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diff --git a/23422.txt b/23422.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f288ffc --- /dev/null +++ b/23422.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3090 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Essays Towards a Theory of Knowledge, by Alexander Philip + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Essays Towards a Theory of Knowledge + +Author: Alexander Philip + +Release Date: November 9, 2007 [EBook #23422] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE *** + + + + +Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier, Michael Zeug, +Lisa Reigel, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team +at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + +Transcriber's Note: Words in Greek in the original are transliterated +and placed between +plus signs+. Words italicized in the original are +surrounded by _underscores_. Characters superscripted in the original +are inclosed in {} brackets. + + + + +ESSAYS TOWARDS +A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE + + + _Rosalind:_ I pray you, what is't o'clock? + + _Orlando:_ You should ask me, what time o' day; + there's no clock in the forest. + + _As You Like It, Act III. Sc. 2._ + + + + +ESSAYS TOWARDS A +THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE + + +BY + +ALEXANDER PHILIP +F.R.S.E + + +[Illustration] + + +LONDON +GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS LIMITED +NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO. +1915 + + + + ++he gar achromatos te kai aschematistos kai anaphes ousia ontos ousa +psyches kybernete monoi theatei no, peri hen to tes alethous epistemes +genos, touton echei ton topon.+--PHAEDRUS. + + + + +PREFACE + + +Two years ago, in the preface to another essay, the present writer +ventured to affirm that "Civilisation moves rather towards a chaos than +towards a cosmos." But he could not foretell that the _descensus Averni_ +would be so alarmingly rapid. + +When we find Science, which has done so much and promised so much for +the happiness of mankind, devoting so large a proportion of its +resources to the destruction of human life, we are prone to ask +despairingly--Is this the end? If not; how are we to discover and assure +for stricken Humanity the vision and the possession of a Better Land? + +Not certainly by the ostentatious building of peace-palaces nor even by +the actual accomplishment of successful war. Only by the discovery of +true first principles of Thought and Action can Humanity be redeemed. +Undeterred by the confused tumult of to-day we must still seek a true +understanding of what knowledge is--what are its powers and what also +are its limitations. Nor may we forget that other principle of +life--with which it is so quaintly contrasted in Lord Bacon's +translation of the Pauline aphorism--_Knowledge bloweth up, Charity +buildeth up._ + +_January 1915._ + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE +I + +TIME AND PERIODICITY 11 + + +II + +THE ORIGIN OF PHYSICAL CONCEPTS 17 + + +III + +THE TWO TYPICAL THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 36 + + +IV + +THE DOCTRINE OF ENERGY 81 + + + + +ESSAYS TOWARDS A +THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE + + + + +I + +TIME AND PERIODICITY + + +We can measure Time in one way only--by counting repeated motions. Apart +from the operation of the physical Law of Periodicity we should have no +natural measures of Time. If that statement be true it follows that +apart from the operation of this law we could not attain to any +knowledge of Time.[11:1] Perhaps this latter proposition may not at +first be readily granted. Few, probably, would hesitate to admit that in +a condition in which our experience was a complete blank we should be +unable to acquire any knowledge of Time; but it may not be quite so +evident that in a condition in which experience consisted of a +multifarious _but never repeated_ succession of impressions the +Knowledge of Time would be equally awanting.[12:1] Yet so it is. The +operation of the Law of Periodicity is necessary to the measurement of +Time. It is by means, and only by means, of periodic pulsative movements +that we ever do or can measure Time. Now, apart from some sort of +measurement Time would be unknowable. A time which was neither long nor +short would be meaningless. The idea of unquantified Time cannot be +conceived or apprehended. Time to be known must be measured. + +Periodicity, therefore, is essential to our Knowledge of Time. But +Nature amply supplies us with this necessary instrument. The Law of +Periodicity prevails widely throughout Nature. It absolutely dominates +Life. + +The centre of animal vitality is to be found in the beating heart and +breathing lungs. Pulsation qualifies not merely the nutrient life but +the musculo-motor activity as well. Eating, Walking,--all our most +elementary movements are pulsatory. We wake and sleep, we grow weary and +rest. We are born and we die, we are young and grow old. All animal life +is determined by this Law. + +Periodicity--generally at a longer interval of pulsation--equally +affects the vegetal forms of life. The plant is sown, grows, flowers, +and fades. + +Periodicity is to us less obvious in the inanimate world of molecular +changes; yet it is in operation even there. But it is more especially in +the natural motions of those so-called material masses which constitute +our physical environment that Periodicity most eminently prevails. +Indeed it was by astronomers that the operation of this Law was first +definitely recognised and recorded. Periodicity is the scientific name +for the Harmony of the Spheres. + +The two periodic motions which most essentially affect and concern us +human beings are necessarily the two periodic motions of the globe which +we inhabit--its rotation upon its axis which gives us the alternation of +Day and Night, and its revolution round the Sun which gives us the year +with its Seasons. To the former of these, animal life seems most +directly related; to the latter, the life of the vegetal orders. It is +evident that the forms of animal life on the globe are necessarily +determined by the periodic law of the Earth's diurnal rotation. This +accounts for the alternations of waking and sleeping, working and +resting, and so forth. In like manner the more inert vitality of the +vegetable kingdom is determined by the periodic law of the Earth's +annual revolution. When fanciful speculators seek to imagine what kind +of living beings might be encountered on the other planets of our +system, they usually make calculations as to the force of gravity on the +surface of these planets and conjure up from such data the possible size +of the inhabitants, their relative strength and agility of movement, +etc. So far so good. But the first question we should ask, before +proceeding to our speculative synthesis, should rather be the length of +the planet's diurnal rotation and annual revolution periods. Certain +planets, such as Mars and Venus, have rotation periods not very +different from those of our own Earth.[14:1] Other things being equal, +therefore, a certain similarity of animal life must be supposed possible +on these planets. On the other hand, the marked difference in their +revolution period would lead us to expect a very wide divergence between +their lower forms of life, if any such there be, and our own terrestrial +vegetation. The shorter the annual period the more would the vegetal +approximate to the animal, and _vice versa_. It would, however, be +foolish to waste more time over a speculation so remote. + +But these two facts remain unshaken:--(1) That our measurements and +whole science of Time depend absolutely on the operation throughout +Nature of the Law of Periodicity, and (2) that the periodicities which +affect and determine animal and vegetal life upon our Earth are the +periodic movements of rotation and revolution of that Earth itself. + +Now it is to the curvilinear motions of the heavenly bodies that we must +ascribe our subjection to the periodic law. If these heavenly bodies +moved for ever in straight lines, as they would do if unacted on by +natural forces, the periodic rhythm of Nature would disappear. + +It is to the fact that all Nature is under the constraint due to the +constant silent operation of physical Force that we owe, therefore, the +law which determines the most essential features of vitality. The +pulsations in which life consists and by which it is sustained are +attributable to the constraint and limitation which we recognise as the +effect of the operation of Natural Force. It is to this same cause that +we ascribe the resistance of cohering masses in virtue of which +sensation arises and by which our experience is punctuated. It is by +means of these obstructions to free activity that our experience is +denoted, and by reference to these that it is cognised. Indeed, Activity +itself as we know it depends upon and presupposes the existence of +these cohering masses. + +Thus the operation of Natural Force and the constraint and limitation +which are thereby imposed upon our activity appear at once to determine +the conditions of life and to furnish the fundamental implements of +Knowledge. + +We cannot overleap the barriers by which Life is constrained. These, +whilst, on the one hand they seem to _create the environment_ which +sustains Life, on the other hand seem to impose upon it the limitations +under which it inevitably fails and dies. We cannot even in imagination +conceive, either as reality or as fancy, the illimitable puissance of a +Life perfectly free and unrestrained. Yet the assurance that Perfect +Love could overcome the bonds of Materiality and Death encourages in +mankind the Hope of an existence beyond the impenetrable veil of +physical limitation. And this at any rate may be admitted, namely, that +that dynamic condition in which materiality arises is also the +condition-precedent of Tridimensionality, of Force, of Time, and of +Mutation. But we cannot thus account for the _elan vital_ itself. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[11:1] Plato in the dialogue _Timaeus_ tells us that Time was born with +the Heavens, and that Sun, Moon, and Planets were created in order that +Time might be. + +[12:1] This might be contrasted with the statement of M. Bergson who +tells us (_Evolution creatrice_, p. 11): "Plus nous approfondirons la +nature du temps plus nous comprendrons que duree signifie invention, +creation de formes, elaboration continue de l'absolument nouveau." + +[14:1] Recently, we believe, astronomers have favoured the view that the +day of Venus is equal in length to her year. + + + + +II + +THE ORIGIN OF PHYSICAL CONCEPTS + + +"_Penser c'est sentir_," said Condillac. "It is evident," said Bishop +Berkeley, "to one who takes a survey of the _objects_ of Human Knowledge +that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses or else such +as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the +Mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination either +combining, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived +in the foresaid ways." J. S. Mill tells us, "The points, lines, circles, +and squares which one has in his mind are, I apprehend, simply copies of +points, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his +experience," and again, "The character of necessity ascribed to the +truths of Mathematics and even, with some reservations to be hereafter +made, the peculiar certainty attributed to them is an illusion." "In the +case of the definitions of Geometry there exist no real things exactly +conformable to the definitions." Again Taine, "_Les images sont les +exactes reproductions de la sensation._" Again Diderot, "_Pour imaginer +il faut colorer un fond et detacher de ce fait des points en leur +supposant une couleur differente de celle du fond. Restituez a ces +points la meme couleur qu'au fond,--a l'instant ils se confondent avec +lui et la figure disparait_," etc. Again, Dr. Ernest Mach, Vienna, +remarks, "We are aware of but one species of elements of Consciousness: +sensations." "In our perceptions of Space we are dependent on +sensations." Dr. Mach repeatedly refers to "space-sensations," and +indeed affirms that all sensation is spatial in character.[18:1] + +According to the view of Knowledge of which we have extracted examples +above, the ideas of the mind are originally furnished to it by +sensation, from which therefore are derived, not necessarily all our +Thoughts, but all the materials of Discourse, all that constitutes the +essence of Knowledge. + +Our purpose at the moment is to show that this view is altogether false, +and our counter proposition is, that it is from our Activity that we +derive our fundamental conceptions of the external world; that +sensations only mark the interruptions in the dynamic Activity in which +we as potent beings partake, and that they serve therefore to denote and +distinguish our Experience, but do not constitute its essence. + +We do not propose now to devote any time to the work of showing that +sensations from their very nature could never become the instruments of +Knowledge. We propose rather to turn to the principal ideas of the +external world which are the common equipment of the Mind in order to +ascertain whether in point of fact they are derived from Sensation. + +Of course to some extent the answer depends on what we mean by +Sensation. If by that term we intend our whole Experience of the +external, then of course it necessarily follows--or, at least, we +admit--that our Knowledge of the external must be thence derived. But +such a use of the term is loose, misleading, and infrequent. The only +safe course is to confine the term Sensation to the immediate data of +the five senses--touch, sight, hearing, smell, and taste, with probably +the addition of muscular and other internal feelings. It is in this +sense that the word is usually employed, and has been employed by the +Sensationalist School themselves. + +Now we might perhaps begin by taking the idea of Time as a concept +constantly employed in Discourse, but of which it would be absurd to +suggest that it is supplied to us by Sensation. It might, however, be +urged in reply that the idea of Time is not derived from the external +world at all, but is furnished to us directly by the operations of the +Mind, and that therefore its intellectual origin need not involve any +exception to the general rule that the materials of our Knowledge of the +world are furnished by Sensation alone. Without, therefore, entering +upon any discussion of the interesting question as to what is the real +nature of Time, we shall pass to the idea of Space. + +Mach, the writer whom we have already quoted, in his essay on _Space and +Geometry_ speaks constantly and freely of sensations of Space, and as +there can be no denial of the fact that Space is a constituent of the +external world, it would seem to follow that those who hold Sensation to +be the only source of our Knowledge must be obliged to affirm the +possibility of sensations of Space. Mach indeed claims to distinguish +physiological Space, geometrical Space, visual Space, tactual Space as +all different and yet apparently harmoniously blended in our Experience. +He is, however, sadly wanting in clearness of statement. He never tells +us when and where exactly we do have a sensation of Space. In truth he +never gets behind the postulate of an all-enveloping tridimensional +world; so that he throughout assumes Space as a datum, and his inquiry +is an effort to rediscover Space where he has already placed it. + +Let us, however, consider for a moment what can be meant by a sensation +of Space. Does it not look very like a contradiction in terms? Pure +Space, if it means anything, means absolute material emptiness and +vacuity. How, then, by any possibility can it give rise to a sensation? +What sensory organ can it be conceived as affecting? How and in what way +can it be felt? + +The truth is the idea of Space is essentially negative. It represents +absence of physical obstruction of every kind. No doubt, we may describe +it positively as a possibility of free movement, and such a description +is at once true and important. Yet even _it_ involves a negative. The +term "free" is in reality, though not in form, a negative term and means +"unconstrained." And the reason why such a term is necessarily negative +is to be found in the fact that a state of dynamic constraint is the +essential condition under which we enter upon our organic existence. +Freedom is a negation of the Actual. Absolute freedom is a condition +only theoretically possible, and is essentially the negation of the +state of restraint in which our life is maintained. + +But the definition last quoted is nevertheless valuable because it +clearly shows what really is the origin of the idea of Space. It proves +that the idea of Space is a representation of one condition of our +Activity. It is because the primary work of Thought is to represent the +forms of our dynamic Activity that we find the idea of Space so +necessary and fundamental. + +But it will perhaps be argued that our ordinary sensations carry with +them a spatial meaning and implication, and that indirectly, therefore, +our sensations _do_ supply us with the idea of Space. It will readily be +agreed that if this is so of any sensations it is pre-eminently true of +the sensations of vision and touch. Indeed, it will perhaps not be +disputed that the ordinary vident man derives from the sensations of +vision his most common spatial conceptions. We propose, therefore, to +inquire very briefly how the character of spatial extension becomes +associated with the data of Vision. + +The objects of Vision appear to be displayed before us in immense +multitude, each distinct from its adjacent neighbour, yet all +inter-related as parts of one single whole--the presentation thus +constituting what is called Extensity. + +This is the most commonly employed meaning of the term spatial. Yet it +is evidently in its origin rather temporal than spatial. In ordinary +movement we encounter by touch various obstacles, but only a very few of +these impress us at any one moment of time. On the contrary, they +succeed one after the other. To the blind, therefore, as Platner long +ago remarked: Time serves instead of Space. In Vision, on the other +hand, a large number, which it would take a very long time to encounter +in touch, are presented _simultaneously_. In this there is an immense +practical advantage, the result being that we come habitually to direct +our every action by reference to the data of Sight. Now it is because +these data--so simultaneously presented--are employed by us as the +guides of action that their presentation acquires the character which we +denominate Extensity. The simultaneous occurrence of a large number of +Sounds does not seem to us to present such a character. But let us +suppose that all the objects which constitute obstacles to our Activity +emitted Sounds by which they were recognised; it