANTRY. + + +The subject will be considered under the following heads:-- + + I.--ITS ATTACK, GENERALLY. + II.--FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK. + III.--THE ATTACK, HOW MADE. + IV.--BAYONET CHARGES. + V.--DEFENCE AGAINST INFANTRY. + VI.--DEFENCE AGAINST ARTILLERY. + VII.--DEFENCE AGAINST CAVALRY. +VIII.--SQUARES. + IX.--SKIRMISHERS. + + +I.--Its Attack, generally. + +Infantry attacks with its fire, or with the bayonet. Which of these is +the more effective? + +1. The _object_ of an attack is to destroy or capture the hostile force, +or, at least, to drive it from the field. + +Capturing the enemy, or driving him from the field, cannot usually be +effected by merely firing upon him. + +True, a mere fire at a distance may finally destroy him. But an +insuperable objection to this mode of attack is, that while we are +killing or disabling his men, he is killing or disabling as many of our +own. + +2. If we fire from _behind cover_, our loss may be comparatively small. +But, in that case, the enemy will never remain for any length of time +exposed to our fire. He will either attack and rout us from our cover, +or retire. And even if he did neither, his actual and complete +destruction, capture, or rout, would still require an attack with the +bayonet. + +3. It follows that the proper mode of attack by infantry on infantry is +with the _bayonet_. + +The Russian Suwarrow's victories and reputation were won chiefly by his +fierce bayonet attacks, which often effected great results, in spite of +his ignorance of the art of war. + +4. But there are _exceptional cases_ where infantry may properly use +only its fire; as-- + +(1.) When acting as a support to artillery, it should rarely, if ever, +leave its position to use the bayonet; thereby endangering the safety of +the guns which it is its first duty to guard. Its function, in this +case, being purely defensive, it should act by its fire alone. + +(2.) Against a line of skirmishers deployed, a well-directed fire will +usually be sufficiently effective. + +(3.) In mountain warfare, its only practicable mode of attack will +sometimes be by its fire. + +5. When both sides are _equally exposed_, the actual attack with the +bayonet should not be preceded by a distant musketry fire; for, as in +that case, our loss will generally be equal to the enemy's, this fire +will give us no superiority in the charge, and the loss we have +sustained will be therefore entirely thrown away. + +6. Nevertheless, our actual attack should be _prepared_, when possible, +by the infliction of such a loss on the enemy as will make him inferior +to us at the decisive moment. In war, the object is not to test the +comparative courage of the combatants, but to beat the enemy. We must +never, therefore, when it can be avoided, fight him on equal terms; and +so, never close with him without such a superiority in numbers, +position, or spirit, as will make the chances decidedly in our favor. +If, without exposing ourselves to much loss, we can inflict a +considerable loss upon him, we shall render him inferior to us, both by +the number of his men we have disabled, and by the demoralization +thereby caused in his ranks. + +7. This preparatory loss can be most effectually inflicted by the _fire +of artillery_; as, from its great superiority of range, it can suffer +but little, meanwhile, from the enemy's infantry fire. Our attacking +infantry are thus enabled to keep out of the range of the fire of the +infantry they are to attack, till the moment of advancing to close. + +8. When we have no artillery disposable for the purpose, the preparatory +effect may be produced by a _well-sustained fire of infantry_, provided +it can find a sheltered position to deliver it from; or, by the fire of +a heavy line of skirmishers. + +9. If we can make the infantry we wish to attack _engage in a prolonged +fire_, this will exhaust them, and thus render them inferior to us in +strength and in spirit, even if we inflict on them but little loss. But +as our attacking infantry should, in the mean time, be kept fresh, the +preparatory fire, in such case, should not devolve on the troops that +are to close with the enemy. + +10. One cause of the _indecisiveness of the results_ obtained in many of +the battles of the late war, as compared with the great loss of life on +both sides, has been, that the opposing battalions were too often kept +firing at each other at a distance, both sustaining nearly equal loss, +until the ranks were so weakened as to disable either party from making +a vigorous and decisive charge. Or else, charges were made on the +enemy's battalions before they had been shattered by artillery; so that +the attacking troops were easily repulsed, sometimes with great +slaughter. + + +II.--Formations for Attack. + +1. Infantry may advance to attack in either of _three ways_: in column; +in line, marching by the front; and by the flank; that is, in line, but +faced to a flank. + +2. Of these three formations, the last is undoubtedly the _worst +possible_; for-- + +(1.) On arriving at the enemy, the troops are not concentrated at the +point where the struggle is to be. As they must come up successively, +they will be crushed in detail by superior numbers. + +(2.) Advancing in such a formation, they would be exposed to a +destructive raking fire from the enemy's guns; especially since the +adoption of the new flank march by fours, which gives to rifled +artillery a tolerable mark. + +3. The question is, then, between an attack in column and an attack in +line. _Which is the better_ of the two? + +The decisive effect of infantry is produced by a rush on the enemy with +the bayonet. The chief elements of success in this attack at close +quarters are, the physical momentum of the charge, and the powerful +moral effect caused by the swift approach of a compact and orderly +hostile mass. A charge in line does not admit of both these elements. +The advance of a line of one or more battalions, to be united and +orderly, cannot be rapid, and thus has no impetus. Such a line, +advancing swiftly, especially over uneven ground, would soon become so +broken and disunited as to destroy, in a great measure, the effect, both +moral and physical, of its charge, and, at the same time, to deprive the +attacking troops of that confidence which is inspired by the +consciousness of moving together in one compact, formidable mass, in +which every soldier feels himself fortified by the support of his +comrades. + +4. On the other hand, _a column_ can move rapidly without losing its +compactness and order. + +In attacking the enemy's line, a close column concentrates successively, +but rapidly, a force superior to the enemy at the decisive point, and +can hardly fail to pierce the line attacked, if it arrive with its +momentum unchecked. + +In a close column, there is a real force created by the pressure of the +mass behind on the leading subdivision, pushing it on the enemy, and +preventing it from drawing back or stopping; thus imparting to it +somewhat of the actual physical momentum of a mechanical engine. + +A close column shelters raw troops, and carries them irresistibly along +with it. + +A close column, in case of need, can rapidly extend its front by +deploying. + +It can promptly make itself impenetrable to cavalry. + +Finally, in a column, the officers being seen by the men, the benefit of +their example is not lost. + +The close column would, therefore, seem to be the best formation for +attack. + +5. Movements in line requiring that high degree of perfection in drill +which can rarely be attained by any but regular troops, they were +accordingly abandoned by the raw and undisciplined masses of French +soldiers that so successfully defended the French Republic from invasion +against the veteran armies of Europe; some of which were led by generals +who had served under Frederick the Great. Conscious of their military +inferiority to the enemy, they instinctively clustered together in +close and heavy columns; then rushed down on the enemy's line with the +force of an avalanche, often carrying every thing before them. Thus was +inaugurated that system of attack in _deep and solid columns_, which was +afterwards so successfully used by Napoleon. + +6. Close columns have two defects. One is, that they are _oppressive and +exhausting_ to the men, especially in hot weather. + +But this is not a very serious objection; for they are, or should be, +formed only when about to be used, and then their work is generally soon +over. + +7. The other defect, however, is of so grave a nature as, in the opinion +of some, to more than outweigh their advantages; and this is, the +_terribly destructive effect_ upon them of the enemy's artillery fire, +or of that of his sharpshooters; for the solid mass is an easy target, +into which every shot is sure to penetrate. Many of the missiles which +would fly over an advancing line, are sure to fall, somewhere or other, +in a deep column. + +This destructive effect was strikingly illustrated in Macdonald's charge +on the Allied centre at Wagram. The eleven thousand men (some accounts +say fifteen thousand) composing that famous column, advanced under the +fire of one hundred and eighty hostile guns. After being driven back +twice, they succeeded, in a third attack, in breaking the enemy's +centre. But of the entire column, only eleven hundred men, it is said, +were left standing. + +8. The recent improvements in fire-arms must render the fire on a close +column of infantry, both by artillery and sharpshooters, still more +destructive than it was before. But this sacrifice of life can be +prevented, to a great extent, by using the columns at a proper time and +in a proper manner. They should, like storming parties (which they +really are), never be launched against the enemy's line till the fire by +which they would suffer has been _quite or nearly silenced_ by our +batteries. Sometimes this may be impracticable; but this precaution has +often been neglected when it was perfectly feasible, thus causing a +great and useless slaughter. + +9. But destructive as may be artillery fire on close columns, on troops +advancing in line grape and canister _begin to be equally so_ on their +arriving within four hundred yards of the enemy's batteries; and are +certainly quite as destructive, and more so, at the distance of two +hundred yards. So that, within this distance, at least, the superiority +of lines over columns ceases; and, probably, much sooner. + +10. The _desideratum_ is to preserve the advantages of the column, while +saving the attacking troops from the almost total destruction which +would now seem to threaten them, when marching in such a formation, from +the new rifled artillery, which is said to fire with accuracy at two +thousand yards, and from the new infantry rifles, said to be reliable, +in the hands of sharpshooters, at five hundred yards. + +11. Perhaps this object might be attained by the advance of the +attacking troops in line, but _in loose order_, and at double quick, to +about two hundred paces from the enemy, a halt, a prompt alignment on +the colors, a rapid ployment into close column doubled on the centre, +followed by a swift and resolute charge with the bayonet. + +This method, while giving the rapid clearing of the intervening ground, +to within two hundred paces of the enemy, and afterwards the impetus, +and other advantages of the column, would, at the same time, afford that +comparative immunity from a destructive fire which is the chief +advantage of an advance in line. + +To guard against the danger, in the use of this method, of the troops +stopping to fire, instead of ploying into a column of attack, they +should commence their advance with pieces unloaded. Their boxes might +even be previously emptied of their ammunition. Why should not a battle, +as well as an assault on a fortress, have its "forlorn hope?" + +12. This mode of attack would be open, it is true, to _two +objections_:-- + +First. It would require for its successful execution under fire great +coolness, and much previous instruction in the manoeuvre, to enable +the troops to perform it promptly and accurately. + +Secondly. In presence of a bold and active enemy, it would expose the +attacking troops to the danger of being charged and routed while +manoeuvring. + +13. In the late War of the Rebellion, in lieu of close columns, attacks +have been sometimes made in _several lines_, following each other at +distances of three hundred paces or more. Although these attacks have +sometimes succeeded, they are objectionable in principle; for each line +is in danger of being repulsed successively, before the arrival of the +one in its rear; and there is wanting that great superiority of force at +the decisive point which is the most important element of success in a +battle. + +Such formations are essentially defensive in their nature, and not +suitable for attack. A line in position, against which the enemy is +advancing, is strong in its fire, which will usually preserve it from +absolute defeat till a second line, posted at one hundred and fifty, or +even three hundred paces in its rear, has had time to come up in +support. But even these distances Napoleon's experience appears to have +taught him to be much too great; for in his last battle, at Waterloo, he +posted his second line, both infantry and cavalry, at only sixty paces +behind the first; thus sacrificing, to a great extent, the advantage of +keeping the second line out of fire, in order to secure the more +important one of concentration of force. But this was only his formation +for defence; for, in the same battle, his formations for attack were +always in close columns. + +14. Our present Infantry Tactics have adopted two new expedients to +accelerate the advance of battalions, and diminish the loss to which +columns of attack are liable--Division Columns and Advancing by the +Flank of Subdivisions. + +As _Division Columns_ break the battalion line into several columns, +each of two or three subdivisions deep, as a substitute for a single +column four or five subdivisions deep, they undoubtedly diminish the +loss from the enemy's artillery fire in corresponding proportion. But in +compensation for this partial advantage, they have three defects:-- + +(1.) In moving rapidly for any distance, especially over broken or +obstructed ground, both the alignment and the proper intervals between +the columns will usually be lost; thus causing, in the deployment, a +dangerous loss of time in re-establishing the alignment and the correct +intervals. + +(2.) In advancing in line of division columns, there is no means of +forming square, except by passing through an intermediate formation. + +(3.) The intervals between the columns are so many gaps, through which +cavalry could easily penetrate, and take the columns in rear. + +The line of division columns appears to have been first suggested by +Marshal Marmont, who was a good artillery commander, but not +necessarily, for that reason, a weighty authority on a point of +Infantry Tactics. + +15. The manoeuvre of _Advancing by the Flank of Subdivisions_ is +obnoxious to all the objections just pointed out in regard to Division +Columns. On being threatened by cavalry, though the troops would have no +intermediate formation to pass through to prepare for forming square, +they would have to face into column and close to half distance, which +there would often not be time to do. + +In addition to this, the flank march being habitually by fours, the +subdivisions would offer a tolerable mark for the enemy's artillery, and +thus be exposed to a destructive enfilade. + +And in forming into line, where the leading guides have not accurately +preserved both their alignment and their intervals, which must be the +usual case in the field, there must be more or less delay and confusion, +of which a prompt and active enemy would not fail to take fatal +advantage. + +The mode prescribed by the Tactics (Par. 150, School of the Battalion), +for executing the manoeuvre of forming line while advancing by +subdivision flanks, seems also to call for remark; it being "by company +(or division) into line." In other words, each individual soldier +brings a shoulder forward, breaks off from his comrades, and hurries up, +not on a line with them, but detached from them, and moving +independently, to find his proper place. This destroys for the time +being, and at a critical moment, the unity of the subdivisions, and so +impairs the confidence soldiers derive from realizing that they form +part of a compact mass. In thus executing this manoeuvre under fire, +and near the enemy, there is danger of the men becoming confused and +bewildered. For this reason, a better method of forming line would seem +to be to re-form the column by a simple facing, and then to _wheel_ into +line by subdivisions. + +16. The worst possible _order of marching_ in battle, for any +considerable number of men, as a battalion, for instance, is by the +flank. Such a line, advancing in what is really a column of fours, would +be rolled up and crushed, on the enemy's attacking its head; and would, +meanwhile, be exposed to enfilade. Marching _to_ a flank, it would be +running the gauntlet of the enemy's batteries and musketry fire. In +forming into line in either case, much time would be lost; as in flank +marching in the field, especially when the ground is ragged or +obstructed, distances cannot be preserved. + +It may be here remarked, that marching to a flank in column also, +whether by division, company, or platoon, is highly objectionable, as it +constantly exposes the column to an enfilading fire, as well as to be +suddenly charged in flank by cavalry. + + +III.