is not doubtful that +these would then come to be employed by us as the guides of our Activity +and would acquire in our minds the character of Extensity. They would +arrange themselves in a cotemporaneous, extensive, or spatial relation +to one another just as the objects of Vision do at present. + +It is only, therefore, when we come to employ the simultaneous +presentation of Vision as the instrument of our Activity and the guide +of Action that it acquires the character commonly called extensive. +_Successive_ visual sensations convey no extensive suggestion. + +It is important to realise the nature of this peculiar feature in the +data of Vision. The sounds which we hear, the odours which we smell, are +the immediate result of certain undulations affecting the appropriate +organ of sensation. We refer these to the object in which the +undulations originate. In like manner a light which we see is referred +to its objective luminous source. But light also and in addition is +reflected from, and thus reveals the presence of the whole body of our +resistant environment. Hence is derived the coloured presentation of +Vision to which the character of extensity attaches. Nothing similar +takes place in the case of the other distantial sensations. If sonorous +undulations excited vibration in every resistant object of the +environment they would undoubtedly come to arrange themselves in an +order resembling the extensity suggested by Vision, though the slower +rate of transmission of sound would detract from the practical +simultaneity in the effect which, as we have seen, largely accounts for +the perception of visual extensity. The universal diffusion of sunlight +is also a determining factor. + + * * * * * + +The matter becomes still clearer when we contrast the experience of +vident men with what we have been able to learn of the experiences of +the blind. Nowhere have we found this aspect of the question discussed +with the same clearness and ability as by M. Pierre Villey in his +recently published essay, _Le Monde des Aveugles_--Part III. + +The blind man, as he remarks, requires representations in order to +command his movements. We must then penetrate the mind of the blind and +ascertain what are his representations. Are they, he asks, muscular +images combined by temporal relations, or are they images of a spatial +order? He replies without hesitation: Both, but, above all, spatial +images. It is clear, he says, that the modalities of the action of the +blind are explained by spatial representations. These must be derived +from touch. What, then, can be the spatial representations which arise +from touch? The blind, he says, are often asked, How do you figure to +yourself such and such an object, a chair, a table, a triangle? M. +Villey quotes Diderot as affirming that the blind cannot imagine. +According to Diderot, images require colour, and colour being totally +wanting to the blind the nature of their imagination was to him +inconceivable. The common opinion, says M. Villey, is entirely with +Diderot. It does not believe that the blind can have images of the +objects around him. The photographic apparatus is awanting and the +photograph cannot therefore be there. + +Diderot was a sensationalist. For this school, as Villey remarks, +_l'image est le decalque de la sensation_, and he refers not merely to +Condillac the friend of Diderot but to his continuator Taine whose +dictum we have already quoted. + +Diderot attempts to solve the problem by maintaining that tactual +sensations occupy an extended space which the blind in thought can add +to or contract, and in this way equip himself with spatial conceptions. + +There would, on this view, as M. Villey remarks, be a complete +heterogeneity between the imagination of the blind and that of the +vident. M. Villey denies this altogether. He affirms that the image of +an object which the blind acquires by touch readily divests itself of +the characters of tactual sensation and differs profoundly from these. +He takes the example of a chair. The vident apprehends its various +features simultaneously and at once; the blind, by successive tactual +palpations. But he maintains that the evidence of the blind is unanimous +on this point, that once formed in the mind the idea of the chair +presents itself to him immediately as a whole,--the order in which its +features were ascertained is not preserved, and does not require to be +repeated. Indeed, the idea divests itself of the great bulk of the +tactual details by which it was apprehended, whilst the muscular +sensations which accompanied the act of palpation never seek to be +joined with the idea. This divestiture of sensation proceeds to such an +extent that there is nothing left beyond what M. Villey calls the pure +form. The belief in the reality of the object he refers to its +resistance. The origin of each of these is exertional. The features upon +which the mind dwells, if it dwells upon them at all, are _les qualites +qui sont constamment utiles pour la pratique_--in a word, the dynamic +significance of the thing. + +We may remark that much the same is true of the ideas of the vident. In +ordinary Discourse we freely employ our ideas of external objects +without ever attempting a detailed reproduction of the visual image. +Such a reproduction would be both impracticable and unnecessary, and +would involve such a sacrifice of time as to render Discourse altogether +impossible. All that the Mind of the vident ordinarily grasps and +utilises in his discursive employment of the idea of any physical thing +is what we have ventured to call its dynamic significance. And the very +careful analysis which M. Villey has made of the mental conceptions of +the blind clearly shows that in their case he has reached exactly the +same conclusion. + +Our fundamental conceptions of the external world are therefore derived +from and are built up out of the data of our exertional Activity +combined with the interruptions which that Activity perpetually +encounters, and in which sensations arise. It would indeed be a useful +work of psychological analysis if the conditions of exertional action +were carefully and systematically investigated--much more useful than +most of the trifling experiments to which psychological laboratories are +usually devoted. + +The principal elements of such a scheme would be-- + +(1) The force of gravity. This force constantly operating constrains +the organism to be in constant contact with the earth on which we live. +But, further, it gives us the definite idea of _Direction_. It is from +the action of gravity that we derive our distinction between Up and Down +from which as a starting-point we build up our conception of +tridimensional Space. And in this respect it must be remembered that as +the areas of spheres are proportional to the squares of their radii it +necessarily follows that gravity if it acts uniformly in tridimensional +Space _must_ vary in intensity in proportion to the square of the +distance of the point of application from the centre of origin. Gravity +and tridimensionality are in short necessarily connected. + +(2) The same law which determines the force of gravity seems to +determine also the force of cohesion, and therefore the form of material +bodies. These, therefore, are necessarily subject also to +tridimensionality, and in the force which generates solid form we find a +second source of our elementary spatial ideas. + +Such form is the expression of an obstacle to action which determines +all our movements, and in which we discover those forms of the +limitations of activity which we call spatial characters. + +(3) Organic Dualism is a third determinant of activity, and thus also a +source of spatial ideas. + +The structural dualism of the human body, its right and left, its front +and back, etc., furnish our activity with a set of constant forms to +which its action must conform, and which necessarily also partake of, +and help us to conceive of tridimensional form. It is interesting to +note that this dualism characterises the organs specially adapted to +serve exertional action rather than those which serve our vegetal or +nutrient life. + +The way in which our spatial conceptions are ever extended and built up +out of the data of action is also well illustrated in the case of the +blind, and to this also M. Villey devotes an interesting chapter under +the title _La conquete des representations spatiales_. + +This is effected in their case by the high development of what we must +call active touch. Just as we distinguish between hearing and listening, +between seeing and looking, so must we distinguish between touching and +_palpation_. + +Mere passive touch gives a certain amount of information, but +comparatively little. It is necessary to _explore_; that is what is done +in active touch--palpation--of different degrees. + +The sensitiveness of the skin varies at different places from the tongue +downwards. Palpation by the fingers marks a further stage. The blind +also, we are told, largely employ the feet in walking as a source of +locative data. + +To the concepts reached by such palpation with the hand, M. Villey gives +the name of Manual Space. In this connection he thinks it necessary to +distinguish between synthetic touch and analytic touch--the former +resulting from the simultaneous application of different parts of the +hand on the surface of a body, the latter that which we owe to the +movements of our fingers when having only one point of contact with the +object the fingers follow its contour. Various examples of the delicacy +of the information thus obtainable are given. Following two straight +lines with the thumb and index respectively, a blind man can acquire by +practice a sensibility so complete as to enable him to detect the +slightest divergence from parallelism. + +The analysis passes on from the data of Space manual to those of Space +brachial; then to the information derived from walking and other +movements of the lower limbs, and then to the co-ordination of the +information derived from the sensations of hearing, which is necessarily +very important to the blind. + +The conclusion of the whole matter is that our principal spatial ideas +are common alike to the blind and the vident. Both can be taught and are +taught the same geometry. Both understand one another in the +description of spatial conditions. The common element cannot possibly be +supplied either by the data of visual sensation which the blind do not +possess, or by the data of passive tactual sensation which the vident +hardly ever employ. _Une etendue commune se retrouverait a la fois dans +les donnees de la vue et dans celles du toucher._ The common element is +furnished by the common laws and forms of our exertional Activity by +means of which and in terms of which we all construct our conceptions of +the dynamic world of our environment. + + * * * * * + +It is from our dynamic Activity also that we derive our conception of +Force. Force, though it is studied scientifically in the measurement of +the great natural forces which operate constantly, is originally known +to us in the stress or pressure to which muscular exertion in contact +with a material body gives rise. Such a force if it could be correctly +measured, would record the rate at which Energy was undergoing +transmutation, and it is from such experience of pressure that our idea +of Force is originally derived. + +The mass of bodies is usually measured by their weight, _i.e._ by +gravity. Its absolute measurement must be in terms of momentum. The true +estimate of the Energy of a body moving under the impulse of a constant +Force is stated in the formula 1/2MV{2}. To ascertain M, therefore, we +must have given F and V, and these are both conceptions the original +idea of which is derived from our exertional activity. + +Quantity of Matter originally means the same as amount of resistance to +initiation of motion, at first estimated by the varying amount of +personal muscular energy required to effect the motion in question, +thereafter objectively and scientifically by comparison with some +independent standard whereby a more exact estimation can be attained +than was possible by a mere reference to the varying inferences of the +individual who might exert the force. + +Space, Mass, Force are all therefore ideas which are furnished to us out +of our experience as potent actors, and the recognition of this great +truth provides us with the means of clearly apprehending and co-relating +our conceptions of the external world, the framework of our Knowledge. + +The true distinction between a _percept_ and a _concept_ is just that a +percept is a concept associated with the dynamic system discovered in +and by our exertional activity. + +In like manner we find here the true solution of the many questions +which have been raised as to the distinction between general and +abstract, singular and concrete terms. + +Language expresses action: the roots of language are expressions of the +elementary acts which make up experience. They are therefore general. +Each applies to every act of the class in question. They are also +concrete. That is so because they refer to exertional activities. +Abstract terms are terms abstracted from this dynamic reference. Thus +_white_ is concrete because colour is a property of the dynamic world. +But when this property is considered apart from its dynamic support it +is called _whiteness_, and becomes abstract. In the case of purely +mental qualities the term is regarded as abstract simply because the +quality is in every reference extra dynamic. Thus _candour_, _justice_ +are called abstract terms; they are properties of the Mind. But a +property of the dynamic system, _e.g._ Gravitation, does not strike us +as abstract--the sole distinction being the dynamic reference which the +latter term implies. + +It will even be seen that there is sometimes a shading off of abstract +quality. Thus _Justice_ as an attribute of the Mind strikes us as a +purely abstract term. But as the word takes up a dynamic reference so +does its abstraction diminish. Thus in the expression "Administration of +Justice" the abstractive suggestion is less pronounced; till in the +person of Justice Shallow it vanishes in the very concrete. + +Behind and beneath all these considerations we should never lose sight +of the great main facts--that thought is an activity; that its function +therefore is to represent or reproduce our pure exertional activity; +that such representation is _at the basis_ of all our concepts of +externality; that sensation, _per se_ is mere interruption of activity; +that _per se_ it possesses no spatial or extensive or external +suggestiveness; that sensations nevertheless serve to denote or give +feature and particularity to our experience of activity; that all +perception of the external is at bottom therefore a mental +representation of exertional activity and its forms, denoted, +punctuated, identified by sensation, which latter by itself, we repeat, +carries no suggestion of externality. This view revolutionises the whole +psychology of Perception, and therefore, though it at once gives to that +science a much-needed unity, clarity, and simplicity, it will naturally +be accepted with reluctance by the laborious authors of the cumbrous +theories still generally current. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[18:1] His reason is that we _ab origine_ localise sensations with +reference to our organism. This, of course, means by reference to the +system of potent energy in which our organism essentially consists. + + + + +III + +THE TWO TYPICAL THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE + + +The evolution of living organisms is in general a gradual and continuous +process. But it is nevertheless true that it presents well-marked stages +and can best be described by reference to these. Frequently, moreover, +the meaning and true nature of the movement at one stage is only +revealed after a subsequent stage has been reached. + +The development of a brain or cerebrum marks one important advance. The +presence of this organ renders possible to the animal in varying degree +what are called representations of objects, and the faculty of making +such representations appears to be a condition precedent to the +development of deliberation, volition, and purposive action as opposed +to reflex or instinctive activity. The latter is specially +characteristic of other orders of organic existence such as the +Articulata--being remarkably exemplified in the activities of the social +insects such as the bee. + +The advent of man with his faculty of Discourse may be regarded as +marking another distinct stage in the evolutionary movement--a stage, +moreover, the operations of which throw light upon the whole nature of +cerebral representations. The faculty of rational Discourse, as Max +Mueller pointed out, is denominated in Greek by the word +logos+, +applicable at once to the mental activity and to its appropriate +expression in speech. Discourse is an instrument by means of which man +has been enabled to construct his whole system of representations of the +world in which he lives, the system of what is commonly called his +Knowledge. Human Knowledge just is the body of man's representations of +his Experience in the world of which he forms a part. It is not +necessary to insist here on the gradual but remarkable growth and +extension which Human Knowledge has undergone during the last two +thousand years. Concurrently with its extension man's ability to control +the forces of Nature has been enlarged and increased. At the same time, +however, that extension has rendered possible false developments and +aberrations to which the more limited representations of the brute are +less liable. + +With the faculty of rational Discourse constantly striving to extend the +bounds of Knowledge, man came in time to attempt to give an account not +only of the immediate objects which surround him, but of the whole choir +of Heaven and furniture of Earth. In this advance the Greeks took a +leading part. + +When we first make acquaintance through historical records with the +intellectual activity of the Greek mind, we find it engaged in the +construction of various such schemes for an explanation of the +world--usually called cosmogonies. + +It was at this stage of intellectual progress that what we might call an +interruption occurred in the normal process of evolution. Great +intellectual activity had for some time prevailed in the Greek +communities; several men of conspicuous genius--notably Heracleitus and +Parmenides--had carried speculation as to the origin and nature of the +world to a height hitherto undreamt of. These achievements and the +consciousness of continual progress had engendered in Athens +particularly what might be called an epidemic of intellectual pride. + +On this scene Socrates appeared, plain, blunt, critical. His teaching +was in effect an appeal to men to reflect: to turn their attention away +from the world which they were supposed to be explaining to the +contemplation of their own Minds by which the explanation was +furnished. +gnothi seauton+ was his motto. All explanations of the +Universe or of Experience were, as he showed, vain unless the Cognitive +Faculty by which they were constructed were operating truly. In +particular, the process of Rational Discourse implied the use of +concrete general terms, which were recognised to be the essential +instruments of Cognition. Socrates therefore devoted his attention +specially to a critical examination of these general terms and also of +the abstract terms which were the familiar instruments of Discourse. + +The Greeks of that day were endowed with a singular clearness of +intellectual vision. They readily recognised that Knowledge was an +intellectual process; they appreciated the activity of Thought or +Rational Discourse as essential to its formation. They quite understood +that Knowledge is not of the nature of a photograph--a resemblant +pictorial reproduction of the data furnished by sensation. Only very +casually and occasionally do we ever attempt to supply ourselves with a +resemblant reproduction of our sensations. Obviously such a reproduction +would only be of value memorially and could tell us nothing new. + +These early Greeks realised this, and they appear to have realised also +pretty clearly that it would be impossible by means of such pictorial +impressions to establish any community of Knowledge. It is of the +essence of Knowledge that it is something which can be communicated to, +and which is the common possession of, several individuals. That can +never be true of sensation. We can never tell whether our sensations are +the same as those of other people--never at any rate by means of +sensations themselves; never unless and until such sensations have been +inter-related by some other instrument. A mere photographic reproduction +of sensation is thus quite useless as a means of Knowledge. + +In some way or other general terms supply the common bond. The +recognition of this fact was one of the great results of the Socratic +discussion. This explains the immense importance which Socrates +naturally attached to the criticism of general and abstract terms. + + * * * * * + +The work of Socrates in this direction was immediately taken up and +carried much further by Plato. Plato maintained that these general and +abstract terms were in truth the names of ideas (+eide+) with which the +mind is naturally furnished, and further that these ideas corresponded +to and typified the eternal forms of things--the essential constituents +of the real world. Knowledge was possible because there were such +eternal forms or ideal elements--the archetypes--of which the +eide+ +were the counterparts and representations. + +Knowledge, Plato held, was concerned solely with these eternal forms, +not with sensation at all. The sensible world was in a state of constant +flux and could not be the object of true science. Its apprehension was +effected by a faculty or capacity (_Republic_, v. 478-79) midway between +Knowledge and nescience to which he applied the term +doxa+, frequently +translated _opinion_, but which in this connection would be much more +accurately rendered, _sensible impression_, or even perception. At any +rate, the term _opinion_ is a very unhappy one, and does not convey the +true meaning at all, for no voluntary intellective act on the part of +the subject was implied by the term. Now intelligence in constructing a +scheme of Knowledge is active. The ideas are the instruments of this +activity. + +Plato's doctrine of ideas was probably designed or conceived by him as +affording an explanation also of the community of Knowledge. He +emphasised the fluent instability of the sensible impression, and as we +have already pointed out, sensation in itself labours also under this +drawback that it contains and affords no common nexus whereby the +conceptions or perceptions of one man can be compared or related with +those of another. + +Indeed, if Experience were composed solely of sensations, each +individual would be an isolated solipsistic unit--incapable of rational +Discourse or communication with his fellow-men. To cure this defect, +Plato offered the ideas--universal forms common to the intelligence of +every rational being. Not only would they render possible a common +Knowledge of Reality--the existence of such ideas would necessarily also +give permanence, fixity, law, and order to our intellectual activity. +Our Knowledge would not be a mere random succession of impressions, but +a definitely determined organic unity. + +In all this argument it must be remembered Plato never said or suggested +that the intellect of man--thus equipped with ideal forms--was thereby +enabled to become, or did become, the creator of the world by and in +which each one believes himself to be surrounded and included. He always +distinguished between Idea and Reality, between Thought and Thing. The +ideas were types of the forms immanent in things themselves. It has been +said by some scholars that he generally distinguished between the two by +the employment of distinct terms, applying +eidos+ to the mental +conception and +idea+ to the substantial form. This verbal distinction +was accepted by many scholars of the epoch of Liddell and Scott and +Davies and Vaughan. A reference to this distinction in the present +writer's essay on _The Dynamic Foundation of Knowledge_ provoked at the +instance of one critic the allegation that it is not borne out by a +critical study of the Platonic texts. That is a matter of little moment +and one upon which the writer cannot claim to pronounce. The important +point is that in one way or another Plato undoubtedly distinguished +between and indeed contrasted the idea and the substantial form. No +trace of the solipsism which results from their being confounded and +which has ultimately brought to destruction the imposing edifice of +Hegelian Thought is to be found in his writings. + + * * * * * + +The Platonic doctrine of ideas speedily found an energetic critic in +Aristotle. In Aristotle's view, it was quite unnecessary and +unwarrantable to postulate the existence in the Mind of ideal forms or +counterparts of the substantial forms of Reality. This, according to +him, was a wholly unnecessary reduplication. He was content to believe +that the mind found and recognised the essential forms of things when +they were presented to it in perceptive Experience. _Universalia in re_ +were conceived by him as sufficiently explaining the genesis of +cognition without the postulation of any such _universalia extra rem_. + + * * * * * + +To the Platonic doctrine he offered the further objection that the +eternal forms of things which that doctrine affirmed and which it +declared to be represented in their ideal types were necessarily +impotential. There was no generative power in the pure activity of +Thought. If, therefore, the essentials of Reality were ideal, it +followed that they also were impotent, and incapable of causative +efficacy. The sensible world, however, was a fluent and perpetually +generated stream, which required some potent cause to uphold it. + +The eternal Reality which sustained the world was for him an Energy +constantly generating the actual, and no conception which failed to +provide for this process of causative generation of the things of Sense +could in his view adequately account for the phenomena of Nature nor +consequently could constitute the system of science. + +In this argument Aristotle undoubtedly expressed a profound truth, but +it may perhaps be admitted that he rather failed to appreciate fully +the difficulty which the Platonic doctrine was designed to meet--that, +namely, of providing some sort of common nexus or unifying principle by +which the validity of Knowledge could be maintained. For he had no +certain means of showing that the potent energy of Nature was unitary +and homogeneous. + +He is frequently described as a sensationalist, but such a view is +certainly incorrect. This, however, may be admitted--that he sought the +essentials of Reality not in the Mind but in the Object. It may be +fairly claimed that to this extent he occupied common ground with the +sensationalists, in that he was an adherent of the _tabula rasa_ view of +the Mind, expressed in the maxim:-- + +_Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit in sensu._ + + * * * * * + +Plato and Aristotle may be taken as typical of the two principal +intellectual tendencies which have characterised all subsequent +speculation--the Platonist, he who finds in the constitution of the Mind +the eternal principles or at least the types of the eternal principles +of Reality; the Aristotelian, he for whom these seem to reside in the +object and, in the act of Cognition, are merely impressed upon, +transferred to, presented to, or otherwise introduced into or +apprehended by the Mind. + +The Aristotelian view of Nature as an energetic process failed to +impress itself upon his successors. Greek Philosophy soon after +Aristotle's death decayed or was deprived of its early vigour, and the +doctrine which survived the wreck was essentially derived, however +imperfectly, from the Platonic theory. + +Throughout the first fifteen hundred years of the Christian era this +doctrine undoubtedly dominated the course of speculation--a speculation +of which much is now forgotten and almost as much was certainly barren +and unfruitful, but of which we would entertain a very mistaken notion +if we were to imagine that it was not often pursued with great subtlety +and acumen. + +One natural result of the fact that such a principle dominated human +thought was the prevalence of a belief that the explanation of Nature +and natural processes could be derived from the cognitive faculty +itself. Our cognition of our immediate surroundings was doubtless +continuously corrected by immediate practical tests. But the science of +a more extended view of Nature was vitiated by this false principle and +in consequence for many centuries our whole Knowledge of Nature remained +unprogressive and unfruitful. + +_Causa aequat effectum_, Nature abhors a vacuum, are examples of the +maxims derived or supposed to be derived from the necessities of our +Reason, and by the aid of which it was vainly hoped to attain a +knowledge of Nature and natural laws. + +The principle was in itself unsound. + +The necessary laws of our rational faculty could discover to us only the +essentials of that faculty itself. + +The maxims by which it was sought to constitute _a priori_ a scheme of +natural laws could not justly claim descent from the necessities of +Thought. Had the Schoolmen formed a true conception of the nature of +Knowledge they would never have imagined that any necessity of Thought +obliged them to believe that a 10 lb. weight would fall to the ground +more rapidly than a 1 lb. weight. Equally true is it that their +scientific principles had not been derived from any study of the action +of natural law. They were unacknowledged intellectual orphans. + +The movement associated with the names of Galileo, Bruno, Bacon, Kepler, +and Newton owed its origin and its success to the abandonment of this +vicious principle. So far as Nature was concerned, the Mind was regarded +as a _tabula rasa_, and the physician set himself to ascertain the laws +of nature not by reflection upon his own mental processes or +requirements, but by experiment with and observation of natural +processes themselves. The result has been the establishment of modern +science--the greatest triumph which the human mind has yet achieved. + + In a criticism of the writer's essay on _The Dynamic + Foundation of Knowledge_ in the _Revue neo-scolastique_ of + Louvain, the critic wrote as follows: "Remarquons qu'il n'a + pas compris la synthese scolastique du moyen age, elle qui + cependant a concilie d'une facon admirable l'_actuel_ et le + _potentiel_ dans l'explication de la nature des choses. Il + s'est mepris aussi sur les caracteres de la methode + scolastique de connaitre la constitution intime du monde + experimental; il croit cette methode exclusivement deductive." + + We have felt that candour demanded that we should quote the + foregoing passage--coming as it does from a source + exceptionally well qualified to express an opinion. If we have + nevertheless allowed ourselves in the precedent paragraphs of + this essay to express again the view which this critic seeks + to qualify, but which we still think in the main sound, we are + at the same time very glad to be able in this way to invite + attention to the undoubted fact that the distinction between + the actual and the potential was recognised by the schoolmen + as of a very deep significance. We believe further that the + real secret of the failure of mediaevalism to extend its + Knowledge of Nature was not so much a preference for + deductive over inductive methods as the failure to realise + that Nature was a dynamic operation. + +It is important, then, to understand accurately what is the method of +Science. + +The external world of our Experience seems to be composed of sensible +impressions. The ever present visual panorama combined with the constant +occurrence of other sensations suggests that Nature is, as has so often +been asserted, simply another name for the sensible presentation. A +truer view of Nature was adumbrated by Aristotle when he formulated the +theory of an Energy ever generative of the sensible. If the founders of +Science did not fully grasp the Aristotelian conception, it is at least +certain that they looked upon Nature not merely as a sensible +presentation but as a process--a dynamic operation. It was to the study +of these operations, to the measurement of the natural forces or normal +categories of physical action that Galileo and Newton devoted +themselves. The true estimate of a moving force may indeed be said to +have been their first great problem, just as the law of universal +gravitation was their grandest generalisation. + +It was to this sure instinct that the founders of Science owed their +success. Had they devoted themselves to the mere study of sensations--of +blue things and green things, of hard things and soft things, of loud +things and silent things--Science as an efficient and co-ordinated +system would never have come into being. + + * * * * * + +Having struck the right path, they moved rapidly along it, leaving the +Schoolmen and Philosophers behind them, suspicious, hostile, and amazed. + +But Philosophy did not remain altogether negative. The new movement +extended itself to Metaphysics, and under the leadership of Descartes a +resolute effort was made to reform Philosophy on sympathetic lines. + +It was in the true spirit of Socrates that Descartes advanced his famous +method of Doubt. The whole fabric of beliefs and rational principles was +to be subjected to a re-examination, and Descartes found himself on +bedrock when he touched his famous _Cogito, ergo sum._ The simple fact +or act of Doubt implied the Activity--the Reality therefore--of the +Doubter. But the cogitant subject was reduced very much to the condition +of a _tabula rasa_, and when Descartes proceeded to fill up the blank +with a rediscovery on more scientific lines of the essentials of +Cognition he found his basal feature in Extension. Tridimensional Space +seemed the simple elementary framework of our Knowledge of Nature. + +The method of Descartes was further extended by the English philosopher +Locke. Those qualities which formed the elements of Knowledge were +described by him as the primary qualities of body; the sensible +presentation comprised also the secondary qualities which seemed to be +in some way superposed upon and contained within the former. + + * * * * * + +Our fundamental ideas of Nature were called by Locke sensible ideas. +These ideas were derived from our sensible Experience, and it is only +just to Locke to point out that, when examined in detail, his sensible +ideas are seen to be not mere qualifications of sensation, but rather +the elementary characters of Nature viewed as a dynamic process and +discovered by our Activity. Yet the ambiguous term _sensible ideas_ +unfortunately led to their being regarded as ideas derived, not from our +action in any form, but from pure sensation alone. + +This extraordinary error was intensified in the speculation of Berkeley +and Hume. Experience with them appeared to consist solely of a +succession of sensations appearing to, impressing, or affecting a +_tabula rasa_ of consciousness. + +Of course in such a state of affairs all Knowledge would be impossible. +The scepticism which logically followed from such a doctrine was too +universal to be capable even of the fiction that it was credible. +Berkeley, it is true, endeavoured to save the situation by postulating +the incessant and immediate intervention of the Deity as the sustainer +of the sensible panorama. This purely arbitrary and fictitious expedient +was entirely rejected by Hume, who with fearless honesty carried to its +ultimate results the direct consequences of the doctrine and then +complacently left human Knowledge to take care of itself. + + * * * * * + +A masterly protest against the position of Hume was made by his +countryman Reid, who in his _Inquiry into the Human Mind_ very clearly +pointed out the fundamental difference between the sensible +accompaniments or constituents of our Experience and the real and +independently existent substratum by which that Experience is sustained +and organised. His argument, though it attracted considerable attention, +did not, however, affect as deeply as might have been expected the +future of philosophic speculation, probably because he offered no new +clue or key whereby to detect the origin and account for the presence in +our Experience of those enduring and substantial elements or forms by +which it is sustained, but on the contrary left their recognition to +what he rather vaguely described as common sense. + + * * * * * + +Much more influential was the elaborate answer of Kant, which has +profoundly affected the course of Metaphysics since its publication. +Reverting in principle to the platonic method, Kant again sought the +enduring elements, the fundamentals of Science, in the constitution of +the cognitive faculty itself. But very differently from Plato he +discovered these in the categories or essential forms of intellective +action,--the category of causality and dependence and the so-called +forms of the transcendental aesthetic--Time and Space. Under these +categories the indefinite data of sensation were thought to be organised +into a cognisable system. + +A rapid advance of speculation along the lines signalised by Kant took +place after his work was published, and for many years this movement was +regarded by a large part of the speculative world as the most hopeful +and progressive of philosophic efforts, and by its own votaries as +placing them in a position of superiority to all other schools of +thought. The thoroughness of their studies and introspective methods to +some extent justified, or at least excused the arrogance of