--The Attack, how made. + +1. The speed of a column of attack must _never be checked_ for a moment, +to enable it to reply to the enemy's fire. The fire of the column will +be ineffective, for it will be the fire of excited men, and very limited +in extent, as it can proceed from the leading division only; and the +fire once begun, it will be hard to stop it. If, in order to fire, we +halt the column, re-forming it under the excitement of the fire will be +very difficult; and the enemy's least forward movement may then cause a +rout. + +At Maida, in Calabria, in 1806, the French columns attacked the English +under General Stuart. When within thirty paces, the English gave them a +volley. The French, stunned, as it were, began, at once, to deploy. The +English fired again, and the French retreated. + +At Waterloo, in the last grand attack by the French, the advance column +of the Imperial Guard was decisively repulsed by the British Guards. +These had been lying on the ground behind the crest of the slope until +the French appeared, when they suddenly rose up and poured in a +murderous volley at short range. Instead of instantly charging with the +bayonet, the French hesitated, then began to deploy. The British charged +at once, and drove them down the hill. + +2. This dangerous halt and deployment is apt also to occur when the +column finds _sheltering objects by the way_. Therefore, hurry by these, +and hasten the step. + +3. It will also tend to prevent such an untoward accident, if we furnish +the columns of attack, where several are employed, with _skirmishers_ in +their intervals, as well as on their outer flanks, to draw the enemy's +fire. Otherwise, the column fired into will be apt, in order to return +the fire, to halt instinctively and deploy into line, which breaks up +the attack. + +4. From this it appears that the limited fire of a column of attack is, +in fact, _no defect_, the highest offensive power of infantry being in +the bayonet. Fire, in the attack, is generally ineffective, and +sometimes injurious. It should rarely be used till the enemy has turned +his back. + +5. As to attacking _cavalry_: + +Infantry may advance in line and attack cavalry safely, provided its +flanks are protected. Before a long line of infantry, cavalry must +retreat, or be destroyed by its fire. In the Austrian service it is said +to be a received maxim, that horses will not stand before the steady +approach of a mass of infantry, with bayonets at the charge, but will +always retire before the infantry closes on them. + +6. So, infantry _in column_, either closed in mass, or at half distance, +may attack cavalry successfully; taking care to be ready to form square, +or "column against cavalry," at the first symptom of their preparing to +charge. + +7. As to attacking _artillery_: + +Before charging, the infantry sometimes first seeks the shelter of +ground, using its sharpshooters to annoy it, and, if possible, to +silence its fire. + +Or, when circumstances are favorable, as when it can get a position near +its flank, it attacks it vigorously, at once, with fire and bayonet. + +But when infantry has to advance to the attack of a battery in front, it +should never be in any compact formation, but always deployed as +skirmishers. Otherwise, it would usually meet with a bloody repulse; +especially where any considerable space of ground is to be cleared. + +At the battle of Malvern Hill, the rebel General Magruder's division was +sent, either in column or in line, to charge a powerful Union battery +just beyond an open field a mile and three-quarters in length. The +rebels rushed into the field at a full run, but encountered a murderous +fire from the guns they were sent to attack, which mowed them down by +hundreds. By the time they had cleared two-thirds of the ground, the +carnage was so dreadful as to drive them back to the woods from which +they had started. Twice more they were sent forward in the same manner, +but with the same result; when the undertaking was abandoned. + +8. In attacking a battery, we may often secure its capture by a volley +_aimed at the horses_; the effect of which may prevent the enemy from +carrying it off. But this should be avoided when there is a good +prospect of capturing the battery without disabling the horses; since +then, if we succeed, we shall be able to immediately use the battery +against the enemy ourselves. + +9. In the French Revolution, the Chouans of La Vendee attacked the +Republican batteries in _several single files_, of one or two hundred +men each, at intervals of fifty paces. Such a formation protects the +attacking columns, to a great extent, from the enemy's fire, but exposes +them to destruction by a charge from the battery supports. In the +absence of these, it would often be very advantageous; since, by proper +drilling, these columns in one rank could be made, on arriving near the +enemy, to rapidly double in two or four ranks, without halting, and +then, by filing to a flank and facing, to advance by the front in a +compact line. + +The same formation would be useful for troops advancing to assault an +intrenchment; but, as in the case of a battery, subject to the risk of +being destroyed by a sudden sortie from the work. + +10. Artillery is never without _supports_. One part of the infantry, +therefore, deployed as skirmishers, should attack the guns, circling +round them, and opening fire on the men and horses; while the other part +attacks the support in flank. On getting sufficiently near, the +assailants should try to draw the fire of the guns, and then rush on +them before they have time to reload. + +If a battery gets into confusion, or there is any delay in unlimbering +or limbering up, then is the most favorable time to capture it by a +vigorous charge with the bayonet. + + +IV.--Bayonet Charges. + +1. When made resolutely, and _without slackening the gait_, bayonet +charges have succeeded in nine cases out of ten. + +2. The bayonet is usually more effective than _grape_, _canister_, or +_bullets_. + +At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Kleist's Prussian division was sent +to carry the position of Probstheyda. For this purpose it was necessary +to advance up a long slope, the crest of which was occupied by Drouot's +artillery. The French allowed the Prussians to approach to within a +short distance, and then poured into them a most destructive shower of +grape, which drove them back for a moment in confusion. But they +immediately rallied, and rushed desperately on again. Marshal Victor +then charged them with the bayonet, and completely repulsed them. + +Afterwards, having been re-enforced by Wittgenstein's Russian division, +they again advanced, under a constant shower of grape from Drouot. They, +nevertheless, kept advancing; and, in spite of the great loss they +suffered, were about carrying the position, when the French again +charged with the bayonet, forcing them down to the very foot of the +declivity; where, being once more covered with grape, their repulse was +complete and final. + +So, at the battle of Mill Springs, in January, 1862, after the +combatants had been exchanging musketry fires for several hours without +any decisive result, the rebels' left was vigorously charged by the +Ninth Ohio with the bayonet. This charge broke the enemy's flank. His +whole line gave way in confusion, and the battle was won. + +So, at Malvern Hill, in 1862, in several instances, columns of rebels +whom a storm of canister and shell had failed to repulse, were driven +back and routed by a dash with the bayonet, after a volley poured in at +a few yards from the muzzles of the guns. + +So, at the battle of Seven Pines, according to General Heintzelman's +report, whenever our troops used the bayonet, their loss was +comparatively light, and the enemy was driven back, suffering heavily. + +3. The bayonet charge, when made from any considerable distance, should +be _in column_; the only formation in which order can be combined with +sufficient speed. But, at a short distance, a bayonet charge by a line, +instantly after firing a volley to repel an attack, will be very +effective, and usually successful. + +4. In ordinary cases, the charge should be _prepared_ by first +shattering the hostile masses, or, at least, wearying and demoralizing +them by artillery, or by skirmishers' fire. + +5. The more _vigorous and resolute_ the charge, the greater the chance +of success. The enemy never retires before a moderate advance. + +6. Where the enemy is _forced into a defile_, a charge with the bayonet, +preceded by a few rounds of grape, will complete his destruction. + +7. When the enemy is _behind cover_, the best way to drive him from it +is with the bayonet. This will cause less loss of life than to attempt +to return his fire. But, in such case, the charge should be prepared, +when possible, by a few shells, or rounds of canister. + +8. Shots up or down a declivity usually miss. A _height_ should, +therefore, be carried with the bayonet, without firing. + +The moral effect, moreover, of a steady charge of infantry up a hill, +without stopping to fire, is very great; and such a charge is usually +successful. Prince Czartoryski, Alexander's most experienced general at +Austerlitz, admitted that he lost all confidence in the result on seeing +the French infantry ascending the plateau of Pratzen, the key to the +Allies' position, with a firm and decided step, without once stopping to +fire. + +So, at Chattanooga, in November, 1863, Thomas's troops carried the +height of Missionary Ridge by a similar steady and determined ascent, in +spite of the volleys of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces of +artillery, and of musketry from the rebels' rifle-pits at the summit. +General Grant attributed the small number of casualties our troops +sustained in the attack to the rebels' surprise at its audacity, causing +"confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces." + + +V.--Defence against Infantry. + +1. The defence of infantry is by its fire, and therefore its proper +defensive formation is in _deployed lines_. + +2. Avoid a _premature commencement_ of the fire. Long firing exhausts +the men's energy, expends the ammunition, fouls the pieces, destroys the +soldier's confidence in his weapon, and emboldens the enemy. + +3. So, a fire upon an enemy while _under cover_, as in a wood, would be +virtually thrown away. If his fire from such a position causes us any +loss, he had better be shelled, or driven away by skirmishers, according +to circumstances. + +4. The practice of hostile regiments exchanging for a considerable time +a _musketry fire at a distance_, is highly objectionable, as it causes a +great sacrifice of life without corresponding results. Instead of +standing in line for ten minutes, receiving and returning fire at a +distance of three hundred yards, it would be much better to clear this +space at double quick in two or three minutes, and close with the enemy; +for, in returning his fire, we can do him no more harm than we receive, +while nothing decisive is accomplished. The case is, of course, +different where our own troops are behind cover, while the enemy's are +exposed. + +5. But in _special cases_, as where we have to cover a flank movement of +our second line, or of the reserve, or to await a force coming to our +support, it may be necessary to keep up an incessant fusillade, without +regard to losses received. + +6. Fire in action is of two kinds: the fire at will, and the fire by +volleys; the former kind being the rule, the latter the exception. +Although the fire at will is the one principally used, there are _very +strong objections_ to it. + +(1.) The men load and fire as individuals, and generally with great +rapidity, and under more or less excitement, rarely stopping to take a +deliberate aim. The consequence is, that very few shots take effect, and +the fire is, for the greater part, wasted, as is shown by the +well-established fact that, in every engagement, for every man killed or +disabled, there have been from three to ten thousand musket or rifle +bullets fired. + +(2.) Except on windy days, a cloud of smoke soon collects in front of a +line firing at will, hiding, more or less completely, the enemy from +view. The fire being then at random, it is, of course, unreliable. + +(3.) The fire at will leads to a rapid and enormous consumption of +ammunition. To show how serious is this objection also, it is only +necessary to consider in how many instances victory has been turned into +defeat by the premature exhaustion, by one or more regiments, of their +ammunition. + +(4.) As a necessary consequence of this rapid consumption of ammunition, +the pieces soon become fouled, and thus, to a great extent, useless. + +(5.) Troops under a musketry fire at will, soon become accustomed to it, +and its incessant din produces on them a stunning effect, which deadens, +in no small degree, their sensibility to danger. + +7. On the other hand, _volley firing_ has often been attended with +decisive results, especially when it has been reserved to the proper +moment, and delivered at short range. Instances of this have occurred in +almost every great battle we read of in history, as also in the late War +of the Rebellion. For example: at the battle of South Mountain, +Doubleday's brigade was engaged with a heavy force of rebels at some +thirty or forty paces in its front. Our men were behind a fence, firing +at will; but their fire made little or no impression on the enemy, who +attempted to charge at the least cessation of the fire. Our troops were +then made to cease firing, to lie down behind the fence, and, on the +enemy's approach to within fifteen paces, to spring up and pour in a +volley. This was so deadly, that the rebels fled in disorder, leaving +their dead and wounded, and could not be rallied again. + +At Chickamauga, in 1863, the regiments of Hazen's brigade fired only by +volleys; every one of which, it is officially reported, was powerfully +effective in checking the enemy's attacks. + +8. Nevertheless, it has been a common military saying, and supported +even by high authority, that the fire at will is _the only one possible +in action_. This assertion implies that the rank and file are not +sufficiently cool to reserve their fire, and that they must be kept +constantly occupied by the excitement, noise, and smoke of their own +fire, in order to make them remain steady in their ranks under that of +the enemy. + +As applied to raw, undisciplined, or demoralized troops, the proposition +may be, to a great extent, true. But in reference to disciplined or +veteran troops, whose _morale_ has not been impaired, it will be found +disproved on almost every page of military history; from which a few +examples will be cited hereafter. For the present, one instance will +suffice; that of Colonel Willich's regiment of Thirty-second Indiana +Volunteers, at the battle of Shiloh, in April, 1862. While under fire, +their commander, perceiving their own fire to have become "a little +wild," caused them to cease firing, and then drilled them in the manual +of arms, which they went through as if on parade; after which, they +again opened on the enemy a fire, which is reported to have been +"deliberate, steady, and effective." + +It may be here observed that, whenever troops lose their presence of +mind, there is no surer way of restoring it than by the repetition, by +their officers, in their usual tone, of any words of command they have +learned instinctively to obey on the drill-ground. + +9. Infantry, when charged in position, should reserve its fire till it +can be made _with deadly effect_, as at the distance of fifty paces; and +the volleys should be instantly followed up by a countercharge with the +bayonet on the charging enemy. For, if our fire has staggered him, a +vigorous charge will complete his repulse; and if it has not, our only +chance of success is in suddenly taking the offensive ourselves. + +Whilst awaiting his charge, we shall incur but little, if any, loss +from the enemy's fire; for the fire of troops advancing to attack is +usually of very little account. + +The only disadvantage attending a volley just before we charge is, that, +as the smoke veils us from the enemy's view, it will rob us, to some +extent, of the moral effect of our swift advance. + +But, in many cases, if the enemy see us awaiting his bayonet attack, and +reserving our fire to the very last, he loses resolution, relaxes his +speed, and then stops short, or retires. + +At Cowpens, Colonel Howard broke and routed the British line which was +advancing to attack him, by reserving his fire to within thirty yards, +and then charging with the bayonet. + +At the battle of Friedland, the Russian Imperial Guard charged on +Dupont's division with the bayonet. The French did not wait for them to +close, but rushed on with the bayonet themselves, and completely routed +them. + +10. A volley concentrated upon the enemy's _regimental colors_ will +usually disable the color-guard and the men near it; and, if promptly +followed up by a charge, may enable us to capture the colors. This is +always an important advantage; for, by the loss of its colors, a +regiment is not only dispirited, but in danger of disorganization; +these being its proper rallying-point. + +11. When infantry is acting as a _support to artillery_ which is +attacked, it should throw out sharpshooters to reply to the enemy's +skirmishers that are firing at the gunners and horses, whilst it engages +the compact mass by which it is itself attacked. + +If the enemy should commit the blunder of attacking the battery with his +entire force, without detaching to engage the support, we should profit +by it by instantly charging him in flank; but taking care not to be led +away to any distance from the battery we are protecting. + +12. Infantry, surrounded by the enemy, will often be able to _cut its +way through_ and escape. For this purpose, as the highest degree of +concentration is required, its formation should be in close column. + + +VI.