their +pretensions. + +But it is to-day almost unnecessary even to criticise this Philosophy. + +From the first it was foredoomed to failure, and had no prospect of +succeeding where Plato--equipped with armour from the same forge--had +already failed. + + * * * * * + +Kantianism like Platonism failed because it still left the sensible +unaccounted for. Not only did it fail to tell us whence came these +sensations which, however transitory and unreal, constantly saluted our +consciousness and largely constituted our Experience; it failed also to +show us how they could be brought into relation with the faculty of +Knowledge. + +Finding its elemental forms in the structure of the organ of Knowledge, +it failed to tell us how we ever managed by means of these to get beyond +our own subjective states, or how we ever came to think that there was a +World outside of the individual consciousness, by the categories of +which, according to them, our cognitions of such a World were called +into being. For if Reality were unknowable except by and through the +categories, then our Knowledge of Reality was the creature of our own +mental activity, and we must still remain unable to understand why we +should suppose that we had got beyond ourselves. + +These defects of Kantianism were early recognised by Schopenhauer, who +also appears to have realised that what was wanted was another and a new +key to unlock the gateway of Knowledge. + +Knowledge was in essence an affirmation or series of affirmations about +a real World distinct from the Knower. It was surely now obvious that +the warrant for such affirmations and the source of their validity must +come from somewhere beyond the cognitive faculty itself. The source upon +which men again and again have seemed to fall back is Sensation; but +Sensation being transitory and dependent for its existence upon its +being felt can really give us no help. Some other, some self-existent +thing is wanted, and with considerable insight Schopenhauer suggested +that the key was to be found in the Will. + +But this theory, though it has lately attracted considerable attention, +can hardly be claimed as offering any definite prospect of a solution. +Its cardinal defect is that it still fails to show how the sensible +arises. It is supposed to be generated out of pure Volition, but no +causal nexus, no direct connection of any kind is immediately apparent +between the two, and Schopenhauer in developing his theory did nothing +to supply the want. The doctrine cannot therefore be regarded as more +than a helpful stepping-stone to the true answer. + + * * * * * + +In recent years various forms of opportunist philosophies under the +names of Pragmatism, Pluralism, etc., have endeavoured to elude the +pressure of the dilemma and to solace mankind for the failure of +Kantianism by advising them to accept Experience as it is. But though +such a counsel of resignation may in a popular sense of the term be +regarded as philosophical it can hardly be accepted as a solution. + + * * * * * + +We find, then, that since man first began to inquire reflectively upon +the nature of his cognitive faculty his speculation has followed one or +other of two great lines or divisions of theory, neither of which has +been found to afford intellectual satisfaction. + +We have (1) the theory that seeks in some way or other to derive the +real constituents of Science from the constitution of the cognitive +faculty itself. To this theory, which has inspired one whole stream of +speculation from Plato to Hegel, there are at least two absolutely fatal +objections. + +(_a_) It fails altogether to account for the sensible presentation which +however fluent and unstable appears to stand in a direct and even +unique relation to the real. It fails to let us understand how that +relation arises, how the sensible is generated, or how it enters into +our consciousness. + +(_b_) We are unable under this theory to discover how we ever reach a +Knowledge of the real World, how we can get beyond ourselves, how if the +Mind in its search for truth is perpetually intercepted by its own forms +it can ever furnish us with any genuine cognitions of the external. + +(2) We have the theory that the essential forms of Reality are to be +found in the Object and are thence supplied to the Understanding, which +plays the part merely of a receptive surface or _tabula rasa_. + +In the hands of Aristotle this doctrine took the form of an affirmation +that Nature must be regarded as an energetic process containing within +itself the potency by which it perpetually generated the actual. + +Promising as it was in Aristotle's hands, this speculation was not +carried forward or assimilated by his immediate successors. Indeed, it +was practically forgotten until the intellectual revival of the +sixteenth century, which inaugurated the foundations of modern Science. +However little the fact may have been consciously recognised even by +the leaders of scientific discovery, this was the conception of Nature +which inspired and sustained the scientific advance. In the department +of philosophic speculation, however, it appeared only under the debased +and misleading form of a belief that the sensible presentation was the +true source of the contents of Cognition, that it was from Sensation +that the Mind of Man derived the whole fabric of Science. "_Penser c'est +sentir_" was the form in which it was expressed by Condillac, but was +equally the view which commended itself to Berkeley, at least in his +early writings, to Hume, and to a whole army of successors down to J. S. +Mill. + +We hope we have already sufficiently emphasised the falsity of such a +view. Obviously, if the Mind were merely the passive recipient of a +stream of impressions, no sort of rational Discourse, no scientific or +cognitive effort could ever have been stimulated into activity, and the +very ideas of causality and relation, indeed all that we associate with +the exercise of the understanding, could never have been called into +being. + +Upon neither of these views of the nature of Knowledge can we arrive at +any consistent or intelligible conception of its genesis, nature, or +method of operation. + +What, then, must we do? It is hardly doubtful that if we are to make +any progress we must find another and a new key whereby to unlock the +double door that bars the entrance to the inner shrine of truth. + +Now _the_ fundamental, or at least _a_ fundamental error characteristic +of all these various efforts after a solution is to be found in the fact +that they view the World as a static thing rather than as a kinetic +process. + +The World to vision seems a great still thing in or on which no doubt +innumerable bodies are moving to and fro, but which itself--the +fundamental thing--is solid and unchanging. But this is an illusion. The +seemingly unchanging features are changeless only in the monotony of +their constant mutation. + +Cohering masses are rigid in respect only of the constancy of the +dynamic process of transmutation in which cohesion consists. The sun +shines eternally steady only in consequence of the ceaseless kinetic +energies which give it being. + +What we are ever doing in rational Discourse, what Knowledge constantly +accomplishes, is to furnish an account, a reproduction of a series of +operations. The World is a process--an activity. That was recognised as +long ago as the days of Heracleitus, but his disciples did +not--although we think there is good ground for believing that he +did[60:1]--his disciples did not realise that a process, whilst it +implies constant flux and change, implies also something permanent even +in its mutations, something which undergoes the change and sustains the +flow. + +To understand a thing is to discover how it _operates_. The eternal +forms of things are laws of natural action. Such are the law of +gravitation, the laws of optics or of chemical combination. A static +picture unless so interpreted must be at once valueless and meaningless. + +It follows that Thought and Discourse, in furnishing us with Knowledge, +must themselves be active, and must in some way or other reproduce the +activity of Nature. Thought, in short, _is_ an Activity which reproduces +the activity of things, the activity in which the phenomena of Nature +arise. + +But how do we arrive at any apprehension of Natural Action? What informs +us that Nature is a potency ever operative? What suggests to us the +conception of potency at all? We reply that we arrive at the idea of +potent action because we are ourselves active beings. Our organism +maintains itself by constant physiological activities. These are the +permanent constancies of transmutation which _constitute_ the organism. + +But superimposed upon these there are our voluntary exertional +activities. By these latter we necessarily mingle with and indeed +participate in the action of the natural forces which (as we usually +say) surround us, but which in point of fact do more than surround us. +The disparate grouping of natural bodies in vision blinds us to the fact +that we are really not merely surrounded by but are mingled with and +participate in the dynamic system.[61:1] We are continually pressing +with our weight upon the bodies on which we rest, we are continually +exerting or resisting the pressure of so-called adhering +masses--resistance-points in one dynamic system of which we are +ourselves a part. Thus it is that in our exertional action we reveal to +our consciousness not only the forms of our own activity but the forms +of the dynamic system which contains and yet transcends the Sensible and +the Ideal. + +The theory we have suggested enables us to proceed at once to a +rational explanation of Sensation. + +Sensation is _obstructed action_. A detailed consideration of as many as +you like to take of the myriad constituents of our sensible Experience +will continually and without exception confirm this simple fact. + +In Nature it is the potent action which is real. It alone can be +directly represented by the activity of Thought. The mere obstruction of +activity is not a real thing, hence the unreal character of Sensation. +Yet the obstruction being an obstruction of the real action of Nature +is, if not real, at least actual and immediate. Nay, its presence in our +Experience, however mutable and unstable it may be, is the only sure +test and guarantee of Reality. + +Each of the two leading theories which have dominated speculation +presents one partial aspect of the truth. + +The eternal cognisable element of Reality _is_ apprehended, as the +Platonist holds, by the intellect and by the intellect alone. To that +extent the Platonist is right. That cognisable element is Action. But +Action is denoted for us only in the obstructions which it encounters. +These obstructions constitute our World of Sensible Experience, which +is therefore for each of us the sure indicator of the Real. In +recognising this fact the sensationalist is right in his turn. + + * * * * * + +Not only does the dynamic conception of Nature enable us to account for +Sensation, but it lets us see how the Sensible World becomes a +constituent of Experience. It is by and through its obstructions and +these only that we featurise or denote our Experience. It is by the +breaks, the turnings in the road that we cognise its course. It is by +the line of rocks and breakers that we define the shore. But we must not +mistake the turnings for the roadway nor the shore for the ocean. + +It is in and by our activity that we discover this World of sensible +obstructions. The features of the Sensible World correspond therefore to +the laws of our exertional activity, but the correspondence is +relational, not resemblant. Just so, it is by the reflection of Light +that we discover the forms of the obstacle which solid bodies oppose to +the radiant undulation. The resultant colours correspond to the form of +these obstructions; but the correspondence is relational not resemblant. +The same is true of sounds, of tactual sensations, of every other +sensible obstacle to pure activity. + +By the clouds of smoke we follow or used to follow the progress of the +battle, but the battle is something other than a cloud of smoke. + +We are, as Plato told us in his famous allegory, like prisoners in a +cave--our attitude averted from the aperture, and it is only by the +shadows cast upon the cavern wall that we can interpret the events which +are transacting themselves outside. + +In one sense, therefore, the whole sensible and spatial World is real. +At least it is actual; and it affords us the materials from which we +construct our scheme of phenomena, and by which the kinetic process of +Reality is denoted and conceived. + +The question ever and anon occurs to us--How upon this view can we solve +the problem of transcendence? How even on this view of the case do we +manage to get beyond ourselves? How are we in any way helped thereto by +the fact that Reality consists in potent action rather than in +Sensation? + +Again, the answer is significant. In action, that is, in exertional +action, we are really _part_ of a larger _whole_. Our exertional action +is _ab initio_ mingled in and forms really an integral part of the +dynamic system in which our life is involved. The ever operative forces +of Gravity, Cohesion, Chemical Affinity, and so forth are the phenomenal +expression of the laws of energetic transmutation in which we partake +and of which we are organically a part, however apparently separate and +disparate our bodies may seem to be. It is life and feeling, not action, +which really distinguish the individual from his environment, at least +from his material dynamic environment. Be it noted that what is required +is not an explanation of how we transcend Experience. That by no effort +can we ever do in Knowledge. All we are required to explain is how we +transcend our Thought and our Sensibility. The answer is: Our Experience +begins in action, and it begins therefore in a sphere which is beyond +the mere subjective Consciousness, and yet is _organically one_ with the +organs of Cognition and Feeling. + +It is only by a visual fiction that we come to regard our active selves +as distinct from the dynamic system. We cannot, in fact, shake off the +bonds of corporeality, of gravity, of all the various restraints of our +organic activity. + +Relatively, however, the cerebral activity of Thought is liberated from +the stresses of the dynamic environment; hence the apparent freedom and +independence, under certain conditions, of Thought, Imagination, and +Volition. + +A great difficulty in realising this view of Experience is to be found +in the apparent Solidity and Inertia of material bodies. Sensible +experiences group themselves round these _constancies_. But a material +body, when its sensible concomitants are abstracted, is nothing more +than a permanent process of energy transmutation the interruption of +which in one form or another may originate Sensation. It follows that +the world of spatially extended bodies is a homogeneous and consistent +whole, reflecting in its laws and forms the real operations by which it +is constituted and sustained. But all this actual World is nevertheless +phenomenal only, albeit the phenomena are derived from and related to +the Real as change is to the thing which changes. + +To a large extent we are misled by the impressive prominence of the +visual data. In vision we are presented with a system of inter-related +and simultaneously occurring sensations which we find by experience to +be the sure and certain indicators of the potent obstructions which our +activity encounters. For this reason we habitually make use of the +visual sign as the guide and instrument of our exertional activity, and +this habitual use leads us to regard the visual presentation as the +essential form of Reality. However sure we are that that is a false +view, it yet is very difficult to retrace our steps and re-enter the +elemental darkness which involves the blind. + +The philosophic value of the interpretation of Experience by the blind +ought therefore to be very great. Observations made on the experiences +of the blind and of those to whom vision has been restored are not very +numerous, but many of these recorded by Plainer, the friend of Leibniz, +and others are of the highest value, and remarkably confirm the view for +which we have been contending. + +Undoubtedly, so far as we are aware, the most valuable contribution to +this aspect of the discussion is to be found in a little volume recently +published in Paris under the title _Le Monde des Aveugles_. The author, +M. Pierre Villey, is himself blind. In the interests of Science he has +cast aside the delicacy and reserve which have generally prevented the +blind from analysing or at least from discussing the import of their +experiences. He is also fortunately possessed of a philosophic and +highly cultivated intellect, and has not failed to make himself +acquainted with the general course of metaphysical speculation. + +The present writer has been in correspondence with M. Villey, whose +conclusions remarkably confirm the view for which this essay contends, +and he finds that M. Villey recognises the truth of that view. +Individual quotations would only detract from the cumulative effect of +his argument, but we may refer in particular to the interesting +discussion as to the relations between the space concepts of the blind +and those of the vident. The blind can be taught, and are taught, +geometry, and can discuss and understand spatial and geometrical +problems. The sensible furniture by which the spatial conceptions of the +blind are denoted obviously cannot be visual, and are no doubt largely +tactual, whilst on the other hand the vident utilise the visual data to +the almost total exclusion of any other. There must therefore be some +common measure by means of which a community is established between the +spatial conceptions of the blind and those of the vident. M. Villey +concludes and clearly shows that the common medium is to be found in the +fact that our spatial conceptions are fundamentally based upon and are +expressive of the discoveries of our exertional activity. Touch, in +short, is an ambiguous term and includes both passive sensations and +those forms of Activity which we describe when we use the term "feel" as +a transitive verb. Just as we distinguish between seeing and looking or +between hearing and listening, so should we distinguish between touch +passive and touch active or palpation. + + * * * * * + +The view of Science which we have endeavoured to explain has received a +notable confirmation from the establishment during the latter part of +the nineteenth century of the scientific doctrine of Energy.[69:1] + +The culmination of the scientific fabric of which Galileo and Newton +laid the foundations was reached when it was demonstrated that the whole +physical universe must be regarded as composed of Energy, either kinetic +and actually undergoing transmutation from one form to another, or +potential and quiescent yet containing within itself the quantifiable +capacity of transformation. The objective correlatives of the different +classes of sensible experiences are found to be different forms which +this Energy assumes--the kinetic energy of a mass in motion, the radiant +energy of Light, the energy of Heat, the potential energy of chemical +separation, etc.