--Defence against Artillery. + +1. The best defence of infantry against artillery is by the fire of +_sharpshooters_ deployed as skirmishers, to pick off the gunners and the +horses; the main body, meanwhile, occupying the most sheltered locality +it can find. + +2. Where no shelter is afforded by any natural obstacles, or by +irregularities of ground, it may be sometimes necessary to make the men +_lie down_. + +But this expedient should be used as rarely as possible, on account of +its demoralizing tendency. Troops that have become accustomed to it +cannot be expected to bravely face the enemy; and the habit is very +rapidly formed. At Bull Run, in July, 1861, a whole company was seen to +grovel in the dust at the mere snapping of a percussion-cap of one of +their own muskets. + +This demoralizing tendency does not exist, however, where troops lie +down only to enable their own artillery to fire over them. This was +shown at the battle of Pea Ridge, where several of our regiments lay on +the ground for two hours or more, while thirty of our guns were firing +over them. When, at last, this fire had silenced the enemy's guns, our +infantry then rose, charged him in a compact line, and drove him from +the field. + +3. A line of infantry may _avoid_ cannon-shot by advancing or retiring +fifty paces. A column or a square would have to move this distance, or +more, according to its depth. + +Ricochet shots may be avoided by moving fifty paces to the right or +left. + +This shifting of position is but a temporary expedient, it is true, for +the enemy's guns will soon obtain the exact range again. But for this, +several trial-shots will be requisite, thus making the enemy lose time; +and, in battle, a few minutes lost or gained have often decided between +victory and defeat. + +4. When the enemy opens an artillery fire on a square, _preparatory to a +cavalry charge_, his fire must cease when his cavalry approaches the +square; say, on its arriving within one hundred and fifty yards. To +avoid the artillery fire, the square may safely remain lying down until +the hostile cavalry has reached this point. For, as they will require +about half a minute to clear the intervening ground, the square will +still have time enough left to rise, align its ranks, and deliver a +volley before the cavalry reaches it. + + +VII.--Defence against Cavalry. + +1. The discipline of infantry is never put to a severer test than when +it is required to resist a _charge of cavalry_, properly made. The moral +effect of a charge of a body of horse at full speed, on the troops +waiting to receive it, is like that caused by the swift approach of a +locomotive under full steam, seeming quite as irresistible. It would be +so in reality, but for the counter effect produced both on the horses +and their riders by the sight of the infantry standing firm and +reserving its fire. I have been told by an old cuirassier officer, who +served through the campaigns of Napoleon with distinguished bravery, +that there was no operation that his regiment so much dreaded as a +charge upon well-disciplined infantry. + +2. This counter moral effect on the charging cavalry is the greater, +_the longer the infantry reserve their fire_; since, the less the +distance at which it is delivered, the more fatal will be its effects. A +volley at long range is not destructive enough to check the cavalry's +advance; while this effect has often been produced by the infantry +merely withholding its fire till the cavalry has approached very near; +and a volley delivered at the very last moment has, in by far the +greater number of instances, effectually repulsed the charge. + +Infantry should, therefore, let cavalry approach to within forty paces, +or nearer still, and then give them a general volley. + +At the battle of Neerwinden, in 1793, the Austrian cavalry was repulsed +by the French infantry under Dumouriez, by a volley poured in at the +very muzzles of the pieces. + +At Austerlitz, a Russian cavalry charge on French infantry in line was +repulsed by a volley delivered so near, that it stretched four hundred +troopers on the ground. The rest dispersed in disorder to the right and +left. + +3. The armor of cuirassiers is bullet-proof. To repel a charge of these +troops, therefore, it will be necessary to _aim at the horses_. Their +armor is so heavy, that the mere fall of the riders on the ground is +usually sufficient to disable them, as was the case with the French +cuirassiers at Waterloo. + +4. Infantry in line, in two ranks even, may withstand cavalry, if in +compact order, and attacked _in front_. But the slightest cavalry charge +on the flank of a line will rout it. + +At Quatre Bras, a French infantry line, advancing, repulsed a charge of +the Brunswicker Lancers under the Duke of Brunswick, by receiving it in +steadiness and good order, and then pouring in a destructive fire. + +But, in the same battle, the Sixty-ninth British Regiment was instantly +rolled up and destroyed by a charge of French cuirassiers on its flank. + +5. Where infantry is well disciplined, and its commander is cool and +prompt, it may sometimes _avoid the effect_ of a cavalry charge by other +means than its fire, or formation in square. At Talavera, a French +infantry division, drawn up in close column, seeing an English cavalry +regiment charging down upon them, avoided the shock by simply stepping +aside, thus allowing the cavalry to pass by them. A portion of the +charging troops wheeled round to follow them; but, by the cross-fire of +another division, and the charge of other cavalry, which fell upon it in +its confusion, it was completely annihilated. + +6. A line of infantry charged by cavalry in flank, and so suddenly as to +allow no time to form square, could hardly escape destruction. It would +seem that the best course to be adopted in such a case would be to _open +the ranks_ by a rapid and simultaneous movement of both of them, thus +compelling the charging cavalry to ride between them. If the front rank +should then face about, this would bring the cavalry between two fires, +which might be poured in with most destructive effect. + +But where the cavalry charges with a very wide front, or in line, this +manoeuvre might be difficult, or impossible. + +7. Whenever an infantry line is charged by cavalry in front, and it is +doubtful whether it will stand the shock, the wisest course would seem +to be to make the men lie down, and let the charging cavalry _leap over +them_. This the horses will instinctively do, with but little risk of +injury to the men, provided they lie in a position parallel to the line +of battle, thus presenting the least possible depth. It is said that the +British infantry has sometimes done this, and risen up again immediately +after the cavalry had passed. The cavalry could thus be promptly taken +in rear. + +8. In retreating, when threatened by cavalry, if there be a _long plain_ +in our rear, we must retire slowly. But if cover, or ground unfavorable +to cavalry, be near, we must reach it as soon as possible. + + +VIII.--Squares. + +1. In 1813, France was nearly exhausted of soldiers, so that Napoleon, +on hastily preparing for his campaign of that year, was obliged to +incorporate into his army a large number of raw conscripts, who had +scarcely begun their elementary drill. On the route to their respective +points of concentration, he accordingly ordered his columns to halt each +day, to practise _the three movements_ which he considered to be the +most important for infantry to be familiar with. These were, forming +battalions in square, deploying in line, and re-forming in column of +attack. + +2. In the Austrian service, squares formed by a _column in mass_ are +considered preferable to hollow ones, on the supposition that though +horses will recoil from a dense mass, they may be easily brought to +break through a shallow formation, over which they can see the open +ground. But this theory seems to be refuted by numerous facts. A large +proportion of the formations that have successfully repulsed cavalry, +since the beginning of this century, have been hollow squares. + +3. The rule laid down in the Tactics (Par. 143, Skirmishers), directing +the skirmishers, in rallying on the square, to "come to a ready without +command, and fire upon the enemy; which will also be done by the +reserve, as soon as it is unmasked by the skirmishers," is an unsound +one, for a compliance with it would be dangerous. A square cannot expect +to repulse cavalry by an irregular fire at will, but only by +well-directed _volleys_. If cavalry charge a square firing irregularly, +it will probably rout it. On the other hand, if a square wait coolly +till the cavalry is at twenty paces, its volley will be murderous. At +Waterloo, the Allied squares that reserved their fire till the French +cavalry had arrived at from twenty to forty paces, invariably repulsed +it. At that battle, Ney led eleven cavalry charges against the British +squares, every one of which failed. + +At the opening of the campaign of 1813, Napoleon had, comparatively, but +a handful of cavalry; so few, that they had to keep close to their +infantry for protection. In crossing the plains of Lutzen, a large and +splendid cavalry force of the Allies, supported by infantry and by +horse-artillery, made an attack on Ney's corps, which consisted chiefly +of young and raw recruits, who saw an enemy for the first time. The +situation was extremely dangerous, and Ney and his principal generals +threw themselves into the squares to encourage them. By volleys +delivered at a signal, the enemy's charges were all repulsed, and the +conscripts acquired great confidence from the ease with which this was +done. Ney then broke up his squares, and, pursuing the enemy in columns, +completed their repulse. + +At Auerstadt, in 1806, Davoust's French squares had to sustain a long +succession of charges from ten thousand Prussian horse. By reserving +their fire, each time, to within thirty or forty paces, its effect was +so deadly, that a rampart of dead and disabled men and horses was soon +formed around the squares, and the charges were all repulsed. + +So, at Jena, on the same day, Ney, posted in a square, allowed the +Prussian cuirassiers to charge up to within fifteen or twenty paces, +when the front attacked, at his word of command, poured in a fire which +completely repulsed the charge, strewing the whole ground with dead and +wounded. The Prussian cavalry, in that battle, are said to have been +"terrified at the sight of a motionless infantry reserving its fire." + +Again, at Mount Tabor, in 1798, General Kleber, marching with an +infantry division of only three thousand men, over an immense sandy +plain, was attacked by twelve thousand Turkish horse. The French squares +resisted their successive charges for six hours, by means of volleys +reserved till the enemy were at the very muzzles of their guns; which +soon built up a rampart around them of men and horses. Bonaparte then +arrived with another division. Dividing it into two squares, he rapidly +advanced them in such a manner as to enclose the Turks in a kind of +triangle; when, by a sudden fire upon them from three points at once, he +drove them upon each other in confusion, making them flee in every +direction. + +It may be observed, that advancing or manoeuvring in squares is +practicable only on open and level plains, like the sandy deserts of +Egypt and Syria. + +4. The best reliance of an infantry square being, therefore, on its fire +by volleys, the men should be instructed to come to a _charge bayonet_, +instead of a "ready," immediately on forming square. From this latter +position, there would be much greater danger of the volley being +prematurely delivered. The fire of a single excited man will usually be +followed by a general discharge. + +5. It may be often advisable that the volley should be delivered by +_both ranks_ at once, and not by a single one. Par. 1191, School of the +Battalion, directing that "a battalion, in square, will never use any +other than the fire by file, or by rank," should therefore be amended. + +6. Moreover, in view of what has been said as to volley-firing, and of +the examples that have been cited in confirmation, there is reason to +doubt the wisdom of the direction contained in Par. 67, School of the +Company: "The fire by file being that which is most frequently used +against an enemy, it is highly important that it be rendered perfectly +familiar to the troops. The instructor will, therefore, give it _almost +exclusive preference_." + +The fire by file, after its commencement, becomes a mere individual fire +at will. Independently of the general ineffectiveness of this kind of +fire, one would have supposed that the instructor's attention should be +rather directed to accustoming the men to the more difficult reserved +fire by volleys, instead of practising them almost exclusively in a fire +which, once learned, they will use instinctively, and without any +practice at all. + +7. Infantry _breech-loading weapons_ would be very useful to troops in +square, when charged by cavalry; since, being rapidly reloaded, they +would enable the square to repulse, with a volley, each subdivision +successively, where the charging column is formed at the usual +distances. But it is doubtful whether, on the whole, these weapons are +preferable to muzzle-loaders. Certain it is, that they exhaust the +ammunition much more rapidly, and so cause a suspension of fire, and a +withdrawal from the line of battle, till a new supply can arrive. And, +to obtain this new supply, a long time is generally required; infantry +ammunition being usually carried in the second, or more distant +ammunition train, instead of the first, or nearest one, as it ought to +be. + +8. Although a reserved fire is much the most reliable in repulsing +cavalry, the men may sometimes be ordered to commence the fire at a +_considerable distance_. In such case, they should be instructed to aim +at the horses, instead of their riders, as affording a better mark. + +9. European cavalry is often practised, on arriving within four hundred +yards, or effective grape-shot distance, of an infantry square, to halt, +and then open at the centre, unmasking a battery of horse-artillery, +which plays for a certain time on the square, when the cavalry closes +again, and charges. + +A square, however, attacked in this manner, is _not in so much danger_ +of being broken as might be imagined. The enemy's guns, after being +unmasked, would usually require several trial rounds to get the exact +range; and our sharpshooters, who could safely be thrown forward one +hundred yards, with the new rifled arms, ought, in the mean time, to +inflict such loss on the cavalry, as well as on the battery, as to cause +it either to retire, or to charge feebly, and, therefore, ineffectively. +At the very worst, the square would have ample time to re-form its +ranks, and deliver a deadly volley before the cavalry could reach it, as +it also would if this operation were attempted much nearer, say at two +hundred yards. In this last case, a few volleys from the square itself, +with the new arms, would probably be destructive enough to prevent the +charge altogether. + +10. It is hardly necessary to observe, that troops formed in square, +when charged by cavalry, can secure their safety only by _standing +firm_. A single opening will suffice to let in the enemy, who will then +easily ride over the square, and cut it in pieces. Whereas, if the +square remain unbroken, cavalry can inflict upon it no loss, or but a +trifling one. + +11. In repulsing a cavalry charge, coolness and presence of mind will +sometimes enable troops to accomplish _extraordinary results_. + +At Quatre Bras, the square of the Forty-second Highlanders was not +completed, the companies still running in to form the rear face, when +the enemy's leading troop entered. But the square, nevertheless, +finished its formation; and the French cavalry, caught, as it were, in a +net, was soon destroyed by the concentrated fire of all the fronts, +which had faced inward. + +In the same battle, the Forty-fourth British Regiment, standing in line +in two ranks, was suddenly charged in rear by the French Lancers, who +had dashed round one of their flanks for that purpose. The rear rank +suddenly faced about, and, at a very short distance, poured in a deadly +fire, which put them into confusion. On their way back to re-form, the +front rank, in its turn, gave them a volley, which destroyed great +numbers of them, and completed their rout. + +12. Even when a square has been actually broken, it is _not necessarily +lost_. If the troops are brave and well disciplined, it may sometimes be +rallied again, re-formed, and made to repulse the attacking cavalry, as +was the case with some of the Allied squares at Waterloo. + +So, at the battle of Pultusk, in 1806, a French battalion that had been +broken and overthrown by Russian cavalry, immediately rallied, fell on +the troopers floundering in the mud, and dispatched them. + +So, at the battle of Krasnoe, in 1812, a large Russian square was +retreating before the French cavalry masses. Occasionally, in order to +pass a narrow defile, it was obliged, temporarily, to break the square. +At these times the French made furious charges, penetrated into the +column, and captured men and guns. But as soon as the defile was passed, +the Russians instantly re-formed the square, and continued their +retreat. They finally succeeded in reaching Korytnia, after killing and +wounding some four hundred or five hundred of the French; though with +the loss of eight guns, one thousand prisoners, and seven hundred or +eight hundred _hors de combat_, out of five thousand or six thousand +men. + + +IX.--Skirmishers. + +We shall consider-- + +First, THEIR USE. + +Secondly, HOW THEY ARE POSTED. + +Thirdly, HOW THEY ARE HANDLED. + +Fourthly, RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISHERS. + + +A. THEIR USE. + +1. In approaching the enemy through a wooded or broken country, +skirmishers thrown out in advance, and on the flanks of the leading +column, are absolutely indispensable, in order to _reconnoitre the +ground_, and prevent a surprise. + +2. Skirmishers _protect_ the main body, or any particular portion of it, +from attack while manoeuvring. + +A regiment, or a brigade, in covered ground, whether the enemy be +visible or not, should never change its position in battle, or +manoeuvre, without the protection of a skirmishing line. + +3. They furnish a screen, behind which the main body may _hide its +movements_, and be enabled to attack at an unexpected point. + +4. Where a ravine, a wood, or other similar obstacle causes _a break in +our line of battle_, by occupying it with skirmishers we guard it +against penetration by the enemy, and connect the separated corps with +each other. + +5. Skirmishers may be used to alarm the enemy at a point where he +expected no attack, and thus _create a diversion_. + +6. By their attack at various points, they serve to _unmask the enemy's +position_. + +7. They may be employed to _open the way for a charge_ with the bayonet. + +At the battle of Stone River, the rebels, on one occasion, advanced in +line, with a double column in rear of each wing, preceded by a double +line of skirmishers, who reserved their fire till close to our line, +when they halted, poured in a murderous fire, and fell back on their +main body, which then rushed forward. Both our first and second lines, +staggered by this sudden and destructive fire, were swept from the +ground. + +8. Skirmishers have been sometimes thrown forward to _test the spirit +and disposition_ of the enemy. + +At Biberach, in 1800, the French general St. Cyr, after having carried +the place, and driven the Austrians through the defile in rear of it +back upon their main body, posted on the heights of Wittenburg, sent +forward a strong line of skirmishers to open fire on them, with the view +of ascertaining their temper and disposition after their vanguard had +been defeated and driven in. This drew forth a general and continued +discharge, like that which demoralized troops are apt to indulge in to +keep up their spirits by their own noise. Seeing this, St. Cyr instantly +prepared to charge, although he had with him but twenty thousand men, +and the Austrians numbered sixty thousand, and were in a strong +position. The result justified his decision; for, on the near approach +of the French, the Austrians fired a volley or two and then retreated in +confusion. + +9. Skirmishers should _accompany columns of attack_; for-- + +(1.) They increase the confidence of the troops they accompany. Placed +between the columns, they advance boldly because the columns advance, +and the columns advance boldly because the skirmishers do. + +(2.) Preceding the columns, by driving back the enemy's skirmishers, and +diverting his fire to themselves, they keep the attacking columns as +free from loss as possible till the shock. + +They, moreover, serve to annoy the troops we are about to attack, by the +incessant sharp buzzing of their deadly bullets among them, like so many +bees, killing some and disabling others; and this, sometimes, to such a +degree as to demoralize them. + +It is said that, at Waterloo, the swarms of skirmishers that covered the +French attacking columns so galled and excited the stationary columns +and squares of some of the Allies, as to nearly drive them from the +field. + +(3.) On the flanks of a column, they cover them from attack. + +(4.) They draw the enemy's fire prematurely, and thus render it +comparatively ineffective. + +(5.) They prevent the columns from halting to deploy and fire. + +(6.) They may sometimes conceal the direction of the march of the +attacking column, and even seize the guns that have been playing on it. + +10. In defence, if they can _encircle the enemy's advancing column_, +they may destroy it by their concentric fire. + +11. In a retreat, skirmishers _cover the rear_, so long as the enemy +attacks without cavalry. + +12. The NEW RIFLED ARMS have obviously much increased the effectiveness +of skirmishers. + + +B. HOW POSTED. + +1. They should be always _near enough to the main body to be supported +by it_, if hard pressed, and also to enable the main body to profit at +once of any advantage that may have been gained by them. + +2. They should _cover the main body_, both in front and in flank, except +where the ground may render this impracticable or unnecessary; and, in +defensive positions, they should occupy every point from which the +enemy's skirmishers might annoy us. + +3. In a defensive combat, they should be so posted as to take the +enemy's attack _in flank_: + +(1.) Because their fire will be thus the more destructive; and-- + +(2.) They will not be exposed to be driven back by the enemy's fire, or +by his advance. + +4. If thrown into an enclosure, they must have _an easy exit_. +Skirmishers feeling themselves in danger of being cut off, will lose +somewhat of that coolness which is so essential to their efficiency. + +5. They should not be kept stationary _behind a straight line_, as a +wall, a fence, or a hedge; for this would expose them to enfilade. + +6. Skirmishers are only auxiliary to the main force, and are not +capable, by themselves, of effecting any decisive result. Therefore, in +order not to exhaust the men, _heavy_ skirmishing lines should not be +used, except to lead a decided advance, or to repel one. + +7. The principle is, to post skirmishers so as to give them the _maximum +of shelter_, whilst inflicting the _maximum of loss_ on the enemy. This +applies to the placing of the whole line, and to the separate groups. +The way skirmishers produce their effect is by sharpshooting, which +requires calmness; and the more completely sheltered they are, the +calmer they will be, and the more deadly will be their aim. + + +C. HOW HANDLED. + +1. Deploy them _before coming within range of musketry_; for infantry in +compact order is a good target for the enemy. + +2. They should be kept _well in hand_; especially at the moment of +success, when they are in danger of rushing headlong to destruction. + +3. Coming upon the enemy's main body, they should _occupy him in front +and flank_ till our own main body gets up. + +4. Except in urgent cases, never deploy a line of skirmishers _on a +run_; for this makes them lose breath and calmness, and, with their +calmness, their accuracy of aim. + +So, after deployment, avoid all rapid and violent movements. + +5. Skirmishers become exhausted after long firing. The longer they +continue out, the worse they shoot. Therefore, _relieve them often_. + +6. Skirmishers should be accustomed to _lie down_ at a given signal; as +it is sometimes very important that both our artillery and infantry +should be able to fire over them. + +7. In retreat, skirmishers occupy every favorable point for _holding the +enemy in check_. + + +D. RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISHERS. + +1. In advancing, in retreat, or at a halt, use _every cover_ that +presents itself. + +2. Preserve _the alignment and the intervals_, so far as possible. On +open ground, this may be done perfectly. In woods, skirmishers should +never, for a moment, lose sight of each other. + +3. The security of the _flanks_ should be looked out for by the men near +them. + +4. Run over _exposed ground_ as quickly as possible. + +5. Approach the _crest of a hill_ with great caution. + +6. If threatened by _artillery alone_, advance and kill off the men and +horses before they get into battery. When the pieces have got into +battery, lie down, if on exposed ground, till they limber up again, and +then recommence the fire. + +7. A skirmisher, with the new rifled arms, ought, at five hundred yards, +to be _more than a match for a gun_; for, in men and horses, he has a +much larger target than the gun has in him. + +Again, with the new rifle shells, he may be able to blow up a caisson. + +8. Neither should a skirmisher have much to fear from a _single +horseman_. With his bayonet fixed, he would usually be able to defend +himself successfully against the trooper, whose sabre is the shorter +weapon of the two; more especially, if he will take care to keep on the +trooper's left, which is his exposed side. + +9. Never lose your calmness. Your power consists, not in rapid firing, +but in the _accuracy of your aim_. Avoid all hurried and violent +movements; and never raise your gun till sure of a shot. + +10. The aim, according to the Tactics, is made by bringing the gun down, +instead of raising it up. However little the soldier may be excited, he +will be apt to pull the trigger more or less too soon; that is, while +the muzzle is yet too elevated. This is the reason why infantry missiles +usually _fly too high_. The difficulty would not be obviated by causing +the aim to be made by raising the piece; for then the same disturbing +cause already mentioned, the soldier's excitement, would make the shots +fly as much too low, as they now fly too high. + +Rapid firing is another cause of this incompleteness of aim. Infantry +firing is already too rapid to be effective; so that what is claimed for +the new breech-loading weapons as an advantage, that they increase the +rapidity of fire, furnishes, on the contrary, a strong objection to +them. The effectiveness of the fire of a sharp-shooter, especially, will +be usually in inverse, instead of direct proportion to the number of +shots he delivers in a given time. + +In view of this, and of the tendency to pull the trigger before the +muzzle is sufficiently depressed, it has become an established maxim, to + + "Aim low, + Fire slow" + + + + +TACTICAL USE OF ARTILLERY. + + +The subject will be treated under the following heads:-- + + I.--HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE GROUND. + II.--HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO OUR OWN TROOPS. + III.--HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE ENEMY. + IV.--POSTING OF BATTERIES AND PIECES AS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. + V.--HOW USED. + VI.--ITS FIRE. + VII.--ITS SUPPORTS. + + +I.--How posted with respect to the Ground. + +1. Artillery has a much longer range than musketry. In order to avail +ourselves of this advantage, we must so post it as to overlook all the +ground to which its utmost range extends. It therefore requires _an +elevated position_. + +2. It has been considered an additional advantage of a commanding +position for artillery, that it enables our guns to cover our infantry, +attacking or attacked, by _firing over their heads_. + +This was done by the French at Waterloo, apparently with great effect. +But the advantage is a doubtful one; for firing over our own troops, +especially with cast-shot or shell, is very dangerous to them, and is +apt to intimidate them. It moreover furnishes to the enemy a double +target. The shot which miss our troops will be apt to fall among the +guns behind them; and some of those which do not reach the guns, will +probably take effect among the troops in front of them. + +3. But _very high_ points are unfavorable positions for batteries. +Batteries so placed would not command the ground immediately below them; +as guns cannot be depressed to fire below a certain angle without soon +destroying their carriages. And this would facilitate their capture; +for, once arrived on the ground near them, the assailants could not be +injured by their fire. It has been estimated that the slope in front of +a battery should not exceed one perpendicular to fifteen base. + +4. When guns have to be used as a support to other parts of the line, +which is often the case, their capture might lead to serious +consequences. They should therefore have the ground clear of all +obstacles which may _mask their fire_, not only in front, but to their +right and left. + +5. Although the most favorable position for guns is an eminence sloping +gradually towards the enemy, an _open and level plain_ is by no means an +unfavorable one; for, on such ground, the enemy will be visible at a +great distance, and our shot may act by ricochet, which causes more +destruction than ordinary point-blank firing. + +For ricochet, firm and even ground is requisite; on soft or rough ground +it is not attainable. + +6. In enfilading the enemy's position, or in raking his advancing +columns from head to rear, a _grazing fire_ is the most destructive that +can be used. This consists of a long succession of ricochets at low +heights. Where the ground is level and firm, we can obtain this fire at +a short distance from the enemy; as, on such ground, ricochet shots do +not rise much. But where the ground is uneven, to obtain such a fire, a +more distant position will be requisite. + +7. _Muddy_ ground is unfavorable for artillery. Over such ground, its +carriages move slowly, and its fire is less effective. Balls cannot +ricochet; and shells often sink into the mud, and thus are either +extinguished or explode with but little effect. + +Napoleon depended so much on his artillery at Waterloo that, although +every moment was precious, he delayed commencing the battle till his +chief of artillery had reported the ground, which had been covered by a +soaking rain, to be sufficiently dry for the movements and effectiveness +of that arm. The three hours' delay thus caused, would have sufficed him +to crush Wellington's army before the arrival of the Prussians. + +8. _Stony_ ground is a bad location for a battery; for the enemy's shot +will scatter the stones around it with more or less fatal effect. + +9. _Rough_ or _uneven_ ground immediately in front of a battery is not +objectionable, as it will stop the enemy's shot. + +10. A battery, when it is possible to avoid it, should not be posted +within musket range of _woods_, _bushes_, _ravines_, _hedges_, +_ditches_, or other cover from which the enemy's sharpshooters might +kill off the gunners, or, by a sudden dash, capture the guns. + +11. To prevent the enemy from approaching a battery under cover, it +should be so placed as to be able to sweep all _villages_, _hollows_, +and _woods_, in front and in flank. + +12. In taking up a position, a battery should avail itself of all +_inequalities of the ground_, for the shelter of its pieces and gunners, +or of its limbers and caissons, at least. + +For the same purpose, a battery posted on an eminence should have its +pieces some ten paces behind its crest. + +13. Where the ground affords no shelter, and where the position of the +guns is not likely to be changed, it may be worth while to cover them by +an _epaulement_ or breastwork, some three feet, or more, high. + + +II.--How posted with respect to our own Troops. + +1. In order to be ready to support the flanks of our attacking columns, +and to aid in the defence in every part of the field, batteries should +be placed at _several different points_ in the line of battle. + +2. In a defensive battle especially, as it is uncertain on what point +the enemy will mass his principal attack, the artillery should usually +be distributed _through the whole line_. + +3. A line of battle has been compared to the _front of a fortification_, +of which the infantry is the curtain, and the artillery batteries the +bastions. + +4. The _lighter_ guns should be placed on the _salient_ points of our +line, from which they can be more easily withdrawn; the heavier guns, +constituting the stationary batteries, on the more retired points. + +5. Pieces should not be placed _in prolongation with troops_; for this +would be giving the enemy a double mark. Artillery posted in front of +other troops will draw a fire on them. When a battery must be placed in +front of the line, let the infantry in rear of it clear the ground by +ploying into double columns. + +6. Never place artillery so as to _impede the movements of the other two +arms_. A battery posted in front of the centre would often hamper the +movements of the infantry; besides being peculiarly exposed to a +converging fire from the enemy's batteries. + +7. The safest position for a battery is on that wing which is most +secure from a flank attack. + +But guns should re-enforce the weaker points, thus making the enemy +attack the strongest ones. + +Therefore, _where a wing is weak_, place the largest number of guns +there, to support it. If we have one wing entirely uncovered, of four +batteries, for instance, we should give three to the uncovered wing. + +8. Of the heavy batteries, one, at least, should be placed in the first +line, so that we may be able to open an effective fire on the enemy at +the _earliest possible moment_. + +9. The prompt use, at the proper moment, of the reserve, may decide the +battle. The movements of heavy artillery, therefore, are too slow for +the reserve, which should have most of the light pieces. _Horse +artillery_ is especially suitable for it. + +10. Guns near an infantry square should be posted at its _angles_. If +the square is charged by cavalry, the gunners run into the square, after +filling their ammunition pouches, which they take in with them, as well +as their sponges and other equipments. The limbers and caissons are sent +to the rear; or, if there is no time to do this, they may be brought +into the square. If this is impossible, they may be formed into a +barricade. + +At Waterloo, on the French cavalry's retiring from their charges on the +enemy's squares, the British gunners rushed out from the squares in +which they had taken refuge, and plied their guns on the retiring +squadrons. + + +III.--How posted with respect to the Enemy. + +1. If the enemy's batteries are concentrated in one position, by placing +our own batteries properly we may obtain a powerful _cross-fire_ on +them. + +2. It is always advantageous to so dispose our batteries as to take +those of the enemy _in enfilade_, or obliquely (_en echarpe_, as it is +called). + +At the battle of Murfreesboro', in December, 1862, a rebel battery, +being taken in enfilade by one of our own, was silenced in about five +minutes. + +3. So, also, if we can obtain an oblique or enfilading fire _on his +troops_, it will be very destructive. A flanking battery, raking the +enemy's position, is often enough, of itself, to decide a battle. + +Thus, the battle of Chippewa was finally decided by our getting a gun or +two in a flanking position, enabling us to enfilade the British line. + +So, at the battle of Shiloh, the rebels' triumphant advance on the +evening of the first day was effectually checked by the fire of our +gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, which had taken an enfilading position +opposite their right flank. + +4. For this reason, we must never post one of our own batteries so that +the enemy's guns will take it _obliquely_, or _in flank_; unless, +indeed, by doing so, we may probably obtain some important and decisive +effect before it can be destroyed, or made unserviceable. + +5. Batteries should be so placed as to _command the whole ground in our +front_, even almost up to our bayonets, and so as to be able to direct +their fire towards every point; at all events, so that a fire can be +kept up on the enemy till he is within short musket-range. + +It is manifest that the best position for a battery, to enable it to +effectually cover the entire ground in our front, would not be in our +line of battle, but in advance of one of its flanks, from which it could +take the enemy's troops advancing over it, in enfilade. + +6. Artillery fire from _an unexpected quarter_ always has a powerful +moral effect. Two guns, even, hoisted up to a place where the enemy does +not dream of there being any, may have a decisive effect. + + +IV.