--all these have now at length been shown to be forms of +one real thing capable under appropriate conditions of being transmuted +into each other and of which not only the inter-transmutability but the +equivalent values can be calculated and have been found by experiment to +be fixed and definite. Thus the mechanical equivalent of heat is a fixed +and definite quantity. The Energy of a body in motion can be measured +and stated in terms of mass and velocity. + +The profound conception of Aristotle, under which Nature was regarded as +a potent Energy containing within itself the capacity of generating the +phenomenal World, has again been revived and realised--but with great +additions. The theory in the hands of Science is now not only confirmed +by incessant experiment, but the relation which it affirms between +reality and phenomenon has been _quantified_. + +Moreover, the actual operations under which the potential generates the +actual have, so to say, been laid bare to view; and lastly, the +inter-transmutability of all forms of Energy and its real unity have +been established. + +The doctrine has therefore received a confirmation of which Aristotle +did not dream, and its explanation has at the same time received an +illumination which his vague if profound adumbration could never afford. +With this added support the true conception of human knowledge has +received new strength. The theory is still, nevertheless, not to be +grasped without a resolute effort of reflection. It involves an +inversion of our everyday conceptions more radical than that which was +demanded by the Copernican theory of astronomy, and we know that that +theory--offered to and rejected by mankind before the beginning of the +Christian era--had to wait through sixteen or seventeen hundred years +before it secured an acceptance, at first grudging and even now not +always adequate. + + * * * * * + +The ordinary metaphysical student has hitherto rather resented the idea +that in order to a true solution of the problem of Knowledge he must +acquaint himself with the fundamental conceptions of physics. Yet so it +is. It may perhaps be hoped that when the first strangeness of the new +position has disappeared the conditions may be accepted with greater +readiness. At any rate, a correct apprehension of our fundamental +conceptions of the world of our external experience is indispensable. No +theory can wholly dispense with such conceptions. It is therefore +essential that, however elementary, they should be clear and not +contradictory. Philosophy has always vaguely realised and exacted as +much. The need is now imperative. + +Some years ago, in an essay on Schopenhauer, the author, Mr. Saunders, +remarked, "How the matter of which my arm is composed and that state of +consciousness which I call my Will [imagine anyone calling Will a state +of consciousness!] are conjoined is a mystery beyond the reach of +Science, and the man who can solve it is the man for whom the world is +waiting." + +Well, if that be so, then the world need not wait any longer. The +required explanation is offered to metaphysics by the scientific work of +the physicians who built up and consolidated the modern doctrine of +Energy. It is true that most of them have continued to postulate the +reality of material bodies. For their purpose there was no real +difficulty in doing so. What they required was a datum of configuration, +a phenomenal basis upon which their calculations could proceed and in +terms of which, as a point of origin, their statement of transmutations +was made. The persistence of material bodies is a condition precedent to +the phenomenal manifestations in which our Experience arises. Organic +existence in every form and the world in which it arises presuppose the +actuality of these. But dynamically they are merely the phenomenal +result of certain permanent forces constantly in operation. To beings, +if there be such, inhabiting the Ether there is little doubt but that a +gravitation system like that of the sun and its planets must present a +corporate rigidity and identity somewhat similar to that which cohering +masses present to our intelligence. But, in terms of reality, Energy, +potential and kinetic, containing within itself the potency which +generates the actual and sustains the constant transmutation in which +phenomena arise is the sole and only postulate. + +The rise of meta-geometrical methods and other branches of scientific +speculation have led in recent years to a considerable amount of very +interesting inquiry into the nature of our fundamental geometrical +conceptions. Strange to say, a large body of respectable mathematicians +have been found to favour the extraordinary view that our mathematical +conceptions are derived from Sensation. We do not propose here to +discuss at length this idea. It is merely another form of the old +sensationalist view of Knowledge, but we suggest that the conditions of +the problem will readily appear in their true light and real nature +whenever such inquirers realise the fact that our exertional activity is +the source of our cognitions of the external, and that therefore our +pure exertional activity is the source of the basal concepts of +geometry. + +Here lies the root of the distinction between pure and empirical +science. The propositions of geometry, being derived from our own pure +activity, are of the former class; the inductive conclusions of physical +experimental science, being gathered by observation and measurement +from sensible data, are empirical and approximate. A geometrical +proposition--such, for example, as the assertion that the three angles +of a triangle are equal to two right angles--is not merely approximate. +It has no dependence on measurement. It is absolutely true. It is +ascertained deductively, and therefore measurement is not involved, and +is never employed. Its truth is not ascertained by measurement. It is +not verified by measurement. It in no degree depends upon the sensible +figure. It is equally true for every human being whatever be the degree +of accuracy of the figure by the aid of which he studies it, or indeed +whether he studies it by figure or otherwise, as must necessarily be the +case with the born blind. + +There may be many different forms of energetic transmutation which may +determine many other forms of space besides that form of tridimensional +space in which our Activity is involved. For such, a different geometry +may and will be applicable; but for the tridimensional conditions of +_our activity_ the proposition is necessary and absolute. No measurement +of any stellar parallax, however minute and whatever the result might +be, could have any bearing on its truth. Geometry is the science of the +pure forms of our motor activity amidst corporeal bodies. + +A useful illustration of our argument is to be drawn from a +consideration of the question of phonetic spelling. Occasionally we find +persons urging that all spelling should be an exact reproduction of +sound. Indeed, an improved alphabet has been designed to enable the idea +to be carried out with greater accuracy. + +Now it is quite true that it is by their sound that we recognise or +denote our words. Hence our alphabet was originally phonetic in +principle, and indeed still is so, although the correspondence is +imperfect. As the use of visible signs develops spelling seems to fall +into certain fixed frames and to deviate more and more from pure +phonetic simplicity. But why is this so? It is because the sounds are +merely the symbols or indicators of the different forms of vocal +articulation (vocal acts), and it is really as the symbols and +indicators of these actions that they possess any meaning and acquire +such permanence and identity as they have. The phonetic system, +therefore, becomes in use subordinated to the expression of the acts by +which are produced these radical vocables which constitute the +essentials of rational Discourse. + +In all this the process of the expression of words in spelling is a +microcosmic counterpart of the process of cognition as we have tried to +explain it. + +It is noteworthy that the same thing necessarily happens in the case of +any new system of spelling. + +The most prominent advocates of phonetic spelling have been also the +authors of a system of phonetic shorthand. + +Like the written and printed alphabet of Europe, the alphabet of +Phonography was made phonetic. Indeed it started off as a more nearly +perfect phonetic system than the ordinary European alphabet. But as its +use advances its employment undergoes the same change. The phonetic +symbols are abbreviated by grammalogues and contractions, and this +proceeds in accordance with a principle unconsciously recognised but +which really depends on the same inherent necessity to preserve in a +consistent form the expression of the radical vocables of Speech. +Finally, in the hands of the expert stenographer the system of phonetic +shorthand (though he still uses the sound as the guide and indicator of +his actions) is as far removed from a pure phonetic representation as +the ordinary method of spelling. Indeed, unless some such suprasensible +and unifying principle were available, phonetic spelling would speedily +perish in an infinity of degenerate variations. + +We adduce this illustration as one which very well confirms our main +argument. We have no desire to discuss on its merits the general +question of Spelling Reform, which of course is quite apart from the +attempt to establish a scheme of spelling on a purely phonetic basis. A +more rational system of spelling is nevertheless an object worthy of all +consideration. + + * * * * * + +Intellectualism and sensationalism have both broken down. The world of +speculation is anxiously looking for a new clue. Witness the pathetic +eagerness with which it clutches at every floating straw. The +innumerable "isms" by which it seeks ever and anon to keep itself afloat +are most of them but the sometimes unrecognisable wreckage of the old +systems drifting about under very inappropriate names. Such terms as +Realism and Idealism are freely used (generally prefixing the adjective +"new") by writers in philosophic periodicals in a sense which might make +Plato, Aquinas, or Kant turn in their graves. + +We see their votaries encumbered with the trappings of a futile +erudition of the insignificant or clinging pathetically to the insecure +relics of teleological doctrine, or, still less virile, seeking support +in a return to the unscientific tales of supernatural spiritualism. Such +efforts are vain. + +Only by facing the facts with all their consequences, whatever these +may be and whatever they may involve for the proudest aspirations of +mankind--only thus can truth be attained. And lest any should say that +we preach an unrelieved pessimism, let us remind such that Knowledge is +not after all the source of Life, that another category and a different +principle--that, namely, which we indicate under the term +Love-divine--must have generated the potent current of Life, and that no +one should close the door against the hopes of the human Intelligence +until he has discovered what are the limits imposed upon what Perfect +Love can do. + +The question still remains whether mankind will be equal to the effort +required to assimilate the essential truth. They very nearly failed to +assimilate the Copernican cosmogony. For sixteen hundred years after it +was first offered to mankind the race preferred to grope in the darkness +and confinement of a false conception. + +If they succeed in accomplishing the reception of the new truth, +unheard-of progress may be looked for. If they fail, civilisation must +disappear and humanity decline. There is no middle course. As Bacon +remarked, in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only to God and +angels to be lookers-on. + +We know how stubbornly the Ptolemaic cosmogony still clings to our +conceptions, how largely it still dominates--or till recently did +dominate--the religious cosmography of the most civilised peoples. + +In Philosophy our leading teachers seem as yet to have a very feeble +appreciation of the new conditions. They turn greedily to the eloquent +pages of _L'Evolution creatrice_, but however earnestly they search they +cannot find there any definite solution of the difficulties of the +age-old problem. They wander wearily through the mazes of psychological +detail or wage almost childish logomachies over the interpretation of +each other's essays. Philosophical magazines are filled with articles +which reflect this state of the philosophic mind. Philosophical +congresses meet and argue and go home; Gifford lecturers prelect; yet so +far as can be seen there is little sign that the key has been grasped. +The great fact remains obscured amidst a mass of words. + +The elucidation of the problem of Knowledge demands certain improvements +in our philosophic terminology. Language as a rule is a very unerring +philosopher, and words shaped and polished by long usage generally +express, more truly than those who use them realise, the essential +reality of things. Yet these long-enduring errors of the ages which we +have been discussing here have left their impress too on the terminology +of Metaphysics. + +Thought and Action are in common speech contrasted, and the distinction +expresses an essential truth. But when we seek to say further that both +of these are Activities, we are stating another truth in terms which are +hardly consistent with the previously contrasted distinction. It might +be better if Action and Active could be applied generally to both and if +the term _exertion_ could be substituted for Action in describing the +forms of activity which we denominate _motor_. To that suggestion, +however, there are also serious objections. The words derived from _ago_ +have historically a special application to the exertional and dynamic. +We leave the question to our readers as one of which it is of +considerable importance to find a satisfactory solution. + +In the foregoing pages our object has been to illustrate the erroneous +conceptions by which the theory of human cognition has been obscured and +to explain briefly what we conceive to be the true solution. The +argument in support of the doctrine here explained has been more fully +presented by the present writer in an essay entitled _The Dynamic +Foundation of Knowledge_, to which the reader who desires to study the +question further must now be referred. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[60:1] +Kosmon tonde ton auton akanton oute tis theon oute anthropon +epoiese, all' en aiei kai esti kai estai pyr aeizoon haptomenon metra +kai aposbennymenon metra.+ Quoted by Clement of Alexandria, etc. (_The +First Philosophers of Greece_, by A. Fairbanks, p. 28.) + +[61:1] "La subdivision do la matiere en corps isoles est relative a +notre perception" (_Evolution creatrice_, p. 13). + +[69:1] For a clear brief summary of the theory the reader may be +referred to a little work by Sir William Ramsay, F.R.S., entitled +_Elements and Electrons_, pp. 8-15. + + + + +IV + +THE DOCTRINE OF ENERGY[81:1] + + +The problem of Metaphysics--the nature of Reality--still presses for a +solution. Agnosticism is but a cautious idealism--a timid phenomenalism. +That philosophy, however named, which proclaims that the experience of +life is nothing more than a vain show, a pantomime of sensations +distinguished only from ideas by their greater intensity and +distinctness, is not only a confession of failure. It is a denial of +fact. + +To know the nature of the Absolute as such, to present the Absolute to +finite minds as it must be presented, if that be possible, to the +Absolute itself, must ever remain impossible to man. But it is equally +true that to attempt such a task has never been the urgent mission of +Philosophy. The distinction between the Ideal and the Real, between the +conceptual and the perceptual, is quite certainly and incessantly +recognised. Agnosticism can neither deny the fact successfully, nor +solve the speculative difficulties which its recognition raises up. The +Real and the Ideal, essentially distinct yet mockingly similar, for ever +blend and intermingle in the composite experience of life. Truly to +discriminate and unravel these,--validly to separate the Ideal element +which impregnates that Reality which we are for ever compelled to +postulate and recognise, still remains the great problem of +Philosophy--humbler perhaps and more practical, but not less profound +than any vain attempt to discover to finite conception the Absolute as +it is in itself. Therefore it is that the efforts of negative and +agnostic criticism to dispense with the recognition of Reality as a +necessary postulate of our activity are foredoomed to failure. They +leave us not a solitude which we might pretend to be peace, but a +seething sea of troubles urgently demanding a new attempt to reveal the +unity which must underlie the infinite diversity of experience. + +Such, indeed, seems to us the present position of Metaphysics; and, what +is more important, it appears to react with increasing force upon the +theories and investigations of Science. + +The problem of Reality is thus at present not without a special and +increasing interest for the students of Physical Science. Until lately +they have been taught and have always maintained that Matter is the +direct object of sense-perception. No doubt it is long since Philosophy +has urged that our conceptions of the external world are a mentally +constructed system. But this doctrine has made but little impression +upon the students of Natural Science. The objective origin of our +sensations and the apparently objective reality also of the intelligible +qualities and operative laws of the external world are too strongly +impressed upon their minds. Idealism and Transcendentalism have carried +no conviction to them. Still, the difficulties of common sense have +continued to grow. Recent developments of scientific theory have +increased the urgency of the problem, but they seem to us also to +suggest a solution the beneficial results of which affect the whole of +Metaphysics. + +We refer to the doctrine of Energy, which occupies now as great a place +in the physical sciences as the doctrine of Evolution does in the +zoological sciences. + +Natural philosophers have for some time taught that there are two Real +Things in the physical universe--Matter and Energy. It seems a very +striking theory. Has it received the attention it deserves from the +student of Metaphysics? We are convinced that it has not: and the reason +he most frequently gives for this neglect is that, being a purely +scientific doctrine, it does not come within his sphere. Science, we are +told, deals with the phenomenal