--Posting of Batteries and of Pieces as between themselves. + +1. The best mode of posting batteries is in the form of a crescent, its +horns pointing towards the enemy, or forming the sides of a re-entering +angle; for this gives a _convergent fire_ to the enemy's divergent one. + +Its inconvenience is, the exposure of its flanks to attack, or to +enfilade. Therefore, when such a position is adopted, its flanks must be +protected by natural obstacles or by artificial defences. + +2. Batteries, or parts of batteries, should be at _supporting distances_ +from each other; that is, not over six hundred yards apart, so as to +effectually cover the whole ground between them, in case of need, with +grape and canister. When rifled guns are used, this distance may be +increased. + +3. _A long line of guns_ in our line of battle is objectionable; for, if +it should become necessary to withdraw them, they would leave a +dangerous interval. + +4. It is dangerous to collect _a great many pieces in one battery_, +especially in the beginning of an action, when the enemy is fresh, for +it strongly tempts him to capture it. When used, such a battery should +have powerful supports to protect it, or should be sheltered by a +village, a defile, or other cover, occupied beforehand. + +5. Although, to be used offensively, guns should be in strong masses, in +order to strike a decisive blow on some single point; this is by no +means the case when _used defensively_; for, + +(1.) It is only when guns are more or less scattered over different +parts of the field, that they can be made to give a cross-fire on the +enemy's advancing columns, or on any part of his line. + +(2.) If the position where they are massed does not happen to be +attacked, they become useless, while stripping the rest of the line. + +(3.) If they are captured, all the artillery is lost at once, as +happened to the Austrians at the battle of Leuthen, causing their +defeat. + +6. A certain number of pieces of horse-artillery must always be _kept in +reserve_, so that, if an artillery fire at any point should be suddenly +wanted, it may be furnished with the least possible delay. + +7. Guns of _various calibres_ should never be in the same battery, to +prevent confusion as to the respective ranges, and in the supply of +their ammunition. + +8. An independent section or battery should never consist of _howitzers +alone_, for the proper fire of these pieces is too slow to be effective +in repulsing an attack on them. + +9. There should always be _wide intervals_ between the pieces; otherwise +the battery would offer too good a mark to the enemy. + + +V.--How used. + +First, GENERALLY. +Secondly, IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT. +Thirdly, IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT. +Fourthly, AGAINST INFANTRY. +Fifthly, AGAINST CAVALRY. +Lastly, AGAINST ARTILLERY. + + +A. GENERALLY. + +1. So far as is possible, guns should be kept _hidden from the enemy_ +till the moment of opening on him. They may be masked by the ground, or +other cover, natural or artificial, or by troops placed in front of +them. The surprise will add much to their effect. Moreover, concealed, +they will be less exposed to be taken. Nothing discourages troops more +than the loss of a battery at the beginning of an action. + +2. A desultory and indiscriminate artillery fire will accomplish +nothing. To effect any thing important, it must be _concentrated on some +object_; and the fire must be persevered in till the desired effect has +been produced. + +3. It is a general principle that artillery should not reply to the +enemy's batteries, unless compelled to by their effect on our own +troops. To obtain the most decisive effects from artillery fire, it +should be directed _on the enemy's troops_, instead of his guns. + +4. If it should become advisable to silence one of his batteries, it +will be done more promptly and effectually by the employment, for this +purpose, of _two_ of our own batteries, than of a single one. + +5. There is usually great advantage in keeping our batteries constantly +_shifting their position_; for then-- + +(1.) They have the effect of a surprise, by opening on the enemy at +some unexpected point. + +(2.) They make the enemy believe our guns to be more numerous than they +really are. + +(3.) They are in less danger of being captured. + +But these changes of position are attended with this inconvenience, that +they expose the horses to be taken in flank by the enemy's batteries and +sharpshooters. + +6. The movements of a battery in the field should be _as rapid as +possible_; for, while moving, it is helpless and exposed. + +Moreover, celerity of movement and accuracy of fire will often more than +compensate for inferiority in the number of guns; as was the case at the +battle of Palo Alto, in the Mexican War, where the enemy's guns +outnumbered ours two to one. + + +B. IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT. + +1. When used to _prepare for an attack_ of infantry or cavalry, +artillery concentrates as much fire as possible on the point where the +attack is to be made, in order to overcome the resistance there, and +thus make success easy. + +2. When there are several points on which our fire should be directed, +we must not batter them all at once, but concentrate our whole fire on +them _in succession_. + +3. In attack, artillery should _not be split up_ among different +brigades or divisions; else no decisive result can be expected from it. +Whole batteries, used together, will have a more telling effect than if +scattered over the field in separate sections. + +In no case should less than two pieces be used together; for, while one +piece is being loaded, the piece and its gunners need the protection of +another one ready to be discharged. + +4. Pieces in support of an infantry column of attack should never be in +its rear, but _on its flanks_, near its head, in which position it will +best encourage the infantry. But if a battery have already a position +from which it can afford to the attack effective assistance, it should +remain in it; sending a few pieces to accompany the infantry, which +always greatly values artillery support. + +5. Powerful effects may be produced by the _sudden assemblage of a great +number of guns_ on some particular point. This was a favorite +manoeuvre of Napoleon; who, by his rapid concentration of immense +batteries of light artillery on the important point, usually obtained +the most decisive results. At Wagram, for instance, when Macdonald's +column was ready to make its great charge on the Austrian centre, +Napoleon suddenly massed one hundred guns in front of his own centre, +and made it advance in double column at a trot, then deploy into line on +the leading section, and concentrate its fire on the villages forming +the keys to the enemy's position, in front of his right and left wings +respectively; each battery opening its fire on arriving at half-range +distance. The effect was overwhelming. + +6. The _nearer_ artillery delivers its fire, the more powerful, of +course, are its effects. Horse artillery, in sufficient strength, +attacking the enemy at short grape-shot distance, say within three +hundred or four hundred yards, may lose half its pieces, but with the +other half it will probably decide the battle at that point. + +At Palo Alto, Duncan's rapid closing with his guns to less than half +range, drove back the Mexican right wing, which could not stand the +destructive fire. + +7. _Horse artillery_ does not usually attempt to follow up cavalry in +its attack; but takes a position to cover its retreat, if repulsed, or +to push forward in support, in case of success. + +8. When cavalry has to _debouch from a defile_, horse artillery may +render it most effectual assistance, by taking a position that will +enable the cavalry to form without fear of being charged and destroyed +while forming. + + +C. IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT. + +1. Artillery should always reserve its fire till the enemy's _real +attack_. + +2. It should play on that portion of the hostile force that _threatens +us most_. + +3. It should wait till the enemy has come within _destructive distance_, +and then open on his columns with a concentrated fire. + +4. It should protect our troops _while manoeuvring_, and accompany +them in retreat. + +5. We must _subdivide our batteries_ whenever we wish to obtain +cross-fires on a _debouche_, or on the head of an advancing column, or +on the ground in front of a weak part of our line. By so doing, we +compel the enemy to divide his own artillery in order to reply to our +fire. + +6. A _sudden concentration_ of a great number of guns at some particular +point may be used with the same decisive effect in a defensive, as in +an offensive battle; though in this case, artillery plays, for the time +being, a part strictly offensive. + +At the battle of Friedland, where the French were attacked by the +Russians in overwhelming numbers, Ney's corps was driven back by a +terrific concentrated fire, in front and in flank, from the Russian +batteries on the opposite side of the river; its own artillery being too +feeble to stand before them. Seeing this, Napoleon instantly ordered all +the guns of the different divisions of the corps next to Ney's, on the +left, to be united and thrown in one mass in front of Ney's corps. +Taking post at some hundred paces in front, these batteries, by their +powerful fire, soon silenced the Russian batteries; then advancing on +the Russian troops that had crossed the river to within grape-shot +range, they made frightful havoc in their deep masses. The French +infantry, profiting by this, rushed forward and captured the village of +Friedland, driving the enemy in their front over the bridges, which they +then burned. This was decisive of the battle; for the whole Russian army +was then driven into the river. + +So, at the battle of Kunersdorff, in 1759, after Frederick's left and +centre had driven the Russians, and captured seventy guns and many +prisoners, Soltikoff promptly massed the whole artillery of his right +wing at a single point behind a ravine, which, by its concentrated fire, +swept away the flower of the Prussian army in their efforts to force its +passage; and Frederick was badly defeated. + +7. When compelled to retreat, guns should _retire successively_, in +echelons of batteries, half-batteries, or sections, in order that the +fire of one may cover the limbering up and retreat of another. + +Besides the mutual support thereby afforded, these successive +face-abouts of artillery have a powerful moral effect on the pursuing +enemy, already more or less disorganized by success. + +It would be well for some pieces in each echelon to be kept loaded with +canister, so as to drive the enemy back if he should press very close. + +8. The protection afforded by artillery in retreat is very powerful, as +it keeps the enemy constantly _at a distance_. + +A fine example of the use of it for this purpose occurred just before +the battle of Pea Ridge, in March, 1862. A rear-guard of six hundred +men, under General Sigel, was retreating before a force of four +regiments of infantry and cavalry, that followed and attacked it on +every side. Sigel disposed his guns in echelons, the one of which +nearest the enemy played on his attacking squadrons with grape and +shell, which suddenly checked them. Instantly profiting by their +temporary hesitation, the echelon limbered up and galloped away to +another position, while the next echelon, again checking the enemy by +its fire, followed its example. By this means, Sigel, cutting his way +through a vastly superior force, succeeded, after a retreat of ten +miles, in rejoining the main body with but trifling loss. + +9. If driven to the last extremity, the gunners should try, at least, to +_save the horses_, and to blow up the caissons they have to abandon. + +At the battle of La Rothiere, in 1814, where Napoleon, with thirty-two +thousand men, was overwhelmed by one hundred thousand Allies, and was +obliged to leave fifty guns on the field, he succeeded in bringing off +all his gunners and horses. + + +D. AGAINST INFANTRY. + +1. It is an important rule that artillery should play on the enemy's +_troops_, without attending to his batteries, except in urgent cases. + +2. Against a _deployed line_, whether marching by the front or by a +flank, case-shot, that is, grape, canister, and spherical case +(sometimes called _shrapnel_), are most suitable; as these all scatter, +right and left, to a considerable distance. + +The best effect of canister is within two hundred yards. Beyond three +hundred and fifty yards, it should not be used. + +The best effect of grape is within four hundred yards. Over six hundred +yards, it is not very effective. + +Spherical case is effective at much greater distances, its range being +nearly equal to that of solid shot. + +Against a line of infantry at a greater distance than six hundred yards, +spherical case should be used, chiefly, if not exclusively; as being +more likely to be effective than ball. + +3. But case-shot are _unsuitable against a column_, as they consist of a +number of small balls which have not momentum enough to penetrate into +it to any depth. When the enemy advances in columns, solid shot should +plough through them from head to rear, a cross-fire being obtained upon +them when possible. + +4. Especially should _round-shot_ be used against a close column rushing +to attack us through a defile. Grape and canister might sweep down the +leading ranks, but the mass of the column sees not the destructive +effect; and being carried forward by the pressure of the ranks behind, +continues to rush on till the battery is carried, though with more or +less loss. + +At the battle of Seven Pines, on one occasion, when the rebels were +advancing in close columns, they were plied with grape and canister from +two of our batteries with but little effect. Every discharge made wide +gaps in their leading ranks, but these were instantly filled again, and +the columns pressed on. + +A round-shot, on the other hand, comes shrieking and tearing its way +through the entire column, carrying destruction to the very rear-most +ranks. The hesitation produced is not limited to the leading ranks, but +extends throughout the column. Thus both the actual and the moral effect +of ball on a close column is much superior to that of grape or canister. + +At the bridge of Lodi, the Austrian gunners plied the French column +with grape. If they had used round-shot instead, it is doubtful whether +Bonaparte would have succeeded in carrying the bridge. + +5. But a direct fire with ball on the head of a column of attack would +be much assisted by the fire of a few light pieces taking it _in flank_. +And, for this fire in flank, case-shot would be powerfully effective; +for, from their wide scattering, both their actual and their moral +effects would extend through the whole column, from front to rear. + +6. A battery with _guns enough to keep up a continuous fire_ has little +to fear from an open attack on it by infantry alone. Napoleon observed +that no infantry, without artillery, can march one thousand yards on a +battery of sixteen guns, well directed and served; for, before clearing +two-thirds of the way, they will have been all killed, wounded, or +dispersed. + +This remark was made in reference to smooth-bore guns; the new rifled +guns should be still more destructive. + +7. _Against skirmishers_, as they offer but a poor mark for ball, grape +and canister should alone be used. + +E. AGAINST CAVALRY. + +1. The ground round a battery should be so obstructed as to _prevent the +enemy's cavalry from closing on it_; but in the case of a light battery, +intended for manoeuvre, so far only as this can be done without +impeding the movements of the battery itself. + +2. On being threatened by cavalry, a light battery may sometimes +promptly change its position to one where the cavalry would attack it +_at great disadvantage_. For instance, if posted on an eminence, and +cavalry should attempt to carry it by charging up the slope, instead of +awaiting the charge in a position which would allow the cavalry to +recover breath, and form on the height, it might run its pieces forward +to the very brow of the slope, where the cavalry, having lost their +impetus, and with their horses blown, would be nearly helpless and +easily repulsed. + +3. At a distance, the most effective fire on cavalry is with +_howitzers_, on account of the terror and confusion caused among the +horses by the bursting of the shells. + +On the cavalry's flanks, when within four hundred or five hundred +yards, the fire with grape would be most effective. + +4. The _last discharge_ should be of canister alone, and made by all the +pieces at once, when the battery should be swiftly withdrawn. + +5. If the cavalry succeed in reaching the pieces before their +withdrawal, the gunners may find temporary refuge _under the carriages_. + + +F. AGAINST ARTILLERY. + +1. As guns in the field should generally play on troops instead of +batteries, there should be a _reserve of horse artillery_ to take the +enemy's batteries in flank, in case of need, as well as for other +purposes. + +2. Though the ordinary use of artillery is against infantry and cavalry +only, special circumstances may render it expedient that a certain +portion of it should _respond to the enemy's batteries_. In this case, +not over one-third should be used for that purpose. + +3. When we have _guns in abundance_, it might be sometimes advisable, by +using several batteries at once, to silence the enemy's guns, before +beginning to play on his troops. + +4. Artillery properly plays on the enemy's _guns_-- + +(1.) At the moment of their coming into action, for then they are so +exposed that our fire will be peculiarly effective, and perhaps to such +a degree as to prevent their opening on us. + +(2.) When our troops move forward to attack, in order to draw away from +them the fire of the enemy's batteries, or, at least, to render it +unsteady, inaccurate, and ineffective; and + +(3.) Generally, when his guns are causing us very great damage. + +5. _Against guns_, solid shot or shells only should be used, since they +alone are capable of inflicting any serious injury on either guns or +their carriages: solid shot, by their great weight and momentum; shells, +by their bursting. + +But within three hundred or four hundred yards, grape and canister would +soon destroy the gunners and the horses. + +6. Our fire on a hostile battery would not only be very effective when +it is coming into action, but at all other times _when its flanks are +exposed_; as in limbering up to move off, or in a flank march. On these +occasions we should use grape, if near enough; otherwise, spherical case +would be generally the best. + +7. When possible to avoid it, _a field battery should not be opposed to +a battery of position_, or, generally, a battery of light guns to one +of heavy guns. For even when the numbers of pieces on the two sides are +equal, the enemy's superiority in range and in weight of metal would +give him such advantage in the duel that our own battery would soon be +destroyed or silenced. + + +VI.