world internally considered; Philosophy +with the relations of the phenomenal world to Reality, and with the +nature of the transcendental elements in our Knowledge. + +This may be generally true. Nevertheless, Philosophy and Science have +surely concepts in common. They both refer to the same thing when they +speak of Space; we presume also when they speak of Matter. Indeed, +Philosophy analyses the conceptions involved not only in scientific +reasoning, but in the most common and ordinary mental processes. It +analyses them with special reference to the relations between the +Phenomenal and the Real--a question which, though it always lies latent, +does not in ordinary circumstances arise in urgent form. It is therefore +evident that the fundamental conceptions of Science _do_ fall within the +purview of Philosophy. + +The study of Physics _can_ be carried on practically as a study of +phenomena--of Heat, Colours, Sounds, Forces, etc., all of which are +kinds of phenomena--without the expression of any dogmatic and +formulated opinion as to their relation with Reality. Physics can speak +of mass and weight and avoid all reference to Matter; but there always +is, in scientific reasoning, an implicit reference to Reality, and it +facilitates, therefore, the expression of scientific reasoning, when the +account of a physical process is stated with reference to a supposed +reality, such as Matter. And in making such reference Science _is_ +thinking of the thing-in-itself. It _is_ a reference beyond phenomena. + +Heat, Light, Sound, Force, are names of classes of phenomena, and the +great discovery of Physics during the nineteenth century has been that +these are all transformable into each other, and bear definite numerical +relations to each other in proportion to which such transformations take +place. Science availing itself of this discovery, unifies its conception +of Nature and gives expression to the doctrine of the +inter-transmutability of the various classes of physical phenomena by +postulating an entity called Energy, and regarding the various classes +of phenomena as transmutations which this entity undergoes. But Science +has been reluctant to recognise that it is now entitled to dispense with +the postulation of Matter. The theory, as announced by the leading men +of science, has therefore been to the effect that there exist in the +physical universe _two_ real things--Matter and Energy--in place of one +only, as commonly supposed for so long. + +Now we maintain, on the contrary, that such a statement of physical +theory is erroneous and redundant; that Science is not obliged to +postulate _two_ such entities; that the concept of Energy supplies all +her requirements; and that the employment of that conception obviates +the very serious contradictions which are involved in any assumption of +a real entity of the nature of Matter as ordinarily understood--a +conception of which the very description involves difficulties which +have perplexed thinking men for more than two centuries. + +Our argument on this point involves consideration of the place occupied +by Energy in a potential form. + +Whilst the transformability of Heat, Light, Sound, and other physical +phenomena in definite numerical ratios has led to their being all +regarded as actual manifestations of transmutations proceeding in one +real thing, occasionally there is a seeming break in the catena; no +phenomenon can be detected into which the heat or light or other +immediately preceding manifestation has been transformed; but, later on, +the co-relative reappears, and by an argument as strong as that which +asserts the continuous identity of an intelligence before, during, and +after a temporary suspension of consciousness, the student of Physics +maintains the continued existence _in posse_, if not _in esse_, of the +Energy which by appropriate action he can again reveal in an active or +kinetic manifestation. Hence arises the conception of potential Energy. +The Energy to which we attribute the force of cohesion which any +particular body can on occasion manifest, we believe to exist +potentially whilst that body continues unacted upon. Our belief is +confirmed by our experience of the certainty with which, on the +recurrence of the given conditions, the force always again manifests +itself. In like manner the potential Energy to which we attribute the +Force of Gravitation we believe to exist at all times, even when not +kinetically active. Indeed, it only manifests itself when a +transmutation is taking place into some other form of Energy. Now it is +the universal association of these two forms of potential Energy with +the common and fundamental data of our sense-experience that has +suggested the construction in our minds of the conception of Matter, and +furnished us with the ideas of solidity, impenetrability, and weight +which constitute its groundwork. + +Our view, therefore, is that the concept of materiality can, in the way +just indicated, be in all cases analysed into, and derived from, the +conception of Energy; and that Science, if consistent, cannot postulate +the reality of Matter as well. Potential Energy adequately supplies the +demand for a real substratum of which phenomena are the manifestation. + +The whole question is very well worth the attention, not only of +scientific students but of metaphysicians. The inquiry will distinctly +gain if it receive the auxiliary attention of those who have studied the +process by which we form our mental conceptions, and whilst the students +of Physics deserve the honours of discovery, they cannot safely dispense +with such assistance, for which the present confused and inconsistent +state of the fundamental definitions of Physical Science most urgently +calls. There is here a neglected but very interesting field for the +metaphysician's efforts. + +Recent scientific writings contain enough to show us that men of science +are already beginning to recognise not only the inconsistency of the +theory of two real things, but the dominating significance of the +conception of Energy, and are gradually coming to claim for the +conception of Matter little more than recognition as the vehicle of +energetic transmutation. Let us then for the moment accept the position +that Science--ridding itself of redundant theory--postulates Energy as +the real thing-in-itself, in terms of which it frames its statement of +physical phenomena, and let us examine briefly the effects which the +acceptance of this new postulate is likely to have on philosophic +speculation. + +All my Presentment, all the content of my sense-experience, according to +this theory, I attribute to a multifarious continuous series of +transmutations constantly proceeding in some portion of the system of +Energy which constitutes the real substratum of phenomena. I study, +measure, and classify the different species of these transmutations; I +associate particular sensations and classes of sensations with +particular transmutations, and I thence infer the existence _in posse_ +or _in esse_ of more or less Energy in some particular form transmuting +itself according to some one or other definite physical law. I infer +also the existence of various supplies of potential Energy constantly +available, and of other intelligent agents like myself. + +I associate every such intelligent agent with a particular series or +group of sense-experiences, and further I assume that the world at his +Presentment, consists for him in a similar series of transmutations +continuously going on in that portion of the energetic system which I +believe in a similar way to constitute such person's bodily organism. +Thus by the same process of reasoning by which I am led to believe that +my own Presentment consists in the energetic transmutations proceeding +in my organism, I explain the universality of the experience of all +intelligent agents. In my own case, by that union of consciousness with +physical energy which accompanies the manifestation of life, I am +immediately related with that portion of the energetic system which is +the real substratum of my organism, and am made conscious of the series +of transmutations occurring at that particular point in it which is +represented by my sensory system. In the case of others, from certain of +the transmutations occurring in my Presentment, I am led to infer the +existence of other similar microcosmic systems in the energetic +macrocosm of the physical universe. + +This is all very well as a theory, but if all I know is the series of +transmutations occurring in the portion of the system of Energy related +directly to my intelligence, how did I ever learn to infer from these +transmutations the existence of that Energy underlying them, and still +more of the whole energetic system extending far beyond my organism? How +do I deduce from transmutations proceeding in the portion of the +energetic system which constitutes the real substratum of my organism +the existence, not only of that substratum itself, but of other portions +of the system similarly related to other intelligences, and of the +energetic system as a whole? How do I get beyond my Presentment? How +pass from Ideality to Existence? + +I answer that I never could by any chance or possibility have got beyond +it or got any suggestion of the Reality had I been merely related to my +Presentment as a passive and percipient subject. In point of fact, +however, I am in relation with the energetic system not merely or +primarily as an Intelligence percipient of the transmutations proceeding +in it at a particular point, but also as a Will initiative to some +extent of such transmutations and capable of influencing and directing +the physical process. Life necessarily involves a process of energetic +transmutation constantly proceeding at that portion of the system of +Energy which constitutes my organism, and I am there related as Will +with a larger system which embraces the part in which intelligence is +developed. + +Fundamentally, life manifests itself in all grades of the zoologic +hierarchy as a union of Volition (or what appears in action as Volition) +with some particular point in the universe of physical Energy, the union +constituting what we call a living organism. + +Despite its profound importance to us personally and to our race, we +should not forget that, objectively considered, the brain in man and the +higher animals is merely a special organ highly developed by use, as +the trunk is in the elephant, the middle phalanx in the horse, or wings +in the bird. Intelligence is hardly to any extent a necessity of the +vital union of the Will with the energetic system. It is not at all +developed in the vegetal kingdom, hardly at all in some branches of the +animal, and there may conceivably be an infinite number of other +"kingdoms" in which it may be either undeveloped, or very differently +developed, or superseded by some other manifestation by us unimaginable. +Its development indeed seems to be concurrent with the development of a +locomotive faculty--a striking confirmation of the theory that it is in +our activity that we derive the suggestions which call forth the +exercise of the Understanding and transform sensation into perception. + +It is only with a comparative fraction of the organism that I am related +as a passively percipient intelligence. I am directly or indirectly +related as Will, as an originative cause of activity, with a larger +portion of my organism, many parts of which are quite distinct from the +cognitive portion. Now it is from my relation as Will with Energy other +than and beyond the energetic transmutations which constitute my +Presentment that I discover the energetic system of Nature, as a real +thing--beyond, underlying, and by its transmutations constitutive of my +Presentment. Many of the transmutations which occur in my Presentment I +recognise as attributable to my own volitional activity operating upon +my energetic organism, and _in my own activity there is thus suggested +to me a source of phenomena lying beyond these phenomena themselves_. A +transmutation initiated in my brain is a pure idea. The key which +suggests to me the real world is the occurrence of transmutations +ascribable to my activity operating beyond the sphere which constitutes +my Presentment. + +It is in this way that I originally discover the real energetic +substratum to the phenomenal world of my Presentment. I learn from the +transmutations to infer the agency and operation of the underlying +energy, and thus gradually construct my whole systematic conception of +the real world in which I live and move and have my being. + +This view of my activity and of the consequences of my relation as Will +to the energetic system represented by my organism, including the +portion thereof related to my intelligence, supplies us therefore with a +key to the inevitable reference of thoughts to things. + +I distinguish in my active experience a clear difference between wishing +and willing, and further between willing and effective action. My +Power--the Energy related to my Will--the exertion of which is +necessary to translate Volition into an overt result--is a limited and +quantifiable thing, but that such a hidden energetic medium or +substratum underlies all phenomena is evident from the fact that I do +not will directly the appearance of any given phenomenon. I may wish +that. But when the Volition is reached and the wish transformed into +overt exertion I find myself involved in the multifarious processes of +an energetic system which I may so far influence, but which is +nevertheless in many ways constantly going on irrespective of my +Volition. I may wish to avoid pain and may will certain exertions with +that view, but the consequences may be the reverse of what I wished. +This shows that the Volition operates immediately not on the sensation +but on the energetic system. + +In all cases between Volition and overt result there seems to be erected +and constantly maintained around me a vast energetic system, a part but +only a small part of which, namely the Energy of my organism, can be +influenced directly by my Will, whilst, even in immediate relation with +that part, transmutations beyond the reach of my Will are constantly +going on. Indeed, what fundamentally distinguishes Volition from Desire +is its relation to the energetic system. + +The doctrine of Energy therefore puts in a new and clearer light the +whole theory of Causation. + +It is common for philosophers to talk of invariable sequence as the +criterion of Causality. But, in fact, that is quite fallacious. No one +ever regards a phenomenon as the cause of another phenomenon. We ascribe +Causality to the energetic transmutation which in some form or other we +inevitably believe to accompany the appearance of every phenomenon. We +never postulate a causal relation between day and night--the most +notable case of invariable sequence. When we say the fire warms the +room, or the horse draws the cart, or the sun ripens the corn, it is the +Energy which we rightly or wrongly associate with the visual sensation +referred to in the words "fire" and "horse" and "sun" of which we are +thinking, and by no means of these visual sensations themselves. As has +been well said, we never suppose that the leading carriage of the train +draws those behind it, although their relation of sequence is quite as +close to it as to the engine. + +True, it is and must be from and by phenomena only that I infer and +measure the transmutations of Energy, but the transmutations measured +are operations of the real thing-in-itself postulated by Science. The +existence of such Energy is suggested to me primarily in my experience +of my own activity in which I recognise my power of doing work--a +quantifiable and measurable thing, homogeneous with the Energy in +respect of which Science states the relations and conditions of all +physical phenomena. My most incessant mental act is that by which, on +the analogy of my own active experience, I refer all phenomena to the +underlying energetic system. This reference it is which transforms +sensation into perception; and the constant affirmation of this +reference is the great function of the synthetic mental activity of the +understanding, and is at once the origin and explanation of that +imperative mental tendency which metaphysicians call the law of +Causality. + +How, then, does this doctrine affect the theory of the nature of Space? + +If it be true that the world as my Presentment consists in the +transmutations occurring in that particular part of the energetic system +which constitutes the real substratum of the brain, then phenomena as a +whole must arise in transmutation, in a process of Becoming rather than +in a state of Being, and Space must be the content, the condition, in +which that process proceeds. The laws of Space, therefore, are laws, so +to speak, of motion, not of position. The most absolutely still and +motionless visual presentation is really a series of constant +transmutations of Energy and the form of Space is constituted by the +laws of transmutation, which are thus at once the necessary conditions +of my perception and the universal conditions of all sense-perception. +Space, therefore, does not contain the real thing which sustains the +phenomenal world any more than it does the reality which underlies my +conscious self. It is the universal condition of the transmutations +which constitute phenomena; and it therefore "contains" all these +phenomena, including my body as phenomenon and only as phenomenon. Its +form is discovered by my organic motor activity, and in representing +this activity the mind constructs its concepts of Space and Extension. + +This view of the nature of Space, by relating its forms and laws with +the objective, and a-logical thing-in-itself in virtue of the +transmutations of which our sense-experience occurs, relieves an obvious +difficulty which must always have been felt in accepting without +qualification the purely Kantian view which regarded it as a category +imposed by the Intelligence upon the otherwise unknowable world of +sense. + +The most ardent assertors of the ideality of Space have hitherto +apparently had difficulty in avoiding the tendency to conceive it as the +persistent all-embracing objective content of the thing-in-itself, not +merely of the phenomenon, although the latter only might enter into +Knowledge. The doctrine, however, which presents our conception of Space +as discovered in our activity amid resistant transmutation-processes not +only establishes its ideality but at the same time explains the relation +which its form nevertheless bears to the objective material laws of the +sensible presentation. It liberates the mind from the oppressive +necessity of regarding Space as still somehow objectively extending and +containing the real world. It also relieves an obvious difficulty which +confronts the Philosophy of Schopenhauer in locating those +transcendental forms of the phenomenon which are imposed _a priori_ upon +the presentation, and yet are not to be found in the pure