--Its Fire. + +1. It is important not to commence the fire till our guns are in _sure +range_-- + +(1.) Because a harmless fire serves but to embolden the enemy and +discourage our own troops. + +(2.) Because artillery ammunition should never be wasted. The fate of a +battle will sometimes depend on there being a sufficient supply of it at +a particular moment. + +2. The usual maximum distances at which smooth-bore field guns may open +fire _with any considerable effect_, are-- + + For 12-pounders 1100 yards. + For 6 " 750 " + +What these distances are in respect to rifled guns, it does not appear +to be yet definitively settled. The extreme range of the new rifled +six-pounders is said to be three thousand yards; of the twelve-pounders, +four thousand five hundred yards. + +3. Guns are usually fired _by order_, and not by salvos, or volleys; and +never as soon as loaded, unless delay be dangerous. Artillery fire is +formidable only in proportion to its accuracy; and this is attainable +only by a cool and calculated aim. + +4. Artillery fire should never cease _through the whole line at once_. +This would have a discouraging effect on our own troops, and an +inspiriting one on the enemy's. Especially must this not be done when we +are about to execute any manoeuvre; for it would be sure to call the +enemy's attention to it. + +Therefore, if a particular battery has to change its position, it must +not cease the fire of all its pieces at once; for, besides its +disquieting effect on our troops, it would notify the enemy of the +movement. + +5. In _covering an attack_, our guns should keep up their fire till the +moment it would begin to endanger our advancing columns. + +6. By a _ricochet_ fire, artillery is said to increase its effect, from +one-fourth to one-half. It is especially effective in enfilading a line +of troops, a battery, or the face of a work taken in flank. + +Ricochet shots have also great moral effect. + +7. When used against _breastworks of rails or logs of wood_, guns should +be fired with moderate or shattering charges; so as more surely to +demolish them, and, at the same time, to increase the destructive effect +of the fire by scattering the splinters. + +In view of the frequent necessity of battering such defences, and of +using a ricochet fire, which also requires small charges of powder, it +would be an improvement in our artillery service to make a certain +proportion of the ammunition in each gun limber to consist of cartridges +of half the usual size. + +8. In _bombarding a village_ during a battle, if our object be to set +fire to and destroy it, this will be best accomplished with shells. If +we wish merely to drive the enemy from it, solid shot from heavy +calibres will be necessary, which will more surely reach and destroy his +troops, wherever they may show themselves. + +9. The _moral effect_, both of solid shot and of shells, is much greater +than that of grape or other case-shot, from their more fearful effects +on the human frame, and from the great number of men that a single ball +or shell will kill or fatally wound. One twelve-pound solid shot has +been known to kill forty-two men, who happened to be exactly in its +range. + +10. _Ball and shell_ should be used-- + +(1.) When the enemy is at a distance. +(2.) When he is in mass. +(3.) When he is in several lines. +(4.) When his line may be enfiladed. + +11. In _silencing a battery_, our fire should be concentrated on one +piece at a time, while some of our guns throw spherical case, from a +raking position, if possible, on the gunners. + +12. Though grape has a much less range than ball, yet _within four +hundred yards_, on account of its scattering, its effect is superior to +it. + +The fire of guns double shotted with ball and a stand of grape, is +fearfully destructive when used at a short distance to repel a charge. + +13. It is artillerymen's point of honor _not to abandon their pieces +till the last extremity_. They should always remember that when the +enemy is closing on them, the last discharge will be the most +destructive of all, and may suffice to repulse the attack and turn the +tide of battle. + +In our attack on Quebec, in our War of Independence, on the near +approach of our assaulting column, the British gunners fled from their +pieces; but the one who fled last, before leaving, discharged his gun, +which was loaded with grape. The discharge killed and wounded several of +our men; among them the brave General Montgomery, who was leading the +column in person. The effect was decisive. The assailants fell back, +panic-struck at the loss of their commander; and our attack failed. + +14. To prevent our own captured pieces from being turned on us by the +enemy, it is the artillerymen's last duty, when it has become evident +that the guns cannot be saved, to _spike_ them. The operation requiring +but a few moments, it can rarely be omitted without disgrace. + + +VII.--Its Supports. + +1. Artillery must always be protected from the _melee_, in which it is +helpless whether against infantry or cavalry; and should therefore have +a strong _support_. + +2. A portion, at least, of every artillery support, should consist of +_sharpshooters_, whose fire will be the most effective in driving off +skirmishers sent forward to threaten or attack the guns, or to pick off +the gunners. + +3. Batteries must be secured _on both flanks_, and their supports will +be posted with that view; on one or on both flanks, according to +circumstances, and more or less retired. + +4. A support should never be directly _in rear_ of the battery, where it +would be in danger, not only of receiving the shots aimed at the +battery, but also of killing the gunners belonging to it, as has +repeatedly happened during the late war. + +5. A battery and its support owe each other _mutual protection_. +Therefore, when an infantry support, after holding the enemy in check, +to enable the battery to limber up and retire, is obliged, in its turn, +to retreat, the battery should take such a position as will enable it to +cover the retreat by its fire. + +6. A battery consisting of any considerable number of pieces may be +able, sometimes, to _dispense with a support_. + +During the battle of Ucles, in Spain, in 1809, the French artillery, +under General Senarmont, had been left behind, owing to the badness of +the roads. The Spaniards came down upon it in large force. On their +approach, the guns were formed in square, and, by their fire on every +side, defended themselves successfully, and finally repulsed the enemy. + +So, at Leipsic, in 1813, when the grand battery of the Guard, which had +been left temporarily without a support, was charged by the Russian +hussars and Cossacks, Drouot, its commander, rapidly drew back its +flanks till they nearly met; and the cavalry were soon repulsed by its +fire. + +7. At the battle of Hanau, in 1813, Drouot's eighty guns were charged by +the Allied cavalry. Having no supports, he placed his gunners in front +of them with their carbines. This checked the cavalry, who were then +covered with grape, which drove them back to their lines. + +Ought not our gunners also to have _carbines slung on their backs_ for +such emergencies? Against infantry, our guns would often need no other +support. The carbines could be used to reply to the enemy's skirmishers; +and the example just cited shows that, thus equipped, artillerymen may +sometimes successfully defend their pieces even against cavalry. + + + + +TACTICAL USE OF CAVALRY. + + +We shall consider-- + + I.--ITS FORMATIONS. + II.--ITS STRONG AND ITS WEAK POINTS. + III.--HOW IT IS POSTED. + IV.--ITS SUPPORTS. + V.--HOW IT IS USED. + VI.--HOW IT FIGHTS. + VII.--ITS CHARGE. +VIII.--ITS ATTACK ON INFANTRY. + +And shall conclude with some-- + +IX.--GENERAL REMARKS. + + +I.--Its Formations. + +1. The _formations_ of cavalry for battle are either-- + +(1.) In deployed lines. +(2.) Lines of regiments, in columns of attack doubled on the centre. +(3.) A mixed formation of lines and columns. +(4.) Echelons of lines or columns; or-- +(5.) Deep columns. + +2. _Deployed lines_ are not objectionable in principle. They are often +not advisable; but are sometimes necessary. + +But long, continuous lines should always be avoided; being unfavorable +to rapid manoeuvring, which cavalry is constantly called upon to +execute in the field. + +3. Cavalry has, in its horses, an unreasoning element, which is not +controllable, like men; and is therefore much more easily thrown into +disorder than infantry. For this reason, when deployed, it should always +be _in two lines_; the second behind the first; the first line deployed, +and the second in columns of squadrons by platoons. There should be also +a reserve at a few hundred paces behind the second line. + +The second line should be near enough to the first to be able to support +it, if checked; but not so near as to partake in its disorder, if +repulsed. + +4. Cavalry should be always _in column_ when expecting to manoeuvre, +or to be called on to make any rapid movement; this being the formation +best adapted for celerity. + +5. Cavalry deploys _in lines_-- + +(1.) When preparing for a charge in line. + +(2.) When preparing for any attack requiring the utmost possible width +of front; as where the enemy is to be suddenly surrounded. + +(3.) When it becomes necessary in order to prevent our troops from being +outflanked by the enemy's. + +(4.) When exposed to continued artillery fire, which is much less +destructive on a line than on a column. + +6. Cavalry should always present _a front at least equal to the +enemy's_; otherwise, its flank, which is cavalry's weak point, will be +exposed to attack. When inferior in numbers, we may extend our line by +leaving intervals, more or less wide, between its different corps. Any +hostile squadrons that may attempt to pass through these intervals to +take the line in rear, could be taken care of by the second line. + +7. The best formation in respect to _mobility_ is a line of regiments in +columns by squadrons, doubled on the centre; corresponding to infantry +double columns. + +8. The _mixed formation_ of lines and columns is more manageable than +simple lines. Which of these two is preferable depends upon the ground, +and upon all the other circumstances of the case. + +9. The order _in echelons_ is as good in attack as in retreat; since the +echelons mutually support each other. + +10. Decidedly the most objectionable of all cavalry formations is that +in _deep columns_: + +(1.) From the almost entire loss which it involves of its sabres, which +are cavalry's peculiar and most effective weapon. + +(2.) From the long flanks which it exposes to attack. + +11. The formation in _one rank_, instead of two, has been introduced by +the new Cavalry Tactics, though it has been as yet but partially adopted +in the field. + +This innovation has two advantages. It doubles the number of sabres to +be used against the enemy; and it enables the cavalry to cover double +the ground; thus doubling, also, its power to outflank, which is a +valuable advantage, especially when opposed to cavalry. + +Its disadvantage is, that it must, more or less seriously, impair the +solidity and vigor of the cavalry charge proper; in which a whole line, +with "boot to boot" compactness, comes at once to the shock, like some +terrific mechanical engine; and in which the riders in the front rank +are compelled to dash on with full speed to the last; knowing that if +they slacken rein, even for a moment, they would be ridden over by the +rear-rank men one yard behind them. From there being no rear-rank to +fill up the gaps caused, during the charge, by the enemy's missiles, or +by casualties occasioned by obstacles of the ground, the charging line +must generally arrive on the enemy broken and disunited, or as foragers. +The moral effect of such a charge on our own men will be unfavorable, as +they will not realize the certainty of mutual support at the critical +moment; and its moral effect on the enemy must be decidedly inferior to +that produced by a charge that is at once swift, solid, and compact. + +But the force of this objection is somewhat weakened, by the +consideration that the compact charge of "cavalry of the line" must +hereafter be comparatively rare, in consequence of the introduction of +rifled artillery and infantry weapons, with their greatly increased +accuracy and range; which ought to cause such slaughter in a line or +column of charging cavalry, that, if it arrive at all to the shock, it +would generally be only in scattered groups. + +12. In advancing over wooded, or other obstructed ground, it may be +necessary to break the line into _company columns of fours_, as in the +infantry manoeuvre of advancing by the flanks of companies. + +As the cavalry column of fours corresponds to the march of infantry by +the flank, the use of this formation in action is open to the same +objections that have been already pointed out as applying to flank +marches by infantry. + + +II.--Its Strong and its Weak Points. + +1. The value of cavalry on the battle-field consists chiefly in its +velocity and mobility. Its strength is in the _sabre-point and spurs_. + +2. Its charge is accompanied with a _powerful moral effect_, especially +upon inexperienced troops. But, + +3. Cavalry has but _little solidity_, and cannot defend a position +against good infantry. For, if it remain passive on the ground it is to +hold, the infantry will soon destroy it by its fire, to which it cannot, +with any effect, reply; and if it attack at close quarters, the +infantry, by means of its defensive formations, will be able, at least, +to hold its ground, and probably repulse its charges by a reserved +fire. So that the cavalry will finally have no alternative but to +retire. + +4. It is exposed and helpless _during a change of formation_; like +artillery limbering up, or coming into action. + +5. _On its flanks_, it is the weakest of all arms. A single squadron +attacking it suddenly in flank, will break and rout cavalry of ten times +its number. + +At the battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon kept a few squadrons in rear of +either flank, which, on his line being charged by a formidable body of +Mamelukes, vastly superior to his own cavalry in numbers, horses, and +equipments, nevertheless suddenly fell on their flanks and destroyed +them. + +6. Cavalry is never so weak as directly _after a successful charge_; +being then exhausted, and in more or less disorder. + + +III.--How Posted. + +1. A part of our cavalry must be so posted as to _secure our flanks_; +remaining in column behind the wings, till the enemy's movements require +its deployment. + +If one wing is covered by natural obstacles, give the cavalry to the +uncovered wing; posting it in rear of the flank battalion of the second +line. + +2. When cavalry is posted on the flanks, it should _not usually be on +the first line of infantry_. If it is to be used for attack, it is +better to keep it retired from view till the last moment, in order to +strengthen its attack by the powerful moral effect of a surprise. And, +used defensively, it will be best posted on the flanks of the second +line; since, in advancing to charge, it must have a clear space in its +front of at least two hundred or three hundred yards, to enable it to +act with freedom and vigor. + +3. But if a position can be found for cavalry in front, where it would +not be too much exposed, this may sometimes enable it to exercise an +important moral effect, by _threatening the flank_ of such of the +enemy's troops as may be sent forward to attack. + +At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, the Wurtemburg cavalry was launched +against Blucher's Prussian cavalry. But, seeing the Prussians drawn up +not only in front, but opposite their flank, they lost confidence, +charged feebly, and too late. They were consequently repulsed and +driven back on the Marine Battalion, which they threw into confusion. + +So, at the battle of Prairie Grove, in December, 1862, the First Iowa +Cavalry, which was held in reserve, by its mere presence, caused every +attempt of the rebels' flanking regiments to be abandoned. + +4. In order not to impede the manoeuvres of the infantry, cavalry +should not _fill intervals_ in the lines, or be placed between the +lines. + +It is dangerous when the ground is such as to require the cavalry in the +centre of the first line; for, if it is beaten, a gap is left through +which the enemy may penetrate. At the battle of Blenheim, in 1704, +Marlborough owed his victory, in great measure, to the Allies' forcing +back the cavalry forming the centre of the French army; thus turning the +whole of its right wing, and compelling the infantry posted at Blenheim +to surrender. + +5. Yet cavalry should always be near enough to the infantry to take +immediate part in the combat; and although it should not be posted in +the intervals between infantry corps, it may _debouch through them_, in +order to attack more promptly. + +At the battle of Friedland, the Russian cavalry charged a French +infantry division. Latour Maubourg's dragoons and the Dutch cuirassiers, +riding through the battalion intervals, charged the Russians in turn, +and drove them back on their infantry, throwing many of them into the +river. + +6. When _both wings are uncovered_, the best place for the cavalry will +usually be in rear of the centre of the second line; whence it can be +sent in the shortest time to either wing. + +7. Cavalry should not be _scattered over the field_ in small +detachments, but be kept massed at one or more suitable points; as +behind the centre, or behind one wing, or both wings. A small cavalry +force should be kept entire; or it will have very little chance of +effecting any thing whatever. + +Cavalry of the line, to produce its decisive effects, must be used in +heavy masses. In the beginning of the Napoleonic wars, the French +cavalry was distributed among the divisions. Napoleon's subsequent +experience led him to give it more concentration, by uniting in one mass +all the cavalry belonging to each army corps; and, finally, these masses +were again concentrated into independent cavalry corps; leaving to each +army corps only cavalry enough to guard it. + +8. For tactical operations in the field, cavalry insufficient in number +is _scarcely better than none at all_, as it can never show itself in +presence of the enemy's cavalry, which would immediately outflank and +destroy it, and must keep close behind its infantry. + +At the opening of Napoleon's campaign of 1813, he had but very little +cavalry to oppose to the overwhelming masses of this arm possessed by +the Allies. In consequence of this, he could make no use of it whatever; +and the tactical results of the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen were far +inferior to those habitually obtained in his former victories, and were +purchased with much greater loss. + +9. Small bodies of cavalry threatened by the enemy's cavalry in greatly +superior force, may sometimes be saved by taking refuge _in an infantry +square_, as practised by Napoleon at the battle of the Pyramids. + +10. Cavalry should _remain masked_ as long as possible; for it produces +most effect when its position and movements are hidden, so that a strong +force may suddenly be brought upon a weak point. + +For this reason, a flat, open country is less favorable for this arm +than plains with undulations, hills with gentle slopes, woods, +villages, and farms; all these being so many facilities for screening +cavalry from view. + +11. Cavalry should never be brought to the front, _except to engage_. It +is unfortunate when the ground is such as to prevent this; for cavalry, +compelled to remain inactive under fire, is in great danger of becoming +demoralized. + +12. As to the _ground_: + +(1.) Cavalry must not rest its flank on a wood, a village, or other +cover for an enemy, till it has been occupied by our own troops. If +compelled to do so, it should send out patrols to reconnoitre and +observe. Its position is no longer tenable from the moment the enemy +appears within striking distance on its flank. + +(2.) It must not be posted on the very ground it is to defend, but in +rear of it; as it acts effectively only by its charge. + +Attacking cavalry must have favorable ground in front; defending +cavalry, in rear. An obstacle in either case may be fatal. + + +IV.--Its Supports. + +1. The flanks of cavalry lines or columns are always exposed. They +should, therefore, be protected by _supports_ of light cavalry, which +can act promptly and swiftly. When behind a line, these supports should +be usually in open column, so as to be able to wheel, without a moment's +delay, into line. + +2. The _most effectual_ mode of protecting the flank of a line or column +of cavalry is by means of squadrons in rear, formed in echelons +extending outwards; as this exposes the enemy's cavalry that may attempt +to charge the main body in flank to be immediately charged in flank +themselves; which would be destruction. For this purpose, irregular +cavalry may be as effective as any other. + +3. This cavalry support or reserve behind the flanks may sometimes play +_an important offensive_ part. The enemy's first line, the instant after +either making or receiving a charge, is always in greater or less +disorder; and a vigorous charge then made on it in flank by our own +flank reserve, would have a decisive effect. + +4. Cavalry should never engage without a support or _reserve in rear_, +not only to guard its flanks, but also to support it when disorganized +by a successful charge. + +5. So, when engaged in _skirmishing order_, being then very much +exposed, it must always be protected, like infantry skirmishers, by +supports in close order. + +6. It has been already seen that, although cavalry may carry a position, +it cannot hold it, if attacked by infantry. When used for such a +purpose, therefore, it should always be accompanied by _an infantry +support_. + +The French cavalry succeeded in carrying the plateau of Quatre Bras; +but, having no infantry with it to reply to the terrible fire of the +Allied infantry from the surrounding houses, it was compelled to retire, +and yield it again to the enemy. + +According to Wellington, Napoleon frequently used his cavalry in seizing +positions, which were then immediately occupied by infantry or +artillery. + + +V.--How Used. + +1. Cavalry generally manoeuvres _at a trot_. At a gallop, disorder is +apt to take place, and exhaustion of strength that will be needed in the +charge. + +2. The ordinary use of cavalry is to follow up infantry attacks and +complete their success. It should never be sent _against fresh +infantry_; and should generally, therefore, be reserved until towards +the last of the action. + +Napoleon, who, by concentrating his cavalry into considerable masses, +had enabled himself to use it on the battle-field as a principal arm, +sometimes produced great effects by heavy cavalry charges at the very +beginning of the action. + +But, though Napoleon's splendidly trained heavy cavalry might sometimes +break a well-disciplined infantry without any preparatory artillery +fire, it would be dangerous to attempt this with cavalry inferior to it +in solidity; and the new rifled weapons would seem to render the cavalry +charges of his day no longer practicable. + +3. Cavalry _may_ be hurled against the enemy's infantry-- + +(1.) When it has been a long time engaged, and therefore exhausted. + +(2.) When it has been shattered by artillery. + +And _always should_ be-- + +(1.) When it is manoeuvring. + +(2.) When the attack would be a surprise. + +(3.) When its ranks begin to waver, or when it manifests any unequivocal +symptom of hesitation or intimidation. + +In the three latter cases, success will usually be certain; in the two +former ones, quite probable: but, in most other cases, a cavalry charge +will succeed, perhaps, only one time in ten. + +4. The chief duties of cavalry in a _defensive_ battle are-- + +(1.) To watch the enemy's cavalry, to prevent its surprising our +infantry. + +(2.) To guard our troops from being outflanked. + +(3.) To defend our infantry and artillery while manoeuvring. + +(4.) To be ready to charge the enemy the instant his attack on our +troops is repulsed. + +5. _Used offensively_, it must promptly attack-- + +(1.) The enemy's flanks, if uncovered. + +(2.) His infantry, when, from any cause, its attack would probably +succeed. + +(3.) All detachments thrown forward without support. + +6. When cavalry has routed cavalry, the victorious squadrons should at +once charge in flank _the infantry protected by the cavalry just +beaten_. The great Conde, when only twenty-two years of age, by this +means, won the victory of Rocroi. + +7. Deployed as skirmishers, by their noise, dust, and smoke, cavalry may +furnish a good _screen_ for our movements. + +8. Cavalry skirmishers _scout their corps_, to prevent the enemy +reconnoitring it too closely. + +9. When a cavalry rear-guard has to defend, temporarily, a defile, a +bridge, or a barricade, a part should _dismount_, and use their carbines +till the rest are safe. + +So, a cavalry vanguard, by its fire, dismounted, may prevent the enemy +from destroying a bridge. + +In these, and in similar cases, the cavalrymen should habitually +dismount, in order to render their fire effective; acting and +manoeuvring as skirmishers. + + +VI.--How it Fights. + +1. The success of cavalry in battle depends on the _impetuosity of its +charge_, and its _use of the sabre_. When deployed as skirmishers, +mounted or dismounted, its proper weapon is the carbine or pistol; and +in individual combats, these weapons may occasionally be very useful. +But when acting as cavalry proper, in any compact formation, it must +rely on the sabre. The aim with a pistol or carbine in the hands of a +mounted man is so unsteady, that the fire of a line of cavalry is +generally ineffective; and there are few occasions where it should be +resorted to. When cavalry has learned to realize that these are not its +true arms, and that it is never really formidable but when it closes +with the enemy at full speed and with uplifted sabre, it has acquired +the most important element of its efficiency. + +2. Cavalry should, therefore, not fight _in columns_, as most of its +sabres would thereby become useless. But if a facing about to retreat is +feared, an attack in column would prevent it. It is said, also, that a +column is more imposing than a line. If so, it might have a greater +moral effect on the enemy. + +3. When cavalry are deployed as skirmishers, as a curtain to hide our +movements, they should be _in considerable number_, with small +intervals, and should make as much noise, and smoke, and dust as +possible. When the charge is sounded, the skirmishers wait and fall in +with the rest. + +4. The great rule in cavalry combats is to _cover our own flanks_, and +_gain the enemy's_; for these are his and our weakest points. + +5. When the enemy's cavalry is already in full charge on our infantry, +it is too late for our cavalry to charge it with much prospect of +success. In such a case, it would be better to defer our own charge till +the moment that the enemy's _is completed_; for our success then would +be certain. + +6. Cavalry attacks cavalry _in line_, in order to have the more sabres, +and, if possible, to outflank the enemy. + +7. If we can manoeuvre so as to attack the enemy's cavalry _in flank_, +our success will be certain. + +Military history affords hundreds of instances in proof of this +proposition. At one of the battles in Spain, for example, in 1809, +fifteen hundred French horse, by charging four thousand Spanish cavalry +in flank, completely cut it in pieces. + +8. Cavalry _never waits in position_ to be charged by cavalry. Its only +safety is in meeting the charge with a violent gallop; it would +otherwise be sure to be overthrown. + +When hostile cavalries thus meet each other, there is usually but small +loss on either side. A certain number of troopers are usually +dismounted; but the colliding masses somehow ride through each other, +allowing but little time for the exchange of points and cuts. + +Thus cavalry can defend itself against cavalry only by attacking; which +it must do even when inferior to the enemy in number. + +9. To attack artillery, cavalry should be in _three detachments_; +one-fourth to seize the guns; one-half to charge the supports; and the +other fourth as a reserve. + +The first party attacks in dispersed order, as foragers, trying to gain +the flanks of the battery. The second party should manoeuvre to gain +the flanks of the supports. + +10. Where a cavalry attack can be masked, so as to operate _as a +surprise_, a battery may be taken by charging it in front. The +formidable Spanish battery in the Pass of Somosierra, was finally +carried by a dash of Napoleon's Polish Lancers upon it, suddenly +profiting of a temporary fog or mist. But, in ordinary cases, when +cavalry has to charge a battery in front, its fire should be drawn by +our own guns or infantry, immediately before the charge begins. + +11. In an attack on an _intrenchment_, the office of cavalry can rarely +be any thing else than to repulse sorties from the work, and to cut off +the enemy's retreat from it. + + +VII.--Its Charge. + +1. As cavalry acts effectively on the field of battle only by its +charge, good cavalry of the line can be formed in no other way than by +being _exercised in this_, its special and peculiar function. + +On taking command of the Army of Italy in 1796, Bonaparte found the +French cavalry to be entirely worthless. They had never been accustomed +to charge, and he had the greatest difficulty in making them engage. +Seeing the great importance of this arm, he determined to make good +cavalry of them by compelling them to fight. So, in his attack on +Borghetto, he sent his cavalry forward, with his grenadiers on their +flanks, and his artillery close behind them. Thus enclosed, and led on +by Murat to the charge, they attacked and routed that famous Austrian +cavalry whose superiority they had so much dreaded. This was the first +step in the formation of the splendid French cavalry to which Napoleon +afterwards owed so many of his victories. And, at the battle of +Hochstedt, on the Danube, in 1801, its superiority over the Austrian +cavalry was, at last, completely established. + +2. Cavalry _charges_-- + +(1.) In line; but this only on even ground, and at short distances; + +(2.) In column; and + +(3.) As foragers, or in dispersed order. But this kind of charge is +exceptional. It can rarely be used with safety against any but an +uncivilized or an undisciplined foe. + +3. A charge in _one long continuous line_ should never be attempted. +Such a charge will be usually indecisive, as it cannot be made with the +necessary _ensemble_ or unity. The success of a charge in line depends +on the preservation of a well-regulated speed and of a perfect +alignment; by means of which the whole line reaches the enemy at once. +At the charging gait, this is rarely attainable; so that the charge in +line, except at short distances, and over very even ground, usually +degenerates into a charge by groups, or individual troopers, arriving +successively. The most dashing riders, or those mounted on the swiftest +horses, will naturally arrive first, and be overpowered by numbers. + +4. A charge _in deep column_ is also objectionable; its long flank +exposing it too much to artillery fire and to the enemy's cavalry. + +But when cavalry is surprised, it must charge at once, in whatever order +it happens to be, rather than hesitate or attempt to manoeuvre, for +this would expose it to destruction. + +5. A prompt and unhesitating obedience to the command to charge, without +regard to the circumstances under which it is given, may sometimes lead +to results _unexpected even to the charging troops themselves_. + +One instance of this was related to me by an old officer of Napoleon's +favorite Fifth Cuirassiers. The regiment was on the left of the line of +battle. Directly in front of it was an extensive marsh; beyond which +rose an eminence, abrupt in front, but sloping gently towards the rear, +the crest of which was crowned by formidable Austrian batteries. For two +hours the cuirassiers had been standing in line, listening to the roar +of battle on the right, and eagerly expecting a summons to go +_somewhere_ to engage the enemy. The very horses were neighing and +pawing the ground, in their impatience to be off. Just then galloped up +one of the Emperor's aids, saying, "Colonel, the Emperor desires you to +charge directly on the enemy's batteries opposite your position." The +brave colonel, who was one of Napoleon's personal favorites, though +chafing at the prolonged inaction of his command, pointed to the marsh, +and requested the officer to inform the Emperor of the obstacle in his +front, with the existence of which his majesty, he said, was probably +unacquainted. In a few minutes the officer came riding furiously back +with a message to the colonel, that "if he did not immediately charge, +the Emperor would come and lead the regiment himself." Stung by this +reproof, the colonel plunged his spurs into his horse's flanks, and +giving the command "Forward," led his regiment, at full gallop, directly +through the marsh upon the point that had been indicated. + +The charge itself was, of course, a failure. The regiment finally +struggled its way through the marsh to the opposite side, but leaving +behind it a large number of gallant officers and men, who had sunk to +rise no more; my informant being of the number who escaped. + +But the result of this demonstration was most decisive. Seeing that the +height on which the Austrians had planted their heavy batteries, and +which commanded the entire ground, was the key of the battle, Napoleon +had determined to wrest it from them, together with the batteries which +crowned it. Accordingly, the evening before, he had dispatched a body of +light infantry by a very circuitous route, to turn the position and +attack the batteries in rear. He had accurately calculated the time the +detachment would require to reach its destination; and when the moment +arrived at which it should be ready to commence its attack, he ordered +the cuirassiers to charge directly upon the position in front. The +Austrian artillery, suddenly attacked in rear, and, at the same time, +threatened with a cavalry charge in front, where it had deemed itself +perfectly secure, tried to change the position of its pieces, so as to +get a fire on its assailants from both directions. But it was too late; +the temporary confusion into which it was thrown enabled the French +infantry to carry all before it, and the height was won, with all its +batteries. + +So, at Waterloo, Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade of Light Cavalry, which was +marching in column by half squadrons, left in front, had begun to form +up into line on the leading half squadron, when an order arrived from +Wellington to charge. Instantly the charge was made, and, of course, in +echelons of half squadrons, extending to the right. The effect of this +was that a body of French cavalry on its right, then attacking the +British line, was suddenly taken in flank and completely routed. + +6. A charge in deep column may sometimes be made necessary by _the +nature of the ground_, which, at the same time, protects its long +flanks: as where, in our pursuit of the rebels after the battle of +Nashville, in 1864, the Fourth United States Cavalry, approaching them +over a narrow turnpike, made a vigorous charge in column of fours, which +broke their centre, and, with the help of infantry skirmishers on the +flanks, drove them from the ground. + +7. When the ground is rugged, in order to lessen the number of falls, +the rear-rank, in the charge, should _open out six paces_, closing up +again at the last moment. + +8. Cavalry advances to charge at a _trot_, or at a _gallop_. A fast trot +is better than a gallop, as alignments are not easily kept at great +speed. Experience has shown that the best distance from the enemy to +begin the gallop, is about two hundred and sixty yards; thence steadily +increasing to the maximum of speed. This gradual increase of speed is +very important, to prevent the horses from being completely blown on +reaching the enemy. + +9. Cavalry should not charge by _a wood_, till it has been carried by +our own infantry, if it can possibly be avoided. + +At the battle of Kollin, in 1756, Frederick's cavalry, pursuing the +Austrians, was taken in flank by some Austrian infantry posted in a +wood, and made to retire with great loss. + +10. When cavalry is required to charge over unknown ground, it should be +preceded by a few men thrown out to the front as skirmishers, in order +to _scout the ground_ to be passed over. The neglect of this precaution +has sometimes led to great disaster. + +At Talavera, two cavalry regiments, the First German Hussars and the +Twenty-third Light Dragoons, were ordered to charge the head of some +French infantry columns. When near the top of their speed they came +suddenly upon a deep ravine, with steep sides. Colonel Arentschild +commanding the Hussars, who was in front, at once reined up, and halted +his regiment, saying: "I vill not kill my young mensch!" But the other +regiment, commanded by Colonel Seymour, which was on its left, not +seeing the obstacle in time, plunged down it, men and horses rolling +over on each other in frightful confusion. Of the survivors, who +arrived on the other side by twos and threes, many were killed or +taken; and only one-half of the regiment ever returned. + +So, at the battle of Courtrai, in 1302, from the French cavalry's +omitting to scout the ground they charged over, the Flemings won a great +victory. All the _elite_ of the French nobility and chivalry was +destroyed, and gold spurs were collected by bushels on the field. It was +the French Cannae. The Flemings were drawn up behind a canal, flowing +between high banks, and hidden from view. The French rushing on at full +gallop, all the leading ranks were plunged into the canal. The entire +cavalry was thereby checked and thrown into irretrievable disorder, +which extended to the infantry, in their rear. The Flemings, profiting +by their confusion, crossed the canal at two points simultaneously, +attacked them in flank, and completed their rout. + +So, at the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Murat, in his great cavalry +charge on the Allied centre, had captured twenty-six guns, and was +carrying all before him, when he pushed on to the village of Gulden +Gossa, where the ground had not been reconnoitred, and could not be +distinctly seen from a distance. Here the French found their career +suddenly checked by a great hollow, full of buildings, pools of water, +and clusters of trees; while the Allied infantry, from behind the +various covers afforded by the ground, opened upon them a destructive +fire. Being then suddenly charged in flank by the Russian cavalry, they +were driven back with heavy loss; the Allies recapturing twenty of the +twenty-six guns they had lost. + +The troopers employed to scout the ground before a charge would not be +in much danger from the enemy, who would hardly fire on a horseman or +two, especially when expecting a charge. + +11. Cavalry must never pursue, unless its supports are _close at hand_. + +In pursuing, it must be circumspect, and not go too far. Union and order +are indispensable; for, without them, a slight resistance may suffice to +cause a repulse. + + +VIII.--Its Attack on Infantry. + +First, as to its ATTACK GENERALLY. +Secondly, its attack ON SQUARES. + + +A. GENERALLY. + +1. Cavalry must avoid _distant engagements_ with infantry; in which the +latter must always have the advantage. + +2. The slightest cavalry charge on the _flank_ of infantry will rout it. + +3. As to a cavalry attack _in front_: If the infantry stand firm, the +chances are against its success. If the infantry cannot be attacked in +flank, the cavalry should therefore wait till it has been shattered by +artillery, or has become exhausted, or demoralized, or till it begins to +manoeuvre. + +4. If the infantry be _in line_, or _in column_, cavalry should attack +it in flank; if _in square_, at one of its angles; if _in several +squares_, at one of its flank ones, so as to avoid a cross-fire from the +other squares. If a flank square be broken, the next one to it, being no +longer protected by the fire of any other square, may be attacked with +the same prospect of success; and so on successively. + +5. But if the hostile infantry have _supporting cavalry_, we must not +charge in such a manner as to enable it to take us in flank. + +6. To _test the infantry_ about to be attacked, cavalry may pass a few +hundred paces in its front, to threaten it, sending forward a few +horsemen to fire, gallop forward, and raise a dust. If the infantry, +instead of disregarding these movements, begin to fire, it will probably +be broken, on the cavalry's charging it at once and vigorously, whether +in column or in line. But otherwise, if the infantry reserve its fire, +and only sends out a few sharpshooters. + +7. _Ascending slopes_, if not too steep, are not unfavorable to attacks +on infantry; for their shots, as experience shows, will then mostly fly +too high. + +8. On a _descending slope_, cavalry charges down on infantry with +terrible effect; as it then arrives with an impetus which nothing can +stop. + +At Waterloo, a column of French infantry was ascending a steep slope. +Suddenly the Scotch Greys cavalry regiment dashed down upon it from +above, rode over, and destroyed it. + +B. ON SQUARES. + +1. Infantry squares are usually charged in _open column_; the distance +between the subdivisions being a subdivision front and a few yards over; +in order that each subdivision may have time to break into the square, +or, if unsuccessful, to disengage itself and retire. + +But the distances should never be so great as to allow the square to +reload after firing a volley at the next preceding subdivision. + +2. The leading subdivision will usually _draw the fire_ of the square. +If this is delivered at very short range, say at twenty paces, it will +raise up a rampart of dead and wounded men and horses which will +probably suffice to check the following subdivisions, and so repulse the +charge. But an infantry square rarely reserves its fire so long; and if +the fire is delivered at any considerable distance, no such effect will +be produced. + +3. A _good formation_ to attack a square is said to be a column of three +squadrons, with squadron front, at double distance; followed by a fourth +squadron, in column of divisions or platoons, to surround the square, +and make prisoners, if it is broken. + +4. Before cavalry charges a square, it should be first shattered or +demoralized by _artillery fire_, when this is practicable. In the +absence of artillery, sharpshooting infantry skirmishers may, to a +certain extent, supply its place. + +5. A square should be attacked at one of its angles, which are obviously +its weakest and most vulnerable points. But to cover a real attack on an +angle, cavalry sometimes makes a _false attack_ on the front of a +square. + +6. When squares are formed checkerwise, cavalry must attack _a flank +square_, and not expose itself to a cross-fire by charging an interior +one. + +7. Cavalry charging a square firing irregularly will usually break it. +But when the square reserves its fire, and pours in well-aimed volleys +at short range, the charge will rarely succeed. The cavalry should, +therefore, before charging, use every effort to _draw the fire_ of the +square, or of the fronts which threaten it. This is sometimes +accomplished by sending forward a few skirmishers to fire on the square. + +8. When one square fires to assist another, the firing square should be +_instantly charged_, before it has time to reload. + +9. To succeed, a cavalry charge should be made with a _desperate, +forlorn-hope recklessness_, and with reiterated attacks on one point. If +the fire has been delivered at very close range, though its effect has +probably been destructive, the smoke will momentarily shut out the line +of infantry from the horses' view, thus removing the chief obstacle to +their breaking through it. The survivors of the fire should therefore +rush desperately on. + +If the French attacks on the British squares at Quatre Bras had been +made in this manner, instead of opening to the right and left, and +diverging to a flank at the moment of closing, they would probably have +succeeded. + +But this sudden divergence is often the fault of the horses, which +instinctively recoil before a serried line of infantry, with bayonets at +the charge. Cavalry should, therefore, never be practised on the +drill-ground in charging a square, as the horses would thereby acquire +the habit of suddenly checking their course, or of diverging to a flank, +on arriving at the enemy. This would so strengthen their natural +instinct that they could never be got to break a square. Or, at least, +when this manoeuvre is practised for the purpose of instruction, the +horses used should never afterwards be taken into the field. + +10. The cavalry most formidable to an infantry square are _Lancers_. +Their lances, which are from eleven to sixteen feet long, easily reach +and transfix the infantry soldier, while the sabres of the other cavalry +are too short to reach him over the horse's neck, and over the musket, +lengthened by the bayonet. But Lancers are usually no match against +other cavalry, who can parry and ripost before the lance can resume the +guard. + +11. When cavalry has succeeded in completely breaking a body of +infantry, it may often inflict _fearful slaughter_ upon them. + +At the battle of Rio Seco, in Spain, after Lasalle's twelve hundred +horse had broken the Spanish infantry, they galloped at will among +twenty-five thousand soldiers, some five thousand of whom they slew. + + +IX.--General Remarks. + +1. Besides its uses on the field of battle, cavalry may render most +important service in completing the destruction of beaten corps, or +compelling their surrender, and so enable us to secure the great +strategic objects of the campaign. Thus, after the battle of Waterloo, +it was the Prussian cavalry that completed the dispersion of the French +army, and prevented it from rallying. And, but for Napoleon's ill +fortune in respect to Grouchy, in that battle, he would, to all +appearance, have succeeded in accomplishing his plan of campaign, which +was, to separate the English from the Prussians, beat them in detail, +and complete their destruction with his twenty thousand cavalry. + +2. The battles of the late War of the Rebellion, the earlier ones, at +least, were mostly indecisive. One chief cause of this was, that neither +side had a sufficient force of true cavalry to enable it to complete a +victory, to turn a defeat into a rout, and drive the enemy effectually +from the field. The cavalry charges were generally such as mounted +infantry could have just as well made; charges in which the pistol and +carbine played the principal part, instead of the spur and sabre. It was +not until the fight at Brandy Station, in June, 1863, that sabres were +used, to any extent, at close quarters. Thus, neither of the contending +armies was able to break up and disperse, destroy, or capture its +enemy's infantry masses, in the manner practised in Napoleon's great +wars, not having, to any considerable extent, that description of force +called Cavalry of the Line, which alone is capable of effecting these +results by its solid and compact formations, its skilful, yet rapid +manoeuvring, and its crashing charges. + +3. European cavalry of the line is divided into Heavy and Light. Heavy +cavalry is heavily armed; that is, their weapons are larger and heavier +than those of light cavalry, and to these weapons, carbines, in most of +the corps, are added. Some of the corps wear steel or brass cuirasses; +and the men and horses are of the largest size. + +In Light cavalry, the only weapons are the sabre and pistol; and the men +and horses are light and active, rather than strong and large. + +Lancers are considered a medium between Heavy and Light cavalry. + +4. Great as may be the advantages of a large force of regular cavalry of +the line, there were serious objections to its being raised at the +opening of the late war. + +(1.) The theatre of war presented nowhere any of those wide and level +plains so common in Europe, and on which cavalry masses are able to +produce such decisive effects in battle. On the contrary, the ground was +almost everywhere so rugged and mountainous, or else so densely wooded, +as to be extremely unfavorable to the movements of cavalry of this +description. + +(2.) Since the introduction of the new rifled arms, exposing cavalry +masses to a deadly fire at far greater distances than ever before known, +a fire often reaching to the reserves, it seemed doubtful whether the +manoeuvring and charging in heavy, compact masses, which formerly +rendered cavalry of the line so formidable, would any longer be +practicable. + +(3.) The comparative cost of this kind of force is so great, that, if it +had been raised and kept up on the scale required, the expense of this +war, enormous as it has been, would have been vastly augmented. Three +years are required for the thorough training and instruction of the men +and horses; so that it would not have been until the fourth year of the +war that we could begin, even, to reap the fruits of so enormous an +outlay. + +5. But to carry on any war successfully, what is needed, and is, in +fact, indispensable, is an ample force of light cavalry, of a kind +requiring comparatively but little time and training to fit it for the +various and important duties devolving upon it in the field, and +therefore far less expensive than cavalry of the line; and having all +the discipline of this latter kind of force, though wanting its +perfection of manoeuvre. Every army, or considerable detachment, must +have enough of this kind of force with it to furnish what is requisite +for Outpost duty, Patrols offensive and defensive, Escorts to trains, +Foraging parties, Reconnoissances, and the various other purposes +necessarily incidental to operations in the field; and in marches, all +Advanced, Rear, and Flank guards should consist, in part, at least, of +cavalry. Finally, this description of force is needed for the +performance of those arduous, but most valuable, services often rendered +by the quasi-independent bodies called Partisan Corps; services usually +requiring great celerity of movement. + +6. This kind of force being "the eyes and ears of an army," it often +contributes powerfully to the success of strategic operations. + +In the campaign of 1813, Napoleon complained that, for want of light +cavalry, he could get no intelligence of the enemy's movements. + +So, in the rebel campaign of 1863, culminating at Gettysburg, General +Lee attributed his ignorance of our position and movements, which led to +the failure of his operations, to his being destitute of this arm; +Stuart's cavalry, on which he depended for information, having got too +far away from him. + +In Pope's campaign in 1862, the rebels, by their cavalry raid on +Catlett's Station, obtained possession of the commanding general's +correspondence, plans, and orders from Washington. + +On the other hand, whilst keeping us informed of the enemy's movements, +an abundant light cavalry, active and well commanded, may be so used as +to constitute an impenetrable screen of our own movements from the +enemy, as effectual as would be a lofty and impassable mountain range. + +Again, if we are greatly inferior to the enemy in cavalry, our own +cavalry will have to keep itself within our infantry lines; and the +consequence will be that the enemy will obtain control of the entire +country around us, and so deprive us of all the supplies it contains. + +As, besides this, cavalry is absolutely necessary for the protection of +convoys, and, from its celerity of movement, is the kind of force best +fitted for guarding our communications, it is evident that the +subsistence of an army is dependent, to a great extent, upon this arm. + +From what has been said in relation to the three arms, it is evident-- + +1. That ARTILLERY, within the range of its fire, is powerful in +preventing the enemy's approach to it; but, only to a limited extent, +can pursue and drive the enemy from his position; and that its function +is, therefore, mainly DEFENSIVE. + +2. That CAVALRY, by the impetuosity of its charge, is peculiarly fit for +driving the enemy from his position; but, remaining in position itself, +has but feeble power to prevent the enemy's approaching it; and this, +only by its carbine and pistol fire, which is far from effective; and +that its function is, therefore, mainly OFFENSIVE. + +3. That INFANTRY has great power, both in keeping the enemy at a +distance by its fire and in driving him from his position with the +bayonet; and that this arm is, therefore, both OFFENSIVE and DEFENSIVE. + +4. That although artillery is mainly a defensive arm, it plays an +important offensive part in the powerful assistance it renders to +infantry, in shattering and disorganizing the enemy's masses; thereby +opening the way for our attacking columns. + +5. That although cavalry is mainly an offensive arm, its defensive value +is also very great in the protection it affords, in various emergencies, +to the other arms, by its actual charge, or by its threatening position. + +The special parts usually played in battle by the three arms +respectively, may be briefly stated thus:-- + +Artillery prepares the victory; Infantry achieves it; Cavalry completes +it, and secures its fruits. + + +THE END. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the +Three Arms: Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry, by Francis J. 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