Volition. + +Of course, it must never be forgotten that my whole sentient experience +consists primarily of the series of energetic transmutations occurring +at that part of the energetic system which is in immediate vital +relation with my consciousness. It is my experience of active exertion, +of moving, speaking, etc., which gives a suggestion of the real +energetic world. The transmutations of the real Energy of the world +beyond my organism never enter my Consciousness. Transmutations arising +beyond my body only enter the presentation by influencing the cerebral +process. The luminous undulation and the sound-wave must both produce +transmutation of the cerebral Energy in order to affect Consciousness. +Yet the various characters of the transmitted impulses are +distinguishable in the resultant cerebral transmutations. Thus I feel +sensations of hardness, roughness, pain, colour, sound, etc. It is by a +process of mental construction that I associate these with the forms of +my exertional activity, and thus frame my conceptions of real bodies in +the world around me--those which I more directly associate with the +Energy subject to my Volition being conceived as representing my body. +For reasons of convenience, I refer those conceptions chiefly to the +co-ordinated visual presentation, and thus build up my conception of the +extended world of material things. Science is possible because all +transmutations of Energy take place according to definite numerical laws +and ratios. The whole work of Science is to explain every phenomenon in +terms of its definite transmutation of Energy. These definite numerical +laws and processes are characteristic of all Energy transmutation, and +thus regulate the experience of every intelligent being. It is in virtue +of these that our separate systems of knowledge correspond, and that we +are thus presented each with corresponding aspects of one outer world. +The laws which regulate the cerebral changes that accompany +sense-presentation are for me the necessary _a priori_ laws of +perception. It is because these laws operate in common in all brains +that community of intercourse is possible amongst mankind. It is because +of the further fact that the whole of the transmutations of Energy which +constitute physical phenomena compose a numerically inter-related and +regulated system that Science and rational knowledge are possible to the +intellect of man. Our knowledge is what we are obliged to think and +assert regarding experience; but the universality of experience is not +explained merely by the common nature and general laws of Intelligence, +but depends also on the generality of the laws under which the +transmutations of Energy proceed. + +We are now, therefore, by the aid of the doctrine of Energy, better able +than before to distinguish accurately between the Ideal and the Real as +contrasted elements in our experience. + +My Presentment as a whole consists in the transmutation-processes--in +the sensations, feelings, perceptions, images, ideas--in short, in all +that is going on at the point where (I necessarily express myself in +terms of spatial relations, though in this connection these are +figurative) my sentience and intelligence are developed. + +My whole Presentment is, therefore, in one sense subjective, or, as some +would say, ideal. For me, my Presentment is the impression produced on, +the condition established in, my Consciousness in virtue of what is +going on at this so-called point of contact. + +What we mean, therefore, by the subjectivity or ideality of the +Presentment is the aspect of energetic transmutations when viewed as +affecting my Consciousness in contrast with their obverse aspect when +viewed as transmutations in the objective system. As my Presentment, +they are all subjective or ideal, and it is in this reference that +Berkeley and Hume, for instance, speak of ideas of sense, such as the +colour blue, the heat of the fire, the pain of a blow. These, +constituting the bulk of the Presentment, they distinguish from what +Berkeley called ideas of the imagination--those stimulated or +originated, or, as he said, "excited," by the intelligence itself. +Whilst he contended that both classes are ideal or subjective, in +respect that they are constituents of the Presentment, the latter have +an additional title to subjectivity in respect of their origin, and +constitute what are called "ideas" when the word is used in +contra-distinction to "sensations"--such pure ideas occurring in +response to a subjective impulse. + +On the other hand, there is a sense in which the Presentment is, if not +real, at least actual and objective. + +So far as we know, Intelligence never develops except in conjunction +with an organism--that is, in vital relation with physical Energy. My +Presentment is constituted by the occurrence and depends upon the +continuance of the transmutations or operations proceeding at the +related point in the energetic system. Even pure ideas, though +subjective not only in regard to aspect but in regard to their origin, +are objective in respect that they also consist in an energetic +transmutation. + +Herein lies the germ of truth to be discovered even in the unintelligent +dogmatism of those philosophers who assert the absolute Reality of my +Presentment, as such--not merely its actuality. It is comparatively +seldom, however, either in Science or Philosophy, that we meet a thinker +prepared to go as far as that. Most take refuge in a distinction between +primary and secondary qualities of bodies, classing my sensations as +non-resembling secondary qualities, which they admit cannot be conceived +to exist without the mind in the form in which they make up my +Presentment, but reserving five or six primary qualities--solidity, +extension, figure, motion, rest--which they conceive to exist +independently, just as they enter into my Presentment. In point of fact, +however, these so-called primary qualities are not the names of +intuitions, but are abstractions or generalisations of the most general +and necessary elements of my active Experience by reference to which I +mentally construct my world. The transmutations of Energy are not a +never-repeated accidental kaleidoscope. They proceed according to +constant, definite, measurable laws, and though subordinate variations +are infinite and make up the details of my Presentment, the general laws +and conditions according to which all Energy transmutes are definite, +and constitute the general features or qualities of my Experience, and +these are the so-called primary qualities of bodies regarded in the +light of the doctrine of Energy. + +The primary quality of extension, in particular, is a conception +resulting from the association of my visual Presentment with my power of +active exertion, and the delusive tendency to regard this quality as in +some sense primarily and fundamentally real is due to the unconscious +recognition of the fact that it is in virtue of my power, or association +as an agent with the energetic system, that I derive a suggestion of the +real world beyond the phenomena which constitute my experience. + +I cannot exist without some development of activity. Hence are derived +my conceptions of free space and of resistance between bodies. My +primary sensations are the sensations of touch, and the primary impulse +of thought is to relate these with my active exertions. When sight is +first restored to the blind the first impulse is to regard the new +sensation as a form of touch. Its intellectual suggestiveness is a +development. The system or stream of transmutations in which my +volitional activity principally takes part is that represented by the +operation of the forces of Gravitation and Cohesion; the system which +influences my visual sensations is a quite different series. The changes +in this latter series, by their greater rapidity, enable me to +anticipate the other series, and for this and other reasons I employ +these sensations to signalise and symbolise the transmutations +proceeding in the series with which I am more immediately related as an +active and "willing" agent. All transmutations, if they result in +sensations, must do so by producing changes in the Energy of my +organism, and must therefore be conditioned by the general laws which +regulate the changes which occur there, or, in other words, must be +contained within a self-consistent spatial condition; but the +differences in the characters of visual Space, as it is called, and the +spatial content of my activity, reflect the differences in the series of +energetic transmutations with which they are respectively connected. + +We see more clearly, therefore, with the aid of the doctrine of Energy, +the import of the theory of transcendental aesthetic enunciated by Kant, +who first pointed out that there are elements, and those the most +necessary and universal, in the sense-presentation which bear the +character of ideality as fully as the most subjective efforts of our +ideative activity. More particularly do we illustrate the ideality of +Space as a cognition precedent to experience. It is because general laws +constantly operative regulate the transmutations which constitute the +individual's Presentment that it is possible for him to abstract from +and generalise the data of sense; and it is because the subjective +process of Ideation, by which we mean our representative mental activity +in its widest sense, consists also in transmutations under the same +general laws of the same portion of the energetic organism, that it is +possible to frame general ideas. These general laws of organic +transmutation are the _a priori_ conditions of the necessary +determination in time of all existences in the world of phenomena. + +The form, therefore, of the phenomenon, in the language of Kant, is +constituted by the transmutations of the Energy immediately related to +consciousness; the matter of the phenomenon is constituted by the +varieties produced in these by the transmitted transmutations from the +Energy beyond--just as the musician may produce a constant variety of +harmonies upon his instrument, but all must be conditioned by the +relations fixed and established between the notes of which the +instrument is composed. Transmutations of the cerebral Energy may be +stimulated not only from without, but by subjective impulse from within; +but in either case the laws of these transmutations are the necessary +form of experience, and it is the possibility of transmutation upon an +internal and subjective impulse which makes possible the formation of +synthetical judgments _a priori_. It is as if the organ were not only +responsive to impressions upon its keyboard from without, but were also +automotive and could originate harmonies in its own notes; and as if, +moreover, it were endowed with consciousness so as to receive an +intuition of both classes of music. The former would correspond to +sensations, the latter to ideas; and we might imagine such an instrument +by presenting to itself its own system of notes, contriving thus to +frame _a priori_ a synthetical system of these general musical laws +which would constitute the necessary and universal form of its whole +musical experience. To complete the perhaps fantastic analogy we must +imagine the world to be one co-ordinated musical system, and our +instrument to be endowed with the power of playing upon the other +keyboards; of thence deriving the suggestion of the distinction between +the internal and external impulses which respectively awakened harmonies +within itself; and lastly, of thus at length conceiving in the spirit of +science that the necessary and universal laws which it recognised as the +most subjective and fundamental conditions of its own operation, at the +same time regulated the activity of the entire musical universe. + +How natural it would be for such an intelligent musical instrument, if +unhappily endowed with common sense, to believe and assert that the real +substance of the universe consisted solely of sounds. Yet how evident +would it be to us from our standpoint of more absolute knowledge that +the whole orchestra of sounds, although actual and quite distinct from +consciousness, was still merely phenomenal, and yet withal, in its every +expression, revealed the laws and structure of reality--of the system of +things in themselves--a system the reality of which was dissimilar to +those appearances, though all its laws and structure could be studied +and derived from them. + +Berkeley, therefore, erred seriously when he described the idea as a +fainter sensation. Faint subjective reproductions of our sensations, as +of blue, green, or the like, constitute a very insignificant element in +our mental furniture. We seldom pursue so far into detail the ideative +effort. Severely and effectively as Berkeley criticised Locke's account +of abstract ideas, the fact remains that abstraction is a primary +feature of our whole conceptual system; and the abstractable elements of +the sensible presentation being the necessary constituents of all +ideative representation are properly denominated ideal. The one element +of particularity which every idea lacks is the reference to the +transmitted transmutation to which the sensible phenomenon owes its +origin. We derive such reference to the external solely from the +obstructions which our free activity encounters and without which we +could receive no suggestion of the non-ego, and in particular no +suggestion of the dynamic element which fundamentally distinguishes +things from thoughts. The empirical content of experience--the so-called +secondary qualities of bodies--are often called in their subjective +aspect "ideal" because the mental impression is obviously very +different from the transmutation objectively regarded. But this is to +confound the ideal with the subjective, which latter term is that +properly applicable both to the sensible impression and to purely mental +activity. The primary qualities, being the general laws or forms of +organic Energy-transmutation, are in a higher sense ideal, for they are +the necessary conditions under which both sense-presentation and +ideative representation proceed. Whilst, therefore, as Kant maintained, +they are the _a priori_ element in perception, they at the same time +constitute the laws which regulate all Energy-transmutation within our +experience both organic and extra-organic. + +We hold, therefore, to the Platonic doctrine that whilst, on the one +hand, the sensible is only an object of thought in so far as it partakes +of the intelligible, on the other hand the idea is not only a type for +the individual mind, but is partaker also of the laws which penetrate +the system of things. Idealism as a Philosophy, in denying the validity +of any reference of the content of the Presentment to a further +existence outside of the subjective experience, has induced that wider +use of the term idea which applies it to the whole actuality of +experience in its subjective aspect. With the advance of Philosophy we +must revert to that more ancient use of the term idea which confines +its extension into the realm of the perceptual to those elements of the +sensible presentation which can be reproduced by the conceptual activity +of the subject, and which in asserting, for instance, the ideality of +Space, reminds us at the same time that Ideality implies not merely +subjectivity, but the expression or representation also of some aspect +of those laws which regulate the system of Reality. + +But is not common sense right, after all? Do I really mean to say that +tables, chairs, houses, mountains--the whole world of my Presentment, +are to be regarded as shrivelled up and located in my brain, or in the +energetic correlative of my brain? Is the whole Universe, as known to me +or conceived by me, contained within a minute portion of itself--the +brain? Now Science does say something very like this, and the logical +difficulties of the position are very pressing. But they cannot be got +over by attempting to revert to common sense, because to assert that all +my conceived Universe is immediately perceived by me as it exists, would +seem to involve a diffusion of my intelligence throughout Space which is +still more inconceivable and self-contradictory. Even apart from this +implication, the assumption of the Reality of the phenomenal world +destroys itself. To assume the reality of so-called material particles +is to lay the foundation of an argument which surely leads to the +conclusion that the whole world of my consciousness is produced by and +consists in motions in that certain small group of these same molecules +which is assumed to make up my brain. The solution is only reached when +we discover that the error lies in forgetting that the Reality which is +the seat of my Presentment is itself unperceived, and that what I +commonly call a body and a brain are the phenomena occurring in my +Presentment, and which I associate with such real substratum. The real +substratum of my Presentment is a part of the energetic Universe, which +is constantly undergoing transmutations. Wherever such Energy is united, +in an organism, with consciousness these transmutations, as affecting +and perceived by such consciousness, constitute its Presentment or +sense-experience; and aided by the constructive activity of thought +expand, as it were, subjectively into a whole world of experience, as +the electric current vibrating darkly along the narrow confines of the +wire suddenly expands at the carbon point into the luminous undulations +which light a city. + +We admit, therefore, to the full the actuality and objectivity of the +sensible presentation. We only deny that it is the real thing-in-itself. +The latter is not discovered by sense. My energetic organism is like a +well-fitting garment; I do not feel it at all. I feel only changes or +transmutations taking place in it. Be not alarmed, therefore, for your +common-sense world. We leave it to you intact and actual--not deducting +even a single primary quality. Allowing fully for the extent to which, +little suspected by you, it is a mentally constructed system, its +elements are still actual and objective; they are modes of Reality; +extension and the other primary qualities are qualities of these modes. +Moreover, the Ego, I, myself, as Will, as a continuously identic +intelligent agent, am not given to myself immediately in my Presentment, +any more than is the real object. The existence of my Ego, of my +cogitant self, is an inference which I am compelled to draw from the +facts of my mental activity. _Cogito, ergo sum._ Similarly, my energetic +organism is the real a-logical thing-in-itself which I am compelled to +postulate in order to explain my perception of physical phenomena in the +light of my physical activity; _ago, ergo possum_. + +We must not overlook the unique position in our Presentment occupied by +the visual presentation. Its universality, simultaneousness, minute +accuracy, quantifiability, etc., are such that it is really to the +visual Presentment that I refer all other elements in my +sense-experience. I think of them with reference to it. In connection +with it I mentally construct my world. I associate with some +modification of the visual presentation the phenomena resultant upon the +energetic activity of my own organism, and the other forces and +potential Energies which that activity reveals and suggests. It is thus +that I derive the compound idea of Body as consisting of Figure, +Extension, and Solidity. The continued appearance in my visual +presentation of the grey colour which I am now seeing is to me the sign +of the continued persistence of that potential Energy in virtue of which +I regard it as the appearance of a solid extended stone wall. Everything +is referred to the visual presentation, and it is in reference to it +that the mind works in constructing its world. + +The whole theory of molecular action is a theory constructed in +reference to the visual presentation--the reality of which, strangely, +it seems to result in overthrowing. A born-blind man could never have +invented the conception of atoms or molecules. This is well worth +thinking over. The visual presentation is not really fundamental; and we +must undo the inversion induced by its great convenience whereby we +refer to it all the other elements of our sense-experience and conceive +of our activity and our whole actual world by reference to the visible +sign. It is in consequence of this reference to the visual that bodies +are thought of as discrete units, so that it is difficult to conceive +that the real thing in virtue of which we experience the perception of, +say, a heap of stones, is truly more or less potential Energy--just as +the continuous process of thought is very different from the disparate +symbols of speech. + +I habitually refer to the visual extended image as the primary basis of +my idea of the world, or of any particular part of the world, such as my +dining-room. Why? Simply because, for the reasons already noted, the +sense of sight is the sense of universal reference. In principle it is +the same habitual tendency which makes me associate every element of my +world with its appropriate name. It is different in the case of other +sensations. When I am absent from Niagara I do not, in thinking of it, +primarily conceive of it as a roar of sound. I think of certain motions +of mass which, if I were present, would occasion the subjective +sensations of sound. But for the habitual tendency arising from the +universal reference to the visible I would do the same in the case of +the visual image. All I am necessitated to think is a real event--a +real, physical, dynamical transmutation--proceeding quite independently +of my perception or presence; and if I can only manage to realise that I +must, for philosophical purposes, eliminate my reference to visual as +well as to audible or other sensations, I will understand that all I am +entitled to, and all I can, without hopeless contradiction, postulate as +real thing existing independently of my perception, is a transmutation +of Energy. This energy is imperceptible, unextended, unfigured, yet it +is by no means a mere logical or mental necessity or associative +tendency. On the contrary, it is very real. It sustains my every act. By +an imperative mental necessity I am obliged, by inference from my +experiences as an active and percipient agent, to postulate the +energetic system in which I am involved, and with one particular centre +in which I am organically related. + +But we recall at this point that Science says she must still postulate +Matter as the vehicle of Energy. But what does that mean except that the +subject of her studies is the sensible presentation which itself +consists of energy transmutation in part constantly changing but with +relatively permanent and recurrent elements? These more permanent +elements constitute what we call bodies. If the sensible presentation +consisted exclusively of one continuous, unchanging phenomenon, Reason +would never be stimulated, and Personality, Cause, Power would never +have been postulated or conceived. But the transmutation is constantly +"accelerated"--incessantly fluctuates and varies. Certain of these +variations I recognise as related to my own volitional activity, and I +am thus furnished with a key which enables me, by a sympathetic analogy, +to attribute all the changes in my experience to various agents, each +related to the other by the intervention of this system of physical +Energy. Some of these I can further trace to the initiative of Volition +of myself or other persons; others I can only recognise as integral +parts of the vast energetic system of Nature, the stimulus of which I +cannot follow further. + +The reality of Matter is said to be proved by its indestructibility; but +this characteristic can easily be resolved into (1) the +indestructibility of Space and Extension which we have seen to be merely +another name for the necessity or inevitable universality of the general +laws and conditions of Energy transmutation, and (2) the +indestructibility of the Energy to the transmutations of which we +attribute the forces of Cohesion and Gravitation. + +All vital activity is but a producing of changes in the stream of +transmutation. We never do, nor in the nature of things do we ever try +to, increase or diminish the quantity of the real Energy itself. We +instinctively recognise the objective source of our physical power, and +this has led some thinkers to suppose that the indestructibility of +Matter is an _a priori_ datum of thought. But such a belief is quite +unfounded. All it amounts to is a recognition that the destruction of +Matter is _beyond our power_--a necessary consequence of the fact that +we merely act upon the transmutation-process. Many a long contest +between the supporters of _a priori_ and experiential knowledge can be +set at rest by this view of the mediating functions of the energetic +organism. + +The reflections which we have thus briefly noted and illustrated open a +wide field for inquiry. The scientific doctrine of Energy would seem to +be pregnant with momentous consequences for Philosophy, and it is worth +while for metaphysicians to devote to this subject the deepest and most +deliberate thought. The results cannot easily be grasped by a mere +cursory perusal of memoranda, in which we have only sketched a few +salient aspects of the doctrine. We deprecate unwarrantable assurance, +and are fully conscious of the difficulty of adequately expressing +thought on such a theme; but we have not written rashly nor without +good grounds for asking attention. + +Science, it seems to us, postulates in Energy an a-logical, unextended, +real thing-in-itself in terms of which the phenomena of Physics can be +adequately and quantifiably stated. At the same time it furnishes +Philosophy with a theory of the objectively real thing-in-itself which +satisfied those necessities of thought by which we are constrained to +interpret our sense-experience by a constant reference to a Reality +beyond it--a necessity due to our association as Actors with an Energy +beyond that which is the seat of our Presentment. Such a view avoids the +incurable difficulties and contradictions involved in the theory of the +reality of extended material substance, or in any theory, indeed, which +asserts the reality--as presented--of the sensible presentation. +Physical Reality thus conceived is consistently thinkable as co-existent +with the thing-in-itself--be it ultimately Intelligence or Volition--of +which our cognitive and conative existence is a manifestation. And such +a doctrine, by explaining all phenomena as transmutations proceeding +(according to the definite mathematical laws prevailing throughout the +whole Universe of Energy) at that point in the system which is +organically related to Consciousness, accounts at once for the apparent +apriority and necessity of the qualities of Space, and at the same time +for their evident universality and objectivity. + +In a word, it would rather seem as if Science, unconscious of its +pregnant possibilities, has not only formulated a theory which +co-ordinates and unifies the entire fabric of physical knowledge, but +has also at length furnished Philosophy with the key to that problem the +solution of which has, in the words of Schopenhauer, been the main +endeavour of philosophers for more than two centuries, namely, to +separate by a correctly drawn line of cleavage the Ideal--that which +belongs to our knowledge as such--from the Real, that which exists +independently of us; and thus to determine the relation of each to the +other. + +To us it seems not strange that Philosophy should in the end be indebted +to Science for this solution--nor should Science, in the hour of her +greatest speculative victory, object too hastily to the assistance which +the thinker, trained to the study of the process of thought, can render +in clarifying and restating in its metaphysical aspects a theory which, +if profoundly conceived, and formulated by men of science from Rumford +and Davy to Stewart, Tait, and Kelvin, was partially anticipated by the +metaphysician who conceived the world as will and idea. + +We maintain, therefore, that the presentation of sense, the continuum +or manifold, or what you will, consists in the transmutations of a real +substance itself unextended and unperceived; that the laws of these +transmutations are what constitute the geometric all-containing Space; +that at a point in this real energetic system organically related to the +intelligent self, the transmutations occurring there constitute the +individual's sensible experience; that his mind, by also actively +influencing the system at that point, can stimulate the train of +transmutations which constitute his world of ideas; that the mind can +discover itself as Will influencing transmutations in the organism which +are transmitted through a wider, larger portion of the system; and can +recognise the transmutations at the related point as influenced +sometimes by its own Volition and sometimes by other agents. We seek to +bring the added light of scientific theory to reconcile the conflict +between the law and the fact, between the objects of reflection and the +objects of sense, between the world of thought and the world of +phenomena,--the problem which Plato raised and which has since been the +central problem of Metaphysics. In doing so we present a doctrine which +not only maintains the truth of the Ideal, and the actuality of the +phenomenal, and the relative reality of both, but which proves, with +all the cogency of Science, how it is that the Sensible is permeated by +and made knowable only by the Ideal, by the laws of the transmutations +which constitute actuality, and that, on the other hand, the Ideal only +enters experience as the regulative principle of the ever-transmuting +Reality. + +The world consists not merely of phenomena, nor of phenomena and laws +which regulate them. These are but transitional and imperfect aspects of +Reality. "Our standard of Truth and Reality," says a recent writer, +"moves us on towards an individual with laws of its own, and to laws +which form the vital substance of a single existence." We approach such +a goal in the conception of Energy--the laws of whose constant +transmutations are what we call Nature. + +We must distinguish Energy as Absolute Reality from such conceptions as +Activity, which is its subjective aspect, or as Force, which is really +the rate at which Energy is, in certain cases, transformed. Dynamics, +which investigates Force, is a study of the fundamental transmutations +of Energy. It postulates Energy as the Real Entity in terms of which it +can frame a satisfactory theory of dynamical phenomena. + +The metaphysical labours of the century which has elapsed since Kant +have not been altogether in vain. The deeper thinkers are pretty nearly +agreed that the Absolute is not to be identified with its appearances. +How far they can bring home this view in practical form to the +intelligence of man is another matter. Plato doubtless saw the truth in +a sort of beatific vision, but the tide of speculation ebbed after his +death, and its healing waters never inundated the deserts of mediaeval +thought. The discursive weakness in which the speculation of the +transcendental Philosophy seems to dissipate itself makes us fear a +similar decline. Metaphysics must receive the assistance of the great +speculative achievement of Physics. It must realise that Science can +postulate a Reality unperceived and unqualified by the conditions of +sense, but in terms of which Science can explain the whole phenomena of +the sensible presentation in their objective aspect,--explain these as +transmutations of Reality, proceeding in accordance with the general +mathematical laws under which Reality transmutes itself. + +It may be said that reason requires us to think that the Universe is a +unity. Where do you embrace within Reality, in such a view of it, +Intelligence, Volition, Feeling? We answer: Of course, obviously +Reality, as postulated by Physics, does not contain these. But the Real +Thing postulated by Physics is but one aspect of the whole, and may be, +must be, merged in a higher Reality--of which phenomena, on the one +hand, and Thought, Conation, Feeling on the other, are the appearances. +That involves a further advance, the attainment of a higher degree of +Truth which would bridge the Dualism of Thought and Existence, of Self +and Not-self, of Spirit and Nature, and whilst, on the one hand, such +Reality must fundamentally be a-logical, on the other hand Energy may +owe its energy to Spirit. + +In the dualism which we must, in experience, recognise, we notice one +fundamental distinction: quantification, measurability, appear the +attributes of the physical; quality, ideality, of the spiritual. The +apprehension, therefore, of the doctrine of Energy should accomplish in +clarity and security the abolition of the intolerable contradictions +which have hitherto involved the search for Reality amid its +appearances. We think it suggests the most satisfying explanation of the +distinction which separates, and the principle which relates Ideality +and Externality, and should obviate the almost childish efforts of +transcendentalists to expound the relation of the Mind to a body which +is involved in, and which is yet--for the individual--distinguished, +they cannot tell us how, from the whole system of Nature. + +Of course, neither Thought nor Volition, as such, can be the absolute +Reality. They, like Physical Force, are but transmutations, affections, +phases of Reality. Nor, again, is Energy, as a quality, a correct +description of the Absolute, as such. The Absolute, as such, we cannot +describe; but in studying, as Physics does, the relations of physical +phenomena and stating these in terms of Reality, it conveniently gives +Reality a name appropriate to its own standpoint. + +Metaphysics rightly declines to be required to study special branches of +Science. Nothing but grotesque absurdity ensues when this precaution is +overlooked. Yet Metaphysics has hitherto thought itself the better of a +little logic, and in the future it will have to grasp the scientific +conception of Reality. There is nothing else for it; and, after all, it +is remarkable how far the most fundamental conceptions of Metaphysics +are dependent on a physical origin. + +Surely it is of primary importance to realise the effect upon our +conceptions of Space and Extension of the doctrine of the transmutations +of Energy. Even the profoundest metaphysicians have seemingly failed to +explain how Space, Matter, and Extension are related with Reality. You +cannot ignore this difficulty by saying that these are the working +conceptions of particular branches of Physical Science. But when you +realise that physical phenomena, even the most permanent and rigid, are +by scientific demonstration but transmutations of the real thing, you +may then understand that Space, Body, and Extension are but the laws and +conditions of the process. As appearances, and within the realm of +phenomena, they seem still what they have always seemed. So much we +still concede without diminution or obscurity; and at the same time we +can harmonise them as they could never be harmonised before with +postulated Reality. + +It is the same with Time. The facts of memory would seem to imply that +there is no succession in the Absolute. We are always present at all +times of our life. In recollecting a past event we are contemplating no +mere image, but the actual past event itself. Our chronometry depends on +the annual motion of the Earth round the Sun. It has thus a purely +physical basis. + +We might illustrate the application of the doctrine of Energy to every +department of Metaphysics. But such is not the object of the present +essay. We merely desire to indicate briefly some of the many aspects of +the theory, and if only we have been able to suggest a line of inquiry, +the primary object of this essay has been attained. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[81:1] Originally printed in 1898, now revised and rewritten. + + +_Printed by_ MORRISON & GIBB LIMITED, _Edinburgh_ + + + + +_BY THE SAME AUTHOR_ + + +THE +DYNAMIC FOUNDATION +OF KNOWLEDGE + +_Crown 8vo. 330 pp. 6s. net_ + + +"Mr. Philip, a thinker of considerable acuteness, expounds further the +dynamic theory of knowledge which he propounded in 'Matter and Energy' +and the 'Doctrine of Energy.' What we are really sensible of in the +external world is mutation; but the consciousness of our own activity +suggests the existence of something behind phenomena. The reality which +sustains experience is found to be, in essence, power--power conceived +as an energy containing within itself the principle of its own +evolution; an energy constantly transmuting itself, and in its +transmutations furnishing the entire presentation of sense. The +universal application of this concept unifies science or the knowledge +of nature; and the dynamic theory is applied by Mr. Philip to life, +economics, and education." + _Times._ + + +"Well written, and contains much sound analysis of perception and the +like, with much that is debatable but suggestive and +stimulating."--_Nature._ + + +"The argument is conducted with great ability and thoroughness, and the +writer reveals a most accurate acquaintance with the results of both +science and philosophy."--_Glasgow Herald._ + + +KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUeBNER, & CO., LTD. +BROADWAY HOUSE, 68-74 CARTER LANE, LONDON, E.C. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Essays Towards a Theory of Knowledge, by +Alexander Philip + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE *** + +***** This file should be named 23422.txt or 23422.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/3/4/2/23422/ + +Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier, Michael Zeug, +Lisa Reigel, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team +at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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